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
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## THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JANUARY 1939.

### SETTLEMENT WITH GERMANY.

IN the summer of 1935 I met President Beneš in Moscow, my visit coinciding with his formal reception, designed to mark the achievement of the Russian-Czechoslovak Pact. The recollection of my talk with him at the party given in his honour brings home to me the revolution which has since occurred in the grouping of states. Beneš was confident that his country was secure, and German aggression foiled. So indeed it might have proved, but for the weak spot in the Czechoslovak armour, the presence in Czechoslovakia of a German block larger than the population of several European States, and mainly desiring union with the Reich. That unstable factor in the balance of power could not last; but its removal has been so sudden that public opinion adjusts itself with difficulty to the new situation. We are confronted with an increase of German power on the one hand, and a diminution of the stimulus to German aggression on the other. There are new hopes and new fears; some are moved by the hopes, some by the fears.

For those who hold, in spite of recent events, that German external action has been little different from that which we ourselves should have pursued in similar circumstances, there is plainly no course but to seek to meet Germany's requirements in the future in a friendly spirit, and then, having secured a satisfied and amiable Germany, try to rebuild some structure of international law, making provision for the peaceful settlement of any future disputes.

For those who fix their attention upon the defects of the German system of government, the persecution of Jews and democrats, the ever-mounting German demands, the threats of aggression, the glorification of force, there is less attraction in the policy of appeasement; these people would have greatly preferred to stand firm last September, in what seemed to them a favourable situation. But now that the problems of September 1938 have been resolved in a sense contrary to their wishes, they cannot but desire that the present British foreign policy may succeed, in spite of their fears that it will

not. The Czechs have paid for the Munich settlement in a material sense ; we, as well as they, have suffered a certain moral loss. One must wish that such great sacrifices may be rewarded by a real pacification. It is therefore essential to refrain from dismissing German claims out of hand as unreasonable ; above all, we must avoid the fatal mistake of France, in 1934, when she returned to the German offer her categorical : " No, never ! "

We have, indeed, achieved certain definite gains. We have secured a respite, which will be valuable if—but only if—we turn it to good account. What are our other assets for the coming attempt at a general settlement ? Since the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations, the opportunities which used to exist for contact between the leading statesmen of Europe have been lacking, so far as contact with the Germans is concerned. The Führer is reputed to prefer doing business with responsible Ministers and not with diplomats. Germany has complained that our Ministerial contacts were almost exclusively with the French ; but now personal contact has been established between the Leader of Nazi Germany and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. This is a great gain, offering possibilities for the future.

Further, Herr Hitler appears to believe in the regulation of European affairs by the statesmen of the four Great Powers—excluding Russia. At Munich he had his wish, for the " Big Four " disposed of the affairs of Central Europe in a single day, without the League of Nations being consulted at all. It must go far towards the contentment of Herr Hitler that his neighbours are prepared to deal with him in the particular way which arouses his sympathy. We naturally deplore the supersession of the League of Nations ; but League action has been vitiated by the unequal status accorded to Germany, so we are driven to the second best course.

Another factor in the situation was disclosed for the first time when Mr. Chamberlain went to Germany. Hitherto, the German people had given no evidence of having any views of its own upon foreign policy. Now, however, it gave Mr. Chamberlain an ovation because he was believed to have prevented war. The indication that the German people does not sympathise with a policy which incurs the risk of war against Great Britain constitutes a factor which the German Government will presumably take into account.

From the German point of view, the constellation of Europe before the recent crisis presented the appearance of a system for the encirclement of Germany. A strong Czechoslovakia was allied, on the one hand with France, on the other with Soviet Russia, and in support of these alliances there was the Little Entente. However innocent and defensive the intentions of the allies, the Germans saw a body of States apparently prepared to fight for the "*status quo*," in opposition to their own aims, which involved change. They saw no moral difference between threatening to fight for change and threatening to fight for the "*status quo*." But possession was nine points of the law ; the German army was the tenth. The Germans could therefore justify to themselves the use of the threat of war, or even, if necessary, of war itself. Here was a dangerous situation, arising from the system of " encirclement." The recent shattering of the bands of encirclement cannot be regarded otherwise than as a very great gain to peace.

A similar relief has been afforded by the removal of the threat (very real to German minds) of " Bolshevism." The Germans considered that the existence of the Czechoslovak Communist Party with forty-eight Deputies in Parliament, coupled with the Czecho-Soviet Pact, gave the Russians an unrivalled opportunity for using Czechoslovakia, even in peace time, as a centre for their propaganda. In war, swarms of Soviet aircraft might bomb the towns of Central Germany, while Kiev and Moscow and Leningrad remained safely out of reach of reprisals. Now that the Czechoslovak Communist Party has been dissolved and the Czecho-Soviet alliance ruptured, Germany will feel calmer ; and may, indeed, eventually even be brought to accept Russia at the conference table.

It is also a factor of practical value that Great Britain demonstrated her willingness in certain circumstances to go to war. Those were proved wrong who advised the Führer that England would not resort to force. The indication that a policy of Napoleonic aggression would not go unresisted has dispelled some dangerous delusions. Now, moreover, that a great thirst has been slaked by the substantial union of all large masses of Germans in a single unitary State, Herr Hitler may be left, like Alexander, with " no more worlds to conquer."

At these and many other points the new situation removes



obstacles that barred the way to harmony. The Czechoslovak problem has been settled, not without grave suffering, but without the vastly greater suffering of war. A serious German grievance has been remedied by the application (for the first time, apart from the Saar Plebiscite) of self-determination *in favour of* Germany. A great transfer of territory was accomplished without war—a practical demonstration of treaty revision. Events even stirred the United States to play a part, and to send Presidential appeals for peace.

The Czechoslovak settlement is a resounding defeat for the tradition implanted in the Foreign Office by Sir Eyre Crowe. In his famous Memorandum of 1907, Crowe asserted that Great Britain was faced with perpetual demands from Germany; that when these demands were satisfied by concessions, the Germans declared that nothing now divided the interests of our two countries; only to produce after a short interval a new set of demands. In Crowe's opinion, we should eventually be faced with demands that were absolutely unacceptable, unless we earned Germany's respect by a firmer attitude, and ceased to concede alterations in the "*status quo*" merely on Germany's demand, irrespective of their merits. Crowe's policy was adopted in the crisis of Agadir. Its soundness appears at least doubtful when we contemplate the events of July and August 1914. The snub which the Kaiser received at Agadir determined him to strengthen the Triple Alliance and to increase his navy; this was the nett result of standing up to Germany between 1907 and 1914. The moral is plain for those who wish to apply the Crowe policy in the circumstances of to-day; the defeat of Croweism in the counsels of the Government is thus a great gain to the cause of international appeasement.

Germany desires to obtain substantial control of the countries of Eastern Europe. The strength of the Third Reich will be greatly increased by the possession of sources of raw materials not capable of being cut off in time of war by the British Navy. Nearly all the necessary materials of war are, in fact, found not in Central Africa but in Europe. We have to beware of the tendency to regard any German profit as an automatic British loss. It is reasonable and fair that Germany should do an immense amount of business with

South-Eastern Europe; that region is Germany's natural market and source of supply. What is not reasonable is that Germany should bleed the Balkans white by one-sided, forced economic bargains, and should further by menaces obtain political agreements with these States upon her own terms. The countries of Eastern Europe should remain politically independent and economically healthy.

The type of economic control envisaged by Germany is exemplified in the agreement said to have been offered by her during the autumn to Bulgaria. Germany was to buy at fixed prices the whole of Bulgaria's exportable surplus for a number of years, paying in specified goods at prices also fixed in advance. Bulgaria would gain by the promise of a stable market; but she would become entirely tied to Germany; she would be unable to develop other economic connections, and would thus be at the mercy of Germany in all future bargaining; and she would have no opportunity of securing free currency for the purchase of goods not supplied by Germany. The economic stranglehold might have been used to secure political favours.

In the political field, a defenceless Czechoslovakia has been obliged to enter the German orbit. Already the democratic Czechs are becoming infected with anti-Semitism, and Czech Jews removed from prominent positions upon trumped-up excuses. The Communist Party is suppressed; there has been danger of an Agrarian-Fascist Dictatorship; there is a forced reduction in the number of political parties to two, and an alteration (in a non-democratic direction) of the system of elections to Parliament. The Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions have been obliged to sever their international connections. Changes of this nature, whether they be for good or evil, do give an indication of the kind of political hold that Nazi Germany may seek to obtain in Central and Eastern Europe—a domination not at all on all fours with her perfectly natural and proper desire to be the principal supplier and customer of these States.

This does not mean that we must try to prevent the Germans from doing business on a large scale with the East European States; but that we must give the latter that degree of support, economic and political, which will enable them to do their business upon fair terms, without sacrificing either their economic or their political independence. This

support may involve some modification of the attempt, rashly made in recent years, to create a partially closed system of economy within the British Commonwealth. Even Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the existence of our great empire did not provoke animosity only so long as our policy was to champion free trade and to promote access to the markets of the world for all countries. The Ottawa system, on the other hand, does not enable non-British countries to trade freely with us, and it tends to throw South-Eastern Europe into the all-too-warm embrace of Germany. Just as we dislike the idea of living at the mercy of an all-powerful Germany, so do the Germans naturally object to the economic domination of the Ottawa Empire. It is becoming increasingly necessary to revert to the Open Door, upon which alone can be founded either a liberal policy or the strategy of Sir Eyre Crowe. The attitude of "live and let live" is essential to the world and to the British Empire, both in the political and in the economic spheres.

Of all the individual questions between Germany and the former Allies, that which most intimately concerns Great Britain is the future of the colonies. Strategic arguments against the cession of territory cannot be pushed to the point at which no Power with which we may ever disagree can be allowed to hold colonies in Africa. The most effect that can be given to such considerations is that we may reasonably express a preference, if colonies are to be restored to Germany, as to which ones they shall be; and make a bargain with Germany for the cession of other territory in place of some that she held before the war. From the strategic point of view, there are many authorities who hold that German colonies would be a factor for peace, as leading their owner to avoid the risk of losing them by war.

Other motives, of quite a different kind, operate in regard to the proposal to give Germany territory in Africa. The idealism of our people has found expression in an effort to secure in Africa the more effectual application of the principle of trusteeship, which is at present professed, but incompletely applied, in our colonies. In the former German colonies it is provided for by the Mandates System. It would conflict with our idea of what is due to the native populations if we were to scrap the Mandates, and to hand over the present

Mandated Territories to the full and exclusive sovereignty of any Power. On the other hand, Germany could hardly accept her former colonies under mandate from the League of Nations. Why, indeed, should she accept restrictions upon her sovereignty, when other colonial Powers are under no similar limitations? And even were we ourselves to place our colonies under mandate, in order to be upon an equality with Germany in this respect, it would still be extremely difficult for the German Leader to eat his words about the League of Nations, and to place Germany in the ranks of the Mandatory Powers. It is thus a difficult problem to reconcile the satisfaction of Germany's claim, upon conditions which Germany can accept, with any real protection for the natives. The solution of the dilemma is to be found in the development of the system of the Conventional Basin of the Congo.

The Congo Basin system was established at the Berlin Congress of 1885, and was a mainly German invention. Certain Central African territories were to be governed internationally (which did not work out in practice); there was agreement in regard to the interests of the natives; and the Open Door was established for the trade of all nations. This system was subsequently amended, but the Open Door provisions are effective to this day. In 1919, Germany was forced to resign from the consortium of Congo Basin Powers, having no longer any colonies. The Convention of St. Germain now governs the Conventional Basin, and its fifteenth article provides for a further conference to be held in ten years' time. This long overdue conference would, if it were held, furnish an excellent opportunity for the readmission of Germany, the extension of the Conventional Basin to include the whole of central Africa, and the bringing up to date of the provisions of the scheme. A new Statute, including the most fruitful provisions of the Congo Convention, of the Mandates, and of the relevant International Labour Office Conventions, together with improvements shown by recent experience to be desirable, would have the effect of extending the experiment of international supervision to a larger area, and of bringing back Germany as a partner in the task of jointly developing backward Africa. The new System would include the reality of the principle of trusteeship, without the (for Germany) unfortunate associations of Geneva. Within such a system there would be no objection to transferring to German

administration considerable territories in West Central Africa. The status of colonies in general having thus been altered, Germany would hardly expect to be granted an exceptional status of sovereignty, applying to her colonies only; she would presumably be content to obtain territories to administer on the same conditions as the administration of similar regions by the other colonial Powers.

This is the kind of settlement that could be made of the vexed colonial question, provided that we were sure of a real desire on the part of the German Government for genuinely peaceful and friendly relations. There has been too much readiness to confuse the things which Germany would like to obtain with those to which she is entitled on grounds of abstract justice. If justice is to be followed, no nation will obtain precisely what it would like; there must be give and take, and such adjustments as will enable the nations to live together under conditions tolerable for them all. In the first fifteen years after the war, "right" meant what the former Allies desired; in recent years it has tended to mean what Germany has desired. Neither of these conceptions embodies "right" of a sort that will enable nations to live together as friends. "Right" which is to bring real peace, the re-establishment of international confidence, the reduction of armaments, and genuine friendship between nations, must be something arrived at impartially, neither side backing its wishes with the threat of force, whether to achieve or to resist changes. This is the "right" that is based upon negotiation and upon peace plans genuinely discussed; it is not based upon speeches in favour of peace, followed by negotiations that are stalled until new demands are presented.

The British Government has announced that it is not considering any transfer of territory. It is all to the good that Mr. MacDonald refused Mr. Amery's invitation to commit himself to a "No, never!" and one may hope that the refusal to consider the German claim only arises from anxiety lest the Nazi Government be not willing to make its fair contribution to general pacification.

In considering the questions that require to be settled between ourselves and Germany, we shall fix our attention upon the stabilisation of peace; we have secured our respite; it remains to provide for real pacification. Truly friendly

relations, however, are incompatible with a race in armaments. One may sympathise with Germany's dread of a disarmament conference, while other questions remain unsettled, as "an attempt once again to steal our weapons"; but with other questions disposed of, she might well participate in a limitation and reduction of armaments.

It is perhaps too much to expect that Germany will wish to rejoin an organisation which is associated in her mind with humiliation, inequality, and resistance to her just claims. The partiality of the League of Nations, up to the failure of the Disarmament Conference, undermined its future stability; there was a denial of the equal status which must be the basis of a successful League, and there was resistance not only to German ambitions, but to the redress of genuine wrongs. It must be reckoned that Germany will not rejoin the League in its present form. But the principles which were embodied in the League Covenant were sound, and no international order can be constructed without them. Germany is justified in complaining that these principles, though outwardly accepted by the former Allied Powers, were in fact betrayed and perverted by them; that the League of Nations lost authority through the failure of its own supporters, rather than through the attacks of its opponents. Nevertheless, the principles themselves embody what is necessary to a world order, and the task of Germany is to promote their better fulfilment, not to condemn them because they were never put into practice. The method must be carried into effect, whether at Geneva or elsewhere, whether through an effective "Concert" or a closely-bound Federation of Europe. Let Germany champion the right ideals, and we in the democratic countries, who have understood those ideals often better than our rulers, shall be the first to welcome her co-operation.

NOEL-BUXTON.

## CORDELL HULL AND COBDEN.

**A**T a time when Europe was encompassed by an atmosphere of suspicion which destroyed the confidence that is so necessary to commerce, rays of sunlight suddenly pierced the clouds on Thursday, November 17th. On that day, after nearly two years of negotiation, the trade agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States of America was signed at Washington by the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, and Mr. Cordell Hull, the State Secretary.

It is not my intention to enter minutely into details of the reciprocal concessions made by certain classes of manufacturers and producers or of the reciprocal advantages obtained by consumers in this country and the United States, though I shall have something to say on this later as well as on the benefits likely to accrue to the peoples of the British Empire and of foreign countries.

It may, however, be admitted at the outset that the tariff reductions effected on both sides, though numerous, are not sufficiently substantial to promise any very great expansion of trade. They are all to the good; but our tariff and the American tariff remain so high that we cannot hope to see anything like the old volume of trans-Atlantic trade which existed before the War, or even in the decade following the War, re-established. That is unfortunate and disappointing, but at the same time we may well rejoice that the Ottawa Treaties have at last been modified and some of the preferential rates reduced with the consent of all parties. With all its manifest imperfections the Treaty may fairly be described as the most important free (or freer) trade pact that has been signed since the Anglo-French reciprocity agreement of 1860, best known as the Cobden Treaty.

In comparing the two we must remember that in 1860 for at least fifteen years Free Trade had been in the ascendant in Great Britain, then by far the greatest commercial and manufacturing nation, and that the success of the tariff reductions already effected by Peel and Gladstone had impressed enlightened opinion in France, Germany and many other countries. That made the task not only of Cobden and Gladstone but also of the Emperor Napoleon and Chevalier very much easier than that confronting Mr. Cordell Hull when he embarked two years ago on the grand enterprise that will

always be associated with his name. For since the Great War Protectionism, Economic Nationalism, Self-Sufficiency or Autarchy, and all the other fine names which disguise the policy of obstructing trade or diverting it from its natural channels, have been in fashion. Under the stress and strain of unbalanced Budgets and depreciating currencies Government after Government has adopted remedies which violate all the rules and canons not merely of political economy but of common sense. The American tariff which President Roosevelt inherited was the highest and most prohibitive on record—worse even than the famous “Tariff of Abominations” which shocked good Jeffersonian democrats more than a century ago; and on our side the general protective and preferential tariff imposed in 1932 is the highest since the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and bears a strong family resemblance to the system under which British commerce and manufactures and employment suffered between Waterloo and the Hungry Forties. Under both these high tariffs efficiency has declined and inefficiency has received State support. Rings, cartels and monopolies have clustered under the hospitable shelter of high Customs duties, raising prices and the cost of production in the home market and causing shipping, shipbuilding and exports to languish. Unemployment has been rife in British and American ports as a natural consequence of this double embargo on imports and exports.

No one conversant with the art and science of political economy, or with economic history, need therefore be in the least surprised that the negotiations started some two years ago when Mr. Runciman visited Washington have been impeded, protracted and in no small measure frustrated by the protected interests here and in the United States and by the preferred interests of our self-governing Dominions which, while zealously protecting themselves against British as well as foreign manufactures, were bent upon preserving for themselves a free and favoured market in the United Kingdom for their dairy and fruit produce. It is only by recalling these facts and remembering that the voice of the consumers—the whole body of the people—is apt to be stifled by the noisy clamour of protected interests, or by the insidious machinations of their representatives in the lobbies of Parliament and Congress, that we can fairly judge and assess the extent of Mr. Cordell Hull's achievement or the credit due to Mr.

Chamberlain for insisting that something must be done to satisfy public opinion and strengthen the bonds of friendship and kinship between the two English-speaking democracies. It is not many months since the Prime Minister was assailed in the House of Commons by Mr. Lloyd George as a Cobdenite, merely because he was not willing to stimulate British agriculture at the expense of British shipping and British commerce by excluding a vast proportion of our food imports. Perhaps there is no harm in reminding the Prime Minister that filial piety need not restrain him from further incursions into the field of reciprocity; for our present protective and preferential tariff is far higher and wider in its scope than that which was projected by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform League in the early days of this century. By removing hundreds of petty duties, which produce no revenue, and by reducing high protective duties on half-finished goods (which are the raw material of countless industries) and upon household necessities, he would do more for the relief of unemployment and the recovery of trade than by all the subsidies and marketing schemes (at the expense of our over-burdened taxpayers) which can be devised by Parliamentary busybodies and bustling Ministers who think they can improve trade by spinning red tape in their departments. After all, to judge by the withdrawal of the Milk Bill, the public is increasingly hostile to meddlesome interference with economic liberty.

It will be instructive, I think, and even edifying, to compare the situation which confronted Cobden when, with the enthusiastic support of Gladstone, the mild approval of Lord John Russell and the acquiescence of Palmerston, he went to Paris in October 1859. It has already been observed that from the standpoint of tariff reductions and freer trade Cobden had an easier task than Cordell Hull. On this I need not expatiate further; but in one way there was a similarity with a difference. As Free Traders Cobden and Gladstone were quite alive to the academic objection that might be raised, and was raised in some quarters, to a treaty of commercial reciprocity. They were both ready and willing to get rid of what remained in the British tariff of protection and preference, because they were convinced that the trade and revenue of the country would benefit enormously from a complete system of free trade. As John Bright said, it was to

our advantage to reduce our tariff whatever foreign countries might do. But M. Chevalier was an equally good Free Trader, and neither Cobden nor Gladstone could resist the force of his emphatic assurance that in no other way could the French tariff be altered in the direction of free trade than through a diplomatic act, i.e. a commercial treaty with England. Moreover the French Emperor, though a complete dictator, who on every question gave the initiative to his Ministers, could not disregard the opinions of French manufacturers, farmers, and wine producers. He was, as Morley put it, "practically powerless to reduce his duties unless the English Government gave him the help of a corresponding movement on their side."

Moreover, then as now, there was a strong prejudice against dictators, and especially against the French dictator, and this worked against Cobden though it worked in favour of Cordell Hull. From this point of view commercial reciprocity with France was in 1860 as difficult, and for European peace as desirable, as commercial reciprocity would now be with Germany. Not only had the Napoleonic dictatorship driven Victor Hugo and many French Liberals to take refuge in British or other neutral territory where they could give free expression to their thoughts, but his seizure of Savoy and Nice had alarmed public opinion at home and on the Continent. It was feared that he had Napoleonic designs, that he aimed, if not at conquering, at dominating Europe. Nay, in England there was a large and very noisy section of opinion which insisted that the French Emperor was contemplating an invasion of England and that the invention of steam had made this quite feasible. The Prime Minister, Palmerston, had himself fostered the invasion panic and insisted on fortifying the southern coast in order that we might be in a state of preparedness to resist the landing of a French army.

This very dangerous situation was perhaps with Gladstone and Cobden an even stronger inducement to a trade pact than the economic advantages which would flow therefrom; and happily they had invaluable support from Disraeli, the leader of the Conservative Opposition. Instead of countenancing the popular agitation against France he declared (July 21st, 1859) that Napoleon ought to be conciliated: "Go to your great ally"—in the Crimean War—"the Emperor of the French

and ask him to join you in a spirit of reciprocal confidence and thus achieve conquests far more valuable than Lombardy." Every cottage and cabin in England and France, Disraeli added, ought to be assured that the "disastrous system of rival armaments" would be brought to an end and that "peace is really our policy." Then the Chancellor of the Exchequer might look without apprehension to his next Budget, and "England might actually witness the termination of the income tax."

Cobden was as fond of freedom and free institutions as any English or American statesman in our own day; but for the sake of promoting peace and friendship between the British and French nations he was ready to use all his marvellous power of persuasion with the French Emperor, and there are few more interesting documents in the history of the successful efforts, all too few, to promote peace and goodwill among nations than Cobden's accounts of his interviews with the Emperor Napoleon seventy-eight years ago. I could wish that all the leading statesmen of Europe might be induced to read the eleventh chapter of Morley's *Life of Cobden*, in which they are printed.

After less than two months of negotiation M. Chevalier informed Cobden that M. Rouher, the French Minister of Commerce, had prepared his plan for a commercial treaty, and that it would be submitted to the Emperor on December 10th, 1859. The plan, with sixty pages of illustrative argument, was read to the Emperor. He listened attentively and signified his approval; but on December 21st, when Cobden had another interview with him, Napoleon was hesitating under pressure from the powerful interests which had united in defence of the existing fiscal system. He complained to Cobden: "the protected industries combine, but the general public do not." The Emperor's arguments and Cobden's counter-arguments, and the French Finance Minister's objections to abolishing even the prohibitions of the French tariff are of extraordinary interest. In January 1860 the resistance to the treaty in France grew stronger; but the Emperor had been convinced; he stood firm, and on January 29th the treaty was signed and executed.

It was a great and triumphant achievement of economic and political appeasement. It put an end to the naval rivalry between the French and British Admiralties and

ended the invasion panic. Long afterwards Gladstone put on record his belief that it had prevented war. His words deserve to be recalled:

"A French panic prevailed, as strong as any of the other panics that have done so much discredit to this country. For this panic the Treaty of Commerce with France was the only sedative. It was in fact a counter-irritant; and it aroused the sense of commercial interest to counteract the war passion. It was, and is, my opinion that the choice lay between the Cobden Treaty and, not the certainty, but the high probability, of a war with France."

If the Cobden Treaty had merely tinkered with Customs Duties and had given no important stimulus to the trade between France and England, it would have been amply justified by its political consequences and by the savings on armaments. But in fact the tariff reductions were very large and extensive. On the French side all prohibitions were removed, and the French Government made substantial cuts in the Customs Duties on coal, coke, iron, steel, tools, machinery and practically all the staple British exports. The maximum duties on the articles specified were 30 per cent for the first three years and 25 per cent afterwards. On our side all the protective duties on manufactured goods were swept off the face of the British tariff, and the duties on French wines were lowered. No exclusive privileges were attached to the Treaty. Though many of the remissions were specially beneficial to France, they applied to all nations without distinction. Thus the most-favoured-nation clause gave reason for rejoicing to traders all over the world. Among the articles from which protection was removed under the Treaty in Gladstone's Budget of 1860 were gloves, silk, cork, watches, leather, china, glass and musical instruments. The initial cost to the Custom's revenue was estimated at about £1,737,000, but this did not matter at all, for in the sixties of last century our commerce, our revenue and our invested wealth or savings advanced by leaps and bounds. Between 1860 and 1870 British exports rose from 135,000,000 sterling to 199,000,000, while our re-exports rose from 28,000,000 to 44,000,000. The total tonnage of ships built in British shipyards (I have not before me the figures for 1860) advanced from 133,000 tons in 1850 to 342,000 tons in 1870. By the end of the century we were building 902,000 tons! The total

net tonnage of vessels registered as belonging to the United Kingdom was in 1860 4,658,000 tons, in 1870 5,690,000 tons, and in 1900 9,304,000 tons.

So much for the economic benefits accruing from the Cobden Treaty and the completion of our Free Trade system. I turn now to the reductions effected by the Cordell Hull reciprocity treaty in the American and British tariffs. As I have indicated, the long and protracted bargaining and the rather disappointing results were due to the fact that the officials on both sides had to work under the political influence of protected interests and their representatives at Washington and Westminster. Instead of looking to the advantages of consumers they were instructed to think of the disadvantages of producers, and every reduction of a Customs Duty was advertised as a concession or stigmatised as a sacrifice.

A friend of mine, who carefully analysed the schedules, has been unable to find among the hundreds of individual reductions in the tariffs of the two countries any "really striking substantial concession." Probably the most important advantage to British trade is one of our own "sacrifices"—the reduction of the preferential duties on timber. It will lower the cost of housing and improve the quality of our softwood imports. But cuts of 20 to 30 per cent. in Customs Duties of over 100 per cent. (which have almost killed the exports of British wool and cotton textiles to the United States) will not cause any great expansion of trade. The reductions look impressive on paper, but most of the prohibitive duties are still prohibitive or nearly so. What may be expected is an enlarged import into America of British linens, fine worsteds and a few grades of cotton goods which even before the Treaty trickled over the great tariff dam that generations of protectionism have thrown up round the United States. It is possible, too, that the accumulation of useless gold in lieu of useful imports may also diminish. Anyhow, all that has been done by these reciprocal reductions is to the good. Their psychological effect may prove very important.

An address by Dr. Schacht in Berlin on November 29th to the Economic Council of the German Academy was at once a defence and a criticism of Germany's efforts to attain self-sufficiency. Referring to the American refusal to allow German imports into the United States to benefit by the most-favoured-nation clause, he declared that "the trading

methods so much disliked by our rich American cousins are not of our choosing, but were forced upon the Reich by the war tribute and the clearing system." He hoped that "a door would be opened through which Germany could return to multilateral trade and a system of free international payments." He stood by his description of the New Plan as "horrible" and expressed sympathy for the German merchant who "decorated his stand at an exhibition with forty forms, all of which must be filled up by an exporter or importer before he could do any business." He hoped that Germany would soon be in a position to give up its exchange restrictions and its control of foreign trade.

It would seem, therefore, that the moment is favourable for a British initiative towards economic appeasement in Europe. It might, I suggest, start with an Anglo-French reciprocity treaty, or still better with a treaty which would include Germany. According to the latest statistics British trade with Germany, though enormously reduced by the British tariff and by Germany's exchange restrictions, is larger than with any foreign country. May it not be that the road to peaceful disarmament and security in the New Year, as was the case in 1859, will have to be driven through tariff barriers?

FRANCIS W. HIRST.



## THE CRISIS IN FRENCH FINANCE.

IN the autumn of 1938 the economic and financial situation of France had reached such a point of embarrassment that the French Parliament was induced to pass the law of October 6th. Under the terms of this statute the Government of M. Daladier was authorised "to take measures destined to realise the immediate restoration of the economic and financial situation of the country." These plenary powers, however, were to expire by the date of November 15th. Unfortunately, there followed a period of hesitation and inaction up till the early days of November. Then, suddenly, the Finance Minister, M. Marchandeau, vacated his office in order to become the Minister of Justice, while, conversely, the Minister of Justice, M. Paul Reynaud, became Finance Minister instead. The latter after five days' reflection produced a "train" of thirty-two elaborate Decree-Laws arranged into five classes, and dealing respectively with Labour, Public Health, Commerce, Finance and Public Works, Fiscal measures, and the control of foreigners resident in France. This stupendous series of statutes came into operation on November 15th. Nor was this all. A second "train" of Decree-Laws was prepared, but it did not start. Assuredly, putting aside this second batch of statutes, no legislation so wide and so complicated has ever been conceived, and produced, and executed, with such lightning speed.

Let us endeavour to realise what the nature of this crisis was that now confronted France in the financial and economic field. We can then proceed to ascertain the nature of the proposed remedies, and to offer some opinion upon them. In spite of the remarkable complexities and obscurities of French public finance, there is a sufficient clue to explain them. This clue is furnished by the single word—war. The payment for past wars, and for wars in prospect, is the dominating fact regulating the whole. In order to verify that observation, let us examine the prospective public expenditure of France for the calendar year 1939. Or, to be more exact, let us examine it as it faced M. Reynaud on his attaining office in November 1938. This is a convenient way of looking at the matter, all the more that the change which he was to propose in expenditure was relatively unimportant.

The prospective figure of the total expenditure of the

Ordinary Budget for 1939 was 64·5 milliards. But, besides the Ordinary Budget, there was the Extraordinary Budget, the total prospective expenditure of which was 29·5 milliards. A grand total of 94 milliards. How much of this was attributable to wars past and wars to come? As regards the expenditure of the Ordinary Budget of 64·5 milliards, no less than 37·3 milliards of it can be ascribed to the needs of warfare in the past and in the future. This latter figure is arrived at by adding together the three following items: first, the service of the Public Debt; next, the cost of war pensions and soldiers' allowances; and thirdly, that portion of the remaining expenditure which, according to the official calculation of the French Government, is to be reckoned as arising from military exigencies. These three items, 15·1 milliards, 7·4 milliards, and 14·8 milliards, respectively, make up the 37·3 milliards mentioned above.

But this is not all, or nearly all, of the annual cost of militarism entailed upon France. For practically the whole of the Extraordinary Budget is due to this same cause. Accordingly, the sum of 29·5 milliards, the total prospective expenditure of the Extraordinary Budget, must be added to the sum of 37·3 milliards chargeable in the Ordinary Budget. By this addition we arrive at a total of some 67 milliards due to the requirements of Mars. This constitutes a ratio of something like 70 per cent., as the proportion of the public expenditure, contained in the Ordinary and the Extraordinary Budgets, arising out of war. It was mainly under the weight of this huge and increasing burden that, in the autumn of 1938, the public economy of France seemed not unlikely to break down.

There was, however, an important subsidiary cause of this distress. For besides the military there is, of course, the non-military expenditure, and in this latter department great disorder was visible too. The main cause here resides in the Constitution of France itself. There has been war, not only without, but within. Since the Government of France, without the co-operation of the Senate and the President of the Republic, does not possess, or at any rate has not sought to exercise, the power of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the Administration is normally at the mercy of the Chamber or of its groups. Of these groups public money is the food and the prey. And thus we have had the spectacle of Governments



perpetually held up to ransom, and then, when the ransom is not forthcoming, destroyed. In this respect and on this account France has had, economically, the weakest executive in the world.

This unfortunate defect in the Constitution is clearly reflected in the costs of the civil administration of the State. The Chamber of Deputies has been turned into a species of employment agency. Even in 1914 public servants numbered 600,000 persons. This huge army has been so rapidly recruited since that it numbers 960,000 to-day, and, if nothing is done, will be 1,000,000 to-morrow. Besides this there are the railway servants, 500,000 to-day, as compared with 400,000 in 1936. There are 400,000 State pensioners, and 200,000 railway pensioners, and 300,000 local officials, active and retired. France is becoming a bureaucracy.

This double diversion of the national energies, into the service of war and into the service of officialdom, is exercising a marked effect upon the public economy. Industrial production is inevitably prejudiced by both tendencies alike. This production in 1938 is at least 25 per cent. lower than it was in 1930, whereas in other nations it has tended to rise during that period. The volume of manufactured exports is now nearly 50 per cent. lower than it was in 1930, and some of the export markets have been almost wholly lost. Thus the export of cloth is down by 87 per cent., and that of cotton piece-goods by about 94 per cent. During the years when the building activity in Great Britain has risen by 100 per cent., the corresponding index in France has fallen by 40 per cent. Thus France has almost stopped building, and her housing is in decay.

But the expenditure of the State has not only prejudiced industrial production in these two direct ways; it has also hurt production in an indirect way. For four years past the State has absorbed the whole of the national savings. Despite all the artificial measures taken to reduce interest rates and to grant cheap advances to the business community, the French loan market has become one of the dearest in the world. It is impossible to obtain mortgage loans at less than 9 or 10 per cent. If there is the slightest risk involved, a private borrower cannot obtain capital at less than 10 or 12 per cent. Issues for the purpose of obtaining capital have become negligible owing to the difficulties involved. This decline is due to the scarcity

of available capital, a scarcity due principally to constant appeals from what has become almost the one and only borrower, the State.

Besides all this, the State has not only prejudiced industrial production in the ways described above but it has further done so by direct legislation. The social laws of the summer and autumn of 1936 were very well meant. They had to meet and overcome a movement among the working classes which was almost revolutionary in its character. In truth, social legislation was very much in arrears at that date. Nevertheless, the social legislation of 1936, while proving of benefit in some directions, is now seen to have been far too hasty and drastic on the whole. In plainer terms, the legislation of that date suddenly diminished the working hours per week from forty-eight to forty. It also resulted in the establishment of what may be called the week of two Sundays, that is a five-day week of eight hours a day. Added to this, the rate of wages per hour was raised by a considerable percentage, and on the top of all holidays on full pay were increased outside the forty hours' week. The result was that national production was hit at every turn, with the result already stated.

Faced with all this situation, the policy of M. Reynaud has been to formulate a Three-Year Plan. He has aimed at securing in a period of three years the gradual restoration of the economic and financial equilibrium of France. He begins with hoping to obtain budgetary equilibrium. The year 1939 is to be "a period of adaptation and of consolidation of the first advances to be made. After 1939, still another difficult year of reconstruction. . . . Not before 1941 can France hope to have recovered a stable and sure economic and financial equilibrium."

M. Reynaud was confronted on attaining office with a total national expenditure for 1939 made up of six items: the expenditure of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budgets, of the Sinking Fund account, of the Local Authorities (for whose budgets the State is indirectly responsible), of the railway deficit, and, finally, of Public Works. Total, 137 milliards. Against this there would only be available the receipts of the Ordinary Budget, of the Sinking Fund account, and of the Local Authorities. Total, 85.5 milliards. How did M. Reynaud propose to tackle this enormous deficit of 51.5 milliards,

or, rather, if we necessarily include some prospective special outlays into account, of 55 milliards? I may summarise his proposals very briefly as follows. By new taxes, by the prospective extra yield of existing taxes, and by economies in expenditure, he will gain for 1939, 20 milliards. In this way it will be seen that, out of the total deficit of 55 milliards, 20 milliards will be met. But how will the balance of the deficit, i.e. 35 milliards, be possibly defrayed?

It can be met, and no doubt will be met in several different ways, all, however, more or less tantamount to borrowing. First, there is the advance, to a total of 10 milliards, of a permanent character, arranged by the Bank in favour of the Treasury. Next, the gold holding of the Bank, now valued at 110 francs to the £, is re-valued at 170 francs to the £. A paper profit is thus created of about 31 milliards. This windfall the Treasury takes over from the Bank, and at once uses it to liquidate so much of its existing debt to the Bank. Evidently this operation will open the way for the Treasury to obtain renewed credit from the Bank, should Parliament alter the existing convention, which forbids the enlargement of this "temporary" credit. Lastly, there is the expedient which will be resorted to of raising money by short-term bills from the money market, *marché monétaire*. Not for six months, at any rate, will recourse be had to public loans from the *marché des capitaux*.

And now, having mentioned how the French Government proposed to avert the immediate pressing necessities of the moment, let us take a wider view. It might have been thought that, since the Front Populaire, in overwhelming command of the Chamber, is composed of Communists, Socialists and Radicals, the Reynaud plan would have had to be in conformity, to some extent at any rate, with the views of the two first sections of the Front. But, on the contrary, it is the expression of pure radicalism, of orthodox finance, of strict individualism as opposed to State control. It eschews the Capital Levy, so much in favour with the sections in question. It avoids control of the exchanges, so much advocated by many advanced persons, in order to stop capitalists from sending their money abroad. It will have nothing to do with the forcible conversion of Rentes. Then, besides this, the forty hours' week, the favourite child of the Front Populaire, is done away in practice, though retained in principle, that is

to say, it is to be regarded only as a basic period of work. Again, there is the increase of taxes, amounting as seen above to about 10 milliards more or less equally divided between direct and indirect taxes, the latter of which already weigh so heavily upon the poorer taxpayers of France. In fact, there is so far to be found a flavour of deflation, that word so unpopular with the Front Populaire, in the Plan.

Besides all this there are two other very sound, if deflationary, principles adopted in this scheme. For some years past the favourite remedy for economic disorders has been, among economists on both sides of the Channel, the institution of Public Works. But France has found by a bitter experience that "the repeated trouble of the last few years has been that when the State raised 10 milliards to finance large Public Works, 20 or 30 milliards of private works were abandoned, as the result of the rises in interest rates and prices. Thus the State indirectly diminished the turnover of business." So state MM. Daladier and Reynaud in their joint Memorandum prefacing the Decree-Laws, as presented to the President of the Republic.

The other deflationary factor is contained in the provision calculated to reduce the inflated body of the administrative services. Numerous attempts have been made during the last fifteen years to lighten the load imposed upon France by these latter. But the Memorandum declares that "all these efforts have been in vain, as is shown by the uninterrupted growth of the services, and continuous increase in the number of Civil Servants." The existing system is obsolete, and there is a jungle of overlapping and mutually antagonistic bodies. One way to deal with this would have been to decree a systematic and all-round cut. But this plan has been rejected as too drastic and unfair. Instead, it is planned that a Comité Supérieur de Réorganisation Administrative of five members be appointed to formulate a scheme of reduction by the end of 1938. This implies a searching inquiry into the administrative organisation of all the Ministries, into the armament factories, into transport, and, in fact, into all the departments in which the State participates, not neglecting the conduct of their affairs by the Local Authorities. All this, if viewed from the financial point of view, may be summarised in the words of the above-quoted Memorandum: "We are hostile to inflation."

On the other hand it cannot be said that this hostility to inflation is carried to excess. On the contrary the Plan declares definitely for a liberal credit policy as the corner-stone of economic policy. The stringency of the reductions in the expenditures of the State and of the local bodies is to be counter-balanced, it is hoped, by the affluence of capital available for industry. This affluence is to be provided by the repatriation of French capital from abroad, thanks to renewed confidence, and by its greater availability now that the State will not absorb all the savings, and more than all the savings, of the country.

Besides, when M. Reynaud's Plan is compared with the deflation pursued by M. Laval in 1935 with such unfortunate results, it must be remembered that in this latter case the total expenditure of France is in deficit by some 55 milliards in 1939, and that only 20 milliards of that deficit is to be met by deflationary methods. Consequently, the 35 milliards which remain to be found can only be found by means which must be characterised as direct or indirect inflation. While the Plan seems to steer as safe a course as possible between the twin rocks of deflation and inflation, it must be further a matter of satisfaction that it involves no fresh devaluation of the franc. During the past few months of the middle of 1938 the behaviour of the franc seems to indicate that its present value in the exchange is justified, in the sense that the price levels of France and Great Britain have attained equilibrium, so that from that point of view the franc is neither under-valued nor over-valued. Happy for France if she can avoid adding to the number of the devaluations of her currency which she has sustained in the last ten years, in 1928, in 1936, in 1937, and in 1938. In virtue of these successive devaluations the gold content of the franc, which was originally 322.58 milligrammes in the old franc of Germinal, is now to-day only 27.6 milligrammes, as valued in the books of the Bank of France.

The hard fact is that since the Front Populaire came into office France has had to borrow as follows: in 1936, 30 milliards; in 1937, 40 milliards; in 1938, 45 milliards; and, prospectively, in 1939, 55 milliards, as explained above. Correspondingly, in those same years she has had to devalue her franc thrice, with all the consequential chaos in her economic life.

M. Reynaud, in producing his Plan, prefaced it by a General Report, which our journal, *The Economist* (November 19th), has justly described as "one of the most forceful and brilliant State papers that can ever have appeared in any land or tongue." And it adds, also justly, that the Plan itself deserves success "as an honest and courageous attempt to reinvigorate the liberal system of free economy on which the democratic world has prospered." While echoing these words, I could wish that M. Reynaud could have loosened, or could have broken, the shackles which Protection binds upon France. Unfortunately no French statesman has yet perceived that it is Free Trade which would start France once more upon the road of prosperity, and, indeed, of security. Instead, we find in this Plan the raising of duties on some of the necessities of life. A policy technically defensible, no doubt, in that these are specific duties and are raised only to counteract the fall of the franc in which they are expressed. Nevertheless these duties are, if I mistake not, fruitful of trouble and out of step with freedom.

I write these words on the date, Wednesday, November 30th, when a General Strike has been proclaimed by the G.C.T., i.e. the Labour Organisation of France, by way of protest against these financial and economic Decree-Laws. But it is beyond my present purpose to comment on the significance of that proceeding; and this article is solely concerned to set forth as clearly as possible the root causes of the present crisis and the cure which the Government of M. Daladier proposes to apply. The alternative before France, from the purely economic standpoint, is either to accept this unpalatable but salutary programme, with or without some minor modifications, or else to undergo in the alternative a further devaluation of the franc.

GEORGE PEEL.

## THE EUROPEAN CRISIS AND BRITAIN'S MILITARY SITUATION.

WHEN looking back at events one is apt to see them in the light of the present, instead of as they actually were. This effect is misleading to judgment. So I propose to begin by repeating an appreciation of the situation, from a strategic point of view, which I made early in September, and discussed with various parliamentary leaders :

If Germany invades Czecho-Slovakia she has now, through the possession of Austria, the opportunity of delivering a stroke northward from the direction of Vienna against the waist of Czecho-Slovakia, i.e. the Moravian sector between Bratislava and Brno. This is the most menacing direction of advance. The measure of progress attained here in the first few days is likely to have a far-reaching effect on the whole situation.

If this thrust is checked before it has made a decisively deep penetration, the Czech forces should be capable of putting up a prolonged resistance elsewhere—so long as they are not completely dominated in the air. Because of this condition, much will depend on the rapidity and extent of air reinforcement from Russia.

There would seem to be a reasonable probability that the German advance might succeed in occupying a considerable part of the frontier belt, where the Sudeten Deutsch areas lie, during the first week or so ; but that upon their initial momentum being exhausted, their further progress would be slow.

There is a fallacy in the argument that because the Sudeten Deutsch areas are disaffected they are a military liability, and that Czecho-Slovakia would be stronger if she gave them up. Not only would it mean abandoning her natural strategic frontier, but the loss of an invaluable shock-absorber.

The Czechs' capacity to block the German advance, after the frontier belt has served its shock-absorbing purpose will be subject to the condition that Poland and Hungary remain neutral. Their attitude will be decided in part by the attitude of Roumania and Yugoslavia, the other two parties to the Little Entente, but still more by the British attitude.

It is doubtful whether the Germans are capable of conquering Czecho-Slovakia as a whole unless they were free to concentrate the bulk of their forces against her—which would hardly be practicable unless the French were "neutralised."

It would hardly be possible, however, because of the strength of the defensive in modern war, to expel the Germans from the

frontier district which they had occupied in the early phase, by any direct action. Only their general defeat would be likely to procure the release of these districts.

The French Army could help Czecho-Slovakia by detaining large German forces in the West—by the threat of attack emphasised by limited operations in the nature of an offensive "demonstration," but it is improbable that the French could inflict any real defeat on the German forces.

The weakness of the French Air Force relative to the German would make it militarily unwise—apart from its folly on grounds of humanity—for the French to apply pressure by air attack on the interior of Germany. Even the assistance of the British Air Force would not provide a large enough balance to justify this form of action militarily. The deficiency of our own anti-aircraft artillery and the inefficiency of much of our organisation both for air defence and civil air raid precautions is an additional reason for abstaining from it.

The early and adequate intervention of the Russian air force, operating from bases in Czecho-Slovakia, would seem to be an essential factor for the latter's chance of offering a prolonged resistance. The value of the intervention of the Russian army is more doubtful. Direct reinforcement of the Czech Army by way of Roumania, if permitted, would be slow and limited in effect. The most effective way of help might be the indirect form of an attack on East Prussia, assuming that a passage through Latvia and Lithuania was conceded.

As regards the ultimate issue, it is not likely that the Germans could be ejected from any lodgment they gained in the frontier belt of Czecho-Slovakia except by their general military defeat. Such a defeat is not a probability, even if the whole military weight of France, Britain and Russia was exerted against her—because there is no sign of any solution of the problem of successful attack on land. The war might go on for years without showing an adequate result for the effort expended.

The best hope of compelling Germany to relinquish her lodgment would be the development of general economic pressure, which would be reinforced by the evidence of moral isolation.

Because of America's strongly anti-Nazi attitude, the fear of Germany which prevails among so many of her neighbours, and Germany's own economic weakness compared with 1914, economic pressure should be easier to apply than in the last war and more powerful in effect.

The general damage resulting from a long war—such length being in any case almost inevitable—could be minimised by restricting military effort against Germany to the frustration of her offensives, at any rate in the earlier stages. This strategy,

besides being wise economy of force, would also be the most productive of demoralisation in her troops and people—since nothing is more weakening to the fighting will than attacks that consistently fail. The effect of economic pressure will be greatly increased by moral pressure, especially if we abstain from the bombing of civilians or from systematic invasion.

It is well to realise that France and Britain are only capable of making a stand against Germany at the present time because—through no fault of their own—the Spanish Republican side has not yet been defeated by the intervention there, with a shrewd strategic motive, of the Fascist powers. If Franco had achieved victory in Spain, and joined the hostile alliance, it would hardly be possible for Britain and France to contemplate the possibility of withstanding any demands that might be made upon them.

To sum up: it might be considered that on balance the opponents of aggression hold a winning hand, although it was marred by one peculiarly weak card—the vulnerability of London. While Germany was handicapped in facing the possibility of a European War by the comparative weakness of her resources for maintaining her effort if the struggle were prolonged, Britain's handicap was the deficiency of preparedness to withstand a hostile air offensive in the opening phase. And owing to defects of organisation the degree of unpreparedness was much worse relatively than was warranted by the actual state of her rearmament. The crisis revealed a failure to make the best of what she had. It was obvious that the quantity of material could not be greatly increased, nor delivery from the factories greatly accelerated, during the weeks while the crisis was impending. But the risks, especially to the population of London, could have been reduced by taking timely precautions, so that minor defects—which in sum become a major deficiency—could have been corrected before the crisis reached its climax, instead of being aggravated by taking steps in a last-hour rush.

If the troubles which arose from the delay in instituting civil air raid precautions were the more obvious, the danger was even greater in regard to anti-aircraft defence, for on this largely depended the possibility of offering any resistance to attack. Since the responsibility for the anti-aircraft defence of the country is entrusted to the Territorial Army, such defence could only come into effect after the personnel had been called out—from their offices, shops, factories, or homes.

The units would then have to draw their equipment from store—only part of it being available in the drill halls for training—and move to their war-stations. When they arrived on the spot there would be a further interval for preparing the position, before they could be “in action.” Even then they would need some practice on the spot.

It was not until after the shock caused by the German occupation of Austria in March that the authorities improvised measures for manning the defences in emergency. While they aimed at getting the units into position in twelve hours, this calculation was regarded by many officers as over optimistic, and some doubted whether the operation would be completed before forty-eight hours. When the approach of the European crisis became clear in mid-September, representations were repeatedly made that precautions should be taken. But it was not until Monday, September 26th, that the calling out of the anti-aircraft personnel was at last sanctioned. If the crisis had suddenly come to a head during this interval London would have been completely unprotected in regard to ground defence, while even such fighter aircraft as might have been ready would have been unable to operate at night for lack of searchlights to direct them on to their quarry.

Thanks to the thoroughness of divisional and unit arrangements the process of calling out the anti-aircraft forces worked smoothly in most cases. So far as could be gauged a considerable proportion of the guns were in position within twelve hours and the bulk of them within twenty-four hours. But even on the second day there were hardly any aircraft available to give the necessary practice in acclimatising themselves to their instruments. And many troubles had been discovered with those which had been issued from store.

The mobilisation has inevitably disclosed the paucity of Britain's defences not only to the public but to the observant eyes of foreigners, who have doubtless noted all the gun-positions. If this may seem an argument for postponing the mobilisation as long as possible, it is worth pointing out that any intelligent student, by reference to the current Army List and previous Army Estimates, could arrive at the calculation that the total number of guns for the defence of London would be little more than a hundred, even if complete equipment were available. If this was a hazardously small number,

worse still was the unusable state of many of the guns and other equipment that had been issued from the Ordnance depots, and ought to have been ready in every respect. Even after six days of mobilisation it was plain that a large proportion of the guns, perhaps almost half of them, were not capable of engaging an attacker. Some were out of action because the predictors were lacking or defective; some for lack of dials; some because the batteries were not charged; some because they arrived without any instruments at all. As for the modern 3·7 inch guns, it did not appear that they amounted to more than a small fraction, perhaps a fifth or a sixth, of the guns which were available—in contrast to the impression given to Parliament in the spring that the output was becoming rapid and that deliveries were already substantial.

Again, while the danger of low-flying attack had long been emphasised, it was only this spring that steps to meet it were approved in principle, and even so, the creation of the organisation to deal with this sphere was further delayed. When the crisis came it was hastily arranged, for lack of proper weapons, to employ ordinary Lewis guns (light machine-guns) supplemented by old naval 3-inch guns. Lack of sufficient specially trained personnel then inevitably proved a handicap in utilising the weapons that were provided. If an attack had come this improvised defence against low-flying attack might have been more dangerous to civilian life and property than to the attacking aircraft. For the old naval 3-inch guns were fired by the obsolete Case 1 method (over open sights) which makes them, when firing shrapnel, easily affected by the natural excitement of the firers. And the handling of Lewis guns is, of course, even more susceptible to this influence. It was only on October 14th, when the crisis was past, that the long-delayed scheme for organising the local defence of vulnerable points against low-flying attack was at last announced.

What are the causes of the condition of deficiency and inefficiency which the crisis has brought into the light? Partly, of course, the reluctance of the Government in the past to accept as unavoidable the financial burden involved in raising the scale of the defences to the level that was indicated by strategic considerations. Partly, differences of opinion and conflict of interests between the War Office and the Air Ministry, together with the feeling which each service

has that the ground defence of this country against air attack is not its natural sphere. A continued tendency on the part of the Air Force to regard the anti-aircraft sphere as something "foreign" is suggested by the way that, even this summer, practice camps were ill-supplied with suitable aircraft targets, and by the fact that senior air officers did not trouble to visit them. The War Office long showed a similar attitude, if from different motives. A close examination of the problem of home defence nearly two years ago showed that the projected scale of guns and searchlights was not enough to provide an adequate safeguard, and that it ought to be at least doubled. This expansion was opposed. The General Staff made it clear that their main concern was with the formation and equipment of field army for use abroad, in the old way, and that they tended to regard money devoted to air defence at home as money taken from "the Army." Last winter the new Secretary of State for War, Mr. Hore-Belisha, was instrumental in gaining formal priority for the needs of air defence. But even with a new régime it did not prove easy to give full and prompt effect to the decision. Although the need of such expansion was eventually agreed on, its actual inauguration was put off until the autumn.

Nor was that the only check. Apart from the attitude of the General Staff in the past, a main cause of the delay in producing the weapons and instruments required, and developing new methods, has lain in the lack of any centralised organisation to deal with the problems and control the anti-aircraft forces. The men actually responsible for anti-aircraft defence were outside the War Office and had to deal with some eight different authorities in getting anything done. Inside the War Office responsibility was distributed among various departments, and exercised by junior officers in them. The necessity of a centralised organisation was strongly urged last autumn and eventually agreed in principle, but despite constant reiteration nothing was done to translate it into reality until this summer. Then an additional Deputy-Chief of the Imperial General Staff was created for anti-aircraft defence, while a single command outside was created. But the powers of the former office were seriously limited by keeping a large part of its natural functions under other departments. Somewhat astonishingly, in view of the urgency of the task, to both of these new lieut.-generals' posts were

appointed major-generals who lacked previous experience of this anti-aircraft work, to the disregard of the two major-generals hitherto responsible—who had borne the burden, and incurred the odium, of pressing the needs of development on the authorities. Able as they were—but so were the officers on whom they were superimposed—it was obvious that time would be lost while they were picking up the threads of the problem.

But delay continued even after the appointments were announced. The officer who had been selected as the new Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff was out in Egypt as head of the military mission there, and it was intended to leave him there until November. The result was that when the crisis came in September, the new organisation had not begun to function in any real sense, and the difficulties of securing prompt action in the emergency were naturally increased by the lack of any single authority and by uncertainty as to where responsibility lay.

It is hard to say whether the state of the Air Force was worse than that of the anti-aircraft forces, or vice versa. Mobilisation revealed far too many defects and although we had a bombing force of some sixty squadrons, we were relatively weaker than before the rearmament programme began. None of them appear to have been operatively complete. Many of the machines which were available had no turrets and part of those that had were without guns. Another serious handicap was the small number of complete crews which had been trained to operate the new large-size bombers. This appears to have been due to our prolonged concentration on two-seater machines, and our slowness—in contrast to the Germans—to appreciate that the crews of the modern larger machines need to be trained as units rather than as an assembly of individuals. The result was that, although we had nominally a bombing force of about 700 machines, only a fraction of them were capable of being used. Further, the problem of reaching and finding their objectives is one that has been inadequately studied. The enemy's aerodromes, for example, would be an almost impossible objective for modern night-bombers which have to get on their bombing run six to eight miles away. They could hardly spot enemy aerodromes at such a distance. The problem has been needlessly complicated by the slowness of the authorities to recognise the need

for a vertical-dropping bomb. Too many of our ideas in air strategy and tactics seem to be survivals of the past, when speeds were comparatively slow.

As regards the direct air defence of the country, while the German bombing force numbers over 1,500 machines our total number of fighters is reckoned as barely 500. Only a proportion of those which were available were of up-to-date types. And it is highly questionable whether these new types, in spite of, or because of, their great speed, are fitted for their tactical purpose. They are too fast to be truly manœuvrable yet they are armed—with fixed machine-guns—as if they were as capable of keeping a target under point-blank fire as were the machines we knew in the last war. In sum, it may be said of the Air Force that while the state of equipment and training was dangerously inadequate, the state of adaptation to the new conditions of air warfare was dangerously doubtful. This condition of deficiency and inefficiency forms the chief justification for the British Government's part in inducing the Czechs to accept Germany's uncompromising demands. But it can hardly be termed an excuse, since the present Government has been in office seven years.

We have now to take account of the results of the Munich "agreement." First, the immediate results to Czecho-Slovakia. It is better to face the facts frankly, instead of pretending that it was "peace with honour." The Godesberg memorandum or ultimatum demanded the cession to Germany of the 50 per cent. Sudeten Deutsch zone in Czecho-Slovakia, and its evacuation within seven days. The British Government expressed their readiness to go to war if Germany attempted to enforce this demand—"The French Ministers informed us that if Czecho-Slovakia were attacked France would fulfil her treaty obligations, and in reply we told them that if as a result of these obligations French forces became actively engaged in hostilities against Germany we should feel obliged to support them." Yet the terms agreed at Munich required the complete evacuation of this zone to be begun instantly and completed within ten days. Three extra days were so trivial an extension as to be no real concession. Moreover, the Munich terms compelled an even quicker abandonment of the frontier fortifications—a seriously increased handicap. The Godesberg ultimatum demanded that the proportion of the population in 1918—not at the present day



—should be taken as the basis in determining the area. This, obviously, was adverse to the Czechs. But the result of Munich has been to take the 1910 figures as the basis—which is still worse. The privilege of option is already being disregarded. As for the guarantee of the State that remains, we ought to face the fact that Czecho-Slovakia is no longer defensible.

What is the effect on Britain's own situation? It has been argued that if war should come the position of Great Britain "has been strengthened by concentration," and by ceasing to rely on that which is proved untenable. I am very dubious whether this view is justified, from a strategical point of view. An elementary truth of strategy is that the strength of any concentration depends on the distraction that exists or can be created elsewhere to the opponent's power of concentration. A distraction on his flank or rear is invaluable—this is the lesson that has most impressed the Germans from the last war, the result of having to face two ways. With the military nullification of Czecho-Slovakia the potential distraction that she provided hitherto is removed. The Czechs are likely now to go into the German camp. And Hungary may hardly avoid it.

The question is, then, whether Roumania can be preserved, and in particular her oil supplies, from falling into German control. It is clear that this can hardly be done without Russia's help. The ruling régime in Roumania are likely to be afraid of close association with Russia because of the likelihood that it might lead to an uprising of their own peasants. Will this fear drive them into Germany's arms, or restrain them because of the possibly greater fear of an invasion from Russia if they go in with Germany? The attitude of Turkey may be a key factor. She might possibly serve as an intermediary between Russia and Roumania as well as a support to Roumania in facing the German tide of advance into the Balkans.

A further question is whether Italy will continue to adhere to the Berlin axis. Apart from the ideological factors which form a common bond, Italy is of great strategic value to Germany as a lever against the backs of France and Britain, capable of distracting their attention from Germany's moves elsewhere. From Italy's point of view, the axis may still have immediate advantages if ultimate dangers. She has no hope

of direct gain from Germany, immensely her military superior, but much that she would like to obtain in the Mediterranean and southward. Such gains can only be achieved at the expense of France and Britain, or with their acquiescence. And the axis is the means of exerting the necessary pressure. On the other hand, it would be cheaper and safer to obtain such concessions by bargaining for them than by fighting for them, as Germany's tool. Italy's attitude may thus become a time problem—to determine how far and how long she can pull against France and Britain before changing sides. If she defers it too long or helps to weaken them too much, she may find herself helpless to check Germany's advance to the Adriatic. For France and Britain the problem may be whether they can offer her any territorial concessions which will not develop into a strategic danger to themselves, while tending to increase Italy's own commitments—and thereby form a strategic entanglement conducive to mutually peaceful relations.

The one direction in which neither France nor Britain can afford to accept the risk of such concessions is in the Western Mediterranean. A Fascist Spain working in alliance with Italy would greatly increase the insecurity of their sea communications. Hence the results of foreign intervention in Spain are of prime concern to us. Military analysis of the course of the Civil War there clearly establishes the dominating effect of foreign intervention upon military balance. In so far as it has turned in General Franco's favour, the effect can be traced to the progressive increase of assistance from Italy and Germany. The inevitable consequence has been his increasing dependence on the countries providing it. If that should lead to his becoming their tool, and Spain's air and sea bases becoming available to them, in any conflict where we were engaged on the opposite side, the whole structure of our Imperial Defence might be undermined.

It is well to realise that the existing capacity of France and Britain to make any stand against aggression rests largely on the fact that—through no fault of their own—the Spanish Republican side has not yet been defeated. In that theatre the strategic cards were in our hands, thereby enabling us, had we wished, to take a firm line for the stoppage of intervention. If Germany and Italy had replied by a large increase in the quantities of material they had already sent, France



and Britain were in a better strategical position than they were for such competition—since the former powers would be locking up military forces in a potentially isolated theatre. If they had dared to press their objections to the point of war we should have been able to face it with all the advantages of the defensive and in more favourable circumstances of strategic geography than we could hope for once Spain was conquered. These advantages on our side made the risk of war unlikely.

From this survey of the external conditions which affect our policy, we are brought back to a consideration of the internal conditions necessary for maintaining it. During the past decade there have been too many signs in British policy of the same symptoms which marked the "Decline and Fall" of the Roman Empire. The parallel has become disturbingly suggestive as the tempo of events has accelerated. If the process is to be checked, there must be a change of attitude. The British people must face the problems of to-day not with a negative fatalism but with a positive faith.

If there is one distinctive feature of English history it is the love of freedom—the insistence on the rights of the individual; above all, to freedom of judgment and speech. This has been the source of national vitality. For freedom breeds self-respect and self-reliance. Its preservation offers a true foundation for patriotism—which otherwise is no better than an animal instinct or a material interest. It is a tradition worth defence, because it is the mainspring of life. Moreover, it is the one basis of patriotism which offers a hope of rallying the people as a whole. Peace is only of value in so far as it provides an atmosphere in which freedom and justice can grow; and these themselves are but the means to human progress. A "Peace Policy" embodies the mistake of putting the lesser before the greater. What the world needs to-day is a movement inspired by the idea and ideal of freedom. Its natural base lies in the English-speaking world. There is room for a New Model of modern "Ironsides" of democracy—"Men who make some conscience of what they do."

LIDDELL HART.

## THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL.

IT was a disappointment to many who had looked forward to the introduction during the last session of Parliament of an important measure of penal reform when the pressure of public business made it necessary in the view of the Government to postpone the introduction of the Bill. It is all the more a matter for encouragement that this long-awaited measure has been introduced at an early date in the new session and that it proves to be one for which penal reformers must be profoundly thankful. It is surely a significant and hopeful sign for a time in which we have need of hope that, when medieval methods of violence and repression are being increasingly used in countries which once took the lead in penal reform, the Parliament of Great Britain should be engaged in discussing a measure designed to raise our whole penal system to a higher standard. It is encouraging, too, that in spite of the heavy burdens placed upon the Government and their preoccupation with grave international problems and with serious burdens of defence, the Home Secretary has taken up the task of remodelling our prisons, and the treatment of delinquency and crime, in the spirit which inspires this great Bill. For it is a great measure, going further than many of its well-wishers had dared to hope, especially in its provisions for the treatment of young offenders. It is the result of long labour, taking note of the work of four or five departmental committees and of the experience of the Prison Commissioners, as well as that of many others who deal with those coming under the penalties of the law.

It would be strange indeed if such a measure of far-reaching reform did not arouse opposition, and already certain critics are making their voices heard. The punishment inflicted by the law, it is urged, is the expression of the indignation of society against wrong-doing, and its principal object should be to act as a deterrent rather than to reclaim the offender. Prisons are becoming too pleasant places, we are told; a convenient and comfortable harbour of refuge when times are hard. This is a strange misreading of the slow development of our civilisation in its methods of dealing with wrongdoers and an absurd distortion of the actual facts of prison life.

A prison even at its best is not and cannot be a pleasant place. The prisoner has always an invisible chain about him;

he is severed from home, from his own friends and associates, he is not a free man, to act as he wills. But our own past history shows that crime was most prevalent when punishment was most severe. Vindictive hanging did not stop sheep-stealing. Yet steadily, as the old savage punishments have been dispensed with, the hulks, branding, the felon's chains, the treadmill, and all that went with them, the number of criminal convictions has diminished, in spite of the great increase of population. This change for the better has continued markedly during the last fifteen years, during which the Prison Commissioners, as their annual reports make clear, have steadily set before them as one of their chief objects that the prisoner should be helped to come out from prison a better citizen than when he entered its walls. These fifteen years have seen a far-reaching change in methods of administration and in the life within prison walls. Only those who know what the old mechanical, rigid, repressive system was can appreciate the gain.

But the Prison Commissioners and the prison service have been working under a heavy handicap. They have been thwarted by immense, expensive and utterly unsuitable prison buildings, and by laws which, too, were out of date, inflicting as some did both useless and unsuitable penalties, especially in the case of youths and first offenders; sometimes even, in the case of frequent short sentences, they were obviously neither deterrent nor reformatory. The Criminal Justice Bill aims at making possible a more flexible and effective treatment of the offender, in his own interest and in that of society alike. It is based not upon sentimental theory, but on the long experience of the Prison Commissioners and their staff, and the careful and impartial investigation of departmental committees whose recommendations it carries into effect.

There are two main divisions under which it may be convenient to summarise the principal proposals of the eighty clauses of the Bill. It enlarges and improves the scope of existing alternatives to imprisonment, which have already proved to be successful (the probation system and Borstal training), while it provides new forms of training and treatment which the courts have at present no power to impose. It also revises existing forms of imprisonment, removing certain relics of barbarism that are the inheritance of an evil

past, the age of the hulks and the treadmill, and gives a wider scope to the Prison Commissioners to classify the inmates under their charge and give them appropriate treatment.

It further takes account of recent advances in the scientific treatment of mental illness and abnormality, by affording facilities to the courts to obtain medical reports on an offender before deciding on how to deal with him, while also allowing them to make provision in certain cases for persons placed on probation to submit to mental treatment. At the same time it allows courts of summary jurisdiction to deal with an offender who is certifiable as insane by making an order accordingly; while persons who, at present, after being committed for trial on indictment, become upon conviction "criminal lunatics" are to become "state mental patients." The State Criminal Lunatic Asylum will be transferred to the care of the Board of Control as the State Mental Hospital, but the Secretary of State will still retain responsibility for the discharge of its patients.

The Bill commences by providing for a systematisation and improvement of the existing probation system, arranging for the appointment in every probation area of a sufficient number of probation officers, both men and women. At present these are far too few, while many of them have so many cases assigned to them that the purpose of probation is nullified. Provision is made for a suitable scale of salaries and for schemes of superannuation. Local authorities are empowered to contribute to the establishment of hostels for persons on probation, and also towards the cost of maintaining a person on probation in a place to which he is sent to reside by the order of the court which has dealt with his case. One of the difficulties which our probation system at present fails to meet is that of the unsuitable home conditions which too often make it hard for a youthful offender to make the most of the opportunity for a new start which probation should give. Sometimes the home is a thoroughly bad one, or undesirable neighbours may have a harmful influence; sometimes a step-parent makes it no true home at all. In such cases the hope lies in the lad being placed in a hostel or in a suitable lodging and the Bill now gives the court the power to make this a condition of probation.

Probation and Borstal institutions were both instituted to remove from prison young people who ought not to be sent

there. Unfortunately too many now go to prison on remand before they are otherwise dealt with, including some who are subsequently found not guilty by the courts. Only a few weeks ago I found two boys, one aged fourteen years and two months, and the other between fifteen and sixteen, spending a week in prison on remand. There are not enough remand homes and inadequate use is made of them by many courts. The Bill now enables the Secretary of State to provide "remand centres" to which persons between the ages of 14 and 23 may be sent on remand or when committed for trial.

A most useful provision also enables him to provide "compulsory attendance centres" which offenders between the ages of 17 and 21 may be required to attend after their working hours, to be given occupation and instruction. Local authorities are similarly empowered to establish "juvenile compulsory attendance centres" for offenders between the ages of 12 and 17. It will be felt as a punishment when a boy has to go on certain evenings to such a centre, but if the centre has the right type of instructor, boys under his care may not merely be kept out of mischief, but learn some craft or develop some aptitude which will give a new and healthy interest to their lives.

A most useful addition to our present inadequate social equipment for helping the young offender to go straight is the provision of power for the Home Secretary to establish "Howard houses," where those between the ages of 16 and 21 may be required to reside under some kind of discipline, going out to work like others of their age in different employments. This will give the opportunity for a new start to many under more natural conditions than are given by a whole-time residential institution. Here, as at Borstal, everything will depend upon having the right type of persons in charge. Suitable buildings and surroundings are important. The thing that matters most is the influence of life upon life.

Under the existing law it often happens that youths are sentenced to terms of imprisonment who in the opinion of the prison authorities would have been far more suitably dealt with by training in a Borstal institution. The Bill empowers the Secretary of State in the case of persons under 23 years of age to transfer a prisoner to a Borstal institution for the whole or any part of the term of his sentence. This should prove a

beneficent alteration in the rigidity of the present penal law.

In so far as it affects the prison system itself the Bill introduces various changes recommended by departmental committees during recent years and also embodies proposals which are the outcome of reforms already carried out with marked success by the Prison Commissioners. In accordance with the recommendations of the Departmental Committee, the existing power of the courts to pass sentences of corporal punishment is to be abolished, this punishment being only retained under very strict regulations, for grave crimes of violence committed in prison. Penal servitude, an evil name for what was once a cruel form of imprisonment which has in fact already been profoundly modified, is to be abolished, and with it the ticket-of-leave, which kept the prisoners on licence under report to the police. Instead they are to be required to keep in touch with the Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society approved by the Secretary of State. The agents or organising secretaries of such societies have again and again proved of service to the ex-convict, and not only in assisting him to find work. However helpful the police may be, as they often are, the obligation of regular report to them casts a shadow over the ex-prisoner's life and is too frequently a definite hindrance to him in re-establishing himself as a self-respecting citizen.

"Convicts" and "convict prisons" are to disappear from the statute book. The term "hard labour" in connection with sentences of imprisonment is also to be abolished. It once referred to such work as the treadmill. More recently it has in practice involved an initial period during which the prisoner slept upon wooden boards. The actual work of such a prisoner is not in itself harder than that performed by others sentenced to ordinary imprisonment.

Another clause abolishes the three statutory prison divisions, while elsewhere the Bill gives power to the Secretary of State to make rules for the regulation of prisons and other penal institutions and enacts that these rules shall provide for the special treatment of persons convicted for sedition, seditious conspiracy, or seditious libel, as well as for appellants and certain other prisoners. The rules are also to provide for the possibility of temporary release of prisoners and persons in remand homes or centres or Borstal institutions. This

will save much mental anguish to the families of prisoners who are at present prevented from visiting for an hour or two a dying mother, wife, or child.

A most valuable change is introduced into the law by restrictions upon courts of summary jurisdiction in sentencing young offenders to imprisonment, without full consideration of the circumstances, and unless the court has considered all other alternative methods of dealing with the case and states in writing the reasons for its decision.

More disputable is the clause empowering courts of summary jurisdiction to pass sentences of Borstal training. This, it is true, would avoid the present unfortunate delay, during which a boy often has to spend some time in prison before his case is decided at quarter sessions or assizes ; but unhappily all justices do not come up to the level of the best courts of summary jurisdiction and in some cases an appeal from their decision is most desirable. Some day the task of reforming the constitution of these courts will have to be undertaken. It is difficult to secure justice for all, when the standard of justice varies so widely.

The Bill as it stands is one which deserves the whole-hearted support of penal reformers, but it is to be hoped that there may be incorporated in its final provisions a further improvement of the existing law. The use of the cat, an instrument of torture which may leave life-long scars to brand the sufferer, is out of harmony with the spirit of the Bill. It should be abolished altogether. The House of Commons recently passed a resolution moved by Mr. Vyvyan Adams welcoming legislation by the Government to suspend for a trial period of five years the carrying out of capital punishment. The Bill provides an opportunity to carry this into law. At the least it is to be hoped that the age limit at which capital punishment is legal should be raised from 17 to a higher age such as 25 years. The Bill provides for a condition enjoining restitution to be attached to a probation order by the courts, a power which they now possess but too seldom use. It would be well if this principle could be extended to other sentences, sometimes as an addition to a fine.

If the proposals of the Bill are to succeed, as it is earnestly to be hoped they will, it is essential that the right personnel should be made available, as probation officers, instructors, heads of Howard houses, and other officers who will be

required. This and the provision of suitable buildings, as well as the replacement of our existing prison fortresses by simpler, smaller buildings, after the model of the prison camp near Wakefield, with ample grounds around them, will require substantial support from the Treasury. It must be given. It will be a measure of true economy to spend wisely on such work, for it will certainly be followed by a decreased expenditure in future years and upon a decreasing prison population. It will mean a greater economy in terms of human life. If the young offender can be turned into a good citizen it will not only be he himself who will be the gainer. His family and the community gain, too.

T. EDMUND HARVEY.

## THE FUTURE OF THE LEAGUE.

NOBODY who attended, as I did, the Nineteenth Assembly of the League of Nations, could possibly retain the smallest illusion as to its efficacy in the armed world of to-day. If we wish to think clearly about the future of the League, we must begin by an unreserved confession of its complete failure as a political body. We must endeavour to understand the causes of its impotence. For some years the worst friends of the League have been precisely those who refuse to admit its faults or its weaknesses. Indeed, the League was unquestionably killed by its own supporters who insisted on the application of Article 16—i.e. sanctions—despite the obvious fact that some of the greatest nations were outside the League, that many of those within the League declined to proceed to effective action, and that the majority of the members who yielded to pressure did their best to elude their commitments. For my part, I may at least claim consistency; in 1919 I tried to point out that a League which was expected to take punitive measures could not survive; it should, had punitive measures been impartially applied, have invoked Article 16 against nearly every important nation in turn, including nations with which we are now on the friendliest terms. The fatal flaw in the sanctions system is the absence of an international code of morality generally accepted and observed, and of a superior body of impeccable judges. When Germany repudiated the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, the Council of the League solemnly protested; but around the Council table were the delegates of Turkey, France, Italy, Great Britain, Russia, Poland and other countries which had all repudiated important international engagements. When I remarked on this to the representative of a Great Power, he agreed with me, but urged that such admonitions were meant to be reminders to the whole of the nations of the desirability of fulfilling their promises! Such a defence was perhaps acceptable as long as the League confined itself to resolutions; but it seemed clearly impossible, in the present state of international morality, for the League to apply sanctions in a particular case for particular reasons at the behest of a particular member.

For a number of years the League wisely recognised its

limitations. It endeavoured, in a series of reports, to whittle away its duties under the very plain and comprehensive Article 16. It looked upon Article 16 as a dead letter. It was apparent that it would not work. My own belief was that the conception of the League as a military organisation (notably held by the French), as a matrix of alliances, as an instrument of the *status quo*, as a coercive coalition, was entirely immoral as well as inexpedient. It encouraged all kinds of intrigues. It had no relation whatever to a new dispensation of world order founded on justice. Nor could it be successful; for inside the League nations would continue to advance their national interests, while outside the League it was certain that, sooner or later, a rival coalition would be formed. As one of the earliest supporters of the League, I am bound to say that this conception of the League as a temporal power always struck me as an almost insuperable handicap, but I was nevertheless hopeful that, in practice, the League, in its own interest, would decline to be rushed into suicidal courses. I was hopeful that the League would increasingly exercise a restraining influence, and would gradually become, not a political, much less a material, but a moral authority—a sort of conscience for the world.

Jacques Bainville, one of the clearest-minded Frenchmen I have known, used to demolish the idea of an armed League by the simple question: "And what if the League army is beaten?" When the League began the great experiment of economic sanctions against Italy in 1935, few people were sensible enough to ask: "And what if the League fails?" Yet failure was all but certain. The sanctions of France and England against Russia twenty years ago, though partly of a military character, not only failed but vastly strengthened Bolshevism. The military sanctions of France against Germany in the Ruhr demonstrably weakened France. Even had Italy been so feeble as to succumb to the half-hearted efforts of Geneva, it is possible that a far greater evil than the conquest of Abyssinia would have resulted—namely the establishment at Geneva of a Super-State directed by two or three Great Powers. There was little danger of such a consequence; it was virtually certain that the League would lose, and would therefore break up. That is what happened, or is happening, as I saw when I revisited Geneva last September. But, in the meantime, the League had provided Germany

with a glorious opportunity of remilitarising Rhineland, and therefore of seizing Austria and shattering Czecho-Slovakia. It had likewise let loose floods of anti-Fascist propaganda which had helped to divide Europe into opposing camps and to bring about the international situation we now deplore.

I am sorry to make these comments, but I am firmly convinced that the future of the League depends upon our ability to see where it has gone wrong. To persist on a path which has proved to be full of pitfalls would be foolish. We have to search our own conscience if we would make of the League a living reality. To pretend that it is a reality to-day is wilfully to close one's eyes. The melancholy that brooded over the last Assembly was not a passing mood. The fate of Czecho-Slovakia was in the balance; we all trembled on the brink of war; but the principal Foreign Ministers shunned Geneva. Not only did they consider the League to be useless in face of the European danger—they looked on it as positively dangerous. Matters were far too delicate to be debated at Geneva. Nobody thought of threatening Germany with sanctions. Never for a second did it occur to anyone that the League could prevent war. We wandered sadly in the interminable corridors and sat dully in the finest public rooms in the world. They had just been made ready, these halls, sumptuously decorated, composing an immense white palace on the green hill of Ariana, rising from a beautiful landscape of mountain and of lake. We were overwhelmed by an awareness of the vanity of human wishes. This splendid monument, this magnificent mausoleum, mocked mankind's hopes. Armageddon, we thought, was upon us, and the League could only pray to be forgotten. Whoever or whatever was responsible for this tremendous collapse, the collapse could not be denied. And it was merely childish to blame outside forces. Those outside forces constituted the very problem which Geneva had signally failed to solve. Could it be that the League itself was wrong—had been constructed on impossible foundations? To refuse to put these questions is sheer folly. To refuse to answer them honestly is to condemn the League irremediably.

Let us look at the functions which the League has been incapable of fulfilling. When the treaties were fashioned in 1919, the minorities which were created were placed under the protection of the League. Now if the League had, in fact,

looked after the minorities, if the League had insisted on their rights, it would not have mattered so much that the frontiers were badly drawn. Central Europe would have settled down. But every impartial observer knows that some of the most conspicuous supporters of the League in Geneva had the charge of large minorities, and they were opposed to League interference. Complaints were set aside. The minorities ceased to consider the League as their guardian. Hence the disruptive forces in Europe grew; and the Czechoslovakian débâcle was an inevitable result of the League indifference to minorities. Again, when the League was built it was understood that partial alliances would be replaced by universal friendship in the framework of the League. Nevertheless, European diplomacy immediately took out counter-assurances in the form of alliances. France, among other alliances, made a pact with Czecho-Slovakia, and both of them made a pact with Russia; and these pacts were bound to be regarded as hostile to Germany, and, by extension, as France, Czecho-Slovakia and Russia were specially prominent in the League, the League itself was bound to be regarded as hostile to Germany. It followed that Germany would, sooner or later, attempt to smash the weakest link in the chain; and Czecho-Slovakia happened to be that link. As for disarmament, the record of the League is lamentable. It is false to suggest that it is Germany's fault. Germany was disarmed for years, but no other country consented to disarm. Germany made a number of reasonable offers, before she went out of the League and stole a march on the countries which tried to keep her disarmed while retaining their own arms. Once more, the League never even began its task of revising treaties. At Versailles it was claimed that though treaties might contain grievances, Article 19 was designed to deal with them. How often have I heard in League circles, and in the Council itself, declarations by delegates that revision would never be tolerated—that revisionism and terrorism were the same thing—that there could be no peaceful change! While I had the greatest sympathy for Czecho-Slovakia, it is unfortunate that the League was not asked to retrace the frontiers of that ramshackle state long ago, before Germany was strong, before threats were possible. At the present time we are witnessing the same mistake in respect of the question of mandates. The annual reports on the mandated territories, most

of them taken from Germany, have been perfunctory, there has been practically no League control; and the tendency has increasingly been for the countries which divided the spoils to regard them as their legal property. It is argued that the League cannot now demand the return of the mandated territories in order to effect a more equitable redistribution.

These were, however, sins of omission; negative mistakes. The League was criticised in many quarters because it did not take strong action against Japan, against Germany, and in earlier days against other countries which need not be specifically mentioned. But, for my part, I thought it was wise in avoiding tasks which it could not have carried out, and which would have broken the League. I also believed it more consistent with its true function to adopt purely moral as distinct from material means. If it were objected that the League was thus ineffective, I would reply: Better an ineffective League than a mischievous League—better a moral League whose influence is as yet indecisive, than a political League which will necessarily divide the world! The fact is that it is highly improper to use the argument against the League that it did not succeed at once. It would have been a miracle had it succeeded, for its success depended on a general change of heart, an almost universal mental revolution. Its business was not to succeed, but to persevere. Nobody tests the Church by its degree of success—the only test of the Church is whether it is faithful to its own ideals. So with the League; the League should have set its face against the employment of force; it should never have permitted its members to discuss its possible militarisation; it should not have allowed itself to become a weapon, economic it is true, but logically—according to its own texts—military. It may be that force cannot be ruled out of the world—that force must still be opposed to force—but at least force could be ruled out of the League. Anything that tended towards a League “war to end war,” was, as I saw it, deplorable—was a League surrender to the idea of violence. It was virtually certain that the League would lose, but its victory would have been as disastrous as its defeat.

I am aware that I am expressing views that are still unpopular, even among Liberals; but surely the inexorable course of events has plainly shown that a fatal error was made, and that to the feeble use of force has corresponded the

most formidable use of force. Not only inside the League, but outside, the would-be peace-makers have been betrayed into anger. Their anger has been largely verbal, but the reply has been in deeds. They have inflicted pinpricks, and they have received swordthrusts. The feud with Italy was kept up until the Berlin-Rome axis was forged, until Germany had absorbed Austria, destroyed Czecho-Slovakia, annihilated the French diplomatic system, and won the hegemony of Europe. In the Far East that same feud is largely responsible for incalculable sufferings and huge British financial losses. The Jews are persecuted, the Arabs are in revolt. Despite the capitulation of Munich, the possibility of a new world war darkens every household. Nobody thinks any more of moral methods; some of the least bellicose of us are now, in despair of reason, frankly recommending the most ruinous rearmament.

There could be no doubt of the opinion of the Assembly on the League blunder. Sanctions were condemned by speaker after speaker. Some of them proclaimed neutrality; others decided that they must judge for themselves on each occasion; the language varied but the obligatory character of sanctions was invariably repudiated. Certainly there was no proposal to amend the Covenant, for doubtless there would have been nothing like agreement. Rightly it was laid down that recourse to war is a matter of concern to the whole League, and that there should be consultations. The military measures contemplated in Article 16 were held, by general consent, to be no longer binding; and even economic and financial measures cannot now be taken collectively, in view of the new meaning that members put upon their obligations. Indeed, if proof of the demise of sanctions is needed, it is supplied by the decision of the League to leave each state to do whatever it pleases “individually” against Japan. The Assembly did not conclude, but it circulated the observations of the members, and it is clear that the *de facto* situation is that Article 16 has been interpreted out of existence.

It was decided, if one may employ a convenient though technically debatable phrase, to separate the Covenant from the peace treaties. This is a very significant step. While the League stood for the *status quo*—and that was implied in the incorporation of the Covenant in the treaties—it laboured under a genuine disability. The Covenant should never have



had any connection with the treaties; but it is commonly understood that President Wilson hoped to compel the Senate to accept the Covenant, since it could not reject it without rejecting the treaties. The American Senate did not hesitate—it rejected the whole peace of Versailles. Thus, as a result of a political trick that failed, the League has had hung round its neck the millstone of the treaties. The report submitted to the Assembly contains legal subtleties into which it is unnecessary to enter here, but the purpose was to suggest “the method by which the League might exercise its power of amending the Covenant in order to eliminate expressions which might contribute to estrange or induce states to stand aloof from the League; and the method by which the Assembly might modify certain possible misunderstandings as to the essential characteristics of the Covenant itself.”

There was likewise a proposed amendment by which the unanimity rule as applied to Article 11 (which gives the League power to take action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations) should be modified, in the sense that the consent of the parties to the dispute would not be required. Now the settlement of a dispute under this article is a settlement by conciliation; the agreement of the parties is thus presupposed. As there did not seem to be much point in the proposed amendment, there were a large number of abstentions, and two votes were cast against, with the result that the motion fell to the ground.

Inadequate as these attempts at reform may be, they indicate sufficiently the feeling of the League that it can no longer work on the old lines. One would have preferred a bolder approach to the problems which concern the very existence of the League, a clearer choice between the rival conceptions of a coercive League and a conciliatory League, of a League of temporal power and a League of moral authority, of a partisan League and a universal League. But at any rate, the issue definitely emerges. I believe that the only chance of the League's survival (that is to say, as a peace organisation, and not as a war machine) lies in a thorough revision of its methods and of its own conception of its functions. It has been recorded in the newspapers that a drastic purge of the Secretariat is now in progress. It is explained on the ground of economy, but everyone who has frequented the lobbies of the League knows that there has been a departure from the

attitude of strict neutrality expected from officials of a League which should embrace all nationalities, all political creeds, all “ideologies.” I found it extremely unfortunate, in the sanctions period and since, that there should be lively propaganda in the League against some members of the League, and that the League should thus seem to be an “anti” League. New severe instructions to the personnel, and a ruthless dismissal of those who fail to appreciate the elementary need of impartiality, will do something to restore confidence in Geneva.

If the League were reformed, it would assuredly have a vital part to play in a weary and troubled world. Geneva is a city in which Dictators and Democrats should meet. The League should not be run by any set of nations; at present Great Britain, France and Russia are the only Great Powers sitting on the Council. In my view Italy and Germany must be brought back. The United States and Japan must also join the League. Obviously this supposes a common ground, and the elimination of antagonistic bias in the League. I believe it to be still possible for all countries to co-operate in constructive work. There is a vast field of economic and social welfare to be cultivated. The League could be an invaluable centre for studies, a clearing-house for information. It is plain that, in the political sphere, Germany, Italy and Japan, to name no others, are and will continue to be in opposition to a political League as it has lately been conceived; and in effect we shall have, if the League maintains its political activities, a rival League, a coalition against the League. That would be truly tragic. For my part, I would propose the complete suppression of a partisan League, a coercive League, a political League; but I would try to build up a comprehensive League, a co-operative League, a conciliatory League. Doubtless if we are to avoid a European clash there will have to be a Directoire to deal with delicate and difficult European political affairs. Such a Directoire, possibly with its capital at Geneva, will fulfil an essential function that the League cannot perform, but it should not therefore be regarded as a substitute for the League, which has a vastly greater humanitarian rôle, transcending political disputes, and conditioning them. To the definition of this rôle the best brains of men of goodwill must now be directed. The League must be transformed, but the transformed League may correspond more nearly to our original conception.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

## REFLECTIONS AFTER THE CRISIS.

IT is strange that among all the letters and articles written on the recent international crisis, no references should have been made to a similar though less critical situation which occurred after the Belgian Revolution of 1830, and to the methods used to settle it. The comparison is striking. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands had been created as a barrier against French ambitions by the Treaty of Vienna, in the same way that the Czechoslovakian Republic was given her "strategical frontiers" at Versailles, as a bulwark against Germany. On both sides historical traditions could more or less justify this arrangement. The United Kingdom could be said to re-establish the old Belgium ruled by the Dukes of Burgundy and later by Charles V, as the new Republic restored to a certain extent the boundaries of the Kingdom of Bohemia. In the intervening period, however, strong antagonism had developed on both sides. While racial and linguistic rivalry opposed Czechs and German-Austrians in Bohemia, religious and economic antagonism had divided the Belgians from the Dutch in the Netherlands. The Czechs, led by Masaryk, sided with the Allies at the end of the Great War, just as the Dutch under the House of Orange sided with the Allies against Napoleon. Both were duly rewarded at the end of the conflict, without regard for the principle of self-determination, and a difficult situation was thus created which only the wisest statesmanship could overcome.

An examination of the position occupied by the Sudeten in Czechoslovakia and by the Belgians in the United Kingdom is equally enlightening. In both cases there was actually no deliberate oppression, but unequal treatment, giving unfair advantages to the Czechs and to the Dutch, and making reconciliations and genuine collaboration impossible. The old feud persisted and could easily be rekindled by external events.

Here again "history repeats itself." Almost the same number of weeks elapsed between the July Revolution in Paris and the September outbreak in Brussels as between the *Anschluss* and the September crisis. Both were directed against the "systems" established at Vienna and Versailles. The substitution of the Orléans for the Bourbons challenged the European order, as did the absorption of Austria by the Reich. It took fifteen years to divide the Netherlands, twenty

years to disintegrate Czechoslovakia. There are, no doubt, notable differences. The Belgians wished for full independence and, in spite of their sympathy for France, claimed all the rights of a "sovereign nation." The advent of Louis Philippe encouraged their efforts, but when, in September 1830, they succeeded in repulsing the Dutch troops and driving them back towards Holland, their object was solely to conquer their full freedom under a liberal Constitution and a national Government. Europe was suddenly faced, in September 1830, with the alternative either to restore the Vienna system by force or to revise it by negotiations. France, the vanquished of 1815, was keenly interested in the success of the revolution, as far as it weakened the régime installed at Vienna, but Louis-Philippe had too recently ascended the throne and was too cautious to assume unnecessary risks. On the other hand, the Belgians were in a more favourable position than the Sudeten, having practically liberated their territory. Had the Powers answered King William's appeal forthwith, they would have been obliged to invade Belgium, and this measure would have undoubtedly provoked the opposition of France and very probably of England, in spite of the irritation felt by Wellington towards the "rebels."

Strange to say, the world seemed far more tired of war fifteen years after Waterloo than twenty years after the Armistice. Politics, in those days, was governed in the conservative countries—Austria, Prussia and Russia—by dynastic more than by purely national interests, and the wave of Liberalism which swept over Europe caused serious alarm in St. Petersburg and Vienna. The Polish Revolution broke out most opportunely for Belgian interests. Not only was it decided to settle the question by negotiation, but it was implicitly understood from the first that it should not be settled otherwise.

If the world of 1830 had a surfeit of war, the world of 1938 suffers certainly from a surfeit of international palavers. Besides, the two totalitarian powers had in the near past refused to submit to "procrastinating methods," and adopted with remarkable success more forcible means. The comparison between the procedure followed recently to settle the Czech-Sudeten question and that favoured in 1830 by the Five Powers, cannot but sober the pride of the believers in the gospel of progress. Instead of a

series of flying visits paid to Germany by the heads of the States interested, under the imminent threat of war, and of hasty conversations pursued until the small hours of the morning to avoid the execution of an ultimatum, Europe witnessed calmly the negotiations carried out in London for over a year by trained diplomats. An armistice was proclaimed. Both Holland and Belgium were allowed to put forward their claims and to defend them at great length. A first settlement accepted by King William was rejected by the Belgians; a second one accepted by the Belgians provoked a Dutch invasion which was only stopped through French military intervention; a third one accepted by the Belgians was rejected by Holland, and only put into force through a provisional convention after the siege of Antwerp by the French, and the blockade of the Dutch coast by the British, both powers acting in the name of the Conference. The final treaties were signed by all parties eight years later. For months the Tzar growled, Metternich scolded, Talleyrand intrigued and Palmerston wrote numberless protocols, but the peace of Europe was never seriously threatened.

One principle, however, emerged from these long negotiations, as it emerges from those we have just witnessed. The Concert of Powers which had established a system, had the right to alter it at the expense or to the advantage of the small nations which benefited or suffered from it. To the protests made sometimes by the Dutch, and at other times by the Belgians, the Conference answered invariably that although its intention was to respect, as far as possible, the interests of both parties, the ultimate decision rested with the powers who would not hesitate to apply force on the recalcitrant nation if other means failed. Had the Belgians proved obdurate, they would have been faced by Prussian troops. When the Dutch refused to "listen to reason," they were confronted by Great Britain and France. The fact that King Leopold was Queen Victoria's uncle and that the Prince of Orange was the Tzar's brother-in-law did not affect the situation. Belgium obtained her cherished independence under a constitutional monarchy, but King William received important financial and territorial compensations.

Answering Belgian protests against the first plan known as the "Bases of Separation," the Conference issued a protocol on February 19th, 1831, stating that "it was not for the

Powers to examine the circumstances which had broken the bonds they had formed between Belgium and Holland." These bonds once broken, they had nevertheless "the right, and events imposed upon them the duty, to prevent the new Belgian provinces, in their new status of independence, from endangering general security and the European balance." "Each nation," added the protocol, "has its peculiar rights, but Europe also has her rights." Similar warnings were given to Holland, when she refused to grant the concessions required to obtain a settlement. National pride and interests had to give way to European peace and security, and, in spite of the obstinate resistance of both countries, there is no doubt that the final agreement served their ultimate interests and that, after a few years, public opinion was reconciled to it.

"There are two kinds of States," wrote Leopold I in 1847, "the first rely on their own strength; the existence of others depends on the conveniences of the big States and on the part which the great European family wishes them to play. . . . Belgium belongs to the second category." A year later friendly relations were restored between the Belgian King and his Dutch rival. "Uncle Leopold," who had written such bitter letters to Queen Victoria, when in 1839 the powers insisted on the prompt execution of the territorial clauses of the treaties, had accepted the situation.

There is another feature of the Belgian settlement of 1831-9 which applies to recent events in Czechoslovakia. The Belgians obtained their freedom on one very important condition: permanent, compulsory and guaranteed neutrality. Whoever hit upon the idea of extending to Belgium the régime granted to Switzerland at Vienna solved one of the most difficult problems of European diplomacy. Left alone, in the position she occupies on the map, Belgium would sooner or later have been absorbed by one of her great neighbours, thus upsetting the balance of power and provoking another war. Palmerston was almost the only one in the Conference who believed that neutrality would last. The Belgians protested against this "restriction to their national sovereignty," and the conservative powers took advantage of it to deny Belgium every normal right, even that of self-defence. Von Wessenberg called neutrality a "fine dream"; Metternich gave it short shrift. Thanks to the loyalty of the

Belgian kings and to the support given by Palmerston and his successors, it lasted eighty-three years. After 1840 the Belgians lost their prejudice against a régime which had worked so well during the Eastern Crisis. After 1870 most of them believed that it was a sufficient protection against aggression, and refused to increase their army. But after 1914 the reaction came. One of the first demands of the Belgian delegates at Versailles was that their country should be released from an obligation which "restricted their sovereignty without giving them the security" they wished to obtain. Neutrality was in bad odour all over the world. Was it not contrary to the Covenant? How could a neutral, for instance, grant the passage of troops sent by the League to chastise a law breaker? Years later, after the signature of the Kellogg Pact, American statesmen still proclaimed that neutrality was "obsolete." A nation could only condone the "unlawful act" of war, or help other nations to repress it. Every issue was henceforth clear cut, no hesitation was possible. Neutrality was irreconcilable with the new order of things. It was an adjunct of the balance of power and should disappear with it. Switzerland alone wished to retain her old régime. The selection of Geneva for the seat of the League did not blind her to the fact that a lame horse is better than no horse at all. According to the words of Dr. Rappart, she preserved her neutrality when joining the League "as an aviator takes with him his parachute when starting on a flight."

Experience showed that the Swiss were right. The League rendered great services in other directions, but did not solve the problem of security. Aggression followed aggression without bringing any restraint or redress. On the contrary, the Powers were compelled to recognise in fact conquests which they had denounced in principle, as members of the League. As the prestige of the latter weakened, small States endeavoured to buttress their security with new guarantees. Switzerland relied more and more on her "parachute" and prepared to effect a landing.\* Belgium, who had discarded her old safeguards, sought new ones first in a military agreement with France and Great Britain which was nearly completed, but was wrecked by the failure of the Cannes Conference;

\* In April 1938, she declared her intention not to take part in the application of sanctions, whether military or economic.

later, in 1925, in the Locarno Treaty. As its preamble indicated, the Rhine Pact of mutual guarantees seemed an adequate substitute for pre-war neutrality. But it could only preserve its character as long as it was accepted and observed on all sides. After the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact and the reoccupation of the Rhineland, Locarno assumed again a unilateral character and placed Belgium in a worse situation than the one she occupied in 1914. This was made so evident in King Leopold's speech of October 1936 that both Great Britain and France agreed, while maintaining their guarantee, to release Belgium from her obligations, and to resume a status of complete independence, or voluntary neutrality, consonant with the dual character of her language and population. This status, completed by the German guarantee of 1937, allowed Belgium to pass through the crisis without serious anxiety. Complete union prevailed in the country during the mobilisation, her frontiers were guarded on all sides, and there is no reason to believe that, this time, all the powers did not intend to respect them.

Had the Czechs been able or willing to follow the same policy and to adopt a federal system, safeguarding the interests of their German, Polish and Hungarian minorities, they might have avoided the fate which threatened them. Like Belgium, Czechoslovakia was a composite State occupying a key position in Europe. She could not link her destinies with one group of powers without provoking the hostility of the other and releasing disruptive forces within the State. Her difficulties, however, were enormous. The various districts did not enjoy, as in Belgium, the benefit of a long tradition of close collaboration. On the contrary, the Slav-German rivalry had never ceased to disturb the country in pre-war days, under the Hapsburg régime. Besides, the new Republic was part and parcel of the Versailles system directed against Germany. It was linked up with France, Russia and the Petite Entente which M. Barthou had enlisted in the support of that system against those who wished to alter it. The result was inevitable: a European conflagration or a revision of frontiers.

It is highly significant that the agreement achieved in the nick of time at Munich includes the prospect of a guarantee to Czechoslovakia of all the powers concerned against unprovoked aggression. Here again the situation is similar to

that of the Netherlands, after the Treaty of XXIV Articles had deprived Belgium of two provinces. The latter had to suffer territorial losses and to submit to a neutral policy if she wished her independence to be recognised and guaranteed by the concert of Europe. The King of Holland, on the other hand, had to accept the loss of the larger part of his new kingdom.

For some time, the balance of power has been restored in Europe, and guaranteed neutrality, applied to borderlands, appears again as one of the best means of preventing conflicts. In this respect the formation of a league of neutrals, applying to political questions the economic *entente* concluded at Oslo, might render great service.\* If a similar convention could be extended to the smaller States separating Germany from Russia, the risks of war would be considerably diminished and the responsibility of the aggressor more clearly defined. A Czech statesman declared the other day that if the Republic had "lost her strategic frontiers, she had preserved her moral frontiers." People may sneer at such declarations, but they contain a great deal of truth. History has shown that neutrality can yield invaluable results, and does not necessarily break the spirit of a proud nation. It has also shown that the advantage derived from the strongest strategic frontier does not compensate the disadvantage of internal strife.

There is no room in these reflections for vain recriminations, although we should bitterly regret that the Czechs should have had to pay for errors for which they are only partly responsible. However, we must reluctantly return to the pre-war state of affairs—with its balance of power, its neutrality and the wisest counsels of diplomacy—and work patiently until a new order emerges from our present trouble. We should besides frankly recognise that the internal policy of a State, however distasteful to another, should not prevent courteous relations. The sixteenth century was an era of religious fanaticism; the twentieth is sorely threatened with a political fanaticism against which all forbearance will fail unless people decide to associate or collaborate with others, whatever their views, whenever any association or collaboration is possible.

For this purpose the help of trained experts who should

\* A first step in that direction was the joint declaration, made at Geneva, on September 23rd, 1938, by the Oslo powers concerning the facultative character of Article 16 of the Covenant.

keep a constant watch on international difficulties seems essential. Mr. Chamberlain had no alternative but to act as he did, coming boldly into personal contact with Herr Hitler. But the world cannot be saved twice in such a sensational manner. Peace should not depend to such an extent on the personality of the peacemaker. While dictators remain at their posts, Prime Ministers are at the mercy of a political defeat. The new Big Four did invaluable work at Munich, but small committees acting in a hurry are not always so successful.\*

There were five powers represented in London in 1831, each of them by two or three representatives, and the Conference sat month after month until the Belgian question was settled and the trouble over. These plenipotentiaries were not subservient agents of their governments. Nesselrode was bold enough to counsel the Tzar; Talleyrand sometimes took his own line, despite his instructions. The two "blocs" were not always opposed to each other; England and France disagreed on certain points; internal politics did not vitiate foreign politics. It is obviously impossible to return to such dilatory methods, but—under normal conditions—it should not be impracticable for the heads of States, whether totalitarian or constitutionalist, to avail themselves of the services of a permanent committee of experts on which smaller nations might be represented. In case of deadlock, there would still be a supreme court of appeal, while in present circumstances any breakdown would have fatal consequences.

Many opportunities have been lost at Versailles and since Versailles, and from a certain point of view we are no further to-day than we were in 1914. The main difference is that Europe has learnt by bitter experience that no lasting advantage can ever be secured by war. She knows now not only that "war does not pay," but that war treaties do not pay, that no permanent settlement can ever be reached by violence. King Albert used to say that no limitation of armaments could ever be attained as long as the European balance of power had not been restored. This paradox may prove one day the fruit of wisdom.

ÉMILE CAMMAERTS.

\* Since this article was written, General Smuts suggested, on November 6th, that a "standing committee of the great powers" should be "a permanent part of the machinery" of a reformed League of Nations.

## PROBLEMS OF MODERN POLAND.

**P**OLAND, situated at the junction of Central and Eastern Europe, has an eventful history of more than a thousand years, in the course of which she has occupied a dominant position among the nations, suffered defeat and dismemberment, and risen triumphantly to new life. But although her capital is only a few hours' flight from London, her true character, her structure, her aims are but inadequately understood in England. The key to an understanding of Poland's international political situation lies in her geographical situation, while the prevailing internal political currents have their foundation in the country's history. As, however, Poland's history has largely been shaped by her geography, her internal policy may also be said to arise from that factor.

Poland, as her great sons rightly held, was at one period of her history "the bulwark of Christianity" of Western civilisation as a whole. What the *Ostmark* was to the Franconia and, subsequently, the Germany of the Middle Ages, Poland was to an entire continent, stemming the tide of Mongol hordes and Turkish hosts that threatened to overwhelm Western Europe. It was no accident, but a logical historical development, when, in the year 1683, the Polish King John III relieved Vienna from the Turkish siege, thus striking a decisive blow in the interests of Europe. Later, when the Turks had been driven back, a new menace to Poland—the Tsarist Empire—arose on her eastern border. Poland in her struggle with Moscow was at first victorious, and there were times when Polish armies penetrated as far as Kieff, Smolensk, and even Moscow itself; but ultimately, in the eighteenth century, she was decisively defeated, though only by the combined forces of the gigantic Russian Empire and the then new Prussian militarism.

It was a paradox of history that Prussia, a Western power, should have allied herself with the Muscovite to wipe "the bulwark of Christianity" off the map of Europe. The paradox and irony are only accentuated by the fact that at an earlier period a Polish ruler, Konrad Mazowiecki, had invited the assistance of the German knightly order in combating the pagan tribes of the Baltic lands. The German knights subsequently turned against Poland herself, were eventually (at

Grunwald in 1410) crushed by Ladislaus Jagiello, King of the Polish-Lithuanian Empire, and after a period of vassalage to the Kings of Poland, finally recovered sufficiently to lay the foundations of the Prussian State. Then Prussia combined with despotic Russia to work for the downfall of Poland, at that time the democratic country of the continent, until, partly as a result of internecine strife in Poland herself, they succeeded.

Poland has no natural frontiers in the east and west, and her enemies have always found it easy to invade her territory in these directions. She is in no better position to-day. This fact explains both the structure of the Polish State and the motives of Polish foreign policy. On her eastern border there is Soviet Russia; on her western border, the militaristic, imperialistic Third Reich; and Poland has no chains of mountains and no Maginot Lines to guard her. That is Poland's geo-political situation, and she must be strong and patriotically united, must have internal peace, if she is to survive and ensure her development.

But geography is not the only mortal enemy of modern Poland. No less dangerous is a hereditary quality of the Polish people, the proneness to carry its ideals to excess, until they become abuses. The three dismemberments of the Polish Kingdom were undoubtedly due, among other things, to internal weakness arising from the degeneration of the ideal of freedom into wantonness and licence. In the old Polish *Sejm* or Parliament, which was a Parliament despite the fact that it was exclusively composed of the nobility, the "No!" of a single member could frustrate the will of all the rest. Far-sighted Polish patriots always regarded this principle of *liberum veto* as a misfortune to their country. And when Poland was re-born after the war, the architect of her renaissance, Joseph Pilsudski, realised what Poland must be and do, if she was to avoid a repetition of the mistakes that had proved fatal to her in the past. Pilsudski was not only a military leader, the founder and head of the State, but also the educator of his people. He regarded it as his prime task to eradicate the harmful qualities of the Polish national spirit, and it must be admitted that he achieved a considerable measure of success. When he carried out his *coup d'état* he was not following the example of Fascism (whose power and attraction were at that time far less than they are

to-day); he was actuated solely by the determination to make Poland strong and save her from the chaos of ill-considered experiment. Pilsudski was no friend of the *Sejm*, but not, as has been alleged in the democratic countries, because he was opposed to democratic institutions as such; what he was opposed to was anarchy. A nation must be educated to democracy and, in addition, it must have peace. Pilsudski wanted to educate the Polish people in that direction, and at the same time consolidate his country both internally and externally. He realised that Poland, as always throughout her history, was threatened from the east and west and could not afford internal weakness. Although in the first years of Poland's independence Pilsudski himself had defeated Soviet Russia in the field, the menace remained, and he also knew that Poland's Western neighbour could not remain impotent for ever. The events of the last few years have justified Pilsudski. There has arisen the Third Reich, which sooner or later is bound to yield to the *Drang nach Osten* again, despite its present preoccupation with South-Eastern Europe.

Thus the principal aims of Polish foreign policy must be, on the one hand, to maintain, as far as possible, friendly relations with these two mighty neighbours and, on the other, to make Poland so strong that she shall be able to resist attack from whatever quarter. That was the basis of Pilsudski's policy, and continues to be the guiding principle of Poland's policy to-day.

While Pilsudski lived his authority, which was not a despotic but a benevolent one, was undoubtedly the only source of power in the State. After his death the situation changed. The non-Party Bloc of Co-operation, which had been formed by the Marshal's followers, and which existed side by side with the various parties (which were *not* dissolved), soon disintegrated, and was replaced by the National Union Organisation. The latter has totalitarian tendencies, and although the various political parties are at present allowed a limited activity, they are not represented in Parliament. There is an opposition of the Right and one of the Left. The former is mainly represented by the National Democratic Party which, however, is no more democratic than the German National Socialist Party is Socialist. On the contrary, the National Democrats, and particularly their younger dissidents, the *Oener*, advocate a distinctly reactionary Fascism.

The opposition of the Left is composed of the Socialist Party (which has a long and honourable tradition, Pilsudski himself having belonged to it at one time), and the People's Party. The latter, once very powerful among the Polish peasantry, has lost a great deal of its influence, as evidenced by the recent General Election. Its call to abstain from voting (which was also made by the other opposition parties) was only obeyed by a comparatively small percentage of the population, though this may to some extent have been due to the fact that, shortly before the election, the Government scored a great success by re-uniting the Teschen territory with Poland. Thus the present *Sejm*, although almost entirely composed of Government followers, with only a few representatives of national minorities, certainly corresponds more closely to the actual state of political opinion than its predecessor, which was elected by a considerably lower poll. Whether the present *Sejm* will introduce a new, democratic system of franchise, which is supposed to be its prime task, and which lies at the core of the political struggle in Poland, remains to be seen.

Apart from this struggle for democratic rule, the minority question is one of the most important of Poland's present problems. Poland has several large minority groups within her borders. The most important and numerically strongest are the Ukrainians who inhabit what was formerly Eastern Galicia, and Wolhynia. Now possession of Eastern Galicia is an historical and geo-political necessity to Poland; historical, because most of the cities in this territory (e.g. Lwow) are mainly Polish not only as regards population, but also as regards tradition and culture, despite the presence of strong Jewish and Ukrainian minorities among their inhabitants; and geo-political, because Poland, with unprotected frontiers in the east and west, cannot renounce the natural rampart represented by the Carpathians in the south. Incidentally it should be borne in mind that the real Ukrainian problem lies in the Dnjepr-Ukraine which to-day forms part of the Soviet Union. That is where the destiny of the Ukrainian people will be decided, and not in Eastern Galicia, let alone Karpatho-Ruthenia, which is endeavouring—with the aid of German Nazism, remarkably enough—to become a sort of Ukrainian Piedmont.

The White Russian minority can safely be left out of



account, for the White Russians gravitate so strongly towards Polish culture that sooner or later they will cease to represent a minority problem. Poland has comparatively few Lithuanians—fewer than the Polish minority in Lithuania. It is perhaps not generally known in Western Europe that Wilno is a thoroughly Polish city, though it was once the capital of the Grand-Duchy of Lithuania; but that was at a time when the Grand-Duchy was very closely linked with Poland.

The Germans, inhabiting the western provinces of Poland, constitute a comparatively large minority but, in contrast with the Sudeten territory, there are here no compact masses of Germans. They form a relatively small island in a sea of purely Polish-speaking areas. Also it should be borne in mind that the German minority inhabits provinces which have always been Polish, the infiltration of Germans having been carried out, often by brutal methods, in pursuance of the *Drang nach Osten*. This applies not only to the Posen area and Polish Upper Silesia, but also to the famous Corridor separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany. It is probably the universal impression that the Corridor is really German, and was only ceded to Poland under the Treaty of Versailles in order to give the new country access to the Baltic Sea. But that is not true. This territory was Polish before the war, as proved by the fact that its inhabitants sent Polish deputies to the German Reichstag at every election. At the same time, it should be remembered that present-day Germany also has a large Polish minority (more than a million) which would be glad to receive the same treatment as is accorded to the German minority in Poland. Nevertheless, during the last few years Nazi propaganda has made considerable progress among the German population of Poland. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that if a Polish Henlein arose he would have as easy a task as the Czech Henlein, for apart from the fact, already referred to, that the Germans of Poland are comparatively scattered, the military resources of the country are far greater than were those of Czechoslovakia.

