

THE
CONTEMPORARY
REVIEW.

See list

VOLUME CLVI.

JULY—DECEMBER 1939.

570

LONDON:

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW COMPANY LIMITED,
19-19a, CURSITOR STREET, E.C.4.

1939.

CONTENTS OF VOL. CLVI.

JULY 1939.

PAGE

The Prospect for European Peace. By the Right Hon. Wedgwood Benn, D.S.O., M.P.	1
Palestine: The Present Position. By the Right Hon. Viscount Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L.	9
Greece under Metaxas. By George Clenton Logio	18
Scandinavia and the Nazis. By Paul Olberg	27
Labour at a Crisis. By J. H. Harley	35
Inside the Czech Protectorate. By H. R. M. Worsley	41
What Will Happen to Yugoslavia? By Observer	49
Forerunners of the Third Reich. By Count Nicolas Sollohub	54
Pierre Hamp and the Epic of Toil. By Professor F. C. Roe	64
The Raven. By Seton Gordon	72
Homes not Houses. By E. Bedwell	80
The Labour Movement in Austria. By Karl William	87
Feminism and Pacificism. By T. Baty	95
Foreign Affairs. By George Glasgow	101
Literary Supplement:	
Reviews of Books	113
Shorter Reviews and Notices	127

AUGUST 1939.

The Deadlock Abroad and at Home. By Sir Alfred Zimmern	129
Mammon <i>versus</i> Mars in China. By A. Morgan Young	136
Britain and America, Now. By S. K. Ratcliffe	144
Whither Franco's Spain? By Señor Don Manuel de Irujo	153
Rebuilding World Order. By Dr. Maxwell Garnett	160
What Germany Thinks To-day. By Victor Wallace Germaines	168
Deceived Austria. By Austriacus	175
Germany over Roumania. By Basil Davidson	182
Bismarck and the Forbidden War. By Dr. Carl Misch	189
Robert Elsmere: Fifty Years After. By Dr. F. S. Marvin	196
Slovakia: To-day and To-morrow. By Rudolf Schlesinger	203
Instinct and Intelligence. By G. B. Cooch	210
The Disappearance of the Duel from English Life. By "Bedford"	217
Poland's Bonds with Lithuania Revived. By Wolfram Gottlieb	225
Foreign Affairs. By George Glasgow	229
Literary Supplement:	
Reviews of Books	241
Shorter Reviews and Notices	254

SEPTEMBER 1939.

Freedom and Defence. By the Right Hon. Viscount Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E.	257
The Parliamentary Session. By Geoffrey Le M. Mander, M.P.	268
Hungary: The Elections and After. By Dr. Joseph Balogh	276
The United States and China. By Professor Lancelot Forster	287
Native Labour: Success after Thirty Years. By Sir John Harris	296
The Latest Ally: Turkey To-day. By Barbara Ward	304
The German Army—The Nazis' Favourite Child. By Dr. Fritz Kurz	313
El Greco's Legend in his Native Crete. By Demetrius Caclamanos	322
Greater Portugal. By W. A. Hirst	328
Italy and the Soudan. By Dr. Marcel P. Hornik	334
The School-Leaving Age Raised. By Joseph King	344
Germans in Poland. By F. Wirth	352
Foreign Affairs. By George Glasgow	357
Literary Supplement:	
Reviews of Books	369
Shorter Reviews and Notices	382

msb. M62

M62.156

69577

INDEX.

OCTOBER 1939.

The Great Challenge. By Professor Gilbert Murray	...	...	...	...
France at War. By Sisley Huddleston	...	...	...	...
From Kaiser to Führer. By George Glasgow	...	...	...	...
Poland's Leaders. By Dr. S. Wolf	...	...	...	...
Can Italy Keep It Up? By Basil Davidson	...	...	...	...
American Neutrality. By Professor Lindsay Rogers	...	...	...	...
The Meaning of "God is Love." By the Rev. Dr. J. Scott Lidgett, C.H.	...	...	...	...
Justice in Nazi Germany. By Harold Picton	...	...	...	...
The S.C.M. By Dr. Edwyn Bevan	...	...	...	...
Czechoslovakia Æterna. By Dr. Fritz Gross	...	...	...	...
Stresemann. By Dr. F. W. Pick	...	...	...	...
Prospects of Eastern Europe. By Béla Menczer	...	...	...	...
National Socialism and the Church. By Spectator	...	...	...	...
The Unmarried Mother and her Child. By Mrs. H. A. L. Fisher	...	...	...	...
The Way of the Shrew. By Eric Hardy	...	...	...	...
Literary Supplement:				
Reviews of Books	...	...	...	...
Shorter Review	...	...	...	...

NOVEMBER 1939.

War for Peace. By Wickham Steed	...	...	...	...
War Aims and Peace Terms. By Sir Andrew McFadyen	...	...	...	...
The War Budget. By Francis W. Hirst	...	...	...	...
The Economic Future of Germany. By Professor M. J. Bonn	...	...	...	...
Italy and the War. By Don Luigi Sturzo	...	...	...	...
Russia and the Baltic. By Dr. Wolfram Gottlieb	...	...	...	...
Reconciliation and Neutrality in Yugoslavia. By Barbara Ward	...	...	...	...
The Jews in Hungary. By Israel Cohen	...	...	...	...
A Standard of International History. By Dr. Hubert Hall	...	...	...	...
War in the American Labour Movement. By Dr. Adolf Sturnthal	...	...	...	...
An Essay in Slavonic Folklore. By W. J. Browney	...	...	...	...
A Visit to Australia. By Theodora Roscoe	...	...	...	...
Foreign Affairs. By George Glasgow	...	...	...	...
Literary Supplement:				
Reviews of Books	...	...	...	...
Shorter Reviews and Notices	...	...	...	...

DECEMBER 1939.

The Economic Strategy of the War. By Sir Arthur Salter, M.P.	...	...	...	...
The War and India's Freedom. By the Right Hon. Wedgwood Benn, D.S.O., M.P.	...	...	...	...
The Riddle of Russia. By J. H. Harley	...	...	...	...
How Spain and Italy Act. By Robert Sencourt	...	...	...	...
Scandinavia's Efforts for Peace. By Spectator	...	...	...	...
Poland's Struggles for Freedom. By Dr. S. Wolf	...	...	...	...
Blockade and Victory. By Victor Wallace Germaines	...	...	...	...
The Position of Switzerland. By Wilhelm Viola	...	...	...	...
Ancient History and Modern Analogies. By G. H. Stevenson	...	...	...	...
Heine and Our Times. By Dr. Walter Berendsohn	...	...	...	...
Cleaning Up Burma's Murder Zone. By Colonel F. Bigg-Wither	...	...	...	...
Nerves and Hormones. By Professor C. M. Yonge	...	...	...	...
Racine: December 1639 to April 1699. By Dr. M. Joubert	...	...	...	...
Foreign Affairs. By George Glasgow	...	...	...	...
Literary Supplement:				
Reviews of Books	...	...	...	...
Shorter Reviews and Notices	...	...	...	...

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JULY 1939.

THE PROSPECT FOR EUROPEAN PEACE.

IF the new Peace Front becomes a reality the map of Europe cannot in future be altered by force. We shall have either the continuance of things as they are or, if change, then negotiated change. Violence, whether direct or indirect, means war. Let us examine therefore the claims advanced and see how far the States making them are in a position to agree to their settlement by conference; how far, that is, such claims can be granted without disturbing the ordered rule of law, and how far they are made not for the redress of grievances but as stepping-stones to growing power and the ultimate domination of Europe. There are many European States with claims to advance, few indeed without, but for the present purpose it will be sufficient to deal with the cases of Germany and Italy.

Though both are bound by all the engagements of the Axis the Italian position differs from that of Germany. It is not necessary to assume that the Duce desires to become a good European. It may be that despite, or perhaps because of, what has happened in Abyssinia, Spain and Albania, Italy is prepared for negotiation on her demands on France which form the only unfulfilled part of her Imperial programme as at present disclosed. Financial exhaustion, lack of raw materials and above all public opinion appear to account for the obvious reluctance of Mussolini to incur the risks of war. "Corsica" and "Nice" may perhaps be no more than a sounding-board for the discussion on business-like lines of the readjustment of port arrangements at Djibouti, some further concessions in the old-standing Tunisian dispute and a reduction in the canal charges which now bear heavily on the Governors of Ethiopia. If that is so Italy may perhaps be classed as manageable.

The German case is different. All her moves since 1933 have certainly been carefully planned but not, as would seem, so much to correct injustices or to meet the needs of her national life as to increase her strength for general purposes.

VOL. CLVI.

Her claims are opportunist in character and are pressed or postponed as circumstances appear to require. There are, of course, covering slogans, living-room, self-determination, access to raw materials and the like, but it is hard to see what relation they bear to the various strokes which have already been made or to the others which are in prospect. The technique has now become familiar. Wherever Germans are found an agitation is started, propaganda and speakers are provided and if necessary violence is employed. Vienna was the first case of this kind, the Sudetenland the next. These are realised examples but the fact is that on all the German borders the material is being prepared in the same way. And the scheme extends beyond the borders. It may assist the Iron Guard in Rumania or foster the Nazi movement in Hungary or even regiment the Germans in S.W. Africa. The next *coup* might be the overthrow, ostensibly by internal forces, of the Government in Budapest or the forcible annexation of Slovakia. In considering, therefore, the treatment of German claims we have to regard the wide field they cover, the diversity of their character and the dynamic force behind them. Moreover, there is the root question whether a reasonable settlement either of the general demands or the particular cases is compatible with the continued existence of the Nazi régime. The choice in any case between Peace and War in Europe rests mainly with the German Chancellor.

Now what forces are likely to influence him for peace? First there is moderate opinion in Germany. A great many upper and middle-class people regard the Führer as an upstart. It is indeed surprising that those who stood behind Hindenburg now support Hitler. Then there are the manufacturers and industrialists who suffer severely under the control of National-Socialism. Their feelings are unmistakable, so unmistakable that once they received a soothing and sympathetic mention by Dr. Schacht. Speaking of the New Plan, he said :

Admittedly they had had to pay a high price for it. He had in his time described his New Plan as "horrible" and he stood by that opinion. He had been told of a merchant who decorated his stand at an exhibition with the forty forms which an exporter or importer must fill up before he could do any business.

"I am of the same opinion as that man, but we cannot help him at the moment."

The views of these elements were discussed in a recent book by Dr. Hermann Rauschning. His conclusion was (I quote from *The Times* summary) :

That the conservatives and industrialists who helped to secure power for Herr Hitler are deeply disappointed and disillusioned at the course the revolution has taken. They hoped to guide National-Socialism into channels that would enable them to recreate the Germany they had lost, the Germany of Junker influence, industrial hegemony, military prestige. But they confused order with subjection, and by the time they had placed National-Socialism in the saddle it had ceased to be a national movement and had started on a career of violence and disintegration.

Two arguments are used with these critics. The first is that Hitler has saved them from the horrors of Bolshevism, and the second that he has torn up the Treaty of Versailles. Under the influence of Nazi propaganda the first argument is generally accepted in Germany and widely held abroad. It is therefore worth while to quote the contemporary judgment of a well-informed observer. *The Times* Correspondent on March 2nd, 1933, wrote :

There was never a German Communist danger from 1923 until the fall of the Brüning Government. The German working class has hitherto not been militantly revolutionary. . . . If, in a year's time, or sooner or later, the German Labour movement as a whole becomes for the first time militant, and the danger of a Communist (not necessarily Bolshevik) revolution becomes acute, it will, in the opinion of many shrewd observers, have dated from January 30th, 1933, the beginning of this Fascist Revolution, or perhaps May 30th, 1932, when for the first time in German Republican history a Chancellor, Dr. Brüning, was virtually dismissed by the aged President without having been overthrown in Parliament.

Dr. Rauschning, again,

Does not agree that National-Socialism represented the last reserve effort of the nation against impending chaos, as its leaders would have Germany and the world believe. There were," he says, "adequate reserves, if they had been intelligently used, and in any case chaos was not imminent. There never was the remotest danger of a revolution from the Left, still less of a Bolshevik revolution."

As to the second argument, it becomes clearer and clearer that the Nazi programme is by no means strictly related to the *Diktat*. Some of its achievements, the Czech conquest for example and the *Anschluss*, have little to do with the Treaty, whilst what might be imagined to be insufferable wrongs like the loss of Alsace and the Tyrol have been accepted. Nevertheless, these two arguments are effective for their purpose of silencing, even converting, home critics.

Externally, the greatest hope for peace is the creation of the new front. Perhaps it has already changed the course of German policy. But we must not forget that Hitler is conscious of the difficulties it faces; of the fact that at the present moment it is only in a very rudimentary stage; that the smaller States want nothing to do with it because they are not yet convinced that it will be successful, and that the friendship between H.M. Government and the Soviet Union has only ripened in the forcing-house of a very warm public opinion.

* * * *

Now let us consider the forces inclining Germany to choose the path which leads to war. First we must put the fundamental belief that nothing is achieved without force. To quote *Mein Kampf*:

Therefore the interests of the separated territories must be subordinated to the one purpose. That one purpose must aim at obtaining for the central remaining portion such a measure of power and might that will enable it to enforce its will on the hostile will of the victor, and thus redress the wrong. For flaming protests will not restore the oppressed territories to the bosom of a common Reich. That can be done only through the might of the sword.

Next comes the temper of the Nazi Party. The whole strength of the régime is based on a remarkable series of successes. They were hardly thought to be attainable without war. There was great anxiety when the troops re-entered the Rhineland. It was possible that Schuschnigg would resist when the Germans marched into Austria. It was feared that the allies might not persuade Dr. Benesh to abandon his powerful fortifications and lay down his superior arms before a German attack. These were times of great strain for the rulers of Germany. In a very frank speech made at Hamburg

on October 21st, Dr. Goebbels admitted "we had to keep our nerves to the last minute." But all went well. The Swastika steadily advanced and never a shot fired. It is hard to see, therefore, how prestige, which is vital, can be maintained once it is understood that the triumphant progress is at an end. Thirdly, there is the loss of strategic advantage involved in hesitation at this stage. Every previous move has placed the German forces in a stronger position. They speak of encirclement; their own scheme has been that of the pincers. Czechoslovakia was the great military obstacle. With the Germans in Vienna it was surrounded. The seizure of Memel and the subsequent subjugation of Lithuania, combined with the German appearance in Slovakia, made Poland feel the squeeze. When Austria had joined the Reich, Hungary found herself with a German neighbour; just as when Albania was taken Yugoslavia fell into the pincers also. To stop now, therefore, means that the hitherto successful strategical advance, the surrounding and undermining is over, whilst the forces of resistance are enabled to marshal themselves.

Finally there is this obscure problem: What would be the effect on the economic structure of Germany, which is a great war machine, if war were banished from Europe? Manpower, priority of imports, control of exchange, all have been organised to gain military strength. Can the change-over be made without bringing the whole edifice to the ground? To turn back is the more difficult because Munich was supposed to have cleared the way forward. We thought it meant their acceptance of methods of negotiation. They thought it meant our acceptance of German hegemony in Central Europe. As *The Times* Correspondent wrote: "The Czechoslovak Government are required to act on the German principle that Great Britain and France have no *locus standi* politically in that part of Europe." There was probably a genuine misunderstanding. Most people here imagined that Herr Hitler's assurance to Mr. Chamberlain that he would consult him on matters of common interest meant affairs in Central Europe, whereas in the German mind the idea was firmly fixed that British interests lay in the British Empire and in Western Europe, and that German interests were recognised in Central and Eastern Europe. Matters, therefore, of common interest would only be those in which these two major spheres of influence came into contact.

Accordingly, from the time of the Munich Settlement onwards Germany went full steam ahead with her plan for using her new elbow-room to meet the increasing difficulties of her military economics. How it was all done was explained by Dr. Schacht in the speech before the Economic Council to which I have already referred. He said that with the help of their "credit policy Germany had created an armament such as was approached by that of no other State, and that in turn had made possible the success of their foreign policy." He went on to explain the various stages of his credit extension and capital-building policy made possible by the controls which can be exercised in a Totalitarian State over wages, prices and markets. He referred to the reduction in the import of finished goods between 1934 and 1937, which was 63 per cent. As a result, they were able to increase imports of ore by 132 per cent., of oil by 116 per cent., of grain by 112 per cent., and of rubber by 71 per cent. "The weight of 80 million consumers pressed so strongly on the surrounding European world in particular that it was difficult to foresee what economic-political changes in Europe might yet result from it."

Dr. Schacht himself was dismissed in January and his place was taken by Herr Funk. But the policy was pursued with vigour. There was the loan to Turkey. There was the plan for monopolising the trade of Bulgaria. Pressure was brought to bear on Yugoslavia to increase her supply of raw materials. Credit was granted to Poland in order to increase trade in excess of the then existing quotas. There were the beginnings of a treaty with Roumania and demands of an exacting character were made upon Lithuania. There was the plan, brought to London, with the ingenious intention of persuading foreign countries to finance the persecution of the Jews by increased purchases of German goods. Its failure was the occasion of Dr. Schacht's fall.

The Germans were relying on a stock of raw material and food which had been laid in, in view of the Munich Crisis, to tide industry over the new Barter Agreements which were expected in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. But the campaign to secure the new supplies did not go too well. Already, before Christmas, the British Government had decided to support their trade in the Balkans and prevent a German monopoly. In November the exports of Greater Germany fell by 37,000,000 Marks and the imports by over 4,000,000 Marks.

Austria and the Sudetenland were a dead weight. Moreover, Yugoslavia reduced her exports to Germany owing to payment difficulties. Then there were difficulties with Italy. Herr Funk visited Rome, but it seemed clear that the Italians were becoming less anxious to part with their raw materials. This matter arose again in connection with the Axis Agreement, which spoke of organising in common all the resources they possessed for war purposes, but on what terms is not known.

Then there was the hostility of the United States, largely due to the persecution of the Jews. The January figures of German trade showed an abnormally heavy fall in imports, especially in foodstuffs. In May Polish trade was reduced on a warning issued to exporters to avoid excessive exports to Germany, and at the end of the month it was decided to reduce trade to about half its former amount. Even the distribution of foreign newspapers suffered, due to the decline in British trade.

The plea of Herr Hitler in January that Germany must export or die was, in the light of what was happening, almost a cry of despair. A very revealing speech was made in March by Herr Brinkmann, who had been Herr Funk's assistant at the Reichsbank. It was reported by the *Agence Économique et Financière* Dr. Brinkmann declared that 300,000 agricultural workers had gone to the factories and their places had been taken by foreigners who must be paid in foreign exchange; that the German steel output could not be maintained; that they had relied for their supply on the "dowry" of £60,000,000 from Austria and that the whole of that nest-egg had been squandered; that the stock of foreign exchange was exhausted; that, in consequence of the excessive and too-rapid consumption of raw materials, manufacturing costs had increased and the quality of their output had deteriorated; that prices were now four times higher than normal. Dr. Brinkmann's outburst must be considered in the light of the fact that he had a nervous breakdown and, in fact, in May he left the Reichsbank.

It was amidst difficulties of this kind that the Reich decided in March to annex Bohemia and Moravia. This action seems to have been dictated by economic necessity. As a Special Correspondent of *The Times* said:

By seizing Czechoslovakia Germany has secured, without doubt, the key position in Continental trade. She is now in control of the

most important link between the Danube and the Elbe, the Black Sea and the North Sea. . . . As already indicated, Herr Hitler's action cannot be dissociated from the very difficult economic situation of the Reich as to which he made no secret in his speech of January 30th. The success of its self-sufficiency economy depends on enlargement of the territorial basis. The absorption of Bohemia and Moravia is a step towards the solution. There will be further steps, the form of which cannot at the moment be forecast, to transform the whole of Middle and Eastern Europe into an economic unit in which production and trade will be developed and co-ordinated under the leadership of the Reich. That is the German mission in Europe.

To sum up : The war-machine must be fed. It has already consumed such windfalls as the fine on the Jews, Austria's gold and foreign exchange, Church property and the reserves of Czechoslovakia when it could get them. It is now faced with organised resistance to its trade methods and an alliance against aggression. What is there to do ? Is it safe to allow the Peace Allies to come level in arms or even to surpass German strength ? And yet how is the race to be maintained ? And most difficult of all, if reliance on force is to be abandoned, can the Nazi prestige survive ?

That is the black side. The nearest thing to a bright side is set out by Dr. Rauschning. He thinks that even now there may exist the possibility of bringing the Revolution to an end, of overcoming the drift to anarchy, of restoring the State on a basis of Christian ethics, of returning to a sane foreign policy that offers the permanent restoration of Germany to her proper rank in Europe without the hazard and disruptive consequences of war. In the view of Herr Rauschning nobody can doubt that behind the screen of hysterical exaltation this conviction is growing steadily in Germany to-day.

WEDGWOOD BENN.

PALESTINE: THE PRESENT POSITION.

THE struggle in Palestine drags on year after year ; the controversy spreads, and the issues seem to become more and more tangled and confused. The average man finds it hard to form a judgment. And whatever might be the rights or wrongs, he is often inclined to think that the problem has proved itself in practice to be insoluble. I would try in this article to help to clarify the matter, and to offer some way of escape from that counsel of despair. To that end I shall set out, first, a few definite propositions, to which I think impartial opinion might assent—disputed though each of them might be from one side or the other ; and then to submit tentatively the general lines on which, as it seems to me, progress might be made. And in order to clear the air, the first statements to be made are negative. There are certain claims and proposals, prominently advanced, which are ill-founded, and must be definitely rejected before we can approach a right solution.

1. It is not the case that the British Government during the War, as an inducement to the Arab peoples to rise against Turkey, promised through their spokesman, Sir Henry McMahon, that Palestine west of the Jordan should be part of the future Arab domains.

The wording of the British undertaking, it is true, is not explicit. It does not say " Palestine shall be excluded." But it was impossible to word it that way, since " Palestine " was not a name in use in the Turkish Empire. Further, no understanding with regard to those regions had at that time been reached with France, who was closely interested. The excluded areas were therefore described as those that lay to the west of certain other areas. But apart from the question of textual interpretation, a principal reason for holding that it was understood at the time on both sides that Palestine was excluded, is that Sir Henry McMahon himself has publicly and categorically stated that that was so. His declaration was endorsed by the late Sir Gilbert Clayton, the distinguished administrator who assisted McMahon in the negotiations and who drafted the actual documents. Furthermore, when the future of Palestine came to be determined after the War, the Arab delegation at the Peace Conference—which was appointed by King Hussein of the Hedjaz, who had been the other party

in the McMahon negotiations, and was headed by his son, the Emir Faisal—never once advanced the claim that Palestine had been included in the pledge.

There is no substance, therefore, in the contention that the Arabs had been induced to enter the War by a promise that was afterwards dishonoured; and that the Balfour Declaration of 1917, favouring the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, was invalid from the beginning, because it was inconsistent with an undertaking that had been given two years earlier. T. E. Lawrence is often quoted as having condemned the way in which the Arabs were treated by the Allied Powers at the end of the War; and there is no doubt that he felt bitterly that the assurances he had himself given had not been honoured at that time. But two years afterwards the arrangements were revised in important particulars, after a Conference at Cairo held by Mr. Churchill as Colonial Secretary; and then Lawrence was satisfied. He wrote in a footnote in a later edition of *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* that a solution had been found "fulfilling (I think) our promises in letter and spirit (where humanly possible) without sacrificing any interests of our Empire or any interest of the peoples concerned. So we were quit of the war-time Eastern adventure, with clean hands, but three years too late to earn the gratitude which peoples, if not States, can pay."

2. On the other hand, it is not the case that the British Government ever promised Palestine to the Jews as a Jewish State.

It is true that soon after the War individual British statesmen—including the present Prime Minister—held out the prospect that some day, in the fullness of time, the National Home, if it prospered, might grow into a Jewish Commonwealth. But the Balfour Declaration, and subsequently the Mandate, gave no undertaking of the kind. Already in 1922 a formal statement had been made defining the meaning of "National Home," as understood by the British Government, and in terms very different from the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State. The Zionist Organisation accepted that statement, and wrote to "assure His Majesty's Government that the activities of the Organisation will be conducted in accordance with the policy therein set forth." A small dissident minority, who took the name first of "Revisionists" and afterwards of "New Zionists," have always persisted in

pressing the most extreme claims. And a body of Orthodox Fundamentalists, basing themselves on Biblical prophecy, must hold to the age-long aspiration. But the presence of a million Arabs in Palestine west of the Jordan makes in this age any such expectations clearly impracticable.

3. It is not the fact that the Arabs have suffered economically through the creation of the Jewish National Home, or that any considerable number of them have been driven off the land.

The Royal Commission, appointed in 1936 under the chairmanship of the late Lord Peel, repeatedly bear witness to the advantages gained by the Arabs from the Jewish immigration. The Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, Lord Dufferin, said in the recent debate in the House of Lords, that he "could hardly exaggerate the value that the Arabs were getting from the Jews." After a previous inquiry had made a somewhat disconcerting report as to landless Arabs, the Government of Palestine carried out a detailed investigation in 1932. It was found that, in a total Arab population at that time of more than 800,000, only 664 cases were established of persons having left the land, after more than a decade of intensive Jewish immigration; and of those only 347 desired to go back. Taken as a whole the Arab population of Palestine, so far from having diminished, has increased by more than 50 per cent. since the War. In actual numbers the increase has been even greater than that of the Jewish population.

4. My next negative proposition will be challenged in many quarters. It is that no solution can be hoped for by a geographical division of the country.

The two races are so intermixed that it is quite impossible to draw a frontier between them. The Peel Commission tried to do so. But the "Jewish State" which it envisaged would have contained forty-six Arabs to every fifty-four Jews; and one-third of the Jewish population of Palestine would have been left outside it. Furthermore, almost all the principal towns of the country were to be included neither in the Arab nor in the Jewish State, but were to form peculiar enclaves under British rule; their relations with the districts surrounding them, as to trade and administrative matters, being left undefined. When the Woodhead Commission were sent out to give concrete form to the Peel recommendation they found it utterly impracticable to do so, and had to report

accordingly. The possible alternative, which two out of the four members of the Commission were prepared to recommend, though without any great confidence, would have confined the "Jewish State" to a derisory little area along the coast—a plan which the Jews would not even consider and which the Government hastened to reject.

Any suggestion that partition might be made practicable by the wholesale removal of Arabs from certain districts is also out of the question. Those populations have lived there for centuries. The notion that the Arabs of Palestine are wandering Bedouin to whom all places are alike, is contrary to fact. Hardly more than 5 per cent. are in that category. If the settled townsmen and cultivators in selected districts were willing to vacate them in exchange for settlements elsewhere, well and good. But there is no indication that there would be any such willingness. On the contrary, it may be taken as certain that there would be vehement opposition. To move tens of thousands of people against their will would involve coercive measures such as no British Government could for a moment contemplate. It would also be a clear breach of the Balfour Declaration, which assured the Arabs that their civil rights would be respected; and of the Mandate, which declared that their "rights and position . . . should not be prejudiced."

The ordinary affairs of local government—roads, sanitation and the like—must, of course, be dealt with by areas. Land reserves, if they were established, would also be in particular districts. But for the rest, the distinctive requirements of Arabs and of Jews can be met only on a basis of communities, and not of areas. Education, ecclesiastical matters, religious endowments, are already administered by legally constituted communal bodies, representing Moslems and Jews respectively—Christians of the various faiths also. A similar system prevailed under the Turks; well devised to meet the conditions of the mixed populations of many of the provinces of their Empire. The principle should be maintained, and perhaps carried further. But the chief political issues of Palestine—the system of government, the maintenance of law and order, immigration and tariffs—are not, in my opinion, susceptible of treatment by any form of geographical division of the country, whether into "States" or "cantons." Nor, obviously, are these matters which can be left to the communities.

They can be entrusted only to an authority, whatever be its nature, which governs Palestine as a whole.

5. My last proposition is that it is not possible at the present time to devise any final solution of any kind of the Palestine problem.

The conflicts of the last few years have been too bitter, the passions aroused are too intense, to permit the contending parties to sit down together and to frame, or to accept, any permanent settlement. The conclusion is that the matter must be dealt with by stages. Lord Halifax said recently, in another connection:

It may well be that there are questions for which at any particular moment, having regard to the temper of the times and the temper of those concerned, there is no immediate solution. In such cases I suppose it is the duty of statesmanship to work for such a *détente* as may make a real change in the atmosphere through which an approach to the problem has to be made.*

It seems that this is such a question and that the present time is such a moment. The Government, in their White Paper of last May, accepted what may be called the principle of stages. There was to be a five-year interim period in respect of immigration and a ten-year period in respect of constitutional changes. But they did not apply the principle adequately. They tried to lay down too definitely now what was to happen in five years' time and ten years' time. The whole situation in that part of Western Asia may be quite different in 1944 and 1949. In conditions such as these, to attempt to command the future is futile.

If, then, we should aim at securing a period of respite, to be acquiesced in, if not formally accepted, by both sides, it is essential that each should feel that, during that period, its position was not being undermined. If either the Arabs or the Jews had reason to think that at the end of the ten years—or whatever the term might be—they would find that their cause had been seriously prejudiced in the meantime, a provisional agreement would be impossible. They would rather continue the struggle now, whatever the cost, than sign what would be in their eyes a post-dated surrender. It follows that, if an interim period is to be agreed to by the Arabs, they must be assured that meanwhile they will not be swamped by Jewish

* Speech in the House of Lords, June 8th, 1939.

immigration, and that the land will not be sold from under their feet. If an interim period is to be agreed to by the Jews, they must be assured that meanwhile the Jewish National Home shall not be strangled, and that the gates of Palestine shall not be closed to the victims of persecution.

It may seem difficult to devise any plan which will fulfil what appear to be incompatible requirements, but in fact it need not be difficult. Such a plan has been put forward repeatedly. The difficulty is to secure its acceptance. It is of the essence of a compromise that each party shall abate something of its claims. Here each side fears that, if it shows willingness to concede anything, its opponents will seize upon the concession but yield nothing in return. Yet both now are war-weary. There are reasonable elements both among the Jews and among the Arabs, who realise the ruinous results of the prolonged conflict, and who would be quite ready to come to an understanding. But those elements, though strong in numbers, have hitherto shown little strength in action.

The sacrifice that must be asked from the Jews is a heavy one, and it is not surprising that there should be an intense reluctance to face it. It is no less than a limitation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, not only on grounds of the economic absorptive capacity of the country, but also on political grounds. The object would frankly be to reassure the Arabs by providing that, at the end of the interim period, they should still hold a substantial majority in the population. It has been suggested that immigration should be so regulated that at the end of the period the Arabs should be to the Jews in the proportion of three to two—60 per cent. to 40 per cent. of the whole population of Palestine. In addition, those districts which are now predominantly Arab and wish to remain so should be subject to legal restrictions on the sale of land to Jewish purchasers, or their agents. The sacrifice that must be asked from the Arabs is an acquiescence in the continued growth of the Jewish community during the interim period, subject to those limitations; and in the postponement, failing agreement meanwhile, of the establishment of representative institutions.

The White Paper contains provisions partly along these lines. It includes the principle of continued Jewish immigration for a period of years, and provides also a political as well as an economic limit upon that immigration. But it reduces

the inflow to very small dimensions, in order that at the end of the period—five years is taken—the Arabs should still be in a majority of no less than two to one, substantially the same as now. Further, at the end of the five years, the Arabs are to be given a right of absolute veto on any further Jewish immigration at all—a provision to which the Jews could not in any circumstances be expected to agree. And the White Paper, while admitting the principle of stages in the matter of a constitution also, tries to lay down future lines of action which can be acceptable to neither the Arabs nor the Jews.

It is far better, then, to leave these matters open for the present; and meanwhile to set on foot such agencies as will make it probable that, when the time comes for further steps, the conditions may be more propitious than now. For my own part, I do not accept the view, often expressed, that there is such an incompatibility between the two peoples that it is impossible for them ever to live together. Experience leads me to a different conclusion. Although in 1921 there was some serious rioting in Jaffa and the neighbourhood, from that year to the end of my term of office as High Commissioner in 1925, and on till 1929, the country was at peace. There was always, it is true, a sense of tension; leaders of the Arabs consistently maintained their protest against the Balfour Declaration and its application; it was found impossible to establish and maintain any joint political institutions. But the fact remains that for eight years there was a large measure of practical co-operation between members of the two races; neighbours lived at peace; there were no risings, no riots, no outrages. It might be so again.

If there is to be any hope of such co-operation, it is of prime importance that there should be on each side a better understanding of the mentality of the other, their sensibilities, their aspirations. The Jews rightly resent the accusation that they are animated by merely material motives; there are spiritual factors, and factors of personal and racial self-respect, that count far more. It is so also with the Arabs. It is as futile for the Jews merely to say to the Arabs, "See how much better off you are since we came," true though that is, as for the Arabs to say to the Jews, "Why do you want to come to Palestine at all; why don't you go to the United States, or to British Guiana?" Here, as everywhere, it is the imponderables that matter most.

There is one possible development that might fully justify a postponement of the major issues. Within the next few years some confederation of the Arab States, or certain of them, may perhaps be brought about. This has long been an objective of the Arab nationalist leaders. They would wish to see, if not the unification, at least the federation of Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Possibly the combination might include later on Iraq and the Hedjaz. No doubt there are various difficulties in the way. France holds the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon; and although she has been ready to surrender it, on much the same conditions as Britain has surrendered the mandate for Iraq, she would need to be assured as to her future position in a region in which she has long had important interests. No steps can be taken affecting those countries which do not command the approval of France from the outset. There are also dynastic and regional difficulties, and economic ones as well, in the way of closer union; the interests of the several parties are not always the same, particularly in the matter of tariffs. In any event it is for the Arabs themselves to decide whether they wish for such a combination, and to take the initiative. It cannot be imposed upon them by the Mandatory Powers.

But if the coming years did bring a movement in that direction, it might have a profound effect upon the problem of Palestine, which now seems so intractable. A group of closely allied States, with the Arabs in a majority of millions, might look with a less jealous eye upon the growth of a large Jewish population in one part of the combined areas. The Arab leaders, once the position of their people was fully assured, might be willing then to make friends. They might be glad to reap the advantage, in production, in trade, in revenue and in cultural development, which the Arab Confederation could undoubtedly derive from the enterprise and activity of a strong Jewish element in their midst. The Moslem world is well aware that the glory of the Caliphate in bygone centuries was largely due to the participation of Jewish statesmen and thinkers, scientists and merchants.

Already the Jewish enterprise in Palestine, hampered though it has been by terrible hindrances, has achieved great things. The Peel Commission speaks of it repeatedly in terms of warm praise; the Report declares that "no impartial person who has seen the Jewish National Home could do other

than wish it well." The Government's White Paper says, "The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world." It has given refuge and livelihood to tens of thousands of the victims of cruel oppression, and might offer them to as many more. So the impartial observer may be willing to accept this further proposition—that, if the legitimate interests of the Arab population can be safeguarded, the Jewish work in Palestine should be encouraged, not hampered.

SAMUEL.

GREECE UNDER METAXAS.

THE extent to which democracy failed in Greece may be gauged by the fact that she of all countries has allowed herself to be cajoled into accepting as a remedial treatment for the evils it had inflicted on her a dictatorship; a form of government so opposed to her traditions, and to the character and predilections of her people. The equalitarian philosophy which held that each man's opinion was as good as his neighbour's had destroyed respect for authority, and had turned democracy into licentious anarchy. In a democracy the value of rights conferred on the citizen is contingent on their translation into duties, failing which the rights soon become a social danger, as they are apt to be utilised by demagogues for exploiting the mass. A classical example of this is furnished by the humorous scene in Aristophanes' *Knights*, where the sausage seller and Cleon bid against each other for the lucrative post of pimp-in-chief to Demos. It cannot be gainsaid that it was the bitter and uncompromising rivalry of the Greek political factions that induced the Greek people to restore the monarchy. When, however, that mild antidote failed to effect a cure, they were easily persuaded by the industrialists and bankers, whose interests were mostly threatened by the growing anarchy, into passive acceptance of the more radical remedy of a dictatorship, especially after General Metaxas had exorcised the spectre of Bolshevism.

It can be easily ascertained that the dictatorship of General Metaxas has put a stop to the labour troubles and has redressed to some extent the wrongs from which the poorer classes had been suffering. A stimulus was imparted to the policy of land reclamation in Macedonia, and to agricultural production, so that in 1938 Greece was able to supply locally 68½ per cent. of her requirements in wheat, while the development of industry moved apace, and covered 75 per cent. of local demands.* To this productive activity may be ascribed the substantial decrease in the deficit of the commercial balance, from 5,649 million drachmae in 1937 to 4,612 millions in 1938. This adverse balance is to a great extent

* These results were secured by the granting of a subsidy to farmers amounting to 100% of the value of the world price of cereals, and by the imposition of heavy protective duties on foreign manufactures, so that it is questionable whether they are profitable to the community at large.

compensated by invisible imports, such as emigrants' remittances, the tourist traffic, and the proceeds of the mercantile marine, though the latter has seen its gains substantially reduced owing to the increase in its operating charges brought about by the social legislation introduced by General Metaxas.

These substantial material achievements have failed to ingratiate the dictatorship in the eyes of the people, for like similar autocratic régimes it has made the mistake of imposing duties on the citizen without giving him corresponding rights. Obviously, such a system makes no call on the intelligent devotion of the community, nor offers scope for its voluntary co-operation.

What aggravates matters in the eyes of the thinking public is the reiterated declaration of the authorities that the régime is not transitional, aiming merely at the removal of the excesses which had developed under parliamentarism, but a permanent one, so that people are asked to abandon all hope of an eventual return to democratic forms. The repeated affirmations of General Metaxas that "it is necessary to turn to Sparta to realise the political ideals of our nation" awake no response amongst the intelligentsia, and are looked on askance by all Philhellenes. Greek intellectuals have tried to be guided by the Athenian tradition, and rightly so, for Spartan institutions were mainly directed towards producing efficiency in warfare, while the Athenian conception stood not for victory over the foe without, but victory over self. If the description of the "timocracy" in Book VIII of Plato's *Republic* be studied, it will be seen that a state like Sparta, where the qualities of the mere soldier are regarded as the moral ideal, has taken the first fatal steps towards moral anarchy. The regimentation of youth, the preaching of a narrow fanatical nationalism, such as is indulged in by the present Greek authorities, is a suicidal policy for small states, for their sole hope of survival lies in a policy of close and intimate co-operation which obviously will not be attained by the fostering of rival nationalisms.

The verdict of history has it that Sparta governed the world under her hegemony every whit as badly as Athens, and moreover sold Greek cities to the Persians; nor should it be forgotten that it was Persian subsidies and ships that at last gave her victory in 404 B.C. Historians have remarked the contrast between the patriotism of Sparta as a state and the

treachery and venality of individual Spartans ; all the great names of Sparta, Pausanias, Lysander, Cleomenes, etc., recall stories of treasonable ambition and treacherous corruption. Such a record ought to deter statesmen from following in the steps of Sparta, for as Plato teaches us (*The Laws*, 726b-732d) the supreme demand on man is for genuineness in all the relations of life ; want of loyalty makes friendship and all the happiness of life impossible. It may further be noted that such greatness as Sparta achieved was mainly due to the division of sovereign power between several parties, namely the division of the kingship between two houses, and to the apportioning of sovereignty between the kings and the senate. Hence the Spartan constitution was based not on the principle of concentration, dear to General Metaxas, but on that of the dispersion of the fullness of sovereignty.

Another measure which has alienated public opinion is the muzzling of the press, which is now controlled by a Press Bureau, the staff of which is employed in writing articles for all the newspapers which are couched in abject adulation of the régime. The natural result has been a distinct deterioration in the standard of the Athenian press, a matter that has affected injuriously its circulation, creating thereby another class of malcontents, the local journalists. To the alert Greek mind, which loves to dwell on politics, the enforced silence imposed from above is an intolerable servitude. This enforced inhibition of all criticism is likely to have disastrous results for the country, for with a civil service corrupted and disorganised by the nepotism and jobbery of previous administrations, when every change of government entailed the replacement of the majority of civil servants, the latter are not at the requisite level to enlighten the government as to its duty, and the only available reliable guide is that of public opinion, now wantonly suppressed. It may be further added that freedom of speech is the requisite catharsis of discontent, and a régime may always learn more from the criticism of its adversaries than from the laudation of its partisans. In fact, the degree to which a government allows criticism of its policy is the surest index by which its hold upon the allegiance of the community may be estimated.

Discontent was growing, and some months ago things were drifting rapidly towards a *pronunciamento*. The rigorous censorship applied even to internal correspondence, the

extensive superintendence to which army officers were being subjected, the vast network of espionage, were all measures which reflected the anxiety prevalent among government circles. Recent political events in Europe, however, have allayed these fears. All Greeks realise that in a perturbed world, internal peace and unity are indispensable for survival, and the dictatorship has thus received a new lease of life. Possibly the present form of government may be the best for the critical period we live in, for one can hardly forget the narrow and bitter divisions which split the country during the world war and brought on the final disaster of the Asia Minor campaign with the consequent influx of 1½ million destitute refugees, whose upkeep still constitutes a burden and a problem.

Indeed the demographic problem by which Greece is confronted is serious. The exiguity of the available cultivable land renders the absorption of the annual increase of population, amounting to some 86,000 souls, increasingly difficult. With the restrictions imposed on travelling, both by other countries and Greece (the maximum sum one may take on leaving the country is 200 drachmae, or about 7s. 6d.), emigration has dwindled from a total of 37,957 persons in 1914 to 3,908 in 1938, and emigrants' remittances have correspondingly shrunk from 670 million gold francs in 1920 to some 74 millions in 1938. This is a blow not only to the material but also to the spiritual welfare of the country, for previously the greater number of its emigrants used to repair mainly to the U.S.A., live for some years in an environment that not only uplifted them morally but also enriched them materially, and enabled them to return and settle in their native country, where they helped to spread better methods and saner notions. Overpopulation is the cause of the prevalent dire distress in some of the Ægean islands, the inhabitants of which are obliged to seek relief in seasonal emigration to Thrace, where they find occasional work in the tobacco industry, road making and the building of fortifications. In fact Thrace serves as a dumping ground for Greece's surplus population, and otherwise is of little use to her. If it were possible to find elsewhere accommodation for the teeming crowds of destitute people it would be made much easier for Greece to negotiate the retrocession of the lower valley of the Maritsa to Bulgaria, which would secure an outlet to the Ægean for

that country, and thereby settle definitely all outstanding differences with her northern neighbour.

These Greek refugees, pent up in the Ægean islands, cast longing eyes on their abandoned and now derelict homes on the opposite shores of Asia Minor. The Greco-Turkish pact of friendship is to them a continual reminder of the hypocrisy and hollowness of diplomatic assurances. Since, according to official declarations, relations between the two countries are so cordial, how is it, it is asked, that these former dwellers on the mainland are not allowed to return to their villages which still remain unoccupied? The vast empty spaces of Asia Minor are waiting to be filled up, and surely it would be to the advantage of Turkey that the shores of Ionia, on which Greeks dwelt for over three thousand years, should again be peopled by the same inhabitants rather than be eventually colonised by Italians or Germans. This much-vaunted Greco-Turkish pact, however, is and remains a mere scrap of paper. Some years ago the two contracting parties agreed not to create in either country industries that already existed in the other. Thus Turkey bound herself not to erect a glass factory, since Greece already possessed one. Nevertheless Turkey went back on her word and built a rival factory in Istanbul. By this act one may assess the value of all the mutual assurances of neighbourly goodwill which continue to be exchanged between the governments of the two countries. Nor do the economic discrimination and the oppressive denationalising methods, to which both Ottoman Greeks and Greek nationals are subjected in Istanbul, speak much for the sincerity of the friendly assurances so profusely made by official circles on ceremonial occasions.

The existing distress and penury, noticeable almost everywhere in Greece, are endemic. Even in classical times we find Isocrates (*Areopagiticus*, 83) stating that the great problem of Athens was want, and the fact that Aristophanes parodied socialist ideas in several of his plays proves that they were in the air. This, obviously, was the outcome of the prevailing poverty, as the present communist agitation is the offspring of indigence. Greece to-day, as when at the summit of her greatness, is overpopulated, and even in those days thousands of her unemployed had to hire themselves to the foreigner. It was reckoned that when Alexander marched against Darius one hundred thousand Greek mercenaries were serving the

latter in one capacity or another. There are certain measures which it would not be amiss for the government to take in order to reduce the cost of living. Freights, for instance, between the islands and the mainland are abnormally high in comparison with what they were some years ago, and they now constitute a bar to trade and travel. Transport charges from certain Mediterranean ports to the Piræus are often only a third of those charged from the latter port to the Greek islands.

Another obnoxious measure which obstructs the harmonious development of provincial towns is the system of tolls levied on merchandise passing from one town to another. In order to avoid as much as possible the payment of these dues, manufacturers and merchants have all flocked to Athens and the Piræus, the largest urban conglomeration (about one-sixth of the population). This has brought about the well-known phenomenon of overcrowding at the centre and atrophy at the periphery. Provincial towns which some time ago were flourishing trade centres are decaying, because the small markets in their immediate vicinity on which they depended find it cheaper to secure supplies direct from the capital, since by doing so they avoid the payment of "octroi" charges twice over. These tolls bring some 270 million drachmae annually to the Greek exchequer, but if the upkeep of the thousands of officials entrusted with levying this impost be deducted, the net revenue secured would be trifling, not worth the annoyance caused to travellers, and especially to those tourists who love roaming off the beaten track.

It can be readily ascertained too that import duties in certain cases are excessive, and permit local manufacturers to realise unjustifiable gains at the expense of the population. If an impartial commission were appointed to examine into the costs of production of local factories it would certainly find out that many industries do not require the degree of protection they actually enjoy, and that certain reductions in the import tariff are indispensable to force them to lower their prices to the public. In certain cases the profits secured by local industrialists are exorbitant. A stop would certainly have been put to this spoliation of the masses were it not that these gentry, as well as some of the big banking establishments which control them, seem to constitute the main prop of the dictatorship.

This is no baseless statement, and the following facts will to some extent confirm it. As British holders of Greek Exchangeable Refugee Bonds of 1926-8 have learnt to their cost, the London issue of this script has had its service suspended since July 1935, while the Athens issue of the same loan continues to be normally paid. A government that respected itself would certainly not tolerate such unfair discrimination in favour of its nationals at the expense of its British creditors. After endless expostulations and protests the Greek Minister of Finance was induced to order in December 1937 the resumption of the payment of the annuity of the London-issued bonds by a decree, No. 210647/27-11-37, published in the press. Unfortunately, the National Bank of Greece, which was entrusted with the carrying out of its clauses, refused to comply with them. While I was in Greece several bondholders amongst my acquaintances wrote requesting me to investigate the matter, but as I could obtain no satisfactory elucidation from the bank in question, I wrote to General Metaxas, drawing his attention to the deplorable impression the non-fulfilment of the Ministerial decree was likely to have in England. A prompt reply was vouchsafed me, answering me that instructions would be sent without fail to Hambro's Ltd. in London, for the resumption of the service of these bonds, and, as promised, the latter firm made it known in July 1938 that it would accept the coupons for transmission to Greece, where they were to be paid by the National Bank of Greece. Unfortunately this banking institution, in spite of the ministerial order, still withholds payment. Bondholders in touch with Hambro's Ltd. have informed me that in spite of reminders and protests from this firm, the Greek bank does not even deign to reply to the letters addressed to it on the subject. From the above it may be inferred that in Greece as in other totalitarian states there are wheels within wheels, for otherwise the authority of a cabinet minister would not be flouted so manifestly.

Such sharp and arbitrary practices are mainly responsible for the violent attacks made on Greece by the London press, especially at the time the delegates of the Greek Government arrived in England to discuss the settlement of the state debt. No satisfactory settlement of this question has yet been arrived at, to the great detriment of both sides. Too much adroitness and smartness, those classical Greek traits, affront

our lack of comprehension of Greek realities and render an agreement difficult. And yet it is imperative to arrive at an understanding. Greece has an adverse commercial balance, and moreover buys more than twice as much as she sells to us. It is incumbent on us to encourage the absorption of Greek goods in our market in order to provide her with funds wherewith to pay not only for the excess of her imports over exports to us, but also to provide for the service of her foreign debt, mainly held in England. Greece's chief customer, Germany, is hardly likely to permit Greece for long the free transfer of balances derived from trading with her for utilisation as disbursement of debts due to a rival. These facts if brought to the notice of bondholders would do much to allay the irritation they feel at the default of their debtor. If certain economic advantages were offered to the Greeks, they might show greater willingness to improve on their actual offer, which is not over-generous when it is recollected that the burden of the Greek debt has been practically halved by the depreciation of sterling. Such advantages may be secured for Greece if the bondholders bring pressure to bear in certain quarters. We bought in 1938 some 118 million kg. of tobacco from U.S.A., 18 million kg. from Empire sources, and only half a million kg. from Greece. Surely there is scope for an improvement. Tobacco is Greece's staple product. As matters stand, Germany absorbs more than half, and the U.S.A. one-sixth of the total crop, while our share is trifling. The repute certain brands of American cigarettes enjoy abroad is due to the admixture of Oriental with American tobacco, and surely British tobacco concerns could easily be persuaded to follow the example of their American competitors, if it were made clear to them that they would not only subserve their own private interests, but also those of the community at large. If something is not done to assist Greece on this head, she may feel inclined to follow in the steps of her Turkish ally, which after scaling down her debt from 100 million Turkish gold pounds to 14 millions, forced her creditors a couple of years later to receive payment of the annuities in kind. After stabilising her finances by this master stroke, mainly at the expense of French and British nationals, our Government decided that Turkey was "good for" a loan of some £16 millions, which was to serve for developing her coal and iron industries. These have indeed been so well developed by this

influx of British capital that now Turkish coal competes against British as far afield as France and even Brazil.

At any rate it would be politic of the Greeks to display some willingness to pay a higher rate than at present, at least in their own currency, for the special revenues affected to the loans provide several times over the amount needed for their services. The Greek currency made thus available to bondholders could be utilised by them for defraying their holiday expenses in Greece, some parts of which constitute ideal winter resorts. The Greek Government might also arrange for the opening of a permanent exhibition in London of Greek produce and goods, where bondholders could obtain the same in exchange for their coupons. By such a plan Greek wines, tobacco, olives, dried fruit, carpets, etc., would secure a firm foothold in the British market. If such commercial advantages could be secured to Greece, they would constitute an alternative to economic and political gravitation towards Germany, which owing to the present economic dependence of Greece on that country cannot altogether be avoided, in spite of the strong and traditional links of friendship which bind the Greek people to Britain. The strength of this friendship has been once more demonstrated by the enthusiasm which the British pledge to guarantee Greece's independence has evoked throughout Greece and the corresponding expression of anti-Italian sentiment which was everywhere manifested.

G. C. LOCIO.

SCANDINAVIA AND THE NAZIS.

THE Third Reich has worked out a programme of expansion into Scandinavia in full detail. All prominent thinkers of National Socialism have contributed to it. The leader of the Nazi cultural department, Alfred Rosenberg, writes in his book, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, that the watchword of the future would be the Nordic Europe, with Germany as the central Power of the continent forming the bulwark against the south and the south-east; the Scandinavian States including Finland would secure the north-east; Great Britain would secure the west and the oversea countries, as far as it may be necessary in the interest of the Nordic man. The book, which enjoys nearly the same authority in Germany as *Mein Kampf*, and many articles besides written by A. Rosenberg constantly repeat these ideas. There are three chief points: the political union between Germany and the northern States; German direction of the German-Scandinavian bloc; and the use to which the bloc is to be put in the interest of the German imperialism in eastern Europe. A. Rosenberg sums up this programme of a new distribution of the world in the sentence: "Germany will thus at last be enabled to provide living space in Europe for her 100 million people." (!)

General Karl Haushofer, the foreign policy expert of the German General Staff, and a philosopher of Pangermanism, likewise propounds a systematic expansion in the northern countries. According to his description, Sweden suffers from a "luxury of space" and offers conspicuous possibilities to German *Geopolitik*. The Stockholm paper *Social-Demokraten* was recently able to give authentic information as to General Haushofer's opinion that Scandinavia should not be allowed to remain neutral in case of war. Since the Scandinavian countries might become very useful to Germany, General Haushofer recommends a Scandinavian defensive alliance which in time of war, according to the General's conviction, would join the German side.

The idea of a Nordic-Germanic bloc under German leadership is being popularised through numerous books, periodicals and pamphlets written in German as well as in the Scandinavian languages. Nazi ideology emphasises the pretended racial relationship between the Germans and the Scandinavian

peoples, using it as a strong argument to support the German claim to hegemony over the Scandinavian countries which in themselves form both a goal of Nazi policy and a means of achieving it. German and German Northern associations display great activity in the Scandinavian countries. Among these the *Nordische Gesellschaft* is the most noteworthy. According to its own description it is the largest international organisation of Nazi Germany. There were 8,000 members in 1937, the number has increased ever since. The N.G. comprises some forty offices, with two central offices in Lübeck and Berlin. A special office for farmers has been inaugurated in May 1939. Leading party officials direct the N.G., the propaganda is well planned. Under the cloak of loyal activity in the interest of German cultural relations with the northern States, the work of revolutionary destruction of all democratic institutions and ideas in Scandinavia is being prepared.

Two other propaganda organisations are the *Fichtebund* (Hamburg) and the *Weltdienst* (Erfurt and Nürnberg). The *Fichtebund* distributes translations of Nazi pamphlets to the whole of Scandinavia, they are being sent to institutions and private persons. The *Weltdienst* specialises in periodicals, e.g. the *Norden* which is published in German and Danish, and provides newspapers with suitable material. The *Weltdienst* embraces at least thirty-five branch offices all over the world. The *Skandinaviska Telegrambyrån* informs Scandinavian newspapers in the Nazi sense. Then there are mixed associations which have German and Scandinavian subjects for their members. There exist eleven clubs of that character in Sweden alone, where prominent speakers give talks along the line of Nazi propaganda. The most important of these is the German-Swedish Union (*Deutsch-Schwedische Vereinigung*). The interview, which after the American fashion is very popular in Scandinavia, is also being exploited by the Germans. Another successful weapon seems to be the exchange of school children between Germany and Scandinavia. Swedish newspapers have published most deplorable cases of German families which do not mind poisoning the souls of boys and girls from Scandinavia with Nazi propaganda.

How is National Socialism received in Scandinavia? As in other countries it is keen on creating a well-organised and uniform native movement in the Scandinavian countries,

and Nazi parties after the German example have been formed in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. According to general estimates each may count 1,500-2000 members. Exact figures are not available. The number of sympathisers, i.e. of informal adherents, is larger. The Swedish Nazi Party, at present called *Svensk Socialistisk Samling*, for instance, obtained 16,617 votes, 0.8 per cent. of the total, at the last communal elections held in September 1938, in accordance with the new democratic electoral law. This was not even sufficient for one seat. The Nazis have a deputy neither in the Swedish Riksdag nor on any town council. The votes the Nazis have obtained are a mere trifle in comparison with the success of the Swedish Socialist Labour Party which commanded 50.6 per cent. of the total, i.e. 1,312,812 votes with 635 seats. The case is the same in Norway. The *Nasjonal Samling* obtained at the last poll for parliament in 1936 21,435 votes with no seat. There are no Nazis in the Storting. The Danish Nazis, called *Danmarks National Socialistiske Arbejderparti* obtained only 16,000 votes at the previous poll and these remained unrepresented in parliament. At the 1933 elections to the Folketing they secured 30,000 votes and three seats. So unexpected a success was owing to the following reasons. Denmark is suffering from very high unemployment, the figure of the unemployed has reached 100,000, some of whom voted for the Nazis. Certain groups of farmers have not yet recovered from the agricultural crisis, they opposed the liberal-socialistic government coalition. The irresponsible tactics of the communists drove many former socialists into the ranks of the Nazis. Finally it must be pointed out that the Danish electoral system favours small parties. However explained, the fact remains that the Nazis are represented in parliament for the first time. Three seats in a body of 149 are a small enough figure, but the result of the Danish elections gives good reason for apprehension.

The Nazi parties in Sweden, Norway and Denmark conduct small papers, each of which is published several times weekly. The production is lamentable, Berlin being thrifty with foreign currency; the intellectual standard is incredibly low. Public opinion is in no way influenced by these papers. In Sweden and Norway they are just ignored. This is not equally possible in Denmark, where the leading papers cannot help occupying themselves with Nazi reports which chiefly

deal with scandals among Nazis. Analogous cases are happening in Sweden and Norway too.

Finland shows quite a different aspect. There is no official Nazi party in the country, but names are odious. As a matter of fact a large organisation of German and Italian denomination is in existence. It represents Nazi ideology. The name is "Patriotic Popular Movement" (I.K.L.—*Isänmaallinen Kansanliike*). Originating as an independent body, the movement soon became very friendly with the Nazis. It sends its agents to the Reich and keeps in close touch with German institutions. The members are estimated to number roughly 40,000, all of them Finnish subjects. At the last elections in 1936 the organisation obtained 97,500 votes, i.e. 8.3 per cent. of the total. They hold fourteen seats in the national parliament, the same number as in 1933. The I.K.L. publishes eighteen papers, all in Finnish, the chief of which is called *Ajan Suunta* (The Tide of Time). Special small papers are issued for young people and for the working class. Anti-semitic, anti-Russian and chauvinistic propaganda is conspicuous.

The smallest kingdom not only of Europe but of the whole world is Iceland. But the expansionist programme of Nazi Germany is nevertheless interested in it. Denmark represents the foreign interests of this little country and its 120,000 inhabitants. Since it possesses neither an army nor a navy, it has of all Scandinavian countries the least possibility of self-defence. Iceland is important for her food-stuff, but her value in German eyes is even higher because of her importance as a naval and air base in war. Not long ago a German scientific expedition carried out research throughout Iceland and took many snapshots. The pretended courtesy visit of the German cruiser *Emden* alarmed the country considerably. There is no Nazi party in Iceland, no Nazi paper is being published. In the *Allting*, the parliament of Iceland, National Socialism is not represented. The majority is clearly anti-Nazi. Nevertheless, National Socialism threatens Iceland to a certain extent. Some bourgeois groups dependent on their trade with Germany sympathise with the Nazis. The Progressive Party encourages German expansion by the vagueness of their political attitude. Labour in Iceland is weak and split; there are eight social democrats and three communists in the *Allting*. The position is not unfavourable to the Nazis

and their plans. Considering the geographical and strategic position of Iceland, an occupation of the kingdom by the Germans would, according to the feeling of leading Scandinavian political groups, provoke British interference.

Of even more importance than the organised Nazi parties is the great variety of "neutral" associations which are partly or fully sympathetic towards the Nazi movement and are rather widely spread over the Scandinavian countries. The members of these bodies chiefly belong to the upper classes. Big business men, industrialists, civil servants, officers and journalists represent an essential economic and political power. Their sympathies are principally based on economic relations with Germany. German capital is represented in many Scandinavian enterprises. Scandinavian export to Germany on the other hand is relatively large. But even an intellectual affinity with National Socialism thrives within certain groups. The Swedish-German Union and the *Reichsverein* Sweden-Germany are only two of them. A few details as to the origin of these associations might be interesting. Useful information is to be found in the excellent book *Tyska hotet mot Norden* (Nord-Europa publishers, Lund, Sweden). An appeal was published in the autumn of 1937 and was signed by 414 people. Amongst the signatories there were 68 soldiers, five of them generals, 22 professors and lecturers, 35 teachers, 11 parsons, 32 leading business men, 58 were members of the aristocracy. The association has roughly 3,000 members, the propaganda is keen but the paper of the association is run in a poor way, the bulk of public opinion shows a reserved attitude towards this German foundation. Sven Hedin is one of those who launched the association. He is a very active champion of National Socialism in Germany as well as in Sweden. Other adherents are Werner von Heidenstamm and Rütger Essén. In Norway Knut Hamsun adopted fascism and has "hopelessly compromised his genius by his political and personal attitude," as Thomas Mann put it.

According to their attitude towards National Socialism newspapers may be put into one of three groups: the real Nazi press, the sympathisers and the opposition. The papers of the Nazi parties in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the papers of the Patriotic Movement in Finland, some periodicals in Sweden which are published by certain middle-class groups—all of them have a very slight significance, apart from

Finnish fascism. It is different with the sympathising press. The leading conservative and liberal papers belong to that category: *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm), *Politiken* (Copenhagen), *Nationen* (Norway). True, they are more friendly to Germany than to National Socialism, they do not identify themselves with Nazi ideology, but they are flirting with German policy. On the other hand they have been critical especially in foreign affairs, though always in a fair manner. Popular Swedish papers such as *Stockholms Tidningen*, *Aftonbladet* and *Nya Dagliga Allehanda* show strong Nazi tendencies, they are pure business papers, sailing with the wind. *Stockholms Tidningen*, for example, is considered an impartial or liberal paper, but its reports from Germany are inspired by Nazi propaganda. All these papers are read by the masses, National Socialism thus uses the opportunity of influencing the politically uneducated public. Strong and unyielding opposition to National Socialism is carried on by all big liberal papers and the labour press in Scandinavia. The political ideology of the Nazis has been severely criticised especially by the liberal Swedish papers *Dagens Nyheter* and *Göteborgs Handels- und Sjöfartstidning*. To sum up, National Socialism is firmly rejected as a danger to modern democracy and European civilisation by the huge majority of the Scandinavian papers and peoples.

In spite of all efforts National Socialism so far has failed to become a popular movement. The masses in the Northern countries decline Nazi ideology. Finland apart, an internal danger of National Socialism does not exist. Is the fascist danger as such then excluded in all circumstances? The answer must be, no. There are undoubtedly danger-spots, more or less, in all Scandinavian countries. In case of war, in case of a German attack, the danger might become a real menace. Supposing war between Germany and Russia were to break out, Germany perhaps would find it convenient to take her way through Finland, to occupy Leningrad and the Murmansk railway, and thus to cut off Russia from the Arctic Sea. The Åland Islands command the key position in the Baltic and the Gulf of Bothnia. In case of war, Finnish fascism might risk a revolution and take over power when the country was in an ardour of patriotism. Such an attempt is not out of the question, since the Patriotic Movement in Finland is helped by fascist sympathisers in the army, in the

civil service and in the *Schutzkorps*, a sort of semi-military organisation of civilians in the style of the German S.S. Even more probable would be an occupation of a part of Finland by the Russians with the intention of preventing a German invasion. Such a step would enable the Germans to make their appearance in Finland as the would-be saviours and protectors. All bourgeois groups would cheer them, and there would be an end to Finnish democracy.

A second danger zone is Denmark. She is the weak and small neighbour of an overwhelming military power, her system of defence is in no way adequately organised. Danish foreign policy, led by the chief of the Radicals, the Minister Munk, finds armaments useless. It is the old disastrous opinion in Denmark which, by the way, is opposed by many experts, that Denmark could not stand a conflict with Germany. The present Government in Denmark is weakened by the opposition of the farmers, which goes to help Nazi ideas, and the lamentable unemployment. The non-aggression pact between Germany and Denmark does not solve the problem, because Herr Hitler is not thought to make agreements with the intention of honouring them.

The Nazi danger is less threatening in Sweden. The right-wing parties which represent the class interests of finance and industry dislike the modern labour movement and hate the Social Democratic government which has been in power for seven years—as may be seen from articles in *Svenska Dagbladet*, their paper. In case of an economic crisis or of war a political landslide would be quite possible. The right-wing leaders would get help from the lower middle classes, from employees, minor civil servants and the lower intelligentsia, from people who do not like to show their Nazi sympathies under a democratic government. The strong tension between retail firms and the powerful co-operative societies embitters mutual feelings. In case of an internal crisis, a new right-wing government in Sweden would try a *rapprochement* with Nazi Germany. German influence would increase. Would Sweden become a German vassal? We do not want to believe in such a possibility, since the old democratic tradition of the free Swedish people excludes any compromise with totalitarian principles. A similar development might take place in Norway, in spite of the definite failure of all Nazi efforts to pilot Norway into the German wake.

Scandinavian ideology so far has remained democratic and to some extent socialist. The northern governments have to protect the democratic constitutions of their countries. But they have to respect the demands of Germany, the cradle of National Socialism. German pressure uses many different forms and pretexts, it does not shun intimidation even in internal affairs, for instance in Denmark. The Scandinavian governments cannot help being tolerant. The Nazis use and misuse all democratic liberties to undermine the democratic foundations of these countries.

Scandinavian tolerance is caused by one last reason. The northern governments take their political system for unshakable. They just ignore Nazi activities, they do not want to produce Nazi martyrs, they avoid any fostering or advertising of National Socialism by persecution. One wonders whether such an attitude is well founded in all respects. As to Finland, it may be added that the government dissolved the I.K.L. and suppressed their papers. But the court of justice condemned the measure as illegal, and Finnish fascists have resumed their activities. An increasing distrust of German foreign policy is shown by the figures of rearmament in the northern countries. These figures have climbed up considerably in the last years. Another piece of evidence of that distrust is the refusal of the non-aggression pacts Herr Hitler proposed to the northern States. Even the right-wing papers at that point approved of the attitude of the Swedish Government. Denmark certainly was in a special position as shown above. But Finland followed suit in spite of her geographical, strategic and internal situation which is much worse in comparison with that of Sweden and Norway; Finland, by her prudent attitude, has proved that she wants to defend her democratic independence as a Scandinavian State. Finnish co-operation with Sweden and Norway has been warmly welcomed by public opinion in the north. It will be appreciated by western democracy. Neither diplomatic tricks nor would-be peaceful undermining manoeuvres of National Socialism have any chance of obtaining a permanent success with the democratic peoples of Scandinavia.

PAUL OLBERG.

LABOUR AT A CRISIS.

“WE are standing to-day at a great crisis,” said the Leader of the Opposition to the Labour Conference at Southport, “both for the world and for this country.” And he might have added that this atmosphere of crisis had even bathed the delegates when they were considering their own internal affairs. There was a sort of grim determination in the whole Conference such as is pre-eminently suitable for a difficult occasion. Cheers were few and enthusiasm, except at the closing session, was carefully moderated and controlled. Now and then some of the delegates got somewhat out of hand but that was mostly when they had been deliberately provoked. Like most serious people, who are compelled by circumstances to keep themselves for a time at a state of high tension, the Southport gathering dearly cherished its moments of relief. When a speaker told them that his opponents were not “democrats but acrobats” they burst into applause so hearty that it was plain they appreciated the faintest flash of wit on a serious occasion.

The fact was that the great majority of the delegates were tired of what they regarded as an unseasonable prolongation of a domestic crisis. “For nine blasted months” was the expletive language used by a young and lively delegate who evoked the loudest cheers of the Conference when he was describing how his Branch was tied down all that time to discussing the Cripps Memorandum, while subjects of national and international importance were urgently clamouring for attention. “No more of this fooling” was a sort of slogan which appealed most to the prevalent mood of the meeting. At the same time it was plain that the meeting would have to be very carefully managed. One big step, and even one small step in the wrong direction, and the Labour Movement might be severely crippled at a critical moment of its history.

Fortunately the Executive rose to the occasion. They never obtruded themselves too much and they never sought to dominate. They waived the right of reply at an early turning point of the Conference when it was plain that the delegates were clearly indisposed to the case made by Sir Stafford Cripps. They discouraged the strong feeling which had spread abroad among the most influential Unions, that there was no

need to hear Sir Stafford himself in his own defence, and that both on his own account and for the sake of the movement. They guided the Conference to a decision, albeit by a narrow majority, to give the expelled member an opportunity to state a case, and so on the first day of the Conference, when the Chairman had finished his address, Sir Stafford was to be seen, well-groomed, self-possessed, and debonair, as he ascended the steps that led to the rostrum. His speech was artfully prepared and committed to paper. It was careful in its recital of the rights and the wrongs of the case. It was full of appeals to the dearest watchword of democracy—to freedom of speech, to liberty to differ from the prevailing opinion, and all the rest of them. Therein, he said, lay the way to progress and a foundation of a new world. Any other way would mean stagnation, and ultimately decadence and death. And yet it was heard without enthusiasm and for the most part in a stony silence, while the result of the discussion showed that unless he radically changed his ways, the Labour Movement was going to have no more of Sir Stafford Cripps.

What was the cause of this? Why was it that in this personal crisis at Southport Sir Stafford Cripps so decidedly failed? The answer is that it was plain from the prevailing temper of the delegates that he had really only two courses before him. Either he might have been bold, uncompromising, defiant, asserting with no uncertain voice his right to be a rebel. Then he would have failed to carry the block votes of the Unions but he would have clearly divided the Conference into two parts, those who were for him and those who were against him; and those who were for him would have gone forth with strengthened spirit to continue a movement which would have been of grave significance for the future of the party. Or he might have been emotional, troubled, and apologetic, deeply concerned to be outside a party to which he protested he was sincerely attached, and appealing to the good feelings of the delegates whilst he swore by all that was sacred that he would avoid similar misunderstandings in the future. Instead of that he was cold, correct, and logical, and the man who moved in his favour read the statement so like his own that Mr. Herbert Morrison roundly suggested, at a later period of the Conference, that the same lawyer's hand was in both. He was also so much out of touch with a very sensitive mood in the meeting that he referred to the fact that

he was accused of being a rich man, though his riches were looked on as an asset when the day of Election came round. The consequence was that when he sat down and his mover and seconder had had their say, there was no one disposed to follow in his support. Then to cap all, Mr. Dalton revealed how much the Executive had striven to build up a bridge between them and Sir Stafford and how the latter had refused to swear renewed fidelity to the Constitution, or to give an undertaking that there should be some end set to this long course of agitation. This again touched the delegates at a very sensitive spot and it is not surprising that at a later date Sir Stafford and his companions in exile, realising that their cause was hopelessly lost, wrote a not altogether satisfactory letter asking for reinstatement. Only when a man has thus erred and has latterly been reinstated, he has never the same influence in the movement as he had before.

But after all, this was only a personal crisis and it was always apparent, even in his days of most daring propaganda, that Sir Stafford Cripps would never succeed in breaking up the Labour Party. Much more important and specially as the party managers seemed to think a General Election might be imminent, was the Party's attitude to the international crisis. Here it must be confessed there was a certain amount of rather confused thought which would certainly be a source of embarrassment if and when the party chanced to come into power. Mr. Philip Noel Baker, who introduced the resolution of the Executive, was clear and to the point. The only criticism which can be made of him was that he did not sufficiently stress at the outset that the resolution of the Executive was an Emergency Resolution, framed for a world living in face of powerfully and heavily armed aggressors, and where all big constructive schemes were for the time barred because of the menacing shadow of an armed fist. That was why the Executive welcomed President Roosevelt's recent proposal, because the American President first called for a guarantee of good conduct from the aggressors before he thought of summoning "an international conference to limit armaments by international agreement and deal comprehensively with world economic problems." On the other hand, most of the subsequent speakers made proposals which could only have been sustained if this menace no longer existed, and the first task lying before the Labour Party was to begin to lay the foundations

of a bright new world. Again, when Mr. Noel Baker was specifying his more immediate proposals, he said the Labour Party desired to make more and more alliances in the interest of Collective Security—a task which he thought a Labour Government could undertake more successfully than the Government of Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. R. H. Crossman, however, sought to render this opinion of Mr. Noel Baker impossible of realisation by attacking the Governments of some of these possible allies, and by proposing as the most urgent task of the Labour Government a Quixotic crusade—he did not specify with what weight of armaments—in favour of a hundred million peasants living “in desperate conditions,” in Europe outside the happy land of Russia.

It is, however, one of the disadvantages of an annual Labour Conference that it is possible to sit through it all and attach greater importance than they deserve to the more irresponsible manifestations of opinion. Resolutions covering many pages of the agenda are sent up from the affiliated bodies throughout the country, and though some are ruled out of order, others of the movers are only induced to withdraw by being given a chance to speak on main composite resolutions. The consequence is that the majority of the speakers on an Executive resolution are “agin the Government.” Their talk, to use the metaphor used at the Conference in another connection, is like the “buzzing of stingless bees.” Only now and then is heard the opinion of the main body of the Conference, the steady, level-headed men and women who comprise the bulk of the Unions and constituency Labour Parties and who should by their votes at the end of their discussion show wholeheartedly, out of many suggested courses to it, they supported the most responsible action. Now and then one of the working-class orators would speak as if those who advocated the rasher courses were mere theorists—it is astonishing, he said, why clever men should be so often stupid—while he compared them to the man who thought he could safely reckon on a comfortable matrimony if he read a book on *How to be happy though married*. But there were clever men on the Executive as well, and speakers like Mr. Dalton and Mr. Herbert Morrison, who presented the Executive case on National Defence and Conscription, always stressed the case that the Labour Government had now to contemplate the possibility, if only the possibility, of responsibility

for the Government in a time of crisis. There could be no dilly-dallying with the rasher courses whilst the enemy was standing at the gate. Delegates who represented constituencies without a single Labour member on their local bodies might advocate withdrawal from the support of National Service, but those who, like him, were responsible for the government of London, could not accept any rational compromise which suggested participation in the A.R.P. while it declined to help in a more comprehensive military service. Democratise the army by all means, said the Executive—and it showed by statistics how sadly the army needs it—but rise to your responsibilities by furnishing a sufficient force to implement Collective Security. When delegates like Mr. Zeliacus—the “Vigilantes” of many pamphlets—hinted that there should be a general strike against conscription, Mr. Noel Baker referred such fire-eaters to the representatives of Unions who would have to bear the brunt of such a strike, and who, when that suggestion had been made in previous conferences by Sir Stafford Cripps, had shown how much they resented being told their duty by men who would have taken neither part nor responsibility in having that duty so dangerously carried out.

The last critical corner skilfully turned by the Labour Executive was that which goes by the name of the Popular Front. At first it was thought that the debate on this subject would collapse after the confirmation of Sir Stafford Cripps' expulsion, as this great lawyer has certainly constituted the head and soul of its support. But when the debate did come on, it proved to be well worth having, and it issued in a decision which will bind the movement for at least a period of ten years. The discussion was responsible and illuminating. Mr. J. T. Murphy, who put its case, maintained that to win the next Election Labour would need—and by-elections showed that this was a hopeless thought—the active support of some 5 million more electors. On the other hand, a young Labour candidate who presented himself to the Conference as a professional statistician, calculated, as a result of juggling with many figures, that a Popular Front arrangement would at the utmost mean only a gain of ten seats. This was not very comforting to those who were buoyed up by the motto displayed in big letters over the Conference platform: “They conquer who believe they can.” But the wittiest and most appealing speeches came from the representatives of

the constituencies where the Labour cause, if fought alone, is almost hopeless—those constituencies which were in real danger of perpetuating a minority mind, and where men like the Master of Balliol and Mr. Vernon Bartlett might find it possible to succeed. To appeals like this, the Executive, skilful and conciliatory as ever, did not return an absolutely *non possumus* attitude. Through the mouth of Mr. Dodds of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives they spoke of exercising a certain “elasticity” and that “it was possible to be too rigid concerning things of this character.”

The Conference ended on a high note. It was as if the delegates had only just realised that at a critical time they had cleared threatening obstacles from their path and that they are now freer and less impeded than heretofore to face their difficult problem. There was still the preponderating influence of Foreign Affairs which prevented the internal condition of the country from getting the attention it deserved. Spain and Palestine evoked more passionate speeches than Unemployment and the Distressed Areas. Then there was the concern about the condition of Mr. Attlee, who certainly looked gaunt and fragile when he made a fleeting appearance on the platform, to deliver a heartening address. But one thing is certain, that the Labour Party has now definitely reverted to the attitude of its first pioneers and has reaffirmed its determination to remain a completely independent party. Reading between the lines of the Conference decisions it may be inferred that the result in parliamentary life will be, in course of time, a complete reversion to the two-party system. The Labour leaders are against Proportional Representation, which they consider tends to the multiplication of groups, and thus weakens the Executive by placing it at the mercy of the uncertain moods of a weak and changing majority. They are well aware that this strict determination on their part to have nothing of the nature of a national arrangement with any other political parties may affect them in the coming General Election, but they are evidently determined to face the consequences and all the consequences, believing that, in the end, the result will be a strong and confident Government, independent of outside favours and support, and able to carry through Parliament the provisions of the document which goes by the name of “Labour’s Immediate Programme.”

J. H. HARLEY.

INSIDE THE CZECH PROTECTORATE.

WHEN in the spring of 1938 the Czechoslovak crisis had started, a considerable part of the international and especially of the British public were anxious to secure the maximum of concessions for the Sudeten Germans, although unquestionably they were the best-treated minority in Europe, and in some respects far better off than their co-nationals in the Reich. The greatest interest was displayed in the Sudeten case. All their demands and complaints were thoroughly investigated and the necessity for their right of self-determination was stressed. The results are known. Munich and the policy of appeasement have passed, marking one of the darkest chapters in European history.

Now the situation has been reversed completely. The incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into German territory has brought the Czechs under German rule. Whereas the Sudeten Germans, backed by the Reich, have been a minority of $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions in a democratic-liberal State with about 10 million Czechs and Slovaks, the Czechs find themselves to-day as a $7\frac{1}{2}$ million people without anybody to help them amidst 80 million Germans in a strongly organised Nazi State, which lays claim to the German mission in the world with almost unprecedented force. Their position therefore is much worse than that of the Sudeten Germans before Munich. Their request for active interest in their fate and for moral support is fully justified, especially as everybody knows how the “protection” came about. Besides, even at present, the fate of the Czechs is a problem of international interest. Annexed as a foreign race by the Germans, the way in which they are treated offers the most important evidence for judgment of the Nazi minority policy—if such should still be necessary. Germany is always busy with complaints on behalf of her nationals abroad; her treatment of the Czechs should provide the best example of the appropriate policy to be adopted towards Germans in other countries.

The situation in the Protectorate as it stands is very difficult and most unfavourable for the Czechs. Bohemia and Moravia present a sort of huge Slavonic concentration camp, in which German officials, Sudeten leaders and the German population, which remained there after the partition, are in authority. An impartial investigation of the circumstances

is almost impossible. Entry to and departure from the Protectorate appear to be strongly controlled, and even now, almost three months after the occupation, special permits are necessary for that purpose. Foreigners have to prove the object of their visit, tourists are not admitted so far. British subjects require not only the usual visa for Germany, but furthermore a special permit of the Gestapo and in most cases of the German Ministry of Economics as well. No foreign aeroplane is allowed to land, the whole area being declared "an air-closed district." Asked for the reason for such control, the reply is that the necessary regulations are not yet ready. This, however, is an unconvincing explanation. What regulations are they thinking of? All the means of transport are available and in full working order, the initial military occupation having come to an end. The real reason is evidently different! The Nazis obviously want to prevent eye-witnesses in the Protectorate from establishing contact with the Czech public and so finding out by personal experience the real meaning of Nazi autonomous self-administration of a foreign race, as the process of eliminating the opposition has apparently not yet been accomplished.

There can be no doubt whatever of the fact that the Czechs under the surface of a shadow autonomy are subjected to the most strenuous pressure in ideological, political and economic respects in order to be brought completely into line with the Reich. In the terms of the Protectorate issued in Prague it is stated that the Protectorate is autonomous and administers itself, whereas defence, foreign policy, communications, post, telephone and partly the maintenance of internal order are prerogatives of the Reich. Not the slightest indication is given as to what the autonomy consists of. The frame of the decree is kept on purpose as general as possible in order to allow of further changes without being committed in any way. It is laid down, however, that autonomous rights must be exercised in accordance with the political, military and economic importance of the Reich, which leaves very little room for individual autonomy.

Last year when Henlein proclaimed the eight points of his Karlsbad programme, having asked amongst other things for full autonomy, equality of rights, recognition of the Sudetens as a legal personality, full liberty to profess German nationality and the Nazi ideology, he insisted on strict guarantees

for every point. Nothing of the kind has been granted to the Czechs. Although Herr Hitler's proclamation declared that the incorporation became necessary to establish peace and the bases for reasonable order in Central Europe, it must be said that since March 16th as far as the Protectorate is concerned the situation has deteriorated considerably. No firm basis for the autonomy being established, there exists a strong feeling of insecurity in almost all branches of Czech public life. This is due mainly to four reasons: the lack of a strict legal basis; the dualism between the old Czech administration and the German administration since introduced, which deals by now with almost every branch of public life; the unbridged ideological gap between the fundamentally democratic Czechs and the Nazis; finally, strong Czech fears of Germanisation and national oppression in view of the steadily increasing number of Germans in the Protectorate and their hurried organisation as a stormtroop of Nazism.

As far as can now be ascertained there has already been a fundamental misunderstanding right from the beginning. It seems that the Czechs were of the opinion that the fact of their complete disarmament and their abandonment of their foreign policy would secure for them full internal autonomy without being obliged to bring the whole nation immediately into one line with Nazi ideology. The Nazis' interest, however, was to assimilate the Czechs as soon and as thoroughly as possible, not only avoiding in doing so likely unrest in this region, but in order to use the converted Czechs for appeasement among the Slavonic races in the East and South-East. The terms of the Protectorate and the personal appointments made in connection with the Reich administration in Bohemia and Moravia, without any previous consultation with President Hácha, do not allow for much doubt as to that. Not only does the political, military and economic importance of the Reich show the direction of policy, but the head of the Protectorate must have the confidence of the Führer for the discharge of his office, and the Reichsprotector is obliged to see that the German lines of policy are observed. In connection with this he holds key-rights, as, for instance, the confirmation of the Government, the right of exclusive information, of advice and veto, concerning all measures taken by the Government. Nothing can be done if the Reichsprotector objects. The Reich, however, can promulgate orders applicable

to the Protectorate, in so far as the common interest demands. It can take administrative branches into its own hands, set up the requisite Reich authorities and provide for the maintenance of law and order.

This means that although for the time being the Czech administration continues, in fact the Germans administer the country. The striking number of the Protector's offices, a German official's attendance at Cabinet meetings, and the extensive organisation of the Nazi party in the Protectorate give sufficient evidence for that. To-day, in fact, a complete dualism exists in almost every respect, with the exception of the concentration camps which are German only. The German departments for Home policy, Education, Economics, Agriculture, Justice, Public Works, etc., in the Reichsprotektor's office increase their influence daily. In case of divergences, of course, their line is the one to follow.

When it became known that seventeen decrees, decided upon in the Czech Cabinet of March 17th, April 6th and 14th, could not be carried out, failing the consent of the Reichsprotektor, the Prime Minister Beran was immediately replaced by General Eliaš. Since then roughly forty decrees have not received approval so far. What does that mean? Two explanations seem the most probable. As the Reichsprotektor can himself take measures in the common interest, when delay seems dangerous, large possibilities for non-autonomous administration are obviously opened up. But another effect might be even more desirable for the Nazis. The present Government could then be discredited in the eyes of the population as not being efficient enough to deal promptly with the situation; it would not be allowed to tell the public that the reason for the delay lies with the Reichsprotektor's lack of approval. This would help to divide Czech unity, in the establishment of which the Nazis are not interested. There is strong evidence to prove that the Nazis, being dissatisfied with the Czech Government's reluctance to agree to the immediate Nazification of the country, want to hand it over entirely to the Czech Fascists, whose illegal existence is only made possible by full German support. According to the recent entrance notifications for membership in the Government's movement of National Unity 99·25 decided for them, leaving only 0·75 per cent. for their opponents, which, even if entirely allotted to the Fascists,

would amount only to a very small number of followers. The Fascists are playing a similar part now in the home policy of the Protectorate to that of the Slovaks and Germans during the Second Republic. In their recent demonstrations Nazi participation was obvious. There can be no doubt that as soon as they came to power, the terror in the Protectorate would further increase, their Fascist leaders being only too willing to remove reputed Czech Democrats to the useful institution of concentration camps, thus settling at the same time old personal accounts. The process of purification amongst the Czechs, necessary in Nazi eyes, would thus get a new impulse.

It may well be that when this article is published things will have advanced far. For the time being the National Unity Movement, led by President Hácha, rules the country. Having been organised very reluctantly on Nazi orders, after the establishment of the Protectorate, it follows authoritarian lines, is only open to Aryans, and has started an organisation called "Joy in Life," corresponding to the Nazi "Strength through Joy." The work is done in twelve committees, executive, economic, financial, social, cultural, youth, press, propaganda, etc. One of them is concerned exclusively with collaboration with the Nazi party. Keeping close contact with the Protectorate's Government, both as a consultative and an advisory body, they fight the Fascists passionately as a menace to national unity and as irresponsible elements, which, in fact, they have proved to be almost since their establishment. Whether the Czechs will be able to resist both German and Fascist pressure, remains to be seen. They have been forced already to consent to two important Fascist organisations: the "Aryan Cultural Union" and the Fascist "Ex-Servicemen's Association," the activities of which had both been forbidden. The anti-Jewish regulations decided upon by the Government in the more liberal form of President Hácha's proposals will certainly be remodelled and influenced by the Aryan Union "in line with the Nuremberg laws." This does not alter the fact, however, that the Czechs will only very reluctantly join the German anti-Semitic front, knowing that the Nazis will profit from the Aryanisation by replacing the Jews in economic life by Germans, if possible.

It is obvious that in these circumstances and in view of the constantly growing activity of the Gestapo and the ruthless censorship in the Protectorate, the general feeling of insecurity

increases. The local Nazi organisations, headed mostly by passionate anti-Czech Sudeten Germans, do their best to work in this direction. Although Baron von Neurath, the Reichsprotector, had declared that he wanted to demonstrate before the world how the Germans respect a foreign nation, and how they try to win them over for life in common, "being well aware of the necessary gallantry and responsibility," he has failed so far, like the moderates in Germany with the Radicals. The obstructive factors are the Sudetens placed in leading positions in his office, such as Henlein, K. H. Frank, Konstantin Hoess, etc. If anything could demonstrate to the Czechs the vanity of the autonomous rights awarded to them, it is the fact that Henlein and Frank are in charge both as experts and responsible officials of the Reichsprotector's office. From the Nazi point of view it was a lack of tact and a fatal mistake. If they wanted to discourage the Czechs from co-operation and confidence, this was the best way to do it. But they are not concerned with such considerations. Day after day they show their disregard for the Czechs, demonstrating clearly: "we are the masters of the country." "We decline Germanisation by force of non-German races," said the Nazi Minister, Dr. Frick, in Berlin on March 30th. Well, Germanisation can be brought about very well without visibly using force. The German language has now not only the same official standing in the Protectorate, but is even more privileged than the Czech. As in the course of the continued "aryanisation of industries" the ex-officials are mostly replaced by German nationals, perfect knowledge of German is an essential condition for employment. The Nazi Department for Education in the Reichsprotector's office is very busy "returning former German schools," appointing and organising Nazi teachers. It is obvious that in future it will be an advantage from the point of view of employment to be able to prove attendance at a German school. As the incorporation in the German four years' plan makes it desirable for the Nazis to work for a transfer of part of the Czech industries to the Reich—which has started already—the Labour Exchange will also work for Germanisation. At present, 60-70,000 workers are believed to have been transferred to work in the Reich, the Protectorate already experiencing labour shortage. The workers are particularly well treated, allowed to send their savings home, with the use of a most attractive exchange

and are trained to form a Nazi vanguard in the Protectorate later.

The dualism in law, German jurisdiction being now exclusively applied to German nationals, but in various cases against Czechs as well, makes the command of German imperative. Great numbers of German civil and criminal courts, already established, are busy everywhere. Extensive German civil administration set up in Bohemia and Moravia renders constant collaboration indispensable. It consists of four authorities: chief of the district (*Bezirkshauptmann*), (the court of the first instance), chief of the region (*Kreishauptmann*), two chiefs of the land (*Landeshauptmann*), and the Reichsprotector. The fact that not less than twenty regional chief departments exist already demonstrates clearly the Nazi resolution to do away with Czech autonomous administration before long.

The German population is strongly organised, not less than twenty-four local Nazi groups existing in Prague alone. It was stated recently that roughly 1,200 Nazi officials (block-guards and cell-guards included) are in charge of the forthcoming Nazification of the 50,000 Germans of Prague. Great care is taken not only in the task of acquiring registered Nazis (P.G.'s), but in working usefully amongst the Czechs as well. Particularly favoured is the Hitler Youth (HJ), all special branches of which, such as Flying-HJ, Moting-HJ, Marine-HJ, and Reporting-HJ (*Nachrichten HJ*) having been established already. One can easily imagine how usefully the last group especially may work amongst the Czechs. That the SA and SS are in full force is a matter of course. The same applies to all the innumerable Nazi organisations. Nazi methods of demonstrating *Volksgemeinschaft* and the Nazi spirit have not changed in the Protectorate. On the contrary, there is a strong belief in the effect of their teaching and the Nazi Party is just as influential as the Reichsprotector's offices. No wonder that the German stranglehold grows not only constitutionally and legally, but financially and economically as well. The transfer of 466 millions of gold from the Czech National Bank to the Reichsbank for clearing the accounts connected with the position of the Sudetenland was performed during the early days of the Protectorate. Strong control of the Bank and Czech exchange followed. The Bohemian Escompte Bank became the leading German bank,

fighting hard against the Zivnobanca, which is the most influential Czech bank. All industrial and economic organisations are penetrated by the Nazis. In the agricultural sphere they have not succeeded so far, although the Agricultural Department of the Reichsprotector is very eager to do so.

A difficult task faces the Protectorate as far as foreign trade is concerned. It should continue to export, trying to keep old markets in order to implement the unsatisfactory German balance of foreign exchange. Whether this will be possible seems rather doubtful. Not only the reluctance of foreign anti-Nazi consumers, but the rise in prices and the scarcity of certain raw materials, already experienced in the Protectorate, work against it. Anyhow Czech finance and economics is in a state of quick and ruthless alteration, the obvious object being to change spheres of interest in favour of the Nazis. The incorporation of the Protectorate in the Four Years' Plan facilitates the task considerably. The return of Czech gold in England was used as a great moral victory of the Nazis, as evidence of *de facto* recognition and of complete foreign indifference towards the Czechs.

How the Czechs look upon all this hardly needs description. They are aware that both the administrative and the cultural autonomy is purely swindling and fictitious, the reality being oppression, humiliation, persecution, etc. They try to overlook provocation, to keep quiet, to organise national unity, to preserve their spirit, their capital and their property, and wait for a better future in which the nightmare called Protectorate will have ceased to exist.

H. R. M. WORSLEY.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO YUGOSLAVIA?

THREE problems of Yugoslav politics, closely connected with each other, have recently become very conspicuous. The negotiations between the Government in Belgrade and the leaders of the Croatian Opposition in Zagreb have been much commented upon. Secondly, Yugoslavia has been exposed to pressure by the German minority of Slovenia publishing a programme of national claims. Thirdly, the Axis Powers have considerably intensified their pressure.

The negotiations between the Government and the Croatian Opposition ended in an agreement drawn up by the Prime Minister and Dr. Matchek, and published on April 27th. The Regency, a few days later, refused to ratify this agreement, which had been greeted with enthusiasm by the entire nation; but the plan, even if it should never be carried through, will retain its place in Yugoslav history. It will never be forgotten that at least one Belgrade Ministry thought this compromise acceptable; and should the Yugoslav State, so unhappily steered through the storms of our time, crumble to pieces, future attempts at its restoration will have to start anew from this point.

To make this agreement possible, both sides had to make very important concessions. The Government relinquished the principle of Yugoslav unity, and acknowledged the Opposition's assertion that Servians, Croats, and Slovenes are independent nations and not merely three tribes of the indivisible Yugoslav nation. Till then the theory of Yugoslav unity was the basis of Belgrade politics and administration. In consequence of this acknowledgment, the Tsvetkovitch Ministry also gave up centralism as the basic principle of the Yugoslav State. It declared its willingness to transform Yugoslavia, which is now governed according to strictly centralistic principles, into a Serbo-Croat-Slovene Federation, and, within this Federation, to grant self-government to the Croats. If Tsvetkovitch went a long way to meet the Croats they also made important concessions. They gave up their cardinal wish, the demand that the reform of the Constitution must be brought about by a freely elected Constituent Assembly. Having previously demanded a new Constitution, they now agreed to a gradual reform. While they had

previously claimed that the Yugoslav nations must come to an agreement within the Constituent Assembly, they now consented to an agreement drawn up by the Government and the Croatian Peasant Party. They acquiesced in the elimination of the Servian Opposition—their Coalition partners—from the negotiations. Though they had originally demanded a maximum of political and administrative functions for the individual Federal States, leaving but a minimum of functions to the Central Government, they were now satisfied with a restricted autonomy for the Federal States. In a word, they agreed to a provisional compromise, leaving the final settlement to the future.

This conciliatory spirit missed its just reward, for the Regency, to the general surprise, refused to ratify the agreement. This unfortunate decision created a situation as undefined as it is perilous. The Government declares that the negotiations are merely interrupted, and that they will be resumed in a short time. On the other hand, the Croats say: "The negotiations have miscarried. Should the Government wish to start fresh negotiations, we must begin at the beginning again, for we cannot be bound by our previous concessions, as the agreement was not ratified." By this they mean: "We have been imposed upon once again. We refuse to be continually treated in this way. We shall now stick to our original programme." Simultaneously, the population of Zagreb demonstrated against the Regency, and the younger members of the semi-military Croatian Peasant Guards threatened to rise in arms.

The Croatian Peasant Party then appealed to the Great Powers, not for the first time. A few days after Schuschnigg's return from Berchtesgaden, Dr. Matchek demanded the "democratic intervention" of the Western Powers in an impressive interview with a correspondent of the *Agence Havas*. He argued that Austria was now lost and, consequently, Czechoslovakia isolated and seriously threatened, so that the Western Democracies must now, in their own interest as well as in the interest of democracy itself, defend "the next entrenchment," namely Yugoslavia, against Fascist aggression. Such a defence, he added, demanded the internal pacification and democratisation of the country. This proves that when the Croats call for foreign aid they are not necessarily appealing exclusively to the Axis Powers. Yet in the

present international situation such an appeal can too easily lead to an intervention of the Axis in Yugoslavia, which is now nearly encircled by Germany and Italy. This is what makes the situation so extremely dangerous. And nobody can overlook the fact that, although the Croatian Peasant Party has been, up to the present, strictly on the side of democracy, now, after the great disappointment when the agreement of April 27th was not sanctioned, many Croats would welcome intervention on their behalf wherever it might come from.

The Croatian problem, always very delicate, is in a worse muddle than ever. Precisely in the days when the streets of Zagreb resounded with the angry shouts of the Croatian masses and the shots of the police, the German minority of Slovenia published its national demands. The German minority in Yugoslavia numbers about 500,000, most of them settled not along the German frontier, but in the Vojvodina, a province bordering on Hungary. The Germans in Slovenia, genuine borderers, have lived in perpetual strife with the Slovenes. The Slovenes are on similar terms with their German minority as the Czechs with the Sudeten Germans. Several of the German minority's demands are very interesting. They comprise the abolition of the thirty-mile zone, the right to unrestricted cultural work, and a sufficient number of German schools for the German minority.

What is the aim of this programme? In recent years the Germans in the Vojvodina and in Slavonia (a Croatian province situated between the Vojvodina and Slovenia) bought up all the land they could. The price rose steeply: in the Vojvodina it rose to 140 per cent. of its original value in the last four years, while in Slavonia it reached 150 per cent. in the course of a single year. The Germans were able to buy so much land because they were granted bank credits on which they paid only 2 per cent. for the express purpose of these transactions. It is clear that the Slav peasants were unable to keep pace with such competitors. To prevent the creation of a German belt in the frontier districts of Slovenia, Slavonia, and the Vojvodina, the Yugoslav Government decreed that every transfer in the frontier districts within a zone of 30 miles must be sanctioned by a judicial committee. The Germans of Slovenia now want to remove this obstacle, in order to regain the full benefit of their economic preponderance in the struggle for the land.

The cultural work of the German minority in Yugoslavia is organised by the "Schwaebisch-Deutscher Kulturbund" (Swabo-German Cultural League), whose work has created serious dissatisfaction among the Servians, Croats, and even among the Hungarian minority of Yugoslavia. The admirably organised *Kulturbund* is very active. Wherever there is a German minority, it founds a local group. Sometimes it happens that the work of such local groups displeases the authorities. This was the case when members of these groups founded secret societies, swore to abstain from any intercourse with Servians, Croats and Jews, or started similar little tricks. But, in the opinion of the Yugoslavs, these more or less innocuous infractions of a purely cultural society's statutes are not the cause of their real grievance. The fact was that, in the course of the last months, the Slav cultural organisations vehemently protested against the *Kulturbund's* forcing its way into districts inhabited by no Germans whatever or by an infinitesimal number. The Slavs assert that the Germans proclaim Slavs and Hungarians speaking either Serbo-Croatian or Hungarian to be genuine Germans on the strength of a German-sounding name. Following this principle, so they say, the Germans invited people who until then had been officials of Slav or Hungarian cultural organisations to join the *Kulturbund*, and founded local groups in places which up to the present had been considered to be purely Slav. Of course, in districts inhabited by several races, it will always be largely a matter of opinion whether one or the other individual appertains to one or the other of the different nations in question. At any rate, we can understand the South Slavs lacking enthusiasm for this "regermanisation" in their own State, and the South Slav press starting a campaign against it.

In Yugoslavia cultural work is closely connected with school policy. Whenever the *Kulturbund* had founded a group in a certain district, often with the active help of German tourists, it was enabled to claim the necessity of founding a German school for these parts. When this demand was complied with, it was repeatedly found that the German children, for whose benefit the school had been founded, could not speak a word of German. The teachers in these schools had a hard job teaching these children the mother-tongue they had been taught by their mothers from the cradle. So much for the demands of the German minority of Slovenia.

After refusing to ratify the Serbo-Croat agreement, the Prince Regent paid a visit to Rome. It has been reported that on this occasion he was presented with the demands of the Axis Powers. These demands are the following: Yugoslavia is to join the Anti-Comintern Pact, leave the League of Nations, introduce German and Italian military instructors into the Yugoslav army, grant a trade monopoly to Germany and Italy, and finally, to defer any definite agreement with the Croats, in order to keep the Croatian politicians—who are no great friends of the Axis—out of the Government. As to the conversations in Berlin, it would seem that Yugoslavia still tries to keep to its policy of neutrality. Probably the Axis Powers were hampered by the newly arisen Russian-Turkish political activity in Bulgaria. The extraordinarily hearty welcome Potemkin experienced in Sofia has been duly reported. The extremely russophile population of Bulgaria would enthusiastically acclaim pro-Russian policy. It has recently been reported that a Russian trade delegation will shortly arrive in Sofia. The Russians propose to buy an important part of the Bulgarian tobacco and fruit harvest, thus enabling Bulgaria, which is now economically absolutely bound to Germany, to regain a certain amount of economic and political freedom. At the same time, the Turkish diplomats are urging a compromise between Rumania and Bulgaria on the ticklish Dobruja question. The part played by Turkish diplomacy in the recent negotiations between Russia and Rumania is not yet forgotten. This seems to be the reason for Germany's more cautious treatment of Yugoslavia. Several items tend to indicate that the latter has been granted a respite.

To what account will it be turned? The Prime Minister, Mr. Tsvetkovitch, on his recent visit to the inundated provinces of Croatia, stated that the Serbo-Croatian talks will be continued. Similar statements have often been made in the past, but the gulf between Servians and Croats is still unbridged.

OBSERVER.

FORERUNNERS OF THE THIRD REICH.

SINCE March 1938 a subtle change has occurred in National-Socialist political thought reflecting the active excursions of German foreign policy beyond the frontiers of the Weimar Republic. Up till that time the Third Reich had lived in a platonic relationship to the Holy Roman Empire which was accepted as a mere symbol, as the romantic manifestation of German greatness in the remote past—and nothing more. This state of affairs lasted as long as National-Socialism was applying most of its energy to internal reforms in which the Holy Roman Empire could offer little practical inspiration. However, as soon as the National-Socialists were satisfied that they had created an organically sound New Germany, they turned with insatiable “dynamism” to other matters; having destroyed within their country the political bondage to the Treaty of Versailles and the spiritual bondage to cosmopolitan and liberal ideas, they turned to a constructive programme on a much larger scale: namely, to the reconstruction of Central Europe on the basis of their own conception of right and wrong. In so doing, they have begun to invoke the example of the Holy Roman Empire in matters of practical policy and put themselves forward as the champions of a venerable tradition of German political supremacy on the continent of Europe. The annexation of imperial Vienna gave its first impulse to this tendency; the latter was consecrated by the return of the imperial insignia from Vienna to Nürnberg in September 1938 and again manifested itself lately in the reasons given for the absorption of what remained of Czechoslovakia after Munich.

In any other country such an attempt to revive a medieval form of life in order to justify political events of to-day would be incomprehensible, if not ridiculous. In Germany, however, they are comprehensible; for German Nationalism—and especially National-Socialism—is and has always been not a purely political creed but a composite theory of political reform, of spiritual idealism and of sentimental romanticism. German nationalism is tinged with religious feeling; it has a quasi-religious cult for its ideal, i.e. the Holy Roman Empire in the past and a New Empire in the future. Ever since the war the “Third Reich” has symbolised the nationalists’ ideal of “regenerated” Germany. It was not only an effective

vote-catching slogan implying a promise of future happiness but also the symbol of a new *Weltanschauung*. For the National-Socialist, if not for the majority of the population, the Third Reich is not only the name of a new régime but the quasi-religious symbol of a new era.

To-day it is claimed that National-Socialism fulfils the same purpose as religion; in fact, that National-Socialism is the only *Weltanschauung* which is consonant with the instinctive and eternal forms and with the scale of moral values peculiar to the Germans. It has been revealed to the nation through the medium of prophets whom divine Providence has sent at the times of greatest need and whom it has made infallible. By means of this claim the National-Socialists seek to place their doctrine and their policy in the privileged position of a religion, beyond the reach of ordinary criticism based only on practical considerations. It is, therefore, with the zeal of religious fanatics that they combat not only the unbeliever, but also the heretic and the schismatic; and it is with the patience and ingenuity of theologians that they seek to strengthen their position by reference to established authority. Indeed, an important part of their literature is devoted to demonstrating that National-Socialism fulfils the dreams of all who wished for a better Germany, and that the Third Reich was, consciously and unconsciously, their ideal in so far as they could comprehend its nature. Thus the National-Socialists seek to create an Old Testament for the National-Socialist Gospel. The latter becomes merely the final and definitive expression of ideas which have always represented what was best in the nation.

As a matter of fact, a case can be made out for such views. Indeed, the dream of a better Germany has long existed and this better Germany has often been called the “new Reich” or, less often, the “Third Reich.” The dreams of nationalists in the past have developed; many have disappeared in their entirety, others have left certain elements behind; of these elements some have found favour with National-Socialism and been accepted, while other surviving elements are persecuted as heresies. The National-Socialist Third Reich is but one of the countless fruits borne by German nationalism. It undoubtedly expresses some traits of the German character, but not all of them; and the traits it expresses are those which have found fertile soil in the abnormal conditions of

life brought about by the war. It is a comparatively new manifestation of a permanent utopian element in German patriotic thought.

In the following sketch an attempt is made to show in what manner the conception of the Holy Roman Empire evolved through history and finally brought forth the Third Reich as one of its—legitimate—descendants; but also, what a gulf separates ancestor from descendant, a gulf which cannot be bridged by mere assertion of similarity between the political ideals of the two. The term "Reich" can be interpreted in many ways. Here we need consider it only in its associations with German patriotism or nationalism. Even so it can be defined only within the most elastic limits: The "Reich" is the ideal form of German life. This conception is based on two fundamental assumptions: (1) that the German nation has a permanent and distinct character, and (2) that well-nigh ideal conditions can be achieved in practical life (the "Reich" is not a utopia). Finally, this conception is inspired by memories of the Holy Roman Empire in which such conditions are assumed to have obtained.

As early as the beginning of the last century the Reich had come to represent an ideal, as opposed to the actual Germany. Accordingly, the idea of a new Reich derives its prestige from the fact that it implies the goal of spiritual as well as of temporal perfection. It is more comprehensive than a purely political concept and cannot be adequately translated by "empire." In fact, it owes its power of attraction to this very vagueness: for it escapes much of the criticism to which well-defined political ideas are exposed and, by means of its mystic associations, it appeals to the impressionable mass mind. Thus, for at least a century, it has been used by all would-be reformers eager to win the support of the masses by an appeal to their patriotism; for it could serve as symbol—or advertisement—for any theory, provided the latter conformed to certain general principles: belief in the nation's mission and in its potential greatness. The Reich, like art, assumes *species mille*; and its present manifestation is the outcome of a long process of evolution culminating in a fierce struggle for existence between rival theories.

The idea of a new Reich is not of purely German origin. It is merely the German expression of the characteristically human longing for a golden age and it owes most of its prestige

to its non-German predecessor: the Christian teleological conception of history. Indeed, the early Christian thinkers dreamt of a golden age when the Christian Faith would unite all men and nations in perfect bliss. This millennium, the Kingdom of God on Earth, was called *das dritte Reich*; for it was the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost, the age of fulfilment, which succeeded the Kingdom of the Son of God, the age of militant Christianity, and that of God the Father, the age of incipient Christianity. The tripartite, theological interpretation has, incidentally, shown remarkable vitality and is by no means restricted to German thought: thus, for instance, in Russia the belief has existed since the fifteenth century that Moscow is destined to be the third, the truly Christian Rome.

The spiritual conception of a united mankind allied itself to the temporal Roman conception. From their union arose the idea of the Holy Roman Empire which considered itself as the forerunner of the Kingdom of God on Earth, and which tried to hasten its appearance, not only by religious but also by political means. This Empire was built on Christianity; there was no room in it for nationalism. It was built on a conception of the world which reconciled the spiritual and the temporal elements of life; the Pope and the emperor were together responsible to God for the welfare of mankind. There can be no doubt that this conception of a commonwealth of nations, embracing the whole of mankind and governed in all its activities by a common faith, deeply marked the thought of the time. Nor has this grandiose idea of a scheme governing spiritual as well as temporal activities of man entirely disappeared: there are reminiscences of it in socialism and even in totalitarian nationalism. But its most important effect was to have lifted once and for all the conception of a Reich out of the sphere of purely practical thought.

The Holy Roman Empire, however, failed to live up to its ideal. The greatest blow it suffered was the splitting of the Christian Faith by the Reformation which vitiated the assumption of a single spiritual bond. The ideal was further undermined by the failure of the emperors to perform their duty: they cherished, it is true, universal aspirations, but their motives were too often ambition and selfishness. As the empire was gradually becoming a caricature of its ideal and as Germany suffered severely in the process, the idea of a

regenerated empire arose which would recapture the political and cultural glory of the old one. The Germans knew that in practice the empire had been principally a German creation, and they longed for a revival of their past glory. These hopes found poetic expression in the legend of Friedrich Barbarossa's slumber in the Kyffhäuser from which one day the emperor would awake and build anew an empire of justice, peace and happiness. Now, however, particular stress was laid on its German character; for the Germans, regarding themselves as the true heirs of the old empire, thought that the golden age could be achieved only under their own leadership. The Barbarossa legend proclaimed the German mission.

However, up to the Napoleonic era the idea of a new empire was but an impracticable dream. It meant little more than that nationalism was beginning to be grafted onto Christian thought. This process began modestly in the eighteenth century when Germany revolted against the yoke of French culture on the ground that culture must conform to national character. For the formulation of this theory Herder was chiefly responsible; he believed in the possibility of civilised mankind living in peace and happiness; but he also believed that each nation is a living and permanent organism and that a golden age would be achieved by a commonwealth of nations in which each nation would retain its perfected individuality. On his theory are founded most claims to a national mission and to the distinction of being "the" chosen people.

It was a catastrophe that gave the greatest impetus to the development of the Reich ideology. The ignominious collapse of the empire and of Prussia brought home to German patriots the urgent need of fundamental reforms, of a new empire. Fichte, Kleist, Hölderlin, Arndt, Körner, Görres discoursed on the German mission; while, in the realm of politics, Stein and Hardenberg were trying to make their country fitter for the performance of this mission. One school of thought idealised the romantic medieval institution and dreamt of an empire which would be a commonwealth of nations united in the Christian Faith (Novalis), and which would be governed by rulers unhampered by democracy, but guided by divine Providence (Adam Müller). On the other hand, many thought that the prevailing evils were due to a survival of an obsolete social structure which benefited the

privileged classes and oppressed the others. They believed that society would have to be reformed according to new principles. Partly inspired by the ideas spread by the French revolution they longed for a liberal and democratic, regenerated and united Germany.

They were cruelly disappointed by the Congress of Vienna. They were persecuted by the reactionary rulers, fearful lest the seed of revolution should spread. Yet this progressive conception of a new empire flourished. It found champions in the Young German poets who again brought Barbarossa into vogue. Indeed, hardly a writer but resorted to this convenient and romantic symbol to express his patriotism. As a rule this symbol meant little more than the ingenious and vague longing for a new empire; at the same time, however, there were some men, like Friedrich List, who were able to suggest practical measures. Finally, in 1848, the clash came between the champions of a liberal and democratic empire and the defenders of the *status quo*. A typical echo of exasperated patriotism can be heard in these lines by Freiligrath:

*Dass Deutschland stark und einig sei,
Das ist auch unser Dürsten!
Doch einig wird es, nur wenn frei,
Und frei nur ohne Fürsten!*

Great enthusiasm greeted the convocation in Frankfurt of a Parliament that was to transform the German Federation into an empire. But when at last a constitution had been accepted and the crown was offered to the King of Prussia, the latter refused it. At one blow the edifice of hopes was shattered. Parliamentary method had proved unavailing and poets now could only sing:

*Strecke, hochgewalt'ger Kaiser, strecke neu zum Schlaf dich hin!
(Schack, 1850.)*

In the years that followed, the longing for unity superseded, as was to be expected after this setback, the longing for liberty. There ensued a political struggle for hegemony between Prussia and Austria, the two countries without whose co-operation all hopes of unity would have been ephemeral. This struggle was also a struggle between two contrasting conceptions of the national ideal. On the one hand, the traditional ideal of an empire greater than a national state and composed

of many nations was upheld by Austria. Such an ideal appealed to the predominantly catholic South Germany. It accepted Christianity as the guiding principle in organised society, while assigning to the Germans the rôle of colonisers and spiritual leaders. This centrifugal conception of the empire is to-day often treated with contempt ; undeservedly, for it alone enabled German culture to attain the position it enjoyed in South-Eastern Europe and justified the German claim to a mission. Yet, despite criticism, it showed great vitality : it has inspired many conservative nationalists since the war (e.g. Möller van den Bruck, E. Jung and, earlier, the democrat Friedrich Neumann) and, more recently still, it was held by Dollfuss and by Schuschnigg and underlay their policy.

On the other hand, a centripetal conception of the empire as of a particularly powerful national state, was advocated by Prussia. According to this, the Germans were to apply all their energy to the creation of a powerful political organism for themselves. The purpose of the empire was the welfare of Germans only and, in theory, of all Germans. Christianity was not to be the fundamental principle in society, for, to the protestant, religion is a matter for the individual. The state thus severs its connection with religion ; it becomes realistic and nationally selfish ; its ideal is not a perfect world, but a perfect organisation of the nation. The empire is merely a powerful state ; its nature is purely temporal. It is this conception which proved victorious, for in the critical years preceding 1870 Prussia alone seemed to be strong enough to perform the task of unification. And so, more and more often, Prussia is exalted by poets as the champion of national unity—liberty and democracy being often condemned as impracticable dreams. Foremost among these was Geibel, nicknamed the *Herold des neuen Reiches*. He had at first paid tribute with romantic vagueness to the Barbarossa legend ; but later, especially after 1848, he adapted this legend to the Prussian theory, hiding realistic aspirations in insincere, unrealistic clothing. At the same time public opinion was being prepared for Bismarck's work by men like Treitschke and Freytag who by comparison are refreshingly sincere and matter-of-fact.

Sixty-five years after the disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire another empire was founded. It was immediately

hailed as " the " empire, the revival of past glory, the first step towards the golden age. Its creation was likened to Barbarossa's awakening. Hysterical sycophants proclaimed Prussia the repository of the German mission and the Hohenzollerns its champions. The bombastic patriotism and the dynastic pride of the last emperor have their roots in this falsely romantic interpretation of the new régime ; and so, to a certain extent, has the exaltation of Prussianism since the war.

The " heralds of a new empire " felt cheated when they saw that this empire was merely a more efficient organisation of the temporal life of the nation. Out of the criticism of its numerous shortcomings arose the demand for yet another Reich, which would again achieve the synthesis of temporal and of spiritual life and which would create a form of life in harmony with modern civilisation. As, since the loss of unity in the Reformation, the Christian religion was not considered to possess sufficient power to do this and as orthodox socialism, that other reformatory force, tended to disregard the national element, a solution was sought along other lines : in the transformation of sentimental patriotism into a nationalist *Weltanschauung* capable of holding together a new Germany. This trend is noticeable in the works of men like Dahn, Freytag, Treitschke or Wagner who tried to make the modern German conscious of his ancestry. But the theory of nationalism owes more to men like Lagarde or Langbehn who preached the doctrine that nations are specific creations of God and that, therefore, each must have a religion, a philosophy, a social structure and a constitution peculiar to itself. Yet, even this doctrine remained unsatisfactory, for it was based on *a priori* arguments at a time when science had already become fashionable. Nationalism could not be a successful proselytising *Weltanschauung* until an explanation had been found for the permanence of national character.

The racial doctrine, claiming that spiritual as well as physical traits are hereditary, supplied this explanation. Its adoption by nationalism did not take place until the 'eighties and the 'nineties. In these years the Naturalist movement in literature made public opinion receptive for " scientific " ideas and for " Darwinism " ; it was interested in the influence of heredity and of environment and can be called an ancestor of the " blood and soil " doctrine of to-day. But scientific nationalism

became really important only after Gobineau's famous *Essai* had been translated towards the end of the century, fifty years after its appearance and long after the author himself had begun to doubt the accuracy of some of his early ideas. However, once the doctrine had taken root it grew like a weed, until by 1914 some of its exponents had outstripped one of its principal prophets, H. S. Chamberlain; for, unlike him, they condemned Christianity and called for one form or another of Germanic religion. A good illustration of the growth of this doctrine is to be found in the evolution of anti-semitism from religious to social, and finally to racial criticism.

On the assumption that "blood" determines the temporal and the spiritual life of a nation, some German nationalists even before the war made revolutionary demands which anticipated those of National-Socialism. Thus, they sought to substitute national consciousness for class consciousness or personal selfishness as the mainspring of life in society. They condemned soul-killing capitalism and the *petit-bourgeois* civilisation and they demanded socialistic reforms, while rejecting international socialism. In fact, a nationalist interpretation of socialism was achieved long before the rise of National-Socialism. In the question of constitutional reform these nationalists condemned a form of government which, in their eyes, was based on obsolete principles because it ignored the racial doctrine; they even went so far as to envisage a nationalist revolution and a dictatorial form of government. In matters of spiritual life, they condemned the conventional bourgeois morality and sought to replace it by a code of morals based on the racial doctrine and proclaiming that all is right which seems necessary to the nation in question, just as National-Socialism does to-day. Finally, in foreign politics, they dreamt of freeing all *irredenta* and of creating a world empire ruled by the Aryan race. In short, they dreamt of a "regenerated" Germany in which, as in Germany to-day, the individual would be entirely subordinated to the national society. They toyed with the idea of a planned economy and anticipated "totalitarian" nationalism. In fact, their ideas contrasted so much with those which had held sway during the nineteenth century that they can be considered in certain matters disciples of Nietzsche, the "revaluer of all values." The latter thus becomes the teacher *malgré lui* of modern German nationalism.

As yet, however, it was the creed of a minority. But war and the ensuing bitter struggle for national self-assertion made the nation receptive for this creed. Material distress imparted to nationalism the mystic qualities of a religion: nationalist Germany became an ideal, now that it had lost its political reality; and, as an ideal contrasting with the state of things obtaining at the time, it filled with a mystic longing for salvation numberless prophets and even martyrs. Amid the ruins of a once-proud nation, the new Reich was proclaimed by Stefan George as the symbol of spiritually regenerated Germany. At the same time, Möller van den Bruck began to preach temporal as well as spiritual regeneration and forged for nationalism the brilliant symbol of the "Third Reich"; he wrote that a new empire must be founded to replace the second empire which had just collapsed; this would be the third empire. The implication was clear that this third empire might also be "the" third empire, the Third Reich, that final golden age dreamt of by mystics.

The narrow, pagan, selfish conception of the national ideal seems to have carried the day; in fact, it has established a monopoly. However, there are forces left in Germany which, though inarticulate to-day, keep alive the cultural and spiritual traditions of a Christian Europe and thereby work for the future evolution of the idea of a New Reich. This is a question that cannot be examined here. It is enough here to express the belief that the development of the grandiose and creative idea of a New Reich will not in all eternity remain the object of a monopoly and that the implied finality of its present state—a Fourth Reich would not possess the same mystic power—will not render it sterile by depriving the nationalist of a symbol for his future ideal.

NICOLAS SOLLOHUB.

PIERRE HAMP AND THE EPIC OF TOIL.

“THE French are a gay people, fond of dancing and light wines.” With this succinct judgment a school book dear to the Victorians dismissed the frivolous Gauls. Those who know France from the inside are less impressed by the gaiety of the people than by their extraordinary devotion to work, particularly if the work calls for some measure of artistry, some individuality. Recent agitation in fierce defence of the forty-hours week does not prove that France has changed. Labour unrest has been endemic since the artisan—who cheerfully worked, at his own pace, for very long hours, at a craft he loved—has been in so many trades replaced by the factory worker condemned to perform unceasingly some purely mechanical operation which bores him and which he hates because it gives him no opportunity for self-expression.

The old French tradition of the craftsman is celebrated in the modern epic of toil written by a living Frenchman—an epic which glorifies work as the only really satisfying religion. M. Pierre Hamp is that *rara avis*, a workman who can write about his own trades and the crafts of others without needing a love story to give interest to his novels. His books represent something really original and significant in French literature of to-day. Now about sixty-two (he was born in 1876), Pierre Hamp, whose real name is Henri Bourillon, is the son of a skilled cook who took a pride in his craft, which he exercised in several countries before taking service with the Duchess of Montpensier in Seville. Hamp’s mother was equally skilled with her hands, adoring needlework, and the favourite maxim of both was “*Il faut d’abord bien faire son métier*”—“What comes first is doing one’s job well!”

From his early years young Hamp felt in his finger-tips that eagerness to be fashioning something, that impatience to use skill in handling the material of a craft, which is the mark, as he says himself, of a real workman. His childhood ambition yearned for the opportunity of fashioning wood or iron.

“One of my mother’s relations,” he wrote in *Mes Métiers*, “had a locksmith’s shop. In the back room were bolts and screws arranged in wooden pigeon-holes, a library of ironmongery among which my hands adventured blissfully. A climbing vine twined round the balcony overlooking the yard. In summer the shadow of the vine-leaves marked on the locksmith’s bench lines

which mingled with those made by his pencil. The sharp clinking of the hammers on the hard anvil and the muffled blow on the red-hot iron softened in the forge made a delightful music. As soon as I heard this hammering I came out of the room where the vine-tendrils penetrated and ran to the bare-armed workman who smiled at me from his sparkling task. I adored fire. Seeing iron heated gave me as much emotion as seeing the sunset.”

To his father the boy’s ambition seemed absurd. Why should he want to go into a trade that entailed grimy hands and a workman’s cap? He sternly decreed that the boy should follow in his footsteps, and he apprenticed him to a famous pastry-cook in Paris. Hamp depicts himself in *Mes Métiers*, among the underfed little prentices who trotted all over Paris with their trays on their heads, shouting obscene witticisms at the bus drivers and dodging *concierges* and policemen. In the unhealthy basement which served as a kitchen the art of pastry-making was instilled in him by sound advice and hard knocks. But one thing singled out Hamp among the other underfed, overdriven and mischievous apprentices—a passion for reading. While his batch of cakes was baking in the oven, he would furtively draw from his pocket the *Barbier de Séville* or an odd volume of Hugo and steal a few minutes for reading, trembling meanwhile lest the cakes should burn.

He worked in London and Brighton hotels before being called to Spain by an illness of his father. There he first discovered the unreality of French Romantic literature, comparing the flashing, colourful, poetic Spain evoked by Hugo and Gautier with what he saw around him—a sordid town patrolled by drab citizens in sombre garb. The French Classical writers did not come home to his business and bosom any more than did the Romantics. “They had not thought,” says Hamp, “for folk of my sort. On a kitchen table Racine, whom I read behind the spice-box, seemed as strange as a poker would have done among the swords of the gentlemen of the King’s Chamber. Not the same humanity. Another world.” Returning to Brighton to his work, he devoted what little leisure he had to learning Latin, English and boxing. Though now earning a good salary and having excellent prospects, for he was quick, reliable, and knew his job extremely well, he still hoped to be able to escape from his uncongenial task. Hearing of the *Université Populaire* just founded in Belleville, a working-class suburb of Paris, Hamp

set out to become a student, taking with him the savings amassed during the laborious years spent in England and ready to risk his future for the sake of instruction. Lodged in the building which housed the classes, he could peruse at leisure the four thousand volumes in the library, a wonderful experience for the book-starved youth.

When money ran short Hamp began to work again, his first job, a part-time one, being that of auctioneer's clerk. Employed for eight years on the Nord railway, he learned what it was like to spend bitter nights among the clanking goods-wagons, under the glare of the arc lights, and witnessed the daily miracle of clearing the overcrowded lines in time for the passing of the expresses. Having risen to the rank of sub-stationmaster at Boulogne, he obtained, by examination, a post as factory inspector which provided him with matchless opportunities for making new observations on various aspects of industrial life. In 1908 he published the first volume, *Marée Fraîche*, of what was destined to be his great work, *La Peine des Hommes*, a series which now comprises some fifteen volumes, dealing with many of the great French industries.

When these books began to appear some critics thought that Hamp was a new Zola. Is he no more than that? And in what does his originality consist? In Zola the trade or occupation, however fully described, remains in the background. In the foreground of the picture are human beings, with their loves, their hates, their jealousies, their strivings. Hamp, like Zola, sets out to depict contemporary man as modified by the industrial civilisation in which we live. The interest arises, not from hates or loves more or less extraneous to the calling but from the calling itself, or even what may be called the drama of the product, from the spectacle of the immense sum of human suffering on which the enjoyments of the ordinary man—the consumer—are based. *Marée Fraîche* provides an example of this method. The trawlers are, one after another, leaving the wind-swept quay at Boulogne on a stormy evening, sweethearts and wives are saying good-bye. Outside the harbour the fishing boats dance like nutshells on the high waves, till they disappear in the fading light. Then next day we see the dockers kept waiting because the rough weather has delayed the trawlers, the wild rush to catch the fast train to Paris so that the fish may arrive at the market in the early morning; the boat train racing through the night, full of

drowsy well-fed passengers, while the driver strains his eyes peering through the fog, and struggles against the sleepiness that comes over him in the small hours; then the market-folk up before dawn; the broiling heat of the kitchen; the interior of the expensive restaurant where a spoiled chorus-girl refuses the tempting *filet de sole*, which is laid aside and furtively devoured by the waiter; and on the Northern coast the fishermen are starting out again on their daily toil.

The theme of the book, as of others of the occupational novels, is this: All luxury, all comfort even, entails on others labour, suffering, sometimes even grave risk of death. There is no plot, the unity of the story arises from the "product." But these chapters have nothing of the desolate drabness of the chapters in the old school-books on "The story of a piece of coal." The didacticism of Hamp is sublimated by the intensity of his feeling for the human actors, their toil and their sufferings, and an object-lesson is transformed by the literary art of the author into a seventy-page epic, the tragedy of the waste of human effort. The book is made up of a loosely linked chain of pictures, all extremely vivid, all scrupulously exact, scenes that Hamp has either lived through in person or has closely observed.

Hamp's method reminds one at times of the art of the cinema, particularly of the documentary films, but his pictures are richer in human appeal. In *Le Rail*, for instance, we are not only initiated in some degree into the technical side of the railwaymen's work but we get to know something of the men themselves, their preoccupations, their hopes and fears, their professional jealousies, their weaknesses, the antipathy of the practical outdoor executants for the theories of the calculators in comfortable offices. The imprint of the calling on the men is clearly seen in all ranks; they are physically and morally shaped by their work; their work and its problems haunt them. Their soul is made up, as Hamp says somewhere, of the things that make up their job, and, in Hamp's books, their conversation turns more often on their lives as railway servants than on their lives as men.

Hamp firmly believed that, should he ever write a book that would last, it would be because of the soul that his experiences as a workman had formed in him. Is it surprising that his whole literary production should be, in some sense, an attempt to express in literary form the hardships, the sorrows, the

pride, the occasional joys, all the emotions he had lived through while himself a manual worker, whose craft absorbed most of his time and thought? His work is seen to be at once a tribute and an atonement—a tribute to his laborious past, a means of paying off the debt he feels he owes to his comrades of the kitchen and of the railroad whose hardships and trials he had once shared but whom he had abandoned. Here and there in his writings there is more than a suspicion that he felt some remorse for his desertion, for his escape to an uneasy liberty from the sweat and burden of his days of strenuous toil. The new man, the writer, feels the kinship with his old self and has no thought of denying him. His gaze remains fixed somewhat wistfully on his past. Not for him the literature of escape, the romantic vision of an ideal world of quintessential sentiments, of elegant frivolity and badinage, of picturesque heroics. His is the workaday world of everyday life, a world in which drama is provided by the grim struggle to earn one's daily bread. Hamp's attitude towards work is that of the mystic, he sees in it an ennobling influence, a source of energy and vitality, a cause which justifies all sacrifices and for which a man may deem all else well lost. He is less the enemy of the employer as against the worker than the adversary at once of the man who exploits the worker and the worker who is a bungler or slacker. He respects the master who himself works almost as much perhaps as he respects the worker who loves his work.

Like Zola, Hamp is an apostle of social justice. Zola could with more power than Hamp depict the impressive movement of a crowd swayed by this idea, and at the same time conjure up a vision of the individual sufferings which lay behind the demonstration. How comes it that Zola leaves the reader with an impression so different from that left by his successor? The explanation seems to lie in the fact that Zola, seeing the workman from without, failed to make him human. Zola's sympathy, however genuine, is intellectual, he pleads the cause of the worker and perceives the sufferings but does not see into the workman's mind. The reader is left with an impression of sordidness unrelieved and his heart cannot go out towards the workman. Hamp's workmen, even when unhappy, overworked and underpaid, are not driven cattle. They still feel a joy in their work, either because, as artisans, they know what the joy of creation is, or because, units of

some mighty undertaking, a railway or a great industry, they feel that they share in a sort of creation. They can thus find in their task satisfaction for their conscience and for their mind. The atmosphere in Hamp's books is tonic. "Work must have a soul," he wrote in *Les Métiers Blessés*, "One must always come back to this conclusion: Love what one makes. To re-establish pride in one's work is just as important as factory hygiene."

Joy in one's task can only be possible if justice is secured. Hamp's ardour for justice is unmistakable. He pleads for the under-dog, and the grimy mechanic or the horny-handed labourer are more sympathetically presented than the pale and white-handed clerk or inspector. His workmen are not, however, shown as paragons: they swear, and their language is at times as coarse as it is vigorous; in a word they are human, neither brutes like so many of Zola's characters, nor unbelievably perfect. Hamp is avowedly didactic, avowedly a man ardent for a cause; he has no patience with literature that is "mere literature," writing for writing's sake. If he obtains a hearing, and there is no doubt that he does, in spite of his utilitarian aims, it is because he is a poet and an artist and no mere instructor or preacher of social justice.

Here is a delightful vignette from *Le Travail Invincible*:

In the Beguine convent of Ghent embroideresses were tracing stitch by stitch, on linen so fine that their breath stirred it, designs whose lines were so neatly executed that they seemed not to be made up thread by thread but cut in metal at a single stroke by the needle of a skilful etcher. In fours, they each take a corner of the sheet every day for months at a stretch, and they etch in thread ornaments as old as the words of their prayers. Looking at the four of them as they sit, you can see a black list slipper peeping out from under the white sheet held on their knees, four white coifs and pale accurate hands wielding a fairy needle. If you speak to them they merely raise their heads a trifle to smile with the utmost gentleness, except a very old one whose face is motionless, already settled in a death-like gravity.

Hamp imprints on his descriptions the mark of reality partly by his attention to detail. His pictures are documentary. When we read the account of the fish-market auction we learn the prices the fish brought; at the railway station and goods siding the men, foremen and inspectors are all very conscious of their own wage-level and that of their

fellows ; we discover what sort of a living the wine-growers make—none of these questions is left vague. Technical details of any kind threaten boredom but Hamp uses them so skilfully that even if the initiated alone savour them fully the average reader gets the pleasant sensation that he is being shown round by an expert and he certainly does not miss any of the essential points.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Hamp as a literary artist is his vocabulary ; the terms he uses, technical or otherwise, are nearly always remarkably concrete. Like Gautier, he is a writer for whom "*le monde extérieur existe.*" It is true that he occasionally invents some barbarous abstract expression, but in general his vocabulary is tangible, solid, palpable—he reminds one of an artist working in glass paste or molten metal ; his style is remarkably plastic. Here is a short and vivid impression from *Le Travail Invincible* : "*A l'avant désert d'un grand bateau amarré de flanc au quai, la lumière de deux hublots bagués de cuivre pose un tréma d'or sur noir.*" *Marée Fraîche* opens with an equally concrete picture :

Une transparente brume blanche naissait à terre et devenait opaque à fleur de toit. Pas de ciel. Les vols, en accents circonflexes, des mouettes gris perle, montaient s'engloutir dans ces ténèbres blafardes. Des édifices de la ville en colline, les silhouettes seules subsistaient, foncées sur écran brun.

A craftsman in literature, Pierre Hamp loves the material he works in as the potter loves his clay or the sculptor his marble. He has been accused by some French critics, not without justice, of writing at times rather clumsily. If we look for them we can no doubt find a number of unorthodox constructions, some of them provincialisms, for Hamp is by no means an academic writer. He is striving to express with scrupulous exactness aspects of toil, industrial scenes which have never been put into literary form before. His works at times remind one forcibly of the roughness of a statue by Epstein as compared with the smooth, polished, graceful productions of some more orthodox, more classical sculptor. But in Hamp, as in Epstein, the roughness hides a force often absent from orthodox smoothness.

The personality of Hamp, with its somewhat brutal force held in check, with its impatience, its eager striving for truth in delineation, its ardent hatred of injustice in any form, can

be felt in all his work. His outlook on the world—the result, for the most part, of his years as a worker—is often expressed in pithy *obiter dicta* that ring in one's memory : "There is no metal more precious than the hands of a man who loves his craft " or—a maxim which throws some light on the mysteries of finance—"It is easier to take a franc from a thousand poor folk than a thousand francs from a single rich man."

A born writer, Hamp has not allowed his early difficulties and struggles to discourage or embitter him, they have tempered his mettle. They have also furnished him with his material, and literature has been enriched not only by its extension to a new province but by a new view of life. It is tempting for the academically minded to label Pierre Hamp as belonging to the "naturalist" school of Zola. The alleged disciple repudiates his master ; his spirit is different. In Zola, burning with the desire for social justice, we have the bourgeois who sees from the outside the working life of men of toil and recoils at the horror of it. Hamp sees the picture from closer up ; himself a workman he understands that, hard as the worker's lot may be, traversed by sufferings physical and mental, there yet remains, if he loves his work and has courage, a consolation which atones for much, the conviction that the struggle for one's daily bread is a noble one in which it is not impossible to find happiness.

F. C. ROE.

THE RAVEN.

"The hoarse night raven, trump of doleful drere."—SPENSER.

THE raven, if the old writers are believed, was once a bird of a whiteness that rivalled the snow in its purity.

Ovid tells us how the raven acquired his dark hue. Apollo had a great love for the nymph Coronis, and believed that his love was returned. But his trusty messenger, the raven of spotless white plumage, flew knowingly up to him one day, and croaked gleefully to him that Coronis had given her love to another. Apollo, dark jealousy in his heart, thereupon shot a far-reaching arrow into the bosom of his beloved, and then, repenting of his deed, tried by all his healing arts to restrain the spirit from leaving the sorely wounded body. When all his efforts were without avail he turned upon the raven and cursed him, and said that his plumage, and the plumage of all his race that came after him, would be henceforth black as night.

But even before that fatal day Apollo had been having trouble with his raven-servant. The god had sent him one day to a spring to fetch some water in a bowl, to be used at a festival to Jupiter. When the raven came to the spring he saw on a fig tree that sheltered the well some splendid figs which were not yet ripe. The raven said to himself "I *must* wait until these figs ripen," and wait he did, and then, realising that his master's anger would fall on him, he thought of a subterfuge. He found and killed a large snake, and, filling the bowl with water, returned to Apollo with the bowl and the snake, and said that all the time he had been away he had been wrestling with the snake, which had been attempting to keep him from the well. Ovid says that a memorial of this occurrence is still to be seen in the heavens where the raven, the snake and the bowl have ever since remained side by side, and the constellation which holds them was long ago called by astronomers Corvus or Raven.

Philanthus, when besieged in a town of Rhodes, may have forgotten that at one time ravens were snow-white. Consulting an oracle, he was informed that this town could not be taken until ravens became white. This sounded a cheerful omen, but the commander of the besieging force, having received intelligence from his spies of the curious prophecy, trapped a number of ravens, rubbed them thickly on wings and breast with gypsum, and then liberated them. The

ravens, strange white-plumaged birds, were seen by Philanthus and his men, and in despair they abandoned the town to the invading force. Albino forms of the raven do occur, and I believe have been recorded in the Hebrides, in Iceland and in the Faeroe Islands, but they are very rare.

Ravens have often been tamed and kept as pets, and very wise do they become. I know an old fisherman in the Isle of Skye who had a tame raven which nightly slept in his small house but roamed at will through the countryside during the daylight hours. This old fisherman told me that his raven knew him from the air at a great distance, and would dive down towards him and settle on his shoulder with signs of evident pleasure, and would playfully tweak his ear until blood flowed. When boys stoned his pet several miles from his home the old man was heart-broken.

Pliny the Elder relates a remarkable story of a tame raven. In the reign of Tiberius a pair of ravens made their nest and hatched their brood in a high niche of the temple of Castor and Pollux in the Forum. When the brood were learning to fly one of the young birds entered a cobbler's shop in the city, and being received with friendliness soon became very tame. This raven learned to speak, and was in the habit each morning of flying to the rostra, on which he would perch and would wish "Good morning," first to the reigning Emperor, Claudius, then to the Cæsars, his heirs, and afterwards to anyone who passed near him. This raven became beloved by all Rome, and when a neighbouring cobbler, perhaps out of jealousy, killed the pet, he was murdered by the infuriated human populace. The account of what followed can best be told in that scholarly work from the pen of R. Bosworth Smith, *Bird Life and Bird Lore* :

A public funeral was given to the raven ; its body was laid upon a costly bier which was borne aloft on the shoulders of two Nubians, ebony black as their burden. A trumpeter marched before, and persons bearing wreaths and floral offerings of every description, while an unnumbered crowd of mourners followed after, till the solemn procession reached a lofty funeral pyre, which had been constructed on the Appian Way, two miles from the city ; and then and there, in a level spot of ground called Rediculum, on the 28th of March, in the consulship of M. Servilius and C. Cestius, the ashes of the favourite were laid to rest among the magnates of the great Valerian or Cornelian families.

The raven has from earliest times been portrayed in verse and rhyme. In the poem *The Twa Corbies* the poet fancies that he hears two ravens conversing :

As I was walking all alane
I heard twa corbies making a mane ;
The tane unto the t'other say,
"Where sall we gang and dine to-day ?"

In behint yon auld fail dyke
I wot there lies a new slain Knight ;
And naeboddy kens that he lies there,
But his hawk, his hound, and his lady fair.

His hound is to the hunting gane
His hawk to fetch the wild fowl hame,
His lady's ta'en another mate
So we may make our dinner sweet.

Ye'll sit on his white hause-bane,
And I'll pick out his bonny blue een ;
Wi' ae lock of his gowden hair
We'll theek our nest when it grows bare.

Mony a one for him makes mane,
But nane sall ken where he is gane ;
O'er his white banes, when they are bare,
The wind sall blaw for evermair.

In Norse mythology the raven is sacred to Odin, the God of War, he who is commemorated in our "Wednesday." Indeed one of the titles of Odin was Hrafna-gwd, Ravens' God. Odin had two trusty ravens, named Hugen and Munen—Mind and Memory—which left him each morning and each evening returned to him bearing news of what they had heard throughout the world. The Norsemen on their voyages of discovery took with them ravens because of their faculty of sensing land when this was still invisible to mortal eyes. That great sea rover Flokki when he started out on his voyage of discovery took with him three ravens, which had been solemnly consecrated to the gods. He reached the Faeroes, and after sailing for some time towards the north-west, and when far beyond sight of land, he liberated the first raven. That bird, after sailing awhile overhead, returned towards the Faeroes. Onward Flokki sailed for the space of a day and a night, and then he loosed the second raven, which after a time returned

to the ship, and from this he realised that any land was far distant. But resolute Flokki still sailed onward, and when at last he loosed the third raven great joy came to him, and to those who sailed with him, for the raven flew on ahead of them towards the north-west, and by following the course of Odin's bird Iceland was at length discovered.

The banner of the Norse was fashioned in the form of a raven. Before entering battle the Norsemen paid special attention to the appearance of the raven-standard. If it were shaken by the wind, so that the raven appeared to flap its wings exultingly, the omen was considered good, but if the bird appeared listless and drooping, victory would be hard or impossible to win. Sometimes the Raefen or Raven Banner was woven under spells so powerful that it carried victory always to the warrior band who owned it, but death to the standard-bearer himself.

In a little-known version of the *Passing of Arthur* the King did not die, but was changed into the shape of a raven, and will one day assume his proper shape and claim his rights. It is traditionally believed that the raven reaches a great age. Cicero, the elder Pliny, Ovid and Horace all agree that the raven lives long. Mr. Bosworth Smith mentions a raven in captivity which did not *begin* to lay eggs until she had reached the age of 80 years.

The raven is so fine and handsome a bird that I feel that he must be forgiven his faults, but a pair of these birds which had their nest near us in the Isle of Skye scarcely "played the game" by us. My wife had protested vigorously to the local crofters when we saw them endeavouring to net the young birds in the nest, but that very summer the ravens began to attack her hens. They killed several hens, and our farm manager on one occasion saw one of the ravens alight on the back of a fleeing hen, and deal it repeated jabs with its powerful bill before she could gain the shelter of the hen-house. The appearance of a raven was the signal of a stampede of hens toward their shelter. We were then obliged to move our hens' quarters nearer our dwelling-house and since then the ravens have not attacked our domestic fowls.

In the Hebrides the raven is not uncommon, and near our home in the north part of the Isle of Skye one October afternoon I saw, when walking along the public road, an unusual attack by one pair of ravens on another. At first I saw only

one pair of ravens. They were sailing high in the air, and there was something unusual in the quality of their flight that made me stand still and watch them. Then a remarkable thing happened. The ravens separated, and dived earthward, and when they reached the ground—perhaps a hundred yards apart—I saw each grapple with a stationary raven which I had not noticed before. Over and over, down a steep grassy slope, one pair of antagonists rolled, striking the rocks which cropped up from the grass, and receiving such blows that I feared lest one, or both, might receive fatal injuries. But when they had rolled down to the foot of the hill the two ravens separated, stood a few seconds, regaining breath, then flew strongly away. The second pair of fighters also separated, and the pair which I had seen in the air chased, croaking loudly, the pair which had been on the ground. Backwards and forwards above my head the pursuit was carried on, until at last the intruding pair of birds—for such I imagined them to have been—had been put to flight.

The raven is first of all British birds to nest, with the possible exception of the crossbill. Throughout Britain the raven is an early-nesting bird, but it is strange that in the Hebrides, warmed by the Atlantic, the nesting season should be at least three weeks later than on the snow-swept moors of Northumberland. In Skye the raven does not lay her eggs until March: in Northumberland she makes the nest in January, and begins to brood early in February.

Like the golden eagle, the raven usually has two or three nests, to which she returns periodically. She is most wise in choosing a rock ledge that has a sheltering rock above it, and she is thus able to brood her eggs or her small young in dryness and in shelter when wind and rain, and even snow hold revelry in the world beyond her cliff. The raven's nest is deeply cup-shaped, and is warmly lined with sheep's wool. The eggs, resembling the eggs of the rook, but larger, are four to six in number. The young ravens are hatched during the lambing season, and are fed on the *placenta* which is discarded at the birth of the lamb, but the lamb itself is rarely attacked, although a sickly lamb or ewe is considered a fair prize. On one island that I know, the pair of ravens which have their home here each morning follow the rabbit-trapper as he visits his traps, and claim as their share any small or under-sized rabbits which are left on the ground. On this island, but on

the opposite side of it, a pair of peregrine falcons have their eyrie, and when the birds pass over one another's domains (as on a small island is often necessary) there are a few minutes of stooping and turning, wheeling and twisting in the air, the peregrine diving at the raven and the raven side-slipping, or else turning on his back and holding his powerful claws towards his foe. Each bird realises that it is unable to kill or injure the other and these aerial tourneys are held, I believe, largely in a spirit of rivalry, without any ulterior motive.

In the Outer Hebrides a pair of ravens occasionally make their nest on a steep bank of long heather, and my wife and I spent a good many hours in a heather-hide at a raven's nesting site of this kind. The young ravens were fed mostly on meat from a dead sheep which was lying out on the moor half a mile away. They were never satisfied, and the clamour they made when a parent arrived at the nest was deafening. Another pair of ravens of our acquaintance have as their neighbours a pair of golden eagles. They cannot be said to be near neighbours for the two nests are a mile apart, although they are on the same long line of cliffs, but the eagles suffer ignominy daily at the hands (or should it be wings?) of the ravens. This is what usually happens: The eagle, rising from her eyrie with effortless flight, sails unmolested in spirals until she has risen clear of the cliff. In a very few seconds after she is seen against the open sky, a small black object may be noticed approaching. It is the raven, hurrying to do battle with, and to taunt and mob, the golden eagle. Time after time the raven rushes in, croaking, at the great eagle which (as the raven does with the peregrine) turns over and presents her talons to the attacker. The raven knows just how close he can approach in safety, and all the time he is attacking he is shouting defiance in his harsh voice. The eagle is silent; she is not flustered, only bored, and keeps her temper admirably. But sometimes she does give a few strokes of her great wings and chases the raven a little way, and the angry croak of the raven then becomes a higher-pitched cry of alarm as he hurries from her. But the eagle quickly tires of the chase, and then the raven, as though ashamed of his cowardice, returns to the attack with more furious cries than ever and with redoubled ferocity. The golden eagle I believe realises that she is no match for the raven in flight; that she cannot twist and

turn like him. She therefore wisely refuses to exhaust herself in fruitless rushes, and to make herself a laughing stock in the raven's eyes. When the eagle drops earthward and settles on her cliff once more the raven leaves her in peace—indeed I have never seen him attack her when she was on the ground or perched on a rock.

I have mentioned that the raven is usually careful to protect her nest by an overhanging rock but, a couple of years ago, our local pair of ravens made their nest in an open cliff beside the sea. This was a haunt of seagulls, which were continually sailing backwards and forwards past the nest, and although the ravens drove them off time and again they in the end carried off all the young birds—at least I imagine their gradual disappearance was the work of the gulls. It might have been thought that a bird with the brains of a raven would have thought of some plan of outwitting these enemies, and that one of the parents would have remained at the nest while the other was hunting. But this did not apparently occur to them.

In Iceland I often saw the raven, and in that north country he seemed to me to be tamer than in Scotland. This, in the descendants of a sacred bird, was only fitting, and it may be that some of the ravens I saw, flying low over the shore or above the wind-swept tundra, were the descendants of that raven which long ago was released over the ocean by Flokki and, flying confidently forward was the means of the discovery of Iceland. But on Lake Myvatn of Iceland at all events the raven is not looked upon by the human population with friendliness, because of the number of ducks' eggs which are sucked by these sable birds. On a scaup-haunted island on Lake Myvatn which I visited I saw two guns suspended by ropes to a wooden framework and apparently aiming at anyone approaching the island by boat. I was told by the people of the place that these guns were there to alarm any marauding raven, but judging by the sucked eggs lying all over the island the neighbouring ravens treated the weapons with the contempt which they deserved.

How far does the raven fly? In the central highland forests numbers of these birds arrive mysteriously during the stalking season, and feed on the grallach of the deer. A correspondent tells me that he once saw over a hundred together. When one of the ravens nesting on Lambay, an island off the east coast of

Ireland, died, apparently from poison picked up on the mainland, the survivor was seen flying off across the Irish Sea towards the coast of Wales, where he apparently found a new mate and returned with her before all his brood had died of starvation.

It is interesting that ravens have immemorial roosting-places, and each evening before sunset they may be seen fighting home to some high rock where they are secure against attack. There is one sea cliff in the Isle of Skye near Tallisker to which the ravens each evening resort before the mating impulse causes them, while winter is still with us, to take up their quarters on the rock—perhaps a sea cliff, or perhaps a rock rising from some lonely inland moor—where, if fortune favours them, they will later rear their brood. There is always a curious strength, and sometimes great beauty in the raven's flight; indeed under suitable conditions the raven soars on motionless wings almost as skilfully as the golden eagle herself, but the spirals a raven describes are usually smaller than those of the eagle. The raven is, I think, unique among birds in his curious somersaulting in full flight. This is apparently an expression of the joy of life which the bird experiences when sailing, sometimes alone, sometimes with his mate, along the edge of a cliff where he is buoyed up by the mounting wind current. The action seems to me to be less a somersault than a sudden turn over of the flier (always from left to right) on to his back. For a second, perhaps two, the raven sails or glides upside down, then rights himself and continues with normal flight, perhaps uttering a deep croak of satisfaction.

What is the future of the raven in Britain? Some years ago it seemed that this fine bird might become very scarce, for he is shot, trapped, or poisoned in all game-preserving areas. But there are many districts where there is little or no game preserving, and here the raven is holding his own. In Wales he is said to have increased considerably, and along the north-west coast of Scotland, and in the Outer and Inner Hebrides he is certainly maintaining his numbers, although I do not think he is becoming more numerous. Long may he flourish, for his ancestry is old almost as the hills he frequents, and the dignity of his flight, the strength of his cry, and the integrity of his morals render him admirable to the lover of wild nature.

SETON GORDON.

HOMES NOT HOUSES.

IT is just over one hundred years since the condition of the housing of large sections of the population became a matter of general concern. An outbreak of cholera in 1831 had stimulated interest, or perhaps, more selfishly, fear, that unless the crowded areas received attention they might become a menace to the whole community. Sanitation was almost unknown until it was included in the measures affecting public health, which gave expression to the awakened conscience of the nation among other matters relating to the social conditions of the people. Slum areas exist now as they did then by comparison with their neighbours, and although in some places old cottages and tenements can be found which are almost if not quite one hundred years old and possess some of the original features of that period, the general standard as a whole shows a considerable advance. Recent legislation has incorporated a further raising of the standard and also an ideal which the local government authorities are required to attain within a limited period. But whatever may be accomplished in the actual extent and character of the accommodation there still remains the all-important factor of the character of the tenant. It is the active co-operation of the people themselves which has made so much difference and by the extension of which so much more can be done to turn the housing schemes into communities of good homes. This is the keynote of the problem to which the Central Housing Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Health invited the attention of a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Balfour of Burleigh.

It is only twenty years since local authorities were empowered for the first time to build houses to meet the general needs of their areas with the aid of a subsidy from the Exchequer. Since then with the assistance of further legislation a million "council houses" have been scattered all over the country. Alongside the activities of the local authorities there has also been a corresponding increase in the number of houses built for private ownership. In Leeds, for example, the value of housing in 1938 was £2,783,377 as compared with £1,807,845 in the previous year. As the Corporation built 567 fewer houses the increase must be attributed to private enterprise. The Corporation, however, have in hand the

erection of a satellite town, which will rehouse thirty thousand people. These developments have created their own problems. The first municipal tenants were a carefully selected group, who but for the war might have been expected to find their own accommodation without any assistance from the State. In course of time the selection still went on though from a wider field. The hope that, by "a process of filtering up," the problem of slums would be eased was not fully realised. Overcrowding was partially abated but the slum remained, and along with it the problem of the slum tenant. A comprehensive attack was launched by the Housing Act of 1930 which embodied a new principle, that the slum house was to be demolished and the tenants removed to a new house. A later Act in 1935 dealt specifically with overcrowding and fixed a minimum standard of accommodation. The local authorities have concentrated on slum clearance and up to the end of 1937 672,630 persons had been displaced. At this point the human factor becomes a primary consideration. After stating these points, Lord Balfour's Committee asks:

What do these changes mean to the people themselves? Families are being removed whether willing or not, and transferred to modern houses where they will be given a chance to lead happier and more healthy lives. A number will adapt themselves quickly to their new surroundings; some will not react to the change in their condition quite so readily and will need initial guidance. Others without continuous supervision will produce a slum atmosphere wherever they are sent; and a few, a very few will be beyond reclamation altogether!—*Management of Municipal Housing Estates*, 1938, p. 7.

These tenants have no choice in the matter. They are being compulsorily removed from the habitation to which they have been accustomed all their lives. They have never had the chance to know anything better. Their dwellings have been so unsatisfactory that any attempt to keep the places clean and tidy is fruitless. "They have never cooked with a modern grate, nor have they been able to take a bath in a bathroom." They are suddenly uprooted from familiar surroundings to which they have a real attachment and planted among people and conditions with which they have little or no affinity in the unfamiliar environment of a municipal housing estate. "Is it surprising," asks the Committee, "that some families

need a helping hand to assist them in the process of adjustment so as to enjoy in full measure the benefit of their new homes?" It was not within the terms of reference of the Committee to consider the effectiveness of this policy. They had to accept the legislation as it is in operation. But the policy of reconditioning slum properties which has been carried out under the auspices of voluntary societies with official approval is more kind to the tenants and in the long run is likely to be more effective as facilitating a course of education in good home-making. That was the policy associated with the name of Octavia Hill for which John Ruskin provided the wherewithal to put it into practical operation.

Miss Octavia Hill believed that by combining the business and social aspects of property ownership, landlords could not only get a fair return on their money but could also carry out a real social service. Landlords had, and still have, an enormous power over their tenants, and it was Miss Hill's desire to fulfil her obligations as a landlord and instil into her tenants a sense of responsibility. Having acquired a property she did the necessary immediate repairs, and gave the tenants to understand that further improvements would follow if they proved themselves fit to look after new things. She insisted on regular payment of rent which she herself collected each week, thus being in contact with her tenants at least weekly and with a business reason for her visit. By this means contact was made and she found many ways in which a helping hand could be given without at all patronising her tenants, but rather showing them how to help themselves. Miss Hill did all within her power to introduce things of beauty into the lives of these working people who had so little opportunity of getting away from their sordid surroundings. Because of her sound judgment, forceful personality and absolute fairness she was respected by even the worst tenants.

Lord Balfour of Burleigh's Committee sums up the meaning of management as being that on the business side good management may be defined as the application of skill in caring for the commodity, the houses, in order that the commodity may retain its value to both the landlord and the tenant. "But management," they add, "must include far more than rent collection and the ordering of repairs, for unless some steps are taken so to educate the tenant as to secure his co-operation, the landlord, striving to maintain his property, and the

tenant destroying it by his neglect, will remain warring parties. Hence good management additionally postulates the application of skill in treating the person who is paying for the use of the commodity so that he too may do his share in preserving its value; it is in effect a form of social education and aims at teaching a new and inexperienced community to be 'house-minded'."

The principles and practice established by Miss Octavia Hill have been maintained by the Society of Women Housing Managers who are "convinced that an alliance between the business element and social service in the hands of a single person is the surest way to the tenant's confidence." Another school of thought is represented by the Institute of Housing who say that "the matter of rent collection and repairs on the one hand, and social services on the other, are separate functions and as such should be dealt with by different departments." While Lord Balfour's Committee reach the conclusion that they are unable to recommend for general adoption in its entirety any of the systems described to them owing to the variety of conditions in different places, it is clear that they have been particularly impressed by the effectiveness of the work of Miss Octavia Hill and her successors in the Society of Women Housing Managers. Upon one point both bodies and the Committee are in complete agreement, "that the employment of women is essential" as the home-maker is a woman, and another woman is in the best position to establish contact with her. So long ago as 1900, Miss Octavia Hill realised that her best plan for the future "would be not only to train such volunteers as offered and the professional workers whom we required, but to train more than we ourselves can use and, as occasion offers, introduce them to owners wishing to retain small tenements in their own hands and to be represented in them by a kind of manager not hitherto existing." This training to-day is carried out by the Society of Women Housing Managers.

Miss Hill insisted on a definite knowledge for her workers of drains and sanitation, law of landlord and tenant, and other incidental subjects. Now must be added numerous Public Health, Housing and Rent Restriction Acts as well as a knowledge of social and welfare organisations. Whether the appointment held be under a local authority, voluntary organisation or a private owner, the manager with full

responsibility for her estate will have, to a greater or lesser degree, rent collection, house maintenance, selecting and allocating of tenants, accountancy, records, committee work and court procedure.

Rent collection is the most important factor because here is the recognised contact which may mean so much or so little in its influence. When the right relationships are formed over the business transaction then the foundation is laid for co-operation in other spheres. If the rent is not forthcoming it is the duty of the collector (in this instance the trained worker) to find out the reason. Certain licence may be allowed in cases of illness or other misfortune, and when conditions improve arrangements can be made to pay off the debt. Knowledge of court procedure is necessary, but only in extreme cases is there resort to legal proceedings. The question of right relationship is immensely important here as it is only when making inquiries into circumstances and income in a friendly and understanding, not to mention tactful, way that one is able to gain confidence and trust and so be able to give that help which may be lasting in its effect. House maintenance involves all the technical side of the work which unless properly supervised causes unnecessary expense to the landlord and inconvenience to the tenant. The trained manager during the weekly call at the house is able to detect any detail out of order and if the necessary facilities are at her disposal she is able to effect an immediate repair and thus save the expense of accumulated damage. To obtain the smooth running of an estate or even a small block of property, the selection and allocation of tenants must be carefully undertaken and, with judicious mixing of good and bad, the standard of both lives and houses can be raised and quarrels and disturbances eliminated. Accountancy naturally comes into office routine when rents are involved, and it is interesting to note that Miss Hill evolved a very practical system, still used in many offices, which shows at a glance how each tenant stands at the end of the week. This is of the utmost importance especially when dealing with bad payers. Quarterly returns to landlords have to be drawn up by agents, and in Housing Associations and offices of similar kind, methods of raising money have to be dealt with. Records of tenants are another very necessary part of office routine if the work is successfully to be handed down to successive workers.

From this outline it will be seen that house property management covers a wide range of interests and the success of Miss Hill's principles can be seen by the fact that Octavia Hill workers to-day control 40,800 tenancies under local authorities and 13,600 under the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, Commissioners for Crown Lands, Housing Associations and other owners. It may be as Lord Burleigh suggests, that care must be taken that the house property manager should not be overloaded with work connected with the care of the property to the detriment of her social services for the benefit of the tenants. Among the matters which are of primary concern in raising the lowest levels of the population is the condition of the furniture.

To the town dweller "home" means not so much the actual house, but the furniture "which bears the impress" of their use and needs and aspirations. Hence the comparative readiness with which they move from one house to another—they take their home with them; while the country family in moving leaves a large part of its home in the house and garden upon which it has impressed its own personality. But to say that the houses in a street are all alike because they all have the same number of doors and windows in the same places, and are of approximately the same colour is much like saying that human beings are all alike because they have the same number of limbs and features in the same place and are of approximately the same colour. It is within that we must look for characteristic differences, and when we look within we find that in every house which is sufficiently inhabited, whether by rich or poor, the family leaves its characteristic mark upon every detail of adornment and furniture, even the furniture which is turned out by the hundred thousand.—*The Family*, by Helen Bosanquet, pp. 229-30.

The aspect of the problem with which Lord Balfour's Committee were concerned is the infestation of furniture and other household effects with bed-bugs and other vermin so that they recommend that the cleansing process should be applied to all furniture as a routine in the removal of the people from clearance areas to new accommodation. Some tenants have not enough furniture to make full use of the rooms and still less to equip them as a home. Accordingly the Committee commend a scheme by which local authorities acquire a quantity of goods to be supplied at prices within the means of the tenant payable by weekly instalments as an addition

to the rent. They look forward to the extension of the plan by the co-operation of the Council of Art and Industry which would enable working-class dwellings to be furnished with articles of good design and appearance and of a sound construction.

The Committee note a number of other ways in which amenities may be provided for the tenants by skilful management and in particular refer to the encouragement of gardening where land is available. Competitions are, as the Committee observe, "a practical means of fostering the growth of community enterprise" and gardening contributes as no other occupation to the training of character. It is very difficult to find in the prison population a man who has had gardening as a hobby. But the Committee omit any reference to one valuable agency in the training of tenants in the duties of citizenship and that is in the payment of rates. Admittedly, it is difficult to arrange and almost impossible in the cases of the lowest-rented tenements. Miss Octavia Hill recognised that fact in one of her annual letters to her workers, but added "I have felt it to be very important as well as to be worth the effort." Certainly a far larger proportion of the population should pay their rates direct, and though at first the change might be unpopular the tenants would ultimately appreciate that they were enjoying one of the rights of citizenship. This and many other problems in the course of time can be faced and surmounted by the body of trained and experienced women organised in the Society of Women Housing Estate Managers, who have already disseminated the principles of Miss Hill so that they have been promoted by corresponding bodies in Holland, Sweden, Denmark and South Africa. From the outset she demonstrated that good management was a business proposition, and it has developed into an important social service which by converting houses into homes is making a valuable contribution to the well-being of a large section of the population.

E. BEDWELL.

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN AUSTRIA.

EVEN under Hitler's rule two great traditions will influence the attitude of the Austrian working class, the former activity of the Social Democratic Party and the four years of illegal experience under Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. The Social Democratic Party had been unified by Viktor Adler in 1889 and had made almost steady progress since the introduction of universal suffrage in 1906. The political struggle within the old Hapsburg Empire, however, was dominated by national and racial questions and the Party had often difficulty in solving them within its own organisation. One of the most important works ever written on the problem of nationalities and minorities was Otto Bauer's *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* which appeared in 1907.

When the World War broke out the German section of the Party shared first in the wave of patriotism, and a famous article entitled *Der Tag der deutschen Nation* was then published in the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung* by its editor, Friedrich Austerlitz. After a few months, however, a strong opposition against the war arose within the Party under the spiritual leadership of Friedrich Adler, Viktor Adler's son, who later shot the Prime Minister, Count Stürgk, as mainly responsible for the temporary elimination of Parliament. Friedrich Adler's speech as defendant, published later under the title *Vor dem Ausnahmegericht* (Before the Exceptional Court), made a powerful impression on the workers' masses, irritated by misery and starvation. During the last two years of the war, the Social Democratic Party was in the eyes of the rank and file the strongest, if not the only, force opposed to the war and to the régime which had not prevented it.

Hence the influence of the Party grew remarkably stronger after the collapse of the Empire in 1918 and there was for some time virtually no force in the new Republic able to withstand the socialisation measures contained in its programme. In spite of this, they preferred to secure only democratic and social legislation on the lines of capitalism, the arguments being both the disorganisation of economic life owing to the war and the threat of foreign armies at the old and new frontiers. "You cannot socialise ruins" was at that time the main objection to the demands of the more radical wing.

When the proletarian Governments in Hungary and Bavaria were replaced by reactionary terrorism, the position of Austrian Social Democrats became quickly weaker. The two large bourgeois parties, the Christian Social Party and the Pan-German People's Party, succeeded as early as in 1920 in superseding the Socialists in the Government which they never entered again, while they retained the administration of the three largest towns, Vienna, Graz and Linz, up to 1934, and took part in the Provincial Governments of Lower and Upper Austria, Styria, Salzburg, etc. Hence the position of the Party was a particularly strong one. It had influence on many provincial and local bodies as well as on the social insurance boards and many cultural institutions, while it kept a radical attitude in the Federal Parliament and still more in its ideology and philosophy.

Much nonsense has been written about that "Austro-Marxist" ideology both by opponents and by supporters. In the eyes of stubborn reactionaries at home and abroad it appeared to be somewhat worse than even Bolshevism, which at that time, was at least openly anti-democratic. In the electoral propaganda of Austrian Clericals Austro-Marxism was often simply identified with trade unionism, social insurance, municipal housing, or even parliament and democracy. For the Communists it was a skilfully camouflaged betrayal of the workers. The mistake of its own supporters was quite a different one. They considered themselves as having a single philosophy and policy where there existed actually extremely divergent opinions. True, the leading theorist of the Party, Otto Bauer, developed a very original theory which became the basis of the Linz Programme of 1926, the main ideas being trust in democratic methods only as long as the bourgeoisie is willing to maintain them, and the hegemony of the working class within a vast popular movement including the middle classes. But there was also a right wing, led by Karl Renner, whose conception emphasised the increasing rôle of the state within the national economy and the importance of participation in Governments. This philosophy, which also largely influenced the German Labour Movement, was much more popular with the Austrian trade-union leaders than Bauer's and balanced it in all questions of practical policy.

Much more important for the development of the party were actually the successes of its representatives in reforming and reconstructing the Vienna municipality, which embraced almost a third of the Austrian population. The magnificent achievements in social policy and particularly in rehousing attained by a system of luxury taxes (luxury, however, taken in the sense of a poor country) were quoted as an example of practical Social-Democratic policy. On the other hand, with the crisis coming to a head after 1929, the municipal administration was less and less able to fight effectively against unemployment, and many of the less politically trained workless made Karl Seitz, the Mayor, or Hugo Breitner, the treasurer, directly or indirectly responsible for their fate.

This was the situation when Hitler came into power in Germany early in 1933, and Dollfuss started some weeks later his policy of elimination of Parliament and of gradual transformation of Austria into an authoritarian State. On March 15th, when the Parliament was forcibly prevented from meeting, the workers were mobilised and expected to receive the Party's orders for the defence of democracy, as they had been taught for fifteen years that democracy was the most suitable if not the only possible ground for socialist struggle. Some local trouble arose on this day in Waidhofen, in Lower Austria, but nothing happened in Vienna and the Party issued no orders for active mass resistance. The argument was at that time that this attitude was necessary in order to prevent Dollfuss from forming a common front with the Nazis.

However, Dollfuss met no more resistance when he gradually destroyed, by skilful tactics, everything the Social Democrats had secured for fifteen years, either by electoral successes or by organisation. He dissolved the Schutzbund, the Party's defence corps, and granted rights of auxiliary police to their bitterest adversaries, the Fascist Heimwehr. He practically abolished the workers' right to strike and prohibited all the employees of public bodies, including the Federal railways, from being active members of trade unions. He curtailed the revenues of the Vienna municipality so that it became unable to continue its social and housing work. And eventually he restricted the political activity of the Party itself and began to punish its members for socialist or simply democratic propaganda; the youngest police official was

authorised to send people to prison for months without any public trial. Every time Dollfuss decreed one of these measures—for he was clever enough to avoid too drastic *coups* all at once—the Social Democrats protested, but stated at the same time that this measure was not yet sufficient to justify violent or even armed resistance, that civil war should be avoided at any rate and that the Nazi danger made an exceedingly careful attitude indispensable. Thus the workers became accustomed to the daily instalments of outlawry, and the surer they became that Socialism would finally perish defenceless as in Germany the more their political demoralisation grew. The trade unions lost members and influence, and certain sections of the working class gave way to the pressure of the new official body, the Fatherland Front. It became obvious at that time that no particular Austro-Marxist attitude existed any more, and it was Otto Bauer himself who had to justify this policy of “non-violence” before the masses, as far as it was still possible to explain in public Socialist views. His main argument was that every civil war was bound to lead to a European war. On the other hand, peaceful means of opposition had obviously become inadequate and Bauer’s conclusion was therefore that nothing decisive could be done.

On the contrary, a new left-wing opposition led by the Socialist Youth Front (the organisation of the Party members under thirty) asked for abandonment of the habitual legal methods towards a régime which itself applied every day clearer illegal pressure in order to destroy the remains of democracy. But this opposition was weak in organisation and in its connections with the workers in big factories and had no clear positive programme. In view of this situation within the Labour movement it was surprising how tenacious and heroic was the fighting when the civil war broke out on February 12th, 1934. It was not an organised and well-prepared revolt, as the Dollfuss propaganda alleged, but simply an outbreak of despair on the side of the workers’ *élite* over the daily curtailment of their rights. The workers of Linz, Steyr, Bruck an der Mur and the Vienna suburbs fought vigorously. But the railways, the news service and the supply of most kinds of goods were at the disposal of the Government, and no general strike was proclaimed in order to support the fighters.

The bulk of the working class, demoralised first by the crisis and then by a series of defeats, stood aside and let the *élite* fight alone. Nevertheless, the February fighting had a mighty influence on the mood of the workers. They had been defeated, but only by physical force and not by ideological breakdown, as in Germany a year before. Not a superior ideology, but the heavy guns and tanks of the Fatherland Front, had defeated Socialism, and their self-confidence became in many respects greater than it had been during 1933.

Plenty of illegal groups were founded immediately after the defeat, mainly out of the former Social Democratic membership but sometimes with the participation of workers who had long been indifferent. Most of these groups were only of local importance, and some of them consisted virtually of a handful of men who edited some illegally duplicated paper. The names of some of these small groups were Die Rote Front (which embraced mainly Social Democratic intellectuals who tried to establish a Socialist movement between the Second and the Third International), the Red Reporter (Communist right-wing opposition), Der Rote Ring, etc. A much more considerable part of the active younger members of the Social Democratic Party and the Schutzbund formed a new movement called Revolutionäre Sozialisten. On the other hand, the Communists secured a much larger influence than they had ever possessed under democracy. For at that time the “Austro-Marxist” myth had succeeded in attaching the bulk even of the more radical workers to the Social Democratic Party. Now, after the destruction of this party, and after the collapse of democracy, the Communists had much easier work.

The practical activity of almost all these groups consisted during the first period, lasting approximately up to autumn, 1934, mainly in the distribution of periodicals, pamphlets and leaflets, as well as of “mass actions” such as meetings in the Wienerwald, sudden demonstrations at crowded places, etc. The contents of those papers and leaflets were most revolutionary and announced speedy vengeance for the outlawry and the outrages of the February days. Bourgeois democracy, which had finally led to Fascism, was as decidedly rejected as was the Second International owing to its domination by reformist parties. Some of the groups also rejected the Third International because of its stubborn orientation

towards the aims of Russian foreign policy, while other groups considered it, in spite of certain objections, as the only revolutionary body in the international field. Only two of these illegal groups enjoyed help from outside on a larger scale: the Communists received moral and financial assistance from Soviet Russia, and the Revolutionary Socialists succeeded in establishing an auxiliary office in Brno (Czechoslovakia), only a few hours from Vienna, which was directed by Otto Bauer. Both parties were able to import large quantities of newspapers and leaflets into Austria, while the smaller groups were bound to print or duplicate them inside the country. And as the police methods, which had been quite inadequate at the beginning, became better every month, most of the illegal printing offices and editorial staffs were gradually eliminated.

At the same time the régime achieved some stabilisation, and those illegal groups which had been expecting an early anti-Fascist revolution either dissolved themselves or joined one of the larger parties, the Communists or the Revolutionary Socialists. By the middle of 1935 there were virtually only two important illegal organisations, apart from several *Schutzbund* groups. These latter had been reconstructed after the February defeat, the original idea having been to become a common armed corps of both Socialists and Communists in order to prepare political unity and an early revolution. But both unity and revolution failed to come and the *Schutzbund* became gradually a kind of third Party. Later the Revolutionary Socialists (R. S.) left the *Schutzbund* and founded defence groups of their own, which were, however, also dissolved after a certain time, as the Party saw no practical use for such an organisation except in periods of acute revolution. There remained some groups of an "Autonomous *Schutzbund*" which were more or less attached to the Communist Party, which, however, seemed equally not to estimate their importance highly after 1935. In one or two districts of Vienna these groups still survived at the time of Hitler's invasion in 1938.

During the first months of illegality, the organisations for aid for victims of political oppression, attached to the Socialist and Communist Parties, had been working together; in 1935 they separated. The Communists still upheld the theory that their Red Aid supported all the proletarian victims of Fascism

without regard to the Party; but as their funds were rather small they were in practice often obliged themselves to accept aid from the R.S., who had founded for their own members the Socialist Workers' Aid. Some four-fifths of the Communist Party consisted of former members of the Social Democratic Party who felt disappointed and expected to find with the C.P. a true revolutionary spirit. The bulk of active workers, and even a part of the Executive Committee, were former Social Democrats who had enjoyed a good political training and still maintained their personal connections with Socialist workers. Hence a co-operation between the two parties seemed to be much easier than elsewhere, and for some time many people were active for both Parties in some way. However, the mutual distrust did not disappear; agreements of lower sections were often not recognised by the Central Committees and each Party sometimes tried to cheat the other.

At the end of 1936, when the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern had decided to apply the tactics of the Popular Front and of the Trojan Horse (that is, penetration into bourgeois and even Fascist organisations) all over the world, the gap between the two proletarian Parties began to widen again. Though the R.S. had abandoned their former policy of boycott, at any rate towards all the official and legal associations, they refused to recommend to all the workers without any discrimination membership in such bodies as the Fascist "Trades Unions" (*Einheitsgewerkschaft*) and the "Social Community" (*Soziale Arbeitsgemeinschaft*), a part of the Fatherland Front. The R.S. restricted themselves to organising illegally those of their supporters who had been compelled by terror to join the official bodies.

Gradually yet a third Socialist organisation attained the position of the greatest importance. This was the illegal Free Trade Unions, which was certainly one of the strongest illegal trade union organisations in the history of the international Labour movement. Socialists, Communists and non-party workers participated in it and there were factories where the large majority of the workers were connected with these unions. The leadership consisted partly of old social-democratic militants and partly of members of the young generation. Of course, the activity of these unions did not correspond to that of legal trades unions, collection of fees being often qualified by the courts as high treason and strike propaganda

still more. The main purpose was bound to be political influence on the workers of the important factories. The methods were criticism of every reactionary measure of the régime, demands for adequate wages and labour conditions, support of the victims of political persecution and penetration into the Fascist workers' organisations.

This was the situation at the time of the Berchtesgaden meeting. Early in March Schuschnigg made an attempt to secure the co-operation of the Socialist workers. Their conditions were: Replacement of "official" by genuine trade unionist leaders, restoration of a free Socialist press and cultural associations, political rights analogous to those acquired by the Nazis, independent foreign policy and large-scale public works. Schuschnigg seemed to be prepared to grant all these concessions and a new wave of political workers' activity arose in the large factories. But finally the promised rights failed to come and instead of them Schuschnigg proclaimed his plebiscite, against the advice of Socialist leaders. When he was compelled to resign two days later owing to Hitler's ultimatum, the deceived workers remained inactive.

In spite of this the psychological situation is quite different from what it was in Germany six years ago. Both the feeling of a foreign invasion and the tradition of anti-Fascist struggle prevented the bulk of the skilled workers from becoming convinced National Socialists, and so did the general fear of war. On the other hand, Hitler's policy towards Austrian workers has been rather skilful and his public works, as well as the anti-clerical and anti-Hapsburg propaganda, have—during 1938—made some impression on the younger generation of workers. Both Socialists and Communists have had to abandon the methods of illegal organisation which had been applied since 1934, but have been able to maintain a larger amount of connections in the factories than in the old Reich. The Communist slogan is to restore Austrian independence, and they regard this a pre-requisite of securing the co-operation of the Catholic opposition. The Socialists, on the other hand, though they expose Hitler's invasion and oppression methods, consider the *Anschluss* as final and consider that henceforth the only reasonable possibility is to carry on their struggle on the basis of Greater Germany, whose creation has for decades been a historical necessity and could hardly be revoked even by an anti-Nazi régime.

KARL WILLIAM.

FEMINISM AND PACIFICISM.

THERE are two sharply distinct ways of finding a difference between men and women—one based on physical function and the other based upon observed conduct. The time-honoured distinction according to which men are active, aggressive, lively, masterful, enterprising, whilst women are timid, weak, clinging, patient, submissive, uninventive, is of course an inveterate fiction based solely on the characteristic physical function. The attribution of these qualities is based on the idea of struggle—it may be an enjoyable struggle—in which one side triumphs, and the other side has the thrill of wallowing in surrender. It is obviously discarded nowadays. It is perfectly evident from observation that the nature of women, whatever may be said of men, does not correspond to the naïve assumption. We can see that women are very often strong-willed to the point of obstinacy: determined to the point of exasperation; gallant in the face of danger; independent, irritable and uncontrollable. As the proverbial distich has it:

For if she will, she will, you may depend on't:
And if she won't, she won't, and there's an end on't!

What is taken for weakness is usually good-natured indulgence; what is taken for inert stupidity is generally deprivation of opportunity.

But there remains a distinction which may be expressed thus. The masculine character does retain the conception of struggle, and of the dominant and subjected sides to the strife. The masterful and the slavish types are masculine. Has the reader ever met a really servile girl? The feminine character has cut loose from struggle—has repudiated struggle, and has made its ideal neither domination nor cringing survival, but Sweetness, "*Das ewig Weibliche*." It meets triumphant aggression, not with yielding but with vanishing. It declines to live in an atmosphere of crude physical violence, exactly as it declines to live in an atmosphere of filth. No civilised man would spend his days chained up in a pig-stye. To take part in scenes of blood and horror is as intolerable to the feminine temperament. Not, of course, intolerable to individual women; not even to quite a number of women; but incompatible with the feminine ideal.

It is difficult for the old-fashioned masculine mind to conceive this point of view. Such an intolerance of violence must, in its eyes, mean pusillanimity, cowardice and timidity. But it does not. The feminine mind is not intolerant of violence because it is afraid of it, but because it despises it and feels it to be too degrading to live with. Even the most conventional Anglo-Indian colonel of melodrama must feel that it is not timidity or fear that makes a lady disdain a fist-fight with an impudent menial. No curried general thinks that a fearless, hard-riding girl would be the better for being enlisted in the ranks as a rough Moll Davis.

We are confronted, therefore, with a type of character which refuses to accept a career of violence: not from fear, but from disgust, because its own being is permeated by the ideal of firmness and sweetness. And the extraordinary thing is that among the Aryan peoples this ideal character has had their lip-service for two thousand years, whilst their practice has made no attempt to conform to it. The result is a *malaise* which is all too evident to-day. The modern mind is torn between two principles: Sweetness and Violence. It has sworn adherence to both: it has accepted a divided allegiance. It proclaims Love as imperative, and it proclaims as equally imperative the most disgusting Violence. It has never attained the conception of an intrepid Sweetness which is too proud to fight. The God of the moderns remains a God of Battles. In the Hindu system, the supremacy of love and intellect was reconciled with the claims of safety and comfort by the institution of caste, according to which the warrior caste was entrusted with the virtue of protecting the Brahmin. But the notion of the supremacy of the non-violent caste, working through the ages, produced at last the idea of a casteless perfection, dimly envisaged by Greece and Rome, and clearly enunciated throughout the Hellenistic world by Christianity. The same idea of casteless perfection found its Eastern expression in quietistic Buddhism.

This repugnance to crude Violence is by no means a repudiation of all Force. Across the Border, the English have been spoken of as a people "to whom it has pleased the Almighty to deny the gift of logic": and if one reads the correspondence columns of cultivated weekly reviews one may be excused for believing this to be the fact. Actually it is solemnly argued that a person who would be prepared to restrain a lunatic and

fire at a burglar must, therefore, embrace all the most revolting barbarities of modern warfare—the long-range evisceration, the angry bayoneting, the soul-searing discipline and insolent objurgation of the barrack-yard—is it not all Force! If it comes to that, every motion of the physical frame is Force; but it is not force in this sense which is revolting: nor is force in the sense of coercion necessarily and always unspeakable. It is not force which is the intolerable element of warlike Violence: it is its coarseness, truculence and torture of the innocent.

It is impossible to define coarseness. It is an artistic conception which can no more be defined than love or beauty. Nor need we perplex ourselves with the casuistry of hard cases, which was so dear a pursuit to militant squires and bankers sitting on comfortable tribunals during the World War. The appropriate answer to their academic inquiries as to what the victim of their inquisition would do in various stock cases of atrocity would probably have been—"I should certainly go immediately and permanently insane!" Like Dickens' faithful nurse in *A Tale of Two Cities*, the witness of an atrocity threatened against a dearly loved individual, is likely to go mad whether she fires or fails to fire on the aggressor. Dickens' nurse fired, and rightly fired; but the sound of the shot rang in her ears for ever. A. A. Milne has provided the unanswerable retort to all such futile balancings of profit and loss in a case of fundamental repugnancies. "Would you," he would ask the militant squire, "would you commit rape, to prevent half a dozen outrages?" The feminine temper is not prepared to do revolting things on a cold calculation of benefits to accrue, or of more revolting things to be prevented. It prefers to vanish. It will not live in a pig-stye.

If it be difficult to define coarseness, truculence and torture, it will nevertheless be agreed that all and each of them characterise War, and that all and each of them are incompatible with the feminine ideal of firm and invincible sweetness. It is not that the feminine mind puts "safety and welfare" before "honour." *Mori quam dedecori* is its motto. But physical struggle and the indiscriminate infliction of torture are a *dedecus* to it. "Death before Dishonour"; and the hideousness of battle is dishonour. If it should happen that it cannot live without that, it will try what death may bring. "*Vitam ob servandam, vivendi perdere causas*" is as

foolish to-day as ever it was. The Red Indians elaborated a technique of hardness. Like the modern educationist or economist who promises that if he is given the nation's children, or the nation's freedom, he will guarantee it against all the machinations of its dreadful neighbours, the Comanche took the children of the tribe and hardened them out by a well-considered process of systematic torture. He tied them up by the thumbs and stuck splinters in their feet, in order to guarantee the Comanches against the Pawnees (let us say) and the Blackfeet. He created a callous race inured to cruelty, by making the children's lives a hell. And Comanches, Blackfeet and Pawnees alike fell an ignominious prey to a soft-hearted race that had the brains to evolve gunpowder.

Women have more sense than to embark on a half-hearted Red Indianism. Doubtless many women can be found who are prepared to do rough and brutal things. Doubtless very many more can be found who will unthinkingly urge men to combat. The point is that very few are prepared to fight, themselves, or to tolerate the sight of a field of battle. A Tolstoyan attitude of sheer non-resistance is not implied in this. The restraining of wild beasts, mad dogs and human brutes can be accomplished by the concerted effort of civilised beings without any degrading struggle, or torture of the innocent. There is no pedantic Tolstoyan abandonment of Force in the feminine attitude. Nor is there pusillanimity. There is only a refusal to abandon sweetness and self-respect. An explorer or a big-game hunter is not pusillanimous because he sees how absurd he would look, fighting with his fists against an avalanche or a rhinoceros. A woman is not pusillanimous because she despises the truculence and coarseness of warfare. Professor Santayana, in his much overpraised novel *The Last Puritan*, airily dismisses women as having the sole recommendations of "moral intensity" and "refinement." Singular, that he does not give a thought to Love and Affection! He reminds us forcibly of poor Lord Tennyson, with his admiration of "the thews that move the world"; and still more forcibly of Schopenhauer, who measured the value of women by the length of their legs. No claim for "moral intensity" need be made for women: the "moral intensity" of any regimental mess in enforcement of its code of propriety is quite as hard as, if less rational than that of a mothers' meeting. But it is Love, not Pugnacity

that rules the world. Beauty still draws us with a single hair. Mr. Arnold Forster once complained that men-of-war were given such pleasant names as Blanche, Imogen, Iris, Vesta and Diana, and clamoured for more truculent ones. But he only exhibited his own ignorance of human nature. Sailors like everybody else, devotedly admire what is loving and beautiful: and they will fight much better for a *Violet* than for a *Violent*.

O, how can Beauty vanquish the most strong!

But so many professed pacifists are only pacifists so far as it suits them. A recent American writer condemns war so long as it is a war commanded by a Government, but heartily embraces the idea of bloody revolution from Cromwell to Cosgrave, ignoring the fact that the revolutionary leaders are every bit as dictatorial and authoritarian in their revolution as those they displace in their rule. Such pacificism is self-destructive. It does not revolt, as the feminine temper does revolt, from war in its indiscriminate horrors. It only asks that the horrors shall be inflicted for the ends which it admires.

It is by no means too proud to fight. But a lady is: and the conclusion must surely be that if war is to be brought to a permanent end, the feminine type of character must be cultivated to the exclusion of the masculine. It must be a valiant, fearless, queenly character: but it must be too queenly to strive or cry. And if it is threatened with extinction because it will not tolerate sickening slaughter, then it will coolly accept extinction from this speck in the universe which will ultimately be left to snakes and tigers and their prey, as a prelude to its final end.

For it is pathetic to see the satisfaction which Communists profess to find in the progress of the race, when they are driven to justify the present misery which they call upon the individual to sustain. Nothing is more certainly established in this world of uncertainties than the impermanence of the race. The globe will admittedly cool to the likeness of the lifeless moon: and where will Communism be then? and what then will be the profit of its paradises? Communist visions are simply prolonging the agony of a doomed planet. Continuation on this globe is essentially a narrow and limited being—whether for the race, the nation or the individual.

Clinging to Beauty and Love through all shocks and surprises is an unlimited thing : transcending creation, which indeed is evidently itself a mixture of the Lovable and the Detestable. A very worldly author (in *Puka-Puka*) confesses that, in the throes of drowning, he began to be extremely sceptical of his cherished theory of annihilation.

Even episcopal persons, however, are prone to indulge in the futile casuistry of militarism. Agree that some force is right and admirable, and they triumphantly pin you to the admission that all force is right and admirable. Because you will trip up a pickpocket, they saddle you with all the enormities of wholesale slaughter. It really is inconceivable that educated men should condescend to such puerilities : but they do. Even when the apologists of war do not sink to such a bathos, they insist on treating as a matter of logic-chopping what is really a matter of artistic appreciation. Precisely where the line is to be drawn between turning a neighbour's intrusive child out of doors, and blowing a thousand non-combatants into gory ribbons, is not a thing to be decided by hard and fast rules capable of being cast in the form of a catechism. No exquisiteness of measurement will stand in the place of vision, for an artist. No verbal formulæ will stand in the place of decent feeling, for a disputant about Force. I have known a very strong-minded and hard-headed lady who declared that she would not shoot a pursuing tiger. Exactly where to draw the line in the use of Force must always be an elusive entertainment. The militarists must always be firmly kept to the point : which is not the propriety or otherwise of putting an instant end to the life of a truculent assailant, nor the propriety or otherwise of keeping a boy in school to finish his lessons—but quite simply, the propriety or otherwise of inflicting indiscriminate torture and destruction at the bidding of fallible politicians.

There are no three courses before us. Either we must eradicate the masculine tolerance of war and substitute for it a proud and noble contempt of violence, or we must resign ourselves to continued wars and the swift disappearance of civilisation.

T. BATY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

RUSSIA : SAVIOUR OF CIVILISATION ?

WE have reached the odd and perplexing pass where Russia in the opinion of a large body of the British and French people becomes a main safeguard of European civilisation against a danger presented by more Western European Powers. The British Government, centre of an old, practised and still powerful empire, goes on its bended knees to the Soviet Government, the self-appointed destroyer of empires and of the capitalist system on which empires are built, and the self-vaunted leader of materialist atheism ; in such a posture the British Government is snubbed and, as it were, kicked aside by the Soviet Government ; continues nevertheless to crawl and to entreat, accepts more and more of the rigid conditions imposed ; to the end that the unholy alliance of France, Soviet Russia and Great Britain be duly constituted. Within four years we have seen the great British people drive out—some will maintain that there was no alternative course open to them—the great Italian people from our friendship, and substitute a people whose national characteristics are more Eastern than our own and whose governmental practice during a quarter of a century has been based upon the most brutal of all the tyrannies. We live in an age of European gangsterdom crudely provocative of realist expedients of a paradoxical quality. The British people, in their fear of the particular gangsters who dominate Germany, have taken to their bosom the particular gangsters who were first in the field and who have surpassed in barbarity anything that has been experienced in any part of stricken post-war Europe.

The comedy of Anglo-Russian relations in our time is perhaps not more, but is certainly not less, disordered than any other of the anomalies produced by the last Great War. Russia was an ally of Britain and France in the precisely same policy of encircling Germany which again engages our ingenuity : even though we protest that such is not our object, now or then. After a quarter of a century we have reverted to type : but the type has had to triumph over vast differences in the circumstances. One result of the Russo-Franco-British military victory over Germany was the bolshevisation

of Russia and thence an attempted bolshevisation through the Third (Communist) International of Europe and of the world. Horrified by so unintentional a fruit of British victory, the British people found themselves bitterly antagonised to Russia and her works. They promptly fought on one side of a civil war in Russia against the other. The purpose now was to defeat the spectre we were ourselves partly responsible for raising.

For more than twenty years after the Bolshevik usurpation of power in 1917 Britain and Russia never saw eye to eye. After the war Mr. Lloyd George's persistent attempts to deal with Russia on normal diplomatic lines succeeded it is true in bringing the two countries within speaking distance of each other, but not in making them speak to each other in any profitable sense. It was a measure of his initial difficulty that when, in the spring of 1919, he started on the adventure, he thought it tactful to propose that the Allies should meet the Russians on the island of Prinkipo, an outlandish rendezvous which, as no doubt he imagined, might temper the wind to the shorn lambs huddled in Paris. Certainly in 1919 no Russian official could have set foot in Paris or in London. Neither of those centres of civilisation could then have stomachached so unhallowed an intrusion. Even the Prinkipo compromise, so deftly insinuated by Mr. Lloyd George, was howled out of court. Undismayed, he continued his lone adventure. Lord Curzon and Mr. Winston Churchill, members of his Cabinet, put an elastic strain on the principles of Cabinet solidarity and almost openly disapproved of their Chief. None the less the Prime Minister in 1920 brought the Bolsheviks to London. He negotiated a Trade Agreement with them, signed by Sir Robert Horne and Mr. Krassin in March 1921. In 1922 Mr. Lloyd George took the Russians to Genoa, where they showed how little they appreciated the compliment by concluding with Dr. Rathenau the Rapallo Treaty, which, harmless as it might be on abstract principles, was the worst service that Russia could have performed for Mr. Lloyd George at that time. It contributed indeed to his downfall at the end of that year. Throughout 1923 Anglo-Russian relations were mainly concerned with mutual recrimination. There passed between London and Moscow a series of diplomatic exchanges destined to be prolonged through several years. Even the fact that a communication

dated May 2nd, 1926, from Lord Curzon ended with a ten-days' ultimatum did not affect the steady continuity of this Russo-British controversy. Exactly the same points continued to be made in almost exactly the same words on both sides.

When the trading agreement was signed on March 16th, 1921, a clause had been inserted forbidding each party to carry on propaganda against the other. Experience was destined to prove, both in the case of Russia and in the latter-day case of Italy, what indeed common sense ought to have suggested from the beginning, that it is a futile attempt to control either the origin, process, or objects of political propaganda. Lord Curzon himself, for example, devoted some thought and some of his inexhaustible energy to anti-Bolshevik propaganda. His only effect was to make of himself one of the mainstays of the Soviet Government, which in a tight corner was always able to galvanise Russian support by merely quoting Lord Curzon's attacks. Ten years later we had a repetition of that particular sort of futility in the case of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. In May 1926 the Russian Government devoted more than 3,500 words to answering Lord Curzon's irrelevancies about propaganda, and dismissed his only substantial point (about trade) in a short paragraph.

The post-war course of Anglo-Russian relations never ran smoothly. Even when the charming Mr. Rakovsky was appointed Russian diplomatic representative in London, the storms did not cease. He was a man whom no sense of office could restrain. The formal opening of the 1924 Anglo-Russian Conference was delayed several hours because he, the chief Russian delegate, could not be found. He could not be found because he was engaged in slithering about on the various devices provided for that purpose by the Amusement Park of the Wembley Exhibition. Just after he was appointed to his post in London he delivered a speech at Kharkov (July 1923) in which he gleefully prophesied the collapse of the British Empire and exulted in the part he might play therein, to the greater glory of the world revolution, from his position of advantage in London. That, after he had been formally accepted as *persona grata* by the British Foreign Office. Such acceptance was at once suspended pending an explanation from Moscow of Mr. Rakovsky's behaviour: an explanation which was not promptly given, because there was nothing

that delighted Moscow more than to prolong the controversy with London. Mr. Chicherin threw himself enthusiastically into dialectical quibbles, and inspired semi-official denials of the strict accuracy of what Mr. Rakovsky had been reported to have said (though the speech had been officially published in full). The British Government during the course of 1923 felt itself called upon to make vigorous representations to the Russian Government on no fewer than three important subjects: yet continued formally to refuse recognition to the "existence" of that Government.

When Mr. Ramsay MacDonald became Prime Minister at the beginning of 1924 he at once put an end to what a short time before he had called the "pompous folly" of Anglo-Russian relations. He recognised the Soviet Government as the *de jure* Government of Russia. Yet it was not obvious what actually constituted "Russia." What was the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics? At the Genoa Conference of 1922 when Mr. Lloyd George's ambitious Pact of Non-Aggression was signed, some difficulty arose as to what exactly the signature of Mr. Chicherin might be worth. Being an accomplished diplomatist of the old school Mr. Chicherin met the difficulty in advance as far as possible by signing on behalf of "the Russian Governments at present allied with Russian Soviet Government." I remember asking Mr. Lloyd George at Genoa whether he regarded that formula as committing each of the fifteen separate Republics which had been carved out of what was left of the old Russian Empire after the war. He said he thought they were all committed. Yet who could know? Only seven of the Russian Republics—the Bashkir, Tartar, Kirghiz, Daghestan, Gorsky, Turkestan, and Crimean Republics—were then part of the Federation under the Moscow Government. The remaining eight—namely the Ukraine S.S. Republic, Khorezm (Khiva) Soviet Republic, Bokhara People's Soviet Republic, Georgian S.S.R., Armenian S.S.R., Azerbaijan S.S.R., White Russian S.S.R., and the Far Eastern Republic—were independent, and had been recognised as such by the Moscow Government. No one at Genoa, however, imagined that Mr. Chicherin took seriously the Pact of Non-Aggression, nor indeed took anything seriously except his Rapallo intrigues with Herr Rathenau. The validity of his signature therefore did not much matter.

What however had to be taken seriously, even in Moscow, was the diplomatic definition of what constituted the "Russia" that the British Government now recognised. It even needed a decision as to how the British Government should address its Note. The decision was that it should be addressed not to the Russian Soviet Government, but to the U.S.S.R. There certainly was a U.S.S.R., to which, in whatever capacity, all the fifteen republics did belong. In the actual Note delivered in Moscow by Mr. Hodgson it was stated that the British Government "recognise the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics as the *de jure* rulers of those territories of the old Russian Empire which acknowledge their authority"; and Mr. Rakovsky, in acknowledging it, showed what appeared to be an equal agility by declaring that the authority of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics "extends throughout all the territories of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of those which have been severed with the consent of the Soviet Government, and in which independent States have been constituted." That formula, however, was not intended to quibble about the validity of the membership of the U.S.S.R. itself, but only to make it diplomatically clear that in recognising the "U.S.S.R.," it was to be understood that the U.S.S.R. did not include those territories such as Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland which had been detached and which since the war had been formed into separate sovereign independent States.

Having had their minds trained upon the constitutional question what exactly *was* Soviet Russia, the leading Bolsheviks began the attempt to answer it to their own private satisfaction. After the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution (November 7th, 1923) there took place in Moscow a series of conferences and congresses which in the Russian manner talked more than was necessary and did less than was necessary. One of the items on their agenda was to specify more precisely the relations between Moscow and the other capitals; but not enough interest in that subject could be engendered to make any achievement possible.

Equally elusive was the speculation about the precise meaning of the word "communist." No political party was allowed to exist beyond the "Communist" party, just as in

a later period no party was allowed to exist in Germany except the National Socialist or in Italy except the Fascist; but nobody in Russia itself believed in communism. When Lenin was asked how many communists were left in Russia he made the famous answer: "Three—Lenin, Ulianov and myself." His death in 1924 therefore removed the only extant Communist. The so-called Communist party at that time consisted of 440,000 persons, of whom 400,000 held Government offices of one kind or another and only 40,000 were "workmen" in the sense prescribed by the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. The activity of the Communist party consisted wholly of personal quarrels, for there was clearly no other business for it to do.

Having recognised the Russian Government, Mr. MacDonald embarked upon the vast enterprise of settling the outstanding differences between the two countries. A conference was held in London in 1924. The history of such conferences, when they have gone thoroughly cold, is one of the most satisfying forms of light reading. Mr. Rakovsky made an opening speech (when he was captured from the Amusement Park aforesaid) in which he declared magnificently that the conference now begun would embrace in its scope "the fundamental problems of the political life of the whole world," and in particular he advocated in one breath the integral revision of the treaties of Versailles, Trianon, St. Germain, Neuilly and Lausanne, as well as of the League of Nations.

The conference of course did not settle the fundamental problems of the whole world, nor any problem whatsoever. It broke down. The real stumbling block was the question of loans. Mr. Rakovsky thought it an excellent and a proper thing that Russia, having repudiated her existing debts, should start borrowing again with a clean sheet, as it were, and firmly demanded that the British Government should now make loans to Russia. British official opinion counter-suggested that before new loans could be made, Russia's credit ought first to be reinstated by the recognition of her existing obligations: an argument which Mr. Rakovsky did not understand. Indeed, he asked the highly pertinent question: how could Russia repay her former debts unless she were first given new credits wherewith to repay them? A voluminous body of memoranda passed between the experts of both sides on the ethics and financial soundness of the

argument that A owing B a sum of money and having nothing wherewith to pay should be granted another loan on condition that he used half of it to repay a part of the first loan. They reached the point that if only Mr. Rakovsky would declare academically that he at any rate recognised the former obligation in principle, they might help each other to deceive themselves to their triumphant mutual benefit. When the political financiers begin to argue they nearly always talk themselves into thousands of millions of pounds. The reparation indemnity originally asked of Germany reached (on paper) more than £11,000,000,000; the British war debt to the United States amounted (on paper) to about £1,000,000,000. When the experts at the Anglo-Russian Conference began adding up the figures of the Russian debt, they soon reached the heights congenial to them, thus:

(1) The pre-war debt	£26,000,000
(2) The war debt	£650,000,000
(3) The municipal debt	£14,000,000
(4) Private debts (estimated)...	£350,000,000

Total ... £1,040,000,000

A treaty of sorts was duly negotiated, but was of little interest and of less consequence. Russia, however, as jester-in-chief to the world, continued to flourish. There was the incredible episode of the alleged Zinoviev letter which decided a British election at the end of 1924: and which gave genuine entertainment to all Russians, who are depressed only when they are ignored. The Baldwin Government, resulting largely from the said Zinoviev pantomime, promptly put the MacDonald draft treaty with Russia into the waste-paper basket and initiated a dead season in Anglo-Russian relations, what time the British Foreign Office painstakingly collected an enormous volume of evidence about Russian propaganda and Russian intrigue, extending to China, against Great Britain. When on November 7th, 1925, Mr. and Mrs. Rakovsky held a reception at Chesham House to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the Soviet Republic—it was also their ceremony of farewell to London—the chief representatives of the diplomatic corps in London attended as a matter of course; but not one single representative of the British Government

was there. When a week later Mr. Rakovsky left London not a single British representative was included among the diplomatic corps at the station.

The general strike of 1926 inevitably led to a violent campaign of abuse against Russia for her attempt to subsidise the Trades Union Council. The harvest of several years of unprofitable abuse and counter-abuse (which the Russian genius enjoyed more and was better at than the British genius) was duly collected in a Blue Book which must now be regarded as one of the many curiosities of diplomatic history: namely, "Communist Papers: Documents Selected from Those Obtained on the arrest of the Communist Leaders on the 14th and 21st October 1925. Cmd. 2682. 1926." Sir William Joynson-Hicks (Lord Brentford) who was mainly responsible for that masterpiece of wasted effort was destined to perform a still more curious feat. Before he did so, there was another effusion of thin mist from Whitehall to Moscow: equally curious to the historian. On February 23rd, 1927, Sir Austen Chamberlain, His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, devoted some part of a State Paper to lengthy quotations from the works of egregious Mr. Bukharin. Of all the preposterous speeches made by Russian Bolshevik leaders since 1917 none surpassed those of Mr. Bukharin. A British State Paper grimly recorded, for instance, this gem from the Bukharin collection: "Mighty masses are marching under the Soviet star under the banner of Communism. Comrades! Our proletariat is ready to do everything to strengthen the forces of the world revolution and to facilitate the process thereof. Has not our party proved that it will do anything necessary to defend the cause of world revolution? During the great English Strike, during the China Revolution, our party—we can and dare assert this—has shown itself in the forefront." Charles Dickens would have thanked the Soviet star if such speeches had been made in real life before he started to write his *Pickwick Papers*. Yet Mr. Bukharin's wretched drivel "drew" Lord Birkenhead, made Winston wince, and was gloomily enshrined in a Foreign Office paper.

So poor and shallow a controversy had raged between London and Moscow for several years when it reached a climax such as even the annals of diplomatic history can hardly parallel. On Thursday, May 12th, 1927, a contingent of Metropolitan and City police raided the offices of Arcos

Ltd. in Moorgate. The building known as Soviet House contained the headquarters of the Russian Trade Delegation as well as of Arcos Ltd. Sir William Joynson-Hicks, who as Home Secretary sponsored that raid, was not aware of that fact. Scotland Yard had been collecting what casual evidence it could find to prove that a surreptitious propaganda was being conducted from Soviet House under the cloak of a trading organisation. When the evidence was regarded as adequate Scotland Yard consulted the Home Office and was assured by Sir William that there was no political reason against the raid. The Arcos officials refused to hand over the keys of the safes, two of which, they claimed, were the property of the Trade Delegation and therefore diplomatically immune. The police therefore, on May 13th, used oxy-acetylene apparatus and pneumatic drills to force the safes. Now diplomatic immunity had been expressly conferred on the Russian Trade Delegation by the terms of the still-binding Trade Agreement. ("... shall personally enjoy all the rights and immunities set forth in the preceding article and also immunity from arrest and search..." Clause 5.) The upshot was that relations with Russia were broken off on May 24th, 1927: all because the British Government in sheer ignorance had violated its own treaty.

After that climax there followed long years of virtual "non-speaks" between Great Britain and Russia. Suddenly, as a result of Nazi Germany's resurgence as a military threat to British imperialist predominance, a still more curious chapter in Anglo-Russian relations was begun. After more than twenty years of mutual abuse British opinion now turned to Russia for help. Mr. Maisky, the most charming of men, the most skilful of diplomatists, an opportunist to the tips of his beautiful fingers, a genial cynic, saw his opportunity. As long ago as March 15th, 1939, the very day when, "at the request" of Dr. Tiso, Herr Hitler took over the "protection" of the Slovak State, Mr. Maisky, speaking at a public function in London, declared: "You will find that in the last resort peace or war in our time depends upon the kind of relations which exist between London and Moscow." Diplomatic exchanges began in Moscow on March 18th, two days after Herr Hitler announced that Czecho-Slovakia had "ceased to exist." The British Ambassador, Sir William Seeds, consulted Mr. Litvinov, the Russian Foreign Minister,

about the general situation. Mr. Litvinov suggested a Six-Power conference, the six Powers being Great Britain, France, Russia, Poland, Turkey and Rumania. Lord Halifax on the following day made the counter-suggestion to Mr. Maisky that as a conference would take time and would need preparation, it might be better (without prejudice to a later conference) at once to make some sort of a gesture. He proposed that four Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia and Poland) should make an immediate "Declaration." On March 20th the text of the suggested Declaration was submitted to Paris, Moscow and Warsaw. Paris and Moscow agreed. Warsaw played for time, promising that the matter should be discussed when Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister, visited London on April 4th. Polish opinion did not conceal its impartial distaste for Russian or German interference in Poland. The Russian Government was undisguisedly relieved over the Polish refusal and promptly turned the tables upon Lord Halifax by arguing that the method of diplomatic consultation through the regular channels was a now illustrated waste of time, whereas a conference would economise time. The purpose of such a conference, Mr. Litvinov argued, would be to organise concerted military action against Germany, the plan to become operative on the first move in any further German aggression.

A month passed. The method of saving time had lived up to the spirit of Anglo-Russian relations. On April 12th Mr. Maisky went to the Foreign Office and saw Sir Alexander Cadogan. On April 14th he saw Lord Halifax. On the following day Sir William Seeds saw Mr. Litvinov in Moscow. A hint of what was now happening was given by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on April 13th, when he said that the British Government "is raising no objection in principle to any such proposition as that of a definite military alliance between this country, France and the Soviet Union."

Still another month passed. It had by now been made clear that a firm issue had been joined. Russia demanded an anti-German triple military alliance, and rigidly refused to accept anything less. Britain, partly in order to counteract the German propaganda alleging "encirclement," partly because Mr. Chamberlain and other members of the Cabinet still hesitated to plunge into the policy of stabilising the European antagonism by a full alliance with Russia, wanted something

less precise. There was talk of a "deadlock." The apparent object of the British Government was to organise a show of collective and defensive military strength which should deter Germany from risking any further attempts at annexation in Central Europe. One of the difficulties arose, not from the reality of a policy of "encirclement" carried out by Britain, France and Russia against Germany, but from the propagandist use to which that policy was put by Herr Hitler and his men. Let certain dates be recalled, falling within one single year. On March 13th, 1938, Germany annexed Austria; on September 30th, 1938, the Sudetenland; on March 15th, 1939, Slovakia; on March 16th, 1939, Bohemia and Moravia; on March 22nd, 1939, Memel.

Why had Germany refrained for two months after Memel from annexing Danzig? Because Herr von Ribbentrop's faith in the unwillingness and inability of Britain to stop her had been at last shaken. In two historic ways the whole tradition of British political thought had now been broken. Conscription had been introduced, and the refusal to incur commitment in advance of hypothetical contingencies had been abandoned. The other dates are interesting. It was on March 22nd last that Memel fell to Germany. Nine days later (March 31st) the British and French Governments gave their guarantee to Poland, and a fortnight later extended it to Rumania and Greece (April 13th). Within a further fortnight the House of Commons approved the proposal for compulsory military training (April 27th). Little more than another fortnight passed before Turkey (May 12th) joined with Britain and France in the cause of common defence against Germany. Negotiation with Russia in the same cause was renewed on April 15th, when Sir William Seeds, British Ambassador in Moscow, transmitted a proposal to Mr. Litvinov, Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs. It had become clear that Germany's leaders had not been greatly perturbed or impressed by the British and French guarantees to Poland, Rumania and Greece. They had been surprised and shaken by the British introduction of conscription. They had been really perturbed by the unmistakable significance and importance of Turkey's joining the so-called "Peace Bloc." What then of Russia? Did not the argument lead irresistibly to a consummation which should put the final seal on a convincing, business-like, decisive "encirclement for defence?"

against Germany? The Russian Government took that view and argued that nothing short of a full military alliance between Britain, France and Russia, combined with a triple guarantee to the whole belt of countries between the Baltic and the Black Sea, would serve the purpose; that to revert now to half-measures would present Germany with a ludicrous anti-climax, would destroy the excellent work so far accomplished, and would ensure, not peace, but the crumbling of the "Peace Bloc." The French Government agreed with the Russian Government. But no, argued the British Government; there was such a thing as overdoing it; of defeating the object in another sense; of driving Germany into a corner whence blindly she might plunge the world into war.

Yet Mr. Chamberlain, as he again explained on May 19th, was inflexibly bent upon the achievement of the substantial purpose of Russian co-operation with France and Britain for the deterrent purpose of restraining German aggression. During the following week at Geneva Mr. Maisky, M. Bonnet, and Lord Halifax met in personal contact to thrash the matter out. On May 26th the British and French Governments sent to the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir William Seeds, and the French Chargé d'Affaire M. Payart (acting in the absence of M. Naggiar, the Ambassador) a new proposal which they hoped would satisfy the rigid condition which had been laid down by Moscow from the beginning. The proposal was that the three Powers should conclude a Pact of Mutual Assistance, framed within the League Covenant, but not waiting for League machinery to bring it into operation, for any one of three contingencies: namely of a direct attack upon any one of the three; of an attack upon any European State guaranteed by any one of the three; and of an attack, or apparently imminent attack, upon any other State in Europe. The first two contingencies, by that proposal, were to be met by immediate concerted military action, the third by immediate consultation, on the part of the three Powers. But the new proposal did not satisfy Russia. The fact that Finland, Estonia and Latvia were not anxious to be "guaranteed" by Russia any more than to be "annexed" by Germany did not affect the rigid intransigence of Russia's diplomacy. The alliance, the whole alliance, and nothing but the alliance was still her cry.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

June 12th, 1939.

No. 454.

July 1939.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
FULL REVIEWS	113
SECURITY: CAN WE RETRIEVE IT?; THE SPENS REPORT; THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORIES; EASTERN VISAS; THE EMPEROR FREDERICK; THE HEROIC SPIRIT IN ENGLISH LITERATURE; UNDYING FIRE.	
SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD; THE ENGLISH MISS, TO-DAY AND YESTERDAY; EAST ANGLIA; FIFTY YEARS OF THE L.C.C.	127

"SECURITY: CAN WE RETRIEVE IT?"

Broadly speaking, Sir Arthur Salter's *Security, Can we Retrieve it?** may be divided into two sections, one a historical and non-controversial section treating of facts that are more or less familiar and another section dealing with the policy of the present Government, which he attacks on the ground that it is either inert in the face of danger or unwise in its action. It is clear that he would like to see Mr. Chamberlain replaced by Lord Halifax and the Government reconstituted on a wider basis. The book is marked by a clarity of style and much cogent argument, but does reflect a certain amount of bias. He has in the past foretold a good deal of what has since happened and has given advice which the Government failed to adopt. It would be unfair to say that Sir Arthur, like Mussolini, "is always right," since even he did not quite recognise the inevitability of conscription or the possibility of an early agreement with Soviet Russia. In the main, however, he does throw light on the facts that have led up to the present position. He thinks that German and Italian intervention in Spain helped to define the Anglo-French attitude in Eastern Europe. He sees quite clearly that the development of air power in Germany has cost us our old immunity from attack and he believes that if

* Macmillan. 8s. 6d. net.

VOL. CLVI.

8

France and England were defeated it would not be long before even the United States would be faced with the same danger. This seems to the writer to be extremely problematic, but at the same time it is certain that many good judges hold that view. It is, of course, what we want the U.S.A. to think. His apologia for the League of Nations is sound, for indeed it was not far from succeeding, but France, as he points out, regarded the League too much in the light of a special safeguard for herself, while we on the other hand thought of preventing wars in which we ourselves should not be engaged.

Sir Arthur develops a thesis based upon the experience of the last twenty years that Great Britain has been lacking in foresight and has allowed a situation to arise for which we ought to have been prepared long ago. We all know that Germany in 1934 began to rearm and this was followed by breaches of the Treaty of Versailles. What is the psychological explanation of this failure to face up to facts? The explanation given is that Lord Baldwin was primarily responsible and that other members of the front bench seemed to be able to shut their eyes to unpleasing truths or else like Sir Thomas Inskip "look with frank and fearless gaze at any prospect however appalling and fail to see it."

Sir Arthur, however, is nothing if not constructive. You may agree or you may disagree with him, but he does formulate a constructive policy and it is to it that readers naturally turn hoping for some solution of our present difficulties. He deals with Germany as we would expect, recognising her economic position and the difficulties which have compelled her by doubtful currency methods and special trade agreements to meet the demands which the enormous expansion of her armaments have made upon her. Every action that we take that seems to limit Germany is regarded as an act of "encirclement" and if indeed we did restrict her *Lebensraum* there would be some excuse for German bitterness. Sir Arthur, however, wishes to meet the German people half-way and together with other great Powers to co-operate with them to enable them once more to secure economic prosperity. War will not secure this but if the Treaty of Versailles is regarded as obsolete and if the German sphere of trade and economic influence could be regarded as extending to Eastern Europe and if the mandatory system or something like it could be

extended to our colonial régime and be subject to international inspection in which Germany would play a part, then he hopes that the German people would rest content with that kind of equality and be willing to reduce armaments and live at peace with their neighbours in Europe.

He may not be correct in his analysis of the German mind and it is certain that many people will not accept his several hypotheses, but we must be grateful to him for this balanced and powerful exposition of present-day Europe. Few men could have written *Recovery* and still fewer perhaps the book under review.

P. A.

THE SPENS REPORT.*

The Spens Report is a remarkable achievement. The Master of Corpus and his Committee have had the courage to apply the science of psychology to a practical problem of educational administration. If their plan is approved by the Board of Education, a much larger number of pupils in the Secondary Schools of England and Wales will in future receive an education designed to fit each of them for his particular service to the community and for realising his best self in that service.

Oneness is the keynote of the Report, and the chapter on the Curriculum strikes that note clearly and firmly. Thus, knowledge is to be linked with feeling (or emotion) and with the urge to action (conation), so as to integrate the mind by forming sentiments and interests. A school is not to be merely a "place of learning"; and "the value of information has been grossly exaggerated." Again, each subject is to be linked with the others so as to form a coherent curriculum "centred round a core"; and "it is not necessary to study a wide range of subjects." In particular, Scripture is to be related "to the work of the school as a whole." There is to be continuity as well as coherence. Each successive course of study is to be linked with what has gone before and what is to come after. Finally, education is to be linked with life. Instead of a general education *in vacuo* there is to be a specific preparation of the particular child for the life he is to lead.

* The Report of the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education on Secondary Schools with special reference to Grammar Schools and Technical High Schools, published by H.M. Stationery Office in December 1938, price 3s. 6d.

Professor A. N. Whitehead ends his account of *The Education of an Englishman* (at Sherborne in 1870) with these words :

Altogether we were a happy set of boys, receiving a deplorably narrow education to fit us for the modern world. But I will disclose one private conviction, based upon no confusing research, that, as a training in political imagination, the Harvard School of Politics and Government cannot hold a candle to the old-fashioned English classical education of half a century ago.

The Spens Report shows how poor a substitute for this old and narrow, but deep and coherent, curriculum is provided by the study of six or seven separate subjects under independent specialists in many of the English secondary schools of to-day. Whitehead and his contemporaries worked for more than half the week for their form-masters, who came to know them well. But the new secondary schools that grew up after the Education Act of 1902 were intended to lay a broad foundation of "general education" on which any kind of superstructure might afterwards be built. Since, however, this general education was meant for boys and girls between the ages of 13 and 17 and excluded the vocational motive altogether, the result too often was no finished building at all, but a derelict foundation, a lot of loose stones, separate subjects. The Spens Report adds that "the emphasis in educational theory has now shifted from the subject to the child." Where, however, the school work is split up between too many specialist teachers, they may know their subjects but they cannot know their pupils as the form-masters know them in the best schools.

A feature of the Spens Report is its insistence on the folly of supposing that "the traditional academic course directed towards the Universities" will meet the need of the large majority of secondary school pupils for whom a university education is out of the question. The Report accepts the twenty-year-old verdict of the Federal Council of Lancashire and Cheshire Teachers' Associations that Junior Technical Schools of the right kind—"Technical High Schools" as the Report calls them—would provide a large proportion of boys between the ages of 11 and 16 with a secondary education far better suited to their needs than is the traditional academic course of the Grammar Schools. Among

other notable elements in the Report are Dr. R. F. Young's Historical Sketch (Chapter I) and his Appendix II on the development of the theory of a General Liberal Education from Hippias of Elis (about 425 B.C.) to Whitehead of Cambridge and Harvard: a valuable addition, this, to Sir John Adams' great work on *The Evolution of Educational Theory*.

The Report has much, but not a word too much, to say of the harm done to secondary education by the School Certificate Examination as it now is. On the other hand, it might well have dealt more fully with the cost of assimilating Senior and Central elementary schools to secondary schools, whether Grammar Schools or Technical High Schools; with the disadvantages of housing Technical High Schools in those Technical Schools which ought to be full, or nearly full, even in the day-time, of adult students whether whole-time or part-time; with the need for some Higher Secondary Schools (costing for maintenance about £60 a year instead of the average £30 a year) for a few of those thirteen-year-old secondary school pupils whose ability is so outstanding that if properly trained they would be almost sure to take good First Class Honours degrees; and with the urgency of the proposed inquiry into the twenty-year-old demand for regional education authorities, one for each of ten or a dozen provinces of England and Wales.

MAXWELL GARNETT.

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORIES.

The Cambridge Ancient History is now completed with the publication of its twelfth volume,* accompanied by a fifth volume of plates,† and it thus links up with the commencement of the *Cambridge Medieval History*. The latter was finally completed three years ago, so that now, in forty volumes, the Cambridge Histories narrate the continuous development of European civilisation from its known origins up to the end of the nineteenth century. It is very satisfactory to know that two supplementary volumes are now in preparation under the direction of Professor Harold Temperley. The general principles upon which these great co-operative works are constructed are those laid down by Lord Acton

* *The Imperial Crisis and Recovery, A.D. 193-324*. Vol. XII. Cambridge University Press. 35s. net.

† 15s. net.

when the *Cambridge Modern History* was begun nearly forty years ago. They are intended for both the student and the general reader, presenting the latest results of research and scholarship in attractive and succinct contributions by the most eminent authorities, and providing full bibliographies. There is no attempt to impose uniformity of view; it is rather the aim to indicate disputed points of fact and of interpretation. Such difficulties are notably present, for example, in the period 193-324 dealt with in this final volume of the *Ancient History*, which covers the critical years of apparent disintegration of the Empire followed by the work of recovery and imperial reconstruction under the Illyrian Emperors, and the great struggles of the Church and its eventual recognition. The volume terminates with the Council of Nicæa, where the *Medieval History* takes up the tale. Incidentally, in these last and first volumes there is a certain amount of overlapping, for example, relating to the reforms of Diocletian, which is not without advantage.

It is not possible here to discuss individual articles and it must suffice simply to name some of the principal contributors who form an international team. Indeed the majority of the authors are foreign and include Professor Alföldi of Budapest, Professor Bidez of Ghent, Professor Christensen of Copenhagen, Professor Ensslin of Erlangen, Professor Halphen of Paris, Professors Lietzmann and Rodenwaldt of Berlin, Professors Nock and Rand of Harvard and Professor Oertel of Bonn. The British contributors include Professor N. H. Baynes, Professor Collingwood, Mr. H. Mattingly and Mr. S. N. Miller. The late Professor F. C. Burkitt's two contributions, on Pagan Philosophy and the Christian Church and on the Christian Church in the East, have been revised and have received certain additions by Professor Creed. The difficulties, and also possibilities, of reconstructing more adequately this period are indicated in an appendix on Sources by Professor Baynes and Mr. Mattingly. The latter, discussing the importance of numismatic evidence, points out that in a century "where the literary evidence is so broken" coinage is "the only surviving continuous source for the period" and still awaits its full exploitation. Finally, appreciative mention must be made of the valuable fifth volume of plates prepared by Mr. C. T. Seltman and which illustrates volumes XI and XII of the History.

It is useful to note the progress of two other Cambridge co-operative Histories which are planned on similar lines. Of the eight volumes of the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* six are now completed and include the three Dominion volumes, and two on India from 1497 to 1918. Three volumes have been planned to describe the growth of British expansion and imperial policy as a whole and to include the later history of the purely colonial dependencies: of these the first volume is already published and covers the period up to and including the American Revolution. The two Indian volumes form also part of the *Cambridge History of India*, which is planned in six volumes. The second now alone remains to be published and will deal with the period lasting from the downfall of the Çaka and Pahlava empire in the middle of the first century A.D. up to the Muhammadan conquests.

EASTERN VISAS.*

Salute to Youth! In the late summer of 1936 Audrey Harris, a young woman still under thirty, started out to visit Asia—that huge mass of land and conglomeration of peoples. The first part of her book, consisting of letters to her family, begins at Moscow where she took the Trans-Siberian line, third class, for Manchuria, thence Korea, Japan and China. The second part deals with her further travels in Northern India, and ends some sixteen months later with her re-entry into Europe (so-called) from Afghanistan by way of Southern Russia. Far, far is Miss Harris removed from those tourists who view the East from the cocktail bar of a hotel in Malaya, or who spend their one day at Zanzibar playing golf. Travelling "hard" is the keynote of the book, for she constantly eschewed comfortable meals, transport and sojourn. Apart from Heaven's protection of the innocent, there seems no reason why she did not catch trachoma, typhoid and smallpox. As for wars and bandits, the years 1936-7, mercifully for her, and others, fell in the East between periods of turmoil.

Miss Harris went forth partly to seek peace and poise, which she thought to find in Buddhism, that great religion with its healing mechanism of Escape. Like most of us, she no doubt had often felt dismayed at this churning welter of a

* *Eastern Visas*. By Audrey Harris. Collins. 12s. 6d. Fully illustrated.

mill-stream which we call Life, and it is true that the West can learn much from the Orient. But perhaps she set out a little too prejudiced against Europe and all its ways. I sometimes feel that we occidentals need a few more allowances made for us than we are apt to receive during the present filibustering days. Is it really nobler to float like jetsam unperturbed above the flood ; or should one submit to being polished and ground, like a pebble by the race ? I fancy that only those who already know something of peace can further apprehend it ; and that Miss Harris found that, after all, she had taken it with her in her own soul—the peace which accepts and participates in struggle.

In China she did well to seek the judgments of missionaries, they live too intimately with Chinese to be ignored ; and, as she discovered, the East mistrusts people who affect to depreciate religion. But British consuls, specially those “ up country,” also live in close and often affectionate touch with Chinese, and their opinions are worth hearing. Her impatience with them was ill-considered. Hard-working Legation officials would have been held rightly responsible if they had sanctioned journeys into a notoriously unsafe interior by any headstrong young woman of their nationality, who did not even speak the language. Within a year of her visit the alleged murder of a couple of Japanese on Chinese soil led to the pretext for the whole of the present terrible “ China Incident,” with its appalling repercussions on Chinese people. One fact, however, is gradually emerging from the books now being written by women travellers : namely, that a woman, specially when virginally-minded, is safer than a man in disturbed areas ; for she is less likely to be feared as the forerunner of armies.

I hope Miss Harris will forgive me when I admit to preferring the second part of her book. First, because it is more grammatically and carefully written ; second, because we have had several volumes of late from eager young intellectuals on their first encounter with the East, most of them writing, as she records of herself, “ in a trance of ignorant elation.” Certainly this is better than ignorant belittlement, and it is also true that a fresh eye may discover anew features taken for granted by those accustomed to the eastern scene. Miss Harris, moreover, had the grace to prepare herself by reading some Chavannes, The Analects of Confucius, Florence

Ayscough's *Chinese Mirror*. But when she attributes the present condition of Peking to China's deep-seated orderliness, she could not know that until 1900, when the Boxers destroyed half the city in their attempt to capture the Legations, Peking was a shocking rabble of crowded huts, with narrow roads dotted with excruciating cesspools. I could have wished, too, that she had met and talked with many more Chinese in Peking besides her friend, Lin, the seller of embroideries.

The chapters on Nepal and Sikkim confirm what one has read of those aloof and alluring states. Miss Harris' final chapters on her crossing of the Oxus are of particular interest, and her experiences were probably unique, for few Englishwomen have been hardy enough to travel in those parts.

The book is an account of a gallant and extensive journey, made with commendable and sensitive sympathy for the inhabitants of the many lands visited. The numerous photographs are excellent and attractive.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

THE EMPEROR FREDERICK.*

This new biography of the Emperor Frederick is occasioned by the fiftieth anniversary of his death. The author does not avail himself of any new sources but he shapes the material into a lively portrait. In 1888 were buried a whole generation's hopes that Germany's inner development would in time more nearly approach to the English liberal spirit. And it is to that “ creative, optimistic, self-assured, productive, honest and humane ” generation of Germans, who by the Emperor Frederick's untimely death were unfortunately prevented from having a hand in directing the political fate of their country, that the author dedicates his book. In these days when the aims of both nations are so divergent, it reminds us of fifty years ago when both the spirit of the age and the personality of the future ruler gave promise, sadly unfulfilled, of a more parallel development.

Crown Prince Frederick William's generation was an optimistic one, with a firm belief in human progress, and although he was loyal to the Hohenzollern tradition, yet he

* *Kaiser Friedrich III.* By Werner Richter. Eugen Rentsch Verlag Erlenbach, Zürich und Leipzig.

was loyal too to the constitution to which his father had sworn faith, and he disliked every form of violence and intolerance. He and the Crown Princess, Queen Victoria's eldest daughter, who shared his interests and ideals, held themselves in politics to be the pupils of the Prince Consort and his adviser Stockmar. They were planning their own reign to be rather different from the present reign, overshadowed as it was by Bismarck's autocratic rule. But posterity knows that things turned out otherwise. For Frederick III died a brief hundred days after the death of his father at the age of 91, and his and Victoria's programme was never realised.

The author is right to draw the contrast sharply between the promise of the first period of Frederick William's life, when as the victor of Koeniggratz and Wörth, he became the most popular personality in Germany, and those later stagnant years when Bismarck shut him off from all political activities. The difference between Frederick William and Bismarck was fundamental, and could find no real compromise although there were several occasions of collaboration at critical junctures. We agree with the author in supposing that Frederick, if he had become Emperor as a healthy man would most certainly have parted with this Chancellor, as his successor, in actual fact, did in 1890.

The aristocratic and military circles around William I had always been suspicious of the "liberal" and "unmilitary" Crown Prince and his English wife. But they did not dare to allow their suspicion to take an aggressive form until they heard of the Crown Prince's mortal illness. The author finds the open and violent attacks on the "Englishwoman," which now broke out, "difficult to understand." But were they not encouraged by Bismarck himself, as Busch's diaries now show? I should like here just to mention an experience I had as a student in Berlin. Treitschke was lecturing on the attempts of Sophie Dorothea, wife of Frederick William I and daughter of George I of England, to bring Prussia and England closer together in spite of her husband, who cherished the idea of an Austrian alliance. And moved by his passionate hatred against everything English he called out: "May we never again see a day when a Guelph female commits high treason from the Prussian throne." The students applauded stormily. It is no doubt true that Victoria as an Englishwoman found much in the

Germany of William I that was distasteful to her, and she hoped for changes with her husband's accession to the throne. Yet what she wrote to her mother the very day of Kaiser Frederick's funeral was written in all faith and sincerity. She wrote: "We love Germany, and wish to see her strong and great, not through the sword alone but in justice, culture, progress and freedom." It might have been her husband himself writing these words.

This humane Crown Prince battled for days and nights with his conscience before finally forcing himself as Regent to confirm the death sentence on the man who attempted his father's life. And the father himself, still suffering great pain from the wound inflicted on him, thanked his son for freeing him from the necessity of carrying out this unhappy duty. It is interesting to remember this while bearing in mind how lightly the present régime in Germany holds human life.

G. M.

THE HEROIC SPIRIT IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.*

This is a noble book. It traces the persistence throughout the ages of an indomitable note, a "victorious strength," in our great writers, never more finely expressed than by Wordsworth in his early sonnets. Although Professor Chambers' choice of authors was determined by the fact of their having been subjects of his recent lectures or essays, they are linked by this spirit, while we are frequently reminded of others—such as Milton—to whom no special study is here devoted. It is impossible in a brief review to summarise the wealth of thought, learning and wit contained in the book, which will rank with its author's *Thomas More*; it must be read, and to read it is not to "escape" from our troubled world into one of romance; it is to put on fortitude.

Beginning with Bede, who "preserved the continuity of civilisation" and revered "self-denial and heroism," Professor Chambers next discusses the *Beowulf* epic, which "consecrated valour," and forecast the character of the medieval Knight. In the essay following, we are warned

* *Man's Unconquerable Mind*. Studies of English Authors from Bede to A. E. Housman and W. P. Ker. By Professor R. W. Chambers. Jonathan Cape. 1939. 15s.

against overrating the general "tendencies" and "influences" of any age and undervaluing the part played by its great men. An exposition of *Piers Plowman* forms an important section of the book, and will be valued both by scholars (especially as to the textual notes), and by the many of us who have but a rudimentary acquaintance with "the English counterpart of the *Divina Commedia*," conceived, in English fashion,

on a May morning on Malvern hills.

Dating from about 1362, "it reflects the ideals of an England not yet rent by divisions . . . in its broad appeal [it] is the most thoroughly English of all our religious poems." The difficulties it presents to modern readers are admitted, but Langland is defended from the charge of pessimism or narrowness; he, too, strikes the indomitable note, and shows a wide sympathy, as in his vision of Christ the Judge coming in mercy to

have out of hell all men's souls—

contrasted with the usual medieval terrors of the Doom.

More (our author's hero *par excellence*) and Tyndale, sincere and strong in literature as in life, are treated with deep understanding. Then follow three weighty Shakespearian chapters. In a critical discussion of the question whether the poet contributed three MS. pages to the play *Sir Thomas More*, the Professor considers this proved by the handwriting, and by similarity in ideas and imagery to passages admittedly Shakespearian. His judgment has been since confirmed by that of Dr. Flower, Deputy Keeper of the British Museum MSS. From a comparison of his plays of different periods, he lays the ghost of a mythical Shakespeare passing through a stage of disgust and dejection (associated with the fall of Essex and Jacobean decadence), followed by recovery. *Measure for Measure* (1604) is chosen for detailed examination of its alleged "cynicism," and an eloquent, if perhaps not entirely convincing plea is put forward in its defence and in that of the Duke and Isabella. In this, as in all his plays, Shakespeare "shows a belief in forgiveness as the virtue by which human goodness draws nearest to the divine."

In Byron the indomitable quality is again seen: this, with his sincerity and humanity, his "volcanic instinct for justice,"

is shown to have made special appeal to Ruskin and others. Professor Chambers concludes with a filial tribute to University College and with intimate appreciations of three of his colleagues there—Arthur Platt, A. E. Housman and W. P. Ker; the last, as the great exponent of the heroic Scandinavian sagas, fitly brings the list up to date.

E. G. S.

UNDYING FIRE.*

It is not long since a witty, but by no means wise, person wrote to the effect that the Turks abandoned a barbarous, outworn, unreadable script, at the very time when the Irish decided to resurrect and adopt one; and since that which is light floats, this witticism remained uppermost in men's minds and they were wont to repeat it when, on visiting the Irish Free State, they were confronted by the unfamiliar, "oriental-looking" Gaelic characters on railway stations and on street signs, in post offices and on public notices. It would appear that the Irish are indeed a nation of madmen who, having freed themselves from a political bondage, have deliberately bound themselves in the chains of linguistic serfdom: have erected an impenetrable fence of isolationism about the Emerald Isle: have elected themselves as foreigners to all the world: have made commercial intercourse difficult, and cultural reciprocity nigh impossible: but Desmond Ryan's new book* puts a very different complexion on all this.

In August 1630 the Four Masters, Michael O'Clery, Farfassa O'Mulconry, Peregrine O'Clery, and Peregrine O'Duignan, "men of consummate learning in the antiquities of the country and of approved faith, four most eminent Masters in antiquarian lore," finished the great task of setting in writing an account of the history and culture of old Ireland, from the earliest times to the day of that disastrous defeat at Kinsale; and since that time the torch of learning has been handed on from minority to minority, from passionate-souled individual to passionate-souled individual, till to-day, as a condign reward of this tenacity of purpose, every town and village in the Free State has flung off its Anglo-Saxon mask and revealed its Gaelic lineaments. Mr. Ryan very ably traces the tortuous course of this conservationist stream, which is sometimes

* *The Sword of Light*. Barker. 12s. 6d.

almost lost under a thick scum of questionable politics floating upon its surface, sometimes all but dried up under the blazing, unhealthy heat of religious controversy, and which again becomes indistinguishable from the bog of indifference through which it percolates.

Turlough O'Carolan was the last of the bards to ride through Ireland, and, harp in hand, sing of the heroes of old. After his time the Gaelic was "absconded" like a charge upon a too complicated Coat of Arms; till at length came James Macpherson who, with his famous "forgery" Ossian, stirred up so lively a literary dispute that Dr. Johnson bought a cudgel to settle the matter. Delicate Miss Charlotte Brooke modestly "set down from the lips of the peasantry" and conventionally translated love songs and tales into formal English verse; but the absconded charge was, all the while, brilliant in its heraldic hues. Philip Barron, a romantic figure who, like a prophet of old, seems to have ascended into heaven, there being no record of his death, fought for the antique culture and tongue and mentions in his magazine, *Ancient Ireland* (1835), "I have myself known instances where a farmer paid a person 17s. for transcribing for him a small Irish prayer book"; and again: "A labourer gave his work for an entire season, without asking a penny wages, but merely on condition that the farmer who hired him should teach him Irish."

The long and bitter struggle bears fruit to-day; and though those of the peasantry who proudly boast that they had the Gaelic from the cradle, complain that they cannot understand a word of the language as taught in the schools; though the enthusiastic teachers in those very schools complain that the children speak nothing but English at home, a brave, bilingual Ireland is in the making. The young men who wear in their buttonholes the little metal circular badge of the Gaelic speaker are the conscious proud possessors of an ancient treasure which they will never permit to die of indifference, nor yet allow to be killed by a new tyranny: and all who wish to understand the spirit of this modern Ireland, and all who choose to regard her recent ascent into nationhood as sheer bolshevism, should read Mr. Ryan's book, for the mystic Sword of Light illumines the pages and the shadow of anti-Irish prejudice leaps to the rear.

JULIAN FRANKLYN.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Professor C. H. McIlwain has gathered together in *Constitutionalism and the Changing World** a selection of fifteen papers which cover a wide variety of topics though all in some measure linked with the history and problems of constitutional government. The nature of sovereignty is discussed in several papers from historical and analytical angles and the author's criticism of the Austinian theory outlined. Professor McIlwain has included an appreciation of Philip Hunton and his *Treatise of Monarchies* published in 1643, with its theory of a limited "mixed monarchy." He urges a wider recognition of Hunton for his analysis of the Constitution existing in 1640, for the intrinsic merit of his political theory compared with those of Hobbes and Finer and for the close parallel between his "political formula" and the practice of government after the Revolution Settlement. One of two essays on Magna Carta contains an analysis of the famous Chapter 39 subject to an Additional Note which expresses a modification of the author's view in the light of research since this paper was first published in January 1914. These two articles incidentally summarise the principal different interpretations which have been given to the clause. Other papers relate more directly to American constitutional development and principles and also touch generally upon the fundamental differences which separate liberal constitutionalism and the totalitarian system.

* * * * *

The English Miss, To-day and Yesterday,† by Miss A. C. Percival, is an interesting survey of the history of women's education during the past century and aims at showing in particular the change of ideals in the education of girls and the subsequent growth of new types of schools. The material has been collected from many sources, including novels and memoirs, biographies of the pioneer women, Reports of the Royal Commissions and the Board of Education. The one danger of deducting historical fact from contemporary novels lies in the difficulty of gauging the exact depth of the author's personal bias. The novels of social life from Jane Austen to Charlotte Yonge perhaps rightly placed governesses and schools on a low level, but on the other hand future historians will receive poor impressions of many good schools of to-day if viewed from the works of contemporary novelists. The early chapters of the book are particularly interesting in showing the very different ideals and theories of girls' education in the first part of the century, and the resulting difficulties in the way of progress. Improvement meant more than better teaching, for it required a new outlook on social life and different ideals for daughters on the part of the older generation. The difficulties which the pioneer women had to overcome in order to obtain the benefits which the present generation receive as a

* Cambridge University Press. 15s. net.

† Harrap. 10s. 6d. net.

matter of course are clearly shown and should not be forgotten. The work of Miss Buss and Miss Beale, the Girls' Public Day School Trust, and others, and "the Assault on the Universities," as Miss Percival aptly terms it, has had an effect even more far-reaching than could have been imagined fifty years ago. In addition to the chapters on the High School and Public Schools, some account is given of convent and Non-conformist schools, and of Scottish education. The chapter on Primary Education so far as it deals with elementary schools seems somewhat out of place in a survey of this type; in any case it is too big a subject for compression into three-quarters of a chapter. One curious omission in this very interesting history is the lack of reference to either St. Hilda's, Oxford, or to the Society of Oxford Home Students.

The latest addition to *The Face of England* series is an attractive appreciation of *East Anglia** by Miss Doreen Wallace, who writes with a deep knowledge and understanding of the Eastern Counties, deemed here to include "everything east of the Great North Road," and as far north as Boston. Miss Wallace emphasises the "immense variety of scene" in this area of England so commonly misunderstood and condemned out of hand as dull and flat. This book should certainly assist in dispelling such ignorance, and in indicating the intrinsic beauties and peculiar characteristics of its countryside and the wealth of ancient architecture. Those who know East Anglia will be especially interested in, if not always agreeing with, Miss Wallace's comments on particular places. Essentially a book of the country, it passes very scantily over the larger towns: Cambridge receives less than a page. Out of her long experience the author has something to say of the characteristics of the local people, of local farming and of flora and fauna. The volume is illustrated by 158 photographs and sketches, which alone make the book worth having, apart from its excellent text.

Mr. S. P. B. Mais has compiled a short sketch of the growth and achievements of the London County Council in *Fifty Years of the L.C.C.*† It is a crisply written, appreciative account, full of facts and figures and amply illustrated with photographs and drawings. Unfortunately, however, the reader's pleasure is much reduced by the author's extensive use of the single-sentence paragraph which should remain, if at all, confined to popular journalism.

* Cambridge University Press. 4s. 6d. net.

† Batsford. 8s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

AUGUST 1939.

THE DEADLOCK ABROAD AND AT HOME.

ALL the signs point to the outbreak of a major crisis in August or early September. Over what issue would it arise? What is likely to be the result? And how are we preparing to meet it?

Let us take these three questions in order. No one but Herr Hitler—and perhaps not even he—can tell in what part of Europe an immediate issue would be staged. But that is of small account. The real issue has been stated, once and for all, by Lord Halifax in his speech of June 29th. British policy stands for the "preservation of international law and order" and "against the attempt by any single Power to dominate Europe at the expense of the liberties of other nations."

This policy only needed to be clearly stated to win general acceptance amongst all parties in this country—not to speak of its resonance throughout the world. As Lord Halifax added, it is a policy which follows "the inevitable line" of our history. Its proclamation was indeed long overdue. At last the country and the Empire know where they stand.

What is the application of this policy to the existing situation? To this question the speech gives an equally definite answer. It is twofold. "Our first resolve," said the Foreign Secretary, in the opening sentence of his analysis, "is to stop aggression." He recurred to this theme several times in the course of his address. "None of this formidable array," he declared, after having spoken of our military strength, "will be called into play *except in defence against aggression*." And again, a few sentences later, he said: "What is now fully and universally understood in this country, but what may not even yet be as well understood elsewhere, is that *in the event of further aggression*, we are resolved to use at once the whole of our strength in fulfilment of our pledges to resist it."

It is noticeable that in these passages the emphasis is laid on aggression in general, rather than on specific attacks on our allies or on guaranteed States. There is a clear warning to the Führer that he cannot hope to extract further strategic

advantages by pushing forward in this or that region which may not be covered by a specific guarantee. Indeed, this point is driven home in the passage of the speech where the conception of *Lebensraum* is subject to a devastating analysis. "If *Lebensraum* is to be applied in that sense, we reject it and *must resist* its application."

The other side of Lord Halifax's statement of immediate policy is the unequivocal declaration that it is impossible to enter upon any sort of negotiation so long as the German Government is in its present mood. This theme, too, is restated in several different forms, obviously with the object of making the meaning crystal-clear. "It is idle to cry peace where there is no peace." "The threat of military force is holding the world to ransom." "At this moment the doctrine of force bars the way to a settlement and fills the world with envy, hatred, malice and all uncharitableness." "It is impossible to negotiate with a government whose responsible spokesmen brand a friendly country as thieves and blackmailers and indulge in daily monstrous slanders on British policy in all parts of the world." On both sides of its application this policy is faced with a blank negation on the part of the Government of Germany. The doctrine of *Lebensraum* is invoked to justify the extension of German power over the whole of the east of the Continent regardless of the liberties of other peoples, and the gospel of force is more in evidence than ever.

Thus the issue is fairly joined. What is at stake is, in the first instance, the political future of Central and Eastern Europe—that is to say, the whole area between the Baltic, the Adriatic, the Black Sea and the Aegean. The peoples of this area have been struggling for the attainment of a free national life, not since 1918 but at least since the beginning of the nineteenth century. They have had to contend against the overlordship of Turkey and Russia, of Germany, Austria and Hungary—and sometimes against ambitions arising in their own ranks. These vicissitudes have left many scars. There is no space here to go into detail. Two broad facts stand out. One is that every one of these peoples desires to enjoy a real independence, free from domination either direct or indirect. The Power that threatens their independence to-day is Germany. The threat is in some cases so real that they dare not avow it. But that is not a reason for us to

pretend that it does not exist. The second outstanding fact is that there can be no settled peace, no "international law and order" in Europe, so long as the fate of these peoples remains in suspense. A settlement which left Germany in possession of the overlordship in this area would be no more than an uneasy truce. Lord Halifax's speech clearly recognises this. Is it equally recognised everywhere in the City of London? The attitude of the two British Directors of the Bank of International Settlements over the question of the Czecho-Slovak gold deposited in London gives point to the question.

But behind the fate of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe lies the question of the political destiny of Europe as a whole. None of the smaller peoples of Europe, north, south, east or west, at present enjoys assured independence. All are potential victims of the doctrine of force. Some, like the Swiss, are bracing themselves for a heroic resistance. Others, like the Danes, are displaying a more yielding temper. But all realise equally that the crisis involves a threat to their national existence and many of them are already conscious of subtle processes of interference with their own liberties and with the working of their institutions. Indeed, even the larger countries are not immune from this, as the French Premier, for one, made clear in his last speech to the Chamber. This is an intolerable situation which cannot be allowed to last.

But behind the problem of the political future of Europe lies an even more serious problem. The ruler of Germany has debased the moral currency of mankind. "Things are being done to-day," said Lord Halifax, in the gravest passage of his speech, "which we can hardly read without amazement, so alien are they to our conception of how men should deal with their fellow men. Rules of conduct between nations are overriden with the same callous indifference as rules of conduct between man and man." It was right that this should be said—and said with a touch of that moral indignation which has been too much out of fashion recently. One of the greatest dangers of the present time is that our moral perceptions should become blunted through passive acquiescence in the wicked policies of others.

Having examined the issues, let us consider the prospect. There are only three ways in which the coming crisis, in its acute form, can be brought to an end. The first is through

war. The second is through a settlement of the outstanding issues. The third is through a relaxation of the extreme tension and a relapse into a deadlock of the kind with which we have grown familiar. No one can say with any confidence that war will, or even can, be avoided. It seems clear that the German people, who clearly manifested their feelings on this subject last September, have not changed in this respect in the intervening months. But this is not a determining factor and may, in a manufactured crisis, not even be of much importance. Herr Hitler is a past master in the management of opinion and there is ample evidence that the German people do not appreciate the significance of the extinction of Czech independence or the reasons for the change of British policy. The decision for or against resort to war rests therefore solely with Herr Hitler. So far he has shown a preference for a cunning rather than for a foolhardy course. It is for us to convince him that to attempt to renew the tactics of last summer and autumn would be to court not merely failure but disaster. Herein lies the vital importance of our own attitude and of our preparation for meeting the crisis. It is not too much to say that the keys of peace are now in London rather than in Berlin. To this we will return later.

We have seen that so long as the German authorities are not willing to abandon their policy of European hegemony the road to a settlement is barred. Let us therefore consider the remaining alternative. The continuation of the present deadlock, of the "white war," as it is called, is a painful prospect. Apart from its moral aspect, it entails a large measure of human suffering—far more than is commonly realised. The standard of life is being dragged down all over Europe and hundreds of thousands of refugees, whose lot might be lightened by an ending of the crisis, are forced to continue a comfortless existence. Nevertheless the existing deadlock is preferable to war—provided that wise policy ensures that it does not end in war.

The "white war" is waged on two fronts—the psychological and the economic. We hear talk of "a battle of nerves." Those who put such language about are skilled in working upon the superficial plane of public opinion. They rely on so confusing an issue by the misleading use of slogans that the victims finally drop the subject out of tedium and let the aggressor have his way. "Self-determination for the

Sudeten Germans" was the slogan last year. "Danzig is a German city" is the slogan just now. There may be another to-morrow. Happily, we in this country are not very susceptible to onslaughts of this kind when we are sure of the major issue, as, in contrast with last year, we are to-day. "The battle of nerves" is not therefore likely to worry us very much.

On the economic plane the position is still more advantageous for us. The details of the German economy are veiled from our eyes, though every now and then a corner of the curtain is lifted. It is however clear that the continuance of the self-sufficiency policy which is, in essence, not an economic policy at all but a military policy, will sooner or later put the rulers of Germany before a dilemma. They will have to choose between maintaining their ambitions at the cost of misery at home or restoring tolerable conditions at home at the cost of renouncing their ambitions.

This dilemma, which looms before them, is not the result of any action on the part of the allied governments. It arises from the very nature of the German policy. No doubt there are very many private citizens in all the civilised countries who have for some years past refrained from buying German goods; but this is a matter which concerns no one but themselves. So far as the governments are concerned, there is no economic war. Indeed, one of the reasons which has no doubt inspired the German tactic of "bloodless victory" is that, so long as the guns have not gone off, we are precluded from using the strongest weapon in our armoury—our control over the "war-potential." The rearmament of Germany has been carried through very largely by the use of British mineral resources. No one knows this better than the German military authorities.

No, Germany's coming economic dilemma arises from the simple fact that she has adopted an economic policy which runs clean contrary to the natural lines of her economic development. As the greatest manufacturing country on the Continent of Europe it is Germany's obvious interest to buy and sell as freely as possible in the markets of the world. She must either export or reduce her standard of life. Herr Hitler, in a moment of candour last January put it more strongly still—"export or perish." The self-sufficiency policy was adopted in order to render Germany immune from blockade.

But the irony of the situation is that by rendering herself for a limited period immune from blockade, Germany has greatly handicapped herself for the prosecution of a war of any duration. The result is that her chance of winning a war is no greater than it was when she was more exposed to blockade. The only way in which she can win is by a lightning attack—an attack on our fleet, which might give her the physical supremacy and an attack on our cities, such as might break our morale and lead to our capitulation. When this has been tried and has failed victory is out of the question and defeat is only a question of time—of inexorable time.

Here comes in the importance of the answer to our third question: what are we doing to prepare for the crisis? Our preparations should be inspired with a double object. We should make ourselves strong enough to play our part in “preserving international law and order” and freeing Europe from the menace of hegemony. But we should also aim at convincing the rulers of Germany that our resolution to adhere to this declared policy is unshakable. For it is only when they feel this in their bones that they will begin to consider the only possible exit from the deadlock—a change in their own policy. This second aim should really take precedence over the first: for what we all desire is not to win the war but to prevent its outbreak. And there is no other way of loosening the present deadlock, with its perpetual danger of catastrophe, than by inducing the rulers of Germany to turn their minds to more reasonable policies.

Are we doing all that we can to attain this primary object? It is at this point that our domestic politics impinge upon foreign affairs. Not only is this aspect of our preparation unsatisfactory, but it is not going too far to say that our domestic affairs and their present handling are a major factor in the continuance of the existing deadlock with its constant danger of war.

The situation is indeed paradoxical. The Government has been compelled to reverse its policy and to adopt that of the Opposition. Under the normal working of our institutions this should have led to a change of government; for it is not usual for a government, without change of personnel, to adore what it recently burnt and to burn what it recently adored. But this anomaly might be excused, in the interests of national unity, if the conversion were universally felt to be sincere. But

unfortunately no such conviction exists, either at home or abroad, either in the House of Commons, or in Fleet Street, or in the constituencies (as the large proportion of abstentions at by-elections reveals), or in Berlin or Moscow, the two places where it is most needed.

It is very difficult for the plain citizen, anxious to do his duty in the crisis, to feel any patience with the reasons put forward for the refusal to remove this paralysing doubt by the one simple expedient which lies ready to the Prime Minister's hand—the inclusion in the Cabinet of ex-Ministers on the Government side whose clear-sightedness in the past and inflexible resolution in the present are well known and carry conviction throughout the world. Only the most compelling reasons of State would seem to justify continued resistance to what has now become almost an instinctive popular demand. The reasons alleged do not, to say the least, appear to fall within this category. What other conclusion can the ordinary citizen draw but that the Foreign Secretary's statement of policy has not won the whole-hearted approval of all his colleagues and that some of those who have been guilty of ignorance and bad judgment in the past are still secretly clinging to their old errors?

Thus, in spite of the clarion call of Lord Halifax, the country is being compelled by those in charge of its destinies to face the coming crisis with a sense of frustration which blunts its diplomatic initiative and depresses its morale just at the time when both should be at their highest—when a little added weight in the scales may determine the gravest events. Heavy indeed is the responsibility of those who, with their eyes open, are exposing themselves and their country to this dangerous handicap.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

MAMMON VERSUS MARS IN CHINA.

ALMOST suddenly the struggle in China has become a matter not so much of arms as of money. In one sense the Japanese action at Tientsin is a confession of the failure of armed force, but the Japanese might prefer to say that it only shows that to demonstrate a superiority in armed force is only the first stage in conquest and that in order to complete it the upper hand must be obtained over money as well. Two years of war have had effects extremely disappointing for Japan. The Japanese and Chinese figures of their achievements in mutual killing are hopelessly at variance, but even if we take the Japanese figures at their face value, it is apparent that Japan is wasting tremendous energies and getting nowhere except farther and farther into a hostile country. Only by substituting complete economic domination for military conquest can they achieve the mastery of China; hence the trouble about the foreign concessions, which, microscopic as they are in comparison with China as a whole, have assumed a real importance which Japan now finds extremely inconvenient in view of her repeated promises to respect the rights of other Powers in China—so inconvenient, indeed, that she does not hesitate to break her word or to show her exasperation in her method of doing so. The more destructive war she carries on in China the longer will her own economic recovery be delayed, and the less will be her hope of recovering the cost of the campaign, so she is endeavouring to shorten the war.

The fact of there being "treaty ports," with foreign concessions at some of them, indicates an understanding on the part of the Treaty Powers that they will not take such action as will interfere with one another's rights; and where the concessions have been amalgamated they have given excellent examples of public spirit and of international co-operation, the Japanese in Shanghai alone endeavouring to encroach and to make national what it had been agreed should be international.

It is this system of treaty rights which gives the present war its peculiar character. War itself is no novelty in a world that has always professed to desire peace. Its vastness, its cruelty, its unrighteousness are not such as history would give us any warrant for thinking impossible; nor are the

buffetings of the greater at the hands of the less, neither are the grotesque miscalculations of scientific soldiers. There are, it is true, novelties of technique: the air arm, for instance, is a new sort of artillery with a range of hundreds of miles; but though it has made possible a penetration of a couple of thousand miles, it has not made effective occupation of these wide areas possible.

Two years have passed without Japan gaining her object, and this has caused an exasperation which the military men do little to conceal. If at the beginning they had had a reasonable cause for declaring war, they might have been able to declare therewith a blockade of the whole coast of China; but declaring a blockade is a ticklish business. A blockade, to be "legal," is supposed to be "effective," and there would have been a loud outcry about the impossibility of such an extensive blockade being effective. Nor would the Powers interested in trading with China have been at all disposed to recognise the right of one of their number to turn them all out, with the alternative, if they did not quit at once, of receiving no more consideration than the citizens of the enemy country. So unashamed a declaration of the most predatory ambitions would also have evoked the protests of the whole world. And a world in this frame of mind would have had before it the example of the going into effect of the American Neutrality Act. It has been argued that this Act cuts off supplies of guns and ammunition rather than of materials essential to the making of war; but there can be no doubt that Japan's abstention of any declaration of war was dictated by the fear that an indignant world would cut off supplies of materials essential for the conduct of war.

Although the general feeling throughout the world has been one of sympathy with China and of disbelief in the Japanese protestations, business is still business; the manufacturer does not feel called upon to consider ethical problems when fulfilling an order, and the plain truth of the matter is that, by trade with the belligerents remaining open, Japan has benefited far more than China. While she has expressed the utmost indignation at arms being supplied to China, she has purchased great quantities of all the materials needed by her own well-equipped arsenals.

However, in world affairs of this order of magnitude, pure advantages are hardly to be looked for. While Japan refrained

from a declaration of war for her own advantage, she took every care to make things as difficult as possible for foreign traders, paying, indeed, undue attention to those points where groups of foreigners were gathered together, whom they made as uncomfortable as possible short of making an open breach which would have involved several Powers at once.

European and American trade with China was effectually damaged and occidental prestige was successfully lowered; but while the Japanese staff calculated safely enough that they could go a long way without interference—calculations which were politely confirmed by the mildness of the Notes of protesting Powers—there were matters nearer home that they had failed to foresee. They knew well enough that the China they were attacking was not the China of 1894. It was because the country was showing signs of a new centralisation and efficiency that they attacked it. Moreover, Britain's £1,200,000,000 rearmament budget was a sign of two things—first that she was, for the moment at least, in a position that would disincline her to be very censorious about Japan's actions; and secondly, that she might be in a very different temper if by the time her rearmament was completed the preoccupations that had caused it had passed away.

The first of the things that the Japanese General Staff had not foreseen was that not only was China not the China of 1894, but that she was not even the China of 1932. General Chiang Kai-shek had sometimes spoken in terms of exasperation of Japanese actions, but he had also maintained the opinion that it was necessary to crush the internal dissension caused through the Communist movement before the Japanese problem could be tackled. He had made no counter-attack to recover Manchuria, and had left without support the 19th Route Army which fought so heroically at Shanghai in the early part of 1932. He had already been labouring for ten years for the unification of China, the suppression of dissidents, and the improvement of the civil and military machine, when there came that dramatic incident of his "kidnapping" at Sian, and his agreement with the Communist leaders that the position was such that instead of fighting they must co-operate to defend the threatened integrity of China.

The first reaction on the part of Japan seemed to be reassuring. A Japanese economic mission visited North China to seek "economic co-operation," but returned without

accomplishing anything. While this has been cited as evidence of Japan's desire for friendship, the Chinese account of it is that it amounted to a demand that China should deliver her resources into Japan's hands—an account which Japan's demand, in respect of Tientsin and the other ports, that Britain should "co-operate" with her in setting up the New Order in East Asia, makes entirely credible. The mission did not merely fail: it aroused a new opposition. The Chinese bourgeoisie of the North were "realists" to the last degree. They had little faith in politicians or militarists, but believed that the best thing to do with them was to buy them off on the best terms that could be made. But now there was a new spirit among them. They felt their very existence threatened by Japan's offer of economic co-operation, and joined with the Communists in urging General Chiang Kai-shek to save China before it went the way of Manchuria. Japan did not wait, but struck her blow on July 7th, 1937, just outside Peking, where she already had soldiers straddling the junctions where the railways parted for Tientsin and Nanking, and for Paotingfu and Hankow.

Japan's military men know their business as soldiers well enough. They miscalculated the Chinese spirit of resistance, but their arms have been successful against superior numbers, demonstrating that machinery counts for more than men in modern war. But they have a rather simple faith in money also. In the days when General Count Terauchi was Premier, 1916-18, he dealt much more gently with China than had his civilian predecessor, Marquis Okuma, but tried to conquer China with loans. In the present campaign the Japanese have found it not extraordinarily difficult, even when the Chinese resistance was most desperate, to gain a foothold, but this is a different thing from holding the economic power. Puppet governments may be set up, but to what end, when nobody will obey the puppets, except to the extent that they may be compelled by Japanese bayonets to do so? It seemed to the military men a short cut to economic control (to give the process its most euphonious name) to enforce the use of a new currency issued by themselves and depending for its value only on power.

Accordingly the new currency was printed, rates of exchange were fixed, the currency of the Chinese Government was declared illegal and its possession criminal. But the people,

even in areas under occupation, had an insuperable prejudice against the Japanese issues. The trade which went on through the open ports and the British and American credits that financed it kept up the credit of the Chinese Government currency, which declined in value, but remained superior to the Japanese counterfeits, and refused to collapse. That a method which had succeeded in Manchukuo should fail in other parts of China was exasperating. The Japanese military men, incapable of acknowledging their own ineptitude when it came to anything more constructive than the use of high explosives, naturally sought scapegoats, and blamed the existence of the open ports, the foreign settlements in some of them, and particularly the British, whose interest was the greatest obstacle to a Japanese monopoly so long as it remained undestroyed. The settlements have been chiefly blamed for being centres of anti-Japonism (as though the Chinese dislike for particularly cruel and arrogant invaders needed explaining), and for being a means of supporting the Chinese dollar and discrediting the Japanese forced issues.

The Concessions have been of some moral support to China, but not so much as some of us would like to think, and far less than the Japanese now contend. The warm sympathy which many foreigners in China feel for the Chinese in their struggle has, no doubt, been a sustaining force; but the fact that most governments have avoided expressing an opinion and that more war material has been sold to Japan than to China only emphasises the feeling that the Chinese have for long past had reason to entertain regarding the sentiments of the Occident—that these are summed up in the phrase, “It’s your money we want.” Some even of the foreigners in China frankly think that Chinese nationalism and patriotism are confounded nuisances and have done more harm to business than the Japanese would do. The actions of the Japanese, however, have long since lost them the good opinion of those who were inclined to wish for a quick decision in their favour and to believe that, after all, economic requirements rather than politics are the deciding factor in business.

The manner in which the violation of foreign rights in China by the Japanese has progressed from step to step tempts one to believe that if in August 1937 the Powers which kept warships in Chinese waters to protect their interests had told

Japan very firmly that they could not permit those interests to be endangered by fighting, the war would never have extended south of the Yellow River. Such speculations are vain at this date, however. No doubt the Japanese expected the Kuomintang Government to collapse when they had taken Nanking, but as it did not, they continued the attack.

It has been pointed out that the longer the war lasts, the less disparity is there between Chinese and Japanese casualties, and the slower is Japanese progress. It is an enormous change since the days of the capture of Manchuria. Then, the Japanese found moral support in the dictum of Dr. Thomas Baty, the eminent English authority on international law, who has long been attached to the Foreign Office in Tokyo:

The fact of statehood depends on a clear objective test. The fact that a government is in supreme control in a given territory, whilst no serious attempt is being made by a former ruler to reduce it to submission, is conclusive that a new State has arisen there.

China, preoccupied with internal troubles and believing that the League of Nations would be able to redress her wrongs, made no serious attempt, though some Manchurian Herewards are still holding their fastnesses. But it cannot be said that General Chiang Kai-shek is not making a serious attempt to eject the invader. The Japanese pretence that they have created new States with provisional governments does not deceive even themselves. They have enlisted very few respectable Chinese under their New Order banner, but a great many whose incompetence and corruption made China a byword during the first fourteen years of the Republic.

They have, however, by hindering the trade of other countries and forcing their own, and by imposing a currency on the occupied areas which has only bayonets instead of gold or silver to back it, attempted by economic pressure to secure a domination which the terror of their arms failed to achieve. The passive resistance of the Chinese made this as slow a process as the effective conquest by arms; and though the Japanese nation has been warned that the war may go on for years, the military men are realising that a mere stalemate can only bring ruin, and that time is draining their resources. It is easier to make war without declaring war than it is to impose a blockade without declaring a blockade; but to

blockade the whole Chinese coast was the task which the Japanese set themselves. Chinese shipping was, of course, dealt with easily enough, and though it was impossible to make war on international shipping approaching or leaving the treaty ports, bombs were dropped from time to time on the towns, landings made occasionally, and threats uttered in plenty. Canton was bombed so outrageously that there were international protests; but the Cantonese could not be deterred from their work, so at last, in October 1938, landings were effected and Canton was attacked from the land side, and the railway from the British enclave at Kowloon to Canton was cut.

This sidetracked Hong Kong and cut off the means of access to the upper Yangtse, upon whose waters the Japanese did not allow any but their own steamers to ply, whatever treaties might say about it. In a few days Hankow was captured. The sidetracking of Hong Kong was the most audacious thing that the Japanese had yet done, but it "came off." Yet, even with Hankow and Canton lost, there was still no sign of Chinese submission. Indeed, progress by armed force became slower than ever. It was humiliating to the Japanese militarists to acknowledge that Chinese resistance was too stubborn to admit of easy conquest, and it was dangerous too. At the beginning Japan's propagandists had claimed it as a virtue that the war was not popular, but was viewed as a regrettable necessity; but now it was seen with alarm that the propagandists had become prophets and that the soldiers in the field were tired of their shameful task and the people at home tired of tightening their belts. Only the profiteers were really enjoying themselves.

The blockade, therefore, had to be made effectual, if possible without the "incident" becoming "war," and a diversion was sought in an anti-British campaign. Foreign trade was keeping up China's end economically, and, if the British part of it could be stopped, the rest would be easily dealt with. To concentrate against Britain would also help to keep her competitors quiet—until their turn came. More bombs and the worrying of shipping at ports like Ningpo, Swatow, Foochow, etc., contributed towards the destruction but did not operate quickly enough. Amoy was a port which Japan had wanted for her own ever since she acquired Formosa; but the little foreign settlement there on an island

of its own—Kulangsu—was international. Tientsin was therefore marked down for the scene of decisive action, for here was a British concession. On the false yet "realistic" assumption that wherever Japanese troops were in occupation in the near neighbourhood other national interests were bound to regard Chinese sovereignty as being vested in the Japanese command, the Japanese demanded the surrender of Chinese whom they had chosen to bear the blame for the murder of a Chinese—one of Japan's creatures—on the British Concession. This was naturally refused, as there was no reason to believe that they were the real murderers.

This refusal supplied the necessary excuse for further action. There is no need to recapitulate the story of the blockade, of electrified barbed wire, of delays and insults at totally illegal barriers. The Japanese have announced from the beginning that the only terms on which they will cease to make life in the British Concession shameful and intolerable are that Britain shall co-operate with Japan in creating the New Order in China. Britain should be grateful for being spared the insult of an offer of a share in the plunder. The co-operation is to be gratis. If the British Concession agrees to surrender all Chinese persons and property (including a very large quantity of silver bullion), to obey all Japanese restrictions and regulations, to use the valueless Japanese currency and to do their business entirely through the Yokohama Specie Bank, then the British will be permitted to continue in occupation of the Concession until such time as the Puppet Government shall decree the abolition of all such anachronisms.

China has fought Japan almost to a standstill. If the British throw in their hand the other foreign interests must follow suit, and this will enable Japan to complete the blockade without any penalties whatever, and may enable her to complete the reduction of China to another and greater Manchukuo, or a whole series of Manchukuos—unless, indeed, the Chinese continue to show their heroic determination not to be enslaved even after all the Powers, who at Washington on February 6th, 1922, undertook to preserve her integrity, have betrayed her.

A. MORGAN YOUNG.

BRITAIN AND AMERICA, NOW.

ON July 11th the Committee of the United States Senate decided, by the narrowest vote, not to accede to Mr. Roosevelt's call for the removal from the Neutrality Act of 1937 of the absolute embargo on munitions to belligerents. The President had asked for this amendment on the ground that it was vital to the United States, in view especially of the grim possibility of war and the imminent adjournment of Congress. The result of the vote is that the prolonged debate upon Neutrality is suspended in Washington, though not in the country, with the prospect of a special session of Congress in the autumn. A month ago it seemed probable that the President would get his way in respect of the crucial clauses of the Act. His defeat is serious, for it announces in emphatic terms the unwillingness of Congress to entrust Mr. Roosevelt with such powers in a war emergency as would not be refused to a Chief Executive whose leadership in international affairs was of a different character. Meanwhile, we have the word of Ex-President Hoover to the effect that "if the people of the United States have not the will to stay out of war, no amount of neutrality legislation will keep them out."

The debates centred in the Neutrality Act have grown more angry, and more confused, since the successive shocks to the American public suffered in September and March. Among the many changes in public sentiment only one major fact, perhaps, is clearly evident, namely, that an increasing percentage of the American people is convinced that if war should come in Europe, it will be impossible for the United States to maintain the isolationist position. Recent observers, aided by the frequent Gallup polls of public opinion, have been led to these three conclusions: (1) that isolationist sentiment is still very strong, and is by no means confined to the Middle West; (2) that a great and growing number of Americans are losing hope of peace and of the Republic's non-participation in some form; and (3), that there could be no possibility, if a decision has to be made, of the United States being on the side hostile to the European democracies.

In all this it is plain that the relations, present and possible, between Great Britain and the United States are always in the near background of Congress and the general public.

Those relations, of course, are supremely important, and we may take it as certain that the present year will not end, no matter what the turn of events in Europe, without the current issues becoming more sharply defined. If it be true, as very many have testified, that the difficulties and perils of Britain have never been so sympathetically viewed as they are to-day, it is no less true that British policy during the past two years has caused much misgiving, dismay and suspicion throughout the United States. In this article I will deal with some aspects of the problem that are too commonly overlooked. But first I must make brief reference to the unprecedented, and most agreeable, happenings of the early summer.

There is little that one need add to the multiple record of the Royal Tour. Newspapers, radio and news-reels have fulfilled to admiration the task of complete publicity which has now at last become practicable. They have borne witness to a truly amazing success, to something which, by universal agreement, went beyond all standards of comparison. The American people expressed their feeling with entire spontaneity, and the King and Queen responded, through five most exacting days, with perfect simplicity, cordiality, and grace. It may be interesting now to recall that among the firmest of England's friends in America there were many who had misgivings about the enterprise in advance. Such misgivings were understandable; and the fact that they were felt on both sides was made oddly evident to Americans, and particularly to the press correspondents, by repeated inquiries from members of the entourage, before the arrival in Washington, as to whether it was thought that the royal visitors would be safe! The police mind, of course, was at work here, as doubtless it had to be. The answer came in the overwhelming enthusiasm of the American people, culminating in the terrific spectacle of New York on June 10th.

During the month of the North American tour the newspapers of the two countries were an accurate index of the popular feeling. From day to day every journal devoted many pages to the tour. At the week-end of the visit to the World's Fair the leading New York papers were startlingly lavish. The descriptive writers were encouraged to spread themselves on the daily scenes and incidents, while the women reporters revelled in everything connected with the

Queen. "If you want to sell an Empire," wrote one of these, "retain a Queen as saleslady," and a Queen with a parasol. America provided a demonstration, exceeding all forecasts, of the extraordinary appeal that monarchy makes to modern democratic peoples, and most emphatically, it would seem, to a nation of republicans who have inherited a tradition of positive hostility to the British Crown. The American nation, as we know, has cherished that tradition. Every English speaker in the United States has had to be prepared for queries concerning the continuance of "this King business," as it was almost invariably called. The old feeling was expressed in all parts of the country until the later years of King George V, when, for reasons easily to be understood, there spread throughout the United States a new understanding of the character and functions of constitutional monarchy. King George VI and his Consort have carried this good work a great deal further. Henceforward when, or if, Americans ask for an explanation of the continuance of monarchy in a world of fallen thrones, we shall be able to reply: But you, yourselves, have told the world!

I call attention to one special point which English people as a whole have not had an opportunity of noting for themselves. The common belief is that the King and Queen did not meet the full force of an American welcome until they crossed the Canadian frontier. The reports of the tour through the West do not bear this out. Here is one illustration. A halt was made for Sunday at a remote spot in Saskatchewan. The population of the township is about 2,800. When the royal party attended morning service at the United Church the crowd that had assembled from the farms and little towns of a wide region was estimated at 40,000. There were calls for the King and Queen to step down into the multitude. With their unfailing promptitude and friendliness they complied, and the scene which followed was too much for the descriptive powers of the American correspondents present. The huge crowd was composed of people belonging to many European races, including some Doukhobors from Old Russia. They gave way to frantic enthusiasm. Men wrung the King's hand, clutched his arm, thumped him on the back. Women threw themselves upon the Queen, flung their arms round her, smothered her in kisses, held up their children for the royal touch. And their

Majesties took it as the people knew they would, emerging from the ordeal quite unruffled. Such incidents call for no gloss. They occurred in communities far from the centres of population, among men and women who in lives of unremitting toil had never had a glimpse of anything actual coming out of the world of wonder made known to them by the moving pictures. Henceforward they were able to tell one another that they had been much closer to the King and Queen than any of the people in England could have been.

This scene was enacted in a prairie town of the Canadian North-West. It embodied a basic and invincible human feeling. George VI is the King of Canada; but we may be sure that the outburst of popular emotion would not have been essentially different if their Majesties had appeared in Kansas or Dakota. Moreover, our peoples know that in this age it is not the monarchs who have to be feared. But all the same it is most important for the British people that the wrong political conclusions should not be drawn from the spontaneous and heartening demonstrations of the tour.

I have spoken of the constantly changing issues between Britain and the United States. The first important thing to note in this connection is the growth of American interest in world affairs. It is a thoroughly critical interest, and it goes along with an increasing body of informed opinion among ordinary folk. Any speaker on current events can test this for himself: the questions from the audience that he is expected to answer will be no less pointedly worded in St. Louis or Denver than in Philadelphia or Boston. The American public to-day has an interest in world events which I believe to be more extensive, and often more definite, than could be found in any other country. This is largely to be explained as a result of education through the radio; and—a point of special importance to ourselves—the enlargement of the national consciousness has brought with it a new and positive criticism of British action and policy.

Now, in any effort to form an estimate of American attitudes and judgment, we must begin by recognising as a permanent factor the long-established suspicion of the British Empire and its methods. There would appear to be no news value for the American Press in any other imperial system. The corps of American foreign correspondents contains many able journalists not a few of whom have had considerable

experience in and around the less tranquil portions of the British Empire. Nearly all those whom I know are fair-minded, but I think I am accurate in saying that they share the traditional American view of the British system, especially in Asia. No sensible person would want to complain of this, and every competent writer, for instance, on India during the past twenty years must recognise that we owe to straightforward American correspondents no small part of the direct record of happenings from the beginning of Mr. Gandhi's civil disobedience crusade. But we are entitled to demand accuracy and consistency in our critics, and particularly, I should urge, a fair recognition of the important fact that in India there is now going forward a constitutional transition to which no parallel can be found in the annals of empire.

I will take Mr. John Gunther as the most immediate illustration of what I have in mind. His *Inside Europe* gained the suffrages of an immense body of readers all over the world, and he has reason to anticipate a corresponding success for his new conspectus, *Inside Asia*. Travelling from the Far East to India he was interested, naturally, to discover that the Indianisation of the public services had been carried far. The covenanted Indian Civil Service at present contains rather less than 600 Englishmen—that is, a trifle over 50 per cent. Mr. Gunther's comment is :

The British say that by this process they are educating Indians in the responsibilities of government ; meanwhile in effect they buy off discontent with good jobs, good careers. This is probably the most successful imperialist device ever invented.

Mr. Gunther should know that this observation is singularly irrelevant. Discontent is a mass phenomenon, and notably so in countries such as India (and the United States) where the universities, in pursuance of methods that are obviously defective, turn out many thousands of young men for whom there are relatively few jobs and almost no good careers of the kind indicated by Mr. Gunther. No, the justification for the transformation of the public services is that India, under the Government of India Act, is advancing towards the control of her own affairs. And qualified Indians must administer. The advance is admittedly slow, but we may assume with confidence that the movement cannot be seriously impeded, unless the abyss of general war should lie ahead. The new

Indian Governments are anything but ideal. But they stand as evidence of that element in the British system which constitutes its claim to originality—the self-reforming principle, by virtue of which the fulfilment of constitutional freedom is attainable.

In any case, India remains a permanent difficulty in Anglo-American relations. During the past twenty years it has aroused a continuous, though variable, interest throughout the United States. The interest will not decrease, and we cannot look for any material change in its character. Mr. Gandhi always, Mr. Nehru and the National Congress, Hindu-Moslem disturbances, the unrest arising from the new position of the Untouchables—these and many other topics ensure the prominence of India in the news, and very rarely, we must remember, in a fashion which implies credit for the Administration. Nor can we ignore in this connection the increasing gravity of the situation in Palestine and beyond. Here, as in some other regions of the world, it would seem that, whatever the pressure of the forces amid which the British Government is labouring and deciding, coming events are certain to bring serious repercussions in the United States. We cannot, I fear, look for much active sympathy in respect of our responsibilities under the Mandate. Pro-Zionist feeling in America is intensely powerful, while at the same time there is heard the severest condemnation of the British authorities for failure to keep or restore order amid conditions altogether unmanageable. Moreover, Turkey and the new alliance create a fresh difficulty, since the cession of Alexandretta, the key to Syria, will be interpreted by many Americans as an obscure move in policy which in the end may imperil the best of those results for which the peoples of the Near and Middle East are indebted to Allenby's armies. In a word, the burdens and perplexities of Britain east of the Levant are playing their part, along with the bitter memories of Munich and Prague and the hideous possibilities of Danzig, in bedevilling the newer efforts towards that understanding without which there can be no hope for the world.

It seems, however, not improbable that all other questions affecting the relations of Britain and the United States may in the near future be subordinated to the problems of the Pacific and the advance of Japanese aggression. Throughout the United States there exists an almost universal suspicion

of British policy in the Far East, and it is not difficult to state the definite beginning of this feeling in its present stage. It goes back to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the diplomatic activities during the winter of 1931-2. An unusually wide acquaintance with American audiences leads me to the conclusion that the large public which is now interested in world affairs holds certain positive opinions on this subject, for example: that Mr. H. L. Stimson, then Secretary of State, offered Britain and the League Powers full co-operation for the restraint of Japan in Manchuria, and met with a curt refusal from Sir John Simon, who, as Foreign Secretary, was a representative of "the Shanghai mind" and was favourable to the Japanese enterprise. Now we must in candour admit that Sir John Simon was at that time unfortunate in manner and sadly mistaken in technique. When Mr. Stimson announced the principle of non-recognition of conquests acquired by military aggression, the Foreign Secretary intimated that Britain was not interested, since Japan had given renewed assurances as to the maintenance of the Open Door. He thus missed his chance of going along step by step in such action as Mr. Stimson was empowered to propose. Economic sanctions, manifestly, were out of the question. Mr. Stimson could not offer them. The United States was outside the League; American public opinion was overwhelmingly isolationist; the Hoover Government was precluded from all action which would have implied part responsibility for the application of economic pressure. Clearly, Mr. Stimson's plea for joint action under the Nine-Power Treaty fell far short of co-operation with Britain in a League policy of restraint, and I do not think that Mr. Stimson's statement of the case in his book can be made to support the view that has since become American orthodoxy. Sir John Simon, it would seem, failed to envisage the significance of Manchuria, and he lost a most valuable opportunity of establishing limited co-operation with Washington. More than limited, it could not have been; and we have to face the fact, made entirely plain in the course of later events, that such coercive action as the League might have attempted would have produced little result as regards the invasion. Nothing short of full combined action by Britain, the United States and Russia could have availed, and the mere mention of this is sufficient to proclaim its impossibility seven years ago. Here, nevertheless, is the important

fact: the American public in general is convinced that Mr. Stimson tendered full co-operation in a policy of checking a great imperialist adventure, that the British Foreign Office rejected the offer, and that the fateful consequences of this refusal are now writ large over Africa and Europe as well as in the Far East.

These things must be borne in mind if we would understand the tone of the debates in Congress upon Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy and the anxiety over the trend of events in the Far East displayed on all sides. The American press and public are decisively on the side of China in the present conflict, and no less decisively against the aims and methods of an aggressive Japan. But that is popular sentiment. The central contradiction here, of course, is that the unmistakable feeling of the American people finds no expression in Government policy—nor could it do so; and that a high percentage of essential war materials, without which the invasion of China could not be continued, is being supplied from the United States, as from the British Empire, to Japan. And in the meantime we have the immense complication produced by the closing of the Yangste, the threats to Shanghai, and the multiplying affronts of Tientsin and other treaty ports.

The stages in the attitude of the American public towards the Far East are full of interest. It would be true to say that for ten years after the Washington treaties of 1922 there was an almost complete cessation of alarms. The suspension of naval competition was a marked relief; one heard nothing of the menace of fortified islands, and there was no misgiving with regard to American interests in the concessions. The invasion of China in 1937 and the sinking of the warship *Panay* brought a change over the whole scene.

The growing anxiety of America, especially since the blockade of Swatow and Tientsin, is plain enough. But nothing that has occurred so far has materially impaired the American will to avoid war with Japan. There is still, as we can see, the strongest disposition to look upon Tientsin, the threats to Shanghai, and the southward thrust of Japan as the immediate concern of the British Empire. For how much longer, one is led to ask, can this attitude be maintained?

Britain's position in the Far East is that of a commercial Power, plainly subject to rapid change and before long to serious modification. It is impossible, for example, not to

see that the nineteenth-century system of treaty ports and extra-territorial privilege is already doomed. Great Britain, in a word, cannot be a Great Power on the Pacific. The United States, on the contrary, is that by ineluctable destiny, and therefore the American people cannot be indifferent to the character and aims of the imperialist Power now dominating the Western Pacific. The United States, moreover, has been established in the Philippines for forty years. The American achievement there is unique. The Administration has set a standard for other colonial Powers; the economic enterprises are the beginnings of an immense expansion. The Filipinos have attained self-government, and by the Act of Independence they should be cut off, in 1946, from the power and the money of Uncle Sam. Can that happen amid the developments in the Pacific that we have witnessed in the past decade? Or, if we turn to the American record in China, since the transition from the earlier missions to the wonderfully varied American enterprises in education, technical training, and public health, with the unique contribution of the great American foundations—is it conceivable that the United States should propose or accept a policy of abandonment? That would seem to me fantastic. New China is largely the creation of America. And yet it is impossible to deny or to minimise the evidence in support of withdrawal that is to be met with in all sections of the United States.

How is it, one is led to ask, that writers and speakers are content to take refuge in a ritual phrase? "Pulling England's chestnuts out of the fire": how singular and baffling that an expression so trivial should haunt the publicists of three continents, and come as naturally to the tongue of Governor La Follette in Wisconsin or that brilliant New York writer, Mr. Lewis Mumford, as to that of a Hearst employee or Herr Hitler himself! What has the new China to do with England's chestnuts? The future of the Philippines, with their incalculable potentialities, the swift expansion of the Pacific air-routes, with the pivotal islands scattered over the ocean, the momentous and inevitable apportionment of vast spheres of activity and development between the white races and the brown? Let us all think again, study large maps, and find other and more adequate forms of speech for the movements and forces which, before our own eyes, are breaking and re-shaping the world.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

WHITHER FRANCO'S SPAIN?

TO-DAY the war in the Iberian Peninsula is ended and victory has come to General Franco at a time of intense diplomatic activity in the course of which the attitudes of different European countries are becoming clearly defined. Up to the present the true attitude of Spain has not emerged. Soon, however, Franco will be called upon to declare not only in words but actions the policy which he has without any doubt already determined to pursue.

It is obvious to most people that Franco and his supporters must feel themselves drawn to the Rome-Berlin Axis by gratitude for the help received in money, men and war material, by an undeniable ideological affinity (for, to say the least, Franco is no democrat) and by an identity of views regarding international policy. There are some, however, who do not see that, as a logical consequence of three years of war, the Allies—Spain, Germany and Italy—should want to consolidate their position by concluding a firmer alliance. Even Franco's deliberate step of joining the Anti-Comintern Pact is not accepted as conclusive evidence of his intention eventually to throw in his lot with the Axis Powers. Spain's political traditions and economic needs, it is argued, are fixed beyond the power of the totalitarian states to change them and must in the long run draw Spain close to the Governments of London and Paris.

Considerable reliance is being placed on the influence of favourable elements in Spain towards bringing about a *rapprochement*. Undoubtedly there are capitalist circles, of which Señor March is the leading representative, who desire an *entente* with the City. There is also a section of the aristocracy who favour a policy approved by England. Various elements of the old *Accion Popular* organisations, and also certain Church dignitaries, afraid of the spiritual consequences of totalitarianism, would support a régime which possessed a constitutional and pacific character, and was opposed to international or internal adventures.

These circles, however, are not in command at present, and, although supposing that in the long run they may be factors operating against Franco, there are no indications that in the immediate future they can modify the essentials of the situation. In the struggle of tendencies they have obtained, in the

sphere of international affairs, the appointment of the Anglo-phil Duke of Alba as Ambassador in London. But in view of the diplomatic technique peculiar to the Axis dictators, of behaving with alternating capriciousness first to Britain and then to France, the pursuit of a friendlier policy towards England than towards France is probably nothing more than a move in the Axis plan for separating London from Paris.

As against the contention that Spain's need of capital will drive her into Britain's arms, it may be pointed out that just as the economists of Fascist countries do not control their international policy, so the Spanish economists are not in control of Spanish international policy. Indeed, General Franco and the Spanish press have both made it abundantly clear that Spain will not resort to Franco-British economic aid. It is of little avail to point to trade statistics in the face of such statements. To take the statistics of Anglo-Spanish and Franco-Spanish trade before the Civil War, in order to infer the existence of commercial traditions which incline Spain to the side of Paris and London, is deliberately to ignore the will of Franco who has declared that he is determined to introduce what he terms a new period of economic autarchy, or a period of servility to the Axis and as complete an incorporation of their economic system as possible. War, it should be remembered, is always the best opportunity for breaking with the past, and in the new economic situation that has emerged in Spain the first point that comes to notice is the number and strength of the creditors at the disposal of Germany and Italy. Moreover, Germany and Italy, particularly the former, have worked untiringly through their diplomatic and commercial organisations to obtain the control and monopoly of Spanish commerce. Space does not admit of enlarging upon this aspect of the question further than to affirm categorically that the foregoing statements represent a solid body of established facts.

A declaration by Señor Areilza, taken from an article by Luis Barreiro in *Domingo* on March 26th, 1939, may suffice to indicate the nature of the situation :

Recently speaking of the economic autarchy to which the new State aspires, the Head of the National Industrial Service, Don Jose Maria Areilza classified in three groups the merchandise imported to date : in the first he included motor-cars, sulphate of ammonia, commercial nitrate of soda, synthetic nitrate (fertiliser),

manufactured rubber ; in the second, cotton, machinery, electrical material, woods, wood pulp, pharmaceutical products, films, anilines and unmanufactured paper ; and in the third, fresh eggs, codfish, coal, coffee, silk yarn, cocoa, skins and leather, chick-peas, bananas, raw wool, maize and unmanufactured tallow. And he stated that the majority of the goods in the first group must be nationalised, those in the second must be considerably reduced and that efforts would be made to prevent the importation of those in the third.

It will be evident from an examination of the first group that, in considering Franco's economic situation, the first force to be taken into account is the Axis, in comparison with which the pressure which France is able to exert can only be theoretical, in whatever sphere one imagines its application ; while the reported and probably quite real hatred of the Italians in Spain will not be allowed to come to a head, as Mussolini must impose the necessary restraint upon his legionaries, if he wishes to reacquire from Spain the privilege which was first granted to him by Primo de Rivera and then lost under the Republican régime, namely, the use of the Balearics in the event of war.

Further, the endemic disturbance from which the people of the Peninsula are suffering is being accentuated by Franco's Law of Political Responsibilities which has set up what amounts to a permanent régime of reprisals. This Law operates with particular severity in the once free autonomous regions of Catalonia and Euzkadi (the Basque Country) which, it is generally agreed, can never be pacified except by the recognition of their national rights and liberties. The oppressive character of the Law may be judged by the fact that the use of the Catalan language even in the printed heading of commercial letters is punished by heavy fines, while in the Basque country the gaols, concentration camps and disciplinary battalions still contain more than 60,000 Basque nationals. Internal oppression is the method of the Axis powers ; it is the means of their survival. That Franco has adopted it places him in the same camp ; and if he continues his policy of oppression, which he must do to remain supreme, neither France nor Britain can come to his support as allies.

These points having been disposed of, what remains to be said of Spanish imperialism ? Will Franco, who has already joined the Anti-Comintern Powers, the very breath of whose

being is territorial expansion, now proceed to carry out a policy of imperialism? During the Civil War this policy was soft-pedalled, because Franco had to appear moderate: it was referred to as "a need for spiritual expansion." But now that the war is over and Spain is under his sway, his intentions are being enunciated more firmly and more clearly. *El Correo Español* of Bilbao, on March 29th, 1939, includes the text of speeches made on the previous day in that capital, on the occasion of the public demonstration in honour of the conquest of Madrid. Amongst the speakers on this occasion was Jose Maria Oriol, provincial head of FET and of the JONS.

"The war has been brought to an end," said Oriol, "by an army which was formed during the struggle, to which we must now devote all our attention in order to provide the guns and the aeroplanes; in order to add a nought to the number of the ships in our Fleet, as the Caudillo said at the naval review in the Mediterranean, even though to do so it may be necessary to give up many commodities, those commodities to which we grew accustomed under the democratic régime.

"When we have increased the power of our Army up to the required standard, we shall be able to speak to Governments in that firm tone which comes of the knowledge that guns and aeroplanes and the soldiers of Spain are behind, and we shall also be able to use the diplomatic arts which are learned in the exercise of that profession.

"Then will be the hour to ask for the revision of the Act of Algeciras, 1909, which was an act of spoliation perpetrated against Spain, and bring about a return to the position of 1904; and as a consequence, that will be the time to demand for Spain those peoples in North Morocco over which we hold rights of blood and history, because Spain, following the path taken by Isabel the Catholic, has a great mission to accomplish in Africa, the territory which is our future imperial business. . . ."

It should be remembered that Oriol is a member of the Carlist camp and is a moderate, or, at least, has been so up to now.

As regards Franco's attitude to the Treaty of Algeciras guaranteeing the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan of Morocco, the integrity of his States, and their economic liberty, the *España* of Tangier declared on May 1st, 1939:

Six out of the thirteen signatory countries of the Act of Algeciras regard it as valueless. . . . The Act of Algeciras is supported by none. And if any of it remained in force that has now been

destroyed by the great European violations. Spain will do well to free herself in Morocco from such international obstacles which hinder her work of peace and colonisation.

The disgraceful Treaty signified an imposition by France. . . . Thus did our neighbour take away the best of our known zone of influence. With a grabbing hand she marked out the frontiers . . . encircling us in the mountains with the purpose of gaining for herself the rivers, the valleys and the fertile lands. . . . She converted Tangier into a French fief.

Here we are again, we also, free from international ties in Morocco, fully capable of arranging, as any other Power, the extension of its own rights and the guarantee of the interests derived from its geographical situation and from its possessions on the African coast. This time we are in earnest.

With sovereignty and power of State, without impositions of threats from anybody. . . . Spain is standing ready over one and a half million dead and may embrace larger horizons of imperial destiny and historical reappearance.

The Act of Algeciras . . . is older and more useless than the Treaty of Versailles. . . . It must be negotiated again.

Speaking after the victory parade on May 19th to army officers, General Franco himself declared: "When we refer to our Empire, we mean it. It is not an empty phrase. We are going to have an Empire."

Franco's foreign policy moves inevitably towards the initiation of the Spanish demands. The framework of the body controlling Spain is composed of old Germanophiles and of the young generation of Fascists. After the fall of Catalonia three figures from the rebel side came into the forefront of the political stage: Sanchez Mazas, Alfaro and Primo de Rivera. All three are Falangists. The first two have been appointed Council members of the FET, and the last is regarded as a person of highest authority.

The control of international Fascism over the formation of public opinion is absolute. The front rank news agencies are the Italian *Stefani* and the German *D.N.B.* The German Ambassador in Spain publishes a weekly duplicated review entitled *Aspa*, supplying news and commentaries which afterwards appear in the newspapers. There are newspapers, such as *Arriba España* of Pamplona which appears to be an Italian daily, written in Castilian. This means that opinion is continually being moulded in accordance with the Axis points of view. Thus Hitler and Mussolini add to their means of

attraction the prestige of their international triumphs, which encourage a desire to emulate them. It is essential that Franco should have the country united behind him, that party hatred and passions should be rendered quiescent, and economies necessitated by impoverishment should be approved. To effect this, to galvanise public opinion, he can only have recourse to the practice, which has been successfully carried out by the Dictators—that of transferring attention beyond the frontiers, exalting the two ideals of anti-Communism and Imperialism in their concrete forms of the Anti-Comintern Pact and revisions.

It is the aim of the Axis Powers to arouse Franco's ambition. That this should raise problems, suits them. That is the use of Franco to the Axis. On the other hand, it is Franco's belief that the Axis, to a certain extent, needs him. He sees the far-reaching value of his position in the Mediterranean. As his secondary plan—which is far from being an unreal dream—he sees the possibility of his becoming the Axis instrument in the Spanish-American world, and a useful collaborator in the Mohammedan world. In this Franco, Hitler and Mussolini doubtless see eye to eye. The Spaniard does not consider himself to be a figure-head, nor will his dictator-colleagues regard him as such. They have a common interest.

Because the policy of the Fascist régimes does not emanate from a system of contradictions, it is easy to discover their lines of action. The dictators announce more or less clearly what they are going to do. Franco, who has admittedly neither the personal authority of Hitler or Mussolini, nor the backing given to them by their "Nazi" or "Fascist" followers, nor the necessary background in Spanish political tradition to accomplish a political coup, cannot be an exception.

And in the event of a European war what will he do? A precedent was established last September, according to which it appears he promised neutrality. But it would be a mistake to regard this precedent as valid. It must be taken into account that, at that time, the war was far from being finished. Franco was faced with the difficulty of fighting at home and abroad. His neutrality was, without doubt, advised or authorised by the Axis. To-day the situation is different. In the case of war the Axis could not be content with the neutrality of the Peninsula, nor can Franco, even if

he wished, back out at a vital moment. Whether the Axis promotes European peace or a state of tension, Franco will collaborate actively in one way or another. It is evident that in the event of war the special conditions of the Franco régime—the conquered and unconvinced and the disgruntled victors, together with the egoism and the desire for peace which is particularly intense after a civil war, and the Spanish tradition of neutrality, and the possible secret action of France and England—could produce disturbing political phenomena. But although that might modify the situation, it would not be able to prevent Spanish action in favour of the Axis.

Speaking himself or through others, Franco has clearly defined the policy which he will now pursue step by step: adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact; the maintenance of a strong military force; the organisation of the economy of the State in conformity with the principle of autarchy and as a complementary system in the fabric of totalitarian economics; the will to make Spain a European power, in relation to her Mediterranean position, and the recognition of her influence in South America, and also, though less important, in the Arab world; support of the international policy of the Axis in European problems; the setting forth of demands for territorial revisions, timed and formulated according to circumstances and with the approval of the Axis; and finally, collaboration in the event of a European war with the totalitarian powers.

MANUEL DE IRUJO.

REBUILDING WORLD ORDER.

THIS paper treats of world affairs. Using lessons of the past, it seeks a way from the present anarchy to the rule of law; from fears of aggression or encirclement to security, equality and prosperity; from conflicting political doctrines to common ideals and the gradual growth of liberty that comes from harmony of purpose.

To err is human. Human error is due to mistakes of fact or of sentiment. A mistake of fact—to miscalculate the speed of an approaching car when we are crossing the road or to find that what we took for a firm handhold on a rock climb is but a loose stone—may be the end of us. But more fatal mistakes are due to false sentiment and bad taste than to insufficient information. That is because instincts and the feelings that go with them are the driving forces of human nature, and every sentiment includes something of this instinctive drive along with the knowledge to which it is linked. When we make our worst blunders, our feelings are more likely than our knowledge to be at fault. More lives are wrecked by animal passions than by lack of learning. Mankind has as fierce a foe in vice as in ignorance. To feel rightly about the world, to love what is good and to hate what is evil, to seek the highest when we see it, is, for most people, at least as important as accurate knowledge or specialised skill.

The present sombre outlook in world affairs is not so much due to men getting their facts as their values wrong. The danger arises from faults in the affective, rather than in the cognitive, aspects of men's lives. They may *understand* that the whole is greater than the part, that the world is greater than the nation, that no nation can live in isolation from the majority of mankind; and yet they may (and over most of the earth they do) *feel* for the part more than for the whole, for the nation more than for the world.

The danger that our civilisation may destroy itself in an orgy of killing will not finally disappear until the people have learnt, or follow leaders who have learnt, that sovereignty belongs only to God. Any section of the human race that treats its own sectional interests as its supreme consideration resembles the man who leads a wholly selfish life, thinking only how to please himself, how to add to his wealth, how to seize what does not belong to him, how to keep what is already

his. In short, the nation that regards its collective egoism as sacred is a menace to itself and to the world. Almost as bad is the nation that will never move to help the world unless it sees its own national interests gaining directly from its action.*

After the disruption of Christendom at the beginning of the modern age, the idea of the law of God or the law of nations as the supreme authority in Europe gradually gave way before national egoism. When the greatest war in history ended in 1918, the nations seemed for a moment to have learnt its lesson: that British sea power was no longer equal to the task of preventing or circumscribing the wars which are the natural products of collective selfishness. At all events, most of the governments of the world joined in a "Declaration of Interdependence" and made of it a first attempt at a world constitution. In the Covenant of the League of Nations they "sacrificed" a certain amount of national sovereignty. They did not abandon it on principle but they opened a way towards further "sacrifices" of a like kind in the future; and several changes did in fact take place in this direction.†

For eleven years, from 1920 to 1931, the Covenant worked well.‡ There was rapid progress towards a real international organisation. From time to time there was manifested at Geneva a feeling for the whole society of nations strong enough to unite the delegates in the conviction that the national patriotism of each fulfilled itself best by serving the common interests of all. This feeling, and this impulse to put world interests first, were described by the late Lord Balfour as a "collective sentiment."

The advance towards world order took place in spite of great handicaps. Without the mighty power and high ideals of America, the League could never have been created. The

* Fortunately the remark of a Cabinet Minister in the British House of Commons that "we are not prepared to see a single ship sunk in a successful battle in the cause of Abyssinian independence"—i.e. of international morality—did not represent British opinion as a whole.

† For example, His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and in the self-governing Dominions submitted to be bound by the optional clause of the Permanent Court of International Justice; so that any other country similarly bound can summon His Majesty's Governments before the World Court to answer any claim concerning their legal rights.

‡ The historical part of this paper makes use of a report prepared for the Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union.

American President signed the Covenant which he had helped to draft, and a majority of the United States senators voted for its ratification. But the majority was less than two to one, and the American Constitution kept the United States out of the League. Then came a change of feeling towards Geneva; and, by the time the League began its work, a hostile government had been installed at Washington.

Nor did the League Great Powers give the Covenant full support. Among the smaller States, the ex-allies saw it as a means of preserving the *status quo*, and the ex-neutrals tended to revert to their neutrality. Post-war Europe, war-weary though it was, retained the passions which excluded Germany from the League and extracted harsh peace terms. It thus became impossible to use the League machinery, as General Smuts and other framers of the Covenant had intended that it should be used, to revise the territorial settlement of the treaties. And, despite the efforts of Lord Cecil and others, the limitation of armaments was inevitably delayed.

Yet during this period the League achieved considerable success. Its institutions gained authority. It settled many international disputes of which some fifteen or twenty were serious. Its technical work for refugees was effective. Financial and economic co-operation developed under its guidance. Its machinery was used to increase human welfare by fighting disease and other insidious enemies of mankind. The International Labour Organisation became the world focus of social progress. Germany entered the League. Russia co-operated, although she did not become a member until 1934. The United States came to take part in most of the League's activities and her money payment to Geneva was almost as large as that of Great Britain.

Various elements combined to make the early success of the League possible. The whole system was based upon the rule of law. Not only the Covenant, but treaties and customary international law were regarded in League deliberations as normally binding. Except for armaments, all vital inter-State relations were subjected to these rules. Third-party judgment was accepted in disputes concerning existing legal rights. The conception of justice began to have real power at Geneva. The publicity of League meetings enlisted public opinion in its support. The regularity of its proceedings enabled Member States to claim their rights.

Such principles are essential to any working international system.

In the autumn of 1931 the tide turned. In the following years a series of League failures took place, beginning with the conquest of Manchuria and ending with the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Albania. The consequence has been to create an international atmosphere of deep anxiety and suspicion very different from that which had been achieved up to the summer of 1931. Several wars have taken place and more are feared, with the result that most civilised nations have indulged in an extensive and competitive increase of armaments.

It must be remembered that the general peace of Europe was secured in the early years by the overwhelming preponderance in armament of the League Powers. When the League system was first challenged by Signor Mussolini's Italy in 1923, it prevented his intended annexation of Corfu. But when the next challenge came from an armed Great Power, the League's members failed to carry out the obligations of the Covenant. They did not offer collective resistance to Japan although they still had power to do so, and although Japan moved gingerly, looking round after each step to see what the League and the Americans were going to do about it. Had the League stopped the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Disarmament Conference would have met six months later in a much more hopeful atmosphere.

Had the Conference achieved early success, Dr. Brüning and the Weimar Republic would have been saved. Herr Hitler and his Munich Putsch of November 1923 would have been forgotten. Signor Mussolini would not have been tempted to seize Abyssinia. In that case (or had he been resisted as Britain alone would have resisted an attack upon Egypt) there would have been no external aggression against Spain or Czechoslovakia or Albania. We should be living in a very different world to-day.

It is true that some minor inconveniences were found in the application of the Covenant. Most of them were described and remedies were suggested by Mr. Eden in a speech to the League's Assembly on September 25th, 1936.* But it is not to these minor difficulties that the League's failure was due.

* Changes of procedure in the League system have been suggested on pages 12 to 18 of a paper on *The Reform of the League*, published by the League of Nations Union.

It was due to the governments of the League Powers lacking any adequate "collective sentiment," to the feebleness of their "world loyalty," to their narrow conception of national interests as something different from (and more vital than) the interests of the world at large, and to their consequent reluctance to run the same risks for the protection of the covenants of the League as for the defence of their own territories. While the representatives of the governments were talking internationalism at Geneva, they were mostly thinking undiluted nationalism.

The result was to convince Japan, Italy and Germany that they might safely attack or rob their weaker neighbours in defiance of the League and of international law. These aggressive Powers may also have thought that the system of peaceful change foreshadowed in Article XIX of the League's Covenant would never give them equality with "plutocratic" Powers like Britain or France. So they left the League; and the system of collective security was further weakened by the League's failure to protect the victims of their aggression.

There then occurred a revulsion of public opinion against the League system. The smaller nations hastened to repudiate their obligations. In Britain and France the public were partially persuaded that peace could be better preserved by ignoring the distinction between peaceful change, which the League approved in principle, and violent change, which the Covenant forbade; and by confining the activities of the League to non-contentious matters.

The results of this policy of "appeasement" in Spain, Czechoslovakia and Albania have caused another change of mind. Its extension to a majority of the British Cabinet was indicated by Lord Halifax's speech on March 20th, 1939, and proved by the British guarantee to Poland eleven days later. Since that time the British and French governments have been building up a "Peace Front" against aggression. It is, of course, purely defensive. It does not contemplate any attack on the aggressive Powers. It is, in effect, the League system of collective security, but in a cruder form and without the same safeguards against its misuse.

There should be no considerable obstacle to so stating the new agreements that they become a buttress of the League system, in the same way as the Locarno Treaties were. There would, however, be a difference between the Locarno Treaties

and the new ones: the Locarno Treaties were made when Germany was unarmed and unaggressive, and their consequences were not fully faced by the peoples they committed. The new treaties are made in the name of peoples who have already been on the verge of war, are fully cognisant of the dangers against which their guarantees are directed, and are fully prepared to carry them out.

There is a story of an Irishman who, when asked the way to Dublin, replied: "If I were going to Dublin I would not start from here." We cannot go back to the bright prospects of 1930 or to the days of Austen Chamberlain, Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann. If we are to rebuild world order, we must begin in the gloomy summer of 1939, and take the new Peace Front as our starting-point. First of all, the Peace Front must be lengthened and strengthened. To this end, Britain and France and the other members of the Front, must make it abundantly plain that any further attempt by the aggressive Powers to rob another State of its territory or independence by force or threat of force will endanger the peace of the world. A notable step in this direction was the declaration by Lord Halifax on June 29th, that "our immediate task is to resist aggression" and that, "if international law and order is to be preserved, we must be prepared to fight in its defence." But it is of vital importance for peace that Russia should be included in the Peace Front for the defence of any European State, and specifically the Baltic States, whose territorial integrity or political independence may be threatened.

When the Peace Front has been strengthened and lengthened, it should also be widened so as gradually to extend the collaboration of its constituent States beyond collective defence to the settlement of their disputes by third-party judgment, to peaceful change of their legal rights, to finance, economics (trade agreements), transfer of populations (refugees), colonial administration, social progress and human welfare. No doubt the Geneva machinery, with improvements here and there, would be used for these purposes.

Concurrently with this development of the Peace Front, those against whom its power is directed should be made to understand how, as Sir Norman Angell has put it, they can break the "encirclement" by entering the circle. The terms of a general settlement which would be acceptable to the

Peace Front and would ensure equality, security and prosperity all round, should be fully and frankly stated, perhaps in such a State Paper as Mr. Harold Nicolson has suggested. The German people would then understand that their Reich can have equality with Great Britain and other countries—a fair deal all round not excluding colonial territories—without having to fight for it. They can share our prosperity as well as our security, and enjoy a rising standard of life in place of the falling wages and lengthening hours of work that are the inevitable result of Germany's economic isolation.

But all of these benefits are not to be had by merely asking for them. A fair deal must be fair to both sides. A general settlement with Germany should, among other things, include the restoration of independence to the greater part of Czechoslovakia. It should also include Germany's joining with Britain, France and other Powers for the reduction of armaments (so that each forgoes the means to enforce his own judgment in his own cause), for collective defence, and for all those other purposes for which, as we have said, the nations of the Peace Front should already be collaborating.

The same conditions, *mutatis mutandis*, should apply to the admission of Italy and Japan. But we must not forget that Britain and France gave *de jure* recognition to the Italian conquest of Abyssinia although they have refused it to the present régimes in Czechoslovakia, in Manchuria and other parts of China, and in Albania.

The organisation of the Peace Front, and the general settlement which we hope will follow, are but the first stages in rebuilding world-order according to the principles of the Covenant. World-order implies world-government and world-loyalty as the only sure foundation on which that government's authority may rest. Lessons on world-government and world-loyalty may be learned from the experience of smaller human groups, and notably from the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States. But caution is needed in applying to the whole what is true of the part. For example, the larger the society with a government of its own, the lighter that government ought to be.

That is the conclusion reached by Mr. Walter Lippman in his book *The Good Society*. Unfortunately it seems to have been overlooked by that other eminent American publicist, Mr. Clarence Streit, who advocates a federal *Union Now* of

the democratic States, to be joined by others as they too accept democracy. The Federal Government of the United States, as Mr. Streit would be the first to recognise, is no State Government writ large. It shares but it does not usurp the task of governing the United States. Nor should a world government resemble overmuch the federal, State or local governments which it ought to supplement but must not supplant.

World-loyalty is a sentiment akin to patriotism for mankind as a whole. The extremes of nationalism from which the world is suffering to-day are not so much due to excessive patriotism as to insufficient world-loyalty. These two consistent sentiments should re-enforce each other, as a Scotsman's British patriotism is strengthened by his love of Scotland, or as the first citizens of the United States founded their American patriotism upon their feeling for Massachusetts or Virginia or New York.

A sentiment for mankind as a whole may be closely linked to a sentiment for God. "Religion," wrote Professor Whitehead, "is world-loyalty." Indeed, the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man are facts that belong together. In William James' phrase, they are facts of the sort that "hunt in couples," like electricity and magnetism. So religion is brought into politics. Nor is this a modern doctrine. Pericles held that, if his dream of "a united Greece with Athens as its eye" were ever to come true, it must have behind it a religious motive. Something of this kind has already happened in the British Commonwealth of Nations where, as General Smuts has pointed out, there is not only a common kingship but also the invisible bond of ideals.

But there is no need for the nations who begin to rebuild world order to realise from the start that the service of man to which they pledge themselves is also the service of God. Yet, although they may not realise it until later, their co-operation is helping to embody the highest ideals and deepest longings by men of all nations who have dreamt dreams and seen visions of the Commonwealth of God.

MAXWELL GARNETT.

WHAT GERMANY THINKS TO-DAY.

NOTHING is more difficult than to get a really fair view as to what Germany is thinking, or how she is feeling, to-day. Full allowance must be made for propaganda, both conscious and unconscious. It is useless, for instance, to expect a Jewish refugee to take broad views of present-day Germany. He is a man suffering from a burning sense of grievance which tends to thwart and warp his judgment. The same thing must be said for German Aryan refugees; they are largely out of touch with the mentality of their own people. In many cases they have been exiles for years; in other cases they are quivering from the sense of horror and repulsion.

Hitler, whatever his crimes and errors, stands out as the embodiment of German middle-class mentality to a far greater extent than is admitted by his political opponents. It is certainly untrue to represent the triumph of Nazism in Germany as the triumph of sheer brute force, or of iron repression. After all, in the early days of the movement, say 1927-32, the opponents of Nazism not only had a fair chance to state their own case but an even better chance than the Nazis themselves. For an overwhelming proportion of the Press was in the hands of the Parliamentary parties, and most of the machinery for platform speaking and propaganda. If, despite these handicaps, the Nazis had forged ahead till they formed by 1933 the largest party in Germany, this was largely because of their fanaticism and their fierce conviction which carried a majority of the electorate for them, independently of their alleged suppressive methods. Nazism was, and is, less a political doctrine than a militant creed, it triumphed as other religions have done by a mixture of fanaticism and the sword. All sorts of motives brought men over into their ranks, ambition, covetousness, the desire to wipe out old scores, but there was in the movement a leaven of fierce idealism and of passionate conviction which was the primary motive force of its success. The Nazis were prepared to fight harder and to suffer more for the sake of their convictions than were the older parties.

It is unfortunate that so many attempts are made to idealise the Socialists, alike those of Germany and of Austria. The Nazis would never have gained their strangle-hold over Germany,

and their power to menace the peace of the world, had it not been for the cowardice, short-sightedness and narrow-minded folly of the Socialists. Nor were the Liberal parties very much superior. In fact, a hard but truthful judgment must run that democracy failed in Germany because it deserved to fail. It was a form of government for which the German peoples were not ripe, for which they lacked the necessary training and self-discipline; it is to be feared that from the standpoint of morality, whether private or public morality, there was little to choose between them and the Nazis. The Nazis were superior to their opponents in strength and cunning; that was the chief difference between them. It may be added that there is little truth or justice in the savage attacks sometimes made upon the aged President Hindenburg for his alleged treachery to the democratic parties. The truth is that Hindenburg's position was a quite impossible one, and it was made impossible by the action of the democratic parties themselves. It was impossible to get Socialists on the one side, Catholic Zentrum on the other, to sink their feuds and to join in a common front against the Nazis. There remained for Hindenburg nothing else to do than to call in the Nazis, who were undoubtedly the strongest single party in the State.

Now, after six years of power, the idealism of the one-time Nazi party has undoubtedly spent its force. It has developed into a military dictatorship, and is going the way of all such dictatorships with a thirst for military glory and a lust for power, but, and this is the danger, it is a movement which has fed upon its own successes. Hitler has by now accumulated a fund of public confidence behind him bordering upon sheer idolatry. It is possible that Hitler may get murdered one day by some disgruntled fanatic, but as to any military revolt against him, or the breakdown of his rule by any violent ebullition of popular discontent, to anyone who really knows Germany the idea sounds utterly nonsensical. There is only one thing that can smash Hitler, and that is an overwhelming disaster in the field. Short of this, he has the power so firmly grasped that any conspiracy against him would be throttled by his agents; any military revolt would be crushed even before it had begun.

Is the present régime popular in Germany? There is in Austria, at least, a very strong minority bitterly, in some cases passionately, opposed to the Government. In the great

industrial cities of Germany, those of the working people who were Socialists before are still Socialists in their inmost hearts, and those of them who are no longer Socialists are secret Communists. But all this is an opposition which is unorganised, leaderless, and torn by its own internal dissensions. There are non-Nazis who dislike the Communists even more than they do Hitler. As concerns the great mass of the German people, they share Hitler's dislike of the Jews; even though the saner elements disapprove of indiscriminate persecution they sympathise with the ideal of a great Germany, and lend a willing ear to talk of colonies "stolen" by England, the suffering inflicted upon poor innocent Germany by the wicked, hypocritical victors of Versailles. But there is no real war-feeling. The German of to-day is only moderately interested in colonies. If he can get them back, well and good. He does not, however, in the least relish the prospect of a war, whether with England or with anybody else.

As against this passivity on the part of the German mass must be set, however, the workings of a propaganda machine in its way the finest in the world, and for which the clumsy and ill-directed efforts of the British Government in the way of "enlightening" the German public are no real match. This propaganda machine moulds German public opinion in accordance with whatever mood has seized upon the Government, and it is amazing to note how plastic the Germans are, how easily they can be brought to repeat with parrot-like repetition whatever catch-phrase is drummed into them by those in authority. For instance, in Austria there is a lingering dislike and suspicion of Italy even among fervent Nazis. After the alliance the propaganda machine was brought into play to banish this. Italy, it was explained, had always been Germany's good ally. She had fought in the last war not against Germany but against the Habsburgs. And amazing though it may seem there were highly educated Austrians capable of swallowing this sort of thing, and of repeating it in terms of intense conviction!

To an Englishman Hitler's cynical repudiation of his own pledges seems utterly indefensible: he cannot understand the mentality which finds excuse and condonation for the barefaced grabbing of Czecho-Slovakia in defiance of an international agreement freely negotiated and newly signed. But the German public has a conveniently short memory for broken

pledges if they happen to be German ones. The present writer discussed the matter with a prominent Nazi official who, however, is, for a Nazi, by no means extreme in his opinions. Hitler, said this Nazi, could not possibly leave Czecho-Slovakia as a wedge jutting into German territory, with 2,500 aircraft, arms and equipment for forty divisions. Anyone must realise that this was an impossible state of things which Germany could not tolerate. I pointed out that this was power-politics pure and simple. By the same argument Germany could not tolerate the existence of France or England, or any other country able to defend herself. He brushed this argument aside.

Hitler, he went on to say, could not leave the Danzig situation as it was. Danzig was a German city, and the Corridor an artificial creation. Germany must be allowed to get Danzig back again, and to join on with East Prussia. I reminded him that I had personally listened to Hitler's speech at the Sport Palast on September 26th, 1938, on which occasion he had expressly stated that once the Sudetenland was joined on to Germany, he would have no further territorial claims in Europe, and I reminded him, too, that this particular speech had been fairly gushing with friendship for Poland. Yet Hitler had known all the time neutral Danzig was vital to Poland, the Corridor had been just as "artificial" then as now, but he had said no word of claims to be made against Poland; had congratulated himself upon having secured a friendship which was due exclusively to the fact that Poland was not a democracy, and *ergo* open to appeals on a basis of sweet reasonableness. How, I asked, could anyone doubt that Hitler had simply fooled Poland at the time, or put any faith in any speeches or pledges or declarations he might make?

My Nazi friend evaded the issue. What was it to do with England or France anyhow? was the effect of his retort. Germany did not want war with England. She was anxious to be on good terms with England. She was equally anxious to be friends with France. If Germany put forward claims to Alsace Lorraine, then there might be some excuse for England or France to interfere. But what was Danzig to them? And what madness, to have a world war over Danzig! I said that if Germany thought Danzig worth a war, then it was worth a war to us too, and if we looked on and allowed

Germany to take Danzig she would want Upper Silesia, and then she would discover that the Polish oil-fields were essential to her *lebensraum*, and she would not be content till she had grabbed the whole of Poland. My Nazi friend's attitude was: Well, and what if she did? It was nothing to do with England and France anyhow.

But in the course of our conversation the importance of these things to England and France came out. For he himself turned the discussion on Italy. Of course this latter Power had a right to Tunis and Jibouti, and equally of course Mussolini could not be expected to tolerate the Anglo-French control of the Suez Canal, which meant that they could at any time cut him off from Abyssinia. So, I explained, you want England and France to remain neutral while you smash Poland, and then Signor Mussolini will come forward with demands for Tunis, Jibouti and the Suez Canal, and you will explain that you are very sorry, you are full of friendship for us, you wouldn't hurt us for the world. But Italy is your Ally, and if she is at war with England and France you are at war with them too, therefore we must give in to Mussolini or it will be the worse for us. I added that I was quite sure that in the present temper of England and France, any request to surrender the Suez Canal or Tunis would be met by an invitation to come and take them, and that we should certainly not dream of standing by and seeing Germany smash Poland, which would be our Ally in event of war, with the result of finding ourselves either blackmailed or attacked by Germany and Italy subsequently. My Nazi friend shut up.

It is really amusing, however, to talk to these people, and to note how naïve they are, how utterly lacking in any sense of justice or equity in their dealings with other people. To a Nazi justice means merely the peaceable surrender to whatsoever claims the German Government, or the chiefs of the Nazi Government, deem fit to make upon you. To resist these claims is to resist the Lord's Anointed. Charles I of blessed memory had no doctrine of divine right so extreme in its formulation, or so utterly rapacious in its demands, as the Germany of Hitler. To many people the explanation of this frame of mind is the "injustices" of the Peace of Versailles. The German people, we are told, are maddened by intolerable wrongs. Appease these wrongs and you will get peace, fail

to appease them and the best you will get will be a war, which will mean new wrongs and new wars in the course of time, even if you are victorious.

My personal feeling, based upon eight years of intimate knowledge of Germany and the Germans, is that the alleged wrongs of the Peace of Versailles have very little to do with present-day German intransigence. First of all, the Peace of Versailles was, under the conditions of the times, the only peace possible. After four and a half years of war with Germany, with public passion whipped up by savage outrages—and the memory of what Germany actually did in Belgium and in Northern France, has too easily passed from mind—no British or French Government could actually have shown greater generosity to Germany. It would merely have been kicked out of office if it had tried. Secondly, no British or French Government could actually have waged war against Poland or Czecho-Slovakia for the sake of the revision of terms deemed onerous or unjust by Germany. Thus, all this talk of the "injustice" or otherwise of the Peace of Versailles is academic. Incidentally, the Peace of Versailles was very much more generous to Germany than any conceivable terms that would have been offered by Germany had she been victorious, and is much more generous than the terms dictated by Hitler to Czecho-Slovakia at the sword's point. One doesn't quite see why we should always be running round in sackcloth and ashes, lamenting over our alleged deficiencies at Versailles. The terms given were less hard than Germany really deserved.

Would it have made any great difference to the course of events had the Allies shown greater generosity? I cannot see that it would. The thing that brought Hitler to power was not the Peace of Versailles but the economic crisis of 1930-33, with which Versailles had very little to do. Hitler was even more rancorous to the wretched Jews than towards the victors of Versailles, and the Jews had nothing whatever to do with Versailles. And what about Italy? She suffered nothing at Versailles, at all events she emerged greatly enlarged in territory. It was not until Mussolini tried to annex Abyssinia, and his former allies objected, that he discovered the iniquities perpetrated at Versailles. The truth of the matter seems to me that if a Government wishes to attack its neighbours in greed, whether of territory or of gold,

it will always be able to manufacture some pretext convincing to its own people, if not to the world at large. Had Germany been treated more generously at Versailles, we should not have avoided the present crisis; it would only have come earlier, and perhaps upon a more intense scale. For the really unpardonable crime perpetrated by England and France in the last war is that they won it, and Germany lost.

There is no possible doubt that Germany is planning a new coup with regard to Danzig, the crisis will burst in September, perhaps earlier. A cardinal factor making for war is the utter contempt felt by Hitler both for Mr. Chamberlain and for Lord Halifax. I am not discussing whether this contempt is justified or not, it exists. Friends of mine in personal contact with the Führer have assured me that he speaks of them with as much bitterness as disdain, describes them as a brace of elderly hens. "If I give them a kick, they'll cluck very loudly, but they'll still be hens." Official Germany does not believe that Mr. Chamberlain, even if he made war, would have the courage or endurance to wage it for very long. Their idea is that if they lead off with an offensive against Poland and smash the Polish Army, and occupy Danzig and the Corridor and Upper Silesia by armed force, and then make a peace-offensive, powerful voices would be raised in England to make peace and to leave Poland to her fate. These people, the Germans think, would raise the cry "What can we do to help Poland anyhow? It was a guarantee which ought never to have been given. Better to come to an understanding with Germany than to have a war which will last for many years, involve millions of casualties, and thousands of millions of pounds, and reduce us to bankruptcy even if we are victorious." The Germans do not believe that Mr. Chamberlain, or Lord Halifax, are the right people to close their ears to such suggestions, and to carry on a war to the bitter end. In this belief of the German rulers lies the greatest menace to World Peace.

VICTOR WALLACE GERMAINS.

DECEIVED AUSTRIA.

SINCE Hitler got hold of Austria there has been a swift change in her political movements such as has probably never happened before in history. Three different elements have helped Hitler: first of all, those "honest stupid" who actually believed in a millennium of happiness and national grandeur granted by the Third Reich. These autocrats of the breakfast table, presumptuous middle-class people of smaller and bigger places, living on low salaries or small pensions, thought to escape their Austrian insignificance, and to reach the light of national community. They expected that their turn had come at last and that they would reign in justice, honour, freedom and discipline. The second class which helped Hitler were the youth, young fellows paid for bullying their neighbours, ready to commit any sabotage against Schuschnigg's government for only 50 Reichsmark monthly.

These youngsters partly believed in their "ideal," partly they liked the job because they were gangsters. Conscription in Austria was introduced very late, and there was no corporal to master these young fellows who had outgrown every discipline. The boys chose their own corporal and surrounded him with the mystery of a holy conspiracy. Doubtless, the very skilful propaganda telling everybody that there was no more unemployment in the Reich but that, on the contrary, a great number of workmen were wanted, was another factor in favour of Hitler. Together with the "Great-German Intelligentsia" and the youth the employees did their share in undermining the work of Schuschnigg.

As everywhere else ideals and practical wishes were mixed up. The lower middle class and the little tradesmen believed in the splendour of the uniform. They were hypnotised by the dictatorship of half-education, of the would-be-alphabets, as I would like to call them. The man in the street was attracted by the atmosphere of everlasting feasts and gaiety. The Viennese is a bit of a spendthrift, therefore many loudly acclaimed the new régime which taught that money did not matter and that fried pigeons would fly about in huge numbers. This little man, hardened by the struggle for life, saw the northern trick as a magical enlargement of his own daily struggle against competition.

To-day you will find that these three classes, bourgeoisie, youth, lower middle class, are no longer for Hitler. The triumph came with amazing quickness but even more quickly came the utter despair. I want to mention first of all one thing that influences daily life most deeply, and that is felt by everybody: the actual need and food shortage. For months and months no butter was obtainable in Austria, and yet, even under Dollfuss and to a greater extent under Schuschnigg, our country exported large quantities of butter, as Austria produced so much. Schuschnigg was even compelled to limit the production in order to maintain reasonable prices. To-day butter is available only occasionally, and even then the purchase depends on the dairyman's kindness towards the old customer. It is no longer a matter of course to give your children bread and butter, the poor man is no longer able to butter his bread—a meal he could always obtain before. But not only is butter missing, every other sort of fat is rationed, perhaps to accustom the population to severe regulations in time of war. There are no fruit and vegetables, and for weeks only spinach was on the market. It is difficult for housewives to produce their daily meals, especially when they want to maintain their standard of mixed food.

Even the greatest Nazi, ready to shout with the Party and delighted with the pace of the "March of Idiots," was aware of the fact that his wife or cook had to stand in a queue for hours and hours to obtain the necessary food supply from the grocer. Some women, sick of so much waste of time, would rebel, and if they dared to do so, would be sent to prison. These were the promised "fried pigeons," this the promised ideal régime. Officials and employees were equally bitterly deceived. An excellent Austrian humorist used to say: "The Austrian official has got nothing but he is at least sure of this nothing." With Hitler marching in these officials believed in attaining something, but what happened? Apparently wages went up and some taxes were reduced. But what the State admitted on one side, it took back on the other, and especially did the Party, this insatiable monster, get hold of everything. Enormous reductions soon prevented the trees from growing too high. I know people who, on behalf of the *Winterhilfe* (help for the winter), a perfectly uncontrolled and uncontrollable fund, had to pay 20 to 30 per cent. out of their income. There is a new tax, the so-called citizen tax, which means

another and a heavy burden for the man in the street. Even the greengrocer who owns but a tiny shop has to have a complicated system of book-keeping and has to deal with authorities who almost daily find out new laws and regulations to annoy him.

And last, not least, the worst drain: all prices are going up. The Tsar of Austria, Gauleiter (leader) Buerkel, has banned all those Aryans who, pupils of the alleged Jewish methods, tried to make their profit by raising prices. Nevertheless, life is dearer at present. The value of the Reichsmark is, in fact, the same as that of the banished schilling, and some people find that it is even less. Therefore the index has risen by one third (1 Reichsmark is supposed to be 1.50 Schilling) and this fact cannot be hidden away or made up for by several small reductions such as lowered prices for gas, electricity, bread. Instead of the crazy paradise, rising prices; instead of abundance, need—has this really been the ideal that made us despise the honest struggle of our old government, that had ruined the belief in Austria's possible independence?

Well—and what about the fact that we have no more unemployment? This terrific disease has gone, gone for ever. Even huge countries like England and the United States have not been able to ban unemployment so successfully, so thoroughly. This answer is sure to come. But what is the truth? The truth is that every country could avoid unemployment if inflation were admitted, if every single principle of profitable management were denied, if budget and State debts were being held secret. Every country could do that, especially when the centre of all activity lies in armament. Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were not able to eliminate unemployment completely, as they were compelled to show their budgets—they could not work with tax incomes, due in future, but paid in advance, and they could not notify this by means of coupons the unhappy victims would have to accept. They could not do all this and they did not know the wonderful institution of the labour camps. I have been told ever so many times that Austrians preferred not to get any subvention at all in order to escape this slavery. The labour camp means the hardest work with poor wages and bad, even insufficient, food. I have heard people say how violently individuality was fought down in these camps which, on the whole, might have proved to be quite useful. The young

people, very enthusiastic at the beginning, are no more so, and those over 17 who have learned to think and who have had a bad time in Prussia where they were trained for military service, told scornfully of the unworthy treatment, mean cruelty and disgusting behaviour of their officers.

These are the main facts which have caused the great change in Austria's point of view. The lack of raw materials and wares that must be imported adds to the general depression. The simplest apparatus, the smallest machine that is constructed of metal, is often not available. Yet I dare say that the psychology of the moment is still more difficult than the need of materials and foodstuffs. And here again, those suffer most whom I have called the honest stupid. They lived in their ardent faith that German discipline, German organisation and German will power would sweep away the Austrian untidiness like a thunderstorm. They had heard people tell of certain hard measures, especially against the Jews, but they soon persuaded themselves that this would not be quite the same for Austria. The word Freedom fascinated them, the word Freedom was their aim and joy. They wanted to get rid of the clerical system, they wanted to be free. Truth has abolished these sweet dreams. Instead of quiet and discipline, there came chaos; instead of the old, clear Austrian laws there were hundreds of confused and confusing new regulations pouring over the frightened Austrians. After a very short time nobody knew what was right or wrong, people wandered from office to office without being able to find out what they wanted to know. Young employees who had been given their posts because they had been "illegal" members of the Party, perfectly incompetent to fulfil their new duties, helped to increase the confusion. A friend of mine, manager of a big bank, no Nazi, but one of those agreeable to the Party, told me himself: "These people must have lost their heads, there are new dispositions every day, and they want affairs to be settled within a fortnight which actually require several months." Other people have been asked to pay enormous sums as income tax on their factories which they had sold years ago. After long and tiresome enquiries the truth of this statement was proved and instead of 10,000 Reichsmarks they were charged with only a few hundred Marks. A man I knew had paid his tax in due time, a month later officials came and tried to distrain the man for not having

paid his tax. The man refused to pay another Schilling and the official admitted that for months they had not been able to book the taxes as they could not master the enormous surplus of work. At last the man himself was allowed to have a look at the rather untidy files at the tax office, and he succeeded in finding the slip where his payment was confirmed.

These are a few examples to show how the whole apparatus does—not work. Files are being lost, important documents don't turn up again, one branch of the government allows what the next one forbids, one deputy ignores what his colleague has decided upon in the same matter, and does not care to know. Arbitrariness is inevitable, and so is corruption, the most faithful companion of tyranny. An officer at the customs asked for the bookshelves of a leaving refugee as payment for his indulgence in allowing the poor man to take some of his very valuable books with him. The impoverished and outlawed man had to give in, and asked the officer whether he would like a few books too. He eagerly agreed and on being asked which type of books he preferred, he answered: "Any books with covers will do."

The widow of a former very important business man had to sell her factories. Their worth was estimated to be 20 million Reichsmarks. The Nazi who was in charge of the business sold them for 7 millions; but notwithstanding this very crude trickery, the widow was charged with 10 millions of income tax which, as a matter of fact, she could not pay, and was therefore not allowed to leave the country. These stories are by no means sufficient to show the corruption at its worst, they are only meant to give an idea of what is going on. This corruption is closely allied to a cruelty which is felt to be utterly strange and hideous by the average Austrian. A very cultured Aryan said after the pogroms in November last: "These unheard-of cruelties must mean the Waterloo of the régime."

I have seen Aryans weeping as they were forced to look on while poor people were driven out of their small flats, while their shops were closed, their little money confiscated, their furniture stolen or smashed. All this happened under cover of an elaborate theory which in truth was nothing but robbery. The Nazi commissioners in charge of most of the remaining shops, could easily remove their unwanted neighbours. Any offence, even if years old, was a sufficient

reason to have the enemy arrested by the Gestapo (German secret police). Weeks and months would go by without a trial, and the innocent victim would suffer in prison. These and even worse horrors heard of every day have made the Austrians change their minds. Not only were Jews in constant danger, but monarchists and Catholics were not spared either—nor anyone, in fact, who did not very conspicuously join the Nazi chorus. I knew a German-national professor at the Viennese University, a man who years ago eagerly pleaded for the *Anschluss*, and who has now deeply regretted it. It does not matter, he said, whether you are efficient or not, whether you are a good worker, an honest man or not—the only thing that matters is that you shall have been an illegal member of the Party. Justice nowadays means usefulness to the Party. One of Germany's greatest treasures, her medical science, is perfectly ruined. Most of the famous doctors and teachers were Jews. These having been forced to leave the country, very few doctors are available. How did the Nazi Party solve this problem? Medical studies have been reduced to only three years' duration, and even this time cannot be entirely devoted to studies, but is shortened furthermore by military training, activity for the Party, work in labour camps. How is Germany supposed to keep her reputation as a centre of medical science when her young generation of doctors and research men grow up caring only for the training of the body whereas brains and character are being weakened?

The new régime in Austria has produced no personality to fascinate the people. Gauleiter (leader) Globotschnigg of Vienna soon turned out to be as incompetent as brutal. (He was supposed to have thrown a bomb into the shop of a Jewish jeweller during the revolution of 1934, was sentenced to lifelong prison under Schuschnigg, and made governor of Vienna by the Nazis.) Josef Buerkel, Gauleiter of Austria, is fond of noisy speeches, but too weak to organise things properly. He does not know much of the Austrian character either. He certainly is an honest man but he alone cannot alter the course of things. The greatest problem lies in the question whether all these disillusioned people will one day unite in one big, mighty chorus, stronger than the shouting propaganda of their Nazi leaders? I am only sure of one thing: the Austrian loathes the idea of a new war. He might follow the call to the colours, he might even start fighting if

he is ordered to do so by some national device. Weakness and ignorance of the real state of things have paralysed the power of the democracies, and this fact has made a daring conqueror of Hitler. In the event of war, the first military defeat would bring the anti-Nazi people together—the explosion, long-awaited for, would follow and throw over a régime which at its very beginning was the people's idol, but very soon became ardently hated.

Even if war could be avoided, the terrific pressure would one day prove to have become unbearable. We all know about March 13th, 1848, in Austria—nobody knew what would happen, nobody knew who would be proclaimed as leader, and under which conditions. Silently people waited in the large yard of the government's residence. All of a sudden a man sprang upon the parapet, a small young doctor of a hospital, and the first free word was spoken, the undecided knew what to do, where to go, the hesitating knew their duty. Maybe that the development of a new Austria will not be unlike the old one—where there is a will, there is a way.

AUSTRIACUS.

GERMANY OVER ROUMANIA.

IT is now becoming possible to assess the effects of Germany's trade treaty with Roumania, signed nearly three months ago. The importance of the treaty is unquestionable, for it was no ordinary commercial deal comparable with the many which are closed almost every week in Europe. This was a "planned" treaty, a blue-print for Roumanian *Lebensraum*, a departure from tradition that was as sudden as it was shocking. Its political importance was such that newspapers in Britain and elsewhere described it (quite wrongly, in fact) as an "ultimatum": Members of Parliament asked questions in the House, even the City was disturbed. For weeks it became a prime subject of conversation among those who thought they knew their Balkans, and it was variously described as a major challenge to British foreign trade or, at the other extreme, as a storm in a teacup or a dustbowl in the Roumanian plains.

The truth, of course, lies somewhere between the two. But if anyone were inclined to question the importance of the German-Roumanian trade treaty of March 1939, and its bearing on Great-Power politics, they need only be reminded that it persuaded the British Government to do what it ought to have done at least two years before—to send an economic mission to Bucharest which should grant the Roumanians credit for the purchase of armaments and cash in exchange for grain. In the end Sir Frederick Leith-Ross's Mission, after its stay in Bucharest in early May, was the means of granting a credit of £5,000,000 and a number of other facilities, the details of which are not available at the time of writing. These credits and facilities are in part the work of building up the Peace Front, for it would be useless to give a guarantee to Roumania unless we could prove to her at the same time that she could rely on us for economic assistance in the arming of her forces; but they are also a means of proving that we do not intend that Roumania shall become a German colony. In some ways we have reason to bless the Germans for having pressed on Roumania, no matter how gently, a treaty of such wide scope; this is so if only because our action in reply has given heart to all those people in the Balkan countries, and their numbers are not few, who sympathise wholeheartedly with the policy of the Western Powers but are at a loss to

explain the reason why the Western Powers, during the past few years, have withdrawn their material support. It is fruitless to argue with Bulgarians, for instance, that our policy is one which they can back with advantage to themselves, when all the time they perceive very well that their foreign trade is falling into the hands of the Reich and that without help from abroad that trend cannot be stopped. In an equal degree it is useless to try to convince Roumanians that we mean business with our guarantee when we do nothing to help them in their resistance to German economic pressure. Even if the money we spend in this way yields no appreciable economic return, it will have been excellently well spent.

In defining how far the Germans have managed to impress on the Roumanian economic authorities their own idea of what the treaty should be—the moulding of Roumania's economy to Germany's needs—it is necessary to remember that the Balkans are a wonderful breeding ground for still more wonderful rumours. It is all the more necessary to remember this because the treaty carried a number of secret annexes, and the scope for discussion is therefore not confined within known limits. One of those annexes is known to have dealt with the supply of armaments; and if it is true, as was recently reported, that the Junkers aircraft group has negotiated a credit with the Roumanian Government for the supply of military planes to the value of about £5,000,000, then no time is being lost in making good that supply. A second annexe is said to deal with the establishment of a "*réseau commercial*"—an organisation for collecting and marketing rural produce—under German control: this raises particular interest in Roumania because one of the saddest deficiencies from which they suffer is the lack of any means to grade, select, and pack produce like grapes, nuts, and various soft fruits, which otherwise comes on to the market in unreliable condition. It is notorious, for instance, that Roumanian grain commands poor prices on the world market compared with other grains simply because of the haphazard method of marketing. It is one of the undoubtedly constructive aspects of the German *Lebensraum* theory that this deficiency has been recognised and allowed for; the plan is for a large number of German technicians and agricultural experts to be hired out to advise Roumanian producers on the improvement of their methods. This is not altogether to the

liking of those Roumanians who perceive the implications of such advice.

Before going on to assess the gains and losses to Roumania of a commercial attachment such as the Germans wish, it may be useful to recount the actual progress the Germans have so far made in obtaining concessions and forming "mixed companies." They have two main objects: to exploit and increase the production of minerals, and to increase and improve the production of food. Towards the first they have secured, in various parts of the country, concessions for the mining of bauxite, copper, chromium, and whatever else they can find; further, the Roumanian Government has granted oil concessions in Transylvania and also in the rich Ploesti district where the bulk of Roumanian oil is found. Of these the most important is a 30,000 hectare concession at Snagov, near Ploesti; a second concession covering 9,000 hectares has been granted in Transylvania. An interesting contract signed some seven months ago (that is, before the conclusion of the treaty) was with the Muehler Industrie A.G. of Magdeburg for the erection of grain silos to the total value of Rm. 15 millions or about 615 million lei; while on May 13th the Director of the German Forestry Department and the Roumanian Minister of National Economy concluded an agreement whereby Germany obtained certain rights in the exploitation of State forests in certain mountainous regions, and this will mean a whole series of public works contracts. Given the wasteful way in which the Roumanian forests have been stripped for many years past, this promises to be of considerable benefit to both sides. While Sir Frederick Leith-Ross and his colleagues were negotiating the British credit some thirty German agents and industrialists were also negotiating with the Roumanian authorities for the formation of "mixed companies" for oil-drilling and mining: the formation of several of these companies was actually announced while the British delegates were in Bucharest.