The problem of the vast Jewish minority, numbering nearly three and a half million people, is truly tragic. While Pilsudski was living anti-Semitism could make no headway in Poland; it was held in check by the respect for his authority. After

his death, however, the anti-Jewish elements began to gain ground, and succeeded in penetrating into individual groups in the Government camp, in addition to having at their disposal the National Democratic Party whose entire programme pivots round the Jewish question. Also, the raising of race hatred to a main plank of government policy in the Third Reich could not fail to influence developments in Poland. The fact that, despite all this, there are large political groups and many prominent personalities in Poland who have not allowed themselves to be infected with anti-Semitism, arises from the old Polish tradition in which differences of race and religion did not exist, but which is now unfortunately placed on the defensive. However, there is reason to hope that the ideals of humanity and brotherhood proclaimed by the great Polish poets will prevail again at some future time. At present the problem of the Polish Jews is truly unhappy. In the mass they are paupers; they are being steadily driven out of all the trades and professions in which they have taken root, such as commerce, industry, and the liberal professions, but mainly the retail trades and crafts, and their only hope is emigration. But the question of emigration to-day is more difficult than ever before. Every country, including the overseas colonial territories, has strict regulations in this connection which make mass emigration impossible. The situation of the Jews of the Third Reich is so intolerable that it demands an immediate solution of the emigration problem; but the needs of Polish Jewry are no less urgent. To-day it would still be possible to organise their emigration in friendly collaboration with the Polish Government, and this possibility ought to be exploited. There is, in the first place, Palestine, where the Jews, despite terrific difficulties, have in two decades accomplished wonders, and which still has a very considerable absorptive capacity. But there are other overseas territories which could absorb large numbers of Polish Jews, and there is no doubt whatever that the governments and peoples of these countries could only benefit from large-scale Jewish immigration.

The picture of modern Poland would not be complete without an outline of her foreign policy, the main principles of which have already been referred to. Poland's endeavour to maintain friendly relations with her neighbours has been completely realised as far as the Baltic States—Lettland,  
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Esthonia and Finland—are concerned. The relations of Poland with Lithuania, following a period of tension, improved very considerably after the crisis of March 1938. As to Poland's relations with Czechoslovakia, much will depend on the final settlement of the Karpatho-Ruthenian question. Poland maintains the attitude that a Polish-Hungarian frontier is a necessity, and advocates the transfer of Ruthenia to Hungary. With regard to her Western neighbour, Poland has proved by her non-aggression pact with Germany, concluded long before that country's rearmament, that she desires peace. The recent renewal and confirmation of a similar pact with Soviet Russia (in November 1938) must convince all who thought that Poland had attached herself to Hitler's chariot that the sole aim of Polish foreign policy is to preserve peace and her own independence. It should also be remembered that the Franco-Polish Agreement, as well as the Roumanian-Polish Alliance, is still in existence, and, further, that democratic England and America are held in friendly esteem in Poland.

That, in brief, is the position of Poland to-day.

S. WOLF.

## THE FUTURE OF TECHNICAL SCIENCE.

WHAT will future technical development bring? More machines with registering and controlling apparatus, compelling men to continuous work and making of them mere automata? More motor-cars crowding streets and rendering them dangerous, thus defeating their own end, swiftness, by their ever-increasing numbers? More aeroplanes and inventions causing greater restlessness, hurry and noise, vitiated air, much danger to life, over-production, unemployment, increased taxation, danger of war? To-day we suffer terribly from the mechanisation of life and the loss of higher values. Even industry itself struggles against the overflow of new inventions and improvements, because the speed of change and rebuilding—from a business point of view—can no longer be borne. Many already speak of “the error of the machine” and would like to discover a way back to individual craftsmanship and works of art, to the days of our forefathers: the creeds of childhood, fairy-tales, romance and mysticism—a return to the magical and heroic world. Yet the future may bring even more destructive technical miracles and monster machines. Posterity may be abandoned to overwhelming mechanisation and technique, the terror of which will suppress all individuality and genius and the spirit of humanity. If the present development continues, the human race will become mere machine slaves, leading to the ruin of civilisation.

The fault lies with man himself and not with the machine. It is the outcome of profit-seeking which misuses power to produce and over-produce. Curiously unbusinesslike in its results, it has destroyed the economy of life and thus the happiness of mankind. Without the stupendous means of a mechanised technique, development would never have advanced as it has done, but each gift out of this Pandora's box has brought many similar ones in its train. The invention of gunpowder led to machine-guns, shrapnel, bombs, mines, torpedoes, poison gas. Not only has war become more sanguinary and destructive, but the whole struggle for existence and the strife of business have grown hard and exhausting. To suggest the destruction of machines and apparatus would be nonsense. The partial restriction by law of their free use has been attempted, but was unsatisfactory

as it was felt to be an arbitrary measure implying loss of liberty. And the question whether a more highly organised use of mechanistic technique might gradually bring back perfect harmony must be answered in the negative ; this also includes the realms of psychology, sociology, law and economics. For the conditions due to the growth and expansion of life are not abolished by moralising, legislation or organisation. The only solution lies in fresh achievements in the realms of technique. Neither leagues for the prevention of cruelty to animals nor legal measures could save poor horses the excessive exertion of dragging heavy loads uphill. The tractor alone accomplished this. When road conditions are better and prices lower, it will be found more economical and rational to use this machine than the work of a beast of burden. This merely shows that the present inhuman technique of the machine, with its hopelessly entangled civilisation, can be effectually overcome only by perfecting that very technique in the future.

In our endeavour to create a new synthesis let us first take the standpoint of the philosopher and then that of the man of action. We must face the fact that the failure of our civilisation of technique and technical culture lies in an error of principle. We do not understand how to tap the reservoirs of power so lavishly given us by nature. We do not know how to make use of the elementary powers of space with its fields of energy, the rays of the sun, the free energies of the earth itself, the power of the atom. Rather we burn coal, oil, etc., and, by destroying much, produce our own petty sources of power. We tolerate defectiveness and waste products. We are forced to dig our means of energy laboriously from the bowels of the earth, transporting them over great distances and cleaning the waste products by intricate processes, finally obtaining only a fraction of energy inherent in the raw materials thus liberated.

For instance, heat is produced by means of chemical processes, mechanical friction, compression, impacts, the compensatory action of electrical tension and the change of magnetic poles when overcoming the resistance of material conductors for these two streams of subtle energy. Even the sun's rays were only made real as the accompaniment of the processes of absorption of waves of rays in matter. But it will soon be possible to produce specific motions in the

molecular structure of certain classes of bodies as the most suitable resorbents and corpuscular motor transformers, so that friction of an otherwise immeasurably fine movement actually represents heat. It may then be possible to produce heat as the sole effect and aim, not merely as a by-product ; just as it will be possible, under slightly different conditions, by the aid of delicate transformers and further corpuscular motor elements, to produce electrical and other energy. This will then be a pure production of power, which so far has only occurred in chemical matter or in pure bacteriological cultures. Numerous workers in different branches of physics, electricity, chemistry, astronomy and astro-physics are busy to-day, sometimes perhaps without realising the great purpose to which their several labours tend, paving the way for a coming science of liberating and ennobling technique.

Science of old never visualised such an aim, namely the construction of a body that will under certain conditions develop heat without consuming itself or requiring the artificial addition of energy. It was the knowledge of radioactive substances that showed how nature is capable of bringing forth heat as well as rays of several kinds, without oxidisation or any kind of chemical affinities or disintegrations, without any processes of mechanical pressure, shock, friction, or compression, and without the aid of any specially visible electric or radiated outside energy. At the same time decomposition and consumption of material occurred on account of the destruction of the atom ; though this happened very slowly. Natural and artificial permanent magnets, however, perform such a function in defeating the constantly active "pull" of gravity, without consuming themselves or weakening their power. The order of magnitude of the magnetic "pull" is, of course, infinitesimally small compared with the energy liberated by the disintegrations of the atom, when the same measure is applied to both. The writer informed the discoverer of radium, more than thirty years ago, that in his opinion these two phenomena, however much they may differ, fall into line under a certain aspect, because their display of power is fed from the same source of cosmic energy, even though the first shows a dynamic and the second apparently only a static effect of the physical actions of the ether. Magnets can absorb certain forms of etheric pressure, tension and movement on

account of their peculiar molecular structure. Radio-active substances can do the same owing to their peculiar atomic structure. Both can transform these power streams into another form of energy peculiar to themselves. Mme Curie replied affirmatively at first and maintained this opinion for a time. Subsequently she considered that the theory of disintegration was sufficient explanation of the radio-active phenomena that interested her, leaving the force of the permanent magnet and certain other phenomena as beyond her scope. I found the theory of disintegration illuminating. I believed the cause of the disintegration of radio-active atoms to be due to the tremendous collision and pressure of fundamental cosmic energy, to which the labile inner dynamics of radio-active substances were more exposed, and to which they could offer less resistance than inactive substances. To retard the tidal flow of fundamental cosmic energy would make radio-active substances inactive during their isolation. The sensitising of suitable matter other than radio-active must make it sensitive to the pressure and collision of general cosmic motion—it would become radio-active for the time being. A number of experiments have proved the truth of this claim.

The foundation has now been laid for the future technical science of subtle matter and power. This is based on the discovery of general motion and the universal pressure of space as fundamental elementary forces of the universe and on several new possibilities of utilising them technically. The space of the universe is not a dead empty nothingness, as it appeared to astronomers of old. They felt afraid when they contemplated the sparsity of the stars—about one glowing pinpoint every sixty-three kilometres, if the diameter of the sun be placed in proper ratio of size, for comparison's sake, to the distances between them. Yet this space is full of manifold activity, rushing motion, and mysterious fields of energy other than those of an electric or magnetic nature. This is quite apart from the numerous rays of countless stars and from the variations and combinatory possibilities of their power of gravitation. If we consider this, we see that the apparent void is full of bursting with energy, that force is the nature of space.

The revolutions of the earth and other stars show the power of this fundamental motion. The revolutions of the planets

around suns and of many twin stars about each other—in the case of the earth, about thirty kilometres per second—show the analogous motion at twenty kilometres per second of the whole of our solar system in the direction of the star Vega. Finally, the motion at 300 kilometres per second of our entire galactic system, in its form of a lens, that we call the Milky Way, towards the star Capella. The whole immeasurable universe with its countless systems of worlds, nebular stars and streams of heavenly bodies, is subject to this immense urge of expansion, the discovery of which made such an impression on the astronomers that the world was compared to an exploding grenade. Very few of us realise that a second principle of astral mechanics has been determined, compelling the Kant-Laplace theory to be modified out of recognition. Gravitation, raised to the position of an absolute monarch by Newton, has had to accept a deeper and more mysterious aspect of the universe as co-regent, starting to unveil the dynamics of so-called empty space.

Behind both the principles of astral mechanics, gravitation and cosmic expansion, lies hidden the fundamental origin of all power and life in the world, the greatest as well as the smallest, the very origin of the world. The same breathing spirit, the same primeval motion, holds in action the solar systems and the islands of worlds as well as the atomic planetaries and their constituents and complexes.

In addition to the inconceivably great motion there is everywhere in the cosmos as well as in the smallest spot of our earth, in the depths of the oceans, below the piles of the mountains, the terrible pressure of space. Against this pressure the gyratory dynamics of the whirling atoms and their constituents, driven by the breath of universal motion, seem barely capable of maintaining their inherent neutral *vacuole*, although it is just this general pressure of space that achieves the cohesion of the sub-atomic planetary worlds, the hidden cause of cohesion and, probing deeper still, of gravitation.

Man has been placed in the midst of this inexhaustible ocean of power, of the energy of space. Wherever he may be, as long as the earth and the heavenly bodies remain in their courses, he need never have produced light, heat, electricity, etc., by the indirect means of combustion. Motions of molecules, atoms, electrons, etc. (heat, influence of chemical

of generators and transformers that are to serve for the transformation of cosmic motion for technical use will be made of this matter armed with special metals. Various kinds of absorbers, suckers, collectors, conductors, isolators, condensers, concentrators, commutators, interruptors, reducers, filters, refractors, polarisers, analysers, radiators, etc., will be required, and at the same time apparatus for additional irritation, sensitisation and activation of the various parts, so as to make them serve their several purposes.

What can and will this new-born technique bring? Its coming has been prepared to a great extent in secret. First, it will free us from the terrible fear of wars for the possession of oil and other fuel. Secondly, the end of the principle of centralisation—so tyrannically predominant to-day—and a healthy decentralisation; the independence of small undertakings, and a new lease of life for home industries. The power generator, fed by the energy of space without cost, will need next to no service and repairs, as the inner molecular and inner atomistic processes of rotation, oscillation and balance of pressure are not subject to any mechanical wear and tear, need no lubricating, and, above all, no fuel. The owner—and in future that will be the head of a family, or householder—will be enabled to place it in his motor-car or aeroplane, or use it at home to produce light, heat or power, as the manifold source of power and heat in a workshop or factory; that is to say, in the workroom of the family itself. Concerning the production of fresh vegetables, salads, fruit, etc., he can make himself absolutely independent of the markets and all suppliers; for the energy of one generator will suffice to heat a small green-house, the flower beds and the ground itself, and to treat the plants extensively with rays. Every family will produce all the vegetable foods it requires with little work. In a very small space there will be quick and frequent harvests bearing marvellous crops. The family will live an almost separate, independent, economic unit, feeding without having to rely on industry and supplies. If out of work, a man will only lose his additional earned income, for his own plot of land will keep him alive. Man will no longer be the slave of machinery, doomed to perpetual writing and reckoning, neither will there be need for employee or worker. Man will not only—like his ancestors—regain his natural affinity with the soil, but he will also

become acquainted with the universe and its cosmic powers; with the inherent powers of matter and the laws that govern both.

From his own plot of earth that will make him free and independent, he will escape, whenever he wishes, in his small and swift car, or plane, to visit any part of the earth and return home with the rapidity of a wizard. A trip from London to New York, Chicago, San Francisco or to Colombo, Bombay, Calcutta, to Kenya or the Cape, to any part of our globe, will take barely as many hours as our present aeroplanes require days. Not only will there be air-traffic but houses—built from entirely other materials than those used to-day—will fly; for gravity will have been conquered and physical levitation attained. Air screws will only be needed for purposes of ventilation, not as propellers.

The vehicle of levitation of the future creates differentiated spheres of power around itself, which react on their surroundings like a floating top does with whirling streams of water. It creates, moreover, attractions ahead and repulsions (without rocket-backfiring) to the rear. A sucking pole "Sog" ahead, stowing of pressure behind, surrounded by an unassailable and impenetrable whirling gyration, the spaceship of the future will be free to choose its own path, even to the stars, travel with the speed of lightning, without danger or noise, without machinery, simply, safely and naturally.

The sciences of chemistry, metallurgy, pharmacology, biology and medicine, etc., will also be developed and brought to a similar state of perfection by the application of an analogous principle. This must affect science and human culture as a whole, resulting in a new civilisation.

When may all this come to pass? The last masterpiece of the future technique of space and power will be some time in coming; but it most certainly will come, as soon as it will be a blessing and not a curse to mankind, as the evolution of the motorised kite from the sport and travelling plane to the bomber has unfortunately become. Incredible though this seems, the accelerated development of the numerous marvels and blessings of the future technique of space-power will cost a mere fraction of the present methods used by the sinister and gigantic military states of to-day. And the catastrophic destruction of the mechanistic machine age is perhaps drawing near.

E. A. KRAUSE.

## BIRDS OF THE WILDERNESS.

MANY birds which winter in the south of the British Isles select higher altitudes than our shores can offer for their breeding-places, while others which forsake us when the September nights are lengthening in search of summer conditions elsewhere confine themselves during their stay in Great Britain to the most barren parts of the country, thus rearing their young under conditions which, compared with their haunts during the remainder of the year, can only be regarded as winter-like. It is worthy of remark that all birds which migrate seek colder rather than warmer conditions in which to breed, although one might have expected the reverse to be the case, particularly if one draws the inevitable comparison with plant life in which the fertile period invariably corresponds with higher temperatures. The spring movement which coincides with the mating impulse is consistently northwards; the autumnal drift, when mating is over for the year, southwards. And from this, as the question inevitably becomes more involved, some interesting points arise.

Circumstances upon the whole seem to suggest that migration from southern lands in spring, contrary to the purely conventional view, is to avoid excessive heat—according to the standard of the bird—even more than the southern autumnal trend proceeds from a desire to escape from the rigours of the advancing winter. It is possible that many birds would experience difficulty in rearing their young under extremely hot conditions. The distress of the nestlings at such times is frequently apparent even in our temperate climate. One may observe the condition of young birds such as spotted flycatchers, swallows, or any that nest in airless places, and it is not difficult to believe that in a really high temperature many would perish. Everything would, of course, depend upon the precise degree of heat or cold that each species is capable of withstanding, the standard of the tropical bird naturally differing from that of an Arctic animal, even as the temperature in which an Oriental delights might conceivably prostrate an Englishman, and in this respect, among birds even as in human life, one encounters the same curious disposition towards extremes. Thus the snow bunting who for the most part regards this island as too far below the Arctic Circle to be worthy of consideration as a breeding-ground is

not averse to sunbathing in the Mediterranean countries during the remainder of the year. The latest flights of wheatears—presumably the most extensive globe-trotters of their race—are said to continue the northward movement to its extreme limits, while that curious little bird, the whinchat, another northerner who in this country only nests upon high barren ground, does not find Africa too warm a retreat when family duties are accomplished.

In view of the essential part that migration plays in natural distribution, and taking its obvious practical advantages into account, one can only wonder that the movement is not universal among birds. It is, of course, far more general than was realised within comparatively recent years. Many species are semi-migratory, changing their habitat without actually crossing the sea, while in others the tendency is incompletely developed, being evinced only in certain strains. This limitation of the instinct, indeed, constitutes its most curious feature. During severe winters one has known birds such as redwings perish in considerable numbers from cold or starvation, when the obvious solution of their difficulties lay in continuing their southward journey. Our own resident song-thrush provides an apt example of many species which are not really adapted by habit to survive even a hard English winter, and it seems unaccountable that while the redwing and fieldfare are migratory, the song-thrush, so closely akin, should lack a corresponding disposition.

The respective habits of the whinchat and stonechat present a similar problem. During summer the requirements of the two species are identical, also their behaviour when they occupy common ground, yet it is the apparently harder whinchat, the confirmed mountaineer, that invariably migrates. This seems to suggest that the winter movement is a matter of food rather than climate, the upland or mountain bird caring only for the fare that can be procured upon high altitudes, and when this is no longer obtainable on the British hills it seeks the more southern heights where berries and insects still abound.

The whinchat is one of those birds which, owing to its retiring habits, is frequently overlooked, and upon this account is probably more widely distributed than has as yet been discovered. Its nest, if possible, is even more deftly concealed than that of the stonechat, and is harder to find

because the parent birds, being less bold than their relatives, do not proclaim its vicinity in so aggressive a manner. Apart from this, the attractive little bird possesses all the engaging qualities of the stonechat and would provide a welcome addition to the avifauna of our commons were it more generally represented. The young birds are always more in evidence than the adults, which latter possess the knack of effacing themselves so completely after the nestlings take wing that it seems probable that a great many migrate before the young are ready to accompany them.

Of the true moorland birds one could not select a more interesting or outstanding example than that of the ring-ouzel, in whose history most of the puzzling points in connection with distribution and migration are illustrated. In this species one finds a bird which, while adhering resolutely to the moors and hills, differs little structurally or in its general manner of living from the ubiquitous blackbird. There is no apparent reason why either bird should not thrive in the habitat which it surrenders so exclusively to the other; no satisfactory cause for the respective scarcity or abundance of the two species concerned, or for the migratory or resident habits which each again observes so rigorously.

Apart from the problematical side of its history, however—questions which might be applied in varying degrees to a great many migrants—the ring-ouzel is one of those birds to whom a special interest has always been attached ever since the days when their passage through the New Forest in spring and autumn first attracted the attention of Gilbert White. At that period when ornithology was comparatively in its infancy, even the breeding range of this species remained something of a mystery, and although the bird is no longer a stranger to the naturalist, to most people he is still, perhaps, sufficiently unfamiliar a figure to justify a closer study of his many attractive ways.

Spring climbs the high moorland with tardy feet, but soon or late tempestuous March introduces a day when the sun shines from cloudless blue, and it is then that the cock ring-ouzel in the pride of full dress suit and golden bill sings his wild love song above the pool where the little trout are rising. In southern England the ring-ouzel's range is mainly confined to Dartmoor and Exmoor, where it nests regularly, though seldom below the 1,000-foot level. Its arrival roughly

coincides with that of the curlew, its clear far-sounding whistle being one of the first indications of spring's return to the uplands. Perched upon some outstanding boulder, his white cravat agleam in the clear sunlight, he presents a conspicuous figure that can scarcely fail to attract notice, and his bold voice is usually the first to challenge any human intruder into the rocky valley which he quickly appropriates as his own.

An effective stroke of natural artistry is that white adornment which, like a touch of winter's brush, proclaims the ring-ouzel's identity. One might imagine that the Snow-King, while reluctantly yielding sovereignty over these lone, cold heights for a brief period, in withdrawing had placed his brand upon the creatures which inhabit his domain, even as the coin of a realm must display the head of its ruler. Apart from fantasy, however, more than a hint of the austere is inseparable from the ring-ouzel's personality, and one cannot but wonder that a bird so sturdy and courageous should find it necessary to forsake our shores when the wintry conditions which fail to appal him upon the March moorlands are resolutely faced throughout the year by the less hardy members of his order.

Whether the rule is general or otherwise, it certainly seems to be a matter of food rather than climate which induces the ring-ouzel to migrate. He arrives when the insect life of the hills, dormant through the long cold months, creeps forth for its first tentative survey, when frogs are spawning and vipers emerge from the rocks. Later, when sated with the grub diet so lavishly provided, he fattens upon the purple harvest ripening among the tumbled rocks and beside the hill streams where his brood is reared. He inherits all the blackbird's passion for fruit, and where the whortleberries are most luscious there the ring-ouzel will always be found, selecting the pick of the wild crop with a connoisseur's skill, and feeding upon little else as long as this abundant store is available. Whortleberries, indeed, seem more essential to him than water, and probably upon this account his nest is sometimes built high upon a bleak ridge, far from a stream but surrounded by his favourite plant which ensures a liberal provision for the young. This, of course, applies particularly to the second brood which appears about whortleberry time, the nursery site being frequently chosen at a much higher altitude than that of the first venture.



It is not an easy nest to find, since the bird, suspicious for all his boldness, is almost as wary as his neighbour the stone-chat, and gives the observer little assistance. When conscious of espionage, the male bird holds aloof, or disports himself upon the rocks at a discreet distance with a creditable assumption of indifference. The hen, however, is a close sitter, never running but flying straight off her eggs when directly approached, the clatter of angry protest with which she takes wing usually betraying the secret otherwise so skilfully guarded. Few moorland nests are more attractive. Always picturesque in setting, the structure suggests the character of the bird, bold, neat, and vested with an atmosphere of unconquerable wildness entirely foreign to the homely and somewhat untidy nest of the blackbird. It may be placed deep in heather or among the roots of dwarf gorse, more frequently with a rock foundation embedded in moss or silver lichen with which its perfect green contour and lining of fine grasses provides a pleasing contrast. Sometimes it overlooks the fretful course of a mountain brook a few feet below; at others, a desolate expanse of grass over which bog-cotton waves and snipe are drumming, and I have found it near the summit of a raven-haunted peak commanding a wide vista of moorland, rock and stream, with ever-changing cloud-shadow and mist effects upon which the brooding bird might ruminate as each slow day rolled by. Such being the scenes upon which the bright inquisitive eyes of the young ring-ouzel first open, it is not surprising that the free moorland spirit should be the bird's inheritance, or that something of the hill torrent's austere music should have crept into his song, imparting a hint almost of harshness to his softest notes.

The cock ring-ouzel conforms to the curious habit—more common among birds than is generally supposed—of conveying green material to the nest long after the eggs have been laid. I have watched shags assiduously collecting grass for this purpose, and once saw a herring gull deposit a liberal beak-load upon the back of his brooding mate. There can be little doubt that the odd proceeding is prompted by a prolongation of the building instinct. In other words, it provides an emotional outlet. The feathered householder, wearied of or puzzled by his lady's inaction while incubating, and anxious to forward proceedings, continues his efforts long after the necessity has passed, and like many well-intentioned

males where domestic matters are concerned, becomes a nuisance rather than otherwise.

In this connection I recently witnessed a somewhat peculiar incident. When entering a Dartmoor ravine in which a pair of ring-ouzel had been located, I was greeted by excited outcry and the most unexpected appearance of the two birds in vociferous attendance upon a buzzard. The unusual procession swept down the coombe at whirling speed, the cries being quickly lost in the distance, and while awaiting the return of the ouzels who were obviously chasing the wide-winged bandit away from their domain, we happened to notice the disturbed appearance of an abandoned carrion crow's nest in a lone mountain ash near by. The wool "mattress" had obviously been stirred up, and investigation disclosed that the hollow of the nest had been re-lined with green willow, so freshly gathered from an adjacent bush that the leaves, always quick to wilt, were still unaffected by the hot June sunshine. It seemed more than probable that the buzzard, a famous exponent of this queer "adornment," had been indulging his predilection in the vacated structure of the crow.

Like most migratory birds, the ring-ouzel returns annually to a prescribed nesting-site from which it is only driven by some material change in the character of the locality, such as the burning of the herbage which provided food or cover. A certain coombe or ravine, once selected, remains the property of the pair that appropriates it for a period of years—probably as long as the partnership survives—and one rarely finds two pairs established in the same neighbourhood. Although tolerably prolific, being much the same as the blackbird in this respect, the stock never seems to increase. Rather, the tendency is to decline, and the present season of 1938 has been marked by a notable decrease, at least upon Dartmoor, and it is to be feared that the excessive burning of the heather which took place early in the year, induced by the abnormally dry conditions, will have a further adverse effect upon the status of the birds.

The latter circumstance is most regrettable, since, owing to their distinctive character, few birds provide a more attractive or outstanding feature of the summer and autumn moorlands. They display themselves to the best advantage when the young first leave the nest, the open character of

the country making it possible to observe their doings just at the interesting time when woodland species usually take advantage of dense green foliage to conceal their family story. The picture which they present is eminently typical of avian life and character. In bringing up the brood both parents assist to some extent, but as usual the lion's share of the actual work falls upon the mother bird. Now and again the male brings a contribution which he delivers ostentatiously, and is so proud of the achievement that he retires forthwith to an adjacent rock or prominent bush, from which he proclaims his merits and magnificence in the high-sounding whistle which is not unlike the opening notes of the skylark's song upon a louder scale. There he remains for perhaps an hour, bursting with self-satisfaction and doubtless flattering himself that he is intimidating some imaginary lurking enemy, while his wife, quiet and efficient in true feminine style, continues to fill the hungry little mouths dependent upon their joint efforts, coming and going almost without rest, except when she joins her splendid and probably much admired mate for a minute or two upon his platform, but whether to express appreciation of his fine appearance and musical abilities or to suggest that he might help a little with the real work does not transpire. The only note she ever utters is a harsh chatter which may be heard from either bird at moments of alarm. This at a distance, since it differs only in volume, is scarcely distinguishable from the famous metallic challenge of the stonechat, and is also practically identical with the alarm call of the wheatear, except that the latter bird occasionally punctuates his protests with an intermittent pipe, inserted like an afterthought.

The fledglings, meanwhile, are stowed away at various convenient points in the heather, and one cannot but appreciate the skill with which the parents discover their hiding-places, no matter how frequently they take up new positions. Neither of the adults appears to experience the least difficulty in finding them, flying or usually running straight to the new refuge as though it had been prearranged. The male, when bringing food, seems to have a special favourite upon whom his contributions are always bestowed. The hen-bird, upon the other hand, is strictly impartial, in which respect she evinces a far higher degree of intelligence than certain birds, as the swallow, to give one example. If one watches young

swallows a-row upon a roof awaiting rations, it will be seen that the nearest claimant, or sometimes the noisiest, will receive attention again and again while the remainder go hungry. The ring-ouzel, upon the contrary, not only attends to the needs of all in turn, but divides each supply that she has brought, appearing with an enormous beakful which diminishes as she passes from one member of the family to another.

All young birds of this order develop rapidly after leaving the nest, and the parents are soon at liberty to embark upon their second venture, which is usually but not invariably undertaken. At times, indeed, duties overlap in this respect, and a thrush may serve the interests of posterity even to the length of laying another clutch while still feeding her first family. A bird of the wilderness may be "blithesome" at this time of year, but it is anything save "cumberless," and might have been described as an emblem of industry and fortitude rather than essentially of "happiness."

The ring-ouzel remains upon the hills until the rowan berries which succeed the whorts have been duly harvested. This is his farewell feast, spread by the good genius of the moorland to cheer the departing birds and to ensure that throughout their southern wanderings they shall carry a pleasant impression of the wild home which, despite its rugged sterility, proves a land of plenty to all who can utilise its wealth. This is also a convivial season when the ring-ouzels, at other times aloof and eminently exclusive, assemble in gay parties, and as the berries redden, each lonely little mountain ash is visited in turn, the harsh but not unpleasing notes of the banqueters mingling with the river music and the moaning of the mountain winds into which a chill has crept. This is the note which sounds their departure, the force that sweeps them away, and suddenly, as such things usually happen, one discovers that the moorland has surrendered its complement of summer life, that the valleys are silent save for the raven's croak, and that the golden plover has taken possession of the ridges to await the Snow-King's return.

DOUGLAS GORDON.

## ANGLO-HUNGARIAN CULTURAL RELATIONS.

A HUNDRED years ago, John Paget travelled in Hungary and Transylvania collecting material which enabled him to write his excellent book *Hungary and Transylvania*. At that time Hungary was for the average Englishman merely an exotic corner of the Austrian Empire. It was regarded as a land where travel was not safe, or at any rate not too comfortable, yet a place from which the intrepid traveller carried back with him colourful memories and remembrances of quaint Anglophile society. For even at that time, and yet more in the middle 'forties, during Széchenyi's period of reforms, Hungary looked with admiration towards the distant island country; to the cultured Eastern European observer it seemed the Utopia of political freedom and of economic and social prosperity. A knowledge of England at first-hand was in those days the privilege of the few, of the aristocracy, of statesmen, and of a few writers and teachers. Anglo-Saxon culture had not yet come within the reach of the general public, except in the form of translations of poetry and essays.

Some thirty years later, Arthur J. Patterson came to Hungary on a visit; he was a friend of the writer's father and a childhood memory. Patterson travelled all over the country on three occasions between 1862 and 1869, and in the latter year published his book *The Magyars*. Here we read that the aristocracy of the 'sixties was not only Anglomaniac but almost dangerously polyglot; he found that the English language was widely spoken, though of course not so much as French and German. He finally returned to Hungary, and made it his second home, becoming the first professor of the newly established Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Budapest in 1887. Patterson was a most erudite man of great personality, and Arthur Yolland, his successor, followed in his footsteps; his excellent work in the last forty years has won many devoted friends for him in Hungary. Nevertheless, the chair occupied successively by Patterson and Yolland only achieved real significance after the war, when Count Klebelsberg, who was Minister of Public Instruction from 1922 to 1930, in the course of his many and progressive reforms introduced the English language as a

compulsory subject in some of the schools. It was only natural that the attention of young people training to be teachers should be increasingly drawn towards English. Mr. V. D. Barker's interesting article\* gave an account of English-teaching in public schools, an innovation not ten years old.

The problem of cultural relations between London and Budapest was brought into prominence by various events in 1936 and 1937. It was in these years that the first steps were taken. *The Hungarian Quarterly*, round which a Society has gathered, was first published in 1936. The single aim is to act as an intermediary between the two nations, and the British Council has joined in the work by sending lecturers to the S.H.Q. in Budapest since the autumn of 1936, while the Society itself has invited several well-known Englishmen to lecture.

Such lecturers as Sir Ronald Storrs, Sir Richard Livingstone, Sir Kenneth Clark, Professor Arnold Toynbee, Wedgwood Benn, Bruce Lockhart, Hugh Ruttledge, Sir Charles Petrie, Graham D. Hutton and Vernon D. Barker are Great Britain's finest "culture-diplomats," and we can never have enough of such lecturers. But besides this what we need is the visit of an English theatrical company; since the war we have not had a single one in Hungary. And we need books, for the newest things in the English publishers' lists only reach us now and then, and with difficulty, and we also need exhibitions. In the spring of 1937 the Anglo-Hungarian Society was revived in London; its framework had been in existence for some years, and we may now hope that its activities will be continuous, permanent and useful.

The distress that followed the war left the Hungarians little time to think of anything but their own impoverished and dismembered country. In the years of consolidation, however, about 1925, their Ministers of Public Instruction were at last able to think of the future on purely cultural grounds. Not the least among their aims was the establishment of a Hungarian readership at the University of London. Twelve years ago the writer was asked by the late Lewis Tóth, Under-Secretary of State for Public Instruction, to make private inquiries about the feasibility of the project. The obstacles at that time were partly financial and partly personal; financial inasmuch as the endowment of such a

\* In *The Hungarian Quarterly*, Spring 1937.

department would have been too heavy a charge on the State budget. But an even greater difficulty was that at the time no English scholar could be found who was sufficiently well versed in the Hungarian language, literature and history, and was also in a position to accept the professorship.

In my opinion, the solution of the problem must be reached in three stages. First of all, a reader should be established in the university, whose only duties would be to teach the language itself. This would of course be purely practical and not scientific. We may assume that a small group of those interested in Hungary and Hungarian history would form round the reader, and this plan took shape in 1937: the Hungarian language is now taught at London University. Those interested in historical, literary, scientific, artistic, political and economic problems would seek further information. That would be the time to seek ways and means to supplement the language courses with lectures on such subjects. There are only one or two English scholars who have a thorough knowledge of Hungary, and they would at present hardly be prepared to give up their positions for a chair which might be established later. In my opinion, the best solution would be to begin with English-speaking Hungarian scholars. For a start, they might be invited by some English university to give a course of ten or twelve lectures. These would cover various aspects of Hungarian literature, history, or other matters. The result of the work of readers and professors would undoubtedly be that young English students of international politics, diplomatic history, the history of Central Europe and so on would sooner or later turn their attention to Hungary. And we should have to look for readers for the three Hungarian universities from those who, in the first years of Hungarian instruction, took up the subjects offered.

I must here point out a deficiency which needs immediate remedy. Three of our provincial universities, Szeged, Debrecen and Pécs, have chairs of German, French and Italian, but so far not of English. For a nation which is as Anglophile as Hungary, the situation is really intolerable. It is a case of "*Peccabatur intra muros et extra*," and both we and the English have been perhaps negligent. We should have realised that these universities are incomplete until the English language and information about the British Empire

can be acquired there under the guidance of first-rate scholars. Not only this, but the University of Budapest alone is unable to supply the high schools with teachers of English. The University of Debrecen has inaugurated a Chair of English this autumn. No doubt Szeged and Pécs will follow later. The British Council has now made an excellent start, and should be able to find the means of supplying the three universities with trained English readers. The Hungarian government would undoubtedly make arrangements for professorial chairs as soon as there are any Hungarians well enough qualified in English subjects to become professors.

Several years' work under the plan outlined above would be necessary before, either under the tutelage of the London reader or the English department of a Hungarian university, a man can be found who is sufficiently well trained to become professor of Hungarian subjects (also called Hungarology), at the University of London. Anyone, however, who is aware of the laws that govern intellectual life will agree that sooner or later English intellectual circles will produce a full-fledged "Hungarologist." We may be disappointed and yet encouraged by what we have neglected to do in the past. With proper care we may yet foresee a great future growing from the institutions which we have mentioned, the Anglo-Hungarian Society, the Society of *The Hungarian Quarterly*, which recently has founded a branch at Szeged, at which Sir Richard W. Livingstone delivered the opening address, the Hungarian chair in London and the English ones in Hungary. Interest breeds knowledge and knowledge leads to interest. There are two things in this respect which are inseparable from each other, though at first sight they seem to have different objectives: a knowledge of English culture in Hungary, and a knowledge of Hungary in England. The introduction of instruction in the English language in Hungarian middle schools, and the further development of such institutions as the public school on English lines at Sárospatak, is in the interest both of Hungary and of England. Such schools will have the education of young Hungarians who will later continue their scientific training at English universities. But Hungarian educational establishments will always welcome gifted young English scholars who are prepared to devote a few years to the study of the history and characteristics of the Danubian peoples. It is obvious that the men we shall welcome are those who will

help to develop literature about Hungary in the English language, English literature about Hungary, of which we are and have been in sore need for some time past. Apart from the *Hungary* of Mr. C. A. Macartney and a few amusing and clever rather than thorough travel-books, there is hardly a single readable and serious modern book about Hungary or Hungarian history. What we need is a series of short books dealing with various aspects of Hungarian life, and above all a companion volume to the study of Hungarian matters, to include all necessary scientific information. This type of book is well represented in English semi-scientific literature. I have every hope that, out of the movement which is growing up round *The Hungarian Quarterly*, such a handbook will soon be forthcoming as a basis for future work.

The field is broad enough; it awaits a practical and creative mind. Young intellectual people are growing up in the Danube valley who have a more and more comprehensive knowledge of the English language, and who are curious to know of the civilisation of the British Empire. It would be a worthy task to show them the world of English books, films, plays and arts, and would bring rich reward to anyone who would undertake it. This reward will indeed be rich, because it would lift Hungary from her isolated position in the Danube valley, from the embrace of the Slavs and Germans, and bring her nearer to the British Empire. Cultural ties that may yet be forged in the future will contradict the principle of geopolitical materialism, which holds that the intellectual attitude of a nation must be defined and limited by her geographical surroundings. The Hungarians have always received stimulus and encouragement from London. Humanity returns from time to time to Europe like a prodigal son, returns to the highest forms of human thought, initiative and imagination. A knowledge of Europe includes a knowledge of the Danube valley, which though a small part of the whole is no inconsiderable one. The Hungarians have dwelt at the "elbow" of the Danube for a thousand years; you cannot pass them by in silence. Now, after the *Anschluss*, our geopolitical position is perhaps even more interesting, and our historic rôle even more important, than it was before.

JOSEPH BALOGH.

Budapest.

## THE WRITER AND THE STATE.

### THE AMERICAN GUIDE.

YOU will search the Constitution of the United States in vain for a word about the relationship between the Federal Government and literature. Neither its eighteenth-century framers nor its subsequent amenders ever imagined that as far as the Government was concerned such a creature could exist. Yet at the present moment the American taxpayer is supporting some 3,000 writers, not merely as Government propagandists or recipients of an unemployment dole, but as paid men of letters engaged on work which provides a natural outlet for their creative abilities. Such a body is a new creation in American life yet it lives in no fear that a Supreme Court judgment will pronounce it unconstitutional, for like most of the other New Deal innovations that have taken surest root it has come into being by no simple fiat but as a by-product of something else. In 1933 the Government accepted the principle that wherever possible the unemployed should not merely be paid to keep alive but given an opportunity to work, and the Civil Works Administration came into being. Its organiser, Harry Hopkins, imparted such momentum to his machine that by the spring of 1934 he had exceeded his budgetary allowance and the C.W.A. was temporarily dissolved. But its principles were reborn and its lessons re-applied in its successor, the Works Progress Administration, in the spring of 1935. W.P.A. activities were determined primarily and consistently by the capacities of the unemployed workers on its rolls: it first of all considered not what work required to be done but what its workers, by previous training and capabilities, were best able to do. Under the imaginative direction of Harry Hopkins this produced a number of "projects" remarkable for their range and diversity. With an ease perhaps only possible in a country like America, where the white-collar workers have never organised themselves into a professional caste, the W.P.A. embraced the unemployed in all walks of life; in particular, as the arts are always the first economic activities to feel the impact of a depression, it received on to its payroll a large number of out-of-work artists of every kind. To meet their needs a special division of the W.P.A. was created, the Federal Arts Projects, which

in turn were organised in the four sections of the visual arts, the theatre, music and literature. Of these, the first three produced the most immediately obvious results—in murals on half the Federal buildings in America, in thousands of concerts, in theatrical productions that made even Broadway take notice—but though the Federal Writers' Project, from the very nature of its task, broke on the public consciousness more slowly, its effects are likely to be equally far reaching.

In the foreword to his *Britannia*, Camden announced that it was his intention to "restore Britain to her antiquities and her antiquities to Britain." It is some such function that the Federal Writers' Project would discharge towards America, only that to "antiquities" it would add—what to Tudor England was unnecessary—"modernities." As Roosevelt's public works were to "prime the pump" to prosperity, so the Federal Writers' Project would prime the pump to national self-awareness, both of the past and of the present. One of the most signal achievements of the New Deal has been its success in harnessing the confident patriotism of the "boom years" to the critical stocktaking of the Depression: the result has been a kind of second birth of the national consciousness comparable in quality if not in degree with the awakening to nationhood that attended the War of Independence. America is realising herself anew. And in proportion as the realisation is not something forced by conflict from without but grown out of a struggle within, it is taking the form not of a crude, complacent patriotism but of a critical, rather restless self-determination. The Federal Writers' Project at once expresses and seeks in some measure to direct that self-determination, to restore America to herself.

The director of the Federal Writers' Project in this crusade—for so it is, despite all the hard sense and lively imagination that accompany it—is Henry G. Alsberg, who has brought to the task the varied experience and catholic sympathies it requires. He had previously served as a lawyer, a leader-writer for the *New York Post*, secretary to the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, foreign correspondent for the *Nation*, and for two years director of the enterprising Provincetown Theatre in New York. It was his task to appoint directors for the Project in every State of the Union, and it is undoubtedly to him, though the Project works behind almost complete anonymity, that major credit is due for planning

the main item on its programme, the *American Guide*. The Project employs all kinds of writers—unemployed journalists, professional free-lancers, graduates of schools of journalism who have found their degrees waste paper in their hands, research workers whom no one else would pay to research, poets, novelists, every grade in the literary hierarchy. The problem was to devise a task on which all these various skills could equally profitably be employed. The theme that offered itself—indeed that cried out for treatment—was one as varied as the available performers: it was America itself.

Some years ago the *New Yorker* undertook to portray the average New York resident's idea of America. It was a strangely misshapen continent split in two by the great cleft of the Hudson River, the east bank of which was charted in tolerable detail; beyond it, however, the great spaces of the west and south were a chaotic jumble of legend (countless Swannee Rivers), scandal (Reno—a state on the Pacific coast), and fancy (Alaska—co-terminous with Oregon). It is a state of mind not peculiar to New Yorkers. I have talked to educated Middle Westerners who did not know what a share-cropper was, and to Californians who regard New England as a land of perpetual ice and snow. Regionalism still remains the dominant factor in politics, although Republicanism has made a temporary withdrawal to the fastnesses of Maine and Vermont. Despite an amazing dissemination of newsprint and a broadcasting network which even the smallest hamlet cannot escape, Americans retain an extraordinary ignorance of the manner in which they live. Although business trips might carry them from coast to coast, it was not until the Depression that they abandoned Europe as the goal for each summer vacation and were driven by sheer economic necessity to divert their curiosity to what lay across their own State line.

When they turned to domestic exploration they were met by an immediate difficulty. To this huge country full of beauty and interest there was nothing that an educated person could call a guide. The last Baedeker for the United States was published in 1909 and the traveller, although he might be well enough served for occasional localities, had nothing he could rely on for the country as a whole beyond the spare details of the Automobile Association's handbooks or the boosters' brochures of the Chambers of Commerce. This

is the need which the *American Guide*, not so much practically as ideally, sets out to meet. It is more ambitious than an ordinary guide-book. Not many visitors to the District of Columbia are likely to steer their steps by the five and a half pounds of reading matter contained in the volume devoted to *Washington, City and Capitol*. The announced purpose of the guides is rather "to acquaint Americans with their country" and "to furnish cultural workers with a vast amount of material that has hitherto remained unexplored." To that end the *Guide* aims at an extraordinary comprehensiveness: there will be volumes not only for the separate States but also for many of the major cities and counties, each prepared by workers in its own locality, co-operating on a scale and to a plan which no private publishing firm could possibly organise. The result will be the marshalling of a huge quantity of material, informed by intelligence and imagination, which has hitherto not been available at all. To compile Baedeker from this will be child's play. In fact the Federal Writers' Project has already begun. In convenient form they have issued a tourists' handbook to U.S. I—the great highway that links the eastern seaboard from Maine to Florida—which compresses the relevant material of a dozen guides into a book that can be used by the motorist as he travels.

How much more the *Guide* itself is than a mere tourists' handbook is apparent to anyone who reviews one of the thirty odd volumes that have so far been issued. In America more than in most countries the scope of the conventional guide-book is inadequate to express the significance of the land. In a country where the proportions of interest differ so enormously a guide-book must vary its treatment from State to State. The tourist in Montana will encounter gaily painted "Historical Markers" by the roadside, which will inform him that "This valley was the stomping ground for Kootenai Indians until 1892" or "was opened for settlement in 1910." Clearly, where history is only what happened within living memory, a guide-book has to know something more besides. So very properly the focus of interest is shifted to the natural features and the industrial development of such a State. Frequently the *Guide* makes a deliberate attempt to counteract the bias of ill-informed popular sentiment. It will find more in the South than *ante-bellum* plantation mansions or

even tobacco roads, and even in a State like Massachusetts where "history" has been tidied away as neatly as in Westminster Abbey, the *Guide* has opened up the vault to insert the corpses of Sacco and Vanzetti.

The Federal Writers' Project is a creature of the New Deal and the child has no more escaped criticism than the mother. But it has taken more than Liberty League stupidity to find anything dangerously wrong with the *American Guide*. Even the charge of "radicalism" only becomes comprehensible when one realises that in America it is still a collective term for trade unionisation or advocacy of a super-tax. As a connotation for irresponsibility or communistic sympathies it is about as relevant to the *American Guide* as to the *Dictionary of National Biography*. That is not to say that a careful reader of these volumes in the year 2038 will not be able to place them within the New Deal era of this century. If he tried to date them otherwise he would be puzzled, for example, in the *Washington* volume, by the objective but slightly irrelevant three-page history of the American Federation of Labour, or by the discriminating selection, on page 546, from the declarations of policy made by the United States Chamber of Commerce. But he would find equally cogent evidences of the spirit of the decade in the lively frankness of the volume, which enables it to treat its solemn subject-matter without debunking or embalming. He will welcome it perhaps as the first official guide to Washington's welter of public monuments which combines artistic discrimination with encyclopædic comprehensiveness. He will find the accounts of the various departments and agencies of the government admirably impartial and true both to their twentieth-century functioning and their historical development. If he has an eye for the price levels of an economically crazy century he will single out this book as a miracle of value at \$3.00 for its 1,100 admirably printed pages.

A country so diversified as the States has cultural resources peculiarly difficult to tap owing to the impediments that race and, to a lesser degree, language interpose between various sections of the community. There is a town on the eastern seaboard that comprises among its Italian population the inhabitants of two Sicilian villages, who have transplanted with them, almost intact, the rich idiosyncrasies of their native cultures, but among the "American" residents of that



city there is not one in a hundred who has even an inkling of that fact. In a modern society awareness is the only agency of preservation, and the Federal Writers' Project is taking the first step towards saving these riches from destruction by making them available in some measure to the community at large. The kind of work it is doing in this field is adequately suggested by the titles of a few of its books, some published, some in preparation: *Armenians in Massachusetts*, *The Italians of New York*, *Louisiana Folklore*.

This is raw material, or at most the semi-fabricated article. What has the Project produced of the pure artefact—"creative writing" *per se*? The Project would reply, I think, that they were not greatly interested in creative writing *per se*. If imaginative masterpieces are there to be written they will probably get written, Depression or no Depression, Relief or no Relief. The Project does not exist to provide aspirins for the headaches of genius: it is content to let genius look after itself. But it is concerned to keep the environment in which genius has to work healthy and alive, to cultivate the vast public which is the audience of the present and the breeding-ground of the future, to see that literature does not resort to a diet of cake because it can get no bread. The Project has had distinguished "creative" artists working on its rolls—Conrad Aiken, Nathan Asch, Carleton Brown and others—and has produced an anthology of original work of which no publishing house need feel ashamed. But if anyone is looking for "literature" in the Project's productions he will most often find it to be, like the Project itself, a natural by-product—paragraphs of vivid descriptive writing inspired simply by the scene that is being handled—the alley slums of Washington, or Deerfield that lies among the loveliest scenery in New England. But if the *American Guide* constitutes, as Lewis Mumford asserts, "the finest contribution to American patriotism that has been made in our generation," it is because these high lights are subordinate to the picture as a whole, a picture still only half painted. At the moment the Federal Writers, receiving their weekly pay cheques along with W.P.A. bricklayers and road menders, are content to have it so. But only Congress, voting their annual appropriation, can say how long it shall continue.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

April 1938.

## CYPRUS—AN IMPRESSION.

FAMAGUSTA, Paphos, St. Hilarion, Buffovento—their names alone have enough in their sound to keep the imagination going endlessly. This year I went a step further than the imagination, and on a warm spring afternoon our little ship glided in through "the shore-sea green" to the tiny harbour of Famagusta, and weighed anchor by lines of wicker baskets full of oranges destined for the thirsty Egyptians, in exchange for the savoury onion which had been our cargo from Port Said. The general impression of Famagusta is of medieval ramparts enclosing numberless ruins, one for every day of the year, they say; with the little shops and dwelling-places of the modern Cypriot rambling in and out. Medieval buildings it is true, but not that half-grey, half-beige, rather moss-grown effect of their counterparts in Europe; these are of golden masonry glowing in the sun. Above all else towers the great cathedral of St. Nicholas, built by the Lusignans in the thirteenth century. Three distinct strains run through the impressions which go to make the atmosphere of Famagusta. First the Cyprus of Flecker, with his old ships, the vines, the Phœnician sailors and the wine. Secondly, the very concrete, tangible Cyprus of the great crusading families, their monumental architecture, and the ramparts and forts of subsequent Venetian and Genoese. Then lastly, the old sleepy round of life which for centuries has stood for the wisdom of Turkey—so diametrically opposed to Turkey as she is to-day—and only to be found now here and there in the eastern Mediterranean islands. These last two rather surprisingly combine in the cathedral of St. Nicholas to give a perfect impression of grandeur and peace. Outside, above, the flying buttresses gleam against the blue sky, and the beautiful tracery of the rose window takes your breath away as it must have done on the day it was built. Below, some mild-faced old Turk slips off his shoes and very reverently goes in to his midday prayer. A sycamore tree leans against the wall, and underneath two or three old Turkish gravestones lean against it. The huge, plain Gothic interior is whitewashed and spotlessly clean, light and airy. A grey-bearded khodja murmurs his prayers with his hands on his knees, turned up to receive blessing.

Nicosia, in the centre of the island, is the capital, where the

ramparts are so perfectly preserved that an accurate survey map of the town looks more like a rosette pattern on a Persian carpet than anything else. Here are more mosques and episcopal palaces, more cathedrals and caravanserais, all built one up against the other by the successive conquerors of the island. There is one little mosque right on the ramparts called the Mosque of the Standard Bearer. During the great conquests of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Turks had the custom of building such a mosque on the site of the battle in memory of the first man slain, theoretically speaking, the standard bearer, though who the actual man had been was, of course, hardly ever known. It was a custom not unlike the honours given to the unknown soldier in so many countries after the Great War.

Forty-five minutes' drive from Nicosia, which stands in rather an arid plain, brings you to Kyrenia on the coast and the grey rocky mountain ridge behind. Between the mountains and the sea are little smiling valleys of red soil, silver olives and the abundant fresh green of mulberry trees. Kyrenia is a little pocket town with a tiny ancient harbour and a huge square fort where Charlotte of Lusignan spent five unhappy years. This fortress played a prominent part, too, in the wars between the Lusignan family and the Genoese. Queen Eleanor of Aragon went down to betray her brother the King of Cyprus to the invading Genoese, then in Famagusta, and led the enemy army up the pass to the castle of Kyrenia and its unsuspecting garrison. However, on the way back she discovered that, when the Genoese had possessed themselves of the place they had no intention of placing her young son on the throne as she had hoped. So, without saying a word, on arrival at the gorge some way from the castle, she spurred on her white mule, galloped on by short cuts to the ramparts, warned the soldiers, and the first thing the Genoese saw when they had marched on the last bit by themselves was the Lusignan lady encouraging her soldiers to the defence of their castle and hurling down abuse on the heads of her allies of a few minutes ago who had now no hope of taking the castle. She had changed her mind!

The coast-line east and west is broken into endless little bays with sand, rocks and sea such as only the eastern Mediterranean can produce. Practically anywhere along here one can emulate Venus and rise from the foam in the same state

of "négligé" as the goddess of old. I do not think anyone can get more than just the flavour of the castles of St. Hilarion and Kantara by any written description. They grow out of the highest mountain peaks, the turrets and keeps a continuation upward of the craggiest grey rock. At St. Hilarion you can scramble to your heart's content round the ruined chapel halls and the outer *enceinte* of this incredible castle, built mostly in the thirteenth century as a refuge in times of invasion.

To reach Kantara involves a motor drive of the most hair-raising type, and then a scramble up and up through stunted junipers and undergrowth, over grey rocks where the cyclamen bloom, and across little gullies down which the water tears after rain. When, however, the top is reached you are rewarded out of all proportion by seeing the imperial eagles floating and wheeling below you. On a clear day you can see the hills to the north-east in Syria and the snows of the Taurus heights gleam to the north. The Karpass, that long narrow peninsula of Cyprus which the ancients called the Oxtail, lies below you with the blue sea broken into foam along its rocky uninhabited coast. The drive down to the plain is further enlivened by flocks of goats. You meet them at the top of the road, and they jump down the hill out of your way, but as the descent is a series of hair-pin bends, one straight below the other, the same goats are always ready waiting for you at the next corner. Another terrifying drive takes you up the mountain ledges which serve as roads, above the highest olive tree into the pines.

Every breath fills your lungs with that peculiar indescribable aromatic smell which comes off the low wild vegetation of these islands. Sometimes it drifts right out to sea—it is as intoxicating as wine. Soon we found ourselves standing in a small Byzantine building, so dark that at first, after the strong light outside, we could see nothing. After a while we realised we were in a basilica church, the walls, ceiling and dome covered with the most lovely frescoes, gold and strong blue, green and crimson. Looking down, we saw torn remnants of prayer books on the ground in the dust, old Bibles lying open on broken chairs among spiders and dust, and old yellow litanies on the altar covered with candle-grease and dust. It seemed as if no living thing had been near it for hundreds of years, except the swallow darting in and out, and the bee

buzzing in the shaft of light thrown across the tiny building from the broken window. As we came out into the light we looked across a low wall, thick with scarlet and gold wild flowers, to the blue sea and the snows of Taurus floating forty miles away. Such is the church of Antifonitas, one of the oldest Byzantine buildings on the island.

To get to the southern coast of Cyprus the road takes you over Mount Tröodos, where the pines grow straight out of the red earth with no undergrowth to soften it. In this strange, rather harsh country, the *mouflon* still lives, and the earth is seamed with curious minerals, chromium, asbestos and copper. We climbed to the summit, Mount Olympus, and there, 6,000 feet up, we stood with our feet in snow, and in our faces blew a hot wind straight across the 200 miles of sea from the Egyptian deserts on the south. Dropping down from here through curly little valleys which might have been the background to any Gobelin tapestry in shape and colour, you come to the southern coast and to Limasol, where Cœur de Lion first set his invading foot, and where with due festivity he married Berengaria of Navarre. Having ousted Isaac Comnenos, Richard discovered that the island was, at that moment, rather a white elephant to him, so he induced the Knights Templars to buy it for a considerable sum, telling them that after some time he would buy it back. However, when the time approached he was unable to put his hand on the ready cash, so he arranged that the Lusignan family should buy it instead. After a prosperous Lusignan rule of 200 years the Venetians conquered the place, and they in their turn gave way to the invading Ottoman Turks, from whom we took over—not all at once, but a step here and a pace there—till in 1914 we made the ultimate move, since when Cyprus has been a Crown Colony.

From Limasol we drove west and had not gone more than half an hour, when looking across an upland stretch of low bushes we saw the tops of two plain Doric columns. We stopped the car and made straight across country to them, putting up a fine Cyprus hare as we went. Soon we found ourselves on the site of a temple of Apollo in the process of coming to light. A young excavator from America was hard at work, and as we watched he produced little earthenware votive offerings from the soil, one after the other, literally hundreds were there. The sensation of watching something

come to the surface which was last seen by human eyes countless ages ago, is hard to describe—that they should be there for us to see and feel—funny little pottery objects, while the hands that made them and the minds by which they were conceived have passed so utterly away. Carefully we dusted off the grass roots clinging round the features of a perfect little Grecian head which had been there with the others, watching the centuries roll by, as it lay not two feet below the springing turf.

“Aphrodite’s home in the soft sea foam,” of which Euripides sang in the fifth century B.C., is at Paphos where the long low waves roll slowly in with their creamy white crests; and it does not need much imagination to see her there. To Paphos also came Paul, and here the governor of the town was so impressed by the quality of the religion Paul showed forth, that he too became a Christian. All round the neighbourhood are tombs, catacombs, and cells where the ancient Christian community lived or were buried; some have frescoes still clinging to the old rock walls. The cliffs behind Paphos are white, and little valleys and gorges run up into them for short distances. Up one of these little valleys in the year 1159 climbed a young man called Neophytos. He was looking for a place to make his home, where he could meditate on God, could write and pray and read undisturbed. He visited this spot once in every season of the year to see it under every condition before finally deciding upon it. In the soft limestone rock he cut out two little rooms, a sarcophagus to do the double duty of bed and eventual coffin, a stone stool and table in one room, and the other to be used as a chapel. Here he lived and later a few disciples joined him, an entirely self-dependent community, wearing the clothes they wove and eating the vegetables they grew. Seven hundred and seventy-seven years later we went up the little valley, too, through mulberry and olive trees, by a little stream with a bed of reeds and overlooked by walnut trees. Halfway up the side of the cliff we were met by one of the Greek monks from the monastery built on the side of the hill near the original little dwelling of Neophytos. Our monk had that calm, courteous, soft voice and quiet manners of so many of the Orthodox clergy. He greeted us and led us into the guest room where, seated on high divans, we were regaled in true Greek fashion with glasses of water and cherry jam. From here we could

appreciate Neophytos' choice of valley, for the windows looked straight out on to the tops of the olive and walnut trees below, beyond that sloping arable land and the blue Mediterranean behind. The tall, dark-eyed, cultured priest showed us the saint's little room in the cliff side; it seemed as if he had just walked out. Everything is as he had left it, except he himself, so to speak, for his actual body had been removed to the ornate Orthodox church in the monastery. Many of the works he produced at this little stone table spread all over Europe, and some of his MSS. can be seen to this day in the Berlin museum.

As the sun went down a thin little silver moon shone in the pale green sky. I walked through a cornfield out to the edge of the cliff with the sea turning a silver-green below. Suddenly I found myself among the foundations of a Byzantine villa, just spread there under the evening sky in the cornfields. The mosaic of the rooms is as clear and fresh as the day it was made. A verse in Homeric Greek is worked into one of the floors saying that this house was dedicated to Christ and not to idols.

Limasol is a port but Limasol has no harbour, and our small ship, waiting to take us back to Egypt, tossed up and down off the shore in the most discouraging way. A little pier runs out to sea, and beside it lay little ships such as St. Paul must have used for his travels. Up and down the pier, carrying vegetables and bales of produce, ran the brown-limbed sailors clad in nondescript tattered garments, the very picture of their Phœnician ancestors. Others, looking for all the world like the most cut-throat variety of pirate, were busy loading our ship with kegs of Cyprus brandy. The kegs were towed out to sea, one strung to the other, bobbing about in the water; the simplest grappling iron was lowered from our ship and fixed by these ruffians in a rowing boat to each keg as it floated half submerged in the sea. There was a keen wind blowing and the sailors were consequently soaked to the skin in the process. We weighed anchor and steamed out. The last I saw of this island, so full of impressions and atmosphere were those bronzed, laughing, shouting seafarers, their little ships and merchandise—Cyprus of the Phœnicians.

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## FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

RETROSPECT.

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### 1. *Civilisation in Our Time.*

NO year in living memory offered a profounder or more alarming commentary on civilisation than 1918, excepting only the years of actual war from 1914 to 1918. While the material benefits of scientific progress multiply at a rate undreamt of only half a century ago, the equally rapid and quite horrible degradation of man in his moral quality threatens to turn such progress into the instrument of his own irretrievable ruin: irretrievable at any rate as far as human imagination can penetrate into the future. The revolutions of 1848 were child's play in their general European disturbance by contrast with what threatens Europe to-day. A century ago at any rate they had not subdued the elements of air, land and water to their destructive purposes. To-day the whole fabric of political civilisation, not in Europe only but in every continent in the world, is exposed to the menace of monster political bandits, men endowed with the organised and disciplined power of whole nations, men who lack the very sense of caution that might save them from launching such weapons and bringing down the world about their ears. Drunk with power, blinded by mad ambition, they gloat over the very magnitude of what they are capable of accomplishing.

This is one of the continuing results of the war of 1914-18. A world war in a sense so literal that it was new to the experience of man had as one of its incidental effects the transforming of the very technique of war itself. Professional wars and mercenary armies were swept into the category of historical curiosities. It was a war of human beings, of men, women and children in the mass. Governments were invested with total power over the lives and property of their subjects. The so-called totalitarianism exercised by certain contemporary governments is merely the formulated consummation of what was practised between 1914 and 1918 by every government in the world. *Facilis descensus*. It is easy to imbue governments with total power. It is hard to retrace one's steps to the sane practice of political organisation in which government is the servant of the common need, not the

master and the dictator of the common life. It cannot surprise intelligent people that so profound and so universal a folly as that of the Great War should leave behind a trail of havoc, a nemesis of punishment, which twenty years later still devastates the earth. Herr Hitler is the living symbol of what men did a quarter of a century ago when they surrendered their liberty, their life, their family, their wealth to enable the politicians of the earth to embark upon a world war. We have not yet paid the full price. Of all the certainties in human experience the greatest is that we reap what we sow, and we pay for what we squander. We have squandered our liberty. We pay in slavery.

The year 1938 registered a record low level in the well-being of civilised peoples. From one end of Europe to the other those peoples stood in terror of the very political incubus they had themselves created. Since the war ended in 1918 there has been no worse a menace to our security than we had to face in 1938; and in 1938 by a true corollary the nations were armed as they never were armed before in the history of the world. It is the old conundrum. Ought the famous proverb not to read: *si vis bellum para bellum*?

It is true that memories are short. At the end of 1933 for instance the prophets were talking seriously of the possibility of a new war. They were still talking in that sense at the end of 1934, and at the end of 1935, 1936, and 1937. When in October 1933 Germany gave notice of her intention to leave the League of Nations, Europe was faced with "crisis," the word at that time being used on all sides with the freshness and dismay that betoken the real thing. In December 1933, when Russia repudiated any intention of joining the League of Nations, and Italy by a Fascist Grand Council resolution decided to leave the League unless that body were radically remodelled to her own prescription; in July 1934, when Herr Dollfuss was murdered; in March 1936, when Germany tore up the Treaty of Versailles: on each of those occasions true crisis was the result. But in May 1938, and still more in September 1938, all the former crises by comparison became a small and unsubstantial bogey.

## 2. *The International Panic.*

The successive stages by which the year 1938 developed into the climax of the nightmare we shall never forget stand

out all too clearly in the retrospect. At the very beginning of the year we were plunged into the disquiet of a German challenge. Lord Halifax had visited Germany in November 1937, as Lord Haldane visited Germany in February 1912, to assess the strength of that challenge and to try if possible to divert it from the path that leads to war. Lord Halifax saw Herr Hitler, Baron von Neurath, Field-Marshal (then General) Göring, Dr. Goebbels and other leading exponents of Nazi Germany's pretensions and temper. Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking to the House of Commons on November 24th, 1937, declared that "the visit has been valuable in furthering the desire, which I believe to be generally felt in both countries, for the establishment of closer mutual understanding."

Immediately after the return of Lord Halifax from Germany the French Prime Minister, M. Chautemps, and his Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, came to London to engage in consultations with Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. The chief result of those talks, as disclosed in the official communication issued on November 30th, 1937, was that "a preliminary examination was made of the colonial question in all its aspects. It was recognised that this question was not one that could be considered in isolation, and, moreover, would involve a number of other countries. It was agreed that the subject would require much more extended study." What was still more interesting was the commonly known, but not publicly revealed, fact that in November 1937 the British and French Governments had established agreement on two points, namely (1) that Germany should not be given any colonies and (2) that Germany should not be "allowed" to disturb the existing status of Central Europe.

But even at that stage the first step was taken in the process of what was to become the historic abandonment by Great Britain and France of their habitual identification of their own policy with that of the Czechoslovak Government (as the name was then still officially spelt). It was agreed by the British and French Ministers in November 1937 that M. Delbos, who was about to visit Prague in the course of a round tour of Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, should drop a hint on a joint and equal British and French authority to President Beneš, to Mr. Hodža, the Prime Minister, and to Mr. Krofta, the Foreign Minister, that as the means of destroying any German pretext for action in

Central Europe, they should go to the full limit of concession in their treatment of the Sudetendeutschen.

M. Delbos duly left Paris for his Central European tour on December 2nd, 1937. Concurrently, on December 6th, Mr. Stoyadinovic, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, left Belgrade for conversations in Rome with Signor Mussolini and Count Ciano, and a month later (January 15th, 1938) he went to Berlin for parallel conversations with Baron von Neurath.

In short, as the year 1937 merged into the fearsome year 1938, we were given a spectacle of restless journeyings and talks between the political leaders of nine countries: Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium (for King Leopold of the Belgians visited London in November 1937), Italy, Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

In one of its aspects the spectacle was completed on December 11th, 1937, when Signor Starace, Secretary of the Fascist party, announced from the balcony of the Piazza Venezia that Italy had decided to leave the League of Nations. The resultant situation was that out of seven Great Powers, four stood outside the League: the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy. Three remained inside: Great Britain, France and Russia.

The year 1938 began in a blast of recrimination and animosity on all fronts. Mr. Anthony Eden, who was still the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, was carrying on a full-throated controversy with the Italian Government on the unprofitable theme whether Anglo-Italian relations could be improved until Italian propaganda ceased to pour out uncomplimentary commentary on Great Britain in general. Anglo-German relations presented the discomfort of suppressed tension over colonies and an increasingly evident tension over the Sudetenland. In the Far East Japan was more and more exuberantly bent upon the conquest of China, having ignored the abortive Brussels Conference which had been naïvely called to explore the means of peace between Japan and China. The Spanish war, with its ramifications into the ideological quarrels between the four Western European Great Powers, was stubbornly entrenched during its second winter. General Franco set up a formal government in that part of Spain which he controlled. Herr Hitler carried out a purge of leading army generals who were known to differ from him not so much on matters of high policy as on the

appropriate time for giving effect to them. France, after passing through one of her periodic parliamentary crises, set up a unified command of all the armed forces for use in war. The United States announced an enlarged programme of naval building.

### 3. *The End of Austria.*

Such was the inauspicious beginning. The actual events soon began to crystallise. On February 12th Herr Hitler suddenly summoned Herr von Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden: wherein was illustrated the fact that Herr Hitler, having failed in his attempt to persuade Great Britain and France to offer him colonial satisfaction, or using that failure as a pretext, had turned the flood of his ambitions upon Central Europe. The independence of Austria had been a matter of general diplomatic interest ever since Articles 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain and 80 of the Treaty of Versailles prescribed that such independence be "inalienable" except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. An Austrian Chancellor was a martyr to that cause. But it is now clear that when Herr Dollfuss was assassinated on July 25th, 1934, his martyrdom was destined, not to save the cause, but to symbolise its defeat.

The effect of Herr Hitler's summoning of Herr von Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden was not immediately made clear. The official statement issued simultaneously in Vienna and in Berlin on February 15th declared that the object was to facilitate the working of the agreement of July 11th, 1936 (whereby Austria recognised herself to be "a Germanic State" and promised to collaborate with Germany for the "peaceful development" of Europe). It now declared that "both parties have decided on the immediate execution of measures which will ensure that a close and friendly relationship between the two countries shall be established corresponding to the history and common interest of the whole German nation." The measures thus hinted at were (1) the inclusion in the Vienna Cabinet and in a key position of a Nazi sympathiser, (2) an amnesty for Nazi prisoners in Austria, and (3) the grant of full political liberty to the Austrian Nazis. Dr. von Seyss-Inquart was the new member of the Austrian Cabinet thereby introduced, as the spearhead of Germany's peaceful conquest of Austria. He had been the

leader of the Austrian Nazis and a "pacification commissioner" appointed under the 1936 agreement. He now became Home Minister with control of the police: and that was indeed a key position.

Herr von Schuschnigg then emerged as the last defender of Austrian independence. On February 24th he expressed his memorable defiance. He addressed a special session of the Federal Diet in which the keynote was given in his now famous words: "So far and no farther." He explained that he had gone to the limit implied in that phrase, "trusting in the word and in the personality of the Führer and Chancellor who successfully guides the destinies of the great German Reich," and had decided "to walk a common road with him which, if it is trod consistently and conscientiously, will, we are convinced of it, lead to the welfare of the Austrian Fatherland and of the entire German people and is in the interest of European peace." Like Herr Dollfuss, whose dying words were "We have never been the aggressors, and we had to defend ourselves," Herr von Schuschnigg declared that "Austria must remain Austria." He appealed for an "unshakable determination to maintain the liberty and independence of our country." He failed, as Herr Dollfuss before him had failed, beaten by superior force.

Herr Hitler, of course (for this was not an isolated example of Herr Hitler's method), prefaced his annexation of Austria with a renewed promise not to interfere in Austrian domestic affairs. By March 13th, little more than a fortnight after Herr von Schuschnigg's brave stand, Herr Hitler's troops had marched into the country and Austria had been proclaimed a part of the German Reich. The technical method used was that Dr. von Seyss-Inquart first supplanted Herr von Schuschnigg as Chancellor of Austria and then invited Herr Hitler to send in the German troops to maintain order. Herr von Schuschnigg had on March 9th declared his intention of holding a plebiscite in Austria within three days, so that the people of Austria could themselves establish as a matter of unequivocal fact whether they wanted to remain Austrians or become absorbed in the German Reich. A German official statement expressed its horror over what it alleged to be a denial of freedom in such a plebiscite; German influence brought about the resignation of Herr von Schuschnigg, and the substitution of Dr. von Seyss-Inquart; and the deed was

done. Herr Hitler promptly decided "to restore order and tranquillity in my country [Austria]" as he expressed it in a letter to Signor Mussolini (March 11th); and after the *Anschluss* was duly effected, he went on to hold a "plebiscite" in Austria to confirm it. The result of that plebiscite was known in advance.

#### 4. *Czechoslovakia as Bone of Contention.*

It was the conquest of Austria by Germany that led to Mr. Neville Chamberlain's historic speech of March 24th, 1938. The situation was eloquently enough epitomised by the fact that the practical decision to be made by the British Government after Germany's conquest of Austria was whether a guarantee should be given to Czechoslovakia against German designs. Mr. Chamberlain recalled the general discriminatory obligation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, whereby members of the League might (not must) bring help to a victim of aggression in any case where in the judgment of those members it would be proper to do so. No definite commitment was involved in the wording of the Covenant, for despite the initial pledge incorporated in Article 10 ("The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League") the subsequent Articles virtually modified that obligation into a matter of voluntary discretion on the part of members. Mr. Chamberlain then faced the question whether we should "forthwith give an assurance to France that, in the event of her being called upon by reason of German aggression on Czechoslovakia to implement her obligations under the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty, we would immediately employ our full military force on her behalf?" Or alternatively, should we "at once declare our readiness to take military action in resistance to any forcible interference with the independence and integrity of Czechoslovakia?"

Mr. Chamberlain's answer was no; and for this reason, which was not new in British diplomacy: "From a consideration of these two alternatives it clearly emerges that under either of them the decision as to whether or not this country should find itself involved in war would be automatically removed from the discretion of His Majesty's Government, and the suggested guarantee would apply irrespective of the



circumstances by which it was brought into operation, and over which His Majesty's Government might not have been able to exercise any control. The position is not one that His Majesty's Government could see their way to accept—in relation to an area where their vital interests are not concerned in the same degree that they are in the case of France and Belgium; it is certainly not the position that results from the Covenant. For these reasons His Majesty's Government feel themselves unable to give the prior guarantee suggested."

But Mr. Chamberlain went on to express still another of the abiding principles of British diplomacy, thus: "But while plainly stating this decision I would add this. Where peace and war are concerned legal obligations are not alone involved, and if war broke out it would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations. It would be quite impossible to say where it would end, and what Governments might become involved. The inexorable pressure of facts might well prove more powerful than formal pronouncements, and in that event it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries besides those which were parties to the original dispute would almost immediately become involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven, devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty and determined to uphold them." In a word, Mr. Chamberlain refused a formal commitment, but gave a virtual warning that in practice we should probably do what we refused to commit ourselves to do.

At the same time Mr. Chamberlain put on record his ultimate hope (which was ignored by public opinion at the time) that as "the increase of armaments alone is no sure guarantee of peace . . . it may yet be possible to arrive at a reasonable balance of armaments by agreement rather than by free and unlimited competition."

On February 20th Mr. Anthony Eden, disagreeing with Mr. Chamberlain's policy, or his method of carrying out that policy, of making peace with Italy and other countries of a controversial quality, resigned from the Cabinet. His resignation marked an epoch. Thenceforth Mr. Chamberlain's policy, helped by Lord Halifax as the new Foreign Secretary, was concentrated simply on making peace, without any of the

refinements about war for the sake of peace being better than peace for its own sake.

##### 5. *Peace for its own sake.*

In its Italian aspect the Chamberlain policy of "go-getting" peace bore fruit on April 16th. On that day there was signed in Rome an Anglo-Italian Agreement. It was characteristic of the times in which we live that it was not obvious what precise or practical problems that agreement was designed to solve. Its value lay in its simple achievement of substituting friendly instead of unfriendly feelings as the motive of policy on both sides. And such an achievement makes and marks the whole difference between peace and war. There were those, of course, who castigated Mr. Chamberlain as much for his attempt to make peace with Italy as for his attempt to make peace with Germany. Italy, they said, was as insincere as Germany; and the only way to peace with such countries was to knock them down, in short to have a war with them. Life is always real and earnest, but sometimes very odd.

Yet even the Anglo-Italian Agreement could not at that time be dissociated from the Spanish war. Italy was an active intervener in Spain. Spain had an effect on general European relationships, involving the ultimate issue of general peace or war. The agreement was therefore signed, but not at once put into "operation." It was left for the two signatory parties subsequently to decide when it should begin to operate, being guided in their decision on the one hand by the Italian pledge (1) to accept the British plan of proportional evacuation of the foreign troops from Spain, and (2) not to leave any troops nor to entertain any political designs upon any Spanish territory; and on the other hand by the British postulate that "a settlement of the Spanish question" be a prerequisite of the entry into force of the agreement.

Even before the agreement came into operation it exemplified the truth of one of Mr. Chamberlain's reiterated maxims. "For my part," he said on May 2nd, "I repudiate the idea that it is impossible for democracies to come to terms and to understandings with States where authoritarian ideas prevail." Authoritarian is the absurd word used to denote the dictatorship system of government in use, for example, in Germany and Italy. The agreement was finally brought into

operation on November 15th. As Mr. Chamberlain said at the Guildhall banquet on November 9th, that consummation, "if not the result of Munich, was certainly connected with it."

The next landmark in the troubled history of Europe in 1938 was fixed on May 21st, when a dress rehearsal, as it were, was staged of the German-Czechoslovak conflict which was destined to be really enacted four months later. It was on May 21st that two Sudeten German farmers were shot dead by a Czechoslovak policeman. Czechoslovakia partially mobilised. Germany had been moving troops towards the frontier for two days before that date. The British Government intervened, and by warning Germany that a conflict would probably involve British participation, in accordance with the principle enunciated by Mr. Chamberlain on March 24th, was probably decisive in preventing an outbreak at that time.

The details of that passage of high diplomacy in Europe were given to the House of Commons by Mr. Chamberlain on May 23rd. He said: "On May 19th rumours began to gain currency of German troop movements in the direction of the Czechoslovak frontier. The German Government informed His Majesty's Ambassador on the following day that there was no foundation for these rumours, and they gave a similar assurance to the Czechoslovak Government. On May 21st His Majesty's Government in Berlin received further assurances from the German Government that stories of German troop movements were completely unfounded. The Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Minister in Prague on May 21st that a formal invitation had been sent to Herr Henlein to negotiate on the Nationality Statute, which had been approved on the 19th by the Czechoslovak Government. But on that same day—May 21st—it was announced in the Sudeten press that the Political Committee of the Sudeten German Party had decided to inform the Prime Minister that the party were not in a position to discuss the Nationality Statute so long as peace and order in the Sudeten districts and, above all, the constitutional rights of freedom of opinion of the press and of assembly were not guaranteed. In face of this situation, the principal concern of His Majesty's Government has been to use all their influence, wherever it could be effective, on the side of restraint

in word and deed—while keeping open the way to peaceful negotiation of a satisfactory settlement. With that object they have represented to the Czechoslovak Government the need of taking every precaution for avoidance of incidents and of making every possible effort to reach a comprehensive and lasting settlement by negotiation with the representatives of the Sudeten Party. His Majesty's Government have represented to the German Government the urgent importance of reaching a settlement if European peace is to be preserved—and have expressed their earnest desire that the German Government would co-operate with them in facilitating agreement. His Majesty's Government have at the same time informed the German Government of the advice tendered in Prague and of the assurances received from the Czechoslovak Government. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he welcomed the efforts being made by His Majesty's Government and that the German Government fully shared their desire to see negotiations succeed."

#### 6. *Mr. Chamberlain and his Critics.*

The emergency, however, was only postponed. The events of the last week in September are too recent, and they made too deep an impression, to need any recapitulation at this time. The war was averted. Fear gave way to a reaction of a perhaps not unexpected kind. Many of the shallow people, whose emotions are liable to change quickly, began buckling on their figurative armour when they knew they would not have to fight. It was a very human spectacle, as muddled as human spectacles often are.

Mr. Chamberlain emerged as something like a prodigy of gymnastic improbabilities. Some of his critics said that he had cravenly surrendered to a parade of force by an overwhelmingly strong Hitler; others that he had saved a tottering Hitler from imminent collapse. He performed the like gymnastics, according to other critics, in relation to Mussolini. Others again declared that Mr. Chamberlain was himself bent upon becoming a dictator and was indulging in a little practice, and contriving to combine with it a little propaganda, by showing the world (vicariously) how irresistible a dictator could be. Some said that he was an idealist, unfit for the conduct of practical affairs; others that he was a low sort of commercial traveller whose only interest was trade,

who would sell his soul—and his country's—if only he could make sure that there would be no interruption of commerce. Some of the more broadminded people confessed that they could not make up their mind whether he was sincere or not, adding that if he was sincere he was a fool; if insincere, a knave. There was one highly original source of criticism—or was it misguided adoration?—which maintained that the whole thing was a put-up job between Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler, that in fact the German Führer had taken his orders from London ever since he began to issue, or to pass on, his orders to the German nation. That source of comment came from the resilient and pertinacious people who explain everything that happens in the world as the result of "Jewish international finance." They, of course, land themselves into a state of dreadful confusion. By their ironic theory Mr. Chamberlain was using Herr Hitler to ensure that the reign of Jewish high finance should continue for ever throughout the world; and we were asked to believe that Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler together concocted a plan in such a way to defeat communism.

Mr. Chamberlain's mind apparently works on simpler principles. He is not warped by the fear-complex. His reasoning is that if you do not want war, the best thing is to have peace. But suppose the other people really are "gangsters"? The argument is not affected. Why have a war with people because they are gangsters? To clear-minded simple people that is all the more reason for not having a war with them. Clear-minded simple people are much more likely to be sound in their judgment than the clever people whose over-worked brains and imaginative fears drive them, like fascinated rabbits, into the very thing they fear.

The year 1938, beginning in a widespread panic about the possibility of war, working up month by month to a climax of imminent war, ended narrowly in peace. Mr. Chamberlain, who was chiefly responsible for averting the disaster, found himself reviled by many of those who owed their safety to him. Of so wayward a kind is the miracle of life on this earth.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

December 10th, 1938.

No. 448.

January 1939.

## LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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### MR. SPENDER ON GOVERNMENT.

Mr. Spender's fine book\* gives us even more than the title suggests, for it deals not only with institutions and theories, but with the evolution of society throughout the ages. He has re-read the classical treatises from Plato to Marx, and he is acquainted with the latest archæological discoveries and historical monographs. How has man shaped his community life? How should he shape it to-day? Is government a science or an art? Who are the best guides? He brings to the consideration of these questions a well-stored mind, a ripe experience, an inexhaustible interest in life. He is rooted in the great tradition of Victorian Liberalism, which combines fidelity to ideals with a full awareness of the processes of change. There is nothing either rigid or flighty about Mr. Spender.

The story opens with a survey of primitive man and passes quickly to Egypt and Mesopotamia. In the former the idea of social justice emerged, and the level of what may be broadly described as humanitarianism was higher than in the

\* J. A. Spender. *The Government of Mankind*. Cassell. 12s. 6d.  
VOL. CLV.

latter: the code of Hammurabi indicates a hard, realistic, business-like people, without much interest in unseen things. The contribution of the Jews to political thought was the conviction that righteousness exalteth a nation and that public no less than private affairs are subject to a moral test. Seven chapters follow on the Greeks, who are described as the inventors of what we call politics. The immortal Periclean oration is found to contain an element both of liberalism and internationalism, the former in its reverence for individuality, the latter in the joyful recognition of the fact that Athens by her greatness received as well as gave. What even Plato and Aristotle lacked was the sense that every human being, whatever his calling or status, had rights which the ruler was bound to consider and society to recognise. The conception of the spiritual equality of man came into the world with Christianity, and indeed Christ may be described as the best friend of the poor.

The thousand years from Augustine to Machiavelli are quickly disposed of, for political thinking was merely a department of theology. With *The Prince* we enter the modern world, which boldly proclaimed and unflinchingly applied the maxim that governments must be guided by what seemed to them the interest of the State, not by considerations of religion or morality. Next in the sequence of modern political thinkers comes Hobbes, with his crude gospel that might was right. His appeal lay in the fact that, in Mr. Spender's words, mankind will accept anything rather than anarchy, and that, confronted with the alternatives of anarchy or despotism, we prefer the latter. That a middle course is possible was the argument of Locke and the verdict of 1688, and to its adoption we owe the blessings of ordered liberty.

No two minds or personalities could be more different than Locke and Burke, the one typically English in his cool empiricism, the other an eloquent Irish metaphysician; but in the vital question of the method of government they were at one. "Burke seems to elicit and give expression to all the characteristics, live and let live, compromise, patience, toleration, which were to be the acknowledged virtues of British parliamentarism in the nineteenth century. He was above all things a gradualist. It was his firm belief that you could do almost anything with human nature if you gave it time, but

that it would surely defeat you in the long run if you tried to force it according to your arbitrary will or into a pattern of your own devising. This led him equally to his detestation of tyranny and his denunciation of revolution."

Disciples of Locke, Burke and Mill are not much attracted to Hegel and Marx, the former with his gospel of the State as the divine idea, the latter the Calvin of economic theory. "The capitalist in the Marxian scheme plays the part of the sinner in the doctrine of predestination." In neither system does the individual count. We should not have escaped the horrors of Nazism, Fascism and Bolshevism if Hegel and Marx had never lived, for all three are the unhealthy children of the World War; but those famous thinkers prepared the soil for the tares. The ruthless systems which to-day hold the larger part of Europe in their grip are analysed in one of the most striking chapters of the volume. Mr. Spender always controls his emotions, but we can see how deeply he detests both the theory and practice of the dictators. "An Englishman, with his history and traditions behind him, finds it extremely difficult to realise that a great modern nation can place itself absolutely at the mercy of one man, and strip itself bare of all the guarantees against tyranny and misgovernment, all the correctives to human infirmity and failure of judgment, which other nations have evolved through centuries of experience. . . . History shows nothing quite like the spectacle of all Europe hanging on the lips of Herr Hitler and waiting in suspense while he decides the question of war and peace for them all." In proclaiming that they are a law to themselves the dictators are turning their backs on civilisation and reverting to the crude contrivances of the early Oriental empires.

The final chapter, entitled "Retrospect and Prospect," bids us keep up our courage, for dictators are mortal and leave no heirs. "We shall not argue our way out of the present confusion. If a prediction may be hazarded, it is that the present phase will be short as history counts duration. So feverish a departure from the normal life as we are witnessing in these times cannot be greatly prolonged, whether it ends by eruption or exhaustion." Civilisation in any worthy sense of the word, as Mr. Spender says, is unthinkable without liberty. Man has risen from savagery, with many backslidings, and he is not going to destroy his handiwork. Our duty is not to scrap our

institutions and desert ideals, but courageously to adjust them to the needs of a more complex national and international society.

G. P. G.

### BRITAIN AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF LATIN AMERICA, 1812-1830.\*

"The emancipation of Latin America from European control," writes Professor Webster, "ranks with the American and French Revolutions as one of the determining political forces which brought into existence the world in which we still live." In that epic story Great Britain played a secondary but important part. She supplied, though unofficially, both material and human resources. Sympathy with the Latin Americans was widespread amongst her citizens. Her merchants, faced with a contracted European market, saw in Latin America a new El Dorado and a cure for most European ills. Indeed, from the first the interests of British trade shaped, if they did not control, the development of British policy. The United States also played a part in this movement of emancipation. They had presented the first example of freedom in the new world, a fact which Professor Webster signalises as by far their greatest contribution to Latin American independence. They were the first to recognise the new states; and in 1823 they promulgated a doctrine of non-interference which was to become increasingly important in the successive stages of its evolution. The documents which illustrate the phases of United States policy and the development of the relations of the States with Latin America were published as long ago as 1925 in Dr. W. R. Manning's three volumes of the *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations*. The British archives are incomparably richer, and, despite the Monroe Doctrine, the policy of Great Britain was incomparably more decisive. Yet it is only now that the richness of those archives and the full significance of that policy are illustrated in the relevant documents. The publication of these two volumes is itself something of an historical event.

\* Select Documents from the Foreign Office Archives, edited by C. K. Webster, Litt.D., F.B.A., 2 vols., published for the Ibero-American Institute of Great Britain by the Oxford University Press, 1938. 50s.

The 626 documents here printed are a selection from the Foreign Office papers. They are prefaced by an introduction which is a masterly interpretation of British diplomacy in relation to Latin American independence. Professor Webster analyses in turn the policies of Castlereagh and Canning, the proposals for mediation and intervention, the plans for establishing monarchies in the new world, the serio-comic jealousies of the maritime powers over Cuba, the rivalry between Great Britain and the United States, and the part played by Great Britain in securing the independence of Brazil and in the establishment of the Republic of Uruguay. The documents themselves are chosen to illustrate the principles and methods of British diplomacy in the age of Castlereagh and Canning and the nature of British relations with Latin America before and after recognition in 1825.

Volume I contains the documents concerning British relations with the Latin American countries themselves. Great Britain was, on the whole, fortunate in her representatives in Latin America. Colonel Hamilton in Colombia was, it is true, remarkably inept, and there were other failures; but Woodbine Parish at Buenos Aires, Ward in Mexico and Dawkins at Panamá deserve a high rank amongst diplomatic representatives. The reports from these men and others are highly interesting in their relation to the formulation of British policy; they reveal the political and diplomatic position of Great Britain in Latin America and, incidentally, her rivalry with the United States; and they frequently provide an instructive commentary on the domestic history of the new states. It is only possible to refer here to the remarkable conversations of Consul Ricketts with Bolívar.

The complement to this correspondence with Latin America is the documents in Volume II which display Great Britain's attitude towards the European powers and the United States. The contrast between the diplomacy of Castlereagh and Canning and the difficulties which each so skilfully faced are here clearly illustrated. Castlereagh was "the first British statesman to recognise that the friendship of the United States was a major asset to Britain, and to use in his relations with her a language that was neither superior nor intimidating." But as a good European he wished recognition to be a European policy, and he was preparing to carry out that policy when his untimely death postponed recognition for

three years and changed its method and character. Canning, like his great counterpart in the United States, John Quincy Adams, was an ardent nationalist. He preferred a British to a European policy. Disliking the United States he was yet impelled to make those advances to them which provided the safe occasion for the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine. This Professor Webster characterises as Canning's one serious error. Henceforth Canning strove with eagerness and success to recover the ground he had lost in Latin America. Whatever Canning's motives may have been, however, in making these advances, it is clear that no serious danger of intervention existed in 1823. In effect, after Castlereagh's memorandum of August 20th, 1817, that danger was at an end. From that date the British navy safeguarded an independence which was already assured.

While it is true that the strength of the British navy and the interests of British trade to a large extent shaped the story illustrated in these documents, it is necessary to modify Canning's boast that he called the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old. Brilliant as his achievements were, he had built on Castlereagh's foundations, though the designs of the original architect were changed. In the last analysis, moreover, the Latin Americans won their own independence. Professor Webster's plea that in recognising this British historians should be drawn "to a more extensive and sympathetic study of Latin American history" is given force by his own admirable example.

R. A. HUMPHREYS.

## GERMANY'S CAPACITY TO WAGE WAR.

*Germany in a Lightning War*,\* by Dr. Fritz Sternberg, a well-known writer on economic and financial matters, gives an enlightening analysis of the German war potential, which he compares with that of the Great Powers, enabling the reader to draw his own conclusions from figures and other official statistical material. He also compares the present situation with 1914, giving in broad outline the economic development since that time and the changed character of war. What are his conclusions? Germany waged war in 1914 and lost. What would have been her fate if war had broken out on

\* Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.

October 1st, 1938? Her position would have been even worse. In 1914 she had twenty-five classes of trained men, to-day she has three. In 1914 she produced 27 million tons of iron ore, to-day she is producing 8-9 million tons annually. The problem of nourishing the population has become more and more difficult under the Nazi régime. Her dependence on the import of raw materials and foodstuffs is a question of gold and foreign currencies. Germany entered the World War as one of the richest creditor countries with a gold reserve of about 3½ milliard marks, and with an unshaken credit abroad. Nobody will doubt that, while she was able to place milliards of marks of war loans in neutral countries in the first years of the struggle, now she would not have been able to place anything abroad, in view of her gold and foreign currency shortage.

Dr. Sternberg compares Germany's war efficiency with that of Great Britain and France. In view of their unlimited resources in raw materials from abroad, even if America had remained neutral, the great democracies would have been unconquerable, especially when we consider the war potential of Russia, which the author discusses in great detail. This chapter is of the utmost interest for English readers, since the "Russian enigma" played an important part in the defence of the Chamberlain policy. The fundamental difference between Tsarist and Soviet Russia emerges from the data in this book. The industrial capacity of pre-war Germany was five times that of Russia. Now the industrial strength of the two countries is approximately equal. Moreover, apart from the United States, Russia is the one big Power which is independent of imports with regard to all important raw materials. For instance, she produces four times the quantity of coal produced in 1913, three times the quantity of iron ore and oil.

The book, excellently translated by Mr. E. Fitzgerald, will strengthen the case of those who opposed the view that peace could have been saved only by the yielding of the Democratic Powers, and who were convinced that Germany, while employing her war-like intention as a threat right up to the last moment, nevertheless would not have played the trump card of war, if she had been faced with a firm stand, owing to the economic factor and the internal situation and tensions in Germany on which Dr. Sternberg dwells. War, he believes, would have led to a catastrophe for Germany. Only when the

political and economic domination of Central and South-East Europe has been accomplished can Germany launch the war she lately threatened.  
B. R.

### ULRICH VON HUTTEN.\*

Most of us have approached the career of Hutten through the delightful pages of Strauss. But he wrote in 1860, and a mass of new information has since come to light. Of this the author has taken full advantage, both when this book appeared in German in 1929, and now in the revised American edition. This book at once steps into authoritative rank. We can well imagine that the horrors of the Nazi régime have lent an insight into the tragedies of the Reformation that otherwise might have been denied to so fine a scholar as the author. No matter what period the biographer examines he cannot forget his own, and no doubt Professor Holborn's book receives a new value from the fact that he has lived through the transformation of modern Germany. Not that for a moment we believe that this transformation appears in his book explicitly, but we think it does so implicitly. The scholarship is unimpeachable. Naturally, the author pays a tribute to the great edition of Hutten's works due to Édouard Böcking, and he laments the loss of two thousand of the reformer's letters which Szamatolski had gathered, a loss all scholars mourn. At the same time there is gain as well as loss, and among the gains are the Allen edition of the letters of Erasmus and the Weimar edition of the works of Luther. Secondary works, too, receive adequate notice, and in addition to notice there are comments on their value. Inevitably *Strauss* is condemned as the work of a superficial writer whose delightful style fails to redeem its superficiality. The index is scarcely worthy of this highly important biography. Hutten himself in its pages stands out as the vigorous personality he is, and his background is sketched with the loving familiarity of one to whom he is much more than a humanist who lived some three hundred years ago. He is a friend to be understood and the significance of his place in the sixteenth century duly assessed. The whole book vibrates with the vitality of its distinguished author.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

\* By H. Holborn. Translated by R. H. Bainton. Yale University Press.

### PEPYS AND THE NAVY.\*

It is a pleasure to welcome the third volume of Mr. Arthur Bryant's life of *Samuel Pepys* and to know that it does not conclude a work which stands in the first rank of historical biography. Mr. Bryant is here dealing with a short but pregnant period from August 1683 to February 1689, which covers Pepys' second and greater administration at the Admiralty; and he has deferred to a final fourth volume the fourteen years of retirement which followed upon the accession of William and Mary. The difficulties in narrating these five and a half years lie not in the dearth but in the spate of material, and the author, while garnering and gratefully acknowledging the work of other Pepysian scholars, including the late Dr. J. R. Tanner, the late Mr. Edwin Chappell and Dr. W. Matthews, has laboured among and analysed quantities of papers hitherto unexamined and unpublished. In the result Mr. Bryant has produced a detailed yet nicely balanced narrative, composed in his lively and stimulating style. If it necessarily lacks the thrill and dramatic intensity of the second volume, it is more important as a piece of historical writing in which for the first time Pepys' place in the history of naval administration has been more than adequately revealed.

Mr. Bryant opens with the Tangiers Expedition in which Pepys accompanied Lord Dartmouth as a Commissioner in the task of destroying and evacuating the port. The mission served to impress Pepys with the deplorable state of decay, licence and indiscipline into which the Navy had lapsed since he had left the Admiralty five years before. These impressions were more than substantiated when in May 1684 he was reappointed to his old post of Naval Secretary. While in 1679 seventy-six ships had been fully equipped ready for war with 12,000 men in pay, and a debt of £305,000, by 1684 there were only some twenty frigates and several fireships fit for sea, manned by 3,000 men. The rest of the fleet was "literally rotting in harbour"; there were few stores and the naval debt had increased to £384,000. The whole administration was riddled with corruption and discipline had disappeared. In short, to use the author's words, "the Navy was being run as a gigantic swindling concern by those who

\* *Samuel Pepys*, Vol. III, *The Saviour of the Navy*. By Arthur Bryant. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d. net.



should have been its trustees." It was Pepys' task and achievement to cleanse thoroughly and to re-equip the Augean stables before he left office at the Glorious Revolution. It is true that he had almost every advantage which an administrator might desire. He was a faithful adherent of the Duke of York who, in spite of the Test Acts, controlled naval policy; and upon the latter's accession Pepys "was left the unchallenged administrative head of the first service in the State." Allowed a free hand and encouraged by the King, he was supported by a regular flow of sufficient funds. In March 1686 he was assisted by special commissioners appointed at his instigation and composed of his own supporters or nominees. It is clear that Pepys made the most of his opportunities. By the end of 1688 he had rebuilt the Navy, increasing its aggregate tonnage from 62,594 to 101,032, composed of seaworthy ships fully equipped and with adequate stores. He reorganised the administration and radiated from Whitehall effective control throughout the Service. Notorious abuses in the fleet such as private trading and carrying passengers for profit were checked; he reimposed and elaborated rules of discipline, the impress of which are still felt to-day. He also revived the system for training officers, having as the author says, a "passion for naval education."

Mr. Bryant ranks at their highest Pepys' labours during these years, as the supreme achievement "by virtue of which his country still rules the seas." Undoubtedly he played a great part in making possible British naval supremacy. He possessed a genius for honest and constructive administration, and it may be that Mr. Bryant has justification in conferring the all-embracing title "father of the civil service." The author lays some stress upon his "unshakeable loyalty," and declares that he never acted from "prudential" motives. He made at no time secret overtures to William of Orange, unlike so many others, including Marlborough, whose "betrayal" Mr. Bryant condemns and for whom he can find no extenuation in Mr. Churchill's apologia. James' purported policy of religious toleration was accepted at its face value by the mature mind of Pepys, a virtuoso who was "never a zealot for any one creed or dogma," and who suffered severely at the hands of intolerance. While, however, an ardent supporter of the King he was admittedly actuated at least by "a sense of caution." He kept carefully to his own department,

prudently avoiding James' inner circle of Catholics and Jesuit priests. Indispensable himself, he was glad to use his influence for and maintain friendship with those who might be in disfavour at Court. Upon one occasion, at least, he used a flimsy pretext to drop out of the Royal Progress when in 1687 he was being entertained by the Dean and Chapter who had been met by James' disfavour. After lingering long in the library and discovering that the King had already left the city for Chester, Pepys used the opportunity to return to London. As an example of his independence, Mr. Bryant cites his evidence at the trial of the Seven Bishops, when as a last resort the Crown called him to prove legally, what in fact all knew, that the seditious petition had been in law "published" in Middlesex. His evidence was of no assistance to the prosecution, and it is difficult to draw conclusions as to the motives of a witness called by the Crown and whose testimony in fact aids the defence of popular heroes. Similarly Pepys' eagerness to greet James upon his apparently popular return to London after his first attempt to flee the country is susceptible of various conclusions.

No doubt Pepys was a loyal and incorruptible official under James II. He well knew that his tenure of office was bound up with continuance of the Stuart régime. Having regard to his earlier experiences and the temper of the times naturally he would govern his actions prudently to avoid persecution in the event of a fresh political change.

### WOMEN IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.\*

Miss Hilda Martindale, lately retired from a high position in the Civil Service, has ably compiled the first history of the employment of women in that Service, from their entry through the Post Office to the present day. It is a record of which women may well be proud: successive official reports have recognised the value of their highly efficient, devoted work, and their organising ability. Miss Martindale recalls the objections originally urged against their admission, the continued opposition to it in some quarters, and the persistence of the idea, only dispelled by the war, that they could not possibly work side by side with men. An amusing account

\* *Women Servants of the State, 1870-1938*. By Hilda Martindale, C.B.E. George Allen & Unwin. 1938. 7s. 6d.

is given of their early segregation in locked rooms : long after that, they were still working in " watertight compartments." A chief motive for their introduction was that they were cheap ; they " are also less disposed than men to combine for the purpose of extorting higher wages " (quoted from Post Office Report, 1871). Some of these women clerks trained in the Post Office were applied for by other Departments.

The first Woman Inspector under the Board of Education in 1883 was styled " Directress of Needlework." In 1905, under Sir Robert Morant, the real Woman Inspectorate for girls' schools and training colleges was set up. Miss Martindale records the successful labours of women as e.g. Inspectors of Poor Law schools and homes, of prisons, of factories ; in connection with National Health Insurance, or Inland Revenue. Short biographical sketches of three pioneers are included—Miss M. C. Smith in the Post Office ; Dame Adelaide Anderson, Factory Inspector (Home Office), and Miss H. M. Mason, Inspector of Boarded-Out Children (Local Government Board). Two chapters are devoted to the war years and subsequent reconstruction schemes respectively, and another discusses the vexed question of the marriage bar. Compulsory retirement on marriage for women in the higher grades is still the rule, except in a very few cases of special qualifications. Women have now obtained the same pension rights as men, and the differentiation in pay is reduced. They are now admitted to the administrative classes by open competition, with the exception of those of the three Defence Departments, and of the Colonial and Dominions Offices. Moreover, by an Order in Council of 1921, " all posts in the Diplomatic Service and in the Consular Service are reserved to men." This decision has been more than once officially reconsidered, but never rescinded. Miss Martindale sets forth the arguments on either side, and concludes with the confident hope that before long the sphere of women's service to the State may be enlarged to include overseas administration.

E. G. S.

*N.B.*—On December 14th Mr. MacDonald, in answer to a question in the House, said that he had decided to remove the restriction. The admission of women to the administrative staff of the Dominions Office and Colonial Office is to be regarded as " experimental."—E. G. S.

## SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

*The Modern Historian*,\* by Professor C. H. Williams, contains about three-score selections from modern historians which may help the reader to make up his mind what history is and how it should be written. They are classified under the Nature of History, the Widening Scope of History, and the Historian at Work. Among those who have passed away we note the great names of Acton, Maitland, Bury, Firth, Vinogradoff, Creighton, Tout, Haverfield. Among living scholars we meet Trevelyan, Pollard, Herbert Fisher, Powicke, Toynbee and many others. It was a good idea to put the historians in the witness-box and let them explain their task. If help is required it is supplied in the thoughtful Introduction by the Editor, who discourses pleasantly and pertinently on the problems raised by the utterances of such writers as Acton and Bury, Trevelyan and H. G. Wells. Professor Williams has a tolerant as well as a richly stored mind, and he rejoices in the disappearance of old catchwords and controversies. In the countries which are fortunate enough to preserve their liberties we move towards the larger freedom in every sphere. The task of the historian remains unchanged—the recording and the interpretation of the life of humanity. Immense progress has been made in the half-century illustrated by the selections in this book.

\* \* \* \* \*

*Mediterranean Cross-Currents*,† by Margaret Boveri, well deserved the honour of translation, a task skilfully performed by Louisa Sieveking. It is a long and important book, packed with information, yet extremely readable. The author knows every part of the ground, and some snapshots reveal the observant traveller. No student of international politics can ignore it. The Introduction to the English edition summarises events since the German original appeared in 1936. But the author aims at a great deal more than a picture of the Mediterranean countries and islands as they are to-day. She seeks to give " something of its permanent essence, its structure and temperament, its ever-recurrent historical tendencies." The main reason why the book has been written is the emergence of a new Italy. " It was Italy's rapid and purposeful increase in strength that appeared to be the new factor demanding detailed description," and she speaks openly of the possibility of a struggle between her and England. Of all the Great Powers of Europe, she declares, England is the most seriously engaged in trying to prevent the outbreak of a future war, whether in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. Yet it takes two to keep the peace. Chapter Four, entitled " Italy, the Centre of the Stage," reminds us that Fascist Imperialism is no joke, and when Mussolini showed his teeth during the Sanctions controversy we and the French ran away. The

\* Thomas Nelson. 7s. 6d.

† Oxford University Press. 21s.

final chapter, entitled "The Strategist Takes the Lead," is not pleasant reading. The Mediterranean no longer exists merely as the paradise of tourists and artists. The Mediterranean peoples have again become dynamic. We are entering on one of the heroic epochs in which their history abounds, and indeed the author plainly expects war. Whether she is right or not the future will decide. Meanwhile we shall do well to study her massive volume, which is of value not less for its detailed information than for its quiet mastery and its breadth of vision.

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Dr. David Mathew, in *The Jacobean Age*,\* has successfully depicted a transition period, its earlier years dominated by Elizabethan traditions and the rule of the Cecils, its latter, under the ascendancy of the favourite, Buckingham, preparing the stage for Charles and Laud. Yet the age had its own individual flavour, which the author has subtly recaptured. Hitherto unpublished documents at Hatfield House, supplemented by those from other great houses, and by letters and diaries, show the life of the day, based on wealth and stability, and the increasing importance of the landed gentry. James is portrayed less unattractively than usual, and other characters fill the canvas, e.g. Bacon, Donne, Bishop Andrewes, and the statesmen Conway and Coke. A general toning-down of Elizabethan exuberance, whether in sea adventure or literary style, is noted; the Authorised Version is, of course, the glory of the latter. We are shown the building of great country houses—Knole, Audley End, Hatfield, Wardour—and the patronage of the fine arts initiated by Thomas, Earl of Arundel, who toured Italy with Inigo Jones. In religion, the Bishops and typical Anglicanism, while strongly averse to Popery, were equally aloof from Geneva, though Puritanism was spreading in some towns and among the smaller squires. In spite of the fury aroused by the Gunpowder Plot, wealthy or noble Roman Catholics were often left unpenalised. The activities of the Virginia and Bermuda Companies make interesting reading. The portrait illustrations are an added attraction.

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An interesting and finely illustrated volume on *The Old Public Schools of England*† has been written by Mr. John Rodgers who discusses schools founded prior to the nineteenth century. His aim is "to show the richness of the educational tradition" in the public schools and sketch their historical growth both collectively and individually. The author has compressed together a great mass of material and leavened it by a pleasant and lucid style with many anecdotes and accounts of school customs. The greater public schools are given individually much attention and, perhaps rightly, Eton is awarded pride of space. Fortunately Mr. Rodgers has given a wide interpretation to "public schools" and his brief sketches of the principal

\* Longmans. 1938. 15s.

† Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

grammar schools make his volume of particular value. The author possesses, naturally, the highest regard for the public schools and it is interesting to note his opinion that they should be open to the working classes. As he points out and shows in the course of the text, the endowments of most of the early institutions "were intended for the poor" and "a return to this basic principle" would "be ultimately to the lasting benefit of the public schools, and do much to broaden their outlook and sympathies."

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The History of a Society is a series of pictures of French life, of which *The Survivors*\* is the first to be translated into English. M. René Béhaine, the author, observes closely the habits and thoughts—though of thought there is very little in the characters in this book—of a class of society which has got left behind in these modern days, the aristocratic women of the French provinces. Three generations brought up in convent schools, their life centring round the life of the Church and convent and the local charities, meditating chiefly on their latter end, unmoved apparently by all the happenings in the world outside, finally issue in the partial emancipation of number three, Catherine de Laignes. Minute as the observation is and circumscribed the whole subject, yet it is a vivid picture and promises further good reading—at leisure—when other volumes appear. The translator is good and it is to be hoped he will go on. Since *The Survivors* appeared its success in England has stimulated a success in France, too. But whereas France knows herself, it is to readers in other lands that this book appeals. In a preface, Mr. Ford Madox Ford says: "One may say of M. Béhaine that if the world would read his books—his one immense book in many parts—the world would be spared its worst Armageddon . . . because it might know France."

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Professor Friedrich Lenz has devoted many years to Friedrich List, the leading German economist and political thinker of the first part of the nineteenth century. There existed in Germany a Friedrich-List-Gesellschaft (1925-36) whose chief duty was to publish a critical edition of the writings, speeches and letters, a fine piece of work, the result of the indefatigable activities of many scholars with Lenz at the head. In 1936 he published an exhaustive biography, which is at once a full account of the heroic life of a thinker and patriot, a description of the historical background, and an outline of the system, which the author himself has continued by adapting it to the new problems of our period. List's ideas are fascinating in their actual and prophetic power. This brochure† shows how a Suabian Civil Servant and Professor could become a citizen of the United States, how he was the first German to

\* Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

† Friedrich List und Grossdeutschland. By Friedrich Lenz. Leipzig, 1938.

understand the necessity of railways and an independent national production of valuable goods. He combined an extraordinary instinct for practical questions with the vision of a philosopher and a prophet. He created the theory of modern imperialism and tried to place a central European unit at the side of the other world Powers. English readers will be especially interested in his ideas on Anglo-German co-operation, Great Germany becoming the ally of the British Empire and helping England, by her economic activities in the Balkans and the Near East, to maintain the balance with Russia and France.

VEIT VALENTIN.

The second volume of *The Handbook of British Birds*\* is almost as exciting to open as was its predecessor. Running from the warblers to the owls, it covers ground familiar to the ordinary bird-loving public and is equally indispensable. The chart of song-periods is continued, as also, of course, is the unique series of coloured plates depicting each species in as many plumages as are necessary for identification. There are six maps. Four show the breeding distribution in the British Isles of the reed warbler, nightingale, great spotted woodpecker and little owl. Two show swallow spring migration dates and the recovery of marked swallows in Africa. The last indicates that while German birds tend to winter near the Equator, ours push right on down into South-East Africa. Despite the mass of material brought together in this book, it is again emphasised that "it cannot be too clearly insisted that a vast amount of detailed and intensive observation is still required before any reasonably complete account can be given of the life histories of even our commonest species of birds."

Dr. F. Fraser Darling has published an interesting book in *Wild Country. A Highland naturalist's notes and pictures*.† He himself calls it a scrap-book because it is concerned with many aspects of the countryside rather than with any one in particular. It is a collection of valuable photographs taken mostly in the West Highlands, with descriptive text and comments. The subject-matter includes birds, seals, deer, landscape, rocks and water. Perhaps the most interesting sections are those on birds and seals, and in particular the "Flight of Birds," which is illustrated with remarkable photographs of the fulmar petrel, black-backed gulls and herring gulls. Many of the cliff and rock photographs emphasise the fastness of the breeding-grounds and give some idea of the dangers and difficulties of obtaining photographs.

\* Witherby. 25s. each volume, or £5 5s. the set of five volumes.

† Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

## THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

FEBRUARY 1939.