An aspect of the treaty which has caused anxiety in Roumania is the provision—at unspecified points—of "free zones" in which German activities shall be extra-fiscal. It was currently understood that these zones referred to the grain ports of Braila and Galatz in the Danube delta region; and very little objection could be taken to proposals whereby the storage and elevating equipment in those ports would be

improved. On second thoughts, however, it appears that these free zones may be established, with the consent of the Government, wherever the Germans decide that it would serve their interests. Thus the Allgemeine Elektrische Gesellschaft of Berlin has obtained for its subsidiary company, "Elgiba," a contract for the construction at Timisoara in the Roumanian Banat of a large power station designed to supply current to the districts of Arad, Timis-Torontal, Carash, and Severin. Allied to this contract is a proposal for the establishment of a free zone in which German light industries could be set up. The danger of these free zones is not immediately obvious, but is none the less real. It does not need a great deal of imagination to see what might be the effects of a large number of German light industries established under particularly favourable conditions, for although at the outset they might have to conform to Roumanian fiscal statutes, a little gentle pressure here and there would later on be sufficient to ease the terms of those statutes. Many Roumanians see in the "free zones" one more proof that the Germans are determined to keep Roumania in a state of rural backwardness, hinder to the top of their bent the development of Roumanian industry, and so gradually exercise a dominating control in every sphere of national life.

But it would be wrong to think that Roumanians are unanimous in seeing only disadvantages in Germany's drive for economic control. There is a considerable section of public opinion, both in the towns where contact is made with the efficiency of German negotiators and their high-pressure methods and in the countryside where the Germans with their high prices have reaped a harvest of good will, that welcomes this intense interest in Roumanian commercial well-being. For fifty years and more the markets of Roumania have been filled with goods from Central Europe, and chiefly from Germany, while Central Europe has always bought the lion's share of Roumania's produce. Before the World War Germany was in command of an even higher percentage of Roumania's foreign trade than is the case to-day—the difference being that then she paid in free exchange—and in Bucharest they are accustomed to thinking in terms of German markets just as German exporters are accustomed, as their British competitors seldom are, to thinking in terms of Balkan markets. In the course of time there has come into being a sense of

mutual goodwill that is as natural as it is widespread. It is not surprising that many Roumanians see in Germany's latest trade drive a friendly and welcome chance to renew and extend the ties of the past. Apart from these psychological considerations there are solid advantages to be counted in: the organisation of transport, the construction of wheat silos, the revising of methods of marketing, and, of course, the provision of armaments. Potentially it is true to say that Roumania is one of the richest countries in Europe, for her size perhaps one of the richest in the world: not only does she possess the wide and immensely fertile "black earth" plain, well-watered and blessed by nature in every way, but she also has great mineral wealth that as yet has scarcely been prospected. All Roumania needs is a long period of peace and plenty of capital development: in those circumstances her richness and fertility will triumph over any handicap, including the abysmal inefficiency of much of her administration.

It is at this point that informed Roumanians are wont to pause in their panegyrics and wonder if, after all, the German windfall is quite the blessing that it seems. The number of those who, having paused and wondered, have made up their minds that it is not, is growing; already they include a group of influential politicians and financial experts who are playing an important part in resisting wherever they can the advance of German penetration. Their reasons are various, but can be summarised under a few brief headings. To begin with, they perceive that under the existing barter system, whereby trade with Germany is conducted without cash, the German authorities have all the advantages. They hold all the good cards. Having a vitally important position in Roumanian foreign trade they can force concessions they would not otherwise obtain. They can "fix" the exchanges so that the Roumanians are handicapped by high internal prices from exporting on to world markets, and at the same time are forced into paying correspondingly high for German imports. Most sinister of all, they can retard the development of Roumanian industry.

It is this last point that weighs most heavily on Roumanian consciences. With an annual natural increase of 11·7 per 1,000 inhabitants, one of the highest in Europe, Roumania suffers increasingly from over-population with its corollary of rural unemployment. For this the only known solutions

are either emigration to the towns, emigration to foreign countries, or a change-over from extensive (arable) farming to intensive farming. With emigration to foreign countries more and more restricted, the only possible solutions remain those of urbanisation (with a corresponding industrial development) or intensive agriculture. It is precisely these solutions that the Germans do not favour, and, indeed, are out to render impossible. If Roumania is to become Germany's larder she must go on producing wheat and other grains, for Germany can obtain plenty of dairy and vegetable produce elsewhere; equally, if Germany is to continue paying for imports from Roumania with machinery and capital goods and the products of light industries, then Roumanian industrial development must be checked.

There are, broadly speaking, two ways of retarding industrial development. You can do it either by treaty—by laying down certain limits which shall not be transgressed—or you can do it by creating conditions under which industrialisation becomes impossible. The Germans are reported to have tried and failed to obtain the first; they are enjoying far more success with the second. The method is simple though somewhat roundabout. By purchasing large quantities of rural produce at relatively high prices (which are equivalent to world prices *plus* the Roumanian Government's export subsidies to "free exchange" countries) the Germans are contributing to a steep rise in the Roumanian cost of living, not only by the automatic raising of internal prices but also by the food shortages which those purchases are causing. The Central Institute of Statistics in Bucharest recently published figures to show that the cost of living increased in Bucharest by 25·7 per cent. between February 1937 and February 1939, and by 49 per cent. over July 1934.

To industrialise a country's economy the one essential element you must be able to command is capital. To some extent the Germans are willing to provide Roumania with capital, for the formation of "mixed companies" of Germans and Roumanians, for the extension and improvement of communications, building roads and railway tracks, for the laying down of arms industries. Obviously, however, their provision of capital is limited by their decision that Roumania shall remain a predominantly agricultural economy. Meanwhile they are increasing their hold, advancing their penetration,

To these economic considerations the push-and-pull of Great-Power politics is now adding several of a more immediate nature. With the Peace Front steadily taking shape in a more and more constructive and formidable guise, the British guarantee is seen in Bucharest to be worth far more than was thought at first. Under the able direction of MM. Constantinescu and Bujoiu, respectively the Minister of Finance and the Minister of National Economy, the Roumanian authorities are finding it possible to impose a speed limit on the pace of German penetration. Great things are hoped, in the meanwhile, of the proposed Anglo-Roumanian trading organisation which is to organise the Roumanian market for increased exports to Great Britain and find means of increasing British exports to Roumania. Roumania, in short, is taking measures to avoid economic encirclement.

BASIL DAVIDSON.

BISMARCK AND THE FORBIDDEN WAR.

IN 1875 the Great Powers of Europe prevented Germany from waging war against her weaker neighbours. Four years after the founding of the second German Empire, Bismarck meditated a war of aggression against a number of states whom he considered to be members of an anti-German league of Roman Catholic states. Considerable sections of the German people, especially in the south and west, were still in opposition. Berlin came into sharp conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, which resulted in the *Kultur Kampf*. Germany's rise to power was resented by her neighbours, and the distrust of Prussian-German policy was strong. She aspired to the hegemony of Europe, she did not wish any country to evade her influence. Those who did not submit were to be coerced.

In March 1875 France passed a military law, known as the cadre law, which, by re-forming the infantry regiments (and reducing the number of battalions from four to three), would create a framework enabling her to put 144,000 more infantry into the field at the outbreak of war than hitherto. Though this measure dealt with the future—the French army immediately after the war of 1870 lacked the requisite number of trained troops—the General Staff in Berlin received the news very badly. An alleged connection was found to exist between this law and Austrian plans for a revenge for 1866. Fearing an alliance between Austria, France and Italy, enjoying the patronage of the Pope, Bismarck entertained the idea of a preventive war. Francis Joseph met Victor Emmanuel in Venice, April 5th-7th, 1875. This meeting in the very city that Austria had just ceded to Italy meant the final renunciation of all claims to re-conquest and a voluntary acknowledgment of Italy's national unity. The path to an Austro-Italian alliance was now open. Such an alliance need not be directed against Germany; but Bismarck's suspicions waxed because Vienna kept Berlin in ignorance of the projected meeting as long as possible.

In Bismarck's time, as to-day, the bellicose tendency of the Government in Berlin was first shown through a press campaign. His Secretary for Press Affairs, Aegidi, sent a "Letter from Vienna" to the *Kölnische Zeitung*, and in the covering letter he stated emphatically: "Every single word has been

pondered, as in a state document." This highly official article was published on April 5th, on the first day of the meeting between the two monarchs. Under the heading "New Alliances," the danger was emphasised into which Germany was plunged by an alliance of the Roman Catholic states, and the increased armaments in France were especially mentioned. This article did not attract much notice at first. Bismarck thereupon caused another, clearer article to follow, published on April 8th in Berlin in the *Post*, the organ of the *Freikonservativ Partei*. The very caption was alarming: "Is War in Sight?" This question was raised, and the article answered it with an emphatic affirmation. "War is certainly in sight; this does not, however, exclude the possibility of dispersing the threatening clouds."

This sentence, which we should consider quite friendly to-day, caused a panic in 1875. The European Exchanges registered appalling slumps, and the Chancelleries were fluttered. This was heightened by the fact that, on April 11th, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* emphatically underlined the alleged danger caused by the French armaments. Further, diplomatic correspondents in Berlin reported that Army circles, like Bismarck, made no attempt to hide their warlike aims. Moltke told the Belgian Ambassador on April 30th that the Great Powers must induce France to curtail her armaments, as otherwise it would be impossible to prevent war next year. Bismarck informed the leader of the *Freikonservativ Partei*, Dr. Lucius, subsequently Minister of Agriculture, that the war of 1866 might well repeat itself; in six weeks Vienna might be taken, or the Austrians, who always deserted their allies after the first defeat, might be won over and be turned against France. The historian Treitschke remarked to his publisher on April 25th that three days previously Moltke had asked Miquel how the country would react "should we begin an offensive war this very year." Although an attack on Vienna was the first aim in view, and Paris was threatened in a slighter degree, France took this press campaign far more seriously. The Government in Vienna could, of course, always fall back on the alternative of throwing in their lot with Germany and so escaping attack. France, lacking such a possibility, appealed to England and Russia. In England Gladstone had been replaced by Disraeli, under whose leadership England once more paid greater

attention to European politics. He declared Bismarck to be another Napoleon who must be restrained. He was thinking of a joint move by the Great Powers against the disturber of peace, following the precedent of 1840, when France was isolated and had to submit. Disraeli instructed the British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord Odo Russell, to warn Germany, in co-operation with Russia, to renounce all bellicose intentions.

Russia took the lead in the intervention to preserve peace. Alexander III seized the opportunity of a visit to Berlin, planned for some considerable time, to frustrate Bismarck's plan of a preventive war. The Russian Chancellor, Prince Gortschakow, informed Bismarck that if Germany attacked France, she would find Russia side by side with France. Bismarck assured him that no plan of aggression had been contemplated. He insisted on the omission of the word "now" in the statement that was issued concerning the Russian visit to Berlin. Gortschakow was prevented from stating that "Now [i.e. after the Russian intervention] peace is preserved." Instead, the statement declared that: "The Tsar leaves Berlin fully convinced of the peaceful intentions that rule there and that secure the maintenance of peace."

Austria and Italy had not participated in the intervention. The Vienna Government, with Andrassy as Foreign Minister, was labouring for a better understanding with Berlin, which resulted in the Dual Alliance, the Triple Alliance, and finally in the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire in 1914-18. An account of the attempts of the Western Powers to persuade Austria to adopt another foreign policy may be found in the letter of her Ambassador in Paris, Count Rudolf Apponyi, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrassy, published in the *Revue de France*:

Secret.

Paris, May 8th, 1875.

My dear Count! Duc Decazes has given me confidential information that I was far from expecting. He read me two telegrams from the French Chargé d'Affaires in London, concerning conversations with Lord Derby, in which the latter expressed serious concern about the German Government as regards Austria. According to His Grace, these apprehensions are fully shared by competent and capable politicians, and are confirmed by his own reports from Vienna and Berlin. The danger is not believed to be imminent, but apparently the impending storm would break over

Austria. The meeting in Venice has deeply disconcerted Herr von Bismarck, his mind is obsessed by the phantom of a coalition and he believes the danger might be averted if he attacked us suddenly, seized our German provinces, which have been thoroughly prepared by Prussian propaganda, before the other Powers had time to come to our aid. Lord Derby recalled the fact that Napoleon I had been greatly disturbed by the coalitions formed against him, although he had himself been the first to provoke their formation by his ambitious policy of invasion. This juxtaposition, emanating from so level-headed [Andrassy's marginal comment "yes"] and cautious [Andrassy's marginal comment, "no"] a man as the Secretary of State, is sufficient proof of the apprehensions that filled him.

I could not hide from my partner in this conversation the deep astonishment caused by this communication, which could not be explained either by our own peaceable course of action, or by our present relations to the Court of Berlin. I added that my own news from Vienna was far from causing me to sense any such possibilities, and I cited some of the sentences in your private letter, dated April 28th, among them the one stating that the "nervous side" of Bismarck's policy ought not to be taken too seriously. In reply, Duc Decazes read to me the following passage from a private letter he had received from Marquis d'Harcourt (French Ambassador in Vienna), that I have memorised almost verbatim. The Ambassador writes: "I have recently been greatly astonished by the sincere attempts of the Austrian Government to entertain good relations with the Cabinet in Berlin, although, despite this good will, causes of differences of opinion between the two Governments are continually arising and multiplying. It would seem as though Germany were collecting points of recrimination against Austria." What do you think? continued the Duc. We must be prepared for everything when dealing with a madman, and a madman possessed of such power is doubly dangerous. [Marginal note of Andrassy's: "This view is most tempting, but it is wrong. Would the danger be less if Bismarck were less mad? Why does Decazes complain if his opponent loses his wits?"] I am communicating this confidential news to you, dear Count, and leave it to you to ascertain its value. If it were merely a case of French impressions, I should account for them largely by the continual unrest caused here by Prussian policy, which amounted to a veritable panic more than once during the last week. But the opinion of so sceptical a mind as Lord Derby does appear to me to warrant some attention.

Andrassy, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was at great pains to convert the Emperor to his policy of friendship

with Bismarck. That is why he recorded, in his marginal note, his opinion that Bismarck might well be unpredictable, but not necessarily the more dangerous. He, Andrassy, reaped the greatest advantage in the "War in Sight" crisis, for he caused Berlin to be checkmated by Russia, and at the same time he ingratiated himself with Bismarck. When Andrassy was informed, before the Tsar left St. Petersburg for Berlin, that, according to the Russian press, Gortschakow had assured the French Ambassador that Russia would know how to prevent Germany from attacking France, he cut short the report with the words: "Leave me in peace with such nonsense. That is not true. That is a silly invention." When he heard in reply that this telegram was published by the official news agency, he jumped from his chair, threw his legs up into the air three times for joy, and cried enthusiastically: "Bismarck will never forgive him that!" And the culprit, whom Bismarck actually never did forgive, was Gortschakow.

In Berlin the Tsar threw his full weight into the cause of peace. The Austrian Ambassador, Count Karolyi, gives the following account of this to Count Andrassy (House, Court and State Archives, Vienna, 28/B).

Secret!

Berlin, May 15th, 1875.

The Tsar asked me whether I too had heard rumours of war against us talked about. I replied that such a rumour had come to my knowledge these very days, but only in a very nebulous form, so that I had of course attached no importance to it. The Tsar said that Bismarck was in such a bad temper in consequence of the meeting in Venice that he had even gone so far as to inform the British Ambassador that he would in any case march on Vienna first and subsequently on Paris. Lord Odo Russell had communicated this information to him, the Tsar. The Tsar's first query had been whether Bismarck had made this remark before or after dining. This time it happened to have occurred during the forenoon. . . . The Emperor William had begged him, the Tsar, to tell me how absurd such a rumour was, and that he, the Emperor William, considered it quite superfluous for him to give an assurance that he had never entertained such an idea, and that it was quite out of the question. His Majesty (Tsar Alexander) has added that I was not to mention this confidential information to the British Ambassador unless he spoke about it himself.

Even Andrassy could not quite suppress a sense of apprehension that Berlin might desire to annex the German-speaking

parts of the Dual Monarchy. In his private letter to Apponyi in Paris (House, Court and State Archives, Vienna, IX/100, France) we find the following :

Secret!

Vienna, May 17th, 1875.

What could one really think of a statesman who, notwithstanding the numerous difficulties with which Germany has to contend at home, with an Empire only just founded, lacking, as yet, all the solid foundations that only time can bring, yet contemplated the idea of allowing new and greater difficulties to arise by working towards an annexation of the German provinces of Austria—even granted the possibility that it depended on him alone whether such an aim could be achieved, which is, of course, extremely dubious? Setting aside the strong ties which bind the inhabitants of Austria-Hungary to their dynasty, that has ruled over them for many centuries, ignoring their loyal affection, which would lead them to oppose any attempt to make them gravitate towards Berlin, we may well doubt whether Herr von Bismarck could assert that the Austrian provinces could be changed into simple German frontier counties; it would require extraordinary illusions to imagine that the German parts of the Austrian nation, accustomed to play a leading part in an Empire of 36 millions, would easily accept a depressed and secondary role instead of a privileged one. Is it possible, on the other hand, that the Chancellor forgets that the Austrian parts of the people, though of Germanic stock, are yet different in every aspect from the North Germans? Their tastes, aims, tendencies, vary considerably, and even the language in Austria is not identical with that which is spoken in the greater part of the German Empire. And can one believe that Herr von Bismarck, or any other statesman, would care to strengthen the dissatisfied Roman Catholics in Germany by an additional contingent of opponents?

The threat of war in 1875 was checked so effectively that, during the remainder of his life Bismarck denied that it had ever existed. Especially towards his Imperial master, William I, at that time 78 years of age, he always emphasised the assertion that it had been a mere case of malignant press alarm. The shortest criticism of this method, detrimental in its brevity, was made by the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, Count Karolyi, in a private letter to Andrassy, dated Berlin, May 29th, 1875 :

We must take into account that His Majesty [the Emperor William] has weakened considerably mentally. His Majesty

believes firmly that the press alone bears the responsibility for all this war-scare, that is to say, the so-called independent press. His Majesty does not appear even to suspect in what manner the hand of the Cabinets has been made effective through the exercise of official influence.

In the Europe of those days the war crisis lasted for about eight weeks. Not a man was mobilised. Nothing emerged except articles in the press and diplomatic interventions. The Germany of Bismarck had received a sound lesson. To employ an expression coined by Andrassy in his final report to the Emperor Francis Joseph : "We have been given peace and the Germans have had a lesson."

CARL MISCH.

"ROBERT ELSMERE": FIFTY YEARS AFTER.

IT was in February 1888 that *Robert Elsmere* appeared, which made Mrs. Humphry Ward famous. In the May of the same year Mr. Gladstone wrote his famous article in the *Nineteenth Century*, which gave the book its world vogue. His article followed several friendly letters between them and one or two long and interesting conversations which Mrs. G. M. Trevelyan records in her admirable life of her mother. There was no animosity between the two protagonists, only a different approach to a religious problem in which both of them had a fundamental and passionate sympathy. In the issue, as Mrs. Trevelyan tells us, her mother moved like her hero Robert in the direction of the Unitarians. She formed with immense energy a committee of Unitarians and Unitarian sympathisers and raised money enough to build a settlement near Russell Square, which still continues to work and keep her name alive. And she added to this, as one item in her prodigious mental and moral output, the movement for Play Centres in great towns which also still flourishes, and has led, through the persistent devotion of her daughters, to the acquisition of the great Foundling Hospital site nearby for similar purposes of healthy recreation for the children of a crowded part of London. When we think that one woman was able to accomplish all this while writing thirty books, visiting several times the fighting fields of France and inspiring the Americans (whom she also visited) with some knowledge and sympathy with what Great Britain was doing in the war, one may well think that she was one of a very small group of Englishwomen who have moulded the life and thought of her country.

It is not intended here to give a life or a character-sketch of Mrs. Ward. Though her books are not now read as they once were, or perhaps as George Eliot's still are, most educated people know the main facts about her—the granddaughter of Arnold of Rugby, the niece of Matthew Arnold, the wife of a well-known member of *The Times* staff, the friend and correspondent of most men of intellectual note in her time either in France or England, the indefatigable and mainly self-taught student of many languages and much history,

"ROBERT ELSMERE": FIFTY YEARS AFTER. 197

especially the history of Christian origins. There are the bald facts of an outstanding woman whose name will not be forgotten among us, and to whom it will always be refreshing to return in the turmoil of a world which in some ways follows and, alas, in so many others is unlike the world of her dreams.

We are not concerned here with all her later novels. But in her most famous book she was possessed by a great idea and it is by that that she will live and by that that she interests us now on the jubilee of the book which captured Mr. Gladstone's attention and seemed for the moment to have diverted him from his Irish campaign. It is unnecessary here to go into the details of the story. Most people have a general notion of its trend. An ardent young Oxford man, full of social and religious zeal, comes under the influence of T. H. Green, to whose memory the book is dedicated. Green died in 1888 so that the events narrated must be supposed to have occurred some time in the seventies, that is, after the publication of the *Origin of Species* (1859) and all the religious stir which it aroused. Green appears in the novel as "Grey" and is faithfully and sympathetically described. He is memorable in English thought as the most powerful exponent of Hegelian ideas who has ever taught among us. It is not, however, on his intellectual or purely philosophical side that Mrs. Ward either studied or presents him. She knew him well when living in Oxford and the attack made on him and other liberal theologians by Bishop Wordsworth in his Bampton Lecture in March 1881, inspired her with the idea of *Robert Elsmere*. It was the man of passionate social and religious interests, free from the traditional theological dogmas which had been predominant in England till then, who captured her imagination and created the ardent young clergyman "Robert Elsmere." There is much in the story beside the widening out of Robert Elsmere. He has a thrilling love-adventure which binds him for life to one of the strictest of the old belief. And there are many other interests in the book, which is the longest Mrs. Ward ever wrote, and was at first actually longer than we now have it. But the two interests which grip us most are: (1) what Robert does when as a clergyman he fully accepts the non-revealed aspect of religion and (2) how this change affects his relations with Catherine the strictly orthodox

wife. It is enough to say that she sticks to him faithfully and perhaps even more lovingly after the change, and that he dies on the last page, having worked for years with Unitarian friends in an educational and social centre in the East End, having given up his living in Surrey. This is a bald summary of the leading thread in Mrs. Ward's most famous book. It may be interesting to set down a few of the impressions which crowd in on one, reading it half a century after its publication.

It is in the first place an extremely thrilling tale. No one can fail to be held tight by the development of the love interests which are perhaps more varied and exciting in the case of Rose, Catherine's sister, than they are in her own. Then we have a quite unsurpassed account of the old-fashioned life among the dalesmen of Westmorland and in the charming Surrey village before they move to Elgood Street, the settlement of the liberal-minded men in the East End of London. Both of these episodes are perfect in their way and postpone the religious crisis which made the fortune of the book. One almost regrets that the author's later objects should have obscured the larger part of the book, for on both of the earlier episodes it deserves to live, had Robert never felt religious qualms all his life. It is in fact full of matter, vivid and admirably told by a born story-teller. It may perhaps be one feature of the change of taste which has come over us in the last fifty years that the main incident now takes a somewhat subordinate place. In fact nowadays the resignation of his living by Robert on account of certain doctrinal differences from the published orthodoxy of the Church is less thrilling than his conflict with the cynical and sceptical squire as to the condition of some of his unhealthy cottages. The struggle with Henslowe, the drunken and inefficient agent of Squire Wendover, and the intellectual hold which the same squire afterwards establishes over Robert, are now the points which grip the reader most closely.

Does not this one fact denote the chief change which has come over the public mind since Mrs. Ward wrote: "Sociology and psychology have come to the front and theology is in the background"? It now seems intolerable to us that a rich literary man should be content for years to leave the management of his estate to an incompetent blackguard and that, through this neglect, the lives of a number of children and

others should be lost or made miserable, while, on the other hand, we take quite quietly the revelation by Robert to his wife that his religious views had moved a stage in the direction of what we should commonly call "rationalism." Does not Miss Rose Macaulay in one of her books bring into the drawing a wavering parson who admits that he has just been obliged "for the sixth time to change his religion"? Hence our present sympathy for Catherine is considerably lessened. "Well, my dear," we should imagine her saying, "surely many people of your class and order think just as you do now and make no fuss about it"? On that side of our life and thought compromise has gained enormously and, one must add, indifferentism also. On the other side, how people live is an interest which has shot up high above the other-world questions of what happens to them when they die or what they may think about the Virgin Birth. Humanitarian and social zeal has covered the country with agencies of every kind of which Mrs. Ward would have been a wholehearted supporter. Religious—or at least doctrinal—zeal has proportionately diminished.

One minor character, "Wardlaw," appears in the Elgood Street part of the book, who deserves a word of notice. He is a "Positivist," a good little man who helps the work of the settlement as well as he can. But his views and his want of tact and his strong opinion as to the subordination of wives make him an ineffective figure, curiously uncongenial to Catherine. Now it is well known from Mrs. Trevelyan's life of her mother that Mrs. Ward was a friend of Frederic Harrison who was the most prominent Positivist of that time. He co-operated heartily with her in her anti-suffrage agitation and wrote her a cordial letter of appreciation on her book, *Richard Meynell*, in 1911. It is worth quoting, as estimating *Richard Meynell* "as fine as anything since George Eliot," and judging Meynell as a "finer type than Elsmere both as a man and as a book." "I am sure that it will have a greater permanent value—even if its popularity for the hour is not so rapid—for it appeals to a higher order of reader and is of a larger kind of art." Mr. Harrison's judgment touches both the quality of the book and the forward change in public opinion since its appearance in 1911. This is nearly a quarter of a century since *Robert Elsmere*. It is a most moving tale, most skilfully told, undoubtedly the best of Mrs. Ward's

later books. But the contents are also significant in regard to the questions moving in the minds of the two men. Elsmere, finding that his intellect rejected the creeds and formularies of the Church of which he was an ordained member, resigned his living and took up religious and social work in the East End of London. By the time a similar change had come over the mind of Meynell, he found himself backed by a large minority of the clergy as well as the enthusiasm of his parishioners. He introduced a new form of service into his church, which while remaining Christian—as he understands it—avoids the errors and formalities of the traditional type. He is a Modernist of the order of Loisy and Tyrrell, besides adding to their doctrines a passionate, loving and delicate care for his neighbours and especially those most closely bound to him. The Bishop is sympathetic, but the case must go before the Court of Arches and the Modernists lose their suit. This is the religious kernel of the book, enclosed in a casket of intriguing and tragic romance. Catherine appears again, deepened and saddened as Robert's widow and dies quietly on the last page. One wonders that the book is not oftener read, as Frederic Harrison prophesied it would be; but one obstacle stands out and will probably continue to stand out in the course of its success. The public has lost any taste for the religious kernel. Since *Richard Meynell*, since the great agitation which followed as to the revision of the Prayer Book, people have become accustomed to the freer treatment of the old services. They are hardly preserved in their entirety anywhere and those who go to church now are quite accustomed to alterations which do not agree with Richard Meynell's revisions, but at least are fresher, more varied and always shorter than the old service. So far we may think that Mrs. Ward has won her fight.

But certain larger questions remain. The first which will occur is the general falling off in the interest which Mrs. Ward no doubt rightly describes as existing in her day. It is undoubtedly true that people generally do not take the same interest as they did, either in the practice of religion or in the special historical approach which occupied so much of her study. People are found to say that they would remain religious, even call themselves Christian, though it might be proved or believed that an historic Jesus never existed. Religion has thus become more generalised and more vague.

The Catherines of the books have become rare indeed. One might write a long treatise on the subject, but one thing is clear that the main interest which people now most discuss is not religious in the strict sense, but social and political. "Think what you like about these doctrinal and historical questions but take a hand in withstanding the dictators and preserving the freedom of the democracies." That is now the prevailing popular passion and one must add to it that religion in Mrs. Ward's sense has retired far into the background, whether we speak of Germany and Italy or of the other ideological camp in Russia. One may say that they have acquired another religion with a more direct bearing on the growth of their nations and the actions of every day. This is a narrow use of the word religion and we should avoid it much as Mrs. Ward would have done. She widened out in the course of her thought, though to the end she would have called herself a Christian; and she is capable of saying in one place, "God is history." One cannot read the working of another mind—nor indeed wholly one's own. But it is safe to say that the movement called "Positivist" has much to do with the formation of the party called Modernist and that they will have still more to do with one another in the future.

The most obvious weakness in the Gospel which Mrs. Ward offered to the world is its sectionalism or westernisation. How can we reasonably ask the Buddhist or the Confucian or the follower of any other divine leader recognised in the world to say that Christ was all and Buddha and the rest merely partial anticipations? Nor does the Elsmere gospel, centring in Christ and human kindness, allow for the growth of the human spirit in science, art, technology and the thousand aspects of power and expansion which are independent of the exquisite goodness and self-sacrifice of the Robert Elsmere or Meynell of the Ward gospel. They are needed; perhaps they are the supreme thing in human life. Yet they are not all and they seem at the moment to have suffered a grievous eclipse in nearly half the world. The full ideal must be humanity in its entirety and at its best. No one in her time did more to promote this ideal than Mrs. Ward. She would have been grieved to the depth to see the havoc now raging in the world. How would she have set about to combat it?

There is a sentence on this in her reply to Mr. Gladstone which appeared in the March number of the *Nineteenth*

Century for 1889. *Robert Elsmere* had stirred the old statesman deeply. He first sought an interview with her at the Talbots' house in Oxford, and an extremely interesting report of their talks appears in Mrs. Trevelyan's life of her mother, quoted in Mrs. Ward's own words. But this was not enough. He had already determined to write about the book in the *Nineteenth Century* and his article appears in the May number of 1888. We noticed above the widespread interest which this article secured for *Robert Elsmere*. But it is clear from a reading of what Mr. Gladstone wrote that his interest in it has led to thoughts which go far beyond the incidents of the story itself. He gives us not only his impression of the characters and the scene in which they moved but also, and principally, a passionate and historical defence of the divinity of Christ. The literary criticism leaves one rather cold; he actually suggests that the book is "difficult reading." But the *Apologia pro Fide Sua* is a moving thing. He seems to speak quite apart from the current thought of the day and has no reference to the new religion of humanity which was at that time attracting so much attention from thinking people of all kinds. To him Christ was all, and he argues through many pages that the amelioration of mankind in the last two thousand years—in which he firmly believed—was due mainly—if not entirely—to the spread of the belief that Christ was God. It remains a monument to the intense religious conviction of the old man and still deserves respectful and careful reading. Mrs. Ward replied in a lighter vein in the March number of the same review in 1889. She was consciously and clearly much more a master of the historical literature which bears on the question than her polite and friendly antagonist. She approaches very close to the religious ideas which were then inspiring the positivist school, and the concluding sentence of her article might well have been taken from one of their essays. What is the substitute for that concentrated belief in the one-man God? "Keep firm hold," she says, "on the whole of that vast heritage of feeling which goes back through all the overgrowth of dream and speculation to that strongest of all the forms of human life—the love of man for man, the trust of the lower soul in the higher, the hope and the faith which the leader and the hero kindle amid the masses."

F. S. MARVIN.

SLOVAKIA—TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW.

IS Slovakia, which is again beginning to play a greater rôle in the Central European crisis, an independent political body, or is she merely a territorial base for German militarism? Is there really any prospect of her leading a political life of her own? From the purely legal point of view one can only speak of the relationship as that of a protectorate under the German Reich. This state of affairs is not altered by the fact that in order not to offend Slovak susceptibilities the relationship was based on a bilateral treaty instead of being based, as in the case of the "Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia," on a unilateral "Order of the Führer." On the contrary, the type of treaty chosen for Slovakia is only in accordance with the classical prototypes of protectorates. In any case, the Slovakian army organisation and Slovakian foreign policy are bound up with those of Germany by Articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty. Article 2 transfers to the Reich not only the right of keeping garrisons, but even "military sovereign rights"—and what does this not include in German eyes?—over a belt of territory which embraces the lower and the middle valley of the Vah from Bratislava to Žilina (including these two main towns), and also the frontier mountains to the west and north. This occupation has no direct connection with the German "obligation" to protect Slovak territory—an obligation which, however, does not extend to the one frontier, namely the Hungarian, which is really threatened. And this for good reasons: In March and April of this year not only did serious frontier clashes occur between Slovakian and Hungarian troops, but considerable portions of territory were separated from Slovakia and annexed to Hungary, without the German "protective power" intervening in any way; nay, without one single German regiment moving east from Žilina when the Slovak Government found it necessary to mobilise against Hungary.

Actually, the German occupation has totally different aims. These are: Firstly, military control of the main towns and thereby of the "independent" Slovak Government; secondly, the isolation of the "Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia" from the outside world; and, thirdly, the acquisition of an excellent land base for facing Poland from the south. This last aim obviously stands in the forefront at the

moment ; for the concentration of two or three infantry and four motorised divisions (of the XIVth Army Corps) in Western Slovakia, and the creation of a separate German Army Command with its headquarters in the capital, Bratislava, can be explained only as a preparation for a serious offensive against a potential military enemy. A glance at the map shows that, starting from the middle valley of the Vah, Western Galicia could be attacked from the south as far as and beyond Cracow, thus preventing the possible defence of Polish Upper Silesia. It does not seem clear, therefore, how a country which has conceded to a Great Power such rights over its territory, can be considered an independent state.

Yet it seems worth while to ask ourselves whether there is some historical justification for that "independence" which, though it is just a formula to-day, might be transformed into reality at some future date. The first observation to make is that Slovakia has never in modern times formed an independent whole in her economic and social structure. In pre-war Hungary these mountainous countries in the northerly bend of the Carpathians were poor ; they were deliberately kept in a state of cultural backwardness, and were simply exploited by the Magyar feudal lords ; they supplied cheap labour for all the neighbouring territories. Because of this desperate situation there was considerable emigration from Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia to America, where they surpassed greatly their fellow-countrymen at home in respect of their cultural and economic life, and formed (until the birth of the Czechoslovakian Republic) the centre of national culture. As part of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Slovakia advanced immensely with the aid largely of Czech capital investment and Czech engineers, officials and intellectuals. This help evoked some ill-humour on the part of the Slovakian *petite bourgeoisie* and the intelligentsia—in part surely due to clumsy behaviour of the Czechs in certain directions.

But no serious person has ever questioned that without this help the rise of Slovakia and even the formation of these social classes would have been impossible. The sudden growth affected to a great extent those territories which reverted to Hungary after Munich and whose real life had only begun with the Czechoslovak agrarian reforms so much decried by Hungarian feudal lords and their friends. The development of industry was extensively connected with the Czechoslovakian

State, and above all with its defence requirements. These war-industries, which were established in Slovakia (around Bystrica, etc.), enlarged the railway network and are to-day an additional factor in drawing the German conquerors deeper and deeper into this country. This exploitation is hardly conducive to the independent economic life of the Slovak people. It may well be that the Slovak worker, accustomed as he is to a very low standard of life, reacted with less resentment at first to his compulsory dispatch to German fortification labours than his Czech fellow-sufferer ; but a national life can be founded as little on the sending away of the "surplus" men of a people as on the use of roads of communication and stocks of wood by the German occupiers. Since the separation of the southern regions annexed by Hungary, agriculture needs very earnest efforts merely to satisfy the extremely modest requirements of the country itself.

Slovakia, therefore, seems incapable of existing without any outside support ; but those who have severed her connection with the Czech territories, under whose guidance the country went through its first real development, cannot put anything else in their place but the simple exploitation by the German troops of occupation or by Magyar feudal lords. Moreover, the Slovak "nationalists" know very well that before Tiso began his ill-famed negotiations with Germany and thereby started the final crisis of the Czechoslovak Republic, he put his far from modest demands (2 billion Czech crowns) to Prague. The notorious round-trip during which the "right of self-determination" of Slovakia (and therewith the future of the whole of Czechoslovakia) was negotiated, had its origin in the Prague Central Government's promise of material help only on condition that the expenses for Fascist guards, Jewish pogroms and separatist propaganda should be discontinued.

Hardly different from the material conditions are those of the intellectual and political character of true independence. The alleged national separation from the Czechs is really only attributable to the fact that, before the war, a part of the very small Slovakian intelligentsia tried to find support against Magyar oppressors in the Catholic Austrian dynasty, from whose domination the more developed Czechs had already begun to draw away ; and after the war a part of

the *petite bourgeoisie*, now becoming stronger, took up this attitude of opposition towards Czech predominance. No doubt these circles are occasionally obsessed by hatred of the Czechs which in its motives and ways of expression is related to anti-semitism in Germany as well as in Slovakia itself, but neither is capable of a real national consciousness. Moreover, we ourselves while on our march through Slovakia in the critical weeks of the second part of March, encountered this "Anti-Czechism" much more among the German and Magyar innkeepers, merchants, etc., than among the Slovaks themselves; that is among people who do not care a hoot for Slovakian independence and who simply see in it a provisional means of getting rid of the hated Czechs.

Nor should we forget that Slovakian autonomism (which for all that was not yet separatism) could not obtain more than a third of all polled votes in any of the elections held under strictly democratic conditions. Under the conditions created by the German terror after Munich, the Czechs tolerated an electoral comedy during which all other parties were prevented from the presentation of lists, as well as the coercive *Gleichschaltung* of the anti-separatist Slovak parties, but this must be considered as a weakness for which the Czech people had to pay heavily on March 14th when the Parliament elected by such means proclaimed the "independence"—yet this must not be taken as a measure of the will of the Slovak people. As for the Hlinka-guards, though from time to time they are characterised as "part schoolboy, part criminal," I should not like to subscribe to such a strong judgment, though I have seen things with my own eyes at different periods which seemed to confirm it. The preponderant majority of men who wear the uniform of the Hlinka-guards in Slovakia (and, it must be added, who do not participate in pogroms of Jews and Czechs) are healthy elements of the people who have been pressed into it by some mechanical coercion, for example the railwaymen, of whom nobody will believe that they have finally discarded their democratic opinions by putting on the double-cross badge; or those forest workers who answered our questions as to how they could as old Social-democrats have become members of the Hlinka-guards: "The policeman went through the village yesterday, saying that every man must become a member of the Hlinka-guards." Moreover, these men were of a thoroughly national

disposition, i.e. the great majority followed the order of mobilisation (though there were also some complaints of non-compliance) against the Hungarian attacks, and they were quite prepared to defend the country against the old and hated masters. Still more would they have liked, they declared, to go to Žilina and to make an end of the "miserable Hlinka gang."

To complete the picture, however, the lack of a serious State organisation of its own must be mentioned. The expulsion of the numerous Czech officials, some of the worst cases of which we have ourselves witnessed, was surely in the interest of "national" aspirants for jobs whose number—not to speak of their capacities—does not in the least suffice to fill even the most urgent gaps. Everything has worn the mark of disorganisation—and this was only checked by the German authorities of occupation insofar as these conditions threatened their own security; the "mobilisation" against Hungary is a case in point. In addition, the Slovak Government according to the wishes of the occupiers, but in strongest opposition to the army itself, wanted to dissolve the army; this provoked protest movements and caused certain especially exposed persons and parts of the army to cross the frontier into Poland and join the legion formed there by the Czech emigration.

Such were the conditions under which the Slovak "State" and its leading party evolved. One can hardly regard the most decisive group to-day, namely Tiso, Duzsanski, Tuka and others as differing much in character from the "independent Governments" of the Ukranian "Hetman" Skoropadsky, and similar creations of the German troops of occupation during the Great War. Under such cover nothing but exploitation of the country takes place. *Der Deutsche Volkswirt* of June 2nd for instance registers with satisfaction the German "mass-purchases" in Slovakia; only the orders of the Slovaks for German industrial products were still outstanding, on account of which there now exists an uncovered clearing balance. The fault lies, according to the *Deutsche Volkswirt*, on the one hand with "ignorance of the German sources of supply" (or rather, we may add, unreadiness of the population to buy German *Ersatz*) and, on the other hand, with the retention of the Czechoslovak protective duties. While there is a demand for the abolition of these duties, the rate of the Slovak crown has been fixed at 8.6 Reichspfennig in order,

it is declared, to promote Slovak exports. Even in the "Protectorate" the rate was fixed at 10 and in Sudetenland, which is much more industrialised and has real export interests, but with whose population the Germans wanted to be on a good footing, it was fixed at 12.5 Reichspfennig. It is thus evident that goods are sold under price to Germany.

Apart from the open German exponents, there exists a group inside the Hlinka party with more pro-Polish sympathies which originated during the time of struggle as opposition inside Czechoslovakia. Its chief exponent is Sidor. It is excluded from all official influence and is accused of being "Pan-Slavist" by the official propaganda (since German hegemony this has become an abusive word). Furthermore, the leading group tries to work against an obvious *rapprochement* between the two peoples by underlining in their propaganda the losses of territory to Poland—which compared with those to Hungary are of little import. In any case, the fact of such propaganda proves that this tendency should not be underestimated. One dare not break with it altogether. A proof of this can be seen in the fact that Sidor has been offered (obviously as some sort of honourable banishment) the post of Minister to the Vatican which is important in such a strongly catholic country.

The people of a democratic or a pro-Czech tendency are condemned to keep silence. In spite of that one cannot doubt, if one has seen the country in the crisis, that this opposition has a great future. True to-day the pro-Polish Hlinkists, let alone the representatives of the former Czechoslovakian parties, cannot act openly; but the mere existence of these tendencies (quite apart from the contrast between Catholics and Protestants which is to some extent related to politics) forms many centrifugal elements in the "Unity party" which has hardly yet established itself in the country. Prussian bayonets may be able to drive such contrasts from the surface, but they cannot decide any of the insoluble problems of this state. This has already become very clear if we look at the prospect as indicated in the delimitation of the German frontier zones: The alleged achievement of "independence" is ephemeral, "liberated" Slovakia may serve as "small coin," her main parts (now that the south and the extreme east have been amputated) may serve as an instalment for the "restoration of the integrity of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen";

while those zones which are strategically the most important towards Poland and Bohemia-Moravia remain occupied by the Germans; except in the event of Hungary's becoming a German protected country (*Schutzfreundschaftsgebiet*). The Slovakian people, which has been misused in breaking up the Czechoslovak Republic, has hardly any means at its disposal to put up any resistance against such or similar steps.

Yet, to look at it from the historical point of view, no such "solutions" can be definitive. If Slovakia is going to be kept under the Prussian iron rod, the common struggle against the oppressor will break through the dialect frontiers artificially exaggerated by nationalist propaganda. The Slovak people will make higher claims and will learn a greater political consciousness from their Czech brothers, who fight with great energy against their oppressors. If Slovakia—or the essential parts of her—came to Hungary, we should see a repetition of what caused the Magyar feudal class to withhold electoral rights from the larger part of the territory ceded to Hungary after Munich, though the majority are Hungarians. Slovaks will be bound to make comparisons between the times of the Czechoslovak democracy and that mixture of old and new which the Magyar ownership of estates involves. And the political leaders of to-day, who before Germany became strong were not ashamed to take up treasonable connections with Hungary (it is well known that Tuka was in prison for some time on account of espionage for Hungary) would be the sooner disposed of when the ordinary citizen knows that the "independence" was only a roundabout way back to the old servitude.

What Masaryk hoped for far more than was warranted by reality, namely a united Czechoslovak nation in spite of the differences of the populations composing the state, will now become reality under the boot of the foreign conqueror. And the eventual victory of democracy in Central Europe will restore to this nation the possibility of playing that rôle amongst the peoples of the Danube basin, bound together as they are in a common destiny, which will correspond to the part she took in the common struggle for freedom.

RUDOLF SCHLESINGER.

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE.

MOST people have heard of Darwin's famous argument concerning the connection between the number of spinsters in a village and the clover crop. He argued that the more spinsters there are, the better will be the clover and, of course, the fewer spinsters, the poorer the clover. Darwin assumed that the more spinsters there were, the more cats there would be. I think most of us would agree to that. Very well--cats kill mice and the fewer mice there are, the more wild or humble bees there will be, for mice destroy the nests and young of these insects. Finally, the great naturalist argued, the more bees to pollinate the clover, the better the crop. Conversely, the fewer spinsters, the fewer cats and therefore the more mice, and the more mice, the fewer bees and so the clover suffers.

That is just an illustration of the sort of interdependence one finds among living beings. Let me give you another. You have all heard of the liver-rot disease of sheep and probably know that it is caused by an internal parasite, the liver-fluke. But perhaps some of you do not know that during a part of its rather complicated life history the liver-fluke is also an internal parasite of a small fresh-water snail. In fact, it is entirely dependent on this snail and dies if it cannot find one, so that if we could exterminate the snails concerned, we should automatically rid our sheep of this fell disease.

I do not wish, however, to suggest that all associations are of this sinister kind. On the contrary, the association of two animals may be of a purely friendly nature. I am sure we have all seen starlings and jackdaws perching on the backs of sheep and cattle and deer, ridding them of many troublesome insects while themselves having a very good meal. In Africa there is a small white heron that does the same thing--I have seen it leaping up and down indefatigably as it snatched fly after fly from the neck of a placid cow. I have seen, too, a stickle-back following a gudgeon along the muddy bed of a slow-flowing river. Every time the larger fish stirred up the mud as it gulped down some food, the little one darted excitedly about chasing and catching the many minute insects and crustaceans that the bigger fish had inadvertently driven out of their hiding-places.

The relations of one animal to another are often exceedingly strange. There is, for example, a small creature to be found in ants' nests, which uses ants much as we use buses and trains. That is to say, when it sees an ant going (presumably) in the right direction, it jumps on, and when it has been carried far enough, it jumps off. The ant does not object--the uninvited passenger is very small. I think I have said enough to suggest that often you cannot study one animal without getting mixed up with several others. Of course you can study small parts of an animal's life--how it makes a nest, feeds its young and so on, but even then you need to compare the nest-building, say, of one animal with the nest-building of another. It is clear that animals are just as much members one of another as we are. In fact, there is more than a grain of truth in the schoolboy's saying, "Big bugs have little bugs on their backs to bite 'em, little bugs have lesser bugs and so *ad infinitum*."

In studying living creatures an interesting question that is always cropping up is, how do animals differ from ourselves in their ability to face life? As you know, it is sometimes said that the actions of man are governed by reason while the actions of animals are supposed to be governed by instinct. Naturally this is an over-simplification, for man is constantly under the sway of instinct and animals frequently act with intelligence. But if here I may take it as broadly true that man is guided by reason and animals by instinct, it at once follows that we are at a very great, though temporary, disadvantage. It is often said that this man is a born teacher, that one a born writer or artist. In considering animals we may carry this a step farther, for many are born craftsmen, needing little or no apprenticeship. One, perhaps, is born a mason, one a carpenter, one a thatcher. Not only that, each is born with the tools of its particular trade ready at hand and with the knowledge of how to use them. It may have no chance of watching others, learning what to do and then practising (even if it has the brain); yet its own life or the life of the next generation often depends on its doing a highly skilled piece of work with absolute accuracy the very first time. And usually it manages to do it while we, poor mortals, serve years of apprenticeship at this job or that.

Sometimes animals perform tasks that we, with all our skill and all our reason, would say were quite impossible.

can tell you when you are passing over a river winding its way like a ribbon across the earth hundreds of feet below. But this is only one instance of the many that could be found of animals having, apparently, a sense that is beyond our calculation. I have watched a mole breaking open the stems of the bulrush or reed-mace and eating the large fat caterpillars that I, at least, could never have guessed were there. All the stems looked alike, but the mole broke into only those that contained a caterpillar, tearing open the thick white stalks with its powerful front feet. Of course, in this case, the animal may have used its sense of smell. But it is interesting because normally these caterpillars live inside the stems of plants growing in water, so that one would not associate them with the mole. However, in a dry season, when ponds sink, the mole evidently finds not only its territory but also its food supply enlarged. Actually these caterpillars, or rather the chrysalises, are eaten by moorhens in an ordinary season, for, of course, these birds are constantly swimming about amongst the rushes. They too rarely split open a stem that does not contain a chrysalis and, although the caterpillar may have channelled the stem for a foot or more, the birds tear open the stem just where the tit-bit may be found. Again it is not known what tells them where to peck, for it is not likely that they can smell a chrysalis, for birds on the whole have very poor noses.

Returning to my remark that many animals are born into what may be called highly skilled trades—born not as apprentices but as, apparently, experienced workers, I also said that sometimes it is of vital importance to an animal to carry out its own special job with absolute accuracy the first time. Let me give you an example. In this case the animal concerned is a born actor or impersonator. It has only to go through its special act once, but at the same time this is the most important moment of its life. If it fails it may be killed. I expect you know the pretty little blue butterflies that are common in the summer. Perhaps you also know that the caterpillars of some of these, when seen from the ants' point of view, are really nothing but movable tuckshops. Each has on its back a sort of hump that produces a sweet juice, and ants may be seen climbing over these caterpillars and helping themselves to a free meal. All this is just a sideline, however, a sort of curtain-raiser in the life of the particular caterpillar I have in mind.

Some of these little creatures spend the winter months asleep, tucked away in a warm spot with their breathing-tubes closed to keep out the cold. As they do not feed all the winter they are naturally very thin when they creep out in the spring. But the caterpillar of one of these blue butterflies, on the other hand, reappears in the spring looking fat and jolly. Moreover it is not only fat, it is also bigger, which suggests that it has been living on the fat of the land. For a long time nobody knew where it spent the winter, how it kept warm or what it ate, its normal food being the sweet-smelling thyme that grows on molehills, ants' nests and so on. Now it is known that at the approach of chilly autumn weather this caterpillar leaves the thyme plant and goes up to one of the holes leading into an ant's nest. There it stops, for if it went nearer it would be attacked. Perhaps the warm air rising from the ants' front door blows temptingly in its face. Nevertheless it waits patiently outside, just as though it were begging for a night's or rather a winter's lodging.

Ants frequently carry one another about. If you are an ant and you want another ant to help you with a job of work, you merely go down the village street until you see a likely looking fellow with time on his hands, you pick him up and carry him to the work on hand. On another occasion he may possibly come along and carry you off. When an ant sees that it is going to be made use of in this way, or when it wishes to be carried, it turns up its body, folds back its head and in general makes as neat a parcel of itself as possible. Strange as it may seem, it is into this sort of parcel that the caterpillar presently contorts its body. And it does it so well that in time an ant comes along and understands what is meant. The ant, in fact, is being spoken to in its own language, and it responds by picking the caterpillar up and walking with it into the nest. In no other way could it get into the nest alive. Once inside, however, introduced as it were after giving the special password, it no doubt soon takes on the smell of the nest and is in consequence ignored by the ant community. Having obtained the snugest imaginable winter quarters, the caterpillar repays its unsuspecting hosts—by eating their babies. Indeed it gobbles up so many that in the spring it emerges fat and sleek when all self-respecting caterpillars are thin. There is no time to waste in looking for mislaid babies in the busy life of an ant, so the awful truth is apparently never known.

And anyhow, who would suspect a caterpillar of being carnivorous?

Much has been written on the wonderful perfection of instinct in animals, and I have given you examples of instincts which are perfect. But there are many animals whose evolution is not by any means complete, and whose instincts are still so imperfect that many of their kind die every year. In California, for instance, there are two oak trees, one which keeps its leaves through the winter and one that sheds them. Now the caterpillars of a certain moth live through the winter by eating the leaves of the ever-green oak. The moth has, as yet, no special instinct to guide her to the right tree, and accordingly she lays her eggs indiscriminately on both kinds. Inevitably all those caterpillars that are born on the deciduous oak die in myriads when the leaves fall, while those on the ever-green tree munch their happy way through the mild Californian winter.

Even animals, however, that are perfectly endowed make the most ludicrous mistakes simply because of the very perfection of their instincts. Many creatures so rarely need to bring even a grain of reason to bear on any problem, that when the need arises they either cannot think or, if I may put it so, it does not occur to them to think. Rather than think, indeed, they often struggle on with some sort of activity, however ridiculous, just to satisfy as far as possible an instinctive desire. A tame white rat, for instance, building a nest, ran out of material. Its instinct was to go on building until it had finished its nest. So strong was this desire to build that eventually it picked up its own tail and in triumph carried that to the nest. Dashing happily out again, it began to hunt for more material, found its tail for the second time and again carried it back to the nest. This happened repeatedly, the rat perfectly at peace with the world because it had at last found an apparently inexhaustible supply of material. The rat has a good brain, yet it could not stop to use it because for the time being it was, so to speak, wound up to fetch and carry.

It is, of course, common knowledge that when the egg of a cuckoo hatches in the nest of its foster parent, one of the young bird's first actions is to eject its foster brothers or sisters. The point I wish to stress is that the foster parent, returning to find, it may be, four babies lying just outside the

nest—which is often on the ground—and only one baby—which of course is the young cuckoo—in the nest, ignores the four and concentrates its attention on the one. It must see its own nestlings, for they are often only an inch or two away, but its instinct to feed young birds *in* the nest is so strong that it takes no notice of any that are outside. I do not think it recognises them. That may seem incredible, yet it is in keeping with what we know of animal intelligence and animal instinct.

In an emergency of this sort the bird has no instinctive knowledge of what to do. The rat, on the other hand, will retrieve her little ones if they fall out of the nest. Yet I do not think that we can say that in this respect the rat is more intelligent than the bird. Many little rats are probably dragged out of the nest when clinging too long to their mother's teat. It is really essential for her to know what to do in these circumstances and she is, in fact, born with the necessary knowledge. A very young bird, on the other hand, hardly ever falls from the nest unless it is pushed out by a nestling cuckoo. The bird, therefore, need not be burdened with the instinctive knowledge of what to do in an emergency that will probably never arise. That the rat's behaviour in retrieving her babies is instinctive action is suggested by the fact that if you put *sixty* young rats outside her nest, she will carry every one of them inside, even though none of her own infants has fallen out. If you argue that this is intelligent, kind-hearted emergency relief work—a sort of rat's Save The Children Fund—I must add that, even if you put young kittens outside the nest, it is all the same to her—she will take them in. Obviously she is not likely to find sixty young rats or a litter of new-born kittens at her front door, so here again we see the rather exact limits imposed by instinctive action.

I think it will be agreed that what I have said shows us that, though many animals have a great advantage over us in being born as highly skilled craftsmen, this advantage is only temporary. In an emergency, or when conditions alter, as they must alter from time to time, the animal with the most highly developed instincts is often at a loss ; while we, or any animal with a comparatively poor set of instincts, but with an intelligence of sorts, are able to adapt ourselves to altered circumstances.

G. B. GOOCH.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE DUEL FROM ENGLISH LIFE.

IF the reader should walk across Hampstead Heath and enter Ken Wood, once a nobleman's estate and to-day dedicated to the enjoyment of the public, he would see in several places finger-posts directing him to the Duelling Ground. They are not, as a visitor from another planet might wrongly suppose, a reminder of municipal provision for an activity in which members of the public might wish to engage ; they merely indicate a spot which the curious may care to see as a relic of past times and of an institution which no longer exists. These past times are not very distant from us ; a hundred years ago duels were still being fought in England ; and a few years earlier Ken Wood, Chalk Farm and Calais Sands were among the well-known rendez-vous. The Regency was one of the heyday periods of duelling. Yet the duel had practically disappeared from English life by 1850. There are few instances in history of an institution so deep-rooted, so widespread, and so coercive, disappearing in so short a time. It should be of interest to inquire into the nature of this institution and to examine the causes of its sudden decline.

The origins of the duel of honour are obscure. It cannot be decided with any assurance whether it developed out of one of the earlier forms of single combat or whether it developed independently. It can be said quite definitely that, whatever its origins may have been, it became very different in form and spirit from any other kind of single combat. With the heroic combats of Homeric times it has little in common ; these were usually fought by champions of opposing groups, and their occasion was not a point of personal honour or of personal interest. The fight between Paris and Menelaus, described in the third book of the Iliad, bears a certain resemblance to modern duels in that it was fought over a woman. But the resemblance is only superficial. In the first place, it was fought for possession of the woman, not for vindication of her honour. And in the second place, it was only an incident in a war ; well would it have been for Ilium and for Greece if the grievance of Menelaus could have been settled by the comparatively merciful method of the duel. In later times Greeks and Romans sought satisfaction for their

wrongs in the law courts, and sometimes doubtless in the use of the dagger ; they knew no duel of honour between citizens.

Many writers have supposed that the duel arose out of the judicial combat or ordeal by battle of the early Middle Ages, and the word "duel" seems actually to have been used at times of these. But a consideration of some of the features of the judicial combat shows clearly its difference from the duel of honour. Ordeal by battle was established as a legal form in Europe in A.D. 501, when Gondebald, King of the Burgundians, issued a decree recognising and prescribing it. It is interesting to note that it did not disappear from the English statute book until 1819, though it had fallen into disuse before the time of Elizabeth. The institution of the ordeal by battle was based on the belief that God would give victory to the party who was in the right. It is natural to suppose that some such belief originally underlay the institution of the duel also, since otherwise it is difficult to conceive how a combat, the outcome of which was uncertain, could have been accepted as a touchstone of honour. But however it may have been at the beginning, the duel of honour was early differentiated from the ordeal by battle in that whereas in the latter case the outcome of the combat was supposed to establish guilt or innocence, in the case of the duel honour was supposed to be vindicated for both parties. No stigma attached to the defeated party in a duel ; the only stigma was in case of refusal to fight.

Another conspicuous difference between the two institutions was that the duel was from the first a class institution, being restricted to men of gentle birth. No such restriction obtained in the case of the judicial combats, and there are many references to peasants engaging in them. Thus the abbey of Sainte Croix de Talmont received profits from judicial combats between the peasants of its district. It is true that Jews were not allowed to engage in judicial combats, but the discrimination was on grounds of religion and of civic status rather than of social status.

Though the duel of honour is to be clearly distinguished from the ordeal by battle, and though it is extremely doubtful whether the one arose out of the other, there were certain features in common and the older institution may well have influenced the younger institution. There is, for instance, the practice of vindication by proxy. Proxies were very commonly employed in cases of ordeal by battle, and churchmen in

particular often maintained professional champions. So in the institution of the duel the honour vindicated was not necessarily that of the duellist ; he might, and often did, fight on behalf of a woman's honour and more rarely because of a slight put upon some near relation such as an aged father.

The conception of honour which seems to be at the root of the institution of duelling appears to be a product of the age of chivalry. Knightly honour was thought of as a precious personal possession, to be guarded and vindicated by personal prowess. The Courts of Chivalry, which considered matters of honour, prescribed the duel as a means of vindication much as the common courts had prescribed the judicial combat as a means of establishing guilt and innocence between litigating parties. And since the honour in question was peculiar to certain classes in the community, the duel was from the first an aristocratic institution. Its private character arose out of the inadequacy and weakness of law and government. Men are ready enough to resort to violence in cases of serious dispute. In ages and countries where the machinery of the law was little developed, it was not strange that groups of individuals with a special code of conduct should work out a system of more or less regulated personal combat.

The duel of honour seems actually to have been first established in Italy in the thirteenth century and from that country to have spread over most of Europe. It had reached England by the sixteenth century, and from there it spread later on to Ireland, America, and even to Australia. It flourished during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ; and, as we have remarked already, it disappeared rather suddenly from English life in the first half of the nineteenth century. It has diminished everywhere, but in some countries it still lingers and may even be socially compulsory, especially in army circles.

The duties and formalities associated with the practice were early codified and there were written at different times a number of handbooks of duelling, to one of which there is an allusion in *As You Like It*. The custom of having seconds appears to have spread from Italy, roughly at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It fell to the seconds to arrange all details, sometimes on the advice of a court of honour. They arranged the place and time of the duel ; scrutinised the weapons ; fixed the paces and method of firing, where pistols

The attitude of the State was in most countries equally hostile. Laws against duelling were passed in England during the reigns of Elizabeth and of James I, during the Commonwealth, and in the reigns of Charles II and of William and Mary. In France there was similar legislation in the reigns of Louis XIII, Louis XIV, Louis XV and under the Republic. Penalties were severe and might include loss of State offices and emoluments, confiscation of property, imprisonment and capital punishment. But this severity failed of its effect. In part this was due to the fact that the executive power was not strong enough to apply the law rigidly and universally, so that many infringements went undetected and unpunished. But also, public opinion was such that even when a conviction was obtained the extreme penalty could seldom be inflicted. The survivor of a fatal duel might be guilty according to the letter of the law of murder, but public opinion held him not guilty because he had been compelled to the action by something external to himself. And it must be remembered that the administration of the law was entirely in the hands of members of that social class which alone supplied the culprits.

The divided opinion with regard to the duel is reflected in literature. It is from the beginning of the eighteenth century that the volume of criticism becomes considerable. Both Steele and Addison attacked the practice, the former directly and the latter for the most part with ridicule. Mandeville defended the duel: "if every ill-bred fellow might use the language he pleased without being called to account for it, all conversation would be spoiled." Dr. Johnson at a later date was inclined to defend, but admitted to Boswell that he could not explain the rationality of it. Sheridan, in his *Rivals*, represents Falkland as having qualms of conscience, whilst the servant Fag is disturbed by the illegality. Bentham defended the duel much on the lines of Mandeville.

The quickening of humanitarian feeling, which was so notable a feature of the late eighteenth century, did something no doubt to increase the uneasiness of men's minds with regard to duelling. But there is no reason to think that this alone would have put an end to it. There did not appear to attack it any champion as active and ardent as John Howard was with regard to prison abuses, or as Wilberforce and his associates with regard to slavery. There was indeed an Anti-Duelling Association founded in 1845, to which the

Prince Consort gave his support, but it cannot be classed with the Anti-Slavery Society or the Anti-Corn Law League. There is no story of persistent propaganda triumphing at last over dogged resistance.

The truth is that the duel was one of the institutions which were killed by the Industrial Revolution and the social changes which accompanied it. The structure of society changed, and the industrial middle class rose to social and political importance. At the same time the machinery of government became a good deal more efficient. And there were improvements in the law, particularly with regard to libel and slander. All these combined to undermine the prestige of duelling as a social institution.

There had been a certain amount of control of libel and of slander before the nineteenth century, but it had not been very effective, legal proceedings being both intricate and expensive. With the rise of the press the amount of harm which could be done to a man's reputation was much increased, and the need for efficient laws and efficient administration became pressing. The law of libel was strengthened both in 1820 and in 1843; and there were further Acts, some relating particularly to the press, during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Similar legislation was passed in many foreign countries. Contemporaneously there were great improvements in the machinery of enforcement of law and order. Sir Robert Peel established the new London police force in 1829. An Act of 1839 made permissive, and an Act of 1856 made compulsory, the establishment of police forces in other parts of the country.

The conditions no longer obtained therefore which had been recognised by many writers in past centuries as a cause and justification of duelling. There were now legal methods of protecting honour and they could be relied upon with considerable assurance to be effective. There was an equal assurance that the breach of the peace involved in duelling would be detected and punished. It was natural that there should be more resort to the law and less resort to sword or pistol.

Moreover the coerciveness of the duel had rested on tradition, the tradition of an aristocratic class, and this tradition could not have the same binding effect on the new rising middle class. The decline in coerciveness can be marked in a series of episodes. In 1815 O'Connell was challenged by

Peel, and his reputation is said to have suffered because he did not fight. In 1831 Sir James Graham avoided a duel, and Greville's comment was that "nowadays that piece of chivalry is dispensed with." When in 1837 Disraeli tried to provoke an eminent barrister to challenge him, the latter replied by application to the Court of Queen's Bench, and Disraeli was called before the court and had to apologise to it. In 1845 Roebuck, who ten years previously had reluctantly fought a duel, brought to the notice of the Speaker a challenge which he had received from a fellow member of the House of Commons. In 1850 Cobden received a challenge and threatened to hand over the sender to the police. Four years later on a similar occasion Lord Shaftesbury, a member of an old aristocratic family, referred Lord Mornington to his solicitor. The last duel on English ground was that fought at Weybridge in 1852 between Colonel Romilly and George Smythe.

To the student of social institutions the duel presents several features of special interest. During the whole of the period during which it flourished it was banned by both Church and State, and yet it was of an extreme coerciveness. It was essentially the social institution of one class, and when the structure of society began to change, its foundations were undermined. Yet it might not have disappeared if it had not been that better means were found of supplying a need which *faute de mieux* it met, the need of having some curb upon insult and defamation. When the State was able to exercise an effective check, the institution of the duel wilted away.

"BEDFORD."

POLAND'S BONDS WITH LITHUANIA REVIVED.

THE recent visit to Poland of General Rashtikis, Commander-in-Chief of the Lithuanian army, has produced very satisfactory results not only for the two countries concerned, but for all those who are interested in the general stability of Europe. It has renewed a centuries-old collaboration which, though interrupted by the post-war conflict over Wilno, is now sufficiently well cemented to resist the influence of forces which stand to gain by sowing discord among the various states.

The friendly meeting between the strong man of Lithuania and the leaders of Poland was the first held between statesmen of Kaunas and Warsaw since 1920, when the Poles seized Wilno. But the extraordinary importance which was attached to this meeting by political circles in the two capitals was not only due to the fact that it marked the end of an old quarrel. It was expected that it might lead to some formal agreement. When the visit was over, however, no such agreement was announced. But that was not necessary. Even without official declarations an identity of interests compels the two neighbours to draw closely together. The tenor of General Rashtikis' statement to the press, even more than his actual words, shows that Poland and Lithuania are united.

This is absolutely essential for the safety of both states. When Poland, in the spring of last year, issued her rather forcible ultimatum to Kaunas demanding the latter's renunciation of her claims to Wilno and the establishment of friendly relations, this was not dictated by sentimental but mainly by political and strategic reasons. It is one of Poland's main concerns lest Lithuania, her third largest neighbour, should side with her potential enemy, thus constituting a serious threat to her northern frontier, in addition to possible German assaults from the west and south. This apprehension increased considerably after the cession of Memel to the Reich, when the latter's influence in Kaunas began to grow. For this reason Warsaw induced Lithuania to bury the hatchet, which as her press asserted was only sharpened by elements from outside in order to prevent a Polish-Lithuanian *rapprochement*. She went even farther and began actively to woo Lithuania. The present time was particularly well chosen.

For after the loss of Memel and all that it entailed, the Lithuanians were psychologically prepared to seek support at their back. The Non-Aggression Treaty signed with Germany after the crisis apparently guaranteed the integrity of their state. But growing pressure, economic as well as political, on the part of the Reich was not calculated to allay the doubts of Kaunas about future German intentions. That is why Poland's outstretched hand was welcomed by the Lithuanians, and their goodwill followed General Rashtikis to Warsaw.

With the acceptance of Marshal Smigly Rydz's invitation by Rashtikis, Poland advanced a step farther towards her goal. Her press reflected frankly what Polish public opinion expected from Lithuania. The authoritative *Kurjer Warszawski* reminded her that for nearly 500 years Poland and Lithuania had formed a single and very powerful state, and that both parties had profited from the arrangement, since it enabled them not only to resist aggression, but to play an important part in Europe. Now the time had come again when both states had to defend their independence and therefore a revival of the old collaboration was necessary. The official organ of the Polish army, *Polska Zbrojna*, went even farther by stating plainly that this collaboration should take the form of a union to stop the German push to the East, just as it did in the Middle Ages.

Now Lithuania is just as much interested in stopping this push to the East as Poland. The whole Lithuanian population understood the great implications of General Rashtikis' journey to Warsaw. Within one year after the Polish ultimatum the Lithuanian attitude to their southern neighbour changed. In spite of Wilno, they are now prepared for the closest possible relations with Poland. But with regard to these relations there is a marked difference of approach between the two states. Whereas the Poles want an *entente* or union, the Lithuanians are primarily concerned to preserve their independence absolutely and in every respect. It was the word "union" which frightened them in particular. The ancient union had worked more in favour of the Poles than themselves. And since the Poles again are materially much stronger than the Lithuanians, the latter cannot free themselves from the suspicion that they might be led one day to merge in the Polish state once more. To guard against this,

they took refuge in their recently adopted neutrality. They pointed out that this neutrality barred them from any alliance or block, but that at the same time a neutral, strong and friendly Lithuania was a better safety factor for Poland than one forced into a union.

Polish diplomacy, one of the most alert in Europe, saw the red light at once. It was clear that Lithuania's will to fullest independence had to be recognised. To insist on an extreme course would be dangerous. Consequently the Polish diplomatic apparatus was skilfully switched over. And the same *Kurjer Warszawski* declared that Poland more than any other state in Europe desired complete Lithuanian sovereignty, and that nothing was wanted but co-operation in accordance with Lithuanian inclinations. This made an excellent impression in Kaunas. The right atmosphere for Rashtikis' visit was created.

The way the Poles handled the visit itself is another proof of their diplomatic art. A favourable psychological condition had to be staged for the co-operation of the two nations after the coldness of eighteen years. The Lithuanians had to be made to forget Wilno, which still stood between them and the Poles. Rashtikis' visit provided the opportunity. Great attention, extremely flattering to Lithuania, was bestowed upon him. He received the Order of "Polonia Restituta," Poland's highest mark of distinction, in recognition of his services for the *rapprochement* of the two countries. He was received by President Moscicki and met the Premier, the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff. He was shown the best cadres of the Polish army, the munition and airplane factories, the industries and chief garrisons. The intention was obviously to bring home to the Lithuanians the whole strength and importance of Poland as a potential ally. Rashtikis did not hide the fact that he was very much impressed. "The Polish army is one of the best in the world," he declared, and under the present circumstances it is not without significance that he added: "With an army like this it should be easy to gain great victories."

Not less significant is what Rashtikis said of his talks with Colonel Beck and the other leaders of Polish policy. He stated that he had found great sympathy with the Lithuanian point of view, and that it was easy to come to an understanding. Since it is safe to assume that he explained to them once

more the Lithuanian policy as being one of strictest neutrality, the position now is this: Poland accepts Lithuanian neutrality fully, and this the more readily in view of Lithuania's determination to defend it against all attacks. As Warsaw's vital interests demand an independent Kaunas, this is all she can possibly want. Moreover, it is particularly reassuring that Lithuania has agreed to co-operate with Poland on the political and military field, should both be beset by identical dangers. And since the dangers in that part of the world, coming from one source, are identical with all, Poland's northern frontier is safeguarded against Germany.

Lithuania, on the other hand, has succeeded in remaining neutral among the contending great Powers. But at the same time she assured for herself Poland's help in case of need, and this is the best thing she could get, since no other country is so interested in her as Poland. That is why both countries have reason to be content with the result of General Rash-tikis' visit to Warsaw. The old mistrust between the two nations has been replaced by the conviction that "the present friendship, based on the bonds between their armies, will grow ever stronger." And since the ancient collaboration is revived now in a new form--by mutual consent of two sovereign states--it should prove a bulwark more powerful than ever against aggression towards the East.

WOLFRAM GOTTLIEB.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

WORSE THAN WAR?

THE general situation in Europe had by midsummer so much worsened that, by a refinement of paradox, a sort of quickening impatience began to develop in British minds over the very fact that there was as yet no war. This sort of suspense and uncertainty, men began to say, was worse than war. Even if it be true that war cannot settle any problem (added the more broad-minded British thinkers) yet this sort of "shadow" war, this war of nerves and "jitters," was not any more likely to lead to settlement; and what, it was asked, was to bring the nervous strain itself to an end, unless it ended after all in war? Would it not be better, or in the long run less disastrous, to have the war and get it over? The fact, and it was a fact, that many serious people began to argue in such a way, proved how serious was the moral deterioration that had been produced by the continued diplomatic tension.

The actual detail of what was taking place, whether in the Far East or in Europe, no longer seemed to matter by contrast with the cold, almost dead resignation to the inevitability of war that was increasingly apparent. In the Far East Japan was engaged in what appeared to be the deliberate policy of insulting British nationals with the crude object of damaging British prestige. In Europe the grim energy of German intrigue was concentrated upon Danzig, where military effectives and armaments were being collected, and the political spokesmen were beginning again to clamour for the incorporation of the Free City in the Reich. London and other parts of England were the scene of an unbroken series of atrocities by bomb and incendiarism committed by members of the posthumous Irish Republican Army, with or without encouragement or support from German agents. It was a remarkable thing that no fewer than five German newspaper correspondents had lately been stationed at Dublin: Dublin being thereby diagnosed by Dr. Goebbels as an "important" centre of liaison. The importance attached to it was not primarily journalistic. We know only too well that German national activity is a co-ordinated whole, and that newspaper correspondents are an integral part of the diplomatic and military organisation. Whether the Irish Republican Army

needed any encouragement or support from Berlin for the prosecution of anti-British outrage was no more relevant a question than the question whether Japanese militarists needed German instigation for the like enterprise.

There could be no reasonable doubt that the German leaders, in particular Herr von Ribbentrop, were obsessed with the business of undermining the British position in the world. Dr. Goebbels, whose business it is to express Germany's aspirations, could not have been more downright than when he made a certain speech in Berlin on June 14th last. His political title, fairly descriptive of his particular function, is Minister of Propaganda and National Enlightenment. Addressing a meeting of students at the Sportpalast on that occasion he made a broadside attack upon Great Britain in the course of which he said: "If in the seventeenth century there had been a man capable of uniting Germany, then Germany would rule the world to-day, and not England; for we had the necessary qualifications. We do not recognise the existing order as an expression of the Divine will; on the contrary we are convinced that it is the work of man; and what man has done man can undo. There are people who say 'what would you have done if there had been war in September, if Chamberlain had not come to Munich?' I can only reply, 'But he did come.' He did not come for amusement, but because he knew no other way out. We had so cornered him that, as one says in chess, he was checkmated."

It is one of the depressing characteristics of the times in which we live that the vast majority of people in every country of the world who have influence upon the public opinion of their country have surrendered themselves to the profitless and indeed disastrous exigencies of carrying on the vendetta. They do not rise, do not seem to want to rise, seem incapable of rising, above the sordid mentality which competes by fair means or by foul for material gain. This question, which in our time has reached the dimension of a real climax in the affairs of mankind in their broadest and deepest implication, greatly transcends the particular circumstance of the diplomatic controversy. It is a philosophic question. If we are to rescue ourselves from the grossest form of failure in the elementary business of human life, we shall have drastically to revise what are to-day the commonly accepted standards of public policy.

What for instance is "realism" in international affairs? The evidence sticks out a mile, yet we miss it. What the plain man knows is that the conventions and standards of behaviour applicable to the relations between nations are something quite different from those which regulate the relations between individuals in any single nation. The same man can at the same time behave and talk reasonably, often even charitably, in his business and social contacts at home, yet talk and behave like a gangster when the subject is "foreign affairs." Indeed it is almost a canon of "realist" thought in international relationships that we should base the argument exclusively upon the cause of winning the spoils at all costs. Those members of parliament who howled about the transfer of Czech gold to Germany were behaving like wild animals at bay, and we most of us howled with them. We thereby dramatised the fact that there is no such thing as international law, nor even any pretence of international "morality."

The fact is so commonplace that it tends to escape notice. Herr Hitler can address a German audience, men and women, educated, cultured and otherwise even intelligent, on the subject of his "foreign policy," can shriek the most hysterical nonsense, and his audience will lash itself into a frenzy of enthusiasm. At the present time, when the very man in the street is resigned, without alarm, to the probability and almost to the desirability of another war with Germany; when the City has ceased to do any business, when we and every "civilised" nation in Europe concentrate our wealth and our energy upon armaments and A.R.P.; when there appears to be no obvious likelihood of stopping the rot: at such a time the normal craziness of what we grandly call high diplomacy is merely being spectacularly illustrated. The central fact of international brutishness, clothed in fine patriotic slogans, remains unchanged.

The interesting thing is the explanation of it all from a human point of view. There are those of us who experienced the last great war, who have spent a quarter of a century studying "foreign affairs," who are not only nauseated, but bewildered by a steady conviction of the quite gross and sordid malignity of the thing.

We talk a great deal of nonsense about a "knowledge of foreign affairs." There are those who have travelled, have known the political leaders of various countries, have attended

international conferences, have read the original sources of information, know a little of historical backgrounds, and the main present facts of the diplomatic controversy. They are no more competent to hold a view of the situation than any backwoodsman who is only just beginning to hear the sinister words Hitler, Stalin and the rest. The thing is terribly simple. It needs courage to say quite simply what it is that is obviously wrong with the world, because the world is so badly wrong that good sense is unpopular.

Let an elementary truth, however, be again repeated. No man whose vision has not been blurred, nor his judgment warped, can deny that the infinitude we know as life is in its original conception without flaw. The physical machinery that a finite intelligence can appreciate is obviously perfect. The day does follow the night, the leaves do come out in the spring, the supply of air, water, heat is inexhaustible and indestructible. What then of the mystery of human life? Why this hell on earth which we know as high diplomacy? That too is an easy one to answer. The material and physical equipment of a universe can be provided by a universe-maker. The human race for whose benefit that equipment is provided is, however, a mystery in the sense that its welfare depends upon a subjective, spontaneous choice. Intellect and free will by themselves spell chaos: as we see in high diplomacy. The only lodestar is what we have always called charity or "love"; and without it the human element in the universe simply does not work. If you were to burst into a general meeting of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, or into the room where Mr. Molotov and Mr. Potemkin have been discussing certain matters with Sir William Seeds, M. Naggiar and Mr. William Strang; if you said to them: "You don't believe it, but you are trying to put the roof on before you build the foundations"; and if you went on to explain that the only workable principles in Realpolitik are to be found in the Sermon on the Mount: you might raise a few eyebrows and you would certainly be ejected as one of the many victims whose sanity has been undermined by the strain of modern life. Yet scientifically and on an exact calculation of practical factors it is obvious that unselfishness—crude and unadorned—is *the only means* whereby there can be any satisfaction in any human cause whatsoever. The opposite tactic of competitive acquisitiveness (which is the

whole and only motive of the foreign policy of every single government in the world) can equally obviously result in nothing else than what we all know it does produce, and has produced for thousands of years.

Yet we cannot enter into a discussion about the likelihood of an Anglo-German war at the beginning of next September by going about and quoting John xiii, 35: "In this shall all men know that you are My disciples, if you have love one for another," because we should have no effect, or no good effect. None the less the weather-beaten people are tired of going round the same old vicious circle of international politics. The world no doubt cannot be got back to the principles of the Sermon on the Mount at one go. We cannot hole out in one, except by a fluke. That is not an argument against driving off from the tee. We may as well honestly recognise the things that are clear. A "knowledge of foreign affairs" is after all as fatuous as the "realism" of any Bismarck or Palmerston. We either go back and start again from the beginning, or we plunge from generation to generation into the same sort of mess as always before.

Sed revocare gradus . . . How can it be done? It is useless to talk of the Christian religion as a unifying influence between the nations, when it cannot unify the body of professed Christians themselves. Therefore we have to dig deeper. The realist problem in foreign affairs is to get back to Christ: and that process cannot be started until the so-called Christians themselves go back to Christ.

In other words the very beginning of wisdom towards the solution of the diplomatic problem in Europe must be sought in the religious field. Until the professed followers of Christ decide to unite as one body and one Church, we waste our breath when we argue about the diplomatic problem. Those leaders of the Established Church who indignantly concern themselves over the denial of religion in Germany and in particular over the fate of Pastor Niemöller are unconsciously begging their own question. They would be more profitably employed in doing their own business, which is to put the House of the "Christians" themselves in order by working sincerely for Christian unity. The Dean of St. Paul's, who is one of the honest thinkers, in that way sets a noble example to his fellows.

"A FIRM PEACE."

The twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles passed on June 28th, 1939, without other ceremony than that of the hushed foreboding which has become the normal feature of diplomatic life. In Europe another stage in the general process of treaty-breaking was expected to take place in Danzig. In the Far East Japan was unconcernedly concentrated upon still another breach of the Nine-Power Washington Treaty of 1922 by the occupation of two more of the Chinese treaty ports; and a British newspaper could thereupon make the weary comment: "Japanese policy in China has become one long process of treaty-breaking." The Treaty of Versailles—that famous instrument described in its own words as something "firm, just and durable"—had gone the way of all such treaties.

Why is it that the treaty-makers so much like the word "firm," when the cumulative experience of mankind tells them that whatever else their treaties may prove to be, they are almost certain not to be "firm"? When a century earlier the four Great Powers—England, Russia, Austria and Prussia—defeated the then operative menace to civilisation (France, not Germany; Napoleon, not the Kaiser) they duly signed their Treaty of Paris (May 30th, 1814) in which they announced their purpose of establishing "a firm peace, based on a just equilibrium of strength between the Powers." The explanation perhaps is to be found in that particular effect of fear or superstition which makes the wish father the thought, in a propitiatory spirit, much as the terrified victim who is attacked by a dog exclaims "Good dog!"

The late Lord Phillimore, sometime Lord Justice of Appeal and English representative on the commission which sat at The Hague in 1920 to prepare the scheme of a permanent Court of International Justice, made a study of *Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace* (John Murray, 1917). It is a hard thing to believe that any man should examine within one volume the two hundred or so treaties beginning with that between Poland and Russia in 1582 and ending with that between Greece and Serbia in 1913, and yet retain any sort of hope that any future treaty could have any better fate in store. He did concede the "unhappy conclusion that too much is not to be expected from any treaty," and that "the

best treaties are those which merely record conquests and cessions already *de facto* made or relinquished." He did draw up a list of typical defects which made all the former treaties the reverse of "lasting"; defects which were duly destined to be incorporated in full measure in the new series for which his book was intended to prepare us. He did state in simple words: "We want a lasting peace. But we want a just peace. We want it because no peace but a just peace can be counted upon as lasting." And behold the new peace treaty dictated in 1919 was not just, nor even intelligent.

How can one explain the reputation that has been thrust upon high diplomacy as a "cynical" form of human activity? Could any technique of cynicism go on producing through the ages the same sort of inherently unsound treaty in the never-dying hope that each in turn would be the precursor to a period of "firm, just and durable peace"? What is wrong with high diplomacy is not any form of cynicism (for caution is inseparable from cynicism), but a too easy and foolish type of optimism which defies all former experience.

DANZIG AS SYMBOL.

When the foundations of a given structure are unsound a slight disturbance may cause the decisive collapse. In the present case of Danzig it looks at first sight as if the British people were about to be invited to fight the Great War all over again for no other purpose than to prevent a German city from again becoming a part of Germany. On the face of it such a contingency apparently runs counter to elementary common sense. Yet the fact is that the foundations of the diplomatic structure in Europe are so bad that the "annexation" of Danzig by Germany might, indeed obviously would, precipitate a general catastrophe of incalculable consequence. On paper and by ordinary standards Germany has a good case for the recovery of Danzig. Up to the end of the Great War the city had been the capital of West Prussia; and was therefore an integral part of Germany; it is inhabited almost wholly by Germans; the language spoken is German. When Germany was defeated by the Allies, she was subjected to a treaty whose main object was to weaken her so materially that she would never again rise as the potentially dominant Power in Europe. One of the stipulations was that Danzig should be

separated from Germany and constituted as a Free City under the protection of the League of Nations; that the corridor inland from the city should be given to Poland, so that East Prussia was separated from the Reich; and that the main beneficiary of the new Danzig should be Poland.

Poland demanded the clear outright cession of Danzig to her own sovereignty. The Allied Powers shied at doing honestly and openly what it was nevertheless their clear purpose to do. They camouflaged the new status of Danzig under the guise of a Free City. Their object was adequately recorded in Article 104 of the Treaty of Versailles, thus: "(1) to effect the inclusion of the Free City of Danzig within the Polish Customs frontiers, and to establish a free area in the port; (2) to ensure to Poland without any restriction the free use and service of all waterways, docks, basins, wharves and other works within the territory of the Free City necessary for Polish imports and exports; (3) to ensure to Poland the control and administration of the Vistula and of the whole railway system within the Free City, except such street and other railways as serve primarily the needs of the Free City, and of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication between Poland and the port of Danzig; (4) to ensure to Poland the right to develop and improve the waterways, docks, basins, wharves, railways and other works and means of communication mentioned in this Article, as well as to lease or purchase through appropriate processes such land and other property as may be necessary for these purposes; (5) to provide against any discrimination within the Free City of Danzig to the detriment of citizens of Poland and other persons of Polish origin or speech; (6) to provide that the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when abroad."

It is indeed the case that Danzig is of essential value to Poland, not only because it is her only outlet to the sea, but also because, as Frederick the Great famously put it: "Who rules over the mouth of the Vistula and the City of Danzig will be more master of Poland than the King who rules there." Yet the German grievance, on all the accepted standards of international politics, was at least understandable. The unintelligent bid by the Allies in 1919 to cripple German strength

on the very border of the Reich was bound in the nature of things to fail. Being a strong Power Germany bit by bit did win back the territory wrested from her; but then in her exuberance—for the German character is essentially unbalanced and lacking in sense of proportion or moderation—proceeded to take more than German territory. The rape of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia last March was a blunder of irreparable consequence to Germany, the more so as it was effected within six months of Herr Hitler's Munich declaration that he had no further territorial designs against Czechoslovakia. The result was the complete closing of British thought to any further claim by Germany, reasonable or unreasonable. Since March last we have ceased talking sense on either side. British opinion in particular has been solidly concentrated on organising for war against Germany in the event of any further "aggression" whatsoever. To that end, Poland, Rumania and Greece were "guaranteed" against aggression, which means that they were won as allies. Russia was courted in the like sense, although in her case the achievement was difficult owing to the reluctance of the Baltic States, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, to be guaranteed by a Triple Alliance, one of whose members was known to be actuated by a desire to recover those very territories (which Russia in her turn had lost as a result of the Great War) for herself.

For four months Europe has hovered on the brink—or most people have so diagnosed the situation—of another Great War, because on the one hand Germany was apparently determined to recover Danzig, and on the other Britain and France were equally determined to go to war in support of a Polish resistance to a German coup in such a sense. In fact no war, up to the time when this paper was written, did result. For four months Germany did stay her hand. The few who argued that "shadow" war was in fact operative as an alternative method to that of actual war appeared so far to be justified. But the damage done to commerce and to the ordinary amenities of civilised intercourse between nations assumed dimensions of approaching catastrophe.

The last of the annexations, that of Memel, took place on March 22nd last. It was common knowledge that Germany's purpose was with little delay to annex also Danzig. But the storm created in Britain by the annexation of Slovakia (March 15th) and of Bohemia and Moravia (March 16th) was

now so unmistakable that the German strategists, one must deduce, decided to give the storm time to die down. It did not die down. Within nine days of the last annexation, namely on March 31st, the British and French governments had received Poland's acceptance of the famous guarantee which henceforth was to be the basis of the entire European relationship. The resultant situation was on the one side the spreading of the "ring" against Germany by the inclusion of Rumania and Greece (April 13th), Turkey (May 12th), the attempt to include Russia and the three Baltic States; and the introduction of conscription by Great Britain (April 27th); and on the other side a sullen German anger against being thus baulked in her campaign. Could Herr Hitler risk plunging Germany into war for the attainment of his object? Would not that object itself be thereby defeated? In short, had Herr Hitler any sense at all? On such questions seemed now to depend the peace of Europe.

The main landmarks in the controversy of the last four months are as follows: On April 28th, Herr Hitler in the Reichstag speech in which he denounced the German-Polish agreement made by himself and Marshal Pilsudski, declared that "some months ago" he had made an offer to Poland which represented "the greatest imaginable concession in the interests of European peace." Those proposals he said were as follows: (1) Danzig returns as a Free State into the framework of the German Reich; (2) Germany receives a route through the Corridor and a railway line at her own disposal possessing the same extra-territorial status for Germany as the Corridor itself has for Poland. In return Germany was prepared: (1) to recognise all Polish economic rights in Danzig; (2) to ensure for Poland a free harbour in Danzig of any size desired, which would have completely free access to the sea; (3) to accept at the same time the present boundaries between Germany and Poland, and to regard them as ultimate; (4) to conclude a twenty-five-year non-aggression treaty with Poland (a treaty, therefore, which, he said, would extend far beyond the duration of his own life); (5) to guarantee the independence of the Slovak State by Germany, Poland and Hungary jointly, which would mean in practice the renunciation of any unilateral German hegemony in that territory.

Those proposals were rejected by Poland. On May 5th

Colonel Beck in an address to the Sejm dismissed the German decision, announced on April 28th, to denounce the treaty in these words: "The pact of 1934 was an attempt to give a better course to the history between the two great nations—an attempt to leave the unwholesome atmosphere of daily clashes and wider hostile designs, and to rise above the animosities of centuries. The pact aimed at creating the deep foundations of mutual respect. The endeavour to oppose evil is always the best expression of political activity. The policy of Poland proved our respect for that principle in the most critical moments of recent times. From this point of view the breaking of that pact is not an insignificant matter. However, every treaty is worth as much as the consequences which follow it, and if the policy and conduct of the other party diverge from the principles of the pact, we have no reason for bemoaning its slackening or dissolution."

By the beginning of July Germany was importing large numbers of troops and armaments into Danzig, a "Free Corps" having been formed there in the last week of June. On June 17th Dr. Goebbels had addressed the third annual rally of the Danzig Nazi Party and had said: "Your determination to return to the Great Mother of our common Fatherland is strong and invincible. It is your misfortune that your beautiful German city lies at the mouth of the Vistula, and according to Warsaw's theories cities on estuaries always belong to the countries through which the rivers flow. By this theory Rotterdam would belong to Germany. The Poles know they are wrong, and because of that they resort to abuse. They demand from Germany East Prussia and Silesia; Poland's frontier is to be the Oder."

Lord Halifax made a clear statement on behalf of the British Government when he addressed the annual dinner of the Royal Institute of International Affairs on June 29th. He made three cardinal points thus: (1) "We have assumed obligations and we are preparing to assume more with full understanding of their causes and with full understanding of their consequences"; (2) "In the event of further aggression we are resolved to use at once the whole of our strength in fulfilment of our pledges to resist it"; and (3) "We have an unchallengeable Navy. Our Air Force has now nothing to fear from any other. In our Army we are creating a powerful weapon for the defence of liberty."

Two days earlier M. Daladier made an equally clear statement on behalf of France. "France," he said, "is determined to fight with all her strength against all attempts at domination. The Government knows that an attempt at hegemony in Eastern Europe would subsequently turn against the West." There seemed to be no escape from the position that if Herr Hitler did make an attempt upon Danzig the result would be war. Yet a consensus of opinion demanded that the Prime Minister should add his voice to that of Lord Halifax, so that no shadow of a possibility of doubt should remain about British policy. The Polish aspect of the issue was bound up with the Russian. The delay in concluding the Russo-Franco-British alliance, one object of which was to guarantee Poland against a threat of aggression, direct or indirect, made it necessary for the British Government to specify what exactly was involved in its own separate pledge of defence to Poland. That pledge also was made against the contingency of "direct or indirect aggression."

The practical issue now was to specify the circumstances in which the British pledge to Poland would come into operation.

Mr. Chamberlain made his declaration on July 10th:

"We have guaranteed to give our assistance to Poland in the case of a clear threat to her independence, which she considers it vital to resist with her national forces, and we are firmly resolved to carry out this undertaking."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

July 12th, 1939.

No. 455.

August 1939.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
FULL REVIEWS	241
THE RISE OF A PAGAN STATE; POLAND; THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE PHILOSOPHER; BRITAIN UNDER THE EARLY GEORGES; LESSING AND THE DRAMA; MR. NEVINSON'S "FILMS OF TIME"; BENJAMIN FRANKLIN; QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S FATHER.	
SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: ANTHOLOGIE DES POÈTES JAPONAIS CONTEMPORAINS; REMINISCENCES AND REFLECTIONS; THE HANDBOOK OF BRITISH BIRDS; MIDDLESEX; THE WORLD OUTLOOK	254

THE RISE OF A PAGAN STATE.*

Mr. Morgan Young understands Japan as few people do, and in this, his latest volume, he gives the historical and anthropological background for her present imperialistic attitude. He draws a grim picture down the ages of a harsh and narrow mentality imposing itself, like a fetter, upon an isolated people. One reads, perturbed and perplexed. There is warning in it all; and one prays to be delivered from the pride and insularity from which Japan unwittingly suffers. Perhaps Mr. Young is a little downright about what he rightly considers a farrago of nonsense—Japan's deification of her human Emperor; but one cannot blame him, for this doctrine of the Japanese Succession to the Rule of the Earth is working infinite havoc and distress in the Orient. He traces its origin to a dim prehistoric past, possibly Melanesian. It seems almost unbelievable that to-day Japanese people, whose intelligence otherwise cannot be doubted, should be so completely dominated by such an atavistic conception. Only the anthropologists elsewhere in the world now take stock of the primeval ideologies on which Japan still frames national and international policy. In a former book, Mr. Young has told us that one general on the Japanese staff actually proposed the elimination of scientific studies from

* Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

university courses as they led to "dangerous thoughts"; but it would seem that the whole nation has for centuries been forced to submit to a species of intellectual anaesthesia. One wonders what Japanese school teachers can find to teach their children.

Mr. Young shows, too, the fallacy of an historical Emperor Myth. It can, indeed, never have been a safe task to ascend the Japanese throne, for during the course of Japan's history its occupants have been deposed or put away mercilessly, and not so long ago either. At one time, in the Middle Ages, there were four deposed emperors all living in retirement at once; and it is not a century since the rulers of Japan were the Tokugawa Shogunate, while the Emperor counted as nobody, except as a ritualistic symbol. Although the roots go back to the primitive legend of the Sun Goddess, it was only during the war with Russia that Shintoism, the religion of the divinity of the Emperor, if so pagan a state of mind can be called a religion, came to power. Yet it is because of this legend that political murders, the invasion of China, and discourtesy to the West are not only permitted, but exalted in modern Japan. The only remedy seems to be that enlightened Japanese people, Christians or otherwise, should be willing to offer themselves for martyrdom. This is not an easy demand to make of men with families, for the families too would be made to suffer according to the cruel code of Bushido, the Way of the Warrior.

Mr. Young, as well as being a recognised authority, writes interestingly and with conviction.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

POLAND.*

The book entitled *Poland: Key to Europe*, by Dr. Raymond L. Buell, has come at a time when it was very much needed. Poland is to-day in the limelight. There is no country in Europe about which so many misconceptions have been abroad in Great Britain, and where an able, balanced, dispassionate, and at the same time sympathetic account is so much required. Dr. Buell has gone a long way towards supplying this want. On reading the book we are at first wellnigh bewildered by the number and extent of the

* *Poland: Key to Europe*. By Raymond Leslie Buell, M.A., Ph.D. Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d.

problems which Poland has to face. The State was built up of three parts partitioned among three Empires, each with its own political and constitutional system and its own economic development. The country started out with a completely democratic system based on the French constitution, which owing to the multiplicity of parties and races completely broke down. Dr. Buell has given us the best account that has yet appeared in English of the system that has succeeded pure democracy—not totalitarian as it is sometimes falsely represented but based on the OZON or Camp of National Union. The idea of the OZON is no doubt to exchange for the war of parties or the uncertainties of party government a single party which would combine all that is best in the nation. Dr. Buell has traced very fairly the growth of this idea and the dangers and opposition which it has had to encounter; but doubtless because the greater part of his book was written before the present crisis he has not sufficiently stressed the remarkable unity in the presence of danger which is manifest to-day.

Dr. Buell is specially interesting and informative in his treatment of problems—the economic problem, the problem of minorities, the Ukrainian question, the question of colonies, the Jewish problem, the peasant problem—all of which meet us, sometimes in very difficult forms, when we are considering the social fabric of Poland. Each of these problems the author takes up in turn, studying them carefully with full documentation. Too often he is oppressed with the sheer intricacies of the position he has to face, so that, to use the old and hackneyed phrase, we can hardly see the wood for the trees. For example, he rightly stresses the tremendous issues raised by the rapid growth of Poland's population combined with its immaturity of industrial development and the autarchical policy of some of the surrounding countries. He gives an interesting account of the legislation for parcelling the land and especially the effort to found a new Central Industrial District, but he hardly says enough of the brighter side of this increased population—the greater relative amount of virile young life and the fact that while Poland is increasing in population others of its competitors are on the decline. After all this will count in the future history of the world.

Dr. Buell is perhaps least satisfactory in his treatment of Polish foreign policy. In his chapter on the Ukrainian question he tells us that Poland's effort to establish a common frontier

1714-1760.* Except for the years 1760-1815, this series now covers in a continuous survey the course of British history from 1558-1914; of the earlier periods the only volume which has yet appeared relates to *Roman Britain and the English Settlements*.

Like its predecessors, this volume is planned to provide a comprehensive view of the period covered in its manifold aspects and in this Professor Williams has accomplished a most difficult task with conspicuous success. Although in large measure particular topics are discussed concurrently in separate chapters their inter relation as parts of one general whole is not forgotten. Within the confined limits of some four hundred pages there is necessarily compressed a great quantity of material, but this work is in no sense a bare enumeration of facts. It is, rather, a vigorous, clear and well-sifted narrative comprising an analysis and interpretation of the period by an acknowledged authority. Professor Williams writes with special weight on foreign policy and particularly, of course, as the biographer of Stanhope and Chatham. In a work of this nature some slips are almost inevitable and it may be noted here that Lord Mansfield's tenure of office as Chief Justice lasted for thirty-two years from 1756 and not for "twenty-two" as stated in the useful summary of our legal system and law reform in this period. A small example, on the other hand, of the author's erudition and care in detail may be noticed in his assertion that Marlborough made payments to the Pretender on behalf of the 1715 rebellion. He refers to passages in support from the Stuart Papers which Mr. Churchill has apparently missed in writing his monumental biography. Upon some of the main questions of the age there are also bound to be differences of view, such as the beginning of the Tory Party's revival. Incidentally, Mr. Keith Feiling's recent *The Second Tory Party, 1714-1832*, should be added to the bibliography.

Professor Williams points to "the rare unity" of this period, seeming "to concentrate in itself all the faults and merits that we are apt to think of as specially characteristic" of the eighteenth century. There was "stability in politics, in religion, in literature, and in social observances, a stability needed to enable the nation to recover its poise after more than a century of excitement." The age, however, was in

* Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d. net.

no sense static and, as the author says, "under cover of its orderliness, ideas and movements were originated that found fuller expression in later years." Some readers may feel that Professor Williams has not sufficiently considered all these developments. For example, the importance and significance in the development of local government of the growing practice in this period of appointing *ad hoc* authorities might have been discussed with advantage. The author does deal, of course, specifically with the most numerous of these bodies at this time, namely the Turnpike Trusts. The condition of the roads must remain to some extent a matter in dispute, and it may well be that Professor Williams exaggerates somewhat their "abominable" condition. He is not impressed at all by Daniel Defoe's eulogy. In discussing the relations of the local and central authorities he notes the largely independent character of the former but concludes that "the secretaries of state, especially in times of emergency, exercised supreme and unquestioned control over the local authorities." It is interesting to recall Professor Holdsworth's view that the most effective control over these autonomous bodies was exercised by the Courts and not by the Legislative or the Executive. The latter, particularly Parliament, allied themselves with, rather than purely dominated, the local authorities through the community of outlook and common vested interests of one close governing class. Indeed this was a chief co-operative element in the working of government when the separation of powers was a real feature of the constitution. Professor Williams emphasises, perhaps unduly, the influence of Locke's interpretation of the Revolution Settlement upon the practice and theory of government at this period.

In the passages on trade and industry the author should have mentioned, at least, the effect of the Bubble Act, 1720, in confining for a century joint-stock enterprise to a comparatively few chartered corporations and to the new statutory utility companies which were appearing in the middle of the century. This and other criticisms, however, are of very small importance compared with the high general merit of Professor Williams' work. It will be found of great value to the reader who requires an authoritative survey of the period as a whole or who seeks concise treatment of particular aspects; as for example the excellent contributions on art and literature.

LESSING AND THE DRAMA.

No one entering the United States at New York can fail to see the Statue of Liberty. No one entering the vast realm of modern German literature can overlook the statue of that gallant fighter for intellectual freedom and human broad-mindedness which adorns its entrance. Lessing was a beginning and not an end. Most of his doctrines are forgotten or have only historical interest to-day. But the manner in which he appealed to the public of his age fascinates us still, for it is lucid, manly and independent. Lessing knew himself to be only a second-class playwright (though the sound realism and skilful plot of his *Minna von Barnhelm* can still hold its own); as a dramatic critic, however, his incisive style could drive home lessons which in the hands of others would have remained clumsy and unconvincing. Lessing held aloof from the eighteenth-century routine of a university lecturer or a clergyman and boldly led for many years the life of a freelance writer. In 1765 he declined a chair in the University of Königsberg because he would have been obliged to deliver yearly a eulogy on the King of Prussia! In 1767 he entered upon that short but significant association with the Hamburg *Nationaltheater*, the fruit of which was his famous *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*. Here Lessing's function was strange, perhaps unique. He was employed to conduct a journal at the expense of the theatre he was to criticise. The *Dramaturgie*, however, only contained criticisms of actual performances in the first half of its 104 sections, becoming more and more a kind of German *pratique du theatre*, a platform from which Lessing discussed passionately, if unsystematically, many problems of eighteenth-century dramatic theory.

A recent work by the late Prof. J. G. Robertson, carefully edited by Prof. E. Purdy,* throws new light on Lessing's enterprise, dramatic in the true sense of the word. The first part of this very learned book examines the background of the Hamburg *Nationaltheater* and of Lessing's connections with it, whereas his criticism of the Repertory plays (and particularly of the German and French plays) is considered in the second part. The last and, as it seems, most instructive

* J. G. Robertson, *Lessing's Dramatic Theory*. Being an introduction to and a commentary on his *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*. Cambridge, 1939 (Cambridge University Press), 308.

section of this well-documented piece of research is mainly devoted to the sources of Lessing's æsthetic conceptions, to the function of imitation and illusion in the drama, to his theory of tragedy, and to the question of dramatic characters. Prof. Robertson destroys a good deal of the Lessing-legend, for he rejects much of Lessing's claim to originality. His friendship with Moses Mendelssohn—we are told—has left its visible mark on Lessing's æsthetic theories, and he frequently reproduced the views of other contemporaries such as Dacier and Curtius whom he follows rather closely in his well-known interpretation of Aristotle's poetics. As to the latter, Prof. Robertson's verdict is that Lessing "arrived at no discovery and stated no conclusion . . . that was new or unknown in his day, and where he did attempt to initiate new interpretations of the Aristotelian text, these have proved, almost without exception, unacceptable to later scholarship." The author further blames Lessing for "his lack of impersonal fairness and historical perspective." Yet Lessing's bias against Voltaire, whose plays at that time dominated the repertory of the Hamburg theatre as well as that of the German stage in general, is as unquestionable as it is, to some extent, natural. After all, Lessing was primarily a pugnacious critic, and not a detached historian. If he wanted to succeed in his struggle against French classicism, he thought it better to take off the gloves. His idea of Shakespeare as the purest embodiment of Aristotelian theory seems to us strange enough, if not absurd, but in its age it has considerably helped to further the prestige of, and the interest in, Shakespeare in Germany. What Lessing tried to prove by rational methods was felt instinctively and exultantly later by the young generation of Storm and Stress and of Romanticism: i.e. that Shakespeare was *the* genius *par excellence* and as such much closer to the Teutonic outlook than all the French plays together. Friedrich Gundolf, in his astonishingly brilliant book, *Shakespeare und der Deutsche Geist* (1911)—which unfortunately is not mentioned by Dr. Robertson—has in a special chapter discussed Lessing's place in the dynamic process by which Shakespeare was absorbed and assimilated in Germany. "*Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem.*" If Lessing shared many of his æsthetic ideas with others he presented them in a way that was completely his own.

Above all, Lessing's clear-cut phrases, his precise way of expressing difficult problems, his playful and witty antitheses are as unusual in German letters as they are still attractive. Prof. Robertson acknowledges that fact in his short conclusion. It is to be regretted that his thorough commentary lacks an analysis of Lessing's style; for that would perhaps be more enlightening and fascinating than all the hunting for literary influences and parallels which characterised the positivistic philology of a bygone age.

E. KOHN-BRAMSTEDT.

MR. NEVINSON'S "FILMS OF TIME."*

In *Films of Time* Mr. Henry Nevinson recalls scenes of his adventurous life and represents past personages who made them notable. "As in a modern film" he has seen them and their contemporaries "moving about and heard them talking," and "become one with them, as having a double or even multiple personality." At Ur, he depicts a funeral procession to the tomb of Hammurabi where the chief of the Royal Guards defies the High Priests and saves himself and others from being buried alive; and as a pendant to the tale, the beautiful Sarai who had previously fled to Abram to escape such immolation is married to her deliverer and accompanies him to Canaan. At Gaza, Delila is acclaimed as Philistia's deliverer by the worshippers of Ashtareth to whom she narrates her triumph. Before the temple of Apollo at an Olympian festival, Herodotus tells of the lands he has visited. At Ephesus, Demetrius inflames his fellow craftsmen against St. Paul and later threatens to set his dogs on the saint for trying to convert him. Beside the Blue Danube, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius jots down his Meditations which are compared with those of Epictetus. Five other films portray British scenes from the Wars of the Roses to modern times. The most interesting narrates the life and reflections of a Mr. Parr who was born in 1483 and lived to the advanced age of 152, having skilfully eluded the embarrassments and burnings which changes in royal religion necessitated.

In a final fantasy Henry Nevinson is arraigned after death by three ancient Judges. Moved by the prisoner's pleadings that he is unworthy either of Hell or Paradise, they finally

* Routledge. 10s. 6d. net.

condemn him to fifty years of Europe as being worse than a cycle in Hell.

One terror, he confesses, I have lately come to dread: I have heard that in the Seventh Circle the three great rivers of Hell are formed by the tears of human beings who suffer under evil governments, and in the present state of the world such rivers must now be appalling in their power. . . . But my Lords, I have never yet betrayed my friends or my country. I have never yet sought to undermine the liberties won by my people in so many centuries of bitter strife. I have not yet been a Fascist or a Nazi.

That is true. Excepting those who betrayed their friends and country the author has a Christian conviction that he could have sinned worse than others. He shares also a Christian realisation of the wonder and mystery of existence.

Amid all the solemn beauty of an ancient cathedral, or amid all the solemn simplicity of a Nonconformist chapel, I see crowds of men and women kneeling in prayer, listening to noble words, singing praises to some fatherly Being whom I cannot even imagine. I sympathise, but I cannot share. . . . I hear the message plain, but no belief is mine. I worship the architecture, whether Greek or Christian. I delight in the smell of incense, and in the Catholic symbolism which can be traced back to the inexplicable yearning of a primeval race, but that is all.

He speaks for a generation that strove for human freedom without recognising its basis in Christian revelation. It is very unlikely that future generations will be able to repeat the feat. The author's fantasies vary in quality; and Socrates whom he would choose as a companion in eternity might deprecate portions of his irony. Humanists who share his passionate sympathy for the oppressed and know the liberty wherewith Christ makes men free, are stirred to reflect how that freedom transmutes their hopes and despairs, infecting even their dreams.

D. P. H.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.*

No other printer has ever attained the same eminent position in the world at large as the sage of Philadelphia, who, proud of his calling, began his last will and testament

* *Benjamin Franklin*. By Carl Van Doren. Putnam. Illustrated. 15s.

with the words: "I, Benjamin Franklin, Printer, late Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America to the Court of France, now President of Pennsylvania."

Printing gave Franklin his press and his platform; it helped to encourage his flair for writing; it was his means to a comfortable livelihood; and it also taught him the power of the printed word and stimulated his gift for organisation. Had he, however, not been richly endowed with outstanding qualities of mind and heart he would hardly have become what Jefferson called him, "the greatest American" of his age. There was nothing small about him. He had no use for petty quarrels or intrigues. He respected other people's convictions even if he could not accept them himself. He believed the best of his fellow men unless and until he had unmistakable proof of their falsity. He had early trained himself for a broad-minded charity by making an experiment on himself with a scheme of "desirable virtues" and discovering how far he fell short of perfection. Even in his youth the scientist in him that was later to invent the lightning conductor and indulge in a variety of interesting and valuable experiments could not permit him to deceive himself as to his own shortcomings. But his benevolence of heart, his sincere attachment to principle, his ease of manner and his sturdily practical wisdom were well calculated to win for him esteem and affection in ever-widening circles. He thus made an ideal negotiator for a treaty between France and the revolting colonies and for the subsequent peace between England and the United States. Had his earnest and patient advocacy of the colonists' claims from the middle sixties to the early seventies received the attention it deserved from George III and his Ministers, it is more than possible that there would have been no American revolt. As it was, a great British Imperialist, whose language was often strangely prophetic of Empire changes to come, was lost in the subsequent part-framer of the Declaration of Independence and in the man whose prudent intervention at psychological moments literally saved the drafting of the American constitution from being obstructed and wrecked by inter-State jealousies.

Franklin wrote his own autobiography, but while posterity has acknowledged its excellence and continues to read it, the book suffers from the obvious defect that it is by no means a complete record of a full life. It has nothing to tell us of

Franklin's later and more memorable years. And up till now, though many books have been written on and around him, giving us special studies of the man, no one appears to have attempted a thoroughly complete Franklin "Life." This omission has at last been repaired by Mr. Carl Van Doren in a book which, with its index, runs to 885 pages and which bears the unmistakable stamp of years of scholarly and painstaking research. For all its formidable size it is a book to appeal to and fascinate the average reader. Mr. Van Doren has no other object to serve than to present the living man as he was in all his many aspects. For this purpose he lets Franklin wherever possible tell his own story through the vast number of documents he has left behind him. And he does this with a skill that enhances the story's interest, while justifying his claim that "Franklin's autobiography is here completed on his own scale and in his own words."

CLIVE RATTIGAN.

QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S FATHER.*

King Christian IX of Denmark became famous for his daughters. He used to call Queen Alexandra his beautiful daughter, the Empress of Russia his clever daughter, and the Duchess of Cumberland his good daughter. As a young man he was one of the suitors of Queen Victoria and he became the grandfather of King George V. When he was heir to the Danish throne, the Danish nationalists suspected him of being German. Later, as the monarch of a small country with a glorious history and dangerous neighbours, he showed the utmost tact and chivalry, proving a distinguished host to the Czar and the Prince of Wales as well as to the German Emperor and his son. Mr. Madol deserves thanks for having written a life of this attractive but in no way outstanding royal gentleman, a true conservative in mind and a good liberal in action, who gave his countrymen all the democratic rights they needed but who allowed a Minister to tap his shoulder on one occasion only.

From the standpoint of European history the old King remains remarkable for two reasons. He was a member of

* *Christian IX*, compiled from unpublished documents and memoirs by Hans Roger Madol, translated from the German and Danish by E. O. Lorimer. Collins. 1939.

the royal generation which after the revolutions of 1830 and 1848-49 deliberately became "bourgeois." With a certain political reserve, they emphasised family life; the prosperous palace at the top of the social pyramid became the pattern of middle-class social and economic activities. Queen Victoria and King Louis Philippe had given the lead; many European princes followed in their steps. This adaptation to the new style of life substantially helped old and new dynasties to resist home and foreign menaces. The second point is intimately linked with the first. King Christian tried many a time to help his country to obtain the plebiscite in Northern Schleswig promised by Article V of the Treaty of Prague. In view of the results of the ordinary Landtag elections under Prussian rule, the plebiscite would undoubtedly have given back the Danish-speaking inhabitants of Southern Jutland to Denmark. King Christian used his personal authority and the Danish feelings of his daughters in that direction, but he always refused to take part in an active anti-German policy. Political discussions at the famous family gatherings in Fredensborg and Bernstorff, the continuation of the historic meetings at Rumpenheim on the Main, the well-known centre of Hessian family interests, were sternly controlled by the King and kept non-political in spite of the outspoken sympathies of his womenfolk. There was a wide gulf between the work of the Danish political agent Jules Hansen who later became a French subject, and the attitude of the head of the Danish state. The author adds interest to his well-produced volume by some typical family portraits.

VEIT VALENTIN.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

M. Steinilber-Oberlin knows Japan on its gracious side; he lived for some time with various Buddhist sects in Japan, and now his latest work,* in conjunction with Kuni Matsuo, has been the collecting of this anthology of some two hundred and forty poems from the works of over thirty Japanese poets, all of whom wrote between 1868 and 1939. To most of us it will be a revelation that there has been in Japan, in our lifetime, such an outpouring of the spirit of poesy. The poet Ryuku

* *Anthologie des Poètes japonais contemporains*. Translated into French by Kuni Matsuo and Steinilber-Oberlin. *Mercure de Paris*. 15 Frs.

Kawaji contributes a preface in which he speaks of the vitalising influence which Western writers, during this period, have had on Japanese poetical literature. He cites such names as Rossetti and Baudelaire, Maupassant and Swinburne, Paul Valéry and Maeterlinck, and speaks of Modern Futurism, Expressionism, Surrealism.

Most of the poems, as one expects from the East, are about Nature in her most delicate forms, mists, lakes, the dew, mountains, flowers, rain. A few, however, are stronger meat and realistic. Takuboku Ishikawa, for instance, a Socialist who knew the iron heel of poverty, in his poem on "Le Carrefour" writes of a bleary old man, a tired woman with her shopping basket, standing at the cross-roads. The poem which pleased me most, however, was called "Le Secret," by Motomaro Senke, in which a Japanese father describes his little boy being undressed for the night by his mother. The child runs away, laughing:

"Comme s'il était un oiseau échappé de sa cage."

He hides himself in a corner, turns his bare little back on the world and imagines himself unseen—*blotti*. It is well, on occasion, to come upon such a book these times, when Japanese soldiers are massacring Chinese, poets and babes alike; to remember that, somewhere, there remains a gentle soul in Japan which, given its true bent, would prefer to sing rather than to slay.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

* * * * *

Mr. Heber L. Hart has published an interesting volume of *Reminiscences and Reflections** which touches on the principal activities of a long and distinguished career. As an eminent King's Counsel his legal experiences and views are of especial interest, including particularly an appreciation of the work of the Mixed-Arbitral Tribunals of which he was a prominent member. Incidentally it is notable that Mr. Heber Hart is influenced in some of his opinions by the continental legal systems. For example, he favours the complete abolition of the jury in civil cases and the trial of actions by panels of three judges sitting together. In view of the pending criminal reform legislation it is valuable to know that Mr. Hart supports the abolition of flogging as a penalty. He is also in favour of suspending capital punishment. This volume in addition reflects his other and varied activities, personal contacts, and interests, particularly in pre-war Liberal politics, literature and education.

* * * * *

The third volume of *The Handbook of British Birds*† deals with the diurnal birds of prey, the herons, swans, geese and ducks. Of the seven

* The Bodley Head. 10s. 6d. net.

† Witherby. 25s. each volume or £5 5s. the set of five volumes.

maps, six are concerned with the breeding distribution and migration of the ducks, while a double page of drawings by Mr. J. C. Harrison helps in identifying the different species on the wing. The geese are shown in a series of plates painted and presented by Mr. Peter Scott, while the other birds are shown in their various plumages in the unique series of plates now so well known to the public. On the whole this volume, in the text, in the text figures and in the illustrations, is perhaps the most exciting of the three, if indeed it is permissible to think of each volume as a separate entity, when in reality they form a single work indispensable in its entirety to every ornithologist and serious amateur.

The Middlesex County Council have published recently in celebration of their jubilee an interesting and instructive volume on *Middlesex** by their Clerk, Mr. C. W. Radcliffe. The book is designed primarily for senior schoolchildren and their teachers and is fully illustrated. It sketches the historical development of the county and outlines the immense development and scope of the Council's services and their relation to the smaller authorities. A final Part devoted to the opportunities of local government service completes a volume which is well calculated to encourage among its youthful readers civic responsibility and pride.

A series of public lectures recently delivered by seven distinguished specialists upon *The World Outlook*† has been given very wisely a much wider audience by publication in book form. The lecturers were invited "to examine the spiritual and material values which determine the outlook of the Great Powers and especially their attitude towards the idea of international order." Dr. G. P. Gooch lectured on the Third Reich and Mr. Wickham Steed on France. Mussolini's Italy is discussed by Mr. C. J. S. Sprigge and Japan by Mr. Morgan Young. Sir Bernard Pares deals with Soviet Russia and Sir Frederick Whyte has devoted his Paper to the United States. The series is completed with a contribution by Professor A. P. Newton on Britain and the British Commonwealth. The lectures were designed as "an ordered examination of fundamental and enduring values" and as such should be of much service in assisting the public to appreciate more fully the significance of the international situation.

* 2s. 6d. net.

† Nicholson & Watson. 5s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

SEPTEMBER 1939.

FREEDOM AND DEFENCE.*

THE conditions of the world to-day revive old problems and present them in new forms. If force in international relations is fundamentally wrong, does it become right to use force in order to resist an aggressor? Are conscientious objectors to military service to be admired and imitated, or to be condemned? If freedom is good and compulsion bad, does compulsion become good when it raises conscripts to defend freedom? Liberalism must take stock of its ideas in the light of new circumstances, must consider how far principles established in the nineteenth century can hold their ground in the conditions of the twentieth.

Liberty is man's freedom to do what he will, subject to the equal rights of others. The obstacles to his freedom are not of one kind but of several kinds; and liberty is not a single and simple thing, but is made up of several elements. There is national liberty—the freedom of a people from alien domination. There is constitutional liberty—the freedom of a people from the rule of a tyrant or of a class. There is personal liberty—the freedom of the individual to think, worship, act as he wishes, without the restraint of oppressive laws or customs. And there is economic liberty—his freedom from the constraint of poverty and bad environment. These four are connected, but separate. It is a source of constant confusion to ignore the distinctions. For the various factors do not always pull the same way. Occasions constantly occur when the question arises whether one of the four may not have to be sacrificed in some degree for the sake of others. For example, membership of a trade union involves some surrender of personal freedom in order to win greater economic freedom. So does the early closing of shops by law, and all the great code of industrial legislation of which that is an instance. It is a mistake to think that crude *laissez-faire*, the mere absence of State action, must always be a safeguard of freedom. Often it is, but often it is not; and there are many cases in which more law may mean greater liberty. Would the roads be more free of traffic if all traffic regulations were abolished?

* Address delivered at the Liberal Summer School, Cambridge, August 5th, 1939.

A Bill was introduced by a private member into the Legislature of Ontario last March—it did not pass for it was *ultra vires*—the purpose of which was “conscripting the property and civic rights of every individual in Ontario in defence of free institutions.” That seems a plain contradiction in terms; but it might not necessarily be so. The sponsor of the Bill no doubt had in mind that it would be worth while for Canadian citizens to surrender those rights if that was the only way to save Canada from foreign conquest and the overthrow of democratic institutions that would follow; it was worth while to sacrifice their personal and economic liberty if it was the only way to save their national and political liberty.

The crux lies there of the problem whether compulsory military service should be accepted in a democracy. It is true that that issue is complicated by the claim that military service is a good thing in itself—promoting physical fitness; bringing classes together; strengthening character. It is claimed that conscription, therefore, is not a burden to a nation but an advantage; that it is as legitimate to require youths by law to accept military training as to require children by law to accept instruction in the schools. It may be answered that if the case as stated is sound, the same results might perhaps be achieved, and possibly better achieved, by compulsory part-time higher education, as proposed by the Fisher Act, combined with physical training. I cannot here enter into the many pros and cons of that debate. I would only express my own conviction that the reasons given are not sufficient to show that military conscription is a good thing in itself; that is to say that if the necessities of national defence did not require it, if we were living in a peaceful and harmonious world, it would nevertheless be right to require every young man to spend a period of his life in military service, whether he wished to or not, for the sake of the advantages he would gain to mind and to body. I regard conscription as a real sacrifice. It may have incidental advantages, but on balance it is a bad thing and not a good. If it is to be justified it could only be on the ground that it is indispensable for the safety of the nation as a whole, and therefore of each individual in the nation. If it is to be justified it could only be because there exists a hard necessity which compels us to sacrifice some part of our personal liberty in order to safeguard our national liberty.

Here the question arises—whether it is right, in any circum-

stances and for any purpose, to engage in war. We have the Pacifist position—the position of the Quakers, of Lansbury, of the Peace Pledge Union, of Gandhi—that armed defence is not a duty at all; that only non-violence is a duty. Before examining this issue let us first review the situation as a whole.

One often hears it said that nowadays all the world is mad. Viewing the colossal waste of man-power and of wealth on military preparations, the perversion of some of the brilliant discoveries of modern science to achieve the wholesale destruction of human beings in the most horrible fashion, the prospect that all the nations may soon engage in a conflict that will bring about the collapse of our institutions and therefore of civilisation, it is not surprising that many people should think that we are all insane together. But that diagnosis itself is not sane. It does not correspond with the plain facts. There are sixty-six nations in the world, and only three of them are infected by the virus of aggressive militarism. Even in Germany, Italy and Japan the masses of the population are by no means incurably affected. The British Empire, America North and South, France, and almost all the countries of North-Western and Eastern Europe are free from the disease. If they were similarly affected, then indeed it might be said that the world had gone mad. But the virus of violence has not so spread.

Yet the fact remains, obvious for all the world to see, that those three nations are on the move; they mean to shoulder their way about the world; they do not “renounce war as the instrument of policy,” as the Kellogg Pact required, but on the contrary openly proclaim that they mean to use war as the instrument of policy if they cannot secure their aims otherwise.

There are principles which have long been recognised as the foundations of international comity, and these countries reject them all. They are—that large nations and small have equal rights, as rich and poor have equal rights before the law; that each State must abstain from interference in the domestic affairs of others; that treaties freely signed are sacrosanct. Japan in China, Italy in Abyssinia and Albania, Germany in Czecho-Slovakia, prove beyond doubt or question that these principles are flouted. Power politics of the crudest kind replaces them. The spirit of aggression is let loose in the world.

Where dictatorships are prompt to use force, for the rest of the nations to renounce force in reply would merely be to hand over to the dictators the control of the world's affairs.

Liberty would perish because she was too high-minded even to raise a hand in her own defence. Says a French writer: "Force without justice and justice without force—these are disasters." If the dictatorships are examples of the one, let not the democracies exemplify the other.

Even if the Powers seeking domination were likely to impose a loftier civilisation, still their success, through the very fact of domination, would be a calamity. But when we study the philosophy of Fascism—psychologists would call its ideas "infantile"; when we watch the spiritual tragedy of modern Germany; when we contrast the urbane principles of the Chinese people with the horrors brought by the invaders; when we look forward to the generations yet to come, and imagine what the world would be if these views of life were allowed unchallenged sway over the destinies of mankind—then we may realise how shameful would be the dereliction of duty were the free peoples weakly to acquiesce in the violent usurpation by those forces of world control.

Some say that, however that may be, their individual consciences forbid them to undertake military service. But because a man's conscience tells him that this or that is the right thing for him to do, it does not follow that it is the right thing. Conscience may err. History gives numberless examples of men of admirable character, animated by the most conscientious motives, committing deeds which later generations have unanimously condemned as acts of cruel persecution and ruthless barbarism. It has been well said that, though we cannot blame a man for acting according to his conscience, we may blame him for the kind of conscience that he has. It is not enough to say, "My conscience compels me, and I can do no other." You must first try to be sure that your conscience is right.

Among the 220,000 young men called up in the first batch of the new militia, there were 4,200—2 per cent.—who claimed exemption as conscientious objectors. But if that was right for the 4,000 it would have been equally right for the other 216,000. Kant's ethical law is not open to challenge—always act as you would wish everyone else to act in similar circumstances. The 4,000 would not dispute this: they would not think of saying that the others ought not to take the same course as themselves. On the contrary, they would earnestly desire that everyone should follow their example. That would mean that no Englishman should consent to serve in the army, navy or air force. But what is right for Englishmen

would also be right for Frenchmen and Americans. The great democracies would therefore be obliged to disband all their armed forces. On the same principle so should the totalitarian States. But is there the remotest possibility that they would? Is anyone prepared to say with confidence that the prospect that they would do so is sufficient to justify the risk? "England," said Meredith, "cannot invest her all in the millennium and be ruined if it delays to come."

It is clear, then, that the great democracies have the duty to resist aggression, on their own behalf and on behalf of smaller States. If the totalitarian Powers say that they are driven to violence by the denial of justice, then let the claims on the grounds of justice be considered, and, if they are substantiated, and not offset by equally just claims on the other side, let them be met. But on condition that violence is discarded as the means to a settlement, and negotiation re-established. They declare sometimes that that is their own desire. But the object-lessons of China, Abyssinia, Albania, Czecho-Slovakia refute those pleas. "What you do speaks so loud that I cannot hear what you say."

If for us there is that duty of resistance there is an equal duty to make it effective. To take up a resolute attitude and then to be driven by superior forces into helter-skelter retreat would merely be to accept great sacrifices and to accept them in vain. To adopt a strong policy with weak resources would certainly be dangerous and probably disastrous. As an old writer has said, "Let not thy will roar when thy power can but whisper." Plainly the maximum effort is now incumbent upon the democracies. The conclusion must be that conscription, though an evil, would be justified if it were essential for such an effort. The issue is narrowed to the question whether it is essential or not. Here there is much division of opinion.

In the Great War 5 millions of men in the British Empire voluntarily enlisted for military service of one kind or another prior to the enactment of conscription. This was by far the greatest number of volunteers found by any of the belligerents and by far the greatest voluntary military effort known to history. When it is said that this age is materialistic, utilitarian, that men are animated nowadays only by economic motives, it is well to remember that one fact and to ponder over it. There is no reason to doubt that if the need now were the same the response would be the same. Had the Government now in office in this country been wholeheartedly

attached to the voluntary principle ; had they taken effective steps to make the situation known ; had they proclaimed their requirements, and offered to voluntary recruits the same conditions with regard to pay and allowances and the right to return to their employments as have been secured to the militiamen—there is every ground to suppose that 200,000 recruits, and many more, could have been raised without the smallest difficulty. And if they had been so raised the effect upon opinion among our potential allies and possible opponents, of which so much was heard, might have been not less, perhaps even greater, than the impression made by the acceptance of conscription.

But very many Conservatives hold the view that conscription is a good thing in itself ; they were glad to seize the opportunity of establishing the compulsory principle, even though it might have been possible to secure the same results in man-power without it. Spokesmen of the Government declared indeed that the measure had been introduced “ with extreme reluctance,” and only for the period of the present emergency. The Act itself is described in its title as “ temporary ” ; it is valid in the first instance for only three years. But there is room for doubt whether the Government as a whole is sincere in these professions. Arguments used in support of the measure, emphasising the virtues of military service and the inequalities of the voluntary system, would justify a permanent rather than a temporary law. Already on the first day when the conscripts were assembled, the Secretary of State for War frankly stated that although “ the militia was expected to be raised for three years . . . it looked as if the young men of the future would be disappointed if they did not undergo the same democratic experience these militiamen were undergoing.” This does not suggest any very resolute determination to observe the undertakings given as to the temporary character of the Act.

No one would be rash enough to venture a forecast as to the course of events during the next three years, or the position of this country at the end of that time. But it seems at least probable that when the question of renewal of the Militia Act comes up for consideration there may be much controversy, raising questions of principle of fundamental importance. It would be well for Liberals not so to commit themselves now that it would be found then that the cause of personal liberty had been irretrievably com

Mr. Aldous Huxley, in his recent book *Ends and Means*, declares that democracy and military efficiency are in any event incompatible with one another. He writes :

A democracy which makes or even effectively prepares for modern, scientific war must necessarily cease to be democratic. No country can be really well prepared for modern war unless it is governed by a tyrant, at the head of a highly trained and perfectly obedient bureaucracy.

I do not think that we need concur in that. It is true that dictatorship has certain advantages for warfare ; but democracy has its advantages also, and it is by no means certain that the balance is on the other side. Mass obedience is characteristic of the one system, and it is of great military value no doubt. Individual initiative is characteristic of the other, and it is at least of equal value ; the appearance of the air-plane and the mechanisation of warfare give ever-increasing value to the quality of the individual. Conflicts no longer consist in masses of infantry or cavalry being hurled at one another, the issue to be decided by drill and courage ; they are more and more a contest between keen men, singly or in groups, men who must be intelligent and resourceful as well as brave, self-reliant as well as disciplined. The Australian and not the Prussian may be the typical soldier of the modern world, and social and political systems like that of Australia, not like that of Prussia, the better calculated to command success.

Secondly, the economic and financial factor, always of great importance in the wars of the past, is likely now to be decisive. The scale of the conflict, the costliness of the means, the involvement of the populations as wholes, renders the provision of supplies of all kinds, as well as of money, a matter as vital as it is complex. Dictatorships are always weak on the economic side. The dictator himself seldom knows the first letters of the alphabet of public finance or the economics of production. The qualities that have made him what he is are never those of the far-sighted economist. For him it is the business of finance and industry primarily to produce money for armaments, and perhaps for spectacular city development ; and to furnish food and materials for the armies, and for the civil population who are the base for the armies. Supply and demand must obey decrees, be ruled by penalties, yield to diplomatic pressure. So it is that almost always dictatorships in the end are brought down by economic collapse and financial ruin.

Thirdly, there is no stability in a political system that depends on a single person. Let his judgment fail, let him sicken or die, and the whole machine is put out of gear. The self-confidence that was his making may prove his unmaking. Napoleon, the arch-type, believed in his "star"; he followed it, and it led him to Moscow, Leipzig, Waterloo and St. Helena.

Fourthly, and most important of all, dictators must needs be cynics. They can set little store on morality. They may speak when it suits them—like Napoleon—of liberty and justice, but all the world knows that that is a pretence. On the other hand, peoples in the mass do care as a rule for what is right. They may at moments be misled by falsehood or carried away by passion; but not for long. A democracy will not go into war unless it believes that it has right on its side. It will not do wrong wittingly. Not so with dictatorships. And in the long run it is the moral factor that is decisive.

These are reasons why, even from the standpoint of winning victories, democracies usually outlast dictatorships—as the British Commonwealth, France and the United States outlasted the three Empires in the Great War. But it is essential to remember that principles of liberty are not enough of themselves to avert defeat. They must be supported by military efficiency, and not hampered by domestic disputes. Nor yet may democracies carry devotion to liberty so far as to consent to their own overthrow by any group of ruthless buccaneers who use the freedom so scrupulously allowed by the democrats to deprive the democrats of theirs—the freedom that has been described as "the free fox in the free hen-roost." Recall the origins of the existing totalitarian States of Europe—Russia, Italy, Germany, Spain—and it will be seen in every case that the weakness and incompetence of the democratic régimes was a prime factor. There have been moments when even France seemed not far away from the same situation.

British Liberalism has never under-estimated the importance to a democracy of strong government. It has never withheld from the executive adequate powers for the enforcement of law and order, even exceptional and drastic powers when sudden dangers make them necessary. It has never refused to co-operate with other parties in times of national crisis, whether military or economic. And it has never doubted the necessity for maintaining sufficient armed defences. There have been differences of opinion from time to

time as to the right standard of sufficiency. Gladstone may have held one view and his opponents sometimes another. But neither Gladstone, nor any other Liberal statesman—except John Bright—has ever subscribed to the principle that Britain should consciously accept a position of military inferiority to possible or probable opponents.

It had been suggested that the subject of our discussion to-day might be "*Freedom versus Defence*." But that title would have been misleading. It seemed to imply that the two were alternatives. If you preserved Freedom you could not have Defence; if you wanted Defence you must abandon Freedom. That is, indeed, the position, as I understand it, of Mr. Aldous Huxley. I hold the contrary. In the world in which we now live a country may, it is true, have defence without freedom, at all events for a time; we see several examples. But a country cannot have secure freedom without defence. Its national liberty, constitutional liberty and economic liberty must depend upon freedom from conquest; and even if it is found necessary to derogate in some degree from personal liberty, still on balance it is liberty that is served.

None the less we should be foolish to blind ourselves to the fact that we are here on a slippery slope. The derogations from freedom may easily be carried beyond the need. It is agreed that adequate defence is necessary. It may perhaps be true that it cannot be adequate without a great army. From that the conclusion is drawn by many that compulsory service is therefore indispensable; but such a conclusion may be wrong, or at least premature. Again, conscription having in fact now been established, almost without opposition, as a temporary measure in a moment of grave danger, it may be sought to make it permanent, although the emergency may have passed. Or drastic powers having been conceded to the executive to meet some exceptional challenge to order and security, the use of them may be stretched to quite other purposes, so as to impair freedom of speech, for example, or of trade union activity. Or again, a Department of Information may be set up, with general consent, in order to present the nation's standpoint to the world; and it may be found later that it is being used in effect to buttress the political position of the government in office. It is to-day, as it always has been, the specific task of Liberalism to exercise that vigilance which is eternally the price of liberty.

Let me summarise in a few sentences the ideas that I would offer for your consideration.

Liberty is not single but multiple. There is national liberty, and constitutional, and personal, and economic. Sometimes one of these has to be sacrificed in some degree for the sake of others. The question arises whether conscription is such a case; whether a man can rightly be called upon to surrender, for whatever period, his personal liberty to choose his own way of life in order to defend the national, and possibly the constitutional and economic liberty of the society of which he is a member. The claim is made that universal military service is a good thing in itself, apart from the needs of defence, because of physical and moral advantages that it brings. I submit that there are countervailing considerations of greater weight, and that that claim should not be allowed.

A claim is made from the opposite standpoint that, as war in its very essence is morally wrong, conscription must also be morally wrong; that the conscientious objectors who refuse to serve are therefore right, and should be supported and imitated. This view also, I suggest, should be rejected. It ignores the facts of the world situation, and those facts will not disappear merely because they are ignored. If refusal is right for the conscientious objectors, numbering a few thousands, it would be equally right for every man in the whole population; and if right for the people of Britain it would be equally right for all the peace-loving countries—for the Dominions, and the United States, and France. This would not lead to a universal disarmament; it would mean abandoning the control of mankind to the militarists; it would be the betrayal and the death of liberty. It is not enough for a man to say—my conscience tells me that this is the right thing to do. Conscience may err. He has the duty first to make sure, so far as he can, that his conscience is right.

Putting aside, then, the contentions that conscription is right *ab initio* because universal military service is good in itself, and that it is wrong *ab initio* because all military service is bad in itself, the question is narrowed to the issue whether conscription is indispensable in Great Britain at the present time; whether it is essential for effective co-operation with other free countries in resisting aggression. On this there is room for difference of opinion. Many Liberals hold, and I rank myself among them, that it was not established that voluntary methods, if properly applied, would have failed to

obtain the results that were sought. The Militia Bill was a temporary measure, but many of the arguments used in its support had a permanent application. If and when the international situation would justify the discontinuance of the Act, it is to be expected that strong efforts will be made to perpetuate it nevertheless. Unless the conditions at that time are very different from the present, the issue may give rise to a keen controversy.

Mr. Aldous Huxley's contention that freedom and defence are alternatives between which we must choose, that only a dictatorship can succeed in modern war, is also to be rejected. On the contrary the system of free government brings immense advantages, and dictatorship has great inherent weaknesses, even for warfare. The factors of individual self-reliance, economic strength, stability of institutions and moral purpose are in the long run decisive; and these are strongest in democracies. But there are characteristic dangers also—particularly a tendency to push domestic disputes so far as to make unity in face of danger impossible; a reluctance to establish executive authority that is strong enough; and a respect for liberty carried to the extreme of allowing would-be tyrants even the freedom to overthrow freedom. Liberalism in Great Britain has never fallen into such excesses.

On the other hand it must ever be on its guard, when infractions of one kind of liberty are found to be indispensable for the sake of others, against their being carried too far or continued too long. Freedom to think, speak, act as we will is one of the ultimate goods. Every kind of liberty is to be valued. The man who is fully free, and who is able to live the best life, is a man who lives in a country which is independent; in a State which is democratic; in a society where the laws are equal and restrictions at a minimum; in an economic system in which he has a secure livelihood and full opportunity to rise by merit. And I may add that even then he is not fully free, as the facts all around show only too clearly. He cannot live his life as he will, he cannot live in peace and tranquillity, unless he is free also from the peril of war. And that can only be if there is a world order ruled by moral law.

So far as conditions allow, our task is to cherish every one of these liberties—national, constitutional, personal, economic; and to strive so to mould the conditions about us that each and all of them shall increasingly flourish.

SAMUEL.

THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION.

IT is indeed remarkable that the situation at the close of the session is one in which the Parliamentary Oppositions are urging the Government to make it a more truly Conservative one. There is no suggestion that it is possible, in the present House of Commons, to have in peace time a Government including the Liberal and Labour Parties, but it is felt, and not amongst the Opposition parties alone, that the administration should at least be truly representative of all angles of Conservative opinion, particularly of those who have proved consistently during recent years to have been right on foreign policy.

The scene continues to be dominated by the personality of the Prime Minister, who firmly maintains all power in his own hands. Since he took office he has acted with vigour and determination in pursuit of the policy which he believed would bring peace. No one disputes his sincerity, but it is felt to be remarkable that he should continue with uncontrolled power after the failure and abandonment of his policy. At Munich Mr. Chamberlain was prepared to trust Herr Hitler and believe his word (very few persons experienced in foreign affairs were). It is not Mr. Chamberlain's good intentions, but his judgment that has been found wanting. Sir Archibald Sinclair, who throughout the session has led the Liberal Party with great ability and fine Parliamentary skill, is right in saying that the personality of the Prime Minister is the main stumbling block to national unity. It is obvious that the policy now forced upon him can never be accepted by him with any genuine enthusiasm or conviction, and it is widely feared that a fresh attempt at appeasement will be made immediately an opportunity presents itself. His unwillingness to have Parliament in session is significant. The inclusion in the Cabinet of Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Duff Cooper, or any or all of them, would be justified on the ground that nothing else can bring conviction in the United States, in Russia and in Germany, that we mean what we say. Mr. Chamberlain, however, has resisted and will resist any such change, for he knows that it would mean the end of his personal dictatorship.

During the various crises of the last few years it has generally been the opinion in the lobbies that the Government

could not continue unchanged, but the Prime Minister has always continued to drive forward unmoved by the storm, and he is not in the least likely to change so long as he has a majority who will support him. Widespread as is the general support for reconstruction, even in the Conservative Party, the great majority will never force a change. Amongst the Conservative supporters of the Government in the House probably only about thirty or forty are convinced supporters of the new policy of collective security, who would put it, if necessary, in front of party loyalty.

Mr. Chamberlain has at times, as the surge of crises rose, looked tired and strained, but he has continued indomitably and ably to lead the House of Commons, and by his continued presence on all important occasions shows that sense of leadership which, if it were rightly directed, is so much to be desired in the executive head of the State. It is remarkable that he continues to hold the Conservative forces as well as he does, but there is a grim imperviousness to events and a narrow partisan determination neither to see nor to admit that anything has ever been wrong under his guidance that seems to have hypnotised a certain number of people into thinking that it really must be so. Mr. Churchill's position as the session closes is enormously strong; after all, he has had no ministerial responsibility for any of the events of the last seven years, all his prophecies have come true, and though at times, as during the Munich crisis, his outspoken criticism of the Government has been keenly resented amongst Government supporters, there is no overlooking his great qualities, energy and clear-sightedness.

The position of Mr. Eden has been one of great interest and importance. Ever since his dramatic resignation in February of last year he has been looked to as the representative of those elements in the Conservative Party who do sincerely believe in the League of Nations system. Great attention, therefore, has been paid to the various addresses he has given about the country to gain some indication as to what leadership and guidance he was prepared to offer the nation. It must be admitted that great disappointment has been caused by his unwillingness to hit hard and his over-scrupulousness in refraining from attacking the Government whose policy, until the change came in March, he must have strongly disapproved. Again and again it has seemed as if he really were

going to speak out but in the end only admirable generalities have been emitted. He was right, however, to remain well inside the Conservative Party and on a long view his rise to the top may be predicted. It has been very difficult in these conditions for his Conservative sympathisers to exert very much influence on the direction of affairs, and it was indeed only the direct action of Herr Hitler in March that compelled the Prime Minister much against his will to reverse the engines and adopt the Eden policy.

Mr. Duff Cooper is a very powerful debating asset to this group and one who does not mince his words. He has the habit of expressing his meaning with fearless directness, and it is unfortunate that his personality does not happen to be more sympathetic to the House as a whole.

Let me turn for a moment to the question of the succession to the Premiership whenever that should arise, probably as things are, at a moment not long after the next General Election. The position in this matter has considerably altered during the session and I hold that Lord Halifax is the favourite. His emergence in the field of foreign affairs has been important and powerful. There is no doubt of his growth in stature politically and that he has exercised an effective influence in the right direction during the last few months. Mr. Chamberlain could not afford the resignation of another Foreign Secretary, and fundamentally he is sympathetic to a foreign policy of collective security. Lord Halifax's sincerity, breadth of outlook and clear expression of the British point of view has marked him out as the person most generally acceptable to public opinion in his own and other Parties to succeed to the highest office. The fact that he is in the House of Lords is not an insuperable obstacle. Lord Curzon failed to become Prime Minister not because he was a Peer but because he was Lord Curzon. There might even be an advantage in the situation because it would make it possible to place one of the other two most likely aspirants in the position of Leader of the House of Commons, in which position far less exception would be taken to them.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer is naturally and properly most desirous of becoming Prime Minister and he has even gone so far as to make it clear that he is willing to abandon the use of the word Liberal as a political appellation as a measure of appeasement. He is, however, regarded as the

main architect of disaster in foreign affairs during the last seven years and his influence in the Inner Cabinet is still felt to be strongly hostile to a thorough-going collective system. For these reasons, which cause him to be profoundly distrusted, he would prove a most unpopular leader of the nation quite apart from any questions of personality.

Sir Samuel Hoare, the other main candidate, would not command full confidence either. His record at the Foreign Office and present influence in the Inner Cabinet are against him, and it is difficult for anyone to regard him with enthusiasm as the leader of the nation. At the same time it should be recorded that at the Home Office he has shown a very real humanity and breadth of view, and it is to be hoped that fate will not deprive him of that great measure of Prison Reform, the Criminal Justice Bill. Sir Thomas Inskip and other favourites have sunk below the horizon.

Mr. Hore-Belisha, after very nearly running on the rocks a year ago, is now well out in the open sea of success. He has shown a well-advertised but real capacity in building up the new military fabric.

Since Sir Kingsley Wood went to the Air Ministry all the well-founded complaints and misgivings that ruled under Lord Swinton have disappeared. Sir Kingsley is an extremely approachable person, has a way of getting on with everybody and of producing results not only in appearance but in reality. There is no doubt that his energy has transformed the situation in respect of the output of military aircraft, and he has been well supported by his capable Under-Secretary, Captain Balfour, who has expert knowledge in addition to political aptitude.

It cannot be said that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald has improved his position. The excellent qualities that enabled him to bring about a measure of agreement in Ireland have not produced the same results in the much bigger and more difficult field of Palestinian affairs. He got himself into a regular tangle over the London Conference, which should never have been called, and he has produced a policy which it is really impossible not to regard as quite inconsistent with the British Mandate and as a repudiation of the British promise of a national home for the Jews in Palestine. It is impossible to believe that the policy can succeed. Even in this House of Commons only a majority of eighty-nine could

be obtained under the lashings of a three-line whip, and it seems highly improbable that the next House of Commons will contain any sort of majority for it at all. Furthermore, illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine which cannot be controlled is bound to grow and produce a situation when the whole policy will have to be reconsidered.

Mr. Walter Elliot has steadily maintained his reputation for first-class administration and geniality at the Ministry of Health, and his position is definitely stronger than has been the case for some years.

The astonishing Mr. Ernest Brown continues to control the Ministry of Labour with profound knowledge and remarkable ability. His replies at question time are really masterly, and on the one occasion when the Labour Party purposely put down so many questions that they all had to be answered by him in one day he came out completely unscathed and the experiment was not repeated. His Under-Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, is living down his earlier reputation for indiscretions and is a capable understudy.

The appointment of Mr. Burgin as Minister of Supply was coldly received, but on the basis of personal qualifications there is no doubt that he possesses powers which should enable him to create and carry on the work of this new Ministry successfully.

Sir John Anderson's appointment to the control of A.R.P. has given him a great deal of hard House of Commons committee work to do. He carries it out with painstaking industry though usually at far too great length. It cannot be said that his House of Commons qualities are the equal of his first-class attainments as an administrator both at home and in India.

Mr. Morrison took rather a nasty toss when he fell together with his Milk Bill in the early part of the session, and his rising star has ceased to shine with the same illumination. He is now, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, assisting the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence and his principal achievement was the debate on the Regulations made under the Military Training Act. In a speech which, allowing for very numerous interruptions, lasted for about two hours he showed the greatest good temper and grasp and he put up what was undoubtedly a first-class Parliamentary performance.

The activities of the Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade, Mr. Hudson, have been somewhat spectacular

and he has survived them all: representations to the Prime Minister about the state of the Government, visits to countries as far as Russia and the United States, loan suggestions to Herr Wohltat. He is a man of ability, blunt, no appeaser either of Germans or Englishmen, and his future should be worth watching.

The direction of the Government's affairs through the Chief Whip, Captain Margesson, has been up to the same high standard as in previous sessions. He has assumed by his personality and success a position of remarkable authority as adviser of the Prime Minister not only in the day-to-day business, but in the appointments to positions both at home and abroad. These have been made to a considerable extent from the Whips' Office. Though this may not appeal to those who have not been put, or are unwilling to be put, through that same gruelling test, there is much to be said for it as it does enable an individual's capacity and temperament to be very fully weighed up.

The ever-youthful Mr. Lloyd George still possesses to the full his great powers of invective and fierce denunciation and his children are worthy of their sire. He is one of the three or four speakers whom the House always crowds in to hear.

It must be said that the Opposition has been giving the Government a remarkably easy time. Those who have only been in the last two Parliaments cannot appreciate the vigour, ingenuity and persistence of the Conservative Opposition to the Labour Government in 1929. It was searching and ruthless. It did not trouble to be "patriotic," and if a Labour Government had been in power now, doing just the same things as the National Government, it would have had an extremely uncomfortable time. The action of a certain number of dissident Conservatives in opposing the Bill to establish pensions for Members gave a taste of what an intelligent, determined, well-conducted group can do in the way of obstructing and embarrassing the Government.

There has been an increase in the number of questions this session, and at times so many Supplementaries have been asked that suggestions have been made for cutting these down. It would be a very great mistake to interfere with the right of questioning ministers. It is one of the most valuable privileges open to private members, and is of enormous value

in extricating information and bringing pressure to bear by the threat of publicity on policies that will not bear the light of day. A good deal of the trouble is due to the fact that ministers give such disingenuous answers that it is sometimes necessary to persist until a real answer can be obtained. There is no doubt that the House would loyally support the Speaker in any action he thinks fit to take to diminish the number of Supplementary questions when they tend to develop into a minor debate.

Mr. Attlee has maintained his position as a sincere, effective, if uninspiring leader. During his illness Mr. Greenwood has deputised on occasion with distinction, but in spite of his abilities it is unlikely that he will ever be his successor. Mr. Morrison is the most likely alternative candidate. Admirable work has been done by Mr. Dalton and Mr. Wedgwood Benn and Mr. Shinwell has stayed the course with zest and vigour. Mr. Lees Smith and Mr. Pethick-Lawrence are most reliable batsmen, and Mr. Alexander is a good slogger.

For an active Labour Back Bencher to accept election to the Front Bench is in some sense self-immolation as it severely handicaps his speaking activities. In particular Mr. Arthur Henderson and Mr. Ede have suffered in this way. Amongst the effective fighters from the rear may be mentioned Mr. Bellenger, Mr. Garro-Jones, Commander Fletcher, and the three industrious Smiths, Ben, Tom and Ellis. Mr. Creech Jones has secured a real personal triumph in piloting through numerous shoals the ancient and now wholly transformed Access to Mountains Bill.

Liberal Members numerically in comparison with other Members show great activity in support of their popular leader and Whips. Valuable contributions have been made by Mr. Graham White, Mr. Dingle Foot, Mr. Rothschild, Sir Richard Acland and Mr. Wilfrid Roberts.

A great deal of pressure has been exercised on the House during the session by those interested in the welfare of Old Age Pensioners, and continual questions have been asked and petitions presented. This has finally forced the Government in view of future electoral events to give an undertaking which indicates that some increase will definitely be made. The influence swayed by the vast sums spent on the social services is very considerable, and where an honest case can be made out for increase it is very difficult for a Government to resist,

even at a time when we are borrowing such vast sums for national defence.

The session was enlivened by the expulsion of Sir Stafford Cripps from the Labour Party and his continued presence on the Opposition Front Bench, where he is the ablest speaker. Although the Cripps' plan for a Popular Front, openly avowed, has been killed, it should not be assumed that in fact arrangements at the General Election may not come about on a considerable scale locally amongst those anxious to see the progressive candidate returned. If in the next House of Commons there were a majority of members of different parties agreed on a progressive home and foreign policy, there should be no insuperable obstacle to the formation of a Government for the purpose of putting this policy into effect. But such things cannot be advertised or admitted beforehand; they arise naturally out of the facts of the situation.

On the whole, though, it would appear that the General Election which seems certain to take place in the autumn, unless Herr Hitler decides otherwise, will result in the return of the present Government by a considerably reduced majority. This will be partly due to the state of fatalism into which the British public have been driven by the series of international crises, and partly by the fact that they cannot see clearly a strong alternative Government. In any event, it seems certain that the Opposition will be sufficiently enlarged and strengthened to be able to hold the Government to a much more liberal course than has marked the disastrous years of misjudgment, mishandling and betrayal since 1931.

GEOFFREY LE M. MANDER.

HUNGARY: THE ELECTIONS AND AFTER.

THE last few weeks saw assembled in Hungary a new Parliament, elected for the first time by secret ballot. This seems an appropriate dividing-line at which to halt and, in so far as so close a view allows one the necessary perspective, sums up a period rich in fresh facts, with a view to extracting from them such lessons as they may contain. What, it may be asked, are these fresh facts in Hungary's policy? A tangled web of external and internal events which have subjected the life of the country to the most diverse influences.

To take external events first, the *Anschluss*--for this was the starting-point--created a wholly new international situation, in which nearly every Central European relationship shifted or was modified. One of the focal points of the Dual-Power ellipse, Vienna-Budapest, disappeared. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, political and psychological vestiges of which had still survived after twenty years, was finally liquidated. This put an end to the economic and political triangle Rome-Budapest-Vienna which had been called into being in 1934; instead there was formed the Berlin-Rome Axis, to which every small Power in Central and Eastern Europe had to adapt itself--in the first place Czechoslovakia, but to a certain extent also Hungary, whom ties of tradition and interest had long bound to the Axis Powers.

For Czechoslovakia the shifting of the balance of power was fraught with catastrophic consequences. Built on sand, and consequently driven to an inordinate display of self-assertion, this small Power has now ceased to exist. The Munich Agreement, and the complete annexation which followed soon after, brought other important consequences in their train. Hungary's dream of the last twenty years, the territorial revision of the Peace Treaties--the "peaceful change"--was partially realised. She recovered Upper Hungary and Sub-Carpathia, and at one point at least her pre-war frontier, thereby changing back from a practically homogeneous country--there were only Germans and an insignificant number of Slovaks--with out racial minorities to a State of several nationalities. With the fall of Prague the Little Entente lost its triple structure, a part of its *raison d'être*. It was not only Germany's grow-

prestige which disarranged the outlines on the map of political affinities; Hungary's own situation was calculated to bring about a complete transformation of her foreign relations. For a time it looked as though Hungaro-Rumanian relations were on the point of improving; and there is no doubt that the tension between Budapest and Belgrade has perceptibly relaxed. Recently the relationship has not been so good. The armament race between the Great Powers, the increasingly acute conflict in world politics, Italy's expansion in the Balkans, were all calculated to change the situation in the Danubian Valley. In the beginning it was Germany's alleged designs on the Ukraine which stirred imaginations in Eastern Europe; Poland was the first to revise, as a natural consequence, her views of her own situation. Here may be mentioned the important fact of the new Hungaro-Polish frontier, and the peculiar situation of Slovakia, at one time an integral part of Hungary and now her neighbour, who has gained an independence which at best can only be called problematic; the process initiated in that quarter in the spring of this year is as yet far from being terminated. The relationship between Hungarians and Slovaks has been put to the test by recent incidents.

It was after this that Great Britain commenced her diplomatic activity on the Bosphorus, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Each of these events not only touched Hungary closely--has she not Magyar minorities on every side beyond her borders?--but also furnished new incentives for her political orientations. Aware that the fate of the Danubian Basin must in the last resort depend on the struggle for hegemony of the Great Powers, or on the new balance which may be its outcome, Hungary and her people are yet convinced that St. Stephen's realm guards a key position and that without it no final and definite settlement can be conceived in the future any more than in the past.

The events of the memorable year 1938, even if they occurred without Hungary's initiative and, in part, without her co-operation--were, in fact, in some particulars, even contrary to her expectations--yet accorded in their essential features with the aims and conceptions nourished by her for the last twenty years. Ever since Trianon, Hungary has steadfastly clung to her conviction that the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a Great Power with a

definite mission in Central Europe, and the incidental dismemberment of Hungary herself, not only damaged her own historic rights and most vital interests, but, based as it was on a false estimate of the organic life of Central Europe injured the interests of the entire Continent. According to this view, the doctrine of the reconciling and pacificatory character of St. Stephen's Hungary fitted organically into the wider framework of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Empire of nations—one complementing the other in a happy union. But this fundamental conviction has been accompanied by other complementary concepts. Just as it is ingrained in every Hungarian that a gradual revision of the Peace Treaty must in time restore Hungary's historic frontiers, so it was evident to everyone that Austria, in the shape she had assumed after St. Germain had "set her on her feet," was incapable of fulfilling her appointed mission in Europe. The new, reduced Austria could not but be ground to pulp between two millstones.

The Western Powers, which in 1919 had called into existence the Little Entente based on Czechoslovakia, were unable to harmonise its role with Austria's traditional mission and were therefore compelled, against their convictions and even against their elementary interests, to give up all thought of the latter's reconstruction. Nor was it hidden from those who guided Hungary's policy that Germany, growing apace both in power and ambition, would sooner or later absorb an Austria deprived of her European mission and condemn her to the rôle of a "German small State." This recognition explains why in these twenty years Hungary was never so free to pursue her political ideals as her desires and interests dictated, but had to subject her aspirations to a bitter reality. She never relinquished her right to Revision, but was compelled to leave its gradual realisation to the evolving policy of the Great Powers. Together, or at least parallel, with Austria, she would have been willing to assume the connecting and reconciling mission, European in the noblest sense of the word, of a "*Reich der Mitte*"; but she had sadly to realise that the policy of the Powers followed a different trend, that, if she wished to survive and ensure the welfare of her people, she must seek to come to an understanding with her neighbouring States in so far as she could do so without spiritual surrender.

The course of events has justified her policy. She has survived in spite of Trianon, and, defying a hostile Little Entente, has managed, without abandoning her rights, to keep open the economic and even to a certain extent the political paths to the capitals of the three States which had united into what they themselves called a Great Power, against her. This policy foresaw that, once free of the trammels imposed by the Paris Treaties, Italy and Germany would assume a preponderant rôle in Central Europe, and that these dictatorial-totalitarian Powers would come to an agreement between them. It may be remembered that there was a time when Berlin and Rome still looked askance at each other while Budapest kept on friendly terms with each. The happy results of this fundamentally sound policy showed themselves in the recovery of the north Hungarian and Ruthene territories.

However, Hungary never lost sight of the fact that she cannot shape Danubian policy on her own account and must be content to be dependent on the European policy of the Great Powers. All that she can aspire to is that as far as possible no single Great Power should assume a preponderant rôle, still less the rôle of an oppressor, in Central Europe, and that her economic and cultural ties with the more distant Powers should not be severed, even though she has to study the interests of the adjacent States. Against all efforts to obtain exclusive influence over her, Hungary opposes the ideal of an inviolable independence. The guerdon of this independence in her foreign relations is independence in her domestic affairs, expressed in a national policy and an unremitting, vigilant care for the integrity of her ancient Constitution. It was under these auspices that last month's election campaign was fought out.

These elections were held in a most unfavourable atmosphere, at the gravest moment of the European crisis, after a year of domestic events which had filled many good Hungarians with deep misgivings. That in such an atmosphere the Government and the country should have dared to embark on such a venture was in itself a reassuring sign. It was a test of the nation's constitutional spirit and more especially of parliamentarism.

The results of the elections are known to the world. The Government Party which, as the Prime Minister, Count

Teleki, repeatedly declared in the course of the campaign, went into the struggle in the name of nationalism, Right Wing principles (anti-Semitism) and the Christian Idea, and at the same time a policy of popular reform, won 180 seats out of 270, while forty constituencies (totalling 500,000 votes) returned so-called Arrow-Cross representatives. If we disregard certain differences of shade, which may conceivably be accentuated in the future, within the Arrow-Cross Parties themselves, this means that there has for the first time entered the Hungarian Parliament a numerically far from negligible "national-socialist" opposition, with all that characterises this party in Germany—its love of uniforms, its gesture of greeting, and doubtless also its ideology, an anti-Semitism *à outrance*, dictatorial tendencies and anti-capitalism; in the field of external politics the Party's attitude is as yet unknown. Tibor Eckhardt's Small Farmers' Party with only fourteen seats has come off worst. There is also a sprinkling of Liberals (Rassay), Social Democrats, and the so-called Christian Catholics of Count Zichy; this Party, formerly of some importance, became merged in the Government Party before the elections. There have entirely dropped out, not only from the Parliament but also, perhaps, from the Government Party itself, the conservative-bourgeois shades, the moderates who were bent on compromise. (In December 1938 this group of seventy "seceded" from the then Government Party and by this act started the process which led to the fall of the Imrédy Administration. Count Teleki did not support their candidature at the elections.) We said "perhaps" because, although the Government Party's programme is known to the world, no one knows the extent of the cohesion between its members. Count Teleki has collected in this new Party, which assumed the title of Party of Hungarian Life just before the elections, many different and in some respects divergent elements, and there is a widespread feeling that only the autumn session will show whether these divergent forces will lend themselves to fusion and co-ordination or whether they will disintegrate into factions which will furnish the foundations for other Party formations. Those who prophesy the latter development point to M. Imrédy, the late Prime Minister, as the most likely person to carry a part of the Government Party over to the extreme Right and to seek a compromise with the Right Wing Opposition. To-day,

while Imrédy is still a member, and a most active and able member, of the Government Party, such prognostications are certainly premature. If we look for the reasons of the success of the so-called "National-Socialist" ideology, the first that occurs to us will be the successes scored by German foreign policy, the universally perceptible power of suggestion of the totalitarian States, and propaganda from abroad. Along with this there is of course the strong radicalism which comes to the fore in any nation which is living at high pressure, which twenty years ago, in Béla Kun's time, took Russian collectivism as its example, while to-day State Socialism is moving towards another form. But this new form of the State brings some satisfaction to those civil servants who have a desire for greater powers. Finally, it must not be forgotten that a considerable part of the Hungarian electorate was always, under all conditions, in opposition, formerly on the basis of ultra-national demands—these were the parties based on the ideas of 1848 and 1867 respectively—while at the present day these two Hungarian parties are to be seen in the two conflicting tendencies of a sober desire to maintain the present form of the State, and a vaguely defined, often half-understood, racial "Messianism."

It has been mentioned that the moderates, who in the past years have set themselves sharply against all anti-constitutional, anti-capitalistic, extreme Right tendencies, and who condemned certain provisions of the two anti-Jewish Bills, have completely disappeared from the Lower House. Their policy, which in Government and Right Wing circles has sometimes been labelled "liberal," although its representatives deprecate a term admittedly misleading, is to-day voiced mainly in the Upper House. Count Stephen Bethlen, for ten years Prime Minister of Hungary, declined to stand for Parliament this time, and has been raised by the Regent to the Upper House. Count Bethlen published his reasons for retiring from public life, first in an open letter to his former constituents and later in a brilliant little treatise which appeared in a daily paper and which gave a masterly analysis of the election results. The essence of his conclusions was that the demagogue methods employed during the elections, partly in obedience to the Government's policy, partly as a result of mistaken tactics, might easily endanger important national interests. He considered Hungarian "National-Socialism"

as a revolutionary movement *par excellence*, and the political mind of the nation to be in jeopardy, and strongly advised moderation and caution. Although the Government press and some members of the Government objected to Count Bethlen's strictures on the new Parliament, even the Minister of the Interior, M. Keresztes-Fischer, has been compelled to acknowledge that the aberrations of the Left Wing have been adopted by the Right Wing camp without essentially changing their character.

The new Parliament, which is viewed in such a different light in the various camps, but, it must be owned, in none with any great optimism, is faced, in difficult international circumstances, with still more difficult domestic reforms. These reforms, two in number, were both initiated by the last Parliament; both are of an economic nature, and calculated to effect the social transformation of the country. The first, the Anti-Jewish Bill, was passed by the last Parliament and is now coming into force; the passing of the second, the Agrarian Reform, will be the task of the present Parliament. Like every question which has come up in the present revolutionary state of Central Europe, the Jewish question is an extremely complicated and controversial one. There is no possibility of a proper settlement, because there is no hope of effecting a compromise between the opposing standpoints. Nevertheless, if the foreign observer is to receive an adequate picture of the situation, an effort must be made to place both these standpoints in as clear a light as possible.

The "*Rassenschützer*" standpoint, which since the Imrédy Administration has been largely that of the Government, holds that the welfare of the nation demands the elimination of the Jews, whose influence is felt to be noxious, or at least alien, to national interests, from economic and public life. The process of elimination should, it is thought, be as complete as possible, but the means employed should never be other than legal. Those who profess this standpoint maintain that Hungarian anti-Semitism was born of the experiences of the Bolshevik period in 1919 and of sixty years of liberal institutions, and is thus neither a German import nor to be ascribed to German political pressure. It will be seen that this Hungarian anti-Semitism is not of the pure "Nuremberg" brand. It allows to a certain, as a matter of fact exceedingly slight, extent for the principle of assimilation: war services; mixed marriages count if of long standing—a somewhat mitigating element; and conversion to one of the Christian Churches.

Otherwise, all but 12 per cent. of the Jews are to be swept from economic life at the earliest possible date, from the economic field within a period of two to four years. The Jews number 600,000 in present-day Hungary, but until recently their importance in the economic life of the country and in the press far exceeded their percentage in the population.

The so-called "liberal" standpoint, on the other hand, is that this governmental anti-Semitism is not only not humane but also unfair and detrimental to national interests. Unfair because in no country in Europe has assimilation been so successful as in Hungary, where the better-class Jews have to a great extent been merged both linguistically and spiritually in the body of the nation, devotedly sharing in the country's defence and particularly in the task of its economic reconstruction. Detrimental to national interests, because in a country where the middle-class is relatively inconsiderable and where the capital-producing bourgeoisie is mostly Jewish, the destruction of Jewish capital and the elimination of Jewish labour cannot but entail serious difficulties. It is feared, on the one hand, that Jewish unemployment may bring a serious social crisis in its train, and, on the other, that the dearth of skilled and capable non-Jewish workers may dislocate production. All of the so-called Jewish legislation is ascribed, in this camp, to German influence—more, it is said that the expulsion of the Jews from the body of the nation is designed to serve foreign interests; that it is the "Trojan Horse" which is to facilitate the introduction of foreign labour.

Midway between the two standpoints there is a third which, bent on compromise, regards it as undeniably advisable, even necessary, to curtail the excessive Jewish influence—less by official measures than by social methods—which condemns all violence and extreme measures, and is by no means willing to sacrifice the assimilated Jewish elements to a grotesque and unchristian racial policy. During the debates on the second Jewish Bill this standpoint was much in evidence, especially in the Upper House. The attitude of the Christian Churches appeared to reflect the same views.

If the Government's more rigorous standpoint has triumphed after all, and the original Bill has, to the regret of many, become Statute Law, the explanation lies in two different circumstances working towards the same result; one of these is the atmospheric pressure emanating from Germany, the other the Government's endeavour to take the wind out of the sails of national-socialist agitation by appropriating the more spectacular elements in its programme. The putting into effect of the Anti-Jewish Law will materially

transform the structure of Hungarian society. The "replacing" or wiping out of capitalistic and middle-class Jewish society cannot be accomplished without a very considerable collectivisation and nationalisation of the country.

It should however also be mentioned that in Hungary during the last fifty years there have been numerous signs of Jewish assimilation, mixed marriages have had a considerable influence in the higher strata of society, while the racial principle is capable of producing spiritual conflicts in many cases.

Similar results may be expected from the other pending measure, the Agrarian Reform. On this question, as on the Anti-Jewish Act, antagonistic views prevail, and both standpoints have a measure of reason on their side. Here, as there, it is easy to stir popular feeling to fever heat; here, as there, the ultimate solution will have to be effected by compromise. It is not to be denied that the land hunger of the agrarian population embodies a legitimate craving and that the question of the big landed properties is a grave problem in a country where, as in Hungary, there is a wide discrepancy between the standard of life and the distribution of income, and where there are still to be found, here and there, improperly cultivated big *latifundia* surrounded by tens of thousands of the landless proletariat. On the other hand it must be manifest to every reasonable observer that an indiscriminate and precipitate breaking up of the big landed properties involves grave dangers from the point of view of national production no less than of the population problem, and may lead to a similar proletarianisation of the country as must inevitably result from the Anti-Jewish Law. This double transformation may lead to the destruction of the nation-maintaining élite, prepare the triumph of incompetence, and ultimately imperil the vital interests of the State. This makes it probable that even if Parliament votes a fairly far-reaching agrarian reform, the execution of the Act will be neither swift nor radical in its methods.

On the whole, perhaps the best description of the Teleki Administration would be to say that it seeks to effect a compromise between a Christian-social radicalism and a conservatism inspired by fear for the nation's welfare. While the Imrédy Cabinet displayed a decided lenience in regard to Right Wing radicalism, Teleki's Government, and probably his Parliament

as well, seek to steer political passions into the channels of law and moderation. There is no doubt that Teleki calmed down the serious differences which were regrettably evident in the latter part of last year, and succeeded at least in neutralising political antagonisms. Teleki, who was Prime Minister for the first time some twenty years ago, is a happy combination of the culture and outlook of a western European scholar and the high moral values of an aristocrat with a full appreciation of all that is finest in Hungarian historical tradition. These moral values are a great source of strength in times of difficulty. It is generally felt that Teleki's handling of the situation contains the elements of success; how great this success will be will in many respects depend on the international situation and on how far it will be possible to isolate Hungarian affairs from the neighbouring German pattern, which the Hungarian Government has repeatedly pronounced to be alien to Hungarian political ideas. According to the Prime Minister, we are the masters of our own fate and do not follow foreign examples, even if we may seek to benefit by the experiences of our neighbours. And we shall on no account destroy so much as a particle of our ancient Constitution. This is no obstinate clinging to a petrified heritage—St. Stephen's unwritten Constitution has at all times shown a wise elasticity—but a "conservatism adapted to the times."

It is in the spirit of this adapted conservatism that the Hungarian Government is trying to compromise with the mass movements said to lurk behind the election results of the Arrow-Cross Party. Many people doubt the reality of these mass movements; others have pointed out that the 500,000 votes are the result of a high-handed and lavish propaganda nourished in some place—so the Prime Minister has stated—by pecuniary contributions from abroad. Certain German influences are undeniably apparent not only in the headway made by the Hungarian National-Socialists but also in the marshalling of the political forces of the German minority. For the first time in Hungary there has taken his seat in the ranks of the Government Party a representative of the 500,000 Germans of the country, who takes his stand not on linguistic rights but on the *Volksstumsgedanke*. The personality and utterances of Dr. H. Mühl, German member for the constituency of Bonyhád, have already caused some turbulent scenes in the House.

But the Government, whose foreign policy is being guided with strong national feeling by its young Foreign Minister, Count Stephen Csáky, trusts that neither the sympathy extended to the Hungarian national-socialist movement by certain circles in Germany, nor the German minority movement and the support it may be receiving from extremists and professional agitators in the *Reich*, will disturb Hungary's neighbourly relations with Germany.

Those who view from afar Hungary's shifting relations with the German Empire, usually forget that these relations are determined on the one hand by geo-political and economic interests, and on the other by psycho-political considerations. The geo-political interests will be easily discernible by anyone who glances at the map: the economic interests are explained by the fact that for years past Germany (with former Austria) has been buying 60-70 per cent. of Hungary's agrarian products and can hardly be replaced by other markets. But side by side with this there runs the psychological consideration that Hungary has never for a moment relinquished her hopes of Treaty revision and that her foreign policy must ever be guided, over and above the wish to lend effective support to her minorities abroad, by the idea of an ultimate recovery of her historic frontiers. This should on no account be ignored by anyone wishing to obtain a clear picture of Hungary's situation, aims and future actions.

The Regent of Hungary, in his speech at the opening of Parliament, which roused widespread interest throughout Europe, once again affirmed the Hungarian Government's unshakable adherence to the principles of political independence, regard for the historic Constitution of this country and for Parliamentary institutions. The gravity, moderation and dignity of his speech, and the traditional pomp and ceremony accompanying the opening of Parliament lend more than usual weight to his utterance. In a fluctuating world filled with explosive matter and in the painful uncertainty in which all the peoples of the globe find themselves at the present moment, Admiral Horthy's declarations, imbued as they were with a progressive Conservatism, embody a desire for and a promise of appeasement and show that the Hungarians are conscious of their European mission and are ready to stand up for their ideals.

JOSEPH BALOGH.

Budapest.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.

CHINA is bitterly disappointed with the United States, because she has not only failed to render any real assistance to China in the hour of trial, but has consistently provided Japan with the materials that she most needs in carrying on the present war. This feeling of disappointment is felt towards Great Britain, though not to the same extent, for she has never been regarded as a real benefactress to China, since she has confined her relations within strictly narrow channels. China, moreover, remembers that the strongest attack she made against any foreign country was specially directed during 1925-8 against Britain. Still those unhappy days passed, and friendship was restored when the Russian influence was removed, and Chiang Kai Shek was established in power.

Why should China expect to be generously treated by America? Is America under any sort of moral obligation to China? The answer is to be found in the development of China from the time of the revolution in 1911 onwards. For twenty-five years the influence of the United States from a cultural and social point of view was dominant. China was moulded by this American philosophy which determined the character of her growth. This was to be expected, since Sun Yat Sen, the father of the new republic, had been as a youth brought up in Honolulu, though, in later years, he acquired his knowledge of medicine in Hong Kong. The important point, however, was that America very early returned her Boxer Indemnity, and devoted all her funds to education. The United States as the eldest republic was naturally interested in China, the youngest. She became a sponsor, a guide, philosopher and friend to the youthful newcomer to the ranks of Western nations, or rather to their system. There was enthusiasm and genuine affection on both sides, as each supplied something—in fact a great deal—of what the other lacked.

On the one side there was the age-long dignity and grace of China, with its incredibly old philosophy and art, both of which had stood the test of time, and were accepted by the world as a testimony of the high quality of China's civilisation, and on the other there were the solid and great material achievements of America, and the high economic level of life

which stood out above those of other nations, and were in violent contrast with those of China. America needed the refining influence of age successfully spent, and China needed the invigorating air of youthful optimism and enthusiasm for higher standards of life. She needed to be rejuvenated.

America seemed, then, to undertake the responsibility of initiating the youth of China into the mysteries of the modern industrial and commercial world. A survey of the educational institutions in China which expressly stood for American ideals shows them scattered over the whole country. In Peking there were Yenching and Tsing Hwa Universities, as well as the big medical school founded with Rockefeller money, namely the Pekin Union Medical College. In Nanking there was the Nanking University and Ginling College for Women. In Shanghai there was St. John's University as well as Shanghai University. Near Foochow city also there is an American university, and in the west of Changsha there was Yale in China, consisting of a large middle school and a medical college. In Canton there was Lingnan University, which at the moment is sharing the buildings of Hong Kong University, while in Chengtu and at Tsinan there are Union Universities which are financed and staffed by American, Canadian and British missions. There is also a considerable number of Christian missions from America which are responsible for middle schools and hospitals, as well as for the ordinary Christian teaching.

The full story of American cultural, political and social influence, however, is not complete if we stop at the institutions which are directly under American boards, since the national universities of China for the most part are or were staffed by Chinese graduates who have sat at the feet of American professors. The Chinese scholars who guided China in her initial efforts to come into line with the West were men like Hu Shih and Chiang Mon-lin—men who sat at the feet of Dr. Dewey in Columbia, and who were responsible for the literary renaissance. Dewey himself came to China in 1923, and provided the scheme or the framework for educational development on national lines. Madame Chiang Kai Shek, who has done more than any woman to mould opinion in China, and more than most men, is a product of Wellesley College in the United States. Men like C. T. Wang were educated in America too, after being through St. John's

University, Shanghai, which, under Dr. Hawks Pott, the American president, poured out a steady stream of social and political leaders for China. Then again the nomenclature is American when we are speaking of Chinese universities. There are "credits" and "semesters," campuses and programmes, schedules and recitations, but in addition the tone, the routine and the accent savour more of the American than of any other national system.

The report of the League of Nations Commission which went out in 1936 drew attention to this great emphasis on the American tradition, especially in higher education in China, but it was recognised and remarked upon by observers long before that. The question arises whether this educational assistance and financial generosity expressed the warm feelings of the general public in the United States, or whether it expressed the surplus energy and sentiment of the various Christian missionary bodies who are an important factor in American life, but not, perhaps, representative of the whole. Certainly a tour of China's educational establishments gave one the impression that the United States was, if not the real father, at least a very generous and interested godfather of the newly born young China.

The group that was submitted to this discipline was destined to become the most powerful in the new China, and to transmit the ideals and new knowledge of applied science, of economics and of political science to the whole of China. Is it any wonder that in the process they enlarged upon the merits of America, and advanced only those who had drunk at the same fountain of knowledge? The question arises whether America did not commit a great wrong in giving the impression that the whole of the United States had sponsored the movement and would steer the country safely through the infant stages of political development, seeing that the character of the teaching implied the active protection of the powerful tutor-nation. Without that guarantee the system imposed was dangerous.

The important feature of American life is its emphasis on higher living standards—the full garage, whereas China had been content with the ideal of the full rice bowl. Students, then, who were reared in this atmosphere were unfitted to return to the real China and share its hardships, since they had acquired a distaste for anything Spartan. The real life of

China is essentially rural, whereas the real life of America is urban: the one is as emphatically agricultural as the other is industrial and commercial. The whole of the new energy was thrown, therefore, into those activities which remodelled the cities by destroying the walls, widening the roads, putting up better buildings, establishing schools, universities and municipal waterworks and electricity plants. These towns became the centres of a vigorous social, industrial, educational and political life, but the fundamental problem of China was left untouched, as the peasants who form 85 per cent. of the population did not share in this general policy of uplift. On the contrary, they were left for many years at the mercy of rapacious magistrates and extortionate and ruthless warlords. In despair many of the more virile fled from their lands and joined the so-called Communists. Had some of the new thought been generated in Denmark, for example, instead of in the United States, the result would have been more beneficial to China, since rural life would not have been neglected.

The emphasis upon social problems, the exploitation of the sources of Nature by scientific means in order to enrich the material life of the individual, the substitution of horse-power for man-power in order to reduce the almost intolerable burdens which Chinese have to bear, the lengthening of life and rendering it more wholesome by the application of medical science to human ailments—it was this kind of knowledge that China sought and America supplied.

The result of this contact with America was that the mind of young China was conditioned in a setting that had little or no relation to the actual requirements of China. The important point is that America had no political burglar on her doorstep ready to bludgeon his way in and take possession of the premises. America has three thousand miles of ocean on one side, and four thousand on the other, and can pursue her course without serious distraction on account of enemies. Neutrality or freedom from foreign entanglements is the keynote of American political life. If she departs, as she did in the past, from this policy it will be for sentimental reasons and not for reasons of national security. Hence Americans devote all their energies to the solution of social problems, and emphasise the civilian rather than the military side of national life. The young Chinese student was nourished on these same

doctrines, and so on his return to China he was more concerned about waterworks than gun emplacements, and about civic centres rather than military training centres. Ten million dollars could be voted to establish a deep sea harbour at Whampoa, but only three-quarters of a million dollars could be collected in the same area for war planes for Chiang Kai Shek.

It is always a difficulty, when young students are sent abroad to study for a number of years in foreign countries, to shield them from the temptations which beset them when freed entirely from home discipline. They are not brought strictly under the new discipline of the nation to which they have gone, and consequently, from a moral point of view, they suffer, and this is still more likely to happen in America than elsewhere, seeing that there are not the same demands made in the educational system for rigid personal behaviour. It would be fair to say that the aim of the educational system in the United States is to inculcate scientific knowledge with a view to its application afterwards in the world at large, and this means that the moral and religious teaching is left to be done or not done by the various bodies whose business it is to work in those fields, but the Chinese student is not likely to come under those influences. It is precisely in this sphere that China needed and needs most guidance, since those who are responsible for the good government of the country find it much harder to get a trustworthy administrator than an efficient chemist or economist. The tales of corruption and extortion in high places make the thoughtful Chinese and foreign well-wishers almost despair of the future. The real problem of China is a moral one, and to the solution of this the United States has been able to contribute very little indeed.

The revolution in 1911 was against the incompetence and the corruption of the Manchu dynasty: it was not against the kind of tyranny which we associate with the French and Russian revolutions. National efficiency could only have emerged after the revolution if there had been not more individual liberty but less, and a more severe national discipline instead of the emphasis upon individual and family independence. The American contacts and influence merely intensified the existing evils, by presenting a condition of exceptional privilege and freedom which the individual at present enjoys

in the United States. The Chinese youth was sharing the political heritage and stored-up wealth of America without experiencing the severe training and making the necessary sacrifice that the enjoyment of such privileges demanded. But again it must of course be conceded that the Chinese themselves were drawn to the American schools, because of the genuine welcome they received, the indulgence extended, and because of the character of the teaching. The Chinese and American people are both lovers of peace. In neither country does the soldier obtrude too much in social life, since in both cases there has been the great wall either of brick or water, or both, to protect them against the invader. Life has been lived primarily for the purpose of pursuing human happiness, rather than destroying the peace and happiness of others. But for China that security no longer existed.

It was, however, a matter of considerable importance that the Chinese students, who on their return exercised no small degree of influence among their fellows, should have been made to realise the necessity for national solidarity, good organisation and the need for providing for national defence. This was not done, nor could it be done, and yet the antagonism in China against the Japanese found a sympathetic response in the Western state where the encroachment of the Japanese in agricultural and commercial spheres was resented. It is because this atmosphere of the educational institutions in China was considered by the Japanese to be anti-Japanese that a special effort was made to destroy them. It is in the universities of China that one finds the true source of the national spirit, the fierce burning zeal for a strong united China, but too often it has been thought and felt that the expressed desire for unity and strength would bring about the desired result. Obviously this was a defective view, for practical results depend upon action and example on the part of leaders as well as on their exhortations. The readiness to sacrifice is a measure of the sincerity of one's faith.

This aspect of the question was first realised in Kwangsi, a province ruled by three very able men, Pei Chung Hsi, Li Chung Jen and Chairman Huang, who saw that slogans and enthusiasm for the national cause were no substitute for military and social preparation. They organised their province for the coming struggle in such a way that everyone was made aware of the fact that efficiency was only possible if a disciplined

order in the villages, with definite objectives, replaced the *laissez-faire*, negative policy that had been pursued for so many centuries. They demanded reorganisation, and got it. Every village had to provide a trained militia, open a school, and modernise the economic and industrial methods, and young magistrates, specially trained, were sent into each of the 24,000 villages, with the authority of the provincial rulers behind them to carry out their policy. No one was allowed to proceed to a higher education who had not completed six months in a military camp at Wuming, and passed the final test which required each youth to march in full kit from the camp to Nanning, the capital of the province, a distance of thirty-five miles.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is American culture that is being destroyed in China. It is the democratic outlook acquired in the States and applied in China that the Japanese are definitely eliminating. Britain is losing for the time being her trade, but nothing else. In commerce she is dominant among the Western powers in China, just as in the same way America is or has been dominant in the cultural sphere. The United States was believed by China to stand *in loco parentis*, and was clearly ready to share her responsibility with others in that capacity when Manchuria was seized by Japan. Later, however, she clearly indicated to China that she had no further interest, as when her Ambassador informed Wang Ching Wei, then Foreign Minister, that America's economic interests in China were so small that his country would not take any steps to oppose Japan. After the interview Wang Ching Wei said to his colleagues that the statement was the most disappointing and least expected of any that he had heard. Is it any wonder, then, that one section of China should be moving towards the Russian system, and the other towards the Japanese, since there is no possibility of standing independently between these two antagonists? Wang Ching Wei, a personally ambitious man, but not corrupt, is the most outstanding politician in China to-day. He is no lover of the democracies, and firmly believes that China can make the best deal with the powerful neighbour near her coasts, rather than with the Western powers who, from a great distance, support China's claims sentimentally, but can do nothing practically. This is clearly shown in the progress of the campaign in which Japan has not only

extended her control over the vital coastal ports of China, as well as over the Northern provinces, but also taken possession of islands such as Hainan, the occupation of which challenges the position of the French, British and even Americans in the Far East.

The exclusion of foreign ships from the ports of China by the orders of the Japanese, the numerous high-handed acts, and the much advertised insults and outrages which have accompanied the extension of Japanese control over China, and the seeming utter helplessness of the nations which suffer these insults because of the difficult situation in Europe—these matters have naturally driven many Chinese in the occupied areas to the conclusion that the Western Powers—America, Britain and France—have not the power to defend their own interests or maintain their own legal rights, and still less the desire or the power to help China in her distress. China has been left to fight this war entirely on her own, though a united stand and joint action on the part of the Americans and British would certainly have curbed Japanese ambitions, and even called a halt to her advance. Just as Britain failed to co-operate with America in 1932 with reference to Manchuria, so now there is the same fatal reluctance to act and put an end to the terrible suffering that is being endured by the Chinese. Two years have passed and still there is no kind of pressure being exerted on Japan in a military or naval way which would relieve the pressure on China. Russia remains strangely neutral in spite of the golden opportunity to repair her damaged reputation as a fighting nation. Internal conditions may be the cause, better terms may be wanted from China before doing something really important, or it may be that Russia is definitely committed to the policy of defence and of preserving her own independence, knowing quite well that she can, in her own strength, withstand the assaults of both Germany and Japan. She can, therefore, like the United States, pursue a policy of isolation, since as a nation she is self-contained, and needs foreign imports only to a very slight degree.

It would seem, then, that China is to be left to work out her own salvation, and if this is successfully accomplished then the future of Japan is as dismal as that of China is bright. There are those who think that this war was necessary to bring out the real strength of China and the real weakness of

Japan. China could only become self-conscious as a nation, and be made to realise the necessity for personal self-sacrifice, during the stress of war and the threat to her existence as an independent nation. To become a vassal of Japan, a country to be exploited, kept down on a low level of culture, governed as in the Northern provinces by sheer terrorism—it is this prospect which stiffens and prolongs China's resistance. There are those who think that a compromise might be achieved and the present deadlock ended if China would but agree to the sacrifice of the five Northern provinces, and shape her foreign policy along lines acceptable to Japan. Those who come from Shantung and know the situation in the North very well, cannot conceive, certainly within the next thirty or forty years, of the withdrawal of Japan, seeing that she is so deeply entrenched there. On the other hand, those who are familiar with the military situation in Shansi, Hunan, Szechuan, in fact with the whole of the Chinese front—such as Dr. Robert Brown—cannot discover the slightest sign among the Chinese of a desire for such a peace. There will be no peace so long as Japan occupies the sacred soil of China.

There is no alternative to conquering and administering the whole of China—a truly formidable task—or getting out of China altogether. The extension of the military lines of communication, the maintenance of armies of occupation, and the slow, gradual process of attrition, is more likely to wear out Japan than China, while the attempt to consolidate and hold the strategic area in the North will not be permitted by the Chinese who will carry on a relentless border warfare and so make the occupation extremely costly, and the provinces untenable. It may be, then, that the lessons America did not teach young China are now being more realistically learned in the theatre of war than they could have been in the peaceful groves of colleges and universities. It may be also that the needs of the situation will teach China to stand on her own feet. To win in such circumstances would be a triumph indeed. Out of this welter of misery and suffering China would emerge with her soul purified and strengthened, and Japan, too, would become a more liberal-minded and neighbourly country.

LANCELOT FORSTER.

Hong Kong.
July 17th, 1939.

NATIVE LABOUR: SUCCESS AFTER THIRTY YEARS.

THIRTY-FIVE years ago there began a struggle, the extent of which was at the time beyond the vision of the principal participants. William Cadbury, Henry Nevinson, Joseph Burt, St. Loe Strachey and their colleagues could not have anticipated the triumphant success which was destined to reward their devoted efforts—a triumph which became possible by the creation of the League of Nations and its International Labour Organisation. Along the years 1905-10, William Cadbury, Joseph Burt, Henry Nevinson, and others, were wandering about Western Africa gathering material, the publication of which it was hoped would lead to the reform of systems of contract labour, which had gathered to themselves so many abuses that they differed but little, if at all, from plantation slavery. In due course publicity came, and was relatively effectual, for it brought with it the issue of several official White Papers, and, of course, in its train, the usual world-wide abuse of all those who had dared to draw aside the veil and expose to public view the hideous drama behind the scenes.

But this exposure of Portuguese and other "Contract" labour did something else; it caused Governments to examine very critically their own system of native contract labour, the most extensive of which was British Asiatic labour, under which thousands of Indian coolies were being contracted for tropical and sub-tropical Dependencies. To Lord Sanderson and a committee of seven persons the task was in 1909 entrusted by Lord Crewe, and the Report was issued in 1910.

The Portuguese system, as a Portuguese Foreign Minister admitted, showed that the workers were secured by means which amounted to crude slave trading. A missionary, Mr. Charles Swann, was invited by Mr. Cadbury in 1908 to visit Angola, and make a thorough inquiry. Mr. Swann brought back with him overwhelming evidence of slavery, and a declaration signed by the missionaries of one English and two American societies. These missionaries confirmed the reports that "the natives have been bought and sold . . . and still continue to be bought and sold . . . that many thousands of these natives have been . . . exported to the islands of S. Thome and Principe under so-called 'contract' system."

The contracts were supposed to be of five years' duration, then the labourer was to be repatriated, carrying with him to his African home his accrued balance of wages. But, as Mr. Burt said in his Report, "in practice no repatriation of the labourer from Angola ever takes place; he never returns to the mainland. Once in S. Thome or Principe he remains there till death." Mr. Cadbury stated that ten natives were repatriated to the mainland on December 14th, 1908, and that these were the first ever allowed to return of the thousands shipped to the islands during probably the preceding fifty years.

The conditions on many of the plantations on the islands were appalling. Henry Nevinson, describing one of his visits to a plantation, said: "All looked as perfect and legal as an English industrial school. Then we sat down to an exquisite Parisian *dejeuner* under the bower of a drooping tree, and while I was meditating on the hardships of African travel, a saying of another of the guests kept coming back to my mind: 'The Portuguese are certainly doing a marvellous work for Angola and these islands. Call it slavery if you like. Names and systems don't matter. The sum of human happiness is being infinitely increased.' The doctor had come up to pay his official visit to the plantation that day. 'The death-rate on this *roça*,' he remarked, casually, during the meal, 'is 12 or 14 per cent. a year among the *serviçaes*.' 'And what is the chief cause?' I asked. 'Anæmia,' he said. 'That is a vague sort of thing,' I answered; 'what brings on anæmia?' 'Unhappiness (*tristeza*),' he said frankly.

If it was felt that British official criticism, to have its full force, required that Britain should enter the coming controversy with hands as clean as the Government could make them, hence the appointment of a Commission under Lord Sanderson, with terms of reference which provided scope for probing every aspect of Indian contract labour. Although there was little approaching slavery in the system, it was found to be so full of ugly features that with the publication of Lord Sanderson's Report it was at once clear that the whole system was doomed.

A good deal was made of the relative advantages to the coolies of settling in the Dependencies, as compared with continuing half-starved lives in densely populated areas of India, and no impartial student of the mass of literature on

the subject can doubt that there was validity in this argument. But the methods of recruitment, the terms of the contracts, and the treatment of the coolies on the plantations, disclosed to the Sanderson Commission a state of affairs which public opinion would not tolerate in any British Colonial territory. An official of the Indian Government described the recruiters as "the worst kind of men they could possibly have -- and they are paid by results." A witness brought by the Government from Trinidad said that the terms of contract were misrepresented to the coolies in India, who were led to believe "that if they buy a piece of land, and they just dig it, they will find gold, and things of that kind." Sir Selwyn Fremantle, commenting upon the evidence of one witness, said: "And therefore . . . the recruiter who tells the most lies gets the most coolies."

The contracts were highly objectionable partly because of a duration of five years, which by a system of "tasking" worked out much longer. The infliction of criminal penalties was severely criticised by Lord Sanderson: "There is, however, one unsatisfactory feature of indentured immigration which is at least as prominent in this as in any of the other Colonies, and that is the extent to which the employers resort to the criminal courts in order to enforce the fulfilment by the immigrants of their statutory obligations." The attitude of local officials to penal sanctions was illustrated in the reply of a witness to Sir G. Robertson. Asked what he did when a planter complained, this official replied:

I have them (the coolies) up; I talk to them and tell them, "That is what you are brought here for; you are breaking your contract." I say: "We will not stand any nonsense. You will either work for your pay on the estate, or you will work for Government for nothing in the gaol." He goes to gaol, and he does work for Government for nothing, and he comes back. He still demurs. Then we wait again, and we prosecute him again, and again he goes to gaol. The third time he comes back he starts to work on the estate.

During this period, other scandals were exposed which still further disturbed the public mind, more particularly those of the Congo and the Putumayo. Although these had but a remote relationship to contracted labour, they emphasised the need that existed for overhauling the treatment of native

labour conditions, but nothing could be done immediately owing to the outbreak of war in 1914.

Almost a library of books and pamphlets were written on the foregoing conditions as they obtained at the beginning of this century, and the short extracts of evidence are merely quoted to indicate the background to the reform work now accomplished. There may be disappointment in some quarters that more has not been achieved, but if there is to be criticism then the "yard stick" which measures the reform should also be used to measure the extent and tenacity of evils which had obtained for over a century. The general result of these disclosures made during 1905-13 was that the officials of more than one Government became convinced that the whole system of contract labour needed to be radically reformed, and secondly, that to be effectual it must be done by international action.

This then was the background behind the discussion and later the decisions of the Conference of Versailles, and thus it came about that the task was comparatively easy of getting into the Treaty of Versailles articles which opened the door to official international activity for the improvement of labour conditions for "native" workers. During the Conference at Versailles and at each stage since, the evidence gathered by the inquiry into Portuguese conditions and into that of contracted coolie labour has been invaluable; again and again during the preliminary discussions upon the proposed terms of the three Conventions, the data contained in these inquiries has been quoted in justification of proposed terms for the Conventions. The efforts made to fulfil the terms of the Treaty of Versailles fell automatically into two parts. First, Slavery and Mandate questions. These were allotted to the political section of the League of Nations, and the reform of native labour was given to the International Labour Organisation.

What was secured at Versailles?

First came Article 421 of the Treaty of Versailles, under which all Member States of the League of Nations are required to apply all ratified Conventions . . . "to their colonies, protectorates and possessions which are not fully self-governing."

Next, that:

"Each of the Members shall notify to the International

Labour Office the action taken in respect of each of its colonies, protectorates and possessions which are not fully self-governing."

Then came the Covenant of the League and Article 22, which provides that in all colonies and territories under mandate "the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant."

Finally, in Article 23, the Members "undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control."

The choice of M. Albert Thomas for the headship of the International Labour Organisation was a most fortunate one for those interested in native questions—his readiness to listen to suggestions, the wide knowledge he possessed of the problem, his moral courage in dealing with sluggard nations, showed that he was determined to deal vigorously with the question, and finally there was his wise choice of Mr. Harold Grimshaw as his right-hand man for the task.

A review of the whole field of abuses led to the adoption of a plan under which most of the abuses disclosed could be combated and probably abolished. The plan envisaged the abolition of Forced Labour under one Convention; under another the Reform of the whole recruiting system, and under a third Convention a new system of contract labour as between employers and workers. The first dealt with forced labour. It had been laid down repeatedly by eminent colonial statesmen that, whilst under well-defined conditions it was permissible to secure native labour by compulsion for certain essential public services designed for the common benefit of man, Labour was Slavery when it was secured by fraud or force in the interest and for the profit of private persons. Thus it came about that M. Albert Thomas and his colleagues commenced the work by framing the first Convention on Forced Labour. This Convention contains thirty-three Articles. The first group prohibits every form of forced labour for private profit, including such pernicious practices as convict leasing. It also includes a prohibition against granting any rights over labour to concessionaires. The second part of this Convention defines the only conditions under which compulsory labour may be exacted for public purposes, any

illegal exaction of forced labour being punishable as a penal offence. The central administrative authority is at all times responsible for the calling up of compulsory labour. This Convention is obligatory upon all States which have ratified it, and altogether to date nineteen States have ratified it and their ratifications have been registered at the League Secretariat. Another seven States have notified that their competent authorities have recommended ratification, making together twenty-six States.

The second Convention, covering Recruiting of native labourers contains thirty-two Articles and was adopted in 1936. This Convention deals first with the type of recruiters and of organisations to be given permits to recruit, then follow several Articles prohibiting the recruiting of minors and certain members of the family. A considerable section is devoted to conditions under which a licence to recruit can be granted by officials. The Convention places upon the employers responsibility for the health, transport and oversight of the workers. This Convention comes up for revision every ten years, and it has been ratified to date by three States and recommended for ratification by the competent authority of another four States, making seven, and thereby now comes into force.

These two International Conventions having been safely piloted to the International Statute Book the way then became clear in 1939 to bring to the Conference table the main instrument, namely, the actual contracts under which native labourers and employers, both immigrant and indigenous, would regularise their engagements. Although the Contracts Convention itself is of greater importance than its two junior relatives, it has fewer Articles, namely twenty-two, but it has an additional Convention on Penal Sanctions, containing three Articles, and also "Recommendations" for interpreting and applying the Convention running to the length of a CONTEMPORARY REVIEW article!

The Convention provides that all contracts shall be made before the competent authority; they must contain period of service, wages, nature of employment, conditions of repatriation—and finally, that the worker must be provided with a copy of the contract. The competent authority "shall cause summaries of regulations relating to contracts to be printed in language known to the workers and made available

to both workers and employers." The public officer before whom the contract is made must satisfy himself that no compulsion has been exercised, nor any fraud practised, and he must refuse attestation of any contract if he has any doubts about the "free consent" of the worker. The public officer must also refuse to sanction any contract involving minors.

The Convention deals firmly with the vexed question of repatriation. The worker can claim to be repatriated at the expense of the employer to his place of origin as a "right." The worker is also entitled to his expenses both for travelling and subsistence, and if for any reason the employer is unable to discharge his obligations, then the competent authority must accept liability. There may be exemption to this rule where the worker does not wish to be repatriated, or if he proposes to settle near his place of employment, or where termination of contract has been due to any fault of the employee. In the past, many abuses attached themselves to "re-engagement." The Convention lays it down that any such "re-contracts" should as a rule be shorter than the initial one, and before the second has been entered upon the worker must be given the opportunity of returning home for holiday at the employer's expense!

One of the most far-reaching sections of the Convention is that which deals with the employment of natives recruited from territory under one administration for service in areas under another Government. The attesting of contracts must be made before a public officer in the country of origin, and the competent authority must assume responsibility for any failure of the employer to carry out his obligations. In the event of the worker taking a contract in a territory in which the Convention does not run, then the public officer must satisfy himself as to conditions obtaining in the territory concerned before attesting a contract.

In the Convention itself, no rigid time is laid down as to period of contract; there are, however, several passages which in effect circumscribe periods, whilst the "Regulations" lay down principles which should govern period; these include distance from home, period of separation from family, cost of journey. Then there is the general recommendation that the period should always and everywhere be as short as possible and "in no case to exceed two years if unaccompanied by the family, or three years if so accompanied." All contracts

exceeding one year should provide the worker with a holiday of at least one week a year, with pay.

Two safeguards are attached which provide the International Body with a measure of guardianship; first an Inspectorate is recommended in each territory where contracts and recruiting are in operation; secondly, the Ratifying Power must each year submit an annual report to the Governing Body of the International Organ of the League.

Upon the public of each country there now rests the responsibility of seeing to it that its own Legislature without delay ratifies all three Conventions and gives instructions to all local administrators to apply legislation and direct administrative machinery towards a loyal application in the spirit and letter of the commitments accepted in the Conventions. If public opinion will play its part, if Governments decide to honour their own signatures, then there will begin in practice the greatest advance in native labour conditions which the world has witnessed since that day in 1833 when the British Parliament decided to abolish slavery.

JOHN HARRIS.

THE LATEST ALLY: TURKEY TO-DAY.

NO division is so well advertised as that of Right and Left, few adjectives are used so freely and applied so loosely as "fascist" and "red." But for those who still allow themselves the rather precarious luxury of not looking at the world through ideological spectacles the gulf which divides the two brands of Totalitarianism dwindles at times to the measure of a dry ditch when taken in comparison with the number of extraordinarily rich and varied resemblances which bind them together. Most of these resemblances have become commonplaces—the single hypnotic leader, the all-determining party, the bureaucratic machine, the state monopoly of press, radio and education, the policy of intimidation finely compounded of mass-suggestion and appalling brutality—but even in spheres where division is supposed to be most complete, a surprising family likeness can be made out. Germany has forged a state economy which bears no resemblance to the "monopoly capitalism" which Fascism—so we are told—was created to defend. In Russia, the national roots of an old and magnificent culture are being uncovered and the word "fatherland" has been restored to the headlines. Italy has her capital levies, her expropriations, her entirely class-free educational reforms; the Japanese state encroaches more and more upon the power of the old trusts; in Portugal a "fascist" Premier wins the approval of good Liberals by his orthodox finance. Is it possible, after all, that the comfortable simplification of using "fascist" and "communist" as all-embracing categories shares the fatal defect of all simplifications—that of masking the truth and serving as a substitute for thought?

Turkey is a salutary field of research for the slogan-minded. They find a dictatorship until recently controlled by a man of restless and dynamic genius, a country whose national pride is being fostered by every means at the state's disposal, whose outlook is profoundly militaristic, the army holding the place of honour in the community. They find a single party and a controlled press. They find an economy in which private enterprise is tolerated. With that they conclude—with some justification—that Turkey is a fascist state. But no stretch of the imagination can characterise Turkey as "fascist." There has never been any monopoly capitalism in Turkey,

only some foreign concessionaires and a handful of indigenous business men. There is no local armament industry. The army is supplied indiscriminately by Britain, Germany, Poland and Russia. And far from showing an interest in fighting, the Turkish Government shows a profound interest in peace. Either Fascism is something different, or else Turkey is not fascist.

Neither, however, can she be classed as Left Wing. It is true that her educational system is egalitarian, that she vies with Russia in emancipating her enslaved women, that the state owns and works a great part of the industrial system, that the Soviets were her earliest ally. But private enterprise is actively encouraged, the state's philosophy is fiercely and narrowly nationalist, many of the higher officials have not changed the liberal convictions of their pre-war education in the West and, which is after all entirely conclusive, the idea of class is condemned in the official party programme (in favour of the concept of the nation); Point 66 expressly states that "no association shall be founded in Turkey with the purpose of propagating ideas of class distinction or of class conflict." Here, then, we have a state neither Right Wing nor Left Wing, yet extraordinarily like both, in fact a species of common denominator. The interesting fact about Turkey is simply that she really seems to be a laboratory specimen of the typical modern state, the quintessence of a whole variety of trends which other states exhibit only in differing degrees of definition. Thus the Turkish body politic provides invaluable clues as to the nature of the slow-moving secular revolution which is carrying along separate regional revolutions on its broad surface.

In the first decades of this century the extraordinary development of research and scientific discovery, the breath-taking succession of new inventions, the impact on static societies of revolutionary changes in technique and power, created the need in every sphere of life for much more centralised control, for bigger units of government, for greater freedom of action and for a more scientific approach to the problems of production. The more backward the society, the more violent and convulsive was the effort it had to make to adapt itself to new conditions. The most typical reaction has been that of the modernising dictatorship, a system of government which can combine unity of plan with great freedom of

action and deal effectively with the lively opposition which all sudden innovations are bound to excite.

On the spiritual plane the changes encouraged a vast extension of the supremacy of the state and, with it, of the nation, upset traditional authority and belief and, by opening up apparently unlimited opportunities of expansion, created a secular and materialistic attitude towards life. Now the Turkish state which, according to its constitution, is "nationalist, populist, etatist, laic and revolutionary" is an epitome of all these tendencies, each word conveying a characteristic common to states in every quarter of the globe. Naturally the actual form of modernisation differs as between European and non-European states, for it is just the political and technical achievements of the West which initiated the modern revolution. In the West modernisation has been working on existing political habits and on an economic machine already complete. Non-western states have had to create and modernise at one blow—hence the relatively greater upheaval caused by their revolutions. But allowing for this difference, the surprising thing is the extent to which the final results—the adaptation of existing systems in Germany or Italy, the creation of entirely new ones in Russia or Iran or Turkey—resemble each other in structure and spirit.

The political structure of revolutionary Turkey follows familiar lines. The will of the nation has one mouthpiece only, the Republican People's Party. There are no electoral struggles in the constituencies, no Opposition in Parliament. The centre of authority is the President, who until November last, in the person of Kemal Atatürk, was the most extraordinary genius thrown up by the upheavals of the war and the peace. Government is entirely centralised and a growing bureaucracy has the task of directing, or at least of supervising, every aspect of the nation's life. All this, of course, is true to type, but the Turks give their system a flavour of its own. Turkey has been much influenced by French culture and there is something of the old "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" about their political outlook. There is no contempt for democracy as an effete and decadent philosophy, only an admission that until now the political training of the Turkish masses is not sufficiently advanced to introduce it. In 1931 Atatürk attempted to create an Opposition, but the experiment had to be abandoned after a few months since it became

a rallying point for the more extreme reactionaries. This year, however, has seen a renewal of the attempt when an Opposition bloc was formed in the Kamutay in May. It is difficult to see as yet what its special functions will be, for criticism is no new thing. Parliament has always discussed the measures placed before it by the Dictator, in this resembling the Italian Senate rather than the German Reichstag. Another particular characteristic of the Turkish system is that most of the officials are middle-aged. It follows that their revolutionary principles have more than a trace of pre-war Western liberalism and there is less hysteria and more common sense in Turkey than in many Totalitarian countries, a state of affairs encouraged by the fact that the revolution is twenty years old and has passed beyond the excitement and growing pains of extreme youth.

In this context it is interesting to speculate whether marked differences will follow Ismet İnönü's tenure of the Presidency. He was Atatürk's closest collaborator and there can be no question of a reversal of any previous policies. But temperamentally wide differences exist. It is said that he is more conservative than his great predecessor. It is probably nearer the truth that, in a country where all opposition comes from the side of conservatism, he is more tolerant of opinions other than his own. His reported sympathy for a certain encouragement of religion may be a boon for the Turks, for there are signs of some reaction against the crude materialism of the early days,* questioning and doubt among the younger people, heart-searchings among the elder officials and particularly among those connected with education as to the loss of spiritual values and the impoverishment not only of moral life but of the whole field of culture.

One change at least has been brought about by İnönü. These last six months have seen an attempt to raise the standard of political probity. A number of old parliamentary leaders have been deprived of office and something approaching a bloodless purge is going on in certain departments of state. The President faces a secular problem. Graft was an inseparable part of the pre-war Turkish system. Atatürk

* Part II (e) of the Party programme demands as the basis of administration "the needs of the world" and "the fundamentals and methods provided for modern civilisation by Science and Technique" and regards as an insurance against failure the separation of "ideas of religion from politics, from the affairs of the world and the State."

had the reputation of not inquiring too closely into an official's activities provided his work was done promptly and efficiently. But İnönü is asking more, and in the process a number of important changes have taken place (of which the most sweeping was the abolition of the state *Deniz* (Sea) Bank, established in 1937 to control practically all Turkey's maritime interests, the redivision of its work among existing ministries and the trial of its leading officials for corruption). The President has no light task ahead of him. It is difficult enough to disturb the customs of centuries. The rumour that the reform is to be combined with economy in the matter of salaries seems to make it virtually impossible.

Turkey's economics are as typical as her politics. As in Russia or Japan or Iran or Poland, her modernising revolution is based upon giving the country an industrial system. Like Germany or Poland or Russia, the Government is directing the economic process by a series of Four- and Five-year plans. But the Turks have given their system a character of its own, for which they coined the term "etatism." Etatism, however, is neither a philosophy of production like Communism nor a philosophy of aggressive militarism like *Wohlfahrtschaft*. It is not a philosophy at all. It is merely the most convenient way of getting the work done, a piece of common sense entirely in keeping with the Turks' shrewd realism. The policy of the Ottoman régime was to let the foreigner in and let him do the work. The Greeks and Armenians carried on the buying and selling. Practically all enterprise—from the coal-mines at Zonguldak to the electric light in Adana—was in the hands of foreign concessionaires. In other words, Turkey went through the typical nineteenth-century process of being stripped by non-Turkish capitalists. After the war the position was reversed. The War of Independence was fought to free Turkey from the foreigner and it had its economic front in the buying out and turning out of the concessionaires, a process barely liquidated to-day. (It was only in the early part of this year that Istanbul's tramways were bought by the municipality.)

But once the concessionaires had gone, who was to take their place? The industrialisation of the country stood as a first point in the revolutionary programme, but there were no private people to whom the task could be entrusted, no local capitalists, no local capital. Turkey adopted the only alternative, a state-financed, state-directed and state-operated

industrial system and inaugurated the new policy in 1924 when the *Iş* (Work) Bank was set up to finance and direct industry, its capital largely found by the state, its directors deputies, its staff civil servants. The next few years saw little progress. Politics were too uncertain, reforms too recent. There were minorities in revolt. There followed the economic crisis. But by 1933 the young state felt stable enough to embark on a really systematic programme of development and a Five-year Plan was elaborated in that year, followed in 1937 by a Three-year Plan. The experiment of the *Iş* Bank had worked well enough to be repeated. The *Sümer* (Sumerian) Bank took charge of the first plan which was concerned with the production of consumers' goods—with textile and paper plants, mills, breweries and refineries. The *Eti* (Hittite) Bank controls the Second Plan which is designed to give Turkey the backbone of her economic system—heavy industry. Practically all the mining and metallurgical ventures in Turkey are controlled by the Bank which works in collaboration with two other state institutes, one for research into Turkey's mineral reserves, the other for working out schemes of electrification. Apart from her four most important minerals—coal, chrome, copper and iron ore—Turkey already produces lead, zinc, molybdenum, antimony, manganese, magnesite, lignite, sulphur and cement, a list which gives an idea of the riches of this undeveloped country whose surface until now has barely been scratched.

The *Eti* Bank's record with the principal minerals is encouraging. In one year it increased the country's production of chrome from 150,500 to 213,630 tons, which meant a growth in exports valued at over 2 million Turkish lire. The copper mines at Ergani (among the richest in the world) are being provided with new plant which will double their output and, combined with the copper from Kavarshan and Murgul, raise Turkey's annual output to about 20,000 tons. The most important coal seams lie near the Black Sea coast at Zonguldak. The Bank completed the task of buying out foreign concessionaires last year and already controls 40 per cent. of the basin's productive capacity. Its present programme includes a plan for the electrification of the whole area, a vast contract which will probably go out to tender in the course of the summer. The *Eti* Bank is also responsible for Turkey's first steelworks, which a British firm, Brasserts, has built for

the Government at Karabük. This side of the Plan is more doubtful of success. The site was chosen for strategic reasons far from a port and sufficiently far from Zonguldak whence the coal for coking is to come. Experts on the spot doubt the coking qualities of the coal and a stroke of ill-luck was the discovery, a thousand kilometres away at Divrik, of important reserves of iron ore when the steelworks were already half completed. Steel will certainly be produced, but it might be cheaper to use platinum.

Turkey's economic progress is hampered by a variety of causes, some of them inseparable from a young community embarking on industrialisation, others accidents of her geographical position and of the policy of her great neighbours. Among indigenous causes severe lack of capital is the first which, coupled with her natural determination not to be dependent upon foreign loans (as distinct from credits), tends to clip the wings of any really ambitious scheme of development. Another is the position of the peasantry. In a population of nearly 17 millions, 70 to 80 per cent. are agriculturalists. Turkey is fortunate in having no problem of land shortage and in spite of a rapidly increasing population will not have one for forty years to come. But the standard of living of the peasants is so low and their farming methods are so primitive that they neither produce for the market nor buy industrial goods from it. What Turkey needs is a big stable internal market, but considerably more will have to be done to improve the peasants' condition before it can be achieved. A great deal of work goes on in rural education. Model farms and plant stations have been set up and a system of training reliable N.C.O.s in animal husbandry, vegetable and tree planting, sowing, ploughing, building and rough plumbing before sending them back to their villages, is giving valuable results. But the peasants get neither the subsidies nor the attention which are given to industry—another characteristic which Turkey shares with every young country in the process of industrialisation.

Turkey's greatest external difficulty lies in the sphere of foreign trade. The economic crisis played havoc with her exports, which fell from 155,214,071 Turkish lire to 96,161,855 Turkish lire between 1929 and 1933. With stocks of unsalable produce (tobacco, fruit, cereals, nuts) she welcomed Germany's buying drive in 1934 and 1935 and by 1936 was sending over

50 per cent. of her exports to Germany and taking from her 45 per cent. of her imports. A cry of alarm was raised and in 1937 an attempt was made to reduce the proportion. Then Turkey discovered the insecurity of her position. Germany had offered prices well above the world market price. The effect had been to inflate Turkey's price level until her own goods were unsalable in any free market. Moreover, Germany had bought much more than she sold and Turkey could not afford to forgo her accumulated frozen balances in Germany. She had to continue to trade with her powerful partner or risk an economic loss she could not hope to sustain. By 1939 (following the absorption of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia) the percentage of Turkey's foreign trade with Germany was almost back to its old figure (46 per cent. of her exports and 50 per cent. of her imports). Since Turkey's share in Germany's total trade counts for only 1·8 per cent., Turkey's extreme dependence is all too clear. Germany could close her market to Turkey without feeling it, but if she did Turkey would be virtually ruined.

Apart from this obvious disadvantage, Turkey's economy is jeopardised in a more subtle way. Germany's aim in her *Lebensraum* is to create a ring of primary producing states feeding the vast industrial machine of the Reich with raw materials and receiving manufactured goods in return. In fact, her attitude towards her smaller neighbours is that of Great Britain to her colonial empire in the age of Mercantilism. But Turkey has no desire for "colonial" status. The political motive underlying industrialisation is her determination to achieve full national independence. Her real need is for trade with highly industrialised countries which are prepared to foster, not retard, her own industrialisation, which have capital to spare to help her with the installation of new plant, and whose markets and currencies are uncontrolled so that she is allowed complete freedom in her choice of imports. In other words, Turkey wants to increase her commerce with the West.

The percentages of this country's trade with Turkey tell their own sorry tale. In 1929 we took 9·63 of Turkey's exports and provided 12·23 of her imports. By 1936 our share had fallen to 5·39 of the exports and 6·88 of the imports. Turkey's attempt in 1937 to find non-German markets for her goods increased the percentage to 7·08. Imports

remained stationary. In 1938 Turkey gave further evidence of her goodwill by almost doubling her purchases from Great Britain under the new Clearing Agreement. Great Britain replied by allowing her purchases to fall to the lowest point on record. Last year we accounted for only 3.4 per cent. of Turkey's exports. The inevitable result was a complete blockage in the Clearing account. England has over 11 million Turkish lire to her credit and practically all commerce has ceased. The £16 million credit of last year makes no difference, for the commercial credits are already earmarked and the Government credit only touches armaments. Besides, credits make no difference to the fundamental difficulty, that if we do not buy from Turkey she cannot sell to us and, therefore, cannot break an economic dependence on Germany which might be fatal in time of war.

There is nothing intrinsically impossible about the exchange. We could supply everything Germany is supplying to-day. We are a nation of smokers and fruit eaters. Turkey's tobacco, her figs and plums and raisins could find a ready market here. A start might well be made with tobacco. Adding 1 per cent. of Turkish tobacco to our common blends and reducing our Virginian purchases by a mere 5 per cent. would practically solve the problem. Unfortunately the British tobacco companies are not interested and our Government lacks either the power or the initiative to bring pressure to bear. It is thus that we hope to compete with the vast state-controlled economy of the German Reich, even when a serious political objective is at stake.

Turkey's economic dependence should not be underestimated. The Turks do not under-estimate it themselves, but they expect a little positive goodwill on our part now that they have taken the courageous, almost foolhardy, step of joining a Peace Front designed to check the ambitions of their largest customer. Few countries could give greater assistance in building up a strong modernised Turkey than we. We have the experience, the technical skill, the capital. We have no territorial ambitions or predatory tendencies. Turkey is not part of our *Lebensraum*. And in return for our help a young, vigorous and expanding Power would make its weight felt on the side of peace in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

BARBARA WARD.

THE GERMAN ARMY—THE NAZIS' FAVOURITE CHILD.

WHEN in Germany military service became compulsory again people embraced each other in the streets. This outburst of joy was caused not only by the pride at the breaking of what were called "the chains of the Versailles Treaty," but also by the sincere desire of the people to have an army. The German loves a uniform and the uniform he likes the best is a military one.

The new German Army built up under the Nazi régime should be a Nazi Army. But is it a Nazi Army? Let us begin with the officer corps. It is an easy job to create out of nothing *Standartenfuehrer*, *Obergruppenfuehrer* and all the other leaders of the Party organisations; but this cannot be done with a corps of officers. It became inevitable, therefore, to fall back upon the old officers when building up the new Army. But these officers were far from being 100 per cent. National-Socialists. Furthermore, as the selection and training of the new generation of officers lay in the hands of old army men it is not difficult to realise that the officer corps cannot possibly be so thoroughly National-Socialist as the Government would like to see it. So everything has to be done to keep the Army in good mood and in fact there is no other class in Germany which is treated in the same careful manner and is enjoying similar consideration.

The officer corps takes this preferential treatment with affable condescension. Experience it one morning waiting in the housekeeper's lodge at the Berlin War Academy and you will be a witness of a rather peculiar ceremony: without a single exception all the officers coming to attend the courses will say "Good morning" whilst the housekeeper will lift his right arm and say "*Heil Hitler!*" according to instructions. You will soon get the impression that the "*Heil Hitler*" exists only for the "*misera plebs*," whilst the "higher classes," to which the officer of course belongs, are allowed to carry on with their old familiar greeting. In their relations among themselves little is to be seen of the much-advertised "levelling of National-Socialist ideas." The different Services look down upon each other much in the same way as they did in the good old days of Imperial Germany. The Air Force despises the Army, and in the Army the cavalry despises the

artillery, the artillery the infantry, the mechanised troops the non-mechanised ones, and so on.

Aristocrats are to be found both among the regular Army and in the reserve. In the barracks office I once had the opportunity of reading a two-page circular issued by the *Kommandeur* and dealing entirely with the question how two officers of the reserve (one being a duke and the other a prince) should be addressed on and off duty by superiors and inferiors. Most assuredly these regulations did not show the slightest trace of a National Socialist spirit; on the contrary the remarks made by the men in the office (small badly-paid civilian officials) could as well have been spoken in Soviet Russia.

In these circumstances there is nothing astonishing in the fact that young convinced National Socialists, called to the colours, full of enthusiasm and with the aim of becoming an officer, do not find things quite as they expected and often withdraw. I knew of one young man who was from the National point of view an excellent German—healthy, athletic, bright, reasonably intelligent and inspired with high ideals. He became an ensign in the Army (last degree before the lieutenant), then the spirit of caste became so unpleasant to his National-Socialist ideals that one day he made his appearance at the *Reichsjugendführung* (Leadership of the Youth Movement) in full dress with sabre and spurs. There he was heartily welcomed. He changed his beautiful uniform for the blue overall of the youngsters (*Jungfelle*) and the elegant breeches for short trousers and bare knees. Up to now he has not regretted the change for he became *Jungbannführer* within a very short time and 6,000 youngsters paraded before him. In the Army he would have had to wait a lifetime for similar advancement.

And the contrary case: for reasons of organisation a young paymaster was shifted for one year to the National-Socialist Motor Corps (N.S.K.K.). I shall never forget his terrified face when I asked him if he would keep his military uniform or exchange it for the brown shirt of the N.S.K.K. "I shall of course keep the uniform of the Army," he replied. These examples are typical and show how distinct the officer corps and Party really are. There is a gap between them which cannot be filled, for the Party organisations are not taken seriously by the officers.

How about the non-commissioned officers? Those who wish to become professional soldiers have to contract for twelve years' service. During his last years the N.C.O. is sent to school to train for the Civil Service, which is to be his occupation after his discharge. During the twelfth year duty ceases and the N.C.O. only attends these courses and his career in civil life will depend upon the results of an examination held at the end of that year. He also can be paid out if he wishes and start business. Have a talk with such an N.C.O. just at the end of his twelve years' period and ask him about his plans and wishes! You will be amazed to find that his ideal is a small job in the municipality of a provincial town, with short hours and plenty of leisure; furthermore, a small house and a garden—the ideals of the "retired" man! But these men are between 30 and 40 and in the prime of life. After twelve years' service with the German Army they have very little strength and energy to start on their own. After twelve years of obeying orders and very hard work, they are unable and unwilling to enter the normal competitive struggle, but prefer to become officials, law-abiding and obedient, having long since ceased to think effectively for themselves.

Many of the N.C.O.s of the regular Army have been seriously misled in the last few years, for they contracted to serve for twelve years at a time when the German Army had only 100,000 men and even a corporal played a rôle of his own. Nowadays things have totally changed, for every reasonably intelligent young man can be a corporal of the reserve after two years' service and the professional soldier naturally regards this as prejudicial treatment. These bored, dull citizens with a cottage and garden as their ideal, are certainly not "fighters" in Hitler's sense. No, they are thoroughly unpolitical and not interested at all in party matters. Should the attempt be made by the Army to change the political leadership of Germany it can be taken for granted that the non-commissioned officers would blindly carry out every command whether those commands were for or against the Nazis.

The ordinary soldier more truly represents the spirit of German youth to-day; and on him depends the future of the Third Reich. The young man will usually be commencing his two years' military service at an average age of 20 years and has already been for several years a member of the Hitler

Youth and in a Labour camp for six months. Both are Party organisations, and the youngster is therefore saturated with National-Socialist ideas. In consequence he is either an enthusiastic Nazi or—and this is the case in general—he is bored stiff with the whole business. The military training does little to alter this mental state. In spite of the fact that the military service usually follows directly on to the Labour service (where the young man is also subject to a half military drill), the first weeks under the colours are physically exhausting to the recruit and there is little or no strength left for “political conviction.” And once the six weeks are over, all his thoughts are centred on his daily duties, and all his wishes and ambitions are concentrated on the aim of obtaining the maximum results, in order to please his superiors. He feels himself as soldier, soldier, soldier and nothing else—and grows to be proud of it.

But what a tremendous difference compared with the Labour service that he has just left! Primitive lodgings and a Spartan catering against the luxurious barracks and varied food of the Army. A thoroughly disgraceful, badly fitting uniform in the Labour service, but here a beautiful tunic. He has been used to coarse, uneducated leaders: and in their place he finds the smart, imposing officers of the regular Army. In fact, everything is done to make military service as comfortable as possible, and the older generation of soldiers can be heard grumbling about “nursing the Army” and that in their time food and lodging were very different from to-day. From end to end of Germany the huge, imposing barracks are to be seen which, apart from the “*Reichsautobahnen*,” are the most striking monuments to the Third Reich’s building efficiency. Compared with pre-war barracks the new buildings are more cheerful to look at. No more useless ornaments and towers that seemed like great fortresses, but buildings with a simple exterior, admirably fitted for the purpose they are to serve and with innumerable windows through which light, air and sun can pass freely. The soldiers’ rooms are bright, the walls painted in light colours, with curtains at the windows, and the barracks have hot water in the numerous washing-rooms, shower-baths and central heating.

Much money has also been spent on beautifying the grounds. I remember a certain barracks built on sandy soil when 30,000 marks (£1,500) was spent on lawns and trees alone.

Roses and enormous rhododendrons often complete the garden layout of the barrack courtyards. The barracks house between 500 and 1,200 soldiers, and when it is remembered that in the case of the mechanised troops the cars have to be garaged as well, it is easy to imagine what an enormous area must be provided. Admirable roads lead across the vast grounds, past garages, engine halls and workshops, round to the gigantic kitchens and comfortably furnished dining-halls and canteens, where chairs in bright colours suggest a pleasant restaurant rather than a barracks. In general, it seems a little overdone and naturally everyone, seeing such splendour, asks: “Where does all the money come from?” And usually they will receive the whispered answer: “From the Winter Relief Funds.”

The building of new barracks is still far from finished, although the speed of construction has been slowed down, and barracks which should have been ready in May last year are still unoccupied. The reason for this is the lack of raw material in Germany. The provision of radiators for the central heating system, for example, became a serious problem and rumours were circulating that in the future the old-fashioned stoves would make their reappearance “for reasons of health.” But apart from this there is a shortage of such things as latches, windows, varnish, timber, cement and, of course, labourers. A long time before the September crisis the buildings were deserted, for all the labourers had been brought to the West of Germany to build the famous *Siegfriedlinie* against France. In the west miles and miles of roads and railways were congested with traffic carrying materials for the fortification and for months there has been little or no cement for private buildings, and, of course, the military buildings have shared the same fate.

The equipment of the barrack kitchens has been carefully attended to, and the most extravagant kitchens and refrigerator stores are to be found everywhere. The problem of catering is taken so seriously that a special department of the War Office was created to deal with it from a scientific point of view. The original idea was to change the rather monotonous bill of fare to one based on the modern food theories (vitamins, calories, etc.). Demonstration kitchens were installed and model menus prepared, but with the growing food shortage in the Third Reich this task could not be completed and at present the department is mainly concerned with propaganda

and concentrates on directing Army consumption into the desired channels: thus if there is plenty of cabbage, they declare cabbage to be a most healthy food and various recipes, all employing cabbage, are issued; if fish is easily available the entire Army has to eat fish twice a week. Once there was an abundance of prawns; very quickly came the order to serve prawns once a month!

The control of consumption as well as the repeated crises, which make it necessary to create large reserves of foodstuffs, often lead to considerable confusion in the orders that are received from day to day. Once it happened that for a long period all the Army catering offices refused to buy rice on the grounds that it was "imported." But just before the Austrian crisis the Army Administration purchased huge quantities of rice, mainly from Japan, which when the danger was over was distributed to the troops. The rice had to be eaten up, the poor soldiers got rice food in every possible form. But in the Third Reich nobody cares for such inconsequences. Memories are short; or at least it pays to have a short memory.

The Army Administration and the separate Army units who purchase their own food supplies do so with little regard for the population as a whole, and this is the reason for the many food shortages from which the German housewife suffers. In one case the market was flooded with fresh tomatoes for several days. This pleased the housewife, but before she could lay in a stock, those supplies had completely disappeared again! The same happens with fruit, vegetables, meat—all these things are wanted to make preserves for the Army. At a time when eggs were terribly scarce I happened to be in one barracks when boxes and boxes of eggs were delivered: that day every man—1,200 of them—had spinach and two eggs for dinner. The shortage of butter which is now a permanent feature in the Third Reich does not apply to the Army. Every soldier gets more than 2 oz. of butter daily with his bread, whereas the civil population does not even receive 1 oz. for eating and cooking purposes. The soldier's daily menu is something like this: coffee, bread, butter, marmalade for breakfast; soup, meat, vegetables, 2 lb. potatoes or in place of the soup compote or a sweet dish for dinner; tea, bread, butter, with sausages or sardines or cheese for supper. Meat at least five times a week, and on the other days fish or vegetables.

The regulations of the Army Administration are not always strictly observed. Commander, doctor and paymaster still remain quite independent and they usually take the individual inclinations of their men into consideration. Thus the troops in South Germany refused to eat the large quantities of prawns they were sent by the Army Headquarters, but called them "earthworms" and the whole lot were thrown away. On the other hand the North Germans declined the rice and asked for their 2 lb. of potatoes. Tinned soups hoarded by the Army Administration and distributed at regular intervals are also most unpopular. Many paymasters give them away to the Winter-Help, thus completing the circle in a grotesque way. The money which comes from the Winter Relief Funds finds its way back in another form, but such a procedure is economically very wasteful. "Our forces have a hard duty to perform and therefore need the best food." This is the excuse given for any extravagance.

The arduousness of the duty is nowadays due to the very extensive athletic activities and the young man who is not gifted at sports has a terrible life in the Army. Drilling, exercising and practising the most exhausting German "march-past" also play a considerable rôle; but apart from this gymnastics, handball, running and—during the warm season—swimming are carried on daily. Some mechanised troops do "stunt" riding for which not every young man is suited. In the barracks of a motorcycle corps to which I was a regular visitor, I have either been witness of an accident or at least heard of one which had just happened every time I was there. (In spite of this fact the young German, given a free choice, prefers the mechanised troops, for all mechanical things are very attractive to the youth of to-day and, furthermore, the military technical training proves very valuable to the soldier when he re-enters civil life.) I often heard from medical quarters that the troops' physical condition is not as good as it appears to be. The youth now being called to the colours was born during and immediately after the war, and shows signs of having suffered from defective nutrition in childhood. The endurance of those young men who are so marvellous to look at is said to be rather poor and many fatal accidents (about 200 were rumoured), which occurred during the annexation of Austria, were caused chiefly by exhaustion and falling asleep when driving.

The treatment of the soldier by his superiors is in general quite good. The previous "*zu Befehl*" (at your order) has been changed to "yes" and in practice the soldier has to reply "yes" to everything that is said to him. His own wishes, as far as he is allowed to express them, take the form of "I beg to be allowed to . . ." The complete physical and spiritual submission upon which every army must insist in a certain degree is in no way calculated to keep the National-Socialist spirit alive. Membership of the Party is suspended during military service and the young soldier lives in a world quite of his own. The State, however, does everything to create a strong link between the civil population and the Army. One Sunday a month every German is supposed to eat a cheap meal and to give the surplus to the Winter Relief. On this Sunday the troops come with their *Gulaschguns* (camp kettles) selling a "one-pot-meal." No big show of the "Strength-through-Joy" Organisation is complete without its Army contingent. Once a year all the barracks are opened to the public whose entrance fees go to the Winter-Help, and each guest is allowed to eat a meal, ride on horseback and to shoot—a kind of a fair with the Army as circus owner! In fact there can be no doubt about the tremendous popularity of the German Army to-day.

Whilst the civil population is proud of the new Army and ready to make sacrifices in order that it may be built up and maintained, the soldier himself considers every man who does not wear a military uniform as a "shabby civilian." He takes for granted all the sacrifices made in his favour, but how far is he himself prepared to make similar sacrifices? The Czechoslovakian crisis provided an interesting trial and—to the surprise of most—the German soldier did not show the slightest desire to go to war. Of this there cannot be the slightest doubt, for after five years of National-Socialist drill and Dr. Goebbels' tremendous propaganda it was still not possible—and this to the honour of the German youth—to persuade the German soldier that he had to sacrifice his life in order to free his "Bohemian brothers" who were, in fact, totally indifferent to him. I was at one new barracks the day before the troops should leave, and long columns of lorries were ready to start for an "unknown destination." Small groups of infantry, silent without the usual lusty singing, awaited orders. An N.C.O. that I knew came up. Weeks before

I had met him beaming with pride, but now he was pale. "We have all been induced to get a family and now I must bid them good-bye," he said softly, as we shook hands.

No, there was certainly no war enthusiasm, and it is questionable if this Army, with its brilliant outward appearance, would be prepared to give of its best in case of an emergency. At the top an officer class, the majority of whom are indifferent, if not even hostile, towards the National-Socialist leaders. A corps of non-commissioned officers with little initiative and no inspiration to carry out commands, but most likely quite as ready to succumb to pressure from below. Young soldiers perfectly willing to lead the comfortable life but not in the least prepared to die as heroes, and—in the case of war—the mobilised reserve would have to be drawn from all classes of the nation. "They should give us a gun—and we shall know what to shoot at" was often heard during the September crisis. Taken as a whole they were not in the mood in which battles are successfully fought, and the story then circulating was profoundly right. Adolf Hitler asks his Commanders-in-Chief: "Our ammunition will be sufficient for how long?" "My leader, for two years!" "And food is enough for . . .?" "My leader, two months!" "And the spirit of the troops?" "My leader, two days!"

In spite of the fact that the German Army is far from being "National-Socialist," the optimistic belief that they will force a change in the régime is quite wrong, for their position to-day is too favourable to induce a violent change. It is obvious, however, that the building of barracks is falling off and despite all the efforts which are being made to improve military catering, the general food situation is affecting the Army as well. The factories making uniform cloth have been instructed—after some hesitation—to use no more pure cotton. No one is permitted to mention the serious effects that are following the use of substitutes in technical equipment generally. If no way is found to improve the German economic situation the Army is bound to be handicapped in comparison with the armies of other nations. But this will take a long time, and meanwhile "National-Socialist" leaders will call for the greatest possible sacrifices in order to keep the loyalty of their most dangerous child.

FRITZ KURZ.

EL GRECO'S LEGEND IN HIS NATIVE
CRETE.

THE LEGEND.

KYRA MARGI, the old village story-teller, relates to her neighbour Kyra Rinoula the legend of El Greco, as it is recorded, we are told, in one of the popular tales of his own native village, Fodele, near Candia, in Crete.

"Once upon a time, my dear," Kyra Margi began, "when the fate of Christendom looked very dark and almost hopeless, a gang of bandits, coming from far over the sea, landed here, on the very soil of our beloved Crete. They plundered and ravaged every village throughout the country. Such men and women who escaped the deadly daggers of the murderers continued to tell for many years afterwards the tale of the unspeakable disaster which in this dark hour befell them and their lovely but unhappy country. It is said that the bandits carried away as slaves handsome young men, lissom and slender as the cypresses down yonder, and pretty girls, fresh as the pure clear waters of our mountain streams. They took them on board their accursed ships and sailed at once for the world from which there is no return, in order to sell them, these handsome lads and pretty girls, in such markets where people used to buy human beings—and shame to them, Kyra Rinoula!

"Among those carried away there was a young boy who was kept alive only by chance. They intended to murder him, but one of the robbers, less inhuman than his companions, pitied the boy and took charge of him. When the bandits reached the place for selling the slaves, the boy was bought by a rich man who entrusted him to graze his goats (*N.B.* Kyra Margi used for them the ancient Greek word: *αἴγες*). The boy came from the village of Fodele, close to our Rogeia, and his name was . . . what was it? . . . The other day I heard it from Yanni. . . . Yes! . . . his name was Theotocopoulo.* . . . Yes! that is the name that Yanni, who knows everything, mentioned to me some time ago. He must have heard it from his great-grandmother, now nearing her hundredth year—but I think that she conceals her age, the coquettish

* In Modern Greek *θεοτοκόπουλο* may be translated as the child of Theotokos (the Holy Virgin).

woman she is!" (Kyra Rinoula guffawed loudly at the joke.)

"The new master of the boy soon took a liking for him, because he was so nice and so punctual in taking and carrying out orders. He pastured his master's flock, carefully looking after the goats. Instead of chasing birds and cicadas, the lad was drawing on fragments of pottery and stones. One day his master happened to see the drawings and realised at once that the boy was endowed by birth with some rare gift. So he left him free to do according to his bent.

"Time went on and the Cretan boy progressed in drawing and painting. In the town where his master lived more and more was heard about him, and the master, seeing how clever and industrious and honest the boy was, and as he himself was childless, adopted him. Seeing the drawings and pictures of the lad, other painters became jealous of him and said that he was mad and that his pictures, with their slender and elongated design, were much short of the beauty of their own. The Cretan, however, did not reply to these wicked people. He worked hard in his workshop and paid no attention to their idle gossip. The more his enemies worked and talked against him in their envy and ill will, the more his fame spread throughout the world. The King of the country where the Cretan young man lived took him in great esteem and honoured him. He grew then to be one of the most reputed men of his time. Everyone except his enemies loved and appreciated him. Thus he fulfilled what God assigned to him to do for his own glory and for that of his native country, our beloved Crete, and his own village, the lovely Fodele, yonder. He remembered always his origin and the place where he was born and lived as a little child and a young boy, but old enough though, when he was taken away, to remember it all. He would dream of the lovely gardens, where he used to gather violets and roses and all our Cretan flowers. He never forgot his Island. All his pictures, which now adorn churches and palaces abroad, are signed in our language. I understand the Christian name and the surname, although here in the island it was not called *Δομένικος*, but *Κυριακος*, Kyr Yanni said it is the same name, only the Franks changed the word into their own language, for their own ends and aims. They change everything in the same manner, Kyr Yanni says. As for the final

word *'aporia'* what does it mean, Kyra Rinoula? Probably a foreign word too, added to his Greek name, as the pictures were to be hung in foreign Frankish churches and palaces, the like of which we don't see here, Kyra Rinoula, you or I, and we will never see. Kyr Yanni, when he journeyed to a far country called Venetia, told me that he saw many of them, built in marble and gold. There were perhaps, in old times, some like them here, in Crete, but the accursed earthquakes, which, let us pray, are far from us, destroyed them, and it is said that they are buried now deep underground."

Kyra Rinoula listened with excited interest to the story. "But Domenicos—let us call him so!—is he buried in a foreign land? Then his beautiful soul must wander now, lonely and sad, around here," Kyra Rinoula interrupted.

"It might have been so. But years and years ago, after God recalled him," Kyra Margi pursued, "and Domenicos had taken his place among the saints (and let us have his blessing!), some of his countrymen found his grave abroad, exhumed his bones and buried them here, near the Church. Flowers bloomed around the tomb, and the whole place smelt lovely, until with the time, and perhaps with another accursed earthquake, the grave disappeared. Only some flowers continue to bloom on the spot and perfume the air. Even the great-grandmother of Yanni cannot remember the place of the grave."

"So," Kyra Rinoula remarked, "Theotocopoulos became a saint?" "And why not, Kyra Rinoula?" Kyra Margi replied in angry tone. "Don't you believe it?" "I believe it, I believe it, good friend, and I bow to his grace. Blessed be his name and his blessing be upon us, the sinners."

Both women made the sign of the cross, looking towards the supposed place of the grave, which was unknown even to the great-grandmother of Kyr Yanni.

This is approximately the tale by Manoli Dermitzaki, the village poet and story-teller, as it was printed in Candia in the Cretan dialect, in which are found some words of the classical Greek in an unaltered grammatical form. Although I adapted it with a respectful accuracy, I cannot conceal having introduced some slight alterations in the text, not out of the spirit of the popular legend recorded in it. What I missed perhaps is the rendering of the colourful dialect of the original.

THE NOTES.

Such is the legend and such the story in which it is recorded. History is more prosaic as befits itself. It teaches us that the artist, born in Crete and adopted by Spain, leaving his native island in circumstances similar, perhaps, to those recorded by the legend, went to Toledo after passing through Venice and Rome, in the glories of which he matured his talent and enriched his natural gift. Felix Paravicino, who as Gongora, has written some sonnets in praise of the "Cretan," as the artist himself used to sign some of his pictures, recalls in two instances his origin. More precisely, Giulio Clovio, the protector of Greco during his stay in Rome (where it seems that the artist in a kind of youthful boastfulness, claimed that he would be able to repaint, and better repaint, the frescoes of the Cappella Sistina) commended him to Cardinal Alessandro Farnese as a young native of Candia and a pupil of Titian. Greco, having served as interpreter at Toledo before the Tribunal of Inquisition, signed a document, dated May 1585, as Dominico Teotocopoli [*sic*] "native of the City of Candia, a painter residing in this City (Toledo), etc." It is admitted by many of his biographers that Greco remained long enough in his country to assimilate its culture and tradition. The inventory of his library, it is added, proved that he continued to read Greek with predilection. On the other hand, to serve as interpreter before the Courts in a lawsuit in which a Greek was involved, constitutes a decisive proof of his good knowledge of Greek. As it is generally admitted now, he was born at the village of Fodele (mentioned in Kyra Margi's tale) situated near the capital, Candia, at which the tourist now lands for visiting the marvels of Cnossos, excavated by Sir Arthur Evans. A Greek biographer of Theotocopoulos, Mr. A. Kyrou, claims that he has established this fact, on the basis of oral tradition and even written evidence. The present Fodele is situated between sheer cliffs, close to the sea, among pine and olive trees, whose perfume and silvery foliage El Greco also found in Toledo, the city where later on his fame bloomed. Which icons and paintings in the small church of Fodele, still in existence, imprinted on the soul of young Domenico or Kyriacos his first ideal of beauty? Enthusiastic biographers and critics such as Mr. David Rice and Mr. Robert Byron defend passionately the thesis that El Greco's

style, with all its peculiarities and eccentricities, is derived directly from the Byzantine painting school. To vindicate the theory they published photographs of pictures from the churches of Mount Athos, and opposite to each one show a picture by El Greco. Another critic, Don Manuel Cossia, speaks with extreme prudence of Byzantine influence on the art of the painter. There are, however, so many who now adhere to the former conception that antagonistic views begin to give way to the Byzantine theory.

Among the "Byzantinists," as we may call them, there is a Greek numismatist, Mr. Constandopoulos, who found in the Numismatic Museum in Athens a leaden seal of the fourteenth century, of "Manuel of the Theotocopoulos family." He believes that this family had for descendants the Theotocopoulos family, the head of which, after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, established himself at Corfu, whilst a branch of it went later on to Crete. But the evidence seems very meagre. On the other hand a distinguished French art critic, M. Camille Maclair, adopts an ingenious theory to explain the eccentricities of El Greco's art, and the elongated deformations of the anatomy of many of the figures in his pictures. Two passages from his study may be quoted here, in order to give the gist of the theory developed. Maclair does not exclude the "Byzantinism" of El Greco, but refers to it in a way much vaguer and less convinced than that of the English writers above-mentioned. "Let us remark primarily (the French critic says) that this deformation in the paintings of Greco are always in one direction, that of the height. He respects the normal anatomy of heads, torsos or limbs; he confines himself only to stretch them in a vertical sense. It is evident that he was at first influenced by Byzantine forms, which he saw, when a youth, through the eyes and in the spirit of a Byzantinised Greek. When studying in Venice and working under Titian and Tintoret or approaching Giorgione, Palma and Bellini, he realised the meaning of beauty of proportion and gorgeous sensualism. He tried, however, to conciliate that science with the elongated forms haunting his memory. On the other hand there is an explanation which has its own value. Greco suffered from astigmatism, from a kind of progressive strabismus, caused by a malady or deficiency of the liver, which led him more and more to a faulty conception of proportion and perspective by an abnormal

vision of planes. . . . We know nothing definite about the affected eyesight of the artist. We possess, however, the visible traces of it. It is highly probable that Greco purposely, deliberately started to mis-shape normal forms, in order to obtain some effects, and that afterwards the disease distorted his vision to the extent of inducing him unconsciously to dislocate his delineation. This ended in his producing discordant faces, puriform skulls, and dreadfully disjointed limbs, in denial of his admirable anatomical science of yesteryear, as well as in startling but yet vividly ashen colouring, in some caricatural distortion of the artistic processes used by him in his own purest masterpieces. No snobism or threat of anathema will compel me to profess admiration for such poor productions, on the sole evidence of the signature beneath the picture."

Should you submit this argument to the theorists of the intuitive hereditary Byzantinism of Greco, you would arouse violent wrath and provoke thundering fulminations against the impious doctrine. As other creeds, the Greco religion is based on the rock of unqualified continuous faith, and the only safe way out is to try and keep neutral among the combatants. What the reader may conclude from these lines is that the famous Greco-Iberian painter surviving in his wonderful works as an artist of original genius, his memory as a man stands half-suspended among the clouds of legends—the popular one, construed by the imagination of proud, simple fellow-countrymen; the others worked out by erudite criticism or elaborate antiquarian research. Legend is, after all, a kind of synonym of glory. Theotocopoulos the Cretan, or El Greco the Spaniard, raised to the heights of celebrity as an artist, left his personality as a man to float among the iridescent mists of myth.

DEMETRIUS CACLAMANOS.

GREATER PORTUGAL.

WE have every reason to be interested in Portugal, our friend and ally for some six hundred years. A sign that we are becoming alive to our interests is the Anglo-Portuguese Society, which was founded last year. The main object is "the dissemination of reliable information regarding the two countries," and this is being furthered by establishing headquarters in London, by giving lectures, by holding conferences, and the like means of dispelling our ignorance or our apathy.

It may be noted that recently a lecture was given by the Anglo-Portuguese Society at the Royal Empire Society by Senor José Barcelar Bebianno, sometime Colonial Minister. He was awarded the G.B.E. at the opening of the Benguela Railway, which was an Anglo-Portuguese enterprise and attended by Royalty. The subject was "How Portugal Expanded," and the lecturer traced the adventurous story of that wonderful exploration, which began long before the close of the Middle Ages. Describing the vast realms that became subject to the Portuguese, Senor Bebianno pointed out that they carried the blessings of Christianity and Western civilisation to the places they discovered and made them freely available to the native populations.

Most people know that Portugal, after a long period of trouble, attained peace and prosperity, mainly through the exertions of the wise and statesmanlike Dr. Salazar. He has given new life to every part of the Empire. The country, which forms a section of the Iberian Peninsula, though less well known than it deserves to be, is familiar to some tourists and many business men. Nowhere, as I can testify from experience, is travelling more pleasant. The people are most courteous, the climate is delightful, and so the country, beautiful in every direction, is ideal for a walking tour.

However, on this occasion, we will take a subject which is less known - Portugal beyond the seas. There is here a great dearth of information, as far as books written in English are concerned. There are a few works (by no means recent) on Angola, but there is hardly a single volume which gives adequate, up-to-date information about Portuguese East Africa. In the aggregate the Colonies are very important. Some are quite small in area. Madeira is nearly half as large

again as the Isle of Man and is very much more populous. As is well known, it is a favourite health resort and famous for its excellent wine.

The Azores are a numerous group, St. Michael being larger than Madeira, but not so populous. Oranges and other fruit are exported in great quantities. Madeira and the Azores form an integral part of Portugal and are represented in the Assembly. The Cape Verde Islands, of which the largest is St. Vincent, are a group of ten. Their total area is not very considerable, and the population is about 150,000. Very many vessels make St. Vincent a port of call; the tonnage entered and cleared amounts to about 3½ millions annually.

A generation ago two islands belonging to Portugal came prominently before the public, i.e. S. Tomé and Príncipe; their combined area is somewhat less than that of Madeira. The chief crop of S. Tomé is cocoa, and this was cultivated by indentured labour imported from Angola. Such a system is always liable to abuse, and it was discovered that the treatment of the workers was very bad. Accordingly the principal British chocolate manufacturers boycotted the island. The Portuguese authorities took up the matter, and in due course improvements were made. Conditions are now said to be very satisfactory. Portuguese Guinea is on the coast of Senegambia and on the land side is entirely surrounded by French territory. It is somewhat larger than Belgium, but the population is under 400,000. It produces rice and various tropical products. Bissao is the chief port.

The Portuguese were in India long before us, but their relics are now scanty. Their exploits were marvellous. The main object was, as Albuquerque wrote to his King, "to dispose the commerce of India in such a manner that the goods and wealth contained in her should be forwarded to you year by year in your squadrons." Accordingly, they built forts at Ormuz, Calicut, Cochin, and Cannanore, where they gathered together the treasures of the gorgeous East. It is impossible in this article to say anything of the growth and decay of their power in India. Goa and its environs alone remain. The area is 1,637 square miles and the population about 600,000. It is a tolerably prosperous place, exporting large quantities of fruit and nuts. One thing deserves notice. Both Spaniards and Portuguese founded schools and colleges wherever they went, and the latter left their mark on education

and religious life in India. The Jesuit College of St. Xavier in Bombay is one of the best in India.

A striking instance of the far-flung line of the old Portuguese is another relic, Macao, an island in the Canton river. Though only extending over five square miles it has about 160,000 inhabitants (nearly all Chinese) and a large trade. It came into Portuguese possession as early as 1557. Another small Asiatic (or Oceanic) possession is the island of Timor which is shared with the Dutch. It is of considerable size—7,330 square miles—and has nearly half a million inhabitants. It exports coffee, timber, copra, and wax.

We now come to the two remaining possessions, which far exceed all the others in importance, namely, Angola and Portuguese East Africa. Angola is of great size, considerably larger than France and Spain put together. Expeditions were made there in 1491, but it was long before lasting settlements were established. Loanda was founded in 1576. This town, with about 20,000 inhabitants, has a British Consul-General. As regards the hinterland, the territory was long most imperfectly explored and little coveted. However, when the Congo country was opened up, the value of the adjacent lands was recognised, and rival nations put forward rival claims. There is a melancholy contrast between the 'eighties and our own days. Then valuable territory of vast extent was divided up without any international animosity being engendered. To-day a dispute over some comparatively small and valueless territory leads to a "crisis" and threats of war. A large part of the hinterland was assigned to Portugal.

Angola is a land that possesses considerable attractions. From a flat alluvial coast strip the country rapidly slopes up into mountains of which the highest peaks attain elevations of over 7,000 feet. A large part of central Angola consists of a table-land, some 4,000 feet above sea-level. The country is well watered. The Coanza has a course of 700 miles, falling into the sea thirty miles below Loanda. From the point of view of navigation it is disappointing, as a dangerous sand-bar crosses its mouth. Another great river is the Kwango, which flows due north and empties itself into the Congo. It is navigable for 200 miles. The Kunene also is one of the largest streams; it forms the boundary between Portuguese and German territory. In its lower course it has a tempestuous career, rushing through and over huge granite rocks. Its

upper reaches though good pasture land are very imperfectly explored. Great Britain has, next to Portugal herself, the largest share in the trade; the country is agricultural, and coffee and sugar are the main products. An interesting non-agricultural product is diamonds. It is a recent industry and of increasing value. There are eighteen mines, which employ 160 white and 8,536 coloured labourers. They are located in Lunda, adjacent to the Belgian Congo. They yield over half a million carats annually, valued at about £600,000.

There is much good grazing land, and the stock of horned cattle is considerable. Unfortunately the numerous pests hamper this industry. Much has been done of late to improve the breed, notably by the Bovril Company. It has been pointed out that Africa, as a continent, is becoming progressively more and more arid. We have seen that there are excellent pastures along the upper reaches of the Kunene; these might repay development. None of the towns is large. Loanda is the oldest and until recently was the most important. It is situated upon a beautiful bay, and the harbour is good, though somewhat impaired by drifting sand-banks. Benguela is also a coast town and the terminus of the chief railway. Lobito, thirty miles farther away, has been called the finest harbour in Africa; this is certainly an exaggeration, but it has probably no superior on the West coast. It is from Lobito that the important Benguela Railway starts. It runs for about 1,200 miles through Angola to the Belgian Congo, and, passing through that country, ends at Beira. It also connects with the South African system and the Lorenzo Marques Railway. This is a remarkable feat in opening up difficult country, but the traffic has not yet fulfilled expectations. The Portuguese Government is making every effort to develop its colonies, which are rapidly improving; they are admirably placed for trade.

Portuguese East Africa is a large and rich territory. It is larger than France, Belgium and Holland combined. Lorenzo Marques, with 40,000 inhabitants, is the capital. It is a country of great rivers. The Limpopo or Elephant River has a course of 800 miles; one of its affluents has a length of 450 miles. The Zambesi is well known. Rising near Johannesburg it makes a huge curve northward, and, after a course of 1,600 miles, enters the sea near Beira. It is usual to include in Portuguese East Africa the Mozambique district, which

makes a much greater figure in history. Vasco da Gama reached the mouth of the Zambesi in 1498. Sofala, some distance south of Beira, was long a noted headquarters of the Portuguese. In the latter part of the nineteenth century there were, as in West Africa, some disputed claims in East Africa. These last were more difficult to settle, the question being complicated by the presence of Germany, but eventually the award was satisfactory to Portugal. She now possesses a part of what used to be German East Africa. The country is the paradise of big-game hunters; indeed, the books written by Englishmen on this subject usually give the reader little information on anything but shikar. The country is rich and produces maize, sugar, and many tropical products. The mines yield a moderate quantity of gold, but the mineral resources have not been exploited to any great extent. The imports for the two territories are valued at 3 millions sterling, the exports at 2 millions. Undoubtedly the potential wealth of these fine colonies is very great.

It is not surprising that certain nations desiring "a place in the sun" should have cast covetous eyes on Portuguese possessions. The country was by no means powerful, and, as compared with Salazar's Portugal, had long been most unprosperous. To Germany, ambitious of ruling the waves as well as the land, the African and other possessions seemed a tempting prize, and it was believed that Lord Salisbury would have been willing to allow sale of territory to Germany, if the smaller nation were willing. Germany also had various concessions and interests in the Lorenzo Marques Railway, which she hoped to use as a lever. However, in 1900, the Foreign Minister announced in the Chamber of Deputies that Portugal would neither sell, cede, nor lease any portion of her colonial possessions.

Germany, in fact, as late as July 1918, was envisaging a vast "Black Empire," extending from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. It was to have an area of some 5 million square miles and 30 million inhabitants. Portugal, of course, was to be a substantial contributor to this ambitious scheme, which, as one publicist remarked, "would set a bar, once for all, to England's efforts to become mistress of Africa from the Cape to Cairo. . . . It would give us, not only a great part of what we want in order to become economically independent of England but it would also put the means into our hands of

striking England home at any moment with the help of our navy and the man-power latent in this future dominion." However, this scheme failed through the insufficiency of the German navy and German man-power to carry it out, and now the Portuguese overseas Dominion is as safe as our own. It will be seen from the above brief survey that these possessions are of great value. They are now well administered, and we share with Portugal the greater part of the trade. It would be well that we should take an increasing interest in Portuguese culture and Portuguese affairs. International animosities are unfortunately now more common than international harmonies, and therefore we are all the more behoven to develop this age-long friendship to the utmost of our power.

W. A. HIRST.

When Italy did not dare to participate in this great action she sought compensation in small-scale, cautious and—as was wrongly thought—inexpensive action in the Red Sea. Here the Italians started on a chain of events which led to the first war with Abyssinia and to the catastrophe of Adua, and finally—after a pause of forty years—to the destruction of Abyssinia and the rise of a great Italian empire in Africa. It is one of the strange ironies that England herself had pushed Italy in this direction by her support of the Italian occupation of Massawa, an important harbour on the Red Sea coast. Already in 1869—the year of the opening of the Suez Canal—Italy had acquired the harbour of Assab on this new and highly important world highway. But Assab remained a modest coaling and trading station until the occupation of Massawa in 1885.

The downfall of the Egyptian Government in the Soudan in the struggle against Mahdism had left England faced with most difficult problems. With the victories of the Mahdi she was entering on a decisive phase of her African policy (1884-98), whose beginning and end are characterised by two dramatic events—Gordon's death and the Fashoda crisis. Between these two events lie fourteen years of diplomatic struggle below the surface, hardly perceived by the conscience of the European public; its aim being England's determination—more clearly crystallising from year to year—to prevent any foreign Power from setting foot on the Upper Nile. She was at that time unable militarily to make herself responsible for the security of those immense countries. She had therefore to consider approaching other foreign Powers who would be willing to act as sentries on the flanks of the Soudan, but who were too weak to become a menace to the Nile country itself. How England achieved this—in accordance with the imperialistic ideas of the time, perhaps with some lack of scruples in the choice of means—proved to be a masterpiece of British diplomacy. In our limited space we cannot relate how England tried—in the Anglo-Belgian convention of May 12th, 1894—to lease the Bahr-el-Ghazal country, which was endangered by French expeditions and afforded direct access to the Upper Nile, to the Belgian Congo State—"the wildest piece of diplomatic jugglery on record"—as a shrewd English

at the Red Sea coast secure against French expansion from Djibouti towards Abyssinia, perhaps even towards the Nile. English diplomacy sought to induce the Sultan to send Turkish garrisons to the coast and harbours of the Red Sea. But in spite of all pressure brought to bear in Constantinople the Sultan refused politely but categorically; the Turks did not feel inclined to stand sentry in one of the hottest places of the earth. So there was nothing left for England but to come to an understanding with Rome. Accordingly the Italians occupied Massawa in February 1885, and seemed to be willing to perform a service here which they had rejected in Egypt: to act as counterpoise and barrier against the dreaded French expansion.

From this first settlement in Massawa one line of Italian expansion goes in the direction of Abyssinia. It has often been related how from Massawa, under the leadership of Crispi, *Africanista*, Italy sought access to Abyssinia, and set foot on the road which led to the annihilation of all her dreams—the Battle of Adua.

From Massawa another line of Italian expansion led in the direction of Egypt and the Soudan; these efforts, too, had to be abandoned after Adua. When Crispi criticised Mancini's Red Sea policy—he would much have preferred to see the Italian activities engaged in Egypt—the Foreign Minister answered with secretive allusions to a coming "parallel action" with England; whereupon Depretis, another pungent critic of the Government, observed that unfortunately it was a strange peculiarity of parallel lines that they never met. Now Mancini was a master in the art practised by Foreign Ministers of saying very little in their verbose enunciations; but from all his allusions and hints it resulted that in the days when Egyptian domination in the Soudan crumbled to pieces, Government circles in Rome indulged in secret hopes that a common action of Italy and England in the Soudan would ensue and that Italy would reap adequate compensation for her help.

of the Opposition followed; they demanded clear and distinct explanations about the African policy of the Government. The English Ambassador in Rome, Sir Saville Lumley, felt it his duty to defend England against a possible reproach for having brought Italy into a difficult situation on behalf of her own interests: "If (he said) Italy's colonial policy seems to be in a bad tangle at present, that is due to the unexpected fall of Khartoum. If that had not happened, there would have been a fair chance for Italy of acquiring a part of the Soudan with Kassala." But these retrospective declarations could not prevent the outbreak of a serious crisis in Rome. When Mancini tried again in Parliament to point to a special accord between England and Italy, a prompt declaration followed from London that no accord existed, and he was forced to resign immediately.

Negotiations then ensued between the Italian Foreign Ministry and the English Ambassador: Rome wished to get rid of Massawa. She asked that England should give her energetic support to an Italian mission to Abyssinia. England should try to secure Abyssinian assistance for a campaign in the Soudan, not only towards Khartoum or Dongola, but also towards Kassala; the Negus should be indemnified with Massawa and Italy would take a piece of the Soudan with Kassala, a highly important trade and caravan centre midway between Massawa and Khartoum. England rejected these proposals out of hand. The new Ministry of Depretis, with Count Robilant—the former Ambassador in Vienna—as Foreign Minister, had to take possession of a not too pleasant inheritance. The troops suffered terribly in the blistering heat of Massawa; the attitude of the Abyssinians became hostile: the Italian Treasury felt the strain and the whole adventure seemed to end in a blind alley. This state of affairs was further aggravated by the bad news from Abyssinia. The defeat of Dogali spread paralysing depression in the country. When Crispi came to power in 1887, African affairs, which threatened to assume the character of a chronic and malignant disease, laid claim to his whole volcanic energy.

A fresh impulse now came into the African enterprise, which reached its culmination when Crispi succeeded in signing the Treaty of Ucciali (May 2nd, 1889) with Menelik of Schoa, the new and rising star of the African sky. But this great success, with all its implications of an Italian

protectorate over Abyssinia, proved to be insufficient to satisfy Italy's ambition. She began to clamour at the same time for Kassala and that caused rising uneasiness in London. The English began to ask themselves whether they did not incur the risk of getting out of the frying-pan into the fire by having patronised Italian activities. Lord Dufferin, English Ambassador in Rome, complained in February 1890, that "the Italians were a little too enterprising: they might even try to tap the Soudan and the Nile." Lord Salisbury, who took an intense interest in Soudanese affairs, could not shut his eyes to these possible dangers. He had some talks with the Italian Ambassador and warned him that Egypt was maintaining her territorial claims to a full extent, as England considered the Nile Valley of vital importance for Egypt.

Salisbury's stern warning made an impression in Rome and the Government decided to send General Dalverme, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of Massawa, to London to negotiate with the British Government for a delimitation of the spheres of influence. Salisbury seems to have attached great importance to these negotiations for he invited Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) to come to London and, when Baring was unable to attend, he asked Dalverme to go to Cairo to talk things over with Baring. These talks about a partition of the Soudan into spheres of influence and an Italian occupation of Kassala, brought no decision and Dalverme had to leave without having reached his object. The English at this time felt disinclined to make concessions and to open to the Italians the road to Khartoum. Only in the autumn of 1890 were these talks resumed, and because of the importance of the subject, England sent an influential delegation to Naples—Sir Evelyn Baring, Lord Dufferin and the Sirdar of the Egyptian army, Sir Francis Grenfell. Crispi's far-reaching ambition desired general regulation of all outstanding questions, a general delimitation of all frontiers and spheres of influence from the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean up to the Nile; the English were from the outset opposed to this extensive programme and were determined only to discuss frontier delimitations between Suakin and Massawa and not to include Kassala. When Crispi insisted on discussing the Soudan question the English put up a stiff resistance, the two points of view proved irreconcilable and the negotiations broke down. Crispi's anger

and disappointment at this setback, for which he made Sir Evelyn Baring mainly responsible, found its expression in a stiff note of the *Agenzia Stefani*.

In spite of this momentary setback Italy could look forward to the future with great hopes. She could lay claim now to immense territories bordering the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, from Ras Kaser in the north to the Juba river in the south. By the Treaty of Ucciali she had acquired, at least according to the Italian conception, claims on the whole of Abyssinia with the Galla and Somali countries. If she could now succeed in overcoming English resistance on the question of Kassala, if she could expand her territories towards the Nile, she had then every prospect of the formation of a great African empire—a prospect which would surpass all expectations and justify all present efforts and sacrifices. For these reasons Crispi did not cease to fight until the sudden downfall of his Government (1891) checked for the time being his indefatigable energy. His resignation made an understanding with London easier. It was well known there that his successor, the Marquis de Rudini, detested the African adventure. Salisbury personally was delighted to be rid of Crispi. One of the reasons why the relations of the two nations were sometimes strained was the Prime Minister's personal dislike of Crispi's Latin versatility.

A penetrating study of Italy's African policy in these years leads to the conclusion that her main object was the Nile and that she only turned towards Abyssinia when she learned that an expansion into the Soudan would meet with the most determined English resistance. It was the *locus minoris resistentiae*. Mancini had always tried to disarm his critics by conjuring up magic pictures of the coming Italian settlement in the Soudan. Italian policy in the course of these years had made every effort to acquire at least a part of the Soudan up to the Atbara, and Kassala. This Soudan policy never assumed such spectacular forms as the Abyssinia policy and is therefore little known. But Government circles in London were well aware of these Italian plans and defended the access to the Nile with the greatest obstinacy. Berlin also felt worried about the far-reaching ambition of its southern ally and Caprivi gave warning that this policy must cause resentment in England and would benefit only France.

Where Crispi had failed Rudini succeeded. He quickly

brought about two Anglo-Italian Conventions delimiting the respective spheres of influence in Africa. (Conventions of March 24th and April 15th, 1891.) Of main importance was Article 2 of the latter Convention which entitled Italy to occupy Kassala and the Soudan territory up to the Atbara. For formal reasons it was stated that the Egyptian rights remained reserved and that Egypt could occupy these countries again should she once be in a position to do so. Both these Conventions were finally completed by the Convention of May 5th, 1894, which contained a further concession to Italy concerning the rich province of Harrar. In a secret clause Harrar was attributed to the Italian sphere of influence, but England would include Harrar in her own sphere should Italy for any reason not be able to occupy it herself. England secured herself in this way by announcing her claim immediately after the Italian. Italy got a mortgage on Harrar, then came the English claim; this was all intended to exclude the possibility of French interference.

Finally—*post tot discrimina rerum*—Italy could occupy the much coveted Kassala, then still in possession of the Mahdists. In May 1894, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, General Baratieri, came to Rome to get the blessing of the Government for his action. He conquered Kassala after a hard struggle on July 17th, 1894. Crispi, who had been returned to power in the meantime—was loudly cheered when he announced this good news to the Senate. England seemed surprised at this swift and successful action; the English Ambassador in Rome, Sir Clare Ford, took notice of the news "with a somewhat wry smile." "Kassala gives access to the political and economic domination of the Soudan," reported the Austrian *Chargé d'affaires* from Rome, "and the rather transparent allusions of high officials at the Consulta and of the colonial enthusiasts lead to the conjecture that Italy hopes to round off this new possession considerably in future, and nobody thinks of ever giving back the newly acquired territories to Egypt."

But before the year came to an end blight fell upon all these daring plans. The news from Abyssinia assumed a more and more threatening turn. In the first days of 1895, Buelow received a despairing letter from his friend Baron Blanc, the Foreign Minister in Rome, who complained bitterly that the whole Abyssinian resistance was organised

by the French in Djibouti. In December Ras Maconnen of Harrar routed and annihilated the Italians completely at Amba Alagi. Crispi was in despair; he accused the whole world and made everybody and anything responsible for his situation. A deep shadow descended upon the country and the decisive defeat of Adua, news of which reached Rome on March 2nd, 1896, was the end of all Italian ambitions not only in Abyssinia but also in the Soudan. In a stormy session of the Italian parliament, Crispi was overthrown; in dangerous outbreaks the Roman people turned against his dictatorial methods, against the African adventure. When Crispi went to the decisive session he had to elude the raging mob round the Chamber; his downfall was accompanied by furious shouts of "Down with Crispi!", "Get out of Africa!" Crispi's successor, Rudini, when he reviewed the results of this policy in later years, used to say: We went to Africa to be equal with the other Powers, from sporting instincts and pure snobbery."

What should happen about Kassala, now isolated and endangered? Could Italy expect English help? Baron Blanc did not believe it. On the contrary, he complained to Buelow that the English had tried repeatedly to utilise the distress of the Italians to steal Kassala. "*Les Anglais* (he wrote) *ne nous donnent que des coups de pied.*" When after Adua the Mahdists attacked Kassala the Italians thought of immediate evacuation, but desisted on account of English remonstrances. Colonel Stevani was sent with reinforcements; he succeeded in April in defeating the Mahdists and relieved a little the anxiety at home. Finally, the English decision to send a great force down the Nile (the Dongola expedition) came as a relief to the Italians; the Government, when they learned of it, decided to stay in Kassala. Rudini explained why he was resolved to keep Kassala: to retain for Italy her due share in a final settlement of the Egyptian question. It seems doubtful whether its prolonged occupation could be vindicated, as it could result only in doing England a good turn. Did Rudini really believe that he still held a trump in his hand which he could play on the table at the final settlement of the Egyptian question? We do not know; Italian policy, especially in its relations with England, was caught in fateful self-deceptions, and at the beginning and end of her African activity Italy was influenced by the hope of solving the Sudanese problem

together with England and of being compensated by an adequate share of the spoils. So the Italians stayed in Kassala, and when Lord Kitchener took it over in December 1897 with an Anglo-Egyptian troop he must have felt thoroughly thankful to those who had held the place at such great sacrifice.

Nearly half a century has passed since then. Mussolini took vengeance on the old defeats: in the victories of the Abyssinian campaign he always remembered that he was avenging Amba Alagi and Adua. Has he forgotten Kassala and the Sudanese policy with all its disappointments and sacrifices? If we listen to his words this seems to be the case; for in his famous interview with the *Daily Mail* (May 5th, 1936) he repeated his old promise, that the Napoleonic plan to destroy the British Empire was far from his mind; that he did not intend to deal a deadly blow from Abyssinia against the heart of that Empire, and that it was not his ambition to stretch out his hands to the Soudan, to Egypt and Palestine and to attack its vital communications. On the contrary, with the conquest of Abyssinia, Italy was entering the ranks of the saturated Powers. He emphasised again that Italy had not the slightest political interest in the Soudan and he concluded that Italy had no further colonial ambitions.

We believe that the widely ventilated question: Can we trust the dictators and believe their words—is basically wrong. Their conception of truth and honesty is fundamentally different from ours. They certainly do not believe in an "eternal and objective truth." Contrary to the static character of our old-fashioned idea of truth and according to the dynamic character of their revolutions they certainly believe in a Hegelian kind of unfolding and expanding truth, which can be nothing more than an expression of a momentary belief, a momentary situation, and might therefore certainly be contradictory to other truth. Certainly Mussolini is governed by nothing else than the new Fascist "law of life"—"good is that which is good for my country"—which is after all only a further development of the old and well-known *sacro egoismo*. Who knows whether he will not find out soon that the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan—separating Abyssinia from Libya—means an intolerable restriction of the "living rights" of the Italian people in Africa?

MARCEL P. HORNIK.

THE SCHOOL-LEAVING AGE RAISED.

"The age of fifteen shall be the age up to which . . . this Act shall require parents to cause their children to attend school." Thus opens the Education Act, 1936.

THUS, long overdue, the Bill was introduced and passed by Mr. Baldwin's Government in compliance with an election pledge that he would pass a measure to raise the school-leaving age; the Labour Party had hoped that maintenance grants would be given where families faced the extra burden of losing the earnings of children from jobs; Free Church voices were raised against sectarian advantages being given to Catholics and others; employers of child labour in certain industries gave strong warnings; these and other interests were considered by the framers of the Bill. The public interest was occupied with grave foreign and international affairs; the Government Whips treated it as an agreed Bill. There was no real ground for the Government to expect no opposition to its startling provisions. In Grand Committee the Minister would permit no amendments of principle. When the Bill passed, it was seen that this complicated measure depended on how the local authorities applied their powers.

The Education Act, 1936, in its first seven sections raises the "compulsory school age" to 15 and deals with employment certificates, by-laws under Home Office and Ministry of Labour, and the release of scholars for "beneficial employment," etc. It will depend on local, industrial and other conditions and especially the use of the Local Education Authorities' powers to impose conditions "beneficial for children residing in their areas"; the employment of all under 16 years, their withdrawal from schools, part-time teaching, and other relations in which Home Office or Ministry of Labour may be concerned. All this falls under sections 1 to 7. Sections 8 to 11 give powers to Local Education Authorities to make grants for building and enlarging non-provided schools on the basis of agreements made between the Local Education Authorities and "persons duly authorised" to make proposals to provide new public elementary schools, subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement. Numerous conditions and questions are raised in these sections. The grants made to such schools or enlargements thereof shall

not be less than one-half and not more than three-quarters of the cost of carrying out the proposals. These sections are complicated and vague and have caused differences and delays, hardly lessened by the Board of Education's Circular 1452, published to "suggest Procedure" when the Act passed.

Section 12 provides for the giving of non-denominational teaching in denominational schools to the children whose parents desire it. Section 13 applies to provided and non-provided schools and makes possible the withdrawal of children for the purpose of receiving religious instruction "of a kind which is not given in the school." But this can only be done when the L.E.A. is satisfied that proper arrangements have been made elsewhere.

The Act refers to the Hadow Report in its mention of "special accommodation for practical or advanced instruction for senior children"; the organisation of primary teaching will introduce the new graded system. Nursery schools take children under 5 years of age. Infants, from 5 to 7; Juniors, 7 to 11; Seniors are 11 to 15. The elementary schools have been taking scholars up to 14; this has frequently meant a mere repetition for the elder scholars of what the younger seniors learn; for the future, reorganisation means the provision by Local Education Authorities of schemes for advanced and practical instruction in all schools; this is only possible when the seniors are drafted into senior schools where 200 to 400 or even more scholars can have the classrooms, workshops, laboratories, etc., in which boys can have wood and metal work, science, physics, the outlines of chemistry and electricity, and where girls can have needlework, cookery, physiology, domestic economy, and so forth, under special technical staff. There will be opportunities in playgrounds, and playing-fields for physical training, gardening, gymnastics and organised games; and even for displays in which music and art will be included. The time-tables may be varied to give a choice of subjects to suit local circumstances and personal or family needs; these are obvious as the area of senior schools is agricultural, urban, industrial or maritime. It is easily appreciated that the enterprising and enlightened Local Education Authorities have in the central, grammar and secondary institutions already taken many children from the upper standards of their elementary schools. Many parents are ready to make sacrifices to secure wider opportunities for

their families. Since 1931 far-seeing Directors of Education have been making preparations for the new teaching programme for the extra school year. Another aspect of this senior-school problem is raised by the distances which scholars must travel to and from schools, and the prolonged hours from eight in the morning to five in the evening, often seven to ten miles each way by road transport, rail, bicycle or omnibus. Distance and time away from home necessitate new plans for local transport and wide developments of nutrition policy—something much larger than the milk-ration which is already supplied to more than half the school population of the country, and which officials and teachers want to see supplied (free, if possible) to all!

The full functioning of the Hadow Report scheme is in social and national life as vital as raising the school-leaving age. It may now be asked how it has been received. A new senior school, well built, designed and equipped with a staff of teachers and workers numbering thirty or more, with 350 scholars, drawn from a wide area of sixty to seventy square miles, when it is in full working order, will require motor buses and canteens, drainage, water and lighting services. The whole picture promises a great advance in national life.

The new order of schools and advanced elementary teaching now before England has met with unanimous acceptance. Opposition both from the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches might have been expected had not the Act made generous provision of public money in the form of building grants. But that possible opposition was largely allayed by the extended facilities for withdrawal already referred to under sections 8 to 11 whereby they might obtain the full property of new or enlarged senior voluntary schools if they made agreements under which the Local Education Authorities would provide at least half or not more than three-quarters of the total cost. These generous offers to the friends of voluntary schools were considered in many places. Their reception occasioned divided counsels and dubious answers. This was seen at the Church Assembly on June 22nd, 1938; Lord Grey, Chairman of the Board of Finance, referred to the possibility of the Church of England obtaining grants for new senior Anglican schools thus:

He was deeply concerned at the position of the National Society; there were over 200 schemes for Senior Church Schools towards

which the Church had to find £750,000. The National Society had only been able to grant £9,175 towards an outlay of £198,251, and was eating up its capital. He appealed to the dioceses, as their finances increased, to join with the Central Board.

Two facts were now apparent: After eighteen months to consider the offer, the forty-nine dioceses of England and Wales had over 200 schemes on hand; if in the country perhaps five or six hundred senior schools at least were wanted, the 200 Anglican schools would be reasonable; but the National Society had no financial hopes of obtaining them. The other fact was that some dioceses with increasing finances might find funds locally, or join with the National Society. A year later, when the Church Assembly met in June 1939, there was no public reference to any schemes for senior Anglican schools. If certain schemes had been initiated, they had been left to diocesan authorities. This is confirmed by a courteous reply to inquiry made by the present writer, who wished to know how far the "over 200 schemes" had advanced. Dated May 27th, 1939, the reply stated:

The National Society received seventy-six Forms of Application for Grants towards New Senior Schools built under the Act of 1936, but in only eight of these have building grant agreements been signed. As to the remaining sixty-eight very few have arrived at final figures. . . . There are in addition 106 schools, which are proposing to apply to the National Society for grants but have not as yet filled in Forms of Application.

It is therefore impossible for anyone to say how many of the 200 schemes referred to in 1938 would be completed in 1940, nor even how many are now under construction.

The policy and proceedings of the Anglican authorities are not clear; since 1937 there have been Churchmen who did not favour the acquisition of senior voluntary schools by accepting building grants; the alternative policy to arrange Anglican religious instruction for a much larger number of schools using new facilities (clauses 12 and 13) has had powerful support. Unpopularity of the former policy is shown by the columns of *The Guardian* and *Church Times*; Canon Girling wrote in *The Guardian*, January 8th, 1938:

If inquiry were made at the offices of the National Society one finds little or nothing is being done . . . even in dioceses where this unique opportunity is being recognised, we need all the help that we can get and not defeatist letters. . . . Get as large a number of

these Church Central Schools as possible (and we shall never have an opportunity like the present), then we shall put new heart into the whole of the Church's work.

On the other hand the Archbishop of York wrote a foreword to *A Diocesan Policy for Religious Education in Elementary Schools* (issued February 1938, 6d., the National Society). The foreword offers it as a policy for the Church "comprehensive in scope and entirely practicable." Its main contention is that direct competition with provided schools is impossible in senior schools, that in junior schools the possibilities of exerting Anglican influence are greater. It therefore recommends the withdrawal of scholars from Cowper-Temple teaching to give them the opportunities for Church of England instruction offered under section 13. The liberal and powerful pleading of Dr. Temple's pamphlet seems to have been little heeded; Canon Girling was asked at a public meeting a few months later, whether he had considered Dr. Temple's policy and seen the pamphlet, but replied he had not heard of it.

The advocacy of two alternative policies is seen in the pamphlets and appeals of the National Society, and must have been remarked by those who heard the speeches of Lord Sankey and the Archbishop of Canterbury at the meeting of the Central Council of Church Religious Education, January 30th, 1939. Lord Sankey said:

For every child in a Church School there were three children in Council Schools. A large number of Church of England children must be in Council Schools. . . . Strain every nerve to maintain Church Schools. . . . I would not maintain Church Schools which bring discredit on the Church, or which are in such a condition that they cripple the Church in other directions. Some schools upon the Black List are probably not worth keeping. . . . In my view we ought to co-operate with every religious body in getting the very best possible Syllabus of Religious Instruction taught in every Council School . . . and we should see that . . . advantage be taken of Section 13 for our own children to have something more. . . .

In reply to this the Archbishop of Canterbury deprecated defeatism or apprehension about the future prospects of Church Schools . . . he doubted whether at any time their position . . . had been more secure than at present. . . . Education authorities were not likely to impose further difficulties. . . . It was discouraging to hear that their policy was . . . first to maintain all the schools that could be equipped . . . and second to close all the other schools.

Lord Sankey spoke with candour and his recognised humanity and sympathy, while the Archbishop of Canterbury with that complacent superiority which is not helpful.

The National Society or the Central Council of the Church for Religious Education is inactive, and does not contribute to many schemes for obtaining new senior Anglican schools. Yet some bishops have made efforts which deserve notice. It may be useful to take the Diocese of Chichester, which can provide facts and details repeated elsewhere. The county of Sussex, co-terminous with the Diocese of Chichester, is a wealthy county, without any political or social elements likely to cause trouble, with low unemployment and a high standard of living, a rising population and rateable value, new educational opportunities and many new public institutions. These are all favourable conditions to obtain new senior schools with generous building grants. The local Councils energetic and progressive. The Bishop of Chichester held in the highest regard and notable for his European reputation and distinguished record.

Late in 1937 the Bishop of Chichester spoke thus to his Diocesan Council:

An opportunity is offered to the Church in an unprecedented way by the Education Act of last year. The State in this Act says to the Church—We want you to work with us in building these new schools. And what is more, we offer new Church Senior Schools with the aid of large grants from the State. Thus, to take our own diocese, the County Council and other education authorities are able to say, "For every new senior school that you will build, we will pay you three-quarters of the cost, and it will be a real Church school with the head teacher a churchman, and most of the assistant teachers churchmen as well, and with Church school managers managing the school." It is an extraordinary offer. Will you please consider the full significance of the fact? It is quite without precedent that the State should be able and willing to find three-quarters of the cost of building a new school. . . . I want to emphasise the greatness of the chance before the Church, especially in the rural areas under the control of the East and West Sussex County Councils. My aim is that we should secure twelve Church Senior Schools in strategic centres throughout the diocese in addition to those already in existence. . . . The Bishop then proceeded to give a list of the twelve strategic centres, stating it was "not exhaustive."

This stirring appeal to his diocese must be fairly considered. It is not a State offer that the Act makes ; the Bishop says, "the State is able and willing to find three-quarters of the cost of building a new school" ; really the Act leaves it to the Local Education Authority (the County Council) to make an agreement, with a large number of conditions ; these must be signed before any progress can be made. The first step is taken when a general preliminary consent by the Local Education Authority is given to make an agreement. One factor which the Bishop forgets is that the ratepayers have a right to appeal to the Board of Education when any new school is proposed. In Crowborough such an appeal was made and a public inquiry held when the Board of Education rejected the scheme for an Anglican school. This reduced the six strategic centres in East Sussex to five ; it now appears that as "generally accepted" four only remain, for though the agreements necessary in the schemes for Cuckfield, Hurstmonceux, Uckfield and Worth are nearing conclusion, it has taken the Bishop nineteen months to get so far. It is necessary under the Act that the schools built in these cases must be finished by September 1st, 1940.

Delays have occurred in reaching agreements in most counties, on various points. They have arisen in Sussex about numbers of reserved teachers. The Bishop wanted "Most of the teachers Churchmen." Local Education Authorities seldom allow more than 75 per cent. of the teachers to be "reserved," though sometimes the 75 per cent. is in addition to the head teacher. The Bishop named twelve strategic centres and has now retreated. In three of the four remaining hopeful for him, in East Sussex, difficulties arose. Architects also cause delay ; the Local Education Authorities have staff architects, experienced in this special line, and often offer their services free to the proposers. Private or personal reasons have come in ; other architects, inexperienced in this new work, are unaccustomed to the complicated and special rules of the Board of Education and of Local Education Authorities ; weeks of delay arising, officials and committees are tired out and costs increased. Similarly, over sites, and whether canteens should be paid for by the Local Education Authority or the proposers. Reference to, and interviews with, the Board in London cause delay and do not always decide the question. Especially over the financial demands

delays and doubts have arisen, sometimes certainly due to the proposers' disappointments in securing their voluntary quota ; payments, promises, loans and guarantees are all increasingly difficult in collecting Church funds. In West Sussex the estimates for schools are still unprepared ; when builders' contracts come to be made and when building can begin, no one can say.

Two questions remain for the Bishop to answer :

1. The County Boroughs of Brighton, Eastbourne, Hastings and Worthing are in his diocese ; these Local Education Authorities have senior schools in preparation ; why are these strategic centres not mentioned by him ?

2. Another question, about the cost of providing senior schools. Does the Bishop realise what it all costs ? His four schools in East Sussex : Cuckfield, Hurstmonceux, Uckfield and Worth, are to have an aggregate of 1,120 school places, and the preliminary estimate for the four schools, buildings, clerks of works, printing, etc., totals £78,750, to which must be added about £650 for the sites ; this works out at over £70 for each school place. The Church must collect about £17 10s. per place. In order to take up this "extraordinary offer" voluntary subscribers are to collect over £16,000. Is this policy of the Bishop fair to Church subscribers or to county ratepayers ?

The circumstances of Sussex and the Diocese of Chichester are typical of cases where the Local Education Authority and those proposing voluntary senior schools are both active and well-intentioned. Final results may still be uncertain ; but proposers must be troubled already and the beginning of education under Hadow Report conditions is delayed. Probably in a year's time the results throughout England will follow the course of events impending here.

JOSEPH KING.

GERMANS IN POLAND.

IT is significant that in the present Polish-German crisis there are on the whole very few German complaints as to the treatment of the German minority in Poland. Obviously Dr. Göbbels' propaganda machinery could not dispense entirely with the invention of ludicrous atrocity stories. But those who remember last year's barrage of German propaganda during the Sudeten crisis will wonder why Germany did not resort to similar methods, considering the extraordinary effect they had in 1938. One possible explanation is that the sensitiveness of the Western Democracies on the subject of German minority problems has rapidly diminished, especially as it has become obvious that they are used as mere pawns in Germany's game of power politics. Moreover, after Munich and the disappearance of Czecho-Slovakia the position of Germany has become so strong that she has no need to use obsolete methods in her imperialist drive. To-day she can put forward her case for European hegemony without any pretence of sympathy for her racial brethren.

The most important difference, however, between the two crises created by Germany is that in the present upheaval she is unable to count on the support of the German minority in Poland to the same extent as she could with the Sudeten Germans. In fact, the German minority is the least Nazified group of non-Reich Germans in the world. They are certainly less Nazi than the South-West African Germans. They have an anti-Nazi movement, which is the strongest of all the German groups scattered over the world. The Nazi ideology has made headway in Poland chiefly among the younger German generation, but only to a certain extent. The two rival groups, the Nazi *Jungdeutsche Partei* (Young German Party), headed by Herr Wiesner, a Polish Senator, and the old-established anti-Nazi *Volksbund* (People's Union) have strictly divided spheres of action and influence. There are Nazi and non-Nazi Co-operative Societies, separate private schools and even separate theatres. The German-Christian journal *Der Deutsche in Polen* (The German in Poland) is strongly opposed to Nazi ideology and methods—an attitude rarely to be met with among German minorities even in more distant places. One of its brilliant contributors who lashes the Nazi idols mercilessly is Herr Rauschning, the ex-Nazi

President of the Danzig Senate. Apart from the conflicting middle-class parties, there is a German Social-Democratic Party affiliated to the Second International and co-operating with the P.P.S. (The Polish Socialist Party). Its members are recruited from among the numerous German workers' settlements which were established a century or so ago to help to run the large textile centres in and around the city of Lodz—the Polish Manchester. An interesting group of definitely anti-Nazi Germans is the Mennonites, a Baptist Protestant Church, whose teaching is based on that of Luther's contemporary, Menno Simon. Small settlements of Mennonites are to be found in Southern Poland, and male members of this Sect are exempted on conscientious grounds from service in the Polish army.

The reason why Nazi propaganda has achieved such meagre results is because of the strength of the Evangelical Church in Poland. The Polish Protestant Church is not an entirely German movement in spite of the fact that popular belief in that largely Catholic country regards Lutherans and Germans as synonymous terms. Protestantism in Poland, while making some headway among the intellectual élite, never gained the support of the masses because popular instinct repudiated it as a German creed. Only in the Polish part of the former Austrian Silesia did Protestantism assume larger proportions among the Polish population, and that was because it was derived from the Czech Protestant movement. Up to 1926 Warsaw and Wilno, the Polish centres of Protestantism in Silesia, were separated from the German bodies of the same creed. The Constitution of the Protestant Church in Poland (1926) welded both groups together, and the Church was granted self-government similar to that of the Auto-Kephalic Orthodox Church of Poland. It is obvious that in such a state of affairs the Protestant Church in Poland cannot be subjected to ideological Nazi experiments, and for that reason it stands the more firmly for the defence of Christian ideals among the Germans in Poland.

In spite of the signs of stubborn self-defence among the independent German parties in Poland, the extent and virulence of Nazi propaganda must not be overlooked or under-estimated. A few years ago I visited a mountain district in the Polish Carpathians. About thirty miles from the nearest railway station, far from the main road leading to

the present Polish-Hungarian frontier, there are three German-inhabited villages hidden among the dense coniferous mountain forests. Yet not a single week passed without some wandering Nazi teacher appearing in these hamlets, though he had to cover a distance of nearly seventy miles in a horse-drawn cart over an indescribably rugged road. Even these remote settlements were being continually supplied with Nazi books and leaflets. The flood of propaganda was intensified when the villagers followed the teacher's advice and bought wireless sets. This persistent intoxication could be observed as early as 1933 and remained undiminished in spite of communication difficulties. Nor did it disappear when these isolated German-speaking villagers realised that they were dependent on their neighbouring Polish and Ukrainian compatriots, who resented their growing intransigence. In spite of a few isolated cases, the main body of the German minority in Poland cannot be regarded as Nazified. One version for this is that they are quite well off, although they have neither desired nor been granted the extravagant privileges or the special status which the Nazis would like them to enjoy.

At the present moment the German population of Poland totals nearly three-quarters of a million: that is to say 2.3 per cent. In the province of Poznań there are 193,000 Germans (9.2 per cent.), in Silesia 90,000 (7 per cent.). Before 1918 there were over a million Germans within the present boundaries of Poland, but a great number of them, consisting of Prussian officials and colonists settled on the soil from which the Polish peasant was evicted, left the country, fearing a violent outburst of popular hatred and disgust. The maritime province of Poland—Pomorze, or rather what remained of that historical Polish province in the shape of the so-called "Corridor"—has always had an overwhelming Polish majority of more than 90 per cent. It is interesting to note that the German Imperial Geography described this region as a "danger zone," on account of the "alien" majority and on account of the number of Polish deputies returned to the various Prussian representative bodies, in spite of the intensive gerrymandering made possible by ingenious Electoral Laws and similar administrative devices.

There is no name which revives memories of a more burning injustice than that of the once ill-famed H.K.T. Society.

The H.K.T. (or *Hakata* in Polish) is a compound name consisting of the initials of the three founders of the anti-Polish "Society for Promotion of Germanism," the intellectual fathers of the Bismarckian Colonisation Commission, Heinemann, Kennemann, and Tiedemann. This Commission had power to buy land compulsorily from the Polish peasants and sell it again at advantageous terms to German colonists drawn from all parts of the Kingdom of Prussia. All opposition on the part of the Poles against this ruthless eviction was crushed with Prussian thoroughness. Feeling ran high in those days, but the Poles did not take revenge upon the Germans after they obtained power. The German rural population still numbers 130,000 in the Western provinces of Poznań and Pomorze. Their economic and cultural development is not restricted, and, according to the 1931 census, they possess no fewer than 167 agricultural co-operative societies, 104 co-operative dairies, and 333 co-operative banks. The total turnover of the German Co-operative Societies in 1936 amounted to 70 million zloty (nearly 3 million pounds), and their dairy co-ops controlled an output of 89,000 cows. These figures are on an average higher than those of the corresponding Polish and Ukrainian societies.

In the field of cultural development and civil liberties the situation of the German minority cannot be compared in its advantageousness with that of the Polish minority in Germany. There are about 450 German primary schools, half of which are State-supported or maintained by municipal councils. Of the thirty-one secondary German schools seventeen are endowed by the State. Compare this with the sad plight of the Polish educational system in Germany. The Nazi State does not provide a single secondary school for the children of its 1½ million Polish citizens. The few existing Polish primary schools are in the course of complete Germanisation. There is only one Polish private secondary school in Opeln. After five years' activity the German authorities did not think fit to empower this school with the right to issue Matriculation certificates.

At a time when the Press in Germany and Austria was decaying under the deadly "cure" of Dr. Göbbels, the number of German newspapers in Poland rose from 95 in 1933 to 105 in 1938. Apart from a few newspapers with veiled Nazi tendencies, the increase must be attributed to more

vigorous German Christian and democratic counter-propaganda. There are thirty-one religious journals printed in German and ten professional reviews of strongly anti-Nazi tendencies. There is a German theatre in Lodz, and the German democratic workers' organisations have a well-managed University Extension Lecture Society in the same city.

These, briefly, are the reasons why it is *not easy* to Nazify the German minority in Poland, and why it is not being drawn into the sinister schemes of Nazi world-domination plans. The resoluteness of the Polish authorities in refusing to allow foreign agents to stir up trouble accounts for much of the calm which is now prevailing in Poland in spite of the international tension. It proves that the German population, when it is *not* preyed upon or intimidated by Nazi agents, remains calm, peaceful and democratic.

F. WIRTH.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

A QUARTER OF A CENTURY.

I

TWENTY-FIVE years ago a great war had just started. Any man who in August 1914 had reached maturity, who went through that war and then through its diplomatic results, and who in August 1939 is still alive and receptive to elementary ideas, has something to say which, if he is honest enough to say it, may make some contribution to an understanding of what is after all the most important thing on earth, namely the human race and its misfortunes: what Pascal called "l'aveuglement et la misère de l'homme et ces contrariétés étonnantes qui se découvrent dans sa nature." Pascal gave the answer quite simply in these words: "La pente vers soi est le commencement de tout désordre." It really does seem to be so simple.

A quarter of a century is a substantial span of a man's life. If a particular quarter of a century happens to have begun with something outstandingly characteristic of human life and to have ended in something almost as striking, there is no excuse for the man who happens to have lived through it not to put on record what he honestly believes to be the truth about it. To moralise on adequate evidence and with adequate thought on a specific experience of such a kind cannot be wrong, even though he who does it might wish that someone more enlightened were making the attempt.

One of the historical truths that dawn upon one in reflection is that the fortunes of men, nations and empires react according to certain broad principles. Prosperity tends to soften the fibre and to blunt the intelligence both of individuals and of societies. The sense of fear, which tends further to undermine judgment, attacks those who have something to lose and nothing to gain, just as conversely he who has nothing to lose and something to gain cannot be the victim of fear.

The perfect illustration is given by the history of Anglo-German relations in our time. It is necessary at the outset to concede a considerable weight of argument to those who see in the character of the German people something which makes difficult any reasonable accommodation with them. It cannot be wholly an accident that in our time Germany has twice

dislocated the entire business, for instance, of British civilisation. It cannot be the case that Germany has been wholly right and Britain wholly wrong in both cases. The real difficulty that is encountered by fair-minded British people is that with the best will in the world we sooner or later discover in the character of any single German that we know something that is radically antagonistic. The familiar diagnosis of a German affinity to the British character is true only superficially. The people of every other race on earth that one knows by personal contact are in a large measure actuated by the same sort of broad human feelings that actuate ourselves. In the German, above a certain level, there is a like sort of common humanity; but when one gets down to bedrock one is forced to admit that there is a difference of kind. At bottom the German race has never (in the highest sense) been civilised nor Christianised. There have been certain fruits, remarkable in themselves, of the German intellect; in music, in letters, in science, in scholarship. But we all know that pure intellect can be, and mostly is, divorced from true humanity. It is the case—let the crude fact be crudely stated—that there is something elementally insensitive and intransigent in the German character.

There is a type of British student of German affairs who still refuses to believe that such a thing is possible. During the last war it was the conventional refuge of such students to pretend that the mass of the German people were human beings very much like ourselves, but exploited, owing to a too submissive docility and an abused capacity for discipline, by a madman. At that time it was the Kaiser who was supposed to have established the monstrous lien over them. To-day such people again argue, rather incorrigibly, a like case. The name of Hitler being substituted for that of Wilhelm II, they say exactly the same thing as before. The Reichswehr leaders for instance, we are again asked to believe, are to-day brutally dismissed by Herr Hitler—and meekly accept dismissal—as mere pawns in the Führer's absolute authority as military and political commander-in-chief. It cannot be true twice in living memory that a whole race of people should be dominated against their better will or judgment by a madman. There must be, at any rate, some predisposing susceptibility. One's German friends of a quarter of a century's standing, who have always appeared

reasonable men, are now found in practice to be, all of them, up to 100 per cent., the devotees of a materialist, atheist, cunning, unscrupulous, fanatic agitator. The central fact that Adolf Hitler is a German is the decisive element in the several circumstances that have enabled him to subdue the whole German race to his will. It is a manifestation of patriotism that amounts to dementia. There is something peculiar, and something terrifying, in such a race of people.

Had it been otherwise, had the German people been broadly moulded as are all other peoples on earth, the now chronic Anglo-German problem would probably have been solved. It is unreasonable to believe that the horror of the last war would not have chastened any ordinary vendetta. It is precisely the original and intrinsic difficulty of the German character that has constituted the problem of the present century. It is that difficulty that the British genius, undermined by the prosperity aforesaid, has failed to appreciate. We have failed in intelligence. It is only when abnormal difficulty arises that the real test is applied to intelligence. Up to the end of the last century Great Britain and the British Empire were an achievement of majestic grandeur. The old enmity with France had been merged in a mature practice of tolerance: one of the greatest of human achievements. The French Empire was in no wise now regarded as incompatible with the British Empire. To live and let live was the practical rule of life that resulted from the wise use of tolerance.

And lo! a new Germany loomed on the horizon, a Germany that had been fashioned as an effective unity by Bismarck under the stimulus and opportunity provided by Napoleon. With amazing rapidity Germany expanded both into the colonial field and into that of international commerce. She almost took away our breath; she certainly upset our judgment. Yet Germany's prosperity before 1914 was a source of prosperity to ourselves; prosperity being as indivisible as adversity. Before 1914 Germany was a profitable field for British investment and a profitable incentive to British industry. Blunted by a vulgar resentment and an absurd sense of jealousy we decided to accept an issue with Germany. Granted all the forbidding elements in the German character—the pitiless arrogance in success, the cruelty, the total lack of the very quality of tolerance that was to constitute the test

of our own character—it was nevertheless the case that the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 was one of the most fatal blunders of all history. Of course Germany contributed to it, made it almost inevitable—but it could have been avoided. If ever in history there was a case for peace at any price, that case was clearly presented in the decade that preceded the World War. We for our part had everything to lose, and nothing to gain, by war. Yet we went to war. The German invasion of Belgium was not the real *casus belli*. It was a late symptom of causes already chronic, including the encirclement of Germany by Britain, France and Russia. That encirclement was an undeniable fact. To-day we can look round and observe the devastated districts of the British heritage that is the price we have paid for going to war in 1914. The two years 1904, when we began to “encircle” Germany (to argue that it was defensive in motive is beside the point) by constituting the Entente Cordiale with France, and 1914 when we declared war on Germany, were the origins (*ce n’est que le premier pas qui coûte*) from which derived the historic abdication of British power from its dominant position in the world and from its resultant opportunity to carry out a real civilising mission in the world. The proof of the pudding is simply and quite invariably in the eating. To-day we see the ruins of what in 1914 was British prosperity and strength. We could and ought in 1914 to have accepted Germany as an equal party with France and ourselves as a world imperialist Power.

Having embarked upon so unintelligent a policy, we did not arrest our progress on the downward path. Why was it that nearly the whole world came to our side in the last war? Only because we were the strongest Power. We had command of the seas. We had an immense reserve of wealth. Our empire was impregnable. Why is it to-day that Japan and Italy are on the other side and it has proved so difficult to make a treaty with Russia? Because we are no longer the impregnable Power.

We embarked on the last war from a stupid motive. We next proceeded by the like stupidity to ruin the peace won by our military victory, a victory falling to us because “to him that hath shall be added” (to-day by contrast we have to brood upon the complementary truth that “from him that hath not, shall be taken even that which he hath”). We

attempted in the ill-fated Treaty of Versailles permanently to cripple Germany. Could anything be less intelligent? The very adversity we thrust upon Germany was the original source of Germany’s exuberant strength during the present decade. In 1939, impoverished and weakened by the last war, crippled—for it is we who, relatively to our former strength, are crippled—by an income tax of nearly one-third of income, a tax which can never again be substantially reduced, we find ourselves embarked upon an expenditure of some £2,500 million for the purpose of preventing a German city from again becoming a part of Germany. On the ground of intelligence and elementary common sense, need anything more be said? Does it really matter to any British man, woman or child whether Danzig belongs to Germany or to Poland? The price, £2,500 million, is such that one’s imagination reels at it. There are men, women and children in this country who are in want, who cannot buy elementary things without which daily life is accompanied by distress, whose wants could be satisfied at a price wholly negligible by contrast with what we pay for a fantastic foreign policy.

It is one of the remarkable things that the most obvious and most palpable facts can escape notice. One’s faculty of perception can be blurred over to such an extent that we look at an obvious thing and do not see it. Those who have the longest experience of public affairs are driven farther and farther back to first principles in their search of an explanation. The experienced people do not laugh, are not shocked, if the simple elementary truths of life are argued, even when the subject of discussion is “foreign affairs.” If a party of children sitting round a table weighted with all the good things they want to eat, enough to satisfy the maximum appetite of each, were to emulate the “policy” of governments in international relations they would, instead of eating the good things, fight over them and ruin them, and would achieve the total denial of satisfaction to everyone concerned. The world is the table. The children are the nations. The world contains enough, and an abundance, for every need. Brains could be profitably used for an infinite improvement of existing amenities. There are even provided, for a constructive use of the human intellect, certain physical fields of high endeavour in the common good. There are accidental “defects,” storms, floods, quakes, accurately called by the

insurance companies "acts of God," which human intelligence could profitably organise against for the common cause. An absence of obstacle, a uniformity of good fortune, spells death to the spirit. There is adequate scope for human enterprise, human courage and human skill, in the world as God made it. The peoples of the world by contrast concentrate their energy, their wealth, their skill on the manufacture of armaments, and the training of a human agency, whose exclusive purpose is the blasting of a maximum number of fellow human beings to bits. The spectacle of Christ crucified by man is so elemental in its meaning that no words are simple enough to express it. The spectacle of a human race bent upon the competitive manufacture and organisation of the instruments of its own destruction is in its turn so clearly symbolic that any words must fail adequately to express it. What is more remarkable is that mankind does not yet see the simple truth. In the end, no doubt, man will see it.

In the meantime, the exercise of reason has to direct itself to the sordid and symbolic case of Danzig. The great British Government on March 31st, 1939, in the words used by Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on that day, gave this astounding pledge to Poland: "In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all the support in their power."

Could the theory of government be reduced to a greater absurdity? There resulted, among others, three simple facts that place almost too great a strain on one's belief in what is possible: (1) The British Government gave to the Polish Government the absolute right to decide whether Britain should go to war; (2) The British people accordingly prepared with all the resources at their disposal to go to war, if Poland should decide to demand it, in order to prevent a German city from being incorporated in the German nation; and (3) The said German city, being controlled by a wholly German Senate, elected by a wholly German people, wanted thus to be incorporated in Germany, and yet the British Government really believed its policy to be based upon the principles of "democracy": and even in such a cause joined issue against

The great British people in living memory had been reduced to a level of national activity where all the arts and propaganda and appeals to patriotism were mobilised to drive them into digging air-raid shelters, instituting universal military service, spending all their national wealth (and more) — what for? To keep Danzig from Germany, where it logically belonged, and to interfere in Eastern European affairs of not the slightest logical importance or interest to Great Britain.

On July 10th, 1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, spoke in the House of Commons. It was regarded as a great occasion. To give him the opportunity of making a statement of historic importance a question was put on the paper by Mr. Harold Macmillan in these terms: "Whether the Government will issue a declaration to the effect that any change in the present position of Danzig, other than by an agreement to which the Polish Government is a party, whether brought about externally by military action on the part of Germany or internally by a movement initiated or supported by the German Government, will be regarded as an act of aggression on the part of Germany, and therefore covered by the terms of our pledge to Poland?"

Mr. Chamberlain prefaced his declaration with this historical premise: "Racially, Danzig is, almost wholly, a German city, but the prosperity of its inhabitants depends to a very large extent upon Polish trade. The Vistula is Poland's only waterway to the Baltic, and the port at its mouth is, therefore, of vital strategic and economic importance to her. Another Power established in Danzig could, if so desired, block Poland's access to the sea, and so exert an economic and military stranglehold upon her. Those who were responsible for framing the present statute of the Free City were fully conscious of those facts, and did their best to make provision accordingly. Moreover, there is no question of any oppression of the German population in Danzig. On the contrary, the administration of the Free City is in German hands, and the only restrictions imposed upon it are not of a kind to curtail the liberty of its citizens. The present settlement, though it may be capable of improvement, cannot itself be regarded as basically unjust or illogical. The maintenance of the *status quo* had, in fact, been guaranteed by the German Chancellor himself up to 1944 by the ten-year treaty which he had concluded with Marshal Pilsudski. Up till last March Germany

seems to have felt that, while the position of Danzig might ultimately require revision, the question was neither urgent nor likely to lead to a serious dispute." He then made what may indeed prove to be an historic statement in these words: "Recent occurrences in Danzig have inevitably given rise to fears that it is intended to settle her future status by unilateral action, organised by surreptitious methods, thus presenting Poland and other Powers with a *fait accompli*. In such circumstances any action taken by Poland to restore the situation would, it is suggested, be represented as an act of aggression on her part, and, if her action were supported by other Powers, they would be accused of aiding and abetting her in the use of force. If the sequence of events should, in fact, be such as is contemplated on this hypothesis, honourable members will realise from what I have said earlier that the issue could not be considered as a purely local matter involving the rights and liberties of the Danzigers, which incidentally are in no way threatened, but would at once raise graver issues affecting Polish national existence and independence. We have guaranteed to give our assistance to Poland in the case of a clear threat to her independence, which she considers it vital to resist with her national forces, and we are firmly resolved to carry out this undertaking. I have said that, while the present settlement is neither basically unjust nor illogical, it may be capable of improvement. It may be that, in a clearer atmosphere, possible improvements could be discussed."

There was no longer any possible doubt about the nature of the British commitment. Its real implications were illustrated in the negotiations with the Russian Government. It seemed logical that having guaranteed Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey against aggression we should go further and incorporate Russia in the system called (by us) a Peace Bloc. Yet, as Russia rightly argued, the hypothetical danger from Germany was not that of a "direct" aggression but an "indirect" aggression of the Sudeten type. Speed was of the essence of any effective safeguard. What then? Neither France nor Britain could take speedy action in Eastern Europe against a German move. Obviously, therefore, Russia must be competent to decide if and when any change in the internal situation of Finland, Latvia, Esthonia or Poland did constitute "indirect aggression" from Germany; and to take action at once in such an emergency. A mere change of

Government in either of those four countries might therefore bring Russian troops over their border in the guise of a "protector." And those four countries were as much afraid of Russian as of German interference. Moreover, the first result of an Anglo-French-Russian alliance designed to safeguard the small states of Eastern Europe from a German "indirect aggression" might be a Russian "indirect aggression" against those states. Small wonder that the negotiations in Moscow were prolonged from week to week.

II

The question will inevitably be asked: granted the truth of every gloomy sentence so far written in this paper, what is the constructive suggestion for putting the matter right? Obviously, if there is going to be an improvement in international relations, there must be a machinery for improving them. To sit back in one's chair and quote the Sermon on the Mount is to beat the thin air with talk. The obvious first step towards controlling international gangsterdom and instituting some principle of order is to set up an authority that is at least competent to make an award. In the case of Danzig, for example, which is the present bone of contention, it would help if there were a tribunal before which the case could be argued. *Ubi societas, ibi lex*.

The month of September has been the traditional month since 1920 when the League of Nations, set up by the Treaty of Versailles, has staged an annual ritual of progress made. That particular League of Nations is not the first of such enterprises. When Castlereagh called one of them "sublime nonsense and mysticism," he coined a phrase more interesting than he probably intended. Certainly the League of Nations is a sublime idea; certainly its success implies a change of heart so great that one might be tempted to diagnose the inspiration as mystic; and certainly so far the attempt has been nonsensical because the clear conditions of success have never been fulfilled. Grotius wrote his famous *De Jure Belli et Pacis* (1625) under the stimulus of the general nausea produced by the Thirty Years' War; but though he did argue a case for the pacific arbitrament in international disputes, he was mainly concerned with the nonsensical subject of the "laws of war." Wars being the negation of all laws, there can

be no laws of war. Yet he started a train of thought, which produced something more substantial a century ago, which in its turn was given its opportunity by the general sense of weariness and repentance that followed the Napoleonic wars. Castlereagh's own subsequent bid for the diplomatic instead of the belligerent method through the instrumentality of a European Concert marked a further step forward: though in its turn it proved futile.

At the turn of the century the Emperor Nicholas II of Russia was responsible for the two famous Hague Conferences (1899 and 1907) which attempted to organise the pacific settlement of international disputes, the stabilisation and subsequent reduction of armaments, and the abolition of what were regarded short-sightedly as the more obnoxious instruments of war. The third of those objectives was as curious then as it has been in the more modern attempts. At the beginning of the present century the international reformers could deprecate (1) the launching of projectiles and explosives from "balloons" or by the use of other similar "new" methods; (2) the use of projectiles whose only purpose was to spread "asphyxiating or deleterious" gases; and (3) the use of bullets which "expand or flatten easily in the human body"; just as in recent years men have talked about "humanising" a submarine whose only use is none the less inhuman. In 1919 the crushing weight of war weariness and repentance gave the greatest opportunity yet experienced for setting up a League of Nations. The resultant instrument in its turn was destined to be wholly futile. Who knows but that the present appalling state of international relations may provide still another opportunity for setting up a League of Nations and for avoiding all past blunders in the building of it? At any rate it is arguable that the only effective next step in the salvation of the world from the chaos now afflicting it is to concentrate upon a new League of Nations; and the past quarter of a century's experience is full of lessons about what to avoid.

In the first place the tactic of setting up half a League in the hope that success in small matters might lead to success in big matters and thus empirically lead on to a full and perfect working instrument for the pacific settlement of international disputes, is proved to be totally misdirected. It is obvious that the principle of universality, which is

essential to the success of a League of Nations, must be made a rigid and uncompromising precedent condition to the functioning of any new League. In 1919 both Germany and Russia were excluded from membership of the League; and the United States refused to be a member. The League was therefore born dead. It would have been better in 1919 to accept that fact rather than to persist in an experiment that could not do good and might (indeed did) do harm. To-day it is a possible constructive expedient to concentrate upon a new League of Nations. It would be possible, for instance, for the British Government to declare that it is prepared to suspend judgment on every outstanding issue in foreign affairs and to lend its whole weight to the fashioning of a new League of Nations, which should be the instrument of a general settlement.

A book has been lately published (*Union Now*, by C. R. Streit, Jonathan Cape) in which the case is argued for the union of fifteen democratic States. The fact that the book has excited a good deal of interest and even an organised attempt to stir up a practical movement towards the fulfilment of what it suggests, shows that opinion in more than one country is ready to consider drastic measures as a means of escape from present troubles. Yet that particular suggestion begs the very question it asks. As a means of putting an end to present tension, of safeguarding the democracies from the danger of war with the dictatorships, a defensive union is postulated which shall be strong enough to deter any further aggression by the dictatorships: in other words we are asked, as a method of preventing conflict, to accentuate the division between the two potentially warring camps. The appeal of such a thesis is to the belligerent spirit. It attracts those who are concerned more for the victory of the one side over the other than for any ideal of international collaboration. But if it is to be regarded as possible that fifteen nations should unite for a partisan purpose, is it impossible that all nations should unite for a common purpose?

If peace, in the elementary sense of a working arrangement whereby the nations agree to live and let live, is to be an attainable object, it is necessary that the seven Great Powers of the world should all agree to constitute a League of Nations. The refusal of any one of them would put an end to the proposal. What therefore could be done at once would be that

the British Government (for example) should publicly launch a proposal that the seven Great Powers—Japan, Russia, Germany, Italy, France, Great Britain and the United States—should agree in principle to meet in conference for the exclusive purpose of constituting a new League of Nations. If the seven Great Powers were to agree on such a proposal, every small Power in the world would automatically join in. Certain political influences, so widely separated as the Vatican on one side and the extreme British Left on the other, have lately put about the suggestion that a world conference be convened to discuss on a *tabula rasa* a new peace settlement. An agenda so comprehensive strikes many people as unpractical. The restricted agenda of a suggested new League of Nations, the inducement for which in the case, for example, of Germany would be the prospect that Germany's claims would be considered without the present prejudice, would be the more likely to prove manageable.

It may be that such an adventure would be doomed to failure from the start; that it would be impossible to induce, for example, Japan and Germany to consider it. The difficulty, even the probable futility, of any adventure is not an argument against the attempt at it. In the alternative we drift from one catastrophe to another. The only remedy is an instrument of collaboration, instead of chaotic conflict. And collaboration means giving something up. If it be out of the question, then we must resign ourselves to the abandonment of hope; and that also is not in human nature.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

August 12th, 1939.

No. 456.

September 1939.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
FULL REVIEWS	369
LORD HALDANE'S LATER YEARS; DEFENCE AS THE BEST ATTACK; CHINA AT WAR; A STUDY OF HISTORY; MEN AND THE FIELDS; EARLY NORDIC ART.	
SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: REGENT OF HUNGARY; THREE MEN TRIED; THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH; THE COUNTRYMAN'S ENGLAND	382

LORD HALDANE'S LATER YEARS.

The second volume of the official biography of Lord Haldane,* though shorter and less interesting than the first, is equally indispensable to our understanding of the man. No one had done so much to prepare the country for war, and no one was treated with such ingratitude when it came. He was too noble to be embittered, and the last thirteen years of his life, the period covered in these pages, reveal him as a great public servant in many fields. He was a rare, almost a unique example, of the trained philosopher who was also a constructive thinker and a skilled administrator. Sir Frederick Maurice writes with the sympathy of a friend and the admiration of a colleague. The closing chapter, entitled Haldane's Public Services, is a fine tribute, every word of which is well deserved.

No statesman of his time, or perhaps of any time, believed in the value of education with such conviction, and no one contributed so effectively to the good cause. When his work for the army was over, this became the chief concern of his public life. The nominal reason why he transferred his allegiance from the Liberals to Labour in 1922 was the lack of

* *Haldane, 1915-1928*. By Sir F. Maurice. Faber & Faber. 18s.

interest which he detected among most of the leaders of his old party in "education in the widest sense." A letter to his sister, however, shows that this was not the whole story. "Asquith and Grey are making an effort to stage a Liberal revival, but the Liberal Party as we knew it has been killed, and there is, I think, very little chance of its being galvanised into life. . . . Old-fashioned middle-class Liberalism is out of touch with Labour and its ideals."

When the first Labour Government, in which Haldane served as Lord Chancellor, had fallen in the autumn of 1924, he dictated a memorandum on that short-lived and disappointing experiment. "I am glad I joined the Labour Party. It has made mistakes, but its reality rests on this, that it is the party that is most in contact with the democracy of this country. . . . I think that it will prove in the end to be the party that has really averted upheaval. It may progress slowly, but it seems to me to be progressing surely." Ramsay MacDonald, he added, was a man of remarkable ability, and he had acquired that rare gift, an International Mind. His weakness as Prime Minister was that he failed to give sufficient attention to the various Departments of State. In changing his party, needless to say, Haldane abandoned none of his old political beliefs. He had never been and never became a Socialist in the orthodox party sense, though, like the rest of us, he desired the activity of the State to be increased in many directions. Dying in 1928, at the age of 72, the year before the second Labour Government, it is useless to speculate on what his attitude would have been in the split of 1931.

Perhaps the most interesting revelation in this volume is contained in a letter to Haldane from Sir Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a few days after the fall of the Labour Government. "You will, I feel sure, be interested, perhaps even gratified, to learn (what I tell you in strict confidence) that we have now proof that Zinovieff has admitted to the Soviet Government in Moscow having sent the letter of September 15th. In the discussion on the subject he advised that the only line that the Soviet Government could take was to deny the whole story, which was accordingly done." The episode has given rise to so much controversy and recrimination that one regrets that the nature of the proof is not revealed.

Haldane began life as a student of philosophy, and he was working at it to the end. His larger works, *The Pathway to Reality* and *The Reign of Relativity* are not easy reading, and indeed he never excelled, either with tongue or pen, in the brief and lucid presentation of a case. But at the end of his life he summarised his beliefs in a little book entitled *Human Experience* and in a brochure *Mind and Reality*, written a few months before his death, which any educated reader can understand. He owed more to Hegel than to any other thinker, and there is a restfulness and serenity in all his philosophical utterances which reminds us of the great German idealists. Like them he regarded creeds as provisional and imperfect formulations of what can never be apprehended by finite minds; but like them he never doubted that "the more things are interpreted as spiritual, the more they are found to be real." In closing the volume we feel we have been in the company of one of the wisest, kindest, cleverest and most useful men of his time.

G. P. G.

DEFENCE AS THE BEST ATTACK.

At a moment when the nation is straining to the utmost in preparation for war the proper employment of its armaments and man-power in the event of hostilities is clearly a matter of the gravest importance to every thinking individual. It is thus most timely that this problem should receive dispassionate analysis by an outstanding military thinker, Captain Liddell Hart, in his new work, *The Defence of Britain*.* Writing with the knowledge and experience of the expert, he approaches the question with a fresh and critical, yet constructive, mind which is eager to benefit from the lessons of history and to grasp the realities and needs of the present situation. In some respects no doubt his views clash with orthodox military opinion, while in others, for example army reorganisation, they have received a wide measure of acceptance. Part of this work is necessarily of a technical character, but the enunciation of principles governing the general conduct of a war can, and ought to, be considered by the layman, given the necessary factual and technical hypotheses.

Captain Liddell Hart's approach to the question of gener-

* *The Defence of Britain*. By Liddell Hart. Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d. net. Pp. 121.

war strategy rests upon what he considers to be "the fundamental military conditions of the present time," namely "the increasing value of machine-power in comparison with man-power," industrial and economic resources and the growing advantage of defence over attack. The former's superiority was a fundamental lesson of the Great War and has since steadily increased with the emergence of new and improved weapons. "To give the offensive an adequate prospect of success the force which attempts it seems to need at least a three-to-one superiority of strength over the defence—reckoned . . . as 'power units': the fire-power multiplied by mobility of artillery, tanks, and the aircraft employed to support the land forces." Even where this, or a greater ratio, exists, the offensive may well exhaust itself and recoil with deadly effect against the attackers themselves. This is the lesson of the German offensive of 1918 and, in the author's view, the general experience in military history. In the majority of battles, "the loser was the army which was the first to commit itself to the attack." History offers "overwhelming evidence that the counter-offensive, after the enemy has overstrained himself in the offensive, has been the most decisive form of action." Moreover, historically the British soldier has had a natural aptitude for the defensive. If Marlborough's tactics were an exception, their success was mainly due to his genius and to the large non-British element in his armies.

In the air, while "the offensive may still have the superiority," defence prospects are improving and there are "signs that air attack is not so overwhelming as popular fears anticipated." A knock-out blow from the air can be prevented by anti-aircraft defence, and in this connection the author considers that too much weight can be given to the restraining effects of counter-bombing attacks. It is at sea that the gravest menace may well exist. Under modern conditions the method of close blockade is "hardly feasible" and the system of distant blockade and convoys may be ineffective with a hostile Italy and operational Atlantic bases in Spain for marauding enemy ships.

Captain Liddell Hart strenuously argues that our war aim should be not to win by offensive action but to demonstrate, not exhausting the enemy's resources and conserving our own, the utmost, that we cannot lose. Germany will succumb

only to economic pressure: and it would be disastrous folly to attempt an Anglo-French offensive, at least in the early stages of the conflict, when the Axis Powers enjoy much greater military strength. On the other hand assault against the Maginot Line has not much chance of success. The author acknowledges the necessity, since the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia, of a British Expeditionary Field Force to France, but he stresses that it should be a mechanised and not an infantry force. Its main function should be to reinforce, where necessary, the French defence and to be available to stem any invasion on the flanks through Belgium or Switzerland. Had the B.E.F. in August 1914 been used to reinforce the Belgian resistance and not in conjunction with the ill-conceived French offensive the German advance might well have been broken at once. Moreover, a mechanised force, being by its nature in reserve, may well discourage the French from embarking upon unprofitable offensive action. Although the French army have learnt from the Great War the appalling risks of attack, Captain Liddell Hart fears that they may be pressed to launch a general offensive as the only means of assisting the Poles. "We should be wise to insist that this mechanised reinforcement should be taken as an emergency insurance rather than as an indefinite land commitment." We must retain sufficient forces available for reinforcements which might well become necessary outside France, as for example in or near the Western Mediterranean where there might develop scope for an effective offensive. We must, however, be careful to avoid national exhaustion through land operations, remembering that priority must be given to our sea and air power. By a policy of general strategic defence and preserving our economic superiority we should wear down the enemy in a conflict of exhaustion. In short, Captain Liddell Hart reverses the motto and declares that defence now forms the best attack.

Captain Liddell Hart has much to say upon army reform, including strategic and structural organisation, personnel, training, air-defence and the Territorial Army, in the light of the international situation and modern conditions. He has played, of course, a very prominent part in pressing reforms and recognition has been given to much that he has urged. It must suffice here to state his view that "more has been done in Mr. Hore-Belisha's two years of office than has been

achieved before in a generation." Much remains to be done and Captain Liddell Hart has criticisms to make with respect, *inter alia*, to War Office organisation, wastage of talent under the present system of promotion, training, drill and tactics, including the low tactical level of the Territorial infantry.

CHINA AT WAR.*

Freda Utley is the author of that enlightening and first-hand survey of Japan's position, called *Japan's Feet of Clay*, a very readable volume which appeared just at the Japanese invasion of China, and which remains an excellent guide to Japan's economic state. She has now returned from some months spent as a newspaper correspondent to the front Chinese lines. As she ruefully remarks, little of the news she sent appeared in her London paper—a complaint made by other correspondents to the Far East; not so much, one hopes, because editors are unwilling, but because the situation in Europe goes from crisis to crisis, and blots out other interests. It is perhaps better that we should be able to have Miss Utley's impressions, not as scattered items, but as a whole picture, and accompany her on her tours of inspection. Her book is, therefore, an eyewitness picture. Miss Utley took risks and endured miseries, and she writes out of the fullness of her experience. Her conversations with the Chinese leaders, specially the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang are full of pith. She is an admirer of both, but not a blind one, and gives them credit for believing them willing to accept criticism, when offered by a friend.

Miss Utley, like every other Western observer, was intolerably affected by the sufferings of the Chinese wounded. I endorse her query whether the Generalissimo's continuation of the traditional Chinese attitude toward the scholar is right or wrong, that he must be preserved whoever else perish. Does not it result in a loss of leadership and a spirit of callousness towards the peasant soldier which is both inhumane and bad policy? Yet, while I query, I ruminate: for at the back of this resistance to Japan, its *fons et origo*, is Chinese philosophy; and Chinese mentality must work in its own way. The Chinese, for instance, employed German advisers of disjunction and unquestioned loyalty, to help them train their

army, though not, it seems, their medical organisation. When I have asked why these were German, in all seriousness I would be told by my Chinese friends that Germany won the Great War in the military sense, and only lost it through civilian weakness. Now, however, that it seems doubtful whether China's wisest way of warfare is to attack in mass formations and fortify great cities, one wonders if the Generalissimo, knowing his own people, might not have done his job better without too much foreign methodisation. This last consideration makes me weigh Miss Utley's criticisms. She found herself, for instance, out of sympathy with his New Life Movement, that basic political philosophy which postulates that it is the example of the leaders which infiltrates down to the people. Very far back in Chinese culture is that idea found. And, when one comes to examine it, is it not the example of Hitler, of Stalin, of the leaders of the Communists of the Eighth Route Army in North-West China, which is of supreme importance to their people? "As the wind blows, so the grass bends," is the classic Chinese phrase on the subject.

Another focus for Miss Utley's thoughtful and useful criticism is the administration of relief. But it must be remembered that Miss Utley in the main was visiting "Free, or Fighting China." Behind the lines of the Japanese are nearly eight hundred cities and ports; and though they hold, and that insecurely, only some fifty of these and the railways, the greatest mass of China's population is, more or less, in their grip. It is these cities which first suffered, and still to-day suffer the frightfulness, rape and cruelty which have been Japan's deliberate policy for a "New Asia." It was not surprising that the Generalissimo wrote to the foreign Red Cross and asked its members to undertake the relief of these unfortunates. "They are Chinese as much as those here in Free China," was the burden of his letter, "and as we cannot help them ourselves, we beg that you will." Seeing that from his harassed government half the relief funds for these sufferers have come, he had a right to speak. Nevertheless, the sufferings of the wounded Chinese soldiers, fighting, if ever men did, for Democracy, cry to heaven and to us. Old beliefs and customs die hard, and too often their own people seem unfeeling, gripped by the fear of ill-luck, or that they might have to provide an expensive coffin, if a wounded man die on their hands. That is where the educational and social

* Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d. Illustrated. With map.

efforts of the "partisan" armies will be of value. At first, moreover, there was not a single nurse, doctor or bandage for all the many thousands of wounded in the armies which took the first shock of battle : and the only means of taking medical help was by spasmodic personal effort, full of danger and ineffective. Meanwhile, Shanghai with its millions was shelled and bombed, and huge refugee populations were in direst need. To-day, in Nanking, the chapel of the University is still the only granary for thousands of most miserable people utterly dependent upon its uncertain stores. But in Free China, things have begun to move a little : and that fine Red Cross leader, Dr. Robert Lim, is now organising medical help, although on far too small a scale for the stupendous needs. It has been a major catastrophe that the United States should have been smitten with one of her periodic attacks of fear lest she should in any way "pull Britain's chestnuts out of the fire for her," so that her gifts of relief to China these two years of invasion have been far beneath her usual generosity. Indeed, none of the funds has approached what was sent to Japan after the great earthquake. One compensation, however, is that, owing to the lowness of exchange, even small gifts from Britain buy double their former value in China. A steady flow of such gifts in money and kind is constantly going out, and 70 per cent. of it comes from that much-maligned but unfailing spring of charity, human and divine, the Christian Church!

Miss Utley's book should be read for any serious understanding of China's problems in her warfare. It is outstanding, and gives valuable information which cannot be had elsewhere. Nor is it despondent. A Chinese friend wrote me lately that Madame Chiang had been visiting her in Hong Kong "for dental treatment," and added : "She is full of faith in God, pride in the Chinese people, and is sure China will win." I think Miss Utley would agree.

Dr. The photographs are personal and topical. The map is clear.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

A STUDY OF HISTORY.*

It is not unfitting that in his preface Professor Arnold Toynbee should recall St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, for

* *A Study of History*. By A. J. Toynbee. Vols. IV, V, and VI. Clarendon Press. 70s.

both men essay the task of discerning the future of civilisation amid the dangers of the present. The Vandals were besieging the city walls of Hippo just as other Vandals are besieging, in bloodless war, the city walls of London. Our author confesses that he has often fortified his soul by considering the fate of St. Augustine's work which survived to inform the minds and inspire the souls of Christians from that far-off day to this. So too we hope and believe that his *magnum opus* will survive to inform the minds and inspire the souls of Christians and of all who read his inspiring and stimulating pages. In these three volumes he continues the labours of its three predecessors with the same fertility of imagination, the same keenness of judgment, the same speculative subtlety and the same enormous knowledge. *A Study of History* are easily the most elaborate and the most valuable volumes of Professor Toynbee, those which have cost him most toil and afford the most complete conception of his abilities.

Volume IV concerns itself with the breakdown of civilisations ; Volume V with this disintegration, a problem that occupies the whole of Volume VI. Each volume contains annexes. One in the fourth volume raises the question of the true catastrophe, the breakdown or the birth of a civilisation. Others in the fifth volume discuss Roman policy towards primitive peoples, demonstrating the unequalled power the Romans possessed of assimilating such peoples ; the relationship between Marxism, Socialism and Christianity ; and historic fact and "heroic" tradition. The annexes in the sixth volume treat of such matters as the analysis of correspondences between the Gospels and the stories of pagan heroes ; the life and death of Socrates ; and the economy of truth. In fact, close on two hundred pages examine the problem of Christus Patiens in its manifold aspects. These three volumes, even more than their three predecessors, recognise and emphasise the importance of the moral and the spiritual in the life and the movement of humanity. They represent history as one great whole guided to some extent by principles and proceeding to issues through an orderly and disorderly series of stages.

It is clearly out of our power to consider the many breakdowns of civilisation recorded by the author. Let us take one that is never long out of the minds of those who dwell on such matters, and who cannot help dwelling on them at this

moment? No one can read of the Roman Empire without feeling once again the thrill which stirs one at the sight of the amphitheatre at Verona, or of the ruins of Aqua Claudia, or of the lonely wall that crowns the escarpments of the Northumbrian hills—the sense of the greatness and of the fall of Rome, which must give pause to any nation called to the wide responsibilities of empire. The age of the Antonines witnessed the absence of the colour bar, the blessings of the Pax Romana, the longest period of peace the world has ever known, the greatest free trade empire, international culture, a world State, universal law and administration as good as human frailty can achieve. Gibbon, like Mommsen, looked on those distant days as the happiest humanity had known. None the less, the men of the Antonines were expecting the crash of the world, and the savage self-denial of the Egyptian hermits testified to their belief that life was not worth living. Even the wisest of the Roman Emperors gave it as a counsel of perfection, that the man who felt God's call within him should be ready for death as for a trumpet's call.

In his six volumes Professor Toynbee enables us to see that at the beginning of the fourth century Rome had no real rival on earth. Sovereign of the world, she had conquered Europe, Asia and Africa; she had afforded proof of a vitalising power strong enough to absorb all kindreds and tongues without ceasing to be herself. The conquered had ceased to complain and had adopted the language of their conquerors. It is then that Rome despaired of the future and uttered an intense cry of distress. From many points of view the author helps us to understand this cry. The proscriptions had brought about what Seeck calls the extirpation of the best, and in his land the concentration camp now takes their place. The purpose of the proscriptions was to destroy the best, the strongest, the most formidable; and thus the survival of the unfittest was secured, thanks to despotism and the servility which is its inevitable concomitant. There is truth—if not the whole truth—in Seeck's view. Consequently, there is loss of energy, there is loss of spirit, and there is a failure of nerve which is quite incompatible with progress. It was a world where the grave fear was that the machine of State would break down, and ultimately Rome ceased to produce characters able enough to work its ever-growing complexity. Spengler regards this decay as an example of the principle that

“Zivilisation is the fate which awaits every Kultur.” By Zivilisation he means the “mandarism” to which bureaucracy falls a victim, and by Kultur he means the product of the creative spirit.

The degeneration did not display itself merely in the sterility due to the lessened inclination of men to propagate the race, for it is strikingly shown in the want of intellectual originality which marks the Imperial period from the beginning. What did the Romans of the Empire originate? We know of nothing. No great writer succeeded Juvenal or Tacitus. No orator rivalled Cicero, no poet explored the unexhausted possibilities of the hexameter as Virgil left it in the later books of the *Aeneid*. For three centuries what fresh movement is there in native Roman literature? Poverty of ideas, incapacity for hard thinking, and excessive deference to authority characterised the Roman world. We detect a symptom of degeneracy in the absolutism of the Empire, which we attribute to the moral weakness of the Senate. “Rome, thou has lost the breed of noble bloods.” More, much more, one might write, but we have written enough to show the power that Professor Toynbee can communicate to the understanding of the past and—what is no less important—to the understanding of the future. We lay down his book for the moment conscious that we shall often take it up for the light and leading he freely lavishes upon us.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

MEN AND THE FIELDS.*

This is the latest addition to the studies of country life, more especially in East Anglia, with which Mr. Adrian Bell has delighted us since his *Corduroy* in 1930, and it is worthy to rank among them. Like his *confrère*, Mr. A. G. Street, he is no mere *litterateur* (though his literary gift is undeniable), but a practical farmer, with inside knowledge of husbandry carried on through the changing seasons, and a real understanding of country folk. We meet them here, good companions all—farmers and their wives, shepherd and ploughman, blacksmith and miller, the handweaver, the hedger, and thatcher—and hear their talk, ruminating or racy. We enter great old farm-houses, and little old churches, where the

* *Men and the Fields*. By Adrian Bell. B. T. Batsford, 1939. 8s. 6d.

churchyard is often a farmyard. The farm beasts, and even the farm implements, take on fresh life for us. We join in the gay, if laborious, communal pea-picking, visit the cattle market and the County Show, with its humours and its most modern exhibits of tractors and fertilisers. Present-day difficulties are described, and the valiant fight the farmer puts up against them; a tragedy like death it is when they prove too much for him and a farm has to be sold up. Old-time hardships are recalled—the stone-picking, for instance, for which women and children used to be paid one farthing per pail. Mr. Bell has a keen perception of Nature in her varying moods, and gives us accurate and charming word-pictures not only of the cultivated fields but of woodland and riverside, their birds and flowers. He is most at home in Suffolk, and we assume that, where no local indication is supplied, the description is of that county; some chapters, however, take us also to Sussex, the West Country and Wales. With all the changes that have taken place, we are made to feel the essential continuity underlying agricultural life.

The book is produced in the style we have learnt to associate with its publishers, and Mr. John Nash has illustrated it sympathetically with bold, effective colour lithographs and delicate line drawings, some of them full of humour.

E. G. S.

EARLY NORDIC ART.*

The book under review is a most wholesome and necessary corrective of the ideas on art of those connoisseurs who, having been reared on the æsthetic standards of the nineteenth century, still cherish a belief in the permanent and unshakable superiority of the art of the Italian Renaissance. They may at first feel shocked or repelled by the apparent crudeness and imperfection of the works of art here reproduced; just as many people feel embarrassed and repelled by Expressionism, the modern equivalent of that early art. But Mr. Picton has brought out his main thesis so well that it may be hoped that he will succeed in converting at least some adherents of pseudo-classical harmony to a just appreciation of Nordic art. Northern European art, he maintains,

has always been essentially an art of ornament, whilst Mediterranean art is representational. There is no question of superiority or inferiority of the one art or other—they are simply different: *ars una, species mille*. It clearly follows that the Nordic tribes, when they first come on to the stage of history, by no means lacked artistic achievements and therefore were not obliged to take them over from the South. On the contrary, the author flatly denies that Northern art was, to any large extent, dependent upon Rome; when, at any time in history, southern conceptions influenced northern artists, it has, so Mr. Picton protests, always meant an aberration from their genuine genius and was bound to fail. In accordance with the doctrines of Strzygowski of Vienna University, Mr. Picton traces Northern art back to influences from the Near and Far East: Assyrians, Scyths, Sarmatians, and Armenians are considered the forefathers or at least the godfathers of Teutonic and Keltic artists of the early Middle Ages. It is characteristic, for instance, that Mr. Picton takes the trouble to quote Egyptian, Assyrian, Caucasian, Siberian, Chinese and Hungarian parallels when he tries to answer the question whence and how the technique of stone inlay reached the Nordic peoples. The idea does not seem to have occurred to him that, after all, the Germans might have found and worked it out by themselves. It would be rather disastrous if the wild hypotheses of Professor Strzygowski, which are refuted by practically every continental art-historian except his immediate pupils, should gain admission into this country and thereby disturb the natural growth of a national school of art-historians, through so persuasive an interpreter as Mr. Picton. There can be little doubt that the value of his book is the greater the more he abstains from *jurare in verba magistri*—which he, fortunately enough, does more and more as the book progresses.