### TWENTY YEARS OF EUROPE.

TWENTY years ago the victors in the fiercest struggle in history met at Paris, conscious that they were presented with a unique opportunity of rebuilding the world on new foundations. Like other victors they had to deal out rewards and punishments, but the main problem confronting them was to prevent a repetition of the catastrophe. How could this ambitious aim be accomplished? Firstly, by a moderate territorial and economic settlement; secondly, by the creation of machinery for carrying on the international business of an increasingly interdependent world and facilitating peaceful change; thirdly, by reasonable consideration for the feelings and interests of the defeated states in the early years after the restoration of peace. Let us see how the statesmen and peoples discharged their onerous responsibilities.

The treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly and Sèvres cannot truthfully be pronounced a wise or far-sighted settlement. Mr. Keynes incorrectly described the first as a Carthaginian peace, for Carthage disappeared while Germany was quickly on her legs again. But thoughtful men like General Smuts and Colonel House were well aware that it would not produce the appeasement and stabilisation for which we all craved. "I go to Vienna," declared Castlereagh in 1814, "not to bring home trophies of victory but to restore Europe to the paths of peace." The Treaty of Vienna was far from being ideal, but at any rate its makers realised the unwisdom of pressing France too hard. A negotiated peace secures far more than it sacrifices, for its provisions are the most likely to endure. For that reason Europe quickly recovered from the passions as well as the ravages of the Napoleonic wars. The treaties of 1919-1920, on the contrary, registered the smashing victory of the Allies without troubling very much about the future. No real attempt was made to study the interests or to visualise the emotions of the defeated states, who had simply to swallow what was forced down their throats.

VOL. CLV.

Looking back after twenty years we can only marvel at the short-sightedness of a treaty which, among other items, deprived Germany of all her colonies, imposed a crushing burden of reparations, established unilateral disarmament and demilitarised the Rhineland without limit of time. But for the efforts of British and American statesmen it would have been even worse, for the French wished to erect the new frontier at the Rhine. Nobody imagines that the Central Powers, who had dictated the harsh terms of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, would have given us better treatment if they had won. It is a great exaggeration to describe the treaties as wholly bad, and it is true enough, as Professor Seton-Watson has shown in his admirable book, *England and the Dictators*, that there were fewer discontented minorities in Europe after the war than before. Yet some of the new frontiers were very unfairly drawn, sometimes for strategic reasons, sometimes according to whether a state had been on our side in the world war or not; and the total neglect of economic planning was a tragic mistake. As Professor Shotwell admits in his recent work, *At the Paris Peace Conference*, there never was a peace conference at all, for at the wish of the French no discussion was allowed. Many articles, he adds, were far from any generous or even fair construction of the Fourteen Points.

In his arresting volumes, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, Mr. Lloyd George has strongly defended not only his own share in them but the settlement as a whole, on the ground that it merely carried out the intentions of the Allies formulated long before victory was in sight. "It is not the treaties that should be blamed. The fault lies with those who repudiated their own solemn contracts and pledges by taking a discreditable advantage of their temporary superiority to deny justice to those who, for the time being, were helpless to exact it. . . . Between the retreat of America and the treacheries of Europe the Treaties of Peace were never given a fair trial." This line of argument is more plausible than convincing, for the whole Versailles system rested on a false basis. "We were all convinced," writes Mr. Lloyd George of the British Delegation, "that this devastating conflict had been deliberately provoked by the enemy that was now suing for more lenient terms." The French, needless to say, shared this conviction, which was natural enough when the secrets

of the archives were under lock and key and the desire to discover the truth was still very weak. To-day we realise that Bethmann Hollweg was just as anxious to avoid a catastrophe as Grey himself, and that throughout the reign of William II the German Government, while committing one folly after another, never seriously contemplated the crime of aggressive war. The main cause of the conflict was not "Prussian militarism" but the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Near East. Germany stood by her ally as readily as France stood by Russia. There was and there could be no sense of guilt. We can understand nowadays the resentment at what was considered the intolerable stigma inflicted on a proud nation after an heroic fight. Unless we realise how the Treaty of Versailles and "the war-guilt lie" appeared and still appear to the average German we shall fail to understand the collapse of democracy and the Nazi triumph.

Not very much remains to-day of the treaties of 1919-1920, and in the case of Turkey a new settlement was amicably negotiated at Lausanne in 1923. But what are we to say of the League of Nations, which we welcomed with mind and heart as the idealism of true statesmanship, tempering the so-called realism of victory, greed and revenge? That mankind was not fully ripe for the greatest experiment in world organisation ever attempted is now clear enough, for international institutions without the international mind are as hollow as democracies without public spirit. Yet the League never had a fair chance. Two grievous and quite needless mistakes were made at the outset. Firstly, the articles of the Covenant formed part of each of the treaties dictated by the victors, and the new institution was thus identified in the defeated countries with their own suffering and humiliation. Secondly, Germany was excluded during the years in which it was getting to work. It was inevitable that in German eyes, to use Sir Ian Hamilton's expressive phrase, the League should appear as a Committee of Conquerors, for such it was. We can understand the disinclination of France to co-operate with the foe who had inflicted such terrible sufferings. Yet such feelings ought to have been subordinated to the supreme interest of the pacification of Europe, which was just as necessary for the victors as for the vanquished. Germany was far too important a member of the human family to be ignored, and after the flight of the Kaiser there was no real

excuse for a boycott. The Weimar statesmen, such as Rathenau, Stresemann and Brüning, were civilised and patriotic men with whom it was quite possible to work. It is a tragedy—one may almost say a scandal—that so little was done to foster the democratic experiment during the first difficult years when sympathy and support would have made all the difference. That America had backed out was an additional reason for bringing Germany in.

If the excessive severity of the Versailles treaty and the scornful exclusion of Germany from the League were costly errors, the invasion of the Ruhr was still more inexcusable; for by 1923 the passions of the struggle had begun to cool. That the full amount of reparation deliveries was not forthcoming was true enough, and Poincaré, who took a narrowly legalistic view of the treaty, decided to enforce the contract. His patriotism was a burning passion; but no one has ever called him a "good European," and he was singularly destitute of imagination. When the French troops marched into the Ruhr the economic recovery of Germany was checked and the mark toppled into the abyss. The psychological shock was equally severe and far more enduring. France, it was felt, was determined not to give her neighbour a fair chance. As Mr. Chamberlain has recently admitted, the treatment of Germany by the Allies after the war was neither generous nor wise.

After a bad start with the short-sighted peace treaties, an incomplete League, and the ill-judged invasion of the Ruhr, a welcome change in the European atmosphere took place in the middle twenties. The *Bloc National* in France was succeeded in 1924 by the Left Centre of Herriot and Briand; the reparation problem was provisionally settled in the same year by the Dawes plan; the Locarno Pact of 1925 seemed to end the old quarrel about the Rhine provinces; Germany's entry into the League in 1926 was welcomed by Briand at Geneva in the greatest oration of his life; the Pact of Paris, signed in 1928 by all the nations of the world, solemnly renounced war as an instrument of national policy; the army of occupation marched out of the Rhineland in the summer of 1930, five years before the date laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. The three makers of the Locarno Pact, Stresemann, Briand and Chamberlain, liked and trusted each other. The Locarno *quinquennium* was the only satisfactory chapter in

the history of post-war Europe. There was an immense improvement in every field, political, economic and psychological. To employ the title of Sir Arthur Salter's famous book, it was the period of Recovery. Unfortunately it was a false dawn.

In 1930 the tide began to ebb. Disasters and disappointments, revolutions and acts of violence, followed each other in breathless succession. In 1930 the terrible American blizzard burst on Europe. In 1931 Japan grabbed Manchuria. In 1932 the Disarmament Conference met, squabbled and failed. In 1934 the Nazi Putsch occurred in Vienna and Dollfuss was foully murdered. 1935 witnessed Italy's unprovoked attack on Abyssinia. In 1936 a savage civil war broke out in Spain. In 1937 Japan again sprang hungrily at the throat of China. In 1938 Hitler gobbled up Austria and the German districts of Czecho-Slovakia. Europe gazed down with a shudder into the abyss. The Munich meeting of the Big Four saved peace at the expense of Czecho-Slovakia, but the world instinctively felt that it was only a truce. In such a period of surprises, when the League has lost what little authority it possessed and nothing except brute force seems to count, it is not surprising that all countries, large and small, are arming to the teeth.

What part has England played in the dramatic and melancholy events of the last eight years? Not one of which we can be very proud. There has been no perfidy, but friends and foes alike have been amazed at the timidity and vacillation of our policy. It has been a story of regretful acquiescence and humiliating retreat. Our record at the Disarmament Conference was singularly disappointing. We did nothing when Japan attacked China, when Hitler remilitarised the Rhineland, when Franco bombed British ships and killed British sailors in the harbours of Spain, when Austria was invaded. Our attitude in regard to the Abyssinian outrage was an application of the cowardly maxim *Sauter pour mieux reculer*. When the British lion at last opened his mouth to roar, remarked a foreign journalist, he showed his false teeth. Not till 1938 was there any sign of leadership, and then, in the opinion of many observers at home and abroad, Mr. Chamberlain led us in the wrong direction by his subservience to the Dictators. In particular his apparent blindness to the grave strategic dangers of a Fascist Spain in

league with Hitler and Mussolini is a source of perpetual astonishment.

The passivity of England and France in the Far East, in Abyssinia and in Spain encouraged Hitler to strike his blows in 1938. It is generally believed in Germany and Italy that the Western Powers, unless they are actually attacked, are more likely to surrender than to fight. In Guido Zernatto's poignant work, *Die Wahrheit über Oesterreich*, there is a disturbing passage in Schuschnigg's report of his historic conversation with Hitler at Berchtesgaden a year ago. It was useless, argued the Führer, for Austria to look beyond her frontiers for help. The British Empire was a colossus of clay. The Dominions would stand aloof from a European conflict in which neither the mother country nor themselves were directly concerned. Under the impact of war the empire would probably collapse. France, he continued, was weakened by her internal differences, and she no longer played a leading part in the European game. Mussolini had no choice but to retain the friendship of Germany. Italy had weakened herself by her wars in Abyssinia and Spain. Her army was of poor fighting quality, and 100,000 German soldiers could smash it to pieces.

No doubt Hitler laid the colours on rather thickly in order to intimidate his unwilling guest, but his words undoubtedly reflect the general trend of his thoughts. Every sentence breathed the conviction that, owing to the weakness of her rivals and her own growing strength, Germany could do almost whatever she liked. Moreover, like most other dictators, he believes not only in his mission but in his star. On three critical occasions he has preferred his own untrained judgment to the advice of his military experts. Mindful of the uncertainty of war and the dread penalties of defeat, leading soldiers cautioned him against his *coups* in the Rhineland, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. "I am surrounded by cowards," he burst out on one occasion, and went his way. Henceforth he will not trouble overmuch about warnings and advice. He can point to his bloodless victories as the proof not only of the sharpness of the German sword but of his own sureness of hand. So far, indeed, he seems to have the luck of the game. To-day all roads lead to Berlin. The short-sighted Versailles era, based on the victory of the Allies and the military hegemony of France, only lasted twenty years. It

was built on sand and it has collapsed. The laurels of 1918 are faded, the face of Europe is transformed.

What are the main elements of Hitler's strength? First, the energies of a virile nation of nearly 80 millions, with an astonishing capacity for work and a tradition of obedience unequalled in Europe. Second, an immense army and air force, with a newly constructed Siegfried line in the Rhineland which, after the feverish labours of last summer, must be as impregnable as its Maginot model. He is now making use of the right to equality in submarines contained in the Anglo-German treaty of 1935. Third, what he calls the World Triangle, the partnership of the three dissatisfied Great Powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, all of them armed to the teeth. Fourth, a growing capacity to exert political, economic and cultural pressure on every state in central and eastern Europe with the exception of Russia. Czecho-Slovakia, a pale shadow of her former vigorous self, feeds out of his hand. Hungary, now a neighbour, owes him her revised frontiers in Slovakia and Ruthenia, and has recently become a member of the anti-Comintern Pact. Yugoslavia, under the guidance of Stoyadinovich, is *persona gratissima* with the Dictators. Greece is ruled by a rough-handed soldier whose spiritual home is Berlin. The Little Entente, the child of Beneš, has disappeared with its author. A naval blockade has few terrors for Germany to-day, for the roads to the south and east are open.

It is an impressive list, but there are some solid assets on the other side of the balance sheet. First comes the Anglo-French partnership, sadly diminished in prestige since the crumpling up of Czecho-Slovakia, but still intact, tightly bound, as Mr. Chamberlain has reminded us, not merely by a defensive treaty but by the stronger tie of common interests and ideals. Secondly, though the Czecho-Slovak-Russian alliance is dead and the Franco-Russian alliance in a state of suspended animation, Russia is in no danger of being sucked into the Rome-Berlin axis. It is a tragedy that the atrocities of Bolshevik rule render cordial co-operation with the Western democracies impossible; but we may be grateful that at any rate there is a vast community in Eastern Europe content with its frontiers, too strong to intimidate, and in which Hitler's writ does not run. Thirdly, the rapid growth of German power has begun to alarm Poland, though her



*rapprochement* with Moscow has been followed by Beck's visit to Berchtesgaden. Fourthly, there are two states in south-eastern Europe which have no desire to become mere satellites of Berlin. The sympathies of Bulgaria and her ruler, King Boris, are with the Western democracies, and the execution of Codreanu suggests that King Carol is resolved to follow an independent course. The distress aroused in Berlin by the elimination of the Iron Guard is the measure of the hopes which its ruthless leader had aroused. Fifthly come what Bismarck called the *imponderabilia*, among which may be reckoned the conscience of mankind. The sickening horrors of the anti-Jewish pogroms, the murders and tortures in the overcrowded concentration camps, the intensification of the campaign against Christianity and the Churches, the cult of violence and hate, have left the Nazis with very few friends. At last even the blindest among us know them for what they are. Mr. Ickes told them in plain language what America thought of their crimes, and the protest from Berlin was sharply rejected by the Department of State at Washington on the ground that the views of the Secretary of the Interior were shared by the great majority of his countrymen. Everyone knows how President Roosevelt thinks and feels. In restoring the Dark Ages the present rulers of Germany have isolated that unhappy country from nations which have no desire but to be her friends. Happily there is no anti-German feeling. On the contrary there is sincere sympathy with a great and sorely tried nation which has fallen into evil hands.

Looking round at our distressed continent at the opening of 1939 we seem to see the scales of war and peace hanging level in the air. Such a perilous balance is easily upset. The chief factor making for war is the land hunger of Germany, Italy and Japan. The chief factor making for peace is the utter uncertainty as to its outcome if once it starts. If we were to judge from Hitler's own words, we need not fear that he will set light to the powder-barrel. Did he not sign the Munich No More War declaration? Did he not tell Mr. Chamberlain that he had no further territorial demands in Europe and that, though the difficult question of the colonies remained, he did not think it necessary to fight for them? Has not Ribbentrop visited Paris and signed a Franco-German pact of peace? Unfortunately the Fascist Dictators are never fettered by their promises. The Prime Minister's keen

anxiety to prepare for the worst indicates the narrow limits of his confidence. It is not impossible, as Lord Noel-Buxton suggested in the January number of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, that Hitler may become a pillar of European peace now that so many of his aims have been achieved and so many of his grievances removed. But even his mildest critics admit that his course is beyond prediction. This haunting uncertainty is the explanation, and, as most Englishmen think, the justification of our colossal armament programme.

For the moment, though only for the moment, the greatest danger seems to threaten from Rome. While the Abyssinian war was in progress, it was believed in some quarters that the doubling of her African empire would automatically remove Italy from the category of dissatisfied Great Powers. This soothing forecast has proved inaccurate. A much wider problem has arisen, a much more ambitious goal is in sight, the control of the Mediterranean, *mare nostrum*. Here is the explanation of the audacious invasion of Spain, not the ridiculous legend that it must be saved from Bolshevism. Here is the explanation of the costly military road through Tripoli from the Egyptian frontier to Tunis. Here is the explanation of the shrill cries for Tunis, Corsica, Nice, Savoy, French Somaliland, in the Italian Chamber and the Press. Such excursions into *la haute politique* do not occur in totalitarian states except by authorisation from above. The Duce, himself a veteran journalist, writes anonymous articles in the paper once edited by his brother, and the constant threats of Virginio Gayda, his authorised spokesman, make ugly reading. So keen has Italy's appetite become that neither the *rapprochement* with England nor France's recognition of Abyssinia avails to prevent its strident expression.

Mussolini was glad enough to obtain the Laval concessions in January 1935, which smoothed his path for the Abyssinian adventure. To-day, with Abyssinia in his pocket and the Rome-Berlin axis flaunting its omnipotence across Europe, he believes that he can extract better terms. The Laval agreement is denounced on the pretext that it was never ratified. To the latest demands, unofficial as they nominally are, France has made the only possible reply. If she were to pay Danegold to the Duce she would cease to count. Are the Dictators so drunk with power and victory that they believe they have only to hammer on the door? Is the Duce in such

urgent need of another feather in his cap that he asks for much in order to obtain half a loaf? It is natural enough that he should wish for a larger share in the Addis Abeba railway, for better docks and lower dues at Jibuti, for representation on the board of the Suez Canal Company, for privileges for the Italian settlers in Tunis. Such aims would have had a better chance of fulfilment had they been put forward in friendly negotiation, unaccompanied by menacing demands for slices off the French joint.

The reason for the intensification of the quarrel with France at such a moment eludes us. That the seizure of Austria was a shock to Italian opinion is no secret. That the rapid growth of German power is not altogether welcome in Rome after Hitler's spectacular triumphs is very probable. That Mussolini desires to strengthen his régime by some striking demonstration of his power and his skill is not in doubt. But would not his wisest course have been to secure a little more freedom of movement by restoring friendly relations with the Western Powers? Every schoolboy, as Macaulay used to say, knows that friendship with England and hostility to France are incompatible. You must be friends with neither of us or with both. Any attempt to break or weaken the bonds merely adds to their strength. The Duce's reputation as a moralist does not stand very high, but no one regards him as a fool. Is he playing a deep and masterly game which we are too lacking in subtlety to understand? Or is he merely giving rein to his resentment at the stubborn resistance of the Barcelona Government to the onslaughts of his *protégé*, and displaying his anger that, in his own words, France is on the other side of the barricade? At present we can only guess.

There is no reason to suppose that Mr. Chamberlain loves the Dictators any more or detests their actions any less than the rest of us. Since, however, they are far too powerful to be ignored, they must be dealt with in one way or another. The choice of methods is the supreme political issue of the time. It carries us far beyond party barriers, as fundamental issues of foreign policy always do. There are two main schools of thought. The first is what Mr. Churchill calls the Grand Alliance, what Emil Ludwig in his latest work calls the new Holy Alliance, what the veteran champions of the League Covenant call Collective Security, what the man in the street

calls standing up to the Dictators. The other school, of which Mr. Chamberlain is the High Priest, believes that such a policy in existing circumstances leads straight to war; that it is better to accept humiliations and indignities than to pick up the gloves at every challenge; that what seem to us reasonable demands, however roughly put forward, should be discussed in a friendly spirit; that personal contacts should be employed for all they are worth.

How will history judge this policy? We cannot tell, for the drama is still in progress. In his last speech before the Christmas recess the Prime Minister pleaded with his critics for a little more time for his experiment, adding that, if he found it was a failure, he would be the first to adopt another course. This significant phrase, coupled with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's official declaration that the Government is not considering any transfer of territory, suggests that he is not unaware of the swelling tide of discontent in the constituencies and the House of Commons. The greatest danger to peace to-day is that the Dictators, with whom he is for the moment *persona grata*, may under-estimate the courage and determination not only of the Western democracies, but of Mr. Chamberlain himself, and may be tempted by our unprecedented passivity during the last eight years to gamble on our indefinite acquiescence. Despite Munich, Paris, Rome, the storm signals are still flying and the barometer remains obstinately low. As we watch the dark clouds above our heads we sorrowfully recall the lost opportunities of twenty years, the lack of generosity on the part of the victors, the absence of any vital sense of the unity of civilisation. After long wanderings in the wilderness, perhaps only after fresh struggles and under new leaders, the nations will have to find their way back to Geneva and to the gospel of intelligent co-operation for which the League in its better moments has always stood.

G. P. GOOCH.

## THE AFRICAN SURVEY.\*

THE Survey of Africa, by Lord Hailey and his colleagues, is far more than a prodigious book of 1,800 pages: its issue is an historic event for the African continent. Lord Hailey has thus not merely made the whole African race his debtors, he has rendered an inestimable service to the civilised world, every citizen of which derives some benefit from Africa. It was inevitable that critics should detect omissions of subjects in which they have peculiar interest, just as it was also inevitable that the need for corrections of detail would arise and that some aspects would change even during the printing of the book. But it is astonishing to find one or two omissions (to be noticed later) of really cardinal importance to any complete survey of the African continent.

The Survey is not a railway companion, its size and weight alone would deter that pleasurable exercise, but equally it should not be put on the library shelf merely as a reference book, for it is a living thing, affecting profoundly the future of a hundred million people in Africa, and other hundreds of millions far beyond its shores.

The panorama of African life and industry which Lord Hailey has painted is of absorbing interest, but almost everything will turn on the reader's attitude towards the element in the picture which matters most—the native inhabitants. The white man, as Lord Hailey shows, has his essential place in the background, the Indian midway between the white and African races, but without the African the greater part of the continent would soon be little more than a wilderness. The reader, and in a peculiar sense the British reader, must ask as he examines this Survey what position is to be allotted to the African in Africa; the final answer to that question will decide the fate of the British Empire. Is the African to be kept farthest down in the human scale? Is he to continue to be relegated to the position depicted by Lord Hailey, under which the African is almost exclusively an unskilled labourer, employed only in such jobs as the benevolent white immigrants decide to allot to him? Is he to be told that even if he should attain a high social, ethical and economic level, the law, because of his colour, and his colour alone, will continue, at least in South Africa, to put

him outside the pale of civilised men whose colour happens to be white? Or, conversely, is the African to be allowed to attain to the full British citizenship promised to him in numbers of treaties and proclamations under which British citizenship was to be accorded to the African, guaranteed by the promise that under the British Crown there should be no disqualifications either in law or in the administration of the law which rested upon race or creed or colour? Is the door to human civilisation to be opened wide to all Africans of character and attainment as in France, where, as Lord Hailey shows, advancement rests upon merit, a policy which opens a highway, as in the case of Henry Carr in Nigeria, to the position of British Resident in charge of a Province of Nigeria, or again, as in the case of M. Blaise Diagne, the Senegalese, who rose step by step in the confidence of the French people until he became, not once, but several times, Under-Secretary of State in Paris for the Colonies?

These questions demand an answer from every British subject who gives himself to the study of the historic Survey of Africa. Lord Hailey quotes with great force the contemptuous reference which one so frequently hears south of the equator about the African becoming "a danger to the white civilisation." The African will only be a danger to white civilisation if he is treated unjustly. It may be said that in this conflict of racial policies, Lord Hailey has endeavoured to take up a detached position. If so, he has failed lamentably, for there are scores of passages where his sympathy for the underdog is obvious, and there are hundreds of other passages which echo a deep-seated British desire to insist upon a square deal for that simple, fuzzy-headed, warm-hearted African.

Lord Hailey, like all students of Africa, gives pride of space to African land, for taking together the kindred questions of tenure, agriculture, forests and erosion, no less than 347 pages are devoted to land problems, as against eighty-nine pages to native labour and ninety-seven to education—each of these little enough within which to compress a survey covering an area nearly six times the size of India. The survey gives the African population as somewhere between 138 and 163 millions, or about one-half that of India, and the white population as just over four millions. It will be a shock to most people to learn that vast areas of Africa, like

\* By Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. Oxford University Press. 21s. net.

Bechuanaland and South-West Africa, have a population of only one person to the square mile, and that nowhere in Africa, excepting Ruanda and Sierra Leone does the density reach fifty to the square mile.

Lord Hailey's story of alienation of lands is a pretty sordid one—every excuse, every means, just and unjust, have been used to take the land from the original owners—penalties for rebellion, "concessions," arbitrary interpretation of "native tenure" and "vacant lands" have combined to reduce the native inhabitant in many parts to a landless serf. A pregnant sentence runs: "In equatorial Africa monopoly rights were granted in the first rush of concessions over about two-thirds of the whole territory." The story of dispossession in South Africa was largely one of simple expropriation, whilst even to-day the 6,000,000 natives may only occupy 40,000,000 acres out of the 300,000,000 acres of land, thus leaving 260,000,000 acres to the 2,000,000 whites in full ownership. The South African native *occupies* less than seven acres per head against the 130 acres per head *owned* by the whites, or just over 370 per head of whites engaged in agriculture. In his "comparison" of Colonial Land Policy, Lord Hailey quotes a striking passage from the report of the Native Economic Commission of South Africa: "With few exceptions, the carrying capacity of the soil for both human beings and animals is definitely on the down-grade; a state of affairs which, unless soon remedied, will within one, or at the outside two decades, create in the Union an appalling problem of native poverty." Since that sentence was penned in 1932, the situation has become not only appalling but is rushing towards catastrophe. The systems under which natives of Africa hold land vary from the Nigerian model where "the whole of the lands of the territory, whether occupied or unoccupied . . . are public lands . . . for the use and common benefit . . . of the natives of the territory" to the systems of native reserves within which the natives may occupy, but in the main cannot own, any land. In short, whilst in Nigeria and in two of the South African Protectorates a white man cannot own any land, in most other parts of Africa the white man may own land almost anywhere outside the native reserves.

Labour in Africa ranges from forced labour for public benefit to forms of peasant labour thriving on the land held

securely in its own interest. Lord Hailey begins his survey of labour with a reflection on the aftermath of slavery and quotes Theal who places responsibility for South Africa regarding the native merely as a "hewer of wood and drawer of water" upon the early practice of slavery. It is, however, difficult to avoid deducing from the Survey that in many other parts of the African continent a slave mentality has followed in the wake of actual slave-owning. The Survey devotes large space to what is perhaps the most inexcusable and certainly the most oppressive form of labour in Africa, namely, that of the industrialised workers of South Africa. Lord Hailey himself traces the present condition of the African labourer to organised white labour, because in 1912 the Labour Party of South Africa adopted the political philosophy of the permanent "political and economic supremacy" of the white community. Lord Hailey points out that although "the operation of the legal colour bar is confined to the mines, the trade union system applies in practice a colour bar discrimination in most of the skilled trades." Lord Hailey also points out that colour bar legislation has not yet been adopted in the copper belt and other mining regions in Northern Rhodesia because "the relation of European to native labour has not been subject to the influence of any such political or social theory as has produced the 'civilised labour' policy in South Africa," but he says that "on the railway a strict colour bar prevails owing to trade union influence from Southern Rhodesia."

In the schools, on the land, in the workshop, in the Church, in the State, the dominant cry to-day is segregation. The folly of this policy, to put the matter on no other plane, is almost incredible, when it is borne in mind that if segregation is really carried to success it must inevitably bring ruin to South Africa. As one travels through the pages of the Survey, the question which one constantly asks is: "Suppose Africans some day say 'we accept your policy of segregation,' and the cry goes forth 'back to the kraals. Let us segregate'—What would the white man do then?"

The Survey demonstrates the keen desire of the natives in most territories, particularly in the native areas, Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Uganda, for education. At the same time it is lamentable that Lord Hailey should have to say that in South Africa "over 70 per cent. of the native children of school age

are receiving no education" and that for a population of 6,000,000 apparently less than £350,000 is spent by the State on the education of the natives. The higher school attendance of the "Protectorates" and the relatively larger financial provision is one of the most remarkable features of Africa. The native Government of Basutoland provides as much for the children of the 600,000 Africans as Southern Rhodesia provides for the children of 1,200,000! The Basuto attendance at the schools is nearly 100 per cent. higher than that of the neighbouring Union territories.

The figures of expenditure in the Union of South Africa are indeed eloquent, the more so when taken in conjunction with Lord Hailey's figures of the minerals taken from South Africa by different European nations. In the forty years of modern mining, over £2,000,000,000 worth of minerals, or an average of £50,000,000 a year, have been won mainly by those horny black and brown hands blasting and delving into the bowels of the earth, often at a depth of nearly two miles vertical from the surface.

In the chapter on "The Approach to African Problems," Lord Hailey combats the suggestion so frequently made that the Secretary of State should have the assistance of a Colonial Council. It is probably true that all the great domestic departments of State draw upon the advice of the non-official class to a far greater extent than the Colonial Office, yet Lord Hailey says "It is indeed open to doubt whether the advice obtainable from a Colonial Council would have greater value than that which, in modern conditions, is readily available to the Secretary of State from the heads of colonial administrations or from the advisory bodies appointed by him." The British Colonial Service is second to none amongst colonising nations, but it is after all a body with the limitations of expression which are inevitably the lot of officials serving their Chief. This part of Lord Hailey's survey will certainly fail to satisfy those who think they see the need for a Colonial Council.

Two of the omissions in the Survey are surprising. First, Liberia; the Survey admittedly covers territories which include Liberia, and it is a very complete picture of every other form of settled Government in the continent. Liberia is the only purely African Government, and yet all we are told is "Liberia has been omitted." One wonders why. It

cannot be for lack of information, because Lord Hailey singles out Lord Lugard's *Dual Mandate* and Raymond Buell's *The Native Problem of Africa* as the two works which were especially helpful to him. Raymond Buell's work was very largely a study of Liberia, moreover, he devoted nearly 200 pages to Liberia. Nor is this all; the League of Nations has a mass of material upon the subject. It may be hoped that in any new edition of the Survey, Lord Hailey will enlighten his readers upon this curious omission.

Another omission concerns the High Commission Territories of South Africa, and is a serious one. Lord Hailey quite rightly says: "The British Government is pledged to Parliament that no transfer shall take place until the inhabitants of the territories, native as well as European, have been consulted, and Parliament has had an opportunity of expressing an opinion." This entirely omits the formal and written declaration made with some emphasis by the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava in the House of Lords on June 9th, 1937, in which a form of consent was added to the obligation to "consult" the inhabitants. This reads as follows:

I would ask your Lordships to mark those words—it could be effected with the full acquiescence of the populations of the territories concerned.

The importance of this declaration received added emphasis from the fact that General Hertzog was stated to be in the House of Lords when the statement was made! Doubtless Lord Hailey will make the necessary correction in any new issue of his great work. The first Survey of Africa is worthy of its subject, and the foundations for future surveys have been well and truly laid; students the world over and for generations to come will have good reason for remembering with gratitude the name of Lord Hailey.

JOHN HARRIS.

## RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

NEVER in the world's history has it been more clearly manifest than at the present time that the course of nations is in the last resort determined and inspired, not merely by material needs, but by spiritual ideals. In times of equilibrium this is not apparent, for a static period is, for the most part, superficial and complacent. But when great national movements take place they are obviously due to inspirations or obsessions that transcend merely material concerns, although these may occasion and be taken up into them. At such crises the efforts of peoples and, therefore, their international relations are shaped by their spiritual attitude and outlook, by the prevalent conceptions of the meaning of the world and of human life. What is latent in periods of quietude becomes patent at the outbreak of mass movements, whether progressive or subversive, whether national or sectional. At such seasons, the principles and policies that govern action are derived from the spirit, from the ideals and impulses that spring, not merely from calculation, but from what becomes, at least for the time being, a dominant faith. Even when national ambitions or economic needs give birth to such movements, they are constrained to find for them a spiritual basis, if needs be by a revolution in the realm of hitherto accepted beliefs. Axioms and postulates must then be discovered or invented that stimulate, control, and are held to justify the ideals, by which alone can the strenuous efforts of peoples be sustained. The movement wanes when the faith fails and merely utilitarian considerations prevail. It takes a faith to move a people and a change of faith to effect a revolution. The truth of this statement is illustrated to-day by the fact that nations that magnify race, force and hate are constrained to deny and to persecute the Christian faith that has hitherto been assumed. At the present time the hitherto cherished ideals of peace, international friendship, reason, and personal freedom, upon which the Western democracies have counted are brutally challenged and denied. Civilisation, as we have understood and pursued it, is at stake. Yet its maintenance is only possible so long as it is treated not only as useful but as imperative. This sense of a categorical imperative has been derived from the fundamental assumptions of the Christian Faith, and only

by the recognition and reassertion of them can the civilisation which has resulted from them be upheld in the crisis through which mankind is passing.

It is essential, therefore, that we should recall what these assumptions are in order that we may see how exactly and fully they meet, and they alone, the present distress. The assumptions of the Christian Faith are five-fold :

1. The Christian religion rests upon the acknowledgment of the Supreme Personality, Jesus Christ, Who exhibited and brought about the union of God and Man, in terms of Fatherhood and Sonship, of Brotherhood and Self-giving.
2. This faith was Catholic from the beginning. Its Catholicity was not a mere claim to world-wide domination. It sprang from the recognition of human kinship as supreme over racial distinctions and international divergences. It issued in the urge to attain Catholic fellowship.
3. It emphasised at once the sacred importance of the individual, yet sought the fulfilment of the individual in and for the community.
4. It affirmed the world-purpose of God, as Love, and, as the result, the establishment of a world-partnership of mankind.
5. It exhibited a tempered optimism. It envisaged a dire struggle between Christ and Anti-Christ. Yet it nourished the superb confidence of the ultimate triumph of Christ, because the supreme values, eternally realised in God, are, by consequence, the true life and making of mankind.

Upon the acceptance, however imperfect, of these five assumptions of the Christian Faith, has our British civilisation been reared. Only through the renewed and deepened recognition of them can it be preserved. The truth of this assertion is acknowledged, not only by the Churches with their recall to religion, but by men prominent in the national life, as the summons to Moral Rearmament, the Manifesto of Witness sent forth by numerous and influential Members of Parliament, and the plea urged by such writers as Mr. Middleton Murry have recently showed. That the urgency of this need is being widely felt by the English-speaking peoples has been demonstrated during the past year by the successive commemorations of the Methodist and Evangelical Revival,

and of the Fourth Centenary of the English Bible. The crowds that everywhere took part in these celebrations, the Press appreciations of them, and the abundant literature which has accompanied them are striking and encouraging evidence of the reawakening of a religious spirit that is alive to the most urgent need of the present time. Discussions took place in the last century as to whether the Sermon on the Mount was practical politics. To-day it is becoming apparent that the Sermon is the only practical politics. Transgressions of its spirit in every sphere, and not least of all in international relations, are visited by judgment which, whether swift or tardy, is sure and certain.

In accordance with the recognised necessity of the present situation, from the spiritual point of view, it is significant that the importance of Religious Education is receiving a remarkable and welcome reassertion. If this were not already the case, the urgency of the matter would be forced upon our concern. Nazism in Germany, Fascism in Italy, Bolshevism in Russia, all seek to forward and perpetuate their power by the capture of the youth, from infancy onward, and by the ceaseless inculcation upon them of the principles and discipline of the dominant régime. If the nobler values for which democracy stands are to be upheld, this can only be by a like inculcation of the Faith, which underlies and inspires the pursuit of Righteousness, Reason and Humanity as the vital values of true civilisation. Utilitarian interests, whether political or economic, are insufficient. Ethics, lacking motive power, are not enough. Only Faith, bringing receptivity to spiritual values, self-discipline and high endeavour can suffice. For this the only instrument is live, well-informed and suitably adapted instruction in the basal truths of the Christian religion.

Happily, the urgency of this task is becoming widely recognised. Eminent educationists, local education authorities, statesmen and politicians are becoming alive to its importance and sympathetic to all enlightened endeavours to meet the need. Voluntary associations are springing up seeking to assist and equip the teachers to fulfil this task. The universities, even those that have been founded upon a secular basis, are awakening to a sense of the need. Extension courses and diplomas for teachers are being instituted by the universities, syllabuses of religious instruction are being prepared and being

adopted by the education authorities, and the National Union of Teachers is favourable, provided that freedom of conscience for the teachers is carefully safeguarded. The readiness of the local education authorities and of all the representative associations of masters and mistresses to take part in the celebration of the Fourth Centenary of the English Bible are a welcome sign of this awakening concern.

That there are difficulties in the way is beyond question. In regard to the universities, Professor Ernest Barker has called attention in a recent address to the Council of the Institute of Christian Education to the problem caused by what he terms "the fractioning" of education. "The question," he says, "which thus arises and confronts us to-day is whether we can combine this fractioning with some sort of integration; whether we can add to the specialisation some sort of synthesis; whether we can give, in our universities, some sort of philosophy of life and the universe while preserving the special studies which are now accepted as inevitable for the activity and the progress of the intelligence." This difficulty arises, not only in the universities, but, to some extent, in all forms of higher and secondary education, especially where the emphasis is laid upon the physical sciences. Difficulties, however, exist in order to be overcome. Where there is a will there will eventually be found a way.

In view of this situation great importance attaches to the *Report of an Unofficial Conference between Anglicans and Evangelical Free Churchmen on Religious Education*, which has just been issued. This Conference, of which the present writer was Chairman, was composed of men of great experience in the work and administration of national education. It has held regular meetings during the past two years, has taken counsel with eminent representatives of various branches of the teaching profession, and has adopted its Report with complete unanimity.

After alluding to the deplorable controversies between Christian communions, which have disfigured the past and have so seriously hindered the cause of Religious Education in this country, the Report goes on to say:

Secondly, and on more general grounds, those who are responsible for this present Report have been actuated by a deep sense of the momentous importance of the Christian Faith to the character and well-being of the English people, and therefore of the vital necessity



of securing adequate religious instruction concerning it throughout the whole of our educational system. This necessity, while including, transcends all ecclesiastical interests and concerns. It must therefore be met with full appreciation of such conscientious differences of belief and thought as are to be found within the ranks of those who are agreed as to the urgency—alike on personal, social and political grounds—of maintaining the Christian character of the people, and, therefore, of conveying fuller knowledge of the Christian Faith—its facts, values, and motives—to all the future citizens of the Nation.

The urgency of this concern is widely recognised at the present time and it is deeply felt by many who owe no allegiance to the Christian Church in any of its branches. The chief danger to the improvement and even to the existence of civilisation throughout the world is that material resources and our command of the forces of nature have far outrun improvement of character. Through the neglect of spiritual values and the disregard of ethical principles the means of advancing human well-being are being misused for its destruction. Even if materialist philosophy be discredited, materialism of outlook is prevalent. The representatives of the physical sciences rightly repudiate responsibility for the misuse of their discoveries. They are only to blame, in so far as their legitimate preoccupations incline them to suppose that these even in their totality can constitute an adequate representation of reality as a whole, or provide complete equipment for the guidance and fulfilment of human life. Yet what the best representatives of the sciences repudiate is too easily accepted by the multitude. It would be a grave mistake to attempt to hinder the advance of science, and indeed any such attempt would be futile. Yet this only increases the responsibility, primarily of the Christian Church, but also of statesmen and administrators, to devote their utmost efforts to seeking, and if possible securing, at least a commensurate advance in human character, so that peoples and individuals may become trustworthy in the use of their material powers.

Such an advance is only possible by the quickening and deepening of faith, informed by reason, securing the soundness and wholeness of human life, personal and collective, under the inspiration and control of the highest values, and of these as contained in and inculcated by the Christian Faith.

The Report proceeds as follows :

From the standpoint thus briefly set forth it follows that the Conference unanimously and strongly urges—

- (1) That, in addition to the practice of corporate worship, instruction in the Christian Faith should have its due place

among the subjects that are recognised by the community and by all education authorities as demanding reverent and intellectual study in the colleges and schools of the country.

- (2) That teachers in all types of schools should be adequately equipped to give to religious instruction this place both in the work of the school and in the minds of the scholars.
- (3) That scholars should be carefully taught in graded courses suitably adapted to the different stages of their education.

With these objects in view the Report proceeds to give a series of recommendations for the advancement of religious education in the universities, the training colleges, the secondary and the elementary schools. Particulars of these cannot be given in this article, but copies of the Report can be obtained from The National Society, 19 Great Peter Street, Westminster, S.W.1. They include the establishment of Degree Courses and Diplomas in Divinity at all universities, and the ample provision of Extra-mural Courses of Lectures for the Assistance of Teachers. The Report says that "it is desirable that all teachers who give religious instruction should be qualified by attendance at such Courses." It is noteworthy that the *Report of the Consultative Committee on Secondary Education*, which has been published since the Report of the Conference was issued, goes far to support the recommendations of the Conference, though the important remark is made that "religious instruction, or 'Scripture,' is, of course, only a part of religious education."

The Report of the Conference gives noteworthy assurance of the prospective alliance of the Anglican and Free Churches in a common concern for the joint advancement of religious education. The Report has received an encouraging welcome from the Press and, in particular, has been commended in a leading article of *The Times*. It has been sent to the heads of the universities, to the governing bodies of the training colleges and to the local education authorities, as well as to the heads of the Churches. The Conference has not finished its labours. It is taking steps to prevent the Report from becoming a dead letter. In this endeavour the active support of all people of goodwill in the nation is invited, so that the urgency of the matter may be pressed upon the Churches, the administrators and the politicians. This support, we are persuaded, can be counted upon. *Dominus illuminatio nostra.*

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

## THE DIFFUSION OF OWNERSHIP.

IN a previous article, under the title of "Property and Liberty" (*CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, November 1938), I urged that we must think out afresh the relations between property and liberty, in the light of the change that has taken place in the character of property with the development of the joint-stock company: property has become incorporeal, and ownership has been divorced from responsibility. In that article it was argued that these conditions had brought into existence a new ruling class, not the class of the wealthy, but the class of directors, who control the vast masses of capital invested by millions of owners in the gigantic concerns that now dominate our economic life; and an attempt was made to show how the formidable and irresponsible power wielded by this class could be brought under effective regulation by the State, without any serious interference with the healthy development of large-scale production.

But this is only half of the problem of establishing a right relationship between property and liberty. The defence of private property is that the ownership of property safeguards a man's personal independence, and enables him to feel that he is not at the mercy of circumstances. But this justification disappears unless the ownership of property is widely diffused; it becomes derisory in face of a gross inequality in distribution, whereunder a small minority own vast wealth, and a huge majority own little or none. This is the state of things that exists in our society. It has to be amended if democracy is to be made real.

The best means of estimating the way in which property is distributed in Britain is supplied by the return of death duties. In a recent year (1934-5) 560,000 people died; a number large enough to give a fair average for the community as a whole. But 425,000 of them left either no property at all, or less than £100 worth. This figure includes, however, all the children who died in that year, and all the married women (a large number) who had no property apart from their husbands. Even when we have made the fullest deductions on this head, it remains true that the number of adults who left little or no property at death was probably much larger than the number (135,000) who left more than £100; that is to say, half of our population, at least, consists

of a "propertyless proletariat," a very unhealthy state of things.

If we turn next to analyse the 135,000 who left enough property to deserve the attention of the inland revenue, we find that a substantial majority of them—more than 62 per cent.—died possessed of modest fortunes between £100 and £1,000. But the total of these formed only 7 per cent. of the total amount left by the 135,000. Next comes a substantial class, forming 34 per cent. of the total, who left between £1,000 and £20,000: the middle class. Their total property formed about 40 per cent. of the total amount left by the 135,000. Taking these two groups together, we find that over 96 per cent. of all those who left more than £100 owned among them less than one-half of the total amount bequeathed.

This leaves substantially more than half of the total wealth to less than 4 per cent. of those who had more than a negligible amount of property. These are the rich, and among them is a tiny fraction of the very rich, who left £250,000 or more per head. This tiny group owned among them nearly 15 per cent. of the total.

If these 560,000 people who died in 1934-5 can be regarded (and I think they can) as giving a fair average of the population as a whole, we reach the following conclusions. Substantially over half of the adult population own practically no property worth considering, except their clothes and their furniture; they are a "propertyless proletariat," with no resources beyond the strength of their bodies. Substantially over one-half of the remainder are only able to accumulate enough to leave their families between £100 and £1,000; this probably represents, in the main, insurance benefits, from which they draw no advantage during their lifetime. There is a considerable and growing middle class, forming perhaps about 15 per cent. of the total population, whose members own enough property to make a real difference to their lives, and to give them a sense of independence. Finally there is a small class of rich people, probably less than 2 per cent. of the population, who can live in comfort, if they desire to do so, without the need of working; and, within this small class, a minute section, probably not numbering 10,000 in all, whose wealth is so great that they have difficulty in spending it, however lavish the luxury in which they indulge. Nobody

will deny that this is an unhealthy state of things, which needs to be amended if democracy is to justify itself. It has been the chief provoking cause of that demand for a social transformation which is called Socialism. But would the Socialist plan really cure these evils?

The Socialist believes that social justice can be attained by transferring to the State the ownership and control of all capital engaged in production or distribution. This could be done in two ways: by confiscation; or by buying out the existing owners, giving them State bonds in return for their land, shares, etc. The method of confiscation was tried in Russia, but it succeeded there only because the country was in chaos, and even so it involved the shedding of oceans of blood. It could not succeed in this country, where there are millions of property-owners, including the trade unions. The method of buying out the existing owners would create an immense class of *rentiers* drawing large incomes guaranteed by the State, without risk and without responsibility; and their wealth would tend to increase, because the State would look to them for much of the new capital it would constantly require. The contrast between the idle rich, whose incomes would now be guaranteed by the State, and the great mass of poor people, would be even more poignant than before. In short, the Socialist scheme can contribute nothing to the juster distribution of property.

If we desire, as all people of goodwill must do, to bring about social health and a reasonable redistribution of property without a social upheaval, there are two main lines of advance open to us, which can be pursued concurrently. One aims at bringing about the break-up of swollen fortunes; the other aims at making it easy for all men to win small fortunes.

Nobody wants to prevent men from creating great fortunes by their own energy, or from disposing of them according to their own desires. But it is right that the State should discourage unsocial methods of disposing of them. The death duties, though primarily imposed to raise revenue, have undoubtedly had a substantial effect in preventing the increased concentration of wealth in a few hands; but for their influence, the picture drawn above of the distribution of our national wealth would be much more forbidding. But in their present form (which imposes the main burden upon

the total estate left by a rich man) the death duties have had two unfortunate effects. In the first place, the necessity of suddenly withdrawing a large proportion of the available capital from a commercial concern or a landed estate often cripples those who have to carry it on. In the second place, knowing that the State is going to take a large proportion of his fortune, the rich man is tempted to bequeath the bulk of the remainder to a single heir, and thus to preserve a great fortune in being. It would be far better if the main burden of taxation were transferred from the estate as a whole to the legacies drawn from it, which come more or less as windfalls to the recipients. If the duties were graded in proportion to the size of the legacy, and to the existing wealth of its recipient, with very heavy duties on very large bequests, the testator might be tempted to leave many smaller legacies instead of one big one; he might even be tempted, in order to prevent the dislocation of his business, to leave shares in it to his employees; and if bequests to public objects were very lightly taxed, as they ought to be, he might leave money to universities, schools or churches, and thus help to maintain their freedom from external control. This may seem a modest provision for dealing with inheritance, which is the main cause of swollen fortunes. But it might have unexpectedly large results in bringing about the break-up of very large fortunes, and in helping to diffuse the ownership of wealth.

The main need, however, is to facilitate the growth of small fortunes. This may be done in two ways: by making it easier for the small man to save and to invest his savings; and by ensuring that the mass of workers shall have a share of the new wealth that is constantly being created. So long as the wages of at least half the population continue to be, as statisticians assure us that they are, too low to provide adequate sustenance for a family of normal size, it must be impossible, and indeed it would be wrong, for the recipients of such wages to save money for investment. The amazing thing is that working-class saving goes on upon so large a scale as it does. That it does so is undeniable; the increase of working-class saving in the last few years has been remarkable. It is a proof of the eagerness of the average man to acquire "a bit of property"; and perhaps it has only been made possible by the shrinkage in the size of families; the "normal"

family of a man, wife and three children is already exceptional. But wages must be increased all round before general saving will become possible—before the thrift of the millions is able to supply its proper proportion of the capital which the nation needs, and which has hitherto been supplied from the superfluity of the rich. And in order that wages may be increased, there must be a revival of trade through a removal of trade barriers, and a more efficient development of our national resources. But these are themes beyond the scope of this paper.

Meanwhile much can be done to increase the facilities for saving and investment. The new form of property—without-responsibility through shareholding lends itself readily to such an end. It is far easier to-day for a man with modest savings to invest them so that they will yield him a reasonably secure income, once he understands how to do it. Working-class investment used to be much more prevalent in Lancashire than in other parts of England. This was because the local cotton mill, in the days of prosperity, accepted loan-stock from its own employees and others, at a good rate of interest. These savings were mostly destroyed by the iniquitous refloating of cotton mills in 1920 and 1921. But the practice showed how eager men were to seize opportunities of acquiring “a bit of property” if they knew how to do so; and the remarkable success of Savings Certificates illustrates the same point. The middle-class man is able to distribute his risks with the aid of his stockbroker. The working man with a few pounds saved usually does not know how to invest them, or how to distribute his risks, and his small contributions are not welcomed. Perhaps the growth of trust companies will meet the need, for they provide a means of spreading the investment of £10 or £20 over a wide range of securities. But if the trust company is to become a common vehicle for popular savings, it ought to be subject to certain public regulations. In these ways, the new form of “disembodied” property lends itself to a wide diffusion of ownership, and makes a systematic pursuit of this object much easier than it used to be.

A further way in which small investments can be encouraged is that the State, and also the great municipalities, should keep regularly on sale in the banks and in the post offices bonds of low denominations which could be purchased

with the minimum of formality. This, and indeed saving and investment generally, would be greatly encouraged if the use of banking facilities were made more widely available for people of small means. The chief obstacle lies in the stamp on cheques, which discourages the use of the banks for small accounts. This tax brings in but a small revenue. If it were abolished, or limited to cheques for (say) £5 or more, the habit of using the banks would be greatly and rapidly extended; wages might even be paid by cheque. Nothing encourages saving more than the possession of a bank account.

But the greatest contribution which can be made by the joint-stock system to the diffusion of ownership is the readiness with which it can be adapted to schemes of profit-sharing. An illustration may be drawn from a very successful American scheme. In this case all the ordinary shares of the company were turned into preference shares, with a fixed rate of interest, and new ordinary shares, of no par value, were distributed among all the workers in the concern, from the chairman of the company downwards, in proportion to their scale of pay. After the payment of the preference dividends, all further profits were used either to pay dividends on the employee shares, or to buy out the preference shareholders, who in the end would disappear. In this way a new nexus was created between ownership and responsibility. All the workers in the concern were made to feel that their interest was deeply involved in the prosperity of the concern, and the quality and keenness of their work were rapidly increased.

It is the worst defect of what is called “capitalism” that it assumes that every industrial concern is the property of those who have invested capital in it, though they may have contributed nothing else to its success; while the workers with brain and hand, who make its service the chief business of their lives, are regarded as merely the hired servants of the “owners.” This theory may have had some justification when a factory was built and carried on by one or a few men, who gave their whole time to its service, and who incurred an unlimited liability for all its debts. It has become quite untenable now that the owners of the capital have only a limited liability, and ownership is divorced from responsibility. Such owners have a right to a fair return on their capital, but they have no right to more; no right to very big dividends, or to bonus shares which they have done nothing

to earn. It is the chief virtue of the scheme described in the foregoing paragraph, and indeed of all sound profit-sharing schemes, that they largely redress this injustice.

For that reason, and also because it would tend to bring about a real diffusion of ownership, it is of the first importance that profit-sharing or ownership-sharing, in one form or another, should become a normal feature of our economic system. We must aim at a state of society in which every man who works for a concern shall feel that he has some share of ownership in it, and that, if it prospers, he will profit. This ideal has hitherto been coldly regarded by the director class, who aim at producing the maximum profit for their shareholders, and at most vouchsafe some share of these profits to their employees as an act of grace or of charity, and as a means of keeping them quiet. It has also been coldly regarded by the trade unions, which fear that a system of profit-sharing might divert the loyalty of the worker from his trade union to the concern for which he works. But the attitude of the trade unions might be modified if they were called into consultation in framing schemes of profit-sharing appropriate to different industries, and if schemes thus framed could be made legally obligatory upon all concerns in the various industries.

In an earlier article, when discussing how the tendency towards monopoly which is so marked to-day could be checked, it was urged that in the case of big and well-established concerns there might reasonably be a limitation of the amount of profit to be distributed in dividends, profits beyond this figure being shared with the workers. It was also urged that the distribution among shareholders of new capital created out of profits, in the form of bonus shares, was indefensible, since the shareholders had done nothing to earn them; and that new capital thus created might more profitably be allotted to those who were actively engaged in the concern. Ranking for dividend behind the original capital, these holdings would indirectly benefit the shareholders by making their own holdings more secure.

The main way, and the best way, of bringing about a diffusion of ownership is a wide extension of the system of profit-sharing; all the more so because it gets rid of the worst feature of the capitalist system, the fact that it assigns the absolute ownership of every concern to the owners of the

capital invested in it, although their liability is limited and their ownership is divorced from responsibility. This, and this alone, if courageously and generously carried out, will provide an answer to the main attack that is directed against capitalism. This, and this alone, will ensure a just distribution of property, and introduce a better spirit into our economic life. This, and this alone, will encourage the development of "individual enterprise," not only among the small ruling class of directors, but among the whole working community.

If democracy is to survive, it is essential that a sound relationship should be established between property and liberty. And, although much more is necessary for this purpose than I have here set down, I submit that there are two primary needs. The first is to check the tendency towards monopoly, and to bring the power of the new ruling class of directors under regulation and control. The second is to bring about a wider diffusion both of property and of responsibility.

RAMSAY MUIR.

## THE FRANCO-GERMAN FEUD.

AT the present moment, as in 1914, the peace of the world is gravely menaced by the division of Europe into two hostile and heavily armed camps. The constitution of these camps varies from time to time: Italy, Poland and other states appear now in the one, now in the other. But the permanent nucleus of the one camp is Germany; of the other, France. It is the intense and deep-seated antagonism of Germany towards France that is at the root of most of the international agitation and unrest of the present day. If, as seemed possible in the halcyon days of Locarno (1925), France and Germany could be brought together in amity and friendly co-operation, the peace of the world could be regarded as secure. Such being the case, it seems worth while to ask what are the causes of this embittered Franco-German feud; what it is that prevents the return of the Powers to Locarno or Geneva.

The mutual antipathy of "Gallia" and "Germania," like that of cats and dogs, dates back to prehistoric antiquity. One hesitates nowadays in rational society to speak of "race." But whatever is connoted by that illusive term, there are probably racial differences between the two peoples roughly divided by the Rhine that to some extent account for their misunderstandings and dislikes. In spite of all late admixtures, the basal population of France consists of the dark long-headed Mediterranean folk, while the dominant element in the peoples of modern Germany is the round-headed Alpine stock. It is difficult for a Frenchman to get a hat that fits him in Berlin, or a German in Paris.

Ethnological differences were heavily accentuated during the period of the Roman Empire. For Gaul was completely Latinised and civilised, while Germany remained anarchic and barbarian. Hence profound cultural differences—differences of language, literature and law; differences of manners, customs and traditions—came still further to separate the contiguous peoples. The frontier between the two, namely the River Rhine, was, during the first three centuries of the Christian era, strongly guarded on the part of the Romans by means of their encamped legions and their patrolling flotilla. The frontier, however, was never quite impermeable, and during the closing period of the Roman dominion in the west

(roughly A.D. 300-500) it completely collapsed. On the one hand, Romans penetrated Germany as explorers, as fugitives, as traders, and later as hermits and as missionaries. On the other hand, and on a much more extensive scale, Germans were admitted into Gaul as settlers and as soldiers. In particular, the Salian Franks (a composite Germanic people), a colony of whom had been established by Constantius, within the Roman limits, near the mouth of the Rhine, in 293, spread until in the fifth century they occupied the whole north-east corner of Gaul as far west as the Somme, with Cambrai as the chief seat of their power.

The Salian Franks were, however, not a numerous people. It is estimated that when in 481 Clovis inherited the chieftaincy they could provide no more than 4,000 fighting men. But they were excellent warriors; Clovis was a leader of genius; and the relics of the Roman power that he had to face were decadent and weak. Before he died in 511 he had made himself and his people masters of almost the whole of Gaul. After his death his four sons, taking up his work of conquest, extended the Frankish sway eastward until the greater part of Germany—Burgundia, Alemania, Thuringia, Bavaria—was subject to their rule. Hence under Clothar I, the last survivor of the four sons (558-561), the Frankish dominions stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the Elbe. "Gallia" and "Germania" were joined under a single authority.

But no real union had been, or could be, effected. The peoples east and west of the frontier—now lying far west of the Rhine—were divided by too deep a gulf of race, language and tradition. So, on the death of Clothar I, a partition took place among his sons, and soon a rudimentary Germanic state took shape as "Austrasia" under his eldest son, Sigebert, while a rudimentary French state came into existence as "Neustria" under his second son, Chilperic. The hostility between the two speedily became intense. Indeed, as fomented by the implacable feud of Brunhilda, wife of Sigebert, and Fredegonda, wife of Chilperic, famous in medieval history, it reached the height of merciless civil war. And, unfortunately, the frontiers of the two realms were by this time hopelessly blurred. "Austrasia" stretched westward as far as the valley of the Meuse, and it had as appendages outlying territories in Aquitania. The Rhine had become wholly Germanic.

A second attempt to unite the Romanised west and the

Teutonic east was made by the Carolingian Mayors and Kings of the Franks in the seventh and eighth centuries, and notably by the mighty and enlightened Charles the Great (768-814). The union imposed by his strong hand was maintained, but with increasing difficulty, until 843; then, at that date, by the cardinal Treaty of Verdun, a final separation took place. The partition of 843 was, unhappily, a threefold one among three quarrelsome grandsons of the great Charles. What may now be called "France" went to the youngest, Charles the Bald; "Germany" went to the second, Lewis; while the eldest, Lothair, received, with the title of emperor, and a visionary suzerainty over the other two, a Middle Kingdom consisting of the Rhineland (Western Austrasia), the Rhoneland (Eastern Burgundia) and Northern Italy. This straggling and indefensible Middle Kingdom had a very brief separate existence. Lothair and all his sons were extinct by 875, and their dominions North of the Alps were divided between "France" and "Germany." Neither of the two was satisfied with the partition, and the conflict of themselves and their successors—for the Rhineland in particular—has embroiled Europe ever since. And the thousand years of strife have by no means yet brought an agreed settlement.

The rival claims of France and Germany to possession of the Middle Kingdom were exacerbated during the medieval period by the further claim of the "Holy Roman Emperor of the German Nation" to exercise suzerainty over France. The title of emperor, conferred upon Charles the Great by Pope Leo III in 800, and continued, mainly to German kings, until 1806, was supposed to convey to the recipient the right to rule all that had ever been comprised in the dominions of the Cæsars, including both Britain and Gaul. As to Britain, Richard I acknowledged the claim; Henry V felt it necessary formally to repudiate it; Henry VIII obviously had it in mind when he declared his realm to be an "empire," and therefore wholly independent. As to Gaul, the Saxon Emperor Otto I claimed the suzerainty and the young French King, Louis d'Outremer (in desperate need of assistance against rebellious nobles), admitted the claim. Later emperors, such as Henry VI and Otto IV, renewed the claim with less success. But right down to the seventeenth century, the imperial assumption of superiority and precedence caused serious friction between the rulers of France and Germany.

Long before the seventeenth century dawned, however, new and grave sources of dissension had arisen. To enumerate them all, or even one-half of them, would be a dreary and protracted task. Suffice it to say that during the later Middle Ages on almost every important issue, e.g. the great Papal Schism of the fourteenth century, France and Germany took opposite sides. As the Middle Ages drew to a close the Valois Dukes of Burgundy made a strenuous effort, extended over four generations (1364-1477), to revive the old Middle Kingdom and secure the title of king. Their unsuccessful effort terminated in the defeat and death of Charles the Bold in Lorraine, A.D. 1477. At once the scramble for the Rhineland was renewed with extreme violence, the main rivals being the French Louis XI and the German Maximilian of Austria (Emperor 1493-1519). Once again an unsatisfactory partitionment was effected, the French King getting the Duchy of Burgundy, the Austrian Archduke securing (together with the hand of Mary of Burgundy) the County of Burgundy and a large part of the Netherlands. The death of Maximilian in 1519 was followed by a fierce struggle between his grandson, Charles, and the French King, Francis I, for the imperial title itself. Charles—the Emperor Charles V—was, of course, elected; but the embittered rivalry of the two men, and of their subject peoples, continued with little abatement until Francis's death in 1547. They both laid claim not only to the Burgundean inheritance, but also to Flanders and Artois, Naples, Milan and Navarre. Their incompatible demands gave rise to no fewer than four wars from which, on the balance, Charles emerged victorious. During the course of these insensate conflicts a novel and unexpected cause of Franco-German dissension had arisen. The Reformation had broken out. Now neither Charles nor Francis had any leanings towards heresy and schism. But Francis, with complete lack of principle, while sternly suppressing Protestantism in France, did not hesitate diligently to foster it in Germany as a handicap to his arch-enemy. And this policy, fatal to the unity of Christendom, was followed by all Francis's successors, and by their ministers—not excepting the ambiguous cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin—until the terrible Thirty Years War in Germany was terminated by the disruptive Treaty of Westphalia (1648).

The Treaty of Westphalia left Germany hopelessly divided



and weak. Scores of small states—some Catholic, some Lutheran, some Calvinistic—went each its own way with little or no regard for the nation as a whole. The imperial title—now virtually hereditary in the Hapsburg House of Austria—remained simply as a symbol of a vanished unity. By the same treaty France, as a reward for her intervention on the Protestant side, received a large part of Alsace together with other portions of the long-disputed Rhineland.

At the time of the Treaty of Westphalia Louis XIV was King of France. He was, however, only ten years old. Not until the death of Mazarin thirteen years later (1661) did he assume the actual conduct of affairs. When he did so, he found that France was unquestionably the dominant power in Europe. Germany was devastated, depopulated, disintegrated; England was just emerging from a debilitating civil war and a long usurpation; Spain was sunk in senile decay; Italy was merely “a geographical expression.” The young king’s ambitions were soon directed towards the complete recovery of the Rhineland, and the re-establishment of the frontiers of France on the lines of those of Roman Gaul. That meant, in particular, the acquisition by some means or other of the Spanish Netherlands (modern Belgium); the whole of Alsace and Lorraine (of which he already possessed large fragments); and Franche Comté (the old free county of Burgundy, one of the Hapsburg possessions). In pursuit of these ambitions he married a Spanish princess (so as to get a claim to the Netherlands); waged four wars; and indulged in not a little sheer banditry, as when he seized Strassburg in 1681 and Luxemburg in 1684. Both Germany and Spain were impotent to stop him. His depredations, however, alarmed both Holland and England, and these “maritime powers,” which in 1689 were united under the governance of William of Orange, combined to put a limit to his conquests. In spite, however, of all opposition, his reign added to French territory in the Rhineland and the Low Countries, *inter alia*, the counties of Artois, Franche Comté, and the all-important Alsatian fortress of Strassburg—an ever-open gate into Germany. The next French King, Louis XV, by means of a diplomatic marriage followed by participation in the War of the Polish Succession (1733-8), secured the reversion of the Duchy of Lorraine, which actually passed into French possession in 1766.

By this time, however, a remarkable change had come over the German scene. The rise of Prussia had begun. The Hohenzollerns were challenging the long ascendancy of the Hapsburgs in Germany. Frederick the Great had seized and secured the Austrian province of Silesia (1740). Louis XV of France and the Empress Maria Theresa, forgetting the ancient enmity of their Houses, had joined to suppress the upstart bandit of Potsdam—a novel alliance sealed by the marriage of the Dauphin (afterwards Louis XVI) to the Archduchess Marie Antoinette. In vain, however, had they fought the Seven Years War (1756-63) against predatory Prussia. Frederick the Great, thanks mainly to English support, emerged unsubdued, ready and able before he died to add enormously to his power and prestige by the spoliation of Poland. Germany had ceased to be defenceless, and had, in one section at least, become aggressive.

Such was the condition of things when the French Revolution occurred (1789), followed by the long Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815). For a time the French, superbly led, carried all before them. The Netherlands, both Belgian and Dutch, were speedily overrun and annexed. The Germans were driven across the Rhine and the old Roman frontier of Gaul was restored in all its length. Then Germany herself was invaded; Austria was overthrown and compelled to accept a humiliating peace; Prussia, crushed at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806, was actually occupied and dismembered, its king being driven as an exile into Russia. The numerous petty states of Western Germany were grouped into a Confederation of the Rhine entirely under French control. It seemed as though the thousand years’ struggle for the Rhineland was definitely concluded by the firm establishment of the French power thereover.

Such, however, was not to be the case. The regeneration of Prussia, under the vivid inspiration of Stein; the rehabilitation of Austria by the shrewd manœuvres of Metternich; the intervention of Russia under its evangelical Tsar Alexander; the revolt of Spain against French domination; the military genius of Wellington; the skilful diplomacy of Castlereagh—these things combined to destroy the Napoleonic Empire and throw Europe back into the melting-pot.

The famous Congress of Vienna (1815) determined the shape that the new Europe should take. Of its numerous provisions

the only one that now concerns us is this: the Rhineland (including Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Coblenz and Trier) was taken from France and transferred to Prussia, which was further strengthened by the acquisition of Westphalia, a large portion of Saxony, and all that she did not already possess in Western Pomerania. Only the strenuous resistance of Great Britain prevented Prussia from also securing the long-disputed and vitally important regions of Alsace and Lorraine (including the fortresses of Verdun, Metz, Toul and Strassburg). Prussia became the "Guardian of the Rhine" on behalf of Germany. France found her hope of recovering her "natural frontier" definitely frustrated. Even her endeavours during the following half-century to obtain "compensations," or additional guarantees of security, in Luxemburg and Belgium were blocked by Prussian diplomacy. Friction continually increased, aggravated by the conflict between the "revolutionary" ideas that continued to prevail in France and the "reactionary" principles that guided Prussian policy. French alarm at Prussian hostility was much accentuated when, as the result of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Prussia annexed Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and the free city of Frankfort-on-Main. Prussia, now guided by the astute diplomacy of Bismarck, was at last ready for a final settlement with France. With incomparable, if wholly unscrupulous, skill the "Iron Chancellor" precipitated the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, as a result of which Alsace and Lorraine were appropriated, and Germany unified under the King of Prussia as Emperor (1871).

The condition of things established in 1871 continued substantially unchanged until 1914, when the Great War broke out. One of the most lamentable results of the Great War was the grave intensification of Franco-German hate. For not only had France suffered a wanton and unprovoked invasion, but her territories and her people had been subjected to a devastation and a spoliation carried beyond all the limits of legitimate warfare. When, in 1918, the German hosts were driven out, they left behind them a foul and filthy desert. The Treaty of Versailles which terminated the Great War (June 1919) restored Alsace and Lorraine to France and also placed in French hands for fifteen years—as some compensation for the devastated French coal-fields—the mines of the Saar. It made further stipulations, subject to later definition,

for German disarmament and for payment by Germany of reparations for the enormous damage her armies had inflicted.

The Treaty of Versailles, unfortunately, instead of healing the breach between France and Germany, deepened it. For, on the one hand, Germany evaded her disarmament obligations, and defaulted in her payment of reparations—the amount of which, indeed, although far short of the cost of her depredations, was equally in excess of her capacity to make them good. Hence, on the other hand, France, in exasperation and disgust, occupied the great industrial region of the Ruhr (1923) and so helped to cause the catastrophic fall of the mark—which fall not only rendered reparations worthless but also reduced almost the whole of the German middle class to destitution.

Hope of better Franco-German relations dawned when M. Briand and Herr Stresemann came together; concluded the Locarno Treaty (1925); brought Germany into the League of Nations (1926); and prepared the way for the Kellogg Pact which formally renounced war as an instrument of policy (1928). But meantime, unhappily, the National Socialist Party under Herr Hitler's command was rapidly rising to power in Germany, and this Party ingeminated not peace but war. In particular, its hostility to France was (and is) diabolical in its ferocity. Said Herr Hitler in *Mein Kampf*: "There must be full clarity about one thing. The deadly enemy of the German people now is, and for ever will be, France. It does not matter who rules in France, whether Bourbons, Bonapartists, or Bolsheviks. The ultimate aim of French foreign policy will always be the attempt to seize the Rhine frontier and to secure through the crushing and dismemberment of Germany the possession of this river." Hence, since Herr Hitler attained to power (1933), the successive German repudiation of Locarno, withdrawal from the League of Nations, rejection of the Kellogg Pact, refortification of the Rhineland, and formal challenge to France in respect of her ally, Czecho-Slovakia. Hence, too, by way of reaction, France's regrettable alliance with Soviet Russia—an alliance which adds to the ancient antagonism of Gallia to Germania the novel clash between Communism and Fascism.

In such circumstances of aggravation, exasperation, and alarm is a peaceful termination of the Franco-German feud possible? Can the Germans forget Louis XIV, Napoleon, and

Poincaré? Can the French erase the memories of 1870 and 1914? On first thoughts one would say No. But history suggests a less hopeless answer. For other feuds as deep-seated and as bitter have happily sunk into the limbo of oblivion. The Romans and the Lombards (*nefandissimi*) have fused into a single North Italian people. The Franks and the Provençals—the *Langue d'oc* and the *Langue d'oïl*—once deadly foes are now indistinguishable members of a single French nation. In our own island the English and the Welsh were for a thousand years implacable foes, struggling for possession of the Severn with as deadly a ferocity as ever French and Germans have struggled for the Rhine. And for a longer period still the Anglo-Scottish Marches were kept in a state of chronic devastation by the incessant conflicts of æonian foes. But all these antiquated and irrational animosities have died down and English, Welsh and Scots, without losing their distinctive characteristics, form a single British people.

Hence we may hope that ere it is too late wise leaders may arise in both France and Germany who will realise that continued conflict can have no other end than the total ruin of both the combatants. It is the main function of British statesmanship at the present moment to act as mediator between these ancient antagonists and to restore a genuine and cordial Concert of Europe united in an endeavour to maintain peace and to re-establish justice in a distracted world. It is satisfactory to know that Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax have recognised this as their rôle and have addressed themselves to the great task. May success crown their efforts!

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

## WHO THREATENS SCANDINAVIA?

MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S classical remark about "A nation of which we know nothing" presumably extends to most of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. But it cannot possibly apply to those of Northern Europe, of which we do know a little, and should—if we were wiser—know a great deal more. Both on political and economic grounds the Northern countries—or Scandinavia for short—are of the utmost importance to Great Britain. Taken together they are our best customer—not only in Europe, but in the world, and they are also a most vital source of supply. Politically they are Britain's closest and most loyal friends, sister-democracies, that for many years have looked upon the British Commonwealth with respect and genuine affection. Since the word nowadays is fashionable, it can be said without exaggeration that a voluntary "axis" exists between the British Empire and the sovereign, free and independent commonwealths of the North.

All this, one might have thought, would command in this country an attitude of active interest in, and utmost consideration for so important a European unit, so vital an economic and political factor in the intricate machinery of world affairs. That, however, is not the case. We are inclined to take Scandinavia for granted, and do not seem to be much concerned about our moral and political prestige there, or even the maintaining of our trade position, which it has taken the Northern countries themselves a considerable effort to build up on the present imposing scale. There is nothing new or sensational in this passive and sluggish attitude. Indeed, more than once the present author has ventured to draw attention to it in *THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, as for instance in an article called "The Lost Key" (August, 1936) which was written at the time of the Abyssinian crisis. The damage done to British prestige by our behaviour in that affair was very considerable and has not been removed yet. But the effects of "Munich" and all that it implies are, as far as Britain's position in Scandinavia is concerned, simply disastrous.

The incomprehensible self-"*Ausschaltung*" of England and France, that began long before Munich but reached its zenith there, and is still continuing, has as its logical corollary the progressive "*Gleichschaltung*" of small countries. We are

by now well familiar with this process not only in rump-Czecho-Slovakia but in all the Danubian countries and elsewhere. German trade agreements which enable her to secure control of these nations' economy, and consequently also very largely of their political destinies, have aroused a considerable volume of comment in this country. But we have been told by the highest authorities that these alarming developments are quite in order and that Germany is entitled to these activities. Now, staggering and unconvincing though it may seem, there is at least this to be said about it that Danubian Europe always has been a territory of predominantly German economic activity—even though its nature in happier days was of a wholly different kind. Are we going to witness similar developments in Scandinavia and take them in the same spirit of frustration, impotence and reconciliation to the inevitable?

What are the facts? Since the beginning of "Appeasement" Germany has been making a political and economic drive for Northern Europe, the significance of which does not appear to be the least bit appreciated in Great Britain. This has taken the most varied forms, from intensified "legitimate" trade propaganda to direct intimidation and interference. The latter methods can best be illustrated by a quotation from a recent speech by Mr. Rickard J. Sandler, Sweden's distinguished Foreign Minister. To anybody who knows how extremely cautious and conciliatory that statesman is, the following remarks must appear as particularly significant; it is obvious that he made them after mature reflection and because he felt that the time had come to speak out. This is what Mr. Sandler said at Gothenburg on December 8th, 1938:

It has come to my knowledge that by certain German authorities attempts are being made to carry through "Aryanisation" beyond the German frontiers by influencing trade relations in other countries. Thus it has occurred that Swedish firms who are trading with Germany have been informed of the unsuitability of having "non-Aryan" employees. But that is not all. Swedish subsidiary companies have been asked for information regarding employees and capitalisation from the point of view of "Aryanisation" and this has happened not only to subsidiary companies registered in Germany as German undertakings, but also from the Swedish parent concerns corresponding information has been demanded. Here the limits of propriety have undoubtedly been exceeded.

First of all, this means the inception of a commercial intelligence service of a nature that cannot be accepted. Secondly, it means that pretensions have been made to transfer to a neighbouring country the application of a specific German law the validity of which is not acknowledged here and which is offensive to the general sense of justice.

Firms which have given a blank refusal to such attempts at gaining influence and inside information regarding purely internal Swedish conditions are entitled to the sympathy of public opinion and to the support of the Swedish state. But as I know that unfortunately there have been cases of compliance, it is necessary to voice an urgent request to the leaders of Swedish business life to give their co-operation in vindicating the principle that in this country we acknowledge Swedish law and no other. To meet impudence with submission is not the right method. For reasons that will be readily understood yielding in an individual case constitutes an act of disloyalty to Swedish foreign trade in general. The consequences of not nipping such growths in the bud are very far-reaching. For the sound and correct business relations which we desire to keep up between Swedish and German economic life it would be better if such attempts were stopped at once. I believe that those in a decisive position on the other side possess sufficient judgment to realise the unfortunate effects of exaggerated zeal on the part of subordinates. And here I would ask the members of the Swedish business community to exercise the greatest vigilance in the general and economic interest of the country.

The above remarks are so clear and exhaustive that there is hardly any need to add anything further. Lest it should be thought, however, that the case of Sweden is an isolated one, the following quotation from a New Year's speech by the Danish Foreign Minister, Dr. Munch, is worth mentioning:

There are examples (he said) that German firms have dismissed Jewish agents who represented them here. In isolated instances it is known that Jews have been removed from the administration of German subsidiary firms in Copenhagen. But alongside these cases where Danes have not had the right of decision, cases have been mentioned of another character. Pressure is supposed to have been exerted upon booksellers in order to have undesirable books removed from their windows; in big stores the Jewish personnel is said to have been removed, and so on. . . . Should such attempts . . . be made, Danish business men, who would have the decision in their hands in such cases would be sure to have public opinion behind them if they rejected such requests.

For reasons, to which reference will be made later, the Danish government feels constrained to be even more cautious in its official pronouncements affecting Germany than the other Scandinavian cabinets. Yet the above quotation from Dr. Munch's speech is eloquent enough. As his Swedish colleague so rightly said: this "Aryanisation" business is only the thin end of a wedge, and is merely a pretext for beginning a system of commercial intelligence or even control which is as unprecedented as it is unacceptable. Moreover, the number of Jews in Scandinavia is quite negligible—amounting only to a fraction of 1 per cent.

While on the subject of commerce, it might be added that since Munich there has been a spate of articles in the German press calling for an intensification of trade with the northern countries, significantly described by the *Kölnische Zeitung* as "the natural partners of German foreign trade and capable of development." As both Germany's press and her economy are directed by the government it is reasonable to assume that a modicum of co-ordination exists between such press campaigns and increased commercial activities. It is doubly significant that at the forthcoming Finnish Trade Fair Germany was the earliest and largest applicant for space, whereas British firms are, as yet, conspicuous by their absence. Here you have the whole situation in a nutshell. The Fair is held by the Finns to enable foreign merchants to display their goods. Germany jumps at the opportunity and is preparing an impressive show. Britain, whose interest is actually being solicited by the Finns—who are eager to "Buy British"—either ignores the whole thing or else will rush in at the last moment.

Yet only recently British Chamber of Commerce representatives were urging the government to compel Finland to increase her purchases in this country. What steps, it may be asked, are our exporters and industrialists themselves taking to achieve that purpose? How much money and/or energy do they spend on advertising British goods in Finland—or, for that matter, in the whole of Scandinavia? The report of the Advertising Association that held its 1936 Convention in Scandinavia contains some very apposite remarks on that all-important subject, which seems to be entirely disregarded by British traders. Not to mention such old-established obstacles as catalogues, labels and instructions being in

most cases printed in English instead of the respective languages of these countries; the reluctance of responsible principals to visit potential Scandinavian clients and form personal contacts; excessive price differences; and chief of all, complete indifference to these markets when business is good at home. Our commercial interest invariably becomes accentuated when business at home begins to slack down, whereas in times of prosperity we are often incapable or unwilling to trade even with old-established clients.

This makes unpleasant hearing, but it is true. And it is an open secret that in this so-called period of rearmament (where are the results?) we have repeatedly turned down Scandinavian and Baltic orders amounting to very considerable sums. Is there any wonder if in the face of British aloofness and German drive the Scandinavian trade problem is drifting towards a point when drastic adjustments may become unavoidable and will be very largely influenced by political considerations?

If in recent years Great Britain has been able to sell Scandinavia an ever-increasing volume of goods, if to-day 16½ million citizens of the commonwealths of the North buy substantially more than 350 million Indians, and, indeed, absorb nearly 10 per cent. of our world exports and almost 25 per cent. of our European exports, this is largely due to a compulsion laid down in our trade Agreements. Not even the greatest optimist could maintain that those goods are sold on price merits or thanks to particularly efficient salesmanship. They are sold thanks to government pressure and the recognition by Scandinavia that she must buy as much British as possible in order to go on selling in this, her best market. But what would happen if the government pressure were to relax, or if the pressure exercised by another government—Germany—were to become so strong that it would outweigh our own efforts in that direction?

This brings me back from commerce to politics. Certain events have taken place in Northern Europe since Munich, some of which have been reported in the daily press, but which need recapitulating. Here the Germans can claim a very "mixed bag" of achievements. On November 16th Dr. Rudolf Holsti, the Finnish Foreign Minister, resigned from his position. This is how the matter was reported in *The*

*Times*—a paper hardly likely to give it a colouring unfriendly to Germany :

Dr. Holsti states that he was obliged to resign owing to delicate health and financial reasons. At the same time it is known here, though it is not mentioned in the Press, that Dr. Holsti, whose friendly attitude towards Great Britain, France and the United States has prejudiced him in official German eyes, has recently been the subject of vigorous diplomatic attack.

It is alleged by the German Foreign Ministry that at a dinner given in Geneva by Mr. de Valera on September 26th he made objectionable remarks about Herr Hitler's broadcast speech that evening. Though he strongly refutes the accusation, the German Government are understood to have declared that he did not enjoy their confidence. All the members of the German Legation, who had accepted invitations to attend his reception for the Diplomatic Corps last night, later stated that they were prevented from attending.

Now the fact is that Dr. Holsti had been by way of resigning for some considerable time. But neither he nor his government had made the necessary arrangements when he was virtually hounded out of office by this German manoeuvre. Similar methods of first accepting invitations and then returning them at the last moment—to emphasise their deliberate political disapproval—were used by the Germans, it will be remembered, at the recent F.P.A. banquet in London.

Even more ominous has been the case of Mr. Nic Blaedel, Scandinavia's foremost diplomatic commentator, an acknowledged and internationally respected authority on international affairs of the highest repute. Mr. Blaedel is Foreign Editor of a famous Danish conservative newspaper, the *Berlingske Tidende*. In the issue of October 7th of that paper's evening edition (called the *Berlingske Aftenavis*) Mr. Blaedel published an article in which he discussed the fate of Sudetenland under the Nazis. He quoted, without adding a single word of his own by way of comment, a passage from the speech made in the House of Commons by Mr. Acland about Nazi atrocities, and he took his quotation from *The Times* of October 6th. What followed is almost unbelievable. The German Legation in Copenhagen proceeded to exercise its pressure in the most brutal form both on the Danish Government and on the proprietors of the paper. Commercial reprisals to Denmark were threatened, whose nature can be gathered from the

following remarks in the *Nationaltidende*, a paper that has often been the mouthpiece for official Nazi statements to Denmark: “. . . Germany at any time has full liberty of action in choosing her own markets. From now on Germany will prefer to trade with such countries which in their public opinion show an objective attribute to Germany.”

Whether the Danish Foreign Office had reasons to fear a unilateral cancellation of the Trade Agreement, or just did not feel it could afford to antagonise the country's most formidable neighbour and second-largest customer (for live cattle—the only one) the fact is that the next day after this extraordinary episode the paper in question printed in large characters a most humble apology, for allowing itself to quote this “absolutely incredible” speech of a British Member of Parliament. Moreover, it was announced that Mr. Blaedel had gone on a three months' leave. Three days later the Prime Minister Mr. Th. Stauning said in a public speech that “the Danish Press, which is free, must also be conscious of its responsibility and deal impartially with international events. Its duty is to avoid all that is liable to cause resentment.” These words sound strange in the mouth of a venerable socialist leader, a statesman who has spent a lifetime in fighting for freedom and democracy, and who in his own public or private utterances has never displayed any inclination “to avoid all that is liable to cause resentment.”

Stories about the attempted muzzling of the press must have reached such proportions that Dr. Munch, the Foreign Minister, saw fit to deal with the subject in his New Year's speech. This is what he said :

What happens is this, that foreign ministers, and among them also the German Minister, now and then sharply complain of caricatures, etc., published in one or another Danish paper, or in some other form. That sort of thing tends to happen in other countries, as has been proved repeatedly. It happens that the Prime Minister and I, sometimes at press meetings and sometimes in Parliament and at public meetings, have suggested to newspaper men and others who address themselves to the public that they should avoid sharp expressions of opinion against other nations and give their opinion of their actions in such a form as not to offend them or reduce their confidence in the universally recognised impartial attitude of the Danish state towards the groups of power. In this there is nothing secret. It has been stated publicly, again

and again, that there is nothing strange in it. In other states outside the power groupings Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers had not infrequently had occasion to make corresponding suggestions. It happened in one country after another during the September crisis.

It would be interesting to know what other governments, apart from the German—and perhaps the Italian—have made complaints in the manner indicated by the Danish Foreign Minister. But he is quite right when he states that the Premiers and Foreign Ministers “in one country after another” issued warnings or appeals to their respective newspaper proprietors and editors asking them to desist from publishing anything that might be resented by Germany. Thus in Sweden the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister issued a confidential communication to the press on those lines, and it appears that only one great provincial newspaper in Gothenburg is determined to maintain complete freedom of action. But it is reported from Stockholm that German officials and German agents do not even necessarily consider it essential to place their alleged grievances before the Foreign Office, and have been known to go straight to the newspapers themselves.

Now all this is very alarming and very ominous. Yet I wish to say with every emphasis that no blame attaches to our Scandinavian friends if they see themselves constrained to act as they do. Mr. Sandler’s speech at Gothenburg was a timely and courageous act, yet rather an exception that proves the established rule, viz. “appeasement” at any price. The example set by the Western democracies, or again the fate of those who trusted them—like Beneš, or Schuschnigg, or the Emperor of Abyssinia—is hardly encouraging to the leaders of Scandinavian public opinion or to the respective governments of these countries. There can be no doubt about their own feelings: these ministers are mostly socialists, passionately devoted to freedom and democracy, attached to the ideals of parliamentary constitutional government. Totalitarian régimes are naturally abhorrent to them and to the vast majority, or indeed almost the entirety, of their free and freedom-loving nations. The Scandinavian governments remained for years the staunchest and most active supporters of the League of Nations and the new order in international relations this was supposed to represent.

The collapse of the League, or the attitude of Great Britain and France before, during and since the present crisis has been a profound shock to them. Most of them are too polite and too cautious to say from the public platforms what they think. Yet the President of the Norwegian Storting, the irrepressible Mr. C. J. Hambro, though severely criticised by the authorities and the press, must have expressed what most Scandinavians feel in their innermost hearts, when he epitomised the fate of Czecho-Slovakia in the following terms. He accused England and France of having betrayed “a small nation that was not even allowed to fight and to die.”

If all small nations (he said) are hereafter to be given up to the conscience of a great Power the result will be not only the ruin of all such countries but of all ideas of uprightness, liberty and civilisation.

Is there any wonder that feeling as they do the Scandinavian countries are seeking to withdraw from international commitments, to reaffirm their policy of neutrality, to prepare as best they can for a possible emergency and meanwhile do their utmost not to antagonise Hitler’s Germany?

Not content with open interference in Scandinavian affairs, the Nazis maintain a powerful intelligence organisation in Northern Europe which was originally unmasked by the Danish police on November 22nd. One of the objectives of this organisation is undoubtedly British shipping. Significantly enough most of the secret units were operating in Danish and Swedish ports and such vital channels of naval communication as the Big Belt, the Little Belt and the Sound. Some of the leading agents were masquerading as German newspaper correspondents—a favourite form of disguise. Things must have reached boiling point if the Scandinavian authorities felt compelled to unmask this secret organisation.

In the *Times* of January 9th the Copenhagen Correspondent writes:

The Swedish Prime Minister, Hr. Hansson, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Hr. Sandler, and the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Hr. Koht, were present as guests when the Danish Social Democratic Congress, which gathers every fourth year, was opened yesterday by Hr. Stauning, the Prime Minister.

Special interest is attached to the Congress this year because it is the tenth year since Hr. Stauning took office. He has been in office longer than any living Prime Minister. Hr. Stauning made



an important speech on Denmark's military position. Denmark, he said, naturally wanted to be absolutely neutral in any war, but under present conditions it would be necessary to reconsider the country's neutrality and defence. The modernisation of the Army and whatever else was needed would now be considered in the light of Danish economic resources. . .

This declaration does not go very far, but it indicates none the less a certain determination to make an effort for self-preservation. The recent Swedish-Finnish Åland Island Agreement must be viewed in the same light. For many years the Åland Islands, attributed by the League of Nations to Finland—despite their overwhelming Swedish population, were a latent source of irritation between the two countries. It is a welcome sign of their present close and friendly collaboration that they could discuss the problem of partly remilitarising these islands in such an amiable way and come to a decision which is mutually acceptable so soon. No doubt they were largely guided by the realisation of the fact that their destinies are indivisible and that if a conflict were to break out in the Baltic they must stand together to the last.

The problem of actual hostilities in the North lends itself to much mental speculation. In the past Sweden and Finland seemed to apprehend solely a Russian attack, but recent developments must have revealed to them the full extent of the German danger. There is also a popular thesis that in case of war Russia or Germany may not actually invade the Scandinavian countries for their own sake, but rush for strategic advantages in connection with iron ore supplies, air and naval bases and similar vital considerations. Be that as it may, and the point is a very arguable one, it is now assumed that re-fortifying the southern part of the Åland Islands may help to stave off the danger.

The present author does not believe in the danger of a military conflict in the North. What threatens Scandinavia is something of a very different kind. It is the further recession of British influence and prestige, with the corresponding rapid growth of German preponderance—which may be accepted reluctantly, but in such circumstances becomes unavoidable. It is the double danger of German activity, and British inaction.

GEORGE SOLOVEYITCHIK.

## INDIA'S GREATEST PROBLEM.

### OVERCROWDING ON THE LAND.

**B**Y far the most serious problem affecting India as a whole, at the present time, is that of the excessively rapid increase of population. The overcrowding on the land is becoming worse every year and yet strangely enough, while much has been talked about it, there has been very little scientific investigation. Yet this problem underlies nearly every question that is raised with regard both to poverty and unemployment. It clamours for a solution more and more urgently. Facile answers have been given discounting the seriousness of the situation, but the danger ahead is far too grave for easy-going optimism or careless thinking.

It is already estimated that unless some very widespread epidemic occurs, such as that which swept away twelve million people in 1918-19, the Indian population (including Burma) will exceed four hundred million by the year 1941—the rate of increase recently has been so abnormally advanced. This will mean that eighty-one million more human beings have to be provided for, with food, shelter and clothing, in the course of twenty years (from 1921-41)—a population bigger than that of modern Germany and Austria. Not even China, with all its multitudes, has ever shown such an immense increase in so short a time. No further irrigation schemes, and no modern scientific modes of agriculture, can possibly keep pace with an increase of new population on so vast a scale.

There are very few possibilities of further migration to countries near at hand, or from one province to another. In Burma, which still is thinly populated, Indians are now unwelcome, and the same is beginning to be true of Ceylon. Only in Assam is there both vacant land and also a demand for more agricultural labour. But even there the numbers that can be absorbed year by year are comparatively small. Malaya cannot take a bigger quota than it does each year at present; indeed, the Indian Government has refused to send any more labour for the time being. The British Colonies have no more desire to take new Indian emigrants, since the indenture system has been abolished. East Africa looks very empty on the map: but the numbers that could actually

settle there would be so small as to be hardly noticeable when the increase in India runs to over three millions every year.

The reason for this very rapid increase is not far to seek. The monsoon rains have been fairly regular and full : peace has been almost unbroken : the joint family system and religious custom have still continued to set a premium on very early marriage, because the newly married couples have not got to provide for a home of their own, but are accommodated within the larger family circle. All these conditions point to a continuance of the present rate of increase. Even though it is true, as has been already pointed out, that the age of marriage is advancing, and child marriages are now illegal, nevertheless the fecundity of marriages in India does not appear to be diminishing. It has not even, as far as we can gather, reached its highest point. Therefore the pressure on the soil of these added millions of human lives can only make the present distress of poverty and unemployment still greater.

The saddest fact of all is this, that along with such an increase year by year, the normal expectation of life has decreased to a terribly low figure. While in Britain and other countries in Europe the average length of life has risen above 50, and in New Zealand above 60, in India it is still below 25. Men and women are cut off from the community by death just at the period when their mature political experience would be of the greatest possible value. The whole of India has mourned the early death of G. K. Gokhale, C. R. Das, and many others. Men of such intellectual brilliance and devotion to their country can ill be spared. Yet the number of such men who die young is actually increasing.

Recently, Dr. Macarrison, Dr. Ackroyd and others have been working out by experiment the problem of malnutrition and the results of their investigations have been very widely published. They corroborate in detail to-day the statements which have been made by earlier statisticians that a large percentage of the population in India lives below the level of subsistence. Even the rice, which when hand-milled used to have a fair nutritive content, has lost much of its food value now that it is being milled by machines. For the outer skin, where the nutrition lies, is polished away. In spite of every effort to stop this injurious process, it has proved to be exceedingly difficult to restore hand-milling as an industry because it is both tedious and irksome.

Industrialisation, which might absorb some of the surplus village population, does not appear to afford any adequate remedy in an agricultural country such as India. Indeed, already the unemployment in towns is almost overwhelming, and people are actually drifting back from them on to the land. The scope, also, for industrialisation on a large scale is absent in India ; because the mineral wealth is not sufficient for a fully developed factory system and the climate is unsuitable. India, as a country, must and will remain predominantly agricultural. The natural process lies, not in driving the surplus village population into the towns, but in giving them industrial employment close to the villages themselves. The spare time, when agriculture is impossible (owing to the heat of the sun drying up the soil) needs to be filled up with home industries, as is already done in Switzerland and Denmark, and also to a lesser extent in Holland. Perhaps Southern Ireland affords the nearest parallel in Europe to the Indian situation. Greater rapidity of communication, and also a cheap supply of electric current over the rural areas, may do something to render the economic problem of the villages less acute than it is to-day.

There is one side of the Indian problem of the villages that makes it altogether different from that of Germany, the United States of America and Japan. These latter are already highly industrialised countries, while in India the town population is quite insignificant. We have to think, not of Bombay or Calcutta, but of the 90 per cent. of the people of India who live in the 750,000 villages. We have also to remember that, at each census, it has been shown that *the agricultural proportion of the population has become higher instead of lower*. Can the fertility of the soil of India withstand any more abnormal pressure ?

One factor which might tend to lessen the very high birth rate of India, and thus give relief to the soil, would be the rapid spread of education, especially among the girls. For if the girls, in much larger numbers, take to education, then the age at which they are married will automatically be raised. Child marriages can never be done away with merely by legislation, such as the Sarda Act. The aid of strong and effective public opinion is also sorely needed. It is a well-known fact that a higher standard of education among increasing numbers of people aids the formation of new social ideas and accelerates changes in old bad customs. No reform is worth

anything that depends on legislation alone ; for the statute law is certain to be evaded unless the public will is behind it. Therefore the young Indian generation must be made more and more able to think for itself, and this can only be done by the rapid spread of education among the masses.

There is one very great hope that now lies before us in the fact that the people, even in the villages, are laying hold of the reins of provincial government, and are therefore boldly taking up these social and educational questions for themselves. Even where religion has fixed its unalterable prohibitions in the past there is a real prospect of reform. For no foreign government can interfere with the social and religious customs of another people with impunity. It has been quite definitely laid down in the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 that the British rulers would observe neutrality in all matters concerning religion, and therefore it would be a breach of faith to interfere. For these reasons the British rulers hitherto have been necessarily most cautious. They rightly waited for public opinion to be formed very strongly behind them, before even the Sarda Act was passed. But where any new social reform is actually carried through by the people themselves, such popular legislation will be much more strictly observed than any official measures. Therefore self-government may actually prove, *in the long run*, to be one of the chief remedies of the present distress.

But here a proviso is clearly needed from the statistical standpoint. While, under popular government, social progress is likely to be far more rapid, the *immediate* effects of this may not result in a lower birth rate. Indeed, for the time being, this rate may go even higher because of better health conditions. Yet when once the self-governing process has been thoroughly established and won its way forward among the *rural* population—thus giving greater incentive to thrift and encouraging individual initiative—the whole trend will be towards more modern ideas of economy in domestic affairs. Old customs will give place to new ones, and a “slowing-down” in the birth rate is likely to take place even in the rural areas.

It will be seen that I have not mentioned hitherto the question of birth control. As far as I can judge, this matter does not really come into practical consideration as a remedy in village India to-day—whatever view we ourselves may hold

about it. Certainly such a practice as contraception by mechanical means does violence to deep-rooted religious sentiments, and Mahatma Gandhi has condemned it in quite unmeasured terms. Therefore it has no positive chance, as things are at present, of coming either within the means or even within the inclination of 99 per cent. of the vast village population of India. Thus, even though it may still be debated and its supposed value in other countries may be set forward, nevertheless for the Indian villages it is not really a practical proposition on any large scale and we must obviously seek remedies elsewhere.

I have already mentioned the remedy of education carried on everywhere in India among the masses of the people as in the long run one of the most important checks on over-population. Let me add that this has already proved effective among Indians abroad in the Colonies, who are leading the same agricultural life. The value of this check, therefore, is no mere guess work, but based on certain practical conclusions. Nothing else, perhaps, can get rid of the strongly ingrained customary habits, which are so deeply embedded in the village life and still determine, on unhygienic lines, what is the right and proper thing to do about the marriage of daughters. But along with education must go at the same time religious reform. For this is the chief motive power in a country so wedded to religion as India. We see at once, in the Brahma and Arya Samaj movements, and also among the Sikhs and other reforming bodies, how the religious motive has been introduced with good effect to raise the age of marriage. Among Indian Christians also the same thing may be noticed. If orthodox religious opinion were to give way on this point under the pressure of different reform movements, the result might be very great indeed.

For all the while, the national awakening itself is gradually revealing its own powerful influence in these matters. The idea is now gaining ground, even in remote villages, that on national as well as religious grounds, Mahatma Gandhi is strongly against the debilitating influence of child marriages, and that the national cause itself demands the postponement of the marriage age to a much later period in a young girl's life. His word has gone out and it is doing wonders here as elsewhere. Along with his great influence, which can hardly be over-estimated in village India, we notice how every year

the women themselves are taking a much more active and intelligent part in the building of the new Indian Constitution. The extraordinary growth of women's influence, even in the past few years, must surely give us hope. For when the women of India make up their minds that a thing ought to be done, there is a marvellous power of sacrifice released which in the end becomes invincible. Not only Mahatma Gandhi himself, but also his wife, Kasturbai, immeasurably help forward by their personalities the women's movement in the villages.

What may be said, then, with some truth is this, that if the devolution of responsibility upon Indians themselves is allowed to go forward with all speed, it is likely to produce beneficial effects even on this grave and difficult question of over-population. For only as both the mind and will of the people take up the problem with earnestness is there any ultimate possibility of finding its solution. Alien rulers, as we have seen, however benevolent they may be, can never accomplish in a vast matter like this what popular rule can accomplish. But on the rising tide of a great national movement much may be done. Age-long social abuses are likely to be swept away. For very little can be accomplished by a despondent people, who merely hand over their own responsibility to others and allow abuses such as child marriage to go on unremedied, with all the fatal consequences which follow in their train. The difference between such a passive state of mind and the active interest of representative government is enormous.

While I have been writing these words a vivid example of the change which has already been brought about has come before my notice. Here, at Kotagiri, in the Nilgiri Hills, I am far away from any railway station, among the villagers who inhabit these regions. Before the new national awakening took place these people had maintained their age-long Hindu customs unchanged for many centuries. But Mahatma Gandhi has done away with such intractable conservatism and has stirred politically even these remotest villages. The news of his doings has reached every part of these Hills and his actions are everywhere discussed. In the recent elections his name alone carried weight. "A vote for Congress is a vote for Mahatma Gandhi," was the easily understood watchword that won most of the elections. This was no "parrot cry," involving nothing more than a vote in the ballot-box. Every part

of his programme was ardently discussed and canvassed at meetings where thousands gathered. Crowds of villagers, much larger than have ever been witnessed before, assembled. On the day of the elections to the local *Panchayats* the great bulk of the adult population came to the polls. Municipal elections, at the few centres in the Nilgiris which have municipal councils, including Ootacamund and Coonoor, brought with them equal enthusiasm and excitement. The provincial elections caused the greatest enthusiasm of all. The programme set forward by the Congress Ministry in office includes Prohibition, relief of indebtedness on the land, the spread of mass education, prison reform, and a large number of social measures which have been long overdue. Out of the ferment caused by an awakening of this kind the problem of over-population will surely have a chance of finding a solution more readily than during the passive, inert political existence of earlier days.

C. F. ANDREWS.

## ITALY'S CLAIMS TO TUNIS.

THERE is a striking parallel between the part which the Sudeten Germans of Czecho-Slovakia have taken in world politics in the course of the last year and the rôle which the Italians in the French Protectorate of Tunisia may play in 1939. Whatever differences there are of detail, in both instances there is a state which has grievances against the Peace Settlement of 1919 and which considers the protection of its countrymen abroad as a sacred mission. These countrymen live in compact groups in a state not far from their mother country. They have real or fancied grounds for complaint which they claim have not been satisfied. Furthermore, these territories have a vital strategic importance not only to the states which are claiming them, but also in relation to the general balance of power. For, while the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany has given Germany the hegemony over Europe by ending France's influence in Central Europe and thereby reducing her to a second-class Power, the acquisition of Tunisia by Italy would transform the Mediterranean into a true *mare nostrum*. Sicily and Tunisia are separated only by eighty miles of sea, and between lies the now heavily fortified Italian island of Pantellaria. Thus, the possession of Tunisia would enable Italy to divide the Mediterranean in two. Together with her colony in Libya—on the eastern borders of Tunisia—she would be able to increase her pressure on Egypt and reduce France's imperial prestige in North Africa (Algeria and Morocco). Finally, just as the annexation of Austria and Sudetenland was a further stage forward in realising Hitler's "Holy German Empire," so possession of Tunisia (whose capital Tunis is not far from ancient Carthage) would be for Mussolini a great step forward in re-creating the "Imperium Romanum."

Italy's claims are enhanced as she appears to consider Germany's support a *quid pro quo* for her fidelity to the "dynamic" (i.e. forceful) Berlin-Rome Axis before and during the September crisis of 1938. The seriousness of the situation depends, therefore, ultimately on Germany's attitude or—as with Bismarck (but not William II) in foreign policy—upon the final decision of one man.

The Italians have no happy memory of Tunisia. At the

time of the Congress of Berlin (1878), Bismarck lost no opportunity of encouraging the French to take it as being "her natural sphere of expansion," though the Italians had expected it as their just share. Hence, the fury of the Italians was unlimited when the French established a protectorate in 1881 with Bismarck's full approval. The Chancellor's primary motive was to divert France from thoughts of revenge for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine by encouraging her Mediterranean ambitions. At the same time, this policy drove Italy into Germany's arms. France soon pushed her plans forward in North Africa by constructing a naval base at Bizerta in Tunisia. It was not long before rumours began to circulate that she contemplated ending the Protectorate and asserting full sovereignty over Tunisia. Italy became alarmed and, in the middle of 1890, asked her ally Germany to back her in full in any intervention against France which might become necessary. But Bismarck's successor Caprivi, as well as Holstein, supported Bismarck's opinion that the maintenance of the *status quo* in North Africa as defined in the secret treaty of the Triple Alliance should not be interpreted as a *casus belli* if France changed Tunisia from a protectorate to one of her possessions. And Caprivi made it quite clear that "if one would not succeed in finding a completely different *casus belli* from Tunisia, it would be impossible to create that public feeling in Germany which derives its strength from the conviction that war is inevitable, that it has a national aim . . . ; [for] every war of the future must be popular."

Italy's special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* was due to the fact that the treaty of protection concluded by France with the Bey of Tunis in 1881 stipulated that the French Government would guarantee the execution of all treaties existing at that time between the Bey and the different European Powers and that, therefore, the provisions of the Italo-Tunisian treaty of 1869 remained in force. This was confirmed by a Franco-Italian agreement of 1884. In it Italy's position was safeguarded and the rights of her nationals in Tunisia—who outnumbered the French by more than eleven to one in 1881 and still by over three to one in 1896—were secured. Such an inflexible status was in the long run not to the taste of the French Government. The opportunity offered by the year 1896, with all that it implied for Italy after her defeat at Adowa, was taken by the French Government,

who arrived at a more detailed agreement with Italy. While Italy's legal and commercial rights were reduced, her special post offices suppressed and an Italian railway line was sold to the French, she successfully retained for her nationals in Tunisia nearly all the special rights which they had enjoyed before. Italian doctors, chemists, midwives, dentists, engineers and architects could practise without a French diploma. As to education, it was stipulated that the *status quo* should be maintained in the Italian schools already established. Finally, the right of the Italians was confirmed to retain their nationality indefinitely. Italians could, of course, apply individually for French naturalisation, but by the conventions of 1896 France renounced the right to make a law providing for automatic naturalisation (as is the case in France itself).

The Conventions of 1896 were to expire in 1905, but they could then be renewed from year to year. There seems, however, little doubt that the nine years of validity of the treaty were considered as a respite given to the Italians so that they could prepare themselves for the subsequent transition from capitulations to common European law. As it was, the Italian Government showed, on the eve of the century, little interest in Tunisia. Nevertheless, in 1903, an active group of Italians in Tunisia put forward the demand for equal political rights, i.e. participation in the representative body, though their exemption from military service excluded them *ipso facto* from enjoying full political rights. That France did not avail herself of the opportunity to bring the Conventions of 1896 to an end in 1905 or replace them by new ones, was due to her anxiety in this and all the coming years not to alienate Italy during the diplomatic difficulties which she underwent in her struggle for Morocco. While the Conventions were renewed from year to year, Italy seemed to have found some compensation for the loss of Tunisia in her aspirations in the neighbouring Tripolitania (Libya) which, after a war with its suzerain Turkey, she annexed at the end of 1911. Two years later officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry went as far as to advise France to imitate Italian colonial methods and annex Tunisia. To the French Ambassador in Rome, Prince Scalea, the Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, used encouraging words such as: "If you would annex Tunisia, it will certainly not be us who would criticise it." At the same time, the Italian Government put up a fight for the rights of her

new Tripolitanian subjects residing in Tunisia for whom she claimed a special status giving them certain privileges. Such an agreement, France was assured, would have only a provisional character in any case, as the annexation of Tunisia by France was to be expected in the not far distant future. A Franco-Italian agreement on the question was finally ratified in June 1914. It did not give to Italy all she wanted, but it is of interest that Germany made it known to her ally in Rome that she viewed with displeasure the conclusion of an agreement with France. The actual disinterestedness of Italy in Tunisia became apparent during the negotiations of the Central Powers with Italy for the maintenance of Italian neutrality. In order to divert Italy's aspirations from South Tyrol, she was offered Albania and Tunisia as compensation. Whilst she evinced some interest in Albania she was completely indifferent to Tunisia, observing that she would have to conquer Tunisia first and that she did not intend to make France her eternal enemy.

In September 1918, France gave notice of terminating the Conventions of 1896 (except for the convention on extradition). A year later, however, the Conventions did not lapse nor were they replaced by a new agreement, but they were simply renewed every three months. In September 1919 a Franco-Italian exchange of letters regulated certain controversies on the Tunisian-Tripolitanian frontier, made a few railway arrangements for North Africa, and provided for the annual delivery of 600,000 tons of phosphates to Italy. But the problem of the status of the Italians in Tunisia was postponed *sine die*, and the old Conventions continued to be renewed every three months. Why did the French not come once for all to an arrangement with Italy on this question? It was to some extent due to the small attention which France paid at that time to North Africa because of the continental orientation of Clemenceau's policy. But the real difficulty lay in the fact that Italy's promise of territorial compensation given by the Allies in Article 13 of the Treaty of London of 1915 had not been discharged. Hence, we can say with Senator Henri de Jouvenel (French Senate, March 26th, 1935) that a great opportunity of finally settling this question was lost in 1919, especially in view of the coming of Fascism in 1922.

The Fascist revolution soon had its effect on the Italians

on Tunisia and a vociferous minority (which in the years 1918-22 had unofficially propagated the idea of an Italo-French *condominium*) was now hoping that Tunisia would be included in an *Italia Irredenta*. Simultaneously, their anxiety was awakened by the promulgation of a law in December 1923 providing for automatic French naturalisation, i.e. all Europeans residing in Tunisia were henceforth subjected to the French *jus soli*. This, however, did not affect the Italians as they were still protected by the Conventions of 1896, but the fact that these were only renewed for three months made them apprehensive of "the sword of Damocles of denaturalisation"—to use the phrase coined by Mussolini in 1924. In this respect denaturalisation meant something more for the Italians. It was equal to a slow but sure process of outnumbering them. For until then the Italians were numerically superior among the European population. In 1921 there were 85,000 Italians against 54,475 French (the rest of 16,600 Europeans were chiefly Maltese and also Spaniards, Greeks and Russians). In 1926 the Italians (89,200) still had the advantage over the French (71,000). The census returns for 1931 and 1936, however, show the following figures :

|              | 1931   | 1936    | Increase or Decrease |
|--------------|--------|---------|----------------------|
| French ...   | 91,427 | 108,068 | +16,641              |
| Italians ... | 91,178 | 94,289  | + 3,111              |
| Others ...   | 12,688 | 10,847  | — 1,841              |

The Italians call these figures "deliberate falsifications" and claim still to outnumber the French substantially to-day—we remember a similar dispute about statistics which raged between Germans and Czechs. But whatever the truth of these allegations (the French have included for instance in some statistics people not permanently resident, e.g. military), there is clearly a definite trend in favour of the French population. The situation is graver from Italy's point of view as the increase in the French percentage was also due to the naturalisation of her own citizens. And this in spite of the Fascist organisation, and those alluring prospects held out by the Italian Consul, such as subsidies for poor settlers, scholarships and free holidays in the mother country. Moreover, the immigration of Italian colonists, which might have counteracted the French increase, was greatly restricted by new regulations forbidding newcomers to take up work.

In view of all these Italian apprehensions, it must have been a great surprise to the Italians in Tunisia to learn of the agreement between Mussolini and Laval in January 1935 by which they were practically deserted. Italian privileges were to be extinguished progressively : professional privileges in 1945 ; educational rights in 1955 ; and those of nationality in 1965 or finally in 1986. In the meantime, the three months' prolongation of the 1896 Conventions was to proceed until a special convention could be drawn up by the High Contracting Parties regulating the details of the provisions. It looked, indeed, as if Laval was right when he claimed in the French Senate, in March 1935, that France had obtained "the renunciation by Italy of her mortgage on Tunisia." This in turn seemed too good to be true, and, even without the Abyssinian campaign begun in the same year which frustrated the coming into force of the already ratified agreement, it appeared from the start doubtful what value could be attached to a renunciation of a claim which would finally not come into effect until another thirty or fifty-one years had elapsed.