“Northern European art in the early Middle Ages and its dependence upon the East” would describe its scope more accurately than the present title does. In fact, the book contains a comprehensive survey of the artistic achievements of the Teutonic and Keltic tribes and their racial predecessors from late neolithic times to the end of the so-called Ottonian period of art, i.e. from about 2000 B.C. to A.D. 1050. The author uses the term “German” for what is generally called “Germanic” or rather “Nordic” in the widest sense. Thus overthrowing a well-established technical term is unnecessary

* *Early German Art and Its Origins*, from the Beginnings to about 1050. By Harold Picton, with a foreword by Professor Josef Strzygowski. B. T. Batsford. 21s.

as well as annoying—it even makes him speak of “we English Germans.” It would, however, be unfair to dwell on this one whim. On the contrary, the present book deserves the highest praise as a scholarly achievement. It is not only the first of its kind in English, but altogether the first. A perfunctory glance through the footnotes shows the impressive amount of previous research work done by Mr. Picton, who seems to have spared himself no trouble to make himself familiar with the vast and scattered literature on his subject as contained in the remotest books and periodicals of half a dozen European languages. It is the more surprising that he seems to have overlooked altogether the instructive dissertations on medieval portraiture which have been published in Germany from 1923 to 1934. Most of his identifications and dates in this respect need correction. The 101 plates with several hundreds of illustrations are an excellent mine of information in themselves. Every sphere of art is adequately represented, ranging from neolithic and bronze-age pottery to the marvels of Irish and Frankish illuminated manuscripts of the Carolingian age and the precious works of German goldsmiths of the eleventh century. S. H. STEINBERG.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Regent of Hungary,* by Owen Rutter, based on Baroness Doblhoff's authorised biography, provides English readers with the first full account of the life and work of Admiral Horthy. Making all necessary allowance for the bright colours in works of this official character, no reader can doubt that it is the story of a great patriot, who has done far more for his country than any other living man. There is nothing intellectually impressive about him, though his war services in the Austro-Hungarian navy were distinguished. His strength lies in his character, his steadiness, his disinterestedness, his refusal to despair when the realm of the Hapsburgs broke up in the autumn of 1918, when Tisza was murdered, when the short-lived Karolyi régime was succeeded by the nightmare of Béla Kun, and when the Roumanian army earned universal detestation by its robberies. There is a famous saying that Austria during the Thirty Years War was to be found in Wallenstein's camp. Immediately after the World War Hungary was to be found in the little army which Horthy, though a sailor by profession, collected round him and with which he marched into Budapest.

* Rich & Cowan. 18s.

Even then his troubles were not at an end. The most poignant pages in this volume are those which describe the two attempts of the unfortunate ex-Emperor to regain the throne. The Regent, an old *aide-de-camp* of Francis Joseph, has been a monarchist all his life; but in resisting Karl's claims he felt that he was saving his country from the certainty of invasion and foreign domination. It was a cruel decision to have to make, but he has never regretted it. At the age of 70 Horthy retains his health, his serenity and his influence. Prime Ministers in Hungary, as elsewhere, come and go, but the Regent will be a difficult man to replace.

* * * * *

Dr. Edgar Stern-Rubarth's *Three Men Tried** tells the dramatic and memorable story of the fight of Austen Chamberlain, Stresemann and Briand for a new Europe. Written by an intimate friend and collaborator of the great German statesman, it ranks with Antonina Vallentin's biography among the most authoritative sources for the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic. To read this brilliant narrative in 1939, when the storm clouds are black above our heads, is enough to break one's heart. There is a touching picture of Briand, during his official visit to Berlin, going privately to the grave of Stresemann with a wreath bearing the inscription: "Briand, soldier of European peace, has laid this wreath on the coffin of his brother in arms." The author was at Stresemann's side during the historic discussions of Locarno, where Chamberlain's very human desire to reach an agreement on his birthday speeded up the Conference. It was a false dawn, for neither the French nor the German statesman could speak for a united nation, and both were soon to die. The hero of this striking book was a good European as well as a great patriot. "Stresemann's ultimate hope, as he once confessed to me, was to free the Rhineland, to recover Eupen-Malmédy and the Saar, to perfect Austria's *Anschluss*, and to have, under mandate or otherwise, an African colony where essential tropical raw materials could be secured and an outlet created for the surplus energy of the younger generation. An organised Europe, its trade flowering in common, and its people taught to delight in the greatest riches of our civilisation, was to crown that work." Had he lived a few years longer, the author believes, "Hitler would not have had the ghost of a chance to win through to supreme power." This, of course, is mere speculation. What is not in doubt is that Brüning, despite his lofty character and patriotic devotion, was unable to cope with the economic crisis or to prevent the youth of Germany flocking to the party which promised it a new and better life.

* * * * *

In his latest book Sir John Marriott has written a useful account of *The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth*† which should prove valuable both in schools and to the general public. The reader

* Duckworth. 12s. 6d.

† Ivor Nicholson & Watson. 12s. 6d. net.

will obtain from these lucid pages a reliable comprehensive analysis of imperial development from the early days of English expansion until the present time and also historical sketches of each Dominion, India and the more important colonies. The smaller and less significant possessions receive, perhaps inevitably in a volume of moderate size, only the barest attention. While the work is in large measure a factual survey, interpreted in the light of the author's own very extensive studies and of the work of other distinguished authorities, there are naturally expressions of views open to discussion. For example, in his interpretation of the Commonwealth to-day, Sir John overstates, like many others, the importance of the Crown without sufficiently considering other bonds, such as those of freedom, democracy, race, language and self-interest. This volume should serve well the purpose of an introductory history of this vast subject and spur on the reader to deeper study.

* * * * *

The latest addition to *The English Scene* series is a delightful sketch of *The Countryman's England** by Mr. John Moore, who "babbles" from his own experience of the many facets which compose the typical village and its life. This lightly drawn yet penetrating sketch is full of personalities, from the squire to the poacher, depicting without extravagant or romantic distortion their varied lives, their work, outlook and aspirations. In a real sense this is a living portrait, created from personal experience, of a live rural community too frequently forgotten or misrepresented. Mr. Moore is frank, understanding and outspoken; condemning, for example, the traditionalist who glorifies the insanitary tumbledown "old world" cottage and who strives to revive folk dancing, maypoles, reed music and the like among villagers who quite legitimately prefer and enjoy jazz, radio, cinemas and motor bicycles. As a museum the village is doomed; as a living organic thing it must accept developments due to profound economic and social causes. Although in the process much is lost that is loved, yet, as the author points out, country life is mostly enriched by modern changes.

* Seeley Service & Co. 8s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1939.

THE GREAT CHALLENGE.

AUGUST 4th, 1914 : September 1st, 1939. The one is not a mere senseless iteration of the other. It is only that the building of the great World Order which we attempted has proved a harder task, and we less skilful builders, than we thought, and we must gird ourselves for a new effort. The challenge is the same, if deeper and more clearly realised. We have the same enemies and fight against the same principles. We called it then "Prussian militarism" and explained it as a doctrine that "Might is Right"; but now the Prussian doctrine has spread like poison through the world, reinforced by a madly inflamed nationalism: "Might is Right when used by us; Right itself can never be Right if used against us."

But there are great differences. The war of 1914 came to most Englishmen with a shock of astonishment and horror. We had long ceased to think of war as a possibility among civilised nations. An eminent publicist had just declared that war in Western Europe was an eventuality which need not be considered. A great journalist had written: "War between us and our German cousins is unthinkable." The war was a shock and every new horror imported into the methods of war by the German army was a fresh shock, the "frightfulness" in Belgium, the poison gas, the unrestricted submarine warfare and the like. This time the war has come after long expectation, long and patient efforts to prevent it. We are not surprised by it, and shall not be surprised by any devilry that may accompany it. Far worse men are in power in Germany now though more precariously enthroned.

We are naturally, after this long expectation, much better prepared than in 1914. Then we started with an attempt to carry on "business as usual"; now we start as fully organised as in 1917 after three years of fighting. We are better prepared in thought. In 1914 a bewildered though resolute nation was inspired to a sense of its high duty by the splendid appeals of Mr. Asquith and others; but by now the country has had not only four years of war but

VOL. CLVI.

twenty years of soul-searching experience, guided by constant League of Nations teaching; and ideas towards which we were merely groping in 1914 have now become a national possession. Before both crises our Government had worked resolutely for peace. But it would scarcely have been conceivable in 1914 to make the first step in the war a thrice repeated peaceful invasion of Germany by a British air force distributing millions and millions of leaflets. And, prudently pacific as Grey's policy was, we had not then a Prime Minister who had been jeered at by half the world for his fanatical devotion to peace; who had—wisely or unwisely—sacrificed prestige, allies, diplomatic advantages and perhaps even military strength in the hope of preserving the peace of Europe. The world argued about Grey's peace-making; it can never argue about Chamberlain's or Daladier's. It can never argue about the general attitude of Britain or France. Later there may be changes. War fever is a disease that regularly follows the guns. High principles are apt to be forgotten; and Truth, it has been well said, is the first casualty. But now at the beginning we can satisfy Aristotle's claim: we "make war for the sake of peace."

And against us there is what? One sees a tendency to speak of "one man" as the cause of all the evil. That is an exaggeration. It is at least a whole government; and as far as the fighting goes, I fear we shall find it a whole nation. Of course Mr. Hitler could have avoided the war. In that sense it is he who has made it. But the first of many riddles concerning Hitler is the riddle of his rise to power; why was an undistinguished, raucous, verbose, mendacious and half-insane Austrian mystic accepted as the adored Leader of a great nation? The answer is clear enough. He represented with paranoiac intensity the prevailing emotion, open and secret, conscious and sub-conscious, of a proud and warlike people, maddened by defeat. When a certain Oxford scholar asked Hitler what exactly his policy was, Hitler answered in one passionate word: "Deutschland!" That was a cry which could wake an echo in every German heart. Treacherous and openly cynical as Hitler might be in other matters, to one cause he was inflexibly true. His whole policy was "Deutschland," and naturally Deutschland loved him and accepted the queer mythology with which he explained the inexplicable

defeat. It is worth while looking back to his earlier speeches. "Let us be inhuman! If we rescue Germany we have done the greatest deed in the world. Let us do wrong! If we rescue Germany we have swept away the greatest wrong in the world. Let us be immoral! If our people is rescued we have opened a way for the return of morality." (April 20th, 1923.)

One seems to hear Danton: "*Que mon nom soit flétri, que la France soit sauvée!*" It is an emotion that often occurs in times of excitement, and Hitler likes such excitement to be permanent. While it lasts it is impervious to reason and remonstrance. The comfort is that it is essentially insane, and the majority of mankind even in a defeated and exasperated country do not like long-continued insanity. It is impossible to dogmatise about the general feelings of the German people. The kindly and thoughtful nation that we once knew has been somewhat changed. One must remember the destruction of the leisured classes by the inflation; the intellectual impoverishment caused by the Nazi persecutions; the habitual indifference of the German people to political questions; the terrific censorship, the systematic lies, the espionage. Perhaps it is roughly true that Nazi home policy is generally disliked, but Nazi foreign policy, with its long list of successes, and successes without war, is generally applauded. Its popularity will presumably last while its success lasts. It would be much the same in any country.

The common tendency in England, influenced perhaps by continual German propaganda, is to blame the Treaty of Versailles as the cause of these wild reactions. But that fails to account for Italy and Japan; and besides such an explanation is rather unimaginative. The Treaty no doubt had certain grave faults. It was made, no doubt, by governments specially chosen for their war-making qualities, not their aptitude for making peace. But it was not the provisions of the Treaty that exasperated German feeling; it was the fact of defeat. The Treaty itself, under Wilsonian influences, was a great deal more enlightened than average public opinion at the time in the countries that had suffered from Germany's war methods, and more competently framed than much of the policy of the Allied Governments afterwards. But that is an old story now. The errors of France and Britain aggravated one

another. Deserted by America and imperfectly supported by Great Britain, France under Poincaré believed it certain that a war of revenge must come, and devoted herself to the impossible task of keeping Germany permanently weak. Great Britain, lazy and irresolute, disliked French harshness and therefore refused to give France the assurances that would have enabled her not to be harsh, while at the same time the British Governments missed all their opportunities for strengthening the Social-Democrats and Liberals in Germany and allowed them to bear the blame of the defeat and its consequences, while the classes that were authors of all the evil were idealised as heroes.

It is easy to blame particular governments and statesmen. That has been done quite sufficiently and quite convincingly. But if we assume that, roughly speaking, popularly elected governments fairly represent their peoples, the fault lies not in this or that government but in our whole civilisation. The civilised nations of the world do, by this time, form an international community, and they will not accept the elementary duties without which no community can live an orderly life. It became clear at the end of the World War that Europe could not safely continue to be an anarchy of irresponsible independent sovereign states, each free to make war on a weaker neighbour when it chose, while the rest remained "Neutrals," free to look on and make money out of both sides equally. The international community must be accepted as a fact; it must be able to protect itself. A vast majority of the human race—90 per cent., according to President Roosevelt—wish to live in peace and are content to obey the law. Ten per cent. are determined on conquest by fraud or violence. Yet so wedded are the majority to their traditional isolation, so insensitive to the common interest and the indivisibility of peace, that they allow the 10 per cent. to work their will, spreading ever wider the area of conquest, tyranny and persecution. Most people in England are convinced that one clear statement by the American Government and Congress a few months ago would have prevented the present war. Nearly all thoughtful Americans saw it at the time. A similar statement from Britain and America in 1931 would have prevented the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. A similar statement by Britain and France in 1935 would have prevented the invasion of Abyssinia, though

indeed little danger of that could have arisen if the Manchurian aggression had been stopped. The parallel with the Chicago gangsters is exact. The orderly inhabitants of Chicago far outnumbered the gangsters. They hated the gangsters. They could easily have stopped them. But they lacked some sense of corporate duty. Everyone preferred to get out of the way and not risk being shot. Fortunately in that case the Federal Government, which was out of reach of the shots, came in like a god from the machine to settle Al Capone. But the nations have no god from the machine to rescue them. They have only their own corporate strength; and that, it seems, they have hitherto been unwilling to use. They have seen aggression raging; they have seen one country after another devoured; and instead of stopping it by a united effort they have preferred to compete, in sovereign independence, for the privilege of being eaten last.

"We must learn or perish," said Sir Edward Grey. Western civilisation, as a whole, has not yet learnt its lesson. Students of international affairs have learnt it; statesmen of the more enlightened sort have learnt it. In this country, to judge from the results of the Peace Ballot and from the electoral statements of candidates for Parliament, the great mass of the people are at least, if rightly led, ready to accept it; and the same is probably true of France. Those two peoples have had continuous education on the subject. But, of course, the vast mass of unthinking people in Europe and America have not troubled to learn: they have gone on repeating the old watch-words and moving in the old ruts that were good enough a century ago for an entirely different situation. It needed another shock to waken them. But perhaps they are awake now.

The late war was called a War to end War; and honestly so called. To put an end to war was genuinely our purpose in 1914. It is our purpose now. "If we do not end war, war will end us," said Lord Bryce. Let us consider this point critically. Some will say that the conception of a War to end War is intrinsically absurd. War can only continue war. Only peace can end it. The answer is plain enough: Aggression unresisted is encouraged to spread; it is successful, it is accepted as "glorious" and conquest becomes the normal aim of ambitious statesmen. Therefore aggression must be checked,

and it can only be checked by superior force ; if possible, by merely showing that the superior force is there and ready to be used ; at the worst, by using it.

The objector will add : " Experience has shown the folly and uselessness of a War to end War. We have tried it already. We won the last war ; and it did not end war, but only made another war certain." The answer again is simple. Of course victory is not enough ; it is the use made of the victory that matters. The League of Nations was the first organised attempt to establish a peaceful World Order ; the first attempt came near to succeeding, but has not succeeded. It only remains for us to try again. The alternative is anarchy and despair.

What then are the necessary conditions ? First, the forces of Order and Peace must be stronger, and decisively stronger, than the forces of disorder and war. " You mean," it will be said, " that the Haves must be stronger than the Have-nots ? You will fight to maintain the *status quo* ? " If that were the only issue, I should say Yes. The Have and Have-not catchword is itself silly and false ; it is not the real Have-nots, like Denmark and Finland, that make trouble ; it is a few strong nations who have deliberately preferred guns to butter, with all the implications of that preference. But supposing it were true ; admitting that property in the world, as in every civil society, is unfairly divided, does that give a right to every poor man with a revolver to rob his rich neighbour ? Of course we support the existing order against lawless violence, if that is to be the only issue.

But obviously it is not the issue at all. It is we, the makers and supporters of the League of Nations, the International Court, the Mandate system, the I.L.O., who are aiming at the new and better world. It is the gangsters, the believers in violence, who are refusing to advance ; who are keeping alive the very worst features of our present social order and reviving barbarities which we thought the world had outgrown.

There is no alternative. One necessary condition of a good world order is the possession of superior strength by the forces of law and peace. They possessed it not long ago. In 1931 the League of Nations had an enormous preponderance against any law-breaker except in the Far East. England and France were strongly armed ; Germany had for some years been arming secretly, but was still comparatively powerless.

Then came the Disarmament Conference. It represented an obligation under the Covenant, and it came like an answer to the prayer of the whole human race. None who witnessed it can ever forget the immense deputation from the wounded of the Great War, the deep emotion of the first weeks, nor yet the long years of close study by experts which preceded the conference. That conference could have been made a success. If the British Government had put its full force into supporting it, that alone would probably have made it a success. But the great governments did not care ; European civilisation as a whole had neither the public spirit nor the intelligence to see that its vital interests were involved. The Conference was allowed to fail. That was bad, but what followed was almost incredible. Competition in armaments was deliberately accepted as preferable to agreement in limitation : and then Germany and Italy were quietly allowed to outstrip us in the competition. At every crisis that followed, Abyssinia, China, Czechoslovakia, Spain, our diplomacy was hamstrung. We submitted to outrage and humiliation in ways that were quite unintelligible except on the supposition that we were too weak to resist. The exact facts are not known ; but that seems to have been the belief of our government and was certainly the general belief in Europe. This state of things has at last been corrected. Britain at any rate is very strongly armed ; and the forces of law have inevitably great imponderable resources which are denied to the law-breaker.

But to be strong enough is only half the battle. The League in 1919, as we all remember, was intended to be " So strong that no nation would venture to make war, so just that none would desire to make war." The principle was right ; the execution was spoilt through the many weaknesses of present-day public life. Had the League been stronger it could have been more just towards Germany, though mutual mistrust would have remained. Had it been more just it would have gained in strength, because its main lack was a lack of moral resolution, not of material force. These weaknesses have been fully recognised ; they have been judged, if anything, too harshly by public opinion. But twenty years' experience has taught students of the League system a great deal. The Covenant needs some slight improvements : notably in Articles XI, XVI and XIX, all of which must be made

clearer and more efficacious. The sphere of exclusive national sovereignty must be either directly limited or indirectly obliterated to whatever degree the public opinion of Europe will tolerate. But the real cause of the present disaster, and of the general failure of the League as a preserver of peace, has not been any legal or conventional flaw in its constitution; it has simply lain in the weak will of governments and of peoples. Our western civilisation had in 1919 a glimpse of the new truth that under modern conditions civilised nations cannot live for themselves alone. They cannot maintain unrestricted sovereignty. They form a community and must work for the interests of that community. None can be secure while its neighbours are in danger. They caught a glimpse of this truth but have not continued to see it steadily.

Here there is need for an advance. Great possibilities are open. It may well be possible to bring about some federation or military union for the states of Europe; but if so, it must be inside the League and bound by the principles of the Covenant. We must do nothing to imperil the immense gains which civilisation has already secured from the League system. The International Court alone, with its unbroken success and its unchallenged authority, would have seemed a miracle to the last generation. The Labour Office has wrought a steady improvement in the social conditions of the world year by year, and this last year has done for the coloured races a service estimated by experts as the greatest since the abolition of slavery. The League itself, with all its varied forms of non-political co-operation, for health, communications, finance, for humanitarian and intellectual causes, has given a new impetus to the progress of mankind. Whatever closer union of nations we may be able to construct after the war, we must build on the foundations that exist, not in the air.

There are many dangers. Chief of all is the danger of war psychology, with its blind passions and self-deceptions. It is strikingly absent now. The leaders of the country, from Lord Halifax and Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, and on to the chiefs of the Opposition, could every one of them at this moment be trusted to aim at a sober and unvindictive peace. But who can foretell what the feelings of

the people may be when the intensive bombings begin, or who will be in power at the end of the war? There will be grounds enough for hatred before then.

There is the danger of power politics; the danger of seeking some compromise which may suit the immediate interests of Germany, France and Britain, while leaving the international anarchy of sovereign states uncorrected. It is worth remembering that, apart from objections of principle, a Europe consisting of many small isolated sovereign states would soon be a subject empire of Germany.

There is the American illusion, not the Americans' fault but ours; the danger of being misled by wishful thinking and imagining that the United States are eager to take up a burden which they have always resolutely refused, and ignoring the feelings of the rest of Europe towards a prospect of what they call "Anglo-Saxon domination." Any initiative coming from America must be regarded as a matter of the highest importance; but it should not be either counted upon nor angled for.

It is no easy enterprise that lies before us. We must ask the French and British peoples to endure hardships and perils almost unexampled in history, and at the end to emerge with their heads clear and their hearts not perverted by bitterness. Such a challenge seems almost too hard for average human nature to meet, yet it must be met. Let us hope that the leaders of the nation may have the constancy of mind required and be true at the end of the war to the ideals they have proclaimed at the beginning. In the meantime a great task lies before bodies like the League of Nations Union and other societies whose aim is Peace but who see that Peace must be fought for, the task of maintaining the resolution of a great nucleus within the nation to work and think steadily towards the aim not of mere victory but of victory for the sake of a just World Order and lasting Peace.

GILBERT MURRAY.

FRANCE AT WAR.

EIGHT million men are under arms in France. These figures were mentioned officially by the French Ambassador to Washington. Never has there been a more stupendous mobilisation of the armed forces of any nation. How many men are serving in the German, the Polish and the British armies, I cannot say; but it is certain that nowhere has the entire man-power of a nation responded so quickly and found its appointed place in the battalions so smoothly. The whole thing went like clockwork. I saw something of the muster in Paris, and I afterwards watched the formation of regiments in certain villages of France; and I can therefore testify to the extraordinary efficiency of the military machine that was set in motion on that fatal first of September. Curiously, the French were by no means apprehensive as they were in September of 1938. They had believed that the Germano-Polish dispute would be settled somehow, and in spite of the warnings of M. Daladier to Germany they were incorrigibly optimistic to the very end. It was not that they failed to understand the issue. They knew that what was at stake was not simply the future of Danzig and of the Corridor. The question presented itself to them as a struggle against the German domination of Europe. Yet they thought that a compromise was possible, and that it would be found. Certainly there was no bellicosity in the attitude of the French people. Even after the decree of general mobilisation was published, the average Frenchman was incredulous. He would be back in a week or two! In the almost empty market-place of a little town on the Saturday which preceded the declaration of war—almost empty because the men had received marching orders, and because vehicles had been requisitioned—the conversation was comparatively cheerful. Every year—every six months—the alarm had been sounded, and yet nothing that seemed to touch French interests immediately had happened. Last year there had even been a partial mobilisation, followed by a demobilisation. The cry of “Wolf!” had been raised so often that there was no particular reason to suppose it was true this time. On a dozen occasions we had been told—especially during the fighting in Spain—that we were within two fingers of war; and the Frenchman had learned to shrug his shoulders.

Foreign affairs had begun to bore him. Hitler's threats were not taken too seriously.

And yet, throughout that chequered summer, the menace of war had grown plainer and plainer. It began with the entry of Hitler into Prague. The average easy-going Frenchman was prepared to admit that the Germans had a good case, though their methods were wrong, until they suddenly decided to incorporate Moravia and Bohemia, and to vassalise Slovakia. Here was an action that could not be justified on any moral ground. It was a purely arbitrary exercise of force. Then it was that the great European crisis began. The British stiffened, and perhaps it may be said changed their policy. Henceforward they would resist violence. They took their stand on the Polish question—not that they were opposed to negotiations, but that they were opposed to unilateral revision of the statute of Danzig and to modifications of territorial dispositions by violence. They decided that Poland alone should be judge of her vital interests, and that whenever they were touched the British would unreservedly aid the Poles. Here was a startling innovation, and it should have made the position crystal-clear. The French Government repeated the assurances of England, and left no doubt as to its intentions. Moreover, the French masses approved the Government's emphatic statements. In 1938 many voices were raised in favour of a settlement at almost any price. In 1939 these voices were stilled. There was virtually no opposition to the new policy of firmness. In these conditions it seemed to me, as an experienced diplomatic observer, that war was inevitable. Neither side could retreat. Seldom has it been possible to predict the date of a war with such certainty. It might therefore be thought that the French people, well aware of these facts, were also convinced of the imminence of the settling day. Somewhat to my surprise it was not so. Last year they were anxious; this year they were cheerful. They went off on their holidays joyfully, and disinterested themselves in the problem whose solution was to be so terrible.

So much for the state of mind of the French people. It may be highly important hereafter to put it on record. They felt not the slightest ill-will against Germany. They were not only prepared for a pacific settlement, but they expected such a settlement. In this they under-estimated the aggressiveness

of Hitler, but it is to their credit that they were complacent still. It may be that the advisers of Hitler remarked this apparent indifference, and in their turn miscalculated the French capacity for sudden awakening. For when the decisive moment came there was complete unanimity in the determination of the French people as well as of the French Government. They recognised Germany again as the enemy with whom they had an age-old feud, and they responded to the appeal of M. Daladier without hesitation and without demur.

Yet they had had a moment of anger when they realised that Russia once more had betrayed them. They ought, of course, had they looked at the map, had they studied the diplomatic situation, to have perceived that this Russian desertion was the determining factor of war—that the Russo-German alliance (for such it practically is) meant that Germany would go ahead. The *volte-face* provoked disgust, but not dismay. The French had long been taught to believe in the good intentions of Russia. They were prepared to forget the betrayal of Brest-Litovsk—though the betrayal of Brest-Litovsk, the Russo-German rapprochement at Rapallo, the subsequent secret treaty of Stresemann and Krestenski, confirmed by Hitler, were all the work of the same régime as mocked the British and French negotiators this year and secretly prepared the treaty of Moscow. If one would excuse the French workers for their aberration—shared, indeed, by British Ministers—one should recall that the whole of European politics had been falsely viewed from the absurd standpoint of so-called “ideology.”

Particularly since 1935 we had been fighting against some nebulous thing we called Fascism, and we were prepared to accept as ally some equally nebulous thing we called Communism. How many blunders have been made because of these terminological inexactitudes which caught the fancy of the masses, it would need many pages to recount. One of the most important—apart from the alliance with Germany which we forced on Italy, and which enabled Germany to march from triumph to triumph and to feel herself, in the end, strong enough for any adventure—was the political combination known in France as the Front Populaire. It won the 1936 elections and gave Socialism control of France. That in itself might have had no serious results, but

unfortunately the Communist party, more than seventy in numbers in the Chamber, was allowed to exercise a deplorable and virtually unrestrained influence on French life. Nobody dared oppose the Communists, who took their instructions quite openly from Moscow. They dominated the trade unions. They provoked strikes on an immense scale, they continually agitated, they weakened the *moral* of the country and reduced its military forces to the lowest levels, particularly in the branch of aviation. At the same time they were constantly endeavouring to involve France in a war which would have been engaged in the most unfavourable conditions. They became the ultra-patriots—these internationalists were now the nationalists, the fire-eaters, though they had deprived France of arms. At the end of last year, two months after Munich, they went too far: they threatened general strike. It was then that the reaction set in. France in serious mood, set to work to recover her place among the nations. M. Daladier restored order. The finances were put on a sound basis. The wheels of industry began to turn. Military aviation was brought back to its former standard. A sense of discipline returned.

Nevertheless, the illusions about Russia remained, and the Confédération Générale du Travail lost its effectiveness, the Communists were still powerful. Many voices in France protested against the attempt to form an Anglo-French-Russian alliance, foreseeing failure and suspecting treason. But, on the other hand, there were many others who, without the smallest caution, would have given anything to Russia. Then came the revelation that Russia was in connivance with Germany, had long had a tacit understanding, and now at a vital moment publicly proclaimed its accord with the nation that had founded the anti-Komintern league! All the “ideological” masks fell. Under cover of them the character of the interests, the ambitions, of the different countries of Europe had remained unchanged, had been purely nationalist. The effect in France was startling. The Communist party found that in working for Russia it had been working for Germany, and in working against Italy it had, from the French viewpoint, made a disastrous mistake. The ghastly comedy of the civil war in Spain came to everybody’s mind and every Frenchman saw that had the Communists won in Spain the Pyrenees frontier would have been a grave pe-

to France. In short, the Communist party, which has done such grievous harm to France, is now utterly discredited, probably for ever. Nothing served more to whip up French energies than this second Brest-Litovsk. It was seen that, after all, the principal enemy to French conceptions of life was the inhuman totalitarian state notion which deprives individuals of liberty and subjects them to the tyranny of an iron régime which is fundamentally the same whether it is German or Russian. The Russian variant of the régime had for some years been the more dangerous because it operated inside France; but the German variant was now more dangerous because it sought to acquire by military might the hegemony of Europe. The French at the same time put a complete stop to the operations of the first, and went grimly into the struggle with the second.

As soon as it was really appreciated that Germany meant to obtain whatever she set her heart on by fire and sword if needs be, there was a supreme resolve to oppose her by all the means of which France can dispose. M. Daladier has explained in clear language the French sentiment. It is not the question of Danzig which moves the French: it is the question of the life and liberty of Poland. "With the life and liberty of Poland—that is to say, of thirty-three millions of human beings—the destiny of other peoples of Europe is in cause. Our destiny is in cause. If for want of perspicacity or by cowardice we allow the peoples to succumb one after the other, then, after having repudiated our pledges, betrayed our ideals, misunderstood our vital interests, we would find ourselves without honour, without friends, without support, when the enterprise of domination of Europe turns against us. It should be added that the inevitable assault against France would then come when Germany disposes of greater resources than those which to-day might menace our country." Thus it is clearly seen that France cannot simply stand aside on the plea that the Polish affair does not concern her. This is not a "preventive war" in the sense that France is fighting to-day because she thinks the conditions are better than they will be to-morrow; that kind of "preventive war" has always been condemned by men of goodwill, for it makes abstraction of all the many possibilities of settlement other than by force of arms. But the case to-day is different. Certainly we are entitled to think, as the French

Prime Minister says, of the conditions in which we would confront Germany to-morrow, but those conditions would be produced by the repudiation of pledges which, so far as France is concerned, are of long standing. To brush them aside in present circumstances would be tantamount to the abdication of France as a power to be respected in Europe. The unwisdom of brushing aside these long-standing pledges, is all the clearer in that France undoubtedly felt some share in her non-fulfilment of her explicit pledges to Czecho-Slovakia. Excuses may be found for our treatment of Czecho-Slovakia; but none could be found now for similar behaviour, and the influence and the prestige of France would be fatally diminished were she to make no effort on behalf of Poland. It is true that France's relations with Poland have not always been easy, much less cordial, and that Poland's conduct has not always been approved; but in this hour of trial there is no room for secondary considerations—the central fact is that Poland is attacked and that France is obliged by her alliance to go to her assistance.

Every possible attempt has been made by Germany to separate France and England. The quarrel has been represented as principally an Anglo-German quarrel, since it was England who took the initiative of negotiations with Germany and who conducted them to the tragic end, as is seen by the British White Book. France so far as is admitted played a less active rôle and merely waited for the result of British negotiations, though keeping in close contact and giving her approval to the British moves. Here is a point on which German propaganda seeks to construct the theory that France, who has been assured that Alsace-Lorraine is definitely surrendered by Germany and that Germany has no direct quarrel with her, is fighting British battles—though, as we have observed, France's pledges to Poland were given long before Britain's. Something is being made too of the difference of the time at which Britain declared war and in which France found herself at war. I confess I do not understand why the same hour should not have been chosen—that seems to be a minor mistake in tactics—but of the solidarity of France and Great Britain no doubt whatever exists.

France indeed is much more deeply engaged than England, since she has thrown the whole of her man-power into the fray, not in successive stages but at once, and has subordinated

the organisation of the ordinary civil services to the requirements of this immense army. In writing for English readers, that is the most important fact in my eyes: that France has called up all her available men immediately, regardless of the conveniences of civilians. There is no reservation; no cry of "Business as usual." Motor cars of all sorts and sizes have been requisitioned. Very few delivery vans and transport lorries have been left in private hands. It has therefore become impossible for many thousands of small firms—quite apart from the absence of employer and employed—to carry on. They have no alternative but to close, presumably for the duration of the war. I wish I could bring home to English readers the total character of this French plunge into war. There is no question of specialised forces alone, on the sea or in the air, operating against Germany, while the rest of the population goes about its lawful occupations. No, the whole of the formidable and overwhelming territorial forces, on a scale that we have hardly begun to conceive in England, are on the march. There are no exemptions from the general obligations on grounds of privilege. I have myself lodged a *curé* who had put on the uniform of lieutenant, and the Father Superior of a seminary who hurried to take his place as an ordinary soldier, still clad in the robes of a Franciscan. My neighbour, a widow who works her farm, has seen off her three sons, and I do not know who is now to do the necessary jobs. Engineers and writers and doctors of my acquaintance are mobilised, and shopkeepers have gone off after putting up their shutters. There will gradually be a readjustment, for the civil life of the country must continue; but what I wish to emphasise is that absolutely nothing has stood in the way of the putting of the country, in its entirety, on a war footing.

It is not my purpose to enter here into questions of strategy. It is not for me to ask what will be done with all these millions of men. Yet, on the face of things, the war is very different from the war of 1914, when Germany broke through Belgium, and there was a long line across France, frequently in movement, and even when it was stabilised into a line of trenches by no means impregnable to attack on one side or the other. But, this time, Germany has taken pains to neutralise all the countries around her—Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria,

Rumania, Russia, and the Baltic States. There remains therefore only the Ligne Maginot, from Luxembourg to Switzerland, and the Siegfried Line, both of which are supposed to be impregnable. According to a German broadcast, the Germans have learned the lesson of Verdun, where they battered their best troops to pieces against French fortifications. It would seem therefore that their object will be to produce a stalemate in the West, and to defeat Poland quickly. There will, of course, be a "certain liveliness" in the air and on the seas, but it is difficult to imagine that these air and sea incidents will be decisive. We may expect some new factor to be introduced before the war is over, but it is not my business here to indulge in speculation. My business is rather to give my testimony to the magnificent spirit of the French people in this extraordinary upheaval of all their customs and ways of living. They are far graver than in 1914. They remember what war means—its hideous toll of human life, of human liberty, of human decency, of human civilisation. And they have no illusions about the future. It seems highly probable that we must not expect ever again to return to the conditions we have known. Everything is in the melting-pot and what will come out of it can hardly be guessed. But this is sure: that the French people who, from time to time, seem to incur the reproach of frivolity and irresponsibility, are in reality the most sober and the most courageous people in Europe. Nowhere do I hear complaints or vain repinings. Everywhere there is a determination to adapt themselves to the new conditions, and to do whatever is conceived to be their duty. Such a people, with such a spirit, cannot disappoint the hopes we try to retain in the destiny of mankind.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

FROM KAISER TO FÜHRER.

ALMOST with a sense of relief on September 3rd, 1939, the British and French Governments accepted the transition from the shadow to the substance of war. The shadow had for many months become increasingly formidable. At last we at any rate knew where we were. Ever since the British and French Governments gave their pledge to Poland at the end of March, the war had become inevitable unless Herr Hitler gave up his insane designs. Instead he made it abundantly clear that he had no such intention. There is hardly any need to recapitulate the steps whereby the inevitability of war was consummated. The full correspondence has been published in a British White Paper (Miscellaneous No. 8, 1939, Cmd. 6102). From those documents it is clear beyond the slightest possibility of misunderstanding that Herr Hitler had made up his mind at all costs to go to war.

The most cynical of all the devices used by him was revealed the very day before he invaded Poland. A week earlier, in answer to M. Daladier's last appeal for peace, Herr Hitler had argued crazily that his "method" enabled him "to solve problems without bloodshed" and also "relieved the statesmen of other nations of having to explain this revision [of European frontiers] to their own people." To attempt to unravel the mental processes of Herr Hitler is to plunge morbidly into an exploration of mental disease. Having explained his "bloodless" technique, he broadcast late at night on August 31st what he said had been proposals made to Poland for a settlement of the dispute; declared that as those proposals had not been accepted, they therefore must be considered as having been "rejected," and within six hours his troops had started the offensive. Those "proposals" had not been communicated to anybody. What is interesting, perhaps, is that he considered it necessary to embellish what was just a downright lie. The embellishment took this form: (1) a Polish plenipotentiary (he argued) had been "summoned" to Berlin to receive proposals; (2) when he came, and not before, those proposals would be revealed to him; (3) that plenipotentiary would be required to accept the proposals, whatever they might be, without reference to Warsaw; (4) the plenipotentiary did not come; (5) therefore

the proposals had been in effect "rejected." In short, Herr Hitler's lies were now directed solely towards deceiving the German people, towards persuading them that there was something to be said for the war he had determined to wage. The fact that the British and French ultimatums, delivered in Berlin after the invasion of Poland, were not even answered until they had expired and the war had begun, was wholly consonant with his technique: because the German people knew nothing of them.

Except in one essential matter, we are all proved wrong impartially. It has been a common argument for twenty years that if in 1914 the British Government had declared outright that it would go to war in the event of a German invasion of Belgium, then the war would have been averted. In 1939 the British Government did declare outright, and repeated it up to the very outbreak of the war, that if Germany invaded Poland we should go to war in her defence. Again the war was not averted.

There is no room even for controversy about the nature of the British pledge to Poland. On August 22nd last Mr. Chamberlain wrote a letter to Herr Hitler which began thus: "Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by His Majesty's Government, and announced in the Press and on the wireless this evening. These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfil. It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding."

Though the diplomatic tacticians are thus proved impartially wrong, and again we look back on irreparable

history, we again look forward to the time when another peace will have to be made. Whether the new war last one month, one year, or one hundred years, at the end there will still have to be a settlement of the issues with which it started, plus many more. The lives lost, the health impaired, the property destroyed, will in one sense be as totally wasted as the corresponding cost of the last war is now proved to have been wasted. Only in one sense. The essential matter above referred to remains impregnably true. The present war is not likely to end until either Britain and France are defeated, or Herr Hitler is crushed as the Kaiser was crushed before him. In his old age, from his obscure unhappiness in a Dutch retreat, the one-time Kaiser looks upon the dual repetition of a German war and a German war lord. He cannot escape from the past. In essential things it is not possible for a man to deceive himself or to escape from what he knows to be the facts. So it is with all of us.

It is too late to invoke good sense, even though the hope lingers that something may yet cut short what only too probably looks like the horrible certainty of a long and stubborn war. It is not too late to face the essential facts. In war-time the truth is weak and does not prevail. Alleged facts are manufactured, as shells are manufactured, for an exclusively belligerent purpose. The private manufacture of facts, as of armaments, is no longer allowed. The government in all countries is a dictator over the lives, the minds and the means of peoples, and over what they shall be allowed to know. But the soul of peoples is always free. When the soul speaks, only the truth is spoken. It cannot be that any man should have passed through the last war and should now face the present war without knowing in his soul that the only real enemy of mankind is man's own wickedness, and that the wickedness is general in its origin. He also knows that wickedness is little else than selfishness. The penalty of wickedness is automatic. "*La pente vers soi*," as Pascal put it, "*est le commencement de tout désordre*." It needs no elaborate theology to teach us—for we all know it in our experience and in our reason—that a stupid and perverse humanity cannot escape the punishment it has prepared for itself. The particular occasion is not of primary importance. The normal supply of devils is adequate, and more than adequate, whenever the occasion is ripe. A quarter of a

century ago the Kaiser would have been impotent but for the fact that a stiff-necked generation was due for what it got. To-day Adolf Hitler would be a dormant, not an active, curse upon humanity, had not humanity played into his hands. The fact that Hitler is a selfish, godless, lying, cunning, cruel, evil manifestation of human mentality is entirely consonant with what we all know in our soul to be the truth: that the devil is always ready to do his part when the collective human race has made such havoc of its heritage that the penalty has to be paid.

There are those who, being both young and inexperienced and as yet themselves blameless, lost their faith in God as a result of the last Great War. They did not see the very divinity of a conception which made Man his own master, to make or to mar. It is a coward's part to flinch before the punishment he has himself invited. The real mystery is the revelation that God in the long run justifies a conception of free man, by the very attribute of freedom and all its consequences: whereby man is forced to recognise not only the justice but the inevitability of the hell he produces by the exercise of his own free will. In such a way good comes of the evil. The proof of so rudimentary a condition of life is available to all who honestly want it. It is the case—as the present writer knows—that in one specific case a man who lost his faith in God as a result of the last war, has found his recovered faith strengthened as a result of the present war: for he sees that it is not after all unjust, and that if man is invested by God with the sovereign disposition through free will of his own happiness, he cannot complain, indeed he must welcome it, if his freedom is absolute. It is indeed a measure of the Maker's confidence in His creature that that creature can be left to reap his own harvest without danger to the ultimate reaction of human nature towards what is good and towards the voluntary, spontaneous rejection of what is bad.

Maybe it will be thought appropriate for one whose ostensible job it is to write on "foreign affairs," whereby is meant the analysis of motives and facts in what is, though it ought not to be, the low business of international relations, to make some apology for writing instead what looks suspiciously like religion. The present writer would not only not resent, but would welcome, such a charge. The distinction between

"foreign affairs" and any other manifestation of human activity is quite unsubstantial. They are all aspects of the same thing. The laws are the same. It is because international relations have always been a particular manifestation of human activity most grossly divorced from the elementary truth that rules human life, that the penalty is the most spectacular. It is right that the nations of Europe, having by their godless conduct given to a devil-mobilised idiot like Adolf Hitler the opportunity for his congenial work, should suffer the consequences, and at any rate be proud enough not to squeal. But two such monsters in living memory? There will be a third, if man refuses to learn his lesson.

The squealers want to have it both ways. Either man is free or not. If free, then he must face the consequences, whether in the one direction or the other. On the ground of intelligence, does anyone really believe that the present catastrophe is due to one man? Could one bad man, against say, two hundred million good men, really get away with it? The fault is not in our stars, nor in little Adolf. It is in ourselves. "For what things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap," is as true now as when Paul the Apostle wrote it to the Galatians.

Any serious person who wishes to make a contribution to the sombre problem, must begin by honestly mastering the facts. The facts are so far gone that there is now no probable alternative to the uncompromising suppression of Hitlerism, at whatever the cost. But the smug assumption that the rest of us are all blameless, fighting the just fight of the injured innocents, with "God" on our side, leads nowhere except to an unending repetition of what has already afflicted us twice in our time. The blasphemy which invokes God's blessing on the bombs of a particular side against the other side is merely a symptom that we have not yet begun to understand the situation.

We have made one war on Hitlerism (then in the guise of Kaiserism) and at a horrible cost defeated it. We then ruined the peace because we did not even recognise the nature of our own achievement and the opportunity it gave us. If we had recognised it, we should have been able to deal more cleverly with the Germany that put Herr Hitler into prison, instead of exasperating her into throwing out such

men as Stresemann and Brüning and invoking such men as Hitler and Ribbentrop. If, by the grace of a slightly better moral quality, we now contrive to beat the Germans for a second time, we shall have a second chance of dealing with precisely the same problem as before. The ideal of hanging Hitler on the nearest lamp post, while in the long run it might be the easiest way out for him, just as the corresponding impulse in 1919 might have been in the long run the easiest thing for a Kaiser now living it out to the bitter end, would not solve the problem. The problem is how to give effect to some form of unselfishness in the relations between nations: an appalling thought, because never so far in the history of mankind has there been the slightest attempt at any such thing on anybody's part. Hence the periodic wars throughout all history. At the beginning of the present war the British Government has no policy except the negative one of crushing Hitler. Nor can there be a positive programme until we decide the principles which are to inspire it. In 1917, when the last war was in its fourth year of competitive atrocity, and when the British Government had not even decided what its own war aims were, Pope Benedict XV made a proposal. It was taken to the Kaiser by Cardinal Pacelli, then Archbishop of Munich, now Pope Pius XII. In it the Pope suggested: (1) that material force be supplanted by the moral force of right; (2) that there should be a simultaneous and parallel decrease of armaments; (3) that international disputes be settled by arbitration; (4) that the seas be guaranteed free and common to all nations; (5) that both sides in advance should renounce all claims to indemnities except where minor peculiar cases justified such claims; (6) that all territories occupied militarily during the war be evacuated; (7) that all territorial claims, such as Alsace-Lorraine and the Trentino, be amicably examined and in a conciliatory spirit, the aspirations of the people concerned being a relevant factor.

Vague and inadequate as was such a proposal, and destined as it was in the prevailing temper to be totally ignored, it did at any rate remind people that a war in any case must end in peace terms and that people might at any rate know what they were dying for: and moreover it bore a striking resemblance in spirit to that of President Wilson's Fourteen Points which did become the basis of the Armistice in 1918.

The year 1932 was a turning point for Europe. It was the year of the insincere disarmament conference which drove Germany out of the League of Nations and which finally persuaded the German people to put their faith in the gangster methods offered them by Herr Hitler. In that year Pope Pius XI, who clearly saw the direction in which the nations were drifting, issued an encyclical summoning the world to prayer, penance and mortification. The encyclical was called *Caritate Christi*. It gave a diagnosis of the real causes which lay at the root of the international disorder, thus: the concentration of national wealth into the hands of a too small group of a nation's citizens; an exaggerated nationalism in the motive of government; an unequal international distribution of wealth; and the revolt of man against God. He summarised the root cause in the famous words of St. Paul: "The love of money is the root of all evil."

It is one of our commonest experiences that human problems are reducible to simple issues. War constitutes one of the biggest of human problems. The reason why not even a beginning of its solution has yet been made in the history of the world is that the indispensable prerequisite of humility and repentance has never been cultivated; in other words, that the principles of people in the mass have never been co-ordinated with the principles that actuate the majority of individuals. It is not an accident that nearly every human being, when you really know him, has more good than bad in him. The sort of rivalry and jealousy that has turned the German and the British people into wild beasts for half a century would have been impossible between any two individuals in the world. In the mass, people seem to take the quality of the lowest rather than the highest. It is obvious that a settlement of the Anglo-French-German controversy cannot be made unless there is some attempt at justice and mutual tolerance as its basis. That is the real clue to the problem of saving the German people from Hitler.

It is equally obvious that such a thing is impossible unless nations are willing to admit their own faults. No nation in the history of the world has ever admitted its faults. If we are to start talking about peace and the admission of faults, the only businesslike approach is to start with ourselves. It is not even necessary to examine the moral defects of Herr Hitler, for the world is full of authorities on that subject.

Before an Englishman can begin to examine his own country's record, he must rise above the routine diplomatic irrelevancy of face-saving. The saving of faces is always the *pons asinorum* of high diplomacy. "*Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa*" would be a better instrument of international harmony than that which substitutes "*tua*" for "*mea*." What Englishman in his heart would not, if he could, revert to the European situation which existed before 1914? Yet how many Englishmen would at this moment be prepared to pocket their national pride and say: "We were wrong in 1914 to join issue with Germany; we were wrong in 1919 to impose upon Germany the conditions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles; therefore we are prepared to revert to the *status quo ante 1914*"?

In truth, as the same old war of 1914-18 is now in process of being fought all over again, national prestige being again engaged, it is almost a waste of breath for anyone to suggest that we start using our reason instead of our guns. Yet five years hence, or whenever it may be, if we win the war, we shall have to frame a peace policy. Suppose for the sake of argument we do nothing more than reconstitute Poland, the Corridor, the Free State of Danzig, the former Czechoslovakia and Austria, are we not again asking for an insane repetition of what has already happened twice? If by contrast we have some alternative methods, why not think them out at the beginning rather than at the end of the war, especially if thereby we might make a short cut to the end of the war itself?

The tactical principle therein involved is already admitted. On the very first day of the present war British aeroplanes flew over German territory and dropped 6,000,000 leaflets containing (in German) this message to the German people: "Warning. A Message from Great Britain. German men and women. The Government of the Reich have with cold deliberation forced war upon Great Britain. They have done so knowing that it must involve mankind in a calamity worse than that of 1914. The assurances of peaceful intentions the Führer gave to you and to the world in April have proved as worthless as his words at the Sportpalast last September, when he said: 'We have no more territorial claims to make in Europe.' Never has Government ordered subjects to their death with less excuse. This war is utterly unnecessary.

Germany was in no way threatened or deprived of justice. Was she not allowed to re-enter the Rhineland, to achieve the *Anschluss*, and to take back the Sudeten Germans in peace? Neither we nor any other nation would have sought to limit her advance, so long as she did not violate independent non-German peoples. Every German ambition—just to others—might have been satisfied through friendly negotiation. President Roosevelt offered you both peace with honour and the prospect of prosperity. Instead your rulers have condemned you to the massacre, miseries and privations of a war they cannot even hope to win. It is not us, but you, they have deceived. For years their iron censorship has kept from you truths that even uncivilised peoples know. It has imprisoned your minds in, as it were, a concentration camp. Otherwise they would not have dared to misrepresent the combination of peaceful peoples to secure peace as hostile encirclement. We had no enmity against you, the German people. This censorship has also concealed from you that you have not the means to sustain protracted warfare. Despite crushing taxation you are on the verge of bankruptcy. Our resources and those of our allies in men, arms and supplies are immense. We are too strong to break by blows, and we could wear you down inexorably. You, the German people, can, if you will, insist on peace at any time. We also desire peace and are prepared to conclude it with any peace-loving Government in Germany."

A childish manoeuvre perhaps; but it showed that the British Government at any rate appreciated the value of propaganda. If instead of dropping such "talky-talk," devoid of substance, we had dropped a detailed peace proposal, there might have been some chance of its having an effect.

What peace proposals, then, at the present stage could be suggested? The Treaty of Versailles is manifestly very dead. It would obviously be impractical for the British Government to drop leaflets over German territory making precise territorial suggestions. What would be possible, for instance, would be for the British Government to state frankly and openly that it would be willing to abide by the settlement of every territorial question in Europe by plebiscite, the plebiscite to be taken when all armies had been evacuated and the territory in dispute had been placed, for the purpose

of the plebiscite, under the full control of a neutral, impartial non-European Great Power (say, the United States); that when the territorial questions had been thus settled there should be constituted by the States thus determined a new European League of Nations with full powers to settle every other question whatsoever. It would be essential to the success of such a European League of Nations that each of the five European Great Powers—Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Great Britain—should be members.

It goes without saying that such a proposal (or indeed any proposal) would at once be riddled with objections and criticisms from every side. Yet it would be something definite. It might re-establish at any rate a machinery of discussion. It might, moreover, clearly establish a pacific field for the operation of power-politics. For instance: if Germany, Italy and Russia were agreed on a given project they would achieve that project, because they would outvote Britain and France. The project itself might be intrinsically bad. But it is the case anyhow that projects are decided by superior strength, and the trial of strength would better be enacted within a League of Nations Council Chamber than on the field of battle. And need we be so certain that Italy and Russia would both be on Germany's side? Russian solidarity with Germany would be more likely to drive out Italy.

A good deal of nonsense is normally talked about the small States. It never was the case, and is not likely ever to be the case, that any small State can survive except by the leave of Great Powers. In our time Czechoslovakia was created by two Great Powers, France and Britain, by virtue of their supremacy in force over a third Great Power, Germany. When that third Great Power again became strong enough, Czechoslovakia was destroyed. The main weakness of Franco-British policy after the last war was the assumption that Germany, an intrinsically strong Power, could be treated, in the game of power-politics, as if she were a weak Power. The only title of France and Britain to their colonial possessions was that of military strength. Logically and by that criterion Germany was entitled to colonial possessions. Having been deprived of her pre-war colonies in Africa as the result of war—the only arbiter in such matters—she had no remaining claim to her former African possessions. But the essential problem remained, that Germany as a strong Great Power

could not be denied on all the traditional rules of high diplomacy, of world possessions commensurate with her prestige, unless France and Great Britain were prepared again to defeat her in war. If she is again defeated in war, the same problem will still remain.

It looks, therefore, as if the first step towards an accommodation between the Great Powers in Europe must be a recognition of the fact that Great Powers, like murder, will out. Things being what they are and what they will be, why should we seek to deceive ourselves?

When the last war started there was no such thing as the broadcasting through the air of the spoken word. The peoples of the belligerent countries had to wait for the next morning's newspapers for information. The information itself came more slowly from the various centres. The difference now is not only an incomparably quicker mobilisation of national forces and of general organisation in the several belligerent countries—for the heads of Governments can at a moment's notice reach the entire population—but an added instrument of war of incalculable power.

It is a fact accepted on every side that the present war, for the first time in history, will be decided by civilian nerves and by effective propaganda. It is the *moral* of the non-combatant men, women and children, rather than of the fighting services, that will bring defeat or victory: not only because the war itself is carried to the civilian population by actual bombing from the air, but because civilian nerves can be strained even without actual bombing. So far as Britain and Germany were concerned the war started at 11 a.m. on Sunday, September 3rd. At 11.15 a.m.—fifteen minutes after the start of the war—while an intensive evacuation of three-quarters of a million women, children and hospital patients from London was in progress, an air raid warning was sounded and there was a general rush to shelter. At 3 a.m. the following night there was another air raid warning, the all-clear being sounded an hour later. At 7 a.m. on the Wednesday morning a third warning sent the population to underground shelter for an hour and a half. Yet there had been no attempted raid on any of those occasions. It followed that an enemy by merely sending a couple of "bogy" aeroplanes could play havoc with civilian nerves and prevent good sleep. Even though such a technique could not indefinitely be continued—for

the air raid warning system could be adjusted so as to obviate unnecessary scares—yet it served to show the potential scope for war on nerves.

Another example of the like technique came from Poland in the first week of the war. On Friday, September 8th, German agents succeeded in throwing the Warsaw broadcasting station out of order for six hours. The Germans thereupon started broadcasting in the Polish language on the Warsaw wavelength from the wireless station at Katowice, announcing the fall of Warsaw. They even broadcast "noises off" to suggest the booming of guns over the broadcasting station itself. The manœuvre failed, and the Poles recaptured the control of their own broadcasting. This was a new form of war in the air. Similarly, on Saturday, September 9th, Field-Marshal Goering made a speech in Berlin, the particular lies of which need not be chronicled, but which six German short-wave radio stations succeeded during the following night in transmitting to various parts of the world in French, English, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Hungarian, Serbian and Polish versions.

A glance at the map will show that the scope for military activity is as restricted as the scope for propaganda is wide. If Poland should be conquered, the open field of operations on land may be confined to the German-French frontier where the Siegfried and Maginot lines are probably impregnable. There remains the slow war of starvation by blockade at sea.

The obviously greatest scope for war is propaganda. In this field the characteristic German stupidity opens interesting possibilities. The stupid pact with Russia knocked out Japan, Italy and Spain as allies: the two last-mentioned for Catholic reasons. If British diplomacy, taking advantage of its good luck in failing to achieve a godless pact with Russia, were to be clever about Italy, the loyalty of Yugoslavia and Rumania to our cause would be ensured, and Russia's inevitable double-crossing of Germany would be accelerated, as would the Czecho-Slovak and Polish revolts. The propagandist weapon is probably the most effective in the British armoury.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

September 12th, 1939.

POLAND'S LEADERS.

THE leaders of the Third Reich are only too well known to the world. The true characters of the small group of men who have subjugated the German people and whose ambition it is to subjugate the whole of Europe, are no secret to anyone, except, perhaps, to the German people itself. Very little is known about the leaders of the first European country to oppose itself to the plague of Hitlerism and its gospel of violence, the country which is to-day suffering so terribly for its courage. Yet the men who guide the destinies of the Polish people and whom fate has appointed to lead the struggle of the civilised world against the barbarism of the Nazi Reich, deserve to be better known.

The head of the Polish State, President Ignacy Moscicki, is, like all Poles, an ardent patriot, but no politician. He was a scientific chemist, inventor and university professor when, at the request of the late Marshal Pilsudski, he reluctantly agreed to become President of the Polish Republic. President Moscicki is 72 years old, but his slim figure and alert manner give him a wonderfully youthful appearance. His features reflect kindness and nobility of character, which are combined with a great modesty. The desire for power, the ambition to play a dominant rôle even among his own people, are foreign to his nature. The First Citizen of Poland is of a retiring disposition, and although by virtue of his office he embodies the power of the State he has always endeavoured to avoid display.

Ignacy Moscicki was born on December 1st, 1867, in a small village near Plock in Northern Poland, and studied at the Technical High School in Riga. From the year 1892 he participated in the organisation of the Polish National Movement which was, of course, illegal under the then Tsarist régime. Eventually young Moscicki was obliged to flee the country and came to England, where he met and contracted a firm friendship with Joseph Pilsudski who was also living in exile in London. Moscicki completed his studies at the Technical College in Finsbury and also did a great deal of work at the Patent Office Library. In the year 1897 he was appointed assistant to Professor J. Kowalski at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, where he made a number of important chemical inventions. In 1912 Moscicki became Professor

of electro-chemistry and electro-physics at the Technical High School in Lwow, Poland, and it was here that he definitely established his scientific fame. In 1926 the nation, through Pilsudski, invited him to become President of the Republic. During his first term of seven years President Moscicki became so popular that in 1933 he was obliged, against his will, to agree to serve for a further term. His popularity extends to the national minorities of Poland who have convinced themselves that freedom and equality are articles of faith with the President. Nor, remarkably enough, has President Moscicki neglected his scientific work, despite the burden of his official duties. He has found time and energy not only to engage in further chemical research, but also to lay the foundations of a Polish chemical industry. At present this kindly patriot, whose life has been governed by the twin passions of patriotism and love of science, must bend all his energies to foster in the Polish people the spirit of resistance against brutal aggression, and however unfavourable the military situation of Poland may be at the moment, he is convinced that Right will triumph against Might.

The youthful vigour of Poland is fully represented by Eduard Smigly-Rydz, Marshal of Poland and Inspector General of her Armed Forces. He is a living symbol of the Polish nation, its calm, unostentatious pride, its self-control and unflinching courage, its iron determination in the struggle which has been forced upon Poland, and its firm faith in ultimate victory. Smigly-Rydz is a true soldier, but unlike the military robots of the Third Reich he possesses both humanity and culture. Hitler or Goering cannot boast of having had any scientific interests at any time, but Smigly-Rydz was a student of philosophy at Cracow University, and he was also a talented student at the Academy of Arts in that city. Painting is still his great hobby. Incidentally, many other leading Poles have close associations with Art and Literature, including lyrical poetry. The romantic spirit of the Polish people, as expressed in great men like Mickiewicz, Slowacki, Krasinski and Norwid, is to-day experiencing a revival in resurgent Poland. The military education of the Polish army leaders, and therefore also that of Marshal Smigly-Rydz, has not consisted in robot-like drill but, consistently with the conception of Pilsudski as bequeathed to

his disciples and people, in devoted service to the people and the State; it is an expression of the spirit of resistance, entirely unconnected with the Prussian worship of militarism which has degenerated into a veritable idolatry of force under Hitler. Smigly-Rydz is characterised by clearness both in speech and action; he is a plain man, honest in purpose and frank in expression. It was probably on account of these qualities that Pilsudski on his deathbed entrusted to him that which was dearest to him—the command of the young army of a young people.

Eduard Smigly-Rydz was born in 1886 in Brzezany, a small town in South-Eastern Poland. In the year 1912 he joined the "Strzelec" ("Rifleman"), a patriotic organisation, and upon the outbreak of the world war he joined Pilsudski's Legion, becoming a close collaborator and friend of his leader. After the world war he commanded one of the Polish armies against the Bolsheviks who had invaded Poland. On May 12th, 1935, the day Pilsudski died, Smigly-Rydz was appointed Inspector General of the Armed Forces, while on November 11th, 1936, he attained the highest rank in the Polish Army as "Marshal of Poland." However, the supreme commander of the Polish Army is more than a military leader; in effect he is also head of the State, in accordance with the tradition established by Pilsudski, and as the latter's successor; and Smigly-Rydz's headship is recognised with wholehearted enthusiasm by the entire Polish people. Nor does this lead to any sort of conflict between Smigly-Rydz and the President. On the contrary, it is a well known fact that the Marshal of Poland and the President collaborate in the most friendly and harmonious manner in the service of their country, which is the sole concern of both, as both are devoid of all personal ambition. Incidentally, the Polish word "smigly" means "alert" and, indeed, alertness is a characteristic quality of Smigly-Rydz, as the world will probably learn to know in the course of the present struggle.

The best known of the Polish leaders is Colonel Joseph Beck, Foreign Secretary of the Polish Republic. He is, in fact, one of the most interesting personalities on the world stage to-day, and history will certainly not deny him the quality of genius. Colonel Beck is one of the youngest statesmen in the world. When in the year 1932 he moved into the

Wierzbowa, the Polish Foreign Office in Warsaw, he was barely 38 years old. Both his personality and his policy are forceful, determined and purposeful. One thing is clear—even to those who at one time were in doubt as to the objects of Beck's policy—and that is that he has never had any other concern than to serve the interests of Poland as an independent state and a rising Great Power. So long as this was possible he endeavoured with masterly skill to keep the balance between Poland's Eastern and Western neighbours. But when it became clear that Hitler's voracity was directed against Poland, Beck changed his country's foreign policy completely. He realised that this was no time to "keep the balance" but to act, and to act strongly, regardless of any momentary danger, in order to accomplish the ultimate downfall of Hitlerism. Without a moment's hesitation he chose the right course. It was he who, after Hitler's "peaceful" conquests in Central Europe, met his demands on Poland with a determined "No!" It is in a large measure due to Colonel Beck that a powerful alliance is now in being which has declared war on Hitlerism and will undoubtedly encompass its destruction.

Beck is a dreamer, a poet of statesmanship who likes to play with pictures of the future. But he is no gambler, nor has he, even in his imagination, ever left the *terra firma* of political realities. With President Moscicki and Smigly-Rydz, he is one of the trio to whom Poland's thirty-six million inhabitants look with perfect confidence. He, too, devoted his youth to study and patriotic work. He was born in Warsaw in the year 1894, inheriting a bent for political life from his father, a lawyer, who was Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior. From early childhood Beck knew what it meant to have to submit to oppression, and lived in an atmosphere of ardent patriotism whose practical object was to regain the independence of Poland. He studied in Krakow, Lwow and Vienna. In 1914 he answered the call of Pilsudski, entered the Polish Legion, and fought throughout the world war, until the Legion was disarmed by the Germans. Escaping from German captivity, he went to the Ukraine where, under the command of Smigly-Rydz, he helped to build up the Polish secret military organisation. He also fought in the Polish-Russian war as an artillery officer. Later he became military attaché at the Polish

Embassy in Paris. Returning to Poland he entered the Higher Military Academy which he left with the rank of Colonel. In 1926 he became Secretary General of the Ministry of War, Pilsudski being the Minister. Naturally during this period there was a close collaboration between Beck and his Leader. In the year 1930 Beck was for a short time Vice-Premier. In December of the same year he became Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, finally, in November 1932, he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. Beck, like other Polish leaders, is a lover of the arts. In addition he is an active sportsman and a first-class marksman. Above all, however, he is Poland's Man of Destiny, applying all his energy and great ability to the tasks which the present fateful time in his country's history has imposed upon him.

Many people in the Western countries are surprised, particularly in view of the frequency with which the names of Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier are mentioned in the Press, as well as in conversation, that so little should be heard about the Prime Minister of Poland, General Slawoj-Skladkowski. The explanation probably lies in the special character of Polish political life to-day. It is not the office that is decisive, but the personality of the holder. In addition, harmonious collaboration between the leading statesmen is so completely taken for granted (since their friendship dates from the time of their common struggle for Poland's independence) that differences concerning competence are precluded. Each man, whatever his office, regards himself as the servant of the people. General Slawoj-Skladkowski is, so to speak, a silent Premier. He devotes himself mainly to internal affairs, as he is at present also Minister of the Interior.

He was born in the year 1885 in Gabin, Central Poland, studied in Krakow and graduated in medicine. Having, like the other Polish leaders, participated in the Polish National Movement, he was imprisoned by the Tsarist government. In 1914 he joined Pilsudski's Legion as a surgeon. From 1924 till 1928 he was the head of the Medical Department of the Ministry of War. He has been Minister of the Interior twice; from 1931 till 1936 he was Under-Secretary of State for War, and since 1936 he has been Premier.

General Slawoj-Skladkowski is a kind-hearted man with a sense of humour. His unfailing cheerfulness is proverbial in

Poland and has earned him a great measure of popularity, which has been enhanced by the fact that he has remained thoroughly human despite his high office. He shares this popularity, which sometimes assumes familiar forms, with the other Polish leaders, all of whom attach far greater importance to the "human touch" than to blind obedience, in sharp contrast with the Germans whom "leader worship" has turned into robots.

Another Polish leader who until quite recently was entirely unknown abroad is Brigadier-General Wacław Stachiewicz, Chief of the Polish General Staff. In this capacity the General—a former student of philosophy, member of the "Strzelec" and of the Polish Legion—plays a rôle of tremendous importance to-day.

It is impossible within the frame of a short article to give a character sketch of all the Polish leaders of to-day. But Poland certainly does not lack men of exceptional talent in any field. To mention only a few more, there is General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who is known as one of the most prominent strategists in Europe; Wincenty Witos, the peasant leader, who possesses great qualities as a politician; and the world famous Ignacy Paderewski whose name is known to all lovers of music. The Poland of to-day also has other leaders than statesmen, politicians and generals; she has great poets, authors and artists, who must also be regarded as leaders of the people.

At the time of writing this people of thirty-six million souls is engaged in a bitter struggle, putting up an heroic resistance to a military machine loosed upon them by the gang which to-day dominates Germany. Whatever hardships and sacrifices the coming days may demand of Poland, the result of this war is already certain. And when Hitlerism has been wiped out, it will be due not least to the fact that Hitler, Goering and Goebbels are being opposed in Poland by a Moscicki, a Smigly-Rydz and a Colonel Beck.

S. WOLF.

propaganda among the Arabs, has served to convince more than a small minority of his hearers. His chances with the Egyptians were wrecked in Abyssinia—until the Wafd is no longer, in effect if not in theory, anti-British. In taking Albania he frightened the Greeks and Bulgars and angered the Jugoslavs. In opposing the cession to Turkey of the French-controlled Hatay district of Syria he crowned a long run of unpopularity with the Turks. In the western Mediterranean he seemed to have only the future of the Spanish Falange to gamble on, and in return for that he had given the French the unity they had failed to achieve since the war. His military exploits have aroused Whitehall; with every day that passes the Mediterranean balance of striking-power seems to go further against him.

For all that, it remains true to say that the Italians are stronger in the Mediterranean now than at any time in their history. That does not mean to say that they are in decisive command. It does not even mean (in fact I have just written the contrary) that they can keep their present proportion of strength against that of other Powers. They are making a great economic effort to keep it; the only question that must be asked is, How long will they be able to maintain this effort? The economic effort falls into three main compartments: the expansion of agricultural production, the expansion of industrial production and, most difficult, the expansion of Italian foreign trade so that necessary imports can be paid for.

Their narrow escape from economic defeat during the sanctions experiment taught the Italian leaders that their diplomacy must in future rely on less vulnerable supports. In part, too, the move towards self-sufficiency was forced by the contraction of Italy's foreign trade, and by the dangerous adverse balances accumulating against her. Its main excuse, however, was strategic; and it is as such that Fascist apologists have regarded it. The means of which Italy can dispose in an attempt to reach the aims declared in her foreign policy can best be seen against the background of the self-sufficiency drive. Broadly, they may be divided into three groups: agricultural, industrial, and financial. When these are assessed it will be possible to indicate within fairly well-defined limits the power of Italy's endurance.

Not far short of ten million Italians live directly by the

soil, and agriculture was the first sector of national activity to be submitted to self-sufficiency planning. The *battaglia del grano*, an attempt to make Italy self-sufficient in wheat, began in 1927, and to all intents (since Italy continues to import wheat, though in diminishing quantities) still continues. War for self-sufficiency has now been declared in all branches of agriculture. Put briefly, it may be said that Italy cannot obtain virtual self-sufficiency in food unless she increases her livestock by at least 10 per cent., augments wheat and maize production, and manages a growing supply of animal and vegetable fats. From the point of view of finding land for cultivation several of these objectives are mutually competitive: the problem therefore resolves itself into one of making better use of available land and of reclaiming land which now lies little cultivated. This will take years of effort and heavy expenditure; even then, with the population increasing year by year, success is by no means certain. Food production, then, can be continued at its present level, but not much increased. Existing food imports cannot be markedly reduced.

Industry shows a more complicated picture. Badly short of essential raw materials such as coal, iron ore, manganese, chromium, and fuel oil, the Italians are doing what they can to manufacture substitutes or find domestic sources of supply. Only in the direction of oil and textiles have they made appreciable progress: Albania now supplies some 50,000 tons of petrol yearly and this is expected to rise to a maximum of 300,000 tons, out of Italy's annual petrol imports of 1,500,000 tons. Hydrogenation plants are also being laid down. For the latter, of course, coal must be available, and costs are high. The same drawback of high cost applies to the synthetic textiles, such as *Lanatol* and *Snia Viscosa*, which came on to the market about a year or two ago. After the lack of raw materials, the next most serious problem is that of insufficient capital equipment, an aspect of war economy which the Germans, who have made good part of that lack, will not fail to appreciate. Like the French, the Italians are in the process of adapting their industrial equipment to modern methods of mass production: they are in no condition to set aside, for the time being, the calls on reserve funds for replacements and depreciation. As far as technical capacity and business organisation go, Italian industry is

probably better equipped than ever before, for along with the move towards mass production there has been the steady centralising influence of the Government. In practice this has meant that small firms have gone to the wall, and that the favours of the Government have been given to a decreasing number of large firms whose output and prices are carefully watched. Unfortunately this movement towards efficiency (a happy case of centralisation) has coincided with, and to a large extent been caused by, foreign adventures of which the main commercial effect has been to screw tighter and tighter the supply of foreign exchange.

This is the crucial industrial problem, although it laps over, too, into the financial field. It must be seen against the background of huge budget deficits which promise to become chronic and a system of clearings which can only be tightened further and further as the march towards self-sufficiency continues. The problem of importing cannot be solved by "dynamic" methods, for essentially it is one of confidence—and confidence does not thrive on political dynamism. In their efforts to solve the problem the Italians have managed to reduce their adverse trade balance year by year, by painful trial and error, until to-day it is quite insignificant. The volume of goods flowing in and out of Italy has been squeezed into new and restricted channels, the flow has been anything but even, and the total volume shows no healthy tendency to increase in size. A great bulge in fruit exports to Germany has meant a mere dribble towards the pre-sanctions market of the United Kingdom. Only lately coffee was scarce because a dispute with Brazil interfered with the main supply. And, unlike the Germans, the Italians have not been able through their restricted industrial capacity and lack of experience, to capture the markets of the Balkans, buying great quantities of produce on the strength of dubious long-term credits payable through clearing agreements. It is an interesting comment on the play of forces within the Axis that, of recent years, Germany has taken a more and more important place in Italy's foreign trade, so that to-day her share in it amounts to as much as 25 per cent. In Italy's present financial position there seems to be little hope of reversing, or even halting, this tendency, although the war will have striking effects.

The precise stringency of Italy's position is difficult to assess. As with Germany, however, there are certain broad

indications of the way in which things are going. Any assessment must be made against an understanding of Italy's difficulties before and during the Abyssinian War. The attempt to save the lira from a devaluation which, in the event, was only postponed, forced the Italian Government, faced as it was with growing military expenditure, the need for domestic political purposes to invest heavily in public works, and a dangerously adverse trade balance, into a policy of severe deflation backed by exchange control and, eventually, a number of measures to obtain funds by special methods. By September 1935, all private credits held abroad had been called in, and all available foreign securities converted into Treasury bonds; and at the same time a limitation on company dividends was imposed together with an extraordinary tax of 10 per cent. on all bearer and similar bonds. The Abyssinian War, on official estimates, cost the equivalent of £130 millions; the Budget deficit for 1937-8, counting in all extraordinary expenditure, was over £120 millions, and such relevant figures as have been issued since then show that there will be little or no reduction of this in the succeeding years.

With increasing control from the centre as the financial position grows more and more unstable, the obvious comparison is with Germany. But the comparison would be a misleading one. Unlike the Nazis, who planned from the first an economy which would put Germany in a permanent fighting posture, the Italians lacked the despair of having to pay endless reparations, the disaster of inflation, and, what derived from that, the incentive to introduce a war economy during peace time. Even had they felt that incentive, the means at their disposal were hopelessly inadequate. It is only under the stress of recent years that the Government at Rome has been driven to "take in the slack." Yet Italy is very far from full employment, and, short of capital and raw materials, has little prospect of reaching that legendary goal. Normal taxation is probably as high as it may go, though a little further revenue may be squeezed from income tax reorganisation; and for some time past the Government has had to resort to special taxes. Ostensibly to tap the profits of the 1936 devaluation, there has been a series of three capital levies, the first on real estate, the second on joint-stock companies, and the third, applied last November, on

private companies. This method of raising money cannot be continued; and as far as payment for public works is concerned, the Government has already tried the dodge of paying contractors by annuities based on prospective tax receipts. On any sane view, what Italy needs is a period of peace in which her industrial turnover may be expanded in a civil rather than in a military direction, and foreign markets lost during sanctions regained by the normal methods of competition rather than by those of frantic and uneconomic subsidising. Failing that period of peace, the least that may be expected is a steep and continued fall in the standard of living. Signs of this are already clear enough: despite more or less rigid controls (the controls have never been as efficient as Germany's) the cost of living is steadily rising, and wage rates have lagged far behind. And although the Government may be able to explain this steady fall in real wages as an effect of the "white war" which the democracies are carrying on against the good Italians, it is not therefore at the end of its troubles.

For the Government's ability to maintain its present economic policy will be decided, by and large, on the ability of Italian industry to increase its production of capital goods to allow of an expansion in the credit structure without a corresponding price inflation. And this can be done only under two conditions: rigid control of prices, and a supply of free exchange sufficient to allow of ample imports of raw materials. The first condition is already largely fulfilled; in regard to the second condition, however, every available piece of information goes to show that it is not being fulfilled, and that it cannot be fulfilled.

The future, then, is far from bright. Food imports must be kept at their present level; raw material imports must be increased, for the pace of the arms race is getting hotter and yesterday's stride will not do for to-day, much less for to-morrow. To make possible this relentless change of pace—remembering that Italy's export capacity cannot be much extended—the Italian people must shoulder new burdens, must bear with longer hours of work and lower real wages. Their taxes must become heavier. Their last individual liberties must be surrendered.

September 5th, 1939

BASIL DAVIDSON.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY.

AN intermittent contributor to THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for nearly a quarter of a century, I am now struck by the melancholy appositeness of the titles I gave my first two articles: "President Wilson's Neutrality: an American View," and "The American Congress and the Export of War Munitions." The dates of their publication were May and December 1915. The issues I then discussed are in broad outline practically identical with the issues that are pertinent now. They differ only in degree—in immediacy and in emphasis. The language which I then used could almost be the language of to-day.

Writing when the war had been in progress for eight months I considered some of the more important criticisms of American policy with which the British press was then filled. President Wilson's appeal for neutrality in thought as well as in action seemed to be too callous, too neutral, too neuter. The United States was not protesting against violations of international law save when our own interests were affected. The Hague conventions to which we were signatories were being torn up and we remained silent. "America," the *Spectator* had declared bitterly, "seems to reckon it up in cold dollars and cents rather than in terms of flesh and blood of human suffering."

I endeavoured to point out that, aloof from European affairs, we had no responsibility for any of the causes of the war; and that as a neutral we were entitled, within the limits of international law, to safeguard and advance our own material interests. Protests and denunciations in cases where all the facts were not available would serve no useful purpose. Indeed, they might bar any helpful American mediation if there came a time when there was a possibility of a negotiated peace.

Now the United States is again neutral and will endeavour to remain so. For the time being at least, even though the human considerations are far more moving than they were in 1915, it will be charged with considering "cold dollars and cents." Again Great Britain may be resentful and impatient because the United States, her partner in ideology, is not her partner in fact. But American neutrality now differs from the neutrality of which I last wrote.

In 1915 the causes of the war were not translucently clear. Indeed, with the post-war disclosures from diplomatic archives, historians (not the least notable of them is an editor of this REVIEW) have demonstrated that the views popularly held were much too simple. History cannot revise in any substantial fashion the verdict which has already been handed down by all countries whose citizens have a free press. We need expect no "disclosures." Responsibility has been fixed by the long-drawn-out debate between those who threatened to make war if ever-increasing demands ceased to be granted and those who paid ransom time and time again before they finally decided to resist the bandits.

The result is that in the United States only a tiny minority has any sympathy with the Hitler régime or desires anything save its immediate and complete disintegration or destruction. Hence in his radio address on September 3rd, President Roosevelt deliberately did not make the same appeal that President Wilson had made, of impartiality "in thought as well as in action," and did not call for "a curb upon our sentiments." "That every American remain neutral in thought," President Roosevelt did not ask. "Even a neutral," he declared, "has a right to take account of facts. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience."

A difference also arises from the fact that the United States cannot dissociate itself completely from responsibility for the situation which permitted Hitler to gain power. If the United States had been in the League of Nations, the Covenant might, as President Wilson had hoped, have been made a "vehicle of life." Certainly American influence would have worked for an amelioration of the *Diktat* of the Treaty of Versailles. To be sure, European states had ample opportunity to retrieve the situation, but throughout the discussions of the disarmament convention, the unwillingness of the United States to make any promises concerning its attitude toward measures that collective security might require, put brakes on English policy and made Great Britain reluctant to extend her commitments. American responsibility is vague, but it is nevertheless real. Shortly stated, American isolation was a factor that contributed to France's feeling of insecurity. French insecurity resulted in French intransigence. Without that there would have been no National Socialist régime. Without the National Socialist régime, Europe would not now be at

war. It is not unreasonable to trace out such a chain of cause and effect, but its outlines are too vague for them materially to affect either public sympathy or public policy.

Concerning the former, as I have said, there is no question. Concerning the latter, the issue now is the identical issue of 1915. The primary concern of the United States should be the protection and advancement of our own interests. We may be wrong in the methods we adopt, we may even be in error in our conception of what the interests are, but who will gainsay our right to protect them? That has certainly been the basis of recent British policy. In 1931 Great Britain remained aloof when Secretary of State Stimson wanted Sir John Simon to join with him in an active policy in the Sino-Japanese business. Great Britain paid primary regard to her own interests when Italy was becoming an empire, when Spain was being torn by civil war, when the Sudetenland was returned to Germany, and when the Czech bastion was being razed. Britain's estimates of her own interests may have been miscalculations, but no one could deny her the right to make them. She remained neutral even though the Covenant of the League of Nations contemplated a different policy. So now the United States desires to remain neutral in order to protect her own interests. Her desires may be mistaken, but who can deny her right to have them? That they may be vain desires is another matter.

I cite the British parallel because writers like the one in the *Spectator* twenty-five years ago will be contemptuous of a neutrality that is "selfish and silent." Americans, in viewing British policy in respect of the incidents I have cited, ignored, and Englishmen, in considering American policy now, should be mindful of, a failing that they have in common: they judge themselves in terms of their actions; they judge other countries in terms of their ideals.

Six months after I discussed America's position as a neutral, we had vastly increased our trade to England and France. Munition exports were not spectacular, but our trade in materials for making munitions, in textiles, and in certain raw materials had trebled or even quadrupled. At the same time there had been a decline of all other exports which in value exceeded the net increase of total exports. I discussed the unhealthiness of this situation and called attention to the growing resentment against Great Britain for the restrictions

which it was imposing upon our trade with Germany. Congress was about to consider an embargo on the export of war munitions. In my article I anticipated that there would be no embargo; that there were considerations which would rise above the legality or illegality of British restrictions on American trade, and declared that the United States would be unwilling "to assist Germany to a successful outcome of her conspiracy against the peace of the world."

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. In 1939 the initial impact of the war on American economy is vastly different from the impact of 1914. Now the stock market remains open and booms. The prices of foodstuffs rise. Speculators hope that again we will be a great granary and a huge factory for a Europe torn by war. They may be right but the costs to other branches of American economy will be tremendous.

Insofar as concerns the export of munitions proper, our policy is now of greater importance to Great Britain and France than it was in 1915, and the Congressional struggle will be the reverse of what it was then. By reason of President Roosevelt's defeat at the last session of Congress, American legislation bars the export of munitions to European belligerents, and a Presidential proclamation has so declared. Before these lines can be printed, Congress will doubtless be in special session. What policy it will adopt is uncertain. The most probable one would seem to be a relaxation of the complete embargo and permission to export munitions on a cash and carry basis. There will be opposition on the ground that this will make it more difficult for the United States to remain neutral. But such an amendment of the neutrality law will be supported by the solid argument that every American plane or shell which can be used by England and France will be really used in defence of the United States; that if Hitlerism is not destroyed quickly, the United States will be brought to consider helping in its destruction; and that if it should triumph, the United States will have to defend itself alone. The progress of the war in Europe therefore will in effect determine American policy. That was what happened in 1915.

LINDSAY ROGERS.

New York City.

September 8th, 1939.

THE MEANING OF "GOD IS LOVE."

THE world situation at the present time, with its psychological factors and influences, makes a revision of current theological and religious concepts important. Some of these concepts magnify the attribute of Power in God, described as the Almighty. Others spring out of and nourish sentimentality and effeminacy in religion. In either case the course of events must needs be a source of bewilderment and disquietude. Both the hardness and the softness of religious imagination tend to strengthen the pessimist and irrational conclusion that God is "altogether Other" than His world and that His ways are "past finding out." The apparent hard-and-fastness of the earthly order tends to foster either belief of the abstract fixity and apartness of God, or, for emotional religion, the unknowableness which springs from disappointed expectations.

In endeavouring to face these problems the statement "God is Love" should be taken as the starting-point. It sums up the whole content of revelation and claims to express ultimate and highest truth. It infers from divine relationships, deeds and influences what God is in Himself. The Christian Faith, though it has too often emphasised other and lower concepts in its endeavour to "justify the ways of God to man," must in the end stand or fall by this great definition—its meaning and its truth.

It should be noted at the outset that the definition summed up the result of reflection upon Christ—His relation to God, His mind and deeds, His relation to foregoing revelation, and, not least of all, His recreative influence upon men.

It is also noteworthy that the Greek term *Agape* (ἀγάπη) is deliberately used both in the Johannine and the Pauline writings, and in the light of Christ is elevated to the higher and more comprehensive meaning, which it was originally fitted to express. It is entirely free from sentimental, still more from erotic, significance. Lest the purity of the term should be in itself insufficient, the Johannine writer expressly insists upon it. "For this is the love of God, that we keep His Commandments." The term impresses upon us the loftiness, the universality, the comprehensiveness, of the divine aim. The deed of God in Christ Jesus reveals the far-reaching significance of the divine purpose, with which men

may co-operate by keeping the commandments of God. The "costingness" of the activity of God in Christ is, for the epistle, a sufficient answer to the question "Does God *care*?" and lifts His attitude and activity far above the subordinate, and indeed degenerate, inquiry "Does God *feel*?" The former question, if satisfactorily answered, suggests the all-sufficiency of God; the latter, if taken by itself, His insufficiency.

One other preliminary remark must be made. The Johannine writer intends his statement to be taken as *the truth*. He is, in the best sense, a dogmatist. His theology is precise and exact. His description is a definition. For him faith and reason go together. His saying cannot be dissolved in vagueness. It cannot be minimised. Human reason is trustworthy, though inadequate. When the writer says "God is Love," his meaning is not to be reduced by divesting it of strict significance. The question in regard to God must, therefore, be, not "How much less?" but, to quote our Lord, "How much more?" Hence the statement must be taken as a firm basis of inquiry, although the answer to be given suggests many problems that cannot be dealt with in the course of such a short article as this must needs be.

I. What, then, is the connotation and what are the implications of the statement that "God is Love"?

(i) In the first place, God is personal, indeed the only perfect personality. Love is the intensest and highest act of personality and without personality love is unthinkable. St. John was the last man to conceive that love could exist without a lover, that a quality, in the abstract, can be an agent. For him the statement meant that in God love is so central, so supreme, so continuously and creatively active that it expresses His character completely both as He is in Himself, and as He is in relationship to His world.

(ii) The statement therefore declares that God is ceaselessly active in a purposive and beneficent self-giving that embraces His creation both as a whole and in its manifold particularity according to the nature and capacity of every part. What is involved in this can be briefly stated as follows:

(1) The ceaseless activity of God is spiritually inspired in order to realise the highest values, which are essential to love. It is not necessitated, for freedom and choice are the conditions of love.

(2) Complete knowledge, for love and knowledge are mutually involved, and perfect knowledge of its objects is the concomitant of perfect love.

(3) Immanent access to His creation, for love can only achieve its aims by an intimate access that is in keeping with its nature and its spiritual ends.

(4) That these ends are universal and are consistently pursued. Above all, that God is "the will to all goodness."

(5) That divine blessedness means satisfaction through His self-giving and the response it calls forth.

(6) That the methods which God employs for the attainment of His purpose are motivated and carried out by love and by no lower means.

(7) Love, in order to its activity, demands the constitution of creaturely apartness, by the Will of God, both in the system as a whole and in its diverse particulars: the One in the Many and the Many in the One. It also involves the transcending of this apartness by the self-giving, which brings creation home to its creator in the fellowship of reciprocal self-giving. God is self-sufficient *as love*; that is not as the personal centre of self-enclosed attributes, but as actively going forth from and returning to Himself in this self-giving.

Hence it follows that God is not an artificer, working upon His creation from without. He lives and works within the system constituted by the will and wisdom of His love. He is above, yet within, this system. According to the scholastic aphorism God is

Intra cuncta, nec inclusus.

Extra cuncta, nec exclusus.

Love stands for "otherness," but cannot consist with "altogether otherness." This latter conception is compelled to interpret the ways of God in lower terms than those of love. God conditions Himself by the system He creates and constitutes. Yet this conditioning is not a limitation, but an expression. Its adoption is from and for the sake of love. The created system must needs be objective to God, in order that it may be the object of and the respondent to His love.

Hence the attributes of God must be apprehended and construed in the light of love. His power is that which enables Him to create and uphold, to sustain and foster, the

system as a whole and in all its parts ; to exercise appropriate sovereignty and immanent guidance throughout the system in which love is Lord. His wisdom prescribes the end and chooses the means that are consistent with and indispensable to love. His righteousness ordains and upholds the moral order which is essential to love. The truth and purity of God represent the undeviating adhesion to and pursuit of the spiritual values which are essential to love, both in God and in His relations with the world.

(iii) It is clear, therefore, that God as love brings together in Himself and in His activity eternity and time. He is love in His eternal nature. He does not come to be love through His creation, for His love is the spring of His creatorship. In creation and throughout its history He manifests what He characteristically *is*. Yet the very fact that He is love implies that time has reality for God, because it is the condition of His progressive self-giving to and through the process of His world. Love needs history for the fulfilment of its purpose. And the love of God achieves Eternity in Time, because of the timeless values that are realised in personalities and in their fellowship throughout and by means of the history of the world.

II. The affirmation "God is Love" carries with it important consequences in regard to the nature of the universe and its interpretation.

The universe is in process. It is not rigid, nor has it reached finality. Its wholeness means the interdependence, and in a high degree the interfusion of all its component parts. They act and react upon one another, and this in more than an external and mechanical way. The progress of science—whether physical, biological, psychological or sociological—establishes this conclusion. The fixity of biological types has long ago been abandoned. The sharp distinction, necessary for science, between the inorganic and the organic will not bear close investigation. Evolution affords the best description of the past ; relativity is the key word of the present. Only mathematics are changeless and this because they are abstract. Life is interlocked with the non-living and the relation of the environment to life, whether animal or ~~plant~~ ^{plant}, is not merely external. If fixity exists anywhere, and ~~is~~ never absolute, it provides a stage and an instrument for

process on a higher level and in this process the whole creation is involved.

All this is brought home to us by science. Yet our affirmation necessarily involves that the universality of process and the interrelation of all elements and factors of the cosmos are not a merely accidental fact, discovered by scientific investigation. They are the consequence of what God is in Himself and of what He is and does in relation to His universe. Love, with the sovereignty of its unfolding purpose, is not consistent with rigidity. Its action must be in and towards a medium, which is capable of receptivity and of suitable response. The nature of the universe must not be interpreted with the hard-and-fastness of abstraction, but in the light of its actual and active relations with its divine source and ends. A responsive universe is the correlate of a self-giving and purposive creator. Love, therefore, and process go together.

component parts. Hence, his opposition to Hume, who made the particulars of sense perception his starting-point and based all knowledge upon sensation. Thus for Hume the universe as a whole became the subject of precarious inference, instead of what it is, the primary *datum* of experience, to which experience and science proceed to give precise determination. Life is an integral part of this experienced whole, and life is characterised by "absolute self-enjoyment, creative activity and aim" (p. 61). The individual is part of the universal aim. The key statement is that "the energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life" (p. 96).

The following observations upon this must be made :

(1) Process, apprehended as universal, is the legitimate extension of process as experienced in subjective experience and observed within the limited range of initial objective observation. The conception, therefore, appears, in its completeness, to involve sufficient reason, creative potentialities, universal ordering, and an adequate goal in the realisation of the values which give process interest and importance. All these elements are to be found in the history of human civilisation and have been embodied in the spiritual movements which have developed religion and morality, giving to them, and to mankind through them, creative efficacy in process within the orbit of human life. Process involves purposiveness. The objection that purpose is only a feature of the finite and phenomenal order, and that any inference beyond that order is illegitimate depends upon the acceptance of the fixity and departmentalism of physical science and of much philosophy. Against this attitude Professor Whitehead constantly and rightly protests. The nature of reality is being revealed in its process. The concept of process must be held in its entirety, and not robbed of its purposive significance.

(2) Moreover process has culminated, so far as our experience goes, in man. His personality is primary, and is realised in society, with its essential factors of religion and morality. Above all, it is realised in and through love, with its gravity and comprehensive scope, and with the creativity, which is its outstanding feature. All these elements have culminated in Christ. Of process as revealed in man, Christ is indeed "the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the

beginning and the end." Love as the supreme creative and recreative energy in process has been revealed alike in its depth and intensity, its comprehensive creativity in Christ and in Him alone. The Buddha exhibited love as pity, the Hindu mystics showed it as yearning for union with the infinite, but love as the agent, meaning and value of process has been fully manifested in and by Christ alone. Process must therefore be apprehended and interpreted in terms of Christ.

(3) The fact of universal process ordered by God as love must be seen in due relation to its limiting conditions and its method. It appears to be inevitable that the urge of process in fulfilment of its purpose should meet with obstacles. The position reached at every stage must be consolidated as a result and co-ordinated in the universal system. Hence each point is the meeting place of the static and the dynamic. Resistance to change, tending to stability, and response to the forces and influences making for advance in the movement of process are "deeply interfused." Hence an apparent element of indeterminacy in Nature and the certainty of freedom in men must be taken account of. Moreover the particularity of the system carries with it the consequence that here and there the relative forces behind the stability and those behind the processive vary in their immediate and respective strengths. Each part of the system acts upon the rest whether by way of temporary frustration or of acceleration. Hence tension and friction must occur.

The nature of the conflict thus arising varies according to the level at which it occurs, whether material, biological, psychological or sociological. On the highest level of personality resistance to recognised duty, in the moral sphere, refusal or rebellion against spiritual influences felt to be divine are sin. Sin, then, is at once an enormity ; yet it contains within itself natural factors, disordered though they are. Sin is always individual ; it is also corporate. Judgment is, therefore, always taking place ; the judgment of the process itself, seeing that it is the executive of God as Love.

(4) In presence of this abnormal, yet inevitable, conflict the process can only advance to its consummating end by means of, in terms of, and for the sake of Love. Love is constrained to atone, has atoned, and is atoning. Judgment is a vital element of atonement. In atoning Divine Love has

raised the process to an altogether higher level. It has brought about an advance, which by its method of sacrificial love has brought to light alike the meaning, the source and the end of the process as ceaselessly pursued by God as love. This revelation has been made in Christ and in the spiritual results that have been attained, and are being attained, through the indissoluble union of His history and His Spirit. The process operates in men by means of the faith, hope and love with which they respond to and co-operate with the gracious initiative of God as love. Hence it is inevitable and illuminating that those who seek to affect the process by incursions of power-politics and violence should avow themselves to be anti-Christian. Yet despite these invasions, showing themselves to be inhuman as well as anti-Christian, "the foundation of God standeth sure." The process will triumph over, and eventually by means of, the challenges which, for the moment, defy it. The purpose of God as Love will not fail. The purpose, which the process of the world is destined to fulfil, is "to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon the earth; even in Him."

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

NOTE. This article was written just before the war. It need not be altered.—J. S. L.

JUSTICE IN NAZI GERMANY.

THE theories of the Third Reich are simple, and very directly applied. The five men who, in 1932, in the days of the Papen Government, murdered a Communist at Potempa on the Polish border, were described by Hitler as "my comrades" and as "soldiers of freedom." The five men had dragged their victim out of his bed at night, trampled on his throat, and finally shot him. The court at Beuthen sentenced the murderers to death. Hitler wrote: "Herr von Papen, your bloody objectivity is a thing I do not recognise. For national Germany I desire victory, for its Marxist destroyers and spoilers I desire destruction." And the *Hamburger Nachrichten* of August 24th, 1932, commented:

What was condemned in Beuthen was no act of violence against a German racial comrade but the removal of a Polish scoundrel, who, besides, was a Communist. A doubly minus being, therefore, who had long forfeited the right to live on German soil. . . . In God's name, have German judges not yet understood that the frontier combat between the noble Germanic and the subhuman Polish type is part of the struggle for existence of the Germanic people?

Needless to say the "noble Germanic types" were reprieved by von Papen and later released by Hitler.

The "national aim," one may say, circumscribes Nazi justice, and Dr. Dietrich, writing in the *Deutsche Juristenzeitung* of June, 1933, told us that in pursuance of that aim killing, wounding and arson are all justifiable. In September 1933 an article in the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Wohlfahrtspflege* lays down the rule that "only so much should be spent on asocial and inferior elements as will keep life going, not, however, lead to an undue prolongation of it." It is well to remind ourselves that those in power always consider what is opposed to them as "asocial" and "inferior," and that it is always and only by the struggle against those in power that any beneficent change comes.

In an exclusive pursuit of the "national aim" the individual ceases to be an individual and becomes a mere unit in the scheme.

Not the individual personality is the highest bliss of mortals, but rather the well-being of the German people bound together by

blood and soil, speech and custom, hardship and fate. . . . The basis of the penal programme is as unyielding as the State fight against injurious elements means to be. . . . The fear of renewed punishment shall become so vivid in the mind of the prisoner, through the way in which the sentence is carried out, as to prove a barrier to temptation even in those who are not susceptible to inner education.*

There are no doubts, no suspicion that perhaps what we at the moment label injurious may years hence be termed progressive. Dr. Schmidt reverts to the nineteenth-century conception of the respectable comfortably sheepfolded away from the unrespectable, and is certain that our one duty to the unrespectable is to crush them. And yet Dr. Schmidt himself might, before long, be reckoned one of the "injurious elements." I would not for one moment suggest that no useful proposals are now made in Germany, but what stands in the way of almost all advance is—to put it bluntly—the uneducated outlook of the leaders. For these leaders there are only black and white, sheep and goats, and for them the decision as to who is black and who is white is a quite simple deduction from inspired premises. All that does not add to Nazi power is bad. This man does not add to Nazi power. . . . And thus one argues about all activities and all knowledge.

Dr. Franz Gürtner was appointed Reich Minister of Justice in 1933. Why? When Hitler was condemned to five years' fortress arrest after his abortive Putsch of November 1923, Gürtner was Bavarian Minister of Justice and released Hitler after six months. Gürtner had thus favoured the "national aim" and has his reward. In the autumn of 1933 he was asked by Hitler to appoint a Commission to draw up a new penal code "representing the outlook and the needs of the new State." A report was issued in July 1934, and a revised and enlarged edition in the autumn of 1935. References given below are always to the second edition. State Secretary Freisler contributes an article on *Willensstrafrecht*, the new code that punishes the *will* to do evil, not waiting for the deed. I may illustrate this by the case of a boy of nineteen who was executed for the mere *intention* of holding up and robbing a motor.

The law must clearly distinguish: on the one side socialistic energy embodied in the National-Socialist State, on the other side

* Ministerialrat Dr. Schmidt, *Deutsche Zeitschrift f. Wohlfahrtspflege*, November 1933.

anti-socialistic energy, embodied in those who are ready for evil, wrongful, anti-socialistic, anarchistic deeds [p. 20].

On p. 121 Ministerialrat Rietzsch writes:

There can be no doubt of the need of retaining the death penalty in National-Socialist law. . . . Without it an effective protection of the community . . . is impossible.

It is noteworthy that no attempt is made to examine the experience of countries in which the death penalty has been abolished. No one would be allowed to point out that this experience destroys the case for the death penalty. It is the *Anschauung* that decides what is true, not the facts. "The cry for expiation is for us Germans as old as our people." (Freisler, p. 16.)

The "invertibracy" of Republican German law is the refrain in almost all Nazi articles on the new justice, and we find it in the article on the probation system by Senatorial President Grau. He favours, it is true, some retention of the system but manages somehow to convince himself that this retention is no remnant of the old liberalistic days. Dr. Karl Schäfer writes on *Nullum crimen sine poena* (no crime without its punishment) and cites as groundwork of the new as of the old code the other principle: *Nullum crimen sine lege*, i.e. an act can only be punished, if the law specifically declares it to be punishable. But Schäfer proceeds (and this is characteristic) to whittle away the meaning of the old principle. Its origin is declared to be "liberalistic," protecting the individual rather than the State. The New State, we are told (p. 203) claims the whole man. The Commission formulated its conclusions thus:

Anyone will be punished who does anything declared punishable by the law or anything that according to the basic principle of one of the laws and according to healthy public opinion (*nach gesunder Volksanschauung*) deserves punishment. If no existing law is directly applicable, the act will be punished according to that law the basic principle of which most nearly fits the case [pp. 213-14].

All of us feel that our British laws at times niggle about forensic points, but the formulæ of the National-Socialist Commission invite the influence of every kind of prejudice and propaganda.

The general outlook indicated above makes itself only too evident in all the legal journals. We may take in illustration

the issue of *Deutsche Justiz* of January 4th, 1939. The first impression is that we are reading a political pamphlet. Secretary of State Dr. Freisler writes five columns on "1938-Greater Germany," which begins thus :

New Year—Retrospect!

1938! Which of us, as the New Year began, would have divined the wealth of blessing that it would bring to us!

1938! Fulfilment! Realisation of the centuries-old yearning for the Reich of the Germans, the Greater German Reich.

And so on. We are told how, after the years of bitter shame, the Führer called and the victorious march of this one man began. From the Ostmark (Austria) six and a half million Germans "cried for help and the Germany of our Führer came. With one voice they made their choice: *one* people, *one* Führer, *one* Reich!" So too of the Sudetenland. These lyrical utterances may, to the mere democrat, seem a little out of place in a professional legal journal, but they belong to the necessary make-up of the Third Reich. In other articles we learn how new officials have been substituted for old in Austria and the Sudetenland. We are told too that a great many of the German judges and lawyers of a court that remained within the borders of Czechoslovakia placed themselves at the disposal of the German authorities in the new Sudetenland. What has happened now, one asks oneself, to those German judges and advocates who remained by preference with the Czechs?

In the same number Dr. Crohne tells us that crime in general diminished in the third quarter of 1938. On the other hand the law had not managed to control sex better, nor had it increased success in enforcing the currency regulations. The democratic observer might comment that in the field of sex the law often rushes in where a wise angel would fear to tread, while as regards currency the rules have become so unreasonable, that the temptation to break them is irresistibly strong. In other directions improvement may be due to regular employment and (temporarily) to more drastic punishment. Freed from the uncertainties that beset increased knowledge the Nazi can make his laws both simple and telling. Motor thefts—often accompanied by violence—had increased. The remedy is sought in a law thus simply worded: "Whoever with intention to steal holds up a motor

(*eine Autofalle stellt*) will be punished with death." Dr. Freisler devotes an article to this law and emphasises the fact that mere intention suffices to convict an offender. (Hence such a case as that mentioned above.) Dr. Crohne is proud of the fact that recent cases in Berlin, Mannheim, Nürnberg and Hamburg were dealt with so speedily that the whole proceedings from arrest to execution lasted only a few days. Such grim ruthlessness may, at first, have an effect, but the fact that it is felt needful suggests some decivilisation of the people themselves, and this may well balance out a growing decivilisation of their rulers. In that case increasingly barbarous punishment will cease to affect an increasingly barbarous people. Here again the Nazis do not investigate the facts; if they did, they would be checked by the knowledge that all the horrors of medieval punishment did nothing whatever to lessen crime.

Prisoners are set to work. The Nazis pride themselves on that.

Minister Kerrl put the prisoners to work again. He started what is truly the greatest and most modern prison administration (*Strafvollzug*) in the world by setting thousands of prisoners to work trenching the moors of the German West and reclaiming land from them. In this way prison management was got into order once more. (Freisler, in *Beiträge zur Rechtserneuerung*, Heft I, p. 2.)

It is good to get prisoners to do useful work. But this good in the Nazi proposals is vitiated here, as in so many other cases, by their worship of their own ideology. It is one thing to recognise fellowship with prisoners, another to treat them as raw material to be used or destroyed in the interests of an idolised Party and State. Both methods may claim to put the prisoners to work again, but while the first, in wise hands, makes men, the second can only make slaves. There is, alas, no doubt whatever that the prisoners on the moors are slaves. In one such camp bayonet wounds have been a substitute for flogging, while sick men who collapsed at their work were left lying (often in the rain) till evening. The work in the punishment company was so excessive and the mishandling so unendurable, that prisoners have courted grave and agonising injury to escape the still worse torments of their guards. The facts have been printed, and I do not wish to do more here than to say that I know the reports to be correct.

They indicate where the principles proclaimed by the Nazis lead us.

The Nazi State takes the place of God. Again and again in their schemes we can see how this central failing mars all. For instance, it is thoroughly good to give the child born out of wedlock increasing rights, but when only those rights are granted "which correspond to the legal standpoint of National-Socialist Germany" (*Deutsche Justiz*, 1939, p. 14), we know at once the kind of gaps the new justice will reveal. And we are not greatly surprised at the political character of the study courses and lectures in the camp summer schools for legal students completing their practical training for State services (i.e. for *Referendare*). The History Course emphasises such topics as "Encirclement," "Versailles," "The Dissolution of Parliamentary Systems," "The Rise of the NSDAP," and so on. One of the four sections on "The History of German Intellectual Life" is devoted to Dietrich Eckart. Eckart was the first editor of the *Völkischer Beobachter* (the leading Nazi organ) and had been imprisoned for a few weeks on account of his participation in Hitler's *Putsch* of November 1923. That "The Czech Democracy" and "The Sudeten Germans" were the themes of lectures in the summer schools of 1938 is an example of the fact that coming events (especially in the dictatorships) cast their shadows before. That a lecture was also given on "The Struggle of the German Groups in Hungary" is one of the further hints that statesmen (if they still existed) would not neglect. The subject "Tasks and Methods of assuring State Security" was assigned (significantly enough) to a higher official of the Secret Police.

Something should be said about the treatment of youthful "offenders." Here there is, happily, sometimes a marked difference between the theories of the Nazis and the practice of the experts, of whom many are keenly interested in their work. Yet when—as I have known—an expert is refused permission to visit a charge of his who had been sent to a concentration camp, we can see how the Nazi authorities may hinder the help they should welcome. *Gedanken über Strafvollzug an jungen Gefangenen* (Thoughts on the Punishment of young Prisoners) is the first volume of a new series of *Contributions to the New Conception of Justice*. It was published in 1936. The introduction by Secretary of State Dr.

Freisler emphasises, as usual, the need of expiation, "a need deeply anchored in the German soul." We may pass over the rather specially disgusting vilification of earlier Republican work (cf. Dr. Hans Eichler's article); these vilifications of former workers seem, in Nazi Germany, to be necessary stepping stones to "higher things." We may welcome the rule laid down by Dr. Freisler in a second article of his that all minors between the ages of fourteen and eighteen should be treated in youth prisons, but are a little suspicious of the principle that of boys between eighteen and twenty-one only those should be accepted who are not "criminals by nature." This may in practice mean that only easy subjects and those who have not offended the Nazis may be accepted. As a sun worshipper I am delighted to note that in Heilbronn the youthful prisoners carry out their physical exercises in summer unclothed, "with marked benefit to their health." (Article by the Governor.) One is thankful to Freisler for saying that youth prisons must be small, the very highest number of prisoners allowable being, in his opinion, 250. But when he insists that every boy should for the first weeks, or even months, be kept in strict solitary confinement, one feels he is totally ignorant of the psychological effects of such treatment. How easy it is to turn repentance into defiance Freisler could learn even in recent German penological literature. School hours (apart from technical classes) seem usually limited to three in the week, and it is diverting to read how the instruction continually dwells upon the greatness of reawakened Germany and the importance of "blood and soil." The anti-Jewish laws are expounded, and one Governor naively remarks that National-Socialist works are regularly handed out to the young prisoners, whether they ask for them or not. I should, I think, become a cunning young hypocrite under this régime.

There is, however, much sensible writing in this field at the present time. One writer ventures even to warn his colleagues of the error of considering that to stress the educational aim is synonymous with mollicoddling. The official Nazi view is that no female official is wanted in a youth prison. (See, e.g. Dr. Siegmund Nörr in the *Gedanken*.) But the enthusiastic reports on the English Borstal System, with their emphasis on the importance of the matron and other women helpers, have the effect of a whiff of fresh air in a stuffy

room.* As regards general tendencies the reader can find material also in the various issues of *Das Junge Deutschland*. We find the monstrous but common Western notion that punishment itself must be degrading, but we find too the wise suggestion that youthful delinquencies should be expunged from the records. A suggestion of week-end arrest is also made, which would leave a boy free to do his ordinary work during the week.

On the whole the actual results of Nazi (and half Nazi) methods with youthful delinquents seem much the same as those we have seen above in the case of adults. An article by Freisler in *Das Junge Deutschland* of March 1939 records that in 1930 21,485 delinquents between fourteen and eighteen were punished and in 1937 19,094. As the number of this age group was in the two years practically identical, the statistics indicate a slight decrease in youthful criminality. What is perhaps more noticeable is that the total of these delinquents increased from 13,307 in 1936 to 19,094 in 1937. An increase corresponding to the increase in the numbers of the age group would have given us only 14,898 delinquents in 1937. A very careful study of the conditions in Hamburg† indicates the same phenomenon of a fall of criminality followed by a rise. It is also noteworthy that whereas in 1932 sexual offences made up 2.7 per cent., they in 1936 made up 10.9 per cent. of the total. The decrease in unemployment has not reduced the total youthful delinquency, and unfavourable home conditions would seem to account for at most 22 per cent. of the cases that came before the Hamburg courts.

The time has not come for any final pronouncement, but the indications are already of the kind we should expect. Knowledge of the past teaches us to believe that brutal methods will brutalise the society in which they are used. The members of such a society will become less amenable both to punishment and to reform.

HAROLD PICTON.

* See *Zeitschr. f. die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft*, LVI, 1936, pp. 551-76, and *Blätter f. Gefängniskunde*, LXVIII, 1937, pp. 165-239.

† Hans Kruse, *Monatsschrift f. Kriminalbiologie u. Strafrechtsreform*, 1937, pp. 497-516.

THE S.C.M.

THE Student Christian Movement is not one of those organisations which the reader of the daily Press has often brought to his notice. Though it has a continuous history going back now half a century, a large part of the British public has probably never heard of it, or only associates the vaguest notions with its name. Yet in certain circles it is well known. There is no one who has passed through any university in the British Isles during these last fifty years but he will have heard it talked about in his student days and will not improbably have come into contact with some of its members. There must be few ministers of religion, whether Anglican priests or Free Church preachers, who have not been either members of it or had some dealings with it in the places where they were prepared for their life-work.

Out of the past a day is called to mind. It is October 15th, 1889. Some fifteen hundred students have found their way to the old Metropolitan Tabernacle, Spurgeon's Tabernacle, in Newington Butts. Spurgeon himself is there and speaks. But the object of the meeting is to hear two students, British themselves, describe a movement going forward among students in America, a movement which has led to a large number of young men deciding to go out into the non-Christian world as missionaries. It is resolved to form in Great Britain a Students' Foreign Missionary Union. That autumn day fifty years ago has long sunk into the tale of days that are past, and is now remembered by few. But it left the small beginning of something new in the world. Out of that has grown by gradual extensions an organised body of students now spread through the universities and technical colleges of the British Isles, whose total membership last year was given as 10,661. For the last thirty years or so it has been known as the Student Christian Movement, the S.C.M.

It was from America that the impulse first came in 1889. And two Americans hold a prominent place in the early history of the British Student Movement. One was Robert Wilder, who came to England in 1891 and travelled about during that and the following year through British universities, a young man of evangelic fervour and friendly winning personality, whose appeal to students brought numbers to go out as preachers of Christ in the non-Christian world,

numbers too who had never been Christians at all in any real sense to begin a new life in their own country. The other American was John R. Mott. As a student at Cordell University, he had in 1885 been brought to active Christian faith by a young Cambridge man, J. E. K. Studd, who was then going on an evangelistic campaign through the American universities, and whom in latter years we have known as Lord Mayor of London. Mott's talks to British students, when he visited this country in 1894 and afterwards, had a powerful grip. Later on, when his activities extended to the universities of Europe, Asia and Australasia, he became the general secretary of a World's Student Christian Federation, in which the British Student Christian Movement is embraced together with the Student Movements of other lands, and thus a leading personality in the student world as a whole, indeed a public man of note in the United States. He has now resigned his secretaryship of the World Federation to a younger man, but his activities, his authoritative presence at gatherings in various parts of the globe, have not ceased.

Though the British Student Movement owes so much to Americans, its character has always been wholly British. There is nothing in its ways or in its language which could strike anyone as peculiarly American. Its aim at the outset, as we have seen, was a very limited one, simply to induce young men and women who were practising Christians to consider whether they ought not to go out as missionaries. In the course of fifty years its aims have become much more manifold. It duplicated its organisation in 1893 so that it might not only appeal to students who were already Christians to consider the missionary call, but might draw to the Christian life those who were indifferent to it or ignorant what it meant and might help to be better Christians those whose Christianity was hitherto of poor quality. It has prompted some local student unions to undertake evangelising missions in industrial towns. There are religious movements whose appeal is almost wholly emotional; they seek to induce this or that form of conduct by stirring up religious feelings, while there is no serious grappling by the mind with the problem "What is true?" The S.C.M. is not one of these. It early initiated systematic study of the facts of the non-Christian world and of other religions. It also arranged circles for a study of this or the other book of the Bible and

prepared textbooks for this purpose. As time went on, especially after the theological colleges were drawn into association, it found it necessary to meet the intellectual difficulties of many students regarding the affirmations of the Christian faith. Its leaders met together in 1911 to consider in detail what the main difficulties felt by students were—it had already gathered data by a widely distributed questionnaire—and how they could best be met. An interesting little pamphlet drawn up by the late Canon B. H. Streeter called "Doubts and Difficulties," was the result. The Movement had already in the last century its own publishing department and has issued, beside its monthly organ *The Student Movement*, a large number of excellent books, bearing on many sides of the Christian faith and Christian life. In 1929 it formed a special company for its publishing work, the "Student Christian Movement Press Ltd.," under the direction of the Rev. Hugh Martin. Another line of its work has been to meet the needs of foreign students in British universities. In London it established in 1917 at 32 Russell Square a club-house where students of all races and creeds could meet together and learn something about Christianity by contact with it in practice. (The club has recently been transferred to 103 Gower Street.)

"In the Student Movement," says its historian, Canon T. Tatlow, "the evils and disorders of society and their cause were never mentioned during the first seven or eight years of its history." But in 1912 it was recognised as a regular part of its work in future to direct students to a study of social problems. If this is to be done seriously it means of course that various views, the view of Christian Communism as well as the view which opposes any radical change in the present economic order, must have free expression. The Movement is not, as such, committed to any economic theory; some of its adherents no doubt stand for "Christianity of the Left," but others certainly do not. All that the Movement itself, I think, is concerned to insist upon is that evils in our present social framework which are in obvious disaccord with the mind of Christ are there, and that in any schemes of social reconstruction Christians ought to take the mind of Christ, as they understand it, to be their guide. In the matter of social study the Student Movement was only just getting into its stride when there came the cataclysm of the first World War.

The war removed from this world many of its finest members, some of its leaders, and made its financial basis precarious. That it was somehow carried over those four difficult years was largely due to the remarkable gifts of sound judgment, administrative ability and strong faith which mark the man who has just been referred to as the historian of the Movement and who was its general secretary from 1898 to 1929, Canon Tissington Tatlow. When, after the war, the Movement was brought again into normal working, it was plain that another subject, beside that of social problems at home, claimed study—that of international relations. Here too there was pretty obvious disaccord with the mind of Christ. To bring about fellowship between the nations, to prevent a return of war—that seemed to be an ideal which students could co-operate to realise. Canon Tatlow's history of the Movement ends with 1933. At that time the adherents of the Movement included a number of fervent pacifists, though the pacifists were very much in a minority. The Movement as a whole is seen eager for disarmament, for the League of Nations Union. But in 1933 Hitler's coming to power in Germany profoundly changed the situation. The outlook of the student world between 1933 and 1939 came to be as different from that of the years 1919-1933 as the outlook of those years was from that of the years before the first World War. Yet it is truer than ever to-day that "the international problem is the greatest which faces Christians at the present time."

The group which initiated the Movement in the last century was limited to a particular type of Christian belief—that of the old Evangelical tradition. It consisted of Low-Churchmen, Presbyterians and Nonconformist Protestants. In its first years the Movement was closely associated with the Evangelical Keswick Convention. The great majority of its adherents believed in the infallibility of every syllable of every writing comprised in the Bible. But already at that date the Scottish Presbyterian element represented a view of the Bible which was prepared to turn to account the results of critical enquiry, so far as they seemed assured. In Scotland people like George Adam Smith showed a combination of critical scholarship with warm religious appreciation and Christian faith. And in course of time it was such a view of the Bible for which the Movement, as represented by its leaders and the publications of its Press, came to stand.

There would, of course, never have been any desire to exclude from co-operation those who stuck to the Fundamentalist view, had they been willing to co-operate. But when the more modern view came to prevail in the Movement the Fundamentalists excluded themselves. To-day the only group of Anglicans and Free-Churchmen which stands aloof from the S.C.M. in rigid disapproval consists of those who maintain the old Evangelical tradition unmodified.

What gave the S.C.M. that distinctive character which it has kept till to-day is the coming in of High-Churchmen from 1907 onwards. The theological training colleges from which since that time it has drawn its members include Anglo-Catholic ones. Leading men who belong to this section of the Church are among the speakers at S.C.M. Conferences. Father Herbert Kelly, of Kelham, has been a familiar figure in his long cassock at the large summer camps, held since 1912 at Swanwick, and has thrown himself with admirable zest into the youthful activities of the camp.

High-Churchmen, who must necessarily regard any form of Christianity which leaves out their belief about the Church as gravely defective, have come to hold that for the particular purposes of the S.C.M. they can co-operate with Presbyterians and Baptists and Quakers. The movement is not undenominational, but "inter-denominational." Those who co-operate in arousing young men and women to the claim of Christ upon their lives, to the reality of faith and prayer, are not expected to blur the sharpness of those convictions which distinguish their different communions. But on the basis of the things about which they are agreed they can meet, and confer, for these particular purposes, in fraternal fellowship. Thus the Movement has been an agency of immense importance in drawing together the different Churches. When the incumbent of a parish and a neighbouring Nonconformist minister have made friends at Swanwick in earlier days there is not likely in that place to be any bitterness between Church and Dissent.

One ought to say more, did space permit, about the work of that World Federation, in which the British Student Movement, as has been said, is included, in drawing together, not the churches of one country, but the churches of the world as a whole, including the Eastern Orthodox churches. If the British Student Movement is "inter-denominational," the

World Federation is "inter-confessional." Under the Nazi régime, the German Student Christian Movement has been suppressed.

We are entering on a dark hour. There has been a time when in the Student Movement it was felt, as an old member of it once expressed it to me, that the "kingdom of heaven was just round the corner." There were visions of a better world, according to the mind of Christ, to be established almost in our generation. But through the time of darkness there will be a society of young men and women who go on, as Christians in other troubled ages have done, bearing witness to the Light.

EDWYN BEVAN.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA ÆTERNA.

WE do not know the name of the Jesuit priest who boasted of having burnt with his own hand 60,000 Czech manuscripts; we know only that he was one of the line of fanatics from Omar and Siricius to Savonarola and Goebbels to whom it seems better to burn books than to write them. From the days of the Celtic Bojaren, after whom the country Bohemia was named as Tacitus in his "Germania" tells us, until the days of the great Masaryk who has ennobled our time, there was in the midst of Europe a civilisation whose fragments delight us and the loss of which is doubly painful to us.

Of the first beginnings of the Czech civilisation we know practically nothing. The oldest Czech sagas, called *Dalimil*, inform us of a legendary general called Czech, who led his people, later on named after him, into the country of Czechei. Chronicles which were supposed to report about this pre-Christian time, such as the Gruenberger and the Koeniginhofer manuscripts, have been unmasked as forgeries. Kyrillos and Methodios, two monks, produced the first Christian Czech documents in the ninth century. Smil Flaska of Pardubitz appears to be the first Czech national poet. He lived in the second half of the fourteenth century. His most important work, the *New Council*, is a social satire; it marks the beginning of Czech literature. At the same time, in the year 1348, there was founded in Prague the first German university, where professors and students were animated by the international spirit. Some of them were pupils of John Wycliffe.

Johannes Huss, the father and founder of the Czech civilisation and literature, was a pupil of Wycliffe. He created the Czech written language. His end is well known; he was a defender of the suppressed people, murdered by his political opponents, the Emperor and the Pope. On July 6th, 1415, he was burnt publicly at Constance as a heretic. His testament, the *Missive to the Czech people*, contained the request: "You should be merciful to the poor and grant their rights. I pray you also to love one another, not to let the good be oppressed by violence. And do not hide the truth from anyone." After his death the fight of his successors against imperial aggression and papacy lasted for 100 years. Five crusades were undertaken against the Hussites. Where

fire and sword could not break their resistance under their leaders Ziska and Prokop, negotiation and fraud at last succeeded, and the country became again Roman Catholic and Imperial. In the centuries after Huss which were important abroad and at home, two great men worked in Czechei.

Petr Chelcicky (1390 to 1460), a social reformer, clothed his rebellion against the might of the world in the form of allegories. "All this quality of birthright is founded on unjust invention, thought out by heathens in order to acquire their coats-of-arms from emperors and kings. Some receive them as a gift as a result of some heroic deed, and others buy them for the sake of honour. But if the money for such birthright is not enough, then hunger compels them to leave the coat-of-arms and to seize the plough." This Petr Chelcicky, son of a peasant like Johannes Huss and Thomas Masaryk, was the first Czech communist, a great, kind, just man who applied his energies against the exploitation of the serf, who also worked against the despotic methods of the Taborits and who finally founded a primitive Christian community, the "Society of Brothers and Sisters," out of which the Bohemian Brotherhood grew.

The last bishop of this Brotherhood was Jan Amos Comensky (1592 to 1670), still venerated by his people as the greatest Czech humanist. Comensky or Comenius was the unhappy witness of the laceration of his country and people in the bloodthirsty dialectics of the Thirty Years' War. He wrote innumerable tracts of which one should mention the *Labyrinth of the World*, a most up-to-date index of all human professions and guilds; the *Panergesia* or the *World-Awakening*, containing concrete proposals for the political improvement of human conditions; the *Testament* and *Unum Necessarium*, in which the emigrant Comensky summarises his life: "My whole life was a wandering, an ever-changing refuge, never a home." In it he advocated, for the last time, a plan for universal education, an international primary school, with such clarity and fervour that the painter Oskar Kokoschka postulated it as the most important foundation of an international community for education for peace and freedom.

The Thirty Years' War destroyed Europe. We suffer still to-day from its evil, brought about by religious fanaticism.

The Czech people were decimated, their civilisation was crushed. Hand in hand with the mighty of this world, the great Christian potentates, Przemislyden, the Luxemburgs, the Habsburgs, succeeded in plundering the country more and more, pushing it always more deeply into the morass of barbarism and blind obedience. Not until the flood of the French Revolution, in which the Jacobins helped to realise a part of the Hussite heritage, was there a new blossoming in the cultural possibilities of the Bohemian and Czech countries. The most important man of the newly strengthened awareness of Czech civilisation is Palacky (1798 to 1876). In his famous letter to the National Assembly at Frankfurt he gathered together all the arguments against the centralisation of Central Europe and for an autonomous Czech civilisation. The fact that he was against Greater Germany, against a Russian absolute monarchy as he called it, which forced him to declare himself for the Habsburgs, was the great error of his life, later on regretted by him so often. He said: "As I have always placed, in spite of all my ardent love for my people, the interests of humanity and science above nationalism, the mere possibility of a Russian absolute monarchy can find no more determined opponent than me; not because it is Russian but because it is an absolute monarchy. Nature knows no ruling and also no subservient nations. The wish that Austria and Bohemia also should join Germany nationally would be suicidal. On the contrary, the demand that Germany should join Austria would have a more reasonable foundation. That actually the Teutons in Austria left no stone unturned in their racial arrogance and megalomania in order to embitter the life of us Slavs may suit excellently the plan of those who know no higher wish than '*travailler pour le roi de Prusse*'" (1864!!!).

The historic quarrel between Czechei and Austria was liquidated through the Great War. Its fruit, perhaps the only positive result of the otherwise senseless butchery, was the smashing of the Dual Monarchy. This was the work of the man who considered it only as a means to an end: the formation of the Czechoslovak State. Masaryk (1850 to 1937) gave the thousand-year long struggle for independence of the people a deeper and more sacred meaning. In an article, "The Meaning of the Czech Reformation," he formulated the perpetual contradiction between the power of the spirit and brute

force in the following manner : " The idea of humanity at its best does not forbid resistance—cannot forbid it. Our reformation explains exactly in the clearest and most precise way that defence is not violence." " We condemn violence—do not and will not use it. But against violence we will defend ourselves, even if it be with the sword (1915). . . . Independence alone saves no nation ; the people must preserve their independence through morality and culture which can save us. Political independence is only a means to a true national life—we had lost it when we ceased to live ethically as a nation (1895)."

The man who wrote thus has in his life and work preserved and proved the heritage of his ancestors. Son of a poor peasant, he struggled hard for existence, tenacious, indefatigable, self-sacrificing, veracious, fearless, until, on the verge of old age, he attained success. His writings reflect an extraordinary development : *Widespread Suicide as a Class Phenomenon* (1881), the treatise written for the University of Vienna, with a clear rejection of suicide, *Humes Skepsis and the Rule of Probabilities* (1884), *Attempt towards a Concrete Logic, Classification and Organisation of Science* (1887), *The Philosophical and Sociological Basis of Marxism* (1899), *Russia and Europe* (1913), and *The World Revolution* (1927). In the very titles, in the width and universality of these works, are reflected the spirit and character of a man who as a thinker had in our days hardly an equal and as a statesman none at all. He created a State for his people ; he gave them peace and freedom in his lifetime ; he personified wisdom and tolerance ; he abolished the State Church in order to free his people spiritually as well. We shall not find his like again.

His successors mismanaged his work. Relying on deceitful friends, irresolute where unscrupulous enemies are concerned, friends of Bolsheviks without being Bolshevik themselves, ready to compromise without being able to compromise, the fate befell them which they have not deserved and which struck them unresisting. " *Qui mange du Pape en meurt* " is an old saying. But the Pope is not only found in Rome ; sometimes he is found also in Paris, London or Moscow. The country is now, with its 15 million inhabitants, 100 per square kilometre, with its 66 per cent. Czechs, with its 73 per cent. Roman Catholics, with its 42 per cent. cultivated land, with its 5 million farmers and 5 million industrial workers, with its

four universities and five large cities, with its 13,000 kilometres of railways and the traditional five-party system (Agrarian, National Democrat, People's Party, Czech National Socialist and Czech Social Democrat), the " *petka*," a satellite of the idea of an " absolute monarchy." But not on the old Russian model.

Czech poetry is decidedly social. As such it will be imperishable as long as social problems still exist. The song of the joyful pauper in the fifteenth century began :

Winter has come to us,
Listen, low rabble, the time is here.
We are badly clothed.
It goes ill with our garments.
An angry wind blows.
What will become of us ?
Hail storms break
To-day and again to-morrow
And bring us great trouble.

From the romantics, Frantisek Celakovaky and Karel Macha, Czech literature leads us to Jan Neruda and Jaroslav Vrchlicky, who already know the problems of great cities. Josef Machar, with his harsh and bitter verses *Treatise on Patriotism* and *Epitaph on the Bourgeoisie*, Antonin Sova, the writer of impressionistic lyrics, Otokar Brezina, a Walt Whitman figure, have been friends and collaborators of Masaryk. In the broad, rushing, free rhythm of Brezina the hymn tune of the Bohemian Brothers flows once more. Petr Bezruc, the great singer of the anonymous Czech proletariat, miners and peasants :

Ostrau

Buried for centuries in the pit,
The coal is hewed with the hammer.
Jackdaw and raven eat our flesh.
Like iron our muscles are tense.
Coal burns in my eyes.
Coal fills my mouth.
Coal penetrates my lungs.
Coal surrounds me.
And with coal my bread is sprinkled
Morning, noon and night.
Coal glitters still in the mud,
Scraping, strangling, engraving.

Peter and Paul, companions, comrades,
Come to work, come,
Enough blood and sweat has already flowed.
Arise, man after man!

Already our hand lifts the misery
Which far too long bore slavery.
High the fist raises the iron hammer,
Which now strikes the hour!

In him is concentrated in an extraordinary measure the strength and greatness of Czech poetry. The number of writers is indeed legion, but their work is so diverse that one could not call it typical. We may mention the first woman prose-writer, Božena Němcová, also Karolína Světlá and Tereza Nováková. Josef Holecěk, who wrote the *Nasi*, a cycle-novel in several volumes quite equal to those of Balzac and Zola, Jan Neruda and Alois Jirásek, Karel Čapek-Chod, Jakub Deml, Frana Šrámek, Jaroslav Hašek, Karel Čapek, are the most important. Of the essayists are to be mentioned with Blahoslav, Palacký and Masaryk, the critic Franz Xaver Salda, and Ottokar Fischer, whose heart was broken by the annexation of Austria. All these artists play a double part for, though born in the territory of the Czech language, they nevertheless produced there work which formed part of German culture as long as it existed. We may mention here the lyric writers Rilke and Werfel, the novelists Max Brod and Ernst Weiss, the epic writer Franz Kafka, a phenomenon in himself, the reporter Egon Erwin Kisch, the proletarian poets Olbracht and Weiskopf, the poet and critic Karl Kraus, the fantastic and mystical Gustav Meyrink, and many more.

Three men deserve special attention who erected on the frontier line between science and philosophy the gigantic edifice of their words: Sigmund Freud, the founder of psycho-analysis, Karl Kautsky, the Marxist theorist, Josef Popper-Lynkeus, the inventor of the aeroplane, who solved also the problem of electric power transmission and who devised the system for a universal food supply as a solution of the social question. Because these and many of the before-mentioned personalities are Jews, their work may be in the future in great danger, unless the world grant them, these harbingers of a better and greater humanity, before it is too late, a lasting right of asylum. In painting and sculpture we must mention

Zdenka Brunerová, Petr Dillinger, Max Svabinský, Joža Uprka, and must not forget that the three great internationally famous artists Anton Hanák, Alfred Kubín and Emil Orlik also originated in Czechs.

The last word should belong to the loveliest blossom on the tree of Czech culture, its music. Not without good reason is the principal work of the first great Czech musician Smetana (1824 to 1884) called the *Moldava* after the principal river of the country. The singing and murmuring in that music of eternal beauty and sweetness, swelling into life and fading away, the perfect realism of his other cycle *From Bohemia's Meadows and Forests*, are imperishable. And the music of Anton Dvořák (1841 to 1904), in his five symphonies, his quartets, his songs, his operas, his Slavonic dances, his Requiem, is of an incomparable greatness. And finally, Gustav Mahler (1860 to 1911), whose music attained the crowning heights, left to us as a reminder in his nine symphonies, his oratorios, his "magic-horn" songs and, above all, in his unforgettable personality, not only a parable such as in his eighth symphony is shadowed forth, but what is heard more powerfully in the final chorus of his second symphony, the last and greatest peak of occidental music: "Rise from the dead, yes, you will rise from the dead . . ."

Yes, Czech culture will rise again, eternal as the land from which it sprang and with which it is inseparably connected. However much the Huns of to-day destroy, stamp out and burn, there lives and is blooming in the testament of John Huss, in the treatise of Comenius, in the work of Thomas Masaryk, in the poetry of Petr Bezruč, in the dances of Bedřich Smetana, in the *Dumky* of Anton Dvořák, in the *Credo* of Gustav Mahler, a world which is eternal.

FRITZ GROSS.

STRESEMANN.

TEN years ago, on October 3rd, 1929, Dr. Gustav Stresemann died. He had been moulding Germany's foreign policy for six fateful years. With him passed away not only a good German—in the words of Sir Austen Chamberlain “the greatest since Bismarck”—but a very great European too. When he died the main problem, perturbing Europe ever since Bismarck's fall from power in 1890, had been solved: Germany had found her proper place in the European family of nations. The “new course” after 1890 had ended in the collapse of 1914; was another “new course” to be followed after 1929? Hitler and his world war of 1939 are the answer. Ten years, in the life of a nation, is a very short period. The problems Dr. Stresemann had to handle were thus akin to those confronting Hitler. The difference in their method and their policy, however, could not be more at variance than peace and war—which, indeed, is exactly the result of their respective policies. The question: what place is the German nation to take in Europe?—a question which, to-day, stares us in the face in its most murderous form—was answered by Stresemann. His policy can be a precedent for a new Germany in the midst of a pacified Europe.

Gustav Stresemann was a very typical German: “Do you know Dr. Stresemann?” Asquith asked Austen Chamberlain shortly before the Locarno Conference. “You should go and see John's portrait of him—a proper *junker*!” Stresemann certainly looked the part. He had, too, all the romantic leanings of a German (which sometimes touch on sentimentality), and he assumed a certain ponderous seriousness. As a young man he joined a students' organisation and fought duels, as was done in the bygone days of the *alte Burschenherrlichkeit*. On the other hand he later grew to become a man of real culture, whose life was distinctly shaped by his intimate knowledge of Goethe's poetical work.

Stresemann became the first syndic of the Industry Association of Saxony which he had founded by amalgamating local groups of industrialists. As their representative he went to Berlin, and he never lost touch with these industrial circles. But even as their active organiser he showed remarkable independence. When a young man he had objected to

the students' organisation excluding Jews from their ranks. Now, as syndic, he asked for the admission of the Socialists to the executive council of Dresden, which, in 1904, caused a stir. When he was elected Member of the Reichstag—in 1906—he joined the National Liberal Party. He disliked the cautious methods of the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg. An imperialist and nationalist, we find him at the beginning of the war claiming the annexation of Belgium and the French coal mines.

The last years of the World War, however, and the final collapse of the old order made him undergo a slow and, no doubt, painful change. Discarding petty questions of the form the new Republic was to take, Stresemann saw clearly the essentially German task which had to be carried out if Germany and Europe were to be saved from further wars. For the victor it seems easy to talk of peace and the good neighbour; for the vanquished, however, it is difficult to bear no grudge. It took Stresemann five years to know himself and be able wholeheartedly to work for this new policy—the policy of winning friends and of restoring confidence and peace in Europe. Born on May 10th, 1878, he was thus forty-five years of age when he became Chancellor of the German Republic in 1923. From then onwards Germany's foreign policy was shaped by him.

“I wanted to be the bridge from the old Germany to the new,” Dr. Stresemann said shortly before his death. His historic sense for the uninterrupted flow of true tradition made him strive to keep the unity of the Reich unimpaired. There had been Bolshevist republics set up in Saxony and Thuringia; the Reich Cabinet once fled from Berlin; a Foreign Secretary—Dr. Rathenau—had been murdered; Dr. Wirth, of the Catholic party, had coined the ominous word: *Der Feind steht rechts*—the enemy is on the right. The situation was thus nearly desperate when Stresemann took office. French troops had marched into the Ruhr basin (and there were not many responsible statesmen, like General Smuts, who raised their voice to help Germany in her distress). Right wing extremists made use of this golden opportunity and tried to stab the Government in the back—Herr Hitler's rising, at this moment, was nevertheless quickly suppressed. Stresemann's declaration as Chancellor struck a new note: “A nation,” he told his people, “is not great because it is

rich. It is because of its moral strength." Moral strength, this indeed was the principle on which Stresemann based Germany's policy. Moral values were to be his only weapons.

The first question Stresemann had to handle in foreign affairs was the freeing of the Ruhr basin from French troops, and the fixing of Germany's yearly payments of Reparations. His new approach proved successful beyond expectation: he was invited to attend the London Conference of 1924. Here, then, for the first time since the World War, a German delegation took part in an international conference and was treated as equal partner in the discussions. Stresemann, who was accompanied by Herr Marx and Dr. Luther, quickly won the confidence of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, and the French Premier, M. Herriot. It was through the good offices of the United States Ambassador, Mr. Kellogg, that Stresemann and Herriot found themselves engaged in long and frank talks, thus settling the main problems of the conference by direct negotiation. When an agreement was signed on August 30th, 1924, Germany on the one hand and the former Allied Powers on the other had taken the first decisive step towards the reconstruction of a new Europe. Heavy though the burden was which Germany undertook to carry under the Dawes Plan, French troops definitely left the Ruhr basin. This victory had not been gained by force of arms, but by the strength of Stresemann's arguments, by his sincerity and uprightness.

Gustav Stresemann's name—like Aristide Briand's and Austen Chamberlain's—is for ever connected with the Treaty of Locarno, initialled on October 16th, 1925, and signed in London on December 1st of the same year. It guaranteed the German-Belgian and the German-French frontiers against any aggressive act; these powers—together with Great Britain and Italy as guarantors—pledging themselves to give unrestricted assistance against the aggressor. This meant that Germany, the vanquished power of a mere six or seven years ago, received the same promise of military assistance as did France, the victor of Versailles. The story of the three men, Chamberlain, Briand, Stresemann, struggling to do away with old prejudice and to establish this new European order, has often been told. Locarno showed the purity of purpose of all of them; and the friendship which grew up between them henceforth helped to overcome any difficulty in Europe.

There had been one obstacle which we might well recall at this moment. Does such a Rhine Pact not imply, France had asked as early as March 1925, that Germany's eastern frontiers are of less importance? Italy had echoed a similar apprehension in speaking of "second-rate frontiers." "The World War," M. Margerie was instructed to say, "had its origin not in the capitals of the great powers but in Belgrade, and one might therefore fear lest a new world war should originate once more from a conflict in the East." Stresemann's answer was that he would never guarantee the German frontiers in the east; he was, however, ready to enter into discussions with a view to reaching treaties of arbitration with both Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such treaties were actually signed at Locarno. Stresemann, it is clear, hoped for a revision of some of the clauses fixing the frontiers in the east—a peaceful revision, needless to say: "If a situation arises in the east," he said, "which seems to endanger European peace or the economic consolidation of Europe; and if one begins to consider whether the whole restlessness of Europe is not partly due to the impossible frontiers in the east; if furthermore, Germany reaches a friendly understanding and finds a community of interests with the other World Powers who have to decide in that case—then Germany will have the chance of gaining successes."

This, indeed, was the policy of a good German who at the same time was a good European. Revision by way of friendly understanding and peaceful negotiation was his aim. If he had been allowed to reach it, if death had not intervened, he might have solved this problem too. "It is impossible," he stated in 1927 when he had met Marshal Pilsudski at Geneva, "to get rid of the Corridor by means of a war. We must therefore examine whether we can regain it in a peaceful way. This is a question which concerns the whole of Europe. A solution is only thinkable by a continuation of the policy of Locarno, that is, by close relations between Berlin, London and Paris." Here we hear the voice of a statesman who knows his responsibility. While stating his wish clearly, he never lost sight of the common European goal.

Nineteen-twenty-five saw the signing of the Locarno Treaty and the beginning of the evacuation of the Rhineland. The following year witnessed Germany's entry into the League of Nations, when Briand made his unforgettable—

and unforgotten—speech: “*En arrière les canons! En arrière les mitrailleuses!*” Europe, indeed, no longer needed either guns or heavy armaments. There followed Thoiry where Stresemann and Briand met and attempted to settle all outstanding Franco-German questions once and for all. The Saar as well as the Rhineland was to be freed forthwith, they hoped, whereas France would receive economic compensations. General disarmament was to follow. These far-reaching hopes, it is true, proved to be premature. Several years of hard diplomatic bargaining were ahead. But even so, nearly all the big obstacles to European peace had been overcome when Stresemann died. In 1927 the foreign troops were withdrawn from the Saar and the military control missions had left the Rhine. The following year Stresemann went to Paris to sign, on behalf of Germany, the greatest instrument of peace the world has seen so far, the Kellogg Pact which outlawed war. He was greeted by the population of Paris with cries of *Vive Stresemann! Vive la paix!* And peace it was. We cannot help thinking of Herr von Ribbentrop, arriving in Paris ten years afterwards to sign—what mockery!—another No-more-War declaration. His coming was watched by silent crowds: a mere nine months later Ribbentrop and his ruler had plunged Europe into another war.

Stresemann's last diplomatic battle was fought at The Hague where, in August 1929, the Powers had met to fix the yearly instalments Germany would have to pay by way of Reparations. The Conference was also to arrange the definite withdrawal of the troops of occupation from the Rhineland. The bargaining was hard and difficult. Trunks were packed and unpacked. Viscount Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, insisted on the figures he had worked out. The French soldiers tried to keep their troops in the Rhineland for at least another year. For the first and last time during his negotiations with Briand, the German Foreign Minister wrote him an urgent pressing letter asking him to save the conference. The mutual confidence between Stresemann and Briand proved once more that it stood any strain: they reached an agreement. The troops were to be withdrawn forthwith. The last foreign soldier was to leave German soil by June 1930.

Stresemann was not to see this day. In September he spoke

at Geneva for the last time: why, he asked, can we not introduce European money? how long have we to wait for a common European stamp? Europe, he claimed, should at least behave like an economic entity. His sudden death on October 3rd, 1929, cut short any such plans. But when he died he knew that he had at least freed his country. If we compare the Reich he left in 1929, and the misery-stricken country he found when he first became Chancellor in 1923, we stand amazed at this transformation. The only weapon he had had was his sincerity, the moral strength of his case and the righteousness of his cause. Locarno; Germany's entry into the League of Nations; the adherence to the Kellogg Pact—these were, for Germany, the stepping-stones which enabled her to keep the unity of the Reich; to win the confidence of the world; to have the Ruhr freed from the French; to have the yearly payments of Reparations fixed and limited; to see the Rhineland and the Saar free again. The secret of these results, achieved by Stresemann and the Governments whose member he was, is a simple one: he was alive to the greatness of true moral values and he purposely led his people back to that source of strength. “What makes the breakdown so unbearable,” he said in 1924, when looking round amidst the misery of his people, “is not the defeat on the battlefields. What we cannot overcome is the moral breakdown of our people after its defeat.” In keeping moral values invariably before his own mind and his nation's, and before the conscience of Europe, he won his great successes as a statesman. “Called to power at a moment of almost indescribable calamity for his country, his death found her restored to the comity of nations, one of the most influential and respected members of the League.” This was Sir Austen Chamberlain's considered judgment. To us the life of Stresemann contains a message of hope. What was, can be. A new Germany, freed from the dark forces let loose by Hitler, will find in Stresemann's statesmanship a precedent and a model. On that basis a new order in Europe might be built.

F. W. PICK.

PROSPECTS OF EASTERN EUROPE.

THROUGHOUT the many controversies concerning the Peace Settlements of 1919-20 one aspect of the problem has been rather neglected both by the Peace Settlement's German and pro-German critics and by its allied and anti-German defenders. Many critical events of the last few years arose precisely from this rather neglected fact, namely from the existence between Germany and Russia of a large neutral zone of more or less important border states, created not by the Western victorious bloc but by Germany herself in the Brest-Litowsk Treaty in March 1918, and integrally maintained, with a few modifications in minor details, by Germany's enemies. The border-line of states which separates Germany from Russia was perhaps meant to be a defence line for Germany should ever, what seemed plausible in 1918, the Russian westward drive start again, be it under its revolutionary or under its old pan-Slavist aspect.

It would be, however, to underrate the makers of the Brest-Litowsk Treaty to think that their only concern was to build up a zone of friendly neighbouring states for merely defensive purposes. According to all evidence their aim was the creation of what is called in diplomacy a zone of influence and in more crude language a number of vassal states. After the events of November 1918, the German defeat on the Western front and the downfall of the monarchical system—which was meant to be extended eastwards as an instrument of German penetration into Poland and the Baltic area (as it was previously in the Balkans)—the situation east of Germany was greatly altered. Instead of a friendly and more or less vassal Poland which was intended at Brest-Litowsk, an intensely hostile or at least highly independent Poland came into being, much to the discomfort of German Nationalists and much to the reassurance of French military leaders who, even in the weakest years of defeated Germany and even among the most impressive manifestations of the will to peace in the Locarno era, were doubtful of the future final reconciliation of Germany with her Western neighbour.

The Polish State has taken a highly important place in the post-war system of Europe. In the first years of its existence, its frontiers were extended far into the territory beyond the eastern border of the historic kingdom of Poland, owing to

the fact that the Russian civil war turned these territories more or less into a no-man's-land for several years. The rapid increase of Poland's population has become already proverbial. Although this population is partly composed of heterogeneous elements, it is sufficiently large and sufficiently united to justify the ambition of some Poles for a leading position of their country among the peoples of Eastern Europe. Poland has shown remarkable military capacity and her industrial equipment has greatly improved, although it might be as yet insufficient for the needs of a population of over 35 million. At any rate, Poland is the only country on the eastern border of Germany which is sufficiently big in size, sufficiently numerous in population and sufficiently united through history and tradition to be a rival to the ambitions of German expansion. In past centuries the state-system of Eastern Europe, that is to say of the territory between the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Adriatic, often had its centre in Poland. Over all her smaller neighbours Poland is in a favourable position to exercise an influence. Hungary, the country which stood so often on the German side in the great historic struggle between Slav and Teuton, and whom many Slavs accuse of being the main cause of the misfortunes of their race, is linked by a great number of historical memories to Poland, with whom she constitutes a nearly unique case of neighbourhood between two European nations. Throughout the thousand years of a common frontier Poland and Hungary had not a single war between them.

Since the collapse of Czarism, Russia has ceased to be the centre of Slavonic nationalism, and the leading part in Slavonic cultural life was taken over by Warsaw and Prague. After the disappearance of Czechoslovakia as a state, Poland is considered by many Slavonic populations as the only possible protector against the forward drive of Germanism. In the last two years Belgrade and Sofia have seen a great number of manifestations of Slavonic solidarity and although such manifestations are rather restricted to the cultural field, they express beyond any doubt a feeling fairly general among the leading intelligentsia which in Eastern Europe plays usually a great part in the initiation of political movements. Numerous are to-day the Czech patriots who, like General Prchala, the former commander of the East Carpathian Army Corps, took refuge in Poland and who base their hope of a

future revival on Slavonic solidarity. They find sympathies in Yugoslavia and in Bulgaria as well as in Poland. As to Hungary, in the present as in the past, Poland remains for her the only bordering state which never had an ambition to her detriment and against whom she has no claim whatsoever.

Roumania is an ally of Poland and through her this latter has a link with the Balkan Entente. The common policy of Roumania and Poland has been for many years past to separate Germany and Russia should these two Powers feel ever inclined to co-operate against the West or enter into a conflict with each other—a paradoxical task, indeed. To sum up in a few words, under the leadership of Poland an Eastern European bloc is likely to develop. Historical memories, geographical reasons and a more or less common social structure, of which peasant individualism is the most outstanding feature, may constitute the link desired and in the case of some countries the common Slavonic consciousness, a psychological factor which has never completely disappeared and which is likely to experience a strong revival now that Germanism, the old historic opponent, becomes once more aggressive. The possibilities of a movement in this sense in the area which Germany considers as her "legitimate sphere of influence" already appear as a dangerous prospect to some German observers. When Nazism started to propagate the slogan "*Blut und Scholle*," it was not aware that it chose a field in which the potential opponents of Germany, the Slavonic and peasant peoples of Eastern Europe, are strong and very likely superior to the Germans. Circumstances of history and of geography, which we have no space to enumerate here, made the non-German peoples more used to frugality and to hardship than the Germans. The peoples of Eastern Europe propagate quickly and nearly all of them have traditions which make them excellent soldiers. The historic mission of the Germans among them has been to introduce town building, arts and crafts—in a word: "Western civilisation." This mission of Germanism has been often emphasised by its advocates, many of whom in the past have come from the liberal and even democratic and socialist camp. If at present Germanism turns back to "primitivity," it gives up its only claim which could be evoked with some amount of justification, and chooses, as already said, a field of competition in which its opponents are more at home.

It seems, however, already clear that some Germans at least are increasingly doubtful about the future of the Central European "conquest" already achieved by Germany. According to *Wirtschaftsdienst* (Heft 40, 1938) Germany cannot get any substantial advantages from Eastern Europe unless she pursues a policy of expansion in other directions as well. German trade has been doubled in the Danubian and Balkan areas since 1929, but only by about 1943 will Germany be able to cover 25 per cent. of her needs through imports from these areas and a further ten years' period will be needed to raise this figure to 50 per cent. The industrial equipment of this area is not sufficient, according to German experts, for a full exploitation of its natural resources nor for the conservation of the agricultural products in sufficient quantities for the German need. It must therefore be provided with German help; this German help may, however, only come forth if Germany disposes of sufficient wealth and capital through exportation of her products into countries other than the Balkan and Danubian area.

The above-quoted opinion of the *Wirtschaftsdienst* sounds rather like a confession of the failure of autarkical economics and as a hint of doubt concerning the usefulness or the limited importance of further Central European "conquest." Hitler himself voiced, in the lachrymose tone which usually precedes his threats, the cry for German exports in his Reichstag speech at the beginning of this year. An alternative, not impossible with a different Germany, could be a coming back to some form of a world economy in agreement with the Western Powers, but concerning this new form of world economy which might mean the end of Germany's autarkical adventure with a great deal of the consequences it implies, no serious projects have been put forward either in Germany or in the West. Instead of such projects it is the old dream of German expansionism which has recently seen a revival. It was generally remarked and amply commented on that at the New Year's reception of the Berlin Diplomatic Corps Hitler had a "frank and cordial" interview with the Soviet Ambassador. The subject of this cordial talk may be guessed when reading the January number, 1939, of *Osteuropa-Markt*, the official Berlin magazine for the German policy of foreign trade. An expert article in the said Review reiterates the theory that Germany cannot take full profit from her present

position in Central Europe unless her strength in capital is considerably increased, and indicates the means to increase Germany's strength in capital: it would be a more considerable expansion to the East, a capturing of the Russian market. Until the second half-year of 1937 Germany kept the first place among the exporting powers into U.S.S.R., in consequence of the credit and trade agreement concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1935, and maintaining all the substantial advantages of the Rapallo-Treaty. (Those inclined to look at Nazi Germany as the Saviour of Europe from Bolshevism may keep in mind the fact of this agreement and its date. It was concluded in 1935, that is to say two years after Hitler's seizure of power.) At present, according to our above-quoted author in *Osteuropa-Markt*, Germany occupies only the sixth rank among the powers exporting into the Soviet Union while the United States occupies the first. Consequently, "an improvement of the Russian importing capacity ought to be the foremost preoccupation of the new Reich Minister of Economics" (Dr. Funk).

How the improvement of the economic system of a foreign state can be the concern of a Minister of the Reich we are not told. Nazi German mentality and methods are by now sufficiently known in the world and so, without being told, we may guess. What is aimed at is nothing less than the re-establishment in greater proportions of the situation which prevailed for a few years in the nineteen-twenties when many branches of Russian industry were managed by German experts, and units of the Red Army and Air Force were trained by officers of the Reichswehr.

The approach from Berlin was not so entirely unanswered from the Soviet side as worshippers of the Soviet régime would like to believe. On March 13th, 1939, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* published leading articles to the effect that the Soviet Union is not inclined to believe in the possibility of the "stupid senseless adventure" which "Western Imperialists" attribute to Germany in the hope of creating a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, for which these two have no reason whatsoever. In his first public speech in his capacity as Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Molotoff spoke of the possibility of improving economic relations with Germany in the same way as such relations have been recently improved between the Soviet Union and Italy.

Still, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union finds the prospect of German troops and strategic bases drawing nearer to her frontiers a bright one. The plausible explanation of Soviet policy is that Moscow tried to keep the German influence away from the Soviet frontier and hoped for this reason to enter into an alliance with a strong Western bloc. The conditions, however, of such an alliance were differently formulated in London, Paris and Moscow and to the latter there seemed to be a greater hope of reaching an agreement with the West on the Soviet's own terms, if all the doors were not closed to some sort of understanding—however temporary it might be—with Germany.

Space forbids me to enter into any controversy on the merits of the alliance between the West and the Soviet which at the time of writing (June 1939) is the question of the day. The proper question with which we are concerned here is how the future evolution of Central Europe might be affected by developments taking place in Germany, in Russia and in the West. The most characteristic fact about Central Europe is the lack of coherence, source of all the present-day troubles. France and Britain, along with a few smaller states such as Belgium, Holland and Switzerland, form a bloc which might be called "Western Democracy." Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland form a common Scandinavian civilisation, just as Spain and Portugal may be called an Iberian civilisation. Germany and Italy form by themselves compact ethnic unities of two large and numerous nations and the peoples of the Soviet Union have the possibility of forming, on an immense self-sufficient territory, a great common Empire. Meanwhile, the space between the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Adriatic is called characteristically enough "a space," which means in more crude language that all adjacent great powers have hitherto considered it as a territory for their penetration without taking any notice of the peoples inhabiting the "space," except when the sometimes real, sometimes imaginary and sometimes exaggerated national or social grievances of some of the people were used as pretexts for armed intervention. Since the Turkish invasion at the beginning of the New Age historical catastrophes in Eastern Europe were so numerous that although the state-founding nations have survived—which is a fact hardly short of a miracle—and in recent times give even many proofs of their

vitality, all coherence among them vanished or became a more or less vague memory. Perhaps it is only now, at their most critical time, that some consciousness of their common fate starts to develop again.

The nations in the triangle between the three seas were founded in the Middle Ages. The final ruin of the medieval foundations is marked by the suppression of Poland at the time of the ill-famed partition by the efficient modern military centralism of Germanic type, which throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took its most characteristic and definite shape in the three governments in Berlin, St. Petersburg and Vienna. The ruin of Eastern Europe was achieved by the downfall of the Polish State. The rebuilding of Eastern Europe starts or may start, however optimistic this prospect may seem, in view of the confused and dark realities of the day, with the resurrection of Poland. The social and economic basis of a new autonomous Eastern Europe may be in the future the large class of new peasant proprietors. There are over 10 million of them in the three states of the former Little Entente alone. Further peasant millions are to be found in Poland, in Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey. Especially in Poland, but in some other countries as well, peasant co-operative movements, aiming at the building up of a free and sound economic system based on peasant individualism and small property, have greatly progressed. If they have time to develop, there is every hope that the peasant nations will grow sufficiently strong to face the struggle with the centralised state omnipotence which under its Germanic and Russian forms menaces their life and their future. In the days in which we live no prospect, however reasonable, may be visualised without a reservation: a general European catastrophe may frustrate even the most reasonable hopes. Yet it is an urgent necessity to visualise prospects of Eastern Europe and to realise finally that the space between the three seas is not simply a geographical expression, but the home of national individualities which have a mission in the future, which have perhaps a contribution to make to the main task of European mankind, to the salvation of personal liberty.

We spoke of peasant individualism: the chief virtues of the only class in Europe which has survived the calamities of two millenniums are endurance and patience. It is by

understanding the importance of this individualism that a constructive East-European policy, which does not consider the existence of nations as a useless survival but as a positive reality, may be found. The essence of such a new policy cannot be better summed up than in the words written forty years ago by a great patriot who was a great European, Jean Jaurès:

To break the nations would be to extinguish the homes of light and to let subsist vague and foggy clouds. It would mean to suppress all centres of distinct and rapid action in order to bring about the incoherent slowness of a universal effort. . . . It would be to suppress every freedom because mankind, whose action is no more centred in autonomous nations, would be driven to the sort of unity which vast Asiatic despotisms provide.

BÉLA MENCZER.

June 1939.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE CHURCH.

THE English-speaking world has been made acquainted with the National Socialist philosophy of life (*Weltanschauung*) through a mass of publications, the contents of which may be taken as well known in this article. In the following pages this philosophy of life will be referred to as the philosophy of present-day Germany, though well-informed circles know that, in spite of clamorous propaganda, the official teachings are accepted by a comparatively small section of the people. Though astonishing at first sight this can hardly surprise anybody who bears in mind that before 1933 this philosophy, which to-day claims to be the binding law of life for 80 million people, had not, in truth, even a single literary pioneer. The National Socialist claim that men like De Lagarde, Stöcker, Nietzsche, Wagner, and others were their forerunners is not correct. Nevertheless a brief historical sketch may be useful, as it is not without importance for the Churches to know that, however strange it may seem, National Socialist thought can, in the last analysis, be traced back to the Secularisation, that process which was begun by the Renaissance and Humanism, further developed in the era of Enlightenment and Natural Law, and provisionally concluded by the liberal and democratic ideas of the nineteenth century.

The closely knit system of the Middle Ages had for the first time been pierced by the Reformation. That movement had undertaken to create to some extent a direct relationship between God and man. But the real shock to the theocentric world and to Christian cosmopolitanism began with the revolutionary process of general secularisation. In Germany this profound change appears perhaps most clearly in the philosophy of Hegel. According to him it is no longer the transcendent God, but the *Weltgeist* (spirit of the world) who manifests himself through the for-the-time-being absolute ideas of history. Secularisation was further developed by the liberalist belief in the progress (*Fortschrittsglauben*) which would bring man to an ever higher standard of civilisation. Likewise, the positive science of history (*positive Geschichtswissenschaft*) had as its one goal the neutral and indifferent explanation of historical happenings, free from any transcendent meaning.

However, and this would seem to be decisive in this connection, secularisation, with its deification of the spirit in the nineteenth century, did not yet lead to an open rupture with Christianity. True, in that period the Christian Churches were to some extent rallying points of opposition against Enlightenment, Rationalism, and Humanism. But it was more important that the conception of the unity of mankind was still living in the common creed which linked European thought not only to Christianity but even to pre-Christian antiquity. As yet, the unity of Europe, once established under the sign of the Cross, was, strangely enough, not questioned by the declaration of the supremacy of reason. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century did the conception of the all-embracing unity of super-personal reason become a problem. When it arose mankind was in danger of losing its last rational hold, as it had formerly lost the superhuman order of salvation (*Heilsordnung*). It followed that doubts were cast upon the binding force not only of reason in general and the rules of Natural Law, but also upon all laws and institutions which were based on "reason." The spirit became problematical to itself.

How deeply the structure of the human spirit had been changed during the last century may be gathered from the following examples. At the beginning of the century Prussia-Germany had looked to the idealistic philosophy for a continued elucidation of the human spirit. The educated classes of the nation believed that this philosophy to some extent involved the function of a religion. But hardly had a few decades passed when, more and more, pseudo-scientific books which propounded a so-called philosophy of life (*Weltanschauung*) had captured the field, and this movement goes on to the present time, as the publications, for instance, of Herr Rosenberg show. This progressive materialism of the spirit led, principally in Eastern and Central Europe, to a denial and overthrow of the traditional European system of values. Man has lost his creed and begins to doubt the validity of a universal moral law, and to believe that true humanism and tolerance on the basis of an all-embracing society of States are incapable of being realised. What wonder that in countries which in war and post-war years had collapsed mentally and materially, any creed is based on phenomena of the ontological sphere. Thus under totalitarian

governments such phenomena as class, race, the people in its biological sense, and the State in its realistic conception are deified. In Russia, it is the class; under National Socialism and its kindred doctrines, the people, now by no means accidentally understood racially as the blood-relationship, that is to say in a materialistic sense. The terms spirit of the people (*Volksgeist*), consciousness of the people, and others are treated—somewhat paradoxically—as nothing but materialistic derivations of this naturalistic conception of the people.

National Socialism has consciously replaced reason by *bios*. The spirit appears exclusively dependent on the naturalistic phenomena. Instincts and passions, naked life and undisguised force are idolised, but intellect and understanding based on reason are despised. The conflict which in the nineteenth century broke out between knowledge and existence was presented in the most impressive way by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and has now been unmistakably decided in favour of biological existence and against thinking. At the end of this development stands the man who deifies himself, no longer the servant of God, but the lord of the world, the self-appointed judge in the last resort over good and bad. This deification of the material and temporal life is so intense that, not without justification, some writers have regarded it as the expression of a religious creed, deflected from its proper goal. In fact, the not very numerous "believers" in Germany see in the worldly things such as race, and the people formed by the race, "institutions directly created by God." In Russia, too, radical mechanisation and materialisation of the entire life have not prevented the class from being idolised by a mythological-orthodox creed; the creed has its own cult and rites, thereby constituting a sort of substituted religion. This flight into the material, into political biology, demonstrates better than anything else the collapse of the belief in the transcendent God and the revelation in Jesus Christ, and at the same time it shows the dethronement of the reason and spirit and its radical devaluation.

The Dean of Chichester is therefore quite right when he says that two religions, Christianity and National Socialistic philosophy of life, struggle against each other in modern Germany.* In fact, one might almost say that these two religions divide, if not the whole world, at any rate Europe

* *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany, 1938.*

into two camps. We now approach an epoch more closely akin to that of the religious wars than to one which professes to be characterised by the nationality principle. A consequence of this understanding is: home policy to-day governs foreign policy, and not, as is generally thought, in political theory and praxis, foreign policy home policy. This can be seen, for instance, in the attitude of the Czech fascists who without hesitation sacrificed their nationality on the altar of the fascist creed. In fact, the National Socialist movement is making use more and more of quasi-religious forms and methods. True to its principles, an appeal is made to the emotions. Leaders of the movement like to call it dynamic-irrational, and it has been described, just as Fascism has been, as "a revolt of the instinct against the supremacy of the intellect." Quite consciously, therefore, National Socialism cultivates the romantic, the magic, the fantastic, in short, whatever no intellect can grasp. Symbols are popular, the period is proclaimed as that of myths, and the twentieth century is praised for the victory of *mythos* over *logos*.

The leader (Führer) enjoys almost religious veneration by those of his followers who believe in his mission. "I believe in this world in Adolf Hitler alone. I believe in one Lord, God, Who made me and guides me, and I believe that this God has sent Adolf Hitler to us" (Dr. Ley). Or, "Everybody feels and knows: The Führer was always right, and will always be right. National Socialism is the unqualified faith, the devotion which does not ask why, the silent carrying out of its orders. We believe that the Führer is engaged on a higher mission. No criticism of this belief can be allowed" (Rudolf Hess). Thus to the faithful National Socialist the Führer is infallible, whether he renounces agreements solemnly made, makes untruthful statements, or does, or allows, even worse things. If one realises this quasi-religious character of National Socialism one understands its intolerance. But what is frightening is that the intolerance is absolute, and it must be absolute because, unlike liberalism and rationalism, it embraces all spheres of life.

The so-called totalitarian principle is in itself nothing but a method of organising centrally the whole personal and material life. By this principle National Socialism embraces all members of the community in person, and all activities

whatever ; they are thus brought into the political sphere of the State and engulfed in its philosophy. There is no escape for the individual from this totalitarian claim of National Socialism, there exists no place to which he could retreat ; not even leisure time allows isolation. Individuals therefore can no longer form independent associations or clubs of any kind. Indifference in politics and *Weltanschauung* is no longer permitted, nor are autonomy and individuality in certain spheres of life, spiritual, idealistic, or material. The National Socialist State prohibits independent standards of morals, of judging what is good or bad, and the same applies to the law, arts, science and learning, and also to economy. Absolute values of those autonomous departments, such as good and bad, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong, truth and falsehood, are related by National Socialism, as by other totalitarian systems, to the needs of the State, thus falsifying their substance and destroying them. Any sort of individuality and autonomy is denied to civilisation and culture. Their values survive only in so far as they are capable, in some form or other, of serving the political goal of National Socialist ideology.

It was in keeping with these tenets, when, for instance, freedom was determined by National Socialism as "action harmonising with the demands of the race," or when Reich-minister Frank declared : right is not what is just, but "what is advantageous to the community," and "whatever is detrimental to the community is wrong." The chief propounder of modern racialism, Herr Rosenberg, has expressed the same conception in these words : "Right is what Aryans regard as right, wrong is what they discard."

In the same way National Socialists do not recognise generally binding scientific results, and they reject absolute objectivity. Science and learning have become instruments in the hands of the ruling political ideologists, and must serve their goals. The National Socialist philosopher, Kriegk, has admitted this frankly in a speech he made in Heidelberg in 1936 on Germany and Science : "We do not recognise truth for truth's sake or science for the sake of science. Rather must science help to form mankind and the racial order of life—according to the character and the natural law of the community. Science is based on National Socialist thought." In other words, science is but a cog in the machine of National

Socialism. The various branches of learning, such as political science, jurisprudence, economics, and philosophy, can bear witness to the fact how generally recognised facts are arbitrarily twisted in order to conform with the necessary subjective outlook. Strictly speaking, these subjects have ceased to have any place in the life of science and learning. For all happenings of history must be adapted to the basic ideology, and philosophy itself has become a kind of ancillary science in the service of racialism. Thereby it is possible to discover at will that modern dreams have been realised in the past. In the first years of the régime, for instance, Charlemagne was regarded as the slaughterer of the Saxons, and in this capacity he was made the subject of monographs ; a memorial was even erected to Widukind, Duke of the Saxons and enemy of Charlemagne, in order to commemorate this event, until this view was dropped as politically inopportune. Moreover, faithful National Socialists do the same in the abstract and natural sciences. It is characteristic of the situation that books on Aryan mathematics and Aryan physics and chemistry can be published and are officially recommended.

In view of all this, students and teachers of German Universities may be described to-day as something like cadets of the National Socialist spirit. Nevertheless, they do not enjoy any special appreciation in official circles : the possibility of abolishing them has even been discussed. It is by no means accidental that the training of future Nazi leaders has not been entrusted to those traditional institutions. It was recognised quite rightly that this task could be better performed by the party's own schools. As far as possible, certainly until last year, leading party circles have not attended even important academic ceremonies ; they wished to demonstrate by this aloofness the low rank which the Universities hold in the eye of the régime.

The process of destroying absolute values is partly concealed by the fact that the National Socialist philosophy of life is proclaimed as absolute truth by Herr Hitler and Herr Rosenberg. This enables National Socialists to deny that the absolute values have been destroyed, and to give an objective glamour to the German "view of life." What servants of the new faith do is thus always good and just. Outsiders are given all manner of derogatory names ; they and their works are disqualified morally and legally. The subjective meaning

conferred by National Socialists on the absolute values is itself declared absolute. In their new meaning the National Socialist conceptions become in National Socialist opinion objective values of a higher order, and those values which tradition rightly regarded as absolute are represented as degenerate and inferior, so that the truth is twisted.

It is necessary to bear in mind this state of affairs if one wishes to understand the struggle between Church and State. The struggle is unavoidable and the gulf between the two cannot be bridged. Since racialism and Christianity are irreconcilable a compromise is out of the question. A philosophy which turns on the total destruction of everything "infected" by Judaism must of necessity declare war on the Bible; for from the racial point of view this is essentially a Jewish book. In the long run National Socialism cannot in one breath permeate all spheres of life and leave the Church to interpret Christianity. It is impossible to align the people from birth to death according to National Socialist principles, and at the same time allow them on Sundays and holidays to be exposed to the Christian message, which is of Jewish origin and contains doctrines alien to National Socialist philosophy.

Even the uninitiated have by now understood that National Socialism is resolved to realise, wherever its writ runs, its doctrines with brutal force. Whenever National Socialism has in the past given in, or if it should do so in future, it never was, or would be, a true compromise, but merely a tactical move. The Dean of Chichester's above-mentioned instructive book contains ample evidence to this effect with regard to the present *Kulturkampf* between Church and State. The ultimate aims of National Socialist policy towards the Church have been defined by Herr Rosenberg himself, when he addressed the Party Congress in September 1938. He said: "That the Catholic Church and likewise the Protestant Confessional Church in their present form have to disappear from the life of our people is quite certain to my mind and, I think I may say so, also to the mind of the Führer."

It would therefore be a grave mistake if one tried to seek a clue to the actual situation of the Church in Germany by simply judging the tactical position for the time being and the often changing official attitude. This would mean indulging in illusions. Unfortunately the English public, which otherwise is so well informed about the German Church

struggle,* has occasionally been misled by the often admirable tactics of the German authorities. Witness Sir Raymond Beazley's words: "To say or suggest that a new heathenism is sweeping victoriously over Germany as a whole is ridiculous. Never more than the obsession of a small if vocal minority . . . it has almost ceased to be heard."† Again, one read the even weightier words of the Bishop of Gloucester, who said in 1937‡: "The theory and largely the position is that there is no persecution of religion, but only a correction of political activity on the part of Christian clergy." At that time the Ecclesiastical Committees had been appointed, and the Bishop seems to have regarded that as a guarantee by the State for respecting the freedom of the Church. It is not surprising that from this point of view the Bishop arrives at the conclusion that the Church has been victorious in its struggle with the State, and that the Confessional Church has now performed its historic mission.

The history of the last years has disproved these and similar misconceptions. To the student wishing to form an opinion on the present position of the Church in Germany, National Socialist tactics ought to be just as irrelevant as, for instance, the fact that the religious service—in spite of substantial inroads with regards to prayers, intercessions, collections, and in spite of permanent supervision by the secret police—is essentially unfettered and that the Church has a relatively free hand in its regulation. Nor can a comparison be made with former times, when the Lutherans accepted control by the State. It was here well understood, and was indeed a condition for the agreement, that the State in its relations to the Church was bound by the official Confessions of the Church and that the Church could always refer to this basic agreement in cases of conflict, and did so on various occasions. Owing to the revolutionary developments of 1933 this premise has gone by the board.

A true compromise, if at all, could in present circumstances be arrived at only by the Church "adapting" its dogmas and

* Besides the book of the Dean of Chichester already mentioned, cf. his article in this REVIEW, February 1938. Regarding the period after this publication, cf. *Hibbert Journal*, 1938, vol. XXXVII ("The Church Struggle in Germany"), and *Tllico, British Weekly*, March 2nd, 1939. On the situation of the Church in England, Sir Walter Moberley in this REVIEW, May 1938, p. 555.

† "Christianity," this REVIEW, August 1936, p. 157.

‡ *Fourth Survey on the affairs of the Continental Churches*.

destroy the priests as a political enemy of the Reich," one should add, speaking in National Socialist terminology, that a priest in Germany, who is a true servant of God, must become a political enemy of that country, since that nation only concedes to the priest the rôle of a menial servant of National Socialist philosophy, which is incompatible with Christianity.

In one sense the martyrs of the Church of Christ have always been the enemies of the political rulers of the day, and it is not accidental that in these days even official utterances from ecclesiastical quarters declare any international Church movement, Roman Catholic or Protestant, to be a political degeneration of Christianity.* National Socialism may not be able, without losing its basis, to arrive at an open and honest compromise; but the same is true of the Church if it wishes to retain its religious substance and to remain truly a Church. In refusing the lures of the temporal rulers the Church can be sure that it proves its unbroken will to live, and that, at the same time, its battles, which frequently appear hopeless, will, under the sign of the Cross, lead it to highest perfection and to victory over the world.

SPECTATOR.

* Cf. the Declaration issued by the German Evangelical Churches, dated April 7th, 1939.

THE UNMARRIED MOTHER AND HER CHILD.

NO one of our generation is likely to forget the spring of 1918. We have memories only too vivid of agonies, losses, suspense, alarms, strains, suffering, horror and misery which, added to the minor but wearing troubles of shortages, substitutes, lack of help or of fuel, perpetual readjustments to new difficulties, seemed to have brought us nearly to the limit of endurance. Yet, looking back, there is much that in these days of pessimism and disappointment it is well to recall. Although nearly everyone was working harder and longer than before, often under trying conditions, although we were nearly all bearing deep sorrows, yet our passionate determination to build a better world upon the ruins of the old released energy for reconstruction. Nor did we altogether fail. For in that last spring of the war—I mention only those events in which, one way and another, I was myself involved—the Representation of the People Act gave to women not only the rights but the duties of citizenship, and the Education Act opened out for all children a vast range of possibilities. Those two Acts were soon followed by the Maternity and Child Welfare Act, and with its help an incredible amount has been achieved.

The particular memory with which at the moment I am concerned is the establishment of the National Council for the Care of the Unmarried Mother and her Child. Its foundation was part of the general child welfare movement which, begun by a few enthusiasts long before the war, had during the war years acquired strength and momentum. Inquiry into the causes of the unduly high death rate and damage rate among infants inevitably led to the problem of the illegitimate child, an old and difficult problem rendered more acute by war conditions. The illegitimate child had always suffered because of the circumstances of its birth. It had one parent, not two, and that one less able, because of the child's existence, to earn its living and her own. The foster-mother to whose care it had usually been consigned was now making munitions or doing some form of war work, better paid and more attractive than was baby-minding. The illegitimate infant death rate, always high, was rising. Anyone of experience in social work knew of the suffering to which the child born out of wedlock was

almost inevitably condemned. There were over 37,000 illegitimate births yearly, a figure which rose to over 41,000 in 1918 and over 44,000 in 1920. The illegitimate infant mortality rate was always at least twice as high as the legitimate, itself far too high, and was usually well over 200 in every 1,000 births. Attempts to help the child necessarily meant helping the mother, and that was usually disapproved as condoning, if not also of encouraging immorality. Yet, whatever the faults of its parents, or of society, the child was innocent, and the knowledge of its sufferings became less and less bearable the better they were understood. What could and should be done?

On the recommendation of a committee especially appointed by the Child Welfare Association to consider the problem, the National Council came into being early in 1918. Its members were representatives of public authorities, or of voluntary organisations, or individuals with experience of special value. It was instructed to obtain reforms in the existing Bastardy and Affiliation Acts, to secure the provision of adequate accommodation for the various needs of mothers and babies all over the country, with the special aim of keeping mother and child together, and lastly it was to deal with individual inquiries for, or on behalf of, unmarried mothers: a fairly comprehensive programme.

The first thing necessary was to educate public opinion to some knowledge of the facts, and to awaken a real desire for reform. We perpetually wrote and spoke and organised conferences, we went on deputations to ministers and public officials, we interviewed anyone likely to help. We tried to make clear the urgent need for a constructive as against a merely deterrent policy, we never wearied in our efforts to convince a not very sympathetic world that to keep together mother and child, to make it possible for both to live, for the mother to give to the child adequate care, not only did not encourage immorality but tended to decrease the number of mothers with more than one illegitimate child. We tried, too, to spread the belief that bringing home more effectively to fathers of illegitimate children their share of responsibility was not only a means to our declared end of avoiding separation between mother and child, but also a discouragement of promiscuous paternity. Meanwhile our legal sub-committee worked hard, and we soon had ready draft proposals embodying

some of the reforms for which we wished to press. We wanted simplification of the process necessary for obtaining affiliation orders, an increase of the possible amount—then 5s. weekly—obtainable under such orders, the legalisation of adoption with proper safeguards, and such changes in the inheritance laws as would allow an unmarried mother to inherit from her child, or an illegitimate child from its mother, in case of intestacy.

We were amazingly lucky not only in our legal advisers but also in the help given by Members of Parliament. Our Bills were sponsored by the present Prime Minister, by Lord Dickinson, Lord Denham, Lord Rushcliffe, Lord Astor and other public-spirited and generous members of both Houses. That so many of the legal reforms which we desired have now been attained is due not only to their inherent rightness, not only to our own steady work, but also at least as much to the untiring help and support that we have received from so many Members of Parliament, public officials, members and officers of local councils, people of all kinds, of both sexes, and in every walk of life.

The number of cases handled by the Council's Case Committee increased fast. In the early years there were some 600 to 800 annually, while for each of the last eight or nine years there have been between 1,000 and 1,500. Our case numbers now (March 1939) are in the seventeen thousands. We have always kept clearly in mind that our object is not only to help the mothers who come to our office, but also to act as a clearing-house for the whole country. We have gradually built up a complete network of correspondents and organisations not only in this island but in many parts of the Empire, and in many foreign lands, and we can put an inquirer into touch with the required help almost everywhere. For many years we have been accepted as the central organisation for all work done for the help of unmarried mothers and their infants, whatever their origin, work, or religion. By this steady effort towards complete co-ordination we have, we hope, prevented much waste and achieved lasting results. Part, and a very important part, of the required help is given by homes and hostels, some of them providing for child-birth, some for convalescence, all for training, rebuilding of character, education in mother-craft. The Council's Homes and Hostels Committee has brought steady pressure to bear upon

organisations all over the country, and we now have a fairly though not completely adequate supply of accommodation. We have organised many conferences and collected help from many experts upon the various problems of diet, training, staffing and the like, with which the bodies responsible for such hostels are faced, and we hope that our work has helped not only to increase their number but to change the old penitentiary to which the mother was consigned (while her infant was only too often left to the baby-minder) to the new Home where reckless or foolish or ignorant or uncontrolled girls become healthy, disciplined mothers, with an awakened sense of responsibility and of citizenship, of thriving, happy and well-cared-for babies. We still have not quite enough homes. But that an immense amount has been accomplished in twenty-one years no one, looking back, can for an instant doubt.

We have not had an easy time. Public opinion, sometimes unduly sentimental, often disapproving or merely lacking understanding, has required a great deal of persuasion before it would give us any satisfactory measure of support. That we exist at all is due first to the splendid help provided by our first treasurer, Lord Wakefield, to the constant efforts of our members, and to the success of three broadcast appeals made respectively by the present Prime Minister and Lord Gorell, in their capacity of our Presidents, and by Mr. Cyril Maude. We have had, too, invaluable aid from trustees of certain charitable funds. Our first years were an almost desperate struggle; we are now more established and stable, but still overworked and underfinanced. It is difficult to raise funds when one has nothing to show but an office and many files; an actual home full of mothers and babies not only gets a government grant but also makes a far more obvious appeal to potential donors and benefactors. Nevertheless we have survived and functioned, and looking back we feel that we have something to show for our labours, difficult and trying, yet impossible to abandon. There was work to be done, without us it would be left undone, it was well worth doing. We have memories of hundreds of babies who but for us would have been neglected, ill nourished, ill cared for, who would have grown up into beings damaged in health and hurt or crippled in character; of mothers who are now self-respecting citizens, not physical or moral wrecks. We know that the illegitimate death rate has for the last five years

been below 100, for the last two years 88. It is no longer more than twice that of the legitimate, although still far higher than we desire. There are fewer illegitimate births, though not, alas, an appreciably lower percentage of illegitimate to legitimate. As to that, all we can say is that the proportion tends rather to fall than to rise, and that if it continues on its present course we shall some day see a definite change in the ratio between the two birth rates.

Children can now be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents, there have been marked improvements in the affiliation laws, the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 helps to safeguard boarded-out children and makes it possible to arrange special guardianship for young persons exposed to moral danger. Adoption is now regularised and safeguarded, although the experience of the years since the Adoption Act became law has shown need for further provisions.

Yet there is still plenty for us to do, even apart from the case work that must be tackled, carefully and skilfully and patiently, as long as over 24,000 illegitimates are born every year. We should like further reforms in the affiliation laws: it is, for instance, impossible to obtain an order if the father is domiciled in either Scotland or Ireland. We should like more homes and more training. We have had a hard fight to obtain enough collecting officers, and there is still room for improvement in both quality and quantity. The problem of the unmarried mother who is mentally or morally sub-normal is still acute. We should like all local councils to make full use of their powers to help unmarried mothers, to follow, for instance, the example set by Eastbourne, under the guidance of its medical officer, one of our original members. We passionately want a more general acceptance of our firm belief that almost always the best hope for mother and child lies in keeping them together. An illegitimate child is, generally speaking, gravely handicapped by the circumstance of its birth. Yet it will some day be a fellow citizen of the children more happily born. It is surely our duty to do what we can to ensure that it grows up suffering as little as possible from the sins, follies or misfortunes of its parents, or from the existing weaknesses of our social structure, while not abandoning our hope of diminishing those faults, whether individual or social, that have brought it into existence.

LETTICE FISHER.

THE WAY OF THE SHREW.

WHERE the pour of sunshine warmed the south bank to the river, now so low from drought that all the roots of the bushes by the bank hung exposed over little tunnels and caves and passages amongst the dried mud and sand, the water-shrews played. I watched them from the other bank, until a friend joined me, and then a third, until finally a whole party of nature-lovers stood there watching the shrews running back and forth amongst the shadows of those overhanging roots. So much did these little, long-snouted creatures enjoy life that their tameness, as long as we remained motionless, amazed us. A wren, whose bundle of a nest we saw tucked away amongst a mass of flotsam and jetsam left high and dry in some overhanging twigs by the last spate of winter, flew off her eight wee white eggs speckled with spots of red, and spent the rest of the time chittering anxiously from the shrubbery shelter on the other side of the stream. Still the water-shrews ran back and forth in their mysterious comings and goings, lacking all the anxiety of the feathered nester above.

They were not playing in the warmth of the sunny bank, as at first I presumed, but feeding. Quite half a dozen of these glossy black creatures made active use of those twenty yards of river bank directly in our view. A sudden movement in the shadows, and one of these little creatures ran through the hanging roots of an alder, to push its long snout, so liberally covered with bristles, into the soft muddy sand at the water's edge. As quickly it withdrew its nose and shot back into the shadows of roots, to appear again a few inches farther along the bank, and repeat that performance of brief inspection. Then it discovered the object of its desires, a patch of sun-warmed, water-covered sand teeming with the minute animal life it desired, from worms to all manner of insect larvæ. Swishing its little snout from side to side in the soft mud, like a pig grubbing acorns and chestnuts amongst the leaf-fall of an autumn wood, the water-shrew disturbed ripples of water and fed rapidly with evident relish. Such activity lasted only a few moments before it scampered back to the shade of the root-tunnels, then it returned to the same spot, fed again for a few moments, and scampered back to shelter, timid of some unknown foe surprising it at its feeding.

Quite half a dozen sallyings back and forth between the shelter of the roots and that rich patch of feeding in the river bed were required to exhaust the supply, and this done the little *Neomys* shot head first into the water, paddling rapidly with all four feet as it negotiated the big, underwater roots of the willow and then emerged a glistening coat of water bubbles to commence once more its feeding. In the water, and running along the bank, the water-shrew looked so much like a little mole that I wondered how many of those reports of swimming moles were but mistaken water-shrews? However, so soon as the little fellow sat upright on his hind legs, to squat and clean his muddy whiskers, as a kitten might wash its face with its forepaws with so many careful rubbings round the ears, he lost all resemblance to a mole and looked more like some dark-coated dormouse.

This watching of the ways of little creatures in the wild is so much more interesting, and useful to natural history, than catching them and caging them for the purposes of photography. Shrews come easily enough to box-traps baited with shrimps or earthworms, which are the nearest we can obtain in any abundance to resemble their natural insect and worm food, and water-shrews may be caught by leaving a sheet of corrugated iron lying on the bank beside their aquatic haunts, for they will often enter the "tunnels" at night and stay there for the day, so that a quick and skilful collector has caught many specimens by examining his curious "traps" next morning.

There is no cause to destroy the shrew, however, even if the water-shrews do devour a lot of fish-fry; they devour great numbers of snails, the larvæ or grubs of gnats and other insect pests spending their early life history under water, and if you examine their rows of tiny, red-tinted teeth (a variety in the Scilly Isles has white teeth) you will see that they are no relation whatever to the destructive, grain-eating mice, rats and other rodents with which country legend has linked the misnamed "shrew-mouse," but they are relatives of the insect-eating moles, bats and hedgehogs. However, just as the education of the country mind into the usefulness of the owl, once classed and killed with hawks as vermin, so the teaching of the usefulness of shrews and their distinction from mice is increasing their numbers with us, notably so the water-shrew and the pigmy-shrew which were once very local in their distribution but are now really common.

The shrews have enough enemies of their own, and so often do we find dead shrews lying on the paths that legends have arisen to tell us that a shrew always dies when it tries to cross a dry, dusty path. There is no mystery about the origin of these dead shrews (or for that matter the dead moles we so often pick up) about the country. The shrew has a bitter, musky odour, and whenever owl, or cat, or weasel catches one in mistake for the mouse or vole it so much resembles at first glance, the hunter soon drops and discards the distasteful creature. I have picked up dead shrews on the seashore sands where the herring-gulls, which readily catch mice and rats that come into the dunes, have shown equal dislike to their rank taste.

Nature-lovers often follow the older nature books in believing the shrews spend the winter in hibernation in their burrows, with the run stored with a larder of food and the entrance plugged up with turf. That may have been general in the colder winters of a generation or two back, but our winters have become so much milder and wetter this century that it is quite general to find shrews (and most of the small mammals supposed to hibernate) abroad frequently during the winter, although in very hard weather, especially in the North, they may retire and plug the entrance to their burrows to keep out cold, or more likely to escape the keen eyes of hunting weasels. In the first week of March I opened a barn-owl pellet from Cheshire to find it contained the skulls of both common and lesser (or pigmy) shrews, and often during mild moonlight winter nights we can hear the thin, shrill notes of the shrews as they call in their runs amongst the rank mats of unmown herbage. Walking through the night over the Welsh mountains in spring, I have heard the thin cries of the shrews in the grass on the tops of the highest hills, for like the wren, these insect-hunters dwell high up Snowdon as well as at the bottoms of the wooded valleys so far below; and it is significant that the Welsh have a name—*Chwistlen*—meaning “whistler,” they give the shrew because of the frequency of its cry.

As we have found shrews inside herons, it is obvious that some creatures other than owls will eat them after they have killed them, so that there may be some truth in the game-keeper's reminder to me that only the stray cats hunting at night leave the shrews they have killed, because they dislike

their odour. The shrews themselves are no weaklings, despite their charming ways, and on rare occasions the water-shrew will attack and feed upon adult frogs. Shrews sometimes but not usually live more than a year, and they can be trapped in the country during nights of hard December frost. The older naturalists recognised an “oared shrew” which was nothing more than a dark variety of water-shrew, while not content with our lesser shrew as their only common inhabitant the Irish naturalists distinguished the “Irish shrew.” The common shrew has been caught in Ireland, by the way.

Trapping and routine observations in a survey of the common shrew carried out by naturalists organised in the Oxford district, have shown that this little creature inhabits a wide variety of haunts from open grasslands to the dense coniferous woods, and that although other small mammals breed over most months of the year, the breeding season of the shrew seems confined to the months from May to August and it is doubtful whether the females have more than one litter in the breeding season. Shrews do not seem to become mature and breed during the year of their birth, a further notable difference between them and the mice with which they are so often confused, and it seems that the young shrews reach a certain immature stage of their growth by the autumn and remain in that sort of Peter Pan condition throughout the winter months, to continue their growth to sexual maturity upon the arrival of spring, when a marked increase in size takes place.

Shrews are difficult creatures to catch alive in traps of any sort, even the Tring variety so effectively used by naturalists for catching mice alive, because they seem to die quickly from shock or exposure, and in the Oxford survey the visiting of traps three times in twenty-four hours found most of the captures had died. Their most favoured haunts seem to be the rough grassy dykes and the edges of thick woods, with plenty of scrub and brambles, but I have found them freely inhabiting the grassland in the hill woods and the spinneys and vegetation beside the rocky streams of the Pennines, within a short distance of our Lancashire cotton towns like Blackburn, and occasionally in city parks. Mr. Middleton's Oxford survey found the remains of earthworms the commonest food in his shrews, but shrews eat lots of beetles too, and the partly eaten remains of mice and voles in the traps suggested that

shrews had raided the mouse-traps and eaten the victims which had died in the traps previously. If two shrews are placed in the one compartment they are as ferocious as moles and the stronger of the two will almost certainly kill and devour his companion by the next day.

Our listenings for the shrill calls of the shrews scurrying through the grass and the results of trappings clearly show that shrews are abroad as much in the daytime as in the night; but the long grass these creatures frequent is dark enough at any time of day. Early one morning I stood behind a hedge watching a man driving a cultivator up and down a field of peas, when suddenly my attention was drawn to the movements of a shrew in the hawthorn hedge before me, the little fellow diligently searched every nook and cranny of the twigs with short runs, with a pause every now and then to poke his long, slender snout into some crevice. He might have been overlooked for a little wren hunting the spiders had I not missed the cocked-up tail which so clearly tells of the bird. So soon as the little shrew came into the streams of sunlight through the hedge he became nervous and hastily sought the shade. Shrews, however, do not usually climb like this early morning hunter, but this hedge has a very high bank overgrown with bramble and choked with pea haulms, and from these he had made his home.

Shrews, like weasels, will make common use of the runs of moles, voles and mice instead of making any special runs of their own; but I have noticed some runs around the bases of the big beeches in the wood here on my nature ramble each morning, and which the shrews seem to use in their journeys through the long lush grass and amongst the daffodils. Often, however, they travel rapidly where there is no run at all, and forcing their way through the long grass, they send a rippling quiver like a wave without wind to mark the way they went and the watcher above cannot see their wee forms. The little pigmy shrew seems to have similar habits and haunts to the common shrew, and it is certainly almost as abundant and nothing like so scarce as old nature books suggest, for it is so small that it can escape from most of the traps.

The shrew has always been the subject of superstition and even hatred, and its very name arose with the absurd meaning of venomous and spiteful, an old rural belief declaring that when it ran over sleeping cattle horrible sores broke out on the

beasts wherever it touched them. And because the cats and dogs that caught shrews refused to eat such musky odours, people believed the shrews were poisonous. So an antidote had to be found for the "poison" of the shrew that had touched these countrymen, and their antidote after being touched by a shrew was to bore a hole in an ash tree and bury another shrew alive inside, that particular tree ever afterwards being called a "shrew-ash," whose leaves could be rubbed on the sores of cattle believed to have been affected by shrews, and thus "cure" them. Gilbert White mentions the shrew-ash in his native Selborne in his twenty-eighth letter to the Hon. Daines Barrington, declaring: "We have several persons now living in the village, who, in their childhood, were supposed to be healed by this superstitious ceremony, derived down perhaps from our Saxon ancestors." Incidentally, the fact that kestrels, owls and other birds-of-prey will eat shrews when the mammals like dogs and weasels discard them, is often argued to support the theory that birds have no sense of smell. The musky odour of the shrew is produced by two glands on the sides of their bodies and seems to be their natural protection from hunting-animals. The big "musk-rat" shrew of India has so strong an odour of musk that it often makes a European sick.

In damp districts shrews seem instinctively to seek drier haunts for the winter, and in autumn you may sometimes meet with a "line" of a dozen or more shrews following one another in a hurried cross-country trek to haunts anew. A naturalist who met such a party in Essex stood his foot in their path, but the little creatures merely scrambled up one side of his boot and down the other, rather than break the line.

Shrews build similar nests to the mice and voles, the common shrew in moss and ivy-covered banks and the water-shrew in a burrow near the stream or ditch. The water-shrew has even been reported able to sit on the top of the water like a waterfowl as well as swim there, but I have never been so fortunate as to observe such a position. Sometimes he will come up to the surface after running on the bottom of the stream a-hunting, and with almost similar motions to a water-beetle, hang motionless by his nose, as it were, while he breathes in a fresh supply of air, and then goes down again for more hunting. These shrews never seem to chase their food in

the open, but root about the mud like little pigs, facing downstream or across "to keep the mud out of their eyes," as a countryman observed, and as soon as they catch something, up goes the little head almost at right angles until it has mastered the struggling creature and swallowed it. "I have seen them make three kills before coming up to breathe," stated a nature-lover lucky enough to have a colony of water-shrews inhabiting his garden brook. The common shrew is declared to eat no less than four times its own weight in insects in thirty-six hours, which is not surprising considering the almost endless energy of these little creatures; you see a similar hunger to maintain the ferocity of the mole, and only naturalists knowing their ferocity could dread to think of a world mastered by monster moles and shrews! Even the pigmy shrew, which but for one or two foreigners would be the smallest mammal in the world, can spring upon a large worm which squirms and struggles until killed—a veritable St. George slaying the monster dragon, worrying it as a cat worries a mouse, as a puppy shakes an old shoe, or as a kingfisher flays the tiddler it has caught. The way of the shrew is indeed worthy of more observation and less superstition.

ERIC HARDY.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
FULL REVIEWS	497
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FRANCE AND ITALY; THE EXPLOITATION OF EAST AFRICA; FOOD AND NUTRITION; THE FALSE PEACE; THE QUIET WORLD OF NATURE; LIGHT AND SHADE IN GERMANY; JANE AUSTEN AND NARRATIVE ART; THE PRINCE CONSORT.	
• SHORTER REVIEW: THE OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS	512

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FRANCE AND ITALY.

Professor Carr may be congratulated on the first two volumes of his scheme for securing authoritative statements of the foreign policy of the Great Powers. His method is to choose a suitable writer and to give him a free hand. It is a real boon to possess such frank and able expressions of opinion by thoughtful and well-informed representatives of their respective countries. The famous French journalist and the distinguished Italian Professor have done their work admirably, never concealing their opinions on controverted issues, however much they differ from our own, but conveying them in courteous terms.

Vladimir d'Ormesson's *France*, enriched by a Prefatory Letter by the French Ambassador, starts with the shock he experienced when suddenly and unexpectedly called up in the summer of 1914, a shock that was equally felt by the whole of the younger generation. So profound an emotion, he declares, explains and justifies all the subsequent reactions of his people. "To understand the longing for security after the war it is necessary to have been a Frenchman, to have seen your home, your garden, your fields, the place where you

* (1) *France*. By Vladimir d'Ormesson. Longmans. 6s. (2) *Italy*. By Camillo Pellizzi. Longmans. 6s.

worked, invaded within the space of a few moments, when you did not so much as guess the danger that was at your door. You must have been through the agony, you must have drunk of the misery, the despair of it all." Here is the master-key to French policy during the last twenty years—the search for security. That mistakes were made he is prepared to admit. The problem of reparations was badly handled, though it is interesting to note his belief that the invasion of the Ruhr was a success. The worst of all errors was the failure to realise that Germany would recover her strength, just as France had recovered from the disasters of 1870. That great nations cannot be kept in subjection for long is one of the axioms of wise statesmanship.

During the first decade after the war it was possible to believe that French policy had been a success, for the Locarno agreement and the golden age of the League created the hope of a peaceful Europe. The dream was shattered by the great slump of 1930 which brought wind into Hitler's sails. What was France to do when confronted by the Third Reich? It was clear that she could no longer rest on her oars, for the tide was beginning to run against her. In an interesting chapter the author explains the policy of Barthou, with whom he was intimately associated, and who, he assures us, was entirely misunderstood. So far from being the author of encirclement, his fundamental desire was an understanding with Germany. But before approaching Berlin it seemed necessary to strengthen the French position by closer ties with Eastern Europe and by a *rapprochement* with Italy. He was struck down by an assassin before his system could mature, and our author mourns his loss. His much criticised refusal of the German offer to limit her army to 300,000 was due to his conviction that it was not honestly meant.

The story told in these pages is very depressing. At the end of the great struggle the Allies could do what they liked, but only on condition that they remained united. This condition was not fulfilled. "All the troubles that have affected Europe so disastrously may be traced to the divided counsels which have prevailed among the former allies in their attitude towards Germany." The chief offender, in the author's view, was Italy, who played Hitler's game by attacking Abyssinia and thereby smashing the Stresa front. France, like all other highly civilised nations, longs for peace ;

but she realises that only the certainty of resistance—a phrase which is printed in italics—can set limits to "the real or pinchbeck imperialisms that are raising their heads in Europe and the Mediterranean."

Dr. Pellizzi, Professor of Italian at London University, has a harder task in interpreting and defending the policy of his country, but he makes a gallant attempt. Having fought at Caporetto he knows war at first hand, and he complains that Italy did not have a fair deal, her rewards being disproportionate to her sacrifices. A strong vein of hostility to France runs through this striking book. Italy, though on the winning side, was a revisionist Power, while France was the champion of the *status quo*. The French Empire was enormous before the war and received large increases as a result of the common victory. The Italian Empire was insignificant before the war, and the increase was very slight. Hence, argues our author, expansion is Italy's most vital need. Laval understood the situation, and on the occasion of his visit to Rome in 1935 he "granted Mussolini a free hand in the Abyssinian question as far as France was concerned, though for obvious reasons this could not be put on paper." It is important to have this confession, for Laval has always asserted that only economic issues were discussed.

English readers will turn with special interest to the chapters on the Abyssinian war. Professor Pellizzi is aware how we regard that abominable crime, and he does his utmost to make out a case for the Fascist Dictator. He is unlikely to change the opinion of well-informed students, who will notice examples both of *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*. Why, for instance, does he omit General de Bono's damning confession that the attack on Abyssinia was decided in 1933, before the Wal-Wal incident occurred? Obviously because it does not fit into his whitewashing argument. And is the following quite a fair statement? "On September 30th, 1935, the Ethiopian Emperor informed the League that he was forced to order the general mobilisation of his armed forces ; whereupon, on October 3rd, some Italian regiments crossed the Abyssinian border in the North and the actual war begun." The reader is apparently invited to conclude that the second event was the result of the first, whereas the aggressor had merely been waiting till the summer rains were

over. Let us digest this apologia, and then turn back to Professor Toynbee's moving volume on the Abyssinian war.

A postscript makes brief reference to the rape of Albania, though that is not the phrase which the author employs. "The new situation," he writes, "was openly welcomed, and a delegation representative of all the provinces of Albania went to Rome to offer the crown to King Victor Emmanuel, who formally accepted it. The union thus effected does not alter the possibilities of an autonomous development of Albania." One of the most deplorable results of the totalitarian system is that criticism is stifled and the moral sense of the citizen is blunted.

G. P. G.

THE EXPLOITATION OF EAST AFRICA.*

A book sometimes appears of which it is said "No library, public or private, is complete without a copy of it on its shelves." This is true of Professor Coupland's latest work which gives to the world the most complete historic survey yet written of Mid-East African territory—Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar. The book deals historically with two main subjects—the long and successful efforts made through British influence to abolish, first, the slave trade and then slavery, secondly, the methods by which the Sultans of Zanzibar lost their inheritance, demonstrated largely by State papers, hitherto unpublished. The central figures in the scene are the three successive Sultans—Seyyid Said, Majid, Barghash; but flitting across the scene in Africa are sinister figures like Carl Peters, condemned even by Germans for his brutality, the American, Henry Stanley, whose shocking conduct, brazenly admitted, provided the Dean of Westminster with grounds for refusing burial in the Abbey, missionaries of every denomination, like Bishop Hannington, the Martyr, the Methodist, Charles New, the "Conqueror" of Kilima-Njaro, and the solitary devotee of no denomination who arrived on the Coast without money, food or raiment, only to find an immediate and early grave in the heart of the forest.

The Khedive Ismail and Nubar Pasha, Kitchener, Gordon

* *The Slave Trade and the Scramble.* By R. Coupland, C.I.E., M.A., Hon.D.Litt. (Durham). Faber & Faber. 25s.

and Harry Johnston find notable places in the background, but every British reader will contemplate with glowing pride the remarkable picture drawn by Professor Coupland of those two bold figures in the foreground—Livingstone and Kirk: at an age when lying and intrigue were the fashion, and when corruption and murder were a daily practice, these two great African statesmen stood firmly against intrigue, injustice and corruption; and when others asked only what they could get no matter what means they employed, these two asked but one simple question, "What is Right?" In Europe, King Leopold, Prince Bismarck, Lords Salisbury, Ripon, Rosebery and Granville, Mackinnon, W. G. Gladstone, Charles Dilke and Fowell Buxton were watching from afar the shifting scene in Central Africa, and the part they played lacked not only courage but at times one or two were guilty of actions which have brought better men to scaffold or block. One of the cardinal but least-known facts in East Africa, brought well to the fore by Professor Coupland, is the large part which India played in colonising this part of Africa, easily a larger part than all European nations together. But the main political theme of the book is the intrigue by which the Sultans of Zanzibar were robbed of their mainland territories; these intrigues culminating in the German demands upon Barghash to surrender to Germany all his rights over Tanganyika, whilst Britain with less pressure, it may be admitted, quietly absorbed what is now Kenya Colony! Throughout the pages of this book Professor Coupland shows how step by step through all those eventful years Sir John Kirk and later, from different motives, Kitchener, withstood this aggression against their trusting friend Sultan Barghash. But Bismarck and his colleagues made it clear that they were prepared to go to any length to secure their objectives. This is shown by the shameful story of the attempt to trap Barghash into strangling his own sister—a naturalised German woman sent out in a German warship from Germany in the hope of an "accident" and thereby to create the much desired "pretext." This tragedy was frustrated partly by Kirk and partly by the foolishness of the woman.

Few British subjects will feel any pride in the weakness and vacillations of Salisbury, Gladstone and Rosebery, still less at their shortsighted folly in refusing to join hands with Barghash in proclaiming a joint control over the whole of

msb, m62
m62.156.

East Africa and thereby setting up legitimate commerce as the best method of stamping out the slave trade and putting an end to the threatened aggrandisements, first of Egypt, then in turn of Germany, France, Portugal, aggrandisements instead of opposing which Great Britain stood weakly aside and came out of the sordid scramble with the Kenya Protectorate! Sir John Kirk and Lord Kitchener have left on record what were their feelings at seeing so loyal a friend as Barghash abandoned to his fate!

Professor Coupland, saying farewell in his epilogue to Livingstone, Kirk, Kitchener and their colleagues, introduces his readers in the final pages to a new arrival on the African scene, a young man named Frederick Dealtry Lugard.

JOHN HARRIS.

FOOD AND NUTRITION.*

Professor Drummond and Miss Wilbraham in their very interesting and informative book describe the changes in the diet of the English people during the last five centuries. The subject is treated comprehensively; the authors consider not only the changing types of food consumed in different periods, but the causes of the changes, their effect on the public health, and their sociological significance. There is a specially interesting chapter on the food problems that arose during the Great War, and the various methods adopted by the belligerent Powers to deal with them. Grave mistakes were made in this country as well as in Germany and Italy; and in the light of what we now know of nutrition it seems clear that the result of the war was largely determined by conditions of food supply. At the present time, when the public is becoming increasingly concerned with problems of nutrition, the book makes an opportune appearance.

Though the peoples of the Western world have achieved, in peace time at all events, the conquest of famine, so that the difference between a good and a bad harvest is no longer a matter of life and death to many, they have still to deal with a lamentable prevalence of malnutrition. It is attributable to

* (1) *The Englishman's Food*. By J. C. Drummond and Anne Wilbraham. Jonathan Cape. 1939. 12s. 6d. net. (2) *Nutrition and the Public Health. Proceedings of a National Conference on the Wider Aspects of Nutrition*. British Medical Association. 1939. 2s. 6d.

a variety of causes. Food may be adequate in quantity, and apparently good in quality, and yet lack certain elements without which good health cannot be maintained. This has been revealed by the scientific study of nutrition, much of which is of recent origin; it was not until 1912 that Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins demonstrated the importance of the "accessory" food factors now known as vitamins. But though knowledge of nutrition advanced for many years at a slow rate, much slower progress was made in the application of knowledge to practical ends. The value of lemon-juice in the prevention of scurvy was proved by James Lancaster in his voyage to the East Indies in 1600, but it was not until 1795 that the Admiralty adopted it as the principal anti-scorbutic. One result was that the cases of scurvy in the Haslar Naval Hospital fell from 1,754 in 1760 to one in 1806.

Though we have still much to learn about nutrition a substantial body of information has been accumulated, and its extent and significance are brought out in the report of the conference convened by the British Medical Association last April. The outstanding fact that emerges is that a considerable proportion of the population of this country are inadequately fed; their food is inadequate in quantity or quality, or both. It is not entirely a question of poverty. For example, the relatively small consumption of milk and the preference for white bread to brown are probably attributable in large measure to ignorance of food values, distaste or prejudice. Mr. K. A. H. Murray in his Oxford Survey found wide variations in the purchases of milk between families with similar food expenditures, which suggested "that milk consumption could be doubled without raising income levels if the consumer can be induced to do it." A similar conclusion emerged from a survey made in Durham by Messrs. M. J. Carlton-Smith and O. J. Beilby.

But when a liberal allowance is made for such factors, it remains true that the chief cause of malnutrition is lack of purchasing power. Mr. L. S. Amery, in his contribution to the B.M.A. conference, contended that the prevalence of malnutrition was due "to a wage system which takes no account of family needs and responsibilities." He held that one thing common to all recent inquiries into the subject was "the intimate and almost invariable connection between malnutrition and the size of the family." Working-class parents were

unable to afford an adequate diet for more than one or two children, and consequently were with increasing rapidity limiting their families. This frustration of the natural instincts of parenthood was, in his view, leading to a national catastrophe, for the reproduction rate was already 25 per cent. below the level required to maintain a permanent population. He advocated a system of family allowances.

Mr. George Gibson, a delegate from the Trade Union Congress, was unable to agree, since the policy of the T.U.C. is to deal with the problem by developing the social services rather than by cash allowances. This was but one of many important subjects discussed at the conference, which covered a wide field. The speakers included some of the most distinguished authorities on various aspects of nutrition, and the report is full of instruction on what is now recognised as a question of first-rate public importance.

G. F. McCLEARY.

THE FALSE PEACE.*

If other major events do not overshadow the importance of Munich in the near future, we shall soon have to face a literary output on and about this matter which might be compared with the mass of books written on Locarno. In such circumstances it becomes increasingly difficult to pick out the important and useful publications from the merely day-to-day literature. It is not always true that we have to wait for years in order to find an excellent guide to certain events, since it is sometimes just the freshness of the impressions put into writing which makes a book readable. It will be for the historians in time to come—on the basis of a fuller documentation—to give Munich its right place in the history of the first half of the twentieth century. Though we might view it to-day as a milestone in postwar European diplomatic history, it is at least conceivable that future generations will more clearly remember—say the military annexation of Austria in March 1938 and the military occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 than all the long discussion and agitation around the Sudeten German question which, from the German side, were purely academic ever since Hitler made up his mind to solve

* *When there is No Peace: An American looks at Europe.* By Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Macmillan. 6s. net.

this question whatever the costs. Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the American publicist and editor of the excellent quarterly *Foreign Affairs*, wrote a long essay on events leading up to Munich for the January number of this journal which, a short time later, he published, with some additions, in book form. The title of the book and, still more, the title of the French edition (*La Fausse Paix*) leave us in no doubt as to the opinions of the author, but as these—as summed up in the slogans of the titles themselves—are now a commonplace, many a person might be deterred from reading it at all. Yet it constitutes a dispassionate and eminently readable account of the events of last year. A long annex of seventy-three pages contains a chronology of events of which we should normally only be able to get hold in Professor Toynbee's *Survey* at a much later date. The book contains as well the reply of the Czechoslovak Government to the Anglo-French plan which was omitted from the White Paper published by the British Government. It has been objected that much has been left unexplained or has been neglected by the author—that not enough stress is laid upon the state of readiness of the military forces and of public opinion in Britain, or that little has been said about the point of view of “the other fellow” (i.e. the Sudeten German). Though these objections seem to some extent justified, the inclusion of all these considerations might easily have outstepped the immediate object of the study. In any case, it seems justifiable for a publicist to review events from a certain aspect as long as he does not deliberately misconstrue them. It would be a dull book, indeed, if all readers always found themselves in agreement with some of Mr. Armstrong's characterisation of events and persons; and it would be of little value if it contained nothing but that. But we get an able and useful summary of events by an American observer which gives the book a value of its own.

GERARD M. FRITERS.

THE QUIET WORLD OF NATURE.*

Books on natural history continue to be published in considerable numbers year by year. Of these many, too many perhaps, are really collections of photographs (usually of

* *The Quiet World of Nature.* By Bernard Gooch. The Bodley Head. 8s. 6d. net.

first-rate quality) with more or less negligible letterpress; while others, much more important, rely on their reading matter, though here, too, good illustrations may be a welcome addition to a well-written book.

The volume under review falls into this latter class. Its photographs are good, particularly the frontispiece—a typical view of Dartmoor's rolling slopes—but entirely subservient to the written word. The interest of this book is very varied and covers a wide field, ranging from pond-life, in which whirligig beetles play their active part, to attractive chapters on adders, grass-snakes, a salamander and a bat; to the description of the nest-building of chaffinch and spotted fly-catcher, and to much delightful detail in the life of buzzards and of a quaint tame herring gull. Here is matter for many tastes written in an easy, often vivid, style by a man whose whole being is obviously steeped in nature—a true naturalist.

My own preference is, perhaps, for the chapters dealing with birds, but I suspect that Mr. Gooch himself would choose those on the salamander and snakes, on which he is known to be an authority. These latter are packed with lively impressions and one can gain much fascinating information from them. One can also admire and wonder at his almost uncanny power of handling adders!

As an example of Mr. Gooch's vivid word-pictures let me quote this paragraph on the antics of a stoat. "It frolics through our garden in full view of every window as delightful a bit of fluff as ever sped before the breeze; and, with the inconsequence of a whirling autumn leaf, looks now into a tuft of grass, now behind a stone, dodges round a tree, trips along a rat-run, swims a stream, finds a trail and—is gone." To anyone who knows the absurdly playful ways of a stoat this can hardly be bettered.

Here again is a charming turn of expression: "... on a barren rock, wind-swept and sun-scorched, the smallest cushion of stonecrop, starred with tiny flowers, is often as perfect and as satisfying as the loveliest rose in a garden."

Much good writing together with keen observation may be found throughout the book, but possibly the best is contained in "A Summer Night." The encounter with a fox, rabbits at play and starlings assembling at a roost are truly admirable descriptions. One can visualise every action of bird and beast just as Mr. Gooch gives it to us.

Many quotations, did space permit, might profitably be made from this chapter alone. However, enough, I think, has been said to show that Mr. Gooch writes well, with understanding and a fine poetic sense, that sense which runs through so much good prose, and which is so signally lacking in the bulk of modern books dealing with natural history.

W. WALMESLEY WHITE.

LIGHT AND SHADE IN GERMANY.*

In these days of partisanship, it is a true refreshment of spirit to take up Nora Waln's *Reaching for the Stars*. In 1934 her husband's wish to study music led them to Germany, where they stayed until 1938, and when the German translation of her book on China, *The House of Exile*, brought her in touch with numbers of people she decided, wisely and characteristically, to devote her main attention to the National Socialists. "An urge deep within me made it impossible for me to turn any other way," she writes; and the result is an admirably balanced study of modern Germany, of which the impartiality cannot be praised too highly. She listens critically to what people of all types have to say, and watches National Socialism penetrating every corner of everyday life. She spares us nothing; and her very reticence and economy of effort are more impressive than any fulmination. Take the picture of the butler refusing, at Christmas, to serve an old family friend of Jewish descent; or the haunting description of her summons to the Customs to be told that many of her books, including a cherished copy of *Nathan der Weise*, were "forbidden." "The official was sorry—very sorry—but if it was found out that he had let it in, he would lose his job and his pension; he had a wife and children. . . . Then the servant of National Socialism brought a hammer and new nails, shining as silver, with which he fastened the lid of the box that must leave the Reich. His steady, relentless blows shook me, their fall beating a funeral dirge for the Germany whose matchless beauty Madame de Staël heralded in *De l'Allemagne*. Is that Germany dead? Or does she lie as Snow White did, in a trance from eating a poisoned apple?"

Against this dark background the life of the German people goes on, with its warm friendliness, its Christmas celebrations,

* *Reaching for the Stars*. By Nora Waln. The Cresset Press. 8s. 6d.

its music ; and, set in the heart of the book, the lovely chapter on the forests seems to emphasise that here, close to nature, lies the heart of the true Germany. Faith in this real Germany and in her contribution to the common life of humanity is the keynote of the whole volume, and as we meet Hitler Youth and aged professor, forester and vine-grower, we are reminded of the mingled terror and pity of Greek tragedy out of which are born a strange, grave beauty and a high vision of better things to be.

Mrs. Waln has taken considerable pains to study German history, law and literature ; and if her research does not convey much that is new to the professional historian, it brings much valuable information to the wider public, which will also be attracted by her simplicity and her instinct for the arresting phrase. But it is the basis of the book that constitutes its chief value. "I have faith in the goodness, the courage and the endurance of the Germans. In ages past they have reached so high in getting truth for mankind that they have touched the stars. That contribution is not ended. While I lived in Germany, although I saw the building up of the most powerful army the world has ever possessed, there grew deep within me a faith that the Germans will be a powerful force in the making of a frontierless and unfortified world." That is a noble word and one that needed urgently to be said. It comes from this American Quaker with moving power and sincerity.

D. H.

JANE AUSTEN AND NARRATIVE ART.*

Miss Lascelles starts her Preface by meeting the objection likely to be brought against her book—that everything worth saying about Jane Austen has been said already—and maintains that there is room for further study of narrative art, "the story-teller's peculiar problems" ; to this she devotes her later pages. Austeniana certainly seem inexhaustible : even in the last few months, for example, two booklets have appeared on Jane in relation to Bath. Miss Lascelles is intimately acquainted with the previous memoirs and critical essays, as well as with Jane's own letters and, of course, her

* *Jane Austen and Her Art*. By Mary Lascelles. Sir Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press. 1939. 10s. 6d.

novels and juvenile or unfinished work. If she can add little to our biographical knowledge, her comments on Jane's reading, the authors who influenced her, and her response to them, are of great interest and value. For Johnson, Cowper and Scott, Jane expresses her affection. Miss Lascelles points out that *Northanger Abbey* burlesques not only Mrs. Radcliffe and novelists of the "horrid" school, but also the school of sentiment of Miss Burney and others. She traces the influence on Jane's style of the eighteenth-century essayists, and stresses characteristics familiar to her admirers—her accurate observation, critical faculty, use of the right word in the right place, satirical wit, or (to quote Jane's own description) her "playfulness and epigrammatism."

She notes her amusement at "the interaction of idiosyncrasy and life," her preference of the actual world to that of illusion, her avoidance of unmeaning figures of speech, her reticence, and deliberate selection of subjects—there is, for instance, no death in the novels of any beloved character. Jane's methods of revision may be ascertained from existing manuscripts ; Miss Lascelles is of opinion that she "positively enjoyed" rewriting, inserting the minute touches that would make a speech more in keeping with the speaker. With her favourite characters she identifies herself, and delicately invites us to share in their creation. Perhaps we may think here and there that our critic's analysis is too much like dissection, a pinning-down of brilliant butterfly-wings ; that her working out of pattern and antithesis in the novels is over-elaborate, while her "direction of the reader's attention to particular circumstances" is less unobtrusive than that which she attributes to Jane. But this is probably due to the liking all Austenians have for feeling that we have ourselves, unaided and gleefully, fished the murex up. In any case, we must acknowledge our debt to Miss Lascelles for this labour of love and learning.

E. G. S.

THE PRINCE CONSORT.*

There is no adequate up-to-date biography of the Prince Consort. The massive work of Sir Theodore Martin was a

* *Letters of the Prince Consort, 1831-61*, selected and edited by Dr. Kurt Jagow and translated by E. T. S. Dugdale. John Murray. 1938.

monument of affection and retains its value as a treasure of first-hand material ; but the author could not be expected to give an unbiased appreciation, standing as he did too near to the life of the court. As a prelude to a much-needed account a recently published German collection of his letters, now translated into English, may be found useful. There are two prefaces, one by the editor, one by the translator. Their disagreement is an involuntary contribution to the history of Anglo-German clashes. How strange that a German editor should represent the Prince as the saviour of the British monarchy! The low reputation of the monarchy in this country at the time of Queen Victoria's accession was due to a variety of reasons, one of the main being the inferior quality of certain members of the royal house. Even during the reign of the Queen both before and after Albert's death, the foundations of the monarchy were decidedly insecure. It was not until the seventies that its position strengthened, chiefly by the rise of Imperialism.

The collection contains over 350 letters and memoranda, of which about two-thirds were unpublished. These are chiefly the letters of Prince Albert to the Queen during their engagement period, the letters to Frederic William IV of Prussia, to Prince William, later William I of Prussia, to Queen Augusta, and one letter to Duke Ernest II, the brother of the Prince. From the biographical and psychological standpoint the love letters are the most interesting. Politically the letters to the royal brothers of Prussia contain a good deal of information on the secret politics of the period. The Prince had become the chief political adviser not of the Queen alone. He enjoyed unequalled confidence throughout the minor princely families in Germany, which made him a person of highest authority on all questions of German unity. He was generally anti-Austrian. In 1852 he wrote to the Prince of Prussia : " God grant that your government may not bind the permanent interests of Prussia irrevocably to Austria, and, under the hallucination of conciliating that Power, cripple for all time the material and moral demands of North Germany." In 1859 his verdict on Austria was very severe : " The Austrian conduct of the war has been bad beyond belief, and is only to be compared with their management of their policy." His dream was an Anglo-Prussian alliance which would help Prussia to assume the

leadership of Kleindeutschland despite Austrian and French jealousy.

There are many striking details concerning the tragic history of Anglo-German relations. When Radowitz in the name of the King of Prussia offered an alliance under conditions " to be dictated by England," Albert replied that an Anglo-Prussian alliance was a matter of such immense importance that only the constitutional advisers of the two Crowns could properly handle it. Without any wish to overstep the limits of his own political position he gave the King a confidential description of the British official feelings on the suggestion (1850). At the beginning of the Eastern crisis in 1853 he wrote to the Prince of Prussia : " A Prussian alliance with Belgium, Holland and England would, as you say at the beginning of your letter, correspond well with the natural order of things. I think however that it would be stronger and more workable if it rested genuinely on similarity of political opinion and attitude rather than on *ad hoc* treaties." A new Anglo-Prussian *rapprochement* was inaugurated by the royal marriage (1858) and reached its climax during the first years of the " New Era " in Prussia. If he had lived longer, the Prince Consort would probably have had some disagreement with Bismarck. The blessing he wished Germany was a statesman in the style of Stein. He used to explain the secrets of Parliamentary Government to his royal correspondents, and he would have deeply deplored the conflict between the Prussian Crown and the Chamber. " The Germanisation of Prussia," he wrote to Princess Augusta in 1857, " is the condition of her greatness and power and of bringing peace to Germany ; the aspiration to Prussianise Germany is the weakness of Prussia and of Germany, and the source of the disfavour and antipathy with which the rest of Germany unfortunately regards Prussia."

The letters confirm our impression of the Prince as a person of high taste and cultivation, as a sweet and unselfish character, as a tactful and wise politician. One legend is destroyed by the new material. There were many reasons why he remained a stranger in England, but a deficient sense of humour was not one of them. His letter to Victoria of April 1849 is in a pleasantly amusing vein. He would recite with irony the arguments of the enemies of the International Exhibition : the Crystal Palace would be blown down in the

first strong gale, its galleries would crash and destroy the visitors, a scarcity of food would result from the vast concourse of people, the Black Death would make its appearance owing to so many races meeting, etc. Neither mathematicians, engineers, economists, doctors, moralists nor theologians deterred him from his great task. His premature death prevented him from building up a political work of similar shape—the co-operation of a peaceful and united Europe.

VEIT VALENTIN.

SHORTER REVIEW

The *Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs** are performing a valuable service in analysing briefly contemporary international problems. Each publication comprises some thirty-two pages of text and is written by an expert of established reputation. The views expressed, of course, may not always command assent; the pamphlets, however, are designed as informative rather than propagandist articles and as such are to be greatly welcomed. Within the space allotted only the barest outline of a topic can be attempted, and in some of the pamphlets a bibliography could have been added with great advantage. Most of those already published were written, of course, before the outbreak of war; but while at the moment all is overshadowed by the conflict, the subjects dealt with in these articles remain of great importance either towards an understanding of the historic causes of the struggle or as indicating problems to be solved in the new international order when peace is won. It is not possible here to discuss the relative merits of these publications, and it must suffice to mention only a few. Mr. R. C. K. Ensor has written an admirable analysis of *Herr Hitler's Self-Disclosure in Mein Kampf* which deserves to be widely read. Dr. Julian Huxley deals with "*Race*" in *Europe* and Mr. R. R. Kuczynski discusses "*Living Space*" and *Population Problems*. *Economic Self-Sufficiency* is the subject of Professor A. G. B. Fisher's contribution and the question of *Raw Materials and Colonies* is considered by Mr. H. D. Henderson. The Danube States are discussed by Mr. C. A. Macartney and Mr. G. F. Hudson writes on *Turkey, Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean*. Professor J. L. Brierley analyses the German allegation of "encirclement." Mr. H. V. Hodson's sketch of the character and structure of the British Commonwealth of Nations also is excellent.

Finally, the latest pamphlet issued on the *Treaty of Brest-Litovsk*, by John W. Wheeler-Bennett, leads up directly to the situation at the present moment.

* Oxford: at The Clarendon Press. 3d. each.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

NOVEMBER 1939.

WAR FOR PEACE.

ON the morning of Saturday, March 4th, 1916, the thirteenth day of the battle of Verdun, I stood with others on a low spur to the north-west of the town and heard rather than watched the preparation of the second German attack upon the village of Douaumont. A few hundred yards below us French batteries were snapping out defiance at the invisible German guns across the Meuse and beyond the nearest heights. Quick jets of flame would spurt from unexpected positions, huge shells would drone across the valley and burst with terrific clatter into cloudlets of dirty black-grey smoke; but even the stray gleams of anæmic sunshine that broke through the curtain of mist and sleet revealed little of the grim work in progress. Here and there the slaughter could indeed be seen, or guessed. Yet the uppermost feeling, at the moment and on the spot, was one of impatience at being merely a listening spectator, not a combatant. Only on returning westwards and seeing fresh reserves of sturdy humanity rushing towards the shambles in huge motor lorries did reflection overcome the lingering thrill of the distant strife, and the question arise insistently, "Why? Why?"

Little by little the question transformed itself into a hard resolve, into a determination not consciously formed but elementary, like hunger or thirst: "Never again! Never again shall those who let loose this orgy of wickedness upon the world be permitted to hold mankind to ransom, and to measure the freedom of free peoples by the might of their own scientific savagery."

Hard upon the "Why?", with its attendant resolve, followed the "How?"; and before a clear notion as to ways and means could delineate itself in the mind came an angry wish that every Minister and diplomatist, politician and publicist, whose voice might be heard or whose influence be felt in the making of peace should see what we had seen, hear what we had heard, feel what we had felt. A period of compulsory presence on or near a battlefield, of salutary

VOL. CLVI.

exposure to shellfire, of obligatory visits to ruined towns and villages should be an indispensable qualification for every man who aspires, or may be in a position, to influence conditions of peace. How many suave soothsayers would find their words die on their lips, how many political pontiffs would doubt their own infallibility, how many "pacifists" would feel their blood tingle with an unwonted intensity of purpose, could they have direct experience of what war means, and realise the positive criminality of any failure to make it impossible in future!

These were the feelings with which I left the battlefield of Verdun. They are my feelings to-day, though I understand that in this war we may all be "at the front." They moved me then to draft "A Programme for Peace" which, even now, I am not ashamed of having written. Its first point was that the Allies should win the war so thoroughly as to avoid any inconclusive peace; and its second was that "as a preliminary step to the winning of the war the British people entrust its management to a few men determined to conquer, literally at all costs." Many details of this "programme" were realised in 1919, though some had been rendered obsolete by the course of the war. But I was taken to task in 1916 for having ventured in the midst of war to forecast terms of peace. In reply I wrote:

The war may still last many months, perhaps years. The longer it lasts the more exhausted will all the belligerents become, and the more eager will be sections of public opinion in the allied countries to secure a rapid settlement without overmuch haggling as to terms. Fatigue, masquerading as generosity, and unavowed pro-Germanism whispering "Let bygones be bygones," might become serious political factors unless the allied peoples were agreed in advance upon a minimum peace programme. The tendency to compromise upon essential points might become too strong for any allied Government to withstand. The best means of guarding against this danger is to frame a clear-cut minimum programme which must be accepted by the enemy before any armistice can be conceded. The programme must include the giving of guarantees for its execution pending negotiation upon points of detail.

In some ways the position to-day is not unlike that of 1916. Though, on land, the war in the west has hardly begun, German armies in the east have devastated Poland, and we

have already been confronted with a "peace offensive" which has not been without its effect upon certain sections of public opinion. It may not be generally known that this peace offensive formed a definite part of Hitler's policy before his onslaught on Poland began. Early last summer a Nazi representative in a neutral country divulged the main lines of this policy to a citizen of that country whom he may have hoped to influence. But so taken aback was the neutral citizen that he challenged the accuracy of the Nazi representative's information. In the heated discussion which followed the Nazi may have said more than he had intended to say. Upon what he did say the neutral citizen promptly wrote a report; and, as good fortune would have it, a copy of this report came into my hands at the end of June. I took care that an accurate digest of it should reach certain important Ministers and leading members of the Opposition without delay. In view of Hitler's "peace offer" in his Reichstag speech of October 6th its substance is still of interest, allowance being made for Hitler's change of tone towards Russia after the Soviet-German agreement of August 24th and for the Russian interpretation of that agreement.

The report declared that the ultimate aim of Nazi policy is to create a Germanic World Empire of unassailable strength without the risks of a world war. In 1938 its immediate aim was to subjugate Czechoslovakia. In 1939 its immediate aim is to subjugate Poland without war or, at worst, after a short localised war. Germany does not yet feel strong enough to face any long war. But Hitler is anxious to carry through speedily another stage of his programme by the subjugation of Poland and, thereafter, of the Baltic and Danubian States. When this has been done there will be a prospect of comparative tranquillity while Germany organises the territories between her own borders and those of Russia. Then Hitler will seek either to undermine, disintegrate and revolutionise Soviet Russia, or to link the Russian "space" with the "imperial space" of the German World Empire, or to win a war against the Western Powers should they resist him. Hitler is now seeking good relations with Moscow in the hope of localising or isolating his conflict with Poland, not because his "imperial aims" in the east have changed.

Up to the end of 1938 Hitler believed that his eastern policy could be carried through with Polish help. He hoped, too, that this policy would be tolerated by Great Britain and France while Rumania was also being brought, with Polish co-operation, into

the German sphere of influence. A basis for the disintegration of the Russian Ukraine would thus have been assured. Only then would the Polish Ukraine have been "liberated" in its turn, and the full German claims enforced upon Poland.

These plans were thwarted by the Polish alliances with Great Britain and France. Should the Western Powers attempt, with or without Russian help, to block Hitler's road to the east, he would treat Poland as his most dangerous foe. Poland must, therefore, be forced out of the anti-German coalition by any and every means. Before the union of Danzig with Germany is proclaimed, the main strength of the German army will be concentrated on the borders of Poland, while the Siegfried Line will be defensively held in the west. German strategy will aim at crushing the Polish army in the region between Bromberg and Posen, a "lightning" occupation of Upper Silesia being carried out simultaneously so as to cut away the chief centre of Polish industry. This, Hitler thinks, could be done in a few weeks.

Though Hitler still hopes that the Western Powers will be militarily inactive at the beginning of a German-Polish war, he feels the urgency of ending such a war quickly so as to leave the Western Powers no opening for intervention in the east. In the event of a French attack on Germany its chances of success would be belittled. In the west, Germany does not expect Great Britain and France to favour an aggressive war against her, especially if their hopes of Russian help prove illusory. Should the Western Powers nevertheless attack, Germany's western army will stand on the defensive until the Polish army has been crushed. Then the main German forces would be switched over to the west, though there would be no air raids on England or France as long as these two countries should refrain from aerial attack upon Germany. Concurrently with her military concentration on the west, Germany would begin a propaganda peace-offensive in which she and the Rome-Berlin Axis would offer immediate peace to the Western Powers who, if they rejected the offer, would be made responsible for the devastation that would ensue. Special appeals would be issued to the Governments and peoples of Holland, Belgium and Switzerland. Hitler believes that the success of this peace offensive would cause him to be acclaimed as the saviour of the peace of the world.

The "combined strategy" of this method is based on the assumption that the German forces in the west could hold up a French attack long enough for the Polish army to be crushed and the main German forces to be switched over to the west. During this period Italy would remain neutral. There would be no counter-attack by the Axis in the west until the whole German army and air force had been concentrated against Great Britain

and France. Germany assumes further that Russia will remain neutral until the Western Powers and the Axis are at death grips in a long struggle. But Germany is not yet prepared to face a long struggle. Her aim is "World Empire without a world war." With this Empire the Western Powers could make peace on condition that they give up all idea of political co-operation with Eastern Europe, including Russia. As compensation, Germany would be prepared to "guarantee" the British and French Empires.

This is the substance of the report. If Hitler's search for "good relations with Moscow" has taken a turn less favourable to his designs than he anticipated, the launching of his "peace offensive" on October 6th, while his troops were being switched over to the West, serves to show the general accuracy of this forecast of his intentions. It shows, too, that extreme care is needed in Great Britain and France not to countenance, directly or indirectly, his proposals for "peace" in the West while he consolidates his gains in the East. The Western Powers are fighting—alone, for the moment—a war for the freedom and future peace of Europe. Without a free Europe there can be no true peace or, indeed, security in freedom for Great Britain and France. As for the smaller neutrals, they too understand that liberty and independence will be vain words unless the British and French democracies destroy not only "Hitlerism" but help to free the German mind from the noxious infections of which "Hitlerism" is compounded. This time "*Es geht ums Ganze*," as the Germans say; it is truly a fight "For all we have and are." To think of a patched-up "peace" with the foes of everything that makes the life of free peoples worth living would be so heinous a betrayal of our whole heritage that no upright mind can be guilty of it.

It has been said that we have no quarrel with "the German people." However true this may be in the abstract, it assumes in practice that "the German people" do not support Hitlerism to any serious extent, and that they would repudiate it and all that it implies if they could. We need to be very careful before we accept this assumption as altogether valid. Who are, actually and prospectively, "the German people"? None can say, for nobody knows. Since Bismarck turned Austria out of Germany "with blood and iron" in 1866, and especially since he founded German unity on Prusso-German

victories over France in 1870-1, "the German people" have passively accepted the mastery of Prussia over them. To them it meant prosperous invincibility. Can this mastery be broken? Do "the German people" wish to break it? How much political reality lies behind the alleged "otherness" of Bavarians, Saxons, Württembergers or Rhinelanders? The "spiritual home" of Nazism has always been in Bavaria, at Munich, while Nuremberg is its holy city. Hitler himself is an Austrian. He has forced his native land, by murder, terror and aggression, into his Third Reich. Many Austrians writhe under his heel. Yet, in 1918, when the Hapsburg Monarchy and the Austrian Empire exploded from within, the Austrian Republican Government proclaimed union with Germany.

So "the German people" are a riddle hard to read. Certain only is it, in the light of history, that any attempt to disintegrate Germany from without and by force would end in fostering another, and probably irresistible, movement for unity. I am convinced that whatever changes may be brought about in the political structure of German lands and tribes must be mainly the work of Germans themselves, however sympathetically foreign well-wishers of "the German people" may regard the dislike of Prussianism which many Germans feel. No reasonable European can deny that 75 or 80 millions of Germans in the centre of Europe are entitled to, and will inevitably, play a leading part in the affairs of the Continent. All who have the peace and welfare of Europe at heart must desire to see the Germans hold their rightful place, as equals, in a European family of nations. But no good European—and aviation has henceforth made Great Britain indissolubly a part of Europe—can tolerate the idea that the other European nations should be compelled perpetually to defend themselves in arms against German military aggression.

It is in these terms that the future of "the German people" has to be considered, and the problem of recurrent German aggression to be solved. To conceive this problem as being merely that of overthrowing Hitlerism is woefully to misunderstand its nature; and to ignore the formidable body of politico-philosophical doctrine that has developed in Germany during the past 150 years in justification of German hegemony in Europe, if not in the world, is at once futile and self-deceptive. From Fichte to Hitler the line of this doctrine runs

straight. From 1895 onwards it took shape in a definite programme of territorial pan-Germanism. Without dwelling upon the well-known contributions to it of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, it is significant that this doctrine affected more than one apparently liberal German writer. Those who wish to study its later developments cannot do better than read Aurel Kolnai's compendium of Nazi thought in his book, *The War Against the West*, to which should be added (for readers of French) Professor Edmond Vermeil's analytical masterpiece, *Doctrinaires de la Révolution Allemande, 1918-1938*. Whoever studies these works will shake his head over the assertion that the Western allies have no quarrel with "the German people."

The sad truth is that we do not understand the German people, nor do they understand us. It is doubtful whether they understand themselves. This is not a matter of language. It goes far deeper than forms of speech. It may be a matter of temperament, upbringing and outlook. Whatever it is, we are now faced with a militant "German people" in the form of Hitler's system and armies. They are the concrete expression of "Hitlerism," the embodiment of its doctrine. As regards its spirit Hermann Goering is no mean authority. In the spring of 1933, soon after Hitler had come to power, Goering answered certain criticisms by saying: "As for me, I am *subjective*; I commit myself to *my people* and acknowledge nothing else on earth. I thank my Maker for having created me without what they call a 'sense of objectivity.' " It would be difficult to express the essence of Hitlerism more succinctly. It is tribal egoism in the fullest sense. To Goering's statement may be compared that of Dr. Frank, the Nazi Minister of Justice, two and a half years later: "We are under the great obligation of recognising as a holy work of our Folk-spirit the laws signed with Adolf Hitler's name. Hitler has received his authority from God. Therefore he is a champion, sent by God, for German Right in the world." We need to recognise that German "Right," thus conceived, stands in absolute and conscious antagonism to Western liberal civilisation, and inspires a creed of unbridled power and territorial expansion. What is more: Since 1923 this creed has been instilled into the German people by Hitler and his associates; while since 1933 "the German people" have been allowed to hear and to read little else.

These are some of the factors which render the German problem so formidable. We in the Western world, who live in more or less constant touch with the thoughts and deeds of other peoples, cannot easily imagine the cramping and dwarfing influence upon a nation's mind of intellectual and political segregation. The war of 1914-18 lasted four and a half years. At its close Dr. Beneš, the Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government, who had lived and worked in the West from 1915 onwards, met at Geneva a delegation of his fellow countrymen who had come from Prague after the declaration of Czechoslovak independence. Its members were men who had all worked, inside Austria, for the same ideal of national freedom as had inspired Dr. Beneš and Professor Masaryk. Yet Dr. Beneš could hardly understand them. The Czechs from Prague had received their impressions of the war and of its meaning through the medium of German and Austrian official distortions, whereas Dr. Beneš had lived in a freer atmosphere and in contact with reality. Months passed before these equally patriotic Czechs could co-ordinate and, to some extent, harmonise their ideas. In the light of this precedent we may well ask how long it will be before the Western Allies, having overthrown Hitlerism, will be able to reach a common basis of understanding with "the German people" or their representatives? We cannot guess; but there is no room for hasty optimism. In any event we shall need, as interpreters and intermediaries, many of the Germans whom Hitlerism has driven into exile—and whom our blundering authorities and those of France have thought well to treat as "enemy aliens" or to intern in concentration camps. These men should be allowed and encouraged to get together, to consult each other freely, and to consult with us, so that the hour of decision, when it comes, may not find us unprepared or our minds filled with perilous illusions.

The hour of decision may strike soon, or it may be deferred for months or years. We cannot tell what turn events will finally take. In the first few weeks of war there have been so many unforeseen developments that it would be idle to forecast what even the near future may hold in store. Soon after his first great triumph in the German general election of September 1930, Hitler declared at Frankfurt that there were only two possibilities of saving Germany—National

Socialism on the one hand or Bolshevism on the other. And on November 8th, 1930, he wrote in the *Illustrierten Beobachter* that it was his "hard will to lead Germany either to National Socialism or to Bolshevism." As we have had cause to learn, Hitler's words may mean little though his deeds may mean much; and his deed in concluding his agreement with Soviet Russia last August has given the present war a complexion which few thought it likely to take on.

In my own belief this new complexion involves for Great Britain and France a danger more immediate than that of any eventual "Bolshevisation" of Germany. Quite apart from Russian action in taking time by the forelock in the Baltic, and the heavy blow which this represents to Nazi hopes of expansion in that region, Hitler's association with Stalin may cost him dear within Germany herself. The conduct of Russia is not surprising. We have given her as yet no proof that we mean business in withstanding German aggression. Rather the contrary. One cannot assume that Hitler's intention (mentioned in the Report summarised on earlier pages) "either to undermine, disintegrate and revolutionise Soviet Russia, or to link the Russian 'space' with the 'imperial space' of the German World Empire" will have been a secret to the Intelligence Service of Moscow. So Stalin may have thought it well to make hay while the sun shone, and to seize other "guarantees" than Hitler's word against any German attempt to "Nazify" Russia. On the other hand the spectacle of Russo-German collusion and co-operation has undoubtedly moved many minds in Western countries to wonder whether it would be wise for Great Britain and France to wage war against Germany so vigorously as to inflict total defeat upon her, or whether it would not be more prudent to cultivate an understanding with "Conservative" elements, in the Reichswehr and elsewhere, so that with their help "Hitlerism" might be discomfited and a new order set up in Germany that would be proof against Bolshevik blandishments. Such notions have been and are making a certain headway even in British and French quarters which proclaim their resolve to fight the war through, for three years or longer, until freedom and respect for law shall again reign over Europe.

My own conviction is that notions like these are temptations

of the devil. We have one task in hand—to vanquish Nazi Germany. Without military victory over Nazi Germany we shall not destroy the false legend of German military invincibility from which Hitlerism originally drew much of its strength. Nor shall we convince “the German people” that pan-German militarism spells disaster to them, whether under a Prussian Hohenzollern or under a Third Nazi Reich. Efforts to cast out Satan in the name of Beelzebub are not to be recommended. The immediate foe is Hitlerism. When we have dealt faithfully with it we shall be able to face Bolshevism with clear consciences and firm hands. Were we to trifle with our task, to seek to dodge the major issue in the hope of escaping what may be an ultimate but is still a minor danger, we should stand discredited as poltroons and fools.

We are at war for peace. There can be no peace worth having without freedom. Upon us has devolved the stern duty and the high honour of being the champions of freedom. If we be worthy champions the friends of freedom everywhere will rally round us. We may be able to unite them, under Franco-British leadership, with the moral support at least of the United States, and to restore hope to a bewildered world. Unless I err, even Russia would not fail to be affected by this example. Moscow has been deeply impressed during recent years by proofs of Hitlerite purposefulness and strength, and has been scornful of Western pusillanimity and weakness. Our strength lies in the nobility of our cause. If we are true to that cause, come what may, its strength will prevail even against Bolshevism; and a liberated Europe will find the path to creative peace. If we are faithless, if we timorously toy with or adopt half-measures, we and our cause will be worsted. Darkness may then brood over the peoples of Europe for many a day and year.

So I am persuaded now, as I was at Verdun in 1916, that we need a clear-cut programme for peace, and that one of the first and most essential conditions for getting such a programme is that the British people should entrust the management of the war to a few open-eyed and high-hearted men determined to win it, literally at all costs. Our present “War Cabinet” contains few such men. The deliberate reply given on October 12th by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons to Hitler’s “peace offensive” speech of October 6th

breathed a spirit that must inspire his every act and those of his colleagues. As time goes on we shall need more specific “war aims.” Meanwhile it is good for the world to be told that we shall not recognise or tolerate the fruits of Hitlerite aggression, and that when Hitlerism shall have disappeared we shall do our utmost to help a new Germany find for herself a worthy place in a Europe set for peace. In order to make such a Europe we may have to give up as much of our own national sovereignty as is necessary to secure effective union with other free nations for lasting peace.

The thought of this peace must ever be in our minds. To allow victory to fall short of it would be to betray at once the men who fought the first “war to end war,” those who are fighting this war, and the freedom of future generations from the recurrent scourge of lawless, predatory might.

WICKHAM STEED.

WAR AIMS AND PEACE TERMS.

"*Si vis pacem, para bellum*" is a maxim of limited validity, and the history of defensive armaments might appear almost to invalidate it completely. It is truer, and at present more pertinent, to insist that if you want to restore peace you should prepare for it, and that the continuation of that policy to advance which you had resort to war requires you to define that policy with the maximum degree of precision—not merely in terms which will fill in a peroration or furnish a slogan.

Even at this date, when the war is only a few weeks old and the issue has hardly been joined on the Western front, there is more than one reason which should be sufficient to compel us critically to examine our war aims and peace terms. In the first place, prudent though it undoubtedly is to be prepared for a long struggle, there is good ground for hoping, and even some for believing, that this war will be a short one—barring such major surprises as limitless military co-operation between Germany and Russia. Hitler and even Hitlerism may disappear overnight and leave us facing the problem what we are prepared to offer to or accept from a converted Germany. The outbreak or threat of peace might represent almost as grave a crisis as the prospect of war.

Secondly, although in practice the length of the war and its vicissitudes will inevitably have an effect on the eventual settlement (roughly speaking the longer the war the worse the peace treaty which will end it), we ought in theory to be prepared to make peace on terms which are not substantially varied by the extent of our military success. In other words, there are certain minimum terms which we should be determined to demand before we lay down our arms; the cleanness of our crusade depends not less on our unwillingness to raise those demands than on our unreadiness to abate them. We can, therefore, profitably discuss the nature of our terms before we are in a position to impose or negotiate them.

Thirdly, our existing war aims, as officially declared, are dangerously vague; this point will be further discussed in a minute. Suffice it to say at this point that they perilously resemble form without content, and that it is highly desirable that the minds of both sets of belligerents and of neutrals should be clarified at the earliest moment. This consideration,

it must frankly be said, is reinforced in the minds of millions here and abroad by a distrust, engendered by the experiences of the last six or seven years of international history, of the British Government's foresight and ability and a haunting fear that the making of the peace, like the conduct of diplomatic negotiations since the departure of Mr. Eden until the outbreak of war, may be carried out by the personal and quasi-dictatorial methods of a Prime Minister backed by a Cabinet as docile as the German people.

It is true that only the Government, with its command of and access to all sources of information, a knowledge of which is necessary to decide on what Leibniz called "compossibles," can formulate in detail the kind of settlement which we would like to see negotiated (incidentally negotiation and the avoidance of any appearance of imposition are obviously essential), but principles are matters which can up to a point be considered without close regard to their translation into the clauses of a treaty. It is of overwhelming importance that those principles should be the subject of public discussion, that every effort should be made to form and to inform public opinion, and that national unity should endure beyond the armistice, or if that is impossible that the purposes to attain which we are at the moment united shall not be betrayed or compromised by weakness, shortsightedness or greed.

Popularly, if indeed not officially, this is a war to end Hitlerism. Is Hitlerism embodied in Hitler, or is Hitler merely the symbol of a doctrine or way of life, a *Weltanschauung* or ideology which must be extirpated or rendered harmless if the world is to be delivered from the nightmare oppression of the last few years? Plainly the end of Hitlerism involves the fall of Hitler and of Hitler's henchmen, including, it may be hoped, such figures as Goering, who has succeeded by *fausse bonhomie* in creating a legend of his own relative moderation. And as we are presumably not going to duplicate our "Hang the Kaiser" ineptitude we must leave it to the German people, or the German army, to deliver themselves from bondage.

But are we really to distinguish between Hitlerism and Nazi-ism—the doctrine of which he has been the prophet and high priest, and of which he will assuredly prove the martyr—a martyr whose blood, for which thousands of victims cry to Heaven, will be the seed of a Nazi church unless the post-war

settlement is reasonable? Are we much clearer in our own minds when we say that we shall fight until we can negotiate with someone, who will presumably have renounced the devil and all his works, in whose word we can trust? We thought, or our elected rulers thought, that they could trust Hitler in face of all evidence to the contrary; trust in his successor or successors must be conditional.

What reason is there, again, to induce us to distinguish between Hitlerism and Mussolini-ism, or Hitlerism and Stalinism? By their works ye shall know them, and Abyssinia and Albania are the equivalent of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, while in the destruction of the latter Russia has participated, just as to-day's victim was present in the rôle of jackal at the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia a year ago. The parallelism at least suggests that there can never be anything better than an armed truce so long as dictators rule over important states of Europe and the supreme issues of war and peace are in the uneasy custody of one man. Perhaps after all it is specious to say that there is no necessary conflict between the democratic and the totalitarian powers. Can we make a real peace with a German Government which is not in some way based on democratic principles?

The official formulation of our war aims in more general terms is not much richer in content: "to redeem Europe from the perpetual and recurring fear of German aggression and enable the peoples of Europe to preserve their independence and their liberties." These words might cover almost anything from the mere elimination of Hitler to the establishment of our old friend collective security. It is as a formula worse in one way than the vaguer "anti-Hitlerism," because it might be twisted by casuistry into one more attempt to render Germany "harmless" and keep her in subjection for generations. We may safely be considered as debarred from adopting any such policy by our assurances to the German people, reiterated in the air by radio and aeroplane, that we are not at war with them but with a system which we believe millions of them to abhor and despise as completely as ourselves. But there is a by no means negligible minority, as can be seen from the correspondence columns of the daily press, who quite honestly—and on a short view reasonably—believe that the war is the final proof of the thesis which can be summarised as "Germans will always be

Germans." It is a thesis which ignores, or is ignorant of, our own measure of responsibility for Hitler—and in particular our readiness to surrender to Hitler's violence what we would not concede to his more democratic predecessors.

The French will be more readily excused for adopting such a standpoint than ourselves, and we may have difficulty in persuading them that the Germans are not, to use Professor Bonn's phrase, a people afflicted with a double dose of original sin. That there are still some who regard the history of the last twenty years as a proof that the Treaty of Versailles and our subsequent administration of it erred only in not being sufficiently harsh, makes it the more urgent that we should know and declare what sort of a world order we would desire to establish after the war, to take the place of the international anarchy which enabled it to break out, and above all to give the German people a worthy place in a Europe with the interests and prosperity of which they can identify themselves wholeheartedly.

The Government, after all, must have its own ideas regarding the measures required to determine this anarchy. Almost up to the last minute before war broke out they emphasised their willingness to consider all outstanding problems with the German Government, if only the latter would forswear aggression and take to negotiation. What were the problems and what were the solutions envisaged by the British Government? Scepticism as to our state of preparedness for a pre-war peace congress is perhaps permissible, and in any case the kind of settlement which reasonable people would have been ready to make with Hitler must in many respects differ from the courageous solutions which will now be required. We cannot go into a peace conference in the frame of mind which quarrels with the manner of Hitler's procedure in Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, but is inclined to condone the substance of his actions by some travesty of such a principle as self-determination. Let us assume that Hitlerism having been overthrown we can treat with a German Government which represents the German people and can command the conditional respect and trust of the civilised world, and examine in the brief outline which space permits the nature of the problems which will confront European statesmanship.

A profitable approach may be to consider the main divisions of the Treaty of Versailles, examine how far its imperfections

are responsible for to-day's catastrophe, and how far amendment is possible. We should be on our guard against the impression which has been subtly produced by German propaganda that the Treaty is the *fons et origo* of European maladies—until appeasement has come to be identified in many minds with the abandonment of the good as well as the bad features of that settlement. In considering the problems involved under three main aspects, political or administrative, territorial, and financial and economic, we must never lose sight of the fact that a peace settlement is an integral whole; the best possible arrangement of territories will be vain if it is accompanied by economic provisions which make existence in those territories a constant struggle against a falling standard of life; the best possible political arrangements for the prevention of war will be vain if there is no attempt to deal with the causes of war or to provide for peaceful change in a dynamic world.

1. The political clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were, in their widest scope, predestined to failure by the defection of the U.S.A. That defection aggravated the effects of the initial error of leaving Germany out in the cold for a period of probation, and hardened the French in their inclination to regard the League as an instrument for the maintenance of the *status quo*. The League failed to protect minorities adequately, to adjust real grievances, or to avert wars. The fault lay with Governments and their representatives rather than with the League system, and it would be defeatism to abandon the high ideals which the Covenant expressed, but for the realisation of which proper machinery was not provided.

Nothing in the history of the last twenty years can logically serve to weaken belief in the indivisibility of peace or the necessity of disarmament, but it should have taught us several lessons which those who have not lost faith in the ultimate reasonableness of human nature would be well to bear in mind when considering peace terms.

Firstly, it goes without saying that disarmament must be general, and proceed *pari passu* with the restoration of confidence; the shadow of Russo-German co-operation should be enough to dispel any idea of one-sided disarmament. Secondly, we shall make no progress unless all Powers, great and small, are prepared to make some sacrifice of sovereignty, and recognise that not a few subjects generally accepted as

within the sole competence of nations, such as tariffs, are potential causes of war. Thirdly, we must construct more effective machinery for the settlement of grievances, be they political or economic. Fourthly and most importantly, we had better conclude that we were too ambitious in 1919, and that we shall fare better if we concentrate on establishing a real League of European nations, without excluding any who wish to share in the benefits of union. If we can unite most of the nations of Europe in some form of federation, however loose, and thus break down the exclusiveness entailed by a multitude of currencies, armies and customs barriers, we shall have gone far to banish the spectre of war from Europe. And if Europe is at peace and prosperous the rest of the world can be trusted to follow the good, as it has followed the bad, example of Western civilisation.

2. The territorial provisions of the Treaty, as Professor Seton-Watson has convincingly argued, were on the whole defensible; they were at any rate based on a principle, and not merely on greed or dynastic aggrandisement. The attempt to make frontier lines correspond roughly with linguistic and racial distribution was honest, and would not improbably have been successful had the Treaty as a whole produced conditions of relative contentment and prosperity. Some compromise with the principle was undoubtedly necessary; it had to be tempered by economic requirements, as in the provision of access to the sea for Poland, and strategic needs, as in the assignment of the Sudetenland to Czecho-Slovakia, or the South Tyrol to Italy. And in a continent where there are innumerable racial and linguistic pockets scattered on both sides of any possible boundaries the principle must be applied with common sense; it is not open to any and every racial minority, any more than it has been to a political minority, to destroy the organic structure of a state by secession. Still less is it open to any nation to claim that it is entitled to incorporate willy-nilly all who speak the same tongue or have some racial affinity.

We must have the courage to apply the same principles again so far as we have the power. We cannot in honour recognise the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia or the partition of Poland, and we should not hesitate in view of recent experience to ensure the political and economic independence of these peoples by assigning them frontiers which do not

strictly correspond with linguistic differences. The Munich "settlement" has been proved impossible. Any hardships involved can be substantially mitigated by a method to which Hitler has subscribed in a much more doubtful case—the transfer of populations, with full compensation for any immovable property.

We cannot honourably take from Germany any part of her own territory, and any underground encouragement of disruptive or separatist movements would lay up a legacy of hatred. But plainly Austria must be given an opportunity to determine, free from any coercion, her relationship to an after-war Germany. Her choice will depend to a great extent on the non-territorial provisions of the new peace Treaty, but by and large there should be two alternatives before her—incorporation in or federation with Germany or independent membership of a wider federation.

3. It is arguable that the economic and financial chapters of the Treaty, both by what they contained and what they omitted, have been mainly responsible for the renewal of European war. The dismemberment of Austro-Hungary cannot be laid at our charge, for it was in fact consummated even before the armistice. We could and should, however, have prevented the Balkanisation of Central Europe by securing, as a condition of recognition, an economic federation of the succession states. In default of that it was mere cruelty and ultimate madness to use our political power to prevent Austria from seeking the next best solution by forming a close association with Germany. Given economic prosperity in the Danube basin, political jealousies and old resentments would have faded into insignificance, and Germany would have been powerless to exact unfair economic terms from her neighbours.

Few will be found in this year of grace to defend the reparation chapter of the Treaty of Versailles, but it may be suspected that there are many who do not yet realise the very real connection between that chapter and Hitlerism. The sense of frustration which Hitler was enabled to exploit was not due to the war guilt clause, nor to the demilitarisation of the Rhineland, nor to the loss of territory, nor to the danger of communism, which competent observers have always dated from the advent of Hitler to power, but to the great depression of 1929 and the following years, and its effect on German economy. That depression was the fairly direct result of

exaggerated reparation claims, of the unwillingness of the world in general and of the U.S.A. and France in particular to allow the payment of political debts by the only possible means, the ready acceptance of exports from the debtor, and finally of the crazily top-heavy structure of international indebtedness and the concentration of gold which inevitably resulted. A hair of the dog that bit them was the only remedy which the statesmen of the civilised world could prescribe—and let it be added the remedy for which labour and industrial interests clamoured. A Pelion was piled on an Ossa of trade restrictions, currency manipulations, quotas and prohibitions. Economic particularism lowered the standard of life in a dozen countries and exacerbated international differences; these differences in their turn promoted a desire for more and more self-sufficiency with a view to security in war, and ever since the vicious circle has continued to turn at an accelerating rate.

We are hardly likely to repeat the grosser errors of that Treaty and make impossible demands on Germany's terribly debilitated economic structure; the rest of the world must, indeed, be prepared to help Germany once again as it did after the Dawes Committee, but this time without taking away with one hand what was given with the other. This does not necessarily debar us from imposing on Germany the duty of making good damage wantonly perpetrated in Poland; it does mean that Poland must accept, as France was unwilling to accept, reparation in German materials and German labour. And it should not debar us from exacting a substantial contribution to the solution of the refugee problem created by Germany, and the maximum of redress for such refugees as have been corruptly despoiled for the enrichment of individuals.

We cannot, however, be content to avoid the repetition of errors committed; we must reconstruct the economic unity of Europe. Those who preached appeasement will have to face its cost—not the cession of gobbets and snippets of our own or other peoples' territory but the reopening of markets and channels of trade, with all the temporary dislocation and sacrifice of vested interests entailed. If we as a people are not ready to make our contribution, by re-establishing the open door in our colonies and consenting to a systematic reduction of tariffs with a view to their ultimate abolition, then we must at least refrain from discouraging the rest of Europe from

treading the path of sanity ; we cannot and ought not to plead the sanctity of the most-favoured-nation clause to frustrate regional and group free trade movements which are as logically defensible as Ottawa.

Are we prepared to make our economic contribution at the peace conference to the prevention of a resurgent Hitlerism, and to the peaceful evolution of the other -isms by encouraging the federation of Europe ? If not, have we prepared ourselves, as we must eventually, to withdraw from Europe and have no responsibility for or share in its prosperity ? Will we admit the possibility that Hitler's violent economic integration of Central Europe, carried out by foul methods and for unworthy purposes, might yet in the long run have achieved something without which anarchy will persist ?

Somewhere in Herodotus it is observed that the tragedy of war is that it calls upon fathers to bury their sons. Sons will fall in this war whose fathers have lain for twenty years in the fields of Flanders. They died to make the world safe for democracy ; can we, the men of fifty to seventy, claim with a clear conscience to have kept faith with those who died ? "To make the world safe for democracy," to wage "a war to end war," or "to enable the peoples of Europe to preserve their independence and their liberties" are noble tasks, but their accomplishment depends on the vision, imagination and liberalism of those who survive the ordeal of war to make and administer the peace.

ANDREW MCFADYEAN.

THE WAR BUDGET.

PROSPECTS of peace were dwindling fast and expenditure on Defence was mounting rapidly when Sir John Simon opened his Budget at the end of April. I described that Budget, with its unparalleled deficit and its unparalleled expenditure on armaments, as a Defence Budget of such magnitude that, unless a peaceful solution of the European crisis can be found, British capital and labour will before long be conscripted in peace time, "and all our ideas about standards of living and comforts of life will have to be revised downwards." Since then we have had military and civil conscription, compulsory billeting on private houses, a new D.O.R.A., a new bureaucracy and a War Budget.

But even after the war broke out few men guessed what sacrifices would be called for at its very commencement. On September 27th, as I entered the inner Lobby of the House of Commons before taking my seat in the Gallery, I met a veteran M.P. who murmured in my ear : "I suppose it will be sixpence on the income tax." I replied : "It ought to be eighteenpence." It proved to be more. After hearing the Financial Statement and returning to the Lobby I came across an ex-Minister. We agreed that it was a first-rate Budget, simply framed and plainly stated, skilfully devised, fairly apportioned as regards burdens imposed and highly effective as an instrument of revenue.

I am under no illusions as to the nature and extent of the financial and economic disasters in which our country and the British Commonwealth of Nations may be involved by this second war with Germany. Indeed if it were to take three or four years to achieve a victory as overwhelming as that of 1918, I cannot doubt that all large fortunes would be confiscated, that most of the small savings of the people would disappear and that the social services would be wrecked. We have not come to that yet, and there is good reason for thinking that in a war of exhaustion Germany will be the first to go down, possibly in a red revolution like that which took Russia out of the war in 1917. But whatever our views on the probable length of the war, we ought to hail this first war Budget as an invaluable contribution not only to the urgent needs of the Treasury but to a sober understanding of realities and to a nation-wide recognition

that all public waste, central and local, should be cut down.

During the Budget debates a private member of the House congratulated the Chancellor "on the clarity of his Budget statement" and also on his "courage and boldness," especially "in the extra taxation which he is very rightly asking the country to bear." No public man in my time has equalled Sir John Simon in the art of exposition. It comes naturally to him. As I listened to his Financial Statement, I called to mind how we sat together long ago at the Scholars' table in the hall of Wadham College, with F. E. Smith and C. B. Fry, and how in the debates of the Union Society my old friend developed that wonderful power of clear, orderly and logical argument with which Parliament is now familiar. If on that afternoon in September he had not made the needs of the Treasury and the vastness of the expenditure quite plain before presenting his scheme of taxation, he might not have been able to carry the House with him. Here in a condensed form is his preliminary survey :

In the April Budget, he told us, the total estimated expenditure for the current financial year was £1,322 millions, of which £630 millions, rather less than half, was to be spent on Defence. The Chancellor expected to raise £942 millions by taxation and £380 millions by borrowing. But the cost of armaments went on increasing until, towards the end of July, when the Finance Act incorporating the Budget was passed, another £100 millions had been added to the estimated expenditure on armaments, and the amount to be borrowed in order to cover the deficit between revenue and expenditure rose consequently to £480 millions, or, as he thought likely, to a round figure of £500 millions. When Parliament rose in August, the total expenditure authorised for the year was actually £1,453 millions, of which £502 millions were to be borrowed. That, of course, was on the theory that we should remain at peace throughout the year.

"But on September 3rd we found ourselves at war, and a Vote of Credit for an additional 500 millions was promptly proposed and adopted. I must tell the Committee that I cannot guarantee that this first Vote of Credit will be sufficient to cover all our requirements up to March 31st; but even if it is sufficient, the need for a further Budget, as promptly as possible, is self evident since we shall be facing in this financial year a total outlay of nearly 2,000 millions."

Further, as a result of war, the revenue from existing taxes

would be diminished and the April estimate must be revised downwards from 942 millions to 890 millions. These were the main features of revenue and expenditure on which he had framed his proposals for additional taxation. Thus of this year's total estimated expenditure of 2,000 millions, 1,230 millions are to be spent on war and armaments (including all the extravagances of the A.R.P.) and 770 millions on debt charges, social services and the various civil departments of Government.

Before coming to his actual proposals, the Chancellor paused to dwell on the frightful scale of destructiveness which makes modern war "the most potent instrument for the destruction of human wealth." Even since the end of the Great War the increase of mechanisation has added enormously to the cost. The modern types of aeroplanes, for example, are incomparably more complex and costly than those which were being manufactured in 1918. "Broadly speaking a modern aircraft costs from three to seven times more than a comparable type in 1918, and of course maintenance and replacement costs have increased in proportion." Then as regards the army a division in the field now costs nearly twice as much to equip and maintain as it did then, while in the case of the navy, owing to their much more complicated equipment "ships of comparable tonnage now cost two or three times as much as they did in 1914."

Milton in one of his finest sonnets praises Sir Henry Vane because, though young in years, he knew not only civil wisdom, but also :

how war may best be upheld
Mann'd by her two main nerves, iron and gold,
In all her equipage.

Sir John Simon said in prose : "Finance, as has been sometimes said, is the fourth arm of Defence—no less than the other three; for if finance failed, then the prop that sustains the whole of our war effort would collapse." He took the right view of finance as covering the whole political economy of war. It includes the problem of maintaining national production for the export trade as well as for the home market. Upon this the national income, the national revenue, the value of our currency and our very existence depend.

In these circumstances it was evident—so the Chancellor proceeded—that the largest possible amount of revenue

from new taxes must be gathered in by an Emergency Budget which would "call for severe sacrifices." Starting with the income tax at the standard rate of 5s. 6d. in the pound, with allowances and abatements at the lower end of the scale and a graduated surtax at the other end, he proposed "a new curve (based on a standard rate of 7s. 6d.) which would secure increasing contributions from direct taxation all along the line." This steadily ascending curve starts by taking a tiny proportion from the smallest of the incomes which are subjected to income tax. Our income tax code makes the actual rate of charge on the total incomes of individuals—distinguishing earned from unearned incomes—mount in a steadily ascending curve until it takes by far the greater proportion of the largest incomes.

It may be said that the tax-gatherer cannot take more than one's income; and if all incomes could be taxed directly in proportion to ability, a Chancellor of the Exchequer might be content with this single tax. But the cost and difficulty of taxing people with an income of two pounds a week or less (unless it is derived from investments which are taxed at the source) have always been regarded as prohibitive. Two further considerations have guided our public finance. The first was, and is, that certain luxuries should be taxed by means of Customs and Excise Duties. Those on intoxicating liquors and tobacco have always yielded a large proportion of the revenue, and have invariably been raised in war time. The other consideration is that a graduated tax on estates passing at death may fairly be levied as a complement to the income tax. The Death Duties were introduced by Sir William Harcourt for that purpose in Gladstone's last Administration. Harcourt once told me that in his judgment the income tax was our main reserve against war and ought therefore to be at a low rate in time of peace. He regretted having raised it as high as 8d. in the pound; it was to avoid a higher rate that he had introduced the Death Duties to finance a battleship programme.

When the Great War broke out, the standard rate of income tax was 1s. 3d. in the pound and a small super-tax had already been introduced on large incomes. After the war the rate was 6s. It was slowly reduced to 4s., but it was Sir John Simon's misfortune that he had to set out from a standard rate of 5s. 6d., rising to nearly 14s. on the

highest incomes. With such a scale, or rather with such a curve to start from, it would not have been surprising if he had been content to raise the standard rate to the highest point it had ever reached before, namely, 6s. in the pound. But with the national debt higher than it stood at the end of the last war and the possibility of a three years' war in prospect, he proposed a standard rate of 7s. for the current year and of 7s. 6d. for next year. But as the war, the war controls and the black-out have ruined thousands of business and professional men besides reducing the incomes of thousands more, the Chancellor is mitigating the severity of the increased tax in such cases by providing that anyone whose income has fallen off by 20 per cent. may substitute this year's actual income for last year's as the basis. Those who pay less than the standard rate will have to contribute more through a reduction in earned income allowance, in marriage allowance and in the allowance for children. On the upper reaches the war Budget imposes new surtax scales rising from 1s. 3d. at £2,000 to 9s. 6d. for slices of income over £30,000. So that on these slices of income millionaires will pay over 16s. in the pound.*

These, as he said, are "fierce" increases; but the estimates of increased revenue are more than satisfactory; for the changes in income tax are expected to yield 70 millions this year and 146 millions in a full year, while the addition to surtax is to yield 5 millions this year and 8 millions in a full year. An addition of 10 per cent. to the Death Duties on all estates exceeding £10,000 is estimated to yield £1,500,000 this year and 6 millions in a full year. The last of the additions to direct taxation is to be an excess profits tax of 60 per cent. "on any excess of the profits of any trades or businesses

* Though the additions to income tax and surtax are very severe I do not want readers of this article to derive the impression that our financial reserve of income tax is exhausted by a 7s. 6d. rate. If one looks at the official tables one sees that a bachelor who gets all his income from investments does not pay the full 7s. 6d. rate until his income reaches £3,000. If his income is £1,000 a year and it is all earned, he pays less than 5s., and if it all comes from investments he pays just over 6s. This is because no tax is levied on the first £120 of incomes. Again, a man with £500 a year drawn entirely from earnings, who is married and has two children, is only paying 5½d. in the pound this year, and will only be paying 1s. 1d. in the pound next year, though if his income of £500 is all from investments he has to pay 1s. 6½d. this year and 2s. 3½d. next year. Finally one may take the case of a millionaire who has to pay not only the 7s. 6d. standard rate of income tax but also the 9s. 6d. surtax charge. Even he will pay next year not 17s. but 16s. 5½d. in the pound. The surtax charge is applied in "slices." Only the slice above £30,000 pays 9s. 6d.

since March 31st over their profits for a pre-war standard." As it will take time to get the machinery of assessment and collection into order this tax is not likely to produce much revenue in the current year. The question whether additions to the capital wealth of individuals during the war can be taxed by a levy is also being studied—and rightly; for at the end of the last war many new fortunes had been made, reaped as it were from the losses and miseries of the nation. No one ought to be richer after a war than when it began.

In regard to indirect taxation the difficulty of getting more revenue is also much greater than it was in the last war, owing to the law of diminishing returns for taxes on consumption. Nevertheless more is to be extracted:

An addition to the beer duty, equivalent to another 1d. per pint, is expected to yield 11 millions this year and 27 millions in a full year, while an increase of 10s. per proof gallon to spirits is to yield 2 millions this year and 3½ millions in a full year. An addition of 2s. per gallon on imported light wines and British wines and 4s. per gallon on imported heavy wines is to yield a million this year and about 2 millions in a full year.

It has been necessary to get the consent of the French Government to agree to the additional duties on champagne and brandy. What a pity that this opportunity was not seized to introduce reciprocity if not free trade in the necessities and conveniences of life such as coal, fruit, vegetables and clothing with our neighbours and allies across the Channel! Such an arrangement would have given a powerful stimulus to our export trade. In the last war we had the great advantage of starting on a free trade basis; it was only by degrees that controls or restrictions stifled and smothered (as they are now doing) our overseas commerce.

The tobacco duty was raised in April from 9s. 6d. to 11s. 6d. per lb., which represents, I dare say, on an average, four times the market price of tobacco. The war Budget raises this by another 2s. per lb., or 1½d. per oz. The additional yield from the tobacco duty is estimated at 8 millions for the current year and 16 millions in a full year.

As those who do not smoke or touch intoxicants and pay no income tax would not contribute to the war Budget, the Chancellor made one more addition to indirect taxation by adding 1d. per lb. to the sugar duty, which addition is estimated to bring in about £8,500,000 this year and 18

millions in a full year. Though the addition to the sugar duty was opposed by the Labour Party and is certainly open to strong objections, as it raises the price of an essential food and an important raw material, the Government carried the day, and the whole Budget has been put through in its entirety—a wonderful triumph for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and a remarkable tribute to the determination of the House of Commons.

In his concluding observations the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that his Budget would demonstrate to the country the "gravity of the financial and industrial problem involved in the waging of the war"; but he found some comfort by comparing the infinitely greater financial problem that confronts Germany. Of this he gave one illustration. The pound sterling remains an accepted medium of international trade, and the official rates of exchange with neutral countries are published daily. But even before the war the official rates of exchange for the German mark meant nothing. There were over fifty different kinds of marks with differing degrees of depreciation. At present, he said, "the German mark has no position as an international currency and is likely to lose rapidly its value as an internal currency."

If the tax proposals of the Budget were received with the resigned satisfaction that attends sacrifices in the performance of a patriotic duty, there was unanimous approval (at any rate on the ministerial benches) at the announcement that the additional revenue to be derived from taxes is to be accompanied by retrenchment of unnecessary expenditure:

"I do not feel that I should be at all completing the discharge of my duty as Chancellor of the Exchequer if on this occasion I limited myself to proposing greatly increased burdens on my fellow countrymen. It is equally my duty to call for the most determined efforts alike in public and private expenditure to search out means to avoid wasteful outlay. . . . In the various public departments—in public expenditure here at the centre and in local government expenditure too—while we are waging war against the enemy abroad let us also wage war against waste at home."

Special appointments have been made to prevent waste by the Air Ministry and by the Ministry of Supply which furnishes the Army. It is also the Government's intention, said the Chancellor, to reconsider and review the expenditure of the A.R.P. including

that of local authorities. Moreover "the Treasury is sending special and stringent instructions to all Departments to avoid unnecessary expenditure in every sphere. . . . Any well supported complaint of waste or unnecessary expenditure will be promptly investigated and dealt with."

One is glad to hear that the Government is paying attention to the monstrous staffs of the new bureaucracy, whose mushroom growth has caused general disgust and dismay. Here again I would refer to the Budget statement :

Throughout the war we must bend our energies to the utmost to promote our export trade. Its maintenance and extension are vital to the successful prosecution of the war in order that we may earn the means to purchase across the seas those essential materials and goods, including foodstuffs, which we cannot produce or make ourselves.

But many of the controls have played havoc with trade, and the Ministers responsible, who have signed the decrees creating them, seem slow to recognise the mischief that has been done and the need for a reversal of this policy if our exports to neutral countries are to be maintained, much less extended. The case of the Fish Controller, appointed by Mr. W. S. Morrison, provides a startling example. He began by closing the Billingsgate Market. Having thus thrown the whole distribution of fish into confusion, causing the loss of many thousands of pounds and great quantities of food, he retreated with his staff to Oxford and quartered himself in St. John's College, which has been nicknamed "Fish and Chips," as the Potato Controller is also snugly entrenched there! The Fish Control has been disestablished and dis-endowed; Billingsgate has been reopened, and fish is again reasonably cheap and plentiful. But will this glaring case be taken to heart by the Cabinet?

Wool control has been established in what a Yorkshire newspaper has described as a "sylvan retreat," whence it dictates to merchants, woolcombers, spinners and manufacturers. Artificial prices have created chaos, and up to the time of writing export licences have been subjected to grievous delays. Apparently the experience of the last war has served not as a warning but as an encouragement to Totalitarianism.

F. W. HIRST.

THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF GERMANY.

IT is easier to forecast Germany's economic future than to guess at the kind of government which could replace Nazism. For the economic structure of a country survives political revolutions and does not disappear completely in a revolutionary social upheaval. The economic structure of Nazi Germany is the fairly logical development of pre-Nazi economic trends. Capitalism (in the Western sense of the term) never dominated in Germany; such as it was it died from the combined shock of the war, inflation and the great depression—notwithstanding an interlude of big business domination; planning and planned economy originated in Germany at the close of the war—not in Soviet Russia. It might best be described in racing parlance as an off-spring of Karl Marx out of Dora, whilst the social system prevailing in Germany at the outbreak of the present war might be called "barrack-room socialism."

The Nazi economic programme combined middle-class resentment against "big money" with emotional collectivism. It declaimed against "trusts," big estates and department stores; it glorified physical labour and decried intellectualism. It expressed the genuine sentiments of divergent groups, very skilfully blended for propaganda purposes. For Hitler, who in those days described himself as a mere drummer, was not interested in economic realities apart from propaganda value. For this reason he readily fell in with Gottfried Feder's distinction between creative and acquisitive capital, the former being exclusively Nordic, the latter mainly non-Aryan. But economics frankly bored him, for he and his immediate entourage were mainly politically minded: those who held power, namely could shoot their adversaries, could always get cash, those who held cash might be able to buy power, if power did not prefer to despoil them first. Big business and the landed interest who put Nazism into office were slow to learn the truth of these primitive but very practical conceptions; for they retained economic control. No prominent Nazi got a key position in economic administration, with the exception perhaps of agriculture, and the party's socialist programme was held in abeyance; no confiscation took place, except of Jewish property, and even here it was camouflaged. For quite a considerable period

business, big and small, made large profits, as usually happens in the earlier phases of a huge credit expansion ; even Jewish concerns prospered. The large estates were not touched, not because the Nazis sympathised with the Junkers, but because their agrarian policy was based on rather romantic conceptions of the sanctity of real estate property. Farmers' freeholds were to be transformed into a kind of peasants' entails, which could neither be sold nor mortgaged nor divided among several heirs, provided their owners could prove Aryan descent. The splitting up of large estates was planned and the work of the Weimar Republic in cutting them up was continued. But land purchase for close settlement was purely voluntary, and the total amount secured was very modest. Grandiose schemes for the plantation of German farmers' families were advertised, for brothers and sisters of the newly created hereditary holders had either to become their servants or migrate to the towns, or look out for new holdings, to be carved from the large estates in the comparatively "empty East." Their owners were to be compensated by land grants across the borders in the Slav countries, where they were to lord it over their newly conquered subjects—especially in the Ukraine—and slowly lead them in the ways of cultured German efficiency. But these schemes remained schemes. The large estates produced the surplus needed by the towns and the army, and the settlement of a free yeomanry would be a costly affair which could not yet be indulged in by an impetuous government, spending all surplus reserves for military preparations. Private property, so it seemed, was secure. The Nazis after all posed as the defenders of the West against Communism. Notwithstanding its apparent disinclination for open socialisation, Nazism thoroughly collectivised German economics.

Nazism had taken over from its predecessors a system of exchange control, the main object of which had been the maintenance of the internal stability of the German mark. Germany could not discharge her heavy foreign debts and pay for her imports except by devaluation or wholesale bankruptcy. Devaluation would merely have increased her burdens, for most of the 1½ milliard sterling foreign debts were in foreign currencies ; it would have involved internal inflation, which no German régime dared to face. Exchange control provided a convenient cloak for bankruptcy by

avoiding downright repudiation. For debtors paid in full in their national currency which was not depreciated at home, but which could not be transferred abroad except under such a heavy discount that creditors might prefer to re-loan their assets rather than have them transmitted. Exchange control provided Germany with forced loans at the expense of her foreign creditors. But it did very much more : it enabled her government to control the entry and the exit of all goods, services and claims, and to develop by and by a complete system of supervision of all business, which was in any way directly or indirectly connected with foreign countries. It isolated Germany and the German price level from external markets and foreign price levels, whilst her government could at the same time keep up such contacts abroad as it considered desirable. It secured foreign markets for it by the sale of blocked marks, which were of little value in international trade, but retained their full purchasing power in the German markets ; many countries were compelled to become Germany's unwilling creditors, since their claims could not be settled except by the purchase of German goods whenever they were available. Exchange control served the double purpose a planned economy must aim at : isolation from foreign price levels and manipulation of home production and internal prices. Under its sway Nazi Germany managed to undergo a huge credit expansion, which had little influence on the price levels.

An even more powerful agent for collectivisation was the Nazi government's policy of public works. It came in just after the bottom of the great depression had been reached ; in fact the up-swing would have started earlier had not the uncertainties of impending revolution held it back. It resolutely tackled the problem of unemployment by a policy of spending on public works. It copied and very skilfully refined the methods by which Imperial Germany had financed the war : i.e. the issue of treasury bills which were taken up by the banks and could be rediscounted by the central bank, which used them as note cover. From time to time these outstanding bills were converted into funded loans, whenever credit expansion had served its purpose and had inflated monetary incomes. The Nazis employed idle hands and idle plants on unproductive public works ; they raised a floating debt by a well-designed system of faked commercial bills, which were regularly

converted into funded loans. Pre-Nazi Germany had had a small internal public debt ; it now rapidly increased. But the large spendings made the national money income rise proportionately faster than the annual national debt charge. The Nazis assumed that the country could easily bear a dead-weight debt of 100 milliard marks ; if they could but inflate national income from 40 milliards to, let us say, 80 milliards, the deduction of $4\frac{1}{2}$ milliards annual interest payments from these 80 milliards would still leave them with 35 milliards to the good.

These financial operations made the State the central purchaser, directly or indirectly, of the nation's output, and enabled it to eliminate undesirable concerns—Jewish firms for example—and to direct capital investments. It was faced with one great problem : it must control prices, otherwise the fear of inflation might be aroused. Minimum prices were established to protect farmers from world competition ; in various industries rationalisation was banned, in order to stop a decline of prices.

By and by maximum prices became far more important. The resumption of armaments speeded up expenditure on a colossal scale. They represent an ideal type of public works. They are non-competitive, thoroughly unproductive and quickly obsolescent. There is no limit to their expansion—except the strain on public finance. Under their pressure the demands on the German productive apparatus increased enormously. It had to provide an export surplus for payment of indispensable imports and to provide at the same time a surplus beyond current home consumption ; from this the huge plants were constructed, the produce of which was to make Germany self-sufficient. Since Germany's costs of production were high, exports had to be subsidised at the expense of home consumers ; autarchy raised such costs considerably, for it implied an increased production of national goods under most unfavourable conditions. Armaments and autarchy would have given an upward swing to the price level even if credit expansion had not been at work. In order to stop it, capital remuneration, fixed interest as well as dividends, was cut down. Since the accumulation and the direction of investments was regulated and capital flight was punished as high treason, evasion was difficult. Similarly wages were fixed and not allowed to rise. When certain raw

materials became scarce, rationing, permits and priorities were introduced and the flow of industrial life was manipulated. Middlemen's profits were eliminated, small traders and artisans were deliberately squeezed out and forced to enter the labour market—the class which had formed the main support of the Nazi régime was sacrificed to military exigencies. Though money wages remained stable, real wages declined, not so much on account of rising costs of living, but through the deterioration of quality (substitutes), the non-delivery of rationed goods and an extension of the working day. Even before the outbreak of hostilities German economy was a war economy. The government regulated production, directly or indirectly ; it divided consumption into four parts : export, military needs, civil needs, reserve stocks. Land and capital remained private property, but their use, their remuneration and the spending of that remuneration were controlled. Labour was no longer free ; it could be removed at the will of the authorities. The outbreak of war has increased demand and with it the strain on supply, especially on man-power, which neither labour conscription nor (unwilling) prisoners of war can completely satisfy ; the repatriation of the Baltic Germans may perhaps ease it, though few of them are manual workers. Rationing has become universal and financing must be reckless. Germany has become one huge barrack, in which all activities, civil as well as military, are regimented.

It is impossible to foretell the economic outcome of the war, but certain features are by now quite clear.

1. The war is sure to deplete Germany's physical resources. Neither accumulated reserves nor current production will suffice for it ; it can only be carried on by omitting replacement of wastage, by picking the eyes of mines, by exhausting soils, by neglecting repairs—even now the railways have been allowed to run down below their proper standards. If the war lasts long enough, Germany's physical plant will be greatly deteriorated, and the efficiency of her man-power will suffer. Recovery is only possible by maintaining for a lengthy period a very low standard of living, so as to secure a surplus for home investments or for exports.

2. The war will have to be financed by a system of requisitioning, which is more or less carefully camouflaged by an intricate system of borrowing. Most of it will have to be done

by some sort of treasury bills, which may or may not be converted into funded loans. Finally the government will be heavily indebted to those individuals and institutions who hold its long-term or short-term obligations or its banknotes. It has either to devalue these loans or make its taxpayers responsible for them. There will be some inflation, but not enough to wipe out this debt. Recourse will have to be had to some sort of a capital levy. Small holders of government bonds and of other forms of property may be let off easily, the richer ones will have to pay heavily. Roughly speaking a debt of 100 milliard marks might be cut down to 50 milliards by a 50 per cent. capital levy on it; the remaining 50 milliards could be wiped out by a capital levy on other personal and real estates. Bondholders might be asked to hand over a large percentage of their holdings. The inflated value of real estate and of equities due to inflation will be confiscated, as well as the profits made by debtors at the expense of their creditors. Government moreover will requisition a part of the share capital and have mortgages registered in its favour on lands and other property to about 50 per cent. of their value. Instead of sharing the nation's income through taxation, it will socialise its capital and become the owner of half of its property. Plans of this sort were outlined at the beginning of the Weimar Republic; they were never carried out; big business was very powerful in those days and inflation had not yet been tried. Given the tendencies prevailing in Nazi Germany a huge capital confiscation seems inevitable, and with it another step towards collectivism.

3. Whilst devaluation of some sort cannot be avoided, it will not suffice to help Germany to get access to the world markets. She has deliberately created an economic system, in agriculture and in many key industries, which is top-heavy; it is based on the utilisation of extremely expensive national factors of production, such as poor soils and poor ores. Even cheap labour will not allow her to produce cheaply since expenditure for replacing her worn-out plants must be very great. This will of necessity make for continued control and regimentation. As capital can only be accumulated quickly by keeping down consumption, labour will be required to work overtime, but the state, not private *entrepreneurs*, will benefit from its exploitation. Since the number of small *entrepreneurs*

has been greatly diminished by Nazi policy, the support for a system of private capitalism is reduced.

4. Germany's desire for autarchy has failed: she depends on foreign supplies to a very considerable degree. She can only get them by export, for she has neither negotiable foreign assets nor can she get substantial loans. Even if she were to get some from Russia this would merely imply the obligation to furnish later on certain quantities of goods, not mere money payments, without return payments, on which default is not easy. Germany needs additional protected markets where she can exchange the high-cost products of her over-expanded industries against additional raw materials.

5. The territorial expansion which she desired is not likely to take place. Even if she were not defeated, Russia blocks the way to the Balkans and the Baltic. If she were allowed to keep Western Poland, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, none of her fundamental problems would be solved; though the former province of Posnan is rich in agricultural products and Upper Silesia in minerals. The incorporation of 30 million Slavs within the German economic body might provide cheap labour; but as Nazi imperialism is exclusive and cannot assimilate alien populations it might merely reduce standards of living. Repatriation is expensive, it does moreover not increase Germany's natural territorial resources. A Central European Customs Union, which should have been the aim of constructive German policy, cannot be achieved by ruthless subjugation; "Mittel-Europa" cannot be accomplished by Nazi methods.

6. Whether Germany will stick to barrack-room socialism or turn communist will depend on her agrarian structure. The majority of her 5 million freehold farmers are hard-boiled individualists and not prepared to accept "collectivisation" of farms. The old generation of German working men, who had saved the Republic several times from Bolshevism long before the advent of Hitler, may still hold to their faith. But a long war is sure to proletarianise the masses, and to speed up the general levelling-down which Nazism has already accomplished. The vicinity of Russia to the thinly settled agrarian German East with its semi-feudal conditions may open the door to Bolshevism. There may no longer be an opportunity for settling large estates with German hereditary freeholders, for compensation in the

Ukraine and elsewhere is no longer to be had. And an impoverished Germany can scarcely pay compensation in good cash and defray the heavy expenses of close settlement on a large scale. It is far cheaper to confiscate the land and run it by labour gangs as collectives. The Bolshevisation of Soviet-Poland is bound to affect Western Poland and the neighbouring districts of East Prussia. Were the Nazi régime to survive the war it might be inclined to imitate its new-found Russian friend and settle a problem at the cost of a class it never liked. Its disappearance on the other hand will leave a *damnosa hereditas*. Its successors may be unable to repopulate the rural areas—over 700,000 people have left them since Nazism came in. It has not spread German land ownership into the Ukraine, it was filling up the vacuum on the German great estates with Czechs and Polish labourers. It is not germanising the Slavic East, but slavicising Eastern Germany, as repatriation schemes are one-sided withdrawals, not reciprocal exchanges. It has led to a revival of Pan-Slavism, streaked with Bolshevik doctrines.

The social structure of other parts of Germany may be solid enough to withstand the Bolshevik impact. German capitalism is however doomed. It was always semi-feudal and semi-collectivist. Many years ago I concluded a study of its particular features with the words: "Truly the fate of German capitalism lies in feeble hands." They helped to deliver the country to Nazism, but they will not be strong enough to liquidate it and to revive anything resembling a free economic system. If the war does not end in a murderous social revolution the future structure of Germany will at best be a kind of regimented socialism, such as Fichte, who was half a Nazi, outlined it in his *Closed Commercial State* over a hundred years ago.

M. J. BONN.

ITALY AND THE WAR.

WHATEVER interpretation be given to the declaration of neutrality made by the Fascist Government on the outbreak of war, it has been received with keen satisfaction in Italy and outside her borders. To be sure, the neutrality of a State in time of war is primarily shaped by the State in question, and may admit of various degrees and many *sous-entendus*. What counts is that a neutral State as such takes no direct part in the war, either with its armed forces or with its money or by supplying armaments. As for political favours or indirect aids to one or other of the belligerents, or even to both in varying measure, it is not easy to define the limits of neutrality, and this may lead to disputes between belligerents and neutrals.

The Italian neutrality, like that of other countries, must stand this test of the assent or tolerance of the warring States. Facts will show how far the conduct of Italy may deserve criticism or appreciation on the part of the Allies. At bottom what matters to-day is not the petty detail of a neutrality holding more or less a middle course between Anglo-French and Germans, but the ulterior decision whether to enter the war and on which side or to remain neutral till the end of the present conflict.

Only a few days after the outbreak of war, *Regime Fascista*, one of the extremist papers favourable to Germany, wrote as follows:

Italy will keep faith with her engagements, naturally, in the measure of her interests, which are above any other consideration and on which the Government keeps its eyes fixed as on a polar star, on the basis of which it firmly holds the helm of the national ship.

This affirmation has been several times repeated by the various papers and by the Government itself, and up till now it seems the guiding line of Fascist policy. Mussolini in his speech of September 23rd declared:

Our policy was fixed by the declaration of September 1st, and there is no reason to make any change. It corresponds to our national interest, our agreements and our political pacts as well as to the desire of all nations, including Germany, who aimed at localising the conflict.

rule mankind and especially the peoples of Christian civilisation.

Without wishing to set ourselves against or above the Government responsible, let us, for the purposes of study, consider the real interests of Italy in the present situation. This war, like all wars, will sooner or later come to its conclusion—a conclusion either wholly favourable to the Allies, as we hope, or wholly favourable to Germany, or a solution the result of exhaustion and compromise. Let us get rid of the third hypothesis, which would become possible only in so far as Italy remained neutral, waiting for those adjustments to be sought from one side or the other, on terms of mutual advantage, by bringing to bear her intact military position. The hypothesis does not seem to us probable, but it throws a light on the waiting position which Italy might adopt, seeking a compromise between the pacts of the Axis, her own interests, and the justice of the cause of the Allies.

The word justice, in this contest, may annoy those who do not believe in the justice of any cause, still less in that of the Allies, or who believe it not worth while to trouble about justice. But we cannot omit to speak of it, in view of the treacherous aggression against Poland and her occupation by hostile armies, German and Russian. Who can think that Italy, for whom a love of Poland finds place in her noblest and oldest traditions, now that that unfortunate country is overrun, would prepare to sanction its renewed disappearance from the map of Europe, and to draw profit from such a crime ?*

The other hypothesis is still graver, implying an Italy on the side of Germany (and also of Russia) against the Allies. The Fascist Government would not take such a step save in the certainty of a complete victory for the three totalitarian Dictatorships over Western Democracies. But although in such an event Italy would have her share of booty in the Mediterranean and in the colonies, she would not be able to compete with Germany, nor with Russia. The former would become the one true hegemonic power in Europe and beyond. Russia would have her advantages in Asia and in the Balkans

* The sentence in Mussolini's speech of September 23rd in regard to the "liquidation" of Poland does not correspond to the feeling of the Italians or to their traditions. The Pope's words to the Poles on September 30th interpreted the deep feelings of the Italians and of Catholics throughout the world.

(besides those already gained in Poland and the Baltic States), and Italy would be left to play second fiddle, her whole policy, foreign, domestic, colonial, financial and cultural, subservient to the German conqueror. Can anyone doubt that this would be the outcome? No one but the ignorant or the deluded; never a man of foresight or even of intellectual integrity.

If this is a pleasing prospect, another problem would present itself—that of a servitude deliberately accepted, in contrast to the case of Poland and other defeated countries on which servitude has been imposed. The latter alone will allow the ripening of the great and generous revolts, the restoration of free and independent countries; the other servitude would mean an abasement of spirit and a betrayal of the true interests of the country. And hence we refuse to think that responsible men could accept such a prospect as favourable to Italy.

There is the third hypothesis, which to us is far more probable: an Anglo-Franco-Polish victory. Italy will then be able to choose either a friendship re-welded by her conduct during the war, or the mistrust created by an ambiguous attitude, doubled by a political system opposed to that of the victorious countries. This dilemma is bound up with a vision of post-war times, which cannot be fixed at this juncture but of which, in general lines, we must catch at least a glimpse and which must enter into war plans and be placed in the scales of the future. Those who envisage the fates of peoples in function of their material power, forgetting or minimising the weight of moral values, must not deceive themselves. Such values in the end decide the issue. Material power moves ponderously and is still more ponderous to move; there must always be a spiritual impulse. If this impulse is based on falsehood it will fail at the test; if it is based on truth it will achieve its effect.

Two tragic experiences of totalitarianism weigh upon the peoples, the Nazi and the Bolshevik. It was an illusion into which many fell to see in Nazism a lightning conductor against Bolshevism. One is as bad as the other in the oppression of individual rights, of the freedom of peoples, of the Christian faith, and in the enslavement of all human activities to the ends of the State Moloch. We have seen to-day what the Anti-Comintern Pact and the world campaign against Bolshevism were worth. But even if Russia and Germany had not signed the *pactum sceleris*, the experience of over

twenty years made plain what were the aims and methods of Moscow and how closely they resembled Nazism. The idea of a Bolshevism the paradise of labour is as false as that of a Nazism as the guarantee of capital. The Western democracies fell into this error, and to-day they are paying dearly for it.

But it is for this reason that the more far-seeing feel the urgent need of combining the war of arms with a war of ideas, establishing that the war is being fought not for material dominion but for moral values that must be safeguarded and brought to realisation when the war is over—respect for human personality, individual and collective, defence of freedom, the guarantee of the independence of those States that are small, weak or exposed to the oppression of others, the protection of labour and of its social value against all forms of exploitation, economic and political. The intention to remake European unity with a strong and permanent organisation must be placed above the egoisms which have betrayed the Europe of the last twenty years. In 1914 it was said that the war was fought to end war. To-day it should be said that the war is being fought for European Federation. The international problem of Europe is the issue at stake: either federation, or else the hegemony of Nazism allied with Bolshevism.

Will Italy after the victory of the Allies be able to oppose a refusal to the reconstruction of Europe based on the principles of freedom and justice? Will she perchance be able to hinder a revival of the moral and political values of the best European and Christian tradition? Assuredly not. If she is not involved with Hitler (as we hope) she would have to co-operate with all her efficacy in the restoration of Europe. It is impossible to say now what will be the Italian position when that time comes, but there must be no illusions. The repercussion of an allied victory will be immense throughout the world, and Italy will not be able to escape the fascination of such an event. From all the battlefields will arise the colossal forces of a humanity rent by long war, and from all the corners of the earth the immortal principles of justice, freedom and peace will be proclaimed.

Within this idealistic vision practical post-war problems will present themselves to all. Let us see what might be those of Italy in the hypothesis of an allied victory. It is certain that no victory can change physical geography, still less

economic geography, and when political geography is at the expense of real interests it collapses. The problems of the Italy of to-morrow will be more or less the same as those of yesterday, the problem of the Danube and the Balkans, the problem of the Mediterranean and Africa.

After the Great War, the present writer in the name of the Italian Popular Party upheld the thesis that Italy, having achieved her aspirations with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, should become the bulwark of the system represented by the succession States, promoting an economic union and political understandings both in the Danube basin and among the Balkans.* The difficulties in the way of the realisation of such a plan came from various sides, through incomprehensions, political jealousies, uncertain economic situations, till on Mussolini's advent to power he directed his policy against Yugo-Slavia for the sake of Fiume, against the Little Entente for the sake of his policy with Austria and Hungary, finally abandoning the field to Hitler in the whole Danube zone, without any serious gains in the Balkans. To-day that Italy is obliged to review her policy in view of the war and in view still more of what will come after, she must examine the very problem of twenty years ago and decide whether there will be room for her on the Danube and in the Balkans. Certainly in a post-war reconstruction of Europe, Poland, Bohemia, Austria, Hungary, the Balkans, will have to come to an agreement; what will be lacking in homogeneity will have to be supplied by organisation, discipline and community of interests. Italy would here find a field of activity and a need for her effective co-partnership.

Up till to-day a pro-Hitler Italy has preferred the Mediterranean. To what end? To oppose England? To wrest Tunis from France? To bring herself into collision with Turkey and Greece? Assuredly no one can deny that Italy has grave interests in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea, but a policy of understanding and friendship with co-interested parties is one thing, and a policy of conflict with the most powerful of them is another. A Mediterranean hegemony could be sought only by a country in a predominant position, colonially and economically, in Asia and Africa. For Italy to achieve such a position not only would Great Britain and France have to be hopelessly defeated but also Germany and

* See L. Sturzo: *Italy and Fascismo* (1926) and *Politique* (September 1933).

Russia made to moderate their world aspirations. All this would not happen, even in the case of a Hitler victory, apart from the fact that post-war reconstruction cannot be in view of another war but in view of a long peace. Italy would need to be able to guarantee her Mediterranean position and her colonies by treaties and understandings aiming at peace, not at war, nor at threats of war to wring precarious concessions of doubtful utility.

This brings us to the crucial point. What is Italy going to do, to-day or to-morrow, during the war? Will she decide for France and Great Britain, with the prospect of a peace in which she will have her part, or else for Germany, with Russia, to overthrow the order of the world? For the moment, her position of neutrality gives her time to consider the problems of to-day and to-morrow, with calm, serenity and shrewdness. Let us hope that she will not fail in the great destiny of civilisation and peace that should be hers.

LUIGI STURZO.

Postscriptum. It is interesting to note the various reactions of the Fascist press (which, as everyone knows, is in the dependence of the Government) to the events of the day. On the one hand, the papers ridicule "the Russian peril" of which the Allies' papers speak, and "the Bolshevik infection," which is the theme of the Catholic press all over the world. On the other hand they give special attention to the Balkan problem, from a standpoint that is not at all a Russian one. Most significant of all, while the Fascist press supports the peace offensive (making play with the names of Bernard Shaw and Lloyd George), it concerns itself with the future of Europe from a standpoint not at all that of Hitler. *Lavoro Fascista* writes: "It is a case of returning to the fusion of a Europe in which the greater civilisations, the Italian, the Anglo-Saxon, the French, the German and the Spanish, will be reconciled in an established order with fruitful interchanges." (No Russians and even no Poles!) *La Tribuna* speaks of "reciprocal security" (a slight variant of the late "collective security") as the corrective of "nationalism and imperialism." Whose? It must be either that of Berlin or that of Moscow. In this future Europe founded on "reciprocal security," Rome must have its say.

It has been stated that the new Italian ambassador has not brought proposals, but merely offers the offices of Italy for peace. The Italian press has recently been insistent on the subject of peace, and has begun to attack Great Britain rather than France.

L. S.

October 19th, 1939.

RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC.

RUSSIA'S present dynamic policy in the Baltic is not new. It marks her return to traditional power politics. For nine centuries she has been striving towards the sea. As early as 1030 under Tsar Yaroslav and 1106 under Vseslav she made the first attempts to reach it through the land of the independent Latvian tribes. Fierce resistance forced her back. By the end of the Middle Ages she had consolidated her territorial unity and formed a strong government. The invading Mongols had been repelled and vast territories with immense riches acquired. But still the vital link with the sea and the outer world was missing. The Black Sea was held by the Turks. The White Sea was unknown. The Baltic was the only hope. But the German Hansa ruled its waves, monopolising traffic and trade, while in Estonia and Latvia the Teutonic Order blocked Russian expansion.

In 1492 Muscovy erected the huge fortress of Ivangorod, which still dominates the Bay of Narva. This was the first step towards the sea, which Ivan the Terrible expected "to bring his people something of that civilisation which made the European states so strong." The great tyrant was a brilliant statesman. He knew that the Western Powers had an interest in keeping Russia in her semi-barbaric isolation. But he wanted her to have artisans, artists, teachers, and most of all that devilish invention, gunpowder, without which victory was no longer possible. Like Stalin to-day, Ivan seized his opportunity when he saw the German power, which stood in his way, preoccupied in other directions and weakened by political machinations. He demanded commercial liberties for his subjects in the Baltic, the cancellation of the Teutonic Order's defensive treaty with Poland, and the dismissal of the *Landsknechte* who "protected" Latvia and Estonia. A big delegation went to Moscow, bargained desperately and gave in. This increased Ivan's appetite. He now desired a port of his own. It was not lust of conquest. This had already been satisfied in the East. It was the grim realisation that Russia needed immediate contact with the West. With a ruthlessness that justified his name, he invaded the Baltic lands. The port of Narva was soon in his hands. Latvia and Estonia were placed under his sovereignty.

Europe seemed open. But the Swedes blockaded Narva and combined with the Poles to drive him out of the coast lands. Once again the Russian giant was forced back into his boundless plains. Fifty years of war and diplomatic gamble had been in vain. The sea was as far away as before.

A century of darkness followed. Muscovy had long to wait for the man to break a window in the wall of isolation. The pull of the sea, of distant lands and foreign culture, was an obsession with Peter the Great. First he thought only of Carelia or Ingermanland to build a port. In 1700 he marched against Narva, the old object of Russian desire, but was crushed by the Swedes. Not a gun, not a soldier was left. In a cold fury he began new preparations. Two years later he broke out again. He took one town after the other. Narva fell; at the mouth of the Neva he laid the foundations of St. Petersburg, the first Russian port. But still not sure of himself and his people, he stopped. To buy peace, to consolidate what he had achieved, he was prepared to return the Baltic territories to Sweden. All he wanted was the mouth of the Neva, where his cherished city grew, and a part of Ingermanland for which he even offered to pay an indemnity. Charles XII proudly refused. The war went on. The Russians took the rest of the Baltic States in 1710. And Muscovy who, according to Voltaire, had not had a barque of her own twenty years before, became master of the sea.

Now there was no stopping her. Catherine the Great did not hesitate to partition Poland with the Germans. In addition, she got Lithuania and the Duchy of Courland. Her empire stretched to the Prussian border. Russia grew into a European Great Power. Guns were mounted in all the Latvian and Estonian ports she had acquired, and in 1780 she induced Sweden, Denmark and Prussia to sign a convention excluding foreign warships from the Baltic. In 1857 this neutralisation act was repealed. But Russia has been trying ever since to re-establish her domination, and in 1907 Nicholas II at Swinemünde attempted to persuade the Kaiser to agree to the closure of the sea to all war vessels whose home ports were elsewhere.

It was a useless precaution. The enemy was already there. The Reich lived for nothing but expansion to the East. The first stage was the transformation of the Baltic into a German lake. A powerful fleet developed. The Kiel Canal was built,

and systematically William II prepared the invasion of the Baltic provinces. Their conquest was to give him not only control of Russia's main outlets and her trade with the West, but also an ideal jumping-off ground for further aggression. This was a deadly threat to Russia's very existence and one of the main reasons for her entry into the World War. Even the Provisional Republican Government of 1917 realised the enormous strategic importance of the Baltic territories, and when they agreed to Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian autonomy, there was no question of detaching them from the Empire. When the Germans saw they could not keep the Baltic provinces, which they had occupied meanwhile, they sent Lenin and Trotzky into Russia. They hoped that the Communist revolution would so upset their Slav adversary as to play into their hand. This calculation was right. Russia radically changed her whole foreign policy.

Dreaming of world revolution which would make national interests meaningless, the Soviet at once openly repudiated imperialism, power politics and secret diplomacy and proclaimed the principle of self-determination of all peoples formerly oppressed by the Tsars. This was the signal for the Baltic States. When Germany after the armistice had to relinquish the conquered lands in the East, they established full independence. So once again, after 200 years of unhindered access to the sea, Russia was barred from it. Only a narrow door was left to her, Leningrad, a door easily blocked from outside. The work of Peter the Great was undone.

Did the Soviet really mean it? Could they leave it at that, if Russia was to continue as a European Power? In drastically changing Russia's foreign policy they were, of course, faithful to their doctrine. As long as there was hope for world revolution, the old conceptions did not seem to matter. At the same time one cannot help wondering whether these were the only considerations which made Lenin and Trotzky give up the Baltic. Did the state of affairs in Russia not force them to transform necessity into a virtue? The Russian army in 1917 and 1918 was completely disintegrated; the huge country had been bled white by the war; powerful anti-revolutionary forces operated in various centres against the Soviet. It was only wise to eliminate further trouble by ceding recalcitrant provinces to the aggressive and much stronger enemy at Brest-Litovsk. But it is known that even

Lenin was unwilling to part with the Baltic lands; and it was more than significant that, as soon as vanquished Germany was forced to withdraw from the Baltic, Soviet forces overran the newly constituted states in a desperate attempt to regain the old "keys of the West."

Only when this invasion was finally repelled by Latvia and Estonia in 1920 and their existence insured with Allied help, did Moscow accept the changed position. Faced with the gigantic task of building a new social order in a semi-asiatic empire, and hard pressed by enemy armies on their soil, Trotzky persuaded Lenin that it was best to consolidate their Western border. The peace treaties they concluded with the Baltic States in the same year are appropriately described by the Royal Institute of International Affairs as "models of restraint and even generosity." Their main item was the recognition of complete Baltic independence by the Soviet and the renunciation of all former rights of sovereignty. This was also confirmed by the Western Powers. By 1920 it seemed that Russia had definitely given up the Baltic.

That impression, however, was soon to be corrected. By intensive Communist propaganda carried out in all the three small states, the Russians tried to regain by revolutionary methods what they had lost in the field of foreign policy. Though the Soviet Government disclaimed all responsibility, the Third International actively supported local Communist groups operating on Baltic territories for the overthrow of the young governments. The motives were not only ideological. They were inspired by the hope that under a Communist régime the Baltic States would freely join the Soviet Union, thus bringing Russia again into direct touch with the sea. The climax of these activities was the big *putsch* of 1924 in Estonia, but its speedy suppression by the authorities and the failure of similar movements elsewhere proved that the Baltic soil was less susceptible to Communism than Russia.

The standard of living of the Baltic masses had always been higher than that of the Russian proletariat. Though oppressed by the barons, they were in contact with Western progress, whilst their neighbour in the East was shut off in misery and ignorance. The revolution in Russia was a logical sequence of centuries of appalling injustice. It was a social revolution. The struggle for freedom in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania however, though interspersed with left wing tendencies, was

mainly a national movement. In Russia the millions of peasants and workers backed the Soviet against the White armies who fought for the restoration of the old privileges. In the Baltic States, on the other hand, the leaders, though anti-communist, were also against the nobility. There was a large landless proletariat in the three new states, amongst whom the Soviet looked for support. But the Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian nationalists themselves expropriated the big estates and shared them out among the proletariat, thus turning it into a proprietary and conservative element. It was this element that resisted communist infiltration most strongly and, by establishing dictatorships, finally outlawed it.

The Russian Government carefully abstained from counter-measures. With the advance of general stabilisation in Europe, their policy became one of correct co-operation with their neighbours. The Baltic States breathed more freely. Mutual confidence was gradually established, extensive commercial treaties were concluded, and various diplomatic conventions entered into, aiming at the preservation of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe. Foremost among the latter were the Non-Aggression Pacts of 1932.

This friendly co-operation was of course based on one essential condition, Russia's unhampered access to the sea. Nine hundred years of history had proved that she could not exist without it. Now more than ever the huge empire, labouring under a new social and economic effort, needed the Latvian and Estonian ports which had been long connected by rail and waterway with her main centres of production. It was obvious that, in the long run, Latvia's and Estonia's independence depended on their willingness to satisfy Russia's needs in this respect. The Baltic States fully appreciated this. They granted the Soviet every possible facility on their railways and ports, preferential tariffs and free zones. And though the Russians never fully exploited these facilities, the scheme worked for years to mutual satisfaction.

It was the disastrous course of Nazi policy that forced the Soviet to a sudden change of attitude. In the golden days of Geneva, when collective security and international equity seemed to be building a new Europe, they had realised that their interests, too, were best served by these principles. The dream of world revolution was gone. Concerned most of all

with internal recovery, Russia wanted nothing but peace and stability. As long as these prevailed, her interests on her Western border were fully met by the existence of independent, neutral and friendly states who kept Europe's door open to her. But again, as in the Middle Ages and in 1914, an aggressive and dangerous Power has risen against her. Nazi expansion was from the outset openly directed towards the East. For that reason Moscow grew anxious lest Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, whose small but well-organised German minorities were the strongest outposts of Hitlerism, should be too weak to withstand Berlin's pressure. To allow the three small states to succumb to it would have been suicidal.

Russia was undeniably in a weaker position than Germany. Leningrad, her only port, was far from the big routes, closed by ice in winter, and the naval base of Kronstad could be easily paralysed by the power controlling the Gulf of Finland. Germany, on the other hand, dominated the whole sea. Her influence was very strong in the Baltic capitals whose governments, seeing her brutal acts of aggression succeed unpunished elsewhere, could do nothing but submit. As long as the Reich limited itself to Central Europe, Russia could rest. But when it showed the irrevocable decision to march into Poland—the first real step eastward—Russia took action. Whether it was arranged beforehand by Molotov and Ribbentrop or not, the fact is that she invaded Eastern Poland to forestall the Germans there.

Even the Soviet-Nazi Agreement cannot obscure the fact that the Reich, if it follows its historic course, must eventually push east. To withstand this, Russia's only solution is to unfold her complete power in the Baltic. Her interests demand convenient air and naval bases and security in the countries behind. That is precisely what she is now working for. It is idle to speculate whether in the long run she would have contented herself with the *status quo* up to 1939. But it is a fact that her present return to a dynamic and nationalistic foreign policy is the direct result of the collapse of international good faith and morality brought about by Hitlerism. It is outside the scope of this survey to dwell on the tragedy of the small states whose young integrity has had to succumb to these power politics.

WOLFRAM GOTTLIEB.

RECONCILIATION AND NEUTRALITY IN YUGOSLAVIA.

IT is a curious fact that the national independence of the Serb, Croat and Slovene state which was made possible by the war of 1914-18 did not receive any real measure of consolidation until Europe stood on the brink of the next war. A week before the second conflict broke out the political order of the Yugoslav kingdom received a radical transformation, it may be said in the nick of time, for had Yugoslavia faced the crisis in her former divided state, her destiny would in all probability have been to see herself swept into existence by one war and swept out of it again by the next.

The first title of the new state—the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—gives a clue to the nature of Yugoslavia's problem. The Allied victory in 1918 made possible the union into one political community of the three divided branches of the South Slav race, and the Italian invasion of Slovenia which followed hard on the heels of the Armistice drove the three peoples together with almost unseemly haste. What should have been a considered entry into union with fundamental agreement on the main principles was transformed into a stampede of Croats and Slovenes into the protective custody of their Serb brethren. No preliminary discussion prefaced the act of union of December 1918. The state came together as it could with all its problems unsettled and the whole of its political structure still to be worked out. It is no exaggeration to say that the South Slavs have been endeavouring to solve these problems ever since.

The Slovenes have not constituted the main difficulty. This people, barely two million strong, have sided in the last twenty years both with the Serb government and the Croat opposition. In speech, religion and culture, they tend to align themselves with the Croats. As a prosperous agricultural community where the rise of industry is beginning to make itself felt, their economic interests lie with the central government. Under their leader, Father Korosetz, they have on the whole exercised a moderating influence on whichever side the fortunes of the moment happened to place them. At any rate, the Serb government has had their unequivocal support since 1935. The reef on which the young ship of state nearly foundered was the problem of incorporating Croatia into a

unified body politic along with Serbia. For two decades it seemed as though no political structure could possibly stand the strain of housing these two dissident brothers under a single roof. First of all, their origins lay in two different civilisations. Until the decay of the Ottoman Empire and the incorporation of its successor states piecemeal into the expanding Western Society, Serbia belonged to the Orthodox civilisation of Eastern Europe, first under the domination of Byzance, later of the Turks. Her alphabet is Greek, her religion Orthodox and autocephalous and a deep and permanent strain in the Serb character is a distrust of that aspect of western culture which is incorporated in the œcumenical claims of the Catholic Church. On the contrary the Croats were converted by Latin missionaries, their brief emergence as a separate sovereign entity received the express sanction of the Holy See, and when this independence was extinguished a century or so later, it was at the hands of Catholicised Magyars. Croatia entered Hungary and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a subject but autonomous member of a powerful Western community, Western in its catholicism, its alphabet, its entire cultural tradition.

This deep cleavage in religion and culture lying at the very roots of the two peoples' ethos is repeated at more superficial levels, for example in their completely different historical traditions. Serbia achieved a flourishing state at the turn of the thirteenth century only to be extinguished for 400 years under the overwhelming and petrifying weight of the Ottoman conquest. The slow decay of the Empire and the repercussions of the Western era of enlightenment culminating in the French Revolution combined to produce a Serbian independence movement at the opening of the nineteenth century under Kara Georg, the peasant father of the present dynasty. From the beginning the movement swelled throughout the nineteenth century—the century of national independence *par excellence*—until it came into violent collision with Austria-Hungary, partly as a barrier to the Empire's expansive ambitions in the Balkans, partly as a danger to the very integrity of the Habsburg realm, since "liberated" South Slavs in sovereign, independent Serbia came to exercise a magnetic influence on their "enslaved" brethren within the Empire, until there came a point at which this magnetism was judged by the Habsburgs to be incompatible with the security

of their state and the Great War began with the Austrian onslaught on Serbia, a war out of which Serbia, as an Allied Power, emerged triumphant. Certain marked psychological traits follow upon this history. The Serbs built up their independent state in a long struggle and were somewhat naturally determined to be masters in the house which they had built with so much labour and at such cost. Up to 1918 all increases in Serbia's girth—and she had grown steadily—had taken place by total absorption and the new territories were fully subject to the sovereign Serbs. The Serbs had thus no experience in sharing an authority so painfully achieved. The experiment of 1918 found them—psychologically—totally unprepared.

Nor were the difficulties less on the Croat side. It is true that Croatia had known no long struggle for independence. Since the extinction of Tomislav's kingdom, the Croats had remained for over five hundred years under the political domination of the Magyars. But their captivity bore no resemblance to that of Serbia under the Turks. Far from being crushed out, their autonomy and ancient privileges were strictly preserved and although they never achieved complete independence, their national assembly—the Sabor—enjoyed wide legislative powers, their language was respected, and not till the close of the nineteenth century did the yoke of Austria-Hungary begin to feel oppressive. Now this secular position as subject but independent minority within a great state had in its turn marked effects on the Croat spirit. They had saved themselves from absorption by holding fiercely to their constitutional rights and privileges. This *tour de force* tended to make them incapable of compromise and much wedded to form. It made them, too, highly conscious of their rights as a minority and resolutely determined to resist the *Gleichschaltung* which Hungary could always hold over their heads. This bred a spirit of opposition, a tendency to look at every political problem first of all from a negative and obstructive standpoint. It bred, too, a tendency to suspicion, a tendency to see a threat to their liberties where none was intended. The result of bringing together two peoples, one psychologically incapable of sharing power, the other morbidly sensitive to the possibility of subjection, aggravated by the haste with which the transaction took place, is quite enough to

account for the stormy history of Yugoslavia's first twenty years.

The unbridged gulf between Serb and Croat is the *leitmotif* of the young state's turbulent politics. Until 1929 an attempt was made to run the country along orthodox democratic lines. But the secret of democracy lies above all in compromise or co-operation, and for these neither Serb nor Croat had the least aptitude. The Serbs, led by their veteran Premier, Pasić, made it clear from the start that their conception of the new state was that of a unified centralised community under the political domination of the Serbs. But the Croats had not carried on their secular struggle against the Magyars for nothing. Long ago they had worked out obstruction and sabotage to a fine art. Now they applied their technique to the working of their new country. In 1921 the Croat leader Radić refused co-operation and the Constitution was passed without Croat consent. In 1923 and 1924 Radić was abroad appealing for help against the Serbs. In 1924, after a period of imprisonment, he apparently suffered a change of heart and for a few brief months sent his Croats to Belgrade and co-operated with the Ministry. Then followed a period of even more intransigent opposition which ended in 1928 with the shooting affray in the Skuptšina as a result of which Radić lost his life. Soon after King Alexander took the matter into his own hands and announced a personal dictatorship.

Alexander fared no better than his former ministers. The new Constitution of 1931 contained all the features most obnoxious to the Croats, preservation of Serb dominance, centralisation, the wiping out of regional differences and complete failure to return to the promised democratic system. The Croats remained unappeased and a violent terrorist movement, the Ustasi, began (with foreign help) to attempt by violence what the more moderate Maček party could not bring about by constitutional methods. In 1934 the King fell a victim to an Ustasi *attentat* at Marseilles. It was hoped that the Regency might take advantage of the universal horror roused in Yugoslavia by the crime to affect a reconciliation, but the opportunity was apparently allowed to pass. In 1935 elections on the 1931 model were held and the Croats after obtaining their usual 45 to 50 per cent. of the votes, refused to co-operate, maintaining their steady opposition to

the unified Serb state and to its undemocratic constitution. For the following three years their attitude remained unchanged.

During these three years the Yugoslav Premier, Stoyadinović, appeared to be exercising sovereign powers and he was generally included in the picture gallery of European dictators. A rigid Pan-Serb, he continued with a will the centralising dictatorial policy of Alexander and as his tenure of office lengthened he began to adopt the allure of a personal dictator. Membership of his Radical Union tended to become a *sine qua non* of office. His voting expedients were increasingly open to criticism. He conducted the affairs of state as though he could command the Hitlerian 98 per cent. when in fact a good 50 per cent. of the population opposed him. In 1938 other and more sinister signs appeared. He began to cause himself to be referred to as "*Vodja*" (leader), a salute was introduced, and shortly afterwards he instituted a personal and green-shirted bodyguard. His relations with the Dictators gave rise to grave anxiety in the West and among the democratic Croats. The date of Yugoslavia's adhesion to the Axis was a matter of open speculation. Then, at the height of his apparent power after the reaffirmation of his mandate at the elections of November 1938, he was quietly dismissed in the following January and disappeared without disturbance and without clamour below the political horizon. His successor, Tsetković, a relative nonentity, came to office with the express mandate of putting to an end the breach between Croat and Serb and constructing a new Constitution in which the unitary principle should give way to the federal and under which more democratic forms were to be introduced. Negotiations opened late in March, a preliminary agreement was initialled in April and after further delays a new constitution was promulgated on August 27th, whereby Croatia became an independent Banovina under a Croat *Ban* (or Governor), all Croats were included within the new frontiers giving Croatia nearly 30 per cent. of the total population, and the Sabor was reconstituted and given wide legislative powers over local matters. Pending new elections five Croats, including Dr. Maček, entered the central government for the first time in fourteen years. It was this government which a week later, speaking almost for the first time in the country's history for Serb and

Croat alike, announced Yugoslav neutrality in the present war.

It is possible now to see that Dr. Stoyadinović was, throughout his three-year tenure of the Premiership, in fact serving as a convenient screen to the real source of power in Yugoslavia. The confusion arose naturally, for the Regent, Prince Paul, seemed an unlikely successor to the resolute Dictator, Alexander. At the time his choice as Regent aroused surprise and it was known that he accepted the burden of office with extreme distaste. The tendency at first was to write off as politically negligible this reserved and aloof young Prince, particularly once the star of Stoyadinović was in the ascendant. Certain omens, it is true, might have led the intelligent observer to attribute greater significance to the young King's guardian. Stoyadinović himself, for all his dictatorial graces, owed his position entirely to the Regent's fiat. In 1935 his predecessor, Yevtić, fought the elections as leader of the Serb Radical Union. And after emerging apparently successful from the poll, he was summarily dismissed by Prince Paul for corrupt electioneering. Overnight Stoyadinović was called to fill his place, and obviously a man called to office by the whim of a higher authority cannot hope to exercise the function of a modern leader of the masses. When his downfall came, it was, incident for incident, a repetition of the fall of the former Premier. Like Yevtić, he fought an apparently successful election; like him, he was violently accused by the opposition of falsifying the results; like him, he was quietly dropped and a successor chosen from among his own colleagues. From the hour of his appointment to the hour of his dismissal, he was never in fact more than the Regent's man. Why, then, was the dismissal necessary?

First of all, this "Regent's man" was showing signs of indocility. In Yugoslavia only a Karageorgevic may bear the title of "*Vodja*." If there are to be dictators, they will be kings. The Regent could not tolerate encroachments, green-shirted or otherwise, on the royal preserve of power. But there were other reasons, quite as grave. In 1935 the choice of Stoyadinović, a banker and an economist, had been based on the underlying assumption that Yugoslavia's ills were mainly economic. Like all agrarian communities the country had been disastrously hit by the world economic crisis, and

significantly the onslaught of the crisis had coincided with the complete rupture of relations between Serb and Croat following the death of Radić, while the worst atrocities of the Ustasi were contemporary with the nadir of the slump. Stoyadinović received the mandate to restore harmony by restoring prosperity, but by 1938 it was clear that although prosperity had to a large extent returned, harmony was as far off as ever. Stoyadinović's main points in the electoral campaign of November 1938 consisted of import and export figures, statistics, successful floating of an internal loan, the scale of public works. On the political issue he remained as intransigent as ever in his opposition to federalism and democratic reform.

When the elections reproduced almost to a vote the results of 1935 it was clear that the Croats were as obstinately unreconciled as ever and that therefore Stoyadinović had failed. But his failure also showed up the bankruptcy of the régime. It was no longer possible to attribute the gulf dividing Serb and Croat to anything but to its proper cause, the federal issue. Prince Paul therefore accepted the inevitable and decided on direct negotiations with the Croats. To these, however, the person of Stoyadinović, identified as he was with the pan-Serb policy of centralisation, presented an insuperable obstacle. The Croats were ready to negotiate but not through the Premier. The Premier, therefore, disappeared as suddenly and quietly as he had come, and although his successor, Tsetković, had the immediate conduct of affairs, the Regent's hand was apparent at every turn of the negotiations, and to him must go the principal honours for having carried them through to an unexpectedly successful conclusion.

The principal honours, but not all the honours. One laurel wreath at least should be spared for the brows of Hitler. The significance of events in Yugoslavia during the last four years cannot be fully appreciated apart from their international context. Since 1935 the whole balance of power in Eastern Europe has been radically transformed. Until about that year the influence of the West, based on traditional friendship with France, inveterate enmity for the Italians and strong support for the League of Nations, had been paramount. Thereafter the Sanctions *débâcle* co-operated with the rise of Hitlerism to cut out the West and lay Yugoslavia open to new influences. The general feeling was that the League had

failed and the West was in decline; the Yugoslav leaders drew the inevitable conclusion that Yugoslavia, being a small state with exposed frontiers, would be well advised to make her peace with her powerful neighbours. Stoyadinović combined this practical outlook with real sympathy for the totalitarian ethos, and it was under his premiership that the sensational Pact of Friendship with Italy was signed in March 1937 and the inroads of Nazism upon the Yugoslav state began to be really apparent. Reference has already been made to the rumoured linking of Yugoslavia with the Axis. Although officially denied, it showed how far Stoyadinović was prepared to commit his country.

At this point the dangers of the new position became obvious. Every year saw an overwhelming increase in German power, and Nazi policy with regard to Yugoslavia was anything but negative. The first onslaught took the shape of the trade drive inaugurated in 1935 by Dr. Schacht, which in a year successfully brought nearly 50 per cent. of Yugoslavia's foreign trade under the control of Germany. Political action such as the organisation of Yugoslavia's German minorities into militant hotbeds of Nazism followed, and in Slovenia this disquieting phenomenon was accompanied by a policy of land purchase which seemed designed to place the main lines of communication in German hands. Germany's success in Austria gave Yugoslavia at one stroke a long and undefended frontier with her terrifying neighbour. The complete annihilation of Czechoslovakia in the following year illustrated all too clearly the fate of small countries which had the misfortune to find themselves in the path of the German steam roller.

This combination of internal and external events threw into sharp relief Yugoslavia's political dilemma, and its relation to the Croat problem did not escape the watchful eye of the Regent. In the final disruption of Czechoslovakia, the Germans used the Slovaks as a weapon against the Czechs. The subordinate minority was first inflamed and then armed against the dominant majority. Substitute Serb for Czech and Croat for Slovak, and was not Croatia an admirable instrument ready to the Nazi hand in order to extend the policy of *divide et impera* down into the Balkans? The supposition was in no way fantastic. Some of Dr. Maček's hotheads were already threatening to turn to the Germans

for support. Discreet Nazi propaganda in Zagreb began to push the policy of secession and "independence" along Slovak lines. Even Maček declared that the eleventh hour had struck and that the Croats would know where to look if their demands were once again rejected. Prince Paul realised that the time for parley had come. Munich led to the November elections and the passing of Stoyadinović, March saw the German entry into Prague and the opening of Serbo-Croat negotiations, the summer brought war to Europe and the realisation of what we can only hope to be a lasting internal peace to Yugoslavia.

It was thus a combination of internal and external factors which solved the perennial problem of Serb and Croat apparently in the nick of time. One last question remains; will the agreement make any difference to Yugoslavia's attitude to the war? It is hard to say. The Croats are well known for their deep sympathy with the democratic West. Their influence may at some future date tilt the scales in our favour. For the time being Yugoslavia in her own interests is working tirelessly to prevent the revisionist Powers, Hungary and Bulgaria, from attacking under the ægis of Germany their *status-quo* neighbours (Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece). If her efforts are crowned with success, this in itself will be some contribution towards the final victory of the West; but the melancholy admission must be made that Yugoslav neutrality is not the attitude upon which in happier circumstances we might have relied. Here the internal situation has little influence. Reconciled or unreconciled, both the Serbs and Croats up to 1935 were keen upholders of collective security. Since that date the steady retreat of the West before Hitler has driven them willy nilly into neutrality. Thus to-day although France and Great Britain are fighting for the freedom of every small country east of Hitler, they fight without their support. The measure of Hitler's success is the terror he has instilled into his neighbours' souls, a terror which numbs them into neutrality even in a conflict upon whose issue the very survival of independence in Europe, and therefore of their own, depends. Yugoslav neutrality means, in fact, that Yugoslavia is prepared to see her destiny decided by alien arms, and by her resignation we can assess the extent to which Hitler has "won the peace."

BARBARA WARD.

THE JEWS IN HUNGARY.

THE calamity that has overtaken the Jews in Hungary is in distressing contrast to the conditions they had enjoyed for the last seventy years. They had experienced the blessings of political equality in a somewhat lesser degree than the Jews in the democratic countries of the West, but they were for the most part immune from any serious hardship. Proud in their patriotism, and eager to merge themselves in the general population, they had repaid their treatment with the most bountiful services to the State and were always ready to make the utmost sacrifices for its defence. All the more undeserved and revolting, therefore, do they find the legal disabilities to which they have now been subjected, although hundreds of thousands of Jews in neighbouring countries have to suffer a far more galling plight. The oppressive measures that have been enacted against them have aroused the bitterest resentment as acts of injustice and cruelty, which expose them to degradation and beggary. They are the helpless victims of the forces of reaction now raging over the greater part of Central and Eastern Europe, in which the malignant influence of Nazi Germany is playing the dominant part.

The Jews of Hungary obtained their complete emancipation in 1867. The new Constitution of that year declared that "the Israelite inhabitants of the country are entitled to exercise all civil and political rights equally with its Christian inhabitants," and that "all laws, customs, and regulations to the contrary are herewith annulled." For centuries the Jews had formed the only middle class between the aristocrats and landowners on the one hand and the peasants on the other. The aristocrats would not soil their hands with any kind of occupation save military or government service, and the peasants were confined to tilling the soil. The Jews thus fulfilled the useful and vital function of creating and developing Hungary's commerce and providing her with doctors and lawyers. They were the most ardent votaries of Magyar culture, and Magyarised their names. In many parts of the country containing mixed nationalities the Jewish schools were often the only ones where Hungarian was the language of instruction, and they were also attended by Christian children. Before the War the Jews in Budapest had already grown to almost one-fourth

of the population, and in the higher grade schools and some of the University faculties in that city they even formed a majority of the students. Their political status was such that they provided a Minister of Justice in the person of Wilhelm Vazsonyi; and the part they played in the War is attested by the fact that they lost 10,000 men on the battlefield and were awarded a goodly number of the highest military distinctions.

But after the War there set in a period of reaction in consequence of Hungary's loss of two-thirds of her territory and also of the participation of a few persons of Jewish origin in the short-lived Communist Government of Béla Kun. The Jews throughout the country were exposed to a reign of terror for some years by the "Awakening Magyars," and many of them were done to death. The diminution of territory compelled a large section of the youth of Hungary's upper and middle class, who would otherwise have found a career in the army or the civil service, to seek a livelihood in commerce, industry, and the liberal professions, where they met with Jewish competition, and hence the anti-Semitism aroused by political events was exacerbated by economic causes. Popular hostility found expression in the passing, in 1920, of a *numerus clausus* law for restricting the proportion of Jewish students at the Universities, with a view to reducing Jewish rivalry in the liberal professions; and although the civil rights of the Jews were constitutionally safeguarded by the Minorities Treaty, which Hungary, like so many other States, was obliged to sign, the only redress that was obtained with the aid of the League of Nations in 1928 was a verbal amendment of the law—the substitution of an economic basis of admission for that of nationality—while its operation remained in effect as before. But conditions generally were tolerable.

The change in the treatment of the Jews was brought about by the approach of the Swastika. The annexation of Austria by Hitler gave an impetus to the widespread Nazi agitation in Hungary, which had been fostered and financed by Germany. The various Nazi parties clamoured for anti-Jewish restrictions on German lines and emphasised their demands by repeated disorders and riots. They proclaimed that the Jews were the cause of all the country's misfortunes and that only if they were driven out of economic and intellectual life would it be possible for true Magyars to secure a livelihood. The

Government accordingly came to the conclusion that the best way in which to suppress the Nazi agitators, who made no secret of their aim to wrest political power, was to steal their anti-Semitic thunder. They therefore drafted a Bill for the "more efficient protection of the social and economic balance," which was designed to effect drastic restrictions upon the position of the Jews in commerce, industry, banking, and the liberal professions as well as on the press and the stage, and in the cinema industry.

This Bill, after considerable opposition not only on the part of the Jews but also in Parliament and the press, was adopted in May 1938, and took effect on June 28th. It provided that by June 30th, 1943, and in special cases by June 30th, 1948, industrial, commercial and banking enterprises employing ten or more salaried employees must adjust the proportion of such employees, as well as of salaries, bonuses and other forms of remuneration, so that the Jewish share in any category should not exceed 20 per cent. of the total. The proportion of Jews among newly appointed employees must not exceed 5 per cent. of the total until the norm of 20 per cent. was attained. Firms failing to comply with these stipulations might be placed under Government control or expropriated. The law provided further that in the medical, legal and engineering Chambers, in which the number of Jews exceeded the stipulated norm, Jews should henceforth be admitted at the rate of only 5 per cent. of the total number of candidates until such time as the proportion of Jewish members was reduced to 20 per cent. New Chambers were to be set up by the end of 1939 in journalism and in the film and stage professions, where the *numerus clausus* was to be enforced at once.

Although this law was inspired by the example of Germany, it was not of the authentic Nazi brand, for certain categories of Jews were excepted—all those who were baptised before August 1919, as well as Jewish war invalids, ex-servicemen, war pensioners, and their children. The main ground on which the law was advocated was that the Jews occupied a disproportionate share of the trades and professions, and it was necessary to find jobs for the Christian youth. The share occupied by the Jews in commerce, industry, and the liberal professions was determined by the social factors already described, and since they had the full rights of citizenship there was no reason why they should be limited in any particular

sphère. In no case had they ousted Magyars from any field of economic or professional activity ; on the contrary, it was due to their enterprise that positions had been multiplied for the benefit of non-Jews.

In the summer of 1938 the number of Jews in Hungary was 450,000, forming 5·1 per cent. of the total population. They constituted 7·5 per cent. of all those employed in industry, but they had played a very notable part in its development, and to them was due the sole credit for the creation of the textile industry. In commerce they represented 43 per cent., but all forms of trade had always been particularly obnoxious to the Magyar gentry, and the Jews had opened up valuable trade relations with other countries. Fantastic figures have been published in many papers concerning Jewish ownership of the land, but in fact (according to the official statistical returns for 1930) the total area of cultivated land in Jewish hands was only 4·15 per cent.

It is in the liberal professions, however, that the participation of Jews is particularly conspicuous. According to the returns of 1930 they formed 54·4 per cent. of the doctors in private practice, 49·2 per cent. of the lawyers, 31·6 per cent. of the journalists (compared with 42·4 per cent. in 1910), 30·4 per cent. of the musicians, 24 per cent. of the actors, and 14·3 per cent. of the painters and sculptors. On the other hand, and as some explanation of these high figures, it must be noted that in the Civil Service they formed only 1·5 per cent., as their political equality did not extend to an equitable share in the public administration.

The number of Jews and their dependants who would have been affected by the law of May 1938 was calculated as about 50,000. The champions of this violation of the Constitution, the Premiers, first Dr. Daranyi and then Dr. Bela Imredy, argued that since the Jews were little more than 5 per cent. of the population it was not unfair to limit their participation in economic and intellectual life to 20 per cent. They defended their policy on the ground that the Jews were not sufficiently assimilated and that the reduction of their share in the national life was necessary for the preservation of the Magyar spirit and culture. This plea was utterly devoid of justification, for the Jews have made important and enduring contributions to the national culture.

It was largely due to Jewish influence that Budapest was

changed in the course of a century from a German-speaking town into a Hungarian city. Since the establishment of the Hungarian Academy of Science in 1830 it has had fifty-four members who were Jews or persons of Jewish origin. Only two Hungarians have been awarded the Nobel Prize : the first, Professor Baranyi, is a hundred per cent. Jew, and the second, Professor Szent-Györgi, is a " non-Aryan." There is a galaxy of distinguished writers of Jewish origin, of whom the most famous are Joseph Kiss, the popular poet, and Ferenc Molnar and Eugen Heltai, dramatists and novelists. There are illustrious Jewish names in the world of scholarship and archæology, such as Arminius Vambery, who mastered all the languages and dialects of Central Asia and traced the origin of the Magyar tongue ; Ignaz Goldziher, who was the first to give a critical history of Arabic traditions ; and Marc Aurel Stein, who has made remarkable discoveries in China and Turkestan. To music the Jews have contributed the composers Karl Goldmark and Imre Kalman, and the violinist, Joseph Szegeti ; to painting, Philip de Lazslo ; to the film world, Alexander Korda ; and to architecture Joseph Vago, one of the architects of the Palace of the League of Nations.

The passing of the law of May 1938 caused considerable consternation. The consequence was that although the law did not provide for the discharge of more than 1,500 during the first six months the number actually deprived of their positions was 5,000, and, including dependants, the total number robbed of their means of livelihood was 13,500. Serious dislocation was caused in the business world, for it was not easy to replace the victims with their life-time of experience, and similar disturbances arose in the liberal professions. Thousands of Jews immediately decided that their only salvation lay in emigration.

Scarcely had the Jewish community attuned itself to this disaster than it was threatened by a much graver catastrophe. The disruption of Czechoslovakia, followed by the Vienna " award " in November 1938, resulted in Hungary regaining a goodly slice of Slovakia. Such a glorious victory, achieved by the grace of Hitler, called for a suitable expression of appreciation, and this could best be shown by following more closely in Nazi footsteps. The anti-Jewish law was much too mild to satisfy the persecutors of Berlin and Nuremberg. Under irresistible pressure the Hungarian Government,

before the year was out, declared their willingness to supersede it by a new law that would be much more drastic and introduced a bill for reducing the 20 per cent. limitation to 6 per cent.

The official reason given for this turning of the screw showed to what an extent the Government had succumbed to the spirit of oppression inculcated by the Nazi tyranny. They actually referred to the German anti-Jewish code and stated that Hungary found herself surrounded by territories with a population of 200 million people, which all wished to drive their Jews out. The consequence would be that these Jews would all want to stream into Hungary, and, since frontier precautions would prove ineffective, the State must pass laws that would prevent such an influx.

The prime advocate of the new bill was the Prime Minister, Dr. Bela Imredy, who had previously announced that the first anti-Jew law would be the last. In defending it in a speech in Parliament, he admitted that it would involve certain injustices, but argued that individual tragedies must not deter the Government from their aim. The bill encountered quite a formidable amount of influential opposition, in which magnates and churchmen, Liberals and Socialists, all united, and there were stormy scenes in both Chambers. The hostility was due to a variety of motives: to the fact that the bill was a flagrant violation of the Constitution, to recognition of the cruel hardship that it would impose upon hundreds of thousands of law-abiding citizens, to fear of the serious harm it would inflict upon the economic and intellectual life of the country, and, not least, to resentment against the Government acting as such willing tools of the Nazi despotism. One of the foremost opponents was Count Bethlen, who had been Premier for several years when the country was recovering from the effects of the War. Count George Apponyi, son of the famous statesman, wrote an article in the *Magyar Nemzeti*, in which he said that he was ashamed to witness in his old age the introduction of medieval measures against Jews. The Cardinal Primate of Hungary, Dr. Seregi, pleaded that the bill should not affect Jews who were Hungarian citizens before it became law and that it should in any case not apply to converts.

But Dr. Imredy would not be deterred from his purpose. He was angered by some pamphlets that were circulated, accusing him of partial Jewish origin. "I have no Jewish

blood in me," he replied, and redoubled his attacks upon the Jews. He spoke of the "poisonous influence of the Jewish spirit," and proclaimed to Parliament and people that the Jews could never become assimilated with the Magyars even if they had inter-married. In his veins there flowed old Hungarian blood, which reacted instinctively to the sufferings of the nation, and in response to his "instinctive promptings" he had felt compelled to introduce the anti-Jew bill. But Dr. Imredy was doomed to be "hoist with his own petard." He produced the birth certificate of a Christian grandfather as proof of his pure "Aryan" origin, but diligent searchers discovered that he had a 100 per cent. Jewish great-grandfather, Jacob Heller, who had lived during the Napoleonic era and was baptised at the age of seven in 1814. This unfortunate discovery covered Dr. Imredy with ridicule and caused his immediate downfall. Count Teleky, who succeeded as Premier, took up the obnoxious burden and advocated the Bill with not less ardour.