The official denunciation of the 1935 agreement by the Italian Government towards the end of December 1938 means that legally the *status quo* has been re-established, i.e. that the Conventions of 1896 continue to be renewed every three months. But the political background of this challenge must be the criterion for determining the future of these conventions or any other relating to the status of Italians in Tunisia. For it was preceded by the demonstration in the Italian Chamber on November 30th, 1938, for Tunisia and followed by an intense state-controlled press and wireless campaign full of such phrases as "Tunisia is an Italian colony administered by French officials." The tactics of demanding "all or nothing" were most likely the wrong ones, and the Duce seems to have forgotten the maxim of Augustus, *Festina lente*. On the other hand, he might have felt that the decisive period of European history, which he foresaw, over a decade ago, for the years 1935 to 1940, is quickly moving towards its close. As the liabilities of his balance-sheet—Abyssinia beyond the Suez Canal, the increase of Germany's strength by her watch from the Brenner and her domination of the Balkans—outweigh the credit side, which seems mainly to consist in three declarations (given after the *Anschluss*, after Munich, and on



New Year's Eve) by Hitler affirming his friendship and gratitude, he might have thought that the concentration of much effort on one point might redress his loss. However, Germany's success in Central Europe has not only sent Italy back to the Mediterranean as her natural sphere of activity, but has had the same effect on France, who must preserve her Empire, and particularly her North African possessions—reservoir of man-power and material strength—if she does not want to become a third-class Power; hence Daladier's and Bonnet's emphatic declarations as to the integrity and inviolability of every inch of French territory. But words alone have not yet won a battle, and it will be going too far to say already that Mussolini's wrong start in regard to Italy's claims is tantamount to his failure in the long run. Too much still depends on two factors, the result of the Civil War in Spain and the amount of support Germany will give her ally. A victory of General Franco might coincide with or be followed by a positive German backing of Italy's claims. For "an alliance whose aim does not embrace the intention to war is senseless and valueless. Alliances are only concluded for combat." Pre-war Germany made the mistake "of spoiling her relations with all because of her constant vacillation, in a state of morbid weakness, in order to save world peace at any price." Thus wrote Hitler in *Mein Kampf*. To repeat a happy phrase of Sir Archibald Sinclair in the House of Commons (October 3rd, 1938): "... *Mein Kampf* has never yet let me down. . . ."

GERARD M. FRITERS.

## THE PROBLEM OF THE EX-SOLDIER TO-DAY.

ANY old soldier who visits his regiment after an absence of years cannot fail to be struck by the fact that the men of 1939 are very different from the men who filled the ranks in 1914. They look different, their habits and customs are different, they are better educated, they respond to quite different treatment. The older generation can remember another change almost as far-reaching. In India before the war many officers were still lamenting the passing of the type of soldier immortalised by Kipling, and who scarcely survived in the army after the South African War. The soldier of 1914 was as different from Privates Ortheris, Learoyd and Mulvaney as the men of to-day are from the Old Contemptibles. Between the turn of the last century and the present day Thomas Atkins has changed almost out of recognition.

If our memory could carry us back further we should probably find that this stupendous rate of change was something new. Ortheris, Learoyd and Mulvaney may well have more in common with the original Private Thomas Atkins, who was killed in Flanders at the end of the eighteenth century, when the future Duke of Wellington was commanding the 33rd Regiment as a young lieutenant-colonel, or even with the men of whom My Uncle Toby complained that "they swore terribly in Flanders" in Marlborough's time, than either of these with the men of 1914 or those of 1939.

Since its origin at the Restoration of Charles II the British Regular Army has always tended to draw its recruits in peace-time from the worst paid and least fortunate section of the working classes. A tradition more than two centuries old is bound to die hard. With all his *flair* for publicity and however much he may improve conditions and prospects, Mr. Hore Belisha can hardly hope within any measurable time to invest the army with the same appeal as the navy, or to constitute it a serious rival in the popular affections to an air force in whose ranks T. E. Lawrence was content to serve. The *Annual Report on the British Army for the year ending September 30th, 1937*, shows that only some 12 per cent. of the recruits enlisted for the Regular Army in the year under review had anything more than the normal education

provided in a public elementary school. The Report for the current year will not be published until March 1939. It may show some advance on this figure, but it is unlikely that the position will be found to have altered radically.

At first sight, the change that has come over the soldier is only a reflection of the change that has taken place in our society as a whole, over the last two generations, due first and foremost to universal education. All that has happened is that the army has cashed in on the general improvement and the relative position of the soldier, and the rest of the community is very much what it always has been. But if we look closer we shall see that there is more to it than that. Some of the implications of the change that has come over the soldier are of considerably more than military importance.

Even before 1914 the recruit had to go to school. He was not regarded as an efficient soldier and could not draw his full rate of pay until he had obtained his Third Class Certificate of Education. After heroic efforts some 60 to 70 per cent. of the men contrived to satisfy the examiner in this simple test. But, having done so, they were not as a rule called upon to make any notable mental effort. Six months at the depot of his regiment and a year with the home-service battalion sufficed to teach a man the rudiments of the trade of soldiering. Drafted to the foreign-service battalion he again found himself treated as a recruit. There, once he had satisfied the adjutant as to his military capabilities, the rest of his service made few demands on his head. Of course, for the few who were ambitious or lucky enough to get a stripe, life was more exciting: many of them subsequently obtained a commission and did well. But, so far as the average private soldier was concerned, soldiering was of necessity largely a matter of repetition and routine. Indeed, with a battalion of trained soldiers 10 per cent. above war establishment, the ever-present difficulty from the officers' point of view was to fill in the men's time. The cult of "spit and polish" is the traditional recourse of standing armies in such a situation. In our case the monotony of the soldier's life was slightly relieved by organised games.

To-day the Second Class Certificate has taken the place of the old Third as the minimum educational qualification required for military efficiency. The Report that we have quoted shows that only 6 per cent. of serving soldiers had no

certificate at all; 22 per cent. had passed the Third; 61 per cent held the considerably more difficult Second; 10 per cent. had a First (equivalent to a School certificate) and just under 1 per cent. had a Special (equivalent to the London Matriculation). These figures are impressive. There is less room for "spit-and-polish," route marching and other intellect-deadening occupations in a mechanised than in a muscle-power army. The modern soldier's time-table will be filled increasingly, if not with actual book-learning, then certainly with work that keeps him mentally awake. The "old sweat" owed his existence as a type to conditions of soldiering in the past. Conditions to-day are totally different, and the "old sweat" has given place to a bright and alert young man of a mechanical turn of mind.

A parson recently spent a holiday in Palestine. Whilst there he met a battalion in which there were several men from his parish in the slums of one of our great cities. He said that if he had not seen with his own eyes he would never have believed it possible that they could have changed so completely in the course of a few years. Men he had known as rather shiftless young general labourers were dealing firmly and tactfully with difficult situations demanding instant decision, often without the possibility of referring to an officer or senior N.C.O. There is no question that after seven years with the colours the ordinary man has improved out of all recognition, both physically and mentally. But, for a variety of reasons, it is difficult to foresee how the average soldier is ever likely to be able to spend more than seven years with the colours. Mr. Hore Belisha summed the matter up in his speech introducing the Army Estimates in March last: "The quota of long-term soldiers we can take into the army must be fixed in the light not only of the number forthcoming—of which I make no optimistic forecast—but also in the light of experience and the reaction on the reserve."

This brings us to the question of what happens to the time-expired soldier. In the year ending September 1937, 13,241 men left the colours. Their average age would have been between 25 and 27 years. There are no statistics available to show what happened to all of them. A few, but only very few, will have had jobs ready for them to go into. On July 4th, 1937, 1,504 of them were undergoing vocational training at army centres. Since then vocational training has been

taken over by the Ministry of Labour and on July 9th, 1938, 3,513 soldiers were receiving training at Government centres. At the end of a six months' course these men pass out graded as "improvers" in their trade. Trade unionists are scornful of their qualifications. But the records show that a high proportion of trainees make good and ultimately find permanent jobs.

Although the army no longer runs its own training centres, the various regimental associations and similar bodies continue to look after the welfare of the ex-soldier. For instance, the annual report for 1937 of the Royal Artillery Association shows that, in London alone, the employment bureau of this organisation placed 6,139 ex-gunners in work during the year—530 in regular and 5,609 in temporary jobs. The high proportion of temporary jobs is significant. During the year in question only 2,528 gunners were transferred from the Colours to the Reserve. So these figures point to a large number of men subsisting on purely "casual" jobs. The report of the National Association for the Employment of Regular Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen tells a similar tale. The Royal Artillery Association published an excellent pamphlet which is distributed to all gunners going on the reserve, entitled *How to Get Employment on Leaving the Colours*. Under the heading "Hard Facts," the soldier is warned that "the standard of living in the services is high; do not expect to live so well when you become a civilian once more." This is nothing less than the truth. There is every reason to suppose that on leaving the army the majority of ex-soldiers slip back into the class from which they originally sprang, and that very few of them contrive to climb out of it again.

No reasonably observant person can be unaware that one of the salient features of our time is uncertainty of tenure where jobs are concerned. It is not confined to any one industry or even to one section of the community. It is almost universal. Nevertheless, the position of these men is in some ways a special one. We recruit our Regular Army primarily from the class of "unskilled" workers. We take them at the most impressionable time of their lives, educate them and form them in a professional mould. On the whole we make a very good job of it: at the end of seven years they are better men as well as better soldiers. Then we turn them out to earn their living under conditions to which they are quite

unaccustomed and if we give them some skill at a trade the trade unions raise the cry of "dilution."

It is difficult to blame anybody for a state of affairs that is as old as the standing army. The essential thing is that the difficulty should be recognised and steps taken to deal with it. The problem is going to become even more pressing when the present bumper recruiting years are reflected in the increased figures of men transferred to the Reserve. The ranks of the army to-day are filled with men of widely different types and capabilities and no one solution can ever fit them all. There is the type of man who makes an excellent soldier, but who will never again become a satisfactory civilian wage-earner: he is set too hard in the army mould. In his case some kind of Government service offers the only hopeful alternative to remaining on in the army. Land settlement in the Dominions used formerly to appeal to numbers of ex-soldiers and, now that this question is again to the fore, there is a type of man who might make good at it. But it is essential, if past errors are to be avoided, that proper training should be instituted and the whole scheme carefully supervised. Probably the most useful measure of all is vocational training; and there is no doubt that the Ministry of Labour, rather than the army, is the authority best qualified to staff and run the courses. There are a number of excellent polytechnics and institutes in London and other large cities providing courses of technical training for trade and industry as well as for various "black-coated" employments. These might also be turned to account for the benefit of the soldier. On the face of it there is no reason why correspondence courses should not be arranged for men serving overseas, as is now done for merchant seamen, which would materially shorten the final period of instruction required when the soldier returns to this country before discharge. The whole machinery of the Army Education Corps is available to assist in the working of such a scheme. The writer knows of at least one case where this has been done on the initiative and through the exertions of an individual private soldier. The wide possibilities that it offers appear to have escaped the notice of authority. But, without a sympathetic attitude on the part of trade unions as well as employers, the future of the soldier-trainee will continue to be unnecessarily difficult. Last, but not least, the army itself should realise that the future supply

of recruits, and hence its own efficiency, is indissolubly bound up with this problem of the absorption of the ex-soldier into civil life. The difficulties that the soldier encounters are all too often his own fault, and can be traced to the fact that the army, in which he spends seven of the most impressionable years of his life, is more out of touch than it need be with the life of the nation that it serves. By keeping in touch themselves, officers might do much to improve matters.

An able and energetic Secretary of State is now engaged in carrying through a comprehensive programme of army reform, the conditions of service are being improved and the efficiency of the army is being greatly enhanced. But in the last resort this problem of the ex-soldier is no less important—both for the army and the nation. When Privates Ortheris, Learoyd and Mulvaney doffed the uniform of the widow and put on “civvies” they had a rough passage; but they took it as all in the day’s work. The Old Contemptibles—what was left of them—went through a similar experience and, on the whole, complained surprisingly little. The men of 1939 will not always remain so long-suffering. Unless this problem is dealt with we shall eventually find ourselves with an unassimilated body of virile, able and educated men in the State. Post-war history shows that this is dangerous.

B. T. REYNOLDS.

## THE “NEW SLOVAKIA.”

VISITING Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, last month (end of November), I was in the Czecho-Slovak Republic for the first time since the crisis. I was prepared for a stony welcome, even for open hostility. But I soon found that my fears were completely unfounded. In Slovakia Mr. Chamberlain is a hero, and every Englishman is welcomed with open arms. Regrets over the loss of territory to Hungary have been forgotten in excitement over the newly acquired home rule.

The perspective of the various elements of the Czecho-Slovak problem, in fact, had curiously changed with the crossing of the frontier. In Budapest, which I had just left, people were wondering how soon the Hungarian forces, with the sympathy of Poland, would make a snap attack on sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and how soon the rest of Slovakia, or at any rate Bratislava, would slip into Hungary’s lap. In Bratislava none of these questions was actual. The downfall of the first Czecho-Slovak State, which meant tragedy for the Czechs, means new hope for the Slovaks. Nothing matters there now except the future. Czechs and Jews are being driven out and all efforts are concentrated on building the “new Slovakia.” The phrase drums through the whole land as an electrifying catchword.

The first act of the Slovaks, whose newly won autonomy has only been gained after twenty years of struggle, has been to turn on all the Czechs. When the Slovaks, it will be recalled, broke away from Hungarian rule in 1918 and decided to make common cause with their fellow Slavs, the Czechs, they were promised a large measure of freedom. But after the organisation of the new State the Czechs developed into something of imperialists. At home they dominated not only the real minorities but also the Slovaks. They manned the railways and the Government offices in Slovakia, they taught in the higher Slovak schools and often even in the village schools. The Slovaks bore them a grudge for taking the work, but a still greater one for not learning and using regularly the Slovak language. Slovak protests were invariably met with the reply, often justified, that there were not sufficient Slovaks with the necessary educational qualifications to fill all the posts, and that the much-discussed differences between

the Czech and Slovak languages were in reality no greater than those between two dialects.

Now, however, the tide has turned. Nearly three hundred Czech school teachers and twenty-six professors at Bratislava University as well as 9,000 local government officials have already been hurried out of office. Czechs are being given notice in all private businesses and undertakings. Left to themselves the Slovaks have organised an authoritarian State. The former Populist (Catholic Autonomist) party of Father Hlinka has absorbed the Slovak Agrarians and the small Protestant Conservative party, both of which had Slovak patriotic leanings, and together they form the new Government bloc. The small Communist, Socialist and other opposition parties have been disbanded. The present Government, however, represents differences of opinion greater than those that divide most parties. The differences are based chiefly on the degree of slant towards Germany.

The mildest, and also the weakest, group is represented by M. Teplansky, Minister of Economics, a former Agrarian. Then comes Father Tiso, the Prime Minister. Father Tiso, who with M. Sidor was formerly one of Hlinka's chief lieutenants, proposes to introduce a corporative system of government "half way between that of Italy and that of Dollfuss in Austria." This, however, is to be "in accordance with the Encyclical of 1934"; that is to say above all Catholic. He has promised to introduce anti-Jewish laws as soon as parliament meets. In the economic sphere he is prepared to co-operate with anyone, but hopes for particularly close relations with Hungary which, in view of historical connections and the development of communications, is Slovakia's natural partner. He emphasises, however, that although the Slovaks will work with anyone economically, their culture and free political life must remain absolutely intact.

The strongest opponent of Father Tiso is M. Sidor, chief of the Hlinka Guard, the newly formed uniformed corps similar to the S.A. in Germany. Sidor, who always represented the most radical wing of the old Populist party, was Hlinka's favourite. His henchmen are M. Durcansky, Minister of Communications, and M. Cerniak, Minister of Education. All three of them are scarcely over thirty. Sidor himself prefers to remain out of office so as to retain greater liberty of action and speech. This group is for religion in the State but, in spite of their long

allegiance to the Hlinka party, for no particular Church. They are sympathetic to attacks made on Jews by all methods. It is this group above all which is drawn towards Germany. Many of its members even appear to have leanings towards Slovakia breaking the remaining links with the Czechs and becoming a kind of Luxemburg under German protection.\*

In the early days after Munich, it is now learned, the leaders of the National Socialist party in Germany did in fact put forward suggestions for a further dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia along this line. Herr von Ribbentrop and the permanent officials were opposed to the idea, however, and it was eventually dropped, at any rate for the time being. The next development was when Father Tiso paid a visit to Herr Hitler. Tiso returned in good spirits and announced widely in Bratislava that the new frontiers would leave not only Bratislava and Nitra but also Kosice, Munkacszevo and Uzhorod in Czecho-Slovakia. Then came the Vienna Award. Italian diplomacy had been at work, and Father Tiso and the Slovaks received an unpleasant surprise. Slovaks dressed in the national costume who were to have presented bouquets to the judges were hurried back to Bratislava, their task unaccomplished.

Since then a slight cooling off towards Slovakia has been noticeable. Towards the end of November M. Durcansky paid a visit to Germany, taking with him detailed plans for the economic reconstruction and development of Slovakia by Germany. Even factories in need of modernisation, water power to be developed and country roads to be metalled were fully listed. But the scheme was not endorsed. M. Durcansky returned home with it still in his pocket, the reason, it is believed, being that Herr Hitler did not consider that the Slovakia mangled by the Vienna Award merited heavy expenditure. Which of the policies for Slovakia will eventually gain the Führer's approbation, it is said in German diplomatic circles, is not yet clear. Although there may be nothing like M. Durcansky's five-year plan in action it does not mean that Germany has lost her interest in Slovakia. There are many German advisers working in Bratislava and their activities are widespread. They cover, for instance, the

\* M. Sidor has recently been appointed representative of the Slovak Cabinet in the Central Cabinet, and also deputy of M. Beran, the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, and is believed to have moderated his views.

organisation of a huge influx of German tourists next season, including many thousand members of the "Strength Through Joy" (a workers' holiday) movement, and also the organisation of the Hlinka Guard.

In any consideration of the future of Slovakia the Hlinka Guard cannot be overlooked. It is important as the means by which ideas connected with the "new Slovakia" will be spread throughout the land. It will tend to set among the mass of the people in the future a certain political and philosophical standard. Carol Murgas, the Supreme Organiser, and former editor of *Slovak*, the Populist paper, explains that the Hlinka Guard will cater in its ranks for everyone from the age of ten upwards. The Sokol, the famous athletic society, is to be disbanded on Slovak soil as it is considered to be tainted with Czech ideas, and so too is the Orel, the Catholic youth organisation. The official attitude of the Church towards the Hlinka Guard, a matter of supreme importance in so Catholic a land, was during the first days hostile but is now on the whole favourable. Some individual priests remain reserved, but others are members, even officers of the Guard.

In their speeches M. Sidor, Murgas and other leaders of the Guard emphasise that now that "freedom" has been obtained, not dreams and illusions are wanted but the recognition of facts and hard work. No one has the right to enjoy the good things of the Slovak table who does not work and, it is already being suggested by implication, belong to the Hlinka organisations. The Czech and Jewish problems are to be settled according to their "rights." Women are to cease filling men's jobs, and return to the hearth. The speeches seem to strike a strangely familiar echo often heard in the last six years. Most of the members are young officials and clerks in private or semi-State employ. Their attitude towards the Czechs or to anyone who stood in their way was at first overbearing, an expression one was told of "being master in one's own house," but is now beginning to calm down. The active anti-Semitism of the early days of November, when hundreds of Jews from every township in Slovakia were herded into buses, driven off and dumped in the territory to be occupied by Hungary (from which they were later driven back by the Hungarians) has rarely been repeated. Whether the pro-German group of M. Sidor and M. Durcansky realises the potential danger of its policy, whether they see that Germany is little

likely to assist out of sheer kindness of heart a land which, even if of no great economic value to her, is a useful stretch in the path to the east, is not clear. Expert observers who have watched developments in Bratislava from the first are of the opinion that M. Durcansky does not.

After some days in Bratislava I felt that my picture would be incomplete if I had learnt nothing of the Czech point of view. I was anxious to discover two things: the attitude of the Czechs towards the "new Slovakia"; and whether, as a new and ardent nationalism had arisen so surprisingly from the ashes in Slovakia, something similar had perhaps happened in Bohemia. Prague appears again as a rich and prosperous city. Hotels and restaurants are full and the public accepts the new situation phlegmatically. But both they and their leaders, who unlike the Slovaks have lost all and gained nothing, are still too stunned to have made any clear plans for social and economic reconstruction. In certain circles it is even believed that in six months they will slip willingly into a Greater German Reich, with a status similar to that of pre-war Bavaria; that is to say, having their own stamps, railways and contingent for the army, and their own control of local finance, but otherwise subject to Berlin.

With regard to Slovakia the general public has few opinions. News about happenings there is kept out of the Press by the strict censorship. The attitude of the Slovaks, however, has left the Czech leaders disillusioned and grievously hurt. It has hurt them more, perhaps, than anything they have suffered at the hands of the Germans, Hungarians or Poles. From these they expected hostility, but from the Slovaks it came as a complete surprise. As a reaction they are prepared to allow the Slovaks to do exactly as they like. Asked what would be their attitude should the Slovak Government introduce the promised corporative constitution, while the central government and the governments of the Czech lands and sub-Carpathian Ruthenia remain on a democratic basis, or should they introduce anti-Semitic laws which were not in accord with those in the rest of the State, they expressed complete astonishment. Slovakia, they invariably remind one, is now an autonomous province and its Government can do exactly as it pleases within its own territory. No one will put any obstacles in its way.

The situation as it at present stands seems to be not without

its dangers for the future. Suppose that M. Durcansky with his pro-German sympathies succeeds Father Tiso as Prime Minister, as he may possibly do later on, and that the Czechs continue to maintain their attitude of reserve and abandon towards Slovakia. It is not an alarmist view to suggest that in this event further dissolution might take place in Czecho-Slovakia. The change might come about in many ways. One possible starting point is the demand for a customs union between Slovakia and Germany to the exclusion of the Czech lands.

Since this article was written the alleged German plans for the Ukraine have come into the foreground. They are of great interest to Slovakia, which lies directly between Germany and the Ukraine, and might have a profound influence on her future development. Two schemes are envisaged: one, the incorporation of the Polish Ukraine, together with what appears to neutral observers to be a large section of purely Polish territory, in a new Czecho-Slovak or Slovak State, presumably under very close German control; the other, the creation of an independent Ukrainian State consisting of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (now the third province in the Czecho-Slovak Republic), the Polish, the Rumanian and perhaps also the Russian Ukraine. All Slovaks believe in one or other of the schemes and, rather surprisingly perhaps, are in favour of them; some because they would like to bring low the Poles, who only a few months ago came to Hlinka's funeral in deep mourning and acclaimed the Slovaks as brothers and now, having an unexpected chance, have seized slices of Slovak territory; others because they feel that the creation of a new Ukrainian State would add to the composite strength of the Slav world and in the end work against Germany. Believers in the independent State idea do not view the necessary surrender of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with any misgivings, and nobody, except perhaps the extremists of the Hlinka Guard who are Poland's bitterest enemies, wants to become actively involved in a war if it can be avoided.

MICHAEL WINCH.

## THE ARAB-JEW CONFERENCE ON PALESTINE.

THE Arab-Jew Conference on Palestine which should be sitting in London within a few days of this reaching print, is something far more than an inquest on Partition. That hapless daughter of Jephtha had her doom sufficiently pronounced by the Report of the Palestine Partition Commission in three hundred pages of argument, statistics, and virtual predestination. Nor did the Commission's own compromise-formula fare any better at Mr. MacDonald's hands when he rose in the House to play the sexton and do it thoroughly. The bare proposal that the British Government should assume an unlimited liability as an expiation for its mistaken optimism or its self-righteous hesitation—according to the point of view—was wholly unacceptable in times like these, and the Colonial Secretary dismissed it as summarily as his predecessor had accepted the notion at the outset. Nor was anyone less surprised, I dare wager, than the members of the Commission themselves, for their repeated references to the absence of goodwill on either side leave us in no doubt whatever as to their view of the prospect of securing any partitional settlement by negotiation.

In making this salutary announcement, however, Mr. MacDonald declared that His Majesty's Government would "continue their responsibility for the government of the whole of Palestine" and believed quite rightly that it was possible to find "alternative means of meeting the needs of the difficult situation described by the Royal Commission which will be consistent with their obligations to Arabs and Jews." As a preliminary His Majesty's Government invited representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, of neighbouring Arab States and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding future policy, including the question of immigration. If agreement is not reached within a reasonable period His Majesty's Government will themselves decide on the policy which they will pursue, taking into consideration "the international character of the Mandate with which they have been entrusted and their obligations in that respect." This is a wise and prudent step. The "surest foundation for peace and progress in Palestine would be an understanding between Arabs and Jews." But, if His Majesty's Government are



compelled themselves to decide the policy, their position will be considerably strengthened if it is as the result of an abortive attempt to reach agreement by conference. Memories are short, and few in England, or for that matter in Palestine, recollect the previous unsuccessful attempts at conferences. It will be well if those who have to pass judgment on the Government's proposed policy have before them such palpable proof of the impossibility of settlement by agreement.

At the moment of writing there is still a pause in the process of definition alike as to the Conference's date of meeting and its actual composition. The neighbouring Arab States—Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen—are ready with their respective delegations, according to latest advices; no difficulty is anticipated with respect to the Jewish representation; and the British personnel can be announced at a moment's notice. If all goes well, the Prime Minister is to preside at the opening session and to keep in close touch with Mr. MacDonald throughout the Conference's duration. But it has never been regarded as the Government's office to nominate a delegation for the Palestinian Arabs, and lacking this, the cast runs a risk of trying to play *Hamlet* without the Prince. It seems likely that this all-important section of the conclave may include several Arab leaders lately released from the Seychelles, and now for the moment at Beyrout. But the decisive move rests with the Palestinian group as a whole, and there are influential advisers enough amongst the Arabs themselves to warn them against the strategic error of leaving the nomination to go by default. Obviously the man and the moment are certainly theirs, for they have scored effective points already. They certainly ought not to lack satisfactory nominees in the initial talks which are the usual course adopted for discovering the likeliest points of contact for serviceable negotiation between the contending sides. Indeed, this very method of alternating consultations is a reminder that there is sometimes a swing of the pendulum of opportunity at a moment of climax like this, and no true friend of Palestine can think of further unsettlement or delay without the profoundest regret.

Arab circles in Egypt and Syria as well as in Palestine took exception to the passage in the British Declaration that "His Majesty's Government must reserve the right to refuse to receive those leaders whom they regard as responsible for the campaign

of assassination and violence." Arab circles were not alone in this criticism. If His Majesty's Government did not intend to invite certain leaders there was no need to make any specific mention thereof. It was particularly unnecessary to emphasise, as the Colonial Secretary did a few days later, that this embargo was directed at the Mufti, for Hag Amin had no intention of going to London, even if invited. He has found a sanctuary in Syria near Beyrout whence, in spite of all that is said to the contrary and of all the precautions taken by the French and Lebanese authorities, he continues to maintain close contact with, and to control, the leaders of the revolt in Palestine. He feels that no matter how explicit might be the assurances given him, before he left for London, that he could return to Syria, when the time came the situation might easily be considered to have so developed that he could not be allowed to resume his residence there. Moreover, from a tactical viewpoint, it would be far more satisfactory to send a delegate whom he could disavow if necessary, or for whose success he could take credit.

Mr. MacDonald's speech in the House was the most statesmanlike utterance any British Minister has made on the subject of Palestine for many a long year. It did not meet with the approval of the Jews, who considered that it was too partial to the Arabs and who, forgetting that the Jewish Agency represent world Jewry, maintained that if Arab States are represented, countries specially interested in Jewish settlement in Palestine should also attend. His words have, however, much gratified the Arabs. But although General Haining's forces now occupy the whole country and dominate the bands, the people still remain under the influence of rebel intimidation. They have admittedly some ground for this. Since the very courageous, by many regarded as premature, publication of Fakhry Nashashibi's memorandum denouncing on behalf of 75 per cent. of the population the Mufti and his campaign, several of his prominent supporters have been struck down. Others have been forced to flee the country. Further, whereas the Colonial Secretary announced in what seemed categorical terms the exclusion of all whom the Government regard as "responsible for the campaign of assassination and violence," within a week the House had been informed that His Majesty's Government would extend invitations to the leaders exiled on the Seychelles. Those

leaders were deported because of their membership of the Higher Arab Committee and their association with that campaign. Are we, is asked from Dan to Beersheba, to infer that His Majesty's Government do not mean what they have stated twice by the mouth of the Colonial Office, and that within a short time they may reconsider their attitude towards Hag Amin and allow him to return to his post in Jerusalem, which, by the way, is a life appointment?

There has, indeed, been so much vacillation in British policy, the history of our relations with other similar national movements reveals so many *volte-faces*, those who have stood by us in times of stress have so often been abandoned to their fate, that it is not surprising that to-day no one in Palestine has confidence in our assurances or our decisions. Most Arabs are heartily sick of the situation that has lasted since 1936. They abhor the campaign of assassination and intimidation. They do not willingly recognise the Mufti's leadership. They want to co-operate in working out the compromise solution which they recognise is inevitable if Palestine is ever again to have peace and prosperity. Some have already had the courage and confidence to come out into the open and denounce the extremists. Obviously there is no certainty that the Mufti would never return to Palestine; but seeing that His Majesty's Government mean to carry into execution the policy they propose, we must make allowance for the chances of a landslide away from Hag Amin. But no matter how much we have really made up our minds to grasp, and this time hold, the Palestine nettle, I fear that it will take a long time to convince the majority of the Arabs that we are determined to adhere to whatever policy we propose. In spite of all that is said to the contrary, there is every possibility at the time of writing that Palestine Arabs will be represented at the Conference—it may be, if the matter is skilfully handled, with the approval of the Mufti. This would ease the situation, though it would not furnish any greater guarantee of satisfactory results. The Jews will certainly accept the invitation.

A Round Table conference is very doubtful. The Jews maintain that conversations must have for basis the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. The Arabs decline to sit in with them on this basis, as they do not recognise that the Jews have any rights in Palestine. Likewise there is but

scanty prospect of any definite results from the separate conversations which His Majesty's Government may have, on the one hand with the Jewish delegates and on the other hand with the Arab representatives. The leaders of either side will find it difficult, if not dangerous for their position, to accept voluntarily, even in return for concessions from the opposing party, a compromise on immigration, which is the *fons et origo* of the whole trouble. It would be a positive miracle if Mr. MacDonald were able to persuade them to this end. It seems far more likely that he will have to announce the Government's policy and impose it—with little assistance from the Arab side but with no resistance from the Jewish.

The Palestine Partition Commission draw attention to the remarkable expansion in Arab population since the war—from 635,000 to 990,000. The annual natural increase, 25.01 per mille, is far higher than in Egypt, India or Japan. Its continuation will intensify the demand for supplementary employment, which is vital to a large proportion of the Arab population. Supplementary employment has so far been provided by Jewish capital, and the Commission is of opinion that if the source of that employment were cut off, the consequences would be serious to the Arabs. Mr. MacDonald is, however, incorrect in saying that but for the Jews Palestine to-day would not have more than 600,000 Arabs, which was the constant population in Turkish times. Likewise it is an unfair presentation of the case to state, as the Commissioner does, that "we cannot imagine that . . . His Majesty's Government would be willing to provide funds from the British taxpayers' pocket for the sake of enabling a larger Arab population to support itself in Palestine."

The reason the Arab population remained constant under the Turks was that some 20,000 young men were sent every year to the Yemen and the Hedjaz, whence few ever returned. But it is inconceivable that had there been no Jewish immigration Great Britain would not have introduced, at her own expense, in the mandated territory social reforms which, as has been the case under British administration elsewhere, notably in the Sudan, would have produced a marked increase in population. While it is by no means sure that the British taxpayer would be unwilling to provide funds "to enable a larger Arab population to support itself in Palestine," it is certain beyond dispute that he would be ready to do so to

enable the fulfilment of the "sacred trust of civilisation," accepted by the British Empire "on behalf of not merely the peoples of Palestine, but of multitudes in other lands to whom those places, one or both, are Holy Places." But the fact that "the future of the Arab population is already menacing unless Jewish immigration and Jewish imports of capital are allowed to continue" is no argument in favour of the past few years' scale of immigration, which has caused the Arab fears at which the Jews mock, though these fears are very real indeed. Immigration is possible and desirable in the interests of the country generally. But it must be on rational lines. The majority of Arabs would assent to a restricted form of immigration if they could be convinced that this would in no way prejudice their present political position. And many Jews now in the country would rejoice if the flow of competitors were stemmed.

There are two schools of thought as to the manner in which immigration will be restricted. It may be permitted so long as the ratio between the two communities, Jewish and Arab, remains, say, forty to sixty. The difference in the birth and death rates of Jews and Arabs would ensure that there would always be a margin for Jewish immigration. Or it may take the form of "zoning," that is to say in the coastal area immigration would be free, in the plains it would be controlled, and in areas like Galilee it would be prohibited. But while such systems would not be easy to apply, the ratio expedient would undoubtedly be the more satisfactory.

Both Arabs and Jews expect that a strict control will be exercised on land sales—almost as strong an Arab objection as immigration. Also some form of representative government based on population proportion as a step towards that national form of government which, demanded by the Arabs, is also the ultimate goal of the Mandate. In this connection the first of the two brief comments made by the Commission on page 245 of its report offers food for reflection. The Commission, suggesting that the British Government might decide that "economic federality" offered a satisfactory means of overcoming the financial and economic difficulties of partition, says it should be possible to provide a similar solution for certain of the administrative difficulties, such as communications. If a scheme had been accepted whereby these activities were reserved for the central government,

there would have remained for the States merely the municipal and cultural field.

It might well be that some development under the Mandate in the direction of municipal and cultural autonomy in both Arab and Jewish communities would lead in time to their mutual discovery of the benefit of co-operation, which, contrary to what so many affirm, is by no means an impossibility. It is, in fact, in active practice to-day not only in some of the municipalities, but in various commercial and industrial enterprises. On page 118 the Commission writes :

If Jewish immigration . . . is to continue under suitable conditions . . . it is essential that the causes of Arab fears . . . should be removed. The Arabs should be told in precise and unequivocal terms what safeguards are proposed in order to protect them from the economic domination of the Jews.

And again on page 122 :

It is most important that the goodwill of the Arabs should be secured in advance of any direct action for the purpose of facilitating Jewish settlement in this area.

This might well be pondered by both the British Government and the Zionists. Had trouble been taken twenty years ago to appeal in "precise and unequivocal terms" to the Arabs and to secure their goodwill, the situation to-day would have been very different.

From the political point of view the handling of the Palestine problem has been persistently obscured from the beginning by considerations of sentiment. Now, humanitarian feelings are threatening further to complicate the issue. To affirm, as the Zionists do, that the Central European Jewish refugee problem is indissolubly linked with that of Palestine is to misinterpret both the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration. It displays a lamentable lack of sense of proportion. Palestine cannot possibly provide any solution for, nor can it even contribute in any measure to the alleviation of, the Central European Jewish situation.

In any case the time has come to view the Palestine problem from the entirely practical aspect, decide what is for the general good of Palestine as a whole without regard for sentiment or humanitarian ideas, and, what is even more important, administer the country firmly on the lines of the

policy decided upon. Yet no solution will bring any relief unless the British Government decides to "govern" in Palestine, a thing it has never done. The manner in which the Colonial Secretary has so far handled the question as well as his speech affords great promise that the Palestine problem will at last receive this consideration.

But while it is in the power of Mr. MacDonald to bring political tranquillity to this stricken land, public security must for some time remain unsatisfactory. There are in the hills quite a number of men wanted for capital offences, who prefer to continue the fight rather than surrender to certain execution. Also since time immemorial banditry has existed in Palestine and the economic stress resulting from the rebellion has augmented the number of those exercising that profession. This is why it is essential that a large force of troops be maintained in the country for some time, certainly until the police, now happily strengthened by a large British element, have been completely reorganised to meet the new conditions.

ARTHUR MERTON.

## ALSATIAN UNREST.

IN his decisive speech of September 26th, Herr Hitler gave the assurance that once the incorporation of the Sudeten-Deutschen into the Reich had been carried out, his territorial aims would be satisfied, and that he would henceforth claim no other territory and no other German minority living outside the German frontiers. In order to calm the French Government he mentioned especially Alsace and the German-speaking population of that country and pledged his word that he had renounced for ever the winning of them back for Germany. The question is not only whether this assurance is sincere and can be trusted but also whether an Alsatian Henlein will rise or exists already, who would in spite of Herr Hitler's pledge appeal to him to liberate the Alsatians as he has done the Sudeten-Deutschen. Could Herr Hitler neglect such an appeal? And is such an appeal possible?

First of all let us consider Herr Hitler's own words. They are really remarkable for no German Chancellor, even of democratic Germany, has ever made such a formal declaration. As a matter of fact the Alsatian problem has never ceased to exist since France, according to the Treaty of Versailles, took over the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine which she had lost in 1870. As soon as the peace negotiations had begun, in 1919, Germany claimed a plebiscite in the former German provinces, and this demand was backed by the French Socialists and Communists. It was resolutely refused, not only by France but also by all the other victorious Powers, including the United States. The only thing granted then was the authorisation to leave the country and emigrate to Germany. The German press of those days was full of violent articles and sensational pictures trying to illustrate the alleged brutality with which the Alsatian emigrants were expelled by the French. Very soon after the Treaty of Versailles, Dr. Robert Ernst founded a press agency named *Elsass-Lothringische Heimatsstimmen*, which was edited first in Frankfort and later in Berlin and distributed to the German newspapers. There were signs which seemed to prove that this agency had obtained financial subsidies from some official or semi-official sources. It published violent anti-French articles which were written as if sent directly by correspondents in Alsace, and during the

first years that followed the peace the French protested frequently against this campaign and what they called forged reports. Even German newspapers which were generally inclined to advocate a policy of understanding did not refrain from printing some of these articles. Things became better when the Locarno Treaty had been signed, and only the nationalistic press continued the campaign. Considerable agitation arose again when in 1928 the French Government ordered the prosecution of a number of Alsatian editors and local political leaders who advocated autonomy in Alsace. Once again emotion ran high in the German press, and during the trial even German democratic newspapers were seized by the French authorities when entering French territory. All this agitation might finally have died out had not 1933 brought the National-Socialists into power in Germany. Things changed rapidly, and it is just this situation which renders Herr Hitler's new assurances so very remarkable.

If they are really sincere he will be forced to repudiate all that has happened in the last few years in Alsace in the name of the great all-German community. He will be obliged to stop in very clear words the ever increasing propaganda and more or less open work of undermining which is going on in Alsace. Will he do it? Otherwise the Alsatian question, in spite of his speech, will not be settled and may lead to new and dangerous conflicts. What if one day a sort of Alsatian Henlein should appeal to the Fuehrer and claim his assistance? Will he remain deaf or will he declare that he cannot remain insensible to it?

But is there really a man who could become the Alsatian Henlein? This is not impossible. Anyone travelling in Alsace is bound to come upon signs of a very active National-Socialist propaganda. Jewish shops are nightly covered with posters of exactly the same character as is usual in Germany. They carry inscriptions like these: "The Jews are the authors of our misfortune," "Do you want to be governed and exploited by the Jews?" "This is a Jewish shop, don't enter!" There are bookshops in Strasbourg and in other Alsatian cities showing no other books than German National-Socialist propaganda written by well-known leaders of the National-Socialists and exhibiting openly the German "Swastika." From over the German border of the Rhine are sent daily great quantities of German newspapers and

magazines. According to an official statement they number about 50,000 a week. They are sold at an astonishingly low price which does not correspond to the rate of exchange. German illustrated magazines with pictures of the enthusiastic receptions of Herr Hitler in ancient Austria and the Sudeten-Deutsch provinces which should cost 3.60 French francs are sold at less than half this price. There are newspaper kiosks covered with German newspapers and magazines, where it is difficult to find French or Alsatian newspapers printed in German. At the same time the German broadcasting stations of Stuttgart and Sarrebruck send out once a week an "Alsatian programme." From time to time a voice can be heard saying: "Here is comrade Fritz H. I am a native of the Alsatian village or city of ——. During the war I served in the —— regiment. If any comrade of my old regiment is hearing me over there I should feel very glad to get into touch with him. Please write to ——" At the German University of Frankfurt there exists an Alsace-Lorraine Institute where all sorts of questions concerning these provinces are treated. The German radio broadcasting station of Sarrebruck sends every evening a "Frontier echo" and cites only such articles and newspapers as are hostile to France or to the French Left parties. German anti-Semitic propaganda is also invading Alsace. In order to escape the suspicion of the French authorities parcels are not always sent from Germany but from Morocco or Algiers to Alsatian addresses. The French have discovered that between harmless novels were hidden anti-Semitic pamphlets published by the well-known anti-Semitic propaganda centre in Erfurt under the direction of Colonel Fleischhauer. They contain questions like these: "Do you think that the Jews are trying to spread the foot-and-mouth disease? Can you give proofs? Do you think that the Jewish cattle-merchants profit by this disease?" When the plebiscite in Austria took place and every German living abroad was instructed to vote for the *Anschluss* the Alsatian territory was inundated with leaflets carrying the command to obey the order of the Fuehrer. They had been strewn from an aeroplane and were very thin so that a very great quantity could be scattered over a vast area. One has also to notice that the number of arrested and condemned spies in Alsace and Lorraine is rapidly increasing, and it has happened that French soldiers of the Maginot line

when on guard before the powder magazine have been attacked. But all this, serious as it may be, is not the real centre of the problem. What is infinitely more dangerous and more significant is the fact that there exists in Alsace a well-organised political movement resembling very closely Herr Henlein's propaganda which has proved so successful. Who are the leaders?

There is Herr Bickler who has created the *Jungmannschaft*, the office of which is in Strasbourg. Herr Bickler is a solicitor, a man 34 years of age. He was born in Hottweiler of a German father and an Alsatian mother. After the war he remained in Alsace. He is now the editor of a weekly magazine, *Frei Volk* (Free People). When he appears before his followers they greet him with "*Frei Volk*," to which he answers "*Im eigenen Land*" (In our own country). They have installed a bookshop in Strasbourg, where practically nothing but National-Socialist propaganda is shown. The group has many offices, in Phalsbourg, Imbsheim and Quirweiller, and some of the local leaders are known. They are Dr. Alex Kramer, Dr. Kirsch and Pastor Merckling. The total number of the local groups is estimated at 116, but the French admit that there will probably be more which are not known. Their meetings are generally kept secret. Bickler himself recently made the following declaration:

France treats Alsace very badly. She wants to suppress the German language, and has covered the country with fortifications which damage its industrial and commercial life. The Maginot line is an open wound. The French policy is bound to fail because we are a German country and a German people, and because we have 100 millions behind us. If there were a plebiscite in Alsace, 70 per cent. of the population would demand autonomy. I am absolutely sure of it.

It has to be remembered that these words were said after the Austrian *Anschluss* but before the incorporation of the Sudeten Deutschen into Germany. Nevertheless Herr Bickler spoke already of 100 million Germans whom he knew to be behind him! What does he think now?

Herr Bickler is not the only propagandist. There is also Herr Fritz Spieser, who is no less active. Herr Spieser is a native of Neuweiler. A few years ago he married a young and very rich German baroness who provided him with

considerable means. In 1934 he bought the castle of Huchnenburg and made it the centre of the *Erwinsbund*, i.e. an organisation of young men who, apparently harmless Scouts, are in reality fervent disseminators of National-Socialist ideas. Many of them come from over the German border. In summer-time they organise strange festivals in the castle with all the Teutonic pomp and rites which the National-Socialists regard as the expression of pure Germanism. Herr Spieser edits a number of periodicals, such as the reviews *Strassburger Monatshefte* and the *Alsatian Calendar*. He frequently travels in Germany, and it is strange that French officials have found him when crossing the frontier in possession of German authorisations to export large amounts of money from Germany, running to as much as 4,000 marks, while the ordinary German citizen is only allowed to export 10 marks in silver coin. These authorisations had been granted by the *Reichskulturkammer*, the governmental organisation of the German press and writers. Herr Spieser seems to be in close contact with Herr Bickler. He also gave an interview to a French reporter a few months ago, when he said:

I like the French and I am myself a French officer. But we are of German race, and we cannot fight joyfully for a country which tries to suppress us. It was a great fault that in 1918 Alsace was not made a free and independent state like Luxembourg. The Austrian *Anschluss* is natural and the Austrians are now content. One has not been just in regard to Germany. One ought to give her colonies. It is logical that men of German race become again Germans.

He also thinks that in the case of a plebiscite 80-85 per cent. of the population would vote for autonomy.

The League of Alsatian Farmers is under the direction of Herr Joseph Bilger, of whom it is known that he is in relations with the German anti-Semitic propaganda centre already mentioned. As the name of his organisation tells, Bilger addresses himself chiefly to farmers. The language he uses is rather strange and reminds one of the style of the German propaganda. In any case he does not suffer from lack of modesty. There are also other minor publications, such as the periodical *Mitteilungen fuer lothringische Heimatskunde*. It treats questions of local and historical interest. But it is

strange that one cannot buy a number without being a member of the organisation *Fokloria*. Then we have the *Elsass-Lothringer Zeitung*, the unique Alsatian newspaper printed in German which is allowed to enter Germany. The journal openly demands autonomy for Alsace. It belongs to a group which already in 1927 had aroused considerable unrest because it tried to found a "Committee of minorities" in France which should include also the populations of Brittany, Corsica and Flanders! The French authorities were forced to prosecute the leaders, who were heavily fined. There is also the *Landespartei* with similar aims. One of its leaders made the following declaration after the Austrian *Anschluss* :

If Germany suffers from lack of certain materials it is due to the fact that Europe and France have measured too narrowly the German territory after the Treaty of Versailles. And also because they refuse to hand back the German colonies. I think that the French method of centralisation is even worse than the ancient German one. Every year I travel in Germany where I have many friends. I have found that order reigns over there and the farmers are satisfied. You (the French) have made a great mistake in cutting the valley of the Rhine into two separated branches and in separating men of the same race by an economic and political wall for which France is responsible.

All this was said and printed before the annexation of the Sudeten Germans but after the *Anschluss*. Since then the danger of war had arisen, and on both sides of the Rhine the armies had been mobilised. These measures brought with them rather strange results. The above-mentioned *Elsass-Lothringer Zeitung* published the following declaration :

During the days of the mobilisation we have seen that the Alsatians were granted equal rights and even privileges. When the first lines of defence were occupied, it was the Alsatians who would have suffered the first attack. The men of our country would have been sacrificed. Only few would have come back, and perhaps nobody would have found his family and his country. Our towns and villages would have been the first victims of the shells and bombs, and our wives and children would have wandered elsewhere in unknown country. When such sacrifices are expected from us we have a right that our demands should be heard!

What are these demands? The same newspapers give a full list of them :

A bilingual state does not exist in our country. This state would mean that all decrees were published in both languages, that the defendant can use his German mother tongue without the help of an interpreter, and that the man in the street can address himself to the highest authorities in his mother tongue.

At the same time four Alsatian groups held a common meeting in Strasbourg, where a speaker declared : " We have the same right to autonomy as the Slovaks and the Ruthenians." The same groups asserted that all Alsatians loyally responded to the call to arms, but that they think that this loyalty merits now some compensation. As a matter of fact all of them declare they only want to obtain autonomy and do not wish to return to Germany, but the form in which this loyalty is expressed is somewhat strange, as was seen from the declarations previously cited. It is also a fact that even Catholic groups seem rather favourable to restrictions as regards the Jews. A few weeks after the Munich Agreement, Monsieur Joseph Rossé, editor of the *Elsaessischer Kurier*, and the important firm "Alsatia" which publishes a considerable number of other newspapers and books, was violently attacked by some Paris newspapers of the Right because, in the opinion of their editors, Monsieur Rossé, who is also mayor and deputy of the city of Colmar, wants to be an "Alsatian Henlein." Monsieur Rossé, who declares himself a true Catholic, has strongly repudiated these attacks by assuring France of his perfect loyalty, but he also advocates restrictions with regard to the Alsatian Jews. He proposes to limit the number of Jewish lawyers, doctors and teachers! But although Monsieur Rossé thinks himself a true Catholic, other Catholic newspapers have energetically declared that such a view is incompatible with true Catholicism, which does not know any distinction of race in French citizens. This was the case with the two Paris Catholic newspapers, *La Croix* and *L'Aube*. It results from this that Alsatian Catholicism, at least where the group of Monsieur Rossé is concerned, differs from the really French one.

Another consequence of the critical days of September is the demand of many Alsatian groups to come to an understanding with Germany. Immediately after the Munich



agreement, a great number of Alsatian newspapers asked for the removal of German political refugees from the news service of the French broadcasting stations of Paris and Strasbourg. In the eyes of the autonomists these refugees do everything in order to prevent a German-French *entente*. The same have also approved of the attitude of Monsieur Pierre-Etienne Flandin, former French Premier, who had sent congratulations to Hitler as one of the "saviours of peace." "The vampires attack Flandin because he has committed the crime of sending congratulations to the four statesmen of Munich. No wonder that anti-Semitic feeling is strong and is even growing stronger." Why should anti-Semitic feeling rise because of disapproval of Monsieur Flandin's step? The answer is that Monsieur Wallach, deputy of Muehlhouse, has resigned from Flandin's party on account of his telegram to Herr Hitler which he, like many other members of the party, thought unworthy of France. But Monsieur Wallach is a Jew, and therefore "anti-Semitic feeling is strong"! A fine specimen of disguised anti-Semitic propaganda!

There is, however, no doubt that the danger of war and the measures which had to be taken have left considerable unrest in Alsace. Not only the autonomists and the parties of the Right but also the Alsatian Socialists are very anxious to prevent another conflict between Germany and France. Even the Socialist group of the department of Bas-Rhin, i.e. of the lower part of Alsace with Strasbourg as capital, have passed a resolution which declares:

The Socialists of Alsace, living in a province which is particularly exposed to the devastations which would be the result of a German-French war, understand more than any other the sacrifices which have been made in order to conserve peace. They have therefore greeted the Munich agreement with a profound relief mingled with regret.

They also affirm, like other groups of the Right:

The federation of Alsatian Socialists is aware of the fact that Alsace is suffering from international insecurity, which incites men, capital and industries to leave the country and the most menaced frontier. They demand that the Government should take all necessary measures to revive Alsatian economy.

As a matter of fact, some big industrial organisations had been removed into the interior, and the Alsatian population

feared an increase in unemployment resulting from these measures. The Government has already acknowledged the necessity of special credits to Alsace. There is, therefore, almost unanimity in demanding a German-French understanding which, following the expression of a Right group,

is a question of life or death for our border country which can only recover and develop when the peace on the Rhine is definitely settled. We demand an immediate German-French non-aggressive agreement.

On December 7th, 1938, Herr von Ribbentrop signed in Paris a German-French agreement, according to which there exists no problem so far as the German-French frontier is concerned. This agreement has been interpreted in Germany as another proof that Germany has definitively abandoned Alsace. In France, however, scepticism still remains. M. Chautemps, vice-premier, assured the French Parliament at the end of last year that France does not know an "Alsatian problem," but he admitted that foreign propaganda must be watched and that his Government would not hesitate to take the necessary steps. Almost at the same time, M. Grumbach, a Socialist Member of Parliament and himself an Alsatian, declared at the Socialist Party Congress at the end of last December: "A month before the tragic events of September I foretold the secret mobilisation of Germany. To-day I inform you that Hitler, in spite of the new German-French agreement, is making new preparations which concern the West. Yes, I say the West of Germany." Finally, it must be mentioned that the "*Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland*" (The People's Association for the Defence of Germans living abroad), a semi-official publication, has issued a new calendar for the year 1939 containing a list of Germans living outside the German frontiers. This list mentions 1,700,000 living in France! It is accompanied by a declaration inviting all Germans living abroad to work for the defence of the German language, German schools, and German mentality.

There are, as we have seen, different reasons for unrest in Alsace. Some of them are relatively easy to eliminate. Others are, however, more dangerous. The French think that the Nazi-propaganda and the autonomists are not yet a real danger. In any case, their authors seem to nourish other feelings and hopes.

R. A. FRIEDMAN.

## FOOD AND SPORT.

THE dark cloud of war is over the land. At any moment it may burst and sow death and destruction upon us. If it comes, which God forbid, the most vital problem of defence will be how to keep our people fed until the war ends. Last time, with command of the seas and the world's resources available, we succeeded, but only by rationing. Submarine sinkings were counteracted in time to escape famine. And famine would have meant defeat and surrender. At present, taking all food-stuffs together, we produce less than one-half of what we consume, and are dependent for the rest on supplies from over the seas. Stop these or any considerable proportion of them, and we starve. Even to-day a vast number of our population get less food than is necessary for health, and our position is less secure than in 1918.

Then submarines were practically the only danger to incoming food ships. To-day their size, range and power are greater, and the danger is doubled by bombing from the air. Then all seas and oceans were open to us. To-day fortifications and air bases established and controlled by our most likely enemies could close the Mediterranean and jeopardise the East African route, thus shutting off supplies from India, Australia, the Cape, and all the countries from which we then imported via these routes. That this is their aim is no longer in doubt. With these risks to face and nearly five million more mouths to feed, how vital is the need for less dependence on oversea supplies, which increased home production, and that alone, can insure.

Home production of food can be increased in one way only, by fuller use and better use of the land. Fuller use means bringing more land under cultivation; better use means more intensive use of land now cultivated. But for decades the tendency has been the other way. Comparing the last year for which figures are available with the year before the war :

|                                                       |                  |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| Total area of Great Britain (excluding water) ...     | 56,201,688 acres |
| Total under cultivation—crops and grass (1913) ...    | 31,937,303 „     |
| Total under cultivation—crops and grass (1936) ...    | 29,456,699 „     |
| Lost for any kind of food production ...              | 2,480,604 „      |
| Population (1913) 41,302,000, (1937) 46,008,000, Inc. | 4,706,000        |

It will thus be seen that since 1913 our source of supply has gone down while the number of people needing it has gone up by millions. With greater risk of supplies cut off we are less able to produce them at home by what 2,480,000 acres could be made to yield. Besides this, agricultural experts declare that, with the finest soil in the world, we get less per cultivated acre than countries in Europe with poorer soils and worse climate. Some years ago Lord Ernle calculated it at one-fifth that of Belgium and two-thirds that of Denmark.

During this period experimental stations like Rothamsted have discovered hardy grasses that will thrive on bleak hill-sides and hardy grains that will grow on poor soils; chemists have produced manures that enrich them; agricultural colleges have trained men in the knowledge of problems and the use of discoveries that reduce the area incapable of profitable use and make inexcusable neglect to restore to food production much land now waste. On the many causes contributing to our backwardness as compared with other countries, and on the many remedies so far attempted, I make no comment, except that they have miserably failed to affect the process described. Questions of tenure, taxation, marketing boards, protection, subsidies, quotas *et hoc genus omne* lie outside the subject of this paper, which is an inquiry into how far and in what way sport as now practised hinders the full use of land for the production of food.

Ever since the industrial revolution the nature and functions of rural land ownership have been undergoing change. Before that, rural landlords depended for their livelihood on the land in their possession being used. Since, in increasing numbers, rural estates have passed into the hands of men who, having acquired fortunes in business, have bought them as the readiest means to acquire county status and entry into Society, i.e. for amenity rather than profit, of which business made them independent. Amenity is a pseudonym for amusement, which, to the country gentleman, means sport, mainly blood sports, the slaughter by gun or hounds of wild creatures in field, moor and forest. Thus for decades there has been a tendency to reverse Campbell-Bannerman's aim, and the country has become "more of a pleasure-ground for the rich and less of a treasure-house for the people." Amenity has come first, production second; more preserves, less plough.

"Blood sports" means the shedding of blood as a means to amuse and to give pleasure, a form of sadism that persists in certain circles and is perpetuated from generation to generation by teaching children to associate cruelty with fun, a mangled beast as essential to the joy of a glorious cross-country ride. But I am concerned here with economic, rather than moral results. Blood sports require living victims, suggestively called "game," for the most part. Game is destructive. Its presence on or near farms involves risks and losses that discourage and often prevent intensive culture. It would be unreasonable to expect the cultivator to sink capital in improvements that would double his output, knowing that his crops or live stock are liable to depredation by fox, hare, rabbit, pheasant, and that during the hunting season his fences may be broken, his fields trodden down and whole crops injured or destroyed in a day by fifty or a hundred men, horses and hounds galloping over them in pursuit of a fox. Even if sure of recovering his loss from the hunt, that would not prevent the loss of the material destroyed to the food supply of the nation.

Some farms are let with sporting rights reserved; in some cases the land is let to one tenant and sporting rights to another. In either case the interests of the cultivator conflict with those of the sportsman, and this cannot conduce to the best, i.e. the most productive, use of the soil. The fact that the Danish cultivator escapes such disadvantages may well account for his greater return from inferior soil as compared with his British compeer. Blood sports lead to bad farming and under-cultivation, as well as to no farming at all over considerable areas of game preserves and fox coverts. In so far as that is true their abolition would bring much derelict land into use and would add to the yield of half-farmed land, thereby reducing our dependence on overseas produce in case of war or blockade.

Of the millions of acres lost to agriculture since the war all were arable except 307,000. Of England and Wales I have not obtained detailed particulars, but it is well known that much has been turned over to sport, from production to waste, from treasure-house to pleasure-ground. For Scotland figures are known, and the scandal almost passes belief. Of Scotland's total area, 19,200,000 acres, no less than 3,432,285 were returned in 1920 as deer forest, of which more than a

million had been withdrawn from cultivation during the previous twenty years. To enable a few rich men to indulge their taste for killing, not only were thousands of crofters and others deprived of home and livelihood, but the country was denuded of the food they would have provided, and her defences were by that much weakened.

The position in Great Britain is this: population to be fed 46,000,000 (1937), showing increase since before the war of nearly 4,750,000, but a decrease in the agricultural population of 235,000 up to 1931 (census) and many thousands since. The 1931 census includes 10,706 gamekeepers. A glance at the figures given above will show that after allowing for the area cultivated and 5,000,000 acres (an outside figure) for towns, villages and roads, there remain unworked and derelict, yielding as food only rough grazing for a few thousand sheep, cattle, pigs, etc., employing almost no capital or labour, the appalling figure 21,744,919 acres.

In other words more than one-third of the whole island of Great Britain lies waste, while we import yearly millions of tons these acres could be made to yield, providing homes, maintenance and work for thousands who now overcrowd our towns and queue up for unemployment pay at labour exchanges. Of course on some of these acres nothing can be grown (rock, bog, etc.), but with the resources referred to above much "rough grazing" could be made to yield rich grass and some of it restored to arable and yield crops. Agricultural experts have declared that most land below 1,000 feet and some up to 1,500 feet is cultivable; but not while denuded of men and given up to game. The Deer Forest Commission 1892 reported that of the area then devoted to sport in Scotland alone 1,782,785 acres were suitable for crofters' holdings. The 1,112,833 added since are practically all of that character. If restored to agriculture thousands of despairing applicants are ready to take up and use it.

Whatever other forces contribute to curtail the use of land, it is clear that so far as agriculture has given place to game, sport as now practised is a leading cause of diminishing our economic welfare and especially our food resources, and thus of weakening our first line of defence. It sacrifices the welfare of 46,000,000 consumers and the livelihood of tens of thousands, to the mere amusement of a few people, probably not

more than 20,000 in all. At a time like the present the withholding of land from use or its transfer from plough to pleasure is as unpatriotic as in 1916, when Lord Selborne's Committee reported "that the waste of good land on game or games is inconsistent with patriotism." Without legislation the remedy is in the hands of the few who own the land and control its use. If they fail to act, then the Government which is responsible for the safety of the realm, and is spending 1,500 millions to protect it, should act. I have carefully kept politics out of this paper, my object being merely to give information. But unlike other possessions, in legal theory land is not a property but a trust, and under feudal tenure was so in reality. To ask that Government make the fact fit the theory if the landlords will not, is not party, only common sense. A Government that allows land to become and remain derelict without imposing use as a condition of holding can be neither truly national nor patriotic, in that its regard for privilege exceeds its concern for national safety.

The only beneficiaries of blood sports are the sportsmen, their dependants and a few tradesmen who cater for their needs. Everybody else suffers, farmer, small holder, poultry keeper and above all 46,000,000 consumers. Game preserving and pursuit promotes bad farming, prevents land settlement, lowers productiveness and injures stock. But it would be unfair to end this paper without examining the main arguments by which blood sportsmen seek to justify their practice.

Justification is claimed on the ground that game and "vermin" must be kept down to save farmers from ruin. Breeding partridges and pheasants in numbers far greater than their natural increase, importing foxes and hares from districts where abundant to districts where they are scarce, and even from abroad, are strange methods of keeping them down. If the actual user of land were not deterred by custom or law or the fear of his landlord's disfavour, he could and would keep down game far more effectively than by hunt and battue.

Again, hunting and shooting increase the food supply by adding venison and game to the menu. But the amount of such addition is infinitesimal and its food value a fraction of the value of the food production that game preservation prevents. The argument that hunting makes for health, adventure and manliness, that it fits men and furnishes horses

for the army, is specious but false. For these things need no animal victim. The drag requires horses as well as hounds, and it provides all the joys of hunting except its cruelty. As to courage and manliness, the terrorising and chasing and slaughtering of a fox by fifty or a hundred men, horses and hounds calls out no courage, and is not manly, only brutal and cowardly, did huntsmen stop to think.

The huntsmen's chief stand-by, however, is that they bring prosperity to the villages by the money they bring and spend there. Some years ago the British Field Sports Society published a pamphlet in which they claimed that money spent on horses, hounds, servants and upkeep amounted to £4,550,000 per annum, to which must be added from ten to twelve millions of personal purchases. Whether this estimate has since been revised I know not, nor how much debited to hunting would be spent anyway by the same persons in the same country on equine sports like polo. But most huntsmen are well-to-do and run accounts at the big town stores, and the amount of their buying from village tradesmen is problematical. If the facts given already have any meaning, the absence of game and of the cruelty and waste involved in preserving and destroying it would so increase rural produce and rural employment as to make unimportant the profit from hunting made by a little country tradesman here and there. The B.F.S.S. suggest that if deprived of living creatures as quarry "a proportion . . . would be spent abroad." I think better of the patriotism of their members than they. But why should such spending cease, or its benefit, so far as it is beneficial, even diminish? Hounds will follow a scent, whether laid by animal or drag. Substitute the drag and everything is left except the kill. If the live quarry only will keep the chase going, then hunting, however fashionable, fosters blood lust and should be ended in the interests of morality. The living quarry is the source of nearly all the mischief.

Stop preserving the fox to hunt and he will soon disappear except in wild or remote places where he ceases to be a menace or even a nuisance. Stop the slaughter by game-keepers of the farmer's friends (stoat, weasel, owl, etc.) and Nature's balance will quickly reduce the farmer's pests (rats, mice, rabbits, etc.) and make easier their extermination, if desired. Stop preserving game and fruitful fields will replace coverts and waste.

With a live quarry the hounds must follow over fields, ploughed or grass, destroy fences, frighten and injure sheep, cattle, fowls and geese, and thus deprive the land user of the fruits of his industry. With the drag scent can be laid over rough country where horses' hoofs do little damage, avoiding fences, fields and farm-yards, and leaving cultivators in peace, and their property in safety. Secret courses can be laid, discoverable only by the hounds, which add the spice of surprise and adventure claimed to be the chief charm of the chase, charm only achievable by the pitiless harrying and slaughter of a beautiful and sensitive living creature. Taking the blood out of sport need not reduce it in amount or enjoyment. Only when the instinct to kill is strong is any sacrifice called for. But when non-indulgence means increasing the agricultural resources and food supply of the nation and thereby her safety and independence, is not this small sacrifice worth making by sportsmen who are patriots, or failing them, worth enforcing by a really National Government?

H. G. CHANCELLOR.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

### AMERICA INTERVENES.

AS America intervened in the physical European war twenty-two years ago, so now she has intervened in the ideological war. If war be politics by other means, as Clausewitz defined it, the present politics may be defined as war by other means. In the method at any rate we have improved. The last time, America's intervention implied, and in some degree brought about, the end of the conflict. The hope that springs eternal as each new year ousts the old may prompt the belief that the analogy may hold in the present case. Certainly it helps if the men who lead Germany know that across the Atlantic another intervention is afoot.

The analogy is worth looking at. When Europe plunged into war in 1914 America settled down to her neutrality and to her impartial trade. Or thought she would settle down. What Germany's opponents called the technique of *Schrecklichkeit* (or terrorism)—conceiving that none but a German word could appropriately be used to describe the German thing—made an angry impression on American opinion. By that technique as many ships as possible were sunk, merchant ships for choice, others by accident. On May 7th, 1915, a German submarine cruising in the Atlantic sank the *Lusitania*, a British steamer. There were 113 American citizens on board. President Wilson gave rein to his indignation, caused vigorous diplomatic action to be taken in Berlin, and expelled some of the German diplomatists from the United States. Thenceforth the fury on both sides increased apace. On January 27th, 1917, Count Bernstorff sent a Note to Mr. Lansing to inform the United States that Germany proposed to intensify the submarine warfare and would show no mercy. Three months later America declared war on Germany.

Similarly in 1938 it was the German technique of *Schrecklichkeit* that brought America into the fray. There had been rumblings of American concern even before the German leaders decided to unleash their terror against the Jews. For instance, as long ago as October 5th, 1937, Mr. Roosevelt, surveying the general disorders, said: "Let no one expect that America will escape." The truth of that warning was destined to be made clearer in 1938.

The fact is that after February 20th, 1938, when Herr Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag foreshadowed in spirit all that happened in that never-to-be-forgotten year, there flowed from Berlin, as by deliberate calculation, a cumulative abuse of democracy; and not only of democracy in principle, but of the leaders of democracy in person. It may be that the dictators do need an enemy to dangle before their subjects, as a carrot is dangled before the donkey. We know that in the case of Russia the bogey of foreign menace became a regular instrument of government. The long series of organised and advertised trials in Moscow consistently featured the defendants as traitors to "the revolution" and as agents of ill-disposed foreign Powers. In his early days Herr Hitler seemed similarly to depend upon a bogey. The bogey was Russia. His lever was the pretension that he was saving Germany from communism (the while he imposed a virtually communist system upon Germany). But when Russian official energy became concentrated upon the extermination of Russians at home; when Mr. Stalin of deliberate policy abandoned the Trotsky conception of the Third (Communist) International as a means of fomenting bloody revolution abroad; when, in short, Russia ceased from her troubling in the international sphere and confined the disturbances within her own frontiers; then Herr Hitler had to seek another bogey. If the loyal, disciplined and sensitive people of Germany were to be keyed perpetually up to concert pitch for their Führer's purposes, and if to that end they were to regard him as their saviour, why of course there must be something from which he was saving them. "Democracy" was the answer. No one can pretend that democracy is a holy dispensation, or that to criticise it is to slight one of the eternal truths. In common with all political systems it is indeed a bad system, but in degree it is nothing like as bad as the totalitarian system whereby all-powerful leaders impose complete serfdom upon cowed nations.

But if the people of a democratic régime may and do criticise dictatorship why, it may be asked, should not the people of an authoritarian régime criticise democracy? There is a difference. In the democratic countries, criticism of the dictatorships is at any rate not ordered from above. Opinion is free. Dictatorship even has its admirers and its advocates, who say and write what they will in their own country. By

contrast the case for democracy is not allowed to be hinted at in the dictatorship countries. No single German man or woman dare say or write one single good word about democracy. They are slaves. They may think what they will. They write what they are told to write. Hence it is that when Herr Hitler lost his communist bogey, wherewith to add fear abroad to fear at home as the means to his power, he set up democracy in its place. On the word of command the German newspapers throughout 1938 vituperated democracy as the enemy-in-chief.

When the German Government decided to terrorise, rob and expel the Jewish population from Germany and thus presented a spectacle of human distress almost beyond belief to normal impartial human beings, the people of the democratic countries, finding themselves not only subjected to ideological attack from Germany, but forced to witness a horror in Germany such as no democracy could be capable of, burst into indignation. America was roused as deeply as Great Britain. On December 18th, 1938, Mr. Harold Ickes, the American Secretary of the Interior, addressing the Zionist Society in Cleveland, gave free expression to what he thought about Germany. He said that to compare the modern practice of totalitarianism with the practices of the Middle Ages was to insult the Middle Ages. Germany's treatment of the Jews could be compared, he said, only to "a period of history when man was unlettered, benighted and bestial." Referring to the acceptance of German decorations by Mr. Henry Ford and Colonel Lindbergh, he asked: "How can any American calling himself a Christian accept decorations from the hands of a brutal dictator who with the same hands robs and tortures thousands of his fellow humans?" For nearly a year the German spokesmen had poured abuse upon the democratic countries. With a vengeance the democratic countries were now stung into retaliation, not by the words, but by the acts, of the German dictatorship.

Now the average individual German and still more the average individual Italian is a cultured and reasonable human being. But their individuality counts less than their impersonal status as units in a totalitarian machine. Indeed, it counts nothing at all. Such is the very principle, not denied but exalted, of the dictatorship system of government. But individuality cannot be suppressed. It can only be canalised.

In Germany's case one of the abiding characteristics is an extreme sensitiveness to criticism. A German seldom sees anything wrong in anything German. He is hurt all the more deeply, because he is surprised, when anything German is criticised. It is a case of patriotism without humour and without proportion. An American, an Englishman, a Frenchman, damns his government as lightly and as regularly as he goes for a walk. To a German, his government, of whatever kind, is a sacrosanct cult, a fit object only of solemn obedience, and of silent reverence. Mr. Ickes's remarks therefore drove German feeling along a surging unified channel of outraged protest.

It was not surprising when, on December 22nd, Mr. Sumner Welles, Acting-Secretary of State, revealed the fact that the German Government had itself protested against Mr. Ickes's speech. He was told by Dr. Hans Thomsen, the German Chargé d'Affaires, who communicated the protest, that his Government hoped the American Government would make "a public and official expression of regret." The German mind is of a gaunt simplicity. The main interest of Dr. Thomsen's request was that it illustrated the unilateral quality of German feeling, manifested in its blindness both to the improbability that an inflamed America would or could do anything of the kind requested, and to the fact that American opinion, unlike German opinion, happens to be free. Mr. Welles refused to accept the German protest, explaining that Mr. Ickes's views were a domestic matter, and that, moreover, the policy recently pursued in Germany had shocked and confounded public opinion in the United States more profoundly than anything which had taken place in many decades.

The famous warning posted in the French Zoo ("*Cet animal est méchant; quand on l'attaque il se défend*") had been shown to be applicable to the wider field of the human family. Mr. Welles told Dr. Thomsen that he had rarely read any more unjustifiable attacks on other Governments than had been made in the German Press on Mr. Roosevelt and his Cabinet. And those attacks had been directly inspired by the German Government. There followed another regimented outcry in the German Press, bitter and uncontrolled. Nor would it be reasonable to suppose that the bitterness was wholly inspired. It was a genuine feeling, due both to the

general sensitiveness aforesaid and to the particular circumstance that German opinion is kept in ignorance of how opinion in other countries develops. A true vicious circle. The emergency—for the state of feeling that was engendered in the two countries did amount to something like an emergency—was fully signalled on January 4th, 1939, when President Roosevelt delivered to the American Congress and people a Message on the state of the nation. In it he gave the classic answer of democratic thought to the modern doctrine of totalitarianism.

He thereby gave to the exuberant dictators something new to think about, a new factor to reckon with in their calculations. He showed that democracies, too, have their creed. "All about us," he said, "rage undeclared wars, military and economic. All about us are threats of new aggression, military and economic. Storms from abroad directly challenge the three institutions indispensable to Americans, now and always. The first is religion. Religion is the source of the other two: democracy and international good faith." Such are the blessings of the human society which, he argued, are now in danger. The danger being thus manifest, Mr. Roosevelt prescribed the means of defence. "The world has grown so small," he said, "and the weapons of attack so swift that no nation can be safe in its will to peace so long as any other single powerful nation refuses to settle its grievances at the council table. . . . War is not the only means of commanding a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There are many methods short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor Governments the aggregate sentiments of our own people. At the very least we can and should avoid any action, or any lack of action, which will encourage, assist, or build up an aggressor."

On the following day Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, construed the President's prescription as that of "moral, financial and commercial sanctions" as a method of bringing aggressors to terms.

Mr. Roosevelt went on to define the elements of what he called "adequate defence." "First," he said, "we must have armed forces and defences strong enough to ward off any sudden attack against strategic positions, and key facilities



essential to ensure sustained resistance and ultimate victory. Secondly, we must have the organisation and location of those key facilities so that they may be immediately utilised and rapidly expanded to meet all needs without danger of serious interruption by enemy attacks. . . . If these first two essentials are reasonably provided for, we must be able confidently to invoke the third element, the underlying strength of citizenship, the self-confidence, ability, imagination, and devotion that give a State power to see things through. A strong and united nation may be destroyed if it is unprepared against modern attack. But even a nation well armed and well organised from a strictly military point of view may, after a period of time, meet defeat if it is unnerved by self-distrust and endangered by class prejudices, by dissension between capital and labour, false economy, and other unsolved social problems at home."

At the end of the Message the President made a striking indictment of what totalitarianism amounts to in practice: "I hear some people say, 'This is all so complicated. There are certain advantages in a dictatorship. It gets rid of labour troubles. It gets rid of unemployment, of wasted motion, and of having to do your own thinking.' My answer is yes, but it also gets rid of some other things which we Americans intend very definitely to keep, and we still intend to do our own thinking. It will cost us taxes and voluntary risks of capital to attain some of the practical advantages which other forms of Government have acquired. Dictatorship, therefore, involves costs which the American people will never pay—the cost of our spiritual value, the cost of the blessed right of being able to say what we please, the cost of freedom, the cost of our capital being confiscated, the cost of being cast into concentration camps, and of being afraid to walk down the street with the wrong neighbour, the cost of having children brought up not as free human beings, but moulded and made by machines."

Mr. Roosevelt's effect was at once measured in the European reaction. German anger was as truly eloquent as British pleasure. The *Diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz* of January 5th (which is the mouthpiece of the German Foreign Office) naturally assumed that President Roosevelt was conducting policy in the United States in exactly the same way and from exactly the same motives as Herr Hitler conducts

policy in Germany. In short, President Roosevelt was assumed to be conducting bogey-politics. "The failure," it wrote, "of the internal policy of the New Deal has made it necessary to rebuild the prestige of the Administration from the outside, and to this end foreign Powers in other Continents are being instigated against one another. In order to attain that destructive aim it was necessary to arouse fear and hatred by systematic propaganda, which Mr. Roosevelt was doing by assertions that democratic liberties were threatened by dictatorships." For the rest the German newspapers concentrated upon adding Mr. Roosevelt to the existing company of *Kriegsbetzer* ("war agitators") which already included Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, Mr. Attlee and M. Blum; and upon the general responsibility of the Jews for Mr. Roosevelt's heresies. The *Völkischer Beobachter* of January 5th (the Nazi party organ) simply announced that America was now "under Jewish dictatorship."

By contrast British official opinion made the most of the occasion. Mr. Neville Chamberlain on January 5th issued a statement in which he said: "In these islands, where there is so clear a realisation that only through freedom and peace can we hope to maintain and develop for ourselves and those that come after us the benefits for which we have laboured for generations, the sentiments expressed by the President will be welcomed as yet another indication of the vital rôle of the American democracy in world affairs and its devotion to the ideal of ordered human progress." The real service performed by the President lay in the hint he dropped to the dictators that the democracies could not in the future be as lightly dealt with as in 1938; that, in short, peace was best for Herr Hitler, too.

#### THE FOUR POWERS AFTER MUNICH.

A curiously criss-cross relationship developed after Munich between the four Western Powers. The record on paper looked almost like a game of noughts and crosses. On the one hand a German envoy went to Paris, the while German opinion was abusing Great Britain. On the other hand a British envoy went to Rome, the while Italian opinion was abusing France. Could the absurdly-called "axis" of Berlin and Rome thereby really hope to divide and rule the other

axis? If so the axes themselves were running to seed—such a metaphor, or any metaphor, no doubt being permitted by the general misfit in nomenclature.

On December 6th, 1938, Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, arrived in Paris to sign with M. Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, a joint declaration. It purported to be the counterpart of the declaration signed by Herr Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain at Munich on September 30th, whereby Germany and Great Britain enshrined their desire never to go to war again. The Paris declaration of December 6th, however, did not go quite so far as that of September 30th. The Anglo-German statement made in Munich had (1) recognised "that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe"; (2) featured "the agreement signed last night (*re* Czecho-Slovakia) and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again"; and (3) resolved that "the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of differences and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe." The Franco-German declaration similarly was divided into three parts, thus: "(1) The French Government and the German Government fully share the conviction that peaceful and good neighbourly relations between France and Germany constitute one of the essential elements for the consolidation of the situation in Europe and the maintenance of general peace. The two Governments will in consequence use all their efforts to ensure the development in this direction of the relations between their countries. (2) The two Governments recognise that between the two countries there is no territorial question outstanding (*aucune question d'ordre territorial ne reste en suspens*) and they solemnly recognise as final the frontiers between their countries as they now exist. (3) The two Governments are resolved, due account being taken of their particular relations with other Powers, to remain in contact with regard to all questions interesting their two countries and mutually to consult should a later evolution of those questions threaten to lead to international difficulties." Herr von Ribbentrop was given a remarkably silent, and

even absent, welcome by the people of Paris. But Berlin was anything but silent about Great Britain. It happened that in the House of Commons on November 30th, Mr. R. S. Hudson, Secretary of the Overseas Trade Department, speaking of German trade methods, and quoting in particular the German practice in Central and South Eastern Europe of paying to the producer much more than the world price, declared that Germany "was by her methods destroying trade throughout the world." The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* had promptly (December 1st) characterised Mr. Hudson's remarks as "open threats" against Germany; and on the eve of Herr von Ribbentrop's arrival in Paris the German press in general was plunged in attacks on Great Britain both for her Jewish sympathies and for her habit of "mowing down Arabs."

At Munich Herr Hitler promised the world a peaceful Christmas. The first week of December, however, though it was peaceful in the sense that no new wars had been declared, or launched without being declared, ushered in a rather unrestful chapter of diplomacy. It was on December 3rd that the official British announcement was made that Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax would visit Rome on January 11th. Only three days before (November 30th) there had taken place in the Fascist Chamber in Rome a demonstration which was destined to start an acrimonious phase of Franco-Italian relations. While, therefore, Herr von Ribbentrop on December 6th was signing the Paris declaration of which the implied purpose was to improve Franco-German relations, the ceremonial illustration was being given of bad relations between Germany and Great Britain; and on the eve of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Rome, the bad relations of France and Italy were being illustrated.

#### ITALIAN CLAIMS ON FRANCE.

The expectation that French relations with Italy would improve as the result of a French Ambassador being sent to Rome for the first time since the Abyssinian complications began was destined not to be fulfilled. M. François-Poncet, the new Ambassador, transferred from Berlin, was received by Signor Mussolini for the first time on November 29th; but the storm broke within twenty-four hours. One has always to remember that the dictator-complex tends to drive the

dictator always up and up, lest he should come down and down. The competitive factor did without doubt produce in Italy the mettlesome reaction that, if 1938 was Herr Hitler's year, then 1939 at all costs must be Signor Mussolini's year. Hence at least in part the otherwise oddly-timed and undefined Italian "claims" in Tunisia, Corsica, Nice, Jibuti and the Suez Canal.

One could hardly pretend wholly to understand what was taking place in Italy. On the one hand the semi-official *Informazione Diplomatica* breathed the pure conciliatory spirit of Munich, welcomed the Ribbentrop visit to Paris, quoted in that context the Anglo-Italian Agreement and Mr. Chamberlain's impending visit to Rome. On the other hand the *Popolo d'Italia*, on the commonly assumed direct inspiration or even authorship of the Duce himself, elaborately giped at the "democratic" States. The gap between the totalitarian and the democratic systems was at the same time both widened and narrowed.

Just when Mr. Chamberlain's projected visit to Rome was announced there seemed to be two conflicting threads in Italian policy. The strange circumstance resulted, three and a half months after the Munich Agreement, which Signor Mussolini had helped to bring about, that in the British House of Commons on December 12th a question was asked whether any treaty, pact, or agreed understanding existed which, "in the event of Italy embarking on warlike operations against France or her possessions, would specifically require Great Britain to render military aid to France?" Mr. Chamberlain answered that there was no such "specific requirement." In these sensitive days opinion abroad is alert to any chance of jumping to wrong conclusions. French opinion did not hide its anxiety nor Italian opinion its perplexity about what Mr. Chamberlain did in fact mean. The anxiety and the doubt were both unnecessary because Mr. Chamberlain was not enunciating a policy—he had done that often enough—but merely answering a technical question. But Mr. Chamberlain was soon to be given another of his quickly recurring opportunities to repeat elementary truths and to put right equally frequent misunderstandings—even if in the process other misunderstandings were inevitably created. He addressed the Foreign Press Association in London on December 13th. On that occasion the German contingent staged a ceremonial

demonstration of protest against Mr. Chamberlain. They stayed away from the dinner. After the manner of German contingents, it was a large contingent. No fewer than fifty-five chairs were left vacant. The resultant closing of prandial gaps had the unrehearsed effect of bringing French and Italian guests next to each other at the time when Rome and Paris were hardly on speaking terms. An enforced Franco-Italian *rapprochement* was thus enforced by Berlin. On the French part there was all the less displeasure because Germany was obviously playing an undignified rôle, and because Mr. Chamberlain took the occasion to say (with an eye to the misunderstandings of December 12th aforesaid) that "our relations with France are so close as to pass beyond mere legal obligations, since they are founded on identity of interest."

The opening of the Fascist Chamber on November 30th had been carefully heralded by the Italian Press. Opinion had been prepared in advance for something of unusual interest. The explanation came when Count Ciano made his speech. Amid cheers, and with specific mention of Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and Lord Perth, he featured the putting into operation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement (November 16th) as one of the important further steps towards general reconciliation. Then came the remarkable incident. It took the form of an apparently cryptic statement from Count Ciano that Italy would pursue the consolidation of peace "with tenacity and realism not unmingled with that circumspection which is indispensable if we wish to safeguard with inflexible resolution the interests and natural aspirations of the Italian people." At once there broke what appeared to be an organised chorus from the deputies, of the words "Duce" and "Tunisia," accompanied by cries from the balcony of "Corsica" and "Nice."

The assumption that the demonstration had been organised was encouraged on the following day, when the Italian Press concentrated on the theme that the process of readjustment begun at Munich must be continued. Signor Gayda, in the *Giornale d'Italia*, wrote that certain necessary steps in European reconstruction—"obvious and important ones in the case of Italy and much less vital ones in the case of some other countries"—still needed to be recognised. Signor Ansaldo in the *Telegrafo* ominously wrote of Italy's aspiration

to "complete protection of all the persons of our race and language and to the full exploitation of our Empire." The French Press on that same day made the general *riposte* that France had no intention of yielding any of her colonial possessions to Italy or to Germany. M. Bonnet that day saw Signor Guariglia, the Italian Ambassador. M. Corbin the next day called at the Foreign Office in London, and M. François-Poncet lodged a protest with Count Ciano against the demonstrations of November 30th. Then, also on the same day, Signor Gayda wrote that "Italy is ready if necessary even to march against France."

Not that Italy made any official claims. The unofficial method was used of flying kites. All that took place officially was that on December 17th Count Ciano informed M. François-Poncet that the Franco-Italian Agreement of January 7th, 1935, was null and void, and that therefore it would be appropriate for the French Government, by virtue of Article 13 of the Treaty of London of April 26th, 1915, to submit fresh proposals for an agreement. The French Government answered through M. François-Poncet that it was willing to continue the discussion on the basis of the 1935 agreement. The issue was the satisfaction of Italian claims long outstanding. By Article 13 of the London Treaty of 1915 it was provided that "in the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, these two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain." At the time of Mr. Chamberlain's arrival in Rome (January 11th) it was an axiom of French thought that while there could be no question of any sovereign concession to Italy, there was room for adjustment, in the spirit of the 1935 agreement, of Italian interests in Tunisia and in Jibuti. There might, for instance, be a special zone allotted for Italian shipping in the port of Jibuti. It was even in the interest of France that Italy should make the maximum use of the railway.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

January 12th, 1939.

## LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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### THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK.\*

It would be difficult to overpraise Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's volume on Brest-Litovsk. Everyone knows that Russia was smashed to pieces in the World War and that the Bolsheviks had to accept a humiliating peace, dictated, like the Treaty of Versailles, at the point of the sword. Never before, however, has the drama been described with such a wealth of detail, with such balanced judgment, with such literary power. Readers of the Life of Hindenburg know that the author can tell a tale with such skill and power that we are gripped from the start. Here is a massive work of nearly 500 pages, with a thrilling narrative and a mass of appendices, for which all students of the history of the war will be grateful, and which enables us to visualise the harassed actors at their work.

For the general reader the most fascinating portions of the book are the character studies in which Mr. Wheeler-Bennett excels. The tremendous figure of Lenin dominates the whole story, unmatched on either side for strength of will, foresight and clarity of utterance. He was far more interested in saving the revolution in Russia and preparing for it elsewhere than in the frontiers of the country over which he ruled, all the more since he believed that such territorial determinations

\* *Brest-Litovsk. The Forgotten Peace, March 1918.* By T. W. Wheeler-Bennett. Macmillan. 21s.

were only temporary. Even with his unique authority, however, he had not an easy task to convert his comrades to a "defeatist," or, as he called it, a Tilsit peace. Yet the history of the last twenty years has justified his decision. "It is your day now," cried Radek to General Hoffmann, "but in the end the Allies will make you swallow a Brest-Litovsk peace." The prophecy was fulfilled to the letter a year later. The vast edifice of German Imperialism toppled over and Russia has managed to live within her reduced but still ample frontiers. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett is scarcely less impressed by the greatness of Trotsky, whom he has visited in Mexico.

On the side of the Central Powers we find quite as much internal divergence as with the Russians. A portrait of Ludendorff, with his heavy and rather brutal face, forms the frontispiece of the book, and we are aware of his dominating personality throughout. A soldier to his finger-tips, he could understand nothing but material force, and he stood out for the maximum harvest of victory. Hindenburg danced to his tune in his rather elephantine manner; the Kaiser emerges as a pale shadow, and Kühlmann, the Foreign Secretary, is praised for his moderation. The most interesting figure in the ranks of the victors is General Hoffmann, to whose importance the author did full justice in his earlier work and whose leading part in the drama of Brest-Litovsk is here set forth authoritatively for the first time. We are given a vivid description of the famous scene in which the General was authorised to remind the Russians that they were beaten. No shouting or striking on the table was necessary, for the words were plain enough. Austria plays throughout the part of a poor relation, whose notorious semi-starvation deprived her of effective bargaining power. Czernin, her Foreign Minister, was always on the verge of a breakdown, torn between the necessity of concluding a "Bread Peace" and of resisting Russian claims to wriggle out of the consequences of defeat. The German triumph was brief and worse than useless. For the Treaty was formally annulled by the Treaty of Versailles, and its memory provided a precedent for partition and oppression. "In comparison with the mountain of their shame," writes the author in the closing sentence of his book, which is also the most severe, "this was but a pebble, but it was the pebble of Brest-Litovsk upon which their feet had stumbled."

G. P. G.

## GLADSTONE AND THE IRISH NATION.

Mr. Hammond's study of *Gladstone and the Irish Nation*\* is a noble achievement of patient research, of lucid and detailed exposition, and of a most abundant good faith in the handling of the raw material of history. Eloquence and scholarship are combined to describe Gladstone's approach to the Irish problem from his characteristic standpoint of a great Christian and a good European—a standpoint typified by his life-long enthusiasm for Dante and Homer. Yet even more than he was a good European Gladstone was a good humanist. Mr. Hammond, following Morley, distinguishes Gladstone from the "intellectual" Liberals—he quotes his words: "Christianity teaches that the head is to be exalted through the heart, but Benthamism maintains that the heart is to be amended through the head." Whoever is to receive the palm for dialectical victory in that perplexing controversy, there can be little doubt that it was Gladstone's rich and fruitful humanism that gave him his immense appeal to the great mass of the people, not only of these islands, but throughout the civilised world wherever his message was received. The apostolic fervour of his faith in the good that lies, with other things, in the heart of man, kindled its ardour and brought forth an answering enthusiasm zealous to regulate conduct and policy by the light of his inborn moral concepts. Was he wrong? Were the evangelists wrong? Was the Christian Church and its several offshoots wrong in their essential teaching? One can only reflect that, after Gladstone passed from the scene, Liberalism in British politics entered upon a long slow decline into sterility and impotence. The tradition died hard. But from the zenith of the 1880 decade it has declined to the nadir of the 1930 decade. Spiritual fervour, the cult of truth and justice, gave place to the doctrine of "enlightened self-interest"—in which the self-interest waxed as the enlightenment waned—which has, in essentials, confined political action to a competition for larger shares in the distribution of material wealth.

And in the world sphere, in national and international intercourse, Gladstone set aloft a shining beacon that for long guided many a ship of state both through turmoil and in calm. Mr. Hammond's subject necessarily restricts his writing on

\* Longmans. 36s.

this topic to incidental reference. But Gladstone realised that the nation is a definite organism with which civilisation must reckon in all its dealings as inevitably as it must reckon with the individual person and the unit of the family. Contemporary statesmen were inclined rather to consolidation than to decentralisation where the smaller national units were in question—and no Irishman is likely to forget all the learned demonstrations, from the Duke of Argyll downwards, that Irish nationalism was no more than a froward sentimentality unrelated to fundamental factors. But Gladstone held—and it is the teaching of the Christian Church at its best—that every such unit is entitled to its individual liberty with scope for self-development, and that where a clash may arise between such units acting freely—where the free action of one may impinge upon the freedom or interests of another—it is essential that the difference shall be settled by processes of justice and not by force or the threat of force. The long record of his dealings in regard to Naples and Greece and the nations in the Balkan peninsula, not to mention Ireland, his magnanimity towards the Boers after Majuba, which Mr. Hammond justly stresses, and his action in accepting arbitration in the Alabama controversy with the U.S.A.—all these things explain how his world renown was linked with the hope of better things, of the replacement of war and warlike threats by peaceful processes based on justice, which was cherished wherever mankind still dreamed of an enlightened and progressive comity of nations to banish the jungle law. Out of the body of thought and feeling, of which he was by far the most distinguished and powerful exponent, there evolved in natural sequence the Hague Tribunal, the liberal-mindedness of western European civilisation and of President Wilson and a host of other representative Americans—and the League of Nations.

Has the liberalism of Gladstone perished in the international sphere? If it has, then the prospect before mankind is bleak indeed. What other hope can there be for civilisation but the hope of its resuscitation? What else can either religion or philosophy offer as a practical policy? Gladstone's moral grandeur is attested by the black darkness which the eclipse of his doctrine has inflicted upon a suffering world. Could it be better vindicated than by a collective effort for its re-establishment—by a spiritual impulse springing from

the heart of humanity in travail, by an induced enlightenment impelling timorous statesmanship, by an apostolic initiative from the Christian Church, which is as clearly threatened as civilisation itself, and which owes to mankind the pastoral guidance and protection of a shepherd for his flock? It is a thousand pities, as Viscount Cecil recently said, that there is no Gladstone, nor Gladstone's like, here to-day to evoke such an effort. But Gladstone was an Elijah who unhappily left no Elisha on whom his mantle might descend.

It is not to be expected, in the fullness of Mr. Hammond's luminous narrative, that there should not be some judgments that are open to challenge—particularly by an Irishman. Oddly enough he seems at times to be less than fair to Gladstone. He has so closely identified himself with his hero that his own innate courtesy leads him occasionally to accept for Gladstone the blame which should attach to others and to excuse others at Gladstone's expense. Some of his judgments about Parnell seem harsher than a full realisation of the conditions would warrant. On the other hand the judgments about Joseph Chamberlain in relation to Gladstone appear to be positively indulgent. Mr. Hammond was clearly influenced by Mr. Garvin's eloquence, as his numerous citations show, and overlooked a good many of Mr. Garvin's inaccuracies which have subsequently been demonstrated, and to some extent admitted, by Mr. Hammond.

Mr. Hammond's book will prove a treasure-house for students of recent Anglo-Irish history.

HENRY HARRISON.

### WORLD AFFAIRS IN 1937.\*

Those who know and use the annual surveys of international affairs published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs will renew their debts of gratitude to Professor Arnold J. Toynbee and his collaborators for their analysis of events in 1937. Their review extends to two volumes, the second of which is confined exclusively to Spain and the international repercussions of the Civil War. In

\* (1) *Survey of International Affairs, 1937*. Vol. I, 25s. net; Vol. II, 18s. net. Oxford University Press. (2) *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938*. 8s. 6d. net. Oxford University Press.

volume one Mr. G. E. Hubbard continues his survey of the Far East, including a review of world reactions to the Sino-Japanese conflict. The developments in Central Europe have received particularly detailed attention by Mr. C. A. Macartney. For the first time, Professor Allan G. B. Fisher is responsible for the treatment of economic affairs. Apart from valuable articles on Palestine and Egypt by Mr. H. Beeley, the rest of the volume has been written by Professor Toynbee, assisted as previously by Mr. V. M. Boulter. The latter have recognised the importance of the growing Arab consciousness in international affairs by paying special attention to Islamic lands bordering the Mediterranean.

While the survey is notable for detached and objective treatment it contains not merely a narration but also an interpretation of events; and it is all the more interesting for having been composed, for the most part, before the Munich Agreement of last September. Writing from a liberal angle, Professor Toynbee both condemns the aggressor States and is highly critical of the European democracies. In her attitude to the League in 1937 Great Britain was "excessively lukewarm" at a time when, in the writer's view, her own best interests were in line with the application of League principles. This deficiency in "realism" was in contrast to an excess by the French who still clung to the Covenant as an "indenture of partnership" whereby to maintain superiority over Germany. Only in the United States did there grow any genuine movement in favour of the League and that was rendered ineffectual by the continued strength of isolationism. Russian avowals of loyalty to Geneva were offset and rendered problematical by M. Stalin's maniacal "purge," upon which Professor Toynbee lays great emphasis in view of its "vital bearing" upon the balance of power. By contrast the Triangle States had united under the Anti-Comintern Pact to "anæsthetize" the pacific Powers and "to make the world safe for aggression," an attitude somewhat analogous to the claim of the Holy Alliance to suppress "revolution" in any country in the name of "legitimacy." Moreover the democracies themselves, by their hesitancy, feebleness and policy of "peace at almost any price," to use Mr. Eden's phrase, as exemplified in the Spanish Non-Intervention policies, went far towards positive collusion with the Triangle Powers "by virtually licensing aggression at the

expense of weaker third parties," a view which September 1938 confirmed only too well.

The second volume deals with the Spanish conflict from its outbreak in July 1936 up to the end of 1937, and more particularly with the long intricate course of Non-Intervention and the interests of the foreign Powers. This is prefaced by a brief historical estimate of social and political conditions in Spain. Discussing the revolt and the Nationalist assertion that it was planned to frustrate a projected "Red" revolution, Professor Toynbee considers that "the evidence fell far short of convincing"; and he inclines to the provisional view that after the February election, when the Government lost control of its own violent Left, the parties of the Right thought that their only chance of safety or success lay in a *coup d'état*. The course of the war is dealt with by Miss Katherine Duff who, in discussing atrocities and terrorism, refuses to apportion greater blame to either side. She notes, however, that "there was not so much trustworthy evidence to show that the fiendish tortures described by 'anti-Red' newspapers and propagandists were at all common."

It is most satisfactory to know that Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy has published a revised edition of his wholly admirable short history of world affairs since 1920, which was first printed in 1924. He has recast and enlarged the final part beginning in 1930 and bringing the narrative up to last autumn.

### MEDIEVAL PANORAMA.\*

Dr. Coulton's latest contribution to the medieval studies to which he has devoted a lifetime describes in compendious form life in England between the Conquest and the Reformation. He draws admittedly on his more detailed works, such as *The Medieval Village*, and pays generous acknowledgment to those of other scholars, English and foreign. Few historians can present the results of their researches in more attractive style, few have done more to initiate readers into that amazing multi-coloured world of violent contrasts. If some of the glamour is stripped off in the process, if some of his conclusions be unwelcome, Dr. Coulton's scrupulous accuracy and reliance on well-documented facts cannot with impunity

\* *Medieval Panorama*. By G. G. Coulton. Cambridge University Press. 1938. 15s.



be challenged, while his sympathy with the struggling and evolving masses is everywhere apparent.

Though the scene is here set in England, there are frequent references to Continental conditions. Every class is vividly depicted—the Court, feudal lords and village folk, scholars, pioneers in medicine and science, the Jews, and, of course, Churchmen, prelates and parish priests, monks and friars. Every department of life finds its place—education, religion, the home, marriage, war, sport. Literature is represented by Froissart, Chaucer and Malory, by religious drama and play cycles; literature combined with philosophy and economics, by Langland's *Piers Plowman* ("the Peasant Saint"), and More's *Utopia*; mysticism by Rolle, Hilton, Julian of Norwich and *The Cloud of Unknowing*. A study of the *Divina Commedia* is included as being an epitome of the highest thought of the day. The final chapters tell of the introduction of the vernacular Bible, and of the way prepared for the New Learning and the Reformation.

This period witnessed the growing power of the Commons and of the town burgesses. The political importance of London is stressed: "no king prospered in English history who had made enemies of the Londoners." It witnessed also the development of the jury system and the administration of justice. Dr. Coulton quotes Commynes' testimony to the comparative order prevalent in England; "where public weal is best ordered and where least violence reigns over the people," as contrasted with France. Tolerance in religion can also be favourably compared, the Inquisition not being set up, and no burning for heresy occurring before Henry IV's reign. The disturbing effect of the Papal Schism is shown to have given a great impetus to Wyclif and the Lollard movement. The Black Death in like manner "shook many things to the base, and overthrew those whose foundations were faulty, while the sounder survived." Life at the Universities is described, the number of students, the production and sale of books. No less interesting are the homely details of life in the medieval house, with its discomforts of cold, smells, scanty lighting and furniture. Here women, for all their disabilities, exercised a real power. Among the wealth of topics discussed one may indicate chivalry, with the contrast between its theory and practice; monasticism and its contributions to civilisation; the condition of the serfs under

monastic or lay overlords; the life of the masons and other craftsmen. Reproductions of masons' marks are included in the quaint and delightful text-figures. The notes and references for each chapter are conveniently grouped, together with controversial matter, at the end of the book.

E. G. S.

### BRAVE NEW CHINA.\*

This impression of China just before the Japanese invasion is full of interest and should convince all who want to appreciate her tremendous efforts and actual achievements in the march towards a modern, efficient, self-controlled and cultivated state. The admirable leadership of the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek are here met with from east to west, in small places as well as in the important cities, as the inspiration of all endeavour. And what was so evident in 1936 before the war explains the tenacity, the unity, the national enthusiasm of the people now. Through the wireless Chiang is able to reach the farthest outposts. Indeed the transformation in China has been enormous.

Lady Hosie went on this last journey with her mind full of the teachings of Confucius, having just completed the editing of her father, Professor Soothill's, book, *The Analects of Confucius*. She traces the backbone of the old national culture to this source.

For two thousand five hundred years Confucius was as the pole-star to the Chinese . . . a compass that cannot vary. Yet, ten years ago, China was busy throwing away her past with both hands. "Confucius has been our destruction. He was eternally looking back to an imaginary golden age. We must look forward," said a philosopher impatiently in Peking to me then; and I had agreed with him. "You don't let Aristotle or Plato rule your whole government system," he ended. After much digestion of this statement, I am not so sure.

Beginning with the Confucius Temple at Ch'ü Fu, Lady Hosie visited many of her old haunts, mounted the innumerable flights of stone steps, 8,000 feet, to the Buddhist shrine of Mount T'ai in the far west, stayed in colleges and schools and mission stations, travelled days in terrible motor buses to distant parts of the province of Szechwan, steamed up

\* Hodder & Stoughton. 12s. 6d.

and again down the rapids of the Yangtze, visited Canton, Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Chungking, Chengtu. Her descriptions of the improvements in the big cities, the beautiful universities, the modern equipment of hotels, shops, the widened streets, the keenness of students and their professors, the tremendous advance made by the women with their new-found freedom, all bring home the piteousness of the present conditions in those cities with fine new buildings utterly destroyed, inhabitants killed in their multitudes, the land laid waste.

The charm of this book is in the human contacts, reports of conversations with fellow-travellers, impressions of family life, the friendly relations with people of all classes, the confidences of women for which Lady Hosie has a special gift. Her early years as the daughter of missionaries in South China, her life as the wife of an attaché to the British Legation, and her visits since her widowhood have singularly fitted her to observe and to distinguish essential developments.

It was illuminating a few years ago to watch the adoration of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, father of the Revolution, replace that of Confucius; and it has been equally instructive to watch more recently this adoration of Sun metamorphizing into the larger devotion to China as Fatherland. . . . However, I saluted the living as well as the dead, for the portrait of Chiang Kai-Shek . . . hung underneath that of Dr. Sun.

But the testimony to the work of the missionaries, their courage and influence, and the Christian character of many professors and workers, permeates this book all through. There is an account of the demarcation of Interior China into denominational areas.

There has, in consequence, been excellent co-ordination and little overlapping. When a missionary returns home and speaks of Fukien, or Honan, Manchuria or Anhwei, the instructed know at once whether he is Episcopalian, Congregationalist, Baptist, or other arm of the Church universal. Out in China he is merely a Christian.

The recurring note in this record is: Who of my friends are alive to-day? What has happened to the charming "Healthy and Happy" and others young and old who made the visit so stimulating and so pleasant?

E. M. B.

### THE NOBLE SAVAGE.\*

Mr. C. W. Hobley's standard work dealing with the anthropology of the Kikuyu and Kamba people of Kenya Colony has, after being out of print for several years, now been reissued with additional matter. Originally published in 1922 it was made the subject of an essayistic review by Mr. Sidney Hartland in the journal, *Man*, for February 1923. As was then the custom, the reviewer, not stinting in praise, became critical on certain minor issues, such as the exact significance of the word *Engai*, which according to the author means "the deity." This definition, however, barely covers the ground, for before felling a tree the natives call upon *engai*—with the proviso, "If one lives here," to go to another tree. Thus the term seems to refer also to a lesser spirit. We learn, too, that the *aiimu* (ancestral spirits), which are supposed to be more active at night, must receive sacrifices before dawn; yet, when we get a description of the actual ceremony we find it taking place at about 9 a.m., which is long after sunrise. Such faults as these, if faults they are, still exist, for a careful comparison of the two editions reveals that no alterations have been made to the text; but anthropology to-day, illuminated from another angle by Professor Malinowsky's development of "the functional method," is not hampered by hair-splitting nor stiffened by lip-service to "accuracy" of that nature. "Engai" is probably an abstract and formless spirit, possessing all the mystery of a high god, as well as being the name of the high god, and sacrifices to the *aiimu* are possibly deferred on account of ordinary human laziness.

This book constitutes the last word in the study of Bantu tribal life and customs, for the "material" has melted away: the inroads of European culture have cut across the social life of the savage, and while we have a "close up" picture of the pre-war African people in the text, we have a series of "long shots" of the modern detribalised black man in the additional matter.

Gone are the dignified elders, the respectful tribesmen, the industrious womenfolk, the untrammelled children; and in their place has developed a semi-educated and socially inferior type of native who can find peace neither among his

\* *Bantu Beliefs and Magic*. By C. W. Hobley, C.M.G. 2nd Edition. Witherby. 15s.

kinsfolk nor among the Europeans. There are now facilities for education up to secondary-school standard, troops of boy scouts and other socially useful institutions; nevertheless one feels that the nobility of the savage has disappeared beneath the mass production of modern mediocrity.

Turning again to the first part of the work it is interesting to note that many of the Bantu customs have their duplicate in the Bible. For instance, animals for sacrifice must be of one colour only, and without blemish—for which injunction see Deut. xviii, 1, and also Numbers xix, 2. The Africans have, too, a "Flood" story, which, judging by local geological formation, may have some basis of fact, just as our Bible story was shown recently by archaeological excavation to be fundamentally true.

As in other parts of the world twins are a sign of ill-luck, blacksmiths have occult powers, men are afflicted with illnesses and even death as the result of *Thabu*, i.e. a curse, equivalent to the well-known Polynesian *Tabu*. Women, though apparently mere beasts of burden and their husbands' chattels, have indeed a strong social and political influence, and this they wield skilfully without clamouring for enfranchisement.

In conclusion, attention must be drawn to one small paragraph which alone makes the book of supreme social importance to-day. If a man proved to be an incorrigible criminal (not merely a law-abiding citizen of Jewish faith) he might be driven from the tribe, *but he was permitted to take all his property with him*. This is a point that the Evian Conference might bring to the notice of the "Superior Race" in Central Europe.

JULIAN FRANKLYN.

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## SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The members of the Society for Old Testament Study have recently published an important volume on the subject, entitled *Record and Revelation*.\* The book is edited by Principal H. Wheeler Robinson, D.D., and the articles have been contributed by eminent scholars of different denominations. Their collaboration has been so close and

\* Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d.

careful that there is very little overlapping in the volume, which is of singular interest. The work deals with every issue that is important for the study and understanding of the Old Testament—including the origins, the history and the religion of Israel, and the discoveries of archaeology—as well as with the development and content of the religious faith in itself and in its relation both to Judaism and to Christianity. It is particularly noteworthy that the article on the Old Testament and Judaism was contributed by the greatly lamented Dr. C. G. Montefiore. The other names stand in the forefront of Old Testament research and exposition.

We are only able to commend this volume in a very brief notice. Its outstanding merit is that it enables the reader to appreciate the setting of the history and religion of the Hebrews in the wider context of the general movements—physical, social and religious—of the Semite peoples. In the next place, it traces the development of the doctrine of Yahweh to a climax that is unique. It makes these important contributions in the light of the latest criticism and exploration.

Speaking generally, it may be said that fresh researches have established the trustworthiness of the oldest records contained in the Old Testament, though of course reinterpreting them from the standpoint of recent science and of important discoveries. This progress has thrown a flood of fresh light both on the history and on the literature of the Old Testament.

J. S. L.

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*Perfidious Albion—Entente Cordiale*,\* by Geneviève Tabouis, sketches the dramatic story of Anglo-French relations through the centuries. The famous journalist enriches her lively pages with material derived from Paul and Jules Cambon, Herriot, Mandel and other leading actors on the French stage, and it is always useful to learn the opinions of one who throughout life has stood close to the heart of events. The book is full of careless mistakes and misprints, and makes the impression of having been written in a hurry, but the later chapters are of considerable interest. The old quarrels are gone and the new friendship was cemented by blood; but friction began again directly the World War was over. The different attitudes and interests of the two countries in regard to Germany are clearly explained. France wished to keep her weak, while England desired her speedy recovery, largely for commercial reasons. In the post-war years each country had reason to complain of the other, and the Anglo-German naval treaty of 1935, which recognised the breach of the Versailles Treaty, was an unpleasant surprise. Was it the beginning of a *rapprochement* which might gradually lead to the isolation of France? The moral of the story is that, just because the two countries are so widely different, special care should be taken to consult the feelings and interests of each other.

\* Thornton Butterworth. 12s. 6d.

Among fairly recent books on the early development of the Constitution stands out Mr. Jolliffe's erudite and remarkable work, *The Constitutional History of Medieval England*,\* which covers the period from the English Settlements to 1485. It is concerned with "the general lines of social and constitutional evolution" providing "an adequate account of the undercurrents of thought and principle which determine social life and government." His approach to the interpretation of constitutional growth is indicated generally when he writes that "if there is a single predominant theme in the institutions of the first thousand years of English history it is the supremacy of law and the function of the community to declare and, if necessary, change it." His construction is built up from a view of early English kingship which is unorthodox and the subject of divergences among historians. He bases constitutional growth in the folk and its customary law, folk right, with the king as a subordinate figure, acting in the enforcement of law as an extraordinary and "extra-judicial authority." "There was lacking almost everything of that power of later monarchy which rests upon law and lawful obedience." Treatment of the post-Conquest period conforms more nearly to orthodox conclusions. While this very learned work, in view of its controversial character, is not suited by itself as a general textbook on constitutional history, it is certainly a volume which every advanced student should weigh and digest.

It is not inappropriate to mention here Sir John Marriott's latest book, *This Realm of England*,† which is a sketch of constitutional history from the earliest times to Edward VIII's abdication. It is written for "the patriotic citizen" and the beginner in the study of constitutional development. Sir John has made the monarchy rather than the evolution of Parliament "the central point" of his survey, holding that "down to the sixteenth century, Parliament was not really important." While the book is designed as a work taking account of the conclusions of modern research and on various points, particularly the medieval period, sets out questions still in controversy, the volume as a whole not unnaturally bears the stamp of the author's own interpretation of constitutional evolution.

Mr. Eric Partridge, in *The World of Words*,‡ has rendered a service to Language that no language, be it never so laudatory, can adequately express. He has made a contribution, not merely to the chit-chat of etymology but to the wide domain of both the spoken and the written word. Partridge is never "stuffy," as indeed an expert on slang should never be; and this book, albeit one of erudition, is none the less light reading with a laugh here and there. Those of us who believe that

\* Black. 15s. net.

† Blackie & Son Ltd. 15s. net.

‡ Routledge. 7s. 6d.

grammar was invented in the Middle Ages as a punitive device whereby stern monks reduced schoolboys to tears and a sense of their duty, will, after reading the chapter on "What Grammar Is and Why," come nearer to knowing what motivated Browning to write *The Grammarian's Funeral*. There is, in these three hundred and odd pages, instruction for the student and refreshment for the teacher, warning for the writer (and for the reader) and much suggestive matter for both speaker and hearer: actors might avoid affectation by reading it, and wireless announcers ought to be forced to make a study of it. It is certainly everybody's book. Even Hitler could do well to learn from it that the Aryan and the Semitic language families probably descend from a common ancestor; that the Indo-European group was misnamed Indo-Germanic by over-ambitious German philologists; and that the English people, having no conception of "plunder" as an idea, nor of plundering as a national virtue, simply plundered the word, ready-made, from the German language. Further, all who lean kindly to the maniacal Hitlerite idea of "racial history" and "racial geography" should study Partridge's valuable genealogical chart of the relationship between languages, and forthwith "drop the rot." Lastly—diehards, who strongly resent the importation of "Americanisms," will certainly feel better able to digest them after a meal of Partridge. J. F.