During the debate in the Lower Chamber a sensation was caused by the appearance in the public gallery of a number of Jewish reserve officers, dressed in mourning and wearing numerous decorations, as a silent protest against the iniquitous measure. Many deputies were deeply moved by the demonstration. The Jewish member, Dr. Johann Vazsonyi (son of a former Minister of Justice), at once demanded that the Government should alter the Bill so as to ensure to any Jew who fulfilled his duty to the country faithfully the same treatment as that accorded to his non-Jewish fellow-citizen. But the Government were inflexible. The Bill was carried and came into force on May 4th.

This second "Jew Law" takes no account of the racial principle, partly because of the strong opposition of the Catholic Church and partly because the inclusion of that principle would have affected over one million persons—a rather large proportion in a population of ten millions. The Law applies only to those who are Jews by religion, and half-Jews are generally treated as Jews. Moreover, all those who were already Christians on the day of their birth or were baptised at least before their seventh birthday, and whose Jewish parent was a Christian before January 1st, 1939, count as non-Jews, but only if the family has been domiciled in Hungary since 1849 and this can be proved by documentary

evidence. Jewish war-invalids, ex-servicemen who had received gold or silver medals, University professors, and Olympic champions are also exempted.

The Law limits the Jews to 6 per cent. of the membership of the Chambers of the liberal and academic professions; restricts the participation of the Jews in public contracts to 20 per cent., and from 1943 to 6 per cent.; forbids them to occupy any controlling, managerial, or influential position in newspaper offices, theatres, cinemas, or film studios; utterly excludes them from the Civil and Municipal services, and from the staff of social insurance organisations and all public institutions, as well as from the vocations of notary and sworn interpreter. It requires that all Jewish professors and teachers in colleges and higher grade schools, and all Jewish district notaries shall be retired by January 1st, 1943, and all Jewish public prosecutors by January 1st, 1940, with compensation. Jewish students at Universities and higher grade schools are to be limited to 6 per cent. All licences held by Jews for the sale of State monopoly articles must be withdrawn within five years and not renewed, and trade licences issued to Jews must be limited to 6 per cent. of the total held in the local community. Jews have no right to buy or sell land, except by permission, and they can be compelled at any time to sell or lease their agricultural property on terms fixed by the authorities—a provision that amounts to forcible expropriation. In industrial concerns, mines, banks, money exchanges, and insurance companies Jews must be limited to 12 per cent.; they can be dismissed at any time at short notice, and their compensation or pension depends upon the generosity of the employer.

The Law also prescribes that in future no Jew can obtain Hungarian nationality either by naturalisation or marriage. The Minister of the Interior can annul the naturalisation or denization of any Jew who acquired Hungarian citizenship after July 1st, 1914. This provision may seriously affect a large number of the 150,000 Jews of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia who have been incorporated within the State. Only those Jews who are able to prove by authentic documents that their ancestors were Hungarians, born in Hungary, and domiciled since 1867, have a right to vote for Parliament and Municipal Councils, and can be elected members of them.

It has been estimated that of the 600,000 Jews who are now

subject to Hungarian rule, at least one-third will be affected by the new law. The prospect facing them, whether their dismissal has already taken effect or is still impending, is one of distress and despair. Most of them are business employees or members of the liberal and academic professions, who are only too anxious to emigrate, but unfortunately do not possess the means to enable them to do so. At least 50,000 Jews have already applied for emigration facilities, without specifying to what country they wish to go, for they do not know for what country they can obtain a visa. Even those who have the necessary means for emigration cannot obtain permission for the transfer of their capital.

Grossly devalued as Hungarian citizenship has become for the Jews, those Jews of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia—numbering about 75,000 in each district—who have recently come under Hungarian rule, have experienced much difficulty in acquiring it. In order to obtain a Hungarian passport, they must produce three witnesses—Hungarian citizens—to testify that they comported themselves as loyal adherents of Hungary in the 'twenties, after they had ceased to be Hungarians. The loyal attitude of these Jews towards the Czechoslovak State is now accounted against them as a crime. But if the new Jewish subjects of Hungary have no passports or become "Stateless," they will be faced with a very difficult problem in their attempts to emigrate.

For emigration appears to the new as to the old Jewish subjects of Hungary the only means of salvation from the dismal doom that they fear is creeping over them. The second "Jew Law" may satisfy the Nazi oppressors for the time being, but sooner or later there may be a renewal of pressure both from within and without to introduce a third "Jew Law." How long the Hungarian Government will be able to resist the pressure to which the more powerful Government of Italy felt obliged to yield, it is difficult to say. That pressure will doubtless increase as the economic needs of the Third Reich become more exacting, for the elimination of the Jews from Hungary's economic and intellectual life is Germany's opportunity; and in addition to this gross predatory motive is the malignant lust for oppression, which the Nazi sadists are bent upon indulging in an ever-widening region.

ISRAEL COHEN.

A STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL HISTORY.

IN these restless days, when our histories of the present time may be written with an imperfect knowledge of the past, we are apt to forget that not many years ago international historians could collaborate for the common benefit with excellent results. For example, diligent investigators of the dark corners in modern European history could not fail to note an unhappy sequel to the "German struggle for Liberty" from 1807 to 1814. The political system of the leaders of the central European states in the Napoleonic period left a bad example to their descendants. Such liberty as was permitted for another hundred years was not that which Stein and Gneisenau had claimed, nor even that which Mill defined in his protest against a perverted political morality which posed as science. During the last fifty years, however, international history has been largely compiled by the best methods and from the best materials available, regardless of the nationality of authors or editors. Unfortunately this practice is likely to be no longer safe, for it is alleged that while Social-Democratic states may ingenuously avow some Marxist heresies, Totalitarian states may disingenuously tamper with historical facts. In view of the strained relations that might result from such an academic quarrel, an attempt should be made by the respective national academies to correct or adjust such differences. The value of any historical publication must depend on the method of its compilation, and if this method is influenced by some political interest it may become positively misleading. At the same time historians of all nations have sturdily upheld the dignity of an academic status which has been respected, even though the liberty of free speech, a free legislature and a free press has not always been recognised.

But there is still another obstacle to these amenities. The present writer was reminded by a distinguished and very friendly German historian, when a correspondence of more than twenty years was interrupted by the World War, that insular scholars could have no conception of the difficult position of nationals protected only by precarious frontiers from repeated invasion and reprisal. Again, it has been pointed out that certain drastic devices of modern warfare

had long ago been known in embryonic forms, and Victorian rumour depicted one device so terrible that humanity required its immediate suppression. From time to time there was a hushed whisper of its possible resurrection, but though there was some search among official tombstones, the conclusion was mainly negative. Now this *sancta simplicitas* preceded the first cautious experiments in a mechanised traffic by land and air which was destined to effect a complete change in human mentality and in the conditions of international relations and prospects, threatening even the dwellings of a sea-girt nation, together with its industrial and commercial livelihood. For the command of speed and the conquest of space, which already are the cause of death or injury to rash adventurers, might lead to the lust of war, if the rich but weak nations were at the mercy of those poor but strong. A nation that has imprudently disarmed, while its "friend the enemy" has rearmed with secrecy and sacrifice, may not be able to make a recovery at leisure.

It might seem that a conservative procedure in the making of treaties of peace has failed to provide for the safety of a nation, though from the first some security was desirable. In these later days when a perplexed and anxious scrutiny of the broken terms of futile treaties may reveal the ugly fact that a beaten enemy has only crouched, to spring with strength renewed and overweening, there has been a belated search for truth in national history; from which it might be imputed that only a welcome truth can easily be found in History made and recorded by every nation on its own behalf.

Now, what can European historians do about this? Of course they can declare that it is not their business and they would surely be unwilling to scandalise their brethren in other seats of learning by personal abuse of their great ones! The publication of criticism or protest might only evoke the specious answer that political methods, which appear constitutionally objectionable to the nationals of a Social Democracy, are essential for the constitutional requirements of National Socialism, and *vice versa*. But when a Nazi minister invoked lately the judgment of the "Muse of History" his case was not one that historians could support, for here he was out of his depth, and therein lie the comedy and tragedy that are daily presented to us. For when friendly nations make unfriendly reproaches to one another on the

strength of supposed facts, which their own historians will not be able to justify hereafter and on the analogy of which they could not hope for favourable judgment in their own or any other courts of law, it might seem time that something should be done about it in the interests of all concerned.

This is really possible without imposing upon the political or social activities of a League of Nations. Have we not a well-organised international Historical Congress with its relevant committees, representing the respective academies and learned societies which collaborate amicably in historical studies? It is true that the non-Aryan bar might exclude some notable continental scholars, but such prejudices have not always been consistent. It is remembered that the Children of Shem took a leading part in founding the colonial and foreign commerce of a New England where there has always been insistence on a colour bar, which does not seem to prevent Aryan aspirations, in an older world, for similar benefits from the Children of Ham.

As matters stand, old allies have fallen out with later peace-makers; but besides the admitted grievance of worn-out treaties, there is also the distrust of new ambitions. Perhaps young nations, like young children with their innate realism, may wish to believe only what they like, but in that case the position is rather a difficult one. At the same time, we should remember also that it is "liberty" that we crave, and not "license"; and before we put ourselves upon the "Bill of Rights," it might be wise to gain disillusionment by a glance at the Secretary of State's "Warrant Books" for those "good old times." The fact is that from time to time, in the discussion of international affairs, a point is reached at which reiteration of rude abuse or polished sarcasm may cease to impress and when, to escape jovial or cynical irrelevance, a simple statement may perhaps appear worthy of consideration.

That the discovery of historical facts can be equally advantageous to statesmen and historians in every country may be seen from many incidents which arise from time to time and which cannot be easily settled by the Law Officers alone. A few years before the World War the British War Office was asked officially if there was any established agreement as to the sanctity of national archives during a state of war. The apparently correct answer was that the enforced restitution

of certain Napoleonic plunder must be regarded as a precedent for all time, but the experience of Belgian, French and Italian archivists during the subsequent War may be read at large. This and other cases suggest that an agreed respect for archives and other sources of historical literature might be associated with a regard for historical accuracy, safeguarded by national institutions. Without such an agreement, it must be insisted that misunderstandings on questions of fact are likely to arise and cannot fail to add seriously to the existing controversies between the nations.

The *American Guide to German Archives* reports that everywhere in Germany the conditions of access to the archives are most generous, with the additional advantage of careful and scientific preservation and exposition even of local archives by skilled archivists, conditions which excited the envy of our own Royal Commission on Public Records of that period. A few months earlier, in 1913, delegates from German institutions made a brave show at the Historical Congress in London, but a few years later most of them had resigned or had been expelled from their honorary association with British societies during the last and most bitter stage of the World War. But even before the Peace, special reports had been obtained from corresponding members in allied countries as to the effects of the War on their respective archives.

If we were able to survey the impressive results of our own collaboration with other nations in the compilation of historical studies, including the auxiliaries, we could only come to one conclusion. Here every aspect of a nation's growth and activities, from the earliest times to the present day, has been written and revised by the active or tacit agreement of a world-wide family of nations, each one of which has laboured in a cause that is one of the mainstays of our civilisation.

To mention but a few notable instances; the life of Richard, "King of the Germans" in the thirteenth century, which is now being written by an English scholar, has been already written by German scholars, who have also supervised details of the activities of Almain Merchants; while Italian scholars could help with new adventures by merchants of Venice, in which many English owners risked their cargoes against the Moorish galleys to fetch pomegranates or Toledo blades in exchange for the English wool and cloth which furnished the cash put out to usury by English landowners and lawyers.

The position of the Jews in medieval Europe presents difficulties to the historian, and in the later period of Jewish activities in Northern and Central Europe these difficulties increase and are associated with the position of the Jew as an emigrant or colonist. An American professor of Business History has hesitated to decide to what extent the Jew may be regarded as a good colonist. It is already evident that there is need for more historical research in the later period. That already published by Jewish historians for the earlier period is valuable. German historians, who have contributed largely to that period, should be able to assist still further in the later period also.

Nevertheless, during all those centuries of violence and danger the rich cities and fertile manors of "Magna Britannia" were not overwhelmed. And though Continental countries, with their vulnerable frontiers, suffered greater damage, few national monuments of architecture or art perished before the present century when, by the perversion of scientific discoveries, war became an object of shameless political expectation, as well as of nameless terror. But for many years past, there has been, especially in Germany, an earnest attempt to facilitate the removal of precious records, books or works of art to places of safety, and this is surely a precaution for a common benefit which might be generally observed and encouraged, together with further precautions for the immunity of ancient buildings, the destruction of which would be remembered as a common reproach to European civilisation. Perhaps too it was vainly regarded as a hopeful sign that there should have been impartial appreciation of official arrangements and decisions in athletic or sporting contests between the nations, though this seemed a test of honest judgment as clear-cut as any decision affecting historical opinion.

Finally, will English historians of world-wide repute, and others who follow in their footsteps, have to abjure conclusions reached after an exhaustive examination and the citation of official documents relating to the diplomatic history of more recent years, if they should find themselves no longer in agreement with some foreign national opinion or political interest? Studies of the culture of an older civilisation, which are still of some æsthetic and economic importance, are publicly commended in authoritarian circles and have even

been transmitted to this country under the direction of foreign scholars. No reasonable person would anticipate the disturbance of these idealistic studies for political reasons, even though the ideals pursued include studies of religious and civil liberty. Does not this suggest that freedom for the serious study and sober discussion of historical problems is really a matter of academic rather than of political interest?

Since this article was written, much history has been made, with protestations of good intentions and reproaches of ill advice on either side. It is clear that such contentions could only lead us in one direction, and that not in the "way of peace"; and if armed strife has ensued, there can be only one ultimate result. "Ye fight and war, yet ye have not." At the same time, it might seem futile to insist that the conditions of existing treaties of peace must be maintained until they are modified by consent, that justice must be done according to international law, and above all that the national and commercial liberties of every State, great or small, must be respected if the first principle of civilisation is to be preserved.

This indeed is the rub, for having been able to prepare for war while other nations prepared for peace, the Powers of the *Axis* and its followers profess to have a free hand for receiving the ill-gotten benefits, objecting to the plea for peace and goodwill that a "new order" of World power must henceforth be envisaged with fresh boundaries and treaty conditions. Here then we have already a specious and instructive proposition for the consideration of international historians. Indeed it is one that calls for a decisive ruling in view of the plausible pretension of a totalitarian régime to efficiency, in contrast with a policy of liberty and *laissez-faire*. In view also of the circumstances in which an unparalleled threat has been offered to the existing ideals of World civilisation, it is of the greatest importance that all recognised historical institutions should take careful and impartial note of what is happening. *Sic vos non vobis!*

It has been officially suggested that those governments responsible for the terrible catastrophe of the present war will have to stand "at the bar of History." Cannot this authoritative *dictum* be supplemented by another metaphor? Learned fellowships of the nations might form an irresistible phalanx in the cause of historical truth.

HUBERT HALL.

WAR IN THE AMERICAN LABOUR MOVEMENT.

THE American trade unions, perhaps the most powerful industrial labour organisation in the world, are spending an increasing part of their energies in internal warfare, since the peace efforts of last year were unsuccessful. There are a great many reasons which made the split when it came about in 1935 not only unavoidable but also a source of progress. But there is hardly any doubt to-day that the present state of war between the American Federation of Labour (A.F. of L.) and the Committee for Industrial Organisation (C.I.O.) is becoming every day more dangerous for the many important positions which labour has been able to conquer since President Roosevelt started the New Deal in 1933. Admittedly, too, the numerous clashes between the two warring factions of the labour movement are a contributory cause of the economic difficulties with which the United States is faced. Nevertheless, and in spite of official efforts of the Administration to bring about peace in the labour movement, the prospects that this may be achieved in a not too distant future are still not great.

In October 1937 the C.I.O. offered to negotiate for peace. The main peace forces within the C.I.O. were Mr. David Dubinsky and Sidney Hillman. Mr. Dubinsky is the president of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, one of the most powerful and best organised unions in the country. Mr. Sidney Hillman is the leader of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union and assists John L. Lewis in the leadership of the C.I.O., especially in dealing with the Administration and the different Government agencies. David Dubinsky is so to speak the most "European" of the American labour leaders; he not only knows Europe better than most of the rest, he also has deep understanding for world-wide labour interests. The unification of American labour is in his mind not only indispensable from an American point of view, but also as a contribution to the international cause of labour. In spite of the fact that he is the head of a suspended Union within the A.F. of L. his contacts with the International Federation of Trade Unions with which the A.F. of L. is affiliated are frequent and intimate.

Both Mr. Dubinsky's and Mr. Hillman's unions need the

President Roosevelt. On the other hand, some of the biggest C.I.O. unions, such as the miners (Mr. John L. Lewis's own organisation), the steel and the automobile workers, were visibly much less in favour of the peace move. Within the A.F. of L. its Vice-President, Matthew Woll, the representative of the A.F. of L. in the International Federation of Trade Unions, was the leader in favour of peace negotiations. The Railway Clerks' Union, led by Mr. George Harrison, and some of the minor unions backed his move.

According to the peace proposals submitted by the representatives of the A.F. of L. the ten unions which had originally constituted the C.I.O. were to be readmitted to the A.F. of L. The other newly formed unions would have had to negotiate with the corresponding A.F. of L. unions about their merger. The C.I.O. delegates suggested that the C.I.O. as such should be admitted as an autonomous organisation. They rejected the terms offered by the A.F. of L. for various reasons, the main one being that the craft unions would have had, under these terms, a majority within the united organisation. As a matter of fact, the fusion of the C.I.O. unions with the corresponding craft organisations would have strengthened the A.F. of L. representation at a national convention; under the existing voting system the votes of C.I.O. minorities within the reunited craft unions would have added to their voting power. Furthermore, there exist in some of the A.F. of L. unions and in the central organisation of the A.F. of L. the so-called class B members, who while paying full dues have no share in the making of the decisions of the union. The C.I.O. delegates apparently had some reason to fear that a part of their members would become class B members in the A.F. of L. So the peace terms offered by the A.F. of L. were rejected, only Mr. Dubinsky being in favour of their acceptance. He argued that peace in the labour movement was worth almost any price and certainly the price of being a minority—for a while. For he assumed that in a fairly short time, two or three years at the most, the supporters of industrial unionism,

thanks to the irresistible trend of economic development, would win the majority within the unified movement.

However this may be, the clash between the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. has visibly grown from a difference, on undoubtedly very important questions of organisation, into a conflict of personalities: John L. Lewis on one side, William Green on the other. And while reconciliation about the question which caused the split might be possible with some effort, it is hard to see how the leaders on both sides could again co-operate with each other. William Green was formerly a member of John L. Lewis's organisation, the United Mine Workers' Union. He represents the continuity of A.F. of L. traditions. He is a faithful pupil of Samuel Gompers, the founder of the A.F. of L. Cautious and conservative, he sticks to the principles of craft-unionism on which the A.F. of L. was built and grew—but which also explain its failure to cope with the problem of rapidly expanding mass industries and the large masses of unskilled workers they employ. Politically he supports the thesis which a spokesman of the A.F. of L., Adolph Strasser, defined fifty years ago: "We have no ultimate aims. We are going on from day to day. We are fighting for immediate objects, objects that can be realised in a few years." It would be wrong, on the other hand, to assume that William Green is blind to the hard facts of industrial evolution which make craft-unions a less and less useful instrument for the organisation of the working class. During the war William Green himself had said quite openly that industrial unions bring about "a more perfect organisation, closer co-operation and tend to develop the highest form of organisation." But as President of the A.F. of L. he felt bound to conform to the decisions of its conventions which, while accepting in principle industrial organisation, maintained the jurisdiction of the craft-unions over the skilled workers in the mass-production industries such as the automobile industry and looked askance at the efforts to organise non-skilled workers.

John L. Lewis, once himself an ardent believer in craft-unionism, has been converted to more modern forms of trade unionism by the great depression. Until 1932 he had ruled over his own union, the United Mine Workers, in a semi-dictatorial fashion. He had expelled from it Mr. John Brophy—to-day Director of the C.I.O.—and Powers Hapgood

—now one of the most active leaders of the C.I.O.—both because of their radical ideas. He is far from being a Socialist or a Communist. Hostile propaganda describes him as a tool of all sorts of "Reds." As a matter of fact, Communists of all denominations and Socialists played some rôle in the building of the C.I.O. But even John L. Lewis's worst enemies do not dare to accuse him of being himself a "red." More than most of the A.F. of L. leaders he is aware of the rôle the Labour movement has to play in the defence and development of democracy, but his "Labour's Non-Partisan League" is not a political party, apart from the American Labour Party, its branch in the state of New York. His day of awakening came during the first years of the New Deal when the A.F. of L. failed conspicuously to avail itself of the new opportunities which the N.R.A. offered to Labour. The failure of organised Labour to back the N.R.A. codes by organising the workers in the mass industries made them ineffective while John L. Lewis's union, built on the principle of industrial organisation, tripled its membership in a few months. When his efforts to induce the A.F. of L. to take the lead in the organisation of the mass-production industries remained unsuccessful he resolutely burned his ships behind him and set out to create the C.I.O.

The split might easily have been a temporary one but for the growing bitterness between the leaders on both sides. John L. Lewis is a powerful man. He is the undisputed master of the United Mine Workers which formerly was the biggest organisation within the A.F. of L. He had been responsible for William Green's election as president of the A.F. of L. after Samuel Gompers' death. He is body and soul of the C.I.O. It is not easy to imagine that he would allow his organisation to be absorbed by another one in which he would be the second in command and this under William Green. On the other hand, the A.F. of L. and William Green are so full of resentment against John L. Lewis that even to co-operate with him would be considered a tremendous sacrifice by them. The C.I.O. made most of its amazingly successful career during the brief but strong period of economic expansion in 1936 and the beginning of 1937. Many observers expected it to break down or at least to be dangerously weakened during the following recession. Most of the newspapers and the A.F. of L. leaders announced its impending death. The more so as there

were serious signs of an internal crisis in the C.I.O., especially within the Automobile Workers' Union, while Dubinsky's union drifted slowly away from the main body of the C.I.O.

The Automobile Workers' Union is, together with the Steel and the Rubber workers' unions, the most outstanding success of the movement for industrial organisation. The union exists since 1933. It left the A.F. of L. in April 1936, counting at this time about 40,000 members. It joined the C.I.O. which led it into the great strike movement at the General Motors, etc. Fifteen months later the membership had grown to about 400,000. There followed a period of stagnation. The union had been unable to assimilate fully the whole of its new membership, the greater part of which had never before been in contact with organised labour. Factional strife broke out. Homer Martin, the President of the Union, accused his opponents who were led by Vice-President Richard Frankenstein, of being communists, while they in turn pointed to his frequent contacts with Mr. Lovestone, formerly one of the leaders of the Communist Party and now of one of the communist opposition groups. The conflict between the so-called "Progressives" under Homer Martin and the "Unity Group" led by Frankenstein and Wyndham Mortimer, while the group of the Socialist Walter Reuther tried to keep the balance between the two, endangered the very life of the union. Homer Martin expelled four members of the Executive of his union and suspended another one in his functions.

John L. Lewis, who had kept out of this conflict for a long while, came finally forward with a peace offer which was immediately rejected by Homer Martin as an unwarranted intervention into the internal affairs of an autonomous organisation. Some of the biggest local organisations decided to cease paying their dues to the C.I.O. Homer Martin seemed ready to leave the C.I.O. altogether. In this critical situation Mr. Philip Murray, Vice-President of the C.I.O. who had taken a leading part in the campaign for the organisation of the steel workers, and Mr. Sidney Hillman offered themselves as arbitrators. This offer was accepted by both sides and Mr. Martin and Mr. Frankenstein pledged themselves in advance to accept the verdict of the arbitrators. Wisely enough the arbitrators refused to make any comment on the respective responsibilities for the conflict, but limited themselves to recommending the reinstatement of the four ousted officers—

which was identical with John L. Lewis's original proposal. Homer Martin submitted to this verdict and on October 4th the reinstated officers took their seats in the executive board of the union. The crisis in the Automobile Workers' Union was over, at least for the moment.

Dramatic as this conflict was, the much more diplomatic question of the relations between Mr. Dubinsky's union and the C.I.O. may well be of greater importance for the future of the C.I.O. It concerns the whole outlook of the movement for industrial organisation. The International Ladies Garment Workers' Union was one of the backbones of the C.I.O., right at its beginnings. The two needle-workers' unions, Mr. Dubinsky's and Mr. Sidney Hillman's, did much to make the C.I.O. drives in the automobile, steel and rubber industries financially possible. But at the same time Mr. Dubinsky avoided carefully any steps which might have separated him definitely from the A.F. of L. His union is only suspended, not expelled from the A.F. of L., and therefore still virtually a member of the A.F. of L. It constitutes in a way a link between the two trade union centres. Mr. Dubinsky is anxious to use this unique position in order to further the peace movement. He was the only leader of the C.I.O. who voted in favour of acceptance of the peace terms offered by the A.F. of L. While belonging to the C.I.O. he is trying to maintain a certain aloofness from it. He has, therefore, resisted the efforts to develop the C.I.O. into a permanent dual organisation which might make the split permanent. His union, which is especially strong in the New York area, refused to take part in the New York State Convention of the C.I.O., which set up a permanent State organisation duplicating the A.F. of L. State federation.

The Executive meeting of the union decided in May to stay with the C.I.O. "at least for the time being" because this may serve the movement for peace within the ranks of labour. At the same time, it appointed a committee of five members which was instructed to "use every opportunity" to achieve reopening of the conferences between the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. As was disclosed a short time ago, this committee saw the President and may have been instrumental in bringing about his intervention in the conflict.

As was to be expected, the A.F. of L. made all possible efforts in order to take advantage of the crisis in the C.I.O.

Mr. Dubinsky's attitude does not leave much room for doubt whom he considers mainly responsible for the breakdown of the peace move. The struggle within the automobile workers offered another opportunity for attacks on the C.I.O. The main line followed by the A.F. of L. in this was to point out the unique position of John L. Lewis within the C.I.O. "Further peace meetings between the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. are useless," said one of the A.F. of L. leaders in September, "because the C.I.O. is a one-man owned and operated organisation. Only the elimination of John L. Lewis would seem to lend any real hope." In October, the A.F. of L. convention in Houston (Texas) confirmed this stand, singling out John L. Lewis as the scapegoat for all the trouble in the labour movement. John L. Lewis replied by offering his resignation, provided William Green would resign at the same time as President of the A.F. of L. Neither of these resignations did, of course, materialise. William Green mockingly pointed out that John L. Lewis avoided carefully to commit himself to resign as President of the United Mine Workers; this is the union which is practically running the C.I.O. and paying John L. Lewis's salary, while William Green has no job besides the one as President of the A.F. of L. Already during the summer the A.F. of L. had announced that it was willing to allow C.I.O. unions to return into the older trade union centre. It guaranteed them full autonomy in the conduct of union affairs and freedom from political assessments. Furthermore, the A.F. of L. began to charter new unions to compete with C.I.O. organisations and organised a "war chest" for the fight against the rival trade unions by imposing a special tax of one cent a month on each member of affiliated unions. The conflict is not only endangering industrial peace in the United States, it tends to develop into a menace for the newly erected structure of social legislation in this country. It is now being extended even beyond the frontiers of the United States.

Since the failure of the N.R.A., the legal basis for the workers' right to organise and conclude collective agreements is the "National Labour Relations Act." Under this act the National Labour Relations Board is given discretionary powers to determine the bargaining unit, i.e. the union best fitted to enter collective bargaining. This tends first of all to exclude the so-called "company unions," unions led or financed by the management. But the Board has also fairly

often had to choose between rival A.F. of L. and C.I.O. unions and the A.F. of L. complains that its decisions have been one-sided in favour of the C.I.O. It is extremely difficult to form an independent judgment about this complaint. It must, however, be stated that so far the Supreme Court has always decided in favour of the Board whenever its decisions came up for revision. The A.F. of L. started a campaign against the Board. So one of the most important pieces of social legislation in this country is in danger of being a victim of the internecine strife of the labour movement. At the same time, the A.F. of L. is carrying its fight into the field of general politics. Congressmen who are accused of having too intimate relations with the C.I.O. see their re-election opposed by the A.F. of L. Maury Maverick, Congressman for Texas, the leading spokesman of the progressive forces, failed to win his primary election and the A.F. of L. attributed his defeat to its refusal to endorse him because of his alleged preference for the C.I.O. The seat will be held by a reactionary.

The so-called international unions in the United States derive their name from the fact that they have affiliated locals in Canada. The Canadian Trades and Labour Congress refuse so far to expel from its ranks these locals which now belong to C.I.O. unions. Now the A.F. of L. is trying to force the Canadian unions to declare war on the C.I.O. Every Canadian union will in future have to hold a charter from the A.F. of L. in addition to the charters of the Canadian trade union centre. The A.F. of L. may at any time suspend or revoke charters issued by the Canadian congress. In a similar way the war is being extended to Latin America. John L. Lewis has established intimate contacts with the newly created Latin-American Federation of Labour which is being led by the Mexican Federation of Labour (C.T.M.) under Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The A.F. of L. is trying to revive the old Pan-American Federation of Labour with which the Mexican "C.R.O.M." is affiliated. In view of the growing dangers the conflict is bringing about for American economic prosperity President Roosevelt himself made an effort for conciliation in a letter addressed to the A.F. of L. convention. It is even hinted that he may be willing personally to act as mediator. So far, the response from the A.F. of L. was not encouraging, in spite of the fact that the powerful teamsters' union under Mr. Daniel Tobin came out in favour of a new

peace move. The A.F. of L. wants Lewis's head. The C.I.O. does not seem to be willing to sacrifice its leader.

Since this article was written, peace negotiations have actually started between the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O., according to the President's wishes. Under the pressure of several unions, such as the powerful teamsters' union, the A.F. of L. negotiators showed a high degree of willingness to compromise and declared that the A.F. of L. was willing to accept the main former A.F. of L. unions which had joined the C.I.O., in their present state, including their new membership as increased since the split. In many cases C.I.O. unions have organised workers who would belong to A.F. of L. unions under the traditional craft rules of the American labour movement. John L. Lewis, on the other hand, came out with the surprising statement that he did not believe that this concession was really made in good faith. In addition he directed bitter personal attacks upon the A.F. of L. negotiators, particularly Mr. Matthew Woll, Vice-President of the A.F. of L. and its representative in the International Federation of Trade Unions with which the British trade unions are affiliated. The C.I.O. leader accused these men of being reactionaries and charged them with being financially dependent upon sources outside and antagonistic to the labour movement.

For the time being this statement ended the negotiations. However, the painful impression remained that Mr. John L. Lewis had accepted the negotiations in the hope only that the A.F. of L. would operate so clumsily that the burden of the failure could be placed upon its shoulders. Whatever one may think about the merits of the accusations levelled against the A.F. of L. leaders, John L. Lewis knew these men long before he entered the peace parley. It would appear that certain C.I.O. successes during the last months encouraged its leader in the hope for a complete victory over the A.F. of L. However this may be, as the situation now stands, John L. Lewis appears to many as the man who prevented the union of the organised labour movement.

ADOLF STURMTHAL.

Lecturer on International Relations.

American University, Washington.

AN ESSAY IN SLAVONIC FOLKLORE.

IT would be difficult to find a neater definition of the traditional attitude of the rustic Slavs towards the idea of the Devil than the much-quoted Czech proverb: "The devil is not so black as they paint him." In their mythology the ancient Slavs never formed a conception of evil pure and uncompromising. They preferred a Devil in whom, as in man, good and evil are grotesquely mingled and with whom relations were never strained. Thus when he emerged from anonymous elementary existence and became a paintable personality, the Slavs decided that an all-black portrait was not the right style to adopt where one is concerned with an old friend for whom much might be said.

In the current superstitions, proverbs and folk tales of the Slavs, several distinct stages of demonology are discernible. Dating back to different periods they now live on in a curious mixture of ideology which has been, and still is, always ready to absorb more than it discards.

1. *The "Churt" of the Animistic Stage.*

The original name for the Devil was *čert* (pronounced churt) in Czech, *čort* in Russian, *czort* in Polish, *črt* in Lusatian, or *škrť*, *škart*. The root of these words is seen in the modern verbs *črtati*, to sketch, and *škrťati*, to strike a surface with a match or pencil, to strike out. It is an onomatopœia intimating that the first churts were conceived of as small nimble creatures springing out of or from behind objects, and disappearing again at once, almost too quickly for a human eye to see them.

The churts began their careers as a legion. They lived first in caves and hollow trees. There is a current expression in Russian: "to fall in love with somebody like the Devil with a dry willow tree." When people started to build houses the churts fell in with the idea, choosing lofts, dark corners and the floor as their own. They lurked in shadows, short of stature, hirsute, with a tail but no horns. Mustard seed seems to have been their favourite food, for we are told that one can still see them if one stands near a bowl full of mustard seed on a midsummer night. They were freakish little creatures, neutral in disposition but very easily offended. Any omission of an established custom, such as performing a job at a wrong time or in a wrong way, made them cross. So even now it is

believed to be unlucky to sweep the floor "against" the window or carry out the sweepings after dusk. In a Polish tale a churt appears in butter churned on Friday night (cp. May-butter, made in Germany on Walpurgis night). A Russian housewife finds a churt in the bread which she kneaded in a dirty trough. A churt can also "unwind himself" out of the yarn spun on Thursday.

The chief activity of the churts has always been to tease and corrupt people's good temper. They can make a thing disappear by sitting on it or covering it by their tail or claw. The other day a learned professor was advised by his landlady, in good earnest, to say, "Churt, please, let your claw go," whenever spectacles or notes for a lecture proved missing. If a visitor arrives in the middle of spring-cleaning or an income-tax reminder flutters down the letter-box just when one's salary has been cut, people would say, "It must have happened just to-day as of course the churt would have it."

The churts are very vigilant. They "never sleep" and would watch with a malicious pleasure any person lacking in concentration or prone to forgo their promises. They venture into church and hunt underneath the pews for prayers dropped by fidgety worshippers. To quote John Huss, they are "ever ready to collect the 'munched' lines of the psalms recited with unseemly haste."

2. *The Devil of the Converts to Christianity.*

(a) *In the West.* The struggle between the heathen religion of the Slavs and the Christian Faith has left behind a line of demarcation dividing the Western Slavs, converted mostly under Teutonic pressure, and the South-Eastern Slavs taught by the apostles from Greece. Demonology is one of the many instances where the division, though not sharp or consistent, can be traced quite clearly. Perun, Triglav, Veles and other West Slavonic deities shared the fate of their Nordic, Celtic and Teutonic rivals—they were deemed Powers of Evil. They could not go to exile like the Baltic "*ludci*," because the neighbouring countries were hostile, nor could they have been sent into an underworld like Loki, because the placid lowlands by Elbe, Vistula and Danube did not provide the local religions with any clear conception of hell. They retreated simply into the background (cp. *Götterdämmerung*) and in the process of several centuries fused with the Devil of the Christian creed

making him far less black than the apostles believed he must be. A new word was adopted for this kind of devil, *dábel* (Czech), *diabol* (Russian), *djavo* (Serbian), *djabel* (Polish). The old word *churt*, however, remained in use and was probably applied to him at home, or retained for the smaller goblins. But in the long run the two words became almost equivalent and only a phrase reminds us of the original difference of the terms, viz. "*Cert jako dábel*," that is "Like the Churt like the Devil." The phrase is now used much as the English "between the devil and the deep sea."

The new Devil lived at first in remote valleys or hid in rocks, an open worship of the old deities being discouraged. He hated the sound of bells and was afraid of the sign of the cross, but trusted people whom he met alone or in a small company. The hope that he might return and come again into his own was abandoned, but the shock of seeing the ancient idols hewn to pieces by the missionaries lived in the subliminal memory of the converts.

Another argument for the Devil's career in the pre-Christian ages is the idea that "The Devil is old." (Cp. Goethe "To understand the Devil one must be old.") The more naïvely people think of him, the older he appears. A high-spirited lady, a late belle of the drawing-rooms of the 'eighties, used to reassert herself against her not-so-respectful nieces by saying, "Old? I? Certainly not. I am not the Devil." The Devil was much taller than the churt. In addition to his stature he had now horns, like Perun and other thunder gods. He also took over Thursday for his own and insisted on it being a holiday. No spinning or washing was to be done, and beans, the traditional food of the demons, were cooked for dinner. In Austria-Hungary Thursday was a holiday in provincial schools right up to the twentieth century.

(b) *In the East and South.* Under the influence of the Apocrypha and the patristic writings the eschatology of the Slavs belonging to the Orthodox Church is more dualistic from the beginning. The Devil appears on the stage as soon as the days of the creation of the world. A *Simia Dei*, he tries to make a world, too, but fails. All things unpleasant and barren are attributed to him.

The Slavs, devoted to agriculture and always continental in their tastes, attributed to the Devil islands, sea coasts, marshes, bogs, rocks and all unproductive land. The Devil

made the plants which can live on poor soil, like thistle, or on swamps, like *parnasia pallustris*. *Scabiosa pratensis* is called in Bohemia *čertkus*, i.e. Devil's bite, for the Devil, who found it on his boggy meadow without having planted it there, bit its root off in a fit of temper. He also bit out the first and third quarter of the full moon and he tries every now and then to steal the moon altogether (eclipse). It is still customary in the Balkans to cover the wells during an eclipse of the sun lest the water should become poisonous. Envious of God's success in creating the sun, the Devil often hides in black clouds and is then chased and shot at by St. Ilia, the patron of good weather, who owes his reputation to his identification sometimes with Helios, sometimes with the prophet Elijah.

The Devil attempted further to make man, but the result was a monkey. His other creatures are the magpie among the birds and the silurus among the fish. God, in pity for his disappointments, gave him the dog who in those days had no hair. The devil gave the dog his fur and reared it to be a wolf. Of a later origin is the mouse. When Noah was making preparations for the Flood the Devil in his envy wished to wreck the plans for man's preservation and made mice and rats. But God saw him at it and said, "Let there be cats," and so cats were made to catch the mice.

Failing to be God's rival the Devil turned into Satan, the accuser, the adversary, the seducer of man. The word Satan is not used by the Slavs except in connection with the scripture or catechism. Instead he is often called the murderer of the soul, *vorog* (Russian), *vrąg* (Polish), *vrag* (Serbian). As such he has grown wings, a feature hitherto unknown in the Western tradition. He still wears no clothes at this stage. Under this Greek and Persian influence the Slavonic Devil begins the long and losing combat with man whose soul he wants to destroy. Out of sixty legends on the theme there is only one in which victory is his, and that is to be found in Tolstoy's writings. How far Tolstoy altered its original version is difficult to tell, but the moral is obviously his own.

The Devil had been trying for eighty years to seduce a pious *moujik* to sin, all in vain. At last he said to the man, "Ivan, there are three sins from which you may choose, but sin you must before you die. So make up your mind which you would rather do: to blaspheme, to commit a murder, or to get thoroughly drunk." Ivan was getting very tired of the

Devil's frequent visits, so he thought the matter well over. Murder was out of the question of course, and blasphemy—oh, no, that did not bear thinking of, but what about getting drunk? Lots of people get drunk every Saturday and the earth does not swallow them up; why should not he do it just once and rid himself of the tormentor? So Ivan betook himself to the tavern and the sin was accomplished. The Evil one was satisfied and never came again. But Ivan, passing the tavern next time, remembered the taste of vodka and went in, and soon was gloriously drunk once more. And he started drinking daily, and quarrelling with his wife, and cheating the *barin*. Once when he was about to go to the tavern, his favourite grand-daughter tried to stop him. Ivan was seized with fury, lifted his stick and struck the child so that she fell dead. Seeing what he had done he ran out, and, shaking his fists against the sky, cursed Heaven in a terrible blasphemy.

But this fable is a great exception. Almost invariably the Devil is not clever enough to outwit man, though he invents games and sports to divert man's mind from God. At a later date he taught man playing cards and still later smoking. Therefore cards are called Devil's psalter and tobacco his seasoning. His chances were specially low when he attempted to win the soul of a holy bishop or an anchorite. Among many instances of how those energetic ascetics sublimated their temptations and made Satan serve them, the case of St. Procopius is one of the most graphic. Using holy water and a thorny rod, he taught the Devil to plough. Another victorious example is St. Nicolas, who seems to have taken the Devil almost for his pet and is still seen to walk with him and the angel, a harmonious and happy triad. Frequently the Devil himself is called Nick, and dogs and wolves have in St. Nicolas their patron saint. On his feastday they must not be beaten or hunted and they would not bite.

Coerced and domesticated by the saints, the Devil entered upon innumerable bargains with the peasants, sometimes still hoping to destroy a soul, but more often simply to earn his bread and cheese. Here is a story from Russia. The Devil offered his services to a cottager on the condition of going halves for the harvest. "Will you have the half above or under the ground?" asked the cottager. "Above," said the Devil quickly. The cottager planted beet, had the

roots and gave the Devil the shrivelled leaves. "This year it is my turn to have the underground half," said the Devil next spring. The cottager agreed and sowed wheat. So the story goes on, and the Devil is outwitted always, whether the choice is between the outer or inner part of the fruit, or the first or the last sheaf.

3. *The Post-Medieval Devil.*

The further progress of the Slav Devil is limited to the West. In the east and south of Europe it was checked early, together with many other features of civilisation, by invasions of various Mongol peoples. So while the Western Devil benefited by the Crusades and minstrelsy, by Scholasticism and the New Learning, the South-Eastern species remained, from the days of Khubla Khan to the days of Gogol and Saltykov-Scedrin, the same simple-minded, shaggy, nature god. Even in the West his evolution was retarded by the German wars and religious unrest. The thread of poetical imagination is picked up again in the sixteenth century, and the fairy tales and legends from that period onwards bear distinct marks of the days of chivalry and neoclassicism. The collections of the first Slavonic folklorists offer abundant material for study, in which the ideologies of sundry periods are embedded in the same clear and fascinating way as geological strata.

The New Devil's pedigree goes back to the discovery of the Arabian Nights by the Crusaders. From the djinns he learned an amazing number of tricks—how to handle magic carpets which make wings superfluous, how to dazzle man with tablecloths which at his bidding cover themselves with unheard-of delicacies, or sticks which beat one's enemy all by themselves, how to hide or conjure up castles-in-an-apple, and so forth. He is now on visiting terms with man and has a fixed abode in hell under the ground. The Slavonic hell, though borrowed from the classics, is not a gloomy place like Hades or one without comfort and hope like Dante's Inferno. It is well arranged, with Lucifer for a king, a very hot place, very rich and somehow homely, like a brewery in a well-to-do borough. If a meadow of asphodels belongs to it it is used by a couple of devils for a combat, almost a match, we might say; if, on rare occasions, we hear of the black waters of the sunset seas, the Devil Ferryman manages to get his time off duty somehow.

It goes without saying that now the Devil wears clothes.

The cloven foot is hidden in smart boots, his horns under a feathered beret. Only a goat-beard remains to remind us of his forefathers, but a pointed beard is quite the fashion. Besides the traditional black he favours red, the colour of fire. But, unlike Italy, he never wears yellow, the colour of infamy. Why should he? He has become very clever indeed. Gone is the time when he was only as wise as the snake: he has had now the academic schooling worthy of any lawyer or divine. He has learnt all there is about alchemy and science. He is fit to be the jester of kings or their moneylender. Now and then he is a perfect Mephistopheles, but such instances are rare.

A new, and highly commendable, virtue of his is a marked sense for dependability, so much so that many a rogue has out-devilled him. When at last he has realised how cunning man can be, he covers himself by a contract, preferably signed in blood. Even then he always loses, e.g. in the *Fisherman's Son*, or in *Záboř's Bed*. In both stories a motive of bargaining with a babe's soul is used. Still he remains honest and pays his debts scrupulously. There is a proverb, "Do good to the Devil and he will repay you with Hell," and a phrase, used when a mishap occurs, "The Devil owed me this." Having now—that is to say in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—so much to do with witchcraft, he develops a partiality for cats. There are still many housewives among the Slavs who would not have a black cat. The superstition of the lucky black cat first thing in the morning is unknown. In Russian the phrase, "A black cat ran between them" signifies that friends have become estranged.

Another new feature of his is a marked courtesy to women. He is, or in any case is taken for, a bachelor. He visits balls, fairs and country gatherings such as spinning or feather-stripping parties. In many a story he appears in response to a secret sigh of a wallflower. As a lover he is generous and shows a great knowledge of feminine temperament. Alas for him, he lives to regret his adventures.

A truly medieval characteristic is the Devil's fear of three objects, the cross, the aspergillum and the cock. The current phrases to be afraid of some person or situation "like the Devil of the cross," or "all of a sudden there goes the aspergill, my churt," speak for themselves. The idea of the cock as a safeguard against evil spirits is of course well known to all Indo-European races. In a Polish

variant of the theme the Devil has succeeded in winning the soul of a baron. On the night when the soul was due to him he walks bravely into the village where the manor stands, for he has been careful to have all cocks there stolen by a vagrant Jew. Yet when midnight strikes and the Devil's arm stretches to seize the prey, a tiny voice crows under the window. It is a newly hatched chicken, only half out of the shell, but its voice is enough to chase the Devil away and save the baron.

4. *The Protector of the Serfs.*

The eighteenth century was a terrible time for the Slav peasantry. The double burden of serfdom and long compulsory military service proved often beyond the strength of the subjects of the Enlightened Despots. He who deserted or refused to comply with his landlord's inhuman regulations, had to choose between suicide and hiding in forests till he was hunted down like a wolf. Now and then a band of outlaws managed to gather round a leader and form a *kamaradstvo* of highwaymen. The gentry and rich townspeople were afraid, but the serfs looked up to the robbers as heroes and avengers of their wrongs. Stories of the highwaymen's ingenuity in avoiding their persecutors, of their power and their kindness to the oppressed, soon grew into tales of fabulous dimensions. The robbers became endowed with fairy gifts and magical faculties; they were invulnerable, invisible at will and able to turn into giants or animals. No wonder the idea of Devil became mixed up with the romance of the robbers. Tales of how he appeared in a green hat to meet the despair of the objects of tyranny are countless. He became in fact an angel of vengeance on the inexorable landlords and officers, a dream-fulfilment of the serf's craving for social justice and redress of all his suffering.

A typical story of this period is that of the "Devil's brother-in-law" (Bohemia). Jirka succeeded in running away from the barracks where a callous sergeant made his life a misery. He could not go home for fear of the bailiff, a man equally evil-minded. He hid in a forest, met a Gentleman in Green there and entered his service. When his new master seized him and flew up in the air, Jirka realised that his new place would be in Hell, but made up his mind to hope for the best. It could not be worse than the barracks or the squire's

prison. His hope proved to be right. For seven years Jirka stayed in Hell, tending three large cauldrons over an ever-burning fire and feeling quite happy. When his time was up, he received generous wages and permission to peep into the cauldrons. In the first he found the sergeant, in the second the bailiff, in the third an aunt who had treated him badly in his boyhood. The story ends with a triple wedding. Jirka is married to the squire's youngest daughter, while her two sisters are taken to Hell to be married to devils as a punishment for their pride.

5. *The Devil's Yesterday.*

In the nineteenth century the Western Slavs began to revive from the stupor into which they had fallen under the Germanising efforts of the Habsburgs and the Prussian kings. Their cultural progress had been artificially retarded for over a hundred years, during which naïve superstitions flourished placidly in the mind of the middle classes. While the newly liberated farmer settled happily to work at his freehold, his creed summed up in the proverb "Fear God and don't annoy the Devil," the townsman was not averse to imitating any freak of occultism discarded by the fashionable drawing-rooms. We may quote the *séances* in the so-called Faust's House in Prague as an example. The nineteenth-century novels of the Slavs are full of tame hints at the thrill of contemplating, but never actually putting into practice, an approach to the Evil One.

The national revival of the Czechs and Poles from about 1790 onward was accompanied by much success in the field of music. It is interesting to note how almost every composer of this period has made use of the devil motive in his works, and built upon the vernacular tradition that the Devil is fond of music and partial to musicians whom he rewards with gold. Besides innumerable songs we may mention Smetana's opera *The Chert's Cliff*, Dvořák's *The Chert and Cathleen*, Weinberger's *Švanda the Piper*. So what with the survivals of the earlier times and the neoromantic music the Devil was not so badly off even in modern days—that is to say, up to the fateful hour when he met the Realist.

The Realist put his foot down and decided that the Devil, *alias* Chert, does not exist, and therefore must go to hell. Like the Devil himself the iconoclast might not be so black as

they paint him, but one virtue he has always lacked which the Devil possesses—the sense of proportion. So the Devil was turned out, first from the school and nursery, then from the shanty booth at fairs, from literature and science, and finally from most sermon books. He has become a laughing-stock of the provincial butcher's boy and a joke for any simpleton.

Yet every year a red-letter day comes for the old chap, a day when he is once again a demigod and very nearly the centre of the picture. This is St. Nicolas Eve, December 5th. Snows fall thickly, sledges run over the fields and in the town the tram conductors wear high fur hats and top boots. There is a smile on everybody's face as they see the tinsel-trimmed shops and stalls at street markets. The Devil's image, together with his beloved patron saint's, is seen everywhere. Picture postcards and china statuettes shine with gorgeous red. Countless replicas were baked overnight of dough, gingerbread, pumpernickel, sweetmeat or chocolate. Would not his eyes, made of raisins, twinkle and rove towards the stalls with birches, neatly bound and some of them gilded? Most of the birches will no doubt go, like Valentines, to the grown-ups for a joke, but there will be a good few bought to fulfil the traditional duty of the birch. These will be thrust behind the corner of a picture or a mirror and referred to, even by the realistically minded parents, when the new generation shows undue independence.

The short day wears off. It is night. St. Nicolas's night! Out springs the Devil! hurrah! He bounds and fawns at the holy Bishop's feet, he frightens the gentle Angel so that he nearly drops his load of apples, nuts and candies. The rascal has to be put on a chain. There, he has smudged the Bishop's alb, and though contrite under the rebuke one moment, the next he is already putting his tongue out at the passers-by. What a night the three spirits have together! How the children scream and the old folk smile at their entry—how the Devil almost breaks the chain when a pretty maiden turns up her pretty nose at his jokes, how he roars and thumps at the doors which would not open to the Angel's knock! Midnight strikes before the Three have finished their round. The Angel's robe is become almost as black as the Devil's face, the Saint is yawning behind his cotton glove. The Devil is crunching a *lovely* bar of chocolate.

W. J. BROWNEY.

A VISIT TO AUSTRALIA.

I DID not wish to visit Australia. I saw her as a new country lacking in the interest and charm of an older civilisation, and visualised her as scrubby, raw, and sun-scorched. I sat in the woods near my home one February morning and wrote in my diary, "If someone said to me, 'You need not go to Australia,' I would rejoice."

Little did I imagine that I was going to a land that offered intense beauty and interest; to a land so ancient that beside it, geologically, our continent is but a youngster. For the colonising of Australia by the British is only an icing on the rich cake of prehistoric interest that is found there. This colonisation and all that has been achieved within one hundred and fifty years thrills one by its romance. Every sheep, cow and horse was taken by the colonists in sailing ships; and wheat and other grain was introduced to a land that produced practically nothing but grass, edible roots, and edible grubs. After a while I found that, when living in Australia, I had my interest continually directed towards the past, to the cult of the Aborigines, and their prehistoric land, whilst equally my interest was directed forward to the development of a new and splendid nation. In this way life in Australia is never dull.

My visit to Australia included Fremantle and Perth, then some months in Adelaide, a stay of two months in Alice Springs in Central Australia, two or three visits to Melbourne, a few days at Canberra, then Sydney, and so home.

The back door of Australia is certainly Fremantle; the front door is Sydney Harbour. I hope Fremantle will forgive me, but I was frankly disappointed with the first sight of this port when we landed that March day. We had called at ports that suggested the Arabian Nights, only to arrive at the other end of the world to find something resembling English suburbs. Tin roofs, with faded paint, some even rusty; bungalows with variegated ironwork on the balconies, and over all a white fierce light. Such were my first impressions of Australia. Here and there a festoon of purple bougainvillea falling over a fence, or a hedge of plumbago cheered us as we drove from Fremantle to Perth. Later, walking in the King's Gardens, surrounded by splendid sub-tropical trees, I looked down on to that vast lake, the Swan River, and to the hills beyond, a delicate turquoise shade, with filmy shadows

thrown across them, and the sight of this vast and beautiful panorama held the key to the beauty I was to find all over this ancient and strange continent, lying isolated in the southern seas. Now when I look back on the interest and beauty which Australia offers, I can hardly recapture the feeling of depression that her ports gave. Do not judge Australia by her doors to the sea.

In Perth, city of broad streets and clean buildings, the general interest of conversation was the recent rain. It is of national interest in Australia. Besides the healthy look of the people in the streets I remarked on the absence of elderly people. My assumption was that in a country where the temperature sometimes rises to 110 degrees in the shade, no one lived to old age. Otherwise, where were the old men and women, the feeble and the frail? The answer was given me later. These seeming middle-aged, robust-looking men and women were their aged; but in this land of sunshine and youthful spirit no one looked old. Here were men and women of over seventy, upright and gay, enjoying life. This, then, is the place to live. It is a fallacy to think it is always hot in Australia. In the modern houses central heating is installed, which is much needed during the winter and spring.

Adelaide is a little city of flowers and joyousness. To live on North Terrace, with its quaint Victorian houses (now, alas, having to give way to taller structures), always in sight of trees, lawns and flowers, to enjoy the cheerful atmosphere of easy, happy life beneath a clear sky and vivifying sunshine, this is life indeed. Australia lends itself to pageantry; and a levée at Government House, with the regimental band playing on the lawns; a procession to the University of the Vice-Chancellor and the Professors, the gay flower borders in North Terrace mingling with their scarlet and purple hoods, all enhanced by the gaiety of the sunshine, remains in one's mind a part of the happy scenes that modern Australian life is always offering.

Adelaide is more in touch with life in the country, or the bush, than any of the other capitals. It is, to begin with, nearer the hills and the orange groves, and the open rolling country. To it come those from the Northern Territory and the far Eastern plains. Australia is certainly a land of holidays; and every opportunity is taken to enjoy them. Behind all the social meetings of the day, starting at 11

o'clock, for tea, coffee and cakes, and behind all the Australian women's interest in dress (how well Australian women do dress) there is always the thought of the land and of primary productions. This interest in land, sheep, cattle, race-horses and racing, is one of the attractions of Australia. Too many flock to the towns, but I believe at heart all Australians have a sense of the country.

Life is more simple in Australia. It has not become the complicated intricate task of Western Europe. But Australia must have more people; and those who come armed with an urge to work and who have some private means are the most welcome. The new scheme of assisted migration through nomination gives great facilities. I soon realised that to accept a post in Australia is no sign of defeat, but a great opportunity. It means scope in a country of splendid national vigour.

Those that intend visiting or living in Australia may be sure of two blessings: kindness and sunshine. In Australia I found all the traits of the British race, but with that enemy, reserve, happily removed, that kill-joy of so much affection, the self-made prison bars of sensitive natures.

Australian cities are becoming quickly modernised. In the centre skyscrapers are rising, and streets of Victorian or even Georgian features are disappearing. They defend their tin roofs by saying that tin is more useful for collecting the rain when it falls. I began not only to become used to the ugly roofs, rusty and faded, crowning equally ugly bungalows, but even to grow fond of them, because they became associated with the happiness I found in this sunny land. They had no pretensions, there was no idea of making them Tudor by adding artificial beams and useless gables. They were just homes, built at a time when building material was scanty. Even D. H. Lawrence forgot that he had once grumbled at the bungalows, for Australia wove her magic around him too, and he is able to write in *Kangaroo*: "Tin roofs and scattered shanties will always remind me of Australia. They seem to me beautiful, though it's a fact they have nothing to do with beauty."

People in Australia do not have frayed nerves. I put their good temper down to the sunshine and to the amount of good food they eat. Their feeling of loyalty to the Mother Country is deep and touching. This is one of the many joys of living

in Australia. I found, too, little complaint and much optimism. Everyone is busy, or enjoying themselves; they do not know what self-pity is. Only when the north wind blows, bringing grey skies and dust storms, with intense heat, do people go about complaining. I came to the conclusion that Australians are spoilt in the way of weather, and that we, who have to be content with days of dullness, fog, biting winds and endless rain, accept gladly the days which they discard as bad.

The Australian youth is splendid. Beauty of face and limb, with charming deference for those older than themselves, they hold my admiration. The much-talked-of Cockney accent, noticeable in some, is completely lacking in others. The mystery is how did they first acquire the change of the "a" to "i"? Again, their "o" is more often than not pronounced "u"; thus school becomes schule; moon is muune. This has its attraction.

As they come from British stock, Australians have gardening in their bones. I have never seen a greater profusion of flowers than in Australia, for here again is the meeting-place of the English plants with the sub-tropical. Heliotrope and roses, lavender, oleanders and plumbago, grow beside the familiar annuals, and over all is the radiant light of Australia.

There are no primroses, no bluebells among the wild flowers, which all seem dry and twiggy compared to our luscious flowers. The purple bugloss or Salvation Jane, as it is commonly called there, is an exception. I have seen this plant growing in stretches up the side of Mount Lofty, a glorious carpet, chequered by sun and shade, here a pale mauve, there a deep purple. In South Australia one November day we found on either side of the road twenty varieties of wild flowers. There were three varieties of orchids, delicate, spidery things, various grevilleas, the crimson bottle-brush, the common heath, brown-berried baronia, and a delicate blue flower, commonly known as bluebell, but quite unlike our wild hyacinth. Most of the plants were drought resisting. As I roamed about the scrub, picking flowers here and here, I thought how horticulturists and botanists in England would delight to be in my place. There was not one flower in my bunch that I could have found growing wild in England.

Then there are the great primeval forests of Australia, called by the misleading name of the Bush. Here the tall

eucalyptus giants, like marble columns, rise 200 feet out of a dense growth of tree, fern and tangle, a growth that has never been touched until the white man came and cut a road through. These vast, silent forests hold one in their mystery and beauty.

To study the fauna of Australia, a sanctuary has been opened to the public in a corner of one of these virgin forests, at Healesville near Melbourne. In this Australian Whipsnade, the Koala bears, so much admired, so friendly, look at one with queer sleepy expression. They have an intelligence of the lowest order. Their fearlessness makes one realise how they would fall a prey to the more developed animals that never penetrated to this isolated continent. Indeed, the fearlessness of birds and beasts in Australia is most marked to a visitor. I have seen the Kukkaburra sitting motionless in the forest on a bough a few feet away, and quietly contemplating me.

At Healesville I saw the duck-billed platypus, playing in its pool with a mop with which its indefatigable guardian, Mr. Eadie, an official of the Sanctuary, tickled it, to show off its graces. This animal with close fur and a duck's bill, a mammal that lays eggs and lives in water or on land, can only be seen in Australia, and only Mr. Eadie has been able to keep one alive in captivity.

Not all visitors have penetrated into the heart of Australia. Some think it must be quite a feat to visit Alice Springs, the township in the Northern Territory, but since the Government has provided a good though halting train to take you from door to door (except for one change into the narrow gauge at Terowie) you need but book your ticket, and then be sure you arrive on the right Thursday at Adelaide station. If you miss the train you have to wait a fortnight. Lately I understand the train leaves every week. Once on board I do not think there is a more friendly or convivial journey in the world. It lasts three days and two nights, and the distance is 1,100 miles. The track runs due north from Adelaide and the terminus is in the very centre of Australia.

I left Adelaide for Alice Springs on a cold July morning. The Mount Lofty range was obscured in fog. Not until we had travelled for ten hours northwards did it become warmer. By that time we had left the cultivated country, with the broad, sweeping acres of brown and red ploughland, and here and

there a darker streak of green where the young corn was sprouting, and had reached a brown, dried-up country. Away in the distance rose a ridge of blue hills, with great clouds riding over them, bringing a promise of rain that never came. Everywhere the grazing country looked like brown ploughland, which as the sun went down became gilded in a golden lustre. It spoke of endless drought, and a fight for existence, yet these wide open spaces, where no grass grows, save after rain that comes seldom, have a beauty all their own.

Among the other occupants of the train were a party of gold prospectors and two young women nurses going as far as Oodnadatta to stay three years there nursing in the Inland Mission. It was a most sociable, cheery party, the meals on board were well cooked, and sleepers were provided. The train stopped every few hours, to pay the fettleers on the railway, and fill up their water-tanks, then passengers alighted and strolled about, and casually mounted the train as it moved off. Here I saw the scarlet flowers of the Sturt Pea, growing by one of the shacks on the side of the rail.

During the night we picked up the cricket news on the wireless, and were regaled with the latest score of the Test teams in England.

I awoke the second day to find greater aridness. We were surrounded by endless miles of cruel red baked earth, where only a few stunted and half-dead mulga trees struggled to live. The bleached bones of cattle by the wayside told of drought and tragedy. And then we came to the sand, and to the township of Maree, which is nothing but a few corrugated-iron huts, a small hotel and store, all unprotected from the pitiless sun. Here Afghans, tall and majestic, strolled about the station. These Afghans keep the camel teams, which still are used for transport, although motor lorries are replacing them.

We were travelling through a land where Time did not matter; there was just endless space, a hot burning sun, and on both sides mirage after mirage. Once some kangaroos bounded alongside the train, but otherwise there was no sign of life. Oodnadatta, which until recently was the rail terminus, is another isolated township. Here a few green pepper trees gave relief to the eye, and here too were more Afghans and their camels, waiting for loads. Then on again, through red sand, broken by the grey tufts of the salt bush and past the

dried-up salt lake, Lake Eyre. Is the whole interior of Australia drying up, I asked myself?

It was not until the middle of the night of the third day, owing to engine trouble, that we reached that oasis in the centre of Australia, the township of Alice Springs. Shall I ever forget the wonder of the starlit sky as I alighted? Anyone who has not seen the southern sky can picture these myriads of stars, beginning close down on the horizon and sweeping across the heavens with the "white star road" of the Milky Way spanning the dome.

In the morning I awoke to hear parrots screaming as they flew over the tin roof of my humble lodging. They were golahs, with their pink breasts showing. They flew in the direction of the steep, barren range of hills that guards the township from the south, hills which in the early morning light were flushed to a magical shade of coral pink. Then some Afghans chanted their morning prayer near by, in the clear, frosty air, for frosts are common here in the winter where the elevation is 2,000 feet. Whilst I lay in bed, in my airy room, with its rafters and tin roof, I watched some Aborigines pass down the sandy way beside my window, the women looked sordid in soiled skirts and faded jumpers, the men in old trousers and coats and felt hats. It was a disillusionment, and I soon found any romance that might cling to these people of the Stone Age period is destroyed here, where they are in contact with the white people. It was hard to realise that these untidy, half-civilised natives were some of the great hunting Arunta tribe. The Aborigines live in a desolate camp two miles from Alice Springs, and have rations given them once a week. Most of the young Aborigines work as gardeners, stockmen and Government wood-cutters to the white people; the *lubras*, the native women, help in the rough housework. But in spite of their ludicrous clothing, the fine poise and bearing of these natives was not altogether hidden. One has to go farther north-west and north-east to see them in their natural state, where anthropologists are studying the customs and complicated social code of this vanishing race, and awaking the Australian nation to the importance of preserving the remnant of these people, who, it is now surmised, have their origin far back in Asia, or along the Mediterranean.

If the surroundings of "The Alice" are barren and

forbidding, and all water has to be pumped up by means of windmills and electric pumps, I found a great fascination in this parched land, in the gum trees, which grow in the dried-up bed of the Todd river, a river that only flows once or twice a year. The bark of these gum trees is like white satin, and their foliage is grey-green. Here the green parrots and cockatoos gather, their plumage flickering among the branches.

My two months spent in central Australia brought me in touch with geologists, gold prospectors and miners, cattle-station owners, anthropologists, and, best of all, the bush people, those valiant men and women who are fighting drought, isolation and hardships with a splendid courage and spirit. If, in this survey of Australia, I have made the picture too radiant, perhaps it is owing to the radiancy of the light that bathes the whole country, and sheds a glamour over the people. Australia has magic. One feels it after a few months there. For just as one's eye becomes accustomed to the far-distant horizons, so one's mind gradually takes in the romance and the mystery of this ancient land that has been left alone so long, so long indeed that geologists say her best days are over and that she is drying up. May others like myself receive inspiration from this new-old world. But go to her with an open heart and an open mind.

THEODORA ROSCOE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

FROM BERLIN TO MOSCOW.

SINCE the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed in Moscow on September 29th the general balance of forces in Europe has shifted with a speed and a consequence that no one could have foreseen. The plain story of what has so far happened in the diplomacy of this astonishing war seems to suggest that something still more incalculable lies ahead : and not far ahead.

The very dates are interesting. It was late on the night of August 21st that the announcement was issued in Berlin that Herr von Ribbentrop would fly to Moscow on the 23rd to sign a pact of non-aggression with the Soviet Union. That flight to Moscow soon promised to become as historic a turning point in European history as Napoleon's famous thrust at Moscow a century and a quarter before. It was a pact of "non-aggression" that was signed at Moscow on August 24th. To read the text of that document only a few weeks later was to discover a bristling irony in almost every word of it. In Article I the two contracting Powers undertook "to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive act, and any attacks against each other or in conjunction with any other Powers." Article 5, a very parody of the Munich agreement less than a year old, prescribed that "in case differences or conflict should arise between the two contracting Powers or questions of any kind, the two partners will solve their disputes or conflicts exclusively by friendly exchange of views or if necessary by arbitration commissions." The only really interesting thing about those high-sounding moral protestations engaged in by the rival gangsters, each of whom knew that the other had no intention of honouring them (except in so far as it suited his nefarious purpose to honour them), was not whether, but how soon, they would be dishonoured. Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop, whose obvious only practical interest in the matter was that, according to their calculation, it would enable them to defy Britain and France and to proceed at once to the conquest of Poland, duly plunged across the Polish frontier one week later, namely on September 1st. Little more than a fortnight later, when the German forces by inhuman methods had broken Polish

resistance, the Russian army plunged into Poland (September 17th) from the other side, and proceeded to appropriate as much of the spoils (and it soon began to look like the lion's share) as they could capture.

What do gangsters do in such circumstances? Obviously, until they could abandon their mutual pretences, they must go still further in pretence. A treaty of non-aggression was thus diagnosed to be not enough. On September 29th Herr von Ribbentrop (again) signed with Molotov (again in Moscow) a "Treaty of Friendship." On the same day they signed another treaty (the need of treaties having rapidly become something like dope to a dope-fiend) "to establish peace and order in the territory of the disintegrated Polish State and to secure for the nationalities living there a peaceful existence on the basis of their national peculiarities." Other peculiarities were certainly present, even rampant, chief among them being the fevered talk about such things as "peace" and "order" on the part of two brigands whose only object was the very opposite. Next—and the interval this time was logically and realistically eliminated altogether—Russia plunged into her annexationist designs upon the Baltic States. It was on the very day, September 29th, of the Russo-German treaties which enshrined their "friendship" and which partitioned Poland that the Government of the U.S.S.R. signed with the Estonian Government a Pact of Mutual Assistance, which heralded the Russian plan for dominating the Baltic. The language of gangsters needs a Pickwickian elasticity of understanding. Herr Hitler, after one of his kills, is never tired of proclaiming that this is the end of his appetite. "Herr Sthalin" as Herr Hitler called him in a linguistically annexationist spirit in his speech to the Reichstag on October 6th, used such words as "friendship" and "neutrality" towards Germany and the rest of the world, when he did not mean what simple people mean by those words. When he proposed, for instance, to swallow small and helpless Estonia he called it an act of "mutual" assistance.

It would have been interesting to listen-in, if such a thing had been possible, to the mental reactions of Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop when they were presented with the spectacle of their Russian "friends" adopting all the devices made sacred by themselves. If imitation be the

sincerest form of flattery, Mr. Stalin certainly flattered Herr Hitler. The technique followed by the Moscow gang faithfully emulated the classic technique. As Herr Hitler, before "destroying" (one of his later words, equally misapplied) Czechoslovakia and Poland, had laid stress on Czechoslovak and Polish terrorism at the expense of innocent Germans, so Stalin, as the first step towards destroying eastern Poland, dwelt upon the terrorism that had been inflicted by the Poles upon innocent Russians. *Quem deus perdere vult, prius dementat.* Herr Hitler now found himself not only the enforced spectator of a rival gangster's employment of his own technique, but faced with the nemesis of realising that he himself had opened the gates to his rival. Perhaps too he had enough sensitiveness left in his warped nature to appreciate, albeit dimly, the impression that might be made upon intelligent Germans by the fact that the German Leader had himself exposed to the danger of bolshevisation the whole of Europe, including Germany.

The result was, five weeks after the beginning of the war—or after the declaration of war, which appeared not yet to be the same thing—the diplomatic spectators were wondering whether an army revolt or a communist revolt would first come to a head against a doomed Hitler.

I. THE CONTRIBUTION OF RUSSIA.

Just as in the last week of August it was the news of the Russo-German pact of non-aggression that precipitated the state of formal war, so it was the subsequent activity of Russia that promised entirely to alter its character. Neither the one nor the other can be understood unless one remembers that the resignation of Mr. Litvinov on May 3rd last inaugurated a new policy which the Kremlin never attempted to disguise. When the British delegates went to Moscow last June in the misguided hope of mobilising Russia in a "peace front" against Germany, they were met virtually with this argument: "Your purpose is anti-German. We are willing to help you at a price. We are willing even to call ourselves partners in a combination to prevent German aggression (for the words do not much matter by contrast with the substance) if we can strike a bargain. Our own purpose is aggression. You may cloak it as you wish. Let us put it in

this way. Your object is to defend Poland against Germany. Neither you nor France can reach Poland. If there is to be any defence of Poland, only Russia can undertake it. Therefore we demand the right, if and when we diagnose the danger of a German aggression, direct or indirect, against Poland, to occupy Poland with our troops. For our part, that happens to be our particular object: to occupy Poland with our troops."

The negotiations failed, as they were bound to fail. It was politically impossible for Britain and France to combine a Russian alliance for the purpose of defending third parties against aggression with a tacit and compensating connivance at Russian aggression against those very third parties. When by contrast Herr von Ribbentrop went to Moscow on August 23rd, he talked what gangsters recognise as good sense. Germany wanted the diplomatic victory of swinging over Russia from the Allied to the German grouping. Russia wanted Poland, or half of it. The deal was made on the spot. Of course there were subsidiary effects. Russia had contrived to break the Anti-Komintern Pact. Even Herr Hitler, agile and skilful as he is in his mental gymnastics, could not combine at one and the same time an anti-Komintern with a pro-Komintern policy. Japan therefore had to accept the position that having been invited by Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to join an anti-Komintern pact, which she gladly undertook because it promised to provide her with allies against Russia, now found that she had been duped. Italy in her turn found not only that she had been jockeyed into an alliance with (instead of against) her traditional enemy, communism, but was also relegated to third place in the group.

Russia was now beating the other dictators at their own game. She had made Germany conquer Poland for her, and had broken her own encirclement by the anti-Komintern alliance. What then was to be her further object? There was never any mystery about it. She became devastatingly "neutral" towards what she gladly welcomed as the war in the west. She wanted Britain, France and Germany to fight to the last man and to the last bean, was willing impartially to supply both sides with anything they wanted, if they could pay for it, and of the two sides would rather Germany were exhausted first because Germany was the next on her list for communist revolution. The whole history

of Russia's relations with all parties was entirely consistent. Marshal Voroshilov in an interview with *Izvestia* three days after the signing of the Russo-German Pact of Non-Aggression declared openly that during the staff conversations with Britain and France the Soviet delegation had argued that to be able to give effective help to them the Soviet troops would have to enter Polish territory: a thesis rejected alike (and with good reason) both by the Anglo-French delegation and by Poland. Mr. Molotov, speaking in the Supreme Council of the Soviets on August 31st, also declared that the Anglo-French position was "shot through with contradictions." He explained that "the most fundamental of these was that they [France and Britain] feared aggression and sought a pact in order to strengthen themselves. But at the same time they feared to strengthen us, and this fear became the uppermost consideration. We signed a pact with Germany when it was evident that nothing would come of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations." On that day, introducing the new Conscription Bill, Marshal Voroshilov with the technique he had stolen from Herr Hitler declared that Russia was "surrounded by hostile capitalist States" and remarked ominously "Now that the entire world is preparing for war, we shall not be caught unawares."

The further clues to Russia's object now came almost daily. On September 15th, for example, *Pravda* argued that the country must be fully mobilised "because the capitalist world has been caught by the war fever." On the following day an armistice was concluded with Japan with the probable only object of stopping the fighting on the Mongolian frontier in order to free Russia's forces for the supreme opportunity in Europe. The Russian troops crossed the Polish frontier within twenty-four hours. As those troops were crossing the frontier Mr. Molotov broadcast an address to the Russian people in which he first made the routine argument that as Poland had "collapsed" the treaties with Poland were no longer valid, and which he ended in the style made familiar from Berlin, thus: "Peoples of the Soviet Union, the citizens of our country and the men of our Red Army and Navy are all united as never before round the Soviet Government, round our Bolshevik Party, and round their great Leader, our wise comrade Stalin, for the achievement of new and unparalleled successes in labour, in industry, and on the

collective farms, and of new and glorious victories of the army at the front." In less than a fortnight the Russian troops had occupied the greater half of Poland, in particular carrying out an operation apparently designed to "beat the Germans to it" for the Rumanian frontier. After a provisionally agreed line of demarcation nearer to the Vistula and the San, the definitive demarcation provided for in the partition treaty of September 29th followed roughly the "Curzon line" of 1919. That division gave to Germany the main riches of Poland (the minerals of Silesia, the textiles of Lodz, the various central industries round Warsaw, the wheat of Lublin and the timber of the Carpathians) but gave her also the maximum potential mischief in the form of the bulk of racial Poles; whereas Russia, by confining her claim to those forest and agricultural parts where the population was more akin to her own, made her immediate object of bolshevisation easier to achieve, and also she did retain the oilfields of Galicia.

The unanswered questions were whether Germany and Russia had reached a firm understanding for the division of the spoils in Eastern Europe; whether Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop really believed themselves strong enough (with their well-known contempt of Russia in the military sense) to give rope to Russia in the confidence that they could take it back whenever it might suit their purpose; or whether Russia had effectively stolen a march on Germany.

The answer to those questions obviously could not be given until the event decided: for there was no honour among the thieves, and the upshot of their "friendship" would in the end be decided by their rival military strength. But at the outset it could not be denied that Moscow had usurped the initiative hitherto exercised by Berlin. Herr Hitler did not summon Mr. Molotov to Berlin; he sent Herr von Ribbentrop to Moscow. In Moscow too there gathered the representatives of the Baltic States, summoned (again the German manner) to receive their sentences. Mr. Sarajoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, arrived in Moscow on September 23rd. It was soon made clear that, either with or without German connivance, Russia was determined to reconstitute her pre-war Courland, even though a form of sovereign independence was left to the Baltic States. The treaty of "mutual assistance" with Estonia was signed in

Moscow on September 29th, the very day of the partitioning of Poland and of the Russo-German treaty of "friendship." In turn Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were summoned to give facilities to Russia for naval bases on their coasts, and for air bases in their territory. On October 10th, a Finnish envoy too appeared in Moscow, but unlike the other three of the pre-war Russian Baltic States, Finland made military preparations for resistance. It was to be taken as a measure of Russia's strength and of the still unresolved doubt about Russo-German collusion that Finland did capitulate to the extent of sending an envoy to Moscow. The upshot in the case of Finland was not decided as these lines were written.

2. ITALIAN NEUTRALITY.

There is no riddle about Italy. Despite loss of face resulting from the Hitler *volte face* from an anti- to a pro-Komintern policy, Signor Mussolini remained the realistic watcher of events. When the war started, Italy remained neutral. But when, at the beginning of October, Count Ciano was summoned to Berlin, he dutifully obeyed the summons. Immediately after Germany began the invasion of Poland, Rome announced that she would "take no initiative in military operations." She did not declare her technical neutrality; but she certainly did not enter the war as an operative ally of Germany.

In the last few hours before war was declared, whether spontaneously or not, Italy made a last attempt to mediate. She proposed that the hostilities in Poland should cease and that an immediate conference be convened by the five interested parties: Britain, France, Germany, Poland and Italy (not Russia, be it noticed). Mr. Chamberlain's prompt answer (to the effect that no conference was possible while German armies were on Polish soil, but that if Germany withdrew, discussion could begin) was accompanied by a warm tribute to Signor Mussolini's peace efforts. When the short military campaign in Poland was followed by a general expectation of German peace proposals, the general speculation again centred on the possibility of Signor Mussolini's lending himself as mouthpiece. A man of intelligence as well as of realism, he knew that any such mediation now

would be hopeless. On September 23rd he addressed the Fascist leaders who had come from Bologna to Rome. On the one hand he talked of peace, from the old premise that the hope of reconstituting what he called "positions which history and the natural dynamism of the peoples have condemned" would be "a vain illusion." On the other hand he reaffirmed the policy, first announced on September 1st, whereby "Italy will not take any initiative in military operations." He still in short sat on the fence. His policy, as it was flippantly described, was neither offensive nor defensive, but on-the-fence. But the new Ambassador to London, His Excellency Giuseppe Bastianini, whose appointment was now announced, was a young man whose past was known to have been concerned with questions of the Balkan bloc. He had served in Warsaw and in Athens. Moreover Count Grandi, who had relinquished the London Embassy in the summer on his appointment as Minister of Justice in Rome, now took the opportunity for a graceful gesture towards London. On September 26th he telegraphed to Lord Halifax to express his regrets that he could not now come to London personally to take leave. He paid a tribute to "the very gracious benevolence and the exquisite courtesies" he had received from the King and Queen. Such things are diplomatic straws in the wind.

It was on October 1st that Count Ciano arrived in Berlin in answer to the sudden summons. He was back on the following day, having spent several hours in conference with Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop. The silence that enshrouded the visit and its results perhaps best indicated their negative quality. Rome did not become the channel for Herr Hitler's peace proposal to the West. Moreover when Herr Hitler spoke to the Reichstag on October 6th he had as little to say about Signor Mussolini (who was dismissed in one short sentence) as he had much to say about "Herr Sthalin."

3. AMERICAN NEUTRALITY.

President Roosevelt on September 21st delivered his Message to the special session of the United States Congress, convened to consider the unfortunate problem of America's reaction to European barbarities. The problem was complicated by the internal struggle for and against Mr. Roosevelt's

ning for a third term. In its external aspect the problem was: how could the United States on the one hand escape the direct havoc of war and on the other hand express, consistently with formal neutrality, her sympathy for Britain and France, and in addition ensure her due share of the commercial profits that might accrue from supplying the favoured belligerents (and the only belligerents who could be supplied) with munitions? Without any doubt the majority of the people of the United States detested the purposes of Herr Hitler's designs as much as all decent people detested them. Their sympathy was unanimously with the Allied cause. Yet they detested still more the incidence of war (whatever the cause) and were determined, as a first principle of policy, to keep out of it. The isolationists, led by Senators Borah, Bennett Clark, La Follette, Vandenberg, Capper and Lye, representative of an opinion that cut across political parties, were as irreconcilably opposed to Hitlerism as were those who did not share their isolationism. The only real issue was to decide how far America should go in modifying her neutrality in its practice. In his Message President Roosevelt submitted this solution: that the arms embargo provided for in the Neutrality Statutes should be repealed on the ground that it was "most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security and American peace." He made a frank confession. "I regret," he said, referring to the Act of 1935, "that Congress passed that Act. I regret equally that I signed that Act." He now asked, as he had been asking since July, that it be amended so as to make possible the sale of aeroplanes, munitions, and weapons to Britain and France. "Destiny," he said, "has made the United States and the sister-nations of this hemisphere joint heirs of European culture. Fate now seems to compel us to assume the task of helping to maintain in the western world a citadel in which that civilisation may be kept alive."

It was a question wholly of America's own interests, as all political questions in every country tend to be (even though all countries flatly violate their own interests by thus thinking to serve them: a philosophic truth that has not yet sunk into political thought). On the one hand, as Senator Vandenberg (aspirant Republican candidate to next year's Presidency) once put it, to become the arsenal

for one belligerent is to become the target for the other. Yet, the German market being closed, could America, it was asked, simply sacrifice immense orders, when she knew that in the alternative those orders would be placed, and would be satisfied, in Canada? Commerce seemed to conspire with sentiment to suggest to the undoubted majority of the American people that the embargo should be lifted, on a "cash-and-carry" basis, to help Britain and France. As long ago as October 5th, 1937, Mr. Roosevelt had warned his countrymen: "Let no one expect that America will escape." This time the omens seemed to be favourable to President Roosevelt. On September 28th the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate approved the submission to the Senate of the amended Neutrality Bill. The voting showed a majority of sixteen, of whom three reserved the right to vote against part or the whole of the Bill on the floor of the House. There were only seven dissentients. If passed, the result would be that belligerents—in practice Britain and France—would be able to buy arms and munitions by "cash-and-carry." The buyer, that is to say, would have to take title before shipment, shipment would have to be in the buyer's ship, and credits of only ninety days, non-renewable, would be granted. When the Congress debate began on October 2nd, it became at once clear that President Roosevelt was winning support. In particular his old enemy, Mr. Al Smith, now supported him, as did Senator Norris, whose influence was the greater because in the last war he had voted against American participation.

Throughout American activity there was never any doubt that the general antipathy to Hitlerism, strong as it was, was subordinated to the general determination neither to enter the war nor to make war credits to nations (to wit, Great Britain) who had once defaulted. Mr. Herbert Hoover, for example, on October 3rd made public profession of his faith that defeat for France and Britain was "impossible"; yet he left no doubt that his argument was directed against the fear that America might have to intervene "to avoid a catastrophe to civilisation and to save themselves." Similarly American opinion at first supported a proposal of the Pan-American Conference, made at Panama on October 4th, that a safety zone be established, varying in depth from 300 to 600 miles from the American continent out to sea. By

that proposal belligerent ships would be requested not to operate in that zone, and a naval patrol would be maintained by the American nations. True, there were immediate second thoughts on the part of United States opinion against so absurd a proposal. Mr. Cordell Hull for example on October 5th, after discussing the matter with Lord Lothian, the new British Ambassador, declared that the project was rather an aspiration than a policy. The *New York Post* called it a "fantasy," the *Herald-Tribune* called it "just another of those woolly-headed notions." It was indeed obvious that the old problems of territorial waters could not thus lightly be set aside; that it would be impossible to demarcate a frontier on the sea; that there would be the necessary corollary of a guarantee on the part of the Americas that there should not intrude into the zone any ships which might be a legitimate object of attack by the Allied fleets commanding the high seas. And Britain wholly depended for her life in the prevailing circumstances on her control of those seas. Still, the mere fact that such a proposal was made at all showed the extent of American nervousness against becoming involved in the war.

4. THE TURKISH PROBLEM.

While the Russians and the Germans were carving up Poland, and the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Finns were severally facing their sentences, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Sarajoglu, was prolonging his visit to Moscow to the intense concern of all parties alike. It was clear that Turkey held what might prove to be the key position in the whole war. The vital British interests which lay in the Near East were a main object of both German and Russian strategy. Not only was it the case that Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Iran—and Bulgaria too—constituted a front for Great Britain even more important than the Western front. There was the further psychological factor that the whole fate of the Balkans might be involved in Mr. Sarajoglu's decision. Hungary, Rumania and Jugoslavia had been given a sharp object lesson in what happens to States that decide to resist German aggression, when British and French promises of help could have none but a long-distance effect. They were all clearly terrified of Germany.

If Turkey were to join the German camp, the whole position in Eastern and South Eastern Europe and in the Near East would be lost. Hence it was that both German and Russian diplomacy was concentrated upon Turkey. The German lever for many months had been the lavish promise of territory, namely Iraq and Syria and possibly a part of Bulgaria, together with an equally lavish propaganda designed to prove the irresistible armed strength of Germany and the decadence of the Allies. Russia had the more difficult problem of seeking an alliance with Turkey, to the end that Britain and France might be excluded from the Black Sea, while encompassing her own annexationist ends at Turkey's expense: in particular the annexation of Constantinople. The pacific policy of Kemal Attatürk had always been based on friendship with Russia. Now that Russia had made a compact with Germany, Herr von Papen (the ominous precursor of mischief in so many former fields) thought that his task in Ankara was made easier.

It was on September 22nd that Mr. Sarajoglu left Istanbul for Moscow. Before leaving he declared that his object would be to discuss questions of mutual interest to the two countries and expressed the hope "on his return from Moscow to bring Turkey good news." He was supported by the Turkish Press, which developed the argument that as keeper of the Straits, Turkey had no alternative but to maintain the closest touch with the other Power most directly interested in the Black Sea and the Straits. Yet there was evidence that Turkish opinion was still loyal to the Pact of Mutual Assistance with Great Britain and France initialled on May 12th last. Indeed on the last day of September, after Mr. Sarajoglu had been in Moscow a week, it was announced from Ankara that the agreement with Britain and France was now complete and would be signed immediately on Mr. Sarajoglu's return from Moscow; and that a Turkish military mission was already on its way to London to elaborate the details.

October 13th, 1939.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
FULL REVIEWS	625
FROM MUNICH TO DANZIG; C. F. G. MASTERMAN; SOCIAL IMPERIALISM; CHATEAUBRIAND; THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND NAZI-ISM; THE DICTATOR; A RANK REVOLUTIONARY; LEONARDO DA VINCI.	
SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: MORE THOUGHTS AND TALKS, BY SIR ARNOLD WILSON; MR. JUSTICE SWIFT; THE DAUGHTERS OF GEORGE III; A GATEWAY OF EMPIRE; THE WHIG PARTY, 1807-12; THE CHINESE NOVEL; RACING ENGLAND; AN ANGLO-AMERICAN INTERPRETER; THE ENGLISH COUNTRYSIDE; THE LOWLANDS OF SCOTLAND.	637

✓ FROM MUNICH TO DANZIG.*

Early in the present year Professor Seton-Watson published a little book entitled *Munich and the Dictators*, which described the September crisis from inside knowledge of Czechoslovakia, and sharply criticised Mr. Chamberlain's policy. Hitler's seizure of Austria and the Sudeten districts in 1938 was bad enough, but the enslavement of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was infinitely worse. It is of this unspeakable crime and of the revolution in British policy which it provoked that he writes in the new edition, which now bears the title *From Munich to Danzig*. Like all his publications on Central Europe, these supplementary chapters are full of information.

A year ago it was possible to believe as well as to hope that the Munich settlement might be the end of a dangerous epoch and that there was a real chance, as Mr. Chamberlain expressed it, of peace in our time. Even those who had few expectations from the policy of appeasement were ready to give it a full trial. The author, on the contrary, like the Parliamentary Oppositions, Mr. Churchill and many other leading men,

* *From Munich to Danzig*. By R. W. Seton-Watson. Methuen. 6s.
VOL. CLVI.

never believed that Hitler would stop in the middle of his victorious advance towards the domination of the Continent. The payment of Danegeld, they argued, is futile as well as humiliating. He declared that he had no further territorial aims in Europe; but did he mean it? We were soon to learn, for in 1939 one breach of promise followed another in rapid succession. The Preface is dated August 27th, on the eve of the invasion of Poland, which supplies the latest evidence that we are confronted with Napoleonic ambitions. The Pan-German programme having been approximately fulfilled, the Dictator sets out on the familiar path of Imperialist aggression. Professor Seton-Watson would be more than human if he did not say: I told you so! What he described in the earlier edition as an infamous betrayal dictated to a helpless nation, so far from satisfying Hitler's appetite, merely stirred him to fresh adventures. If England and France retreated in Czechoslovakia—and a retreat it was whether or not we approved of it—there seemed to him good reason to hope that they would do the same in other emergencies. It was a case of a man who believes in war as an instrument of national policy, to use the famous formula of the Kellogg Pact, exploiting the horror of war entertained by more civilised communities.

It is scarcely necessary to say that our author welcomes the conversion of the Prime Minister in March and the reorientation of our policy. After denouncing the champions of collective security for many months as war-mongers, Cabinet Ministers suddenly adopted their advice and attempted to build up a Peace Front. Promises of support were given to Poland, Roumania, Greece and Turkey, and we thereby parted with our cherished principle of deciding whether we would fight or not. Henceforth the decision rested with Hitler, who had merely to attack Poland to bring us in. Whether such far-reaching commitments, without the possibility of rendering direct military aid, were wise is a question likely to be discussed as anxiously as our abandonment of isolationism at the opening of the twentieth century. If a bridge is to be found between the old and the new policy, it is in the traditional principle of the Balance of Power, which means that when a European Power of the first rank combines formidable armed strength with undisguised hostility we oppose it by diplomacy or war. In fighting for Belgium in

1914 and Poland in 1939 we are fighting for our own security as we understand it. Whether it would have been possible to prevent the growth of the Nazi threat to the peace of Europe by wiser statesmanship after our victory in the world war and during the following years is a question which we should do well to consider even while the new conflict is raging. For if short-sighted statesmanship can be shown to have in part produced the Nazi revolution, it is of the utmost importance that similar mistakes should not be made a second time. Europe, observes Professor Seton-Watson, is a kaleidoscope, in perpetual movement, and it is impossible for the writer on contemporary affairs to keep abreast of events. That is true enough, but if we understand what has recently happened we are in a better position to interpret new developments. That is the value of this striking little book.

G. P. G.

C. F. G. MASTERMAN.*

The writer sat next to Charles Masterman when he made his first speech in the House of Commons. He was dealing with an Education Bill which was extremely controversial in character, and he took a strong line for the exclusion of all religious teaching from rate-aided schools. He regretted the differences between Provided and Non-Provided schools in the matter of religious education, and he pressed for the secular solution, leaving it to the Churches to do what was required. Joseph Chamberlain, who was present, congratulated him very warmly. It was an interesting and unusual maiden speech, ensuring a successful political career. In later days all his friends asked why, after his meteoric rise to fame, he should have failed to maintain his high position. He missed greatness by reason of certain faults which could hardly be overlooked. He was careless about appointments and letters, rather inclined to be arrogant in his treatment of those who differed from him, and his wit, which was undoubted, became caustic and mordant in his later years. He was distinctly a bad candidate, losing seat after seat.

He left Cambridge in a blaze of glory. He had been President of the Union and took a distinguished degree. He was uncertain as to his future work, but he had sympathy with the

* C. F. G. Masterman. By Lucy Masterman. Nicholson & Watson. 18s.

working classes and real reforming ardour. So first of all he went to live in Camberwell, and it was life in Camberwell which induced him to write the little booklet called *From the Abyss*.

Mrs. Masterman's story is interesting, though somewhat diffuse and uneven. She rightly stresses his association with Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill. He was the former's right-hand man in connection with the Health Insurance Bill, and there is an excellent account of the way in which he also assisted Mr. Lloyd George in connection with the Land Clauses of his Budget of 1909. There is one serious omission, however, and that is the name of Dr. Addison, now Lord Addison. It was he who broke down the resistance of the British Medical Association and the Northcliffe Press, but he gets no credit for it in the book.

Masterman was by nature, temperament and training a social reformer—a Liberal, it is true, but a Liberal of the Left and in high favour with the Labour Party. He owed his success in life to the fact that he was a brilliant speaker, dependent no doubt upon mood and feeling, but nearly always capable of conveying to his audience his own enthusiasm. In this sense he was a real personality and he made a host of friends amongst politicians, journalists, authors and social workers. It is to be regretted that he lost many of these friendships in later life, for when disillusioned or disappointed he could be almost brutal in his language and in his treatment of the very men who had befriended him.

Asquith, when he was Prime Minister, recognised his eloquence and his ability by appointment to office; but although in the Cabinet at the outbreak of the Great War, owing to the attacks made upon him he lost his seat and from that defeat he never fully recovered.

The book throws a good deal of light upon the history of those stirring times. For Masterman was always able and willing to state his own point of view and was in close touch with the protagonists. It is perhaps true to say that he had not really the making of a statesman. He might have been a leading Churchman. He was a first-rate journalist, if he could have endured the drudgery of newspaper offices. He had a keen sense of what was forceful and beautiful in language, and his criticisms of his wife's poems were always apt and to the point. His prevision and intuition with regard to the Peace Treaty justify the claim which may be made for him that in

great affairs he had sound judgment and a spirit of tolerance and justice. After the fall of Germany, which he compared with the fall of Carthage, he makes this remark: "There is much to be said for the view that after the armistice all the men of good will of all the combatants, friend and enemy alike, should have been called in to save the whole race in peril." He points out that, if justice could have been tempered with mercy and if the victors had exercised a wiser moderation, "such a policy might have made an end of the world of evil dreams which Europe found consummated in the catastrophe of the Great War." Mrs. Masterman has written a narrative which those of us who played even a small part in those great events have read with renewed interest.

PERCY ALDEN.

SOCIAL IMPERIALISM.*

This is the first of a series of monographs on world politics and world economics issued from a new research institute established in Bâle under the auspices of the Canton, with the assistance of the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations.

Dr. Grabowsky sets himself to interpret the present period of world history. He approaches his task from the Marxian angle; but his analysis differs in important respects from that of other neo-Marxian writers. He has his own scheme of historical development, which he has outlined in previous works. He believes that we are nearing the conclusion of the age of Imperialism. This, he considers, has passed through three phases, to which he gives the names of Feudal Imperialism (Japan is the best instance of this), Commercial Imperialism and Social Imperialism. The distinguishing feature of this analysis, as against that of those who follow the pure Marxian tradition, is the stress laid on social forces as independent factors capable of retarding and even deflecting political and economic development; this is illustrated in the case of Italy, where Fascism has had to contend with "the permanent underground resistance" of what is, sociologically speaking, a West European society, at least in Northern and North-Central Italy.

After analysing Social Imperialism in its full development,

* *Der Sozialimperialismus als letzte Etappe des Imperialismus.* A. Grabowsky. Bâle: Weltpolitisches Archiv. 126 pp. 1939.

as manifested in the totalitarian States, Dr. Grabowsky concludes that "it cannot be carried any farther by peaceful means," and that its collapse is therefore imminent. He then proceeds to ask what will take its place. He rejects the logical Marxian answer—a world State, the signs of which he cannot descry on the horizon. He examines three other possibilities. The first is a period of Socialism, simply replacing Imperialism in the various governing centres. This he rejects on the ground that in the present phase of world history the masses are too weary to carry through a gigantic change of this character. Another possibility is that the peoples will react against the mechanical rigidity of the large-scale totalitarian State by relapsing into anarchism; in this connection he recalls the controversy between Marx and Proudhon, the advocate of small-scale social solutions. A third possibility is a patriarchal régime. For this a ruling class is needed. Where is it to be found? Dr. Grabowsky has a ready answer—in the military leaders. This, of course, would be no solution but merely a temporary palliative, to tide over a period of exhaustion. But then, as he boldly foretells (his preface is dated November 1938), "Whatever may be the outcome of this world-war, it will leave the peoples even more exhausted than they were before."

Thus far Dr. Grabowsky's argument. A British reviewer cannot refrain from adding a critical footnote. Mr. Wells has lately written of how he has watched "Marxian dogmatism wrapping like a mantle of fog round the minds of two crucial generations." One rises from the perusal of Dr. Grabowsky's suggestive but intricate generalisations with the feeling that he would have succeeded better in his task of interpreting the present period of world-history if he had never read a line of Marx or his disciples and had spent the time thus saved upon a study of the English-speaking peoples. Central Europe is not the best place in which to set up a watch-tower to view the present-day world.

A. Z.

CHATEAUBRIAND.*

It is a curious accident that two lives of Chateaubriand should have appeared within a short space of time. Last year

* *Chateaubriand*. By Joan Evans. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

we had one of M. Maurois' brilliant biographical studies; the authoress of the book under review had written her book, she tells us, before the French book was published. The two books to a large extent complement each other. M. Maurois traces with a sure hand the relations of Chateaubriand to the public events of his time. Miss Evans is mainly concerned with the character and personal adventures of her hero—if hero he can be called—and passes lightly and a little uncertainly over the history of the time. She seems to think that the Bastille fell on July 24th. The Congress of Verona where Chateaubriand came near to playing a really important part is passed over without any attempt to appreciate the issues at stake; for a fuller treatment of the subject we must go to Maurois. On the other hand the character of the man has clearly fascinated her. The book is excellently written and has all the personal interest of a novel. There are passages in Chateaubriand's life that she does not explore with the thoroughness of the French writer; but when the book is finished the reader feels that he has really made the acquaintance of an important personage.

The subject is not without its pitfalls and Miss Evans is well aware of them. The *Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe* are by no means a safe foundation to build upon. Miss Evans admits that Chateaubriand often exaggerates and "occasionally obscures the narrative." A more thorough-going examination of the value of the Memoirs would have been welcome. Many errors have been pointed out. He implies that he had seen the Mississippi, and it seems certain that he had not done so. There are incidents in his narrative of his first residence in England which are doubtful to say the least of it. There are a good many statements which simply cannot be accepted. I do not believe that Chateaubriand's cousin when on active service was so fat that when he fell he was unable to rise without help. But it is not inaccuracies in the statement of fact that are the greatest drawback to the *Mémoires* as a historical document. The whole work is coloured and distorted by a perpetual pose and affectation. He reminds us again and again of Byron, but though he has most of the faults of the English author he has little of his genius. He is the best representative of the romantic movement in its weakness rather than its strength. Miss Evans writes: "He always saw the object of his desire, whether woman or glory or power, in a light that never was on sea or land; he was always

disillusioned when he had attained it; and after a time of empty boredom, that he dignified by the name of melancholy, he always found some other object to pursue." And again she writes, "he lived in a dream and had no wish for reality." There is no reason to wonder or to regret that his career in politics was not more successful. He lacked most of the qualities that make a successful statesman. He had no accurate objective knowledge of European conditions and he could not face unpopularity. He seems indeed to have had only one great gift. He had a great sense of style and a genius for finding a telling phrase. When Napoleon said of him "there are men who think themselves apt for anything because they have a single quality or gift; Chateaubriand is of their number," he touched the very heart of the matter. It is amazing that so empty a writer should hold an important place among those who contributed to the revival of Catholicism in France. Miss Evans devotes little space to his books. They are so completely fallen out of favour now that we should have been grateful for a little discussion of the qualities of *Le Génie du Christianisme* and *Les Martyrs*. There are pages in his letters and his books that are really noble in expression and thought, and it would have been well if Miss Evans, who knows them so well, had drawn our attention to what is best in his writings. But she has written a very interesting and stimulating book which provokes many thoughts and which will send many readers to study the period in which Chateaubriand's life was passed.

A. J. GRANT.

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND NAZI-ISM.

Dr. Nathaniel Micklem, the Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, has furnished an important and exhaustive account of the conflict between National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church.* The book has been issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. It gives a careful survey of the position as it has arisen and been developed since the advent of Hitler in 1933. At every point the narrative is amply documented from strictly official sources. It is altogether fair, but overwhelmingly condemnatory. The Nazi record in regard to religion is marked by the

* *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church*. Oxford Univ. Press. 8s. 6d.

same features as those of its international politics and diplomacy. Its method has been one of continuous equivocation and mendacity. Its dishonesty, however, has not succeeded in cloaking its paganism or in tempering its despotism and persecution. Dr. Micklem clearly shows that the conflict of Hitler, Rosenberg and their associates with the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches has not been confined to recurrent causes of controversy. More fundamental is the attempted imposition of the Nazi philosophy of life—the religion of "race, blood and soil." The intolerance and cruelty of this philosophy has been tragically demonstrated in the persecution of the Jews and by the concentration camps. Nazi nationalism not only as a policy but as a philosophy is fundamentally opposed to the catholicity of the Christian Faith and to its humane sympathies. Those who desire to understand the causes which have brought about the present war should study Dr. Micklem's book, and note the authoritative sources from which all his statements and deductions are carefully derived with conspicuous fairness and freedom from exaggeration.

J. S. L.

THE DICTATOR.*

We dislike hardly anything so much as the inevitability of an event. Those who peruse the pages of the past are well aware that a mere trifle may deflect the form of an event. It was, therefore, with a certain amount of reluctance that we read Mr. Cobban's able volume, for in it he is prepared to maintain the inevitability of the dictator. He is far too well versed in history to hold such a thesis—if the proofs were not overwhelming. *Idées* and *idées-forces* jostle each other in his pages, and he has found it impossible to disentangle them. None the less, he demonstrates that the theory of dictatorship attests the fact of its permanence. The truth is that, to quote Burke, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, and what people is prepared to pay this price? Apart from this abiding circumstance, there is the desire of the multitude for the strong man Carlyle acclaimed. The strength of this volume lies in the pedigree the author has supplied for the dictator. He has three chapters on divine right monarchy and the idea of

✓ *Dictatorship. Its History and Theory*. By A. Cobban. Cape. 12s. 6d.

sovereignty, the transference of sovereignty to the people, and Bonapartism, before he approaches his problem in the twentieth century. We very much appreciate this angle of approach, for it affords considerable assistance in understanding the Hitlers, the Mussolinis and the Stalins of our generation. The thinkers after 1500 scarcely allowed of a dictator of the Greek or Roman type, for whether they supported divine right or natural law they looked to an ultimate sanction. Hobbes created a veritable revolution when he successfully got rid of this sanction by founding absolutism on consent. When conscription arrived, the consenter found himself a soldier in uniform. In the judgment of Mr. Cobban the dictator wears the form of a military leader. Napoleon emerges as the all-round dictator. The rise of nationality at the end of the eighteenth century vastly augmented the Führer's power and prestige, for is he not the embodiment of the nation? Science has lent him illegitimate aid by its stress on the survival of the fittest. In order to win in this struggle there must be a national leader. Nor does Mr. Cobban shrink from regarding specialisation as a factor in the emergence of the Führer. He believes that the growing specialisation in education lends a freer hand to the men specialising in government. The scientist, the educationalist, but, above all, the nationalist have played their due parts in the evolution of the dictator.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

A RANK REVOLUTIONARY.*

Mr. F. MacDermot has written an able survey of the amazing career of Theobald Wolfe Tone. The great Duke of Wellington rightly regarded Tone's autobiography as an extraordinary work, and the author is plainly of the same opinion. He has taken into account recent research, and the result is an important book on one whose career is singular to a degree. The background of the United Irishmen and the Roman Catholic movement towards the close of the eighteenth century with the action and the interaction of the French Revolution is accurately portrayed, though the latter topic hardly receives that degree of attention to which it is

* *Theobald Wolfe Tone*. By F. MacDermot. Macmillan. 15s.

entitled. What the French tried to do for Ireland is placed before us, but how their *idées-forces* affected North and South does not stand out quite so clearly. The potency of Paine's *Rights of Man* and the example of the United States are duly estimated. The part that Wolfe Tone had to play was enormously complicated by the differences between Ulster and Munster. The Protestants of the North, notably the Presbyterians, had chronic grievances. The Roman Catholics of the South had their agrarian grievances which the Ulster custom of tenant right gravely mitigated. The Liberalism of Grattan and Charlemont in Ireland was akin to that of C. J. Fox in England, but this Liberalism was removed by worlds from the revolutionary republicanism of the United Irish Society which its founder, Wolfe Tone, shared. The hard-headed Ulster Presbyterians had not the slightest idea of the plans that lay hidden in the mind of the founder. Mr. MacDermot sees all this with perfect clearness. Nor is he in the least doubt as to the real character of Wolfe Tone himself. He sees him as the man who was willing to serve the English Government—if that Government cared to employ his services. He sees him as the man who turned his back on this Government when his services were spurned. Nor is he in any doubt that the motive that moved Wolfe Tone thereafter was hatred. Curiously enough considering the estimation in which Eire now holds him, Wolfe Tone scarcely ranks himself as a patriot. In these pages we note the United Irish Society at work, and we also note the man who directed its far-reaching labours in France as well as in Ireland. He frankly came to hate England and to spend his efforts in the desire to secure the downfall of that Power. Hatred of England with him, as with Parnell, was the dominating motive in his life, and it is the tragedy of Irish life that so many of its patriots are much more moved by hatred than by love.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

LEONARDO DA VINCI.*

Sir Kenneth Clark's comprehensive account of the artistic development and psychology of perhaps the most enigmatic

* *Leonardo da Vinci*. By Sir Kenneth Clark. Cambridge University Press. 1939. 21s.

figure in Italian Renaissance art is a work of the first importance. Superbly produced, alike as to printing and plates, it incorporates the conclusions and discoveries of recent research, including his own; Sir Kenneth has made a special study of Leonardo in compiling the catalogue of his Windsor drawings and preparing courses of lectures given in England and America. The appearance of the book is timely, following as it does the recent edition of Leonardo's *Note Books* translated by Professor McCurdy. The list of the painter's authentic works may now be considered fairly determined by the latest criticism; one may perhaps regret that the exquisite *Annunciation* of the Uffizi, ascribed by Berenson and others to Verrocchio, must apparently be made over to his brilliant pupil. Sir Kenneth's account of the transformation wrought by Leonardo in the traditional art of Florence—the "strange, visionary world" he superimposed on its conventions; of his influence on the Lombard School and on Giorgione, especially as to chiaroscuro; and of the differences in the two versions of the *Madonna of the Rocks*, will be read with particular interest. Vasari's evidence is quoted to prove that the *Mona Lisa* was originally of a rosy colour; it is suggested that this might possibly emerge from expert cleaning. Among new features introduced by Leonardo in pictorial composition are shown to have been the *motif* of the little St. John with the Madonna and Child, to form a pyramidal design, and the grouping of the Apostles in the *Last Supper*. His pupils' drawings show that the restorer has ruined several heads in that fresco, and two plates in the book reveal how beautiful those of SS. Philip and James were designed to be.

Although Sir Kenneth is chiefly concerned with Leonardo as artist, it was, of course, impossible to exclude his other manifold activities, as e.g. military engineer and architect, or his preoccupation with theories and experiments which were too often detrimental to his painting. Our author claims that Leonardo's complex personality is best revealed in his drawings, where his romantic imagination expresses itself freely in representations of swift movement—flight, battles, waves, deluges, wind-blown grasses, in nightmare allegories and grotesques, and his scientific curiosity, in accurate studies of anatomy, mechanics or plant-forms.

E. G. S.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

✓ *More Thoughts and Talks*,* by Sir Arnold Wilson, is appropriately described as "The Diary and Scrap-book of a Member of Parliament from September 1937 to August 1939." It has all the characteristics of its three predecessors, setting out the views and outlook of ordinary people upon innumerable topics which affect them closely. Sir Arnold is an excellent "mixer" with all sorts and conditions of men, whether in his constituency or in his frequent travels up and down the country. As this volume clearly shows, he quickly gains the stranger's confidence and is rewarded with genuine, often strongly felt, expressions of opinion. While for the most part Sir Arnold records the views of others, he expresses his own on occasion. As is well known, he classes himself as a Tory Radical, in line with Disraeli, tending "in some measure to the Right abroad and to the Left at home." He is an ardent supporter of the Prime Minister, although he appears to have differed upon foreign policy last summer. In July Sir Arnold considered that Hitler would be satisfied with Danzig and a corridor through Pomorze with an international guarantee of existing Polish frontiers; he advocated a renewed attempt at a real peace by "appeasement," which in his view would have been successful. Doubtless Sir Arnold was partly influenced in this opinion by two visits to Germany this year, in April and July, which are recorded here. Looking back, however, few can agree now that an "appeasement" policy could have succeeded upon the basis of Poland retaining her then existing territory, assuming such a policy were just.

* * * * *

Lord Sankey opens his preface to Mr. Fay's biography of Mr. Justice Swift† with the quotation: "Speak of me as I am: nothing extenuate Nor set down aught in malice," and suggests that these might have been the instructions given by Mr. Justice Swift to the person who was to write an account of his life. Mr. Fay's memoir, one of the best of its kind of recent times, clearly indicates that its author has followed these instructions. Mr. Justice Swift loved going circuit and he was a good circuit judge. Mr. Fay writes that "The secret of his success was his insight into the human soul." He was always at pains to see that prisoners, especially those with little means, received a fair trial. Mr. Fay properly recalls how if Swift saw a flaw in the case for the prosecution or a line of defence open to a prisoner he made sure that the prisoner had the advantage of it, and how, frequently, he would advise the accused to plead "Not Guilty," asking one of the counsel in court to undertake the defence. The problem of what to do with those convicted before him was always one

* Longmans. 7s. 6d. net.

† *The Life of Mr. Justice Swift*. Methuen. 12s. 6d. net.

of difficulty to Swift, to which he gave very considerable thought and attention. Ordinarily he tempered justice with mercy. When, however, his indignation was roused, as by cases of robbery with violence, he could be severe. A believer in the deterrence of flogging, he once said: "A man who has once been flogged for robbery with violence very rarely repeats the offence." Mr. Fay has given a most useful selection of the cases in which Swift was engaged as an advocate and as a judge. He has given, too, an account of his relations with the Bar and recalled some of the "Swift stories" which for so long have been told and re-told wherever barristers and solicitors gather together. There is in this most readable book much to interest the layman as well as the lawyer.

Miss D. M. Stuart is already known as an accomplished biographer and has made good use of the material, some of it taken from the Windsor Archives and hitherto unpublished, for the lives of six sister princesses of the House of Hanover.* Apart from the current revival of interest in the Regency period and the immediate antecedents of Queen Victoria, one wonders whether they were of sufficient importance to deserve such elaborate resuscitation. The "Sisterhood" are shown as amiable and affectionate, charitable, attached to their retainers, and devoted to their eldest brother, who proved their unfailing champion, both before and after his becoming Regent and King. He secured for them separate establishments, when their beloved father's recurrent attacks of madness saddened their lives, and the repression of Queen Charlotte made them a burden. The Princesses were handsome as girls, though the adulation of Fanny Burney and other enthusiasts must be discounted. Elizabeth showed some taste for the fine arts, Mary ("dearest Miny") was the general confidante. Three of the sisters made uninspiring marriages, the other three had secret love-affairs, resulting, apparently, in two cases, in private marriages. All took a kindly interest in their young nieces, the ill-fated Charlotte, and, later, Victoria. Some of their confidential letters are sprightly and revealing, others are, frankly, trivial, or too full of details of ill-health. The frontispiece, showing the three youngest sisters as children, is charming; the portrait of the Princess Royal in later life brings out a resemblance to Queen Victoria.

The part played by the City of Bristol and her sons in the history of British Imperial development is the central theme of Mr. C. M. MacInnes' learned and impressive work, *A Gateway of Empire*.† As his narrative so amply discloses, there have been "few aspects of British expansion overseas in which she has not shared"; and in some

* *The Daughters of George III*. Macmillan. 1939. 15s.

† Arrowsmith. 15s. net.

she has played a pre-eminent part, as in the West Indies until the sugar trade collapsed in the nineteenth century. Even to-day Bristol remains the seventh largest city in England and has redeveloped much of her imperial commercial connections, but on a wider and securer foundation. This work is properly, and indeed necessarily, much more than a bare local history. The subject requires, and receives, treatment of many general questions of imperial history, such as the slave trade and slavery on the plantations, in which Bristol was particularly concerned. In approaching such issues and developments from the viewpoint of local interests and endeavour the historian imparts a more intimate consciousness of the past than is possible in the general history. As such, serious and erudite works on the lines of this admirable volume are particularly welcome, apart altogether from the fresh light they may throw upon great issues in our national and imperial history.

In his recent work, *The Whig Party, 1807-1812*,* Professor Michael Roberts reviews the Whig Opposition during the Tory ministries of Portland and Percival. It is a learned detailed piece of work based upon the available sources and while in general it does not substantially add to conclusions already drawn it will be welcomed and valued by students of these years. Professor Roberts discusses largely Whig policies in relation to Catholic Emancipation and Ireland, the Napoleonic War and reform, and analyses the reasons for the ineptitude and impotence of the Opposition at this time.

The Chinese Novel† was Pearl Buck's Nobel Lecture delivered before the Swedish Academy at Stockholm last December. In it she traces the natural dramatic gift of the Chinese people for a story, which grew up alongside of and indeed in spite of the literary work of the scholars with their rules of art. The common people laughed at the scholars and developed a taste of their own. Mrs. Buck mentions especially the novel *Shin Hu Chuan*, which grew out of a handful of tales in the Sung dynasty about a band of robbers, and was written by no one man; *San Kuo*, "the guerillas who are to-day China's most effective fighting units against Japan, are peasants who know *San Kuo* by heart"; *Hung Lou Meng*, a story of a proud and powerful family in decline and "the absolute power of women in the home."

Mr. Patrick B. Chalmers has produced a most engaging volume on *Racing England*‡ which should appeal both to racegoers and the general public. In the course of a light and vivid narrative Mr. Chalmers

* Macmillan. 25s.

† Macmillan. 3s. 6d.

‡ Batsford. 12s. 6d. net.

touches upon most aspects of the sport, including an historical background, concise descriptions of the principal English racecourses, a chapter on the Jockey Club and sketches of great personalities among owners, trainers, jockeys, bookmakers and racegoers of the past and present. The author also discusses some famous horses. The whole book is enlivened by a wealth of anecdote and embellished by more than ninety illustrations from old prints and paintings and modern photographs.

✓ Mr. H. W. Horwill, whose *Dictionary of Modern American Usage* is widely known, has now compiled in *An Anglo-American Interpreter*,* a vocabulary and phrase book of equivalent English and American terms. The collection is not in any sense exhaustive, though it does include a number of words and phrases which are limited in general use to particular areas of the United States. A large number of the American terms are, of course, familiar and widely spoken in this country, while others, though strange, are intelligible after a moment's thought, such as baggage for luggage and drugstore for chemist. On the other hand in a large number of matters of everyday intercourse Englishmen and Americans may be unintelligible to each other. When, for example, in London the American asks the way to the underpass the Londoner will hardly grasp at once that the subway is meant, and if in New York the Englishman asks for the latter he will be surprised to be shown the underground. There are also, of course, innumerable idioms, similes and metaphors which may defeat the uninitiated. The English writer, for example, will be excused for not appreciating that the matter is a mere trifle when informed that it doesn't amount to a hill of beans. This little volume, which incidentally has its humorous side, should certainly become a valuable help to English and American tourists and also to readers on both sides of the Atlantic. To the student, too, of the English language it should prove a significant and instructive collection.

The English Countryside,† issued in the Pilgrim's Library, has an introduction by H. J. Massingham. The different scenery is described by various writers, in chapters on Hedges, Valleys, Orchards, the Downs, Moors, Fens, and so on, and the pictures are of wide views and distant scenes.

The Lowlands of Scotland,‡ by George Scott-Moncrieff, has chapters on Galloway, a delightful county full of old stories and old buildings, the Border, Lothian, the Middle West, Fife, Angus, the Mearns, the North-East; an excellent book to have with one on a holiday jaunt.

* Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 2s. 6d. net.

† Batsford. 6s. ‡ Batsford. 8s. 6d.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

DECEMBER 1939.

THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF THE WAR.

A MECHANISED, "total," war, if it is also a long one, is essentially a contest between economic resources and economic organisation. If the initial advantages are reasonably equal the victory will be to those who can do most to increase their productive capacity and direct it to the best advantage. It is true that a great superiority in the armed forces immediately available on one side might bring a quick victory; or, with more nearly equal forces, great differences in valour or military strategy might similarly bring an early issue; or a very great superiority in economic resources might later bring victory to the side which was inferior to its economic organisation and direction. But except in these three cases—and we shall do well neither to fear nor hope that any one of the three will determine the issue in this war—the result will turn upon the relative efficiency of the opposing belligerents in their industrial mobilisation and in their economic strategy. More and more as the war goes on, and more in this than in any previous one, the number and efficiency of the combatant forces of each side will depend on the capacity of the civilian organisation to supply them. Behind each infantry man must be several civilians to maintain him; behind each sailor there must be more; behind every man who serves the artillery or the tanks still more; behind each pilot, most of all—not less than fifty if the full chain of groundsmen, producers and suppliers is reckoned.

War is indeed rapidly evolving to a stage in which the number of actual combatants will be no higher a proportion of the population than in the days of purely professional armies, while at the same time all the activities of every able man and woman are harnessed to the war machine. If we think of the whole war mechanism as a spear, with the spear-head representing the combatants and the spear-shaft the civilian organisation behind them, the spear-head is continually becoming at once shorter and sharper and the shaft longer.

VOL. CLVI.

A comparison of the resources of the present belligerents quickly brings us to a few questions to which no certain answers can be given. How much can Russia supply to Germany and on what terms will she do so? How far will the combined attack upon British shipping by submarine, raider and air (together with deterrents to neutral shipping) reduce British imports? How far shall we be able to find the foreign exchange for purchases from the U.S.A. and other neutral countries? How far will our blockade and contraband measures be successful in preventing Germany from acquiring enough of her essential imports, especially the three most vital ones, oil, fats and ores?

All we can say, in view of these uncertainties, is that we have no such margin as would enable us to dispense with the utmost vigour and efficiency in our own economic effort and the most careful and skilful choice of a sound economic strategy.

The objects to which our efforts must be directed may be summarised as follows:

1. We must ensure adequate supplies of both food and raw materials. This is a problem partly of developing our limited home resources (which involves the allocation of man-power); partly of rationing and allotting what we have to the most essential needs; but most of all of securing the means of buying (foreign exchange), and transporting (by shipping) from abroad.

2. We need to increase our *manufacturing capacity* to the utmost. This is a question of industrial mobilisation in the widest sense. We need not only to utilise fully and expand to the utmost all our existing industries which make war supplies; we need also to convert one type of manufacturing capacity into another—to use motor-car organisations to make aeroplanes, etc. We require the utmost possible degree of standardised production (with simplified and uniform specification). We need to dilute labour, to train both men and women for the simpler processes with all possible speed and on the greatest scale, and to do this with the active co-operation of the trade unions.

3. We need to finance our expenditure both at home and abroad. The first is a problem of taxation, loans and stimulated saving, and (probably) some degree of controlled

inflation. Our object must be to interpose no obstacle to the fullest use of the man-power, raw materials and productive capacity that we can make available, and to avoid causing either unemployment or labour trouble, as wage demands follow increases in the cost of living, in the process.

The second task is more difficult. It turns upon skilful methods of foreign purchasing, and the preferential allocation of orders where the strain on our exchange is least; the best use of our gold and disposable foreign securities; the maintenance, and if possible the increase, of our exports.

4. We require next to do all we can to prevent vital supplies from reaching the enemy. We can do nothing to intercept transport by land, from Russia and from any of the countries in Central Europe willing to trade, or (probably) across the Baltic. We can, however, intercept the enemy's supplies from overseas, and limit what he can import through neutrals by "rationing" them to what they need for their own purposes. The latter method may of course involve political difficulties which are not perhaps insuperable in the case of the Scandinavian countries, and are likely (in contrast with the last war) to be negligible in the case of the U.S.A., whose vessels are being kept out of belligerent zones, but they may prove serious in the case of Italy.

Interception of imports is not, however, the only method at our disposal. We can in some instances reduce the supplies available to Germany by buying ourselves (e.g. oil from Roumania and ores from Sweden). We might also, if action by Germany makes this justifiable as reprisals, make it difficult for Germany to obtain the foreign exchange which she needs to buy from abroad by intercepting not only her imports but her exports.

5. We must organise the closest co-operation with France. Joint-purchase of our most important necessities will avoid a competitive increase of prices against ourselves and in some cases give us a command of the market which will enable us to keep prices down to an advantageous level.

6. Throughout the whole of our industrial organisation shortages will appear, which will need an intricate but quickly acting system for determining priorities. Many of these will be secondary and temporary in character. But behind them will be the three ultimate limiting factors—foreign exchange, shipping and man-power.

We cannot tell which of these three will prove to be the most serious. In the last war it was shipping. We could always buy more from abroad than we could ship, and we could manufacture as much as we could find the raw materials for. But that was because America became a belligerent in 1917 and made huge loans. If she had not done so we should not have been able to buy even as much as our reduced shipping could import. This time foreign exchange may be our principal "bottle-neck."

This summary will have shown the vast scale of the intensive and co-ordinated economic effort which we now require. So far as Governmental action is required the six vital Ministries concerned are: the Treasury (responsible for both internal finance and foreign exchange); the Ministry of Supply (concerned with supplies of raw materials and also industrial mobilisation for all that the Army needs); the Ministry of Economic Warfare; the Board of Trade; the Ministry of Food; and the Ministry of Shipping. In addition to these there are at least ten other Departments which are making economic policy, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Overseas Department, a part of the Foreign Office, the purchasing Departments of the three fighting services, the Ministry of Mines, the Ministry of Home Security (whose policy as to "black-out" and air-raid warnings has an important effect on production), the Ministry of Health (which controls municipal expenditure and arranges evacuation).

Each one of these sixteen Departments is making its contribution to our total economic effort. If there is inertia or incompetence in any one of them the total result will suffer. Moreover the action of every one of them impinges on that of all the rest; each is competing, or may soon compete, with the others for materials of which the supply is inadequate, or is doing work which requires the co-operation of other Departments for its success; each is building up our economic policy in fragments. It must be remembered that the hundreds of officials in directing positions in these Departments are each engaged in a specialised and limited task, and the Department as a whole, including the Minister, has a specific departmental preoccupation and bias. Meetings of officials or Ministers may to some extent correct this and

enable a momentary solution of immediate problems of co-ordination to be reached. But, if that is all, it is only too likely that, instead of a real economic strategy, we shall have little more than the sum total of successive acts of departmentalism.

We need, it is clear, in the whole of our economic effort, *production and proportion*. We must both maximise our productive capacity and see that it is throughout directed to the most essential war needs, in proportion to their importance. In administrative terms the two essentials are first, *executive drive and ability* and secondly, a sound *economic strategy* and a system which will ensure that it is planned, co-ordinated and put into practical operation.

At present it must be recognised that, while there is now a real unity of national purpose, there is anxiety throughout the country as to whether we are equipped to carry on the war with vigour and competence, especially in all that concerns civilian organisation. It is no part of the purpose of this article to make individual criticisms of those now in the principal offices. It is, however, necessary, before we discuss methods of organisation to emphasise that personal qualities are an essential factor in the problem and that no system, however well devised, can be successful if those who direct it are unsuited for war administration. In war what is required is not skill in advocacy or parliamentary debate, or even an aptitude for peace-time administration, but *executive* ability for the conduct of operations in which drive and energy, initiative and creative force are more important than meticulous caution and precision in the detail of administrative arrangements. The chief defect of a parliamentary system in relation to war is not that it affords opportunities for criticism, for in that respect its influence is on balance salutary, but that it tends to bring to the top those who possess in an eminent degree qualities which are different from those needed in war. This is true not only of Ministers but of the Civil Service which in ordinary times has controlling and regulatory, rather than executive, functions. The Treasury is engaged in stopping extravagant expenditure, not in initiating what is needed; the Ministry of Health controls the initiatives of local authorities; the Board of Trade and the Home Office impose restrictions required by safety upon the initiatives of private enterprise, and so on. There are indeed offices which

have direct executive responsibilities, and the Service has shown, both in war and peace, that it has resources of executive ability within itself. But it remains true that the general attitude of mind fostered by peace-time administration is regulatory rather than executive, and that those who ultimately emerge in the course of a great and urgent task, such as the creation of a new State insurance system or the economic organisation of 1917 are not usually those who are found in the highest ranks of the Service at the outset.

These characteristics are illustrated in the preparations of the last few years. The plans made beforehand reached a degree of elaboration which was not attained in the last war till the third year. But there was in all these plans a curious bias towards the less essential, towards regulatory rather than executive action. The Food (Defence Plans) Department, for example, was much more concerned to elaborate arrangements for rationing, or controlling the distribution of, food in war time than to secure that there would be the food to distribute by importing and storing in advance. So too with raw materials, for which the Board of Trade and Ministry of Supply were successively responsible. To take one instance only, a provident purchase of pitprops would have enabled us to produce more coal than will ever be saved by coal-rationing; just as a reasonable provision of food stocks would have given us much more food than will ever be saved by food-rationing except in a very long war. If we had obtained these stocks (which would incidentally have also been financially advantageous) we might still have resorted to rationing, but in that case the object would have been to increase our coal exports (and therefore our foreign exchange) or to enable ships to be diverted from food to additional war supplies. It is in the same mood that both Departments have set up commodity controls, which regulate but do not ensure the import and allocation of timber, ores, paper and so on, and license the export of what may be wanted at home; or have fixed maximum prices without always taking positive action to ensure that adequate supplies would be available at those (or any) prices. The Administration seems indeed to have been studying the experience of the last war from one point of view only, that of avoiding some of the mistakes then made in failing to prevent such evils as excessive prices and profits, and to have averted its attention from the positive

achievements of that period. We did at least then produce the goods, and we did after all win the war. It is to be hoped that we shall not this time so meticulously avoid the mistakes of that war that in the end we achieve a different conclusion.

The "functional" division of responsibility between Departments, which is natural and proper for peace, is moreover less appropriate to the problems of war, many of whose problems are essentially "geographical." For example, we need, to a much greater extent, to deal in turn with different areas (South America, Scandinavia, the Balkans, etc.) with a single bargaining policy in which the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade and the Overseas Department are all directly concerned. The main departmental organisation cannot of course be suddenly changed; the conclusion is that a very effective system of quick-acting co-ordination needs to be imposed upon it.

One further general comment is needed before we consider the economic organisation now required. The sudden imposition of innumerable regulatory controls, long elaborated in separate Departments and brought into operation on the outbreak of war, has caused great dislocation and inconvenience. The impact on a single part of the economic system, for example on export industry, of new licence requirements, devised separately and without any previous measuring of their total effect, has often been disastrous; and in innumerable detailed cases the loss has obviously been much greater than any discernible gain. There has therefore been a great popular agitation against bureaucratic methods which has led to many relaxations and may lead to more. To a large extent the criticism has been justified and salutary. Some regulations were unwise; many were imperfectly co-ordinated. In some respects, however, the revolt against control is unjust, and it may be disastrous in its consequences. It must be remembered that the administration was bound to prepare for immediate air-bombardment, which was very probable and may come at any moment. The fact that some months have elapsed without air attack does not mean that the arrangements for evacuation, decentralisation of markets, etc., were unwise or will long be without practical value. Improvement, sometimes temporary suspension, may be possible and desirable. But if the revolt against bureaucracy should have the result of

impeding the direction by the State of the general economic effort of the country, the consequences would be disastrous. We shall need, as the war goes on, not a return to private enterprise but a more positive and more drastic central direction. A war cannot be waged without an effective, if temporary, form of State socialism, as the experience of twenty years ago proved conclusively.

The complexity and the vital importance of economic co-ordination will be evident from what has preceded. At least sixteen Departments are carrying out duties which impinge upon each other. They are making contracts which require man-power or raw materials of which the supply does not suffice for all; so that priorities must be established. Urgent tasks are in hand—negotiations with neutral countries, economic warfare against the enemy—in which action by several Departments must be as rapid, effective and consistent as if a single Minister concentrated all the required powers in his hand.

The present system can be briefly summarised. There are of course innumerable personal contacts between the officials of the different Departments, both occasional and through specialised committees. There is an intricate system of supply committees to arrange priorities, culminating in a committee of high officials who report to a committee of the Cabinet, presided over by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. To this system an addition, altogether admirable so far as it goes, has recently been made in the appointment of Lord Stamp (assisted by Mr. Henry Clay and Mr. H. D. Henderson) who with an advisory status presides over the official committee and assists at meetings of the Cabinet Committee. He and his assistants, however, have other duties and give only a part of their time to this work. With the exception of these three part-time advisers every one of those engaged in forming economic policy—and even if we count only those with substantial responsibility they number at least several hundred—are doing specialised and detailed work which occupies all their thoughts and inevitably involves a certain bias; they can none of them have either the leisure or the openness of mind required for thinking out a comprehensive and balanced policy. I know well from experience how, as the pressure of work under war conditions in a Department increases, one's vision contracts and one's impatience with

interference increases. Is it possible that Lord Stamp, for whose personal qualities I have a sincere and profound admiration, after years of work with him, can infuse unity into this vast machine, and not only frame a sound economic strategy but secure its practical execution? He presides over the committee of officials, but does so without the reinforcement of continuous work between the meetings; he has access to the Cabinet Committee, but not on terms of equality as a Minister. Will the Departments be induced to subordinate their departmental policies by one who has the authority neither of a Minister nor of an executive official? It is difficult to believe that in the vast system this small element of unpreoccupied, disinterested, unbiased, co-ordinating authority is sufficient to develop and secure the enforcement of a real economic strategy. Nor can we expect the supreme function to be adequately discharged by a Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the apex of the system, for he is preoccupied with his departmental duties; and the Treasury, though it has a more general survey than other Departments, still has its own departmental bias and outlook which may need to be not only co-ordinated with the needs of other offices but sometimes subordinated to them in the interests of a wider policy.

What then do we need? A broad policy which transcends Departments' policies is essential; so too is the authority which can ensure that it is enforced. For the first a small body of whole-time advisers, without specialised or executive duties, is indicated; for the second, a Minister in the War Cabinet is indispensable. It is equally necessary, moreover, that those who frame policy should have their feet on the ground—and be able to lift their eyes above the ground. Policy must be rooted in departmental action; but must grow above it. Considerations proper to a number of Ministers, political, economic, financial, must be woven into our general strategy, but the strategy must itself be consistent and capable of effective and rapid execution.

The system which I consider would best meet this requirement may be briefly summarised as follows. There should be in the War Cabinet, which in my view should consist, as in the last war, only of Ministers without portfolio as its permanent members, one Minister, with the necessary personal qualifications, who should be specially concerned with

economic strategy. He would be advised by a small body of men like Lord Stamp and his present assistants, who should however be employed whole time and enlarged into what might be appropriately called an Economic General Staff (with purely advisory functions). The Minister would preside, as the Chancellor does now, over meetings of the Ministers in charge of the Departments concerned in the particular problems requiring solution at a given moment, or on which he is working in elaborating one aspect or another of general policy. The Chairman of the Economic General Staff would preside, as Lord Stamp now does, over the committee of officials. And the staff as a whole would need to have the organic relationship with Departments which has not yet been established. It would be worse than futile for them to duplicate the programme-making and statistical work of the Departments; they must have access to the work done in the Departments themselves and be in a friendly co-operative relationship with those engaged in it. An exact analogy for what is required is to be found in the relationship established by the Treasury for its ordinary duties with the financial officers of the spending Departments, whose direct responsibility to their own Department chiefs does not impede constant and intimate contact with the Department which is controlling their expenditure. In the same way the members of the Minister's Economic General Staff would be in daily contact with those who in each Department were drawing up programmes of requirements, during the process of their formation, and would similarly draw upon the statistical work of the Departments.

I believe that such a system, which could be easily grafted upon the present organisation, would meet better than any other the essential conditions already defined. The Minister and his advisers, having no departmental duties, would be able to take long and broad views of economic strategy. At the same time their plans would be rooted in the actual work of the administrative machine as those of detached advisers could not be, and would be ensured both of co-ordination at the top and of practical execution through the Ministerial Committee presided over by the War Cabinet Minister and the committee of officials now presided over by Lord Stamp. And at the same time the economic strategy so formed could be adjusted with military strategy through the presence of the

Economic Minister in the War Cabinet and consequently also in the Committee of Imperial Defence.

It would be tempting to try to anticipate the policies which may and should be formed for each of the different tasks summarised in the earlier part of this article, and the general outline of our economic strategy that should emerge. It will be evident, however, from the nature of the subjects there mentioned in six different spheres of action that each one of them would need to be dealt with at length if any useful suggestions are to be made. I must therefore be content now to indicate the character of the problems to be solved, and to suggest the kind of organisation which they require, without suggesting the solutions.

We can at least be encouraged in the difficult task that lies ahead of us by the reflection that the internal resources of the British Empire and France certainly together exceed those of Germany; and that the resources of the non-belligerent world which, with skilful arrangements, may be available to us also exceed those which are similarly available to our opponent. Success is assured if we make our potential strength actual—and with sufficient speed.

ARTHUR SALTER.

November 9th, 1939.

THE WAR AND INDIA'S FREEDOM.

THE question of Indian self-government is in the first order of importance at all times but assumes even greater significance at this moment. It serves as a test of our own success in putting into practice the ideals of freedom for which the war is being fought and if the test fails it provides a propaganda point for the enemy. It may be assumed that those in India who have raised the issue at this moment would deplore the use, albeit clumsy and even ridiculous, to which it is being put by German propagandists. Ribbentrop's arguments need no reply for has not Hitler repeatedly declared that he will support British "imperialism" in return for permission to practise the like himself?

It is rather the effect on opinion in America that is important. Many societies exist in the United States for the study of world affairs and masses of facts and particulars are made available. But even among such close students there is a danger of the over-simplification of statement and the under-rating of difficulties. This tendency can only be corrected by administrative experience and no country in the world (except perhaps Holland) has experience in such matters as Indian self-government comparable with our own. None the less it is undoubtedly a source of embarrassment to Great Britain to be forced at this moment to rule possibly eight provinces of India under breakdown powers, even if the course of administration is smooth. If difficulties occur the Governors and the House of Commons to which they then become responsible are indeed in a difficult position. One point, however, may be noted here. The Congress ministers who have quite voluntarily abandoned office would probably prefer that this interregnum—let us hope very brief—should be bridged by the powers described, rather than that there should be manoeuvres to find with minority ministers some appearance of popular rule. Their position as dominant party remains thus undisputed.

But whatever may be our embarrassment, the present challenge from Congress, even though exploited by the enemy, is stimulating. It leads us to ask whether we have a good conscience and whether in fact we intend to complete in India that work of propagating freedom which in the last

century has been the chief credit of the British Commonwealth. It is worth note that in the recent correspondence Mr. Gandhi declines even to consider temporary expedients at the centre until both the goal and the road of Indian freedom have been newly defined. Immediate action seems to be of secondary importance.

Two questions are posed. "Do you incorporate in your war aims the declaration by Congress on India's status?" and "Do you agree to the powers and composition of the body which shall draw up the Constitution?" It is because no satisfaction has been given to Congress on those two questions that the Ministers have resigned and the deadlock exists. As to the first question, it is hard to see how any real divergence can be established between the definitions of the goal in India as given by the British Government and by the Congress themselves. Let us take a few sentences from the statement of the Congress Working Committee issued on September 15 last:

The Indian people must have the right of self-determination to frame their own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly without external interference and must guide their own policy. A free and democratic India will gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defence against aggression and for economic co-operation.

Or again, October 10th:

The Congress has been guided throughout by its objective of achieving the independence of the Indian people and establishing a free democratic state in India in which the rights and interests of all minorities are preserved and safeguarded.

Set against these declarations the Balfour definition of 1926: The Dominions are

Autonomous communities within the British Empire equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

It seems incredible that formulæ which contain in common all that is most vital should not be capable of being harmonised.

It is sometimes said by Indians that the plainest meaning

of words may be perverted or denied by enemies of Indian liberty. That is a true statement, but so far from destroying confidence it should engender it. It is events not words that count. What has actually happened is a far better proof than what has been promised and a study of this century alone will show that in these battles for freedom while every sort of opposition of the character feared has in fact been offered it has always been overcome. The supreme fact is the progressive establishment of unfettered freedom in the Commonwealth. History proves the existence of a belief in liberty active and triumphant—a belief which to-day has driven Great Britain—with no material gains to seek—into war.

It is not necessary to recount in detail the story of the Irish or the South African struggles or to point to the ease with which the independence of other Dominions has been secured. The story is well known and its point for India is that opposition, powerful and prolonged, has in the end been overcome. So it will be in her case. Indeed, this has happened in a measure in the last ten years. When Lord Irwin's declaration was made in 1929 it was fiercely assailed in Britain not only by Conservative but also by Liberal leaders. It was the Parliamentary debate on this declaration which was partly responsible for the refusal of the Congress to appoint representatives to the First Round Table Conference and for the Civil Disobedience Campaign which followed. The balance of forces in that debate was such that the Government dared not risk a division. Yet that declaration is to-day universally accepted. A later example might be found in the endorsement of that policy by Mr. Churchill who was one of Sir Samuel Hoare's stoutest opponents only four years ago. The moral of these illustrations is not that the existence of powerful reactionary elements makes British declarations unreliable, it is rather that the conquest of reaction in the case of South Africa, Ireland and India itself is the best proof in fact of the sincerity and determination of the British instinct. No member of Congress would deny that Eire and South Africa have both proved their independence in the differing conclusions to which they have come as to participation in the present war.

Complaint is made that India was declared a belligerent without any popular form of consent. That is true, for India to-day is not an independent member of the Commonwealth.

From the Nazi standpoint, however, she was at war and a target from September 3rd last. It is hard to see what else the Governor-General could have done except to put her in a state of preparedness in much the same way as the Government in Great Britain, a free member of the Commonwealth, was protected.

From the definition of purpose we pass to the machinery of change and the date of its operation. I believe that the conception of an Indian Assembly charged with the duty of framing a Constitution and sitting probably in India is generally acceptable. As to dates, no one asks that it should be immediately convened. The state of war is one reason; another is the need of preliminary consultations and the establishment of accords. It has been suggested that this part of the task must also wait. There seems no need for such delay. In the course of the last war Mr. Montagu, Mr. Charles Roberts and others did much the same kind of work, and prepared and presented the Montagu report and laid all the foundations for the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution. Their labours did not hinder the prosecution of the war, nor India's active participation in it. Rather the reverse.

But though the need for an Assembly and for the early preparation of its work may be admitted, that does not dispose of the difficulties. What is to be its constitution? How is it to register its decisions? Such questions along with a clarification of aim, if that is required, might surely form the matter of discussion between the Indian parties themselves and between them and the Viceroy. As to composition, the Congress have never sought to underrate the minorities problem and the proper representation of the minorities is obviously necessary. In the same way the many ties which at present bind Britain to India demand for their loosening the presence of an authoritative British representation. Some issues will be purely Indian in character and in their solution the British have no part—they simply accept and register agreement. The Hindu-Moslem question is clearly the chief of these. On the Indian side, therefore, the time before the Assembly meets should be used to secure such agreement. The many questions in which Britain has a direct interest would demand on our part some hard thinking, which might start at once. Our purpose should be the honest renunciation of privilege and exploitation. Co-operation and

co-operation on a large scale there will undoubtedly be, but it must be on Indian demand and in the interest of India.

The changing circumstances of these times have given a new aspect to old and tough questions such as commerce, finance, defence and foreign policy.

On the question of trade and finance some remarks were made in the recent House of Commons debate by Sir George Schuster, than whom there is no greater expert on the matter. His words deserve extensive quotation and close study. He said :

For the sake of political peace as well as for economic welfare we must lessen the economic significance of political boundaries, and I hope we shall make it clear to India beyond a shadow of doubt that we believe in this and will work for it.

What is our position in India in regard to this matter ? Looking back on the past, there is no doubt that we cannot say that what I have stated was the creed on which we acted. And I venture to assert that we have never made greater mistakes in our connection with India both for the future and also as regards our commercial interests at the time than when we have tried to use our political position in India for the sake of this country's economic advantage. We have suffered for it whenever we have tried to do that. But if we look at the position to-day we can fairly say that our record is a clean one. What do we mean by exploitation ? What does Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru mean by "exploitation" ? He means surely that we are using India as a place to dispose of our own manufactured goods at a profit to ourselves. But what is really the position ? I need only quote two sets of figures to illustrate that.

Before the last war, in the year 1913-14, India imported from this country goods to the value of £83,500,000 and exported to us goods to the value of £39,000,000, so that we then had a surplus favourable balance of £44,000,000. What is the position to-day ? In the year ended March 1939 India imported British goods to the value of £35,000,000 and exported Indian goods to the United Kingdom to the value of £41,250,000. So that to-day India has a favourable balance of £6,250,000. In the year 1913-14 India took 65 per cent. of her imports from us and sent 23½ per cent. of her exports to us. To-day we are on an exactly even balance. She takes 36 per cent. of her imports from us and she exports 36 per cent. of her exports to us. We have really got on to a basis of complete reciprocal fairness with India in our trading relations. I would like to express the view that in all the negotiations we have had with India on matters of trade and commerce—and a

great deal of time has been spent on them lately—we should really have been in a more favourable position to negotiate if India was an entirely independent country. If we were bargaining with them as independent parties we could use the enormous value of our market to India in asking for concessions. Our fiduciary relations to-day makes that more difficult and I therefore venture to assert that strictly in our own interests and on a commercial basis, the greater independence India had the better it would be for this country.

But, although that is the position as regards trade to-day one cannot get away from the fact that past history has left a deep imprint on the Indian mind, and in matters of finance they do feel that it is objectionable that these should be in the hands of an irremovable member of the Viceroy's Council who is in fact always an Englishman. Although sometimes we may think that we know better than they do, and although the things we may do may be perfectly wise and right, there is irritation in the feeling that their views cannot be considered. In these times when all doctrines of finance have been subjected to revolutionary change and the wildest experiments can go on in all sorts of civilised countries, I must confess that I have a great deal of sympathy with Indians who say "Why should we not try some of these experiments ?" There is nothing which has contributed more to a suspicion as to our methods in India in the past than the suspicion that we were using our political power for our own commercial and economic advantage. I believe that suspicion has in almost every case been unjust, but still it exists, and if it could be cleared away it would be a great factor in making them convinced of the honesty of our purpose.

In the linked questions of defence and foreign policy the technical problems for the constituent body are no doubt formidable. Freedom involves the capacity for self-defence and the right to decide relations with the rest of the world. That such freedom should be possible and safe for every member of a Commonwealth scattered over the whole globe can be demonstrated in theory to be impossible. Yet in fact a workable scheme has been devised. The Dominions have their own forces, their own representatives in foreign capitals and their own policies. At times these policies cause friction. Yet in practice and with the assistance of High Commissioners and imperial conferences the machine works. So in defence. All recognise that the forces of the whole Commonwealth form a protection for each unit, a protection which enables a member even to remain neutral in a war in which the others

are engaged. There would seem no reason why a system flexible should not find a place for a free India. But there is every reason to believe that in such a system India would demand a place. But the essential condition is India should be convinced that she is defending a freedom herself enjoys.

The external pressures of the new dictatorships have changed things. First they represent a physical danger to India, but besides that they have illuminated the deep gap that exists between Indian ideals and the totalitarian conception. Centralised bureaucracy, suppression of religion and cultural freedom, racial domination, the deification of brute force—these are the very things against which India desires to fight. Years ago Indian nationalism applauded the Japanese victory when it was over Russia. Now that view has altered. Let me quote from a lecture delivered by Mr. Edwin Haward who has had exceptional experience both in India and China.

India had firmly shown her sense of what Confucius described as the side of right. Japan's development of the pan-Asian doctrine had lost its attraction, for it was obvious that pan-Nipponism was the proper style. It was charitable to assume that Japan did not understand the new forces current in India. She certainly could not appreciate the steadfastness which enabled Great Britain in her strength to proceed calmly with constitutional progress in India when the rest of the world, including the Far East, was torn by the ambitions of war-lordism rampant. Who could measure the significance to the world of the present struggle? India's own march to self-expression might be profoundly affected. She could not be blind to the lessons which China's physical weakness had for any people endeavouring to take their proper place in the ranks of civilisation.

In short, the difficulties between Great Britain and India are by no means insuperable nor should they cause any long delay in framing a Constitution. Assuming Indian agreements to have been reached the Constitutional Act might either be Legislation or a Treaty confirmed in the British and Indian Parliaments. There are precedents for both.

As this controversy has arisen concerning India's participation in the war it may not be out of place to add a footnote showing the great contribution she made, Princes, Moslems

and Hindus alike, between 1914 and 1918. In money alone she gave over £146,000,000, in stores £80,000,000. The ships of what was then the Royal Indian Marine were at the disposal of the Royal Navy. India sent over one million men. The partnership thus established produced remarkable results in British public opinion. The debates of 1919 showed a willingness to recognise India's claims which never existed before the war.

If I quote Mr. Churchill it is precisely because he illustrates the truth of what I have tried to set out above—namely, the instinct, the reaction, the victory which are the landmarks in the advance towards freedom. In June 1921 he said, when addressing the Prime Ministers of the British Dominions and Representatives of India :

There was another great part of the Empire which had not yet become a Dominion, but which moved forward under the Montagu Scheme in the work which began with Lord Morley, and was continued by Lord Chelmsford, towards a great Dominion status. India was now coming into our affairs and councils as a partner, a powerful partner. We well knew how tremendous was the contribution which India made in the war of 1914, how, when there was no other means of filling a portion of the Front by men from any other part of the whole world, there came the two splendid Indian corps, who were almost annihilated in the mud and the shell-fire of that terrible winter in Flanders. We owed India that deep debt and we looked forward confidently to the days when the Indian Government and people would have assumed fully and completely their Dominion status.

WEDGWOOD BENN.

THE RIDDLE OF RUSSIA.

RUSSIA is a giant country, and when a giant chooses to veil his features it is difficult for the observer on the plain to discern the clear lines of the giant countenance. So, at any rate, must have thought many people in this island as they marked the strange tangle of Soviet events since, towards the end of August, the first news reached us that a non-aggression pact between the German and Soviet Governments was about to be concluded. At first the ordinary man was simply bewildered. In the words of the French wit it appeared that Russia had joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. But gradually there appeared a disposition to behold some reason in it all. Whilst apparently taking a step hostile to the Allied Powers of Britain, France and Poland, Russia was considered to be in reality playing a deep and subtle game which, in some final and incomprehensible manner, would make her actions ultimately redound to the advantage of Europe. Not all who took this view had the same credulous simplicity as a distinguished British dramatist who represented "Mr. Stalin," as he called him, as an unerring superman who found the Ukraine and White Russia going a-begging and condescended to pick them up, "Hitler or no Hitler." In fact the "unfortunate Fuehrer" was regarded simply as a child in the hands of "Mr. Stalin," and was to be "compelled to disgorge half his booty and to face yet another army saying 'thus far and no farther'."

The purpose of this article on the other hand is to show that nothing but confusion, if not positive harm in the future, can accrue from confining our attentions simply to certain prominent and one-sided aspects of a complicated situation without scanning carefully what can be said on other aspects and from other points of view. The Russian enigma cannot be solved by extracting certain of its elements and then turning a blind eye on all the rest. If we dwell on the "pros" we must also carefully tabulate the "cons." This, too, not with any idea of putting Russia in the criminal dock but so that, as the war continues and fresh circumstances and events elucidate a developing situation, we may be in a position truly and accurately to weigh the considerations which should determine our view of the new Europe.

Beginning with the "pros," it cannot be denied that at

first sight they present an attractive spectacle. Hitler appears to have been beaten at his own game. He is hereafter to be barred by Russian hordes from gaining control of the rich wheat-lands of the Ukraine. The dreams of *Mein Kampf* are vanishing into the thin air of Utopia. Although Poland and Czechoslovakia are apparently to remain dismembered it has been contended by those who take this view that, by her new pact with Germany, Russia would be left as the defender of the Balkan Slavs, and that she would permanently prevent a German drive to Constantinople; while, as regards dismembered Poland itself, it was pointed out by Lord Halifax in the House of Lords that in the new division of spoils between Russia and Germany, the former country has only claimed territory which roughly stands to the right of the Curzon line of December 1919, which was suggested by the Commission on Poland in Paris and which was accepted by the Supreme Council without prejudice to the final allotment of territory east of the line. Again, is not Russia handing back Wilno, the capital of the old Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to the new Lithuania? Is not this to be reckoned to her for righteousness? At any rate, should Russia not be credited with working in all this tangled affair not for her own aggrandisement?

Such questions cannot be lightly set aside. Indeed, a consideration of the Russian enigma from this particular angle has led to demands for initiating renewed negotiations with Russia, as if there could be no doubt that her march into Poland was intended to work in our favour and that it only requires the exercise of a little diplomatic tact to get her frankly working on our side. Similar considerations also appear to support the demand for an immediate publication of the Allied "War Aims," because it is assumed that we can now formulate these without any danger of bringing ourselves into unfriendly opposition to her final designs. It is true that even those who take up this attitude are not untroubled by biting qualms. Why has a Russian trade delegation been sent to Berlin? Why is the Soviet Government endeavouring to confuse the British blockade? Yet, on second thoughts, it may be remembered that, throughout the years of Hitler's serious political estrangement from Russia, the commercial relations between the two countries have really been nominally based on the provisions of the Treaty of Rapallo signed

on April 16th, 1922. It was thus possible, at least so it appeared, to draw a distinction between political and commercial relations. You may be commercially friendly and politically hostile. At any rate it was still politic to give the benefit of the doubt to Soviet Russia; and if other considerations were needed, they were to be found in a recent book by a well-known Soviet propagandist who speaks as if the Russia of Molotoff was still the Russia of Litvinov, and as actively busy now as then in leading the League of Nations in the direction of the world's peace. Indeed, had not Molotoff, in a speech of May 31st of the present year, declared that "the Soviet's task in the existing situation consists in checking the further development of aggression and is in line with the interests of other non-aggressive countries"?

So much for the "pros," but what of the "cons"? Here there are some very serious considerations to be taken into account which, though they present themselves individually as enigmas to those who take the aforesaid view of Russia, are not often looked on in their disquieting wholeness. There is first the startling fact that Russia is apparently to be held wholly or mainly responsible for the actual outbreak of the war. Hitler is a paranoiac. He fancies himself encircled by his enemies—"the persecution mania"; and any reader can see plainly from the British White Book and the published despatches of Sir Neville Henderson that one of his most constant obsessions in the weeks before the outbreak of the war was the fear that Germany would have to fight on two fronts. This hysterical tendency, concentrating on that particular fear, magnified it one hundredfold; and it was only on August 25th, when he became convinced that "agreement with Russia was unconditional" and that "Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts," that Sir Neville Henderson reports him as becoming "quite calm," and adds that "he never raised his voice once." It is a sad and chastening fact in this modern world, where wars on a major scale may affect the whole future of civilisation, that the issue of peace and war in some particular case may depend on the psychological history and present condition of a single individual. But there it is, plainly to be seen and marked in the White Book and the accompanying despatches. Now Hitler becomes "violent and exaggerated" when he hears that Britain, pact or no pact with Russia, will honour her

pledges; and he only seems to become composed enough lightly to bear the burden of his fateful decision when he realises, as he expressed himself on August 25th, that the "agreements reached with Russia would also render Germany secure economically for the longest possible period of time."

What had Russia to gain by fostering the initiation of another big-scale war? Was it to fulfil the forecasts of Lenin, who saw Communism rise and triumph after the great capitalist nations had fought themselves to a finish? Only the Fates can decide; but there is evidence, when one gathers together all that has been allowed to filter out about the negotiations between the Allies and Russia that preceded or (disturbing thought!) were partly contemporaneous with the Russo-German Pact, that Russia had aggressive designs of her own which she gradually developed in the sequel and which were responsible for the failure to come to an ultimate agreement. At first it was Latvia, Estonia, and Finland on which, as we now quite understand, she desired to obtain a foothold and something almost like a protectorate; but after the Allied Military Mission arrived she appeared to develop very serious demands which implied a similar stranglehold on the eastern areas of Poland. Nor was this simply owing to an anxiety for the future of her "blood-brothers" the White Russians, or rather, as one prefers to say, the White Ruthenians and the Ukrainians. The Russian leaders were really most interested in what they called the "Wilno Corridor" and the Lwów area of Eastern Galicia, which latter had never belonged to them before the last Great War. The "Wilno Corridor," as they envisaged it, included the Bialystok district, where, according to the last census, the Poles formed 71.9 per cent. of the population, and Wilno itself, which they only handed over to the Lithuanians on condition of keeping a permanent Russian garrison in the town. Apparently, however, as a solatium for coming out on the side of the Allies they desired to occupy both these districts and use them as a base of military operations. They would thus in any case, whether on the side of the Allies or as a result of a pact with Germany, have claimed possession of just that territory which at present they hold; and, as their armies are always accompanied by political Commissars, they would have lost no time, while ostensibly on the side of Poland, in inaugurating a political propaganda throughout every district into which they had

entered for military reasons. Evidently, too, the Russians, when they made these and other extortionate demands, imagined that they should be at once considered by the British and French missions without, at least so it seems, any provision being made for prolonged consultation of the nations concerned. Sometimes the British Government have been blamed because Lord Halifax did not himself go to Moscow, or because some Field-Marshal was not sent to talk strategy in the Kremlin. It is evident, however, from what has been indicated above, that an angel from heaven, with the fullest plenary powers, would not have been able to satisfy the Russians.

Another most disquieting feature, which must certainly be reckoned on the side of the "cons," is that in an invasion of Poland the Soviet Government violated, quite in the style of Hitler himself, a distinct and definite pact of non-aggression. This was first concluded in Moscow on July 25th, 1932, and by a protocol on May 5th, 1934, it was prolonged until December 31st, 1945. It is important to note that this Pact was supposed to have been made particularly watertight, because in 1933 there was added to it a definition of the "aggressor," which was acclaimed as a convincing evidence of the desire of Litvinov to safeguard so far as it was possible a lasting peace for the world. All previous concerted efforts on the part of the League of Nations to stamp out aggression had been met by the objection that it was impossible infallibly to lay one's hand on the real "aggressor." The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs then stepped in, and argued that certainly any encroachment on the territory of one Contracting Party by the armed forces of another would constitute aggression, and that no considerations of a political, military, economic, or any other order could, in any circumstances, serve as a pretext or excuse for committing such an act of aggression. This was convincing enough, to be sure, and when it was combined with the other provisions of this selfsame Convention, it ought to have enabled Russia to remain in this part of Europe for ever innocent of aggression before the world. But no pact, however well guarded, is inviolable when the disposition to keep it is subject to the variable caprices of a single mind. No doubt a certain sophistical apology was put up. It was alleged that Poland's defence had collapsed and that the country was like a ripe

pear, waiting to be plucked. Of course, such excuses were expressly barred by the terms of the Convention itself; but it was not the opinion of competent military men in Great Britain that Poland's defence at that time had certainly collapsed. The Military Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, for example, surveying the contemporary position, wrote that "till the Russian blow was delivered, large Polish forces were still fighting with determination." He then discussed the probability that a new and strong front was in the course of formation with Wilno as its northern point and Lwów as its pivot, and concluded that "this line, less than 200 miles long with its left flank on the Hungarian frontier and the Carpathians and its right on the Russian frontier, could not have been turned, and to the rear it had good railway communication with Roumania." So much for political attempts to make the worse appear the better reason!

But what about making an effort to weigh the relative magnitudes of the "pros" and "cons"? Can any clear guidance be thereby gained for solving the Russian enigma? In all probability not. Indeed, when we survey the whole situation clearly and calmly, we must perforce arrive at the conclusion that neither of the protagonists has any definite idea of what will emerge from his own particular act of aggression. Neither can possibly have any great trust in the other. Each waits for some lucky turn in the grand concourse of events. Both of them, to reach the present position, have violated sacred treaties to which they had solemnly pledged their country. Perhaps some of the British sympathisers with Russia may wonder that such an advanced Socialist country should be concerned in a brutal attempt to suppress the freedom and independence of its neighbour. And if they knew the history of Marxism and the First International their surprise would be doubly intensified. The inaugural meeting in 1864, at which the First International was founded, was called to protest against the brutal suppression of the Polish Insurrection in 1863. Marx was in full sympathy with the objects of the meeting; and just the previous year some prominent English trade unionists had sent an address "to the working-men of France from the working-men of England," in which they asked for a "fraternity of peoples" in order to help the Poles and thereby to advance the cause of liberty in Europe. Many stormy years have passed since then,

and it is now evident that the new Marxists of Russia have lost their belief in the vitality of a free people which makes its own laws and chooses its own system of government. Soviet Russia has entered on great and interesting experiments in a planned economy, and in this field no one can afford to neglect her many achievements. But there has been a tendency to lay too much stress on the economic factor as the governing factor in history, just as Hitler has gone to the opposite extreme and exaggerates, till it dominates his whole line of vision, the other factor of nationhood. Economically Soviet Russia can point to Socialist institutions; politically Soviet Russia is a soul-destroying despotism. But extremes always meet; and that is why Hitler and Stalin have combined to-day in an attempted partition of Poland which, as *The Times* remarked, is only noteworthy for its "insolence and iniquity."

One thing is most certain and that is that to-day we are dealing with a developing situation of which the end is not yet in sight. Who can with any certainty make a catalogue of war aims when it cannot certainly be discerned what is the Europe and what the situation of the actors to which these war aims are to be applied? Both Hitler and Stalin are artificially interfering with the countries in which they are endeavouring to work their will. Germany is trying to transplant peoples from the Baltic lands to Poland and incidentally putting her hand in their pockets during this process of transplantation. Germany, according to the contention of the "cons," has invited Russia to come into Poland; and if the war ends successfully for the Allies, it is difficult to see them absolving Germany of a definite responsibility to redress the wrongs which such countries have suffered through this interference with the rights of nationality and the natural course of the migration of peoples. Soviet Russia, too, must answer at the bar of history for much "Red Ruin" and the "breaking up of laws." No one who knew some of the attractive personalities who have been brutally murdered in White Ruthenia and the Ukraine during the last few weeks can avoid a blush of shame for the barbarities of which human beings are capable. Russia claims to be establishing a Soviet government in the Polish regions occupied by her troops. But how does she proceed? It is as if a Russian Army had England under its heel and then proceeded to search amid

the small and insignificant ranks of the English Communist Party for the future governors of Great Britain. So the Red Army enters a new province of Poland, seeks out an unimportant Polish sympathiser with Communism, and enthrones him in the seat of power after an election in which there can be only one official candidate and not the slightest chance of opposition.

There is one general deduction, however, that emerges clearly as a result of the preceding inquiry. No good can be gained by estimating the actions of Russia as if they were our own actions, or by assuming that if we should decide with a certain amount of consistency in a definite situation they would do the same. The latest speech of M. Molotoff, delivered at the end of October, illustrates this generalisation to the full. The Soviet Premier and Foreign Secretary is almost contemptuously ill-pleased with the Allies. They are accused of aggression, imperialism and self-seeking. But after Munich they were accused by the rulers of Moscow of not having been sufficiently aggressive, or for that matter imperialistic. Which is the true reaction of Moscow—this or that? Again, it is now plain from M. Molotoff's minatory attitude to Finland that the contention of this article is well founded and that Russia's demands on Finland for Hangö and part of the isthmus of Lake Ladoga are for strategic reasons and to get a stranglehold on that country. Does not this raise the presumption that her occupation of Polish territory is not in the interests of her "blood brothers" but for the same imperialistic purpose? Of course it might be said—Mr. Shaw would certainly say it—that this is all to the good. Russia, like a Colossus, now stands entrenched in her fortresses in the face of Germany. But here we come to that glaring fault in the policy of Moscow—its utter indifference to the principle of nationality. M. Molotoff calls for the war to come to an end, Poland is to be carved in two, and the Russian revolutionist imagines that the victim will offer a meek neck to the slaughterer. Peoples are but pawns to be moved at random by their totalitarian rulers. What is it but putting the clock back? It is to unlearn the whole lesson of the nineteenth century. In truth there is no consistency in the policy of Russia to-day. Its rulers offer trade support to Germany with the one hand but give her scant military encouragement with the other. At one part of his speech, M. Molotoff upbraids

the Allies; at another part he gives them solace by an assurance of neutrality.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that Russia, in the pursuit of self-interest, is subject to variable flights of policy; and even before this paper appears there may be some revelation of aims and objects which had been previously disavowed or veiled. Whatever our opinion of its planned economy, the Soviet Republic has in these latter days been definitely placarded before the world as a reactionary political government, and speeches of Stalin are blared out so continuously into the ears of the people from a gramophone in its parks of Rest and Culture that at length they cannot help themselves from being possessed of a one-man mind. In the Russian Ukraine they have had troubles during the past two years, and it was reported before the war began that Stalin was transporting disaffected elements of that population to other areas of Russia. Now that they have got into Eastern Galicia they are continuing the same reprehensible policy, and they are reported to have carried away Dr. Mudry, who is the representative of Ukrainian patriotism in that district. About a year ago it appeared as if Totalitarianism was spreading and tending to supplant Democracy in most of the territories of Europe. To-day there is good reason to prophesy that Totalitarianism is facing a turn for the worse, and that is why we can afford to watch with complacency the clarification of the Russian enigma.

J. H. HARLEY.

HOW SPAIN AND ITALY ACT.

IT is not so very long ago since those even in the secret councils of the Government were debating how they would combat the hostility of Spain and Italy. The idea that both these governments were enemies had spread wide roots among the British people; the sap drawn by those roots nourished flashing foliage, a gaudy flower, a forbidden fruit, which a serpent praised to flattered ears. Such was the apple of Eden.

The main trouble was the loose and general use of the word fascism. Fascism in itself was an Italian thing, the invention of a brilliant opportunist of high dramatic genius, who was able to lead a revolution against parliamentary government, and then began to look about for positive theories, which he finally elaborated into the idea—by no means original—of the corporative state. At the same time Mussolini urged national strength as the means of reasserting Italy's diplomacy, after her leaders had been far from well treated at Paris and Lausanne. He tried to deal with the problem of Italy's expanding population and gradually he associated the movement with the idealism of Croce and Gentile. Such in its essence is Fascism.

National Socialism is also a reaction against democracy. Versailles—Accusation of War Guilt—Reparations—Democracy—and finally the Jews. All these ideas react and intermingle still in the German mind in inextricable (but not quite unintelligible) confusion. Nazism is the reaction to them all. Its aims were to reject the accusation, the reparations, the treaty, the parliamentary system and the Jews who had triumphed in it in a fierce gesture by a system not merely of party corporation as in Italy, but of solid German racial feeling, with traditional militarism. What began as a plea ended as a threat: the voice that had complained began to boast and Germany used her weakness for aggression. She took up the Versailles idea of race, and demanded freedom for the German people. This once obtained was to be used as a means of coercion for all Europe. Both ideas were idealistic, impossible and tyrannous. Both were out of date in a world living by manufacture and commerce. It is those ideas which have led to the war; they make it a contest in anachronisms.

Different from both Fascists and Nazis is Franco's

movement. It was the uprising of a military party with ideas of social reform not against foreign victors, but against the aggression of Moscow from within the State. Certainly, both in Italy and in Germany, there was some danger from Communism behind the weakness of democracy. Yet it was against the parliaments that Mussolini and Hitler successfully rebelled. In Spain that weakness had gone so far that Communism was already in control; what was called the *Frente Popular* was in reality the work of Comintern, and with Comintern worked the international army commanded by the Bolshevik General Krivitsky who afterwards revealed the whole plan in the *Saturday Evening Post*. Franco's fight, at first mistaken in this country for a fight against the Spanish parliament, was in reality a fight against the Russian Soviet and its Spanish agents, who, as we now know from innumerable confessions, coerced the free movement of Spanish people. Britishers who went to fight for democracy found themselves forced to listen to Soviet lectures with pistols held at their heads from behind.

The secret of the Spanish situation is the key to the situation over most of the Continent. The Spanish war was a war of two totalitarianisms; one was Sovietic and materialistic: the other was Spanish and spiritual. And this difference between Christianity and atheism affected them in every detail of their systems. The atheists had torture chambers and starved the poor. The Christians thronged churches and fed the poor. The ideal of Franco was the tradition of honour. Mussolini had also sponsored a religious revival, and worked in closer and closer collaboration with the Church. His own statement of his social idealism in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* rings perfectly orthodox in Catholic ears. The majority of fascists like the majority of "*franquistas*" claim to be good Catholics.

Such is the background in Spain and Italy to the diplomacy which saw Berlin adhering more and more closely to the plans of Moscow. Even the Hitler movement began with some sympathies with religion: it still supports the clergy of the Christian denominations; but its tragedy is that its leaders have worked in closer and closer collaboration with the schemes of atheistic Moscow—of that Moscow which, having failed to win Spain or France, turned its cajoleries after Munich to Ribbentrop, Himmler and Hess. There can now

be little question that Hitler's seizure of Prague was arranged by Moscow through the atheistic General Sirovy who had always had close affiliations with Moscow, and who gave Hitler an obsequious welcome into Bohemia. From that time on, as we know now, Hitler worked in closer and closer collaboration with Moscow. Early in June, according to the diplomatic correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, the German Ambassador in Moscow took back thither from Berlin the draft of a treaty.

Early in August the arrangements were completed, and it was to hear this that Count Ciano was summoned to Berchtesgaden on August 12th. Hitler kept him standing while he harangued him as he had harangued Hacha and Schuschnigg the year before, attempting to exert that *hypnotische Kraft* of which he loved to boast. But the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs proved himself equal to the ordeal. He had himself strong qualities of self-assertion behind his large and prominent features. His manner, even in foreign embassies, had sometimes bordered on the truculent—his scruples were not too delicate. But there is in him a certain power of resilience and of sanity which could come into play when ideas were manifestly wild. The idea of Italy joining with Germany and the Soviet to overrun and enslave Poland struck him, as it must strike almost any Italian, as being far too dangerous. Far from being any use to Italy, it definitely menaced her.

Besides that it had long since dawned on Italy that the Axis was doing her little good. One great German scheme was consummated after another: but Italy got nothing. And Poland, for good reasons, was her friend: it was a representative of values kindred to her own which made a buffer between the Socialist absolutisms of Russia and Prussia. Italy was in no way bound: her military alliance did not oblige her to act suddenly in one case after another for objectives always and only German. And she had long since seen that the Eden-Mussolini quarrel had been as unfortunate for herself as for England. There is nothing secret in debates in the House of Lords, but occasionally words are said there of high importance of which the country hears nothing. An instance of this was a recent speech of Lord Lucan's in which he related how he had seen Mussolini in March, and the Duce, greeting the Field Marshal with the enthusiasm which Italy justly feels for him, had said, "I love England, and I count on

you, Lord Lucan, to win back for our relations the old warmth."

Italians were not in any doubt about their leader's feelings, and whenever practical business brought up the question of the future based all their calculations on their conviction that there would be no war. Two practical considerations weighed strongly in these calculations. Firstly the treaties with Greece and Turkey gave the British Fleet a strategic position in the Mediterranean which Italy would find embarrassing. Secondly the improvement in anti-aircraft artillery proved that even a great air force could do little against a powerful navy. It was found that there was no longer anything in those strategic arguments, with which Mussolini had made so much play in 1935. On the other hand, the hardly won Empire of Abyssinia would be sacrificed at once. Besides Italy had exhausted her financial reserves. Up to the last moment they worked for peace, as Sir Neville Henderson gratefully noticed in the case of the Italian Ambassador to Berlin. In the days preceding war Mussolini tactfully resisted Hitler's obstinate pressure, and, when the war broke out, the Italians declared that they would take no part in a war where the issues were purely German. They had every right, morally and legally, to neutrality. To go to war would have been the height of folly.

At this stage of affairs the French discovered unexpected virtues in the Italian régime. The Italians were greeted with the greatest cordiality, and it was gradually conveyed to them that not only would some of them be welcome in the administration of the Suez Canal, but they could have every freedom at Djibuti.

It is true that the 800,000 French troops, with their Chasseurs Alpains, who had hurried to the Alpes Maritimes at the outbreak of war, remain there, but that is a matter of convenience and not of strategic importance. Flattered on every side, the Italians had two main objects in view. One was not to be overpowered by the Moscow-Berlin axis. This meant a natural interest in the revival of Poland: the other was a support of all those Danubian States which might be threatened by Moscow, or Berlin. In this connection Italy had the advantage of an old and cordial friendship with Bulgaria where an Italian princess is Queen. Their old support of Hungary was renewed: their new friendships with Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece were all established on a new basis.

So much could be done without coming to loggerheads with Germany. This Italy was determined to avoid. Firstly she had no wish to engage in war with the dangerous power overhanging her frontiers. Secondly she had to face the fact that 30 per cent. of her trade went to Germany. If that market were to be closed, her machinery would stop. This is a fact which the Allies have to keep in constant view in all their plans with or for Italy. She must have adequate markets. And because Italy has to keep in good relations with Germany, her Press cannot express the warmth of her feeling for Paris or London. But the diplomats in these capitals received sufficient assurances to make them care very little if Signor Gayda says something on the other side: and at last even he has changed his song.

A continuous factor in the situation has been that Mussolini has never been absolute. In the Monarchy he has retained a conservative force of balance, which never forgets the tradition of Italian diplomacy. The other, not less important, is of course the Holy See. The Vatican is at present working in very close collaboration with the Italian Government, and the Pope makes no secret of his sympathy with Catholic Poland, or his horror at the advance of Bolshevik paganism. At a time when Catholic life in Italy has renewed its strength, the attitude of the Church is of great importance in the policy of Italy. The Pope has spoken out three times in no uncertain tone: once in receiving Polish pilgrims: a second time in a sermon in St. Peter's for the feast of Christ the King: and thirdly in his great encyclical, *Summi Pontificatus*, in which he declared in open terms his refusal to allow the claims of the State to be placed above the Christian conscience. This in itself proves the strength of the Pope's position. If it affects Italy, it also affects Spain. The Spanish Press has been slow to separate from Berlin, but it has of course never veiled its hatred of Russia. It was frequently stated in English papers and periodicals that the Moscow pact had lost Germany the friendship of Spain: but it is easy to exaggerate the change it made then. Spain never had the slightest intention of taking sides against England. That was entirely out of the question. Her exports to England were essential: in a war the British Navy could control her exports to Germany. And besides, even had she desired it, Spain had no resources left for resistance. Every ounce of her energy has been taken in the

difficult work of recuperation and, apart from all that, since all her petrol comes from Standard Oil, she was dependent on good relations with the British Navy. Even with France her relations had steadily improved till Marshal Pétain solved the chief difficulty by insisting that the gold held by the Bank of France on Spain's account should be returned.

Nevertheless, there is a difference in the expressed views of Spain and Portugal. Portugal's abhorrence of the Moscow-Berlin combination is express and definite. General Franco himself, on the other hand, advocates peace between Germany and the Western Powers so that both should combine against Moscow. "The irruption of the Soviet into Europe," he said in a press interview on October 2nd, "has opened very serious dangers for the whole of Europe. The Western Powers should not hesitate to settle their differences, for it is certain that Germany should constitute the main barrier to the orientalising of Europe." If this phrase could be broadcast in Germany, it is the best piece of propaganda that the Allies could produce.

It sums up the attitude of the Mediterranean Powers, and their desire that a conservative force in Germany should arise to separate her from Moscow. This idea also voices the instincts of their national life in their new zeal for corporate institutions, and their old adherence to Christian tradition. It is a spiritual force welling up from within these newly constituted nations, consonant to their vigorous revindication of their Catholic life.

But it affects their diplomacy for different reasons. Stalin's pact with Hitler discredited Communism all over Western Europe. Spain and Portugal can now ignore it. But Communism gains in Eastern Europe, and especially in Bulgaria. Italy, therefore, must watch in relation to Berlin from day to day. On October 11th the correspondent of *Le Temps* at Rome wrote as follows: "The intervention of Russia in the affairs of Europe arouses the intense and incessant care of the Rome. This will be easily understood if one reflects that henceforward the Soviets are at the confines of Central Europe and the Balkans, which are a zone always considered by Italy as of vital interest to herself. The situation touches Rome to the quick, and so much the more because the collusion of Germany with Russia opens up a host of possibilities."

"When Russia took action to introduce Bolshevism into Spain, Italy considered this action as a danger both to herself and to the Mediterranean; therefore she did not hesitate to throw her men and money into the struggle. For the same reasons one can conclude that if a Russian peril of any kind should menace the Balkans, Italy would react with every means in her power. It is a dogma of Italy's foreign policy—a dogma on which Rome cannot compromise—to hold the Adriatic free from danger: and so one can easily understand the new action of Italy in Central Europe and the Balkans. Rome's first object is to see that these regions, always so inflammable and so dangerous, should not be involved in any sort of war."

Not only are the interests of Italy at stake, but those of the traditions and civilisation of Europe. Italy therefore takes an open stand in favour of peace. By a whole series of actions in the sense of appeasement, she plans, suggests and urges the conclusion of agreements to eliminate grievances and friction between the peoples of the Danube and the Balkans. Italian diplomacy has seldom had a more difficult or a more distinguished part to play. But she is alive to the opportunities. She has determined to free herself from the German entanglement and her young men say that in no banal sense, but by great constructive plans their country intends to work with its international Church for the safety, honour and welfare of Europe.

This great hope is founded on new facts. The leaders who exploited fascism for uglier purposes and worked with Germany have been pushed into the background. The Crown Prince, whose wife is the sister of King Leopold, has come into closer touch with the Duce. The Pope, in the most definite and official language, says that at last Italy is at peace with the Church. If that remains true, as it should remain, Europe will have nothing more to fear from fascism.

ROBERT SENCOURT.

SCANDINAVIA'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE.

IS there a real, an indisputable mentality? Is it possible to give a perfectly exact, an absolutely convincing definition of this state of mind, and does it not come to the same difficulty which the old Sophists wanted to elucidate in asking mockingly: "What is a bald head?" "Is it one with ten hairs left or with fifteen or with twenty?" I do not think one can possibly find a state which could lay claim to spotless impartiality in this world havoc any more than an owner of a house can remain calm, cool and equable when he sees a gang of looters out to ransack their neighbours, to smash their furniture and to plunder everything they can get hold of. Neutrality cannot mean lack of sympathy for the great cause the Allies are fighting for. It means only the will to remain out of the mess, to hold aloof, because the special conditions, geographical, economic and political, do not allow a country immediately to join the forces of those who try to repress international criminals and to constitute a new order of Europe, and with that of humanity.

These assertions, so it seems to me, perhaps apply best to the Scandinavian countries. They are democratic countries and no doubt their heart is with the common cause of democracy. They cherish their democratic institutions, built up since hundreds of years, they hate Nazism and all the stupid folly of aggression. They would rather to-day than to-morrow view the triumph of order against chaos and destruction, the end for ever of the armaments race, dismal and idiotic as it is. But they are too near Germany to be able to give forcible expression to their feeling. They are too small to throw their weight into the scales with very great effect, and they even have no adequate armaments (up till now) to defend themselves for long against a ruthless and overwhelmingly stronger enemy. It was, as in England and France, a most decisive fault of the Socialist Party, especially in Sweden, to pursue a policy of unwarranted and unilateral (relative) disarmament. As in these big countries the ruling men were "caught napping" and suddenly saw themselves almost at the mercy of the "ogre." Had these northern States organised a first-rate and well-trained air force, even say of 500 aeroplanes and 500 tanks, they could probably face

the problem of neutrality without undue predicament. They could form a politically nearly self-supporting block; they could defy arrogance, protect their legitimate trade, defend their plucky mariners against piracy. But this preparation lacking they can only play for time and make the most of the fact that even in this state of weakness Sweden has a splendid little army with more than 500,000 magnificent soldiers, that the artillery is one of the best in the world, and that a very strong line of defence has been built in the South. Now, head over heels, 25 millions have been voted by the Riksdag for new tanks, and big sums are destined to increase the air force and the fleet. Several classes have been called to the colours. The peaceful towns of Stockholm and Gothenburg are learning all the pleasures and marvels of the "black out." They play with gas-masks nearly as skilfully as the quarrelling children in this European madhouse. Everywhere you can read in alluring articles and advertisements about the excellence and beauty of the different kinds of shelters. The big hotels and stores have their "Skydds" room; evacuating is a topic of public discussion and of Government plans exactly as it was in England and in France before the hour of decision struck. Also the difficult problems of compensation, of price control and war finance had to be solved without injuring the rights and opportunities of the individual. Benzine is only available with cards. The private citizen was for a time no more allowed to keep his motor car going than in the Western countries, and benzine had to be reserved only for public purposes. A huge wave of hamstering started at first, owing also to some blunder of the Minister of Commerce who warned the people in a radio-speech that they must not buy motor oil lest there should be a shortage of it, a warning which, of course, had quite the contrary effect on the simple-minded consumer. Not only was benzine hamstered, but also jewels, soap and quite a lot of other commodities, especially foodstuffs, in spite of the fact that there was not, nor is there, the least shortage felt in these countries where the agrarian element dominates. Naturally also the question of price regulation had to be discussed, since the increase of freight costs, of insurance for war risks, and a slight increase in the rate of interest, promote higher cost of living. The danger of inflation is no less knocking at the doors of Sweden than of any other country in the world, inflation with all its

consequences of devaluation and destitution. Therefore the Minister of Finance very appropriately warned the public that new taxes must follow in order to fill the gap created by war expenses, which are estimated at at least 500 million kronen. For the time being a wine tax and a spirit tax are proposed, a tax on tobacco, tea and coffee, and a tax on war profits.

So the imitation seems nearly to be accomplished, the "Toilette" as they used to say in the French Revolution about those who were condemned to the guillotine is nearly finished. Notwithstanding all these signs of danger, "*Lugn*," i.e. tranquillity, is the main characteristic of the Swedish and surely of the Scandinavian mind in general. I happened to be just in front of the wonderful old Royal Palace with its simple grand profile when about a hundred thousand people greeted the three Kings and the President of Finland, Kallio, on the balcony. Quietly they stood there in the glaring shimmer of the "limelight" thrown on them. Four chiefs of States but not one of them in uniform, simply Gentlemen on the throne, symbolising intelligence and honesty. Still, there was a halo of heroism round them and especially round President Kallio, whose country has to undergo so severe an ordeal, and round King Gustav, the really venerable doyen of European monarchs, bending just a bit under his 81 years, mildly waving his hand to the masses standing at the Grand Place acclaiming with deep-felt loyalty their friend and leader. Many had tears in their eyes as the National Anthems were played and sung, as the old cherished melody of the Luther choral, "A stronghold is our God," burst from the lips of these thousands.

All this was done without the slightest bustle of militaristic display, without any influence of terror and lie, without any fetish service to one person, without any of those methods of propaganda which mean war already. Clearly these monarchs and their folk want nothing but to be left in peace. Since 1814 Sweden has never conducted a war. Since the days of Louis XIV the country knows the danger of being influenced decisively by foreign powers; and from the time of Gustav III romantics and imperialism no longer play any part in Scandinavian policy. The people want to live and let live. Their economic situation gives them the key position between the two fighting groups, broadly speaking, by selling timber and

wood pulp, paper and dairy products to England in exchange for industrial products, and by selling iron ore and other metals to Germany in order to get machinery and chemicals. Even up to September export and import had shown excellent results. But now, of course, war has upset to a large extent the peaceful machinery of economics. A carefully organised system of espionage has enabled the Germans to know practically everything about the departure and the coming in of ships in Scandinavian harbours. Severe steps had to be taken to repress this treachery. Several U-boat commanders have shown themselves worthy colleagues of Himmler's bodyguard. One of them wanted actually to force a Swedish captain at point blank to falsify his shipping papers in order to claim that his cargo was destined for Great Britain instead of Belgium (which was the truth). The honest captain did not yield to this pressure, as he told the representatives of the press; he quietly faced the danger of death and taught the (probably amok-running) sailor that even the fate of those eleven Danish seamen who had been killed—one might say "murdered"—by this same U-boat would not influence his decision.

Such reports—I can only just give instances of this daily "warfare"—must naturally influence public opinion; and this is in fact the only effective propaganda for the Allies. All other methods have failed altogether—I tell it with great reluctance. For months no newspapers were available except those which were perfectly out of date, whereas German press literature was pouring in. No letters were coming from England except with considerable delay, so that all personal and business relations had to suffer. No telephone was working, and what astonishes many people most is that the B.B.C. could not afford or thought it unnecessary to give a Scandinavian version of their news. Not even the intellectual relations were kept up, whereas the Germans had carefully prepared the ground by inviting thousands of children to the Reich in exchange for a similar invitation from Sweden. A man of the importance of Sven Hedin was given the opportunity to "see Hitler" and boast with a patriotic object of this wonderful "meeting."

It was Hitler and Hitler alone who canvassed for the Allies, his deeds and the deeds of his friends and followers spoke better than any other "spokesman." Politically especially

the pact of Germany with Russia has created a profound and lasting impression. If the Swedish perhaps lack imagination, they do not lack honesty. If they are often sturdy, thoroughly cut and dried "breadwinners"—they know that there is such a thing as straightforwardness, a moral basis you never can lose without losing your soul. But also the political danger became perfectly clear when Russia constituted herself master of the Baltic, forcing Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to concessions which mean a serious hampering of their independence. Already the plight of Estland was felt very intensely because Swedish live there as a minority since the first start of Swedish expansion. But far stronger still was the sorrow when Finland was touched and threatened. Finland belonged to Sweden long after Swedish imperialism was doomed to death. Up to the middle of the Napoleonic wars this political connection was maintained, and even after the severing of all territorial bondage still a very strong cultural and national community of feeling remained. The ruling class in Finland was Swedish until the last years. Their old aristocratic and bourgeois families conserve the well-founded pride of having an ancestry often traced back for hundreds of years. But they are not, to quote an English playwright, like the potatoes whose best part lies under the earth. They represented and still represent an element of cultural progress. Undaunted by the tyranny of Tsarism they did not submit to the exactions of the invading Reds in 1917. Free from this trickery they built up a free country with President Svinhufvud and Field-Marshal Mannerheim as powerful leaders. True, German military help was needed to save Finland from social upheaval. But equally true is it that the folly of Germany and Germany alone has paved the way for Stalin's new expansion. Equally true that, when practically the whole world joined in the wish to protect this little State with its 4 millions of inhabitants against being simply choked by the octopus—Germany and Germany alone "did not feel interested" as a betrayed betrayer, when the worst of a catastrophe seemed at hand for Finland.

But the Finlanders did not shrink in the presence of the danger. They did not lose their nerve, as many others would have done, before so terrible a contingency. They were resolved with hope against hope—modern Spartans—to resist to the utmost if national disaster could not be averted.

All reports which I have received here from refugees and by letters from Finland are unanimous in the praise of the wonderful energy, quickness and quietness with which all measures were taken by the Government for evacuating Helsinki and bringing about 150,000 people into the (comparative) security of the northern provinces. All political and national quarrels ceased. The embittered struggle between the Swedish minority and the Finns (analogous to a certain extent with the former relation between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia) was put aside in this hour of need. All parties, the Agrarians whose leader is President Kallio, the Social Democrats represented by Finance Minister Tanner, joined to strengthen the Government. Nobody complained of the hardships of mobilisation. Parents had to be separated from their children, brothers from their sisters. For hours and hours the silent crowds waited patiently at the railway stations till they got their trains. Without grumbling they went away from their homes and the homes of their parents—packed and herded with a mass of companions. Finland made the decks clear for a desperate fight, the enormous width of the country with its woods and lakes giving splendid opportunities of local resistance.

Also considerable financial sacrifices were borne with courage and patience. Housing had to be prepared for the refugees, food had to be stored, all people had to adapt their conditions of life to the new necessity. The telephone and telegraph services came under state supervision. Currency control had to be established with a maximum of 3,000 finmarks to be exported. War industry demanded thousands of new hands, but still the land had to be ploughed, the family of the "conscript" had to be taken care of. Neighbours did what they could to soften this hardship and the common patriotism helped also to solve the very difficult financial problem. On one day the Finance Minister received from a private citizen alone 5 million marks and an aeroplane as a present. Of course, higher taxation will have to be borne and a loan for the defence of the country is to be launched which surely will score a big success. So this little country has to undergo the same strain as Austria when Italy was no more to be considered an effective "friend" at her borders. When Hitler and Mussolini joined in the now nearly forgotten "axis," no methods of diplomacy, no tricks or arguments—even had they

been better chosen than they were—could possibly save the life and independence of the buffer “between hammer and anvil.” Finland—it is to be hoped fervently—will be spared the worst, because Russia having Libau, Dagö, Ösel and Baltishport as naval bases, occupying a preponderant position in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia—does not need to bring a brave and well-armed people to despair. But even without this worst ordeal, if only the Russian frontier is changed for the worse for Finland,* if the little isle of Högland is to be under Russian influence, the strengthening of bolshevism promoted by Germany will go on as long as there is not an effective check against the powers of destruction.

I may be allowed to quote a little story which illustrates perhaps better this mentality than many big historical facts. Stalin is supposed to have asked Mr. Paasikivi, the chief of the Finnish Delegation, how many soldiers Finland would be able to put in the field. Paasikivi answered about four hundred thousand. Then we will send double against you, was the retort from Stalin. The Finnish delegate rose and begged to be allowed to speak with Helsinki. On his return he was naturally asked why he so suddenly wanted to speak with the chief of his Government. “I only wanted them to give an order,” Paasikivi answered, “that every one of our soldiers should have two supports ready for his rifle. . . .”

How far these destructive powers will work in their ultimately suicidal fanaticism may be gathered from the incredible fact that Germany actually gives up one of her strongest political and ethnical “bastions.” Hundreds of times German propaganda has “rubbed it in” that every German in the neighbouring states of the Reich was under the especial care of the “Führer.” No slogan was better understood than the silly and superficial statistical argument that Germany was so densely populated that she absolutely needed colonies as an outlet. Now the “Lord Protector” has to call back more than a hundred thousand of his people because he cannot protect them against bolshevism. He increases his own population, already so much in need of the most important commodities. He must bring new hungry

* When these lines were written the essential point was the Russian demand for Hangö, a seaside place on Finland's territory, as a naval base. Finland declared that such a concession was quite out of the question, and that they would rather break off negotiations than lose their independence.

ones, new discontented ones into his beleaguered fortress because his new “friends” are not willing to keep these “foreigners” within their walls. All Scandinavia has been impressed by this unheard-of “*Völkerwanderung*.” The Baltic Germans are exactly in the same position as the Swedish minority is in Finland. They are no more “Germans” but have become citizens of their countries for the last 600 years. The Stakelbergs, Benkendorfs, Rosens, Gripenbergs, etc., held always a great position at the Court of St. Petersburg. These are not only “barons,” as they are usually called, a class of haughty, reactionary if powerful landowners; but a very great part of the Baltic bourgeoisie has suddenly lost its home, its belongings, its freedom. Take as an instance the town of Riga. This town, the capital of Latvia, loses 10 per cent. of her folk. Eleven thousand flats are going to be empty, 250 doctors must leave their clients, tradesmen will miss their customers, the State its best taxpayers. The German property to be liquidated in all haste and to be administered by a special organisation is estimated at no less than one milliard of lats. It is an economic revolution, a social upheaval which Hitler's flight before Russia has produced, and now—grotesque consequence of his politics—his own people have to undergo an experience similar to those despised Jews who were forced to emigration on his order. Instead of keeping at least these colonies which the Germans founded in the past—valuable guarantees of permanent moral, political and economic influence—Hitler throws away his best assets only to satisfy Stalin's ambition.

Now one question prevails: How far will Hitler take the responsibility for further betrayal of the vital interests of Germany? Will Scandinavia not be threatened directly if, say, the Åland Islands come under Russian influence? They are only thirty miles away from the Swedish coast. Therefore very great caution prevails in the responsible Press and among official circles concerning foreign policy. Guns are mounted at the Swedish sea coast. Their dismal profile overshadows all political life. The budget for defence is more than a milliard of crowns. Sweden is confident of peace. But the clouds at the horizon are not to be overlooked. If she cannot help Finland in a military way she must try anything which can give to her neighbour moral support. With the terrible fate of Poland kept in memory, Sweden feels that “readiness is everything.”

POLAND'S STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM.

SEPTEMBER 1939 will always remain one of the most tragic chapters in Polish history. In that month Poland, a great country of 33 million inhabitants, a young State on the threshold of prosperity, was subjugated and condemned to the worst form of modern slavery: Nazi domination. To-day, at the beginning of November 1939, some people even in the Allied countries seem inclined to forget what a cruel injustice Poland has suffered, what appalling sacrifices have been forced upon her, and to what unspeakable torment her people are being subjected to-day. It is futile to say that the Poles have not forgotten. It is necessary that the whole civilised world should know not only what is happening in Poland now, but also her history for the past hundred and fifty years, with its unending drama of oppression and resistance to oppression, tyranny and revolt against tyranny, and its continual proofs of the invincible spirit of the Polish people as expressed in their repeated risings against the overwhelming power of their enemies. For a century and a half Poland has struggled for freedom in this way, each generation taking over the standard of revolt from the last. It was so until the year 1918, the rebirth of an independent Poland, and not even Nazi Germany can really believe that this spirit—whose dauntless power was manifested, among others, by the defence of the unfortified city of Warsaw, evoking the admiration of the entire world—can be crushed, though defenceless towns and villages may be razed to the ground by aerial bombardment and a State wiped off the map—for a time!—with the aid of a powerful “neutral.”

Poland has a national anthem beginning with the simple words: “Poland is not lost while we live”; it also has a patriotic song beginning with the words: “Our land shall not be stolen.” During the past hundred and fifty years there have always been thieves who have tried to do that very thing, but every generation of Poles has held fast to their faith that Poland was not lost and to their hope of its resurrection. Nor did they confine themselves to faith and hope; they fought for freedom and independence. The following brief survey of these struggles is a memento of the past which emphasises the reality of Polish hopes for the future.

The three partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth

century certainly constituted an even worse catastrophe than that of September 1939. At that time Prussia, Russia and Austria were able to seize Poland without a previous life-and-death struggle. The internal condition of the country was so deplorable, the weakness of the Polish Government so evident, and the excrescences of many Polish institutions—such as liberty to the point of anarchy—so serious that Potsdam, Moscow and Vienna had a comparatively easy task. However, the miracle of regeneration came to pass the moment the Polish State had been destroyed. On countless battlefields and through risings which were from the outset condemned to failure, but were inspired by an unshakable faith in ultimate victory, however distant, the Polish nation washed out the shame of the partitions and gave glorious evidence of its true spirit.

Tadeusz Kosciuszko was the first great Polish hero of freedom. After the second partition, in the year 1793, he made a desperate attempt to shake off the Tsarist yoke. His peasant battalions scored a magnificent victory over the Russians at Racławice. But that was only a temporary success, and there followed the Polish defeat at Maciejowice, which was soon after “celebrated” by the massacre of Praga, the Warsaw suburb which thereby entered the history of Polish martyrdom. Kosciuszko’s rising, in which Prince Joseph Poniatowski, nephew of the last King of Poland, had also participated at the outset, was over. Poniatowski later fought under Napoleon and distinguished himself at the Battle of Leipzig, in 1813, to such a degree that Napoleon made him a Marshal of France. Shortly after, he died.

Kosciuszko and Poniatowski even after their deaths remained the beacons of the Polish nation in the long, dark night of oppression that followed. There are two glorious dates in the saga of Polish heroism during this period: November 1830 and January 1863. The fires of the famous November Rising were lit by the cadets at the Warsaw Military Academy. It became a wildfire that spread throughout the Polish nation, filling the land with new enthusiasm and new hope. The Polish regiments of the Tsarist Army, approximately 30,000 men, joined the revolutionaries immediately, and their numbers were increased by 80,000 volunteers. This army resisted the might of Tsarist Russia for nearly a whole year. But in October 1831 the rising was

crushed and there followed a reign of the blackest terror. Polish patriots were exiled to Siberia, their fortunes were confiscated, the Polish universities at Warsaw and Vilna were closed, and attempts to deprive the Poles of their national culture were intensified. However, the memory of November 1830 could never be erased, and one of the greatest Polish dramas is entitled *The November Night*. The author was the neo-romanticist Stanislaw Wyspianski.

Every action inevitably produces a reaction. The spirit of a nation can neither be broken, nor suppressed. When Tsarist tyranny once more became intolerable, the heroic youth of Warsaw again rose in revolt. That was in January 1863. The direct cause of the explosion was the Tsarist attempt to put the young Poles into Russian regiments and station them in the remotest parts of the Tsarist Empire. Once more the revolt spread to the whole of the country, and even developed into a regular war, in which no fewer than 650 major and minor battles were fought, and no fewer than 25,000 of the insurgents fell in battle. When they were defeated—that was inevitable in view of the inexhaustible resources of the Tsarist tyranny—the real tragedy began. 150,000 Poles, men, women and children, were sent to the lead mines of Siberia and the Urals; 70,000 others were imprisoned; 1,660 estates were confiscated; the contents of libraries and museums were stolen and taken to the interior of Russia. Tsarist oppression became more and more soulless and brutal.

But in spite of it the ferment of freedom never ceased its work among the Poles. There was another explosion in the years 1905-6. This time it was a nationalist movement tinged with social objects. For this was the time when the workers and the mass of the people of Russia had revolted against Tsarism. The Polish Socialist Party (which was, of course, illegal, and of which Joseph Pilsudski was a leading member) played a prominent rôle in the organisation of the rising. After its suppression Tsarist tyranny became still more intolerable. There was no limit and no end to the sufferings of the Polish people under the Tsarist scourge.

Meanwhile, in the provinces stolen by Prussia at the partition (Poznan, Pomorze and Upper Silesia, which the Nazis to-day have the effrontery to describe as "old German land"), the Poles suffered from the violence of the German "*Drang nach Osten*." Berlin issued instructions that

everything Polish, and particularly the Polish language, must be suppressed, and that the plain must be settled with German peasants. The Prussian method of oppression was even more dangerous than the Russian. It was no less brutal, and better organised, more systematic. Polish resistance, in accordance with the law of action and reaction, was no less violent, how violent may best be gauged from the moving story of a revolt against Germanisation organised and executed by Polish children.

It began in the village of Wrzesnia. Polish children attending German schools were forbidden to recite the Lord's Prayer in Polish; they had to do that in the hated tongue of their German oppressors. The children refused. The teachers threatened. The children stood fast. Whereupon the teachers beat them until they bled. The parents who dared to protest against this barbarous procedure were thrown into gaol. But the spirit of the children of Wrzesnia spread to other parts and very soon no fewer than 100,000 Polish children were on strike. They were determined to remain loyal to their mother tongue. In Russia, too, from the year 1866, there were repeated revolts on the part of the Polish children against Russification. The biggest and best organised Polish school strike in Russian Poland took place in the years 1905-6. The historians who compare the heroism of the Polish children with that of the child crusaders of the thirteenth century are certainly right.

In the Austrian-occupied part of Poland, in Western Galicia, there was the peasant rising of 1846, though the perfidious Austrians succeeded in converting it into a revolt against the Polish landowners. In 1848, Prussia had to deal with the first Polish armed revolt in Poznan. The year 1914 is entered in Polish history with golden letters; it was then that Joseph Pilsudski formed the Polish Legions that later won independence for Poland. The autumn of 1939 saw the almost incredible heroism of Warsaw.

What was it that made the Poles take up arms again and again? Certainly not a desire for adventure, nor the hope of easy victory, since all their revolts were destined to fail—and they knew it. They always derived the impulse from an invincible faith in their ultimate liberation and in the triumph of right. This attitude was fostered by Polish education. As the schools were in the service of the oppressors, Polish

patriotic education had to rely on other sources: the Polish mother and Polish literature. It was thanks to the Polish mother that Polish children from their infancy were taught to prepare for the struggle; while the Polish literature of the nineteenth century constituted a single outcry against tyranny, a single call to arms. The leaders of the patriotic movement in literature were Poland's three greatest poets: Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Slowacki and Zygmunt Krasinski. Their works, which are truly immortal, contained everything, combining beauty of style with ardent hope, exquisite form with inspiring content, universal human appeal with the typical Polish spirit. The three giants were followed by generations of other poets and writers with the same patriotic inspiration. To mention only a few: Adam Asnyk, Or-Ot, Wyspianski, Stefan Zeromski, Henryk Sienkiewicz, and Strug. The written word was, and still is, the greatest treasure of the Poles, a last refuge as well as an inexhaustible source of faith.

The history of the Polish risings would be incomplete if it were confined to a record of armed revolts against the oppressors. The Poles always knew that freedom was indivisible, just like peace. They therefore fought always and everywhere where freedom was at stake, for American as well as Greek and Hungarian freedom. This chapter of Polish history is perhaps the finest: it is a striking proof of Polish romanticism and idealism. Before Tadeusz Kosciuszko became the leader of the Polish rising against Russia, he had been in America, where he went in order to fight in the War of Liberation. America has not forgotten him; there are statues of him to perpetuate his memory in several places. The same applies in the case of another Pole, Kazimierz Pulaski, who also played a prominent rôle in the American War of Liberation. There were many Poles in the Greek War of Independence. The Polish General Bem was one of the leaders of the Hungarian rising against the Hapsburgs in the year 1849. Down to this day Hungarian mothers tell their children of "Father Bem." At the same period, battalions of Polish volunteers were helping the Italians against their Austrian oppressors. There were also many Poles on the Turkish side in the Crimean War. And there were many Poles fighting under the tricolor against Prussia in the war of 1870-1.

We have already mentioned Prince Joseph Poniatowski, who fought under Napoleon and achieved the dignity of a

Marshal of France. In Italy there were Polish Legions fighting for Napoleon under Dabrowski. Another great Polish military leader in the service of France was General Skrzynecki. The Poles placed great hopes in Napoleon. He disappointed them. Rivers of Polish blood were shed for the Emperor on many battlefields, but the result, the establishment of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, a buffer State, was small and transitory.

There is one more thing in this connection that must be emphasised. Poland was never a military nation, like either modern Prussia or ancient Sparta. If she was nevertheless obliged in the course of her history to take up arms again and again, perhaps more frequently than any other European nation, it was in all cases a matter of self-preservation. Wars of conquest, wars with the object of gaining new territories, were foreign to the Polish character. It should be remembered that the incorporation of Lithuania in the old Polish Kingdom, as well as that of the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) was effected in an entirely peaceful manner (Union of Lublin, Union of Horodlo). The wars against the Cossacks of Chmielnicki were at the same time defensive wars against the Tartars and not against the peoples of the Ukraine as such.

In Polish history there are two dates which are connected with glorious martial achievements. In the year 1410 the allied Polish-Lithuanian armies inflicted a crushing defeat on the Teutonic Order, ancestors of the present Prussian-Nazi governing element in Germany; while in the year 1683 John Sobieski, King of Poland, decisively defeated the Turks before Vienna. Both these conflicts were of immense significance not only to Poland, but to the whole of Europe, and both served the purpose of self-preservation and civilisation. If the Germans had triumphed at Grunwald, there might be no independent Slav nation to-day; and if Sobieski had not saved Vienna, there might be no Western civilisation to-day.

That is not militarism. Yet these two heroic deeds lived on in the hearts of the Polish people and played their part in inspiring the Polish risings after the partitions. They lived again in the human and military genius of Pilsudski and in his great work. They were in the heart of Stefan Starzynski, Lord Mayor of Warsaw, in 1939. And this spirit will never rest, never submit, never compromise, despite the most brutal oppression, despite the most bestial barbarism.

SZYMON WOLF.

BLOCKADE AND VICTORY.

THERE are four main means by which we can win the present struggle; Blockade, Propaganda, Diplomacy (the winning over as allies states hitherto neutral; the detaching of other states from the enemy's orbit), Armed Force. All these means are interacting and must be used in combination; we cannot trust blindly to any particular method. Moreover, we must have the courage to look facts in the face even if they are unpalatable; we are not going to win wars by indulging in wishful thinking.

There is too much popular exaggeration in the claims made as to the effectiveness alike of our blockade and our propaganda in the last war. Despite our favourable geographical position, and our overwhelming naval superiority, it was not until the entry of America into the war that our blockade became really effective. It was impossible to impose the doctrine of "continuous freight" upon such powerful neutrals as the U.S.A.; the attempt to do so involved us in endless diplomatic difficulties. Down to the middle of 1917 we were unable to prevent very considerable imports into Germany via Scandinavia and other neutrals, and readers interested in this aspect of the problem would do well to study and digest Admiral Consett's *Triumph of Unarmed Forces*. Even after the blockade had become effective, its actual workings were by no means so overwhelming and decisive as is popularly assumed. No German military operation of any decisive importance was ever hampered and brought to naught by any shortage of arms or munitions which can be traced directly to the blockade; down to the very end of the war there were no complaints of shortage of arms or munitions from German commanders in the field, although there were complaints as to lack of men. The absence of tanks from the German army cannot be attributed to the blockade, the effectiveness of German aircraft or submarines cannot be said to have been reduced by this cause. In other words, the shortages due to the blockade were felt more by civilians than by soldiers, seamen, or airmen, and not even these shortages were so paralysing or overwhelming as is popularly believed. Once more I will recommend to the reader's attention a standard work, General Landwehr's *Hunger*. The effect of this is that the blockade was felt by civilians in Germany

more as a nerve-racking fight to get things which the average citizen is normally accustomed to have brought to his very door, than a matter of actual physical deprivation, and this is a conclusion which I can confirm from personal observation.* The official scales of rations issued were utterly misleading, the population rescued itself from official delinquencies and deficiencies by the development of *Hamstern* and the *Schleichhandel*. Most workers in industrial towns had friends or relatives in the country, every week-end they visited these armed with rucksacks, old clothes, boots, etc., and bartered them for foodstuffs and returned with laden rucksacks. This was *Hamstern*. The *Schleichhandel* was the product of this. Both *Hamstern* and *Schleichhandel* were forbidden; in practice it was impossible to suppress them. The *Schleichhandel* thrived in Germany and Austria during the last war as rum-running thrived in the U.S.A. during Prohibition, the very police and officials charged with putting it down had each their pet *Schleichhandler* from whom they bought supplies. Nothing is more certain than that this sort of thing will repeat itself. A law is only truly effective so long as public opinion supports it; not even a Nazi Government can send half Germany to prison.

The importance of this to our subject however is in its bearing on popular misconceptions. It will surprise many people to hear that the average middle-class family in Vienna could get white bread all through the war, and that the chief food shortage occurred after the war, and not during it, and that it was due more to administrative confusion arising from the sudden setting up of new states and the closing down of frontiers than to the blockade *per se*. Moreover, there is a tendency to attribute to the blockade alone shortages which were due to the absorption of industry with armaments work,

All this is not to suggest that our blockade was useless, or that it failed to inflict very real suffering upon the enemy: it is merely to stress the basal truth too often lost to mind which is that we could have carried on a blockade indefinitely without ever forcing Germany to surrender. There is the same element of exaggeration in what is written about our propaganda in the last war. This was principally effective with the non-German races, Czechs and Slavs. There was in Germany

* For reasons needless to mention here, I passed some time in 1918 in Vienna. General Landwehr was Food-Controller in Austria.

increasing war-weariness and increasing privation, but so long as Germany seemed like winning the war, the spirit of German nationalism continued to run high. Down to the very summer of 1918, the names of Hindenburg and Ludendorff were, to the average German, just as much names with which to conjure as are nowadays those of Hitler and Göring. There was a discontented Socialist minority, but it was a passive minority, the people as a whole trusted their leaders and lived in a world of illusions concerning them and Germany's chance of winning the war. Even the *Arbeiter Zeitung* of Vienna, in 1918 brilliantly edited, and probably the most outspoken and independent organ of public opinion to be found in any belligerent country, had blind faith in the German General Staff, wrote most respectfully concerning them, and had no idea of the impending collapse. It was not until Ludendorff had himself hoisted the signal for surrender by his appeal for an armistice that German *moral* collapsed, and in Ludendorff's appeal for an armistice neither propaganda nor blockade played any part whatsoever. "To-day the troops are holding their ground but no one knows what the morrow may bring forth." That was Ludendorff's message. He had been decisively beaten, and wanted to gain time to extricate his troops. But it was so much more flattering to German national pride to attribute defeat to the "starving out" of Germany, or to the "dagger stroke from behind," that the legends as to these were very industriously circulated, and the really amazing thing is that we find so many English writers prepared to do serious harm to their own side by swallowing such legends blindly.

For the theory that we can beat Germany at a minimum cost in lives and money by sitting tight behind the Maginot Line, and starving Germany into surrender is so very attractive as at the same time to be very dangerous. It obscures the need for a national military effort upon a gigantic scale, holds out an altogether illusory prospect of winning the war "on the cheap." To starve a town into surrender you must completely encircle it, cut off all food imports, and this has been done again and again in war. But in any case there is a big difference between encircling a town and encircling a state. A town, generally speaking, does not produce its own food supplies or raw materials, a state such as Germany does produce a very large proportion of its own food supplies and

raw materials. Thus even if you manage completely to invest it, you cannot produce the same overwhelming and catastrophic effects as you get when investing a town. Under present conditions however we have no prospect of making a complete investment of Germany, our geographical position in respect to this is far less favourable than in the last war, Germany has Italy, Russia, and the Balkans, on her frontiers. We have it in our favour that Germany must pay for her imports whether in gold or in manufactured products or in raw materials, and she has no gold nor any surplus whether of goods or materials with which to pay for her imports. But if we are to sit quiet, and trust to blockade, there ceases to be the overwhelming pressure upon German armaments production which absorbs this at the present time; Germany can quite well switch off from manufacturing armaments to manufacturing goods for export, she can pay for her imports, and the war can go on indefinitely. That is the ABC of this problem. There is no need to go into elaborate statistical material to prove the point, although there is no lack of such evidence available.

Incidentally, even if there were any chance of winning the war by such means, what sane sensible civilian is going to believe that men of the calibre of Hitler and Göring, grim and desperate fighters, even if they are dirty fighters, are going to be content to sit quiet and let themselves be starved into surrender, and do nothing about it? When Signor Mussolini was threatened with petrol sanctions, a form of blockade, he said, If you do this I shall reply by armed force. The sanctions project promptly fizzled out. Theoretically it may be possible to conceive of a boxer as winning his fight by warding off enemy blows, and wearing out his enemy by superior endurance. But no prize-fight has ever been won by such means. Theoretically it may be possible to conceive of one great state as defeating another by acting on the defensive, and slowly strangling its enemy by blockade. But there is no instance of this having been actually achieved in war, and it is very unlikely to be achieved in the present war.

In the last war it was Kitchener's instant appreciation of the true magnitude of his problem, his immediate decision to raise an army of seventy divisions, which truly brought victory to the Allied cause. It is an instance of how if a military policy is conceived from the outset upon fundamentally

sound lines, and if there is enough momentum behind it, then this momentum will enable it to survive totally unforeseen happenings, such as Kitchener's own death, or minor disasters such as the Dardanelles, or new developments such as the collapse of Russia, and carry it through to ultimate triumph. The same thing applies to-day. If we start with a military policy which is fundamentally sound, and set ourselves with wholehearted energy to pursue it, then the "drive" behind this policy will carry us through unforeseen happenings or any new developments, and even through what may seem serious disasters, and enable us to defeat Germany. But if we start with a policy which is based upon fundamentally false premisses, and fumble and falter in pursuing it, then any new development will suffice to throw our whole policy out of gear, and we shall get beaten.

For this reason it is necessary to warn the public against the exaggerated hopes based alike upon economic warfare and upon propaganda. Our situation with regard to propaganda is much more favourable than in the last war, even if our blockade prospects are less favourable. The number of discontented Germans is far greater, the resentment against hardship and privation due to the war will develop more rapidly, and upon a more intense scale. But this disaffected minority will continue to be passive so long as Germany looks like winning the war. It can accelerate the effects of our victories in the field, it cannot compensate for the lack of such victories, should we fail to win them. Therefore we must set all our efforts to producing armaments upon such a scale, and in such a state of efficiency, as will bring us victory in the field. If we pursue this policy with might and main then no new development will take us by surprise, and there will be a general tendency for new allies to join us so soon as they feel we are in a position to give them real and effective help against Germany. In his admirable broadcast of October 1st Mr. Churchill gave the first official announcement that we are preparing to raise armies upon as great a scale as in 1914-18. Mr. Chamberlain, a day or so earlier, gave a public warning against exaggerated hopes as to the results of economic warfare. These are welcome signs that the Government realises the magnitude of the task which confronts us.

VICTOR WALLACE GERMAINS.

THE POSITION OF SWITZERLAND.

IN the great national exhibition in Zürich, which, let us hope, will be re-opened again—there were 8 million visitors until the end of August—the task of Switzerland was indicated as "Guardian of the European river sources and the great Alpine passes." There is nothing new in that. Swiss neutrality goes back to the beginning of the sixteenth century when Maximilian fought Francis I. After having won many battles against Habsburg and Burgund in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in order to preserve its independence, the "*Eidgenossenschaft*" succeeded in remaining neutral. So she kept out during the Thirty Years' War and her "armed neutrality" is a consequence of the latter. Macchiavelli wrote about "*Swizzeri, liberissimi e armatissimi*" and Napoleon said: "Nature destined Switzerland to become a League of States; no wise man would attempt to conquer it." If Switzerland could preserve her independence during 1914-18 it was mainly thanks to her "armed neutrality."

For centuries Switzerland had the most universal conscription in Europe. To-day the little country of 4 million people has 600,000 soldiers, the largest percentage in the world. "The soldier takes his uniform and personal equipment home with him; he is furthermore obliged to attend shooting practice at regular intervals. In every Swiss house there is at least one rifle." Already in spring 1938 the fear that a new war was imminent became so intense that the Federal Government, backed by the great majority of the nation, put forward its demand for "integral neutrality" for Switzerland. This of course was obtained from the League of Nations. But integral neutrality does not mean, as far as the Swiss understand it, that there is now an obligation to keep quiet and to tolerate everything that is done in Europe. Last spring when the war clouds became darker and darker, a wave of resoluteness went through Switzerland to defend the independence of the country by all means. May I quote out of a single number of a leading Swiss daily paper of last April a few letters?

We do not want favour, we only want justice and peace for our country and if they do not grant that then everybody must help. One must arm everybody who is capable of carrying arms and one should shoot everybody who wants to destroy our country.

It would be good to make those greedy people understand that the government of each Canton has the right to call up troops itself. That means that if the entire Swiss Government were taken prisoner or surrendered, resistance would not yet be broken.

In the same paper on the woman's page a number of letters deal with the urgent desire of Swiss women to learn to shoot, to get arms in order to defend themselves against invaders. Swiss women, it is pointed out, have fought and they sometimes decided the victory. "Some people ask that we shall be ready to go into the basement in order to be quietly buried. No. Everyone a rifle in her hand and shoot the bandits."

The wish to be Swiss, free Swiss, goes so far as to produce a serious movement in German-speaking Switzerland to make a literary language of the "*Schwyzer Dyttsch*." As a matter of fact "*Schwyzer Dyttsch*" is spoken both by the university professor and by his maid. It is, by the way, one of the strongest ties of democracy if everybody speaks the same language. Within most nations there is a gap between the language of the man in the street and that of the educated person. This is not so in Switzerland. Now the Swiss dialect is as distant or almost as distant from "*Schriftdeutsch*" as Dutch is from German. Even in the printed language which is of course "*Schriftdeutsch*" there are slight differences. Those tentatives, to make "*Schwyzer Dyttsch*" a language like Dutch or Danish, are well meant and show the general attitude, but can hardly be realised. Besides, there is not one Swiss dialect but many. Swiss feeling is reflected in the saying of a Swiss writer, Falke, already years ago: "Rather than come under German régime, I would turn French and give up my mother tongue." The realistic Swiss citizen knows very well that military defence is not sufficient. One hears now on every side and with increasing frequency the slogan: "*Geistige Landesverteidigung*" (Spiritual national defence). The greatest achievement in that field was undoubtedly the marvellous national exhibition in Zürich mentioned above. I heard a visitor saying: "As a citizen of a canton I entered the exhibition, but as a Swiss citizen I left it." There is still much of that "*Kantönligeist*" in Switzerland but it may prove an advantage. Since the "forest cantons" founded the Swiss federation, in 1291 by the way, the basis of all political

life was the community and the canton. It is amazing how far the independence of these twenty-five cantons goes. Not even a common penal law exists. Last year the federal government tried to introduce a common penal code which was far from being revolutionary. It received a small majority but will not come into force for two years. Most of the French and Italian speaking people in Switzerland are opposing the new code because they fear that the central authorities in Berne may become too powerful. There is no danger in Switzerland that democracy may become synonymous with uniformity.

Neutrality of course has not only a military meaning. Switzerland is an economic factor too. It is a wrong idea to take Switzerland only as a sort of playground of Europe. Swiss Diesel marine engines are found in "all the seven seas." London's streets are paved with Swiss asphalt. In 1937 Switzerland exported goods worth 1,300 million Swiss francs, i.e. £65,000,000 (old rate of exchange). It is not only cheese, chocolate and watches Switzerland exports but first class machines, aluminium, chemicals. Switzerland needs raw materials and food. She has no coal, no iron, no petrol. However, there is hardly a country where the standard of the life of the people is so high. For the time being there is an agreement with Italy that Switzerland shall get all she needs through Genoa.

As far as interior politics are concerned the old established liberal party is still leading, but the influence of the catholic conservatives becomes greater from year to year. Motta, the foreign minister for many years, belongs to that party. He is a friend of Mussolini, who has repeatedly spoken of the Swiss democracy as the most genuine in Europe. There is not the slightest doubt that for the overwhelming majority of Swiss people "democracy is the only political form under which Switzerland can possibly live." There is no other way for a nation, consisting of 72 per cent. who speak German, 20 per cent. French, about 6 per cent. Italian and less than 2 per cent. Romansch, "*la quarta lingua*," to live peacefully together. All four nations have the same rights. There is no minority question, because no nation feels a minority. The time will come when Europe will follow Switzerland.

The political parties in Switzerland have strong youth movements. There are "young catholics," "young liberals,"

and, strongest of all, "young peasants," all decidedly democratic and all wanting very badly a united Swiss nation. All desire a stronger link between the nation and the workers. Up to the present time labour has not been represented in the government although they have a majority in several of the largest towns, such as Zürich, Basle. A straw that shows which way the wind is blowing was the failure of ten deputies of the so-called "national front"—a kind of totalitarian party—to win re-election at the last elections in the city of Zürich. The main condition laid down by many liberals for the adherence of the socialists to the national government, their backing of national defence, was fulfilled during the last years. The socialists now often make stronger demands for defence measures than do some of the "bourgeois" parties. In the May 1938 demonstrations, the Swiss flag appeared for the first time in the history of the social-democratic party in the processions beside the traditional red one. It is probable that the position of the neutral countries, as during the Great War, will become stronger and stronger, both spiritually and economically. Neutral money is already dearer. Perhaps the neutrals will influence the end of the war in a wider sense than it looks for the moment. And perhaps Switzerland will have a special task or as a great Swiss professor, Max Huber, the president of the International Red Cross, put it: "The destiny of Switzerland may yet be a mission."

WILHELM VIOLA.

ANCIENT HISTORY AND MODERN ANALOGIES.*

STUDENTS of the history and thought of classical antiquity are bound to ask themselves from time to time whether they have been justified in devoting so much attention to the understanding of an age so remote from the present. At such moments they feel a doubt whether they would not be better citizens, better qualified to pass an intelligent judgment on current problems, if they had concerned themselves not with the history of the Greeks and Romans but with the careers of Louis XIV or Napoleon, the growth of the British Empire or the rise of Germany. They fear that many of the problems which they have studied may fairly be regarded as trivial, and that their time might have been more profitably employed than in investigating the chronology of Spartan kings, the history of Athenian revolutions or the significance of the legislation of Roman Republican statesmen.

In order to answer such questions it is necessary to ask ourselves why we study history at all. Is the primary object of historical study to enable us to pass judgment on statesmen of the present day, and to "prove from history" that certain courses of action are bound to produce certain consequences? If this is its object, it may be confidently asserted that it has not been attained. Students of history, like economists, are to be found in every camp. As a recent writer in the *Spectator* has said: "Advocates of isolation produce Lord Salisbury; Collective Security seeks for an ancestry in the State Papers of Castlereagh. Elizabeth, William III and Pitt led coalitions to restore the balance of power, but James I and Charles II believed that an alliance with the strongest European Power would spell peace and safety—at the expense of Bohemia or Holland." He points out that historians are far less willing to pass moral judgments than they were when the Whig interpretation of history was generally accepted. "All decent men thought poorly of John, Strafford and Lord Liverpool. All good men approved of Simon de Montfort, Hampden and Lord Grey. None of these opinions is accepted without qualification to-day."

* A paper read to the "Greats Society" in Rhodes House, Oxford, on May 30th, 1939.

If this is true, the Ancient Historian will find some consolation in the thought that it is admitted by those who have concerned themselves with comparatively recent times that they are not qualified to act as mentors to contemporary statesmen. If the study of history is to make any contribution to "citizenship," it seems to be at least possible that this contribution may be derived as well from a knowledge of ancient as of modern times. The question appears rather to be what advantage is to be derived from familiarity with the past, whether recent or remote? Ought historical studies to be regarded simply as a means of satisfying curiosity, or may we hope that they will prove valuable to many who will never be professional students or teachers of history, but who wish to equip themselves for a life of practical activity? What is the nature and value of the "historical sense," the lack of which is so often regarded as a disastrous feature of the time in which we live?

One justification which may undoubtedly be claimed for the study of history is that it trains the critical sense, and that for this purpose Ancient History is a most efficient instrument. The scantiness of the surviving evidence for many periods of classical antiquity may be regarded from this point of view as a positive advantage. The student of these periods becomes acutely aware of the tentative character of the conclusions which it is legitimate to draw, and of the dangers against which those who exercise historical imagination must be on their guard. One who has undergone this training will instinctively distrust statements which rest on inadequate evidence, and is very unlikely to fall a victim to propaganda or advertisement. In an age of which these are very characteristic features, this fact alone seems to justify expenditure of time on subjects which at first sight seem remote from current problems. The fact that the wars between Athens and Ægina were unimportant may be regarded as entirely irrelevant if the study of them is regarded as a means of exercising and training the critical faculty.

But this is not the only or the most important advantage which may be derived from the study of the ancient world. The trained historian is more than a man of exact and critical intellect. His work, unlike that of the scientist or mathematician, has been concerned with human beings and human societies, and it would be surprising if this difference were not

reflected in his general attitude to life. The nature of his subject must have some effect on his judgment of his contemporaries and the problems which they are called upon to face, even though he may not feel qualified to express dogmatic opinions upon them. He may have concerned himself primarily with political questions or with social or economic problems or with military matters or with the history of religion. Whether he likes it or not, his training is bound to have some influence on his method of approach to the political, social, economic, military or religious controversies of the age in which he lives.

A passage from the biography of a well-known Scottish clergyman of the last generation may help to provide a clue to the problem which is being considered. It deals with his attitude to the European War.

His sense of the horror of the struggle was as great as that of any of his brethren. Yet he does not seem to have been convinced that the war had added any new perplexities to faith. Probably this was due to the historical temper of his mind. He knew that the world had experienced similar catastrophes before; that the records of humanity were full of cruelty, oppression, treachery, greed and innocent suffering. He had long ago faced the difficulties which such things present to a believer; and he found nothing which was novel in the terrors of the latest strife. He did not think it more difficult to reconcile the goodness of God with the atrocities wrought in Belgium or France than with the unspeakable desolations of the Thirty Years' War or the horrors of the barbarian invasion in Augustine's day. I think he was puzzled to understand how men of historical knowledge and imagination should have their faith destroyed by being required to face in their own time such facts of human sin and anguish as they had always known to be part of the story of mankind.

This passage gives good expression to what is undoubtedly one of the "lessons of history," that in the problems of to-day there is little that is new. The historian will be aware that these problems are not only old but very complex. He will shrink from facile generalisations, such as "persecution never pays" or "nothing is ever gained by war," and may have to incur unpopularity by contradicting those to whom such generalisations appeal. He will tend to oppose whatever forms of pessimism or optimism may happen to be fashionable. He is unlikely to have an

uncritical confidence in human progress, and equally unlikely to utter gloomy prophecies of the imminent collapse of civilisation. His knowledge of the past will remind him that this is not the first time when human society has been exposed to dangers, and that somehow or other it has succeeded in escaping or surviving them. He will realise how hard it is for contemporaries to pass judgments on the events of their time. He will remember that the conquest of Greece by Macedon, which must have seemed to many contemporaries of Demosthenes to spell the "end of civilisation," led to the spread of Greek culture first to the east and then to the west of Europe. He will remember that the expansion of Roman power, marred as it was by much brutality, led to the creation of a world-State from which all modern imperial powers can learn lessons, and to a golden age in the history of mankind.

I should like to illustrate these general reflections by giving a few examples of situations arising in ancient times which present close analogies to those with which we are familiar. Some of these parallels are so well known and have been so frequently referred to by writers in the press and elsewhere that a brief mention will be sufficient. The opinion of John Bright that "there is more political wisdom in a column of *The Times* than in the whole of Thucydides" has often been refuted in the pages of that journal itself. During the Spanish Civil War Thucydides came to his own, and we were frequently reminded of the extraordinary appositeness of his analysis of the psychological effects of civil strife.

In every city the chiefs of the democracy and of the oligarchy were struggling, the one to bring in the Athenians, the other the Lacedæmonians. Now in time of peace men would have had no excuse for introducing either, and no desire to do so, but when they were at war and both sides could easily obtain allies to the hurt of their enemies and the advantage of themselves, the dissatisfied party was only too ready to invoke foreign aid. . . . Inferior intellects generally succeeded best. For, aware of their own deficiencies, and fearing the capacity of their opponents, for whom they were no match in power of speech, and whose subtle wits were likely to anticipate them in contriving evil, they struck boldly and at once. . . . Any agreements sworn to by either party when they could do nothing else were binding as long as they were powerless.

The Peloponnesian War was to some extent a conflict between rival "ideologies." The majority of Greek States

belonged to one or other of two groups, led respectively by Athens and Sparta, each of which had its own "ideology." The political philosophy which Athens sought to inculcate in the States dependent on her finds its best expression in the Funeral Speech of Pericles, the classical exposition of "liberal" principles, while Spartan ideas had much in common with those of modern Fascism. The chief problem confronting Greek statesmen was to determine whether these two groups of States could live peaceably side by side or whether a clash was inevitable. Attempts were made by moderate men on both sides to establish a *modus vivendi*, but they were rendered futile by the existence in the Greek character of certain unamiable features, and the Peloponnesian War was the result. In many States of each group there existed minorities professing the political faith of the rival group, and thus the horrors of war were intensified by civil strife. Fifth-century Greece has often been viewed as a microcosm of the Europe of to-day. We find a collection of States which had everything to gain by union, but which became involved in a fratricidal struggle, because they allowed themselves to fall into two opposing groups, which, in spite of the efforts of champions of "appeasement" like Cimon and Nicias, could not learn to tolerate each other.

Another feature of the present time which finds a close parallel in the same period is the use of propaganda. The slogans used by both sides in the Peloponnesian War were carefully selected to suit the people to whom they were addressed. It sometimes suited the Athenians to declare that they were fighting "to make the world safe for democracy," but this war-cry could hardly be employed in Sicily, where their chief enemy, Syracuse, had an extremely democratic constitution. Accordingly in that island they posed as opponents of Dorian supremacy and made the most of the principle of kinship. The bogus character of this propaganda was shown up by the great Syracusan Hermocrates. One is inevitably reminded of the emissaries who were sent to the U.S.A. during the European War to "state the case of the Allies" in the hope that America would intervene on their side. These emissaries waxed eloquent on the Pilgrim Fathers and on the ties of blood which united the U.S.A. with England. President Wilson, like Hermocrates, realised that this enthusiasm was not altogether disinterested, and insisted that

American participation in the war must be settled by reference to American interests. Both sides in the Peloponnesian War attempted to justify themselves by the profession of lofty principles. They professed to be fighting to free their kinsmen from oppression, or to liberate Greece from the domination of an imperial power, or to establish some good form of government. Only occasionally, as in the Melian Dialogue or in some utterances of Cleon, do we find language which shows how disingenuous was the pretence that anything was at stake but the interests of two rival coalitions.

A close parallel to another problem in English history can be found in the relations between the States of Greece proper and their kinsfolk in Asia Minor. When appeals for assistance against a great Power like Lydia or Persia reached Greece, Sparta consistently adopted an "isolationist" attitude and was content to send "strongly worded protests." After Athens had despatched a quite inadequate force to assist the Ionians in their revolt from Persia Themistocles was convinced that a "vigorous" foreign policy called for the possession of naval and military power. Both sides realised that intervention in Asia Minor on behalf of Greek cities would make war with Persia inevitable.

The ancients were quite familiar with the principle of the Balance of Power. In the sixth century B.C. an alliance was formed between Egypt, Lydia, Babylon and Sparta in order to preserve the *status quo* in the Near East against aggression by Media or Persia, an alliance inspired by the principle of Collective Security. The Delian League was in its origin a kind of League of Nations, whose failure, like that of its modern counterpart, was due to the absence from it of some important States and to the unwillingness of those included in it to surrender any of their national sovereignty. The policy of Rome in the eastern Mediterranean after the Second Punic War reminds one of the policy normally adopted by this country towards Europe. While unwilling to annex, the Romans felt that they could not allow any "great Power," such as Macedon or Syria, to dominate an area with which they were concerned, and accordingly they assumed the rôle of the champion of "small nations," such as Pergamum or Rhodes. This championship was by no means disinterested, and those who suffered from Roman policy were perfectly entitled to describe it as selfish and hypocritical.

The contrast drawn by Demosthenes between the hesitation and incompetence of democracies and the swift efficiency of "dictator-States" is so familiar as hardly to require a mention.

Always letting slip the present and fancying that the future will take care of itself, we have ourselves raised Philip to a height of power greater than that of any previous king of Macedon. . . . Contrast with your indolence that activity which is part of his habit and very being. . . . No wonder that he, marching and toiling in person, present at every point, never letting an opportunity slip or a season go by, prevails over us who are putting off, passing votes, and asking questions.

Such quotations could be multiplied indefinitely.

Another analogy may be drawn between the position of Delphi in Greece and that of the Vatican in modern Europe. Both can be regarded as institutions possessing enormous potentialities, which for one reason or another have been unable to play a decisive part in politics. Common respect for the Delphic Oracle did something to mitigate the rivalry of Greek States and to inspire a feeling of Hellenic unity. But at the time of the Persian Wars Delphi refused to identify herself with the patriotic States, and it did nothing to prevent the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The primary object of the Delphian priests was to protect Delphi and its treasures, and the "Sacred Wars" which they organised were waged for this limited purpose. I do not wish to suggest that the Vatican supplies an exact parallel. Much of Europe owes no allegiance to the Pope, or is even openly hostile to his claims, and it is only natural that the Head of the Roman Catholic Church should regard it as his first duty to consider the interests of its members. At the same time that there is an analogy can hardly be denied. Religious men in Greece as in modern times felt themselves linked to their fellow-worshippers, and must have regretted that "organised religion" could do so little to harmonise relations between States.

The study of antiquity throws an interesting light on the problem of Church and State. In the famous passage where Herodotus attempts to define Hellenism he mentions among its constituents, along with community of blood, language, and customs, "the temples of the gods and the sacrifices in which we share." Religion was indeed a very important

ingredient in ancient patriotism. Wherever Greeks settled, in the east or in the west, the first thing which they did was to erect temples to the gods. Acts of impiety, such as the mutilation of the Hermæ, were at once ascribed to political revolutionaries. The "virtue" of good citizens like Nicias was associated with the punctual performance of religious duties. This feeling was just as strong in Rome. A good Roman was expected to obey not only the *ius civile* but the *ius divinum*, and the official representatives of religion were not members of a priestly class but ordinary laymen who had been elected to a magistracy or to membership of one of the priestly colleges.

Neither in Greece nor in Rome was much emphasis laid on orthodoxy of belief. What made the Greeks conscious of their unity was not a common faith but the possession of common temples and religious festivals. It was not without reason that the Athenians insisted that representatives of the allies should attend the Panathenaic Festival. They hoped that the imposing ceremonial would affect their imagination and that they would return home less unwilling to be politically associated with a city whose religious ritual was so magnificent. The appeal made by Athens was to the imagination and not to the intellect.

The effort made by Augustus to revive the old Roman religion provides a good illustration of the closeness of the connection between Church and State in antiquity. In the previous generation men like Cicero, who possessed the "historical sense," had been alarmed by the disrespect so widely shown to the religion of the State. Auspices were neglected, temples allowed to fall into ruin and ancient priest-hoods left unfilled. He felt that this threatened the stability of the State not so much because he feared the anger of the gods, about whom his own ideas were vague, as because he was imbued with the feeling that no State could be well governed unless its members showed respect for a religion which somehow embodied moral principles and standards. A purely secular State was to him almost unthinkable.

The attitude of Augustus to religion was not unlike that of Cicero. In rebuilding the temples of the gods his motives were political and ethical rather than religious in the Christian sense. His "Recall to Religion" was closely associated with the laws by which he hoped to secure a higher standard of

family life. He hoped to foster the old Roman virtues by a revival of religion. Wishing to give stability to the new form of government which he was creating, he sought to confer on it a religious sanction and to bring about an alliance of throne and altar. He hoped that his defeat of Antony and Cleopatra might pave the way for a return to the manliness of Italian life and for an abandonment of the corrupting influences of the East.

Englishmen, who in many respects possess the Roman temperament, may well feel that this ancient conception of religion is not unfamiliar and not without its value. Even in an age when church-going is unfashionable and which, we are often told, is rapidly becoming pagan, few would wish our kings to be crowned without religious ceremonial or prayers to be dispensed with in the Houses of Parliament. It would be a shock to many who rarely enter them if our College Chapels were closed. Most Englishmen are as vague in their theological beliefs as the average Roman, but feel, like the Romans, that religious ordinances which have come down to them almost unchanged for centuries are worth preserving. Men of intelligence to whom this point of view appeals may console themselves by the thought that they share it to some extent with the quick-witted Athenians.

Parallels to almost all the problems of to-day may be found in Ancient History. The study of Ancient Philosophy is often defended on the ground that we find in it a discussion of problems of perennial interest, expressed in relatively simple language, free from the technical terms which have done at least as much to obscure as to clarify thought. The study of Ancient History may well be defended on similar grounds. The extraordinary modernity of Thucydides has always been recognised by those who have been competent to judge, and it is unfortunate that his assistance is not available to the students of other periods of antiquity. There is, however, no reason why they should not apply to the study of these periods the lessons they have learned from Thucydides. If they do this they will realise that the problems which mankind has to face are in all ages fundamentally the same, and will qualify themselves to pass a sane and tolerant judgment on the attempts of modern statesmen to deal with situations which in some form have often arisen in the past.

G. H. STEVENSON.

HEINE AND OUR TIMES.

ON February 17th, 1933, at 8 o'clock on a chilly winter morning about three weeks after Hitler had become Chancellor, we, a group of twenty, were standing in front of the Heine monument in the Hamburg Municipal Park. The statue shows the poet of the *Buch der Lieder* as a young man in the fashionable long coat of his period, leaning against a block of marble on which sea-gulls are seen swooping hither and thither. It was the anniversary of the poet's death, and we had come to lay a wreath on behalf of the International Heine Association which we had founded as recently as in 1932, less in the hope of an overwhelming success than as a liberal gesture against the increasing hostility of our time towards matters of the spirit. Nevertheless we believed Heine to be as a political poet very much alive. This assumption proved right. One of our social functions in Hamburg, announced as "A Tea-Party with Heine," attracted about two hundred guests. In the first part of the programme lyrics by Heine were recited. The second part included political poems by Heine, Wedekind and others. During the interval, the chairman read several poems the authors of which the audience were asked to guess, with the result that certain verses by Heine were generally believed to have been written by a German poet of the present day, while several modern poems were attributed to Heine. This shows the close relationship of political poetry under analogous conditions; it also shows how entirely Heine belongs to our present time.

On the day named we were still able to pay homage to the poet without interference (though under police protection). It was, however, to be the last of its kind, for some time at least. The monument, like all other memorials of Heine, has meanwhile been removed. In anthologies as everywhere else his name has vanished at the foot of the *Loreley*, now ascribed to an "unknown poet."* It has even been proposed to substitute new, "homogeneous" German texts for those poems of Heine which inspired the music of Schubert and other German composers. Whether it will be possible to eradicate the love of the German people for Heine remains to be seen. In any case, his work has long since crossed the frontiers and taken its place in the literature of the world. His verses are

* Since this article was written, the famous verses have been banned as "Jewish."

sung wherever *Lieder* are valued. Forty years ago the famous Danish critic, Georg Brandes, asserted in his essay on Heine that no less than 3,000 musical settings of his poems were known, while even Goethe had to be satisfied with 1,700.

Nearly all the outstanding lyric poets of the nineteenth century have at one time or other been under the spell of Heine's art in handling words and have studied at his feet even though later they developed their own modes of expression. Wherever his name is mentioned, the instinctive association is: *Buch der Lieder*. This never-fading poetic garland begins in a mood of youthful *Weltschmerz*. The "absent beloved" (*ferne Geliebte*), assumed to be the source of so much suffering, might as well be unreal, so vague is her delicate figure hinted at in the verses. Their subject is the poet's own ego, lonely in the teeming profusion of his feelings and the manifold impacts of Nature. Harsher tones, too, are heard, criticising society, mocking at himself. The orchestra of words swells into a wider crescendo, grappling with the forces of nature, and drawing ultimate questions into its orbit. For the first time a modern expresses the restlessness of his soul, its dilemma, its wistfulness, but also his faith and the loftiness of his spirit soaring serenely upwards from the abyss of earthly misery.

Alongside creations which are like plants with all their roots lifted from the bottom of the soul, there are others, like the sharply modelled ballads portraying human destiny: *The Grenadiers*, *Belsazar*, the *Pilgrimage to Kevelaar*. 1827 saw the *Buch der Lieder* finished, a work which secured to Heine his place in world literature. In the wider conception of the word it is the fruit of his youth. When he added the finishing touches he was thirty years of age. Great wrong is done him if he is identified with this lyric poetry and nothing else. It is as though the remaining thirty years of his life—he died in 1856—were denied their right. His prose works, starting with his *Reisebilder*, the *Harzreise*, etc., at once became famous. Heine had, too, immense influence as a prose-writer, a brilliant journalist. At first those writings rarely touched political questions; later on, these became more and more predominant. This applies also to his poetic works. Heine the man, as political spokesman and poet, is a complement to the youthful writer of love songs.

I shall not fall into the error of portraying Heine as a

politician. He was never a member of any party, never took any direct part in political work. For a short time he was editor of a political review published by Baron Cotta. Soon after the French Revolution of July 1830, he came to Paris, where he lived as an emigrant until his death. He strove to make the French understand Germany, the Germans France. In the course of time he separated himself more and more from the life of the German emigrants in Paris. He loathed most heartily the discussions of pot-house politicians in smoky taverns. It is impossible to picture him as an orator at a political meeting. Owing to the deep divergencies of their characters, a certain antagonism developed between him and Ludwig Boerne, the courageous pioneer of democratic liberty. Heine felt he had to combat the German democrats because they were more nationalistic and Francophobe than revolutionary, more easily intoxicated by high-sounding words than inclined to join the masses in their efforts towards political liberation. Like Georg Büchner, he foresaw the unhappy end of the period of 1848. He scoffed at the Swabian poets who, instead of facing the political issues of the day, took refuge in an idyllic life. But as a fighter in the spiritual front of freedom he carried on an impassioned literary struggle.

Despite his activities in the political arena Heine remained an aristocrat of the spirit. He was first and foremost an artist, turning his back on practical life. He was obsessed with the urge to formulate his way of experiencing the world. In play and jest, in pain and torment, he was a servant of the word. That becomes evident time and again in his letters and even more in his conversations. It is profoundly moving to realise how even on his bed of pain, putting to shame his decaying body, he time after time rises to the heights of poetic creation which for him was the very breath and essence of life, at once an irresistible compulsion of his nature and its deepest fulfilment.

As soon as one accepts unconditionally this fundamental fact—Heine not a politician but a poet—the problem of the origin of his political poetry takes on another aspect. Where is the connecting line between his creative impulse and politics? He had early recognised that the word is not only a medium of expressing sentiment and a means of interpreting the world, but also an unrivalled weapon. Already by the ironical tinge of his love poems he contrived to strike both at

himself and others. His sparkling wit in conversation was very sharp, and not seldom wounding. When later on he also used it in his prose writings for political issues he was surprised at the value and striking power of this weapon of the intellect. It was an intoxicating experience. He began to feel his vocation as "Knight of the Holy Spirit." In it the youth saw the task of his life, it brought him to maturity. The word, shaped and chiselled as a strong and subtle weapon in man's struggle for a life filled with inner meaning seemed to him a mental task deserving of the artist's most valiant effort. His work in the service of the word assumed social importance.

Heine was drawn into the current of liberalism which was fed by the best German eighteenth-century traditions. Those conscious of their human dignity claimed human rights. It was the era of the Holy Alliance for the suppression of all democratic efforts. Heine realised the danger attaching to his activities and at first, understandably enough, hesitated to stake everything in his country. The French Revolution of 1830 brought things to a head. He moved more and more decidedly into the limelight and had to leave the country. During those years the clashes in the field of censorship between the political powers and Heine became more and more unpleasant. Under the Weimar Republic the literary historian H. H. Houben was given access to the secret archives and published a selection in two large volumes, entitled *Banned Publicists* (1924 and 1928). No less than forty-four pages are dedicated to Heine, whose *Harzreise* was terribly mutilated by the censor when it appeared in 1826 in the Berlin review *Der Gesellschafter*; and the same thing happened to many of his poems. The first prohibitions, in 1827, hit the second volume of his *Reisebilder* throughout the Prussian Rhineland, Hanover, Austria, and Mecklenburg. But the ban only increased their popularity. The publisher Campe even complained that it had "tickled the poet inconceivably and made him conceited." He said he was afraid lest this cheap success of the day should drive the author into political activities "where greater fame is to be achieved, at least, fame with less effort." From now on prohibitions multiplied. At the same time Heine's sallies from the literary fortress increased in virulence since he was now domiciled in Paris. Metternich himself was very fond of Heine's love poems, which, however, did not prevent him from persecuting the poet and his works

most mercilessly. Eventually, in December 1835, the German Diet pronounced a general ban on his writings, those already published as well as future ones. They ought, therefore, to have been suppressed in all the Federal States. This, however, did not turn out to be completely feasible. The publisher Campe was past master of the illegal traffic in this popular intellectual commodity. At times the ban had a propagandist effect. There came periods when the zeal of the authorities slackened considerably. Nevertheless the ban did Heine a great deal of harm in the long run. A painful state of friction prevailed for decades between him and the political forces. Again and again the resonance of his works was dulled by censorship, bans, and confiscations; all of them interfered cruelly with his own personal creative work. He was defending his very soul in this political strife.

Freedom of the press is but a modest part of the rights of humanity; other rights are indispensable and have to be politically and economically secured if there is to be room for the free development of human life. But spiritual freedom, the freedom of the word in speech and writing, is for all that the nucleus, the essence and symbol of all human rights. Only by means of the word can historical events be lifted into human consciousness and produce the currents which carry peoples away. He who has experienced the power of the word as a spiritual weapon will feel that its mastery places on him an especially large share of responsibility in political developments. There are great examples in our time, Thomas Mann for instance. Heine, too, again and again heard the call reminding him of the responsibility laid upon him on account of his power over the word.

The most magnificent examples of his political prose belong to the period from 1830-4. He reaches the zenith of his political poetry in the two dramatic epics *Atta Troll* (1843) and *Germany* (1844). The vivid realisation of the strong repercussions of his political poetry was a surprising result of Scandinavian studies (Cp. *Der lebendige Heine im germanischen Norden*, Copenhagen, 1935). To quote one example, *Germany* has three times been translated into Swedish. The eminent Danish author, Johannes V. Jensen, writes in 1935:

The two long epic poems *Deutschland* and *Atta Troll* are marvels of imagination, wit and descriptive power in a saturated, proverbial form. They constitute a peculiar, sovereign blend of lyric and

political poetry, unique of its kind, which makes as splendid reading to-day as ever. As regards their form, they have qualities never attained elsewhere either before or afterwards, grace and energy of expression, each stanza a jewel. Heine's talent of combining conciseness with breadth of thought has but few parallels: the Bible and the old-Nordic condensed form of art—the songs originating in an exercise of memory, economy of speech coupled with visionary mental power. Those two sparkling, firmly shaped, winged and at the same time heavily armed poems are the only ones I ever knew by heart—I, who cannot even remember my own.

It is small wonder that this quotation points to the Bible in connection with Heine. For Heine is the heir of the people whom the world has to thank for the book of books. Through his descent, early impressions, and intense studies he has had his share of one of the oldest civilisations still alive. The tragic history of his people, which early lost its country and State, and has since lived in Dispersion, taking shelter in its religion, almost always rejected and despised, often persecuted—this thousand-year-old suffering weighed heavily upon him, lent him his melancholy, whetted the sharp blade of his intellect, made him feel akin to all who are oppressed, and made mockery his best weapon. All that is Jewish in Heine's works has been gathered by Hugo Bieber in a selection (published in Berlin in 1926) under the title *Confessio Judaica*.

At the same time Heine holds his place as a German in the German evolution of the nineteenth century, the transition from Romanticism to a realistic conception of life, inward and outward. No writer has given a more pertinent expression to this struggling new humanism. He has by himself done more for the appreciation of German culture throughout the world than all his German adversaries, dominated by racial hatred, put together. Hundreds of times he has poured his love of Germany into imperishable verses. He lashed Germany as he lashed Jewry wherever she gave cause for him to apply his scathing sarcasm. He did not fight against his own country and its people but against the faithless absolute Monarchy, against the omnipotence of the domineering nobility, against the rigid Church, closely connected with both, and the servile stupidity of the subjects. He fought for freedom of the spirit and the rights of humanity. Thus did he, the émigré, outgrow

Judaism and Teutonism and became a good European and world-citizen.

That makes him our living contemporary. At times it would seem as though the ideas he stood for had become obsolete because most of them had found fulfilment. The words "freedom" and "rights of humanity" began to sound like empty phrases. But the events of our times have filled them with new life. In various countries they have to be conquered anew, everywhere they have to be defended. No doubt Heine's influence on political thought is to-day limited. He who wants to engage in practical political work nowadays cannot keep outside the bounds of party politics and needs a stronger spiritual foundation than the poet possessed. Heine's word cannot enflame political movements, for these spring from the special political and economic conditions. But wherever the most elementary rights of humanity are threatened his words resume their old militant ring, their warning, inspiring power. His political poetry proves as imperishable as his love lyrics.

WALTER A. BERENDSOHN.

CLEANING UP BURMA'S MURDER ZONE.

IT was described officially as "the worst district for crime in Burma." Administration was out of hand in every way and before the cleaning-up process began returns showed an increase of 75 per cent. of cases under the Indian Penal Code; ordinary thefts had more than doubled; gambling cases had doubled; the number of persons sentenced to rigorous imprisonment had risen by 93 per cent.; the revenue was shockingly in arrears, and smuggling was rife. With the increase in lawlessness, sanitation became non-existent and there were no roads between the villages. Smallpox, plague and cholera were rampant. There was an annual average of 500 cases of cattle theft while professional murder gangs dominated large areas, terrorising the populace. Gang law was rife inasmuch as no one dare speak against the assassins. Even when a murderer was more or less caught red-handed, the relatives of the murdered person dare not come forward with a charge. Headmen, police and other authority had vanished. Stark terrorism ruled—composed of dacoit and cattle-lifting gangs, secret criminal societies, drug traffickers and organised murderers. Anyone who, from any cause whatever, was suspect of interfering with members of a gang was speedily removed without question or delay. As a result, even peaceful villagers, on the principle of "safety first," were often swept into the growing ranks of dacoity.

To such an appalling region of utter lawlessness the Government turned an uneasy eye. An appointment was made and a Deputy Commissioner assigned to stamp out evil and restore the district to law and order. The first task awaiting the Commissioner was to define the murder zone proper. This zone comprised one police station area with records showing that out of 109 murders committed or traced to have been committed only nineteen convictions had been registered. Obviously, the root of the trouble could only be struck at if the powers responsible for hiding the murderers were traced. The powers to strike at were the secret murder societies! In attacking this problem, the Commissioner discovered to his dismay that no records of crime existed regarding murder gangs. District and police registers were blank, either from corruption or fear of the consequences in making a permanent

record of village crime. In order to learn the names and details of the gang or gangs responsible for the murders in this notorious zone, it was incumbent to seek information from the villagers themselves. This was delicate work, because any intelligence that was given might easily have been prepared by members of the gangs concerned, and it was impossible to differentiate with any degree of confidence between law-abiding villagers and emissaries, spies or active members of the murder societies.

The main cause of all this organised crime was the failure of officers to tour constantly and keep themselves in close touch with what was transpiring in the lives of the native populace. Obviously, then, contact had to be remade with the villagers; their confidence had to be restored and at the same time they were to be shown quite firmly that nothing could be gained by the suppression of evidence. What information was forthcoming and what could be persuaded and legally pressed out of reluctant lips resulted in two murder gangs being named. These were the Kanaungaggale gang of the Obo village tract, and the Momaka gang of the Okpon tract. These two gangs terrorised the countryside and openly flouted law and order. Once having pinned down their existence, swift measures were taken against them. By the use of surprise tactics the Momaka gang were rounded up and safely put away in jail.

The second phase of the cleaning-up process now began. Although the criminals were incarcerated, their victims still refused to speak against them, so terror-stricken had they become. It needed inexhaustible patience, but at last the villagers began to reveal things, reliable statements were eventually forthcoming and the remaining members of the gangs were arrested long before the witnesses got back to their village homes or could be killed *en route*. This sequel would have been inevitable had not quick arrests been made, for the desperadoes had no fear of authority.

But with the larger and more desperate gangs suppression was not to prove so easy. There was always the danger that witnesses would be murdered. As the headquarters of the Commissioner could not be moved from day to day, village witnesses had to travel to give evidence and some idea of the dangers they ran may be gauged from the startling fact that, on one occasion, a witness was chased by a gang member and

slain right in front of the magistrate's bench at the Court House, while the magistrate was sitting.

The utmost patience was necessary at this early stage of the cleaning-up process. The Deputy Commissioner himself had to assume complete indifference in order to win over native confidence, although he knew that he was constantly shadowed by an armed dacoit. Little by little the story of these gangs was gathered and docketed and arrests were made. Sworn evidence became stronger. Witnesses became surer. The villagers showed their pleasure in being able to walk about on the embankments after sunset—a pleasure they had been unable to enjoy for the last three years owing to fear of murder gangs. One small gang was responsible for five known murders and eleven “hurt” cases, but even against this obscure gang evidence was eventually secured and as a result four men were hanged, one turned witness against a bigger gang, and the other was killed by gangsters.

Complete records of the Kanaungaggale Gang were eventually available. Here is the record pieced together from various sources. For generations, the Obo village tract had bred criminals and lawless thugs. To trace the advent of this reign of crime records had to go back to the year of the annexation of Upper Burma. At this time, five men of doubtful character came down from the village of Kyauktalon in the Myingyan district with their families, thus escaping the effects of Government measures for the pacification of the country. Finding a large number of toddy trees at and around Kanaung, and being expert toddy-tappers, they settled at that place and readily found employment where local people knew little of this art. They rapidly made friends with the villagers. One of their number, Mg Gwe Bin, had been an expert killer of stolen cattle and in his new home very soon returned to his old trade. Finally, he came to be a prominent member of a criminal society of this village. By inter-marriage between the children of these five settlers with villagers already possessed of criminal tendencies, the newcomers secured an increasing influence on the village life and Mg Gwe Bin succeeded in forming and directing a gang of over twenty hardened cut-throats. At the same time, he also became a disciple of the then Circle Headman of Obo, and under his protection the gang operated with impunity.

Beginning with drinking, gambling and cock-fighting, crime

quickly developed until assault to murder, petty theft, dacoity, incendiarism and cattle maiming became the order of a very lawless day. It was one of the members of this gang who recklessly murdered a man with his *dah* in the very court of the Township Magistrate. Happily, of the original members of this gang, Mg Gwe Bin and two others are dead, and the remaining two are very old men and quite harmless. With a few exceptions, later members are dead, most of them having been killed while committing crime. Of the survivors to-day, three are past activity and are drinking themselves to death.

It is unfortunately difficult to stamp out gang life. The two youngest members, one of whom was at the time of the cleaning up 53 years of age and the other stone blind, formed another gang of which all the members were descendants and relatives of the first gang! The blind man's boon companion was Nga Shwe Yin, and this cut-throat constituted the brains of this second criminal society. He seldom took any active part in its operations but spent his time teaching the others the technique of gangdom—how to commit crime, how to dispose easily of dead bodies, and how to spoil and frustrate evidence and witnesses. As a sideline he worked a fishery where he employed thieves and dacoits, planned dacoities and received and disposed of stolen property. Most of the young men of the village were his pupils and acted solely on his advice.

It is interesting to trace the growth of organised crime in this murder zone. Before the appearance of the secret societies, criminally inclined youths committed crime independently, though they usually gave mutual assistance to each other to escape the results of their outlawry. When, however, the society or *athin* movement started, a definite gang was formed, which now consisted, as far as could be ascertained, of some seventeen members—all young men who had inherited criminal instincts or, if the scientists will not agree, had acquired them from their environment, for their parents were criminals. With the facility provided by the very large number of toddy trees they took to drink at an early age and, being all related, they planned and committed assaults jointly.

The *Bu athin* or secret society movement gave them greater unity. They formed a specially secret or inner society, a

Bu athin known later as the *Luthat* or Murder Association, within the original Wunthanu (*athin*) society of the tract. The *athin* priests taught them to follow only four of the usual five precepts and advised them to ignore the first, i.e. the one not to take life, on the grounds that if there were no witnesses the Government could do nothing. The members of this inner society became bolder, and assaulted those who refused to join their ranks. The assaults were never reported and no witnesses against them were forthcoming. From being a habit and a pastime, these assaults developed to the wholesale committing of murder. The gang enjoyed the protection of Tha Han Gyi, a wealthy landowner and relative of its leader, Shwe Yin. Several meetings took place in Tha Han Gyi's house where he encouraged murder and harboured murderers and criminals.

Thirty-five murders were traced to this Society besides eight assault cases, and all the time the society's members lived within a mile of the police station! They were absolutely indifferent to authority of any kind and attacked a constable and killed a process-server. They chased constables with *dahs* and spears and on several occasions made killings within sight of the police station. Once they assaulted a police officer. So intimidated was the latter that he kept silence for a long time to "save his face." Members of the *athins* had to take a very special oath which they regarded as far more binding than the one Authority administered. This was called the *Dekkina tha ka*. Into water made sacred by reciting certain verses over it was placed a small image of Buddha (*Dekkina tha ka*), also daggers, spears, *dahs*, needles and any instrument for cutting or stabbing. The usual oath was administered in minute detail and the novitiate swore himself to secrecy by all the articles immersed in the sacred water.

The cleaning up of this murder zone was made doubly difficult by intimidation of law-abiding folk. The most prominent murder which still remains undetected was that concerning a headman in the Zibyugwin village. This man refused to join the *athin* and so he was made away with. To avoid suspicion and fabricate a flawless alibi, all the prominent members of the *athin* met in a monastery and passed the night there reciting prayers. The next morning the headman had vanished. It is conjectured that certain members of the *athin* whose absence from the meeting would not be noticed were

despatched to commit the crime. The wife of the headman knew the men who came and called her husband away, but in vain. The terror created by the *athin* forever sealed her lips! The *Bu athins* seem to have been formed by the priest Zeneya on his visit to Myanaung in 1923. It is said that these *athins* held secret trials and passed sentences as in the Burmese King's reign.

Most of the murders occurred in the localities which abounded in toddy trees and where, under the very noses of the police, toddy was illegally sold without let or hindrance. Drink gave the *athin* members courage. The Excise department might just as well have never existed. The drink-shop at Gyogyaung attracted the worst characters in Burma and crime was rampant there. Crimes of every description were openly committed by gang ruffians and all responsible officers on the spot were either too indifferent or too weak to exercise control. The police station was a farce. This lamentable state of affairs in the Kanaungaggale district was a relic of the lawlessness which had reigned from time immemorial. It has always been Burma's dark spot. The cleaning-up came none too soon!

One of the customs of the gangs was similar to that used by the thugs in the old days of India. Once a man's death was decided upon the members did their best to get on as friendly terms with him as possible, inviting him to meals and drinks, sometimes for several days before the murder was done. As a rule the killing was planned to take place at night time to lessen any chance of evidence being registered. Two members of the *athin*, however, grew bold and murdered in broad daylight. Later they were caught and summarily hanged. It is rather ironical to relate that with the exception of three cases all those who were murdered were dangerous characters!

In the Ngapiseik tract, which included Nyaungwun, and is near the toddy groves in the murder zone, seven murders occurred in quick succession, two of them being political. The *Bu athins* terrorised the people. At night they went about in batches of eight and ten and more. They stopped in front of the houses of those who had not joined them, and on threat of instant injury to person and property called out the head of the household and made him come down backwards and alone. They guided his feet with electric torches! Then he would be blindfolded and taken to a secret house and requested to join

the *athin*. If he agreed, he had to take the *Bu* oath there and then. If he asked for time to consider, he was given a few days grace and sent back home blindfolded. If he failed to join at the expiration of the time allowed he was given no further chance but ruthlessly butchered. It was said at the time that this method was copied by the *athins* from a cinematograph film they had seen!

The Momaka was a smaller gang and not nearly so important as the Kanaungaggale society. It consisted of five or six men who were brothers and cousins and who started out as hired assassins. Its history is interesting. The fathers and forefathers of the Momaka were all of good character, but the sons had had criminal proclivities from youth. They early took to drink and petty crime but as they grew older carried dangerous weapons and made brutal assaults with them. Gradually they came to be the menace of the countryside. There followed cattle-lifting on a wholesale scale, robbery and murder. At all times they lent their services as hired assassins. Here are typical examples of their methods and crimes.

One Po Thin was much bothered by a *chetty* for the repayment of a loan, so he hired the gang to kill the *chetty*. They attacked two *chetties*, not being quite sure which one was the right victim. One was killed outright and the other badly wounded. Another man had a grudge against a man named Mg Pu and hired the gang to kill him while he was peacefully fishing on the river-bank. A distiller was murdered in cold blood by the gang because he could not return a jacket pledged with him as security for liquor supplied by him to the gang's headquarters. Then again, two Indians were lured, while purchasing cattle, to a lonely place, robbed and killed outright. When the Momaka were arrested *en bloc* and their prosecution ordered, their fathers thanked the Deputy Commissioner and, washing their hands of their criminal offspring, declared that they were a disgrace to their families and deserving of their punishment.

Although gang murder was rife, killings were made by individuals for private reasons. In the Kywedegon village tract which included the Hngetkythaik and Aingkalaw villages—both within the murder zone—no less than eight murders were committed, although only two of those murdered were good characters, the remainder being themselves desperate criminals. When these murderers were rounded up

only one bore a previous good character and in all cases the motive for murder was sordid or petty—a dispute over the loan of a fowl; one criminal's cattle damaging another's nurseries; stone-throwing at houses, and so forth. Another murder was the outcome of a love affair. A certain head constable of the Kanaung Police Station was suspected of having instigated three young bloods to kill one Po Mya for making love to his sweetheart. Other murders included that of a woman pedlar who was first robbed, and the double murder of a woman and her daughter for theft alleged to have been committed by her husband. The suspect was Po San, a convert to *Bu athin* preaching. It was Po San's property that was stolen! Apart from gang murder, no less than twenty other brutal killings were attributed to the hiring of individual bullies in the police station areas.

It is impossible to give a complete record of all the murders that went towards making Burma's murder zone the blackest spot of modern times, but it is a great tribute to British authority to learn that after the cleaning-up process had concluded its first attack on organised crime—over a period of eight months—the populace took fresh heart, headmen registered their loyalty and actively assisted in putting down crime. A decrease of 70 per cent. was recorded in violent crime; 80 per cent. in dacoity and robbery, and 70 per cent. in cattle theft. Law and order were restored, lost prestige was recovered, peace and tranquillity was brought to the people and definite promises—which since have been kept—were made by the villagers to co-operate with the Government.

F. BIGG-WITHER (COLONEL).

NERVES AND HORMONES.

GALEN, physician to Marcus Aurelius and unquestioned authority throughout the Middle Ages on all medical matters, believed that nerves were hollow tubes whereby the “animal spirits,” generated in the brain from “vital spirits” carried there by the arteries, were conveyed throughout the body. Andreas Vesalius, Belgian by birth but the founder of the great school of anatomy at the University of Padua, set in motion the stream of enquiry which, broadening under his successors, was converted by the greatest of the pupils of Padua, William Harvey, into a flood which swept away the baseless suppositions of Galen. His supreme work, *An Anatomical Disquisition on the Motion of the Heart and the Blood in Animals*, disposed of these outworn conceptions of natural, vital and animal spirits. Blood was shown to be confined to the arteries and veins within which it circulated in a definite course. In this process the nerves played no part.

But the notion that the nerves were hollow persisted. Descartes believed this and that they possessed, at their points of branching, valves which regulated the passage of a nervous fluid or vapour which passed into the muscles causing distension and hence contraction. Jan Swammerdam, the Dutch microscopist who crowded a lifetime of intense zoological observation into ten years before his unbalanced brain rejected the pursuit of learning as vain and impious, revealed by experiment that there was no such passage of material from nerve to muscle. But not until the work of the Swiss, Albrecht von Haller, in the eighteenth century do our modern concepts of the nerve impulse and its stimulation into activity of the effector organs, such as muscles and glands, take final shape.

During the nineteenth century the diverse activities of the animal body were regarded as being under the exclusive control of the far-ramifying nervous system. Then, in 1902, the English physiologists, Bayliss and Starling, found to their great surprise that the action of the principal digestive gland, the pancreas or sweetbread, could be induced after all nervous connections had been severed. They found that the passage of acid from the stomach into the first part of the intestine, the duodenum, caused the cells which

line this to produce a chemical substance which passed into the blood stream. This was carried in the circulation and, as soon as it reached the pancreas, caused this to pour forth its digestive juices. For the first time an effector organ, a gland in this instance, had been shown to be controlled by chemical and not by nervous agencies. Bayliss and Starling called this substance secretin. It is famous as being the first hormone to be discovered and from its original investigation there has arisen the elaborate structure of the science of endocrinology.

Hormones are organic compounds of moderate complexity. A number have already been prepared artificially, while the structure of many others is known and their synthesis only a matter of time. Their action is out of all proportion to their bulk, for they are liberated into the blood stream in excessively minute amounts. They are produced within ductless glands or endocrine organs of which the thyroid gland at the base of the neck is probably the best known. Enlargement of this gland gives rise, amongst other and more serious symptoms, to a swelling in this region which is known as goitre. The product of this gland, thyroxin, controls the general chemical activity of the body.

A still more important endocrine organ is the pituitary gland. This is situated at the base of the brain and controls by its diverse products many of the activities of the body, including that of the thyroid itself. Insulin is another hormone; its successful extraction from the bodies of animals by Banting and Best made possible the control of diabetes. Other hormones are produced by the sexual organs and they control the appearance of the secondary sexual characters, such as the comb and spurs in the cock and the antlers in the stag, and also lactation and other processes connected with reproduction.

The outcome of this discovery by Bayliss and Starling was thus to reveal a completely new and apparently totally different mechanism of control within the animal body. There seemed nothing whatever in common between the action of nerves and that of hormones. Hormones excited into action certain organs, such as the pancreas and the mammary glands, nerves stimulated others, while hormones in their effect on the general chemical activities of the body appeared to have no counterpart in nervous action. But

it frequently happens that, although the first effect of any major discovery in science is to introduce some added complexity, further research often exposes some underlying factor which effects an eventual simplification.

A variety of animals possess a type of effector organ which is absent in the human body. These are minute but much-branched cells containing pigments of various colours. They respond to stimulation not by contracting like a muscle or by pouring out some characteristic chemical substance like a gland, but by withdrawing the colouring matter as a minute dot into the centre of the cell or by spreading it widely throughout the ramifying branches. In the one case the animal appears pale, in the other it assumes the colour of the pigment or blend of different pigments. A wide variety of animals possess these structures which enable them to tone in colour with the background and to change in colour when necessary. Many crustaceans, such as shrimps and prawns, possess them, also a variety of fishes, most notably the flatfishes. By their aid amphibians, such as the common frog, can change from a pale straw colour almost to black, while the amazing powers of colour change exhibited by the chameleon, one of the lizards, are well known.

The study of the control of these pigment cells has revealed facts which have a most important bearing on our thesis. In all cases the eye is responsible in the first place for the reception of the stimulus; blind animals have at most a very limited power of colour change. But the pigment cells are controlled in different ways in the various groups of animals which possess them. Each separate cell may be under the control of individual nerves. This is so in fish, such as the plaice and the flounder, and also in reptiles like the chameleon. On the other hand all the pigment cells may be subject to a general control exercised by hormones which circulate in the blood stream. Different hormones are responsible for the expansion and for the contraction of the different pigments. This state of affairs is found in the crustaceans and in the frog and related animals. In the latter the hormones originate in the pituitary gland, in the former within a gland in the eye-stalks. These animals thus change the colour of the body as a whole, from light to dark or vice versa in the frog and in more varied ways in

the shrimps and prawns which possess a variety of pigments. Some of these may change in colour from green to brown and again to red or blue. But in the former group, where each pigment cell is controlled independently, different patterns may be produced on the surface of the body. This explains why it is that a flatfish is able to blend so exactly with the background on which it may happen to lie, the upper surface of the fish being coarsely mottled when the animal lies on a substratum of pebbles and finely mottled when it lies on sand. A fish which is removed from one of these backgrounds to the other will adjust its colour pattern accordingly within a relatively short time.

It is a very significant fact that the same type of effector organ is, in different groups of animals, controlled by nervous or by chemical means. It at once indicates that these apparently very different agents of control are actually more akin than, at first examination, they appeared to be. A distinguished American zoologist, Professor G. H. Parker, has indeed gone so far as to suggest that the two are fundamentally the same. He has advanced the interesting theory that the tip of every nerve fibre produces, when excited to action by an impulse passing down the nerve, an excessively minute amount of some chemical substance of the same nature as a hormone. It is, in his opinion, this substance which excites into action the effector organ—muscle, gland or pigment cell as the case may be—and not the actual nerve impulse itself.

According to Professor Parker's interpretation of the facts, in the case of a frog nerve impulses pass from the eye to the brain and thence to the pituitary gland, causing there a discharge of the appropriate hormones which cause the animal to change colour. In the same way the gland in the eye-stalk of a prawn is affected with corresponding results. But in a flatfish or a chameleon the impulse passes from the brain by way of nerves to the individual pigment cells, which are each affected, and not necessarily in the same way, by the substance produced at the ends of the various nerve fibres.

This theory has the attraction of simplicity but it does not rest on any great foundation of ascertained fact. Indeed it appears certain that the matter is not quite so simple as this, but it remains true that chemical substances *are* liberated when nerves are stimulated and impulses pass to their

terminations in effector organs. Sir Henry Dale, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for his pioneer research on this problem, has shown that when the vagus nerve, which passes from the brain back through the body to the heart, is stimulated there appears within the blood passing through the heart minute quantities of a compound known as acetylcholine. Furthermore the injection into the heart of this substance produces exactly the same effects on the action of the heart as does the stimulation of the vagus nerve.

Other nerves apparently also bring about, after stimulation, a similar local production of acetylcholine, but others again probably cause liberation of the hormone adrenaline (the typical product of the adrenal gland, another endocrine organ) or some closely allied substance. Sir Henry Dale has suggested that the former nerves be called cholinergic nerves and the latter adrenergic nerves. But it is not suggested that the tips of the nerve fibres are actually concerned with the production of these substances, as Parker believes, rather that the effect of the nerve impulse is to bring about their liberation locally. But it is these locally produced hormones which are responsible for the particular reaction of the muscle, gland or pigment cell to which the nerve passes. The effect is temporary—as it needs to be or the action would continue too long—because the substance liberated is destroyed almost at once by the action of ferments which apparently exist for this exclusive purpose.

No matter whether we accept the simpler theory of Parker or the more complex but better substantiated views of Dale, a major simplification is made. The two methods of control, by hormones or by nerves, the similar effects of which have been so clearly demonstrated by these researches into the control of colour change in different groups of animals, are revealed as exerting their final effect in the same manner. In the one instance the chemical substance is set free into the blood stream and so exerts a general effect, on chemical reactions throughout the body in the case of thyroxin or insulin, or on pigment cells in general in the case of the pituitary hormone in the frog. In the other case the hormone is liberated locally and so exerts its effect exclusively on the effector organ—muscle gland or pigment cell—on the surface of which the nerve fibre terminates. There is a clear necessity for both this general and this local method of control.

The unity of the mechanism of control within the animal body, temporarily shattered by the discoveries of Bayliss and Starling and by those of their many successors, has thus been re-established. It is by work of this character that the numerous and diverse phenomena of living matter are gradually being reduced to simpler terms. This represents, we may not unreasonably hope, a far-distant foreshadowing of the time when the biological sciences will take their place with physics and with chemistry amongst the "exact" sciences.

C. M. YONGE.

RACINE.

(DECEMBER 21ST, 1639—APRIL 21ST, 1699.)

IN a broadcast for French schools dealing with Racine's place in the history of dramatic literature, the lecturer pronounced the significant words: "In spite of Racine's unquestionable superiority as poet and psychologist, the French nation will, during the time of a national crisis, always turn to Corneille." This statement seems to me to represent in a nutshell the historical and æsthetic valuation of the two greatest dramatists of French literature, and at the same time to emphasise the necessity of a comparison between them, without which an appreciation of the younger poet's position as innovator of French dramatic technique would be futile.

Corneille represents artistically and morally—the two terms are inseparable in French drama—the definite end of a period, Racine the beginning of a new era which has not yet reached its end. Corneille, the grand old man of French drama, wrote for an audience whose chief interest was politics, taking part as actors or spectators in the vicissitudes of the Fronde, a struggle in which unbending will-power turned ordinary mortals into heroes, but also their speech, as the *Mémoires* of the *Cardinal of Retz* show us, often into heroics. Corneille's art was in full accordance with his political background and with the moral spokesman of his time, Descartes, whose *Traité des Passions* had become the breviary of his contemporaries: "By the outcome of those struggles we can gauge the power or weakness of our soul" (article 48). This strength of character can, of course, prove its mettle only in situations of great moment demanding weighty resolutions, patriotism, renunciation, uncompromising faith, etc. Corneille thus relegates love into the background, replacing the wavering, storm-driven impulses of sexual passion by the sublime and heroic, painting, according to La Bruyère's famous comparison between Corneille and Racine, "men as they ought to be." His characters, therefore, are often the outcome, not the creators, of the dramatic situation, ready-made moral abstractions, suffering from a hieratic hardness and rigidity, obsessed by an all-absorbing ethical *idée fixe*, looking in one direction only with the metallic stare of a Russian icon.

Compare with this attitude Racine's self-portrait in one of his Canticles :

*Mon Dieu, quelle guerre cruelle !
Je trouve deux hommes en moi :
L'un veut que, plein d'amour pour toi,
Mon cœur te soit toujours fidèle,
L'autre, à tes volontés rebelle,
Me révolte contre ta loi !*

With Mazarin's death a new generation enters upon the political and social horizon. The young, temperamental and politically autocratic Louis XIV surrounds himself with a coterie vastly different from a La Rochefoucauld or a Madame de Longueville of the time of the stiff-necked Fronde. Madame Henriette d'Angleterre, Mademoiselle de La Vallière, Madame de Montespan now give rhythm and colour to the voluptuous symphonic poem composed and conducted by the Roi-Soleil. Politics has become too dangerous to be mentioned and is replaced by the multi-coloured carnival of pomp and circumstance and amorous intrigues before which Corneille's supermen are paling into oblivion. The stage clamours now for heroes less heroic, for heroines more human than Polyeucte or Chimène, briefly for the dramatic analysis of the tender passion. For a short time Quinault supplies this want, thus becoming the link between Racine and Corneille, who bitterly complains that now "*la seule tendresse est toujours à la mode.*"

With *Andromaque* (1667) this "*tendresse*" became changed into "*sentiment.*"

Quinault's delineation of love as a modish, somewhat affected descriptive programme to the lavender-scented *clavecin* music of his day (he was a really charming librettist), developed under Racine's magic wand into the powerful portrayal of a universal instinct. This new dramatic motive, evolving out of a mere safety-valve for the political passions of the day, no longer to be indulged in, became since Racine the corner-stone of French drama, conveniently labelled as "*amour-passion.*" As such it forms the basic element of Racine's art and deserves therefore a closer study. The idea of love was, as most things in France, from the earliest times subject to fashion. The *chevaleresque* woman-worship of the medieval *trouvères*, the reckless passion of the learned ladies

of the Renaissance, the metaphysical sentimentality of the *Précieuses* in the seventeenth century, tinged according to clerical influence at Court with religious fanaticism, the dissolute life of actors and actresses, all this forms a kaleidoscopic picture which might well tempt an artist of Racine's strong sensuous temperament.

But multiform and complex as his excursions into the Bluebeard chamber of erotic sensations were, he felt prevented from giving free play to his innate naturalist tendencies by three weighty considerations. First : by the ever-present religious background of the seventeenth-century society, second by his stern moral upbringing at Port-Royal, third by the philosophical training of French thought constantly directed towards the dissection and diagnosis of emotions. The first acted as a kind of invisible but rigorous censor, the second deeply coloured Racine's psychological and ethical treatment of human passions, the third provided him with the scientific insight into the last causes of the impulses and inhibitions of his heroines and heroes. But the most powerful influence in his artistic complex was his Jansenist education, an influence often apparently counteracted and even obliterated, owing to the worldly surroundings of his career as dramatic poet. In an age fettered by tradition and the double autocracy of an all-powerful Church and King, Racine represents youth in art and outlook on life. In the eyes of his teachers of Port-Royal he even became a heretic, owing to his unequivocal stand for separation of religious discipline from the dramatic expression of psychological facts. This becomes evident in Racine's virulent attack upon his old master Nicole, who had dared to rank dramatic poets amongst public poisoners of the soul. And yet the very characters in Racine's plays which most interest the modern reader, audience, actor and actress, are those in which the poet endeavours—and how subtly and successfully!—to apply the Jansenist tenets to the study of the human soul. *Phèdre*, *Eriphile* (*Iphigénie*), *Athalie*, *Bérénice*, *Agrippine*, *Néron*, they all are tormented, recalcitrant pupils of Port-Royal, analysing their own *état d'âme*, accepting reluctantly the fatality of their sinful passions, condemning them, and yet following their lure to the bitter end, for how can they resist, free will being denied to them?

And there Corneille's and Racine's ways part ; the older

poet rigidly establishing the moral law as legislator in his dramas, the younger, and this makes him almost our contemporary, letting our ethical conclusions arise out of the swaying, passion-ridden souls of his *dramatis personæ*. It is this monastic trait in Racine's character, which neither the sirens of the theatre nor the intoxicating splendour of the Court of Versailles could eradicate, that gives us the clue to the generally misunderstood reasons for his retirement from the theatre at the age of 38.

With the adaptability of his fluid nature, he followed the trend of events at Court. Military disasters, the growing misery of the people and the prevailing influence of the Jesuits upon Madame de Maintenon, who had become more and more the King's spiritual director, had plunged the Court into an atmosphere of gloom and depression, a veritable Ash Wednesday following the frenetic carnival of *joie de vivre*, unfavourable for the appreciation of Racine's dramatic genius, as displayed in his *Phèdre*, whose Jansenist spirit had reconciled him with Arnauld of Port-Royal, but had alienated the King's favour. To all that must be added the failure of his *Phèdre* (the *affaire Pradon*), the desertion of his mistress and best actress, La Champmeslé, the threat of assassination, owing to a brilliant but tactless sonnet written by the poet against the Duc de Nevers, brother of his arch-enemy, the Duchesse de Bouillon, and the general feeling of frustrated hopes and ideals. In a fit of Pascalian despair he intended becoming a monk, "*un Amen continuuel au fond du cœur*" (Fénelon). Racine had started his spiritual education at Port-Royal, had flagrantly denied its teaching through the worldliness of his life, whilst subconsciously applying it to his dramatic work, and was finally rediscovering its soothing balm in the afterglow of a retrospective existence and in the statuesque grandeur of his swan-song, *Athalie*.

Racine foreshadowed with an almost prophetic power some problems which beset the spiritual life of our day: the instability of sexual relations, the craving for domination, the brittleness of moral and religious convictions, though all eventually corrected and settled by a theodicy whose high priest has received his training in Port-Royal. The fearless advocate of justice does not shun his sovereign's displeasure by scarcely veiled political allusions. Already in his second play, *Alexandre le Grand*, we find an outbreak of indignation

against autocracy which could only have passed unnoticed in this early drama of the still little-known poet and which even to-day might give food for thought to present-day fascist demi-gods:

Porus: "*Quelle étrange valeur qui, ne cherchant qu'à nuire,
Embrase tout sitôt qu'elle commence à luire:
Qui n'a que son orgueil pour règle et pour raison;
Qui veut que l'univers ne soit qu'une prison,
Et que, maître absolu de tous tant que nous sommes,
Ses esclaves en nombre égalent tous les hommes.
Plus d'états, plus de rois; ses sacrilèges mains
Dessous un même joug rangent tous les humains.*"
(*Alexandre*, ii, 2.)

In *Bérénice*, that moving dramatisation of Suetonius' "*Invitus invitam dimisit*," Racine's contemporaries were invited to draw a parallel between Titus-Bérénice and the young Louis XIV and Maria Mancini whom he too had to renounce: "*invitus invitam*"!

And *Esther*, Racine's first play in which *la grande passion* is replaced by racial patriotism and religious ecstasy, which made Madame de Sévigné exclaim: "Racine has surpassed himself! He loves God as he used to love his mistresses." *Esther* must have appealed to the elect audience of Saint-Cyr as an undisguised plea for the official recognition of Madame de Maintenon as Queen of France: Ahasuerus' command: "*Soyez Reine*" (i, 1) sounded like a trumpet-call to King and nation.

But the poet's most courageous attack upon the King's autocratic indifference to justice is the High Priest's warning to Joas (*Athalie*, iv, 3), symbolising Fénelon's pupil, the little Duc de Bourgogne, heir-apparent to the throne:

*Loin du trône nourri, de ce fatal bonheur,
Hélas! Vous ignorez le charme empoisonneur.
De l'absolu pouvoir vous ignorez l'ivresse,
Et des lâches flatteurs la voix enchanteresse.
Bientôt ils vous diront
Qu'un roi n'a d'autre frein que sa volonté même;
Qu'aux larmes, au travail le peuple est condamné.
Que, s'il n'est opprimé, tôt ou tard il opprime.*

We need not be surprised that neither King nor Court savoured such home-truths and that *Athalie* was not granted

a public performance. Nor is Schiller's *Don Carlos* performed in Hitler's Germany!

I believe that our current text-books emphasise too much Racine's insistence upon the sexual problems presented in his dramas. In two plays, *Bérénice* and *Mithridate*, he proved that he was able successfully to steal the thunder from his elder rival. "Renunciation and will-power," Corneille's slogans for his whole dramatic work, are acting also as levers in *Bérénice*, with the sole difference that in Racine's play the clash between duty and desire is never lost sight of. The most Corneillean of his tragedies is *Mithridate*, in which the poet's art makes the Pontian King's imposing personality, like Wotan in *Götterdämmerung*, seem ever-present, even when bodily off the stage. The Racine, however, who claims the interest of the modern reader is the feminist whose field of psychological research is almost exclusively the emotional life of woman. His heroes, with the exception of Oreste (*Andromaque*), Néron, Mithridate and Joas (*Athalie*), occupy a second, or even third place in his gallery of character portraits. I single out Oreste as a curious study in Freudian inhibition, and as a romantic anachronism in the seventeenth century, a René (Chateaubriand) with a touch of Hamlet.

*Je ne sais de tout temps quelle injuste puissance
Laisse le crime en paix et poursuit l'innocence.*
(*Andromaque*, iii, 1.)

and in the same scene :

*Excuse un malheureux qui perd tout ce qu'il aime,
Que tout le monde hait, et qui se hait lui-même !*

Racine's most sombre study in depravation is Néron. A sadist by nature,

Je me fais de sa peine une image charmante
(ii, 8.)

he is the dramatic counterpart of Tacitus' verdict : "He was made by nature to hide his hatred under the cover of treacherous gentleness" :

J'embrasse mon rival, mais c'est pour l'étouffer.
(iv, 3.)

But Racine's most complex characters will always remain his heroines. From the touching simplicity of unselfish love :

J'aimais, Seigneur, j'aimais, je voulais être aimée
(*Bérénice*, v, 7.)

to the outbursts of primitive passion, goaded on by the infuriated goddess, a terrifying picture of prehistoric, ritualist Greek life :

C'est Vénus tout entière à sa proie attachée
(*Phèdre*, i, 3.)

Racine has gone through the whole gamut of passions ravaging a woman's soul. Andromaque's self-sacrificing love for her child and mystic devotion to Hector's memory, Agrippine's thwarted craving for domination over Rome and her son :

*Britannicus le gêne, Albine, et chaque jour
Je sens que je deviens opportune à mon tour*

culminating in *Athalie*'s lurid personality, oriental in thought and speech, treacherous, despairing before the doom awaiting her, and, autocrat that she is to the end, tormented by feminine hysteria :

*La peur d'un vain remords trouble cette grande âme ;
Elle flotte, elle hésite, en un mot, elle est femme*
(iii, 3.)

and at last, breaking down with the heart-rending confession of defeat, but still as equal to equal :

Dieu des Juifs, tu l'emportes !
(v, 6.)

These three instances of heroic types chosen from the poet's plays show us that the "tendre" Racine knew very well when the situation arose, how to create heroines which could rival Shakespeare's greatest achievements. When drawing the sum-total of Racine's portraits of tragic women, *Phèdre*, "the incestuous queen, a Christian to whom divine grace is denied" (Arnauld), the sinner whom confession and penance lead out of the wilds of demon-haunted Greece into the precincts of Port-Royal, and *Athalie*, who, more than any of Racine's heroines, can claim to produce in the listener the Aristotelian reaction of cleansing terror and pity, these two figures will stand out as the poet's sublimest dramatic creations. With Racine woman has come into her own in French drama.

No appreciation of Racine's work can be adequate without an analysis of his technique ; his language is based on the French of the seventeenth century, clipped, polished, but,

also, impoverished and almost drained of all poetical possibilities by that "*gratteur des syllabes*" Malherbe. Words which may seem to us affected and stereotyped have to be understood in their original sense, e.g. *Madame, Seigneur, ennui, aimant, gêner* and that terrible word "*tendre*," which contributed so much to the misunderstanding of the poet's artistic personality. But once familiar with this aspect of Racine's idiom, we can only admire the supreme art with which he wielded the weapon handed on to him. Though writing verse, he was no versifier. His chief aim was the psychological development of his plot, and for that reason he sketched his plays first in prose; then he could safely say: "Now I have only to transcribe it in metre." In the use of the antithesis he went farther than Corneille, but with the difference that he always treated it as a vehicle of psychological significance. Two instances will show what I mean:

Hippolyte est sensible et ne sent rien pour moi.
(*Phèdre*, iv, 5.)
J'entendrai des regards que vous croirez muets.
(*Britannicus*, ii, 4.)

Racine developed his æsthetic views in his *Préfaces*, analytical studies of the poet's technique compared with that of Corneille and the Ancients. He was also an innovator in the treatment of the *confidant(e)*, whom Corneille still accepts as a necessary evil. In Racine's plays they act the part of the modern *raisonneur*, frequently, as in the case of Oenone (*Phèdre*), rising to superb dramatic heights.

With regard to his metrical skill and infinite variety of musical shades, he is beyond praise or cavil. Jules Lemaitre's words on his prose can be literally applied to the poet's verse: "Racine's prose is delicious. It is the most winged, most ethereal of the seventeenth century." But, I may add, for this very reason untranslatable. Racine is the only representative of French classical tragedy who has survived all the vicissitudes of schools and fashions. Inimitable craftsmanship, dramatic genius of the highest order, all crowned by lofty idealism and understanding for human frailties: these qualities alone will secure to Racine his place amongst the Immortals.

M. JOUBERT.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE "WAR" AND THE BLACKOUT

THE tempo of political work and the wear and tear of nerves, in war time, is such that the leading politicians tend to become even more than normally ensconced in a world of their own. In some ways Mr. Churchill is a man of imagination. In war time his gifts are more concentrated. On November 12th during the course of a broadcast address to the people ("the masses of our wage-earning folk and ordinary people" as he called them) he declared that the Prime Minister "is a man of very tough fibre, and I can tell you that he is going to fight as obstinately for victory as he did for peace." Among his listeners thousands were suffering distress of such a kind as, please God, will never touch either the Prime Minister or his First Lord of the Admiralty. The toughness which on a full stomach and with the best medical attention ordains that others shall fight and suffer cannot be denied; but Mr. Chamberlain would be the first to resent the addressing to himself of what in the circumstances becomes a rather cheap and unimaginative piece of frumpery.

As for the war itself, there were those who persisted in expecting the worst; who regarded the cautious and long-drawn-out preliminaries as the forerunner of the devastating phase of war that modern means portend. *Reculer pour mieux sauter* is how they diagnosed it. But the fact, as distinct from the speculation, was that ten weeks after the declaration of war, nothing much had happened, outside Poland, of the spectacularly frightful kind. No towns had been bombed. No babies or grown-ups had worn their gas-masks. The Siegfried and Maginot Lines were enveloped in mystery, mud and peace. Merchant ships, it is true, had been sunk at sea, and one first-class British warship. To the plain man, however, it was an odd and unconvincing spectacle. As the women and children trooped back to London and to Paris, a desperate official attempt was made again to frighten them away by promising that Germany's ten thousand aeroplanes were really only making all the greater and the more thorough preparations. The satanic minds of Herren Hitler, Göring, von Ribbentrop and their kind were merely determined that

when they did strike, they would strike without mercy. This island of ours, the argument concluded, was in the military sense now an island only in the sense that it could be (but we were taking care of that) bodily sunk by the weight of aerial frightfulness that was on its way from the factories of modern Germany.

So far, however, it had not happened. This much at least can be established, that we were all wrong to believe that if ever major war broke out again, London, Paris and Berlin would be a flaming ruin within three hours. There were those of us who thought (and can prove it by what we put on record) that the very certainty of so gigantic a calamity would save us from it. After ten weeks at any rate we had not yet been proved wrong.

What had happened and was still happening, however, was in all conscience bad enough. European civilisation was being undermined. Moral fibre was being eaten into. Trade was being ruined, money squandered. The capitalist system of the nineteenth century, shaken to its foundation by the war of 1914-18, was given its probable *coup de grâce* by two months of the new war. On November 6th, 1939, the Communist International's anniversary manifesto, issued from Moscow, declared that the capitalist ruling classes of Great Britain, France and Germany merited the antagonism of the world's proletariat. Russia had been given an opportunity she had not been slow to take. On all sides the devastation, excepting only the physical obvious devastation of bombs and shells, gaped at us in a quickening spread. The original Gadarene swine rushed to their doom without any of the refinements which we, their disciples, have added to the technique. We creep about our streets, as it were, on our bellies, in total darkness, while the available current is cut off from lamps whose only residuary purpose is that we should break our noses against them. We pay more and more for less and less of the world's goods, including food. The glorious heritage that was ours we have rejected. We stultify and ruin ourselves: and pay for the very process up to the limit of our means. The other Gadarene swine had more sense.

In the meantime the blind "capitalist" politicians of the three countries talked at each other: accusing each other, justifying themselves. The incessant rain was the only

immediate source of congratulation. Many people even saw the deliberate Act of God in the persistent downpour, day after day, as though in a last resource He thought to drown Germany, France and Britain in mud so deep that they simply could not prosecute their crazy purpose.

" Here shall he see
No enemy
But winter and rough weather."

Of actual facts there were only two: America's decision to reap the maximum commercial profit, with the minimum commercial risk, from Europe's war; and Turkey's treaty with Britain and France. The talk that was waged came mainly from Germany and Russia, through the mouth of Herr von Ribbentrop (October 24th) and Mr. Molotov (October 31st), although Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax in London answered them back, and White Papers, damaging to the enemy, were published.

It was on October 19th that there was signed at Ankara a treaty of mutual assistance between Turkey, France and Britain. Its main value lay in the annoyance it caused to Germany, who had made immense attempts, through many months of diplomacy, to prevent it. Turkey holds a position of strategic and therefore of political importance in the eastern Mediterranean, guarding the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus and the Black Sea. The Bagdad railway to India runs through Anatolia. Smyrna (Izmir) and Alexandretta are important harbours. But the real point was the discomfiture of Herr von Papen, who was promptly recalled to Berlin by his angry Führer to explain why the offered bribe of Iraq and Syria had not been effective in attracting Turkey to the German camp.

It looked indeed as if the Führer's cup were nearly full. On October 21st he gave rein to a fury of summonses to everybody he could think of. He summoned his generals, presumably, but not certainly (for no one any longer dogmatises about the workings of Herr Hitler's mind) to discuss military plans, if any. He summoned Herr von Papen from Ankara, to discuss recalcitrant Turkey, Count von Schulenburg from Moscow to discuss recalcitrant Russia, Dr. von Mackensen from Rome to discuss recalcitrant Italy; and

finally, in a very ecstasy of thoroughness, he summoned the Gauleiter or Nazi District Leaders, presumably to discuss—was it possible?—recalcitrant Germany. The oddest of those conferences was certainly that with the Nazi District Leaders.

In war time one does not know things. One guesses. We were given no clue from Berlin about the purpose of the Führer's talks with his lesser Leaders beyond the fact that he regarded the talks as "important": but all his talks are regarded by him (and certainly are to him) important. He had never before, however, taken such a step. The District Leaders are those of his lieutenants who are most closely and directly in touch with the feeling of the rank and file. Normally his information (if he should be interested in the real feelings of his masses) comes from Herr Himmler and his Gestapo, or secret police, who in their turn are mostly dependent on what they are told by the District Leaders. Had Herr Hitler decided to tap the original sources over Herr Himmler's head?

Three days later we were given one revelation of what Herr Hitler had accomplished in those busy days of consultation. He did not make the revelation himself, but assigned the job to Herr von Ribbentrop. It was a singularly hard stroke of luck for Joachim; for he it was who on the very day of his arrival in London as German Ambassador almost exactly three years before (October 26th, 1936) had nailed Germany's colours to the anti-Komintern mast. On arrival in London the new Ambassador made a statement to the Press in which he said: "The Führer is convinced that there is only one real danger to Europe and to the British Empire as well, that is, the spreading further of Communism, this most terrible of all diseases. . . ." Within a month (on November 24th, 1936) Herr von Ribbentrop flew from London to Berlin to sign the anti-Komintern Pact with Japan, which he did duly sign on the following day (November 25th, 1936).

The anti-Communist, anti-Russian campaign throughout the following three years became the one thing in Herr von Ribbentrop's life which he really performed with conviction. He now (October 24th, 1939) was put up by his Führer to talk in an exactly opposite sense: to welcome as a blessing what he before had denounced as a curse. The exigencies of political life, especially of German political life, tend to be pitiless. He made his speech at Danzig. "Recently," he

said, "Soviet Russia has joined Germany's foreign political friends. The conclusion of the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact, and later of the German-Russian Pact of Friendship have put Germany's foreign policy on a new basis. The traditional friendly relations between these two countries have been restored, and there exist all the necessary conditions for a deepening of this friendship. The *Lebensraum* of both Powers are contiguous but do not cut into each other. A territorial divergence between the two States is out of the question for all time in the future. Their economic demands supplement each other in a simply ideal manner. By far-reaching agreements the exchange of raw materials and industrial products is already operating and will increase from year to year. We shall reach the highest point of our turn-over in a short time. The new German-Russian relations are, without a doubt, popular in both countries. It has been shown by these developments that National-Socialist Germany and Soviet Russia, so long as each respects the other's ideology, and both nations are firmly resolved to do that, can very well live in neighbourly friendship. It is surprising what strange discoveries are made by the British propaganda in order to conceal the importance of the German-Russian understanding from the British people."

He did not speak in a happy tone: and it was that fact that redounded mostly to his credit. To propagate under political necessity a doctrine that you do not believe is one thing; to propagate it with a glib facility is a worse thing. Herr von Ribbentrop is no doubt (and an abundant evidence proves it) a very stupid man, but at any rate he has the saving grace that he felt, and could not conceal, extreme discomfort when he perjured himself on October 24th.

The rest of his speech was more congenial to him. He has always honestly hated Great Britain. He had honestly told Herr Hitler that Britain would never fight. To be proved wrong by the very object of your hatred is to inflame your hatred. Therefore on October 24th, in that part of his speech where he was instructed to attack Great Britain, he spoke with gusto. "There is not the slightest doubt," he said, "that the French people did not want this war, and would rather have peace to-day than to-morrow, but the war has been imposed on them by Britain. I can prove beyond all doubt that this war against Germany has been systematically

and secretly prepared for years by the present British Government. . . . Mr. Chamberlain did not come to Munich in order to prevent war but to postpone the war the British Government had decided upon. . . . Not the inviolability of the Polish State but armed assistance against Germany was Britain's concern. This policy can only be understood as an expression of Britain's unceasing will to furnish herself in all circumstances—and in a not too far future—with an excuse for attacking Germany. The results of this neatly calculated British policy followed according to programme. The Poles fell into an ecstasy of megalomania. Again the real intentions of Britain's policy were demonstrated. Instead of advising Poland to decide in favour of a still possible settlement with Germany, Britain, as we now know, incited the Poles to aggressive acts against Germany. But the British Government showed its true face and its desire to annihilate the German people when it rejected the magnificent peace offer that the Leader made to Britain before the Reichstag on October 6th, and answered it, through the mouth of the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, with abuse which called forth utter indignation throughout the whole German nation. Every schoolboy knows to-day that there is no longer such a thing as world domination, and probably will not be in the future. Moreover, there is no part of the world where the British flag is not waving against the will of the people in question, and where deeds of violence, robbery and lies do not mark the path of British Imperialism. The reproach of striving for world domination hits only Britain."

It was now Russia's turn. On October 31st Mr. Molotov addressed the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union with the apparent single purpose of featuring Great Britain as the aggressor. The truth was that Mr. Stalin now wanted peace. He had made his haul in Poland and in the Baltic States. The stand made by Finland showed clearly that there was a limit to Russian, as to German, depredation. So long as there was no evident danger of Russia's being embroiled in the physical war, it was an obvious and an easy policy to encourage war in the West. There were two elements in Russia's expansion policy, the one imperialist, the other communist. Russia's true purpose of bolshevist expansion could best be served by an Anglo-German war.

But there was something odd about that war. It had not

gone according to the Russian plan. In particular the decision of Turkey to sign a treaty of mutual assistance with Great Britain and France showed the danger to Russia of playing with fire. The bluff of Russia's "army" might at any moment be called: not by Germany (who knew all about it, but whose hands were tied by the exigencies of the diplomatic situation) but by some accident in this most unpredictable of wars. Therefore the Kremlin apparently decided that a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. It was time to stop the imperialist, and revert to the communist, policy.

The way in which the Russian argument developed was something like this. The past two months had taught Herr Hitler that his campaign for world domination, and even for bloodless local conquest, had been brought to an end. He had met for the first time with opposition and moreover had had to yield important spoils to what he knew to be a form of Russian blackmail. Herr Hitler therefore was presented with a blank wall in the East (constituted by Russia) and a blank wall in the West (constituted by Great Britain and France). The only remaining outlets in South-eastern Europe and in Scandinavia were small, and, as Herr Hitler knew, could be easily blocked against him. Therefore Herr Hitler could confidently be relied on to be favourably disposed towards the substitution of an armed peace for the existing state of armed (but dormant) war: indeed it was probable that Herr Hitler would regard such a thing as his only chance of escape from his existing *impasse*. Moscow was clearly his only hope of escape. He had a right to ask for Russia's friendly offices in that sense. He knew that Russia would not agree unless it suited Russia's own purpose. It did, suit Russia's purpose; for the Communist International postulated war between the capitalist countries only if Russia herself could keep out of it. On October 25th, therefore, the Russian Government, to forge a link with Germany, issued a protest against the British blockade. It was a gesture of principle (for Russia was not a great importer of such commodities as were affected by the blockade) made for the exclusive moral encouragement of Herr Hitler.

But there came the rub. How could Russia help to stop the war, when she knew that the British Government would not listen? Once Britain starts a war, she settles down to war, and nothing will unsettle her. Moreover, it was obvious

that British policy was to "sit pretty" in the hope and in the belief that time was on Britain's side. What could Stalin do? He decided on the one hand to court British favour by reopening trade negotiations so that, as was broadly enough hinted, Russia could send timber to Britain in return for rubber and tin. Thereupon Russia would pass on the rubber and tin to Germany—for a price. As Germany could not pay the price in cash, Russia would demand in payment manufactured goods which would absorb the raw materials received. Therefore, hinted Russia, she would not so much be supplying Germany with raw materials as making Germany manufacture her raw materials for nothing. On the other hand, and on the strength of the British applause thereby won, Russia would publicly suggest that the war didn't make sense and ought forthwith to be stopped. After all (it was further hinted) the Franco-British postulate that there could be no negotiation with "Hitler" was virtually satisfied by the fact that there was now a new Hitler, baulked and powerless, whose "word" no longer mattered.

Such was the scheme. In fulfilment of it Mr. Maisky, the Russian Ambassador in London, called on Mr. Oliver Stanley, President of the Board of Trade, on October 25th and duly launched the trade negotiation. Mr. Molotov made his speech to the Supreme Council of the Union on October 31st.

The first point that Mr. Molotov made of course was that Russia was undeviatingly disposed to be "neutral." The insistence on that particular point always commanded respect because there was no alternative. The so-called Russian "army" with its 11,000,000 men (figures being easy enough to set forth) certainly had few higher officers, because they had most of them been shot; and would certainly never have many higher officers because Mr. Stalin was afraid they would shoot him. "The Non-aggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany," said Mr. Molotov on October 31st, "bound us to maintain neutrality in the case of Germany taking part in war. We have consistently pursued this course." His further objects were (1) to re-emphasise the friendly relations now obtaining between Russia and Germany (wherein he repeated substantially what Herr von Ribbentrop had said on October 24th), (2) to announce that the settlement imposed upon the collapsed Polish State was final, and (3) to

blame Great Britain as the aggressor for not now agreeing to stop the war.

On all those points he appeared to be echoing Herr von Ribbentrop, but the motive as distinct from the effect was the subtle one aforesaid. The technique too was different. Whereas Herr von Ribbentrop heavily lied his way to his conclusions, Mr. Molotov indulged in the usual Russian finesse which can never be heavy. By far his most entertaining passages were those which accused Great Britain of aggression. "To-day, so far as the European Great Powers are concerned, Germany is in the position of a State which is striving for the earliest termination of the war and for peace, while Great Britain and France, which but yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are in favour of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace. The rôles, as you see, are changing. The efforts of the British and French Governments to justify this new position of theirs on the grounds of their undertakings to Poland are, of course, obviously unsound. Everybody realises that there can be no question of restoring the old Poland. . . . It amounts to this, that the British, and with them the French supporters of the war, have declared something in the nature of 'ideological' war on Germany reminiscent of the religious wars of olden times. . . . Is it back to the Middle Ages, to the days of religious wars, superstition, and cultural deterioration that the ruling classes of Great Britain and France want to drag us? . . . But everybody should understand that ideology cannot be destroyed by force, and it cannot be eliminated by war. . . . The real cause of the Anglo-French war with Germany was not that Great Britain and France had vowed to restore the old Poland, nor that they had decided to undertake a fight for democracy. The ruling circles of Great Britain and France have, of course, other and more realist motives for going to war with Germany. These motives do not lie in any ideology, but in their profoundly material interests as mighty colonial Powers. It is fear of Germany's claim to these colonial possessions that is at the bottom of the present war, a fear that has become substantially stronger lately as a result of the collapse of the Versailles Treaty. It is fear of losing world supremacy that dictates to the ruling circles of Great Britain and France the policy of fomenting war with Germany. Thus the imperialist character of this war is obvious to anyone

who wants to face realities and does not close his eyes to facts. One can see from all this who is interested in this war, which is being waged for world supremacy. Certainly not the working class. This war promises nothing to the working class but bloody sacrifice and hardships."

The new American Neutrality Bill was duly passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on November 3rd. President Roosevelt issued the resultant proclamations on November 4th. Thus after weathering three months of storm Mr. Roosevelt won through. The delay had been due in the main to the circumstance that although most people in the United States wanted the amended Neutrality Bill to be passed into law, many of them wanted still more to defeat Mr. Roosevelt and thus to lessen the danger of his running next year for a third term as President. He himself on November 3rd epitomised the achievement as the recapture by his country of what he called "genuine neutrality." What he presumably meant was that America, finding herself debarred by the effectiveness of the Allied blockade from selling munitions to Germany, had triumphantly refused to accept the German *Diktat* that she should therefore not sell munitions to the Allies. Her slogan was that she was free to sell where she could. Her boast was that she had vindicated her freedom.

Moreover, there was little doubt that sentiment coincided with commercial interest, for the majority of Americans would rather the war were won by Great Britain and by France than by Germany. Still more, it was clear that American political traditions were more consonant with British than with German political ideas. There were embittered British critics who argued (*sotto voce*) that if only America declared war on Germany the Allied cause would probably be at once triumphant and the results might be accelerated which American opinion itself desired. Yet, they admitted, America was the greatest exporter among the neutrals of the commodities and manufactured weapons of war needed by the belligerents and her market was now open to us, while closed (by us) to the enemy. The upshot was that the United States was now ready to sell to Great Britain and France everything they wanted to buy, if they paid for it in advance and took all the risks by carrying it in their own ships. American commercial instincts, however, overlooked the probability

that the stipulation for payment in advance would reduce the trade to a minimum, for it was a first principle of British war finance to conserve its gold, dollars and securities.

Italy, as uncomfortably neutral in 1939 as in 1914, but debarred from the acceptance of Allied bribes by the memory that the promised bribe of 1915 had never been honoured (just as America now stipulated payment in advance for neutral commercial services because the former debts resulting from credits had not been repaid) pursued her course with difficult logic. The war had liberated Italy from the virtual annexation by Germany that had been accepted by Count Ciano and his fellows. Germany was now too much engaged in other problems to prolong what amounted to her military occupation of Italy. It was not surprising therefore when on October 31st it was announced from Rome that six members of the Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, and the Secretary of the Fascist Party, had all resigned, and had been replaced by men conspicuously less identified with Germany's cause. The most symbolic of the changes was the replacement of Signor Starace, who had been Secretary of the party for eight years and was Count Ciano's chief lieutenant in the policy of subservience to Germany. It had been announced that Field-Marshal Göring was about to visit Rome. It was now denied by Berlin that he ever intended to visit Rome. That too was interesting.

The real clue to Italy's present concern lay politically in the Balkans and financially in the opportunity afforded to Signor Mussolini to replenish his exchequer by war profiteering. It was made known on October 31st (the very day of the Cabinet and other changes) that an Italo-Greek Pact of Friendship was being negotiated. The simple truth was that the new Russian factor in the Balkans and the new treaty between Turkey and Great Britain and France had excited Italy's determination to seek again the field of influence and of commerce in the Balkans that she had abandoned in the face of the now scotched German *Drang nach dem Südosten*.

His Holiness Pius XII on October 27th issued his first Encyclical Letter. It had a deeply important bearing upon the political menace to European civilisation. The immediate question that presented itself to everyone outside of Germany was how could the Encyclical be brought to the notice of the 30,000,000 Catholics of Germany? It was a potentially

exciting question because it was remembered that when Herr Hitler once before confiscated a Papal Encyclical the present Pope, then Cardinal Pacelli, Secretary of State at the Vatican, chartered an aeroplane and delivered it to the Bishop of Berlin, who read out its open defiance of the Führer from the pulpit of Berlin Cathedral itself. It was not now possible to fly aeroplanes over the Alps into Germany. It was probable that the German Catholics would never hear of their Pope's message. Could an alternative be found?

The new Encyclical, dated October 20th, and issued for the second time in Church history from Castel Gandolfo, will be known for its first words as *Summi Pontificatus*. In this place only that passage of the Encyclical which specifically deals with the problem of peace in Europe (though the whole Encyclical by implication was largely political) need be quoted. It is quoted, not from the official text, which had not yet reached England, but from a text given in the *Catholic Herald* of November 3rd: "If we are to establish harmonious and lasting contact and fruitful relations it is indispensable that peoples should recognise and observe the principles of international natural law which guide their normal development and functioning. These principles demand that the rights of every people to independence, to life and the possibility of a progressive evolution in the ways of civilisation shall be respected. They further demand fidelity to stipulated and sanctioned treaties in conformity with the law of nations. There can be no doubt that the first and necessary condition of all common peaceful life between nations is to be found in mutual trust, in the expectation and conviction of mutual fidelity to the plighted word, in the assurance, on both sides, that wisdom is better than armaments, and in the persuasion that both are ready to negotiate rather than invoke force or the threat of force, whenever delays, hindrances, changes and disputes arise, not from bad will, but from real changes of circumstances and genuine conflicts of interests. It is true that such changes, due to the passage of time or circumstances, unforeseeable when treaties are made, can in fact make treaties seem unjust, impracticable, or too burdensome for one of the parties. In that case resort should be had in good time to a frank discussion with a view to modifying the treaty or making a fresh one."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

November 12th, 1939.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

FULL REVIEWS	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	749
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN; THE BIBLE AND THE WORLD; ITALY BEFORE MUSSOLINI; MAHATMA GANDHI; THE POWER OF PARLIAMENT; A SECOND AIGLON; A FRENCH VIEW OF BOLINGBROKE; HITLER AND THE JEWS.										
SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES:	THE RACES OF CENTRAL									
	EUROPE; OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS;									
	OXFORD, AS IT WAS AND AS IT IS TO-DAY; COUNTRY									
	RELICS; LONDON FABRIC									
	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	762

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.*

Shortly before his death Austen Chamberlain published a volume of reminiscences and a selection of letters to his stricken father. The books were warmly welcomed, not only because they illustrated an eventful period but still more because they revealed the author in a new light. Every one was aware that he was a man of the highest honour and of considerable though not supreme ability. We learned from those volumes how human he was, how admirable a son, how delightful a friend, how many-sided in his interests. The note both of greatness and of bitterness which fascinates and repels us in the life of Joseph Chamberlain is completely absent in his eldest son.

The official biography, the first volume of which carries us to the outbreak of the World War, confirms the impression left by his own writings. Sir Charles Petrie admires his character and approves his politics, but he never exaggerates his significance. Austen, as he calls him, was not a superman, but a prominent and loyal member of the Unionist Party, of which his father was one of the founders. Filial admiration

* *The Life and Letters of Sir Austen Chamberlain*. By Sir Charles Petrie. Vol. I. Cassell. 16s.

and devotion shine through these pages, and though he had a personality of his own his politics were those of his father. A touching letter written from 11 Downing Street after his appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer expresses his gratitude for "the close friendship which you have encouraged between us. I do not think there are many fathers who have been to their sons all that you have been to me." When the Unionist Party was sharply divided on the tariff problem, Austen found Balfour's balancing attitude utterly exasperating. His letters to his leader, not only on tariff reform, but on Ireland during the Wyndham incident and in the House of Lords crisis are very outspoken, and it says much for the two men that they did not drift entirely apart. Their differences became public property in 1911, when Austen and several other prominent Unionists vigorously opposed the advice of Balfour and Lansdowne to let the Veto bill become law. Balfour's side of the story was given in his official biography by his niece, and no one can wonder at his resignation of the leadership after the open revolt against his authority.

Austen desired to succeed him and was fully entitled by his services and ability to do so, for his rival, Walter Long, had little to recommend him beyond seniority. That the two candidates withdrew in favour of Bonar Law in order to make the selection unanimous was wise and right, and Austen's magnanimity was justly applauded. The new leader was a consummate debater, but Austen was not wholly satisfied with his performance. It is curious to read his verdict that Bonar Law, despite his quiet manners and rather joyless outlook on life, was the most ambitious man he had known in politics; and Sir Charles Petrie speaks of his vaulting ambition. The chief disappointment was that Joseph Chamberlain's most effective champion proved scarcely more courageous in his attitude to food taxes than Balfour himself. Austen confessed that they were unpopular, but argued that the right course was to face and overcome their unpopularity. It was not merely that Bonar Law, as the leader of the party in the House of Commons, had a direct responsibility for preventing a split which Austen could not feel. It was also the fact that for the one the supreme issue was the prevention of Home Rule, for the other the overthrow of Free Trade. There is something rather naive about Austen's faith in the blessings of Protection.

While Joseph Chamberlain retained something of his radicalism when he changed his party, his son was temperamentally a thorough Conservative. Though there was nothing reactionary about him, he opposed so many of the useful reforms carried out by the Liberal Government that he cannot be described as a great statesman; for it is the essence of statesmanship to look ahead and act in time. He was later to express his regret that he voted against the grant of self-government to South Africa, and he changed his mind on Haldane's military reforms when their success became apparent. He opposed women's suffrage, but later confessed that, if the results had not realised all its promoters' hopes, neither had they justified his fears. His mind was neither subtle nor creative. On the other hand he was slightly more progressive in regard to Ireland than most of his Unionist friends, and was prepared for what his father had called Provincial Councils before the Home Rule split.

We shall hear much more of foreign affairs when the second volume appears, and it is only rarely in these pages that we leave the dusty arena of domestic controversy. Yet we are made aware at intervals that his fear of German power was steadily growing. Among the reasons which inclined him to accept Mr. Lloyd George's plan of a Coalition Government in 1910 and the agreed solution of the outstanding problems of the time was his conviction that dark clouds were gathering in the Continental sky. He condemned the criticism of the Tripoli enterprise, high-handed though he admitted it to be, on the ground that it was likely to forfeit the goodwill of Italy. He was dissatisfied with the vague character of the Entente, which he believed to have all the obligations of a formal alliance without its advantages. If war came we should be obliged to intervene, but the real position was not understood by the man in the street. After a visit to Russia on private business in 1912 he vainly urged the clarification of the position on Grey, who felt that public opinion would not approve a binding obligation to engage in war.

The closing chapter, entitled "The Slippery Slope," describes the coming of war in 1914 and Austen's important part in securing British participation. How a little group of Unionists met during the critical days and mobilised the leaders of their party has long been known, but this book explains the precise nature of his activities. Austen, declares

Sir Charles Petrie, played the decisive part in inducing the Opposition leaders to bring pressure to bear on the Government to stand by France and Russia. His father had passed away a few days before the storm burst, but there was another member of the family ready to applaud. "It makes one fairly gasp," wrote Neville Chamberlain, "to think that we were within a hair's breadth of eternal disgrace, and some day the country will be grateful to Amery, G. Lloyd and you for having preserved her honour."

G. P. G.

THE BIBLE AND THE WORLD.*

Dr. John H. Ritson, for more than thirty years Secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society, has just published an autobiography entitled *The World is Our Parish*. It is a vivid account of a remarkable career, devoted in the main to the interests of the great Society of which for a generation he was the chief administrator. The book is therefore doubly important. The personal narrative is also the record of the great religious society with which the author's career has been bound up. In both respects it is a pleasure to recommend it.

Dr. Ritson was born seventy years ago in Bolton and is a typical Lancastrian. By outstanding intellectual ability he won his way with scholarships to the Manchester Grammar School, and thence to Balliol College, Oxford, during the Mastership of the celebrated Dr. Benjamin Jowett. Both at school and college he so distinguished himself in mathematics and natural science that he might have looked forward to a successful scientific career. But he was a devoted Methodist, and the call to the ministry overbore—with the encouragement of Jowett—all other attractions. Entering upon this vocation in 1891, he made such a mark in his early appointments as an evangelical scholar, preacher and pastor, that he was appointed a Secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society at the end of 1899. In this capacity he became not only the chief administrator and advocate of its work, but a world-wide traveller in its interests. Hence this book enables the reader to appreciate alike the immense and varied

**The World is Our Parish*. By John H. Ritson. Hodder & Stoughton. 8s. 6d. net.

scholarship, the remarkable organisation, and the far-reaching range of a Society that has been an indispensable instrument of the spread of Christianity throughout the world. Dr. Ritson tells his readers that "To-day, including versions made by other Societies, the Bible, or parts of it, may be read in over 1,000 tongues." When it is remembered that these tongues include not only all the great languages, but an immense number of tongues spoken by the obscurest tribes, whose speech has been made literary by the Bible, the heroic devotion of missionaries throughout the world will be faintly appreciated. The Bible Society has therefore been a most remarkable pioneer not only of the Christian Faith but of human civilisation and fellowship.

Dr. Ritson gives a highly interesting account of his travels throughout most of the countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and America, superintending the work and encouraging the agents of the Society in their arduous toils. In many of these journeys Dr. Ritson encountered danger and prolonged hardships, which he graphically describes, but his unfailing devotion and courage, his common sense and cheerfulness carried him through manifold adventures that would have daunted weaker men. His account of these travels is full of valuable information and lit up by many humorous incidents.

Dr. Ritson has been called "a Methodist Catholic," and well deserves the description. He has shown the spirit and followed in the steps of John Wesley. Hence his book ends by an account of some of the services he has been enabled to render to the Church of his birth, which showed its high appreciation of his character and eminence by making him President of the Wesleyan Methodist Conference in 1925. The readers of this book will be grateful to those who overcame the reluctance of Dr. Ritson to write it.

J. S. L.

ITALY BEFORE MUSSOLINI.*

Is Italian Fascism to be considered as a new and sudden departure in the political life of modern Italy? If so, how extraordinary an adventure those fifty years of democratic government from the rise of a unified kingdom in 1870, to

* *Pre-Fascist Italy*. By Margot Hentze. Allen & Unwin. 16s.

the twilight of liberty in 1922! Which is the ultimate meaning of that period, judged in the light of recent events? Was it a golden period altogether?

This problem, which Miss Hentze handles with great skill, stands in the background of her survey. The narrative is restricted to the parliamentary side of events, and many an Italian would call it *una storia parlamentare*: but we rejoice at the fact that the author did not go beyond these limits. For, though many Italians have given excellent accounts of what happened in those years, none of them could judge their Parliament like an English writer, carrying in her blood the experience of centuries of free discussion. Indeed, each debate is given its true meaning and its exact value; the issues at stake are summarised with clarity, their implications discussed, their consequences examined: it is as if a teacher would judge the work of a pupil—though not of a very good one. For, as she remarks, the Italian constitution was the English parliamentary system in a bad French translation. Was this system suited to the country? What difficulties stood in the way of a wide franchise? How much weight shall be given to the objection that, owing to the reactionary tendencies of an ignorant peasantry, a government *for* the people could not be carried out *by* the people? And finally, how far can we discern in the practice of those days the seeds of the present dictatorship? As an answer, she introduces us to the leading figures of the Italian political life: Depretis, the "incorruptible corruptor," the "political Loyola," eight times Prime Minister; Crispi, with his authoritarian gestures, his peremptory and uncompromising nature, and his egocentrism so likely to outrage other people's susceptibilities; and Giolitti, a hardly veiled dictator, who governed Italy for fifteen years, pulling the wires behind the scenes when out of office, and skilfully managing a parliamentary majority through "manipulated" elections.

And yet, there is throughout the book a vivid feeling of sympathy for the Italian people, and a deep and indulgent understanding for their misfortunes. For Italy not only deeply resented her humiliations—Tunis in 1882 and Adowa in 1896—but was also foredoomed to reap nothing but bitterness from her victories. The same wave of disappointment followed the Unification, the Lybian War, and the Great War. This feeling of a mutilated victory is not a new one; the

Italians experienced it over and over again, haunted by their own unhappiness and dissatisfaction, and mostly owing to their own fault, which made things more grievous than ever. But was this people really heedless of true liberty? In the chapter on "Zanardelli and the Liberal Spring" we detect the author's mind; and these pages—certainly the best of the whole book—strike a passionate and regretful note at the remembrance of an old Italy of gentlemen, ruled by one of the noblest Italian statesmen. This work is to be considered as fundamental for all attempts in the future at a history of modern Italy. We only regret that the importance of Don Sturzo's Popular Party has not been sufficiently recognised. The bibliography is exhaustive.

ANGELO CRESPI.

MAHATMA GANDHI.*

This collection of appreciations and testimonies from a large number of distinguished people of all nationalities on the occasion of his seventieth birthday was presented to Mr. Gandhi in October of this year. It is edited by Sir S. Radhakrishnan, of Oxford University, who develops in his introduction the deeper thought and meaning of Mr. Gandhi's teaching and expounds to some extent his philosophy. The difficult policy of pacifism is wonderfully argued; its actual achievement is proved. And yet Mr. Gandhi supports the British Government and loves us. Vast numbers of his compatriots have adopted his non-violence. They are gradually training themselves for further progress. There are continual halts, and back they have to go to the original genius for consultation and repentance, and for *ideas*, so that even at this moment 300 millions of Indians are depending on his guidance. His organised followers are largely in command of the Provincial Governments, yet they turn to him for—rebuke?—not exactly, but for example, and they find him meditating and spinning in some poverty-stricken village among the poorest peasants and the outcasts.

To see the universal and all-pervading Spirit of Truth face to face one must be able to love the meanest of creation as oneself. And a man who aspires after that cannot afford to keep out of

* *Mahatma Gandhi: Essays and Reflections on His Life and Work*. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

any field of life. That is why my devotion to Truth has drawn me into the field of politics ; . . . those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means !

Some of the papers in this collection are beautifully written and full of deep reverence. There are appreciative records of Mr. Gandhi's work and sufferings in South Africa—indeed he wins all through suffering. His philosophy is expounded in papers by Srimati Sophia Wadia and Bhagavan Das. It is difficult to choose among so many : Horace G. Alexander, C. F. Andrews, Richard B. Gregg, Carl Heath, Stephen Hobhouse, Rufus M. Jones, Don Salvador de Madariaga, Professor Murray, Maude Royden, Viscount Samuel, Rabin-dranath Tagore, Edward Thompson, H. G. Wood, Sir Francis Younghusband (they have been printed in alphabetical order). Perhaps one of the best estimates of his personality is from the pen of Dr. Ernest Barker :

After Mr. Gandhi went away I fell to thinking about the different elements that met in him. There was the St. Francis, vowed to the simple life of poverty, in harmony with all creation and in love with all created things. There was the St. Thomas Aquinas, the thinker and the philosopher, able to sustain high argument and to follow the subtleties of thought in all their windings. There was also the practical man of affairs, with a legal training to back and strengthen his sense for affairs—the man who could come down from mountain tops to guide with shrewd advice transactions in the valley. We are all of us complicated ; and Mr. Gandhi seemed to me more complicated than most of us are. He had a rich and intricate personality.

In the Appendix there are some excerpts from Mr. Gandhi's own writings.

E. M. B.

THE POWER OF PARLIAMENT.*

Dr. Ivor Jennings has followed his well-known book on *Cabinet Government* by a new comprehensive work which deals with the working of Parliament and its place in the constitutional fabric. It is designed primarily as a descriptive and analytical account although the author's views are from time to time projected or to be inferred. In the preparation

* *Parliament*. By W. Ivor Jennings. Cambridge University Press. 25s. net.

of this work Dr. Jennings not only has consulted established works on law, practice and procedure, biographies and memoirs of statesmen, but also has obtained information from confidential sources. In the result the author provides not only a very able and lucid survey of the parliamentary machine but also an account of its actual operation under modern political conditions.

The fundamental legal basis of Parliament is, of course, its legislative supremacy. As Dr. Jennings says, " Dictatorship could be introduced into the British constitutional system by a Government with a loyal majority in both Houses, without any technical difficulty whatever." This is, however, " essentially theoretical " and the author very rightly seeks the real constitutional character of Parliament in its practical working. There is, for example, the House of Lords acting as a barrier against extreme socialist legislation. He points out the very limited scope of a Money Bill. Seventeen Finance Bills, for example, have not been certified ; and he dispels the " common notion " that by " tacking " provisions to a Money Bill " extreme " legislation could be enacted in a single sitting. The delay of two years, which in other Bills is necessary to override the Lords' dissent, renders such a programme of legislation extremely difficult within the term of a single Parliament. Dr. Jennings confines the constitutional usefulness of the House of Lords to its consideration of Private Bills, Provisional and Special Orders, including Orders for the delegation of powers to Departments, with which the House of Commons is not able sufficiently to cope.

The House of Lords is unnecessary, if not incompetent, as a safeguard against unpopular legislation. The Government itself " is extraordinarily responsive even to small changes in public opinion." The House of Commons is the great focus of opinion and the Opposition in appealing to it " compels the Government to rest its policy on public opinion." During recent years, as the author points out, a Government with a huge majority has on a number of occasions withdrawn or radically altered its proposals in the face of public outcry. Popular opinion is respected mainly because it is inherent in a democratic system which all parties recognise. Threat of defeat at a General Election is no real deterrent to a Government bent upon dictatorship. Similarly Dr. Jennings argues with regard to minority rights in the Commons. " They

depend not upon express rules but upon the custom of the House. . . . They are followed because they are part of the tradition, because they are reasonable, and because they are essential to the working of a democratic system." In his long account of the internal management of the House of Commons' business Dr. Jennings shows how much depends, for its smooth working, upon collaboration and mutual forbearance of Government and the Opposition. "If either pressed its rights to the uttermost, the parliamentary system would come to an end." Moreover, Dr. Jennings argues that the immediate policies of both parties are never extremely opposed, for, apart from the need of compromise to close their own respective ranks, they both appeal to the same small floating vote of some two million electors with no settled party convictions.

It is, of course, not possible here to discuss all the matters dealt with at some length by Dr. Jennings in his very able and comprehensive work. Mention, however, should be made of his lucid account of the degree of financial control exercised by the Commons and also of his chapter upon delegated legislation. He is not unduly alarmed at the character and growth of the powers granted by Parliament to Government Departments and differs in this respect from the views expressed by many others, including the Lord Chief Justice.

A SECOND AIGLON.*

Mrs. John's brilliant picture of the Second Empire and its fall, with "le petit Prince," Louis Napoleon, in the centre foreground, is, from first to last, of absorbing interest. Her narrative style is swift and clear, often epigrammatic. The psychological studies of the Imperial family, including the jealous "Plon Plon," with their mutual reactions, are masterpieces, that of Eugénie especially. The setting of the pinchbeck Court, which always gave an "impression of unreality," its masquerades and *séances*, is vividly suggested. Then follows the unhappy campaign of 1870—in which the despondent Emperor and high-spirited boy are shown as "useless adjuncts of a lost army"—ending in the *débâcle* of Sedan, and subsequent exile in England. This exile, Mrs. John points out, was far bitterer for the Prince, who knew no life outside

* *The Prince Imperial*. By Katherine John. Putnam. 1939. 10s. 6d.

France, than for his Spanish mother, or his father, to whom it was not a new experience. Their earlier conquest of Queen Victoria's favour is amusingly related.

The development in the Prince's character forms the chief theme of the book. We see him from childhood, the "Imperial Fauntleroy," graceful and daring, sweet-natured, fond of display, proud of his name and of his august ancestor, sure of his own destiny. He excelled in riding and fencing, but could never be induced to study, until he went to Woolwich, where, by hard work, he made up for lost time, and where "the P.I." was genuinely popular. Louis grew from boy to man, says Mrs. John, at his father's death. She gives an animated account of the enthusiastic Bonapartist demonstration on his attaining his majority at eighteen, in spite of which he realised, as his mother and some others did not, that "the return from Elba" could not, in his case, be immediate. While waiting, he longed for action and fame, and was bent on going out with his former comrades from Woolwich to the Zulu War. This, after much reluctance on the part of the English authorities at home and in the field to accept such a responsibility, he was permitted to do, as "a spectator." To this rôle it proved, of course, impossible to restrict him. The tragic sequel is well known. Though hardly a case of *Tu Marcellus eris*, the future might have held great things in store for him. Had it offered only exile and inaction, Louis would assuredly have chosen the soldier's death, and tribute of the Zulus who overpowered him: "He fought like a lion."

E. G. S.

A FRENCH VIEW OF BOLINGBROKE.*

It is a pleasure to read so well-documented a book as Professor Baratier's biography of Bolingbroke, and our pleasure is enhanced by the publication of his letters to Lord Stair from 1716 to 1720. As a distinguished French scholar the author enjoys the great advantage of not having fallen under the spell of Disraeli, whose false account of Bolingbroke and Shelburne has impressed itself on our national tradition. The Secretary of State, the exile, the leader in opposition, the hermit of Battersea, all appear before us subtly and skilfully

* *Lord Bolingbroke*. By P. Baratier. Société d'Édition les Belles Lettres. Lettres inédites de Bolingbroke à Lord Stair, 1716-1720.

interpreted. The volume contains some new material, and it is put together with an enviable lucidity. Old writers like Macknight, whose work cannot be ignored, and Cooke, together with new writers like Sir Charles Petrie and Hopkinson, have all been carefully consulted; nor have the contributions of Mr. Keith Feiling, Professor Michael and Professor Vaucher been forgotten. The outcome is a book that at once steps into its place as a standard authority. We see the man as well as the statesman, his demerits as well as his merits. He was unfaithful to men as well as to women; he was so overweeningly ambitious that men did not trust him; and his character left him as politically impotent as that of Mirabeau himself. A man can as readily escape from his shadow as from the circumstances of his generation, and Bolingbroke escaped less than most men. His private life stood in complete conflict with his public. He was forced to serve such a devoted Churchwoman as Anne and to direct the policy of the High Churchmen, and yet he was immoral and free-thinking. This strain of contradiction runs through his life, and is inevitably reflected in his pamphlets. M. Baratier has noted the literary sources of his political thought. For our part we should have discovered them more often in his doings. The claim of a Patriot King is intelligible when we bear in mind that the Whigs dominated public life during the first half of the eighteenth century, and Bolingbroke naturally pleaded for vigorous kingly rule when such rule presented his sole chance of political salvation. The career of George III is easier to understand when we see not only that he fought for the conception of a Patriot King but that he had not the slightest intention of continuing the rule of the Whig oligarchy. The position of the House of Hanover in 1760 was not unlike that of the House of Hohenzollern in 1888. Just as the young Kaiser determined that his dynasty should rule instead of that of Bismarck—was not Bismarck's son Herbert to succeed him?—so George III resolved that he should be every whit as much a sovereign as his ancestors. Bolingbroke helped to formulate this conception in the eighteenth century, and he is among the distant parents of the dictatorship of our generation. The author has been so successful with his labours that we wish we could persuade him to undertake a similar task for Harley, whose life stands in urgent need of fresh investigation.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

HITLER AND THE JEWS.*

"I believe that I am acting in accordance with the mind of the almighty Creator. In beating off the Jews I am fighting for the work of the Lord," says Hitler in his new bible for the German people. Were there ever uttered more blasphemous words? All the violence and atrocities his unscrupulous executioners are heaping in his name on the helpless victims of a satanic fanaticism their author ascribes to the will and plan of God. What sort of God must that be who commanded all the things Mr. Warburg's book tells us, with a documentary exactitude and quiet matter-of-factness which form an uncanny contrast with the things themselves! The disfranchisement and persecution of a people, the expulsion of Jews and half-Jews from all public offices, from all professions, from every branch of economic life, science and art, their utter spoliation by laws and innumerable arbitrary acts of individuals; their extreme humiliation by setting them, during weeks and months, to scrub the pavements, by tearing out the beards of old men, by painting the faces of young girls and forcing them to dance in the street; the unmentionable tortures in the concentration camps and the pogroms of November 10th, 1938, with their lootings and murders, with the demolition of shops, flats and furniture, the burning of the synagogues: all this the neo-German theology ascribes to the Lord God, and declares it to be a restoration of "elementary justice" and a spontaneous outburst of the justified indignation of the German people. In the spirit of the *Stuermer*, the lowest paper humanity has ever seen, German youth is trained for many years in the hatred and persecution of the Jews. I saw once in a public garden of an Austrian city, when Jews were still allowed to sit on garden-seats, how some eight-year-old boys drew them from under some old Jewesses so that they fell to the ground. Obviously this too was God's will! And obviously God wanted the Bible, not that of the Fuehrer, but the other one which Western mankind counts among its most precious treasures to be called an animal book. And the Jewish people the very image of the devil, the enemy of the German people, of humanity in general! A few weeks ago it was only Bolshevism which was also characterised in this way (they combined both, Judaism and Bolshevism, and

* *Six Years of Hitler*. By G. Warburg. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

spoke of the Jewish Bolshevism in Germany). The persecution of Jewry is part of the neo-German barbarism which in the end threw Europe into the war.

J. LESSER.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The foundation of the violent Nazi ideology is the race theory, the creed (*credo quia absurdum*) that the German people is a pure and distinguished race and that all human qualities are racially determined. This theory has been declared most holy and in its light everything is looked at in Hitler's Germany. What now is this: a race? The scientific scribes of the Third Reich launch a flood of slogans upon you when you ask them about it, but what this problem means in reality we are informed in the best and simplest way by Dr. Morant's unpretentious book.* The truth is that there is not much in it at all. This whole science, when studied without prejudice and not for a political purpose, has succeeded in classifying some physical characteristics. It measures (on the basis of some necessarily insufficient statistical data) the height, with extinct peoples also the excavated skeletons, considers kind, colour and stage of the hair, thickness of the lips, the eyes, compares the blood-groups. It reaches the result that, as regards the peoples of Central Europe, almost all their different characteristics are to be found with almost all other peoples. As to the blood-groups, those of the Germans in the West resemble those of the Western peoples, those in the East of Germany the Eastern peoples, with only a difference of language. The blood-groups of the Germans show that Germany is racially much more heterogeneous than any other European people. The Central European peoples themselves are racially rather undifferentiated by physical characteristics, in spite of living in these areas, beside the so-called Indo-European peoples, the racially "different" Hungarians. And now attempts are made to trace cultural and moral values back to the alleged racial differences, and it is impudently contended that the German race is higher than for instance the Poles or the Czechs, and has the right to subjugate these peoples. Dr. Morant comes to the conclusion that one cannot speak of different races in Central Europe. Who knows the origins? To regard the language map as a racial map is a delusion. What madness then to surround the racial theory with religious pathos and to build a philosophy upon it! Dr. Morant thoroughly rejects the mythological conception of race and the fantastic myths regarding the origin of the European peoples. The reasonable and scientific treatment of this

* *The Races of Central Europe*. By G. M. Morant. Allen & Unwin. 5s.

question leads, on closer inspection, to an abandonment of the race theory in Europe. It has always been erroneous fanaticism, not simple truth, which has brought so much misfortune upon mankind.

J. LESSER.

* * * * *

It is not surprising to learn from the publishers that the sales of their excellent *Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs** have reached nearly half a million copies or that Mr. R. C. K. Ensor's analysis of *Mein Kampf* has been the "best seller." Among some recent additions to the series, there is a further contribution by Mr. Ensor in *Who Hitler Is*, which contains a biographical sketch of the Führer and of the Nazi rise to power. In *Can Germany Stand the Strain?* Mr. L. P. Thompson discusses the effect of the naval blockade upon Germany's economic resources and concludes that neither by "ordinary commercial methods" nor by coercion of neutrals "can Germany hope to evade the slow but sure pressure of naval blockade."

In conjunction with this pamphlet should be read Mr. W. Arnold-Forster's account of *The Blockade, 1914-1919*. For a brief indication of the development and nature of the German Church struggle, Dr. N. Micklem's *National Socialism and Christianity* should be much appreciated. Professor E. H. Carr has usefully discussed the growth and nature of *Propaganda in International Affairs*, and Mr. R. Birley has outlined the history of the Czechs and their ancient culture in *Czechoslovakia*. More pamphlets are to come and it may be hoped that they will include topics of international law, such as the rights and duties of neutrals and recognised rules of warfare.

* * * * *

Oxford, As it Was and As it is To-day, by Christopher Hobhouse,† is a delightful book, partly historical, partly architectural and descriptive, and beautifully illustrated. There are chapters on Medieval, Renaissance, Reformation, Classical and Nineteenth-century Oxford. But alongside the description and history are many stories and sayings, humorous references to museums ("kleptomaniac institutions"). Of the Martyrs' Memorial it is said: "The intricate design of this memorial renders it a popular trial slope for the night-climbers which abound in Oxford." Which means that this guide book, besides quarrelling rather violently with various architectural styles, is full of amusement and light reading. In the chapter on Modern Oxford the women come in for severe judgment and some chaff, the ordinary undergraduate and his vagaries are treated with a light hand. The Leftist tendencies are not considered very seriously, nor are the Saturday night orgies, all needed to "correct the education in the public schools." "The undergraduate must learn from the beginning the social scale of values.

* Oxford University Press. 3d. net.

† Batsford. 8s. 6d.


First he must learn the meaning of a bore ; secondly, that alcohol can be a bore ; lastly that sobriety can be a bigger bore than alcohol. He will then be fit to take his place as a member of society." " For nearly a thousand years now, Oxford has by its quiet example taught dignity and the love of truth to the youth of England. There is still no place on earth where a young man will sooner acquire these virtues, or more lastingly embrace them."

Mr. H. J. Massingham's latest book *Country Relics** is born of an intense desire to preserve something of the old rural culture which is fast disappearing in the face of modern agricultural methods and urbanisation. At his country home in the Cotswolds, Mr. Massingham has collected together a large number of old tools and implements, representative of obsolescent, if not obsolete, methods of husbandry and of country crafts, such as thatching and bodging, which have declined almost to extinction. The author provides not only a description of these relics, but also most valuably an account of their functions and methods of operation by old farmers and craftsmen who have experienced their use. The text is illustrated by Mr. Thomas Hennell, who is well known for his work, *Change in the Farm*, which in some respects is complementary to this very readable book. As a protest against the present it is perhaps inevitable that a lament for the past should recur throughout its pages. Mr. Massingham would restore the old methods as essential for the well-being of the land and its population. He is bold enough to envisage that his " collection of ' bygones ' " may be of service to posterity in supplying ideas and models for future tools."

London Fabric,† by James Pope-Hennessy, treats of crypts, Hampton Court, Dulwich, Hertford House, Greenwich, Stafford House, Kensington Palace, Westminster Abbey. It is written as it were by a guide taking a lady friend round, so that it is by no means exhaustive or exhausting ; it is again beautifully illustrated.

* Cambridge University Press. 15s. net.

† Batsford. 10s. 6d.



OL
1756.116.1
1756.116.1