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Lord Baden-Powell's new book, *Birds and Beasts in Africa*,\* is a delightful account of life viewed from his home in Kenya. The descriptions of village and villagers are entertaining and give a vivid description of the native peoples, but as the title suggests the book is chiefly concerned with wild life in Kenya. The accounts and anecdotes of elephants, rhinos, buffalo and others, make good reading, and the addition of folk-tales adds to the interest. The chapters on less-known species, such as the cheetah, the hyrax, the chameleon, and the many different birds, are of particular note. The book is written primarily for young people, but their elders, too, will enjoy it, including the nitty black-and-white pen drawings and coloured illustrations by the author.

Another book on wild life in Africa from a very different angle is *White Hunter. The adventures and experiences of a professional big-game hunter in Africa*,† by Mr. J. A. Hunter. It is the record over many years of a fine shot and his keen knowledge of the habits and temper of the game he followed. Elephants, lions, leopards, buffalo, hippo, crocodiles and snakes, all come within his experience, and the book is full of interesting information and anecdotes concerning them. Some adventures on expeditions for filming and photographing big game show clearly the many difficulties and dangers accompanying such work. The book is well illustrated.

\* Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 4s. 6d. net.

† Seeley, Service & Co. Ltd. 15s. net.

Mr. H. A. Sharp, Deputy Librarian of the Croydon Public Libraries, has written an interesting book and added a new volume to the Practical Library Handbooks in his *Branch Libraries. Modern problems and administration*.<sup>\*</sup> The rapid growth of new districts, town-planning schemes, and the constant increase of the reading habit, has resulted in the considerable growth and development of branch libraries in recent years. In many districts they are regarded by the public as complete libraries, and therefore expected to give the same service as that at the main public library. This may be the right public attitude, but it causes many difficulties for library authorities, and it is with these problems of technique and management that Mr. Sharp is concerned. He gives a general survey of the subject and then deals fully with questions of planning, staffing, relations with the central library and book selection. The illustrations are examples of the planning of such libraries. The book should be of interest to the general reader as well as to the librarian.

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Students of political science and others interested in systems of government will welcome *Constitutions of All Countries* in course of publication by the Foreign Office. The object is to provide a collection from official sources of documents which form the legal basis of constitutional framework and organisations in different countries. In the first volume<sup>†</sup> now published the constitutional instruments relating to the British Dominions, all territories and dependencies in the Colonial Empire and the British Mandates are set out. Space prevents quotation of all documents *in extenso*. Sufficient is reproduced to provide a working knowledge of the legal characteristics of the various systems. It is important, of course, to appreciate particularly in relation to the Dominions that these documents are concerned only with legal structure and not with constitutional conventions by which, in many cases, the former is modified in practice.

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Those interested in the structural evolution of the rural cottage will appreciate a new volume in the British Heritage Series by Mr. Harry Batsford and Mr. Charles Fry on *The English Cottage*.<sup>‡</sup> Within a brief compass they have provided a useful sketch of constructional methods from the medieval peasant's cote and the crude early cruck-building to the artistically crude utilitarian erections of the nineteenth century. The text is explained and embellished by numerous illustrations. As a short outline lucidly presented it should enable the general reader to view the old cottage with greater understanding and maybe with a deeper sympathy.

<sup>\*</sup> Allen & Unwin Ltd. 5s. net. <sup>†</sup> H.M. Stationery Office. 10s. 6d. net.

<sup>‡</sup> Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

## THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MARCH 1939.

### WHAT OF ITALY?

NOW and again in my day-dreams I mount "l'Ippogrifo," the winged courser familiar to lovers of Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*, cleave the air between England and Italy and, descending in "large spirals" on to the Palazzo Venezia in Rome, dismount, pass by magic through roof and walls and, seating myself in Mussolini's chair, thence survey Europe and the world. Though my qualifications for this exercise are slight—I have only met Mussolini once, in April 1918, four and a half years before his "march" on Rome in a sleeping-car—I had the privilege between 1897 and 1922 of fairly constant intercourse with some of the leading statesmen, diplomatists and writers of modern Italy. From them I gleaned a notion of what they believed Italy's abiding interests to be; and it is in the light of those memories that I survey Italy, Europe and the world from Mussolini's chair.

What do I see? The world—it is useless nowadays to restrict one's gaze to Europe—presents to my amateur Italian eyes a picture very different from that which those same eyes seemed to see when I discussed the outlook, and Italy's interests, with Mussolini at Milan nearly twenty-one years ago. Then the greater part of the world, and Italy with it, stood in arms against Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. If victory was not yet in sight the approaching downfall of the Central Powers could be foreseen by men of vision—and it was part of my business in Italy and on the Italian front in 1918 to hasten that downfall. To Mussolini I repeated what I had said to Signor Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister, in London towards the end of January 1918, and had, at his request, written on January 29 to Baron Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister. Signor Orlando had pressed me to give him what he called my "bottom thought"; and this is, roughly, what I had said in reply:

Italy has now a chance of gaining an independence she has never enjoyed since she attained unity by the occupation of Rome in 1870. Until 1875 she lay under the direct menace of a French attempt to restore the Temporal Power of the Pope. From 1875

until 1882 she wavered between France and Germany. In the latter year Bismarck coerced her into entering the Triple Alliance by encouraging the French to take Tunis and by threatening, in his turn, to espouse the cause of the Pope. From 1882 until 1898 she had felt the drawbacks both of French resentment and of German tutelage, drawbacks mitigated only by a somewhat nebulous naval understanding with Great Britain. In 1898 she had reached a *modus vivendi* with France, and had begun to dance what Bülow, the German Chancellor, called "extra dances" with France and Great Britain, notably at the Algeiras Conference of 1906. But Italy had not escaped from German tutelage until she repudiated the Triple Alliance and entered the war on the Allied side in 1915. Even then she foolishly sought to safeguard her security by extorting from Great Britain, France and Russia, by the London Treaty of April 26th, 1915, territorial terms detrimental to her highest interests. On the basis of those terms alone, Italy could not maintain her position in the Alliance; whereas she could, by a broadly liberal policy consonant with the traditions of her Risorgimento, acquire a moral primacy in Central and South-Eastern Europe. She would need openly to espouse the cause of the subject Hapsburg peoples, and to be their champion and advocate at the Peace Conference. Thus she might extend her moral and political influence across the whole Danubian region and secure the friendship of Yugoslavia, Roumania and Czechoslovakia which would look upon her as their guide and protectress. Then she need fear the hostility of no Great Power. By agreement with the Yugoslavs—without which the Adriatic would never be safe for her and might end by becoming a German rather than an Italian or a Yugoslav sea—she could cut through at one stroke the whole network of shortsighted pro-German or pro-Austrian intrigues in which too many Allied public men were taking delight; and she would establish a claim upon the gratitude of the Allied peoples for having been chiefly instrumental in the overthrow of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which was an indispensable condition of the defeat of Germany.

Mussolini, whose mind works swiftly, saw the force of these arguments but seemed to make light of Italy's liberal traditions. He may still have been too much of a Syndicalist, too enamoured of Georges Sorel's doctrine of violence as a good in itself, to pay much heed to anything like moral considerations in politics. At all events, while professing agreement in principle with my suggestions, he gave them each and all so cynical a twist that the workings of his mind left on me a sinister impression.

A year later the deplorable Treaty of London which Sonnino had extracted from the British, French and Russian Governments in April 1915 bedevilled the whole position of Italy at the Peace Conference. It led to an open breach between her, President Wilson and the Supreme Allied "Council of Four" which the departure of Orlando and Sonnino from Paris reduced for a time to a "Council of Three." While the Italian Delegation was thus "on strike," Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson agreed that the signatures of any three of the Great Powers would suffice to render the Peace Treaty valid. They did not invite the Italians to join in the Anglo-American guarantee to France against any future German aggression, and thus excluded Italy from what the Italian press began to call "the new Triple Alliance." The Supreme Economic Council suspended the re-victualling arrangements for the Italian people, and President Wilson held up an American loan to Italy. Finally, the Supreme Economic Council decided to put all the enemy Adriatic shipping into the Allied shipping pool, and to reduce the Italian share of it to the percentage which Italy would be entitled to claim for the actual losses of her mercantile marine. All this was done very quietly until the Italian Government began to realise that blackmailing tactics may be very amusing when they are employed by one side only. For my part I thought these forms of pressure injudicious; and on May 17th, 1919, I wrote in a private memorandum to Lord Northcliffe:

Frankly, I do not think that these tactics are altogether wise. If they had been accompanied or preceded by a positive policy in regard to Italy, and not merely a negative policy based at once on unwillingness to go beyond the Treaty of London, and on unwillingness to tell the Italians flatly that its execution would be diametrically opposed to the best interests of Italy, there might have been something to say for cumulative tactical pressure. In dealing with Italy, one has not only to think of what she ought not to have, but to think also of what she ought to have. That the Allies and the United States have never yet done. Consequently, the Italian Government may be able to denounce to their people the tactics of England, France and the United States as definitely anti-Italian—unless at the eleventh hour some positive settlement is found.

No positive settlement was found. Unwise though they were, these tactics brought Italy back to the Peace Conference

—with rancour in her heart. This rancour presently took the form of an officially fostered defeatism which persuaded the Italian people that Italy, after all her sacrifices, had been defrauded by her greedy allies; and this defeatism opened the door, after three years of chaotic internal strife, to Mussolini and his Fascists, who had the backing of Italian "big business" and especially of the Italian General Staff.

So it is against this background, coloured by some knowledge of Mussolini's record as "Duce," that in my day-dreams I survey the world from his chair. From this point of vantage I see that four of the Great Powers which stood against Germany in the war are no longer in league with Great Britain and France. Japan and Italy are in league with Germany. The United States is unattached. Soviet Russia, after the sacrifice of Czecho-Slovakia by France and Great Britain, holds aloof and is cold-shouldered. I see that the aim of Germany, with the help of Japan and Italy, is now to encircle the Western Powers so as to confront them with the danger of war on several fronts and, if possible, to separate London from Paris as a prelude to the complete encirclement of Great Britain. This latter aim now seems farther from fulfilment than Germany and Italy may have thought it not long ago.

I see also that neither Germany, Italy nor Japan wants a world war, or even a war with the Western Powers or with the United States. War might entail losses disproportionate to the gains which Germany, Italy and Japan expect if they can carry through their programme without direct attack, albeit under constant threat of war. The programme is far-reaching, and demands political deftness and psychological skill in its execution. On the part of Italy, too, it requires constant alertness lest she be "bested" by her German partner and be left without those tangible gains to which the Italian mind attaches major importance.

From Mussolini's chair I look back over the events of the past few years and strike a balance between achievements and hopes. The first notable achievement was the conquest of Abyssinia. Though Abyssinia is still a liability rather than an asset, its conquest in the teeth of League opposition, and of a Britain willing to wound yet afraid to strike, gained for Italy immense prestige throughout Africa, to some extent in Asia and certainly in the Arab world. Besides, together with

the strategic roads from Eritrea and Abyssinia towards the Sudan, Libya may be an effective pincer when it comes to the ultimate "show down" with Great Britain. Meanwhile, Libya serves equally as a means of pressure upon Tunis; and, thanks to the conquest of Spain—by Italian and German intervention in the name of non-intervention, sanctified by the Anglo-Italian Agreement which cost Mr. Anthony Eden his job—France will have to think twice before she makes good her boast that she will give up "not an inch" of territory to Italian demands.

None the less, in Mussolini's chair, I feel one or two misgivings. I seem to hear him musing thus:

My conquest of Spain was, of course, the sequel to my conquest of Abyssinia. I might never have got Abyssinia if I had not wheedled Laval into making his agreement with me in January 1935, or thereafter wheedled the British into making the Hoare-Laval agreement, notwithstanding Sir Samuel Hoare's ridiculous speech at Geneva on September 11th, 1935, which egregious fools in Great Britain and elsewhere mistook for a firm statement of policy. The Hoare-Laval agreement, too, nearly caused a split between London and Paris, which was all to the good. The money I spent on the French press at that time was well spent. And, before the Anglo-French tiff was over, my friend Hitler presented his little bill to France in the form of the Rhineland occupation. An English paper actually wrote: "Well done, Hitler!" Hitler stood by me then and helped to make my gamble less of a gamble. Only, of course, I had to agree to let him have Austria one day, and to plant himself both on the Brenner and uncomfortably near Trieste. Still one can't make omelettes without breaking eggs, and my Spanish *tortilla* may turn out to be a very big Mediterranean omelette indeed.

A good deal may depend upon the way I manipulate those gullible British. The Chamberlains are really a godsend. When I was nearly down and out in 1924 after the miserable Matteotti had to be put out of the way, Austen Chamberlain came to pat me on the back and brought me into the Locarno Agreement. Besides, without meaning to, he gave me Albania. And when I was in a tight place in Spain last year, Neville Chamberlain gave me a splendid lift by clearing out the mischief-making Eden who had bothered me with his Nyon "anti-piracy" arrangement. "Piracy," forsooth! Who can call non-intervention, properly understood, "piracy"?

Neville Chamberlain, too, is grateful to me. I got *him* out of a hole at Munich with my formula, which Hitler and I had settled



in advance between us. So he was able to take home "peace with honour" and "peace for our time" and to sign his paper with Hitler. Also he promised to come to see me in Rome—and kept his promise, though I tried him pretty high. As soon as he had asked whether he and Lord Halifax could come last January, I let loose my "deputies" to shout for "Tunis, Corsica, Nice!"—just to encourage the French. Though this did stick in Chamberlain's crop for a while, and though the French declined the British "mediation" which, after Munich, I meant to be my trump card, Chamberlain did, as his newspapers confessed, hint that in more favourable circumstances he might say a word or two to France in my support.

And he and Halifax swallowed my assurances without a grimace! On their return to London they went bail for my sincerity—though lately they seem to be pulling a wry face over Gayda's version of what I said to my Fascist Grand Council. Whoever expected me, I should like to know, to bring my non-intervening legionaries out of Spain before I have made quite sure that Franco's victory is complete—political victory as well as military—and before Hitler and I have tied up France so tightly that she won't be able to wriggle? I *must* stay in Spain. How can I clear out and leave Spain entirely to Hitler who has already sent far too many men there for my liking? Still, he and I are in the same boat and must sink or swim together. One of the things I really cannot understand, though I am no fool, is that the British and some of the French do not see this. I can't get away from Hitler, even if I would. If Fascism goes, Nazism may go, and *vice versa*. Besides, there are always Balbo, Grandi and their intrigues, with the Court behind them, ready to trip me up.

So I have to keep my wits about me. Hitler may not know that I am informed of all the cross-currents in his own Nazi party, and especially in the Reichswehr. I know that in his talks with his party chieftains at Munich in December there was a fairly strong current in favour of leaving me in the lurch as soon as Germany should have got what she wants in the south-east and the east of Europe. These fellows seem to think they can keep me on the string, and get me to cover Germany's flank while she goes ahead, and that I shall be satisfied with promises that somehow, somehow, Germany will help me to deal with France. I am not that sort of nincompoop. I mean to cash in on Hitler's promises before, not after, he goes ahead; and then we shall see whether his "leave-Italy-in-the-lurch" gangsters will talk quite so big. Hitler, at any rate, knows he can't do without me—not yet, or for many a day. Chamberlain may think he can buy me off from Hitler with vague offers—for he did not say exactly what price he would pay. Nor did he twig that his offers help me to keep Hitler in line.

And with Hitler on the Brenner my price would be too stiff for the British. Hitler sat upon his "leave-me-in-the-lurchers" at Munich, and has sat upon them since. What he said in the Reichstag on January 30th was quite right: "Let nobody in the world mistake the resolve formed by National Socialist Germany. It can only be conducive to peace if no doubt is left that any war let loose against the Italy of to-day, no matter from what motives, would bring Germany to the side of her friend."

This doesn't mean that I shan't keep one or two anchors out to windward so that the "leave-me-in-the-lurch" German school may not be led into temptation. I am not advising Roumania, as the Germans would wish, to follow Hungary into Hitler's camp or, for that matter, into the anti-Comintern Pact. And I am taking a hand in Ribbentrop's dealings with Poland. It is just as well that Poland should dance on the tight-rope between Berlin and Moscow without, of course, falling on either side. In Czecho-Slovakia, too, things are not going quite so smoothly as Hitler seemed to expect they would. I hear that Ribbentrop said the other day in Berlin to the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Secretary that Germany is well aware of Czecho-Slovak feelings and knows that 90 per cent. of the people still believe in the "Beneš system." So Hitler has had to draw in his horns, for the time being, at Prague, and to ask only that special rights shall be given to the German minority which remains in Czecho-Slovakia, not so much because Germany cares about this minority—to make Chamberlain and Daladier believe that she really cared about the Sudeten Germans was one of the great jokes of last summer!—as because she wants those rights as a precedent for her dealings with Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia.

This idea doesn't altogether suit my book. Yugoslavia is a nuisance, and the fall of Stoyadinovitch shows that the Croats are again becoming indigestible. But I don't want to see Yugoslavia cut up. Should the worst ever come to the worst the Yugoslavs might still be useful; and if Germany got hold of them the Adriatic would soon cease to be *mare nostrum*. However much I may extend or consolidate my Italian Empire, Italy will still be in Europe, and I do not want her in the Axis to be a mere tail that does not wag the dog.

For the moment I feel pretty safe. True, Chamberlain now says England will stand by France; but having said it, he can tell the French to be nice to me without riling them. True, too, that the British and the French are rearming; and the United States is nasty. But what can they do? They will never get together against me; and if Hitler and I are skilful, the British and the French will have to give me something. When they have given *me* something, they will have to give Hitler something. One of the best things

Hitler did on January 30th was to smash the stupid pretext that Germany cannot be given colonies because they would be of strategic value to her. Strategic objections, he said, are an attempt to deprive Germany of her rights, and a nation of 80 millions will not be deprived of its rights. It is precisely because colonies have strategic value that we and the Germans want them. When we have got them we shall soon show the use we can make of them. We shall make Britain and France sit up!

At this point I awoke from my day-dream in Mussolini's chair, passed once more magically through the walls and roof, remounted "l'Ippogrifo" and sped back to England. As my winged courser flew over Corsica and across the Gulf of Lyons I got glimpses of the Spanish coast and understood more clearly what the cry for "Tunis, Corsica, Nice!" might mean. I felt that it is not seriously meant for to-day, but very seriously for to-morrow. What I could not understand was why we British had been so swift in 1936 to put an embargo on the purchase of arms and war material by Government Spain, or the ensuing policy, if policy it can be called, of "non-intervention" as a screen for the Italo-German conquest of the Spanish peninsula. I knew that German guns surround Gibraltar on the land side, and grin at the Rock across the Straits. I knew, too, that German aerodromes have been planted along the Spanish slopes of the Pyrenees, and that some thousands of German "technicians" have been busy on Franco's side for two years. Further, I knew that a mysterious German force—originally called "E.K.S.," which might stand for "Expeditionary Corps Spain" or "Expeditionary Corps South"—had been recruited from the regular German army, trained last year at Döberitz near Berlin, then stationed in Southern Carinthia, before going to Italy either on the way to Spain or to Libya, or to be brigaded, as "stiffening," with Italian troops on the frontier of France. I was aware that the first instalment of this special German force consisted of about 100,000 trained men, with another 100,000 in reserve, that it had been re-named "Reichs-Kolonial-Korps" or "R.K.K.," and that its formation had been explained to Reichswehr and Black Guard officers as a military and political necessity. This necessity, the explanation ran, arose from the expediency of employing German troops on fronts outside Germany in the coming war with the Western Powers. The new German colonial troops would serve this purpose.

They must therefore be accustomed beforehand to the *terrain* on which they would have to operate in Italy, Spain and elsewhere.

Knowing these things and suspecting that our Government knows them too, the British policy of "appeasement" seemed to me increasingly mysterious—unless, indeed, its only object be to gain time for the completion of British rearmament. Yet, even so, I could not see how any prospective degree of British rearmament could easily replace the 1,500,000 men of the Czecho-Slovak army, its fortifications, its aircraft and its great arsenals which "appeasement" had sacrificed in October. Something seemed to be wrong somewhere. Here were two effectively insolvent States, Germany and Italy, building up huge armaments on internal credit, and exposing Great Britain and France, who are still semi-solvent, to what may become an intolerable strain upon their own financial systems. Of the two insolvent States, Italy was the weaker. Yet we had relieved her burden in Abyssinia by recognising her conquest, and her King as Emperor, and had helped to ease Mussolini's position in Spain by declining to give countenance or encouragement to the lawful Spanish Government. Without a murmur we had suffered British vessels to be bombed in Spanish harbours by German and Italian aircraft, and British sailors to be killed; and we had noted with hardly a shudder the massacre of Spanish civilians by those same aircraft. And without a thought of the effect of these things upon our good name and our political credit throughout the world, we had continued to maintain the best relations with Hitler and Mussolini, trusting only that their respect for our new armaments would prevent them from trying conclusions with us. Should this trust be misplaced we could, after all—as our Prime Minister and Sir Samuel Hoare had assured us—"give a very good account of ourselves."

On the assumption that these assurances have more solid worth than Mussolini's assurances to Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, the conclusion I drew as I returned from my day-dream excursion to the Palazzo Venezia was that the sooner we stand firm, in deed as well as in word, the better. Mussolini, like Hitler, understands only one kind of argument—firmness, with adequate strength behind it. It is true that the Italian people and the German people do not want war.

Mussolini knows it ; Hitler knows it. But it is truer that the German and the Italian peoples will have no say in the matter if Hitler and Mussolini push their threats to the point of war. Neither the Italian nor the German people has any real dislike of "peaceful" concessions extorted from us or France by threat of war ; and every such concession rivets Mussolini's and Hitler's hold upon their respective countries.

The only way to save those countries, and our own, from war is, I am convinced, forthwith to show that we will yield nothing, nor will we advise France to yield anything, to threat of war ; and that we take our stand not on the defence of this or that territory or strategic position, but on the principle which we have so long trampled underfoot—that until lawless violence ceases to be the rule in international affairs, those who follow this rule, and spurn both human right and democratic freedom, must reckon with our unflinching resistance. With the rule of violence we cannot compromise, nor can we make fear—masquerading as prudence or "appeasement"—our counsellor when we are bidden to "stand and deliver" colonies or anything else. Otherwise we shall merit all the evil that will come upon us. But we need to be quite clear in our minds that in withstanding the rule of violence and armed menace we shall be challenging the very existence of the totalitarian systems. They know and can live by no other rule. The issue is : "We or They ?" The peoples they oppress hope in their heart of hearts that it will be "We," for then those peoples might begin again to breathe the air of freedom.

WICKHAM STEED.

## GERMANY'S EASTERN NEIGHBOURS.

GERMANY'S immediate aims in Eastern Europe are primarily economic. The Reich is to be the manufacturing centre supplying her surplus production to dependent States which, in their turn, provide food and raw material. In one sense it is a conception not dissimilar from Mr. Chamberlain's Imperial Preference schemes of thirty-five years ago, but there is a great difference. This complementary exchange of products is not to be in any sense free. It is to be organised and its character determined among other means by the greater military power of the Reich. To carry it out does not, at any rate at this stage, imply war. It is true that Poland and Russia may in the future present serious military problems to Germany, but of all the other States it can be said that there is none able to withstand her advances.

The weapons Germany has may be detailed somewhat as follows. She provides a vast market. She disposes of a completely dominant military force. She is the leader of a great movement for the extermination of Jewish influence. Wherever her nationals are to be found she proclaims the attractive slogan : "*Ein Volk, ein Reich*," which is made effective by newspaper and radio propaganda, by the creation of paramilitary organisations, or, if need be, by violence itself. In the case of the Ukraine we see for the first time the utilisation of the ethnographic principle among a non-German people to forward German aims. With these weapons in her hands Germany hopes to make whatever changes she desires in her own favour by the same bloodless methods which succeeded at Munich.

It was with a view to talking with people on the spot that I made a recent journey along Germany's eastern marches, starting and ending at Berlin and pursuing a line through Gdynia, Danzig, Königsberg, Memel, Kaunas, Warsaw, Lemberg, Cracow, Budapest, Chust, the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine, and Prague.

Danzig may be said to be entirely Germanised. There is a united political party ; there are the usual bands of S.A. men : the control of the city depends entirely upon orders received from Berlin through Mr. Förster, the *Gauleiter*, who himself is not a Danzig man : orators arrive from the Reich : Jews

are treated in the spirit of Nuremberg. Instances of Jewish persecution abound, of course, in every place where German influence exists. I will give but one example which came to my notice in Danzig. There was an old-established shop for the supply of the highest class of furniture. It might have stood in Bond Street. The proprietors were Jews. They were visited and asked to prove that they had met all tax demands. This they had no difficulty in showing. They were then asked to deposit a security—I think of £2,000—for the payment of future taxes. This they were unable to do and therefore on the window-front is to be seen the customary notice giving the name of the Aryan who has taken over the business of its now ruined proprietors. It is under pressure, of which this is one instance, that the Jews have been given a time limit in which to leave Danzig. I was told that the Police President is a man of much tact and is dealing with the cases as considerately as possible, but there you have it—the German policy, applied of course in flat defiance of the security given by the Danzig Statute.

Poland is sensitive about her sovereignty. There was, some years ago, the famous pillar-box dispute. Recently there has been a controversy involving the issue by Poland, and in reply by the Free State, of postage stamps giving varying accounts of the historical sovereignty over Danzig. But whatever Poland may say it is true that Danzig is ripe to rejoin Germany. Dr. Böttcher, a very courteous official, who was a German administrator in the Cameroons and later a prisoner of war in England, explained that it was just a question of time. When I asked my Nazi guide when it would occur she replied that it was of course not for her to say: the matter would be settled by the Führer—and that exactly expresses the truth.

But the annexation of Danzig involves economic complications. It is true that traffic coming down the river must use the port, but in a general sense Danzig could easily be robbed of her hinterland. The picturesque quays and warehouses of this famous city form a startling contrast to the extensive modern construction of the Polish port of Gdynia. Gdynia is well worth a visit. There is nothing that is historically interesting to see: it is just an impressive lesson in what can be done by the vigour of these new States—miles and miles of railway line, broad and deep docks carrying ocean-going

liners. If, therefore, Danzig were simply taken over by Germany she would just die and leave the Reich with her population to support. Moreover, to annex Danzig would open in an active form the question of the Corridor, to the surrender of which the Poles could not consent. The existence of Gdynia prevents that. They might agree to duplicating the existing railway arrangements, which are said to work admirably, by an *autobahn* which would join Prussia with the big *autobahn* which runs from Danzig to Königsberg. But, is such an *autobahn* to be extra-territorial, like the one in Czecho-Slovakia? If so, would it not prove to be a silken cord round the neck of Gdynia? For such reasons as these it is probable that nothing sensational will happen in Danzig for the present, unless of course the demand for victories to support the prestige of the Nazi régime makes action inevitable.

In Memel the Germanisation is not so complete. There is, for example, no *Gauleiter*: there are no orators from Germany, the matter is left to local people. Dr. Neumann, the leader, enjoys a peculiar advantage in that he is a veterinary surgeon and two-thirds of the Memel *Gebiet* is agricultural. He is no doubt able therefore to combine helpful service with political persuasion. Germans in Memelland complained to me that they had been forgotten by the Reich in their sufferings under the Kaunas Government. Their grievances began, of course, with the forcible assumption of sovereignty in 1923 by the Lithuanians, and Dr. Schreiber, a charming professor of history, showed me with pride original proclamations by the Allies declaring that they would hold the city for the Memellanders. There is, further, complaint of the harshness of the martial law and the inequality of its application as between German and Lithuanian. On the other hand I was told that martial law, which was in force over the whole State, was in fact more mildly applied in Memel than in other parts of Lithuania. Whether a milder régime in Memel would have saved Lithuania from her present dangers is a matter of speculation and Denmark perhaps could explain whether the strictest fairness could protect any small State from German demands. For the present, however, matters have reached the stage when Memellanders demand no more than the full application of the Statute. None the less everything is moving in Memel in exactly the same manner as it does elsewhere

where German influence is exerted. The S.A. is to be introduced—an armed force under foreign control within the sovereignty of the Lithuanian State. Preparations are being made to drive out the Jews. In the handsome hotel under Government patronage Jews and the Jewish press are to be seen. But there exists another hotel which is the centre of Germanism. A Memellander told me that the Jews were leaving Memel of their own free will. That they are leaving there is no doubt. Business men, with sound foresight, are moving to Kaunas, leaving their business in the hands of Aryan managers.

The port of Memel is controlled by a Board, to which the League of Nations appoints one representative. It has, of course, its river trade, but for its main business it depends upon Lithuania, whose only port it is. If Memel were annexed by Germany, Kaunas could starve it out. Their trade could be diverted without much difficulty, by arrangement with Latvia, to Libau, and, besides this, there is the possible development of a small fishing port, Shventai, entirely within Lithuanian territory, for which purpose some money has already been voted.

In such circumstances, to join Memel to East Prussia would merely be an economic embarrassment to Germany. But would such circumstances arise? Germany would not be unlikely to use her greatly superior military power to prevent the Lithuanians strangling Memel, and the Lithuanians could not possibly resist. The annexation, however, is not desired by the business men of Memel. Its supporters come from the farmers, who believe that they would receive from Germany higher prices than they get at present for their products. If Germany did annex Memelland, what territory would she take? I was told that plans existed for the incorporation in the Reich of an area considerably in excess of what is at present in the Memelland *Gebiet*.

The most complete example of the subjugation of a small country is to be found in the case of Czecho-Slovakia. After Munich a good many people believed that she would enjoy a flourishing life as a democratic and neutral State, freed from the incubus of her three and a half million Sudetens. This picture has turned out to be entirely false. Czecho-Slovakia has, of course, to-day no frontier defences. The famous little pill-boxes lie far inside German, Polish and Hungarian

territory, where they face the wrong way. It is said that so effective were they that the Germans have found it too expensive to blow them up and that they are to be filled in with soil. Furthermore, Czecho-Slovakia depends more than ever on Germany for the sale of her goods. Common sense appears to have been used in the new commercial arrangements. For example, a firm manufacturing in Carlsbad, with sale-rooms in Prague, is entirely unaffected by the fact that a new frontier has been erected. But still the fact remains that the Czechs must look to the Germans more than ever. Moreover, most of the brown and black coal has been lost and must be purchased by the Czechs in a foreign currency. This creates particular difficulties in the case of the brown coal, for the heating apparatus in Czecho-Slovakia is mostly constructed to consume it and has to be altered if black coal is to be employed.

As a further illustration of the economic subjugation may be mentioned the case of the railways. The new frontier put great sections of the main lines into Germany, and the Czechs must pay, I was told, under the arrangement by which traffic has been resumed, Kr. 500 a day for every train. In the case of the railway passing through Czecho-Slovakia from the old Germany to Austria there is an agreement which makes this line, when needed, in effect a German military railway. The most striking example of the dependency of Czecho-Slovakia is the case of the electric supply of Prague. It comes from a village said to be entirely Czech in character but now lying in German territory, so that Prague could be put in darkness by the direction of a German official.

On the political side the German control of Czecho-Slovakia is obvious in the constitution of the Parliament. Parties have been compelled to amalgamate and the Communist Party has been dissolved in deference to German wishes. There is a so-called Opposition, but there is no question of an alternative Government. I was told that it was impossible to hold elections because, were they held, the majority would go against the present Government and an impossible situation would be created. The full application of the pressure on the Jews has not yet been made in Bohemia. In Slovakia it is threatened. But there can be little doubt that a demand for such a policy has been made on Prague by Berlin.

Hungary is in the Axis and a Hungarian friend described Dr. Imredi's Government as being 75 per cent. Nazi. It may

be that it will be replaced by one that is 100 per cent. Nazi. This would formally register the control of Hungarian affairs from Berlin. Hungary is useful to Germany both for her supply of agricultural products and because she provides communications with Roumania and the East. Hungarian industry might be regarded by the Germans as competitive, and certainly they would have no desire to encourage it. If the anti-Jewish legislation in Hungary is made effective, a hard blow will have been aimed at Hungarian industry. Hungary, a land of squires, owes what it has of commerce, industry and learning largely to the Jews, who have been good, loyal Hungarians and provided many excellent officers and men in the war. If they go, Hungary becomes a mere farm hinterland to the Reich.

Beyond Hungary is Roumania, in which, for Germany, lies the most important of all raw materials, namely oil. It is to be presumed that commercial arrangements could be made for its purchase, or even barter, but the success of any such arrangement becomes more likely with every increase in the military power of Germany on the Roumanian frontier. Should this increase in strength be accompanied by a change in the Roumanian Government then the circumstances become ideal. There would be identity of ideology. Much interest is taken in Germany in the Iron Guard movement and in a Berlin shop you will see prominently displayed books with a portrait of the "murdered" Codreanu and an account of his work for his country. Should the Iron Guard come to power and the present régime in consequence disappear, the murder would be avenged and adjustment as between Roumania and Germany would be made much simpler. Moreover, such a Government would be more willing to assist German plans against the Soviet Ukraine. In the German view it is not too much to hope that, as the technique of Munich becomes applied with progressive success, Moscow may be made at some time to yield to the sort of pressure which was effective in September, 1938, in Prague.

The Carpatho-Ukraine forms a particularly interesting problem and the labour of a journey to Chust I found very well repaid. This land is partly situated on the hills and partly on the plains leading to Hungary. The railway, of course, is in the plains and for the most part in Hungary. Carpatho-Ukraine could exist as a part of Hungary, which would then

have a common frontier with Poland, or it could exist with the frontiers which it enjoyed when it was called Ruthenia. In its present state it can hardly exist at all, for communications are almost impossible. There is, indeed, a road leading from Chust into Slovakia but it is in a wretched state, being very heavily used by Czech military transport. Chust is now the nerve centre of the Ukrainian national movement. It regards Hitler as its benefactor and entertains, at any rate among its younger elements, very ambitious hopes for the future. The Ukrainians realise, of course, that the special favour they enjoy from Berlin is not entirely due to their own national claims. Carpatho-Ukraine may serve Germany in many ways. In the first place she provides a bridge to Roumania. The road, which has been proposed, would be an expensive affair, but it would lead straight to the Roumanian border. It may not be necessary to construct it if the Hungarian railway line falls, as in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, entirely under German control. The military value of Carpatho-Ukraine to Germany is found in the fact that both Poland and Hungary are faced with a new German-controlled frontier. On the political side, of course, Carpatho-Ukraine provides Germany with a powerful weapon of agitation against Poland. Galicia is intensely interested in the new Ukrainian State and in Chust it is possible openly to avow an association with the revolutionary Ukrainian movement, which could not exist in the case of the constitutional *Undo* party in Poland. Further, Carpatho-Ukraine makes a call to the Ukrainians in Bukovina and Bessarabia, in Roumania, who are not only Ukrainians but occupiers of oil-bearing land. Thus, both as a military passage and as a centre of national agitation, Carpatho-Ukraine is an ideal base for undermining the solidarity of the Soviet Union and detaching, in whole or in part, the Russian Ukraine and joining it to the German system. This hope of breaking up the Soviet Union exists in the mind of many political thinkers in Germany.

Perhaps, therefore, the best forecast of immediate German plans between the Baltic and the Danube would be to say that Berlin aims at the creation of a buffer belt, which, besides providing primary products, for the time being keeps the Soviets at arm's length and may later be used as a base for their disintegration.

WEDGWOOD BENN.

## THE OUTLOOK IN SPAIN.

ON January 18th General Rojo, Chief of the Government General Staff, broadcast to all Spaniards in the loyalist and rebel zones a memorable statement :

All the Spanish people have determined to hold up your offensive. You may yet, by force of material, tear away from it some territory, but you will not conquer it, for liberal Spain cannot perish. Even if you crush her, you may be sure that from her razed towns and from the bones of her dead there will arise, even in your own ranks, this ideal of liberty and independence, fertilised by the blood of our warriors. He conquers who finally conquers. You can defeat an army ; but our war will be won not so much on the fields of battle as in the conquest of the popular will. . . .

Much innocent blood has already flowed, and the road will be very long, whatever your victories or ours. While the liberty and independence of Spain are at stake our duty is clear : the crucifix which still hangs above our beds holds us to it ; and our children, whose look of terror from the explosion of Italian bombs is ineffaceably fixed in our minds, are always before us. Spanish women, prostituted by the invasion, cities destroyed and fields ravaged by the barbarity of your aviators, caravans of peasants fleeing from torture and death, old people queueing for a few ounces of food, so as not to perish of hunger, thanks to your blockade, imperiously demand it of us. It is a duty imposed by God, by our country and by our children. It must be performed every day, every minute, until the end—for the sake of Spain. We do not lose hope that a ray of light may in the end penetrate the blindness of your leaders. I repeat to you, that I do not ask of you either magnanimity or pardon—only a little understanding and patriotism. That should suffice to put an end to the calvary of Spain.

In December 1936 I, along with other Members of Parliament who were in Madrid, lunched at the War Ministry with General Rojo, then a captain and chief assistant to General Miaja ; a quiet man, asked why as a regular army officer he was organising the defence of Madrid, he replied that he had taken the oath to the Spanish Government and saw no reason why he should break it. His wife and children have been in the hands of the insurgents since the outbreak of the war. A Catholic, wearing a cross under his tunic, he represents an enlightened point of view, too rarely found amongst Spanish professional soldiers. To-day he is at his post again in Central Spain.

General Rojo's broadcast was directed to Spaniards whether in Government territory or under insurgent rule. A very moving appeal to all Spaniards to unite against the foreigners who were devastating their country, an appeal which is in keeping with Dr. Negrin's policy, in which he has made it clear on several occasions during the autumn and winter that if General Franco would forgo the assistance of foreigners in the same way as the Spanish Government had done by repatriating their foreign volunteers, he was confident that peace could be established by Spaniards dealing direct with Spaniards. Recently Dr. Negrin has laid down three conditions upon which peace could be obtained :

1. The independence of Spain should be guaranteed free of all foreign interference.
2. The Spanish people should be allowed to choose their own régime and destiny.
3. There should be no reprisals after the war.

In offering peace on these terms, the Spanish Government are in no way departing from the policy which they have pursued in the past. To disillusioned democrats in other countries it may seem extraordinary that the Spanish people have been prepared to suffer hardships far greater than those involved for most of the combatants in the Great War, for the ideals of independence and democratic progress, which fired our fathers and grandfathers, seem cold to many to-day. Both Mr. Eden and Mr. Winston Churchill have observed that Spanish democracy has become increasingly moderate during the course of the war. Those who have visited Spain, whether they went out Liberal, Socialist or Conservative, have usually returned fired by something of the spirit which has characterised the Republic fighting against overwhelming odds. Mr. Michael Weaver, a Conservative who travelled on both sides in Spain, wrote on his return :

Having seen this spirit, I cannot believe that the Republic will ever surrender. I can only hope that if the Nationalist Government continues to bomb civilians, they will lose the sympathy of the world as they have lost mine.

The tens of thousands of refugees on the French frontier represent the wreck of all that a free Catalonia might have



stood for. Perhaps it is true that they were unwise in spending so much time and energy building schools instead of fortifications, but they believe in education, and believe that ignorance is their greatest enemy. As General Franco captures villages, his troops burn the village library and shoot the teachers. While Government Spain has spent on education ten times what the whole of Spain spent previously, the Nationalists have closed universities and know that Moors, sufficiently armed by their Italian and German friends, could effectively silence the spirit of progress which dares to challenge the medieval poverty, ignorance and corrupt inefficiency of the old régime. English observers in Madrid have been amazed at the risks that workers took, risks to their own lives, to save the art treasures of their ancient civilisation from the wanton bomber. Señor del Vayo found time in January at Geneva to carry out a plan he had long considered, to hand over to the safe keeping of the League of Nations some of the best pictures of Spain's heritage. Was there ever such a flight of peasants with their goats and children, disarmed international volunteers, intellectuals with their pictures?

This flight of defeated humanity pursued to the very frontiers of France by the pitiless bombers of the Dictators is a warning to democrats everywhere. *Il Telegrafo* (Count Ciano's newspaper) on January 17th wrote as follows:

It is true that the desire to fight the Red Menace provided the first motive for the Italian volunteers in Spain, but those who stop to think about the Spanish situation will not take long to realise that the reason springing from an ideological opposition is accompanied by all the reasons based on the necessity of opposing French imperialism in the Peninsula. As regards Spain, Italy has direct interests absolutely opposed to those of France.

While *Il Tevere* on January 27th adds:

It is a moral and also a strategic defeat for France. . . . Now thanks to the Italian navy, not a single French soldier will be able to cross the Mediterranean. . . . It needs only a slight pressure on the Alps and Rhine and a united and fundamental pressure on the Pyrenees to force her to a reasonable attitude.

The crime for which the Spanish people have suffered so much is to have opposed German and Italian imperial ambitions. To Italians the capture of Barcelona is not represented as

a liberation of Spaniards from an undesirable social system, but as

Franco triumphs, Mussolini and Italy triumph. France bites the dust and must pay the price of her defeat. Once again she has three frontiers.

Conservative statesmen have repeated again and again Mr. Eden's original phrase that the territorial integrity of Spain and her possessions was a vital British interest. What they have fatally overlooked is that a militant National Spain, armed, organised, and exploited by Hitler and Mussolini, is perhaps a more serious menace to the Western democracies than any mere transference in the nineteenth-century style of territory from one country to another.

Correspondents in Catalonia during the last stages of General Franco's offensive against Barcelona reported that he was using munitions of Czech origin. One victory for the Dictators in Europe leads to another. Last autumn while the democratic forces of Europe were bending all their energies on preventing the British Government from granting General Franco belligerent rights, the Dictators were accumulating in Spain sufficient supplies for an offensive which must overwhelm Catalonia. Meanwhile the British Government are making feverish attempts to win the goodwill of General Franco. We have assisted him to obtain possession of the strongest naval base, Port Mahon in Minorca, remaining in the Mediterranean. Our Government is doubtless proffering him financial assistance to make good the devastation worked by his German and Italian masters. General Franco is indeed a fortunate man. The Dictators lavish upon him their arms, and the British Government without arms to spare can offer him the money which his other friends have not. But just as our mediation at Minorca was interrupted by the arrival of Italian bombers, the Germans and Italians, entrenched economically, politically and militarily in Spain, will have the last word. Franco may accept our money and will proceed to discuss the question of Gibraltar with the German and Italian ambassadors.

The Spanish Government has returned to Central Spain. Dr. Negrin has offered peace on terms which must appear just to democrats wherever they are found, but General Franco having refused them, the Spanish people will fight on.

From many platforms in many democratic countries we have insisted that the Spanish people are fighting our battle. The treachery of our democratic Governments in face of the ruthless dishonesty of the Dictators is enough to make us doubt what the future may be for democracy anywhere in Europe. Perhaps the indomitable courage of Spaniards may set us all an example :

Meanwhile, comrades of rebel Spain, know that the tumult of your offensive does not stun us ; that your war machines do not intimidate us ; nor yet the swaggering of generals giving the Fascist salute to Mussolini on the shores of Mare Nostrum, in order to announce to his starving subjects the conquest of a new promised land.

We shall continue to await you at our post, for such is our duty.

It is not only General Rojo who awaits the enemy at his post, but democracy everywhere watches impotently, fearing where the next blow may fall, and who is to be the next victim. For who knows whose turn it will be next to resist, as Spain is resisting, the designs of totalitarianism ? We might ask ourselves why Germany and Italy lent this support to General Franco. Was it simply on account of political sympathy, or was it to undertake what is called an ideological crusade ? No indeed ! It was in the main to upset the present *status quo*, to further the growing Italian hegemony in the Mediterranean, and in no small measure to destroy the spirit of progress inherent in the Republic. And the Spanish people have dared and challenged the force of the might of the Dictators !

The President of the Republic, Manuel Azaña, has said—though strangely out of place it may seem in these days of international gangsterism—that what matters is to be in the right, and when one is, to know how to defend that right. The Spanish Republicans have that right, and the will and spirit to defend it, but what of those Spaniards who have favoured and perhaps profited by the foreign invasion ? How do they console themselves for the grief of Spaniards when they see their cities destroyed, and thousands of their countrymen killed by foreign arms, or driven from their homes and country ? No nation can live in shame, or, having lost her honour, as Nationalist Spain has, and sacrificed her freedom, has the right to the respect of the rest of the world. How can

they describe as triumph the spectacle of their population decimated, famous cities and villages wiped out, the nation's heritage transformed into smoke, hate swollen into malignity, the means of labour lost, and their country mortgaged for three generations ?

For almost three years the people of the Republic have carried on this war because it was being waged against them. They would not tolerate despotism of any man, group or a foreign power. This is even more true to-day. It is not a question of territory lost or gained, or military victories, but of the independent sovereignty and freedom of a whole nation. This constitutes the undeniable greatness of the Spanish Army, which is to-day, indeed, a nation in arms. They carry on now because their cause, however Spanish, is that of the whole democratic world, the cause of peace and free men. "We are," says Azaña, "sons of the same sun, and tributaries of the same river." This is our cause !

We cannot abandon it at this very critical moment. Or does the intellectual and spiritual future of democracy in Europe mean nothing to us ? Like most ordinary people I passionately desire peace, for ourselves and for Spain. But the Spanish people must be allowed to achieve their peace. For with a peace based on these three points of Señor Negrin, on freedom and human dignity, who knows but it will be an effective brake on the downward slide of democracy in Europe.

WILFRID ROBERTS.

## THE SUEZ CANAL.

NO discussion of the present management and future ownership of the Suez Canal is complete which does not involve a close comparison between it and the Panama Canal. Both have changed the course of the world's trade: both have stormy diplomatic histories and are of first-rate strategical significance. The Suez Canal is a hundred miles long and runs at sea-level: the Panama Canal is half as long and has three locks at each end. The Suez Canal cost originally £30 millions, the Panama Canal £75 million, and the annual cost of maintenance and operation is also higher. The Suez Canal is unfortified and, by Treaty, open in peace and in war to the commercial and fighting ships of all nations, if they can reach it. The Panama Canal is in a fortified zone under United States control, an *enclave* in the territory of the Republic of Panama, itself a creation of Theodore Roosevelt, as a necessary preliminary, in his judgment, to the building of the Canal.

The Suez Canal is owned by a commercial company with its *siège social* in Paris, controlled by a Board of thirty-two Directors who divide 2 per cent. of the net profits between them, on behalf of shareholders who for the past three years have received a dividend of 50 per cent. on their shares and have not received less than 25 per cent. for half a century. The Panama Canal is owned by the United States Government, and governed by an official nominated by the President, whose salary (10,000 dollars) is much less than that of any one of the Directors of the Suez Canal and far less than that received by a number of high officials of the Suez Canal Company: it makes no profit, but incurs no losses.

The Suez Canal zone is subject to Egyptian law: the Panama Canal zone to American law. The Suez Canal Company has no powers in the Canal zone other than are essential for operating purposes: the Governor of the Panama Canal is supreme in all respects within the Canal zone. The Suez Canal dues compare very unfavourably with those of the Panama Canal. Comparison is difficult, for different systems of measurement are applied in calculating tolls, but the difference per ton of cargo carried and per net ton of shipping passing is from 20 per cent. to 30 per cent. higher in the case of the Suez Canal. The difference has sufficed to divert a

considerable volume of tonnage to the Panama Canal, where refuelling is cheaper than at Port Said: it constitutes a definite and often heavy handicap to British traders in the Far East in so far as they are in competition with American houses.

Canal and harbour dues are far more important items in shipping management than formerly, for running expenses have been greatly reduced both per day at sea and per mile, though the all-important factor is still the amount of available cargo, and on the Panama Canal route harbour dues figure less heavily than on the routes served by the Suez Canal. These comparisons are important because, for many ports, the two canals are in close competition. From London to Sydney the Suez Canal route is shorter by 28 marine miles, from New York to Hong Kong by 219, to Manila by 218, to Fremantle by 593. From London to Wellington, N.Z., the Panama Canal route is shorter by 1,077 miles, from New York to Shanghai by 1,091 miles.

These facts are, or should be, part of the background of any dispassionate examination of the demand, long in the background but never actually formulated, of certain maritime powers for a re-examination of the international status and commercial management of the Suez Canal. Before examining these demands British students of affairs will do well to bear in mind a few salient facts. First and foremost is the justifiable *amour propre* of the French people in all that concerns the Canal. It is the creation of a great Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps, whose last years were saddened by his failure to repeat his triumph in the Isthmus of Panama. It was built by French and Egyptian capital. But for Said Pasha's noble and generous support (he subscribed sixty million francs) the Suez Canal Company could not have gone to allotment. It was started against the advice of the best British engineers and completed in spite of the strenuous opposition of British statesmen. The British press vied with Parliament in proclaiming its impracticability whilst denouncing its dangers alike to Turkish suzerainty in Egypt and British predominance in the Indian Ocean. Whilst 46 per cent. of the shares, bought by Disraeli from the Khedive Ismail Pasha, the successor to Said Pasha, are in the hands of the British Treasury, almost all the remainder are held by French citizens. The British shares carry next to no voting rights, for the Articles of

Association provide that twenty-five shares give the right to a vote, but no shareholder may have more than ten votes. The management of the Canal is almost exclusively French, so far as it is not Egyptian and, whilst it has been criticised, not without justice, as extravagant, is unquestionably efficient.

Nor should Egyptian *amour propre* be underestimated. In less than thirty years' time the Canal, which was opened in 1869, will become the property of the Egyptian Government and people, who have never allowed themselves to forget that it was made with the (often forced) labour of their hands, and largely paid for, through the Viceroy's original investment, with their money. They will never accept any arrangement which deprives them of some at least of the fruits of the almost accidental location in their territory of this other great isthmus between two continental land masses. They are not willing to contemplate the separation of the canal zone from Egypt—in the same way that the Panama Canal zone was detached from Colombia. That is perhaps why Zaghlul Pasha, when Minister of Justice, said in the General Assembly on March 16th, 1910, that when the concession expired Egypt would probably have to make the passage of the Canal free and forgo direct profits. The Egyptian Government have recently obtained the right to nominate one-third of the Board of Directors and the Canal Company has promised to provide more scope for Egyptians in the administration. The appetite thus created will certainly grow.

The third set of facts relates to the use of the Canal. On the average of the past three years British shipping has been 46 per cent. of the total tonnage passing through the Canal, Italian 17 per cent., German 9 per cent., Dutch 7 per cent., and French 5 per cent. The proportion of non-British shipping is likely to increase as the years pass. For Italian shipping, so far as it is destined for Ethiopia, Canal dues represent a far larger proportion of gross costs than is the case for the shipping of any other nation. The Chairman of the Orient Steam Navigation Company stated recently (*The Times*, November 14th, 1938) that Suez Canal dues absorbed 13 per cent. of the gross revenue from passengers for the year: on some of the Company's ships it was 30 per cent., in one case 47½ per cent. of gross earnings on a six weeks' trip. Tank steamers, which form a large proportion of the British

and Dutch traffic, may go through the Canal in ballast in one direction, a cargo ship sometimes, a passenger or troopship never, and Italian, like British ships, are largely in these latter categories.

The Statutes of the Canal Company require that the Directors should be drawn from the countries principally interested in the Canal. If, as one may suppose, the word "interested" had reference to the distribution of shares, there is no legal ground of complaint in the present system of appointing Directors. Of the ten British Directors three are nominated by the Treasury; seven were originally chosen by a London Committee to represent merchants and ship-owners. When one of the seven dies the survivors nominate his successor. The arrangement is unique, and anomalous, for they have no real claim to sit except the Treasury shareholding and whatever else they represent, they do not represent the Treasury. India, the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand, the Colonies, Protectorates and mandated territory of Tanganyika are interested in the Canal, but they have no representation.

The remaining Directors, save one representative of Holland and one Egyptian, are French, but as Egyptian representation is gradually increased to one-third of the whole Board, the number of French, (but not, it appears, of British) Directors will be reduced. In present circumstances there is little room for Directors representing other than French, Egyptian or British interests save by reducing the number of British or Egyptian Directors. But in no case would this really help the cause of reform, for the new Directors would be in a small minority and the British shareholding of 353,504 shares out of 800,000, entitles British subjects to almost as large a representation on the Board as French citizens.

So much for the facts. What are the desiderata of Italy, backed, we may suppose, by Germany and supported, perhaps, by one or more of the other Mediterranean Powers. They are of three kinds—commercial, political and strategic. On commercial grounds Italy desires a drastic reduction of dues: she points to the dividends of 50 per cent., to great salaries allowed to Directors and officials and to reports of very lavish expenditure in many directions. Is it fair, ask her spokesmen, to allow an international highway to remain under the control of a commercial company, which sits astride it and

levies a toll, over and above expenses, which handicaps the trade of all Europe in competition with that of Japan in Eastern markets and takes a toll of equivalent to 10 per cent. or more *ad valorem* on Ethiopian produce? (We have heard much the same complaint recently from shippers of sisal and other low-priced goods from our East African ports.) It is true that very large sums have been spent on extension and improvements. It cost £30 millions to build; since then £26 millions have been spent on capital account, but very liberal provision has been made for amortisation, and the concession still has thirty years to run.

On political grounds it may be assumed that Italy, as a signatory of the International Convention of 1888, desires some overt and practical evidence as to the validity of that document, which provided that the Canal should be open to the ships of all nations, including ships of war at all times and in any circumstances. This is no new thesis. It was energetically maintained by Lord Derby in 1877 when he warned Russia that neither Turkey nor Russia would be allowed to blockade or invest the Canal. It was upheld when the Russian Baltic Squadron passed through the Canal in 1904 in order to engage Admiral Togo's fleet. It is so well established that it should not be difficult to reaffirm it, but the claim put forward in this country in 1935, and frequently since then, that Britain should have used her position in Egypt to induce the Egyptian Government to require the Canal Company to deny passage in 1935 to Italian vessels has made it desirable, from the Italian point of view, to reaffirm the freedom of the Canal in peace and in war.

Nor need we hesitate to do so. Speaking in the House of Commons on July 23rd, 1883, Mr. Gladstone said:

We will not be parties to employing influence which may attach to our temporary and exceptional position in Egypt, for the purpose of securing any abatement of any right lawfully enjoyed. . . . We cannot undertake to do any act inconsistent with the acknowledgment that the Canal has been made for the benefit of all nations at large, and that the rights connected with it are of common European interest.

It is important to bear in mind that the Canal has never been "neutralised." That status requires an international agreement: the Convention of 1888 "universalised" it. As

Egypt's ally, British troops hold certain defensive positions in that country, but their presence does not affect the validity of the International Convention of 1888.

As a Mediterranean Power, with a large (and law-abiding) resident Italian population it is clearly to the interest of Egypt to meet Italian desiderata so far as is possible without affecting her independence and her Treaty obligations. There are difficulties, but they are not insoluble. The strategic position, from the Italian point of view, of the Suez Canal is that it is one, but only one, of several vantage points held *de facto* by or for Britain. Italy's strategic ambitions are decided by and dependent upon her political attitude. If the Canal is in the future as in the past to be a free corridor for all belligerents this is presumably all she requires. She may be pardoned for having her doubts. France repeatedly assured Signor Crispi that in no circumstances would Bizerta, at the narrowest point of the Mediterranean, be fortified. But fortified it was within a few years of the occupation of Tunis and, though we were alarmed ourselves,\* we did not protest. The fortification of Pantellaria was a tardy reply to Bizerta.

From the British point of view it is well to remember that half of all the merchant ships lost by enemy action in the Great War were sunk in the Mediterranean, though France and Italy were our allies and all other sea-board countries except Austria and Turkey neutral. The fact cuts both ways. No one's shipping would be safe in the Mediterranean in time of war. It is unlikely that the ships of one country would be safer than those of another. The issue would be decided at sea: the "possession" of Palestine and the existence of British troops in Egypt would not substantially affect the naval position.

On what lines can an agreed and lasting settlement be sought? Not, certainly, in seeking to maintain the present situation until, by efflux of time, the concession expires in 1968. Not by a petty redistribution of shares or otiose directorships. Not, I hope, by a vague formula which hides the real difficulty and defers a settlement for a time, with the certainty that it will become more difficult to achieve.

The key to the puzzle is in Egyptian hands, but it can be used only if they, the French and the British Governments

\* *British Documents on the War*. Vol. VII, page 385.

agree. They could do now what should have been done long ago by the League under Article XIX—summon an International Conference—as in 1873 when tonnage rates were at issue—and with Anglo-French concurrence take over the Canal as a responsibility of the territorial power, buy out the shareholders and proceed to manage the Canal, with the assistance of the existing highly efficient staff, as a Public Utility, under the general control of an International Advisory Board. This is but to revert to a proposal made by Lord Farrer at the Board of Trade, fifty years ago, when he suggested that the Canal should be placed under a European Commission for purposes of management. “Complications and difficulties,” he wrote, “will be endless, so long as this great highway of nations remains in the hands of a private company.” Only the Sublime Porte, and Mr. Gladstone, stood in the way of this solution.

The Suez Canal Company's place, alternatively, could be taken by a new Corporation in which the Egyptian Government would have a controlling interest, subject to a self-denying ordinance as to profits, and to the vesting of administrative responsibility in an International Board. Zaghul Pasha, indeed, when Minister of Justice, said in the General Assembly on March 16th, 1910, that when the Canal reverted to her, Egypt would probably be forced to make the passage of the Canal free and to forgo any direct profit from ownership. That was the policy adopted in the case of the Panama Canal by the United States of America and it has been amply rewarded.

Such a policy will entail a financial loss to someone, represented roughly by the difference between the present value of the shares and their par value, *less* the reserves of the Company, which are very extensive, and *less* the sum payable by the Egyptian Government to the Company under Article X in respect of “*materiel et objets mobiliers*.” The total sum to be made good might be as much as £15 million—but this is a mere guess. It would be a cheap contribution to international justice. The time has passed when a commercial company, however efficient, can be allowed to sit astride an international highway and levy tolls, regardless of the commercial consequences and of the political repercussions of its action. The greatest single avoidable handicap of the trade of Europe in Eastern waters, as compared with

that of Eastern manufacturers, is the high level of canal dues.

In any case, dues should be calculated in future on a basis of services rendered, viz. of draft, or of cargo carried, or of both. The present system is unduly onerous on passenger and on lightly laden ships. The problem is thorny, and discussions must of necessity reveal many divergent claims and interests, but that is all the more reason why it should be tackled and not deferred till those concerned can bear *nec mala, nec remedia*—neither the ills, nor the cure.

The government of the world, said Disraeli in the House of Commons on February 9th, 1876, with reference to complaints then being made against the Canal Company,

is not a mere alternation between abstract right and overwhelming force. . . . The world is governed by conciliation, compromise, influence, varied interests, the recognition of the rights of others, coupled with the assertion of one's own, and, in addition, a general conviction, resulting from explanation and good understanding, that it is for the interest of all parties that matters should be conducted in a satisfactory and peaceful manner.

That was said six years after the Franco-Prussian War, two years before the Congress of Vienna: it doubtless seemed as optimistic to his hearers as it would seem to us to-day. But the event justified his hopes; the Congress of Vienna put an end to war on European soil for thirty-six years.

De Lesseps above all Frenchmen of his generation sought settlement by agreement: the Canal meant more to him than profits. He was not a philanthropist, but he worked single-mindedly for his fellow-men. Were he living to-day I believe that he would be foremost in seeking such a solution as I have outlined, and I believe he would succeed.

ARNOLD WILSON.

## THE NEXT STAGE IN CHINA.

WANG CHING-WEI'S declaration in favour of acceptance of Japan's peace terms, and his expulsion from the Kuomintang, follows logically upon the report from the Associated Press correspondent in Kweilin (Kwangsi) on December 14th to the effect that Chiang Kai-shek was about to "pure the government of defeatist elements" as a preliminary to embarking on the second phase of the war: "guerrilla tactics on Japanese forces throughout occupied territory." This statement, described as a "swing towards the tactics of the Chinese Communists," can only signify the Generalissimo's definite decision to continue the war in spite of the loss of Hankow and Canton. The departure of Wang Ching-wei appears, therefore, to mark a real split between the majority of the Kuomintang and the defeatist minority. Rumours were rife in Hankow all last summer and autumn of secret negotiations in Hong Kong or Shanghai between emissaries of the Wang Ching-wei "peace group" and the Japanese. When one asked why Wang Ching-wei (and the Minister of War, who was said to belong to the same group) were kept in office although the Generalissimo knew of their treachery, one was told that it was considered they could do less harm inside, than outside, the Government. Others, more cynical, said that they were being retained on account of their possible usefulness later should Chiang Kai-shek decide to negotiate with the Japanese.

As early as last July, at the People's Political Congress, a member of the Wang Ching-wei group openly advocated a reorientation of China's policy towards friendship with Germany and Italy. His declaration on December 31st, 1938, that China should make peace with Japan and join the "anti-Comintern" bloc means only that he has come out into the open. This may be the result of his having been turned out of the Government as part of the purge of "defeatist elements," or he may have left it in an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Generalissimo. His defection would be more serious if anyone in China believed, as Wang Ching-wei professes to believe, that Japan "only demands freedom to do business in China and economic co-operation." As it is, his departure from the Kuomintang Government should strengthen, not weaken, the forces of national resistance in China. The retention for

so long as Chairman of the Central Political Council and as Vice-President of the Kuomintang of a man who was known to Chinese and Japanese alike as in favour of surrender was a source of weakness to the Chinese.

Chiang Kai-shek's strength, although it has also been a source of weakness, is that he rides upon the support of the most diverse social elements and political groups. There is probably no one in any of the factions who does not regard him as the only possible national leader. This applies to Communists and National Salvationists on the Left, and to the so-called "C.C. clique" of reactionaries led by Chen Li-Fu (Minister of Education) and his brother on the Right. It applies to the army officers as a whole. It applies to Generals Li-Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, the famous Kwangsi generals who until 1936 maintained complete independence in their south-western province. It applies even to the Cantonese in spite of their resentment at the neglect of Canton's defences. Even Wang Ching-wei, whom I interviewed in Hankow at the end of July, denied that he was in favour of peace, "especially since Prince Konoye's declaration of January 1938." It was obvious that he meant at least until the Japanese ceased to demand the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek, and could be interpreted as an assurance of his personal loyalty to the Generalissimo.

Nevertheless Wang Ching-wei, an opportunist in politics, has apparently never given up the dream of himself becoming the leading figure in China. Power in China, however, cannot be grasped by men who have no armies behind them. Hence Wang Ching-wei could only hope to oust the Generalissimo if he could gain the support of someone with an army. This would explain his reported conspiracy to estrange from Chiang Kai-shek the Governor of Yunnan Province, who controls the Burma route into China. This is but the final example of the manner in which during the past year Wang Ching-wei, although he professes himself a liberal, has joined hands, or attempted to join hands, with the most backward and disruptive forces in China. His "peace group" has tended to act in co-operation with the reactionary "C.C. clique," which, whilst determined to prosecute the war, still regards the Communists as enemies and attempts to suppress them. One of its members, the Pacification Commissioner of Shensi, stated last August at Sian, that although on the



"external front" the main enemy was Japan, on the "internal front" the Communists were the enemy. Wang Ching-wei's bitter opposition to the Communists was on account of the latter's unwavering determination to continue fighting Japan at any cost. There was always a danger that this joint stand at home against the Communists by the "peace group" and the "C.C. clique" might be extended to the "external front," if the loss of wealth and revenue through Japan's capture of all the important towns and ports in China should cause the men of wealth to wish to surrender on Japan's terms; or if the further prosecution of the war should require greater reliance on guerrilla tactics and wider scope for the Communists and their allies the youth organisations, the National Salvationists and others. Wang Ching-wei's expulsion appears to mark the refusal of the extreme Right in China to follow his line of surrender and compromise with Japan. For if the "C.C. clique," which still has a powerful grip on the party machine, had supported Wang the latter would in all probability still be in the Government. It is very probable that the decision of the United States and Britain to give credits to China provided just the necessary encouragement to the vacillating elements to continue the war, and so helped at a critical juncture to preserve the unity of China.

It would be a mistake to attempt to interpret recent events as the result of a conflict on clear-cut political or social issues. Indeed the essential difficulty in any appraisal of the political situation in China is that well-defined economic and social interests, and policies based upon them, are not to be distinguished. Individual loyalties, family connections and personal striving for power all play an important part. There are cliques and groups of Kuomintang leaders and high officials connected with certain banking, merchant and industrial interests. There are others connected with the dying feudal elements in society, such as quasi-independent provincial governors and armies not far removed from the old war-lord type, which the Central Government is not yet strong enough to control absolutely. But one cannot say that any faction represents a definite class interest. In China it is still the high official rather than the capitalist who can accumulate wealth, and official favour rather than enterprise which can enrich the capitalist. The bureaucrat may, and frequently does, become a capitalist; the point is that the

road to wealth is through office rather than through industrial trading, or even banking activity.

In this respect there is a marked resemblance to Japan, where there is the same close connection between the bureaucrat and the bankers and merchants, and where there is a similar absence of formulated political principles. In both countries it is the consequence of the abrupt transition from a medieval to a capitalist society, and the consequent absence of an independent middle class to lead the struggle against privilege, corruption and inefficiency in the local and central government. In China, however, fighting a war of national liberation, there is far more hope for the eventual emergence of some kind of democratic state. Thought at least is free and the country hums with discussion and criticism of the authorities. There has never been a hereditary military aristocracy, and China's very weakness—the old contempt for the soldier—is a hindrance to the establishment of a purely military dictatorship such as the officers trained in the military academies are in favour of.

There are in China to-day two strongly marked opposing tendencies: one towards a purely military dictatorship, the other towards some kind of democratic state. So long as the war was one of massed armies and the Chinese were fighting a positional defensive war with imported armaments the former tendency was perhaps strongest. But even so the war was to some extent acting as a forcing-house with regard to the grant of popular rights and liberties. Without the war there would be no such effort as at present to eliminate corruption and oppression of the people by officials. In Kiangsi, in the war zone, for instance, I found that labour on the roads and military works was being paid for, whereas previously it was forced. Landowners who in the past had always successfully avoided the payment of taxes are now being forced to pay them. The common soldiers hitherto regarded as little better than serfs are gradually being treated more as human beings.

Progress has been slow. There has been failure to educate, train and rouse the mass of the people except in the north-west, in Kwangsi and to a certain extent in Kwantung. Hence the stronger and stronger demand for what is termed "mobilisation of the people." This has been the burning issue in China for the past year. It is demanded, not only by the various Left groups, but by the Kwangsi generals,

Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, who have carried through a large measure of agrarian and administrative reform in their south-western province, and appear to have awakened the people there to as full a national consciousness as prevails in the north-west where the Communists have the strongest influence. Called by some China's National Socialists before the war, their reforms have been from above along authoritarian lines, but there is little essential difference between their policies and that of the Chinese Communists now that the latter no longer "liquidate landowners" nor "propagate class war." In territories under the control of both, rents and rates of interest are reduced, corrupt and inefficient magistrates are eliminated and intensive nationalist propaganda is undertaken. When I pointed this out to General Li Tsung-jen in an interview, and asked why they could not join forces to press for the "mobilisation of the people," he smiled and said that the Communists were now imitating them, but that the latter had not in the past placed the national interest first. Although he did not commit himself I got a distinct impression that such political co-operation was a possibility in the future. It is perhaps significant that the announcement concerning guerrilla warfare was made from Kwangsi province.

By "mobilisation of the people" is meant concentration of all moral and material resources upon the prosecution of the war, and the more equal distribution of burdens. Obviously it is a task of colossal magnitude and difficulty in as backward a country as China. Obviously also it entails far-reaching economic and administrative reforms. Without these the whole people, in particular the peasants, cannot be expected to be actively conscious that this war is *their* affair, and the soldiers *their* defenders. It is, of course, true that without this the savagery of the Japanese troops and the air raids all over China have made even the poorest and most oppressed of China's millions aware of Japan as the greatest enemy, and true also that it is easier to fight a defensive war with a discontented peasantry than to fight a war of aggression. So long as the war remained mainly one of positional defensive tactics—which means so long as arms could be imported with comparative ease and not all the main cities and ports had been lost to Japan—"mobilisation of the people" was not so vitally necessary as now. The "pure militarists" who never saw the necessity could maintain their ascendancy. But

to-day, if mobile warfare and guerrilla tactics on a large scale are to become the order of the day, it is imperative to ensure the willing and enthusiastic co-operation of the peasant and the coolie; for espionage work, for carrying and caring for the wounded, for the feeding and sheltering of the troops. How can this be done unless they are given "a stake in the country"?

The 8th Route Army and the partisans in the north have demonstrated that to-day a comparatively small measure of agrarian reform is all that is necessary to induce the peasants to help the troops in every way within their power. They have also proved that the sacrifices demanded of the possessing classes need not be so great as to throw them into the arms of the Japanese invaders.

If there were no vivid memories of twelve years ago perhaps Chiang Kai-shek and his henchmen would have less fear of the masses. To-day a situation is arising in which he will have the choice between trusting more to the people or losing the war. The grafters, the lazy, the inefficient and the vested reactionary rural interests have naturally opposed vitally necessary reforms so long as it was at all possible to avoid them. A minority may continue to oppose them even at the cost of national extinction. The defection of these from the Kuomintang Government will not weaken it. The officers of Chiang Kai-shek's own army have been too purely military-minded to have seen the necessity for the "mobilisation of the people" at least until now. But Chiang Kai-shek has now declared (according to the Associated Press report already referred to) that "arousing the masses is more important than battles"; he has reshuffled the military commands at a conference held in Kwangsi in December, and has declared that his new slogan means the organisation of farm unions, mass education, and the mobilisation of guerrilla armies in the Yangtze valley similar to those of the Communists in the north.

It must again be emphasised that the situation has radically changed since the loss of the Wuhan cities and of Canton. Prior to this, failure to harness all the wealth, energy, skill and enthusiasm of the nation to the war machine, was not so fatal to China's chances of survival. Now it is an imperative necessity, and those leaders who would, at any cost, avoid its uncertainties and risks may break away and join the Japanese

or pass into retirement. Similarly the faint-hearted who do not believe that any measures can save China and would therefore stop the war before millions more have been massacred or died of starvation and exposure.

The belief that China can, mainly by a utilisation of her own resources, wear Japan down and so ultimately recover the territories lost, is held by the best elements in the country, and shared, I believe, by most foreign observers who have seen the war at close quarters. But this can only be the outcome if the rich are severely taxed, not merely asked to subscribe to loans or to give gold to the State; if officials notorious for corruption are dismissed; if the industrialist and the merchant are forced to utilise their capital as the Government directs in developing new industries or transplanting their machinery to new places. There is some prospect now of China obtaining some foreign capital for the development of new mineral resources in the west, for the establishment of more arsenals and for the development of communications and the purchase of trucks.

Not only this. The educated as well as the poor and the ignorant will have to be pressed into war service. The war is still regarded by most Chinese as the job of the army, and soldiers are expected to be recruited almost exclusively from the peasantry. Young men who are literate, and in general the men of the lower middle, as well as of the middle and upper classes, do not enlist in the army and are not conscripted. Some students go to the officers' training schools, but the avowed policy of the Education Minister, Chen Li-fu, has been to send students to the safe western provinces to study, and in general to preserve the educated for the future work of reconstruction. This policy has something to be said for it if carried out on a limited scale, but it has meant that, generally speaking, the majority of men who are educated feel themselves under no obligation to do any dangerous or arduous war service. This is not only a direct military drawback to China in these days of scientific modern armaments and communications. It has a most detrimental effect on the attitude to the army of the city dwellers. The army is still conceived of by many Chinese as one of peasants and coolies. This largely explains the appalling indifference to the sufferings of the wounded. Dr. Robert Lim, head of the Chinese Red Cross Medical Commission, has managed, in co-operation

with General Lou Chi-teh of the Army Medical Service, to get educated boys to come and be trained in first aid and go up to the front, and to induce some Chinese surgeons and doctors to volunteer for war service. There are other men amongst the most highly educated people in China who have set their hands to tasks in this war of appalling difficulty and danger. In the territories occupied by Japan all classes have joined the guerrillas. But the idea that the educated do not need to play an active rôle in the war dies hard, and the reactionary elements in the Kuomintang have discouraged, or failed to provide opportunities, for them to do anything much besides talking and writing patriotically, or occupying office jobs.

If the Chinese army is to be a part of, instead of apart from, the nation, and if China is to continue to fight under her present handicaps and ultimately defeat Japan, the educated and the wealthy will have to show the same self-sacrificing spirit, tenacity and heroism as the common soldier, who is the real hero of this war.

To-day China appears to have come to the parting of the ways. There are at least indications that Chiang Kai-shek has determined to stake all upon that "mobilisation of the people" which alone, unless foreign aid is forthcoming, can save the Chinese people. It is not as simple a decision as some protagonists of the Left make out. The risks are incalculable. Can it be done without a split in the Kuomintang which would lead other, and more important, elements in the Kuomintang to follow Wang Ching-wei? Can China hold together if the war becomes one of mobile warfare by small units which will naturally tend to become semi-independent? If the national consciousness of the Chinese is sufficiently awakened the danger of a break-up into the provincial régimes of the past, or of the degeneration of guerrillas into bandits, will not be great. Chiang Kai-shek has all along kept some of his best divisions in the rear, for possible future use for the preservation of Chinese unity, and also against the danger of social revolution. If he has decided to throw his weight on the side of the social reforming elements, the second danger may disappear. As regards the danger from the forces of feudal reaction and separatism he will, no doubt, continue to preserve the flower of his own troops to cope with such disruptive tendencies.

FREDA UTLEY.

## THE RÔLE OF ROUMANIA.

THE Eastern Question, which for many decades played such an important rôle in European politics, has come to the fore again, and soon Roumania may find herself in the key position for a new solution of that troublesome problem. The surrender of Czecho-Slovakia by the Western Powers to Nazi control broke the effective barrier which she had formed against the German *Drang nach Osten*. The way in which the Munich agreement has been implemented has made the South-Eastern countries fear that France and Britain have renounced any active interest in their future. Whether this conclusion has been too hastily drawn only the future will tell. So far, it has become clear that Italy is neither able nor willing to defend the influence which for many years she used to wield in the Danube basin. Thus the main consequence of the Munich agreement and of what followed in its wake has been that two of the European Powers resigned themselves to play only a secondary rôle in South-Eastern Europe, Italy being outplayed by Germany, and France having allowed her system of alliances to be disrupted. In these circumstances King Carol II of Roumania paid his long-planned visit to London.

The splendid welcome given to the royal visitor by Great Britain, where only a few years ago he had to live an exile's none too happy life, could not conceal the fact that he did not succeed in eliciting the support he had hoped for. Roumania wanted a British loan for economic development and armaments in order to strengthen herself against Germany's drive eastwards. Moreover, he was apparently striving for a guarantee of his frontiers by Britain. If King Carol, so soon after the Munich agreement, entertained hopes of this nature he must obviously have been of opinion that Britain was interested to secure Roumania's assistance for the defence of the roads leading towards areas of vital concern to the British Empire which are accessible via the Lower Danube and the Black Sea. So far, these hopes have not been fulfilled. On his way home he paid Herr Hitler a visit that originally had not been planned, and the trade negotiations with Germany which had been broken off at the time of the London visit were resumed by Roumania. Comments of the British Press made it clear that Britain was not prepared to "attempt to stem

the German drive to the South-East by bolstering up Balkan resistance except so far as Turkey is concerned," and that only the passage of the Straits into the Black Sea was "the point at which she would put her foot down and say, Thus far and no farther."

With the remarkable exception of Gladstone, British policy all through the nineteenth century has hesitated to stand up for a solution of the Eastern Question along the lines of the principle of nationality. It was Napoleon III who actively supported the claims of the rising Roumanian middle classes for independence and quite correctly J. Bratianu, in his *Mémoire sur l'Autriche dans la Question d'Orient*, wrote of France as "the incarnate principle of nationality." Palmerston, in 1856, spoke of the United Principalities as "being a field for Russian intrigue and not a barrier against Russia"; and Lord John Russell, in 1859, expressed himself to Sir Henry Bulwer in favour of converting the Principalities into an Austrian *Sekundogenitur*.

The reasons why Great Britain co-operated at the time of the Crimean War in founding the then semi-dependent Roumanian Principalities were twofold: to obstruct Russia's advance towards the Straits and to open up the Danube area for her own trade and, still more, for the export of grain needed to feed the ever-increasing masses of Western Europe. It was, therefore, no coincidence that the Treaty of Paris (1856) established the international régime of the Danube, the *Commission Européenne du Danube* (C.E.D.) being charged with the task of making the mouth of the river navigable for sea-going ships. Last August, Britain and France agreed to renounce all their rights in the C.E.D. "not consistent with Roumania's sovereignty." This resolution clearly indicated that, since the nineteenth century, British interests in the Danube area have undergone a noticeable change. The British Isles are no longer dependent on wheat imported from the Black Sea, nor is trade with the Black Sea countries of great importance for British exports. There remains, economically, only one big interest for Britain in Roumania—capital investment in the oil industry. 3,500 million lei are invested, and about 50 per cent. of the production of the country is controlled by British capital. Britain's attitude towards Roumania is therefore shaped less by economic than by political considerations. Whether and when a situation

might arise in which the political aspect would cause Britain to commit herself in support of Roumania is open to speculation.

On the other hand, King Carol might court Russia's support against the German push towards the Black Sea. The question of Bessarabia was settled by Titulescu, when Russia agreed to respect the existing Roumanian territory in the Pact of Friendship signed in 1936. At the same time arrangements were made to improve the Roumanian railways and roads leading from Bessarabia to Transylvania in order to render it possible for Russian troops and war material to reach Czecho-Slovakia in case of the emergency foreseen by the different treaties and alliances linking together the States of Western and Eastern Europe. Although Titulescu was abruptly dropped by King Carol in August 1936, these military preparations went on. The new line between Vatra Dornei and Ilva, crossing the Carpathians in the north, has been almost completed in the meantime. In Bessarabia highways to the Russian frontier were being built, work on another railway across the Carpathians from Campulung in the Bucovina to Sighetula in Transylvania was started. All this would have been dangerous as a defence measure against Soviet Russia. In point of fact Russian aid was to be made possible in case of a German attack on Czecho-Slovakia or on Roumania herself. King Carol has never been opposed in principle to the assistance of Russia for the protection of his country, as the negotiations between the two countries at Geneva and Bucharest during the September crisis have proved.

The readiness to accept Russian support is, however, qualified. When Titulescu was dismissed he had been on the point of concluding a pact of mutual assistance with Russia. But he wanted to make it a condition that Russian troops should never enter or cross Roumanian territory without the previous consent of the Roumanian Government and should withdraw when required to do so. Last September Roumania appeared to be willing to let Russian troops cross her frontiers if Czecho-Slovakia were attacked, provided that the Western Powers guaranteed that the Russians would not remain permanently in Roumania.

Thus King Carol continues to consider Russian assistance as feasible in certain contingencies, but he is not prepared to accept it without having the backing of the Western Powers

at the same time. The implications of his attitude to Roumanian foreign policy illustrate another consequence which the Munich agreement has had for Roumania's international situation. She is bound by an alliance to Poland and by the Pact of the Balkan Entente to Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, whereas the Little Entente Pact has practically become obsolete after the disruption of Czecho-Slovakia. Up to the Czecho-Slovakian crisis, King Carol considered the military alliance with Poland as the *pièce de résistance* of his foreign policy. Recent events, however, have changed the position to a certain degree. Whereas Poland's main concern is to remain on peaceful terms with both her strong neighbours to the West and East, one may assume that she would actively resist any attack and not hesitate to accept Russian aid, if it were forthcoming, should Germany really threaten Polish independence. Roumania appears unwilling to fall back on Russia's assistance alone. Moreover, Poland has for a long time encouraged Germany to expand in other directions in order to divert her covetousness from Polish territory. Support of Germany's *Drang nach Suedosten* might become again a tactical means of saving Polish integrity. There is, therefore, a certain weakening of the ties binding together Roumania and Poland. Concomitantly, the Pact of the Balkan Entente has become more important for King Carol's foreign policy, and the Roumanian Government hopes to find assistance from the Western Powers as well.

Towards the third Great European Power, Germany, Roumania's position in these circumstances is rather delicate. As has been justly said, she runs the risk of losing everything without any chance of winning anything, whereas, in 1914, her position was the exact reverse. Germany, after the Munich agreement, is at the gates. Politically she controls Carpatho-Ruthenia as well as Hungary and has, therefore, practically though not legally a common frontier of about 250 miles with Roumania. In some respects German aims with regard to Roumania seem quite clear. The Third Reich wants a monopoly of Roumanian agricultural products and oil and, secondly, control of the Danube, including its mouth at Sulina and the port of Constantza on the Black Sea which would be linked to the river by a canal ending at Czernavoda. Her intentions with regard to the decisive question of the "nationalities," however, are as yet uncertain.

In his delicate position King Carol continues the political game which he began years ago, and which was the traditional policy of Roumania during the conflicts of the previous Eastern Question. He is manœuvring between Britain, Russia and Germany. His first choice would be co-operation with Britain. Russia's assistance he is not prepared to accept unless Britain were also on Roumania's side. His second choice would be some arrangement with Germany. Such an arrangement could be forthcoming only by accepting German control of Roumania's economic resources and some sort of political vassalage. Whether it could be brought about by King Carol without completely renouncing Roumanian national unity and his throne appears to depend on how Germany wishes to solve the problem of the "nationalities" in South-Eastern Europe. If a general war broke out before Germany could tackle the South-Eastern problem single-handed, Carol could reasonably hope to save his throne and his country without any sacrifices. That he has this possibility also in mind is proved by his serious efforts to improve his armaments.

With respect to the problem of the nationalities, it is necessary to comment briefly on the creation of Carpatho-Ruthenia in which Germany had the diplomatic support of Roumania. If it were actually used by Germany as a lever to raise the Ukrainian question Roumania would be threatened as well as Poland and Russia. There are at least 550,000 Ukrainians living within the Roumanian frontiers, i.e. in the Bucovina and in Bessarabia. The best explanation of Roumania's attitude on the question of Carpatho-Ruthenia, and at the same time one which opens an interesting vista on future possibilities, appears to be that by insisting on her will in face of the opposition of Hungary and Poland, Germany implicitly refuted the principle on which Hungarian policy has been based since the world war, namely that of the indivisibility of the country of the Crown of St. Stephen. If the Transylvanian problem came to the fore in the near future it would appear, therefore, to be an open question whether Germany would back Hungary or not, and it is not at all unlikely that she will manœuvre in such a way as to lean on Roumania and the Roumanian nationality instead of on Hungary as the Germans have done until a short time ago. In that case Carol might succeed in saving the integrity of his

kingdom, though only by granting such concessions in the economic and political field as have been outlined.

Here again the old Eastern Question comes readily into mind. The idea of solving the national question of the Roumanian people as well as the economic problems of the South-East by welding the Hapsburg Monarchy and Roumania into a political unit on federal lines has been discussed time and again. Already in the middle of the nineteenth century Jon Maiorescu evolved such a project. In 1911 Aurel Popovici, the Roumanian exile from Transylvania, discussed it with the Roumanian Minister Filipescu, offering himself to transmit it to the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Conrad tells in his memoirs that in January 1914 the Roumanian Military Attaché admitted that there was a party in Roumania which favoured the inclusion of "all lands of Roumanian tongue under their own King" within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Again in 1914 the Roumanian Minister of War, Filipescu, broached the idea that the Roumanian King should accept the same position under the Hapsburgs as that of Bavaria inside Germany, provided that Transylvania were ceded to Roumania.

The *Journal de Genève* wrote recently :

What does King Carol want ? He will certainly be tempted to choose the smallest evil. . . . If he leans on the Reich he will be able to maintain his dictatorship. . . . The support of the Reich would solve his two problems, the external and the internal ones. The support of Paris and London would solve only the external one. If the general war does not break out in the near future, the dictatorships must become vassals of the Rome-Berlin axis in order to defend themselves against the opposition of their peoples. The Club of the Dictators would create *Mittleuropa*.

Even this aspect of the Eastern Question is not particularly new. Bismarck, for example, agreed with Kálnoky in 1888 in the view that "Charles is making a false calculation in counting on the boiars. . . . He over-estimates the strength of his position . . . and seeks the friendship of the aristocracy instead of winning the devotion of the peasantry against it and against Russia." The danger of a peasant revolt, then foreseen twenty years before it actually came about, need not be any greater now, though Roumanian peasants are no longer semi-serfs and the outlook of the middle classes has also changed considerably. King Carol II is an astute if wilful

politician who ever since he returned to the throne has striven for dictatorial power. He has considerable achievements to his credit ; he has done much to improve the army, to build up an efficient bureaucracy, to stamp out corruption.

He has, however, completely estranged a great part of the population by his dictatorial proceedings. Before he recently introduced the single-party system, he had tried to win over the masses by creating three parties. He failed in this attempt. The old parties existing and to a certain degree even working in the open did not agree. Their adherents still follow their old leaders, Maniu and the Bratianus, who are all opposed to the King's domestic and, in different degrees, to his foreign policy.

Carol is obviously in a rather tight place. Though his rule could at present not be shaken by a popular upheaval it is fundamentally insecure. This is why he could not dare to ally himself with Russia alone without having France and Britain equally as his allies. Furthermore, by driving the opposition more or less underground, he has paved the way for the spreading of groups the policy of which is definitely subversive. That the subversive "Iron Guard" is not at all a negligible factor in Roumania has been proved by their recent risings, which started significantly at the time of the King's London visit. They were suppressed, Codreanu and the leaders who were known to the police were shot, and all their illegal activities continue to be nipped in the bud. Some facts are, however, by now well established which do not justify too optimistic an outlook. The "Iron Guard" is deeply rooted in the Army and in the Orthodox clergy, both of which the King hoped to have as the main pillars of his rule. General J. Antonescu, one of the ablest officers and formerly Chief of the General Staff, had to be put under arrest. Equally, Orthodox monks and priests were again involved in the recent risings. Terror groups of the "Iron Guard" are in existence, mostly formed from the intellectual and semi-intellectual classes including pupils of the secondary schools. Finally, contacts exist between the "Iron Guard" and the national minorities in Roumania. It is rather ominous that the recent outbursts and atrocities took place only in regions which came to Roumania after the world war—in the Bucovina, Transylvania and in the Banat. Members of the Hungarian and Ukrainian minorities seem to have been involved, whereas the Germans stood aloof this time ; and

actually Professor Jorga declared the "Iron Guard" to be "the most loyal protagonists of Hungary." In future a situation might arise in which these subversive movements might be used by foreign countries to wrest concessions in the international field from the King. Against Hungary's claims to the whole of Transylvania he might try to save his throne and the integrity of his country by striking a bargain with Germany, who might be content with minor territorial revisions in favour of Hungary, though major economic concessions to herself, but would leave the bulk of Transylvania a part of his kingdom.

The old Eastern Question appears to have turned up again. All the old problems are there, though in a new form. That of the rivalry of the Great European Powers ; that of the "nationalities" ; that of democratic organisation ; that even of the comitadji-plotting and, finally, that of a constructive solution of the economic questions involved which presupposes large territorial units organised on lines which are satisfactory both from the economic point of view and from the point of view of the spiritual and economic well-being of the peoples. History has shown that the solution of the Eastern Question must not start from the problem of the "nationalities"—nations having in the meantime become going concerns with vested interests, but from the problem of how a worthy and human life could be secured for all concerned. Only the democratic approach could succeed in freeing Europe from that Eastern Question which has already brought to the Continent hardships so unbelievable.

G. O. GARDENER.



## HERR HITLER'S STORKS.

*Ich messe den Erfolg unserer Arbeit nicht am Wachsen der Strassen. Ich messe ihn nicht an unseren neuen Fabriken, ich messe ihn auch nicht an unseren neuen Brücken, die wir bauen, auch nicht an den Divisionen, die wir aufstellen, sondern an der Spitze der Beurteilung des Erfolges dieser Arbeit steht das deutsche Kind, steht die deutsche Jugend. Wenn das wächst, dann weiss ich, dass mein Volk nicht zugrunde gehen und unserer Arbeit nicht umsonst gewesen sein wird.*—ADOLF HITLER, Speech on the Parteitag, 1936.

IN these words Herr Hitler expressed the central idea animating the measures adopted by the National Socialists to check the decline in the German birth rate. During the last sixty years the birth rate has gone down in nearly all European countries, as well as in the United States and in the British Dominions, but in Germany the downward movement though it began late was exceptionally rapid. The annual number of births per 1,000 population fell from 34·3 in 1901-5 to 15·1 in 1932 and to 14·7 in 1933. In the latter year the births were 30 per cent. below the number required to maintain the population at the level it had then reached. A decrease in population seemed imminent, perhaps inevitable.

To those unacquainted with the pitfalls of vital statistics this conclusion may not be easy to accept. Though in 1933 the birth rate had gone down to the low level of 14·7 per 1,000, the death rate had gone down to the lower level of 11·2 per 1,000; the excess of births over deaths was 233,297, equivalent to 3·5 per 1,000. Surely, it may be said, these statistics showed nothing more than a slowing down of population increase? And should not such a result be welcomed rather than deplored? In Germany, as in other countries, there were many who took this view of the declining birth rate. It seemed a reasonable, indeed an obvious view.

It is, however, a fallacious view, and the fallacies underlying it were pointed out by Dr. F. Burgdörfer, Director in the German Statistical Office, in a series of important books, the first of which, *Der Geburtenrückgang und seine Bekämpfung*, appeared in 1929. Dr. Burgdörfer explained that birth rates and death rates computed on the total population convey a wrong idea of a community's demographic position, since they take no account of a highly important factor—the age-composition of the population. People do not die at a

uniform rate at all ages. After the high mortality of early childhood the death rate is low for about forty years. It then gradually rises until in old age it is very high. At the present time in Germany, as in this country, the population contains an unusually large proportion of persons at ages when mortality is low. As they grow older the survivors will reach the ages when mortality is high, and they will not all be replaced by younger persons, for the decline in the birth rate has reduced the supply of younger persons. The population is ageing and therefore the death rate tends to rise.

Similar conditions apply to natality, which depends on the proportion in the total population of the women of child-bearing age, which is generally taken by statisticians to be between 15 and 50 years, although few children are born to women over 45. In Germany, as in this country, the women of child-bearing age now form an unusually high proportion of the total population, and as they grow older and become incapable of bearing children their places will not all be taken by girls now growing up, for the supply of girls has been diminished by the decline in the birth rate. In both countries the present age-composition of the population makes for a low death rate and a high birth rate. As it changes with the gradual ageing of the population the death rate will tend to rise and the birth rate to fall. Most people now alive were born when the birth rate was high. They are being replaced by people born when the birth rate was low, and the age-composition of the new population will be less favourable to a low death rate and a high birth rate.

To explain how the birth rate and the death rate of a population depend upon its age-composition, Dr. Burgdörfer analysed the German vital statistics for the year 1927. In that year the crude birth rate, i.e. the number of births per 1,000 population, was 18·4 and the crude death rate 12·0. There was an excess of births over deaths equivalent to 6·4 per 1,000 population. The balance of births and deaths expressed in this way seemed to promise a continued and considerable increase of population. Actually there was a serious deficiency of births. Dr. Burgdörfer corrected the birth rate and the death rate by eliminating the factors introduced by the exceptional and temporary age-composition of the population, and found that the corrected birth rate was 15·9 and the corrected death rate 17·4 per 1,000. When fertility and

mortality were thus accurately measured it was seen that there was a deficiency of births equivalent to 1.5 per 1,000 population. To put it in another way, the number of births was 9 per cent. below the number required to maintain the population at the level it had then reached. The balance of births and deaths, in fact, had in 1927 begun to go down in favour of death. The deficiency of births steadily increased, until in 1933 the births were 30 per cent. below the number required for replacement.

The statistical implications of the decline in the German birth rate have during the last ten years repeatedly been explained by Dr. Burgdörfer, whose writings have exercised an important influence on public opinion in Germany. Dr. Burgdörfer besides being a distinguished statistician has a remarkable gift for clear and forcible exposition; he can explain statistical problems in a way the general reader can readily understand and his publications have done much to bring home to the German people the gravity of their demographic position. In 1930 he made two estimates of the future population of Germany. The first was based on the assumption that the annual number of births would remain constant at the level reached in 1927; the second assumed that fertility would fall 25 per cent. between 1927 and 1955 and would then remain constant. Both estimates assumed that mortality would remain as in 1924-6, and that there would be no migration. On the first estimate, the population, which in 1930 was 64,337,000, would reach a maximum of 69,750,000 in 1960, and would fall to 66,746,000 by the year 2000. On the second estimate, the maximum population, 67,702,000, would be reached in 1945, and by 2000 the population would be 46,891,000.

Three years after the estimates were made it was clear that the growth of the population had been much more in accordance with the second estimate than with the first. The number of births instead of remaining at the 1927 level, i.e. 1,161,719, fell steadily, after a slight rise in 1928, to 978,210 in 1932. The German people seemed to be heading for a rapid diminution in their numbers. The German population experts attribute the decline in the birth rate not to any loss of fecundity, i.e. the physiological capacity to reproduce the species, but to the deliberate limitation of the family. As Dr. Burgdörfer puts it: *Die Geburtenfrage ist eine Willensfrage.*

When the National Socialists came into power a determined effort was made to check what they regarded as a growing "will to sterility." A population policy was adopted, and in June 1933 Dr. Frick, Minister of the Interior, addressing a meeting of population experts, laid it down that "in the new Germany, the nation, the towns, and the rural communities must judge the whole field of administration from the point of population policy, and, where necessary, remould that administration." The varied resources of publicity were employed to impress upon the German people the fact that the balance of births and deaths had gone down heavily in favour of death, and to create a public opinion favourable to an increase in fertility. A vigorous campaign against abortion was begun. Various economic inducements were offered to encourage fertility, such as taxation reliefs and other preferences tending to equalise the burden of family expenses, the imposition of disabilities on bachelors, rural settlements and a variety of other measures to counteract the increasing tendency of the country people to flock to the towns. The most important of the initial measures, however, was Germany's special contribution to the modern expedients for checking the decline in the birth rate, i.e. the provision of marriage loans.

The Act authorising the payment of marriage loans was introduced on the initiative of Herr Reinhardt, Staatssekretär in the Ministry of Finance, and came into operation in August 1933. It makes available a yearly sum of 150 million marks to be expended in granting loans to newly married couples. The loans, which vary in amount up to a maximum of 1,000 marks, are given in the form of coupons, which may be exchanged for various kinds of household requisites. No interest is payable, but the loan must be repaid at the rate of one per cent. per month. One-fourth of the original sum borrowed is cancelled on the birth of each child.

The loans were at first intended not only to check the decline in the birth rate, but also, by withdrawing women from industrial and commercial occupations, to diminish unemployment among men. With this object a loan is not granted unless the bride has been employed in industry or commerce for at least nine months in the previous two years, or, if doing housework at home, is to be replaced by a domestic servant. Unemployment among men was prevalent when the

loans scheme was introduced, but now that the difficulty is not to find work but workers less importance is attached to this provision, which in the rural areas has, under certain conditions, been relaxed. Between August 1933, when the scheme came into operation, and the end of 1937 loans were granted to 900,000 married couples, and the total sums lent amounted to 600 million marks.

Another feature of the population policy is the provision of family allowances to socially-insured persons with not less than three children. The scope of this provision, which was first made on a national scale in 1936, was considerably extended by a law that came into operation in April 1938. An insured person with a yearly income not over 8,000 marks receives a monthly allowance of 10 marks in respect of a third and fourth child and of 20 marks for a fifth and any subsequent child. The allowance in each case is paid until the child reaches the age of 16, and is continued up to 21 years for children attending school or receiving vocational training. In addition to these monthly allowances, a special grant is made on the birth of a child in a family of not less than four children, if the head of the family can show that there is real need for such assistance. This grant, which on average amounts to 330 marks, is made not in cash but in coupons which are accepted by shopkeepers in payment for household requisites. Another family allowance takes the form of scholarships for school, university, or vocational training. It is estimated that in 1938 the expenditure on marriage loans and family allowances will amount to 520 million marks.

Has Germany anything to show for her strenuous struggle against the sterilising influences of modern life? Have the visits of the German storks been more frequent? They have. The statistical results of their visits are shown below:

| Year     | No. of marriages | No. of births | Births per 1,000 population |
|----------|------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| 1932 ... | 517,000          | 993,000       | 15·1                        |
| 1933 ... | 639,000          | 971,000       | 14·7                        |
| 1934 ... | 740,000          | 1,198,000     | 18·0                        |
| 1935 ... | 651,000          | 1,264,000     | 18·9                        |
| 1936 ... | 611,000          | 1,278,583     | 19·0                        |
| 1937 ... | 620,000          | 1,275,212     | 18·8                        |

In England and Wales the birth rate rose from 14·4 per 1,000 in 1933, the lowest birth rate on record in this country, to 14·9 in 1937. In some countries, e.g. Norway and Sweden, the rate during the same period remained practically constant at a low level; in most European countries the rate continued to go down. The marked rise in the birth rate between 1933 and 1937 is peculiar to Germany; nothing like it has occurred in any other country.

To what extent may it be attributed to the population policy adopted in 1933? Dr. Burgdörfer, in his book *Völker am Abgrund* (1937), attempts to answer this question. The German system of birth registration enabled him to make a much more searching analysis of the vital statistics for the years 1932-6 than would have been possible in this country; for the particulars required on registering a birth include the age of the mother, the number of the child in the family, and the duration of the marriage. It is therefore possible in Germany to find out (1) how many children are born to a given number of women of any particular age, (2) the number of first, second, and later births, and (3) the number of children born to a marriage of any given duration. Such information has not hitherto been available in this country: it will be made available by the Population (Statistics) Act, 1938, which was the source of so much hilarity in the House of Commons during the second reading debate on November 29th, 1937. Working on the data thus placed at his disposal, Dr. Burgdörfer found that there had been a considerable increase not only in first births, which might be expected as a result of the marriage loans, but also in second, third, fourth and even subsequent births, and that fertility had risen even in marriages of comparatively long duration. He estimates that in the three years 1934-6 the legitimate births were 900,000 more than they would have been had the number of marriages in 1932 and the specific fertility rates of 1933 remained constant, and that of this total 300,000 births may be attributed to the increase in the number of married couples and 600,000 to the increase in the fertility of married couples. He thinks that many, but by no means most, of the marriages in respect of which the loans were granted would not have been made without the loans; but even on the assumption that all the additional marriages, with their 300,000 additional births, were contracted because

of the loans, there remain 600,000 additional babies whose appearance must be attributed to other factors.

Among these factors an important place cannot be accorded to the family allowance system, which did not come into operation until 1936 and then only on a restricted scale; it was considerably extended in September 1937 and again in April 1938. According to Dr. Burgdörfer the chief factors are to be found partly in the new social and economic policy that began in 1933; the enormous reduction in unemployment, the cessation of industrial disputes, the new sense of economic and social security. More important still, he thinks, is the new outlook on life of the German people, the new confidence in themselves and in their future, the growing feeling that the individual must be prepared to make sacrifices for the good of the community. A full family life makes heavy demands upon the parents. Sacrifices must be made, sacrifices of ease and comfort; and though economic measures may do much to lighten and equalise family burdens they cannot altogether be removed.

Germany has so far achieved remarkable success in her efforts to check the decline in the birth rate, but, Dr. Burgdörfer shows, the annual number of births is still 10 per cent. below the number required to maintain the population at its present level. (In this country it is 25 per cent. below.) The balance of births and deaths still droops in favour of death. Nevertheless, what Germany has done is encouraging and provides an object-lesson that may profitably be studied in other countries in which the menace of depopulation has appeared.

G. F. McCLEARY.

## PESSIMISM IN FRENCH LITERATURE.

IN Flaubert's *Correspondance* we come across a sentence which might stand as *leitmotif* for the bulk of French literature since the sixteenth century up to our days: "Do you realise to what an extent our mentality is organised for unhappiness?" This complex of morbidity, which strikes the foreign reader as a sort of endemic disease affecting the mind of French writers and thinkers, is in reality the outcome of a philosophical apprenticeship French thought has passed through under the leadership of men like Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal and his teachers of Port-Royal, culminating in La Rochefoucauld, and in modern times in the "*culte du moi*."

The tragic experiences France had to go through in the course of her history may have contributed towards shaping a pessimistic undercurrent, thus preparing the way for the adoption of a definite analytical method. Besides, the French race has always shown a pronounced genius for the artistic expression of the morbid, a genius we meet already in authors of the Middle Ages. Rutebeuf's cry of despair in one of his lyrics is scarcely surpassed by any modern poet:

"What has become of the friends I loved,  
Deep in my heart?  
The winds, I fear, have swept them away,  
Their love is dead.  
They could not withstand the fury of storms,  
Of storms which raged before my door!"

(Thirteenth Century.)

François Villon's (Fifteenth Century): "But where are the snows of yesterday?" has become the counterpart of *Vanitas Vanitatum*. Even in French folk-songs, that *Biblia Pauperum*, it is not so much the reckless gaiety as the note of gloom which holds our attention. In the *Ballade de Jésus Christ*, Christ disguised as a beggar asks a peasant for charity and is given the terrible answer:

"Let the dogs which rabbits  
To hunt have been taught,  
Eat the crumbs from our table!  
Thou, what hast thou brought?"

But it is not before Montaigne (1533-92) that the fragmentary attempts at a sceptical view of life become condensed into a definite system of philosophy.

Montaigne laid the foundation of the research work dealing with moral problems destined to become under Descartes a solid structure to which all succeeding thinkers were to contribute. His insatiable curiosity, uncompromising individualism and probity dealt a smashing blow to traditional dogma. This Pilate of the sixteenth century cleared the way for Descartes by raising the question: "*Que sais-je?*" Montaigne was a philosophical dilettante, the spiritual ancestor of Anatole France. With Descartes we are on firm ground. The metaphysical basis of his system: to doubt everything except the existence of God, to accept nothing but strict evidence, made him the forerunner of the French moralists whose work not only directed philosophical thought, but coloured for good or evil the whole history of French literature. His treatise on passions, which already held the germ of La Rochefoucauld's theory of vice forming the inalienable counterpart of every virtue, became the text-book of all the succeeding sceptics and positivists. For La Rochefoucauld (1613-80) virtue was simply another aspect of egoism, a vice disguised under an hypocritical name. "All virtues find their outlet in the broad stream of self-interest." And another maxim: "Vices enter into the composition of virtues as poisons into that of remedies." This prophet of amorality had only absorbed half of the doctrine of Port-Royal, its dogma of the deplorable status of human nature corrupted by sin. He was constitutionally prevented from drawing the consequences of his conclusions and from breaking down under the weight of his convictions.

La Bruyère (1645-96) presents a different case to the moral psycho-analyst. A plebeian by birth, he had to undergo galling humiliations at the hands of his aristocratic patrons. Like Beaumarchais' Figaro he spent all his pent-up venom against the innumerable injustices of his time, taking the part of the oppressed amongst the lower classes and amongst his intellectual co-sufferers. "*Je veux être peuple!*" His pessimism is of a social-political order, and there he differs from the other moralists of the seventeenth century who studied Man only as an individual. La Bruyère, however, analysed him as member of the whole community, thus foreshadowing the moralists of the eighteenth century and even, in a less gentle way, Michelet's attitude in his book *Le Peuple*: "I have grown like a blade between two paving-stones, but this blade has kept its sap."

In Pascal (1623-62) we meet with the first French writer to whom a spiritual upheaval meant a moral breakdown. A disciple of Port-Royal, he unflinchingly accepted the Jansenist creed which makes man, owing to original sin, responsible for his deeds, grace being a free gift of God and unattainable by mere volition. Thus doubt and terror, together with contempt for man's fallen state, are implanted in the followers of this pitiless doctrine. The spiritual torments Pascal was suffering during the incubation period of his religious evolution left their mark upon his *Pensées*, one of the most poignant self-revelations of European literature. "Half-witted earthworm, depository of truth, of incertitude and of error, glory and refuse of the Universe"—such appeared to him man in general and himself in particular. Though he had ultimately passed through the storm and stress of agnosticism into the haven of Christian belief, the special Jansenist brand of Christianity he had adopted only deepened his intellectual despair.

The greatest masterpiece of pessimistic literature the seventeenth century has produced is Molière's *Misanthrope*. In this comedy, or better, tragedy of the moralist Alceste who commits the unforgivable sin of trying to live according to his ethical convictions, Jansenism which had always so bitterly opposed the theatre, triumphed on the stage. Alceste's desperate cry: "*Et c'est pour mes péchés que je vous aime ainsi*" might have furnished the material for one of Pierre Nicole's *Essais de Morale*. We shall see how the whole dramatic literature of the next three centuries took its cue from Molière's *Misanthrope*, not only in its function as "*littérature à thèse*," but technically by the adoption of Molière's Philinte in the rôle of "*raisonneur*."

On the threshold of the eighteenth century stands the Grand Inquisitor of his time, the Duke of Saint-Simon. Born out of his generation, the very antithesis of the scientific historian, Saint-Simon, the partisan of Port-Royal, the follower of Pascal in his implacable hatred of the Jesuits, the enemy of political centralisation, gives in his *Mémoires* full rein to his personal disappointments. The greatest moral portrait-painter of his day, he becomes inarticulate in his ferocious pessimism, an attitude colouring his sombre style, often torn to bits by his apoplectic indignation. Self-critical, he remains the best judge of his defects. "Carried away by my subject, I could not avoid them."

Voltaire (1694-1778) closes the list of French thinkers who based their speculations upon pure reason without allowing the emotional factor to influence their conclusions. In this great freethinker's case a new element, the social one, adds a broader, collective aspect to his personal convictions. In spite of his cynical pessimism he was a great humanitarian, to whom the splendour of the Grand Siècle could not compensate for the social degradation of his country with its religious persecutions, the judicial murder of Calas and La Barre, the farcical trial of Sirven, the unspeakable misery of the peasants, all of which made him exclaim: "I cannot understand how any thinking being can live in a country inhabited by apes, so often turned into tigers!" The hero of his novel *Candide* (a skit on the radical optimism of Leibnitz), who has learned pessimism through experience, finally resigns himself to humbly enjoying the good things of life. "*Il faut cultiver notre jardin*"—a maxim which almost corresponds to Pascal's "*Abêtissez-vous*" ("become like animals"). And lastly: Foolishness, Voltaire's life-long enemy, receives her *coup de grâce* in his "*Hymne à la Sottise*":

"O thou, big lump of Foolishness divine,  
Who gloatest, pleased like Punch, blear-eyed, upon  
Thy children born on France's sacred soil!"

The period following Voltaire's practical scepticism is characterised by the "*mal du siècle*," the French reaction to the German "*Weltschmerz*," "a state arising out of a sharp contrast between a man's ideals and his material environment." (William Ross: *From Goethe to Byron*.) This attitude is well defined by Goethe in his Autobiography: "Every individual passes through a Werther phase in the process of learning how to adapt his inborn natural tastes to the restricted forms of an antiquated world, a phase when it seems as though Werther had been written specially for him." But the French writers, afflicted with this disease, refused to take Goethe's advice, contained in the epigram on his own novel: "Be a man and follow not my steps!"

The Napoleonic period with its grandiose display of force and heroic exaltation had left many French intellectuals in a state of moral coma: "Napoleon is finished, we have now recourse to books" (Musset). Rousseau had already prepared the way for his contemplative lethargy in his "*Réveries*

*d'un Promeneur Solitaire*." Madame de Staël, in her book on Germany, the acquaintance with English literature (Young's *Night Thoughts*, Gray's *Churchyard Elegy*, Hamlet, Ossian, Byron) and above all Goethe's *Werther* had stimulated the efflorescence of a brooding Narcissism, of a moral and intellectual pose. An imported movement of a purely literary character, it created the type of "*l'homme fatal*" (Ernani), of the "*jeune ténébreux*" (Musset) without becoming congealed into a philosophy. Musset set the tearful complaints of his contemporaries to the undying music of his *Nuits*. Otherwise the intellectual harvest of romantic pessimism is meagre. Even Lamennais' *Paroles d'un croyant* (1834), in spite of their biblical grandeur, savour somewhat of the literary *cliché*: "I passed amongst the people, but we looked at each other without recognition." Chateaubriand's *René* (1805), owing to the illusive shimmer of its style, the bible of all the young tragi-comedians of his epoch, was more the outcome of a hypertrophy of egotism than of a pathological state of the time in which the author elected to play the hero.

Outside the romantic movement, the greatest poets of that period are also the truest representatives of the pessimistic school. Alfred de Vigny's "*Weltschmerz*" is cosmic, not individual. God, impassive nature, love, none of these can bring consolation to him. Solitude and stoicism are the stigmata of the thinker. His Moses suffers in "mighty loneliness," his Christ leaves hapless Earth:

"Having but lifted Misery's sordid cloak  
Whose one end holds but doubt, the other Sin."

Nature is deaf to mankind's entreaties:

"They call me Mother, and I'm but a tomb.  
Unseeing and unhearing do I scatter  
The crowds of humans, side by side with ants."

(*La maison du Berger*.)

Leconte de Lisle possessed even more than de Vigny the secret how to clothe abstract thought in the glittering vestment of artistic expression. The leader of the Parnassian school, he carries impassibility to its extreme limit, the Indian Nirvana:

"The heart steeped seven times in God's eternity!"

To the same group belongs Sully Prudhomme, of whose didactic poem, *Le Bonheur*, a compendium of pessimism, Jules Lemaitre said: what would a poem look like entitled "*Le Malheur*"? Belonging to no definite school, and yet claimed by all is Baudelaire, whose poetical output consists mainly of variations on *Ennui* (*Weltschmerz*) and who epitomised his creed in the terrible prayer:

"Lord, make me strong and brave to contemplate  
Without disgust my body and my soul!"  
(*Le voyage à Cythère.*)

Whilst the poets of the romantic and post-romantic period sought inspiration from their inner experiences, the drama and novel of the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth are the product of three external influences: Science, represented by Taine's determinism, the theory of heredity underlying Zola's work in its pitiless realism, tinged as often in the case of Jewish thinkers, with the most glowing, messianic optimism, and the propaganda of foreign, particularly Nordic literatures. Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Gorki were introduced to French readers in Melchior de Vogüé's *Roman russe* (1882), Ibsen, Bjoernson and Hauptmann through the *Théâtre Libre* (founded in 1887 by Antoine) and the *Théâtre de l'Œuvre* (established by Lugné-Poë). The most significant naturalistic dramatist is Henri Becque in *Les Corbeaux* (1882) in which the moral thesis is thrown overboard to make way for a photographically exact rendering of life as it is: "*une tranche de vie*," the gloomier the better! One of the most brilliant plays of this *genre*, combining the spirit of La Rochefoucauld with the technique of Dumas fils, is Paul Hervieu's *La course du Flambeau* (1901). The sceptical *raisonneur* of the play (we might call him the moral "observer") tries to convince Sabine, who sacrifices her mother's life to her daughter's happiness (who, in her turn, callously accepts this sacrifice), of the innate selfishness of children: "Believe me, humanity tries hard to persuade itself that it is not a bad child; and yet it is a bad child, just as it is a good mother. Read the ten Commandments: not a word about the parents' duty towards their children. Why? Because it is unnecessary, all creatures instinctively taking care of their offspring. But, as to the duties of children towards their

parents, that is not so self-evident! 'Honour thy father and mother,' etc. To this commandment there is a premium attached! Believe me, filial gratitude is not spontaneous, but an effort of civilisation."

It is indicative of the influence the moralists of the seventeenth century exercised upon French literature up to our time that the philosophical drama (Maeterlinck, Claudel, Lenormand, Curiel) is more and more absorbing the interest of French intellectuals whose palate had become jaded by the *pièce bien faite*, and that most of their plays are of a pronounced pessimistic and symbolistic character. In the following passage of Gabriel Marcel's play *Le monde cassé*, the time-honoured French technique of antithesis brings the symbolism of the idea into powerful relief: "Don't you realise that we are living in a broken world? Yes, broken like a watch out of order. The spring does not function any longer. Apparently everything is in its place. But put that watch to your ear, no sound can be heard."

Before discussing the narrative form of pessimistic thought, let us study the scientific negation of dogmatic faith, as represented by Ernest Renan (1823-92). The worshipper of the Unknown God, the "European blasphemer," as a papal Encyclical called him, had, after the tragic struggle with the potential priest in him, used the philological and historical knowledge acquired in Saint-Sulpice and through the study of German Bible criticism in order to sweep away the cobwebs of medieval theology. Renan expresses his gentle pessimism in that magnificent *Prière sur l'Acropole*: "The gods pass away like human beings and it would not be good for us were they eternal. The faith we once cherished must not be a chain. We have done with it, once we have wrapped it up in its purple shroud together with the defunct gods." Destroyer of the belief in the supernatural, this denier of established faith whom Georg Brandes called the wisest man of his age, is at the same time the upholder of tradition. He asserts in his *Souvenirs d'enfance* that "the real men of progress are those whose point of departure is marked by a profound respect for the past." A true aristocrat of the mind, he hated uniformity, above all the political catchword of his country: equality. A confirmed individualist as man and scholar, he pronounces through the hero of his philosophical play: *Le prêtre de Nemi* the dangerous maxim: "Yes, Truth is only



of use to him who has found it. What is nourishment for one may become poison to another."

In my brief remarks on the novel, I shall have to omit the names of Balzac, Flaubert and Maupassant, none of them being ideologists, and therefore outside the scope of this study. Bourget (1852-1936) already in 1880 announced the bankruptcy of science, a criticism taken up later on by Brunetière in the term of "*faillite de la science*." True to the tradition of the moralists of the seventeenth century, he sought artistic expression for the problems of his time. In the preface to *Le Disciple* (1889) his masterwork which gained an incalculable hold over the younger generation, he deals with the growing cynicism and pessimism following the "*Année terrible*." Of the two types represented by the majority of young Frenchmen, the callous hunter after pleasure and success, and the intellectual epicurean, he chooses the latter for the hero of his novel. But Robert Greslou, the promising scientist who seduces his employer's daughter in order to indulge in a psycho-analytical experiment, follows only the teaching of the philosopher Adrien Sixte whose iconoclastic theories, based upon pessimistic amorality, had perverted his impressionable disciple. Adrien Sixte believes that science stands high above the laws of practical morality. Too late he realises the stern responsibility incurred by the thinker and teacher. Similarly Edouard Rod in his novel *Au milieu du chemin* makes his hero exclaim: "Are we authors not our readers' spiritual directors? Have we the right to ignore the evil we may cause?" It is significant that Bourget, who at an earlier stage had undergone the influence of Nietzsche and of the "*culte du moi*" preached by Barrès, cleared after his conversion the pessimistic atmosphere pervading the literature and philosophy of France through his *Disciple*, "dedicated to the youth of my country." And yet, though he had found after his conversion his moral sheet-anchor, we still come across outbursts of pessimistic despair in his writings, a proof how deeply he, too, was rooted in the torturing self-analysis inherited from his spiritual forefathers. Thus we read in his *Cruelle énigme*: "We are not the masters of what survives in us of a previous existence. The slaves and playthings of a force slumbering within us, we need only open our eyes to see ourselves as we were in prehistoric caves and forests."

Both Renan and Bourget belong to that group of solid French thinkers, terribly in earnest in their prophetic outlook on life. Anatole France, that great dilettante of letters and "moral dandy," as Jules Lemaitre calls him, will stand together with Nietzsche as the most complete nihilist of modern Europe. His *Abbé Jérôme Coignard* shows the same consciousness of human misery, the same contempt for humanitarian fallacies as the philosopher of *Thus spake Zarathustra*; but with the difference that Anatole France is never a fanatic. *Jérôme Coignard*, firmly rooted in the soil of Montaigne, could not dream of posing as a superman, as a preacher of metaphysics. There are few writers of modern times who furnish us with such an abundance of highly polished, cameo-like maxims, "*frappés en médaille*." A few quotations will serve as illustration:

"The future belongs to Caliban; Ariel amongst us is finished."

(*La vie littéraire*.)

"Education and heredity, are they not weighing heavily upon our actions? We are born incorrigible, but alas, so old."

(*La vie littéraire*.)

"My father, do not trouble to be grateful to me. What I am doing in this moment, I am not doing for love of you, nor for humanity's sake. I do it merely out of selfishness which often inspires Man to acts of generosity and devotion."

(*Les Dieux ont soif*.)

(A sentence which might have been written by La Rochefoucauld.)

Anatole France's mephistophelian pessimism cannot be the last word of French or European wisdom. Still, without the preliminary work of men belonging to his type, the regeneration of mankind would be hardly possible. His scepticism has helped to promote that state of discontent without which progress is unthinkable. Hypocrisy and stupidity found him a devastating enemy. On the other hand, he is full of tender pity for life's disinherited. He was a great liberator of thought, and, perhaps unwittingly, the creator of new ideals. His pessimism was of the kind to which Brunetière alludes in his essay on *Le Pessimisme dans le roman*: "could it not one of these days become a fruitful source of literary inspiration? Who knows whether this kind of pessimism is not worth more than the sort of vague optimism which we see nowadays in conflict with it?"

M. JOUBERT.

## A GREAT GERMAN LIBERAL.

"SINCE Schiller the Germans have had no great teacher of Liberalism," writes Mr. Fisher in his *History of Europe*. And indeed Germany has produced neither a Charles James Fox nor a Gladstone. Yet German Liberalism, too, could boast of many capable and distinguished men who, if given a chance of creative work in a responsible position, might have become leading statesmen. Most of them are now forgotten and have left no traces. But those amongst us Germans who in the decade preceding the war were young and filled with enthusiasm and a craving for freedom remember one man with love and veneration: Friedrich Naumann. Any prominent English politician can expect that his memory will be handed down in some biography dictated by reverence and affection, but very few German liberals have found their biographer. Naumann was more lucky: his disciple, co-worker and friend, Dr. Theodor Heuss, who as a member of the Reichstag and otherwise stood for the Naumann tradition in the days of the Weimar Republic, has written his life.\* While avoiding indiscriminate eulogy, he has set down the various features of his character with loving understanding, and against the background of an eventful and ultimately terrible period has painted the portrait of a great thinker and fighter.

At first sight the fact that Naumann became a Liberal leader in the prime of his life does not seem altogether in keeping with his beginnings. He was born in 1860, in a strictly orthodox Protestant rectory of Saxony. His parents' wish rather than his own inclination induced him to study theology, and at the university orthodoxy held him for some time. But already the politician and the orator in him began to stir. Those were the years after Bismarck's break with Liberalism, when feeling ran high in the German universities as elsewhere. At Berlin the powerful voice of Treitschke, the great historian, preached a "national" policy, that is a policy combining absolute loyalty to Bismarck with anti-Semitism, of which the newly created German Students' Association made itself the sponsor. Naumann was among the most active promoters of the Leipzig branch, and at the first national meeting of the

\* *Friedrich Naumann: der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit*. By Theodor Heuss. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart-Berlin.

Association in 1881 he made a speech on the German Fatherland and its history. Whosoever at this time might have felt inclined to predict his political future would have placed him in the ranks of the Right.

It turned out to be of great consequence for him when at the age of twenty-three he became a helper at the "*Raubes Haus*" in Hamburg, an institution for the education and moral salvation of waifs and strays. Its founder, Wichern, was one of the first in Germany to proclaim Christian-Socialist ideas without, however, interpreting them in terms of party politics. The first to do this was Stoecker, chaplain in ordinary to the Berlin Court, a much discussed and very questionable figure. Even his adversaries cannot deny that he possessed great eloquence and personal courage. He also was the first politician who ventured into a workers' meeting in Berlin to oppose the Social-Democrats, from whose influence he wished to detach the wage-earners in order to use them as battering-rams in the service of Conservatism in the battle against Liberalism. To achieve this end he fostered anti-Semitism, which he considered a suitable channel for the diversion of the workers' anti-capitalist feelings.

Stoecker made a great if not unreservedly favourable impression on the young Naumann, who saw in him "*one man who can speak of eternal salvation to the masses of Berlin, and who is being heard.*" But Naumann was never a member of his Christian-Socialist Party, though he frequently co-operated with him at Congresses of the Home Mission, at which he soon became a well-known figure owing to his eloquence and his abundance of ideas. A wider sphere of action opened up when in 1890 he became pastor in Frankfurt. But after the lapse of a few years, he clashed with the Church authorities owing to his political activities, and in 1897 he abandoned the ecclesiastical career.

Meanwhile he had undergone a profound change. He had freed himself more and more from the orthodox fetters which had restricted his theological outlook but had preserved his piety; he never modified his estimate of Christianity as the great vivifying and indispensable force. At the same time he dropped certain anti-Jewish tendencies of his earlier years as he increasingly realised how little the Jews he came to know fitted into the anti-Semitic formula. One of them impressed him particularly—Charles Hallgarten, a great philanthropist

who dedicated the profits of his life's work to the service of "practical humanism." Even more important for Naumann was the fact that his intensive occupation with political and social problems drove him further and further away from his beginnings. The starting-point of his political thinking was the social position of the economically weak, above all the wage-earners. He had thoroughly studied socialist literature and was for a time deeply, perhaps too deeply, fascinated by Marx's ideological structure, which looks so solidly built. Yet he always was far from becoming a Social-Democrat himself, owing to his religious background and his views on private property. His definition: "Social-Democracy is the first great heresy of the Protestant Church," is highly significative of this attitude. After many struggles he finally reached the conclusion that the Christian doctrine cannot supply any precepts for current politics.

Such views made his relations with Stoecker impossible. Moreover, the steadily increasing number of his own followers rendered the foundation of an organisation of his own imperative. In 1896 the "National-Social Association" (*Nationalsozialer Verein*) came into being, with Naumann as its President. The majority of its members were junior Protestant pastors, teachers, some university professors and other intellectuals, all of them full of enthusiasm and devotion to their cause. Very few came from the working classes whom the Association most of all desired to attract. Naumann's followers intervened in current politics and attracted a great deal more attention than might have been expected from their numbers. They fought courageously against the attempts of William II to suppress the working-class movement, for instance the Penal Servitude Bill of 1897, and against the growing Protectionism of the Customs Bill of 1902. On the other hand they enthusiastically supported his policy of a bigger navy.

It was at that time that Naumann explained his political principles in a book whose programme is summed up in its title: *Democracy and Empire*—the two forces, he said, which by co-operating would secure Germany's future and develop her power. In it he opposed not only those who claimed the monopoly of devotion to the Emperor and the Fatherland for the Right, but also the Social-Democrats who wanted to fill the people with antipathy against all this. "Never," he

exclaimed, "will a great nation consent to be led by people whose reliability with regard to the power question is not absolute. A nation which would act differently would abdicate. Here is the key to all other political questions."

The brilliantly written book with its historical retrospects and its wide outlook had a success far beyond party circles, particularly with the young, upon whose strongest emotions it played. Looking back one is seized by deep regret for the lost chances of a different political development which might have materialised, had the German Empire had another head. Naumann took the greatest pains to discover favourable, promising traits in William II and to find explanations and excuses for his innumerable mistakes—all this in the vain hope that the Kaiser would at last grasp his historic mission. Max Weber, one of the few really great scholars Germany still possessed at that time, strove to free Naumann, his valued friend, from such illusions, for Weber "hated and even scorned the Emperor." The interview in the *Daily Telegraph* removed Naumann's last doubts about the ruler's political incapacity. "I must confess," he wrote to Weber, "that you were right in judging the Kaiser as you did. It is hard for me to admit, but I believe that henceforth we should only keep one thing in mind—how to weaken his influence upon German policy." The National-Social Association did not live beyond 1903. In that year its members took part in the Reichstag elections and came off very badly. Naumann himself was defeated and the hope of starting a great movement was destroyed. He confessed that the national social idea lacked the power of forming a party.

In this situation two men whose political conceptions and outlook had been strongly influenced by England became of supreme importance for him: Dr. Theodor Barth and Professor Lujo Brentano. The former combined all the qualities which would have predestined him for the leadership of an organised opposition if such a thing had existed in Germany. He was a man full of ardour and inspiration, an intrepid idealist, no less gifted as an orator than as a writer. He was just as capable of carrying an agitated assembly by storm as of opposing even the strongest parliamentary majority by his brilliant dialectics and his development of the essential points of a case. Modelled on the English pattern, his weekly review, *Die Nation*, was the best periodical

German Liberalism has ever possessed. He was rooted in the noblest traditions of classic Liberalism, but open to modern ideas, and he was the first to conceive the plan of a German Left which was to unite bourgeois Liberalism and Social-Democracy. A convinced free-trader, he was delighted with the firmness with which Naumann had fought against the Customs Tariff. He was the man to appreciate the value of personality, and he did his best to save a man like Naumann for Germany's impoverished political life. He realised that the latter had advanced to his decidedly liberal views from a very different standpoint, and he smoothed his way into the *Freisinnige Vereinigung*, one of those small parties into which German Liberalism had split and which distinguished itself by its abundance of political talents.

Professor Lujo Brentano had as a young man—in the beginning of the seventies—closely studied English trade unionism, and was the acknowledged historian and theoretician of this movement as well as one of the leading economists of his country, one of whose few radical free-traders he was. Freedom-loving and humane, combative and full of zest, enthusiastic and inspiring, he exercised a great influence upon academic youth. Though not agreeing with him on all points, he highly valued Naumann both as a man and as a writer and thinker, and made him his friend. That Brentano, who hitherto had held aloof from party politics, now became a member of the *Freisinnige Vereinigung* was a great help for Naumann in relation to public opinion.

His adoption of Liberalism did not come about without struggles, since his former relations with Stoecker offended many old Liberals. But their opposition was finally overcome when men like Barth and Brentano intervened in his favour, and particularly the young welcomed him enthusiastically. They crowded the meetings in which he spoke with never-failing mastery on political, social, or cultural subjects. For thousands he became an unforgettable figure, the man with the powerful body and the commanding brow which indicated wisdom and kindness. His master-mind, which commanded all the resources of an orator from transparent clarity and playful humour to stirring pathos, satisfied the highest intellectual demands as well as his hearers' moral demands. He had a unique way of linking up topical questions with tendencies of general importance for the German nation, and

his faculty of making things live for his audience as they lived for him was incomparable. Dry statistics assumed colour as he described the human adventures or the technical and economic procedures that lay behind them. His public never had the feeling of being told the same things over and over again, but always that of taking active part in the thinking process by which an eminent and honest man tackled the great problems of his time. Yet he never let himself be carried away by the force of his own words. When one of his hearers once asked him whether an orator had himself to be moved in order to be able to move his audience as he did, he made the characteristic reply: "He must *have been* moved."

In 1907 Naumann became a Liberal member of the Reichstag, to which, with the exception of a short interval, he was to belong until his death. Though not particularly enchanted with the parliamentary routine prevailing there—he used to call the Reichstag "the Hall of Repetitions"—he always gave his best through his speeches, which were widely read and admired, as well as otherwise. Many were surprised to find that he showed himself a dispassionate, cool-headed politician, especially when Bülow tried to rule with a majority of Conservatives and Liberals (the policy called "*Blockpolitik*"). He saw in that coalition budding possibilities of a development for the sake of which, though it never materialised, he went so far as to make the heavy sacrifice of his friendship with Barth and Brentano. Untiringly and successfully he worked for an alliance of the Liberal parties, and beyond this he contemplated a union of all freedom-loving forces from the National Liberals to the Social-Democrats, "from Bassermann to Bebel," as he strikingly formulated it. But no party wanted to hear of such a thing, and especially the Social-Democrats preferred to revel in the figures of their successful elections rather than to rack their brains about the future of German politics.

And then the war came. From the first Naumann felt it in all its significance and instantly realised the full import of England's intervention. Needless to say, he placed all his abilities at the disposal of his country, trying with particular intensity to fortify what he called "the inner courage (*das Innerliche*) which triumphs over death." It was also natural for him to assume the victory of his country so long as such a thing was possible. He could not help believing that the

ghastly hecatombs and the furious destruction of so many human values must have some sense for Germany's future, and he therefore evolved the idea of that "Central Europe" which was to embrace the area of the German and the Austro-Hungarian monarchies. "What is the result of the war to be? For what purpose will our dead have suffered? For nothing but that the very next day we should disperse and behave as though we had never known each other? That would spell the waste of the finest qualities of soul and mind. Central Europe is the fruit of the war. Together we have sat in the prison of wartime economy, together we have fought, together we want to live."

These are the last words of his book, *Central Europe*, whose success surpassed that of any political publication since Bismarck's *Reflections and Recollections*. Not that it met with universal approval; opinions were much divided even among his close political friends. But it filled war-depressed minds with a faint hope that after all some hidden sense might be found in that apparently senseless horror. It made Naumann's name known also in the countries of Germany's enemies, where, however, it was wrongly taken as the expression of expansive Imperialism. It is, of course, no use now to argue about the validity of his ideas; but they certainly were not more remote from reality than the fabric of the authors of the Versailles Treaty. On the other hand Naumann also realised that it would not be possible for Germany after the war to keep to the old ways, and he struggled for reforms with all his might, though without success, as long as there was time. He sharply opposed the annexationist day-dreams; in this matter he did not allow himself to be influenced even at times when the military situation occasionally took a turn for the better. This struggle culminated in his Reichstag speech against Tirpitz, whom he had gladly followed in the days of the fleet propaganda. Now he compared him to Wallenstein and reproached him, as the creator of the fleet, with trying to carry on a military policy of his own simultaneously with the Government policy.

When in November 1918 the collapse came, Naumann too broke down. Throughout the war he had scrupulously observed the official food decrees, whose rations were much too small for his big body. His portrait at that time shows a man aged far beyond his years. He was ailing when the

newly founded German Democratic Party sent him to the National Assembly. But once again he took up the work and, what was worse, all the worries and emotions connected with it, with his customary conscientiousness. He was against Germany's submission to the Versailles Treaty and he suffered deeply when the National Assembly finally acquiesced.

In his work for the new Constitution he first of all dedicated himself to the question of fundamental rights. Preuss had wished not to take them into account at all, and experience has proved that he was right. In the shape which they finally assumed they all too often became impediments for the Republican Governments; and when at last the adversaries of the Republic came into power they brushed them aside with a stroke of the pen. Naumann cannot, of course, be held responsible for this result. What he wanted was something very different: the "fundamental rights" were to be the "constitutional expression of the character of a new era." That is why he wanted to give them an ethical rather than a juridical character. It is, however, true that the form he suggested for them was unsatisfactory.

During these gloomy days Naumann was a hope for many. There were those who wished that this man who possessed the general confidence should be entrusted with the office of President. The high esteem in which his political friends held him became manifest in July 1919 at the first rally of the Democratic Party: with an overwhelming majority the audience elected him leader of the party, although he had not even been proposed by the Committee. Spontaneously the conviction broke through that Naumann alone was destined to represent democratic and liberal ideas in a new state and a new era. The party separated after the meeting in the hope of working under this beloved and revered leader for the reconstruction of their country. They were shattered when a few weeks later they learned that he was no more. A stroke had ended his life within a few hours while he was at the seaside, far away from his family. "He was a burning and a shining light," Professor Adolf Deissmann declared at his bier. And Max Weber wrote: "To realise that he was alive has time after time helped us to take heart again. . . . He was born too early or too late. But never mind. The fact that he has lived is something imperishable for us all."

ERICH EYCK.

## FRENCH FEARS FOR INDO-CHINA.

IN recent months reports from the territorial possessions of the Occidental Powers along the southern coast of Asia and in the South Pacific have indicated feverish defence activities against the expected extension of Japanese political influence into these areas. The French, in particular, appear of late to have come down with a severe case of the "jitters" over the safety of their immensely profitable ownership of Indo-China. In part this has been an outgrowth of the present Sino-Japanese conflict which has resulted in numerous "incidents." Among these were the threats by Japan to bomb the important Annam-Yunnan Railway, and the mutual resentment which developed over the occupation by the French of the Paracel Islands and the recent seizure by the Japanese of the strategically important island of Hainan. The Paracels are a small group of islets in the South China Sea, some 300 miles south of the China coast, and 250 miles east of French Indo-China. They were occupied by Annamite police in July of last year, following a sudden influx of alleged Japanese fishermen who took up their quarters there. In theory the islands belong to China, who, however, was perfectly willing to allow the French to occupy them, as Mr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador to France, expressed it, for the present. Japanese protest as to the necessity of protecting their nationals in these islands was met by the bland assurances of the French that they would see to it themselves.

The island of Hainan, which the Japanese have now occupied, came into prominence during the early months of last year in the landing for "inspection" purposes of Japanese marines, and following that, in the announcement by the Japanese Foreign Office that Japan "may occupy Hainan Island, if such action becomes necessary in the campaign to crush the national government." Subsequently, the island was subjected to a series of air raids and a naval bombardment. France and Great Britain immediately took alarm and issued a "hands off" warning to Japan, pledging to act together to handle any complaints involving Chinese and Japanese nationals which might arise. Now that the Japanese have actually seized the island the French and British Foreign Offices are in a somewhat difficult position. However, undoubtedly, present tension in Europe will preclude other than

sharp protests which the Japanese as usual will blandly ignore.

However, particularly disquieting to French official circles has been the changing situation in Siam, which in late years appears to have come directly within the Japanese orbit to the exclusion of previous Occidental interests. The most recent evidence of this, from the French point of view, is the announcement of a contract award to a Japanese firm for enlarging the port of Bangkok to make it accessible to large ships now compelled to anchor outside. Further evidence is the announcement of Siam's abrogation of the existing treaty with France, which has heretofore made possible a demilitarised border zone between Siam and Indo-China. A report made some years ago by a French writer is not without interest in this respect. He stated that Siam herself was not a menace, but that on the day she entered into an alliance with Japan every safety to Indo-China would vanish.

French Indo-China has an area of some 285,000 square miles and a population of 23,000,000. Her foreign residents number approximately 360,000, of whom 30,000 are French. The territory consists of the colonies of Cochin-China and Laos, ruled directly from Paris, and the protectorates of Annam, Cambodia, and Tonkin. With the exception of a small concession in 1787, later abandoned, these territories were all acquired by France in the imperialistic heyday of the latter half of the nineteenth century. With their expert colonisation technique, the French have since garnered a tremendous return from this rich storehouse of the East which Sarraut, one of the territory's former administrators, has called "the most important, the most developed, and the most prosperous of our colonies." Although rice cultivation is the basis of the country's economic life, it also possesses considerable possibilities in raw materials, which have been but partially tapped. These include large deposits of high-quality coal, limestone, resources of wood, tin, zinc, phosphates, precious stones, gold and rubber.

Japanese economic penetration has made comparatively little headway in Indo-China, due to severe restrictions imposed by French decree. These have not only applied specific quotas on Japanese cotton, but also have brought about the imposition of an exchange compensation surtax of 25 per cent. of the assessed duties on all other Japanese imports into Indo-China. Through this it has been hoped not only to curtail

purchases from Japan, but also to exert a psychological influence in order to prevent possible extension of Japanese influence as the champion of the Yellow Race. This last, as a movement, had its inception in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War, and with varying fortunes has persisted to the present day in the form of secret societies nurtured on the ever-present hope of Japanese support for an Annamite uprising against French control.

After the conquest of Annam in 1885, the French desired to safeguard their interests by agreement with China to the effect that the three southern provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwantung would never be ceded to any foreign Power. However this failed, due to the opposition of the British, who at the time may have had in mind plans based upon their own control of Hong Kong. That the strategic value of the present much-discussed island of Hainan was recognised is evident in an agreement of March 1897, by which Britain compelled China to agree not to concede or lease this land to any country for the purpose of establishing a naval base or refuelling station. It is this last which now alarms the French.

A glance at a map will show the importance of this island. Its occupation by an ambitious or unfriendly Power could seriously affect not only the French control of Annam but also of Kwangchauwan, acquired by lease in 1898. Moreover, the island lies half-way between Singapore and Hong Kong and, as expressed by one Japanese writer, its capture by the Japanese would enable them to break the British strength by splitting the two. The island covers about 97,198 square miles and has a large bay at Yulingkang, which would make it an excellent naval base. The land is fertile and could also be cultivated with profit.

Up to late years the French attitude toward Japanese aspirations in China was one of benevolent neutrality. The main reason for this was a treaty between the two countries signed in 1907. In the well-remembered imperialistic phraseology characteristic of the period, this treaty defined France's potential territorial interests in China as the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwantung, with Japan to have similar freedom of action as to the provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Fukien. It is generally believed that this situation was instrumental in toning down the Lytton Report of 1932 condemning Japanese activities in Manchuria.

However, as possibilities inherent in recent Japanese activities have become clearer, the attitude of the French has been definitely modified, and to-day France appears to have made common cause with the other Powers facing similar conditions with regard to their Asiatic possessions. Evidence of this is seen in the frequent rumours, although officially denied, that the latter has reached a definite understanding in a Tri-Power Agreement with British and Dutch authorities that in the event of attack, the naval bases of Singapore and Soerbaya would be made available to the warships of all parties to the Agreement.

France, on her own behalf, has also undertaken preparations for the actual defence of Indo-China. She made a beginning as early as 1933 when she took possession of nine small islands to the east of Indo-China. These are merely sand-bars and rock formations with no inhabitants and are used occasionally by fishing junks. However, they have considerable uses for coastal defence and in sea and air navigation.

While it is at times difficult to sift the true from the many unfounded rumours which develop out of nothing more than possibility and wish-fulfilment, there is little question but that, in view of the present situation in China, the French are making every effort to anticipate Japanese designs with regard to Indo-China. This has been indicated by a number of circumstances—the rapidity with which French warships rushed to the South China Sea at the outbreak of present hostilities between China and Japan, and the extensive air manœuvres held by the authorities in November and December of last year which tested lines of communication not only between France and her North African colonies but also between France and Indo-China. It is also generally believed that France contemplates the construction of a great naval base at Cam-Rah Bay, which is located approximately midway between Hong Kong and Singapore. A considerable project is already in operation there. From there it is intended to operate a modern submarine flotilla, fast destroyers, and a squadron of bombing hydroplanes. In Along Bay, facing the Chinese island of Hainan, a series of secondary defences is being constructed; and at Cape Saint Jacques, which controls the main entrance to Saigon, coastal defences are being strengthened. Vulnerable openings along the 1,850-mile coast line of a territory half again the size of France are to be protected with heavy



guns. The French Government has also constructed military roads up to the Chinese frontier, built several modern air-fields, and, according to reports, is being urged by the military to store huge quantities of supplies to meet any emergency which might arise, since it would require weeks to secure them from Europe.

Needless to say, the British are pleased over these activities. Reports which describe the Japanese as occupying numerous groups along the South China coast for naval and air armament at a cost of 300,000 yen, have been particularly alarming. These islands include the Hopao Islands near Macao, the Pratas Shoals near Hong Kong, and the fortification of the Kimoi Shoals just outside Amoy Harbour. However, with the French arming, not only will a measure of protection be assured for the sea-route from Hong Kong to Singapore, but on the continental side of Indo-China, the caravan route to the oilfields of Burma and through Yunnan into British-influenced Tibet will be defended.

Present activities are a far cry from the situation in 1936, when the Blum Government took office and it was rumoured that the French Socialists, averse to compelling any native population to remain under the French flag against its will, were contemplating withdrawal from Indo-China. British opinion immediately became apprehensive over the possibilities of Japanese infiltration into an independent Indo-China and the subsequent effect on the Straits Settlements and India. It was generally held in London diplomatic circles that "if and when a Government of the Left in France thinks it fit to surrender its rights in Asia, British preferential rights on the Indo-China coast must have been reserved in advance."

However, present French policy with regard to the defence of Indo-China would appear to dispel any likelihood of this. Confirmation, if needed, can be found in the repeated statements and reassurances by those in high French diplomatic circles to the effect that France stands ready to defend Indo-China from attack. As to what dependence can be placed on this can be found in possibilities implicit in the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, as well as in certain other circumstances of European origin. These have made for a solidarity of interests on the part of Great Britain and France, in which of necessity their respective colonial interests in Asia must be a considerable factor.

JOHN C. LE CLAIR.

February 1939.

## NEW LIGHT ON THE WAR OF 1870.

IT is not surprising that, from the nation which always considered military matters as paramount, there arose the man who gave military history its definitive scientific form. Though we knew that the everlasting struggle for power is and has always been decided in the last resort by war and battles, nobody had an idea of the true nature and the principles of these final decisions. Great generals knew how to act, how to lead troops to victory, but the theory of war was desultory and in fact but a series of practical rules, until Hans Delbrück discovered the generalisations which made the theory a science. Yet his *History of the Art of War* was rejected not only by the German historians whose cherished traditions he proved to be false, but by the army and its generals who saw their favourite theories and doctrines crumble. It was the chief of the French General Staff, General de Lacroix, who declared Delbrück's work to be classical at a time when it was still repudiated by the German General Staff. And he never was made a member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences.\*

He ridiculed the absurdly exaggerated numbers which fill our books of history by exposing how, at times when agriculture was primitive, population thin, and roads rare, great armies were impossible. Throughout his work he shows himself to be an iconoclast. European history has to be reconsidered and partly rewritten since its publication. Its four volumes contain the history of military art from the battle of Marathon to the end of the Napoleonic campaigns. It was continued by his follower, Emil Daniels. The three volumes, however, which he and, after his death in 1935, Otto Haintz added to the work, differ from it in so far as Delbrück did indeed write

\* The author of this article has been for years in close touch with Professor Delbrück, as he lived almost next door to him in Grunewald and was a member of the "Delbrück Abend," a society of political men, military officers, historians, and journalists, who met every Wednesday to discuss the political situation. Delbrück, who had himself been an officer in the War of 1870, was one of the finest personalities one could meet, upright, high-principled, and of an irresistible personal charm. A patriot and a conservative, he had always been opposed to Imperialism, and since 1917 he had used whatever influence he had to bring about a timely peace of reconciliation. Yet he utterly condemned the Peace of Versailles. The general esteem in which he was held was proved at the occasion of his eightieth birthday, in 1928, when he received congratulations from the ex-Emperor as well as from the President of the Republic, from the Socialist Government in Prussia, and from members of nearly all parties. General Groener spoke for the army. Delbrück died half a year later.

a history of the art of war, illustrating the theoretic exposition by reports of campaigns and battles; whereas his successors either did not feel equal to this task or, treating of our own time, felt the necessity of giving more details. Their work is a history of those campaigns which gave new impulse to the art of war, beginning with the Crimean War in 1854 and ending with the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.

Delbrück called his work a "history of the art of war in its relation to political history," and it reveals indeed new and deep insight into that fearful and blood-stained development, that eternal struggle for power which we call history, whatever other elements it may include. The same may be said of the three later volumes. One may even say, perhaps, that Delbrück's successors were the greater writers. Delbrück himself is lucid and clear, but the later volumes are so well written and in so vivid a style that they read as easily as novels.

Those treating of the wars of 1866 and 1877 refer to our subject.\* The Franco-German War denotes the culminating point of German military achievements. We are not going to retell the well-known story of the struggle, but will only set forth some previously unknown or neglected traits which throw a new light on it and, perhaps, on much else. Like Delbrück himself, Daniels destroys many legends.

Since the time of Gneisenau, Prussia had produced no military genius. Moltke, though nearly seventy in 1866, was scarcely known. "Genius," says Goethe, "is the sense of the essential." Moltke's greatest innovation was a conclusion which he drew from the altered nature of communications. When roads were bad and few, the marching columns of an army had to remain near each other in order to keep touch and for the transmission of commands by mounted orderlies; after the introduction of railways and the telegraph, the construction of a network of excellent highroads, armies could move independently and be brought into united action on the battlefield. This seems simple enough to-day; but the Prussian generals of the time thought Moltke mad; none of them, not even Leonhard von Blumenthal, who in the next war was his best second, could understand him. Such is the effect of routine. Neither did the king understand Moltke.

\* Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, fortgesetzt von Emil Daniels und Otto Hainz. Georg Stilke, Berlin, 1920-36, Vols. V and VI. (The first edition of the first volume appeared in 1900.)

William I, however, though no genius, was a most loyal gentleman who, when he had placed confidence in a man, held fast to him until he had evidence that he had been wrong. Besides, Moltke derived one great advantage from the fact that nobody could understand his plan: the Austrians did not imagine that such a thing was possible and were, therefore, crushed between two Prussian armies coming from opposite sides.

In 1866 Moltke was but the military adviser of the king, and when the battle of Sadowa was hottest the commander of a Prussian army corps questioned his right to give him an order. "Who is General Moltke?" inquired he of the A.D.C. who brought the order. But in 1870 no one challenged his authority. He had, however, two dangerous opponents in Bismarck and in the war minister Count Roon, who did not believe in him and who did their utmost to prejudice the king against him. Bismarck's reasons were of a political nature. Fearing the intervention of other Powers he wanted to terminate the war as quickly as possible; he considered that the taking of Paris on which Moltke insisted, was not necessary. Several mistakes or rather miscalculations of Moltke's, as for instance that Paris might be taken in a fortnight, gave him a plea. The greatest general, of course, is liable to err; not being omniscient, not knowing the enemy's thoughts, nor all the possibilities of fate, he constantly gropes in the dark. Delbrück said once that every campaign consists of mistakes; the great general must be able to win in spite of them, or make fewer and less capital mistakes than the enemy.

The work composed and edited by the German General Staff on the war of 1870 records no German mistake. According to the official history, every step was exactly calculated, each general took always the right measures, every order from headquarters was more or less anticipated, everything was foreseen. The German army in France acted like a machine of utmost precision which, once set in motion, moved forward relentlessly without the slightest fault. And this version has been accepted by nearly all the world. Daniels, however, does not hesitate to describe the whole work as a "heroic poem," and he adds that it did much to create dangerous illusions in Germany.

No general can plan more than the beginning of a campaign, the opening of the drama, which, no doubt, is very important.

What follows is decided by events. Moltke changed his plans three times in the first weeks of the war. It was part of his greatness that his genius could adapt itself to the situation. It was due to the fact that, in 1866, Benedek, a general of undoubted merit, could not decide to change his plan, when he saw that the Prussians did the unexpected, that the Austrians were so terribly defeated at Sadowa. Moltke, in 1870, expected the first battle to take place near Rastatt in Baden, on German territory, and he intended to crush Napoleon between two armies in a similar manner.

Neither Napoleon nor the French army were adversaries to be slighted. Daniels does them full justice. He even considers that the French infantry was, in spite of antiquated tactics, on the whole superior to the German. The French infantry gun was certainly better, and the mitrailleuse which Napoleon had imposed on his reluctant generals made the French formidable on the defensive. The German artillery, on the other hand, had a range of nearly 4,000 yards against 3,000 of the French. Napoleon III was a general of rank. He was no warrior, but he had great military knowledge and excellent strategic ideas. His march along the Sesia in 1859 was called by Moltke a masterpiece. Neither was he taken unawares. His war minister, Marshal Niel, had on February 20th, 1868, made a programme of armaments which was to be carried through within eight years. France was at that time in men, in money and in raw materials, much richer than Germany, and in 1875 Napoleon would have mustered an army of 480,000 troops of the line, and 320,000 territorials, numbers unattainable to the North German League. That he decided to go to war in 1870, though he well knew that he disposed only of 220,000 men against 350,000, was due to his and his General Staff's mistaken notion that the Prussian mobilisation would take many weeks, whereas his army would be—and was—ready in the first days of August. He felt perfectly sure of victory, expected only a short campaign after which it was his intention to make a generous peace and to conclude an alliance with Prussia, in which case he meant to offer her Luxemburg while he would take Belgium. All these were vain hopes owing to the rapidity and efficiency of the German mobilisation.

Napoleon intended to repeat the manœuvre he had so successfully executed in the Italian War, to march from Lorraine

southward along the German front—in the belief that the enemy would be too weak to thwart him—to join MacMahon's forces in Alsace and then cross the Rhine. Moltke's plan was now to send two armies against the French in Lorraine, while a third army, after beating MacMahon in Alsace, was to outflank the main body. He ordered the Crown Prince who was in command of the third army—the real leader was Blumenthal—to make haste. This manœuvre resulted in the battle of Wörth on August 4th, the twentieth day after war had been declared, in which the Alsatian army was completely defeated. The French troops performed wonders of bravery; but MacMahon, though a brilliant general, handsome, brave, cautious and experienced, was no great strategist and, above all, he disposed of only 50,000 men against more than double that number. It was certainly unfortunate for Napoleon and France that his best general, Adolphe Niel, had died before the war.

The battle of Wörth changed the face of things completely. The French perceived with sudden clearness that they had underrated the enemy's forces, and thenceforth fell into the opposite error of believing that the troops before them were even more numerous than they really were. Napoleon abdicated the chief command—for a time, as he thought—and entrusted it to Marshal Bazaine who had the confidence of the nation. While MacMahon re-formed his army behind the Marne, Bazaine was to lead the retreat of the main body and join him. It was to be a strategic retreat: in accordance with a former defensive plan, elaborated by General Frossard, further resistance was to be offered on the Marne. Now Bazaine was an average officer, brave but devoid of ideas, energy or resolution. Moreover the Emperor himself made matters worse by his parting advice: "Above all, run no risks!" Bazaine, in command of the army in Metz, made several plans, hesitated a long time, and finally decided to retreat on Verdun.

Fearless and ruthless energy and the so-called "*Offensiv-Geist*" (the passion for the offensive) have always been cultivated in the Prussian army. In his masterful book on Marshal Foch, Liddell Hart has brought out in strong relief the disastrous consequences which the "too absorbing devotion to the offensive" on the French side had in the World War. Daniels shows that in 1870 it was exaggerated on

the German side. He shows that the first serious battle of the war, the famous capture of the heights of Spicheren, was a mistake which might easily have had grave consequences; the battle of Colombey-Nouilly before Metz was equally superfluous, and both cost heavy losses. Such mistakes may be excusable, and even unavoidable, but they were still mistakes. Even William I complained that his generals seemed to have forgotten everything they had learnt, and did nothing but attack. General von Steinmetz—called the “lion of Nachod,” because in 1866 he had by sheer bravery and iron will forced that pass—was a bull, a man of energy and courage, but half mad and inordinately ambitious. Public opinion had forced Moltke to entrust him with the command of the first army; but he did so much harm by senseless orders that he had to be removed from the front and was given some command behind it. Prince Frederick Karl of Prussia, who was in command of the second army, was a glorious soldier, adored by his troops, a true leader of men, but no strategist. Incapable of grasping Moltke’s ideas, he made mistake on mistake, though Moltke, who was an adroit courtier and a psychologist, knew well how to lead the touchy prince by flattery.

The battle of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour against Bazaine’s retreating forces, on August 16th, was no victory. It was in reality a defeat, and but for the very intelligent measures of Lieutenant-Colonel von Caprivi—afterwards second Chancellor of the Empire, who then was staff officer of the tenth corps—would have been utterly lost. If Bazaine had taken the offensive instead of standing too cautiously on the defensive, he might have annihilated 45,000 men of the Prussian infantry, and it seems questionable whether after such a crushing defeat the Germans would have again attacked on the following day. Bazaine then could have continued his retreat, joined MacMahon’s forces at Châlons, and thereby averted the disastrous battle of Sedan.

On the next day both commanders-in-chief were in the dark. Bazaine imagined he had beaten not two army corps but two Prussian armies, and he thought that his path was now clear; whereas Moltke believed that Bazaine would retreat northward, in which case he intended to press the French army toward the Belgian frontier. This double error resulted in the battle of Gravelotte on the 18th, the fate of

which was in the balance for many hours. It was finally won by the Germans owing to a masterful manœuvre of the Crown Prince of Saxony, a most gifted general, who turned the right flank of the French army. This battle, which cost the German army 19,000 dead, seems to have been superfluous, as with his far superior numbers Moltke could have forced Bazaine back into Metz without firing a shot. After Gravelotte, Moltke changed his plan once more. He now decided to invest Bazaine’s army in Metz, expecting it to surrender within two weeks.

In the meantime the movements of the French offered him the opportunity of his greatest victory. The question has often been put how MacMahon could ever have made his impossible march westward. It was the political situation in France and French public opinion which forced his hand. With only four corps, which had just been re-formed after a terrible defeat, he was to join the five corps of Bazaine who, it was hoped, would break through the German lines. Napoleon as well as MacMahon were much too experienced generals to believe this feasible against the fifteen victorious German corps which moreover operated on interior lines. Napoleon spoke vehemently against it. But the war minister, Count Palikao, telegraphed from Paris: “If you do not relieve Bazaine in Metz you will have a revolution.” “Well, then, let’s break our neck,” said MacMahon. It was, as we often see in history, that men are conscious of doing the wrong thing and yet cannot help doing so and rush into destruction. After wearisome disorderly marches in pouring rain, and sensing, as troops always do, the hesitation and hopelessness in the souls of their leaders, the French fought with incomparable bravery. Their defeat was due as much to the political situation in France as to Moltke’s masterful strategy. On October 27th Bazaine capitulated in Metz; the siege had lasted exactly ten weeks. The German generals were surprised when they saw his fine troops, that he had done so little with them. Yet he was no traitor; his idea was that this war was lost, that peace had to be concluded, and he wanted to save the troops for a future war.

What followed was a long agony on the side of the French, hard times for the German soldier, and unexpected anxieties and difficulties for the German headquarters. Gambetta organised the *levée en masse*, a feat which the Germans had

never thought possible. To be sure, his enormous armies were badly trained and no match for the wonderful Prussian military machine. This was partly Bazaine's fault. Had he done his utmost, had he resisted three months longer, as according to the opinion of the experts on both sides he well might have done, these armies would have been different. Yet, even untrained, badly equipped, suffering from cold and hunger, they gave a great deal of trouble and remained a constant threat to the army that besieged Paris. Prince Frederick Karl and the Duke of Mecklenburg made several blunders on the Loire—which Lieutenant-Colonel von Stosch, sent from headquarters, had great difficulty in redressing—and General von Werder who operated in the south-east proved incapable.

The French had three very capable generals, Ducrot in Paris and, on the Loire, Aurelle de Paladines and his successor Alfred Chanzy. Faidherbe in the north and Bourbaki in the south-east were efficient enough to be dangerous. In December, Moltke feared that Ducrot would break through the German lines and that he would have to give up the siege. On January 9th, 1871, Prince Frederick Karl noted in his diary that he was tired of the war and doubted whether he could stand the strain much longer. On the same day Blumenthal found the Crown Prince—afterwards Emperor Frederick III—"very much depressed. His Royal Highness talked of peace at any price." Blumenthal himself became doubtful. Bismarck was furious. Moltke had indeed miscalculated the terms, but Bismarck considered Moltke's whole strategy mistaken. For a moment he thought of enthroning Napoleon III once more and concluding peace with him. Now more than ever he stood in fear of an Austrian or English intervention, which any serious German defeat would undoubtedly have provoked. It is well known that Carlyle's famous letter to *The Times* of November 11th, 1870, had made a great impression on English public opinion and, perhaps, prevented a decisive step on the part of the British Government, while the Austrians waited too long. Moltke alone remained imperturbable. A fortnight later the nine divisions in Paris capitulated and, on the very same day, the twenty-five divisions of Bourbaki were forced to cross the Swiss frontier. Yet, as Moltke afterwards wrote: "the severest trial, disaster, has been spared us."

The doubts and anxieties of the winter 1870-1, however, were soon forgotten. Moltke himself demanded that the work which the German General Staff composed on the war, "should be written in a manner that the prestige of the army was not shaken." The most modest and sober of men, in this case, sacrificed truth to politics. Daniels is of opinion that the "Hybris" of 1914, the idea "that to German troops nothing was impossible," was largely due to this policy. The "mediocrity" of 1914 he ascribes to other reasons.

Another noteworthy fact is the chivalrous and humane spirit of the German officers in this war. What French authors wrote on this subject was coloured by the irritation of the defeated. War is always terrible. Most of the German generals, Moltke himself, and especially von Goeben and von Fransecky, both eminent soldiers, were anxious to spare sufferings to the French civil population as much as possible. Neither ought it to be forgotten that when the German army of occupation left French soil on September 4th, 1872, Thiers, as President of the Republic, sent the Commanding General von Manteuffel a telegram in which he thanked him for his "humane and generous administration of the occupied provinces." The letters of the Generals von Voigts-Rhetz and Fransecky as well as those of Goeben are worth reading. "You know," wrote Goeben to his wife, "that though a true soldier and though I try to do the thing well when it must be, I am a man of peace. War brings terrible sufferings upon the unhappy people."

All these men were conservative, but they were unconsciously imbued with the spirit of liberalism and humanity which prevailed in that age and which seems all but lost in ours. This did not prevent them from performing truly great deeds and winning great victories. On the contrary, that same spirit did much to develop great personalities, and one may say that the time of the greatest achievements of the German army was also one in which the purely human qualities of its leaders were the highest.

KARL FEDERN.

## CIVILIANS AND WAR.

BATTLES and wars fill a large proportion of our history books, in spite of the fact that the decisions reached by them are frequently reversed by the less dramatic and slower acts of peace, but the historians only occasionally throw any light on the disastrous effects of wars upon the ordinary civilian inhabitants. Many people in this country, if not in others, think that the slaughter of civilians by bombing from the air has introduced a new element into warfare. The means employed, the aeroplane, is certainly new, but not the killing of non-combatants, which, on the contrary, has been a constant feature of wars since the dawn of recorded history. In this fortunate island there has been no devastating war since the incursions of the Danes, which ended early in the eleventh century. Since then there have only been dynastic or political disputes in which both sides have been careful not to excite the animosity of the populace, but other countries have not been so lucky.

Genghis Khan, the Mongol conqueror (A.D. 1162-1227), massacred whole populations, and some of the countries in Central Asia have never really recovered from his ravages. The following tale which is recorded of him throws a light on the mentality of such destroyers, even if it be not literally true: "One day in the pavilion at Karakoram, Genghis asked an officer of the Mongol guard what, in all the world, could bring the greatest happiness. 'The open steppe, a clear day and a swift horse under you,' responded the officer after a little thought, 'and a falcon on your wrist to start up hares.' 'Nay,' responded the Khan, 'to crush your enemies, to see them fall at your feet—to take their horses and goods and hear the lamentations of their women. That is best.'"

In 1240, thirteen years after the death of Genghis, the Mongols under his descendant, Batu, during an incursion into Europe blotted out the Byzantine city of Kiev with its golden domes. Here the torturing of old people, the ravishing of the younger women and the hunting down of the children ended in utter desolation, which was rendered more ghastly by the following pestilence and famine. The effluvium of the festering bodies was so great that even the Mongols avoided such places and named them "Mou-baligh" ("City of Woe").

Five years later, when Carpini passed through the Mother of Russian Cities, nothing remained but ruins and a few houses and survivors. It may be objected that the Mongols were uncivilised savages. But if Europeans have not indulged in such wholesale atrocities, they cannot be acquitted of similar crimes on a smaller scale. During the Hundred Years War, 1346 to 1453, the French and English nobility behaved to one another with remarkable chivalry, but the French populace was subject to arson, murder, pillage and rape. The French are said to have been worse than the English and the Burgundians the worst of all, although the Black Prince with his army of Gascons acquired a reputation for pre-eminence in these methods of barbarism.

It was an accepted military maxim, if it is not so still, that a walled city which did not surrender when summoned by an attacking army which had breached the defences, might be sacked if eventually taken. During the revolt of the Netherlands in the latter part of the sixteenth century the Spaniards sacked Mechlin, Naarden, Zutphen, Haarlem, Maastricht (twice) and Antwerp with every imaginable horror and outrage. The object of King Philip and his Governors and other principal officers was to cow the Netherlands and destroy their independent spirit; but in this they were quite unsuccessful, and the resistance was only strengthened until at last Spain, the greatest military power of Europe, had to confess herself beaten by the burghers and peasants of a small country. It did Spain no good to have encouraged the greed, vengeance and blood-lust of her soldiers.

In the seventeenth century Germany was reduced from a state of high civilisation to one of barbarism by the atrocities committed during the course of the Thirty Years War. The sack of Magdeburg in 1631 by the German Imperial Army under Tilly was described by Defoe in his *Memoirs of a Cavalier*. Defoe was of course a novelist rather than a historian, but his vivid account is a true representation:

The enemy broke in, took the city by storm, and entered with such terrible fury, that without respect to age or condition, they put all the garrison and inhabitants, man, woman and child, to the sword, plundered the city, and when they had done this, set it on fire.

This calamity sure was the dreadfulest sight that ever I saw; the rage of the Imperial soldiers was most intolerable, and not to

be expressed ; of twenty-five thousand, some said thirty thousand people, there was not a soul to be seen alive, till the flames drove those that were hid in vaults and secret places to seek death in the streets, rather than perish in the fire. Of these miserable creatures some were killed too by the furious soldiers, but at last they saved the lives of such as came out of their cellars and holes, and so about two thousand poor desperate wretches were left ; the exact number of those that perished in this city could never be known, because those the soldiers had first butchered, the flames afterwards devoured.

I cannot pretend to describe the cruelty of this day, the town by five in the afternoon was all on a flame ; the wealth consumed was inestimable, and a loss to the very conqueror. I think there was little or nothing left but the great church, and about one hundred houses.

Not long afterwards similar scenes on a smaller scale were enacted at Drogheda and Wexford during Cromwell's " pacification " of Ireland where racial ill-feeling was reinforced by religious intolerance. According to the *Cambridge Modern History* :

On September 3rd (1649) Cromwell appeared before Drogheda with 10,000 men. A week later he stormed the town, and put to the sword the whole garrison and not a few civilians, including every priest on whom he could lay his hands, in all about 2,800 persons. " I am persuaded," he wrote, " that this is a righteous judgment of God upon those barbarous wretches who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood, and that it will tend to prevent effusion of blood in the future, which are satisfactory grounds of such actions, which otherwise cannot but work remorse and regret."

As a matter of fact the sack of Drogheda, however it may be excused by the laws of war, was a most useless and unjustifiable measure—useless, because after the first terror had passed away it did not serve to weaken the resistance of a single garrison, and unjustifiable, because not one man of the garrison had in all likelihood been concerned in the massacre.

Cromwell's attempt to throw the responsibility upon his God shows at least that his conscience was not clear. In the wars of the eighteenth century and in most of Napoleon's campaigns it seems to have been recognised that it does not pay in the long run to excite the hatred of the inhabitants unnecessarily, but this consideration was not always effective

during the Peninsular War, as for instance when the French sacked Tarragona.

Sir C. Oman, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, says :

The fact that many small parties for a time barricaded private houses gave the French an excuse for something that almost amounted to the systematic massacre of non-combatants. All the larger dwellings were broken open, whether shots had been fired from their windows or no, and a great proportion of their inhabitants murdered. Of the 4,000 corpses which littered the streets of Tarragona more than half were those of civilians, and according to the Spanish official report 450 women and children were among the slain.

When Wellington took Badajoz from the French the slaughter of Spaniards was not on such a large scale, but in a sense it was worse, because the Spaniards were our allies, whereas the French were only in Spain to help them in the same sense as the Japanese now profess to be in China to assist the Chinese. Sir C. Oman says :

At Badajoz the outrages of all kinds passed belief ; the looting was general and systematic, and rape and bloodshed were deplorably common.

Old military tradition in all the armies of Europe held that a garrison which refused to surrender, when the breaches had become practicable, was at the mercy of the conqueror for life and limb, and that a town resisting was the natural booty of the stormers.

But perhaps the most eye-opening sentence on the subject is Wellington's official order of April 7th, 1812, issued late in the day, when the sack had already been going on for 15 or 18 hours. " It is now full time that the plunder of Badajoz should cease ; an officer and six steady non-commissioned officers will be sent from each regiment, British and Portuguese of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and Light Divisions into the town, at 5 a.m. to-morrow morning, to bring away any men still straggling there."\*

With reference to the subsequent looting at San Sebastian, Wellington said : " I am concerned to say that I never saw or heard of a town so taken, by troops of any nation, that was not so plundered." Nevertheless the barbarity and the un-

\* It was at Badajoz that one Harry Smith rescued a young Spanish lady named Juana de Leon, whom he married a few days later. In the course of a distinguished career in various parts of the Empire two towns in South Africa were named after them, Harrismith and Ladysmith.



wisdom of the custom became more generally recognised, but in the Indian Mutiny the ill-feeling, due to atrocities committed by the sepoys, caused a reversion to the old bad tradition, and at the storming of Delhi, Lucknow and other towns many Indian non-combatants were slaughtered, although few of them can have had any connection with the crimes committed.

Although the wholesale massacres of the inhabitants of captured towns and cities have naturally attracted more attention, the sufferings of the people in the undefended villages and open country have really been worse. In the days of small mobile armies it was usual for them to "live on the country," which meant that the foraging parties took without compensation not only food but loot. Incidentally, the soldiers only too often committed murder, rape and every sort of violence. The loss of life thus and by starvation was probably greater in the aggregate than in the comparatively few towns that were sacked. This behaviour is just as short-sighted as the other excesses; not only does it create lasting hatred, but it dries up the source of supplies. The celebrated war correspondent of *The Times*, Sir W. H. Russell, quotes an officer who was attached to Renaud's column during the Indian Mutiny, who told him "that the executions of Natives were indiscriminate to the last degree. . . . In two days forty-two men were hanged by the roadside, and a batch of twelve men were executed because their faces were 'turned the wrong way' when they were met on the march. All the villages on his front were burned when he halted. These 'severities' could not have been justified by the Cawnpore massacre, because they took place before that diabolical act. The officer in question remonstrated with Renaud, on the ground that, if he persisted in this course, he would empty the villages, and render it impossible to supply the army with provisions." Which is what actually happened.

Cromwell's worst deed in Ireland was not the sack of Drogheda and Wexford, but the "Settlement," in which great numbers of Irish were driven from their homes to make room for soldiers and speculators from England. The survivors took refuge in the wilds of Connaught, but problems were thus created which have not yet been solved, and indeed appear to be insoluble. Nevertheless we have now become accomplices of a similar deed in Czecho-Slovakia.

Quite early in the Great War it was apparent that the German military chiefs took the traditional soldier's short-sighted view of the advisability of terrorising the civil populations. And so there were numerous executions of civilians in Belgium, the burning of Louvain, and later the sinking of passenger and merchant ships at sight. Nevertheless, Germany lost the war, and these excesses undoubtedly contributed largely to that result. For they were the main cause of the intervention of the United States of America, and it was the appearance of large masses of fresh American troops, when Germany was already almost exhausted, that was one of the principal reasons for the collapse of the German armies.

Modern warfare differs from that of previous times principally because of the great developments in the methods of transport. The railway, the motor-car and the steamship make it possible to keep such enormous armies in the field that the whole frontier can be manned and entrenched, and armies can no longer manœuvre freely in enemy territory. They must now break through the defences first, but the attempt seldom does more than push back the lines of trenches. On the other hand the aeroplane makes it possible to deal death and destruction without occupying hostile territory at all. The claim is always made that they are only bombing military objectives, and that the killing of civilians is due to unfortunate accidents. There is, however, no agreement as to what constitutes a military objective, and an aggressive power takes a generous view of its nature. I have endeavoured to show that there is really nothing new about this terrorising of civilian populations, and that it always ultimately fails in its object, unless the aggressor is prepared practically to wipe out the population of the invaded country, as the Angles and Saxons did in Britain. The modern aeroplane plays much the same part as the old invading army. In China at the present time both methods are being used by the Japanese.

If I have taken a good many of my illustrations from English history, it is not that I think we have been more guilty than others of these barbarities. On the contrary, I believe the opposite to be the case. It is only to show that when our evil passions are roused we also are liable to "make war on civilians."

A. MARSHALL.

## FARMING DEPRESSION A CENTURY AGO.

### HOME COUNTIES FARMING 1816-36.

**T**ROUBLE in the farming community is no new thing. Ever since the population first outstripped the capacity of contemporary farming to provide the national grain supply, the difficulties of the farmer have been, spasmodically but certainly, becoming greater. All the developments in technique, chemical knowledge, plant breeding, have failed to enable the farmers to increase their output sufficiently. In their attempts to meet the first rapid increase of population they had the stimulus of war-time prices and restricted imports, but as soon as the wars ceased, and indeed just before, in bumper years their efforts had been so successful that prices slumped and farming plunged into an acute depression that lasted well over twenty years. During that period several Select Committees met to take evidence on the state of farming, and the evidence shows that although the farmers wanted Government aid—often they had no idea what form it could take—they were themselves doing their best to combat the depression. Emphasis then was mainly laid on the situation of the arable farmer and particularly upon the disastrous effects of the low price of wheat. This was because the wheat area had been widely expanded during more than two decades of war, and wheat was the main cash crop. Barley and oats were also sold off the farm, but are usually discussed in relation to wheat.

In the Home Counties both wheat and barley were cash crops, but it was mainly the wheat price that worried the witnesses. At that time arable farming was conducted, broadly speaking, on two systems: the wheat, beans, fallow rotation on the heavy clays, and the classic Norfolk four-course system of turnips, barley, seeds, wheat, or some slight modification, on the light land. Wheat-growing on light land was comparatively new, made possible some century and a half before by the introduction of the root-crop and clover and other grass seeds. It had been spreading slowly, with the aid of improved implements, during the eighteenth century, and the pace of its development was stimulated by the requirements of the long wars.

Several great landowners were protagonists of farming, amongst them the Dukes of Bedford, whose great annual gathering at Woburn was one means by which new ideas and new successes were promulgated. The efforts of this and similar meetings were very marked in this country and were felt throughout the civilised world. Such men were considerate landlords, and when every rural class was caught in the post-war slump were sufficiently wealthy to be able to do something to relieve their tenants. But the whole county was not under the Duke's control, and by April 1816 distress appeared in Bedfordshire. Farms had fallen out of occupation at Hatley, Haynes, Ridgement and Lidlington. In places tenants had sold up their crops clandestinely and fled; others were unable to buy manures, and arrears of rent were already alarming. Improvements were at a standstill, less stock were kept, flocks were being sold off and not replaced, and all the desperate remedies that farmers fly to in such conditions were being attempted. Prices had slumped heavily, capital values were down, and no one could see what to do about it.

Unfortunately no evidence about Bedfordshire was taken until 1836, when Thomas Bennett, steward to the Duke, and William Bennett of Lucy Farm (350 acres), near Dunstable, were called. By this time matters were a little easier because both farmers and landlords had been trying to help themselves. Some improvement had also resulted from the new Poor Law of 1834, some unemployed had been absorbed by the Birmingham railway then being built through the county, others had gone to the manufacturing districts, and this had helped to relieve the poor rates. The technical improvements the farmers had carried out in the twenty years, often with the help of the landlords, were draining the heavy clays to make them more easily workable and prolific in yield, and claying all the light land round Ampthill to improve texture. Still, however, the light lands were cheaper and easier to work and yielded more heavily. On the Duke's estate only eighteen bushels of wheat grew on clay, twenty-five on the light land. Elsewhere the disparity was greater, the yield on the clays being even smaller and far more uncertain. Since the clay farms were usually smaller than the light land holdings, the Bedfordshire farmers on the heavy clays "were in a pitiful state." Expenses were higher. Clays needed more force for working and usually had one year's bare fallow for

wheat, so there were two years' rent and taxes to charge against the crop, and yields were only two-thirds or less of those on light soils.

Nevertheless there had been some general improvements in the farming of the county and the output was greater in 1835 than before. It had not been possible to let the land go back to grass, an ordinary proceeding in bad times, because "it would not grass," but would produce more mutton and wool under arable cultivation. Men of capital, when prices began to look a little better in 1825, saw that stock was paying better than corn, and in "attempting to grow mutton and wool they have almost imperceptibly improved their land." Bennett estimated however that the fall in prices since 1831 on an average crop equalled the total amount of his yearly rent, and he was a strong advocate of the then most advanced type of husbandry. To eat off the turnips and seeds he kept 200 breeding ewes on 300 acres in a good year, but the turnip crop failed in 1835 and, although mutton and wool prices had improved, probably as a result of the devastation caused by the rot in the late 'twenties, it was not sufficient to balance losses on grain crops. In Thomas Bennett's opinion, the price of sheep and wool was all that kept the farmers going, and clearly, if his estimates are reliable, they could not have lived on the profits of tillage. The annual expenses on four acres of heavy land were £10 11s. 6d. and the returns £11 12s., a profit of 5s. 1½d. per acre. The ordinary three-course rotation had been modified here, half the bare fallow being sown with tares used for horse and cattle feed; even that innovation could not make it profitable.

The adjoining county of Buckingham had always been a grazing county, but there is a good deal of heavy arable land. On this land the same difficulties were being encountered, and immediately after the war, in two such widely separated villages as Sydenham and Fawley, men had been distrained for rent or forced to sell off their stock at a third of its cost. Few farms however become vacant. Here again there is twenty years' gap in the evidence, but in 1836 statements were obtained from men at Leekhamptstead, Beaconsfield, Amersham, Scotsgrove, and elsewhere. They said the wheat acreage was going down because the crop was unprofitable. Four horses were necessary to break up most of the land, but two could do the second ploughing. Rotations were not so

good as in Bedford, two white crops in succession being habitual in several districts. Occasionally half the fallow was sown with vetches. The arable indeed was worked on roughly the heavy land rotation, and although yields varied between sixteen and thirty bushels, several witnesses' accounts showed they were still losing money. One suggests that in the previous twenty years there had been two complete changes of tenants on the farms round Aylesbury and Buckingham. If so, each successive group came in at lower prices, and in 1836 the capital invested was estimated at only £7 an acre instead of £9 or more in 1816. These reduced values must have enabled the new tenants to cope with low prices more adequately.

The farmers here had not made improvements in order to overcome their difficulties. What they were doing was apparently to let the land go down. They had suffered greatly from the rot in the late 'twenties and had been unable to replace the flocks then destroyed. The county did not breed. It bought ewes at the great Weyhill sheep fair, lambed them down, and sold in the London market. When the rot destroyed the flocks the invested capital vanished. This was not the only disadvantage. The land itself suffered: sheep land renewed its fertility by grazing, and no more sheep meant that future crops were not nourished. There is no talk of field drainage in this evidence, and the county had not made comparable progress with Bedford. Though the four-course system is mentioned, most of the arable was still farmed on a less economic system. The flocks were smaller and the failure of the turnip crop in 1835 did not encourage farmers to buy in stores. Buckingham was farther from recovery than Bedford.

Hertford had enjoyed the reputation of being one of the best farmed counties in the kingdom on the eve of the eighteenth-century agricultural revolution; but it had not made so much progress—there was indeed not the room for it—as some other counties during the century. It had been mainly arable, producing wheat and barley in large quantities for the metropolitan market. In April 1816 the four-course rotation was no longer profitable, if 5 per cent. interest on capital was allowed. An account of 120 acres, producing twenty bushels of wheat and forty-eight bushels of barley per acre, shows a loss of nearly £20, but would have shown a profit of about £30 if no interest on the £1,000 capital investment had been allowed. This was disastrous.

At the same time rents were not being paid in Middlesex, but that county was in a rather different position. It contained wide heaths, parts of which had been recently enclosed or were about to be, and it also contained some of the most intensively cropped land in the kingdom. The large available supplies of stable manure from London made possible rotations involving so many as fourteen or more crops, the land being continuously under marketable produce. The evidence available was given to 1833 and 1836 committees by large-scale farmers.

Round Denham the clay had all been converted to grass because of the difficulties and cost of tillage, but the ordinary man on the lighter soils was working on a five-course rotation. Large flocks of sheep were folded and with the London dung kept the land in fine condition. Yields were not high, only twenty bushels wheat and thirty-two bushels barley. Henry Morton, who farmed 1,500 acres here, said there had been no improvement in the local farming since 1800, with the exception that cattle were matured earlier, an economy in keep.

At Bedfont, Heston, and Harmondsworth there were no fallows, again because of the London manure, and the farming was a species of gardening : forced cultivation by the expenditure of large capital. A farmer of 1,600 acres had been obliged to reduce his flock by half, to 800, because of the failure of the turnip crop in 1835, but thought a wider acreage of wheat was grown than formerly. Part of these farms had been enclosed from Hounslow Heath in 1804 and the land reclaimed. A brother was also working similar land. Neither was very despondent about the situation, but one Tillyer, who farmed 1,000 acres at Harmondsworth, said that many farms had failed round Ruislip. Nevertheless the same quantity of wheat was grown as there always had been.

In Berkshire the cold, wet land did not pay for ploughing by April 1816 and they were "endeavouring to get arable land into grass as fast as possible" if it was of that type. And the dairymen of the county were complaining of the prices they got for butter, cheese and pigs in 1821. Mr. Job Lousley said that the gross receipts of Blewberry, a parish of about 4,000 acres, had fallen from £18,000 to £12,000; so that the labourers were unemployed, tradesmen were applying to the parish for relief, shopkeepers and manufacturers in large towns without customers, except on credit. Lousley himself claims to have lost £500 on ninety acres of wheat in 1819, but

according to his figures he would have required a yield of thirty bushels an acre, double what he actually got, to produce a minute gain. Clearly he either overestimated his loss on the ninety acres of wheat, or underestimated the financial return on the whole parish in good times.

Things were little, if any, better by 1836, a high farmer at Watlington having made little or no profit in the previous ten years. The labour bills on his farm were large, but justified by the high yields obtained by working the land well. Indeed the witness estimates the yield of wheat at forty bushels an acre, nearly double the average then, and eight bushels higher than it is to-day. A flying flock of sheep was kept, but although the wool and sheep prices were fair, profits on the flock were consumed by losses on wheat. This was clear because the sheep were bought in the autumn and sold off the following year, so that what the wool and mutton fetched was included in one year's account. The recent outbreak of rot had not affected many local farmers, who had been lucky. They rarely bought rotten sheep, and although there had been some in the past ten years, it had not materially affected them; but it had reduced the supply of store sheep.

A fair price for barley but a deficient crop had not saved the situation. The same thing applied to beans and peas, and as the whole district was worked on the four-course system, or a wheat-and-sheep economy, the farmers could see no way out of their increasing difficulties. In one parish locally there were three farms and the total expenditure for labour and poor rates amounted to £2,036 2s. 8½d., the produce of 810 quarters of wheat only to £1,458, so there was a deficiency of £578 2s. 8½d. to be made up from other sources, none of which was sufficiently profitable to make it good, if we can believe Allnatt. Even high farming on good land in Berkshire was not paying at that time, and the farmers were in parlous case.

Surrey was in a similar position. Just near the metropolis was an area of market gardens that no doubt were solvent, but there is a wide area of poor land in the county and south of the hills the heavy land of the Weald was in the same plight as it was elsewhere. Farms at Cobham, Ewell, Wanborough, Godstone and Chessington were unoccupied or abandoned in April 1816. Ockham, Clandon, Esher and East Clandon were the same. At Wanborough dealers were taking back the sheep sold to the farmers "for want of payment."

Thomas Drewitt, a farmer and land surveyor, of Guildford, affirmed that a district of twenty miles round Guildford was still very depressed in 1833. His business gave him a wide knowledge of Sussex, Surrey, and Hants. To the south of the Weald farming was in a poor state; about Baynards it was as bad as possible; in the valley of sandy land before you come to Redhill it was much better, not having felt the effect of the reduction in the price of corn so much because the farmers had been able to keep more sheep; in the valley from Betchworth to Dorking, on the Wealdish clay, rents had dropped to from 5s. to 7s. per acre; between Albury and Dorking, a lighter soil, the land was worth twice this amount; round Petworth things were pretty bad; but at Epsom, a dry flinty soil, the land was rather sought after and was let at high rents; near Ripley and about Godalming on the light lands the farmers were comfortable.

To this general description Drewitt added a particular example. One heavy clay farm within a mile of Guildford was derelict, the house unoccupied. The land was very wet and the tenant, having lost a good deal of money, declined to renew when his lease fell in. The land had not been scoured but cropped fallow, wheat, seeds, oats, under the terms of the lease. The yield obtained was only twelve to sixteen Winchester bushels of wheat per acre, so there could not have been much profit in it. This was perhaps exceptional, but such lands could only find tenants at very low rents, much lower indeed than he ever remembered, and he had been a farmer since 1781.

In spite of Drewitt the sheep men were little better off than the heavy-land farmers. Mr. George Smallpiece of Cobham was a sheep farmer and dealer who occupied then 1,000 acres and had occupied more. The rot, introduced a few years before by sheep bought in Somerset, and the bad times had brought the farmers so low that they could not renew their flocks. He said: "There are many parishes that have not a sheep in them that used to keep 2,000 and 3,000 sheep; and there is no wool; the shearers in the county pack no wool." These parishes were principally in the Weald of Surrey and Sussex, and Kenley, Newhurst, Horsham, West Grinstead, Shipley and Billingshurst, are named as examples. Smallpiece bought store sheep at fairs in Somerset, Wiltshire and Dorset, to supply farmers in Surrey and Sussex, and some for Kent and

Norfolk. At Weyhill he had bought 10,000, about a quarter of the number offered. Smallpiece had been in this business for thirty years and supplied farmers on credit. When they had fattened and sold the sheep they paid him. He dared not take the risk in 1833, because so many farmers were practically insolvent. His great losses had forced him to restrict this trade. He says himself, "we used to buy from 50,000 to 60,000 and now we do not have above 40,000."

A great deal of sheepless land was unoccupied, and the grass was going to waste. One glaring example was a farm near Guildford. Another 400 and 500 acres within three miles of Farnham had been let for 1s. 6d. per acre. It was principally heavy clay, but there was some good grassland and a little hop ground. This farm had been advertised for two or three years before it could be let even at that small rent. The land had been spoiled, partly by over-cropping, and partly by bad seasons, but the worst damage had been done by high poor and other rates.

There were many others on the Weald. The farms were not in condition and nobody would take them. Many thousands of acres were, he said, going out of cultivation daily and people wanting to get rid of them in any way. He had himself given up a farm at Billingshurst on which the poor rate was 10s. an acre and the rentable value only 2s. 6d. These were lands that had always been cultivated, not brought under the plough owing to high war prices. Smallpiece did not think it would be possible to get tenants for them, because not one local farmer was solvent.

The arable in the Weald, if well cultivated, made very good wheat land; but was so much enclosed and so expensive to cultivate that it was not sought after by the poverty-ridden farmers. The wet seasons had helped to damage this land and the farmers had no money to maintain it. Ditches and drains were neglected. All the country south of Leith Hill, from Guildford to Horsham, was in as bad a condition as possible. This meant that the poor rates were increasing because each failure added to the burden on the other farms, and so Smallpiece feared that half the Weald would be afforested. Several farmers here had become paupers, and where the yield was ten to twelve bushels in wet seasons, eighteen in dry, this is not surprising.

From Bedford to Surrey and Sussex is a wide semicircle

round London that includes a variety of soils and physical configuration; but the great majority of it was still depressed twenty years after the wars. For the clay farmers there was little hope. High costs of working coupled with low yields put them behind the men on the lighter soils where the new system was followed. When the men on the lighter soil worked under a wealthy and considerate landlord like the Duke of Bedford, a good deal could be done to combat the worst effects of the fall in prices and, when costs and returns had adjusted themselves to the lower levels, men felt that the tide was turning and that they were getting back to prosperity.

On the dry lands too there was less damage to the flocks from the rot, although the loss of the turnip crop in 1835 was a blow to the returning equilibrium. Improved cropping however did a good deal to help out the farmers in Middlesex where there were readily accessible and ample supplies of London dung that enabled them to farm much more intensively than would otherwise have been possible. After the first years of depression Hertford does not complain—at least no one gave evidence before the committees. Buckingham, much of which relied upon grazing, was not in so bad a way, although at times the returns were not what they might have been. Those parts of the county under the plough were hard hit, because they had not adopted the most improved system. Berkshire, never very advanced, had still to adapt itself to the new conditions in 1836, and Surrey, with its wide areas of poor light soil and of heavy clay, had nowhere the good fortune of better placed men.

In spite of the continued complaints in 1836, however, the depression was lightening. Yields were probably improving generally, and costs were going down, so that if prices were still low, they were probably more remunerative than they had been twenty years before. And what is equally important in the two decades farmers' minds had had time to adjust themselves to a new scale of values.

G. E. FUSSELL.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

### DER FÜHRER SPRICHT.

“WHAT does freedom of public opinion matter?” asked Dr. Goebbels in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of February 4th last. One of the comforts enjoyed by the Minister of Propaganda is that he is always unanswerably right: because he himself, so to speak, fashions both the question and the answer. In this case he was laying down a law, namely that there must be no jokes in Germany; that those bright spirits who dared be funny in print about the country's rulers would be suppressed. He was doubly right. Not only was he the living proof that public opinion in Germany does not matter; but it is also obvious, on the ground of abstract truth, that governmental practice in Germany is beyond a joke.

Yet public opinion outside of Germany, and about Germany, does matter. Herr Hitler made a speech on January 30th last. The whole world listened to it. What public opinion thought about it, for instance in Great Britain, was a matter of importance to the peace of mind and to the business prospects of millions of people.

The occasion of the Führer's speech was the sixth anniversary of his appointment as Chancellor of the Reich. This year the oratorical ritual had been preceded in France and in Britain by an epidemic of “jitters” such as spectacularly illustrated the extent of Herr Hitler's capacity for upsetting the normal routines. A year ago the speech he made on the fifth anniversary of his reign proved to be the true prophet of what happened during that distinctive year, including the annexation of Austria and of the Sudetenland. Was he this year about to foreshadow a further achievement, and if so, what was to be the nature of the next emergency? Such were the doubts that caused the “jitters.” When Herr Hitler during the course of his speech made some remark about his expectation that “a long period of peace” was before us, the Stock Exchange jobbers put up their prices, but the more critical people read the speech between the lines and discovered various dark suggestions of troubles, varying in intensity with the reader's state of nerves. The most formidable of the fears inspired in the informed people was due to the impression

that Herr Hitler had smugly assumed a "long period of peace" because he expected to achieve his further ends without war, even though from his fortress he left the enemy guessing what such further ends might be; and that in tone he had treated France and Britain as second-class powers.

After the speech there was clearly recognisable a hardening of determination in influential British and French opinion to build up their military strength to such a point that Herr Hitler would be forced to alter the tone aforesaid. The symbolic climax of that process of hardening was reached on February 6th when Mr. Chamberlain, answering a question in the House of Commons whether a recent declaration by M. Bonnet, French Foreign Minister, was in accord with the views of the British Government, said: "According to my information M. Bonnet stated in the French Chamber of Deputies on January 26th that in the case of war in which the two countries were involved all the forces at the disposal of Great Britain would be at the disposal of France just as those of France would be at the disposal of Great Britain. This is in complete accordance with the views of His Majesty's Government. It is impossible to examine in detail all the hypothetical cases that may arise, but I feel bound to make it plain that the solidarity of interests by which France and this country are united is such that any threat to the vital interests of France, from whatever quarter it came, must evoke the immediate co-operation of this country."

That statement, falling from the lips of the man who had staked his political life on the cause of making peace with Germany, was recognised throughout Europe and America as the unqualified acceptance by the Anglo-French axis of the possibility of issue with the German-Italian axis and the clear announcement that in the event of such an issue arising (for instance in the event of an Italian attempt upon French possessions) the Anglo-French axis would be brought into immediate operation not only for issues affecting the continental frontiers of France but her colonial frontiers as well. Now the real importance of that clarification derived from the circumstance that since Munich German official opinion had believed that the programme of *Mein Kampf* in its anti-French aspect could be carried out in the confidence that Britain would not intervene in defence of France. In his speech of January 30th last Herr Hitler for the first time made

a point of eulogising his Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop, who is the great exponent of the doctrine that British opinion is either wholly and blindly pro-German or in the alternative is both unwilling and incapable of engaging in war for a major European purpose. It was Herr von Ribbentrop who was chiefly responsible for Herr Hitler's assumption in the weeks preceding the Munich crisis that Britain could be ignored as a potentially active factor. There is reason to believe that at Munich Herr Hitler was given ground for distrusting Herr von Ribbentrop's future advice. By January 30th he had equally obviously reverted to his pre-Munich attitude. Whether the statement made by Mr. Chamberlain on February 6th again caused any doubt to Herr Hitler's mind—or whether indeed the triple brass of his dreamer's front is vulnerable to any doubt of any kind—is a matter that only the future can reveal.

The interesting immediate fact appears to be that Herr Hitler's personal intentions or feelings are no longer regarded as an important factor in the prospect: in short, that Herr Hitler is now totally distrusted, that the worst is assumed of him, and that the cause of military preparation in Britain and in France is the only cause that any longer excites the concern of influential people.

It is none the less increasingly evident that in none of the four capitals principally concerned is there any expectation that the vast armaments now available will be used in an actual physical war. There is abundant evidence, not confined to the experience of Munich week, that Signor Mussolini neither can, nor wishes to, embark upon war; that Herr Hitler regards his "peace strength" as adequate to his purpose without the actual bombing of babies; that both Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier are bent upon the production of an answering "peace strength" such as shall be adequate to the trial of "shadow" force which is the modern method of conducting high diplomacy. The threat of force, backed by, as it were, a reserve of armaments, has become the lever in power politics, just as the gold reserve is the sanction for a paper currency.

The stage reached after six years of Hitlerism in Germany, is that the ambitions of the European Governments are frankly launched for the trial of strength; that conciliation, good will, reason, appeasement are no longer an operative



motive; that Britain and France are set to maintain what they have, against any bid by Germany or Italy to win them; but that the trial of strength is not expected on either side to need the physical arbitrament of war.

The successive stages whereby Europe has been launched on this unbusinesslike but not irretrievable form of mutual disservice are most readily indicated by the annual ritual of Herr Hitler's speeches. A distinction has to be made between his impromptu hysterical speeches and the prepared statements given out by him each January, which make rather sober reading in the retrospect. Herr Hitler is one of the world's "great" men in the sense that he calls the tune to which the world does in fact dance. Like Napoleon and all the company of such men, he achieves his gargantuan sway by the deficiencies of his mental equipment. They have one-cylinder minds, capable by their very lack of any other motive, of plunging madly ahead. No one with a sense of humour, for instance, could be a Hitler or a Napoleon. But the bull in a china shop, whatever one may think of his mental equipment, is formidable. Herr Hitler has no sense of humour. His own totalitarian suppression of such a quality (if it needed any more suppression than the alleged German propensity to making jokes needs suppressing by Dr. Goebbels) is proved whenever he opens his lips. On January 30th last, for example, he opened his lips and his first words were: "When, six years ago on this evening, tens of thousands of National-Socialist fighters marched through the Brandenburg Gate to the light of their torches to express to me, who had just been appointed Chancellor of the Reich, their feeling of overwhelming joy and their vows as faithful followers (*das Gefühl ihrer überströmenden Freude und das Bekenntnis ihrer Gefolgschaftstreue zum Ausdruck zu bringen*) . . ."

In its diplomatic aspect the world continues to jitter through the seismic disturbances caused, as a political routine, by men who behave as they do behave because they are capable of nothing better. That is one of the paradoxes. In its political manifestations the mass activity of the human race is dominated by individuals of a mean quality: whence perhaps may be deduced the lesson, among others, that political mass activity is of very little philosophic value except as the means of enabling the individual to train his own qualities of fortitude and patience.

Six years ago, on January 30th, 1933, Herr Hitler was appointed Chancellor of the Reich by President Hindenburg. Two days later (February 2nd) he said: "I ask for only four years; after that the nation can do what it will with me—crucify me if it likes"; and disclaimed any intention of fomenting trouble with other countries. "Anyone like myself," he said, "who knows what war is, is aware of what a squandering of effort, or rather consumption of strength, is involved."

After such a beginning the comedy duly played its first act. On January 30th, 1934, a special meeting of the Reichstag was held to hear Herr Hitler's first ritual speech, his account of his first year's office as Chancellor and his outline of further intentions. He indulged a little practice in his famous gift of scathing philippic (one of the easiest and least valuable of the intellectual gifts), on that occasion concentrating his invective upon monarchists and Marxists. On the subject of foreign affairs (which has been a characteristic field of his ambition) he announced that Germany repudiated all guilt for the world war, and that by joining issue with the Treaty of Versailles and demanding equality of rights, Germany was contributing to a solution of the economic problems of a world suffering from a lack of confidence. He regretted that Germany's relations with Austria were bad, and while dismissing as "absurd" the notion that the Reich had any intention of "coercing" Austria he went on to say: "But it is understandable that an idea which has seized the German people and stirred it to its depths would not halt before the frontier posts of a country which is not only German through its people, but has been for many centuries, as a German Eastern March, an integral part of the German Empire, and whose leaders have marched side by side with German regiments during the war." About France he argued the case for an understanding. "France," he said, "fears for her security. No one in Germany wants to threaten it, and we are ready to do anything to prove that fact. Germany demands her equality of rights. No one in the world has the right to refuse such rights to a great nation, and no one will have the strength indefinitely to prevent her." He ended his speech with this combined warning and promise: "I can only once again repeat to the world at this moment that no threat and no force will ever move the German nation to give

up those rights which cannot be denied to a sovereign state. I can however also give the assurance that this sovereign nation has no other wish than to apply joyfully the strength and weight of her political, moral, and economic resources not only for the healing of wounds which the past has inflicted on the human kind, but also towards the co-operation of all cultured and civilised nations."

The second anniversary of his Chancellorship was so satisfactory to himself that he was content with the issue of a simple manifesto. Only a fortnight before (on January 15th, 1935) the result of the Saar plebiscite had been announced. In the manifesto issued on January 30th Herr Hitler claimed that, in half of the time he had asked for as his trial period, two-thirds of his promises had been fulfilled. He added that no democratic government in the world could submit with greater confidence to the verdict of its people, and that the overwhelming majority of Germany's former adversaries had now changed their view of Nazi Germany, finding in her a country of honour, freedom and social happiness.

The third anniversary was an occasion for even greater self-congratulation on Herr Hitler's part. Before the actual celebration he made a speech (January 26th, 1936) to a rally of students from every part of Germany, in the course of which he let fall a phrase of self-revelation which explained his reliance on instinct as his guide in affairs. "The old German Emperors," he said, "welded the country together at the cost of tribal and regional independence. We are doing the same to-day. Many people ask why we are abolishing the German States. I can only answer 'I do not know why we are doing this. I only know that I must do it. You lose the past and gain the future.'" In the same address he made some observations on his inchoate philosophy about the white man's burden. "It is nowadays believed," he said, "that the task of colonisation is to make undeveloped peoples independent, but no one is eager to act on this belief by granting them independence. We must bear in mind that India did not send a deputation imploring the English to teach them how to walk. On the contrary it was the English who went out to India in order to teach the natives the correct British way of walking. This could not be effected without pain and trouble. In 150 years the aim was achieved, and the Indians learnt to

walk in the true British style. . . . The white race is destined to rule. It has the unconscious urge to rule. This urge arises from its heroic conception of life, which is entirely non-pacifist. After all, what a great statesman said is true, that the British Empire was built up by adventurers. To-day American professors dispute the justification of that conception, but when the white race abandons the foundations of its rule over the world it will lose that rule."

That year the actual celebration of the Führer's assumption of power took the form of an address in Berlin to the Old Guard of his S.A. He claimed that the German people had regained their unity, that Germany would never again relapse into the condition of ignominy she had had to pass through. Her strength, he said, lay not in any mechanical organisation, but in the ideological power of the Nazi movement. Some called it sound understanding, others called it instinct. He called it faith, confidence, conviction. A Nazi, he said, was not born, but was trained, and in the future there would come gradually into existence one people, one spirit, one will, one energy. Outside, they sought peace because they loved peace; but the world must realise that Germany would be peace-loving only if her honour were not touched. In the third year of the régime her honour had in fact been restored before the world. For thousands of years, he said, the German people had had to make sacrifices, too often in vain, in their fight to live. This time, he affirmed, their sacrifices had not been wasted.

It was the fourth anniversary speech of Herr Hitler that ushered in the ideological phase of the conflict between the German system and that of the democracies. He delivered his speech before a specially convened Reichstag on January 30th, 1937. A few days before he spoke an appeal had been made to him by Mr. Eden (January 19th, in the House of Commons) and by M. Blum (January 24th at Lyons) to abandon his policy of "national exclusiveness" and to take part in the work of international co-operation. It was in reality an answer to that invitation that Herr Hitler formulated on January 30th, 1937. He first made his usual survey of achievement in the four years for which he had originally asked. His totalitarian principles were quite frankly and without qualification paraded. "I was not an economic expert," he said, "and I have never been a theorist. I was

determined from the very beginning to exterminate such false conceptions as that which holds that economics may carry on an unrestricted and unsuperseded life apart from the State. To-day there can no longer be a free business life." He then announced that Germany's signature was now solemnly withdrawn from Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which contained the stigma, "extorted by force from a weak Government against its better judgment, that Germany was responsible for the war," and commented that "the restoration of the honour of the German people was the most difficult and the most audacious task and work of my life."

He then answered Mr. Eden and M. Blum in this formula: "As an equal State, Germany is conscious of her European task to co-operate loyally in removing the problems which affect us and the other nations." He protested that Germany was not in fact conducting an exclusive or isolationist policy, quoting as proof the friendly relations she enjoyed with Poland (with whom she made a treaty on January 26th, 1934,) Austria (with whom she made a treaty on July 11th, 1936), Italy, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Japan. Co-operation with Japan against the Comintern was featured as "a virile proof" that Germany was not bent upon isolation. Asked by Britain and France to co-operate with them for peace, Herr Hitler in effect answered that he was co-operating with other nations to that end. But he offered two positive declarations to the west of Europe: (1) "Germany, and I solemnly repeat it here, has declared that there can be no humanly conceivable object of dispute whatsoever between Germany and France"; (2) "The German Government have assured Belgium and Holland of their readiness to recognise and guarantee those States as untouchable and neutral regions for all time." In a later part of the speech he gave this assurance to Britain: "I have already tried to bring about a good understanding in Europe, and I have especially assured the British people and Government how ardently we wish for sincere and hearty co-operation with them." He expressed the hope that "the intelligence and good will of responsible European Governments will succeed, despite all opposition, in preserving peace for Europe. Peace is our dearest treasure." He tilted quite fairly at the League of Nations: "If it is to be the task of the League of Nations only to guarantee the existing state in

the world and to safeguard it for all time, then we might as well entrust it also with the task of guarding the high and low tide . . . its continued existence depends in the long run on the extent to which it is realised that necessary reforms which concern the relations of the nations must be considered and put into practice."

He next recalled, again quite fairly, that in the field of armaments limitation, it was Germany herself who had made offers and that with the exception of the Anglo-German naval agreement, those offers had been rejected. He quoted the offers in detail: that Germany and France should limit and reduce their armies to 300,000 men; that Germany, France and Great Britain should reduce their air forces to the same level; and that Germany and Great Britain should conclude a naval agreement by which the strength of the German fleet should be fixed at a ratio of 35 per cent. Herr Hitler now adopted an openly different tone. To Mr. Eden's suggestion that in future all States should limit their armaments to the strict needs of defence, he objected that a nation must be its own judge of what armaments it needed. In the case of Germany he said: "The estimate of the protective needs, and thus of the defensive weapons for our people is subject to our competency, and this is decided exclusively in Berlin."

Before he sat down he announced two further principles of German policy. The first was his acceptance of ideological conflict. The Treaty of Versailles, he said, had divided the nations into the two categories of victors and vanquished, the latter being deprived of rights. Now a second division had been brought about, "by the proclamation of Bolshevik doctrine, the chief feature of which is not to stay within the limits of its own nations, but to enforce itself on all peoples." The second principle was his claim for colonies. "Germany," he said, "has never demanded colonies for military purposes, but exclusively for economic purposes. To-day Germany lives in a time of fierce struggle for foodstuffs and raw materials . . . therefore the demand for colonies will ever and again be raised for our densely populated country." He added that "Germany has no colonial claims against countries which have taken no colonies from her."

Thereafter the tempo of what may be called Herr Hitler's campaign of expansion by verbal attack increased in spectacular strides. The fifth anniversary ceremony was conducted

in a very maelstrom of jittering disturbance. It had been arranged that he should give his annual statement to the Reichstag on January 30th, 1938. It was postponed. Before he delivered it, he carried through an army purge, dismissing such men as Field-Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister, and General Freiherr von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who were known to be "moderates." The speech itself, delivered on February 20th, 1938, is seen in the retrospect to have been wholly in keeping with what happened thereafter. Hence partly the reputation thrust upon him of being an uncannily efficient strategist, who knows ahead what he is going to do, and indubitably does it. Within a month of that speech he had annexed Austria, and within eight months he had annexed the Sudeten German districts, and a little more, of Czechoslovakia. He spoke 25,000 words, or one-third the length of an average novel. He first plunged into an historical record, not only of his own achievements but of the precedent fifteen post-war years, of the war itself, and back to Bismarck, his point being then summarised in the sentence: "When I entered the Reich Chancellery on January 30th, 1933, I was not the first to be called upon to save the German people, but the last. That means that there was no one after me, except chaos!"

More than half of his speech was taken up in a proud record, with statistics, of his "bloodless revolution" and the benefits, especially economic, thereby conferred upon the German people. He then worked himself up into a furore of foreign policy. "Germany's peace-time army is complete! A powerful German air force protects our homeland! A new navy guards our coasts!" He shouted those sentences in his characteristic crescendo of strident abandon which seems to have so toxic an effect on the German masses. In a tone that made ironic comment on the substance he cried: "Though I can assure the world of the German people's sincere and profound love of peace, I must assert, beyond all doubt, that this love of peace has nothing to do with feeble renunciation or with cowardice or dishonour. If ever an international campaign of hatred and defamation seeks to wreck the peace of our Reich, steel and iron will protect Germany and her people." He launched the anti-democratic ideological vendetta which was to be a feature of the year, representing it to be a German reaction against the perversion of the slogan "liberty for the

expression of personal opinions" into "liberty for journalists to slander and jeer at other nations, their organisations, men and governments, to their hearts' content." The passage that came afterwards to be responsible for Herr Hitler's reputation aforesaid came near the end of the speech, when he broached the subject of the *Auslandsdeutschen*. He said: "Over ten million Germans live in two of the States adjoining our frontiers. Till 1866 they were constitutionally united with the whole German people. They fought up to 1918 in the Great War shoulder to shoulder with the German soldiers of the Reich. Under the terms of the Peace Pact they were kept against their will from forming a union with the Reich. This in itself is sufficiently distressing. But about one thing there can be no doubt. The fact that they are now citizens of other states should not deprive them of their natural rights as members of a national community. Yet a people has the right to self-determination, as we were solemnly assured in Wilson's Fourteen Points which served as the basis of the Armistice. This cannot be overlooked simply because the people in question happen to be Germans! . . . We cannot dispute the fact that as long as Germany was feeble and powerless, she simply had to endure these persecutions of Germans across her frontiers. Just as England looks after her interests which cover a large part of the world, so also will the Germany of to-day look after what are by comparison her own restricted interests. And to these interests of the German Reich belongs also the protection of those fellow-Germans who live beyond our frontiers and are unable to ensure for themselves the right to a general freedom, personal, political and ideological." Yet no one could honestly argue that such words were a precise prophecy of what in fact took place in Austria and in Czechoslovakia during 1938.

And what of the latest ritual speech? On January 30th, 1939, Herr Hitler addressed the Reichstag to commemorate his sixth anniversary. We now saw him in a somewhat transcendentalised mood. Looking back upon the events of 1938, and speaking, as he put it, "before the first Reichstag of Greater Germany," he made this reflection: "We are indeed perhaps better able than other generations to realise the full meaning of those pious words: 'What a change by the grace of God.'" There is clearly something of a case for the contention that the lack of a sense of humour can be

worse than a personal misfortune. It apparently may amount to something uncommonly like blasphemy. True, it is not an uncommon form of vulgarity for politicians and for soldiers in action to arrogate the direct grace of God to their particular cause, loathsome as it often is; and indeed such perversions of a religious instinct are often sincere. But the particular perversion of Herr Hitler's draught upon the grace of God as responsible for a year's events which included the terrorist spoliation and desolation of 600,000 Jews is perhaps inconsistent with his own policy of prohibiting all jokes, good and bad alike.

For the rest, Herr Hitler's speech of January 30th last contained nothing that could even vaguely be called prophecy or intimation of his future plans, if he had any. He did say, in clear words: "I can say two things: (1) that we really are engaged in a tremendous struggle, making use of every ounce of the united strength and energy of our people, and (2) that we shall win this struggle completely—in fact we have already won it!" He also made one remark which was both sensible and justified in experience: "They have already paid far too much for their supposed military superiority, and the wonderful colonial possessions they took from Germany. Economically it would have been wiser to have reached a reasonable and prudent agreement with Germany."

Far from suggesting new claims Herr Hitler stated that "We may regard this process of growth of the German nation as virtually completed. The Greater German Reich now embodies our people's entire struggle for existence over two thousand years." He also said "Germany wishes to live in peace and on friendly terms with all countries, including America"; and "I believe in a long peace." Why not? Herr Hitler was obviously right when he claimed that "we have succeeded without bloodshed in finally constituting the great Reich of our German people." The remaining conflict is for the colonial spoils, a conflict that will never cease; but the interesting and even cheerful probability is that that conflict also will be conducted without bloodshed.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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## LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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### GUNS OR BUTTER.\*

Mr. Bruce Lockhart's latest book is less thrilling than the works which brought him fame, but it is in some respects more satisfying. He has reached middle age, has visited a large portion of the earth's surface, has studied human nature in many phases, has talked with celebrities, has reflected on what he has seen and heard. There is a certain mellowness, a certain steadiness, about his survey of central and south-eastern Europe which wins the reader's confidence in his judgments on men and things. He sets down his experiences quietly, and in dealing with highly controversial problems like the Nazi revolution he shows an unusual capacity to keep his balance.

The interest of his story is increased by the fact that the countries here described were already well known to him, and that he is able to note the changes which have occurred. In Yugoslavia, with which he begins, he discovers immense progress since the war, particularly in the development of Belgrad. The Yugoslav Premier has his critics, but Mr. Lockhart assures us that the burly Stoyadinovich was the

\* *Guns or Butter*. By R. H. Bruce Lockhart. Putnam. 10s. 6d.

right man in the right place. He kept on good terms with the Dictators, but he is not a Fascist. Prince Paul is attractively represented, but he possesses little power. British prestige has fallen, French prestige still more. Passing to Bulgaria we find, as we should expect, a warm tribute to Boris. "He is the cleverest King in the Balkans. He has immense physical courage and his personal charm is irresistible." His character is equal to his ability, and his country is lucky to have such a ruler. When we reach Bucharest, our author becomes slightly more critical. The Roumanians, he assures us, are by no means soft or effete, as is often believed; but "their culture is higher than their character." King Carol appears in brighter colours than usual. He sowed his wild oats long ago, and to-day he is one of the hardest workers in his country. He has no Fascist tendencies and is decidedly British in sympathy, but he is rightly cautious in his foreign policy.

Collectively Roumania makes on me the impression of a country with growing pains. It is, I think, a healthy child. With ten years of good nursing in the form of honest administration—and if King Carol can provide the years and the honesty, he will go down to history—I have no fears for its future.

The later chapters describe the arrival of Hitler in Vienna after the coup of March 11th, 1938, Czecho-Slovakia before the September crisis, and Berlin between the two great triumphs of last year. Mr. Lockhart knows and likes the Czechs and praises the statesmen who brought representatives of the German minority into the Cabinet in 1926. "But for Czech dilatoriness and the economic slump of 1929, which hit German Bohemia harder than any other area of the Republic, Activism might have succeeded." The Czechs treated their minorities far better than the Poles and the Serbs, and the Nazi stories of gross oppression were lies. But it is lamentable that Prague did not seriously endeavour to remove the grievances of the Sudeten Germans before Henlein was heard of and before Hitler had become the master of Germany. President Beneš told the author that he doubted if the majority of the Henlein party wanted to join Germany; but he added that, even if they themselves leaned towards moderation, they would carry out Hitler's orders.

The story ends appropriately enough with Germany, for

nowadays all roads lead to Berlin. We are introduced to Sir Nevile Henderson and Sir Ogilvy Forbes at the British Embassy, to the ex-Crown Princess and her son Prince Louis Ferdinand in her home near Potsdam. We listen to a speech by Goebbels, "the greatest master of propaganda the world has ever seen." We witness Dr. Silex, the well-known editor of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, arguing that Hitler is a pacifist "in the sense that he understood better than most people the danger and folly of a European war." Mr. Lockhart, like the rest of us, detests the barbarous régime, but he writes with restraint. He realises how strongly certain features of the system appeal to the young; he pays homage to the tireless energy of General Göring, "the chief organiser since 1932 of the Führer's triumph"; he emphasises the popularity of Hitler himself. It is not cheerful reading, and since the book was published last October the European situation has further deteriorated. Mr. Lockhart will doubtless soon be starting on his travels again. For the Dictators are making history at a great pace, and it requires no small effort to keep up with their stride.

G. P. G.

### THE TIMES' TRADITION.\*

The first volume of *The History of The Times*, published four years ago, concluded with the death of its great editor, Thomas Barnes, in 1841, and in this second volume the history is carried forward through a vital period in the journal's career to 1884. Like its predecessor, this volume has been contributed by past and present members of *The Times* staff who have had unrestricted access to the paper's archives. It covers a wide scope, dealing with the journal's internal domestic history, its place in the development of the press and its part in the politics of the period. "Nothing has been omitted, however unpalatable, that could contribute to a fair public judgment" of the fortunes of the paper and its producers.

The outstanding personality which permeates the pages of this volume is naturally that of J. T. Delane, whose long editorship of thirty-seven years ended in 1876. It is pointed out, however, that the influence of the Chief Proprietor, John

\* *The History of The Times*. Vol. II, *The Tradition Established 1841-1884*. 15s. net. *The Times* Publishing Co. Ltd., Printing House Square, E.C.4.

Walter III, has been much underestimated. Unlike his father, who left Barnes in unlimited control, he felt himself personally responsible for the paper's general political tone and "his influence over the leader page was marked and constant." Moreover, it was solely through his personal decision that after 1855 *The Times* resisted the popular "new journalism" and continued successfully its tradition as the complete, accurate and independent journal responsible only to public opinion and written, to quote a contemporary leader, "with as much life, spirit, classical taste as could be got for love or money." Between 1836 and 1855 the paper, with the assistance of its unique advertisement Supplement, had outrun its rivals; in 1850 its circulation was four times that of the other dailies combined. It enjoyed almost a monopoly of confidential political information, owing much to personal relationship with members of the Government, particularly to the friendship of Delane with Aberdeen. But the grant of information was not dependent upon the paper's support, which was always precarious. On the contrary, owing to Delane's masterly interpretation of public opinion and the Government's frequent dependence on *The Times'* exceptional foreign news service, the paper could demand private information though opposing official policy, as for example in the Crimean War after its break with Aberdeen. Such "despotism" roused inevitably bitter opposition. The campaign against, and repeal in 1855 of, the newspaper stamp tax is treated solely as an attempt to destroy *The Times'* power by its political enemies, albeit they used for such purpose radical arguments and propaganda. Viewed in historical perspective, tax repeal was both inevitable and just. It facilitated the rise of a provincial daily press and made the national penny daily a practical proposition. *The Times*, of course, at once felt the competition and lost its lead in circulation. With the remission of the paper tax in 1861 John Walter reduced the price to 3d. and resorted to greater yields from advertising and a lower profit to offset a remaining working deficit of £35,000. His action was justified, and the paper settled down to a period of commercial soundness though its circulation during Delane's last years was but a third of the *Daily Telegraph's* two hundred thousand.

For a newspaper that acknowledged only the authority of public opinion Delane was ideally suited in temperament

and outlook. "Lacking profound political convictions" he was interested only in events of topical and journalistic importance; he was "the living personification of the news sense" with wonderful powers of foresight and intuition. One rare exception was his opinion given three days before the declaration of the Franco-Prussian War, that peace would be preserved. Without premeditated views, Delane was frequently open to conviction within generally the broad limits of middle-class sympathies. In his close contacts with statesmen, particularly Aberdeen and Palmerston, he not only acquired a special inner knowledge of affairs and trends of policy but was clearly influenced himself. There was, however, the limit of public opinion; as for example before the Crimean War, when *The Times* forsook Aberdeen's pacific policy and swung round to guide and direct public opinion in its war-like frenzy. Much stress is laid in this volume upon *The Times'* reconciliation with Palmerston in 1855 on grounds of "journalistic prudence." After the break with Aberdeen and the loss of Reeve, with his connections, from the staff fresh contacts became essential and Delane sought and submitted to the spell of Palmerston though the latter never secured "a complete victory" over the editor. Delane was doubtless sincerely persuaded, although almost certainly with increasing press competition he could no longer impose his own terms; and after Palmerston's death the paper's "unique reputation for early and exclusive intelligence" was lessened by Gladstone and Russell.

That *The Times* could be influenced by its own, and also popular, prejudice was clearly demonstrated in its support of the South during the American Civil War. Its lack of detachment, deliberate appointment of biased correspondents, partial statements of fact and errors of judgment are condemned by the history, which points, however, to extenuating facts. Until Lincoln's Proclamation in September 1862 the issue of slavery was not clearly apparent, and at all times the paper "never wavered in its steady and powerful argument for European and particularly British neutrality."

It is barely necessary to add that the volume discusses at length the work and characters of the principal contributors and members of the staff during the period. The revolutionary developments in the gathering and transmission of news, particularly from abroad, are outlined and the work and



achievements described of its famous foreign and war correspondents, including W. H. Russell's exposures in the Crimea and H. S. de Blowitz's "scoop" in obtaining an advance copy of the Treaty at the Congress of Berlin, a feat which helped to restore to *The Times* supremacy in the field of foreign news which it had lost in the growing competition with the new popular press.

### POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS.\*

Mr. Russell finds social science defective in that it lacks a basic concept like that of Energy in the physical sciences. This defect is partly due to the rapid emergence of the idea of society as a subject for science in a period when economic advance in the production processes was the dominant feature of the age. Capitalism in industry, commerce and finance produced a utilitarian philosophy with a materialistic basis, progress conceived in terms of wealth as the source of happiness. In recent years the thinking of Karl Marx has come to play a leading part in the politics of large sections of the people even outside the Soviet system where it prevails. Economic determinism, though it does not altogether mould our politics, religion, social institutions, ethics, as Marxism contends, is everywhere recognised as a chief directing influence. Even the militarism which is to-day the most formidable exhibition of Power is seen to depend upon economic resources of the several Powers, more than upon any other single factor, but it cannot be taken as a separate mode of historic movement. Neither can one find in religion or in group sentiment in its growth from the family to the nation, or into humanity at large, the sole source of power. Russell makes an important distinction between social feelings and creeds resting on custom and tradition and the revolutionary exhibitions of which the leading examples are: (i) Early Christianity; (ii) The Reformation; (iii) The French Revolution; (iv) Socialism and the Russian Revolution. The element of force which was generated in these revolutions began with some fanatical belief but continued in the establishment of an intolerant régime which carried with it the decay of that Liberalism which gave initial value to the revolution.

\* By Bertrand Russell. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.

Though modern events have everywhere given increased importance to States and their Governments, there remain for consideration numerous specialised social institutions organised by like-minded individuals for their common ends which are expressions and sources of power. Many of these are economic, but others relate to religious, social, educational, recreative interests of men, mostly local in structure. Sentiments relating to the nation-State Mr. Russell finds fraught with peculiar danger at the present time. For "the chief activity of the State is preparation for large-scale homicide. It is loyalty to this organisation for death that causes men to endure the totalitarian State, and to risk the destruction of home and children and our whole civilisation rather than submit to alien rule. Individual psychology and governmental organisation have effected a tragic synesis, from which we and our children must suffer if we continue powerless to find an issue except through disaster" (pages 220-1). In his closing chapters upon "The Ethics of Power" and "The Taming of Power," Mr. Russell gives rays of hope from two sources. Power can be put to vitally benevolent instead of to destructive ends. Education rightly directed through teaching and propaganda can combat the injuries done by enlarged officialism and the falsification of power-politics run by interested politicians and military minded citizens.

This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help to create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (page 319).

### THE IDEA OF GOD AND SOCIAL IDEALS.\*

This is a valuable statement, of clear expression and balanced judgment. It is the triple product of expert theology, a sound grasp of general history and a long career of practical life. It ought to help those who feel oppressed by the thickening of Christian-Sociological books with their tendency to special pleading and obscure style.

There are four main divisions; introductory, expository,

\* The Beckly Social Service Lecture, 1938. By J. Scott Lidgett, C.H., M.A., D.D. The Epworth Press. 2s. 6d.

historical and recent. Dr. Scott Lidgett boldly faces the common secular criticism of the Church, that after two thousand years it has given only "doubtful and half-hearted benefits restricted to the elect." He goes on to consider the somewhat extreme forms of apologetic which have been provoked from Niebuhr and Joseph Needham. He criticises their too rigid divisions into orthodox and liberal, Greek and Hebrew elements. Historic Christianity harmonises these opposites and brings supreme values into relation with the time process. "Its 'treasure' is in heaven, but its immediate objective is on earth." The expository chapter gives deep perspective by portraying the Old Testament Idea of God in Abraham, Moses and the Prophets. Their conception of God's moral perfection has given powerful authority to social progress, unlike any of the other great religions. And these Old Testament strivings were fulfilled and perfected by Christ whose teaching "pierced to the depths of the spirit and the heart of men, whence the springs, motives and intentions of conduct arise." The succeeding study of history is full of illuminating generalisation. The efforts of the Church show no facile optimism. They must largely be estimated by the Parable of the Leaven, with its apparent insignificance. Allowance must be made for the pagan mass-acceptance of Christianity as a "mere external cultus." As a result of this the medieval Church used a threatening emphasis on judgment "to subjugate men to ecclesiastical authority and to terrify them into decency of life." Nevertheless the claim is justified that "despite all the disappointing features of its history, the Christian faith has, by its very nature, been philanthropic." The social attitudes of Luther and Calvin are briefly reviewed, but more space is given to the important humanitarian revival in Methodism and the thought of F. D. Maurice. The last chapter considers recent history where secular democracy appears to have supplanted the Church in social concerns. Yet the weapons of authentic Christianity are being unconsciously used, especially faith in a purposive universe. Some may feel that the age of Samuel A. Barnett is discussed too long and lovingly in comparison with the more secular present day. But the main emphasis is true and a very good counteraction to that short-term pessimism which hangs around us so fatally in the post-crisis air.

E. W. E.

### OUR PRESENT DISCONTENTS.\*

Dr. Inge's causeries in the *Evening Standard* have arrested a wide and varied audience, providing him with a pulpit, as he gratefully acknowledges, now that he seldom preaches. The latest collection of his utterances, *Our Present Discontents*, reveals afresh the secret of their appeal. He says not what a Dean should think, but what he does about social and international happenings. The prejudices which colour and confine his sympathies, intense where they exist, are so evident that he cannot mislead. The least sophisticated must realise that a fair picture of the Spanish War or the Labour Party and certain other phenomena are unobtainable from Dean Inge. He admits to keeping a list of his enemies and the most inveterate must admire his courage and sincerity. The scorn he lavishes on the political Left is also turned against their adversaries. The most redoubtable opponent of Roman and Anglo-Catholic claims, he has startled Roman Catholics by publicly joining in their campaign against Republican Spain and Communism. His testimony is never muffled. The public knows where he stands and why. He conserves much that is best in British tradition; fearless pursuit of truth, love of liberty and the elemental virtues without which it cannot exist, concern for the weak, when they strike him as such, though he fails notably at times to discern them. He hates persecution, cruelty, shams and the worship of "that grotesque fetish" the God-State, the menace of which he cannot take quite as seriously as others because it is so utterly immoral and insane. "Humanism," he concludes, "has modified Christianity and been modified by it. Both are factors in modern civilisation and they need not be enemies." "The aim of education," he truly observes, "is the knowledge not of facts but of values which are facts apprehended in relation to each other and ourselves."

The wise man is he who knows the relative value of things; the uncultivated man is he who, though he may know the price of every thing, knows the value of nothing. . . . There is an eternal order in which all the higher values—including human spirits—are preserved safe. "Nothing that really *is* can ever perish," said my favourite philosopher, Plotinus, in the third century. It is a reasonable faith, if there is a God.

\* *Our Present Discontents*. By William Ralph Inge, formerly Dean of St. Paul's. Putnam. 7s. 6d.

He wonders whether he would have been a Christian if he had been an educated Roman under the Empire and the reader wonders too. No reader can doubt his deep veneration for Jesus Christ and the acknowledgment of Him as Master and Saviour.

Whatever his subject, from "The Dead Past" to the contemporary "Problems of Divorce" and "The Servant Problem," such a writer is bound to be educative. But a root cause of our Present Discontents he appears to underestimate, namely the effort of Man to adjust himself to a transformed environment, that created by the Industrial Revolution and the practical applications of science. This transformation involves radical economic readjustment, the justice of which the writer ignores. It is being attempted under forms abhorrent to Christianity; but there are profound Christian thinkers who cannot disregard or caricature just claims. Because so many Christians can, they help to alienate the multitude from the Master they try to serve, but not their Master from the multitude.

D. P. H.

### L'EXTRAVAGANCE CULINAIRE

SOYER.\*

Incredible and fantastic as one of his own confections, with whipped cream and garniture on top, and solid goodness below—such is the life of Alexis Soyer (1809-58). Mrs. Morris presents it (or, may one say, dishes it up?) in a manner to delight every palate. The popular author of *The Gastronomic Regenerator* and other best-sellers of his day is known to all as the presiding genius of the Reform Club kitchens, the introducer of Gallic delicacies to stodgy Victorian menus, the inventor of the "magic stove," and sauce, that bear his name. But it may come as a surprise to some readers to find him personally superintending soup-kitchens for the starving Irish and East Enders in the "hungry forties," and going out, at his own request, to the Crimea, where his voluntary services transformed the scandalously inadequate cookery arrangements for the wounded and sick: Florence Nightingale looked on him as an invaluable ally. Eccentric in dress, an inveterate punster and practical jester, an enthusiastic

\* *Portrait of a Chef*. By Helen Morris. Cambridge University Press. 1938. 10s. 6d.

patron of the theatre, childishly conceited, improvidently generous, Soyer is shown to have been a conscientious hard worker, beloved by his friends of all ranks, and a most devoted husband; the early death of his wife, a charming and accomplished English girl, who had won fame as a portrait painter, was a lifelong grief to him. Thackeray's *chef* Mirobolant, in *Pendennis*, though inspired by Soyer, is merely a caricature of his more ludicrous characteristics. One of the most extravagant achievements of his career is the amazing "Gastronomic Symposium of All Nations," which he instituted in Gore House during the Great Exhibition to supplement the very spartan feeding arrangements within the Exhibition building; the account of the decorations of this restaurant and of the amenities it offered reads like a fairy tale. Another magnificent occasion was the banquet offered to Prince Albert and the Lord Mayor of London at York, when the decorations, as well as the food, were entrusted to Soyer, and were, like it, astonishing. Some of Soyer's recipes, in which "expense was not considered," are quoted; they leave the reader gasping, and Mrs. Beeton nowhere. But he seems to have been equally able to concoct delicacies out of a few rudimentary ingredients. Soyer loved to introduce complimentary or emblematic features into his confections, or ingenious devices by which one food counterfeited another. Besides his stove, he invented various practical aids for the housewife. The illustrations in the text are all in character, and as entertaining as itself.

E. G. S.

### LATIN AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY.\*

This work is by an undisputed authority. All students of the subject are familiar with Professor Kirkpatrick's admirable treatment of it in the *Cambridge Modern History*, and elsewhere. Information, which has hitherto been dispersed throughout a great number of volumes, many of them far from accessible, is now brought within the two covers of one book, and whoever masters its contents will know (with one important exception) all that is necessary for the ordinary man. Latin America consists of twenty Republics, and the total area is three times as great as that of the United States.

\* By F. A. Kirkpatrick. Cambridge. 1938. 18s.

The population is about a hundred millions. It is clear, therefore, that even this large volume of 456 pages is barely large enough for the task of presenting such a vast and variegated subject.

The author has, perforce, to deal very briefly with the establishment and history of the Spanish Empire, which is a most fascinating subject. It is important to remember that this Empire lasted nearly as long as the Roman Empire—from Augustus to Romulus Augustulus, and its success was very remarkable. Unfortunately such of our textbooks as treated of the history completely misrepresented it. They confused the cruelties of the conquistadors and mine exploiters with the acts of the Spanish king and his ministers. These consistently pursued a wise and humane policy, always protecting the Indians, and they established schools, missions, and universities. Elsewhere Professor Kirkpatrick has said: “although the laws of protection and tutelage admit the impossibility of treating Indians like white men, yet from 1542 to 1600 Spanish legislators aimed at making them equal to Spaniards by ordering the abolition of every kind of serfdom and of all forced labour, and enjoining that negroes should be substituted for Indian workmen.”

It is instructive to compare the fate of the Indians from Mexico to Cape Horn with that of the aborigines in North America, Australia, or Tasmania. And while every Indian race has been preserved, the Spanish influence has impressed itself indelibly upon the vast mass. *Mens agitat molem*. “The Spanish essence is predominant and pervasive,” says Professor Kirkpatrick. “Montevideo is Spanish to the core,” said Cunninghame Graham. And Spanish culture has been scrupulously preserved from age to age. The author well says: “Every capital contains a leisured aristocracy, well-groomed, pleasant in speech and manner, preferring to more active occupations the truly human recreations of conversation and informal intercourse. In every capital there is a prolific and usually well-written newspaper press.” Full justice is done to the marvellous physical features of the vast continents. We have considerable towns, perched on heights little lower than the summit of Mont Blanc, and approached by broad-gauge railways. There are tropical swamps and forests where noxious insects make life intolerable. There are the great open pampas grazed by countless cattle and sheep.

There are huge rivers navigated to a distance of 2,300 miles by ocean-going steamers. We have Lima, close to the Equator, with a mild and pleasant climate, and not far away the Nitrate Pampas where, perhaps, one inch of rain falls in ten years.

There is one serious defect—the fine literature of Latin America is totally ignored. The barest mention is made of the great poets Olmedo, the Ecuadorian, Bello, the Venezuelan, and none at all of the still greater Ruben Dario, the Nicaraguan. Ignored too are the historians and novelists. Our people totally neglect these things. Not so the people of the United States who study and comment with zeal and success. Such ingenious and polished peoples deserve study through their literature.

W. A. HIRST.

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## SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Emil Ludwig's latest book, *A New Holy Alliance*,\* was finished before the September crisis, but the argument is strengthened by recent events. Its thesis is that the German Dictator is a danger to peace and civilisation, that he understands nothing but force, and that, to use the popular phrase, he will go on till he is stopped. Unlike many English critics of the Nazi system, the author maintains that, with certain exceptions, it is exactly what the Germans like. “Hitler and Germany are no longer to be thought of as separate entities. The German nation has chosen its leader. . . . The overwhelming majority support him because his nature is akin to theirs.” This is a harsh judgment, but Dr. Ludwig quotes in support Goethe's verdict on the German people, “so estimable as individuals and so despicable as a nation.” What Hitler's subjects think of him to-day it is difficult to guess, for the penalty of criticism is the concentration camp. Many readers of this striking little book feel that the author is not altogether fair to a great people, who receive high marks for their intellectual life alone, and that he underestimates the growing dislike of a ruthless autocracy. Herder described Germany as the land of obedience, but nations, like individuals, get tired of being ordered about. The only remedy for the sickness of the world, in Dr. Ludwig's opinion, is the formation of a new Holy Alliance, captained by England and France, relying on the economic and moral support of America, and joined by most, if not all, of the States who are

\* Robert Hale. 3s. 6d.

threatened by aggression. Would such an association of armed defenders, even could it be organised, suffice to prevent aggression? He cannot say, but at any rate nothing else will. Concessions, we are told, only increase the voracious appetite of the aggressors. He inclines to believe that Hitler's Germany will plunge us into war and end like the Napoleons. "Full of hatred, she stares out into a world which she herself has thrust away." In striking contrast to the extreme severity of his judgment on the German people and its rulers is his leniency for Mussolini, who, he believes, is enough of a realist to escape the fate reserved for his greatest disciple.

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The Rev. J. Wesley Bready has recently published a very important volume on *England Before and After Wesley*.<sup>\*</sup> His work is the fruit of seventeen years of extensive research that was made possible for him as a Canadian by the establishment of a research fund, actively supported by the late Prime Minister of Canada, the Rt. Hon. R. B. Bennett. This work is the culmination of previous endeavours which have been published in a book entitled, *Lord Shaftesbury and Social-Industrial Progress*, and a succeeding volume on Dr. Barnardo. This volume on the need for and the permanent effects of the evangelism of Wesley confirms and expands the works of recent authors who have explored and expounded from different points of view the spiritual, moral and social conditions of England before the Methodist Revival and afterwards. The momentous, comprehensive and permanent effects of the Methodist and Evangelical Revival in creating the England, and indeed the British Empire, that we know, have now been clearly recognised and amply set forth. Dr. Bready's volume sums the matter up with admirable documentation, clear exposition, and arresting emphasis. The book can be confidently recommended for its painstaking thoroughness, and is certain to be useful as a book of reference, not only to the immediate heirs of the revival but to historians of the period.

J. S. L.

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A book of beautiful plates, *Things Seen in the Hadhramaut*,<sup>†</sup> from Miss Freya Stark's photography has been issued as a result of her last visit to Southern Arabia in the Lord Wakefield Expedition. Apart from an introduction there is very little reading matter, just enough opposite each picture to tell what or where it is. There are fine figures of men and women at work, of camels in the desert, of animals of various kinds, especially a lizard which was subsequently eaten and tasted "rather like chicken," but above all there are the beautiful buildings, ancient mosques, fortresses, palaces, gateways with their carvings and mouldings, hitherto unknown to travellers since the days

<sup>\*</sup> Hodder & Stoughton. 10s. 6d.

<sup>†</sup> John Murray. 21s.

when there was a regular trade route for incense. "The Southern Arabs have a natural feeling for beauty of line," says Miss Stark, and that is quite evident in these pictures. Miss Stark's book, *The Southern Gates of Arabia*, published in 1936 (John Murray) should be read alongside this collection which illustrates so many of the places visited on her wonderfully adventurous and interesting journey. The human sympathy of the author makes the country appear so friendly; all the more as a system of truces has now been extended to cover the whole tribal district, which over 1,300 rulers have signed. Travelling is still very difficult, so that few can follow in her footsteps except in imagination, but here are the aids to it.

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Miss Caroline Robbins has performed a useful service to students in editing *The Diary of John Milward*.<sup>\*</sup> As an elderly country gentleman from Derbyshire, who had fought for the King in the Civil War, he was a Member for his county during part of the Cavalier Parliament. His diary covers the short period September 1666 to May 1668, and is largely a painstaking journal of parliamentary business. It contains no startling revelations and nothing to alter general historical conclusions. A large part of it is concerned with local and private legislation and the *minutiae* of business in the Commons. Upon some important topics, however, such as the Clarendon debates, the Fire of London and the Irish cattle question, the diary illustrates or throws some added light on our existing knowledge. Moreover it is interesting as a contemporary record of the Commons in their daily work, for its references to parliamentary leaders and as expressing the outlook of one who was typical of a large section of opinion.

Another diary of the same period but of a very different character has been re-edited and published in its entirety by Dr. William L. Sachse. *The Diary of Roger Lowe* was compiled between 1663-74 and is the record of a young Presbyterian apprentice and shopkeeper living at Ashton-in-Makerfield in Lancashire. Being of a vigorous and sociable disposition and in constant demand as the local amanuensis Roger Lowe made many contacts and his diary reflects in many ways the life, interests and outlook of the lower classes. The editor describes it, perhaps rather extravagantly, as "a word picture, crude and patchy in places but drawn from life, of seventeenth-century rural Lancashire." Although the great national events of the period are rarely, if ever, mentioned the effect of the Clarendon Code on the nonconformists is clearly shown, and Roger Lowe's references to the difficulties and tribulations of the dissenting clergy, whom he actively helped, are not the least interesting entries in the diary. It is also notable, as the editor points out, that a worldly and even convivial nature was not deemed incompatible with a staunch nonconformist belief.

<sup>\*</sup> Cambridge University Press. 21s. net.

*Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 1789-1938*,\* is a new edition of the well-known short history by Professor A. J. Grant and Professor Harold Temperley. The general narrative has been brought up to the end of June 1938, the part dealing with the war and post-war period being largely new. The pre-war years 1895-1914 have also been revised in the light of the new material available. There has been added a supplementary chapter on the Czecho-Slovakian crisis, including its historical background in the Peace Treaties, by one of the authors whom we may reasonably speculate as being Professor Temperley. He finds even a little virtue in the Munich Agreement; "a concession to international control and to the forms of diplomacy is always preferable to assertions of naked force." The Ukraine is regarded as the next most probable object of German expansion. The writer does not entirely despair of the League. "So long as its machinery continues to function . . . there is always a hope that its political influence may revive." Ultimately the democracies may well be driven to construct and work a system of international law and morality.

Miss Frances Pitt's new book, *Wild Animals in Britain*,† is designed as a guide for identifying the animals of our countryside, but actually it is a great deal more. Concise descriptions of each species are followed by life-histories and character studies, which are generally based on personal observation. Our mammals may be well known by name but their personal habits are not common knowledge. The fox, the badger, the hedgehog, the squirrel, mice and rabbits are known a little in theory at least; but the wildcat, the pine marten and polecat, the shrew, and bats (except in flight), are merely names to townspeople. Miss Pitt's sympathetic understanding of animal life combined with scientific knowledge gives her book particular interest. Many of the animals described, such as the wildcat, the fox, the otter, the mole, the shrew and the squirrel, she has kept as pets, and so has had additional opportunities for observation work. The book is illustrated with one hundred excellent photographs which give further interest to a delightful volume.

The annual *Constitutional Year Book*,‡ now in its fifty-third edition, continues its career as a valuable repository of knowledge on political and constitutional matters. In this 1939 edition there has been an extension of information provided concerning government and other public bodies. The usual features of this excellent volume are continued, including the useful statistical tables upon economic and social questions.

\* Longmans. 15s. net.

† Batsford. 8s. 6d. net.

‡ Harrison & Sons Ltd. 5s.

## THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

APRIL 1939.

### THE RAPE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

IN 1933, the first year of the Nazi régime, an eminent British diplomatist remarked to a visitor in Berlin: "The conditions here are not those of a normal civilised country, and the German Government is not a normal civilised Government and cannot be dealt with as if it were." Close observers realised this from the first, and now at last the whole world has learned the lesson. The latest convert is the Prime Minister. The Munich period is over. A Gentlemen's Agreement is only possible between gentlemen. After the seizure of Austria and the German districts of Czecho-Slovakia Hitler repeatedly declared that he had no more territorial ambitions in Europe. There seemed just a chance that, in Mr. Chamberlain's words, we might have peace in our time. It was a false dawn. The pogroms of November were followed by the brigandage of March, which history will brand as it has long branded the invasion of Silesia by Frederick the Great. Europe is littered with the broken promises of a Dictator who has trampled law and liberty underfoot and who recognises nothing but brute force.

The pan-German phase melts into the still more sinister mood of aggressive Imperialism. Drunk with power, the Führer exchanges the rôle of the deliverer of oppressed Germans for that of the enslaver of alien races. Napoleon trod the same path, which ended at Waterloo and St. Helena. We must be prepared for further shocks, fresh aggressions, perhaps for a second world war. The end of our troubles is not in sight, but we know what it will be. The Nazi soap-bubble, swollen to a monstrous size, will burst. The frontal attack on the principles and practices of Western civilisation will fail. Democracy, the Jews, the Churches will outlive their deadly foe. Czecho-Slovakia will reappear. England and France will attack no one, but, standing firmly together, will resist assault. They will receive the moral and perhaps the material support of the United States. The sorely tried German people, sharing to the full the universal longing for peace, is losing faith in its rulers. *Qui trop embrasse mal étreint*. There is no reason for us either to surrender or to despair.

THE EDITORS.

## PIUS XI AND PIUS XII.

THE most touching moment of the life of Pius XI was that of the day before his death, when he asked his doctor to enable him to live till February 11th, in order to read or to have read his Allocution to the Italian Bishops who had been summoned to Rome (and already nearly a hundred had arrived) for the tenth anniversary of the Lateran Treaty. This Allocution, which would have remained historic, he himself had written and corrected the previous night; maybe it was this effort that hastened his end. We do not know what the document contained; but from his speech to the Cardinals on Christmas Eve, on the violation of the Concordat by the Fascist Government's laws against marriages with Jews and foreigners, we may deduce the spirit animating Pius XI and the reason for that solemn assembly. This episode recalls another, when, at Christmas, 1936, after a grave illness that was believed to be mortal, from his very bed he wished to broadcast his message of peace to the whole world. The fact is that Achille Ratti was always a man of will, an iron will tempered by rigorous bodily and spiritual discipline, formed in a labour and responsibility all his own. This gave the colour to his pontificate, which has been said to have been too personal. His collaborators were more or less subalterns and executors (apart from Cardinal Pietro Gasparri); the initiative remained with him alone, and often, too, the elaboration and practical details of his acts of government. Through this his pontificate may be considered as an inward experience on the Pope's part, made through successive phases which, though not all equal, were all imbued with the will to respond to his lofty task, not so much through the tradition of the vast Roman ecclesiastical organism as through a continual effort of personal comprehension.

In the first year of his pontificate, Pius XI was faced with two acute problems in the relations between Church and State: Russian Bolshevism and Italian Fascism. With the first he never abjured contact, in order to mitigate the persecution of Catholics (and, indirectly, also that of the Orthodox Church), and to ensure for Christianity a minimum of toleration and a certain possibility of penetration. We may recall the mission sent to Genoa during the International Conference of May and June in 1922, in order to establish

contact with the Russian Delegation. This did not prevent him from denouncing "atheistic Communism" (as he defined it in his encyclicals), which has spread over the world both through the propaganda of the Third International and through the hard conditions of the worker, due to unemployment, to the various post-war crises and to the enormous pressure of capitalism.

The most notable document of the papacy of Pius XI was the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* (so called to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the publication, in 1891, of the encyclical of Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*, On the Condition of the Workers). A vigorous criticism both of capitalism and of Marxism, in the name of moral principles, with a new impulse towards a more humane and Christian social order, such was its spirit. It has been quoted in the Senate of Washington as in the French Chamber, and may be said to have taken its place in economic and social studies as one of the clearest, most serious and decisive documents of the present crisis. Unhappily many have given far more weight to its anti-Communist criticisms than to its positive teaching on social reconstruction. It has been said that Pius XI was so preoccupied by the spread of Bolshevism as to have been drawn towards Fascism and Nazism, favouring them in the belief that they were possible political solutions of the social crisis; and that, becoming later aware that both contained anti-Christian theories and practices, he ended not only by denouncing their errors but by suffering persecution from them. The guiding idea of Pius XI in fixing the relations between the Church and modern States was that of concordats, as comprehensive as possible. These therefore implied such co-operation between Church and State as to be always an exchange of services for mutual advantage. Differences of period apart, he renewed with Mussolini and Hitler the type of concordat between Pius VII and Napoleon.

With Italy the Roman question was still open. The Holy See had never accepted the *fait accompli* nor the Law of Guarantees. The encounter of two strong-willed men like Pius XI and Mussolini, in an authoritarian situation like that of the Fascist régime, was highly propitious for a final solution. The Lateran Treaty was juridically the work of Pietro Gasparri, but politically the work of Pius XI. With the Concordat, which Pius XI declared to be an integrating and



indissoluble part of the Treaty of Conciliation, it was believed that the Catholic character of the Italian State would be assured. Whether this construction will last longer than that of the "Guarantees" (which lasted nearly sixty years), history will show. Whether the Pope to-day is freer in his Vatican City than in the Rome of the Liberals is a question rather of fact than of law. Juridically, indeed, he is the sovereign of a symbolic State, but morally a mere wish or threat may make him the besieged prisoner of a hostile government.

Since the Conciliation the Papacy and Fascism have twice confronted each other. The first time was in 1931 when the Catholic young men's clubs, on a word of command, were raided and sacked, their members maltreated, their papers and banners confiscated. The Pope protested by the encyclical *Non abbiamo bisogno*, which sounded the condemnation of the anti-Christian theories of the totalitarian State. Then came a kind of *modus vivendi*, bringing a certain tranquillity. The other clash has been over the racial and antisemitic laws introduced into Italy last year, against which Pius XI, up to his last day, did not cease to raise his voice. A passage in an address he gave on July 15th is very moving. After speaking of the plain conflict between "an exaggerated nationalism and Catholic doctrine," he added—says the official report\*—"that he had never thought about all these things with such precision, with, he would almost say, such absoluteness, with such a great intransigence of formulas. And since God had given him the grace of such enlightenment, he wished to enable his sons to profit by it, since they all had an especial need of it in these days when similar ideas raise such a stir and do so great a harm. That very day, precisely, he had learned something very grave [it was the day of the proclamation of Italian racialism]; it was henceforth a case of a real form of apostasy. It was no longer merely one idea or another that was false, it was the whole spirit of the doctrine that was contrary to the faith of Christ."

This confession that he had never before thought with such clarity and absoluteness about the modern errors of racialism, antisemitism and exaggerated nationalism (as an apostasy from faith), is the sign of the profound sincerity of so eminent

\* *Osservatore Romano*, July 1917, quoted by the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, Louvain, February 1939.

a man burdened with such grave responsibilities. He had already several times and in other documents spoken against such errors. It was during his pontificate that in 1928 the Holy Office formally condemned antisemitism. In the first years of his pontificate he spoke against exaggerated nationalism. In 1931 he condemned the theory that man is made for the State, affirming on the contrary that the State is made for man, that the State is only a means and human personality the end. All these themes were gathered up in the encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* of March 1937, in regard to the anti-Christian persecutions in Germany in the name of racialism.

The course of events is strange: the Pius XI of the Lateran Treaty (1929) and of the concordat with Hitler (1933) passed, for certain currents in the democratic countries, as an ally of the dictators. The Pius XI who condemned the *Action Française* and exaggerated nationalism (1926), antisemitism (1928), capitalism (1931), the totalitarianism of the State (1931), racialism (1937), and who proclaimed the Church as the defender of liberty (1938), is denounced by the German press (and also by the extremist press of Italy) as a political pope, influenced by the "Judeo-Masons" who, they maintain, dominated "in the Secretariat of State." Pius XI was accused of having favoured Italy when she attacked Abyssinia, or of having been on the side of General Franco in the Spanish War, by those who to-day extol and acclaim him in the Left press and in the French Chamber as the Pope of Peace. The fact is that events have sped with such rapidity and with so disconcerting a rhythm as to render the orientation of public opinion difficult, and hence that appreciation, in its true sense, of what the Holy See could or could not do, if it were not to compromise either the moral principles of which it is the guardian, or the practical situation in regard to the States, so as to avoid the unloosing of religious persecutions.

The attitude of Pius XI towards the Spanish Republic was not only one of toleration, but of recognition and will to co-operate, with the hope of a new concordat or *modus vivendi*, till, on the outbreak of the revolt, thousands of priests and religious were massacred and during the terrible days of mob frenzy the Holy See asked in vain of the Madrid Government for a word of repudiation. A few days later, in

his address of September 1936, Pius XI had truly touching words of paternal pity for the perpetrators of such massacres. When it becomes possible to write the objective history of the attitude of the Holy See in the two wars of Abyssinia and Spain, sifting it from the imprudent and excessive manifestations of the nationalist Catholics and self-styled "crusaders," then maybe an historical truth will emerge which to-day is darkened and distorted. It will be seen that the Pope sought to maintain a just mean, rather as a father than as a political judge of the wars. Maybe it will be said that he allowed bishops and clergy to be carried away by national passions. Was not this the case in the Great War too? The problem is too delicate to be cursorily treated in the present article.

Now that Pius XI is dead, we may sum up his pontificate under four main headings: A remarkable impulse given to missionary labours, with methods of a real renewal; a decisive affirmation in favour of Catholic Action as a lay apostolate side by side with the Hierarchy, inspired by the example of the apostolic period; a decisive experience in the relations between the Church and the totalitarian States, from which it may be deduced that the totalitarian State by nature tends to substitute itself for religion, as a community deified in the power of the head; finally, a greater sympathy, or at least a diminution of preconceived mistrust between the Roman Catholic Church and the other Christian churches, to-day brought together (especially in Germany and Russia) in a common defence of the principles of Christian morality and civilisation. Of this the moving testimony of the heads of the different churches to the memory of the dead Pontiff is a proof.\* Such is the inheritance that Pius XI left to his successor.

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It seems plain that the Conclave by its speedy choice of Cardinal Pacelli wished to assert a continuity of policy with Pius XI, and that Cardinal Pacelli, in taking the name of Pius XII, meant not only to pay homage to one who had chosen him as Secretary of State and appointed him *Cameralengo* of the Church, but also to indicate a solidarity of government. For a century the Vatican has had a kind of

\* His last act for England, for which he had so great an affection, was the appointment of a Legate Apostolic to represent the Holy See at the British Court.

alternating government; two currents of opinions succeeded one another. It is not that between one Pope and his successor there was a conflict of programmes or ideas—the Church has her dogmas, her traditions, her structure—but the papal governments have their inevitable human side, which receives its imprint from each Pope. Pius XI started as liberal, whereas Gregory XVI had been anti-liberal; Pius X accentuated the conservative trend, whereas Leo XIII had accentuated the democratic trend, and so on.

Will Pius XII attenuate the position adopted by his predecessor on nationalism, racialism and antisemitism? From the theoretical standpoint this is utterly unthinkable: there can be no conciliation between a pagan conception of life and the Christian one. Thus too there can be no going back on the instructions given by Pius XI to the Catholic Universities and Seminaries, by his Circular Letter of April 13th, 1938, on such theories. But from the point of view of practical emphasis, maybe we shall see a pause, a breathing-space with the new Pope. There is a difference of psychology in the state of mind of one who believes he has reached the last days of his pontificate and his life, and wants up to the last to do his duty as first witness of the truth and teacher of the faithful, and that of one who sees a new period, maybe a long one, stretching before him, and therefore, humanly speaking, has time at his disposal.

The first address of Pius XII may be taken as characteristic. He made it on March 3rd, to the Cardinals when they were still in Conclave, after what is known as the "Third Adoration." He spoke of peace, for which his predecessor had so much worked, exhorting men to a Christian peace "as the fruit of charity and justice," a "peace in the conscience of every soul . . . peace in the family, united in the love of Christ . . . peace between all the nations in brotherhood, mutual help, friendly co-operation and the cordial comprehension of all the human family under the eyes and protection of Divine Providence." With these words his appeal to all the heads of States had a significance of Christian and human benevolence for all, without political distinction.

Pius XII has an understanding of the problems of the present hour throughout the world, and a personal experience of Vatican administration such that from this standpoint it would have been impossible to find a man better prepared.

One of the most interesting traits of his personality has been a kind of childlike candour that made him beloved of his masters and superiors, together with a sure penetration of problems and a firm decision in their resolution. Sometimes it might be said that there prevails in him at once the critic who sees on all sides the good and the evil of reality, and the man of government who seeks the conciliation of those fragments of good that reality, in the concrete experience of the moment, presents, on the contrary, as opposed and irreconcilable. But, rising then above contingency, he reaches what the philosophers would call a transcendental resolution, that is, not a practical compromise but the higher value that imposes itself. This and nothing else can be the attitude of a Supreme Pontiff, as that of the apostle, as that of the prophet. Thus alone will the Pontiff overshadow the diplomat and the man of inspiration the man of a purely human government.

Notwithstanding Cardinal Pacelli's remarkable qualities as diplomat, he was able to temper them with those of the priest, for above all he has always been the priest of truth. In his letter, in the name of Pius XI, to the Social Week held by the Catholics of France last July, he wrote as follows :

It should be said first of all that the State is all the better organised when the co-operation of its citizens for the common good is achieved with a greater respect and a greater increase of the qualities proper to man ; for the civil order is not that of tyranny and slavery, which deprives the members of the body social of the rights proper to human nature, or which regulates their exercise in such a manner as to make of the citizen a mere instrument of the despotic authority.

It is here not a case of merely human philosophy ; in these lines there is the grandest Christian tradition.

This tradition to-day has an immense part to play in public opinion. Even the non-Catholic and non-Christian currents of opinion are glad to see its beneficent influence in insistence on the fundamental truths that are at the basis of our civilisation. In the present crisis this task has become urgent. In the conflicts of the hour the word is no longer left to science, to philosophy, to art ; to-day faith in " Progress " (as the past century proclaimed it) has completely vanished. The moral values of shaken humanity must be restored ; there is a quest for a new orientation. To restore peace to the world

is not a matter of political compromises, it is above all the affirmation of a human and civil solidarity made up of understanding and charity. In the flood of hatred between races, classes, nations, the word love which Christ brought as fire from heaven is the only one that can reorient the world.

This was the *leit-motif* of the address of Cardinal Pacelli, then Papal Legate, to-day Pope, at the close of the International Eucharistic Congress of Budapest in May 1938. " This love," he said, " must be above all a feeling, an intimate motion of the heart, a decided and far-reaching will. But from the silent will, known only to God, must be released day by day, hour by hour, the loving working that in the small and great units of human society will bridle and overcome the conflicts, hostility, egoism." (*Osservatore Romano*, May 30th, 1938.) This word of love cannot be other than that of Christ ; a creative word, renewed from age to age as men move onwards in history. To-day it is the only word that can set a barrier to all the overweening pride, the grasping avarice, the frenzied hatred that has been let loose. Only brotherly love, commanded as was commanded the love of God, can save delirious humanity.\*

LUIGI STURZO.

\* The emblem chosen by the Pope for his coat-of-arms is significant—a white dove bearing an olive branch.

## HOW SPAIN'S WAR ENDS.

IN an article which has already become famous, the Madrid correspondent of *The Times* recently summed up the history of the Spanish Republic, culminating as it did in that of the war. In measured words, with that judicious evenness for which he is famous among students of Spain, he assessed the record of the Republic : its failure to attain even the comparative efficiency of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, its tolerance of crime, its attack upon the Church, including the Catholic institutions for charity, for teaching and research, and finally its connivance at terrorism and murder. When the army chastised those faults of the Republican leaders, the faults were not cured but exaggerated. The Republic in spite of its resources proved itself unsuccessful at waging war. The traditionally desperate bravery of the Spanish character, its stubbornness, and the support of the feeling of the Left from all over the world sustained for more than two years the efforts of the Republicans, but as *The Times* correspondent says, all competent observers had decided, more than a year ago, that Franco must conquer in the end. Indeed the bloody battles of Teruel and the Ebro, while deluding many sympathisers with the idea that the war was a drawn game, had proved Franco's energy in attack, even against strongly fortified positions, gallantly held, with all the defensive resources of contemporary warfare ; the battle of the Ebro, as it drew towards its end, proved to be the culmination of the struggle already a year before decided in Asturias. In those bitter autumn months, the flower of the Republican army fell. Its resistance was broken. Then for five weeks Franco prepared for the conquest of Catalonia, preparing by a thorough examination of the *terrain*, by an accumulation of munitions and commissariat, and by the careful massing of 300,000 men under efficient commanders. Then, two days before Christmas, after a biting wind had hardened the ground, with the massed strength he had slowly collected, he swiftly struck.

His procedure was a combination of the methods he had employed among the mountains of the northern coast, and over the rolling hills south of the Ebro. At first he subjected the enemy to a violent bombardment which destroyed their outposts, then their communications were broken by an

aviation which had from the beginning been undisputed mistress of the air. Finally came the combined attack of infantry and tanks. By these means Franco would bring a weight of attack to bear upon an unexpected point. Having broken the line with no very heavy loss in men, he would rush his force forward to a point of vantage already selected. He was there helped by their extraordinary skill in manœuvre. They would capture the heights of the region by an unexpected approach for which no preparation seemed ever to be made. Then from this commanding position, he would strike back in zigzags taking defended positions in the rear. And in a short time the advanced troops would find that their retreat had been cut off.

So for seventeen days Franco developed his attack according to plan. In practically every detail it proved successful. Striking along the Segre river from Balaguer in the north, from Lérida in the centre and from Seros in the south, he progressed steadily over lower and higher hills till, on January 6th, his troops advanced to capture on the main road from Lérida to Tarragona the little town of Borjas Blancas, already destroyed by bombardment from the air. It was only in that quarter that he was behind his schedule : for there the Italians had been less successful. But by that time the last fight for Catalonia was virtually over. Resistance collapsed. As one travelled over those main roads after the advance of the national troops one found that the machine-gun nests which commanded the ascents of the road had not been molested : there was no sign of resistance, except for broken bridges. I had read in an English paper of Mont-Blanch, after desperate resistance, being taken by bombardment from the east with the aid of machine-guns. But on arrival there one found no sign of any battle whatsoever. Proceeding for hundreds of miles in the wake of the advancing troops, one never saw a wounded man, or an ambulance returning. At last on January 23rd General Rojo advised Señor Negrín that his army refused to offer resistance, and that Barcelona would fall within three days. A panic suddenly fell upon the men in control and their supporters. Burning some but not all of their papers, they fled precipitately, and the roads and villages of Northern Barcelona became the scene of hideous confusion. No preparation had been made to receive the fleeing and famished people, amounting to well upwards of

375,000. Of these 225,000 were troops, and 150,000 were civilians. Of the civilians 68,000 were children. Of the troops 75,000 have returned to Franco. A million and a half civilians remained behind in Barcelona.

These figures invite the most careful cogitation. They point to the present attitude of Catalonia, and in short to that of all Spain. For from them one can also assess the state of mind in the Madrid-Valencia zone. What they mean is this. That two-thirds of the army, hardened by obstinacy and the subject of propaganda, holds desperately out. The other third fought against its will, its heart being on the other side. As for the civilians, over 90 per cent. had no impulse to flee from Franco. Of the 10 per cent. who feared and hated him, nearly half were children.

I afterwards talked to some of these refugees in Angoulême and Poitiers. They were an incarnation of that spirit of resistance which has been called *La mystique du côté rouge*. I asked them what their plans were. They told me to return to Spain as soon as Franco was conquered. With an unwavering faith not wholly dissimilar to that which inspired the glorious resistance of the Alcazar of Toledo, they refused to envisage the overwhelming fact of their defeat. So it had been month after month in Barcelona. When the struggle had long since been decided they were still obsessed with the conviction that they must conquer. Seldom able to point to victory in the field, they based their faith on four hypotheses reaching beyond Spain. They convinced themselves that the opposing forces were mostly Germans and Italians, and that this being so, France would intervene; that there would be a general election in England, and that a Labour Government would declare war on their behalf; that Czechoslovakia would occasion a general conflagration in which France would be against Franco, and even, in their desperation, they believed in what had been freely given as the war commenced, but long since reduced to a minimum, direct support from Russia. Their attitude was typical of the range of the popular front: while some declared themselves republicans fighting for democratic institutions against fascism, others proclaimed, with the shrillest insistence, that they were "red, red, red as blood." But in one impulse all the refugees were united. It was hatred of religion. There was not one who did not turn the back at the salutation *Adiós*, because it mentioned

the name of the Almighty. They announced that France was not godless enough for them, and that their eyes turned either to Mexico or Russia. Such was the militant mood to which they gave recognised expression as they shook their clenched fists in the air. None were fiercer in their tones than the girls: not ill-nourished, and in fact splendidly handsome—for they had had advantage of those charitable efforts which had worked so admirably to save the children of Barcelona—they proclaimed undying hatred for God and Italy.

When one came into Barcelona, one found that this reflected the propaganda. When the National troops came in they at once plastered on the walls the portrait of Franco. And the Generalissimo was seen gazing blandly—if a little triumphantly—at posters which said "Down with fascism!" or called on the proletariats of Catalonia to join with those of the world in fighting the Italians. Proceeding up to the firing line north of Barcelona, one came face to face with these invaders. But for a white lapel which the artillery wore on their tunics, and a different head-gear, they were indistinguishable from the Spaniards with whom they were fighting. But to tell the truth, their presence was hardly more welcomed on the National side than on the Republican. Their corps' transport, designated as the *Cuerpo de Tropas Voluntarios*, had accordingly on all its gear the letters C.T.V. But this was expounded by the grudging Spaniards into *Cuando Te Vas?*, which, being translated, is "When will you get out?"

And indeed one often wondered why they were retained. They provided the enemy with his most successful propaganda; they produced disquiet in the National movement. They immensely weakened Franco's case abroad. And what difference did they actually make in the campaigns? Their numbers were guaranteed to me by the highest neutral authorities as certainly not more than 25,000, and probably much less, when the advance into Catalonia began: in fact the number always given to me from sources that in other matters I found reliable was 16,000. Of these a certain proportion became casualties. But they could not possibly turn the scale in a campaign when Franco had 300,000 men for Catalonia alone and where, as we saw, after three weeks of victory, there was no further fighting.

Their enemies will say that they are being kept for political reasons. But how can a force so insignificant affect the

political situation? Far more probable reasons for their remaining are that Mussolini does not want them to return till he can make capital out of the rout of communism in the Mediterranean: and that Franco retains them out of that obstinacy of loyalty and pride which are such strong ingredients of Spanish character, to show his front against the revindications of the "democracies." To this must be added the fact that they are also bargaining counters, *if Paris and London persist in giving them a political importance absolutely unjustified by either their numbers or their driving power.* However these things may be, they were not allowed to enter Barcelona with the National troops. Nor did the German gunners, though they fired the last shells of the attack, at a bridge at San Feliz de Llobregat. It was made perfectly clear to the people of Barcelona that all that was involved was unity with Spain.

One of the most curious things of the war is the fact that all over Catalonia, even in the very prisons, the people were aware of the facts so sedulously hidden from them by Republican propaganda. They might read of splendid order and magnificent morale, of resistance gallantly maintained, but they knew exactly how rapidly Franco's troops were advancing, and long before the advance from the Segre began they had made sure of the result. In fact so certain of defeat had their leaders become that even a year before they had dug trenches before Barcelona. The idea of digging trenches before Burgos, or even Saragossa, would have seemed to the people there absolutely fantastic. But the fact was that, though the Russian influence had been withdrawn, though the ideals were avowedly Spanish and Republican, and though the control—at least to outward appearances—had lost all the grimness of the months of anarchy and murder with which the war began, the people of Catalonia had no heart in the struggle. Over a year ago I heard from Catalans abroad that 90 per cent. were already against continuing the war. In August 1938 the military attaché of a great neutral power, not sympathetic to Franco, wrote in a letter, which I have seen, that the desire of the people in Barcelona, as indeed on the Ebro and at Valencia, was for peace at any price.

And what was Franco's Price? The Republican propaganda insisted that it was bloodcurdling reprisals on a black

list of no less than 2,000,000 men. Franco said that it was complete conciliation for all other than those who in normal courts of law were found guilty of crimes. This assertion of Franco's was also known to the masses of the people, and they waited with a confidence, or rather an impatience, that turned to a delirium of joy when at last the National troops marched into Barcelona. As they advanced along the great avenue which runs down from Pedralbes, the people poured out to greet them with a welcome so intense, so vibrant, so touching that one seemed to have left the common earth for a city of which the gates were a single pearl and where the streets were paved with pure gold. There were a number of journalists, Englishmen, Italians, Germans, Frenchmen, Americans. They all agreed that they had never in their lives come near an experience of such poignant enthusiasm. It was a joy that spread through every village of Catalonia, and as one drove on through that beautiful country, with its wild mountain heights, its views of flashing sea, its distant glimpses of the white Pyrenees, or the blue saw of Montserrat, its olives, its smiling vineyards and gardens, its pearly bloom of almonds, its flashes of yellow gorse, one saw in the people's faces and heard in the shouts a revival not less gay than the spring gave to their beautiful surroundings. Everywhere alike the witness was the same: Why had deliverance been so long in coming? How they had longed for Franco's victory!

The sentiments were so warm and the expression was so general that it would have been invidious to doubt it. But one could not help asking how long this feeling had been nurtured in their hearts. Was it the growth for example of those three days of interregnum in Barcelona after Negrín had fled and before Solchaga had arrived? I sought for the views of responsible neutrals, such as consuls, on this question. The answer was that the Catalans had decided long since. First business had declined, and then food had been short; and then even separatists had decided it was not worth while. But a great number had been horrified by the original excesses. One young officer told me that he had never taken the slightest interest in politics, one way or the other, but when he saw the atrocities he escaped over the Pyrenees to France, and then back again into Navarre, to fight for Franco. One French journalist who came in with the

National troops had been in business in Barcelona when the war began. "And did you see much of these atrocities?" I asked him. "What I did see was enough for me," he answered. "I saw three little girls hung up by their feet from a railing, their tummies slit open with a razor."

Such scenes cut deep. But they were not the determining factor. Certainly the Republicans never punished those crimes, but they did succeed absolutely in preventing their continuance. And when they had done so, the issue turned on other factors which if less dramatic are in reality more momentous. The first of these was religion. It was, of course, in the first wave of crime, when arson was the fellow of sadism and murder, that the churches had been destroyed. But no attempt was ever made to reopen them. In every village, though no other sign of war was generally to be seen, the church was wrecked. Either it was a heap of rubble, or else it was a damaged ruin with the entrances bricked up. With the exception of the Cathedral, all the churches of Barcelona, including that magnificent memorial of navigators and seamen, Santa Maria del Mar, which had been the inspiration of Columbus when he set out to discover America—all had been laid waste. Their monuments had of course been lost to civilisation; but that was not the greatest loss. To the people of Catalonia the churches were something of which few tourists dream: they are the palaces of the poor, palaces which open to welcome them, where faith and imagination entertain them as bride and bridegroom and in their train the most august presences of the spiritual world. Nay more, they were the background of the touching drama where the Divine Redeemer receives them into mystical unity with Himself. From all this they were cut off. They could eat no longer of the Bread of Life.

And because the unseen and the seen are interdependent, this spiritual deprivation was accompanied by physical hunger. The order by which they had received each day their daily bread, that broke down also. In fertile Catalonia men and women were everywhere starving. Of all the indictments that could be brought against the government of A'zaña and Negrín, this was the one that crushed them. It is indeed curious that an administration compounded of democracy and communism into a popular front should be so disintegrated by anarchy into confusion that it left a

prosperous people rapidly to starve. Of course in other parts of Spain it is true that the great food areas where the peasants live their traditional lives rapidly rallied to Franco. But Catalonia has great areas of fertile fields; and yet in every village as one came in after the retreating Republicans there was the same starvation.

Franco knew and made his preparations. For days before every city in northern Spain had been adjured to make sacrifices for their brothers in Catalonia. And a great wave of Spanish generosity rewarded the expectation of the Catalans. Food was rushed in, even though every bridge was blown up. Credits enabled every business to start again. And in this atmosphere of gratitude for a return to the normal *agrément*s and business of life the political problem of Catalonia was solved. Questions of language and administration no longer mattered. "*Viva Cataluña Española!*" was the cry of General Solchaga before he watched his troops march by. And in the newspapers one read that towards this liberated Catalonia the only feeling that an hidalgo could entertain was generosity. One could not move among these grateful people without a feeling of amazement and of sympathy for all those foreigners who had given their sympathy as democrats to the minority who had so cruelly oppressed Catalonia. But for those who had made their sympathy practical, there was one immense consolation, their efforts to save the children had not failed, and every one of them was well enough nourished to share in their parents' thankfulness.

A facing of the facts with regard to Catalonia is the key to the situation in the Madrid-Valencia zone. There the starvation is undoubtedly much worse, and because it is so the army has refused to acquiesce in the intransigence of Negrín. To go on starving, when the only result can be to make the ultimate defeat more crushing, could recommend itself only to those who had surrendered all ordinary human motives either of selfishness or compassion, to the blind obstinacy of their fanaticism. In Madrid Negrín and Alvarez del Vayo have been openly accused of wishing to continue the struggle in the mad hope of carrying on till a new world war begins. The refugees in France show that such a motive still survives, and it is no doubt a motive to those who are "loyal" to Negrín and "rebels" to Miaja. But it is not Negrín's



explanation of resistance, for he says that he was fighting to secure better terms. And Miaja proclaims that his motive is a settlement honourable to himself and to Spanish patriotism.

Catalonia shows the only answer that the winning side can give. They have again and again proclaimed that they must build up Spain as a prosperous nation ; their heart is with the people's good, none need be afraid but criminals ; but Franco certainly intends to have the recalcitrants at work. He grudges the hundreds of thousands of Spanish hands whom France is maintaining in idleness, and he intends to let no more escape.

Meanwhile the Governments of London and Paris seek together for cordial co-operation with National Spain. Burgos is the only authority either recognise as responsible for order. The question of belligerent rights, therefore, ceases to arise ; for these can be given only where two effectual administrations are at war. In the official view of Paris and London the war is over. All that remains is an uprush of anarchy and faction against the duly constituted government of the nation. The present writer welcomes Franco's victory as liberating the Spanish people from error, from horror, and from starvation. He found the inhabitants of National Spain well fed, thankful and united ; those of Catalonia rejoicing in liberation. But if sympathy with a suffering people is practical, those who have given help can be sure that by continuing it they can do essential good ; for kindness and conciliation and big plans of enterprise have still the amplest scope, not less because they are already reaping their reward.

ROBERT SENCOURT.

## AUSTRIA AND EUROPE.

WHEN Hitler's bombers were roaring over Vienna and a deluge of the meanest brutality was flooding the city of Mozart, Beethoven and Schubert, pity for a small, deserted people was widely felt. Some good Europeans may have mused upon what Austria once had meant to Europe, and the question may have troubled them what was bound to follow. The official spokesmen of British democracy entered some protest which was rudely rejected in Berlin. Inwardly they probably felt relieved. Now, they may have hoped, Hitler would be satiated. Then there was the host of ever rosy-minded "pacifists," who easily persuaded themselves that this was a victory of self-determination and a great step towards appeasing Germany. To-day, a year after the annexation, even many of those who do not share this facile optimism often forget to mention Austria when they wish to illustrate the progress of violence. They usually speak of China, Abyssinia, Spain and Czecho-Slovakia. Sometimes Austria is added, but more often not. Surely it is realised now even by former optimists that Hitler was not satiated by his great triumph, but has been pushed on to further conquests. Nobody can deny to-day that Czecho-Slovakia was lost at the moment when Austria was seized, and few will be able to ignore that this event has already made Hitler the dictator of half the continent of Europe. Perhaps it will soon dawn even upon diehard optimists that the fall of Austria has sent his ambitions soaring to the highest pitch, has weakened all opposing forces among German generals and statesmen, and has opened the road to the old pan-German aim of world domination.

Could the annexation of Austria have been prevented ? It is not within our competence to discuss this question from a military point of view for the time immediately preceding the invasion. Yet one fact can be judged even by non-experts : that this whole fateful road would have been effectively barred if the great democracies had stuck to their undeniable right of vetoing the militarisation of the Rhineland. It is beyond doubt that Hitler was not able at that time to defy the military power of the democracies. Their resolute veto would have inflicted such a loss of prestige upon him that he would probably have been overturned by the army leaders,

and the nightmare would have vanished which now weighs so terribly upon the world. This reflection will, of course, provoke the indignation of all those optimists who then assured us that compliance with his tearing up of the Treaty of Locarno—freely accepted by Germany—would appease him and that, after all, the demilitarisation of the Rhineland was an intolerable infringement of her prestige and sovereignty. The prediction of appeasement has been refuted by the march of time, and not much wisdom was required to see through that illusion. As to the other argument we should like to ask why so many other Powers have not found it beneath their national dignity to put up with similar restrictions, imposed upon them in the interests of European peace. Thus the mighty Russian Empire has tolerated the demilitarisation of the Aaland Islands without protest for sixty years. France has equally submitted to the demilitarisation of High Savoy and the region near Basle. England has abided by the neutralisation of the Suez Canal, even in time of war. However generous the intentions behind that policy of not resisting Hitler may have been, history will perhaps judge that the militarisation of the Rhineland was one of the most fatal events in the modern world, provided that history will then not be a monopoly of employees of totalitarian ministries of propaganda.

Now the democracies have abandoned to Hitler all the keys to the domination over Europe and perhaps more than that. This appears to indicate in modern democracy a lack of sense for the realities of power which makes it doubtful whether democracy will be able to survive at all. Such apprehensions have often been aroused long before Hitler put the democracies to the crucial test. Those who doubt their capacity to pursue a long-view policy in international relations could find no more convincing proofs than certain events determining the decline and dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though this catastrophe, of course, was partly brought about by other forces. Many democrats seem not yet to have learned the lesson of that tragedy twenty years later.

The foundations of the old Austrian Empire had been laid when the parliaments of Bohemia, Hungary and Croatia elected Ferdinand I, the ruler of Austria, as their king in 1526 in order to combine all forces against the threatening onslaught of the Turks. World domination and war were the supreme

aims of the Turkish Empire. For centuries Austria remained the bulwark of Europe against the Turkish menace. In consequence of dynastic marriages the Habsburgs also became the rivals of the French dynasty and struggled with them for power in Spain and Italy, the Netherlands and Germany. The interests of Austria largely coincided with those of England, and this community of interests was enhanced when the Russian Colossus loomed large, threatening the road to Constantinople and India. In the course of secular struggles the Austrian Empire gradually became a mainstay of the European Balance of Power forming a relatively strong guarantee of peace. In the epoch of modern imperialism the community of interests between England and Austria was strengthened by the fact that the Habsburg Empire was the only European Power which neither pursued colonial expansion nor as a rule an ambitious foreign policy in Europe. Austria could not follow a policy of aggressive nationalism because she was not a national state. Among her many nationalities none formed a majority or was strong enough to force the state to place foreign policy in the service of its national ambitions. On the other hand this structure was a source of weakness and a danger for peace, for the nationalities carried on incessant internal struggles. This encouraged the nationalists of other states to put their hopes on the dissolution of the Empire and to strive for a world war for attaining their aims. The apprehensions created by such strivings led to the formation of a small group among Austrian Generals which believed that the Empire could only be saved by a preventive war against forces threatening it with destruction. A sinister constellation of circumstances gave them the opportunity to achieve their plan with the effect of destroying the Empire completely. After the Great War the nationalists of all the nations in the Empire availed themselves of its military breakdown for founding new national states out of the territory of the former Austria-Hungary. The victorious Powers did little to restrain their ambitions as far as they could be carried out at the expense of the vanquished enemies. The true interests of Europe were utterly disregarded, and the destruction of Austria-Hungary also destroyed the possibility of a stable European order.

It will always remain a riddle why the leading statesmen of the Allied Powers did not realise what the destruction of

Austria-Hungary really meant for Europe. This blindness was probably mainly due to two illusions closely connected with democratic ideology of that time. One was the belief that the different nationalities who now claimed their complete independence had been oppressed by Austria-Hungary, and that the break-up of the Empire constituted a liberation. The other was the belief that a new organisation of peace was possible in the form of a League of Nations without at the same time securing the functioning of a new Balance of Power.

The first of these illusions was based on a mixture of some truth with a great deal of untruth and owed much of its strength to war propaganda. The Empire had consisted of two independent units which were only united by the person of the Emperor and by certain common institutions. Hungary was a national state with a ruling nation, the Magyars, who considered it as their historic right to dominate the other nationalities. A very liberal law for the protection of these nationalities was in force since 1868, but the rise of Magyar nationalism made its provisions to a large extent a dead letter. The minorities of Hungary were right in complaining about oppression. Only the Croats enjoyed a very wide autonomy and full national rights. Their position was certainly better than after the war under Serbian domination when their historic autonomy was taken from them.

The other half of the Empire was Austria, a sort of federal group of autonomous countries, each with its own parliament and its autonomous administration besides its representation in the central parliament. There was no ruling nationality, though the Germans had a certain preponderance because of their more advanced civilisation, their economic wealth and their language which was understood by all educated people just as many also understood French or English. The former political privileges of the Germans had been largely abolished since 1878, and Austria had gone very far in the direction of a supernational federation of states according full national equality to all the nationalities. If this was never fully attained it was due to the nationalities, not to the government. Nobody understands the nature of nationalism who sees in it exclusively a striving for liberty and equality, or thinks that national conflicts can easily be settled by mutual understanding between the nations on principles of justice and fairness. Nationalism is primarily a striving for power,

domination and oppression, which is opposed to rational compromises and considerations of supernational justice. Again and again Austrian governments have elaborated bills and proposals for a settlement of national quarrels which could hardly have been better. Much of it became law, though usually after prolonged struggles. Many other reforms foundered through the obstinacy and fanaticism of the nationalists of all nations concerned. In every nation the great majority was not very nationalistic, and most politicians deeply bewailed that state of things in private conversations though they seldom had the courage to make a resolute stand against the terroristic minority of nationalists on their own side. Anyhow, it is an indisputable fact that the right of national minorities was much better safeguarded in old Austria than in all the later Succession States. The disruption of Austria has not decreased national oppression and grievances but greatly increased them.

Palacky, one of the greatest pioneers of the Czech National Movement and the most distinguished historian of his people, wrote in 1848: If Austria did not exist, it would have to be invented. He was aware that only a supernational state could secure a free national development to the Czechs, and that an independent Czech state would be swallowed either by Russia or by Germany. It is true, he later changed his views under the stress of passionate national embitterment. Yet our time has proved that his apprehensions were justified. Many nationally minded Czechs realise to-day that their separation from Austria was the greatest disaster for their national independence.

A few words may also be said about the second democratic illusion which has led to the destruction of old Austria. We need not describe the reasons which resulted in the development of an ideology, rejecting all the former principles of the Balance of Power and national security, and making the belief in the League of Nations almost a religion which did not admit of a compromise with the former political creed. Now the League of Nations has completely broken down. Is this only to be ascribed to accidental causes, to mistakes in the text of the Covenant, or to the incompetence of single statesmen? It is much more probable that the League has broken down, not because of its antagonism to Power politics, but because there was no reliable power behind it and because it

had not been possible to combine the Balance of Power with the idea of the League. The main cause, however, why there was no Balance of Power after the war was the destruction of the Austrian Empire. Neither Germany nor Italy would be such dangers to the peace of the world to-day if old Austria still existed. Never could Italy harbour her megalomaniac dreams and contest England's position in the Mediterranean. When in the Tripoli War she tried to occupy several islands the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister immediately approached the British Foreign Office with the proposal to stop her. He declared that it was a common interest of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain to hinder her rise as a Mediterranean Power. Equally Hitler's new pan-Germanism would have no chance if the Habsburg Monarchy had not been broken up.

To-day Austria exists only in the hearts of millions who are groaning under a hateful foreign yoke. Many even of the Austrian Nazis have been so disillusioned by a year of Hitlerism that they are yearning for an independent Austria. Also in Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary the conviction is gaining ground rapidly that the three countries must come together again. The old President Masaryk had this vision, and in confidential talks he expressed his conviction that Czechs, Austrians and Magyars should unite their forces again. Only such a union could form a firm block against the danger of the enslavement of all the nations of Eastern and Central Europe by pan-Germanism and against the constant disturbance of European peace by its ambitions.

ERASMUS HERDER.

## BULGARIA, 1939.

**B**ULGARIA, it is generally recognised, has displayed a tranquil dignity during the various crises which Europe has lately been called upon to face. Germany has released herself by unilateral action from the restraints imposed upon her at Versailles. According to Herr Hitler himself, only the colonial question awaits its solution. The *Anschluss*, if plebiscite figures can be considered anything like a true expression of public opinion, claims to fulfil the aspirations of the Austrian people. Hungary has regained what she calls her Highlands. Turkey, led by the genius of Atatürk, has eagerly and hopefully turned to build up a new State on fresh lines. Only Bulgaria remains with her claims so far disregarded and her hopes unachieved. The circumspection of her Government is rightly praised as exemplary; but nobody with first-hand knowledge of the country can doubt that the sense of injustice is keen and widespread, and that it is something with which her neighbours, and indeed her own Government, must be prepared to reckon.

The Bulgarian State, it is true, dates from the Berlin Treaty of 1878, but it must always be remembered that in the eyes of the Bulgarian people it is the revival of a kingdom which was in existence in the middle of the ninth century, about the time that Egbert became King of all England. When Boris I accepted Christianity, the Bulgarians had already been settled for 200 years and had become gradually merged with the indigenous Slavonic population. Tzar Simeon in 893 ruled over an empire extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, and from the Danube to the Rhodope mountains. About a century later the Bulgarian lands passed into the control of Constantinople, but about the time of Magna Charta the Bulgarian Empire arose again and lasted some two hundred years. Ivan Asen II was a man of peace who sought to develop the trade and the civilisation of an empire which once more extended from sea to sea. But lesser men succeeded him, and the Bulgarians were defeated by the Serbs, who fifty years later were themselves defeated by the Moslems. The ruin of the two Bulgarian Empires was due to the fact that they were content to tolerate the rule of a despot provided he was strong enough, but as the great landowners, the Boyards, increased in power, the central government tended to become weaker

and in some measure Hellenised. Too often in Bulgarian history the nation has given itself up to faction fighting when its real interests called for unity. After the fall of the second Empire there followed five centuries of Turkish rule.

When in the nineteenth century there came about the Bulgarian renaissance, it arose in three ways. There were from time to time insurrectionary movements, led by Levski, Rakovski, Stephen Karaja, Botev and others, but they came to little and were harshly repressed. There were the collections of songs and stories put together by men like Slaveikoff and the Miladinoff brothers from the Bulgarian, and more particularly the Macedonian-Bulgarian, areas. Some of these were collected by Serbians, for up to and beyond the middle of the last century Serbian eyes looked only westward to the Adriatic. But the real forerunners of the national movement are to be found in the cloister, and perhaps the most popular print in Bulgaria to-day is the picture of the monk, Paisii, who wrote a history of the Bulgarian saints and rulers, working by candlelight in his cell at Mount Athos surrounded by old volumes and parchments. Bishop Sofronii, his pupil, wrote of his own times, and it was Neophyte Rilski who at a later date played an important part in reference to schools. In fact the teachers more than the fighters laid the foundations of the Bulgaria of to-day, and few national relics are more highly prized than the hand printing-press, now to be seen in the Museum in Sofia, that was used for the production of lesson books at Gabrovo one hundred years ago. In 1834 there were 189 schools in the Bulgarian lands, by the time of the Liberation there were nearly 1,700, and education has remained since then an outstanding preoccupation to Bulgarians of every political complexion. The education committees which were in existence in various centres for many years before 1878 still continue their work and have become embodied in the national system of education which in its present form dates from 1891. In each town and village the committee exercises a general supervision over the primary schools, and each department has its educational council under the Prefect. Education is obligatory between six and eleven and the full course of instruction in the secondary schools covers seven years. Finally, there is the National University of Sofia which this year celebrates its jubilee, an institution

of which the country is justly proud.\* There are seven Faculties: history and philosophy, physics and mathematics, law, medicine, agriculture, theology and veterinary medicine, and from each of these Faculties there have come into existence various Institutes, such as the Institutes of Philosophy, of Teaching, of History, of Slav ethnography, etc., the influence of which permeates throughout the country. Handsome as are the main buildings of the University, the Faculty of Agriculture, housed at some little distance away, is specially impressive. Side by side with classes of eager students of both sexes are to be seen up-to-date laboratories and galleries of exhibits. In the corridors one may meet a peasant bringing some leaves for examination, or a farmer seeking advice about a new tractor, for in Bulgaria the most ancient methods of agriculture are to be found side by side with the most modern.

There is, of course, another side to all this. It is quite possible to argue that Bulgaria has carried her passion for education too far. As in Canada and other agricultural countries, the younger generation seems more and more inclined to flock to the towns, and too many men who are content to live out their lives on their farms are ready to encourage their sons, even at great personal sacrifice, to seek a career in the capital. King Boris has always realised that the strength of Bulgaria rests in her sturdy peasantry, and his remarkably wide acquaintance with individuals in villages and small towns throughout the country and his understanding of their problems has built up the immense personal loyalty with which they regard him. There is, however, a certain lack of sympathy growing up between the countryman and the town worker and a certain resentment noticeable between the countryman and the black-coated official, especially the small official. Bulgaria is inevitably a country without traditions, and numerous (no doubt too numerous) as are the servants of Government, there is always a number of unemployed clamouring for official employment. It is the work being done in the University Department of Agriculture which can best check this tendency by the knowledge which it can provide for the farmer and so assist to increase the

\* There is also the Free University at Sofia which attracts a crowd of students who have not the time or the means to take the prescribed courses at the National University. It is none the less an important factor in the life of the country, and many of the devoted and distinguished teachers who serve it are connected with the National University as well.

return on his labour. This return will enable him to purchase more modern machinery and so afford him more leisure and the means to improve the amenities of country life. In spite of these drawbacks, however, R. N. Markham, the American teacher and writer, says, no doubt with truth: "Although the most recently created of all the Balkan States, Bulgaria has been one of the best governed if not the best, and she has created in a remarkably short time out of nothing a very creditable literature, an excellent theatre, a very good opera, a wholesome well-informed press, and an appreciably improved standard of living."

We have to visualise the Bulgarians of to-day, therefore, as a people who do not regard their country as something set on foot sixty years ago by the grace of certain of the Great Powers, but rather as the revival of a kingdom which was in existence long before there was a Tzar in Moscow; a people with a sound basis in education and a nation-wide belief in education as a means to a fuller life for themselves and their descendants; a people acutely conscious that alone of the Central Powers in the Great War their grievances remain unsolved. The agreement reached at Munich last year opened a new phase for the people of South-Eastern Europe. The German economic drive, which already for some years past has been an outstanding feature, has become intensified and has been a source of considerable uneasiness to Bulgaria's neighbours no less than to her. Balkan countries recognise clearly enough that their natural markets are with Central Europe and that they should exchange their agricultural products for the manufactured articles with which Central Europe can most easily supply them, just as Central Europe looks to the Balkans for the foodstuffs and the tobacco of which it stands in need. But to barter their produce for goods based on the mark at its present artificial value in the international market is bound to make Germany's customers uneasy, for it means that an international crisis and a collapse of the mark will involve ruin for Germany's customers as well as for Germany. The Balkan countries realise that their economic freedom is bound up with their political freedom; and this means that they must get together and speak with one voice. In the Europe of 1939 it is strength that counts; and unity is strength. Politically in South-Eastern Europe the situation remains what it was after the Treaty of Neuilly:

a defeated Bulgaria, now, as then, finds herself surrounded by Powers who have aggrandised themselves at her expense. To Roumania she has been compelled to cede the Dobrudja, to the Greeks Thrace, and the Macedonian lands to Greece and to Yugoslavia. During recent years the policy of the various Bulgarian Governments has sought to develop good relations with all her neighbours, and the public in Bulgaria has hoped that these good relations might perhaps secure some relaxation of the severity with which the Bulgarian minorities were treated. These hopes have remained so far unfulfilled, and though, with the coming to power of a new generation of statesmen in each country since the war old asperities are undoubtedly softened, the position remains in substance what it was in 1919.

But the European situation has changed. South-Eastern Europe finds itself face to face with the Axis Powers, and if Bulgaria surrounded by the Balkan Entente is powerless to assert herself, those States faced with a new danger cannot afford to have in the heart of the peninsula a small but virile people inspired by a sense of injustice against them all, well placed should opportunity arise, to assert her claims so long ignored. It is not surprising therefore that a good deal has lately been written about Bulgaria joining the Balkan Entente and so enabling the united States of South-Eastern Europe to speak with one mind and to withstand encroachment from whatever quarter, on their national and economic liberties. To those in this country who believe with Gladstone in "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples" such a solution cannot fail to make an appeal. The interference of the Great Powers in Balkan affairs has often been unhelpful: to-day the interests of each and all imperatively call for unity. Bulgaria must be brought into line with her neighbours: and though her neighbours must pay a price for her co-operation, it is in the highest degree unlikely that the price asked would be exaggerated. It may be suggested, for instance, that a small part of the Southern Dobrudja might be handed back to Bulgaria, including the two towns of Baltchik and Dobritch. The question of Thrace is more difficult, for Thrace and the Thracian seaboard were ceded by Bulgaria not to Greece but to the Allied and Associated Powers, and Bulgaria's claim in this matter is against their decision and not against Greece. But if there is a will to agreement in Athens and in Sofia, this

need be no insuperable obstacle. If Bulgaria is given a suitable freehold port on the Ægean together with a surrounding area sufficient to feed it, and if that port is linked up with Bulgaria by a railway under mutually agreed international control, the long-vexed issue would at last be settled. As to Macedonia, the Greeks have found a solution by expatriating the Bulgars from Greek territory, but the population of Southern Serbia remains in spite of Serbian immigration predominantly Bulgarian. It was to Bulgaria that the population always fled from Turkish persecution, and it was to Bulgaria that they emigrated again, when the Macedonian lands came under Serbian rule in 1913. Nor can it justly be asserted that the feelings of the population were due to political or ecclesiastical propaganda from Bulgaria, for the evidence is clear that the Macedonian Slavs regarded themselves as Bulgarians long before the establishment of the Exarchate in 1870 or of the Principality eight years later.\*

If the "Treaty of Everlasting Friendship" between Bulgaria and Jugoslavia had not already been made, the present international situation would have called for it. The recent change of government at Belgrade encourages the hope that an adjustment between the Serbs and the Croats lies immediately ahead, and it is not unreasonable to assume that a similar spirit will manifest itself as regards Southern Serbia. If Jugoslavia will permit the use of the Bulgarian tongue in the churches and schools, if she will appoint to high administrative and ecclesiastical posts in Southern Serbia men who have been born there before the occupation, and if as further evidence of goodwill she would be willing to hand back to Bulgaria an area, even if it be only a small area, of the Bulgarian-speaking lands, the Macedonian Bulgars would become a link uniting, instead of a bar separating, the two countries. All this has no doubt been said many times during the post-war years, but the circumstances of the hour give it a special urgency. Bulgaria has never put forward the conditions under which

\* The Bulgarian claim is supported by Vouk Karadjitch, the Serbian ethnographer, who published in 1815 and 1822 a collection of *Popular Songs of the Bulgars* and by Verkovitch who made a similar collection in 1860. There is the book of the Russian ethnographer Grigorovitch, 1848, and the evidence collected by the Czech Jirecek in 1876. The ethnographical maps all tell the same story: that of Boué the German geologist 1847, of Lejean a French Vice-Consul 1861, of Mackenzie and Irby, two English lady travellers 1867, and Reclus 1876. The map of the German Kieppert 1876 was used at the Berlin Congress 1878, and is in substantial agreement with its predecessors.

she would join the Balkan Entente, and to-day it is for her victorious neighbours to speak. The recent meeting of the Balkan Entente at Bucharest was a lost opportunity. The participating Powers stated in effect that what they had they would hold. But such rigidity is not statesmanship at a time when all the people of the Balkans must think for the future. May they yet set an example to the world of generosity and wisdom.

Since this article was completed, Herr Hitler's annexation of Czecho-Slovakia has destroyed the hope that Munich opened a new chapter in international relations. What has occurred constitutes the most powerful reinforcement possible of the argument put forward above, for unity among the States of the Balkans. Reports in the Press appear to suggest that Turkey, whose relations with Bulgaria are of the most friendly character, may be willing to use her influence to induce Bulgaria's neighbours to give early and favourable consideration to her claims. The spectacle of a country which presses extravagant demands at a difficult moment in international affairs is familiar enough in history, but that is not the case here. Not only have Bulgaria's claims been frequently set forth during the period since 1919, but it is highly probable that, in view of her good relations with all her neighbours, she would to-day be satisfied with more modest and less radical solutions than at any time since the war. But it must be obvious that if, in the interests of Balkan unity, Bulgaria is for ever to surrender hopes which lie deep down in the heart of every Bulgarian, her neighbours cannot in reason expect the benefit of her full and loyal co-operation without some regard being paid to the feelings inherited by generations of Bulgarians, outside as well as within the kingdom. Neither Bulgaria nor her neighbours can afford to haggle; the times are too serious. The Balkan countries must get together, and they must do it now.

EDWARD BOYLE.



## FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT has grasped more fully than any other democratic statesman the importance of establishing the most intimate contact possible between himself and the millions whom he rules. The five massive volumes of his *Public Papers and Addresses*\* which were published in 1938 are not merely a contribution towards this objective, but provide vivid illustrations of the various techniques which he employs, and qualities which he possesses, for the purpose.

It is not usual for a President or Prime Minister to let the public so much into the inside of his life and work while he is still the holder of high office. Brief volumes of speeches, and authorised biographies, do of course frequently appear, and government publications of various kinds provide much information about the public statements and activities of statesmen. But nothing like this record of Mr. Roosevelt's four years as Governor of New York State and first four years as President has ever before appeared in any country. Its value is enhanced by the General Introduction to the whole series of volumes, by additional Introductions to each individual volume, and by a running commentary, in the form of Explanatory Notes to particular speeches, documents, and other material, from the pen of Mr. Roosevelt himself. The five volumes so far published are entitled *The Genesis of the New Deal*, dealing with Mr. Roosevelt's 1928-32 Governorship of New York, *The Year of Crisis* (1933), *The Advance of Recovery and Reform* (1934), *The Court Disapproves* (1935) and *The People Approve* (1936). It is proposed to issue additional volumes for each year so long as Mr. Roosevelt remains President. One may therefore expect a 1937 volume before long.

The volumes include a great variety of material. There are the Addresses of the President to Congress. There are also many other speeches, formal and extempore, delivered on a host of occasions, varying from meetings of Political Conventions to informal gatherings of curious onlookers collected at a tiny railway station in the hope that the President's train may stop, and he appear on the back platform. There are

\* *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*. Compiled and collated by Samuel I. Rosenman. New York: Random House. 1938.

Proclamations and Executive Orders. There are letters of every kind, including specimens of the little personal notes which Mr. Roosevelt frequently addresses to humble Americans, juvenile and adult, whom his immense correspondence brings to his attention. There are transcripts of the proceedings at many of his press conferences. One can therefore not merely rely upon these volumes as a full record of all the important speeches and public documents, and of the relevant non-confidential letters of the President, but can also find illustrative examples of the less important types of activity in which Mr. Roosevelt busies himself as President.

These volumes give the reader a vivid impression of Mr. Roosevelt's unique capacity to visualise America, not like his predecessor Mr. Hoover in terms of statistics and blueprints, but in terms of individual men, women and children, with their widely varying qualities, aspirations, problems and fears. They show equally his even more unique capacity to express himself on all occasions, in writing and in speech, in simple, lucid, fluent English which even the humblest citizen can understand. He is thus able to communicate his own keen personal interest in the problems of individual Americans to the man in the street, who is very often alienated by the lifeless, artificial verbiage of politicians, as of lawyers and civil servants.

Mr. Roosevelt has made much use of the radio as a means of explaining his policies to, and establishing personal contact with, the millions of voters. That instrument would not have been of much value to him but for this capacity of his to talk to the common man in language which can be universally understood, and which serves to bring out and not to obscure the personality and feeling of the speaker. His "fireside chats," all printed in these volumes, had a tremendous effect not merely because the public was flattered that the President should want to explain his policy to them as it developed, and should address them as "My Friends" as if he meant it, but because the tone of voice and the choice of words of Mr. Roosevelt were so admirably adapted to their purpose. Listeners could feel, as they listened to their President, that he was talking directly to them, was sitting in fact at their fireside chatting with them about their government. They developed in consequence a feeling that they knew Mr. Roosevelt personally, and that it was their government which

he was administering. They were encouraged to write to him about their own difficulties since Mr. Roosevelt always conveyed the impression that he was in the White House not merely to serve America as a collective whole but to serve its individual men and women too. Those multitudes of letters are all answered, and answered not in the stilted British form, "Mr. Secretary So-and-so instructs me to say," but in an informal, personal manner. An immense number are dealt with by Mr. Roosevelt himself. The majority which cannot be dealt with by his staff in the same human way which the President believes in, and which is so seldom characteristic of government departments.

Mr. Roosevelt shows in these volumes that he can visualise America geographically and economically, as he can visualise the American people, in detailed and concrete rather than in abstract terms. He has travelled far more widely throughout the country, before and since becoming President, than any predecessor. Only President Taft came anywhere near the Roosevelt record, and he only as President, and not much before. Mr. Roosevelt is able therefore, when visiting isolated little communities on campaign tours, to speak about their local scene and problems with a personal knowledge rarely equalled in public men. And he makes every campaign tour, and he has had three Presidential campaign tours, as candidate for Vice-President in 1920 and for President in 1932 and 1936, an opportunity for adding to this intimate knowledge of the whole United States.

This conception, founded upon intimate personal knowledge, of the United States as 130 million individuals with special qualities and problems, and 3,100 counties with special scenery, economic structure, and other characteristics, which is peculiarly Mr. Roosevelt's own, and which is rare in this collectivist age, when most of us study our country at second hand through books and tables of statistics, has given Mr. Roosevelt an impatience with the ordinary generalisations, evasions and delays of politicians. The President is an opportunist in the sense that he is so conscious of things which America and Americans vitally need, and so determined that the Government shall produce those things, that he is impatient of advice that they cannot be done, or are not constitutional, or are contrary to precedent, or do not square with the party platform. These books indicate, as does so

much in Mr. Roosevelt's recent career, that he is never prepared to admit that anything which seems to him worth doing cannot be done, and done quickly.

Mr. Roosevelt makes it clear in his General Introduction to these volumes that "In this generation the people of the United States have been facing two major problems, the solution of which seems more and more vital to the continued functioning of what we call the requirements of modern civilisation." These are the maintenance of the democratic ideal, which Mr. Roosevelt thinks was seriously threatened by the growing power of selfish private interests, and the establishment of social justice. Mr. Roosevelt pays tribute to the contribution made by Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson before the War towards arousing public interest in these problems. He frankly admits that even he was affected sufficiently by the "soulless decade" which followed the War, and in which most Americans were too busy with their own occupations and speculation to pay much attention to problems of social betterment, not to visualise during the nineteen-twenties the full effects of that period, and the drastic changes which were even then really necessary. It was during his terms as Governor of New York, which covered the 1929 crash and the downward half of the economic depression, that he became fully aware of the real depths of the problem.

Mr. Roosevelt has been accused of inconsistency, and especially in respect of his keen defence of States' Rights while Governor of New York followed by his energetic extension of Federal power when President. He replies to this charge in the Introduction to Volume 1. As he puts it: "In Albany I was forced to work for State action because of the attitude of Washington. When I went to Washington I was able, by reversing the national policy, to give aid to States that wished to help themselves along progressive lines." He shows clearly in this defence, as in his actions as Governor and President, that he is not really concerned about the issue of States' Rights versus Federal Power. His concern is with the problems of the moment, and he is determined in whatever office he happens to hold for the moment to secure for that office any and every power possible, so as to tackle those problems with the maximum speed and energy.

His writings and speeches, and to a lesser extent his acts,

as Governor, as illustrated in Volume I of these *Public Papers* . . . , should have given Americans a better preparation for the hectic innovations of the New Deal than in fact they did. Hardly anyone was really prepared for the Roosevelt Presidential programme, just as hardly anyone thought prior to 1933 that Franklin Roosevelt was possessed of any extraordinary qualities. It was largely believed that he had as Governor merely followed in the footsteps of a much abler radical, Al Smith, and that he was, as Walter Lippman put it, a "very pleasant gentleman who would very much like to be President." Actually his warm humanity, his deep personal concern for the sufferings of impoverished farmers and the unemployed, his keen interest in reforestation and better land use, his prejudice against great vested interests, his unwillingness to admit that projects which he felt to be worth while could not be done, should have been apparent to anyone who followed his speeches closely. Moreover, the techniques so widely publicised when he was President, the press conferences, the fireside chats, the frequent inspection trips, the building up of an immense personal acquaintance amongst citizens of every class and type, were all employed when Mr. Roosevelt was Governor.

Similarly students of his speeches when candidate for President in 1932 should have got a better warning of what a Roosevelt Presidency would mean than in fact they did. It is true that some speeches, like the Pittsburgh speech on October 19th, 1932, when Mr. Roosevelt strongly criticised the Hoover deficits, and promised a 25 per cent. cut in federal expenses to restore the Government's credit, are difficult to square with the subsequent acts of the President, unless one accepts the thesis recently put about that a distinction should be drawn between ordinary and extraordinary expenditures, and that so long as the former are covered by revenue it does not matter that expenses on public works, relief, etc., have to be met out of loans. But a whole series of speeches did give the discerning a glimpse of what was in Mr. Roosevelt's mind. In Chicago on July 2nd he first used the phrase "A New Deal." He pledged himself and his party to bold leadership in relief of distress, wherever occurring. He poured scorn on men who prated of economic laws while men and women were starving. "We must lay hold of the fact that economic laws are not made by nature. They are made by human beings."

He promised that traditions would not be allowed to stand in the way of measures which the emergency demanded.

Subsequent speeches gave a good indication, as one can see from the vantage point of to-day, but as few people saw at the time, of what Roosevelt policy would be in relation to the main fields of government activity. Phrases which he then used should have warned people of what was in store if he was elected.

The issue of Government has always been whether individual men and women will serve some system of Government or economics, or whether a system of Government and economics exists to serve individual men and women. . . . Our Government, formal and informal, owes to everyone an avenue to possess himself of a portion of that plenty [which our industrial and agricultural mechanism can produce] sufficient for his own needs, through his own work.

The detail of the New Deal may have been absent during the campaign, though speeches on agriculture, power, the railroads, natural resources, relief, and other matters, gave some indication even of it. But the spirit of it is implicit in such phrases.

The second volume of these *Papers*, dealing with 1933, brings out well the extraordinary rush of measures of that year of crisis. Mr. Roosevelt's Introduction to this volume also defines his approach to the emergency with which America was then faced.

"In face of this crisis in national morale," he said, "no remedy which stopped short of correcting the immediate material illness of the moment would be a safe or permanent cure. A temporary revival of a sense of physical security would be insufficient. Action was necessary to remove the sore spots which had crept into our economic system, if we were to keep the system of private property for the future. To preserve we had to reform."

He is very critical of those who childishly talked of recovery first and reconstruction afterwards. He makes it clear that in his view, in 1933 as in 1938, reform and recovery went together.

He also defines what he means by "New Deal." "The word 'Deal' implied that the Government itself was going to use affirmative action to bring about its avowed objective rather than stand by and hope that general economic laws

alone would attain them. The word 'New' implied that a new order of things designed to benefit the great mass of our farmers, workers and business men would replace the old order of special privilege in a nation which was completely and thoroughly disgusted with the existing dispensation."

His objectives, in 1938 as in 1933, he lists as follows :

A chance for men and women to work in industry at decent wages and reasonable hours : or to engage in farming at a decent return.

A chance to keep savings in banks safe from the speculative use of other people's money ; and to make investments without danger of deception or fraud by greedy promoters and speculators.

A chance for adequate recreation, better housing and so better health.

A chance to make reasonable profit in business protected against monopolies and unfair competition, but organised so as to provide fair prices for the consuming public.

Planning and use of natural resources for the benefit of the average men and women.

Security against the hardships of old age.

Security against unexpected or seasonal unemployment.

Security against new as well as old types of criminals.

Security against war.

Volume 3, *The Advance of Recovery and Reform*, calls forth a bitter denunciation by Mr. Roosevelt of the growing minority which took advantage of the passing of the crisis, and the improved economic state of the nation, to clamour that reform was hindering recovery, and should cease. He proudly cites his victory in the Congressional elections of 1934 as evidence that the people were behind him in wanting not merely to get back to prosperity of the 1929 kind, but to build a stabler and juster economic and social order.

Volume 4 Mr. Roosevelt has controversially entitled *The Court Disapproves*. His introduction is largely taken up with a summary of the cases, starting with the "hot oil" case on January 7th, 1935, and ending with the New York Minimum Wage case on June 1st, 1936, in which the Supreme Court, often by a narrow margin, had decided against the plea of his administration that the contested legislation was constitutional. He says :

The whole line of decisions cast a deep shadow of doubt upon the ability of the Congress ever at any time to protect the Nation

against catastrophe by squarely meeting modern social and economic maladjustments. It was a complete abrogation of the old theory under which an Act of Congress would not be disturbed by the correlative judicial branch of Government, unless the Act was beyond all reasonable doubt unconstitutional. It was a complete breakdown of the system of government by three independent but theoretically co-operating branches.

He insists that these decisions stopped his administration short in its efforts to stabilise national agriculture, to improve conditions of labour, to safeguard business against unfair competition, to protect disorganised and chaotic inter-state industries, to provide old-age pensions to railroad employees, and in other ways to serve obvious national needs.

Volume 5 Mr. Roosevelt equally controversially entitles *The People Approve*, taking pleasure in the back-handed compliment thus paid the Supreme Court, which had been disapproving throughout the previous volume. It includes his campaign speeches in that important election year, which resulted in his victory over the Republican Alfred M. Landon by forty-six states to two. Two speeches in that campaign were of special importance, the Acceptance speech at Philadelphia on June 27th and the final appeal at New York on October 31st. At Philadelphia Mr. Roosevelt summoned America to join in another revolt against tyranny.

Liberty requires opportunity to make a living, a living which gives man not only enough to live by, but something to live for. . . . To-day we stand committed to the proposition that freedom is no half and half affair. If the average citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling place he must have equal opportunity in the market place. . . . Here in America we are waging a great and successful war. It is not alone a war against want and destitution and economic demoralisation. It is more than that ; it is a war for the survival of democracy. We are fighting to save a great and precious form of government for ourselves and for the world. . . . I am enlisted for the duration of that war.

Interesting, too, was a frank admission of errors.

Governments can err. Presidents do make mistakes, but the immortal Dante tells us that divine justice weighs the sins of the cold-blooded and the sins of the warm-hearted in different scales.

The New York speech was entitled "We have only just begun to fight." Mr. Roosevelt took delight in being

the most controversial candidate in American politics for years.

We have had to struggle with the old enemies of peace—business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, profiteering. They had begun to consider the Government of the United States as a mere appendage to their own affairs. Never before in all our history have these forces been so arrayed against one candidate as they stand to-day. They are unanimous in their hate for me—and I welcome their hatred. . . . I should like to have it said of my first Administration that in it the forces of selfishness and lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said of my second Administration that in it these forces met their master.

Opponents of Mr. Roosevelt, and the large majority of the wealthier elements in America have become his opponents, may find in such speeches ample proof of their thesis that the President is a dangerous radical, and is stirring up class feeling. He is a radical, and an instigator of class prejudice, in the sense of being profoundly opposed to vested interests of every kind, and utterly impatient at the suggestion that poverty and distress cannot be prevented by Government action. He sees no reason why economic security should not be enjoyed by every American. He believes that only the selfishness of privileged groups, and the lack of energetic national action, causes one-third of the American people always, and a larger proportion at intervals, to be living in poverty and insecurity. The nation in his view is rich enough to provide all its citizens all of the time with enough to live on, and something to live for.

It will be interesting to see the 1937 and 1938 volumes, when Mr. Roosevelt has for the first time to record defeats in Congress and at the hands of the electorate. If these earlier volumes are any indication he will not take such defeats lying down. He said in 1936 that he was "enlisted for the duration of the war." That war is indeed just entering a most exciting and critical phase, as America prepares to elect a successor to Mr. Roosevelt in 1940. Anyone who wishes to understand the attractive and powerful personality who will inevitably be in the centre of the pre-election and election picture, whether he be himself a candidate for a third term or not, should read these informative and revealing volumes.

FRANK DARVALL.

## THE LETTERS OF KING GEORGE IV.\*

THE authentic and authoritative sources of historical information available to students have during recent years been immensely increased by the publication of royal letters. The outstanding example is, of course, the correspondence of Queen Victoria. For, not only was that sovereign a voluminous letter-writer, preferring to communicate with even the members of her own household by means of notes rather than speech, but she had in the Prince Consort and the private secretaries trained by him and working under his direction administrative experts who reduced to excellent order the masses of documents that passed into and out of the royal palaces. Until, however, the time of the joint régime of Victoria and Albert, chaos and chance seem to have reigned supreme. Almost the whole of William IV's correspondence has disappeared. Such of George III's as has survived is in almost inextricable confusion, for that monarch had no private secretaries at all, and he had a vicious habit of omitting to date his letters, although he frequently stated the hour and even the minute of the undated day on which he took up his pen!

George IV was, indeed, the first King of England to have a private secretary, and his introduction of this official into the royal household caused grave misgivings among his quondam friends, the Whigs. Was not the Home Secretary the proper person to conduct the sovereign's correspondence? To whom would the private secretary be responsible, and who would pay him? Would it be proper that he, not being a Privy Councillor, should get to know the secrets of the Cabinet? Could it be expected that the Ministers would be willing to receive royal commands if conveyed to them through this unconstitutional channel? The Tories stood up to the Whigs, and George got his private secretary, although to his annoyance he had to provide his salary—£2,000 a year—out of his privy purse. Nevertheless, he was worth the money. For George IV did not like letter-writing, and he was not good at it. He preferred the easier and safer method of personal conversation. Of the 1,596 documents in the three

\* *The Letters of King George IV, 1812-1830*, published by the Authority of His Late Majesty King George V. Edited by A. Aspinall, and with an Introduction by C. K. Webster. Three volumes (pp. lxxxiv + 525 + 554 + 547), 75s. the set. 1938: Cambridge University Press.

volumes before us only 174 appear over George's own signature, and of these a good many were evidently composed by someone else. For the letters which were undoubtedly George's own—gushing epistles to his mother, Queen Charlotte; jocular effusions to his brothers and sisters; paternal exhortations to his daughter—these unquestionably personal outpourings are marked by a sublime disregard of both orthography and syntax that stamps them as royal. Professor Webster suspects that some of them were written after dinner; Mr. Keith Feiling attributes them rather to the subsequent and consequent mornings. They agree that the stimulus was emotional and the stimulant alcoholic.

The 1,596 documents contained in these three massive volumes constitute only one tithe of the 16,000 papers that Dr. Aspinall had at his disposal in the Windsor Archives. The task of selecting and editing them must have been one of colossal difficulty, and it is impossible to speak too highly of the skill and care with which Dr. Aspinall has accomplished it. His knowledge of the period covered by the correspondence is encyclopædic, and he has ransacked every source of information, published and unpublished, likely to elucidate the countless allusions contained in the documents—allusions to persons now almost forgotten, and to events that have quite faded from memory.

When all has been said and done, however, the fact remains that this mass of paper consists but of the shattered and disjointed fragments of numerous once-coherent correspondences. There is no sort of continuity or completeness now. Questions abound to which there are no answers; replies are frequent to inquiries which have to be imagined. Hence the reader who wishes to get the full flavour of the information here presented should absorb it slowly, regarding each item as a separate and independent tit-bit. The cumulative result will be a comprehension of the age immediately preceding the great Reform Era vivid in its realism. And on certain matters, such as the character of George himself, the escapades of Queen Caroline, the indiscretions of the royal dukes, the misfortunes of the Princess Charlotte (but for whose untimely death Queen Victoria would never have been born), the intrigues of Canning, the wisdom and forbearance of the much-maligned Liverpool, the majestic patriotism of Wellington—on matters such as these new and illuminating light is thrown.

The fragmentary nature of the collection of papers here assembled is partly explained by the fact that they have been gathered together from no fewer than six separate sources. Some of them were discovered unexpectedly in 1905 among the miscellaneous lumber left by Queen Victoria; others had been reposing until 1912 among the Duke of Wellington's papers at Apsley House; a third portion had lain at Coutts's Bank hidden amid the debris of the ancient royal accounts; a fourth contingent was unearthed from the Public Record Office; a fifth, relating to Queen Caroline's case, was obtained from the vaults of the solicitors who had acted for that ill-treated but far from innocent lady; the sixth and last contribution came from various private sources, including the stores of a second-hand dealer who had found a packet of George IV's own letters in an old iron box which he had picked up at a public auction.

The miscellaneous and imperfect nature of this collection would probably have been less marked had it not been for the fact that several complete series of letters to and from George had been deliberately destroyed at one time or another by judicious persons. During George's own lifetime, either the King himself or more probably his admirably prudent secretary, Sir William Knighton (one of his two executors), burnt all the letters he could find that had passed between the monarch and his numerous mistresses. To a similar incineration the Duke of Wellington (George's other executor) in 1833 consigned the voluminous correspondence that had passed during many years between George as Prince and Mrs. Fitzherbert, his canonical but unconstitutional wife. Finally, King George V, so lately as 1913, gave permission that his predecessor's correspondence with Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, should also be immolated, for reasons which are indicated in Lord Esher's *Journals and Letters*.

One might well ask whether such an imperfect, if monstrous, scrap-heap of obsolete documents—mere casual survivors of a dim and not very creditable past—was worth raking over and examining. No reader of Dr. Aspinall's selection, and of the admirable array of footnotes by means of which he elucidates all the dark places of the text, will hesitate to answer emphatically, Yes. The Age of George as Regent and as King lives again in these revealing pages. Moreover, the significance of the letters and the novelty of some of the

information that they give is excellently indicated in the masterly Introduction (pp. lxiii-lxxxiv) provided by Professor C. K. Webster. It would be difficult to imagine a more satisfactory edition, or one more splendidly produced than these handsome volumes of the Cambridge University Press.

The central figure of the panorama is, of course, that of George IV himself. One would have supposed that nothing that has not often been said needed to be said, or indeed could be said, concerning this flamboyant figure. His infidelities, his treacheries, his obscenities, his theatricalities, his obstinacies, his extravagances—are they not the commonplaces of historians and biographers? Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that from the light shed upon him by this correspondence he emerges with a distinctly improved reputation. It is clear that his mother loved him; his sisters admired and trusted him; his brothers stood in awe of him; his ministers realised that they could not ignore him. He had distinct lines of policy of his own, and he did not fail to impress them upon his Cabinet. But, above all, he had a deep well of kindness in his nature, and he was constantly performing acts of amazing generosity. He was, too, a great and discriminating patron of the Arts. One of the most interesting documents in these volumes is the “list of pictures painted for George IV by Sir Thomas Lawrence.” The pictures are some sixty in number, including fourteen portraits of the King himself, and the total sum of money paid by the king to Sir Thomas, spread over a dozen years (1818-30) amounted to £25,752 10s. George IV was, indeed, habitually lavish in his payments for services rendered. His dentist, for instance, when he went to see him at Windsor was paid twenty guineas a visit: during the year 1829 his bill amounted to £701 in all. He had seen the King thirty-seven times, and had been kept waiting altogether fourteen hours, for which “detention” he charged at the rate of three guineas an hour. It would appear that if Mr. Samuel Cartwright had had no other patient than His Majesty he would have done not badly.

One of the things for which George both as Regent and as King is usually most severely blamed is his desertion of the Whig party of which he had been a prominent and active member in the days of Charles James Fox. It is clear from the letters, both of Ministers and of Whig Opposition leaders, that in 1812, when the Regency began, the condition of

foreign affairs, and in particular the position of the Peninsular War, then in its most critical stage, rendered it quite impossible that George should do anything except continue to support the policy of the Tory Government. It is equally clear, moreover, that the Regent's continued and steady support of the Government during the cardinal years 1812-14 did much to secure the formation of the fourth coalition and the consequent overthrow of Napoleon.

Next to George himself the most conspicuous figures in the show are those of the six “nasty old men,” as they were comprehensively called, the royal dukes, his brothers. Their royal highnesses of York, Cumberland, Clarence, Kent, Cambridge, and Sussex, indeed merit the epithet “extraordinary” which Professor Webster bestows upon them. They all seem to have inherited in some degree their father's insanity without many of his redeeming virtues. The Duke of York, through gambling and debauchery, became hopelessly bankrupt in 1823. He applied to George for salvation, and George replied (December 3rd):

I cannot sufficiently express to you the pleasure I really feel that I have it in my power to transmit to you the sum of £50,000, which I have raised on my Hanoverian income for your benefit.

The Duke acknowledged the receipt in a note of twenty-four words, with a probable mental addition that he would give his brother many similar occasions of pleasure in the future. The Duke of Cumberland was a savage as well as a lecherous brute, one of the most widely hated and generally detested men of his time. He was, however, less of a fool than the rest of the fraternity, and his antagonism to all reform (and particularly to Catholic Emancipation) had to be reckoned with. The principles of die-hard Toryism could scarcely be expressed more succinctly than in his saying: “Any change, at any time, for any purpose, is highly to be deprecated.” It is well to remember, however, that when he became King of Hanover (in 1837) he proved to be rather better than either his character or his creed had led men, and still more women, to expect. The Duke of Clarence, afterwards King William IV, seems to have inherited rather more of his father's insanity than any other member of the family. He was, however, amiable and well-meaning, if weak and ineffably silly. He had an incurable propensity for the making



of extemporaneous speeches which caused the acutest embarrassment to all who were unfortunate enough to hear them. The letters in this collection show, moreover, that in 1818 his matrimonial vagaries were a source of keen anxiety to both Court and Cabinet, and that ten years later his erratic conduct as Lord High Admiral was exasperating and confounding the Royal Navy. The Duke of Kent is represented by only a single letter. It is dated from Amorbach in March 1819. In spite of the fact that he is in flight from his creditors with a £70,000 debt hanging over his head, he expresses a wish to return to England so that his expected child—afterwards Queen Victoria—may be born on English soil. His wish to return no doubt implied the further desire that a grateful country should pay his debts. The Duke of Cambridge, who acted as viceroy for George in Hanover, writes a number of letters which Professor Webster rightly describes as “sensible,” giving an account of the conduct of affairs in the German kingdom. Only the Duke of Sussex was excluded from the confidence of the family circle. He was permanently at loggerheads with the King. He remained faithful to the Whigs; he consorted with revolutionaries; he supported the cause of Queen Caroline. George would have nothing to do with him: the letters that he wrote, attempting a reconciliation, remained unanswered.

As to Queen Caroline herself, if any doubt remained as to her immorality, it is finally dissolved by a most amazing communication from James Brougham to his brother Henry (March 1819)—a communication which should have prevented him, but did not prevent him, from taking up the Queen’s cause. Still more damnable of Caroline is the evidence provided by these papers of her endeavours to corrupt the morals of her daughter, the Princess Charlotte, prospective Queen of England, and drag her down to the same depths of depravity as those in which she herself wallowed. That Charlotte escaped is a miracle. One of the most moving letters in the whole collection is one which the unhappy princess wrote—strangely enough, to her mother, whom she had so little cause to love—three weeks before her death, and in obvious anticipation of that event:

“Believe me,” she says, “I fear less to die than to live. The prospect of protracted existence is so blended with dangers and difficulties; so shadowed with clouds and uncertainties; so

replete with anxieties and apprehensions, that I must shrink from the contemplation of it, and fly for refuge even to the probability of my removal from so joyless an inheritance. The page of history has determined that happiness is not the possession of those who move in the lofty circles to which my birth entitles me to look. I cannot hope for an exception in my favour. All the joys of life are centred in my present retirement.”

The death of the princess, the only legitimate descendant of any of the seven sons of George III living at that date (November 1817), changed the whole subsequent course of British history. It led to a spate of royal marriages in 1818, and in 1819 to the birth of both Victoria and her ponderous cousin George, who was destined to be the Commander-in-Chief of her armies during thirty-nine reactionary years.

As to the English constitution during the eighteen years covered by his correspondence, the fact that looms largest is the immensity of the influence still exercised personally by the monarch. He mainly determined the choice of ministers; he did much to decide the lines of governmental policy both at home and abroad; he nominated or selected the persons on whom honours should be bestowed; he distributed patronage in both State and Church; in short, he ruled as well as reigned. And, so far as George himself was concerned, it must be admitted that the irrefragable evidence of these letters goes to show that he took his duties seriously and on the whole discharged them honestly and well. In fact, as we have already remarked, George IV emerges from the ordeal of this detailed revelation with a reputation distinctly enhanced. In conclusion, we should like once again to thank Dr. Aspinall and Professor Webster for an important and fascinating piece of work admirably done, and the Cambridge University Press for the production of a magnificent edition.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

exploited their colonies. The "cultivation system," by which the natives were required, and more or less compelled, to produce such crops and in such amounts as the sovereign Power desired, undoubtedly had the effect of restoring the shattered finances both of the Netherlands and of Netherlands India. But it could not continue indefinitely in the face of liberal opinion in Europe. Dekker's novel, *Max Havelaar* (1860), exposed to opinion at home the evils of a cultivation system which, as has been recently and authoritatively said, was "a primitive form of State exploitation, the risks for which were for the greater part shifted on to the native farmer himself." The result was the gradual abrogation of that system—the compulsion as regards sugar, for instance, was stopped in 1870—and the increasing introduction of European enterprise.

The great importance, however, which the Dutch attached to economic welfare has left its legacy in the form of the careful development of scientific agriculture. One example is in the cultivation of the oil palm, with the result that the Dutch production of palm oil as a scientific, plantation industry has become a considerable menace to the happy-go-lucky production of West Africa. It is probably true to say that the Dutch have never regarded themselves, to the same extent as the British, as the enlightened and impartial trustees for native races. On the other hand, they have been, and are, more careful than the British to see that the economic structure, upon which the social services must depend, is sound. In cane sugar, as in cinchona and palm oil, they have set a standard of excellence which is an increasing threat to less careful producers. Their medical and educational services, especially in Java, are good; and since the war there has been a notable "liberalisation" of their general attitude. The penal contract system was gradually replaced, from 1931, by the free contract. The Netherlands India Government Act, 1925, allowed the Governor-General to nominate natives to his advisory Council. Half the members of the "Volksraad," now a legislative assembly, are natives; and there has been, since the economic depression, a considerable Indianisation of the government services.

It was not to be expected, however, that the Netherlands East Indies, any more than any other area producing primary commodities, should pass through the "depression" without

severe hardships. The fall of rubber alone, from 10 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. in 1928 to 1 $\frac{1}{16}$ d. in 1932, was enough to cause such hardships. Exports fell from 1,078 million guilders in 1929 to 362 million guilders in 1936. With the declining purchasing power both of the people of Netherlands East Indies and of their Indian customers, a great market was opened for cheap Japanese goods. In 1928, of textiles imported into the Netherlands East Indies, 25.6 per cent. came from the mother country; 27.1 per cent. from Britain; 30.8 per cent. from Japan. In 1934 the proportions for the three countries were respectively 7.2 per cent., 2.8 per cent. and 83.1 per cent.

In the face of economic disaster, two lines of policy were adopted. One consisted in schemes for the restriction of output of certain commodities; rubber, tea, sugar, tin and Peru bark. The other was the abandonment—carried out with great reluctance—of the policies of free trade and the open door. The Crisis Imports Ordinance of 1933 regulated about 40 per cent. of imports, with the objects of protecting native manufacturers and Dutch exporters. It is proper to say that the effect, and perhaps the purpose, of the Ordinance was to give protection in that order. The development of the Java textile industry has been one result of it. The more drastic clauses, which allowed the Governor-General to enforce something like a navigation system in favour of Dutch shipping, have not been made use of. Apart from this, the chief aims of the Dutch have been to raise the standard of their agricultural produce and to relieve, by emigration to the Outer Islands and Sumatra, the congestion of population in the fertile but overcrowded colony of Java.

Passing from details, how does the colonial empire of the Netherlands stand, first with regard to the mother country and then with regard to the world at large? The continued possession of that empire has maintained the Netherlands not, indeed, as a first-class Power, but as one superior in status, for instance, to Denmark or Norway. That possession, however, is far more than a political luxury. It is, for the present social and economic organisation of the country, a necessity. It has been calculated that, in 1929, the livelihood of 10 per cent. of the workpeople in the Netherlands depended directly or indirectly upon their colonial markets and resources. Without notable mineral resources (and far poorer in this respect than Belgium), their carrying trade

# PRECARIOUS NEUTRALITY: THE NETHERLANDS IN EUROPE AND ASIA.

THERE are at least three reasons why the position of the Netherlands as an international and colonial Power is of particular interest to Britain. The first is that pithily expressed in the rhyming epitaph which one finds in many churchyards, where the tombstone warns the "passenger": "As thou art now, So once was I. As I am now, So thou shalt be . . ." In 1715 the Netherlands concluded a period of more than forty years during which they had been almost constantly menaced by France and for a great part of which they had been engaged in hostilities with that country. In the event they had succeeded in preserving the integrity of their territories, colonial and metropolitan, and the form of their religion. It might have seemed that the stage was set, if not for an increase in prosperity and power, at least for their maintenance. The trend of events was otherwise. An excessive decentralisation, a deliberate preference of trade to war, steadily brought about a deterioration in their international position. Attempting to maintain neutrality as between the increasing powers of Britain and France, they only succeeded in making the worst of both worlds. When they were, reluctantly, involved in the closing campaigns of the War of the Austrian Succession, they found themselves unable to resist the French land forces. While they were neutral, in the Seven Years War, their commerce with the French West Indies was interrupted and as far as possible extinguished by the British navy. When they ultimately intervened in the War of the American Revolution their commerce was swept from the sea by that same navy and the bulk of their American possessions were captured. The history of the Netherlands in the eighteenth century illustrates the difficulty, indeed the impossibility, of a small country which has raised itself to the status of a first-class Power by intensive efforts, continuing to retain that status among larger Powers save by a continuance of those efforts.

But the "lessons" of history are seldom easy and straightforward. The Netherlands ought to have fallen to the status of such a Power as Denmark. They did not. The reason for this lay less in their own efforts or the leaders they produced

than in the fact that their geographical position entitled them to a large measure of consideration. Neither of their near neighbours, Britain and France, could afford to see them extinguished. After the War of the Austrian Succession it appeared to be worth the while of Britain to ransom the southern Netherlands from France by the return to her of Cape Breton, which had been captured by a singularly happy and rather lucky combination of the New England land forces and the Royal Navy in the course of the war. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars it was worth the while of Britain to erect, in the combination—as it proved, the temporary combination—of the Netherlands and Belgium, a friendly state at the north-east of France. To-day the continued possession by the Netherlands of a great colonial empire, and possibly even their existence as an independent Power, depends in the last resort upon the reluctance of any other Power to challenge Britain to the extent of invading a country so near to British shores; a country whose independence formed, in the classical days of diplomacy, a fundamental of British foreign policy.

The result is that the Netherlands continue to possess a great colonial empire; one far more extensive and valuable than can be guaranteed by their own military or naval power. That empire contains to-day nearly 800,000 square miles and a population of over 64,500,000 people. For convenience it may be divided into two parts, the American and the East Indian. The former is much the less valuable. The colony of Surinam or Dutch Guiana, on the mainland of South America, has brought little to the mother country but the occasion for subsidies. It may have—as British Guiana is said to have—vast potentialities, but they have never been realised. The Colonies in the Caribbean, of which Curaçoa is the most important, make a better showing; and Curaçoa in particular, through the oil traffic, has gained a more than modest prosperity.

But for the Netherlands their chief claim to rank as a colonial Power lies in their East Indian possessions, above all in Java and Sumatra. The distinguishing feature of British colonial policy, so far as related to the crown colonies in the nineteenth century, was its humanitarianism, sincere, though confused and limited. It is not unfair to say that the Dutch, for half a century after Waterloo, deliberately

threatened by the subsidised competition of more powerful nations, the development of their manufactures throttled by tariffs and quotas, the Netherlands are bound to regard their possession of and their access to raw materials as their chief—almost their only remaining—economic prize.

Looked at objectively, the Netherlands, a country of something over 8½ million people, are seen by a jealous world to wield authority over some 64,687,000 people and over territories which include some of the richest, both actually and potentially, on the earth. 22 per cent. of the palm oil, 37·4 per cent. of the rubber, 30·5 per cent. of the copra, 16·8 per cent. of the tin ore, 19·7 per cent. of the tea, 6·3 per cent. of the rice produced in colonial territories are produced in the Netherlands East Indies.\* Can these possessions be retained in a world of "power politics"?

It is time now to return to those historical considerations which we set out at the beginning of this article, and to others. The obvious sources of danger to the Netherlands are, in Asia, Japan; and, in Europe and therefore in Asia as well, Germany. The former danger is likely to be lessened for a considerable time by the absorption of Japanese activities in China. The latter is increased by the addition to the ordinary jealousy of the large "unsatisfied" Power of those racial theories which include the "Dutch-Germans" in the list of peoples ultimately to be absorbed into the Reich. It is known that German strategists, reconsidering the course of the last war, have regretted that the German advance did not include the Netherlands as well as Belgium; and although the military precautions of the Dutch include elaborate plans for flooding, it is to be observed that this system is both far more expensive and (since the coming of the aeroplane) far less effective than it formerly was.

The events of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries showed the extreme difficulty of the Netherlands avoiding being involved in a general European war. On the other hand, the results of participation, culminating in the control of the mother country by the dominant land Power and the control of the colonies by the dominant sea Power, were so disastrous that it was worth while to make a great effort to avoid participation in other, and similar, circumstances. Throughout the nineteenth century, and up to and including the Great

\* *The Colonial Problem*, p. 290. Oxford, 1937.

War, efforts to this end were made, and with success. At the end of the war, however, the Netherlands, by joining the League of Nations, fundamentally altered their position. They were differently placed from such countries as Czecho-Slovakia which might well regard adherence to the League as the price to be paid for their recent independence. For a century isolated independence had served the Netherlands well. In sacrificing it to undertake the obligations of League membership they were sacrificing something of value; and the fate of the League has only emphasised the extent of their sacrifice.

Neutrality is still, and must be, the policy of the Netherlands. But neutrality is a policy of different and changing hues and the policies of equally "neutral" countries towards the same object at the same time can differ profoundly. One possibility which the Netherlands have had in mind has been the creation of something between the isolated neutrality of the nineteenth century and the universalism of the League. But the formation of a bloc of "Oslo" states has not proceeded far. The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, consulting at Geneva on the continuance of sanctions against Italy, were only able to give a reluctant endorsement to the policy of the major Powers. Nor has more success been attained in the sphere of economics. The conferences at The Hague and Brussels in the spring of 1937, attended by representatives from the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland (continuing the "Oslo" policy of 1930), resulted in the formation of a low-tariff bloc. But the agreements there concluded, partly owing to the different measures which the different countries concerned had taken to meet the depression, and partly to lack of co-operation from the larger Powers, lasted only for a year.

Once more, therefore, the Netherlands were thrown back from the smaller to the greater Powers. They did not cease, and have not ceased to pursue, their own interpretation of neutrality. Perhaps because of the greater homogeneity of the people that interpretation is less nervous and anxious than the Belgian. The German "guarantee" of Belgian neutrality evoked from the Dutch Foreign Minister in October 1937 the declaration, "The Government continue to hold the view that the inviolability of Dutch territory is axiomatic and can never form the subject of agreements between Holland

We noted at the beginning of this article the possibility that Britain might, by degrees, be tending to a position of holding a great colonial empire by courtesy, unable or unwilling to defend it by arms, but relieved of the necessity of doing so either by international toleration or by the tacit support of some more powerful state; such as the United States. Such a position the Dutch occupy to-day. But if the supporting state withdraws its assistance and seeks such assistance itself, then the position of the Netherlands as an imperial Power is indeed precarious.

It may be urged against this article that it has dealt almost solely with material factors. The criticism is a just one. An empire like that of the Netherlands, although it may seem, in the days of power politics, an artificial thing, is not artificial. It has been built up partly by acquisition in a period when there were great areas of land available for European colonisation and partly by the favourable consideration which the Netherlands gained, through their geographical situation, at the hands of the strongest naval Power. These factors obviously do not now carry their former weight. The far smaller extent of land available for European colonisation makes the struggle for it more intense; while, as we have seen, the reliance of the Netherlands upon the tacit support of Britain must, in view of the present character of British policy, be made with reservations. But a third factor remains, the sober good sense of the Dutch people, their relative homogeneity, the thoroughness of their educational system, their courage and patience. The appeal of the "National Centre" which was formed in 1938 was for a return "to God and the House of Orange." There are worse safeguards than these.

W. L. BURN.

## THE CULTURAL POLICY OF POST-WAR GERMANY.

IN the numerous publications on the history of the German Republic it is taken for granted that the cultural situation and cultural policy of the Republic were splendid and unimpeccable. But this view is false. G. P. Gooch once wrote that the ranks of the Nazis included both the best and the worst of German youth. Why are—or better: *were*, for the attachment of the university students to Nazism has utterly changed since 1933—the best to be found there? Not only the failure of the Republic in home and foreign policy was responsible for this but to just as great a degree, and in the case of certain sections of the youthful generation to a still greater degree, the failure in cultural matters. The Republic left the young generation intellectually and spiritually in the lurch; so the young generation left the Republic politically in the same position. The worst joined the National Socialists because they counted on doing the best business with them. The best joined them because they looked to them for the things of which the Republic had deprived not only their class, but the whole of Germany. The conviction was strong that courage in civil life, and true German feeling, were only to be found on the side of National Socialism. But it is wrong to search historically the spiritual roots of Nazi ideology in order to understand this result and the developments leading up to it, as has so often been done. It is wrong, too, to derive the ideology of National Socialism from Romanticism and Fichte, from Hegel and Lassalle, Friedrich Naumann and a hundred others.

The American scholar, Frederic L. Schumann, has pointed out the close relationship existing between National Socialism and the Ku Klux Klan in a book dealing with National Socialism after 1933. "Had Hitler studied the Ku Klux Klan in detail, he could scarcely have imitated its organisation and ritual more completely." Quite so. But the Ku Klux Klan can hardly be compared with, for instance, the writings of a Paul de Lagarde which are filled with a passionate solicitude for Germany's future. A Spanish advocate of Liberalism, Ortega Y Gasset, says in his book *La rebelion de las Masas*, that the chief characteristic of the present situation is the fact that "the ordinary soul is fully conscious of its ordinariness

and yet is insolent enough to put forward the claims of ordinariness and to assert them on all sides!" Lagarde feared exactly the same thing, half a century earlier, and his entreaties and accusations derive from this fear. He wrote as he did because he saw how the German middle-class intelligentsia was being drawn into a situation which was bound to end in the assertion of what Ortega Y Gasset calls "the rights of ordinariness." National Socialism called the same thing "strength," and by this contrived to make of the middle classes and especially the intelligentsia its support at first, and eventually its victim.

National Socialism mastered the art of turning all the longings and inclinations of the time into attractive promises of panaceas, thus pandering skilfully to the tastes of the middle classes. But it would be absurd to suppose that the question of the inner unity of the German nation and all cultural questions dependent on that fundamental problem occupied only the minds of the members of at first a small party, possessing neither the intellectual nor the moral requisites for discussing it, let alone contributing to its solution. But such supposition would not merely be absurd. It would set the seal on the claim, stridently asserted both then and now by Nazi propaganda all over the world, that the Nazis alone had had the moral reformation of the German people at heart since the beginning. But actually the part which they played or desired to play in this connection was of no historical importance. Their influence was for a long time imperceptible. The historically important fact was, on the contrary, that the longing for this moral reformation permeated all sections of the middle classes and the younger generation. The years between the end of the war and the first election of Hindenburg were filled in the cultural sphere with the breath of battle and the joy of battle, stronger than all the wretchedness of political and economic developments. Those years would have been of the greatest importance for Germany's future if the Republic had understood how to make them fruitful. It did not understand, and finally did not even try to understand: that is the second historically important fact. Only that fact made the third development possible: that the Nazis were able to persuade the German nation and indeed the world at large, in so far as it consists of petty bourgeois, that they had saved Germany from the moral

swamp into which it had almost wholly sunk, thanks to the Republic.

What did men returning from the war expect of the new republican Germany? The distinguishing characteristic of the pre-war period was the problematic character of existence as a whole. The answer to the question is that men counted on the removal of these problems. Indeed, many had believed that the outbreak of war and the war itself were a salutary process. In that they had been mistaken. But the experience of the war in any case produced a spiritual agitation as a result of which men hoped to create a new humanity with a new spiritual attitude towards life and the world: the true and final humanity and the new man. And the distinguishing feature of this man, who is to build up an entirely new future, is not reason, or logic or psychology. These were the gods of the former time, but the new god is the spirit. No longer the rationalistic spirit of the past, but a combination of the highest degree of activity and of cosmic feeling, a grasping of life by its deepest roots. This feeling was the background of the movement called "Expressionism," so called because it was inspired by the striving to give expression in an entirely new language to all that is innermost.

Thus the young generation who returned from the battlefield to the lecture-room were filled with an undefined urge that things must be altered. Only in the rarest cases did they ask themselves "how." But they were prepared to be led, or rather they longed for a leader, a *real* leader. That does not of course mean that they desired a dictator. The cry for the so-called "strong man" was indeed heard even in the cultural sphere, but it was without significance in the early days. What was really desired was a "supreme court" of intelligent, creative and active men and women who should collaborate effectively to bring about a reconciliation of tradition, the present and the future, in the centres responsible for the well-being of culture. It was perfectly well realised that "culture" cannot be created in the void. Either people have it or they have not. But a longing existed for men possessed of a profound sense of their responsibility who should speak the decisive word in the schools and universities, the press and the theatre, later too in the films and the wireless. For it was felt that in this way the old and so far unfulfilled desire for the establishment of the people's

community, the inner bridging of all the party and class clefts might perhaps be satisfied. "Men, not measures," as an English proverb puts it! Germany's renaissance was regarded as a moral problem, not to be solved by force but only by way of the spirit, to which all would have to make the heaviest sacrifices. Force had been entirely discredited by the war and the peace treaty. The young generation counted on their leaders to bring the spirit into new repute, and so to give men, irrespective of all national differences, a new worth. This period had for its slogan: "Oh man!" and at first this slogan was fresh as paint and filled with youthful power. In other words it was very much more than a new slogan. It was a promise, a solemn vow exchanged between those determined to make humanism once more the basis of German life. Humanism was now glorified with as much fervour as force had been in Imperial days and during the war.

There was an opposition to the State only in so far as it opposed this democratic humanism. They hoped through it to conquer Germany and the world. They believed that at least the fate of Europe depended on its realisation. They appropriated the phrase used by the victorious Powers that the war had been fought to end war. But they were undoubtedly as bad politicians as those responsible for the Versailles peace, though for different reasons. For their passion for the democratic people's community as the basis of international peace throughout Europe, springing as it did from spiritual origins, caused them to overlook the practical fact that the war to end war had been followed by a peace which made peace impossible. This very group in the generation of 1920 in Germany is an exact repetition of those idealists whose influence decided the struggle of 1848 in favour of the Prussian power state. They were filled with ideas, and consequently were brought low by reality which they would not look in the face.

This in no way alters the fact that the state ought, in its own most vital interest, to have made the wave of enthusiasm of this period productive by allowing its representatives to play a part in the construction of the Republic. Those men possessed what the leaders of the Social-Democrats and other parties lacked from the start: an *élan*, a deep-seated enthusiasm, a belief in the possibility of a new epoch in German history. It is understandable that those who had newly

acquired political power should feel that the demands of the younger generation were in part far too radical, in part directly opposed to everything they took to be meant by a "democratic republic," and finally much too extravagant and confused to be taken as the basis for any structure in reality. But the youthful elements desired the restoration of the *Universitas Literarum*, and therefore demanded a complete reformation of the educational and cultural system. The first would have been the elimination of the supremacy exercised for decades by the petty bourgeois in the secondary schools and the universities. It is no exaggeration to state that in this particular sphere the Republic could have won a victory which would have made later developments impossible. Instead, the way was made smooth in this department too for National-Socialism, at first through sins of omission, then through sins of commission. It is of course possible to affirm that the economic and political factors were of such a decisive character that any amount of reform in the cultural sphere could not have prevented the happenings of 1933. That is true to a certain extent in that all spheres were interdependent, and the fundamental error—the delay in instituting large-scale economic reform—was committed at the very beginning. But the younger generation would have overlooked this great blunder more easily if they had been able to see that the Republic meant to realise their hopes in the cultural sphere. The only really important factor was their idealism. And this idealism made them, in typically German fashion, more or less indifferent to all economic considerations.

About the time of Locarno and Hindenburg's first accession to the Presidency no one had any more faith in the humanists. They continued to write and to declaim their speeches. But they, and the governments which were meanwhile changing in character, lifted no finger when they saw their positions being taken from them. They were replaced on the one hand by the specialist scholars, whom the youth followed because they could not go physically hungry. On the other hand, the same youth which only a few years earlier had cried out for the rule of reason and for European internationalism, allowed itself to be carried away by the National-Socialist activists in preference to going spiritually hungry. Thus was humanism finally separated from activism. That means that the humanists held their tongues, while the activists opened their



mouths wide for the purpose of driving the last remnant of self-respect out of the minds of their followers. The reason was that all the flaming enthusiasm of the beginnings of the new humanism had either been drowned by bureaucracy, or first damped down by fashion and then drowned completely.

As in the days of the Empire—but to a still greater extent—Public Schools became the object of a reforming zeal which only too soon degenerated into a reforming philistinism not unlike the attitude of the pre-war years: ah, what splendid work we have done! It was quite comprehensible and very necessary that the Republic and above all the Social-Democrats who counted many school teachers in their ranks, should aim at turning the anti-social schools into schools valuable for society. But in this sphere too the process so very well known in the political sphere took place. The zeal for reform of exterior things was stronger than the zeal for reforming the spirit of the institution.

The social character of the new unified schools demanded a preliminary stage, the so-called "basic schools" to which all children from any class whatsoever had to go. The subsequent stages of their education were no longer to be decided by financial considerations, but by the gifts possessed by each child. The aim of the "Gymnasium" and the other similar types of secondary schools was to be the attainment of the highest pitch of development by the young people admitted to them. And the development in question was to be not merely that of the intelligence which would enable the young people to win for themselves a position in life, but development of the character too, educating them to a sense of their duty to the community and preparing them for devotion to the service of the people. The idea was excellent. All the more so as the duty to the community did not imply rearmament or any other kind of militarism. But the whole epoch was full of programmes. And not one, from the Reich constitution down, had any or at least any adequate form of reality. Two conditions would have had to be fulfilled for the schools to become models of life in the national community: organisers capable of distinguishing gifted young people from the rest, and a body of teachers who realised that the value of school and of the knowledge imparted there must be set neither too high nor too low.

The selection of the most gifted students very soon fell

under the sway of a bureaucracy which called forth an ever-increasing degree of discontent, both from the young people themselves and their parents, because it based its actions on considerations of party politics. But in seeking to discover talents among very young people or to strengthen those they already possess, it is above all necessary to realise that precisely those school children with the strongest individualities are least suited to being subordinated to a set formula. Normally, only a very small fraction of a school child's personality is active, or indeed present in school hours. But the psychologists who gave advice in careers never doubted for an instant that they possessed the secret of dividing up life into watertight compartments without destroying it. "Expressionistic" literature stormed against the soulless school of the past through the novel and the theatre, but above all in the publications of pedagogic experts. And on the other hand the republican authorities backed up a mechanical sort of psychologising which treated the young people as objects for experiments instead of developing their spiritual powers, as it fondly believed it did. The pre-war teacher had indeed been primarily a philologist rather than a pedagogue. Provided that he was tolerably good at his particular subject and had passed his examinations by hook or by crook, the authorities did not care whether he was capable of using his knowledge to effect in school or not. It was only right that the Republic should put an end to this false estimation of the importance of the pedagogic personality. But it was wrong that the other extreme should be sought and knowledge as a whole despised, while the whole emphasis was laid on a formal routine, especially as the value—at best very doubtful—of such a routine disappeared altogether when it was backed up neither by a scientific personality nor by an even adequate standard of knowledge.

It was generally believed in Germany before 1918 that people became school teachers because they could not become anything else. That was rather an exaggeration; for in Germany too there were always those who followed an inner vocation in becoming pedagogues. But in general, there can be no doubt, the schools were filled with a lower middle-class type of restricted views which aimed at nothing more than to secure a safe job. The Republic certainly attempted in its first years to root out this type. The teaching profession

at that time attracted people who in earlier times would have wholeheartedly rejected the idea of becoming teachers. The people then attracted were mostly supporters of the republican form of state who relied on those in power to abolish the militarised and Prussianised schools and reconcile a new education and the things of the spirit. They were mostly young themselves and they saw in humanism a duty and an obligation. If the Republic had been other than blind and deaf, it could and must have developed from the ranks of this young generation of teachers a bodyguard which would have succeeded in winning over the schools to the republican cause. But, instead, precisely this new generation of teachers was driven by the Republic's weakness into the arms of the National-Socialists. The less the Republic strove to make the schools the concrete expression of an ideology which was nowhere realised in the political sphere, the more the brave band of independent and enthusiastic teachers tried, in the early days, to work both for this ideology and for a new reality in the scholastic sphere. But not only did the Republic not back them up. It was frankly hostile to them, according as the schools' question became more and more a bone of contention in party quarrels. Everything activistic disturbed the bureaucracy of the educational authorities. They had no desire to lose their jobs because one or two hotheads chose to take republicanism, and the question in and through the things of the spirit, seriously. Democrats and Social-Democrats allied themselves with the old forces of reaction. The latter were cleverer than the Republic—for they knew that the party which understands how to get the schools well under its control can rely on the support of the younger generation. From 1930 on, therefore, it was practically impossible to defend the Republic in the schools, so completely had it lost all credit in the cultural sphere, and moreover disgraced the name of culture whose advocate it had claimed to be. And in this way culture on the one hand and "true German culture" on the other hand became dead opposites. This is the principal reason for the entirely false—but effective—view that it is the process of bringing to recognition spiritual norms and values, and placing faith in them, that causes the deterioration of the "natural" side of man's being. That is an actual fact far from the truth. For in reality the effect of practising a calling which demands not merely technical skill

but also the capacity to sense its inner tension—and only there does the spirit come in—is rather to heighten man's natural powers. But, as the true representatives of the spirit exercised an ever-diminishing influence in German culture, which finally sank to no influence at all, it was possible for the scarecrow figure of the "intelligence beast," as it was called in Germany, to come into being: the beast that sucked the blood of the German people, "the best blood it possessed."

In 1929 a meeting of German university teachers took place in Munich with the object of protesting against what was described as turning the German Universities into charitable institutions. A memoir published at the same time by the Faculty of Arts in Berlin maintained, "*dass die Universitäten und Hochschulen isoliert und ihres geistigen Unterbaus im Volksganzen beraubt werden.*" These facts proved that the humanistic *élan* of the first post-war years had disappeared in the universities too. And in view of the course that events had taken (this is true not only of Germany) this was not surprising. The German universities had originally been small communities held together by the idea of scientific research and teaching. They had possessed independent constitutions resting on the principles of liberty in teaching and autonomy in administration. But, especially since 1870, the state and society transferred to the universities duties which entailed the decay not merely of their character as independent communities, but of academic liberty. The state saddled the universities with the job of developing its administrative officials, judges, teachers at secondary schools and even, after 1918, teachers at elementary schools. The Church looked to the universities for its clergymen, and business for its technical, legal and commercial experts. In addition to all these and particularly after the war a mass of embryo doctors, barristers, librarians, museum officials, etc., thought of nothing so much as passing examinations as quickly as possible and thus getting jobs. Clearly, therefore, the pursuit of pure knowledge and the practice of scientific research, could no longer be called the true *raison d'être* of the universities. The more they persisted in claiming that the contrary was the case, in spite of the development going on before men's eyes, the clearer it became that the universities were steadily sinking to a level where they became, as they themselves rightly described it, "charitable institutions."

The examination for a doctorate which had been in earlier days a test of the highest academic accomplishment and distinction became now a mass-production affair, and consequently sank in the public esteem below the level of the state examinations, the only one through which a job could be obtained. As a result the universities lost all moral as well as all intellectual influence on the students. The enormous number of the latter—Berlin for instance had at times some 10,000 students—meant that a common social life even within the individual faculties was an impossibility. But it was in any case the best of the students who no longer attributed any value to this common social life, because “humanitas” had become a mere word without content or significance. The “revolution of 1918” did indeed in a purely exterior way bring to the surface certain ideas long recognised by minds in advance of their times, and then without influence. Thus the “reform of the universities” became a subject which for years was never absent from the newspapers and periodicals. But in this sphere too the fine symbols of the first post-war years soon degenerated into catchwords. Though many spoke of the reform of the universities nothing was done, and the result was a frame of mind in which the students either mocked at the university or used it for their material furtherance. Just as the old officials with their lack of understanding for and enmity towards the new state were left in power in the local administration, in the law courts and in the army, so they remained in the universities. And once the respect for the universities had disappeared, respect for science and the spirit was not slow in going the same way. Those who had been disappointed threw themselves into the arms of the men who promised the renaissance of Germany through “blood, soil and race.” Hitler sent into the lecture halls men who had been officers in the old army and who were particularly skilful in this field. Thus he succeeded in convincing young Germans that National-Socialism alone was capable of producing the new universities which would reform learning.

It is impossible to blame the younger generation for this evolution. The republican authorities did not see what were the longings of the younger generation which wished to be rid of the contrast between the ideal conception of the universities and the reality. The former was based on German

idealism, the concepts of unconditional liberty in the realm of knowledge, and the “*universitas literarum*.” It is noteworthy that since 1931, when the National-Socialist Students’ Union, thanks to the inactivity of the republican authorities, assumed complete control in the German student world, this contrast had been exposed with a frankness that compares very favourably with the concealing methods of the universities themselves. This frankness was enhanced, moreover, by strong criticism aimed by the students at two institutions which had exercised a decisive influence on the life of the German universities. The first was the student corporations, or the majority of them, which had only one aim: the education of their members up to the point where they became smooth and uniform units of society. The second was the unsalaried lecturer type, described by the late Professor Heller of Frankfurt as an “intellectualist bespectacled snake with a broken backbone.” Both had, indeed, nothing to do with reality. The unsalaried lecturer had in most cases no idea of contemporary events, such as the political and social changes going on in the student body. He was in fact nothing more than a petty bourgeois specialist worker, not even aware of the stresses within his own sphere and not at all qualified to train the student for citizenship. It was not surprising that the students were won over by a demagogy that promised to co-ordinate for them the universities with reality. It has fulfilled its promise. The universities are to-day the expression of the Nazi-citizenship, that is of a party-science which cannot tolerate dispassionate enquiry, because it cannot tolerate the truth. But the more we are hostile to this kind of citizenship the more we ought not to forget that it was brought about only because of the sins of those who were too weak to fight—to fight for humanism.

A. M. WAGNER.

## IMMORTAL FLORENCE.

THIS city is a vein of gold with innumerable ramifications and branches. One can explore it for years and always find more treasures and experience fresh surprises. What I want to describe are entirely chance observations, and each visitor to Florence will make ten other discoveries which will appear to him valuable. The city is rich enough to present each person with his own special store of gold, over which he can feel joyful and proud.

The door to a simple, undecorated chapel was always shut. I knew that it was called San Martino, and that in the Middle Ages ballad-singers and improvisators had stood in the little piazza in front of it with the people pressing round them. To-day the streets are too small and the square is too narrow; they usually remain quiet and apart from the traffic. Here are still preserved the high, gloomy house façades of the Middle Ages, while a few steps further on stand the castle-like towers of the Alighieri, in one of which Dante is said to have been born.

One morning when the chapel was open a poorly dressed woman threw a note into the letter-slit by the door and then went in. With curiosity I followed her—and found myself in the nursery of Florentine painting. In a bright rectangular place scarcely bigger than a room stood a prayer-desk in front of an old Madonna picture, where the woman was kneeling and praying in silence. The walls were whitewashed, but in the semicircular, arched openings beneath the ceiling shone coloured frescoes, fresh and strong, as though it were but yesterday they had been painted on the wall, living and graceful like improvisations of the moment.

An old official explains. It is the chapel of the benefactors (*Confraternità dei Buonomini*), dedicated to Saint Martin, a foundation in the year 1444 of Antonio, the pious Bishop and later Saint, the contemporary and friend of the old Cosimo de' Medici. Through the republic's new taxation policy at this time (a general property-tax—"Catasto"—had been introduced in 1427) numerous respectable families were completely impoverished, and were ashamed to make a claim on public charity. These "ashamed paupers" (*poveri vergognosi*) had to be provided for in a special manner. The assistance given them had to be secret, the identity of the giver might not be

known, and sometimes a husband would remain quite ignorant when his wife and children received money and clothes from an unknown source. During times of plague, bread would be distributed to those waiting outside, through a gap in the wall (which to-day has been blocked up), in order to avoid infection and to keep the givers invisible. The richest citizens, even the nobility, considered it an honour to belong to the society and do good anonymously. They would meet in the chapel in order to examine the written petitions which had been sent in, and to consider means of assistance. This humane institution has survived up to the present day. The society can accept inheritances and legacies, but, instead of itself owning any property, is bound at once to convert everything into alms. Even the tip which I offer the old official is smilingly refused and thrown into the poor-box.

Jacob Burckhardt supposes the frescoes to be by Rafaellino del Garbo. But various hands must have been at work here. There are early works by Domenico Ghirlandajo, and Filippino Lippi, Botticelli and Piero di Cosimo have also painted a lunette. Saint Martin lies there asleep on a bed wearing armour and half a red cloak, his page sleeping at his feet, while in front of him, amid a band of angels, appears Christ in the other half of the red cloak, which he has shared with the poor man. Only Botticelli could have painted such curly angels' heads. Here a released prisoner is coming out of prison with sunken, yellow face, at once to be met in the street by the benefactors, who present him with money and clothes, while the prisoners press together behind the bars. In its vital naturalism this can only have been painted by Domenico Ghirlandajo. Here distinguished gentlemen have entered the dwelling of a poor girl and are filling the chests with material for her dowry, and there bread and wine are being distributed, or a plague-victim is being fed or a poor man buried by masked figures. Everything is conceived with freshness and expression, true to type in the costumes and architecture. On one picture a simple Florentine wedding is represented, with the somewhat stiff, splendidly naïve figures and bold colours of Piero di Cosimo. The very young bridegroom in a short green cloak is said to be Dante, who was married in this chapel to Ema Donati, that he might forget his grief for the dead Beatrice. The young painters, who here produced their joint works, later became famous and

presented the world with imperishable pieces of art. But rarely were they so charming as here, where—probably without pay—they painted simple scenes from the daily life of Florence, with a beautiful combination of youthful gaiety and human sympathy.

Opposite the chapel is the entrance to the “*Penello*” (the crush), an old inn, to which the young painters are said to have resorted while they were painting their frescoes. About fifty years later one of their colleagues himself took over the inn, Mariotto Albertinelli, the painter of a beautiful Visitation now hanging in the Uffizi and of a moving Crucifixion in the Certosa of Galuzzo. He is said to have disagreed with the criticisms of his pictures and therefore to have given up painting and become an inn-keeper. Andrea del Sarto, Raphael, Benvenuto Cellini, even the grave Michael Angelo are said to have resorted here to the “*Penello*” and drunk good wine. The wine is still good to-day, as is also the food, and why should the legend not be true?

Florence swarms with such legends, most of which have a kernel of truth, even though the historical dates are often wrong. Whoever has once sat by night in the enormous Piazza Signoria in front of the Palazzo Vecchio, where the flood-lights illuminate Michael Angelo’s David and Bandinelli’s Hercules like sugar-icing in front of the palace’s gloomy façade, where perhaps a cat scurries over the round, marble plate on the site of Savonarola’s funeral pyre—every year on May 23rd, even to-day, unknown hands deck this plate with flowers—whoever has sat here can understand that this square is surrounded by a garland of legends. So the tale has it that at midnight Michael Angelo’s David climbs down from his pedestal, goes across to his big fat brother, the Neptune of Ammanati, whom the Florentines call the “*Biancone*,” and lends him his sling. And Neptune climbs out of his Triton car and slings stones into his fountain-basin. So the water, which during the day has become dull and dirty, is again made clear and fresh. And even though the Florentine has mocked the shapeless Neptune—“*Ammanato, Ammanato, che bel marmo hai rovinato!*” (Ammanato, Ammanato, what fine marble you have spoilt!), he nevertheless loves his *Biancone* and lets him creep over the square by night and play with the giant’s sling.

In the corner-stones of the Palazzo Vecchio behind the

Uffizi—this is no legend, but truth—there may be discovered above the stone seat the outlines of two male heads in profile, which have been cut into the stone with deep blows of a chisel. This is said to be the work of Leonardo da Vinci, who liked the head of an artisan working here and, having no pencil and paper with him, sketched the profile in the stone with his chisel. He is even said to have done it behind his own back, with his face turned towards the square, while others say the artist was Michael Angelo. But what is there which is not said to be by Michael Angelo? Wherever an interesting door or a fine window-arch of unknown origin is to be found in Florence, Michael Angelo is claimed as its creator. For the Florentine he is simply the genius, but also—strange interpretation of the popular legend—the evil spirit, who overhears and frightens lovers by night, the ugly and unloved one, whom Vincenzo de’ Rossi, his rival Bandinelli’s pupil, caricatured in a marble group in the courtyard of the Palazzo Vecchio.

Thus the great artists of this city go on living in the minds of their people. As I was once standing in front of Donatello’s Saint George at the church of Orsanmichele, I was observed by a simple man, not a professor or a guide anxious for a tip, who came up to me and pointed over his shoulder with his thumb: “*Ha fatto il nostro Donatello!*” A genius cannot enter more deeply into the thought of his people than that 500 years after his death the man in the street should still say: “Our Donatello made that.”

But only a few know where their Donatello lies buried. Every year thousands visit the church of San Lorenzo and Michael Angelo’s Medici graves, and forget to descend into the crypt. It is not always open, and underneath there are some extremely unimposing storehouses to be found; but when a service is being held in the small crypt chapel of Saint Anne, anyone can enter the bare, plain vaults from the monastery court or from the street. Here lie the tombs of Cosimo de’ Medici and Donatello, the two old friends, the greatest men of the first decades of the fifteenth century, the builders of this church, the creators of the new life which we call the Renaissance. The room, where Cosimo’s tomb lies, serves as a storehouse. And yet the conception of this tomb is a stupendous one. The whole vaulting of the crypt rests on a mighty column, which ends in the church in front of the main altar: and the old Cosimo’s bones were walled inside

this column three years after his death. (He died on August 1st, 1464.) Perhaps it was Michelozzo Michelozzi, who built him the splendid palace above the earth and who also had the idea of this primitive and grand last resting-place. Thus the church rests on its builder, old Cosimo de' Medici, who could still shut himself up in a monastery cell of San Marco like a medieval monk, and who at the same time was the bearer of a new age, from whose bones the Renaissance grew.

I continue my search. Finally an old workman helps me and removes a few dusty planks lying in front of a threshold. A marble slab comes to view, plain and dirty. Slowly I decipher "Donatellus." And on it is written that he himself had the desire to be buried near his friend. In the church above a modern memorial has been set for him, opposite the strange sarcophagus of the Martelli family, which he himself chiselled (the Martelli were the bankers of the Medici), and next to one of the finest pictures by Filippo Lippi, whom old Cosimo also loved. But here in the crypt dust and dirty planks lie on the grave. (Donatello died two years after Cosimo, on December 13th, 1466.) Donatellus and Cosimus—here amid mould and dust lie these last pitiful human remains which are at the same time the source of immortal legend, while above them their spirit blossoms in their imperishable works.

In the crypt of San Lorenzo still lies Bernardo Cennini, who made the first printing types in Florence and printed the first books, as well as the brothers Benedetto and Giuliano di Majano, two sculptors, who produced splendid pieces of work for old Cosimo, and also—a strange contrast in this weird, poverty-stricken desolation and in the society of these old men—the beautiful young Bianca Capello, the lover of the Grand Duke Francesco I and later his wife, so often celebrated in painting and song, who is said to have died of poisoning together with her husband, and to whom her family grudged a place in the splendid sacristy. A cross is painted on the wall: this is the "*Carnajo*," charnel-house, where the poorest of the poor were buried, without memorial and without name. Here the beautiful Bianca was secretly interred.

Once more Donatello. In the second court of the monastery of San Marco amid innumerable reminiscences of medieval Florence which were collected here, stands the beautiful great bell "*La piagnone*" (the weeping one), a choice piece of Florentine bronze-casting. Its noble shape and the splendid

ornaments of garlanded cherubs point to Donatello as its author. The restoration of the church of San Marco was finished by Michelozzo in 1441, and the bell must date from that time. This is the bell which was rung by the despairing Dominicans of San Marco in the night of April 9th, 1498, as the soldiers were storming the monastery and the monks heroically defended the life of Savonarola, their prior. When Savonarola was later condemned to death by burning, the bell, too, was condemned to banishment. It was drawn through the city by a donkey, and the hangman whipped it as though it were a living creature. Then it was hung in the tower of San Salvatore al Monte, high above the city (behind the Piazzale Michelangelo of to-day). According to an old chronicle it is said to have rung again for the first time when Tanai de' Nerli, who had carried out the banishment of the bell, was buried in the church. Marcello Virgilio Adriani, writer and secretary to the Republic, who had drawn up the sentence against Savonarola, also lies buried in San Salvatore. In 1509 the bell came back to San Marco, but since then has not been rung.

Another big monastery in Florence, older than San Marco, founded as early as 1295 and reconstructed in the fifteenth century, will soon be made accessible to the public—S. Maria degli Angeli. Cosimo de' Medici and his great grandson, the later Pope Leo X, were educated here. Later the whole estate was attached to the hospital of S. Maria Nuova, medical institutions were accommodated there, and the church became a medical library. But although all that has now been removed to new buildings outside the city and the old cloisters still look deserted and disorderly, yet it is already possible to walk through the fine Renaissance court-yards, in one of which there is a grand *al fresco* Crucifixion by Andrea del Castagno, one of the most powerful and best preserved pictures of this dramatic, expressive painter (most of them have now been collected in the former refectory of the monastery of S. Apollonia), and to have a look into the fine library with its rich, partly gilded wood-carvings. And in a small square in front of it an architecturally very interesting Renaissance building was completed only two years ago, after having been a ruin for centuries—Brunelleschi's Oratorium degli Angeli, a round construction, from the outside sexadecagonal, from the inside octagonal. It was his last attempt

to create a completely self-contained central building after the cathedral dome. The attempt had to remain a ruin, as in consequence of the many wars of the Republic no more money was to be had. Bitterly Brunelleschi had to give the work up: it was his last great design and three years later he died (1446). But the old plans were found and his idea has now been realised.

This is a city in which even death smiles: Florence is always new again, young and gay. Nowhere but here have such delightful, girl-like Madonnas been painted, and here too was born the most charming feature of the Italian Renaissance—the Putto, on Donatello's singer's tribune in the cathedral museum, and later the numerous representations of children's heads, chiselled with most charm and vivacity by Desiderio da Settignano. The best-known are in Bargello, but the two finest are in a remarkable church, scarcely ever entered by a stranger—San Francesco di Vanchettone, not far from the Piazza Santa Maria Novella. Its very name is queer. A street-boy is said once to have mocked the Franciscan monks to whom church and monastery belonged: "*Vedi, che van chetone!*" (See how upright they walk!) The church is usually shut, but one can ring and have it opened. The visitor is led through a hall-like, baroque room with fine bold ceiling paintings, then to a staircase, a room, a passage, another staircase, with memories everywhere, apparatus for processions, a splendidly worked Renaissance chair, and hanging on one wall a valuable piece of silk and gold lace from the fifteenth century: and then the topmost room contains two boys' heads by Desiderio da Settignano, a San Giovanni and a Christ-child. But these are simply two Florentine street-boys, one with a roguish, chubby-cheeked insolence and the other with a gentle loveliness, and both of them treated with a transparent animation of the surface and a charm of human expression that cannot be described in words. Whoever still thinks the Renaissance was a resuscitation of antiquity ought to look at these two boys' heads. That is the spirit born of our spirit. These two heads could turn one into a thief (and for this reason too they have been removed from the church, where they were formerly placed above the doors unnoticed and unprotected, and put in this remote and secure room).

And finally the Madonnas. Love for anything is not a subject for justification nor for criticism. With women each must

work out his own experience. On the right-hand wall of the old church of San Ambrogio is an *al fresco* painting of a throned Madonna between two saints by Agnolo Gaddi (died 1396), whose father Taddeo had been a pupil of Giotto, the painting being still gothically severe, serious and stiff. But from the pale and already badly damaged colours smiles the face of quite a young girl, natural and charming, no longer a religious symbol, but the portrait of a person. A hundred years later the Madonnas stepped down from their stiff thrones, and Nature became the great god of the Renaissance. In the main room of the Compagnia della Misericordia on the cathedral square is a Madonna by Benedetto da Majano (died 1497), a happy mother, vivacious and hale, in whose hands the child is twisting and struggling like an imprisoned young animal—and the Madonna is smiling. Another hundred years later, and the Madonna has become the ideal of womanhood, queenly in the full shining colours of the mid-Renaissance, queenly in her heavy, coloured robes, as she is represented in the picture of an unknown painter in the little church of Santa Barnaba in the north of the city. The figures of the two saints are in dramatic movement, one of them adores her like a passionate lover, while at her feet sits an angel, which in complete unconcern has fixed a violin between its knees like a violoncello and is coquetting like a laughing Cupid. This Madonna's face is melancholy, she no longer wears a halo, and only her beautiful, soft face can still turn the onlooker's mood to one of devotion.

F. GAUFF.



## AFTER JUGOSLAVIA—HUNGARY.

THE transposition of the centre of political tension from Eastern to Western Europe (which may be only temporary) has produced one unexpected result in the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe. Home affairs, which had been relegated to the background by the international excitements of the past few months, have come to the forefront again. These countries are beginning to clear up the internal problems which had to be set aside during the Czechoslovak crisis and the period of the "Munich Peace." The fall of Stoyadinovich, the Yugoslav Premier, was the beginning of the clearing-up process, the change of government in Budapest was a further step, while the attempt to crush the Iron Guard in Roumania—which has by no means been completed—is also part of this development.

In the case of both Stoyadinovich and Imredy the connection between the internal crisis and foreign politics is obvious. The fall of both Premiers had been long overdue, and was delayed solely on account of international developments in which they had no direct part, but which nevertheless reacted on their personal positions. Stoyadinovich regarded himself as the most successful Yugoslav statesman, and as unassailable in his premiership, because the abandonment of Czechoslovakia by the Western Powers, and particularly France, appeared indirectly to justify his *Realpolitik*. Similarly, Imredy, who had lost the confidence of the Hungarian people long before the September crisis and had no majority in Parliament, owed his continuance in office solely to the fact that he was fortunate enough to be Premier when the Vienna Council unexpectedly granted part of Hungary's revisionist claims.

There is another interesting parallel between the Yugoslav and Hungarian Government crises. Both Imredy and Stoyadinovich during the last months of their rule displayed a tendency towards converting their semi-Fascist régimes into totalitarian régimes. Stoyadinovich made no secret of his plan, and Imredy had a similar one. As confidence in him waned and the parliamentary opposition grew, he started a racist movement after the Fascist pattern under the name of "Hungarian Life," whose emblem was the wonder stag of Hun legend. This movement was designed to evolve into the

Hungarian totalitarian party, with the aid of which Imredy intended to abolish the parliamentary system and establish himself as dictator.

It is undoubtedly more than mere coincidence that the attempt to introduce Fascism should have failed both in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and in each case through the resistance of those circles who had observed, and dared not ignore, the popular reaction to the dictatorial experiments of the respective Premiers. In Yugoslavia it was the Regent, Prince Paul, who recognised the dangers of a further intensification of internal political tensions. In Hungary the fall of Imredy was largely contributed to by Count Bethlen, who since 1921 has been the real helmsman in Hungarian politics, for ten years as Premier, and since then as "the man behind the scenes," the man who makes and breaks Prime Ministers, and is always able to rally the opposition round himself—in the present instance the Left, as well as the Centre and the Right.

However, while the deeper causes of the fall of the Yugoslav and Hungarian Premiers lay in their respective intentions to establish themselves as totalitarian dictators after a foreign pattern, the immediate cause was their inability to solve the vital problems with which they were confronted at home. In Yugoslavia there was the Croatian question; in Hungary, Land Reform and the Jewish question. Imredy's rule lasted ten months and began—like that of his Yugoslav colleague—with the announcement of important, fundamental reforms, and more particularly land reform, which has been the most vital and urgent problem of the Hungarian nation for twenty years. But Imredy, a man who has impetus but no endurance, and who also underestimated the strength of the forces ranged against him, or, possibly, did not intend to keep his promises in the first place, failed to prepare the ground for his reforms or to unite in his support those elements which were genuinely interested in a revival of Hungary's internal life. All that is left of Imredy's land reform plans, which were advertised by him with such pride, is the prospect that 50,000 hectares of the big estates will be transferred to the people during the next two years, and only then will an attempt be made to solve the problem on comprehensive lines.

Imredy's fiasco in this connection was followed by a still worse fiasco on the question of the Jew Law. Under pressure

from the Extreme Right Opposition, he increased the severity of the draft law of his predecessor, Daranyi, so that even before this first Jew Law came into force, he introduced a Bill designed to establish racialism after the German pattern in Hungary. The consequences were the same as during the brief rule of Goga in Roumania. There began a flight of capital from the country, many industrial concerns stopped work at their factories, and unemployment grew at an alarming rate. In addition, Imredy's racialist tendencies were opposed by the Church, as well as by the Hungarian aristocracy and the Moderate Right. But during parliamentary debates on the subject, Imredy again and again proposed amendments increasing the severity of his anti-Jew Law, until the general tension reached breaking point through the bomb explosion at a Budapest synagogue, in which thirty people were injured, four of them severely. Wide circles of Hungarian public opinion laid the blame for this act of terrorism on the Government, which by its extreme anti-Semitism had encouraged the gangster element. Imredy attempted to disclaim responsibility, his disclaimer taking the form of the proclamation of martial law throughout the country and other strict measures, but failed to restore the much shaken confidence of the country in his rule. His rule ended with a farcical incident. The man who, more than any other Hungarian statesman, advocated anti-Semitism and racialism after the German pattern, had to admit in public that, as the Opposition had been asserting for months, he had Jewish blood in his veins, his great-grandmother having been a Jewess.

Imredy's successor, Count Teleki, like Stoyadinovich's successor, Zwetkovic, will probably not last very long, though he is described by those who know him as a reasonable man who is likely to succeed at least in bringing about internal political appeasement, which is so urgent and vital in Hungary to-day. Count Teleki, who will be sixty next year, first occupied his present post in 1920-1, being succeeded by Count Bethlen, and was one of the signatories of the Treaty of Trianon. He also played a not inconsiderable role in Prince Windischgraetz's franc forgery affair, but had during the last ten years kept away from politics, devoting his time mainly to his scientific study of geography and ethnography. At the urgent request of Imredy he entered the latter's cabinet in

1938, as Imredy needed an expert on social and ethnographical questions to aid him in his reform plans. Teleki was the only member of the Cabinet who accompanied the Foreign Minister to the negotiations in Vienna which ended with the return of parts of Czechoslovakia to Hungary. In the social field Count Teleki is not a pronounced reactionary, and it is interesting to note that the group of young Hungarian sociologists who last year held a statistical exhibition in Budapest demonstrating the unequal distribution of land in Hungary, thereby incurring the ire of the great landowners, claimed Teleki as their teacher.

If, finally, we wish to know what the developments in Yugoslavia and Hungary signify from the viewpoint of international politics, it is only necessary to glance at the German press which, on the one hand, does not conceal its displeasure at the fall of the two Premiers who were so devoted to Germany, and, on the other hand, eagerly asseverates that there can be no question of any change in the foreign policy of the two countries. Berlin is endeavouring to discover the influences at work in Yugoslavia and Hungary, in order to make it understandable to the German people how it is that there still are in countries ideologically annexed by Germany oppositions capable of bringing down would-be dictators supported by the Reich. In the case of Yugoslavia the German press blames the Roman Catholic Church and Great Britain for everything, while in the case of Hungary—according to the *Berliner Boersenzeitung*—it is the Jews and Bolsheviki "who think they can mislead the feudal aristocracy into adventurings in foreign policy." However, "there will naturally be no change as regards the firmly established facts of the decisive distribution of power and the space-bound laws of Europe." It would certainly be an error to anticipate fundamental changes in foreign policy from the stopgap governments that have succeeded the fallen régimes. But that does not alter the significance of the fact that both in Yugoslavia and Hungary the semi-Fascist régimes crashed at the moment when they were about to establish totalitarian dictatorships. The indignation which their fall aroused in Berlin shows that the Reich is by no means so sure of the countries which it regarded as its future vassals as German propagandists would have us believe.

WOLFGANG BRETHOLZ.

## THE TEACHING OF HISTORY UNDER STALIN.

THE new Russian School History calls for special attention from European public opinion. It is entitled *School History of the Soviet Union*. It is the work of several authors under the editorship of Professor Schestakoff, and is intended for instruction in the elementary schools. As the Soviet newspaper *Trud* was careful to point out, it "was planned on the initiative, and by the direct advice, of the great leader of the nations, Comrade Stalin." The same paper describes it as "a valuable contribution, not only to the educational literature of our schools, but also to the Marxist Science of History." The *Pravda* recommends it as "a genuine gift from Stalin to our children."

In principle, this book implies a new phase in the Soviet teaching of history and, in fact, in the political education of the rising generation. Hitherto, Russian history and Russian culture were said to begin with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Similarly in pre-Bolshevik ages Russia, like the earth in the legendary account of the Creation, was said to have lain in chaos and darkness. Now, however, we read in the *Pravda*: "This book winds up the dismal period which forced upon Soviet school children the dreary impression that the history of the S.S.S.R. started only in 1917, and that otherwise the past could offer them nothing more interesting or important than the vicissitudes of insignificant social forms." An interpretation of the past in Russia would certainly be very welcome. Looked at in this light, the new method of teaching history would imply a certain degree of progress. Unfortunately, the new School History is far removed from an objective and critical elucidation of former Russian policy: on the contrary it surveys the worst elements in Russia's earlier development, accepts them, and actually does not hesitate to justify them. The tendency is specifically nationalist and full of the spirit of political reaction. The official Soviet historians have rushed from one extreme to the other. The will of the ruler in each successive period of Russian history is glorified as the decisive factor. This will, be it noted, was nearly always clear, wise and strong. Ostensibly, therefore, the rulers could register great success. Earlier school books utterly denied the part played by personality in

history: the new book ascribes virtually Divine powers to personality, compared with which all the other factors—climatic, geographical, economic and political—of the rise and consolidation of the vast Russian Empire are presented as insignificant. In like manner, the policy of force pursued by Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great is appraised with kindness and reverence. For Ivan the Terrible's government the book discovers the following extenuating circumstances: "As a child Ivan grew up under the autocratic Bojars, who wounded his feelings and developed bad qualities in him." With such an argument do the historians believe they can justify his policy. The terrorism of the Opritschina, whose business it was to uphold the Czar's dictatorship "with blood and iron," is characterised as a necessity of State; the Czar himself is extolled as a great statesman, who "strengthened Russian Imperial autocracy," and "founded a mighty State out of many scattered provinces." This picture of power-politics is untrue to life. Even conservative Russian historians, like Kluchewsky, who have given conscientious study to the age of Ivan the Terrible, have condemned the Czar's rule unequivocally.

Why are the rulers of old Russia treated thus benevolently? The answer is found easily between the lines of the *School History*, and runs as follows: Because they must be looked upon as the historical forerunners of "the modern leader of the people, Stalin." Stalin, of course, according to these commentators, must not possess the bad qualities of his predecessors. Unlike Ivan the Terrible, for example, he probably had an excellent education in Georgian Caucasus, obviously based on the humanitarian principles of Komensky, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel and other world-famous pedagogues. The *School History* contrasts the wise, good Czars with the bad, stupid Bojars, nobles and "rich people" in general. All these "parasites" were only occupied in stirring up rebellions and treason against the ruler, for which they deserved, and received, severe punishment. This picture is also not difficult to explain: the Bojars, minor princes and nobles must be painted as ancestors of the opponents of Stalin, Trotzky, Zinovieff, Kameneff, Bucharin and so forth. The teacher must understand how to make clear the danger of opposition throughout the ages.

The nationalist and militarist spirit of the book comes out  
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particularly in the accounts of the waging of wars. As a rule, all Russia's wars have been forced upon her by her enemies; and, equally as a rule, Russia is victorious, for the mighty Soviet Union is invincible. Of course there were exceptions; but these only confirmed the rule. It is not disputed that Russia had to undergo numerous defeats; but it was never the enemy's military, economic or cultural superiority that caused them. Heaven forbid! Russia was always invincible: defeat was the result of "treason" alone. Only a few prominent examples need be quoted: Ivan the Terrible lost the war with Poland, Lithuania and Sweden because the Bojars practised treachery against him. In the Great War Russia was unable to gain victories because "the Russian Ministers and Generals, together with the Empress, betrayed military secrets to the Germans." Thus the same legend of the stab in the back which was launched by the German generals and Nazi demagogues as the cause of the German defeat is similarly made use of in the Russian school book.

It is known from official Soviet documents that the peace negotiations with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk were carried out by Trotsky strictly under Lenin's directions. The *School History* maintains, however, that Russia made a bad bargain because "the traitor Trotsky and his accomplice Bucharin sabotaged the peace negotiations." For this reason Russia is stated to have lost vast tracts of land. It is vain, of course, to search in the book for mention of Trotsky's having organised the Red Army after the signing of peace at Brest and having been Minister of War for some years; nor are the school children allowed to know that for years Bucharin was officially recognised as the leading mind of the Bolshevik party and chief editor of the *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. Concerning the close of the Russo-Polish War (1920) and the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw, the *School History* states: "The Red Army did not take Warsaw: it was ordered to retire." Everything, clearly, in perfect order. A chauvinist soldier's witticism follows: "The Polish gentlemen were taught such a lesson in the war that they have not forgotten it to this day."

The glaring lies and unscrupulous demagoguery of modern Russian history teaching reach unparalleled excesses in its picture of the development of Russia in the last two decades. This section of the book opens with the assurance that "from

the first days of the victorious Bolshevik Revolution Lenin and Stalin set about organising the Soviet State." . . . "The Soviet Government gave the Russian people complete liberation—such a liberation as has been conferred on no other nation in the world." To be sure, let there be no premature rejoicings: the constructive work of Lenin and Stalin was disturbed again and again. By whom? By foreign Powers, who cherish bitter hatred against this happy Socialist country. They work hand in hand with the "internal enemies." Who are these "internal enemies"? Hear the answer: the old Bolshevik gang that did not agree with Stalin's policy. Their activities are described as follows: "That contemptible enemy of the people, the Fascist agent Trotsky, and his contemptible friends, Rykoff and Bucharin, organised within the Soviet Union bands of murderers, ruffians and spies. They assassinated the ardent Bolshevik Kirov. They also plotted the murder of other leaders of the proletariat. The Fascist scoundrels who followed Trotsky and Rykoff organised train-wrecking, explosions, fires in coal-mines and factories; ruined machinery, poisoned workmen and did damage wherever they could." All of them, so runs the legend, sought to restore the yoke of Capitalism. "But the bandits were convicted and punished."

The reasons for pouring ignominy on the former Bolshevik leaders, who for years held the highest posts, are as follows: to be able to pass off the failures of the Dictator system as the result of sabotage; to find some justification for the terrorism of late years; and to contrast the "honourable" and "statesmanlike" figure of Stalin with those "despicable internal enemies." There are no limits to the abuse in the legends of "traitors" and "spies." It goes so far that the children are actually asked "to track down carefully all suspicious persons, so that Fascist agents may be trapped." Lenin once coined the saying "A good Communist is a good Tschekist"—i.e. a good agent of the political police.

As befits invincible super-men, Lenin and Stalin have overcome the greatest difficulties caused by the "counter-revolutionists" and the "hostile powers": they have brought the building-up of the Socialist State to a happy conclusion. To our great astonishment we read that "even in 1933 the Soviet Union caught up with, and outstripped, quite a number of European States." The States, however,

are left unnamed. The legend is put forward, cloaked by revolutionary and socialistic phraseology, that the Russian State under Bolshevik leadership has become the Chosen Land. It is stressed that only "our fatherland" is "a socialistic country": once the most backward country in the world, it has now become the mightiest and the most progressive. This is the reason why "we love the Soviet Union so much and are so proud of it." The Soviet Constitution is, of course, the best in the world. "Soviet aeroplanes fly higher and traverse longer routes than any others." Where is the finest and best Underground in the whole world? Why, in Moscow, of course. Similarly, art and science flourish better in Soviet Russia than anywhere else. "The musicians and actors of the Soviet Union are known as first-rate artists. Soviet pianists and violinists gain first prizes in international competitions." So it is obvious that all Russian composers, musicians and actors of earlier days, whose fame extended throughout the world, did not exist. The story about Professor Pavloff is particularly pungent—an illustration showing that scientists of the Soviet Union live and work as in Paradise. We read in the *History*: "It was only under the Soviet Government that Pavloff, as member of the Academy of Science, could develop his talents. Cherished by the care of the Russian people, supported by the power of the Soviet, Pavloff made many new discoveries about human life." In reality Professor Pavloff received the Nobel Prize for his achievements in physiology as early as 1904. At that time the Bolsheviks did not even picture a Soviet State in their dreams. It is not improbable that he suffered less deprivations under the Soviet than hundreds of other professors. On the other hand, it is equally certain that the conditions under which he worked were tolerable only because, as mentioned above, he was already world-famous: his name could be exploited for purposes of Soviet propaganda.

In painting the work of Stalin himself, the *History* glorifies his personality to such an extent as to remind us of the Cæsars. The Soviet Dictator is named only "Leader of the Nations—the great Stalin." In the preface we read that "the oldest State" of the Russian Empire, Georgia, is the home of Stalin. Then everything is praised to high heaven that Stalin has done or even merely wanted to do. We are told, for example, that after the overthrow of the Revolution of 1905,

"Lenin abroad and Stalin in Russia carried on, against the law, the great struggle for Socialism; they were ready to sacrifice their last drop of blood for the cause of the workers." In 1917, when Lenin was living, for a time, hidden, under Kerenski, Stalin presided over the Fourth Party Congress. The Report of the Congress proves, however, that his part was quite insignificant. Further: "Stalin was commissioned to defeat Denikin's army." Stalin "worked out the First Five Years' Plan." Nor is mention forgotten of the great honour done to Gorky by his personal friendship with Stalin. Stalin "gave the people the best Constitution in the world," which is therefore extolled as the "Stalin Constitution." Like Figaro in *The Barber of Seville*, he appears everywhere, marching from one triumph to another. If other people have also played a considerable part in the Soviet State, they are generally described as his colleagues or disciples. Truisms uttered by him are quoted as pearls of political and philosophical wisdom. A picture of a Bolshevik Council of War from the time of the Civil War portrays Stalin in the attitude of a military leader, explaining the war map with a gesture of assurance. Amongst the numerous photographs illustrating the book, only four people are allotted a full page—all the others have to be satisfied with a half or a quarter. The chosen ones are: Marx, Engels, Lenin and "the leader of the nations, the great Stalin."

The reader closes the *History*, in which satire and tragedy meet, with a heavy heart—with pity for the rising generation of Russia to be brought up on a book so far removed from historical truth, and for the fate of Russia, where a ruthless Dictatorship is taught officially, ostensibly in the name of Socialism. The new teaching of history reflects the mentality of the Kremlin of to-day and the mentality of the personal dictatorship of Stalin. From this point of view it is a valuable record of the dramatic phase through which Russia is passing.

PAUL OLBERG.

# THE INTELLECTUAL AS IRONIST : ALDOUS HUXLEY AND THOMAS MANN.

THE nineteenth century was the age of philosophical, and the twentieth is that of political dogmatists. In the nineteenth century Marx and Schopenhauer occupied the centre of the intellectual arena preaching the gospel of dogmatism, while their twentieth-century counterparts in the sphere of politics, Lenin and Mussolini, proclaim a new world order, of which they alone hold the key. This fact is not in itself paradoxical, but becomes so when allied with another : that the twentieth century has produced, not only political dogmatists, but also liberal philosophers.

The outstanding literary figures—one might call them the Voltaires—of the twentieth century are, in contrast to their absolutist predecessors, relativists, sceptics and humanists. Relativism was not, however, foreign to the dawning liberalism of nineteenth-century literature, particularly in England and Germany ; but it was then overshadowed by the prevailing belief in the existence of a pre-established harmony in man and between men. Relativism of to-day, however, sharply stresses the conflicts in and between human beings and is not always successful in bridging the gulf it reveals and analyses so ruthlessly. Thus, what it gains in breadth and depth it loses in compactness and power of conviction.

The relativism of the twentieth century is both psychological and dialectic ; psychological in that it has at its disposal the fruits of modern research in the fields of social psychology, which gives it a new insight into the hitherto hidden forces governing human kind, and dialectic because, unlike the naturalism of Zola and the younger Hauptmann, it is able to observe man from many different standpoints, and not to regard him solely as a piece of Nature's handiwork from which the glory has for ever passed away. For it recognises that man is at once an intellectual and a sexual being, imbued with a sense of beauty and yet possessed of a herd instinct which, while it holds him in its sway, can arouse the latent bestiality in his nature, and transform him into the most degraded of living creatures.

The philosophical author of the twentieth century, as typified by Aldous Huxley and Thomas Mann, is both novelist and essayist, combining the powers of observation of a trained

scientist with a keen insight into human nature and an outlook unhampered by nationalism, and it is not by mere accident that the two greatest literary figures the twentieth century has hitherto produced in England and Germany should resemble one another so closely. While these two authors display a similar attitude towards life there are, none the less, considerable differences between them. The cosmos of Thomas Mann is richer, and his description more subtle, than that of his English contemporary. Lübeck and the Buddenbrooks family, and Davos and the sanatorium of the *Magic Mountain* are worlds in miniature, and the interplay of their characters is portrayed with the utmost exactness and delicacy of perception. To meet the thoughtless, charming Tony Buddenbrook or the sarcastic Hofrat Behrens is never to forget them, but it is difficult to retain for long an impression of Huxley's odd characters, with the possible exception of a few as well drawn as Uncle Spencer. On the other hand Huxley possesses the shrewder brain, keen penetration, the better scientific training, and a philosophical elegance, attained occasionally at the expense of profundity of utterance.

The essential problem for both authors is the relation between body and spirit, the interplay between the intellect and the other forces in man. While the motto of Descartes and Pascal was "*Cogito ergo sum*," Huxley asks : "Why not '*caco ergo sum*'?, '*eructo ergo sum*'?, '*futuo ergo sumus*'?" Whereas Pascal declared that "man must think," Huxley contradicts him, or more properly, supplements him : "Man must also live." A Swiss scholar, Klages, some years ago denounced the intellect as the enemy of the soul, and this denunciation has been echoed enthusiastically by Fascist writers ; but Mann and Huxley have no leanings towards Fascism, and are too critical to fulminate against the power of intellect, which they themselves manifest so brilliantly. None the less they both realise the problems originating in the deep conflict between spiritual and everyday life, between the rational and non-rational elements in human nature ; but both, being lonely "highbrows," reject any form of cheap pseudo-idealism which assumes that intellect is the highest and most powerful force in man.

This problem of the opposing forces in man's being, of "*Leben*" and "*Geist*," has occupied Thomas Mann for many

years, and finds expression in his novels *Tonio Kröger* and *Der Tod in Venedig*, as well as in his reflective essays *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*. He does not treat the problem in the abstract, but presents it in concrete form in the contrast between the full, harmonious and uneventful life of the burgher and the complex, lonely and tormented thinking of the artist. The bridgeless gulf that lies between the crude but healthy merchant Klöterjahn and the melancholy, sensitive poet Detlev Spinell in the novel *Tristan* divides also the powerful, eccentric Mynheer Peeperkorn and the man of letters, Settembrini, in the *Magic Mountain*. But Thomas Mann does not take sides, for he knows that life unilluminated by intellect is blind and without direction, but that intellect divorced from the reality of life is useless and perverted. Huxley discusses the same problem both in his novels and essays, of which *Pascal* and *Spinoza's Worm* perhaps represent his most important contribution to the subject. With Mann, however, the contrast is between different human types, whereas Huxley depicts the dividedness in man's inmost being. Huxley accepts this self-division with a true English instinct for compromise; for in the specialised modern world man must live as a double personality—citizen and poet, man-in-the-street and spiritual man need not negate one another, but rather supplement one another and co-exist, like Stevenson's hero who appears as Dr. Jekyll during the day and Mr. Hyde at night: "A Dr. Jekyll that does the metaphysical and scientific thinking, that transacts business in the city, adds up figures, designs machines, and so forth. And a natural, spontaneous Mr. Hyde to do the physical, instinctive living in the intervals of work. The two personalities and the spontaneous animal being, alive with us."

When Goethe in his youth was once travelling down the Rhine with Basedow, the educational reformer, and Lavater, the orthodox theologian, he said laughingly of the trefoil:

*Prophete rechts, Prophete links,  
Das Weltkind in der Mitten.*

—"A Prophet on my right, a prophet on my left, The child of the world between." This metaphor can, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to Mann's relation between mind and life; the one prophet is the human mind, the other is life, but the place of the mediating child of the world is taken by irony. Thomas

Mann, as well as Huxley, was born with an ironic turn of mind, but whereas Huxley's irony is one of the principal weapons with which his brave and incorruptible realism ruthlessly lays life's contradictions bare, it is gentler and less destructive in the hands of Mann; for Huxley is ironical because he is a realist, Mann because he is a metaphysician. Huxley, following the true English tradition of satire from Swift to Peacock, views the conflict of life and intellect as a psychological, and Mann, the disciple of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, as a metaphysical problem. "The intellectual," one reads in *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, "has the choice—as far as choice is possible—of being ironical or realistic. The only other solution is impossible for a decent person." This irony is by no means one-sided: "Irony is always turned toward both sides. It is like a mirror held up to life as well as the mind, which divests them of all grandiosity, and lends them a peculiar melancholy and modesty. Again and again the German novelist praises irony as a refined scepticism, as the ethical attitude of individualists. The amiable Hans Castorp in the *Magic Mountain* is ironical, while the progressive *bel esprit* Settembrini and the Jewish Jesuit Naphta struggle incessantly for the possession of his soul. In vain Settembrini tries to cast suspicion on irony in the eyes of Hans Castorp, calling it "an improper flirt with inaction." None the less the young patrician from Hamburg clings to it, and turns his ironical gaze on his adviser. "Imagine," says he to himself, "he talks about irony just as he does about music, he'll soon be telling us that it is politically suspect—that is, from the moment it ceases to be a 'direct and classic device of oratory.' But irony that is 'not for a moment equivocal'—what kind of irony would that be, I should like to ask, if I may be so bold as to put in my oar? It would be a piece of dried-up pedantry!" Objectivity is the foundation of irony, as Thomas Mann wrote to the author in 1929: "Epic art is to me identical with objectivity, and also with that which is finite."

Irony has yet another origin in Huxley. It results from his bitter experience of the dividedness of human nature. Man, he finds, is subject to many opposing laws and forces, which statement is borne out by the science of psycho-analysis, with which he, as well as Thomas Mann, is familiar. A glance at the *Magic Mountain* will show how much the latter



owes to his knowledge of this subject, and the moving quotation from Fulke Greville on the flyleaf of Huxley's *Point and Counterpoint* could also act as a text for all his writings :

Oh, wearisome condition of humanity,  
Born under one law, to another bound,  
Vainly begot and yet forbidden vanity,  
Created sick, commanded to be sound.  
What meaneth nature, by these diverse laws,  
Passion and reason, self-division's cause ?

*The World of Light* has as its theme the reason and passion, love and hatred, that hold joint sway in man, making him inconsistent and self-contradictory.

The co-existence of love and hatred, which so completely dominates the relationships between man and woman, is also revealed at the roots of friendship between man and man. Of Judd and Colin, in *After the Fireworks*, it is said : " So Judd remained for him the Oldest Friend, whom one definitely dislikes, while for Judd he was the Oldest Friend whom one adores and at the same time hates for not adoring back, the Oldest Friend whom one never sees enough, but whom, when he is there, one finds insufferably exasperating."

Huxley is a puritan with the sensibility and the contradictions of an intellectual ; his satire is always at the service of ethics, and ruthlessly reveals hypocrisy and self-deception and exposes them to cynicism and ridicule. Perhaps the best illustration of his detective-like attitude is to be found at the end of *Point and Counterpoint*, when Mr. Burlap, the sentimental and unscrupulous editor of the *Literary World* and lecturer to ethical societies, proclaims his glad acceptance of the universe, while his treatment of his typist, Ethel Cobbett, drives her to committing suicide.

He who is of an ironic turn of mind cannot tolerate utopias. It is hardly possible to believe passionately in the realisation of an ideal state upon earth, and at the same time to understand and tolerate the motives underlying human activity. The ironic mind clings rather to the belief that politics is the art of trying to bring about the possible. During the war Thomas Mann from a conservative standpoint attacked the destructive theorising of literary rationalists, their barren utopias of absolute mind for the sake of mind and their

egotistic intellectualism which pretends that shallow rationalism can save the world. Since then Thomas Mann's views have changed, but in a deeper sense he still remains conservative. He would probably join in Huxley's denunciation of technical super-Americanism, so splendidly caricatured in *Brave New World*. The problem of life to-day is to strike a balance between rational and non-rational forces, of technical comfort in a standardised society and the creative force in man which can never be the slave of mass-production. The age of contraceptive technique and of the small Ford motor-car is becoming an age of boredom and sterility. We feel the influence of D. H. Lawrence in this novel, protesting against the unheroic over-rationalisation of to-day, which has found a distorted outlet in the Fascist ideology. Thomas Mann has rebelled against that misunderstood positivism, which would make life too easy by trying to eliminate pain and death, the cross and death from it. Similarly Huxley makes the Savage at the end of *Brave New World* protest : " I do not want comfort, I want God. I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness, I want sin."

Huxley has always rejected Utopian ideals of the kind that Shaw and H. G. Wells have cherished, and he has polemised against the theory of a super-man, whether from a spiritual or material standpoint. He admits of no escape from a distasteful present into a lofty and comfortable future. " The only thing in our power," he says in one of his essays, " is to do our best to be men, here and now. Let us think about the present, not the future."

There is yet another form of irony, which is a typically modern phenomenon and familiar both to Mann and to Huxley. This is introspective irony, the self-mockery of the intellectual and the artist. This was even unknown to the German romantics, who satirised everything but the artist himself, who was to them sacrosanct, and we find no trace of it in Byron or Goethe. It has its beginnings in Nietzsche, and we see its fruits in modern Fascism and in the self-hatred of the intelligentsia portrayed in the works of Georges Sorel. Huxley's introspective satire is more brutal than Mann's, in whose works it takes on at times an almost genial benevolence. The contrast between natural life and unhealthy intellectualism is treated by the German with tormenting earnestness, but by the English writer with elegant cynicism. " The very

gift of style, of form and expression, is nothing else than this cool and fastidious attitude toward humanity ; you might say there has to be this impoverishment and devastation as a preliminary condition. For sound natural feeling, say what you like, has no taste. It is all up with the artist as soon as he becomes a man and begins to feel." (*Tonio Kröger*.)

In his last novel, *Eyeless in Gaza*, the highbrow Anthony Beavis, disgusted with the loneliness and uselessness of his life, questions the intelligentsia from an ethical point of view. Rather bitterly he regards their philosophy as an irresponsible escape from reality.

Kings have lost their divine right, plutocrats look as though they were going to lose theirs. But Higher Lifers continue to be labelled as superior. It's the fruit of persistence. Persistently paying compliments to themselves, persistently disparaging other people. Year in, year out for many centuries. We're High ; you're Low. We're of the Spirit, you're of the World . . . but, in fact, the Higher Life is merely the better death-substitute. A more complete escape from the responsibilities of living than alcohol or morphia or addiction to sex or property.

It would, however, be wrong to overestimate this scepticism towards the intellectual life which these two writers have so greatly enriched. Huxley does not wish to eliminate intelligence, but to assess it at its true value ; not to destroy it, but to render it productive. His ideal is not one-sidedness, but completeness. In *Point and Counterpoint*, besides the many eccentric and decadent figures, Rampion appears as the embodiment of physical and intellectual "wholeness." His mere existence is a lesson to the others that the proud intellect should admit "the claims of the heart, aye, and of the bowels, the loins, and the bones and skin and muscles to a fair share of life." Completeness is also the ideal of the introspective and often unhappy philosopher in *Eyeless in Gaza*, for he longs for "two sets of eyes, to be able to read Voltaire and Thomas à Kempis, the book of the freethinker and that of the Saints simultaneously." He says to his friend :

"I don't value singlemindedness. I value completeness. I think it is one's duty to develop all one's potentialities—all of them. Not stupidly stick to only one. Single-mindedness!" he repeated. "But oysters are single-minded. Ants are single-minded. So are saints." "Well, that only confirms my determination not to be a saint."

Hans Castorp, too, hearkens to the two prophets of æsthetic liberalism and dogmatic catholicism, without identifying himself completely with either.

It is one of the merits of the modern novel that opposing types can be described with scientific detachment. Mann as well as Huxley has often shown his interest in psychological types, and Huxley has seriously discussed the well-known characters of Jung and labelled himself a "mild extravert." Thomas Mann has given us his own typology of the poet in his stimulating book *Goethe and Tolstoy*, and in it has distinguished between the heroic martyrs of the mind like Schiller and Dostoevsky and the robust and somewhat pagan children of the world, smiled on by fortune, like Goethe and Tolstoy.

Both Huxley and Thomas Mann take an ironical view of life, but face death with seriousness. There is no doubt but that death and decay have in this century been depicted with a depth and insight hardly before achieved. Marcel Proust, Galsworthy and Werfel, widely though they differ in other respects, are at one in revealing the power of death with delicate but penetrating observation. In the poems of Rilke and Hoffmannsthal death is portrayed as supplementing life, and as an eternal shadow enveloping it. In Mann and Huxley we find both the portrayal and the philosophy brought to bear on its mysteries. Never before has the process of dying been so vividly depicted as in *Buddenbrooks*, whereas in the *Magic Mountain* it is regarded as being merely an epiphenomenon pertaining to the atmosphere of decay touched with perversion of a sanatorium in Switzerland. The horrors of decay are not minimised, the death agony is awesome enough, but none the less the death's head does not leer at the reader in the way sometimes to be met with in Huxley's writings. In *Those Barren Leaves* Mr. Cardan ponders on the death of a former love and calls it "a disgusting sort of death."

The tragedy of bodily suffering and extinction has no catharsis. Punctually it runs its dull, degrading course, act by act to the conclusion. It ennobles neither the sufferer nor the contemplator. Only the tragedy of the spirit can liberate and uplift. But the greatest tragedy of the spirit is that sooner or later it succumbs to the flesh. Sooner or later every soul is stifled by the sick body, sooner or later there are no more thoughts, but only pain and vomiting and stupor.

But even more vital than the portrayal of death and decay is the philosophical preparation for death. Our two sceptic humanists agree on this question to a surprising extent. Hans Castorp in his old age ponders deeply on death. He cannot reconcile himself to it as easily as the free-thinker Settembrini, who sees in it only a biological event. Hans Castorp knows that death, as cynically regarded by the doctors in Davos, means the destruction of form, and he would have the living regard death with an especial reverence, a reverence befitting the only creature on earth that is conscious that it must die. Life to him is such that men should ever wear sombre dress, that their intercourse should be earnest, mellow and formal as befits those on whom the shadow of merciless death is cast. But if life were shallow except for the prospect of death, it would be intolerable never to escape from it, and it is reverence for death, but not submission to it, which Hans Castorp preaches :

I will let death have no mastery over my thoughts. For therein lies goodness and love of human kind, and in nothing else. . . . I will keep faith with death in my heart, yet well remember that faith with death and the dead is evil, is hostile to human kind, as soon as we give it dominion over thought and action. For the sake of goodness and love, man shall let death have no sovereignty over his thoughts.

Huxley gives the same advice, although in a more trenchant and less harmonious way :

"The wise men," reflects Mr. Cardan in *Those Barren Leaves*, "realise that the farce is a farce and take pains not to think about it. Therein lies their wisdom. . . . But there are times when the worms intrude too insistently to be ignored. Death forces itself sometimes upon the mind and then it is hard to take much pleasure in anything."

But, in his penetrating manner, the author who in other writings supports the doctrine of original sin recognises that only the believer can in the end face death.

Why, then, one is inclined to ask, are Huxley and Thomas Mann ironical ? Because they are solitary, and not sufficiently blind to surrender to any political party or literary clique. Thomas Mann has again and again revealed his solitude in the portrayal of his artists, and he has done so in an elegant and somewhat romantic way. Tonio Kröger, Detlev Spinell and

Gustav von Aschenbach envy the simple and unpretentious average people, and hide a great longing for their mode of life. Huxley has expressed the longing for power to bridge the gulf of loneliness even more poignantly towards the end of *Eyeless in Gaza*. Dividedness is to him the very law of existence ; the conflict in man and between men appears eternal, but the attempt to realise the impossible, to create unity out of division, is the main theme in Huxley's almost religious last novel :

"Evil is the accentuation of division ; good, whatever makes for unity with other lives and other beings. Separation and diversity," recognises this philosophy, "are indispensable conditions of our existence, without which it would not possess life and consciousness, the knowledge of right and wrong, the power to choose between them. On it truth and beauty too are founded. That which is demanded, that which men come finally to demand of themselves, is the realisation of union between beings who would be nothing if they were not separate ; is the actualisation of goodness by creatures who, if they were not evil, would not exist."

Huxley, the disguised puritan, and Mann, the hidden romantic, have often a closer sympathy with odd than with normal characters, and with interesting than with sympathetic types. Portraits of women who are neither morbid nor eccentric nor perverted are seldom to be found in their works. Both are not natural poets, but sentimental ones, to use the concepts of Schiller. Their interests lie more in the problems of the mind than in the beauty of nature, in the abnormal rather than the normal ; but while they reveal the dangers and abysses of modern life in a profound and fascinating manner they maintain, in spite of, or with the aid of, their native irony a degree of human dignity and broad-mindedness not to be found to-day in more dogmatic or fanatical writers. It may indeed be easy to discern the shortcomings of their work, but one might well say : "Let him who is without sin among you cast the first stone."

ERNST KOHN-BRAMSTEDT.

## WOMEN'S PORTRAITURE.

PORTRAITS of women have been mainly studied as works of art. The social position of women has also been studied from historical records, literature or law. But one source which may be equally valuable as historical evidence has hitherto been neglected, namely women's portraiture. An important fact in the social status of women is shown by the existence of women's portraits. It is true that there are cultures which have no portraits, where the idea of personal likeness is not developed, and if figures representing certain persons exist they have a magical meaning. The "portrait" in ancient Egypt is almost unique since it combines the individual with the magical aspect. On the other hand it is characteristic of classical Greek art that it possesses idealised and realistic portraits of men (Sophocles and Socrates for example) whereas the women are represented as types: the goddess (Aphrodite, Hera, etc.), the amazon, the hetaira, the married woman, the young girl. In the Hellenistic period, however, there is an abundance of women's portraits corresponding to those of men, and in the Roman Empire the same holds true. These portraits are given in sculpture, they existed in painting and may also be found on coins.

Late antiquity already knows not only the double portrait of men and women, the head of the man largely covering that of the woman, but also two co-ordinated busts as found for instance in coins of Nero and Agrippina and of Septimius Severus and Julia Domna. This type survived into the Middle Ages and can be found in Spain and the Netherlands with Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, illustrating the formula for Castile: *Tanto Monta, Monta Tanto* (of equal value), *Isabel como Fernando*. The same type was used for Aragon by Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, in connection with her son, the Emperor Charles V. In England this type exists on coins of Philip II of Spain and Mary, whereas it is not found on coins of William and Mary, where one would expect it: actually, the head of the Queen is almost hidden by the King.\*

The occurrence of women's portraits is not an isolated

\* I am indebted to the staff of the Numismatic Department of the British Museum for their kind assistance in my studies.

phenomenon. A single portrait does not appear, but in every case known there are groups of portraits indicating the importance which the particular culture attached to women. This can be verified by studying late antiquity, where women held a dominant social position and influenced politics. It is interesting to speculate what changes would have taken place if Berenice, the Jewish princess, who had already been married twice, and who was thirty-five when she met the Emperor Titus, had become Empress of Rome. Pascal in his *Pensées* says: "had the nose of Cleopatra been shorter, the face of the world would have been changed." This humorous statement is particularly to the point because actually Cleopatra's nose was large, as can be seen on antique coins. Her portraits show that late antiquity valued not only youthful prettiness in a woman but had an understanding of character and personality. This also explains why the leading women of that period were not young girls but were of a maturer age, as exemplified in the life of Berenice.

In the Middle Ages, though a likeness is generally given in an abstract way, the types as such show individual traits. A well-known example in Germany is seen in Bamberg in a highly individualised ascetic face which represents the Bishop Friedrich von Hohenlohe, and in Wuerzburg the Bishop Otto von Wolskehl (fourteenth century). The same conditions obtained as late as the end of the fifteenth century where similar features are found in Mainz on the tomb of Diether von Isenburg, and in Bamberg on the tomb of Philipp von Henneberg. In Quedlinburg a series of tombstones (1070-thirteenth century) represent the abbesses of this monastery, who frequently belonged to the Imperial family. In the thirteenth century we find again in Germany one of the most remarkable attempts at individualisation in sculpture; in the cathedral of Naumberg a series of figures representing the donors and benefactors stand against the pillars of the chancel. Two couples, husband and wife, are given in contrast, and two independent figures of women are included in the series of twelve. Especially remarkable is the statue of the Landgraefin Uta who forms a group with her husband Eckard. Her expression is one of delicacy and earnest charm. Her beautiful slender hands hold her cloak in which she seems to hide herself. This statue is an illustration of the cultured medieval

lady who lived in the world, or retired into a monastery to escape the crude customs of the period, which were only partially modified by the chivalrous idea of love. Unfortunately there are no portraits extant of such remarkable personalities as Eleanor of Aquitaine, first the wife of Louis VII of France, then of Henry II of England. In the Madonna type the change from the typical to the individualised representation can be clearly followed. In the late Middle Ages the group of the "Pieta" (Mary holding the dead Christ) expresses the sorrow of the Mother of God in the guise of a bourgeois or peasant woman, whereas the representation of the "holy family" stands for domestic happiness.

That the idea of personality was characteristic of the Renaissance is a well-known fact, but some of the roots of this conception can be traced back to the Middle Ages in portraiture as in other fields. In the triforium of the cathedral of Prague the Queens of Bohemia (fourteenth century) can be seen in highly individualised style. In the early fifteenth century Christine de Pisan, the first feminist woman writer of France, is frequently portrayed in her manuscripts, building the "*Cité des Dames*," instructing young ladies, or writing her books. Here the typical features still prevail over the individualised ones. On the other hand the abundance of portraits in the early Renaissance of Venice and the north of Italy is too well known to require special comment, especially as the youthful type of beauty depicted does not particularly stress the personal side. It is the late Renaissance which emphasises women's personality in a way not unrelated to the conceptions of late antiquity. The names of Vittoria Colonna and Margaret of Navarre are familiar not only by their writings and their political influence but also by their portraits. It is not surprising that here for the first time the outstanding work of a woman artist is known to us: Sophonisba Anghisciola's portrait of herself (1527-after 1623), when she was a young painter of 27, seems to emphasise the new outlook and freshness of a woman artist who discovers the world. In that it differs from the typical Renaissance paintings of young women which stress their sex charm. Madame de Pompadour gives the prevailing conception of women's attractiveness for eighteenth-century France. Portraits of other women were painted after her model and she

set a fashion which survived her. In a slightly later period a woman artist, like Anna Dorothea Therbusch-Liszewska (1722-82), gives in her self-portrait an earnest and unflattering attempt at characterisation, though it is not uninfluenced by the charm of gesture and situation of the late rococo.

With the early nineteenth century the influence of women's work and women's life is even more strongly felt. The two representatives of well-known women artists, Angelica Kauffmann and Madame Vigée-Le Brun, are unfortunately only representative of a weak type of drawing-room culture, and, though they no doubt achieved a great similarity in their portraits in a superficial way, they do not express any deeper significance. In an age when Madame de Staël was influential in French literature, when Schleiermacher developed his new ideas on women's freedom and independence, and when Schlegel's *Lucinde* gave poetical expression to a new ideal of femininity, portraits of women naturally abound. Dorothea Schlegel was represented as masculine in type whereas at the same period the feminine charm of the lovely German Jewess, Henriette Herz, was emphasised. The variety of characterisation is as symptomatic of the period as the number of women portrayed. In England the equivalent development of a variety of feminine types may be seen by comparing the Brontës and Elizabeth Barrett Browning. In the case of the latter, as well as in the German women of the Romantic movement, it is the person of maturer age who is found attractive.

In the portraiture of women great painters have frequently transcended the limits of a purely sex or superficial interest. Outstanding from these are the portraits by Rembrandt of the woman he loved, Hendrickje Stoffels. It was not her physical attractiveness which interested him but the understanding of the body as the expression of the soul. A similar type of expression is found in the work of the German painter Paula Becker-Modersohn (1876-1907), who painted every aspect of woman's life and especially the woman with the suckling child in a new and impressive style. It may be added that the idea of femininity and motherhood finds expression in the portraits of the two great women rulers, the Empress Maria Theresa and Queen Victoria who, though dissimilar in the details of their appearance, are united by their strikingly feminine characteristics. Kaethe Kollwitz, a self-portrait of

whom was seen at the exhibition of Twentieth-century German Art in the summer of 1938 in London, stresses in her careworn face the general human aspect.

From here it is only a step to the masculine type of woman so much in vogue after the Great War. For example this aspect of self-expression is shown in the works of Renée Sintenis. Mrs. Pankhurst's portrait sculpture by H. G. Walker in Victoria Tower Gardens, unveiled in 1930, is naturalistic in an ordinary way, and fails to give any expression of the militancy or the inspiration of the suffragette movement. The same is true of her portrait in the National Portrait Gallery by G. Brackenbury.

In the last years there has been a return to femininity which is seen in the latest portraits and also in the latest films so typical of popular taste. The "masculine protest" has passed and a tendency towards the synthesis of human and feminine values is marked. Such a tendency is, for example, clearly shown in Robert Briffault's book on *The Mothers* (1927) which, although not always dependable in detail, contains a collection of valuable material and is stimulating to every reader interested in women's place in history. An old story may be related in conclusion of an orator at a suffragette assembly in Paris who said that there was only a slight difference between men and women, whereupon a man in the audience exclaimed "*Vive la petite différence.*" The small difference between man and woman, and between women, gives scope to a wide study of psychological and sociological interest.

HELEN ROSENAU.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

### THE LIAR AS DIPLOMATIST.

WHY the Hare was "not so mad" in May as he was in March, Alice did not even wonder. It was presumably in March that he dipped the Hatter's watch into his cup of tea. Diplomacy likewise, at any rate in the past few years, has been maddest in March. It has been Herr Hitler's favourite month. On March 16th, 1935, he proclaimed the re-establishment of general compulsory military service for the German people. On March 7th, 1936, he denounced the Treaty of Locarno (which was a non-aggression pact), made proposals for an alternative non-aggression pact, and sent 40,000 troops to reoccupy the Rhineland: all on the same day. On March 8th, 1937, he agreed to take part in the scheme of non-intervention in Spain, not having the slightest intention of carrying out that agreement. On March 13th, 1938, he annexed Austria. On March 16th, 1939, he annexed Czecho-Slovakia.

Before annexing Austria he promised to respect Austria's sovereign integrity. He made the like promise before annexing Czecho-Slovakia. He has made the like promise to Lithuania. The interesting thing is not that Herr Hitler is a proved and now notorious liar; but that he should ever have attempted the technique of using his lies as a weapon: as a means, that is, to deliberate deception as a cloak for unscrupulous action. He defeats his object. A promise by him not to do a thing advertises his intention to do precisely such a thing.

This year it looked as if the month of March was to belie the Hitler tradition by launching something good instead of bad. He has seldom in his life done anything good, but he had this year refrained from doing anything conspicuously bad. The Stock Exchange began to revive. Mr. Chamberlain on March 9th even took measures (such as can be taken, and are taken by Ministers from time to time) to encourage the Press of Great Britain to be cheerful about the general situation. We experienced on the following day something like a ritualistic celebration in the British Press of the new era of European confidence and pacification, and were encouraged to look ahead to the time when armaments might be limited by agreement. The feeling of confidence was as exaggerated as the jitters

had been only a few weeks before. It is one of the features of the times we live in that we switchback from the depths to the heights and then down again with bewildering speed.

In the present case the war in Spain was coming to an end, and everyone had always said, with clear good reason, that when it ended, one cause of the jitters would be removed. British rearmament had since Munich made impressive progress. For half a year we had heard nothing of any consequence from Herr Hitler. We knew that both Germany and Italy were encountering increasing financial and economic difficulties. Why not a "deal"? Mr. Chamberlain, who had never deviated from his single purpose of making peace in Europe, of fashioning a *modus vivendi* between the totalitarian and the democratic States, of achieving an ultimate reduction of armaments through the apparently paradoxical means of increasing British armaments—which in the circumstances was not a paradox at all—now decided that the moment was opportune for giving a slight shove to the pendulum that was already moving fast in his direction.

And then on the very day when the aforesaid shove was having its effect, something happened in Central Europe to obscure its progress. An attempted separatist coup in Bratislava produced not only vigorous action in Prague, but disclosed, what was more interesting, a hardly concealed German interest in what was taking place. Bratislava in fact appealed to Berlin, Herr Hitler conferred with his Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop, in a spirit of emergency, and the Vienna broadcasting station was placed at the disposal of the separatist cause in Slovakia. Five and a half months after the Munich settlement, a question arose about the firmness of that settlement. What many people at once asked was whether Berlin had been intriguing in Bratislava to make that particular pot boil? It was not obvious why Herr Hitler should want to renew disturbance in Central Europe at a moment when all his interests dictated a more piano policy. On the other hand no man in his senses ever plunged into prophecy about what Herr Hitler was likely to do, whether it happened to be in his interest or not.

#### 1. Recognition of General Franco.

The decisive event was the surrender of Barcelona to General Franco's troops on January 26th. Though the

historic toughness of the Spanish character still had the effect of prolonging the war, there could be no further doubt about the final outcome. The Nationalists reached the French frontier, and thus completed the conquest of Catalonia, on February 9th, occupying Minorca on the same day. Stubborn to the end, the Republicans on that day appointed General Miaja to be Commander-in-Chief of the land, sea and air forces, the while a ghastly spate of refugees were crossing the frontier into France. The British Government promptly promised to contribute £120,000 to the cost of feeding and housing the hordes of helpless women and children to whom France had opened the gates of her hospitality.

The diplomatic adjustments and manœuvres at once set in. On January 25th, when the fall of Barcelona seemed to be inevitable, the British Government had expressed to General Franco the hope that he would act with restraint, and in particular would refrain from acts of vengeance in occupying the new territory. He answered (it was an easy one) that such acts would accord neither with his intentions nor with his character. On that day a "cultural" agreement was signed by the German and Burgos Governments whereby the parties undertook to co-operate in educational work, including the work of films and broadcasting; and to build a "German House" in Spain, and a "Spanish House" in Germany. Each party further undertook not to allow the publication of any work by political *émigrés* from the other country. On January 26th General Franco telegraphed to Signor Mussolini: "I appreciate the very brilliant efforts of the Legionaries, who in Barcelona will receive the laurels of triumph with their Spanish comrades." Signor Mussolini answered on January 28th with a telegram about General Franco's "superb victory," about "a new era in the world," and about "the imperishable comradeship of blood." Herr Hitler on January 27th telegraphed to General Franco to congratulate him on the "liberation" of Barcelona and to express the hope that he would soon "bring peace" to the Spanish people and "a new and happier era."

There was still, however, no evidence that the Republicans contemplated surrender. Indeed on January 27th the Republican Embassies in London and in Paris put about a statement that they still had 700,000 men to fight for them, still held eleven provincial capitals, and 500 miles of coast



defended by a navy "functioning in perfect order" and comprised of three cruisers, thirteen destroyers, seven submarines and five torpedo boats. But the Republican leaders duly joined the refugees and crossed the frontier into France. Dr. Negrin, the Prime Minister, crossed on February 4th, but with Señor del Vayo, his Foreign Minister, was back in Valencia within a week. On February 10th Dr. Negrin issued a statement that "The Republican Government are moving definitely to uninvaded Spain and fixing their official residence in Madrid." Two days later he and Señor del Vayo arrived in Madrid to the accompaniment of an air raid which killed sixteen people.

The political farce was prolonged despite the monstrous human waste. The "President" of the Republic, whose signature was needed for the decree which fixed the seat of "government" in Madrid, was himself a refugee in Paris, and he did in fact sign the decree in Paris. Madrid now was shelled continuously day and night; and we witnessed the obstinate irony whereby the Republican Government (February 13th) issued a manifesto to the army and to the civilian population, appealing for "passionate co-operation" in the "immense task," and stating that their sacrifice was asked for the cause of vindicating Spanish independence and saving the country from "a sea of blood, hate and persecution."

How was the wanton bloodshed to be stopped? The activity of the French and British Governments was directed exclusively to that end. It was an open secret that those two Governments were disposed now to grant recognition to General Franco's Government, although the formal decision had not yet been taken. On February 13th Mr. Chamberlain told the House of Commons that in the rapidly changing situation he could not give the assurance, asked for by the Opposition, that he did not contemplate the recognition, *de facto* or *de jure*, of the Franco Government as the Government of Spain.

The main obstacle to a truce, however, was constituted by the familiar form of political obstinacy which takes its stand on the ground of prestige. Dr. Negrin and Señor del Vayo stipulated two conditions, namely a promise of clemency for the defeated Republican followers and an undertaking that the foreign troops would be evacuated from Spain. General Franco showed no inclination to accept such or any

conditions for an armistice. His argument was that though he could not give such undertakings as a condition of the Republican surrender, it was obvious that his policy after victory would in fact satisfy the Republicans. His cause was nationalist, and therefore excluded German and Italian interference as rigorously as Germany or Italy would exclude Spanish interference in their affairs. His cause was also Spanish, which fact presupposed the cultivation of goodwill from all Spaniards. While such an issue of prestige and counter-prestige was thus prolonged, Spanish blood was still being shed.

In those circumstances the British and French Governments decided unconditionally to recognise General Franco's organisation as the legal Government of Spain. Explaining that decision to the House of Commons on February 27th Mr. Chamberlain said that General Franco was now in control of the greater part of Spanish territory, both on the mainland and beyond, including the most important of Spain's industrial centres and sources of production. He gave it as his opinion that even if the Republicans continued to resist, there could now be no doubt of the ultimate result, and the only practical effect of delay in ending the war would be further bloodshed and suffering. Moreover, he said, "it seems to His Majesty's Government impossible to regard the Spanish Republican Government, scattered as it is, no longer exercising settled authority, as the Sovereign Government of Spain. In these circumstances they have decided to inform General Franco of their decision to recognise his Government as the Government of Spain, and formal action has been taken in this sense to-day." At the same time he announced that the Government had taken note with satisfaction of General Franco's public statements to the effect that the new Spanish Government was determined "to secure the traditional independence of Spain, and to take proceedings only in the case of those against whom criminal charges are laid."

The bitterness of the feelings engaged for the past two and a half years in the Spanish war was given a rather raw illustration on the floor of the House of Commons. On February 28th the Opposition, proposing a vote of censure on the Government for recognising General Franco, declared that "the decision to grant unconditional recognition to Spanish insurgent forces dependent upon foreign intervention constitutes a deliberate

affront to the legitimate Government of a friendly Power, is a gross breach of international traditions, and marks a further stage in a policy which is steadily destroying in all democratic countries confidence in the good faith of Great Britain."

Mr. Attlee, perhaps tired and jaded, and finding himself under the routine necessity of attacking the Government, spoke in terms so exaggerated, so lacking in proportion and even in courtesy, that he probably regretted his performance as soon as he had made it. He said that Mr. Chamberlain would "always recognise a Government that breaks international law, and outrages any law, human or divine, but any Government that obeys the ordinary international law and the ordinary rules of civilisation is sure to be done down by the Prime Minister"; and that the Government "do not do anything to build up peace or stop war, but merely announce to the whole world that anyone who is out to use force can always be sure that he will have a friend in the British Prime Minister." Political controversy in the House of Commons seldom falls to quite so silly a depth of rudeness.

After all, what is "recognition"? Since 1914 we have had a plethora of cases in which Governments have debated whether or not they should decide to recognise the existence of something that exists. For many years we had the controversy about "recognising" the Russian Government. There was the same sort of controversy about "recognising" Italian East Africa. Between Governments however as between individual human beings, the policy of "not being on speaks" breaks down when the two parties have no alternative but to communicate with each other. For the purpose of communicating with the Government of Spain, the British Government duly (on March 3rd) appointed Sir Maurice Peterson Ambassador to Spain. From the other side General Jordana (who now automatically became, in the British Government's view, the Foreign Minister of Spain) submitted the name of the Duke of Alba (who since December 1937 had been General Franco's "Agent" in London) to the Foreign Office in London as the future Spanish Ambassador.

The name being approved, it came to pass that there was added to the diplomatic corps in London a man whose roots go far and curiously back into both British and Spanish history. His full name and title is Jacobo Stuart Fitz-James Falcó Portocarrero y Osorio, tenth Duke of Berwick, and

Jacobo Maria del Pilar Carlos Manuel, seventeenth Duque de Alba. His British line descends from James Fitz-James, Duke of Berwick (1670-1734), a natural son of James Duke of York, afterwards James II of England, by Arabella Churchill, sister of the Duke of Marlborough. He is also directly descended from Columbus, the only now existing direct descendant. The other, the Duke of Veragua (which title was conferred on Columbus), was killed at the beginning of the present war in Spain. Among his archives in Spain the Duke of Alba treasures some interesting letters from Mary Stuart and Queen Elizabeth. He is not the first of his line to be accredited as Ambassador to the Court of St. James's. There were three others before him. The first was Gutierrez Gómez de Fuensalida, Spanish Ambassador in the reign of Henry VII. He was present in that capacity at the marriage of Henry VIII with Catherine of Aragon. The present Duke of Alba's first book (*El Embajador Gómez de Fuensalida*) contains the letters of his ancestor. The next of his line to be Ambassador here was the third Duke of Alba (the so-called "Great Duke" of Alba) who was present at the Winchester wedding ceremony of Mary Tudor with Philip II of Spain (who was at that time King of Naples). The third Ambassador of that family was Count Fernan Nuñez, who held office in 1816.

## 2. *A War within a War.*

Before the actual fighting in Spain could be brought to an end there had to be enacted another grim stupidity. While on February 27th the Madrid broadcasting station, in making still another appeal to the workers to do their part in support of the soldiers, could declare that Dr. Negrin and his fellow Ministers were "still in their places," Dr. Negrin himself by March 4th had been superseded. The final irony of a civil war within a civil war had taken form. The death agony of Republican Spain had not yet spent itself. On February 28th Señor Azaña, who two days earlier had left Paris for Haute Savoie, sent a letter to Señor Barrio, President of the Cortes, to announce his resignation from the Presidency of the Spanish Republic. In it he explained that the Commander-in-Chief of the Republican Centre General Staff had informed him, in the presence of the Prime Minister, that the war in Spain was irremediably lost. He himself, he added, had advised the Republican Government to conclude an

immediate peace on humanitarian terms, but his advice had not been heeded. Moreover, he said, the recognition by the Powers of the Burgos administration as the legal Government of Spain had deprived him "of the international juridical representation necessary to convey to foreign Governments not only what my conscience as a Spaniard tells me, but what is the profound desire of the immense majority of our people." The political machinery of the State itself having collapsed, he lacked the means, both within the State and without, of carrying out his duties as President.

The first hint of the new war within a war was conveyed in a statement published in the Official Gazette to the effect that Dr. Negrin "had decided to dissolve the present organisation of the Armies of the Central and Southern Zone. The present five Armies and such as may be constituted henceforth will be directly subordinated to my authority through the intermediary of the General Staff." Within twenty-four hours Madrid officially announced that "an attempted rebellion by factious elements among the Cartagena military forces had been quickly and completely crushed." It was further announced that a court martial would be summoned to punish those "who imagined that in these grave moments, when discipline and unity are most needed, they could collaborate with the enemy and traitorously deliver a *coup de grâce* to loyalist Spain."

On that same day (March 5th) a Council of National Defence, headed by Colonel Casado, the Commander-in-Chief of the Centre Army, was set up to displace Dr. Negrin's Government. It consisted of six members, including Señor Besteiro, the moderate Socialist leader. The new Council issued an immediate manifesto declaring that Dr. Negrin had proved his "incapacity," that in the grave circumstances "this handful of men in whom we have no confidence" could no longer be obeyed, and that the Council, in view of the fact that the said handful of men had been preparing to take flight abroad, had decided that they could not allow "a privileged few quietly to make their escape to foreign countries." The Council on March 6th formalised itself as a Government, with General Miaja as President, Señor Besteiro as Foreign Minister and Colonel Casado as Minister for Defence. Dr. Negrin and Señor del Vayo did succeed in reaching France by air, followed by most of their former Ministerial colleagues.

Colonel Casado in a Madrid broadcast on March 6th made an appeal to the population of Franco Spain to make peace on the basis of "national independence and liberty." He declared that those for whom he spoke were ready to make peace if it were in the true interests of Spain, but would go on fighting to defeat the influence of "invaders." General Miaja also made a broadcast appeal for peace. "We are men of good will and of honour," he said, "we want peace, but an honourable peace—in the sense that the war was honourable, inasmuch as our glory consists in the upholding of the honour of Spanish arms. While others want to prolong this fratricidal war, we want such a peace. Whichever side may win the war, in the final reckoning it will be Spain that loses." Señor Besteiro in his turn broadcast a statement in which he accused Dr. Negrin of having attempted to foment a world war so that he and his wandering Cabinet could "save their faces."

The new Government therefore based its appeal on the strength of having eliminated the Negrin Government. The Burgos wireless station promptly broadcast an answer in these words: "Republican militiamen, you have lost the war. Only the criminal folly of Negrin and del Vayo, acting in the service of Russia, is responsible for the desire to prolong the useless shedding of blood. All nations have recognised Nationalist Spain, and complete triumph will be only a question of days from the time when the Army launches its offensive. Cartagena has revolted and joined the Nationalist cause. The Red Fleet has fled. Nationalist Spain offers a generous amnesty to all who have not committed crime, but will inexorably punish those who uselessly sacrifice innocent lives or who cause a futile prolongation of resistance."

### 3. Bratislava and Berlin.

It was in the very first stages of the renewed and officially inspired British campaign for peace, confidence, European settlement and ultimate disarmament that the disturbing news came from Bratislava. On March 10th the central Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Mr. Beran, took drastic measures to suppress an attempted separatist coup on the part of Slovakia. The Slovak Prime Minister, Father Tiso, and his Cabinet were dismissed from office and placed under police detention; several of the Slovak separatist leaders and Slovak officials were arrested; martial law was declared in

Bratislava and in other Slovak towns ; and the Hlinka Guard (the blue-uniformed Slovak storm troops) were disarmed and their barracks seized by the Czecho-Slovak army. Father Tiso telegraphed to Herr Hitler for support against the Czechs. That evening the Bratislava broadcast station announced that it was " again in the hands of the Slovaks " ; and it was further announced that Mr. Teplansky, the Slovak Minister of Public Works, who had been appointed acting Prime Minister by Prague, had ordered the Czecho-Slovak troops to evacuate the public buildings they had occupied the night before. What had led to the trouble was a twelve-hour conference between the Czecho-Slovak Cabinet and representatives of the Slovaks (namely Mr. Teplansky and Mr. Sidor, the Slovak Minister in the Prague Cabinet), who had made certain outrageous demands. While refusing to make a declaration of loyalty to the Republic, they demanded a loan from the Czechs, and made the further two demands that several Slovaks be appointed to posts as Czecho-Slovak Ministers abroad, and that Slovakia should form her own army.

#### 4. *Germany Annexes Czecho-Slovakia.*

The fact that Father Tiso appealed to Berlin suggested the obvious question whether Berlin had instigated the disturbance. Late on March 10th Herr Hitler conferred with his Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop. There was at first some ground for the assumption that the Slovak separatists had tried to be more German than the Germans and had copied German methods not wisely but too well.

The Slovak question is as old as the State itself. When on the evening of March 10th the streets of Bratislava echoed with the cry " Heil Tuka ! " linked with the cry " Heil Hitler ! " we were taken back many years before Munich. But after Munich a symbolic change took place. The very name of the State was altered. It had been Czechoslovakia, a composite, unified organism. Half-way through November last official documents issued in Prague began to spell the name Czecho-Slovakia, wherein a precarious hyphen achieved an historic function. Slovakia now had her own separate Prime Minister.

The real question raised by the events of March 10th in Bratislava was whether Germany was now ready to attempt another step in her famous *Drang nach dem Südosten*. The

informed people were divided about the answer. The fact that both Polish and Hungarian opinion at once reacted sympathetically with Prague not with Bratislava, encouraged the one section of opinion to believe that Germany neither had the desire nor the opportunity to launch another crisis. But there was another section that believed that Herr von Ribbentrop, if he live for ever, will never recognise facts that stand in the way of his megalomaniac dreams. Nor is there much room for doubt that Herr Hitler still relies largely on his Foreign Minister's advice.

After two days of armed clashes in or near Bratislava, which left behind both Czech and Slovak dead, the Czech troops and police were withdrawn. The Hlinka Guards, with bayonets fixed, took command of the town. A new Slovak Cabinet under Mr. Sidor started functioning on March 12th. He at once announced that Prague had given back full powers to the civil authority in Bratislava, that the Czech police that had been drafted from Bohemia and Moravia would leave the town within twenty-four hours, that the political prisoners, numbering some 250, arrested by the Czechs would likewise be released, and those taken outside Slovakia would be sent back. He added a warning to the Hlinka Guard not to interfere with the civil authority. As a means to maintaining his authority he closed the Czecho-Slovak-German frontier at Bratislava on March 12th.

The disquieting thing was the undoubted underground activity of German agitators. It has been one of the features of Herr Hitler's Germany that her purposes have been prosecuted by crooked paths. The guarantee to respect Austria's integrity a year ago was circumvented by the device of insinuating Dr. Seyss-Inquart into a key position in Vienna so that he could invoke German interference from the inside. Such a technique is not peculiar to German diplomacy, though it happens to be exaggeratedly congenial to the present quality of Germany's rulers. One need only recall the cynical formula used by the Italian and British Governments when in 1925 they promised each other a share of Abyssinia's sovereign possessions. They brazenly reconciled such piracy with their own former undertaking to respect Abyssinian sovereignty and integrity, by a cheap sophistry whereby the Emperor of Abyssinia would be invited voluntarily to concede what Italy and Great Britain wanted, and would in such a

case be exercising precisely his sovereign freedom. But such methods of course are worse when Germany uses them, for the reason among others that she uses none other.

Few students of affairs can any longer believe even in the broad honesty of any Ribbentrop-Hitler pretension. When, for example, it became known that Dr. Seyss-Inquart (of all experts in such a technique) had visited Father Tiso in Bratislava on March 7th, the obvious inference was drawn. It was fortified by the open, though unofficial, encouragement of Slovak separatist tendencies by German opinion in Berlin, Vienna and Bratislava alike. There is the possibility that the German Government by its crooked methods in the case of Austria and of Czechoslovakia had started a German fashion they could no longer control, even if they wanted to control it. The really interesting doubt in the present case was whether Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop were content to watch the progress of a subversive movement in Slovakia which they could prove they had not directly inspired. Left-handed satisfaction of such a kind would not be foreign to their mentality.

But whatever the precise chain of events, it is certain that Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop acted with every resource of their famous duplicity. On March 13th they summoned Father Tiso to Berlin. On March 14th he proclaimed Slovak independence, and on the same day Dr. Hacha, the Czecho-Slovak President, arrived in Berlin. On March 15th German troops entered Prague (having been invited to do so by President Hacha, who was blackmailed to that end), the Führer's troops occupied the whole of Bohemia and Moravia and he himself arrived in Prague, where on March 16th he announced that the former Czech State was now a part of Greater Germany.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

March 16th, 1939.

No. 451.

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## LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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### FALLEN BASTIONS.\*

Mr. Gedye's latest and greatest book is written with his heart's blood. Living in Austria for many years as the correspondent of important papers, knowing everybody and hearing everything, he learned to love the country and the people and to take a passionate interest in their welfare. No Englishman witnessed the rape of Austria with a deeper or more enduring grief, and no book on the tragedy conveys such a vivid impression of the horror of Nazi rule. If anyone still believes that Germany is in the hands of civilised men, they should read this poignant narrative of violence and fraud.

The chief surprise of the book to uninstructed readers is the demonstration of the extent to which the rulers of Austria since the war contributed to her fall. Looking back on the story of lost opportunities it seems almost incredible that men of high character such as Seipel, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were much more interested in suppressing their Socialist fellow-countrymen than in forming a common front against the deadly Nazi peril, within the frontiers and beyond, which threatened to sweep both Clericals and Socialists into political and spiritual slavery. The story

\* *Fallen Bastions* By G. E. R. Gedye. Gollancz. 14s.

opens with the bloody July 15th, 1927, when the Government shot down Socialists in the streets of Vienna without the slightest justification, and goes on to the far more terrible massacres of February 1934, carried out under the supervision of Major Fcy, apparently at the suggestion of Mussolini. It was not a Socialist revolution, declares Mr. Gedye, but a Heinwehr counter-revolution. Dollfuss had torn up the Constitution in 1933, and in the following year he madly resolved to break the power of the Socialists in Vienna, where they had exercised control ever since the war and to the health and amenities of which they had made such notable contributions. We may truly say of the attack on the Socialist workers' model dwellings what Talleyrand said of the shooting of the Duc d'Enghien, *c'est pire qu'un crime, c'est une faute*. Henceforth the manual workers of Vienna and the other cities of Austria were treated as outcasts in their own country instead of being welcomed as the strongest bulwark against aggressive Nazi designs.

Why was this costly mistake committed by good men, who were also good Austrian patriots according to their lights? In Mr. Gedye's eyes the reason is that they were blinded by their dislike of people who were outside the pale of the Church. The system of clericalism and fascism which formed the political creed of the leaders of the bourgeoisie found no place for the sturdy, decent, democratic workers who had very different ideals of their own. Some readers may perhaps feel that the author idealises the Austrian Socialists, though he admits that their leaders made many mistakes. But no reader of these pages can believe that they were dangerous revolutionaries, deserving to be stamped out by fire and sword. By treating them as enemies the Government condemned itself to incurable weakness, symbolised by its refusal to appeal to the people when the Constitution had been torn up. The Fatherland Front, henceforth the sole authorised party, was a mere façade, and when the Nazi flood burst in all the world realised that there was nothing behind it. No one can be sure that the maintenance of democracy in Austria would have averted her tragic fate. What we can say with complete assurance is that co-operation with the organised workers offered the best chance of keeping her alive.

Mr. Gedye greatly prefers Schuschnigg to Seipel and

Dollfuss, and he pays repeated tributes to his personal courage. But he was just as blind to realities and when he woke up to the imminence of the danger it was too late. Nothing more dramatic can be imagined than the series of chapters beginning with "the agony of Berchtesgaden" and ending with "Finis Austriae" and "Terror Unchained." The author was in the thick of it, sharing the emotions of every changing hour. A wave of enthusiasm swept over the country and the capital when at the eleventh hour the Chancellor resolved to appeal to the people and when, at long last, he opened negotiations with the trusted spokesmen of the workers. Unfortunately it was too late. Just because it was known that the plebiscite would reveal a large majority for Austrian independence, Hitler struck the blow which he had long meditated and brought the life of the little Republic to an end. Whatever our views as to the political and economic viability of the little State, there can be nothing but horrified condemnation for the bestial atrocities which accompanied the change.

The last quarter of the book is devoted to the scarcely less tragic story of the collapse of Czechoslovakia. When Mr. Gedye was expelled by the Nazis from Vienna he moved to Prague, knowing well that there also the storm was soon to break. An interesting chapter on Henlein informs us that the author was never taken in by his protestations of democracy which produced such a marked effect during the visits of the Sudeten Germans' leader to England. Another striking chapter, which discusses the capacity of Czechoslovakia and her allies to resist a German attack, is notable for the high estimate placed on the military power of Russia. He realises that the beautiful city of Prague would have been destroyed, but he evidently regrets that perhaps the last favourable opportunity of checking the German Dictator was lost. If and when the struggle comes, it will have to be fought by the Western democracies without the invaluable aid of the Czecho-Slovak army, munition factories and fortifications. His record of the last months, weeks, days and hours of Czecho-Slovak independence is written with deep sympathy for a gallant and liberty-loving community, and with passionate condemnation of the statesmen of France and England who left it in the lurch. His anger leads him to use some regrettable words about Mr. Chamberlain which weaken

instead of strengthening his case. But he is on firm ground in complaining that President Beneš and his colleagues were treated with an extraordinary lack of courtesy and consideration by the countries whom they had always regarded as their friends.

G. P. G.

### POLITICS AND MORALITY.\*

What can be more interesting, more important in these violent days than the problems of this book which every *homo humanus* should read with burning sympathy? For if to-day anyone asks about the connection between morality and politics, he asks about the future of Western civilisation. Don Sturzo, a liberal Catholic and author of several remarkable books, in his latest gives us a mirror in which the main problems of post-war times are reflected. He looks with horror and severity at a world gone wild, and shows us in eloquent words that there is something else besides Bolshevism and Fascism, which is a third and better way. He passionately protests against the resolution of ethics into politics, as it is carried out by Bolshevism as well as by Fascism and Nazism. He protests against the sanctification of the notions of class, race, people, against the befogging of people's brains with a fantastic mist of phrases, symbols and myths, and against the devastation of hearts. The idea of the totalitarian State which Don Sturzo traces back to Machiavelli and which, he thinks, has in recent times found its most fascinating expression in Hegel's word of the State being the most perfect manifestation of the spirit—this wrong idea which deifies the State he calls neo-pagan, as in his opinion divinity cannot be attributed to anything earthly, but only to God in heaven; neo-pagan also, because in this ideology the principle of the State and the advantage of the people are declared to be the original fount of all ethics and, by resolving everything into a complete collectivism, the autonomy of the individual personality is abolished. But the Christian religion is, as he says, a personal religion, with personal responsibility, not a voluptuous and at the same time cowardly self-denial in favour of the Moloch State which pretends to relieve you of

\* *Essays in Christian Democracy*. By Don Luigi Sturzo. Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd. 1938.

all conscience and responsibility. The race-theory too he rejects as a radical struggle against the essence of Christianity. What presumptuous nonsense to proclaim for instance the German race as an ethical principle, as a fount of law, as an absolute! "The totalitarian State is the clearest and most explicit present form of the pantheistic State."

Don Sturzo shows that there is no possibility of conciliation between the "totalitarian" and the Christian and humane view of life. One must accept either the one or the other: a humanist or a totalitarian barbarian, but one cannot deceive oneself and the world by speaking of possibilities of conciliation. The Nazi and the Fascist revolution "are neither humane nor founded in Christianity, but mean instead disorder, violence, tyranny." Their State-doctrines are anti-Christian and monistic, they regard the problem of man only as an immanent-materialistic one. The super-individual for them is exhaustively represented in the collectivistic-political, whereas a Christian and a humanist sees the superindividual in the religious-metaphysical of which the political is only part. Don Sturzo summarises his teaching in remarkable sentences. "Therefore all State-exalting, nationalist and class currents (Bolshevism, Communism, Fascism, Racialism), implicitly and often explicitly repudiate freedom, all and every freedom—not only political freedom, but the freedom which expresses itself in personal autonomy, in respect of human personality, in respect of the individual conscience, in respect of the moral, cultural and religious life of each and all." Against all this we must turn in the name of humanism and religion. If, however, he continues, we reject all dictatorships as inhuman and immoral systems—what have we got to hold up against them in the political sphere? Democracy is in a crisis to-day, it must purify itself in order to hold its own against the false magic of the "totalitarians." It must stop being excessively egotistic and capitalistic, being the democracy of a class or even regarding Fascism as a remedy against Communism. Fascism and Communism are not antithetical; they pave the way to each other and are both of the devil. Democracy, however, to be able to resist both for long, must become a Christian, a social democracy, "justice, charity, and Christian liberty even in economic and social life."

We follow Don Sturzo's expositions, at once passionate

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and carefully considered, with great sympathy and gratitude. We thank him for his unshakable belief in the future of Western humanism. His book is the warning of a judge—we should listen to him.

J. LESSER.

### INDIA'S NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.\*

The past century has witnessed many changes and reversals of points of view in Indian frontier policy, but the net result has been much the same: sooner or later there has been a serious tribal outbreak and a punitive expedition launched over the administrative border. Since the close of the Great War there have been a series of major campaigns against various sections of these fanatical tribesmen, culminating in the Waziristan operations which for a considerable period involved the employment of a punitive force of some 40,000 men. The cost and extent of this last campaign inevitably once more raised the question whether the right method of dealing with this troublesome tribal hinterland was being pursued by the Indian Government. The latter-day policy has been described as one of "peaceful penetration," but whatever its merits may be in theory, in practice it has clearly failed hitherto to ensure any lasting peace.

The value of this book of Sir William Barton's lies in the fact that it is written by one who in nearly twenty years' first-hand acquaintance with the frontier and trans-frontier peoples has given much thought and study to the problem of frontier settlement. He not only presents his readers with the right historical perspective, but in considering the mistakes of the past he is at pains to emphasise the true causes of failure and to draw from them a lesson for the future. He works up, in short, to an extremely interesting and well-reasoned constructive programme. The main causes of the failure to assimilate the frontier tribesmen into our Indian polity he finds in, first, the natural affinity of these people to the Afghans, secondly, in our inability to guard what might be called the tribal "back door" into Afghanistan and, thirdly, in the mutual suspicions of the Indian Government and the Afghans that for the greater part of the past century

\* *India's North-West Frontier*. By Sir William Barton, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. John Murray. 10s. 6d. net, illustrated.

have prevented any real co-operation between Kabul and Simla. The Durand Line has divided the tribal hinterland into two spheres of influence without giving either Kabul or Simla any effective control over that hinterland. In the present circumstances Sir William considers that a policy aimed at the complete disarmament of the tribesmen and the administration of the tribal country right up to the Durand Line would prove exceedingly costly and dangerous. Partial disarmament might be feasible, but the policy he himself favours is one of indirect pacification.

In addition to the opening up of the trans-frontier country by the building of roads there must be, he suggests, an attempt to establish some system of tribal government, backed by a force of *Khassadars*. Money should be spent lavishly on the economic development of the tribal hinterland, educational facilities should be offered and every inducement held out to the tribesmen to enlist in the Indian Army. Finally the friendly co-operation of Afghanistan should be secured by the grant of a port on the Makran coast with a "corridor of approach" and by the offer to assist in the exploitation of Afghanistan's natural resources. The Afghanistan part of his proposals Sir William fully realises is not likely to appeal to Hindu politicians who would probably see in it a subtle attempt to perpetuate the British Raj they profess to be so anxious to bring to an end. But, Sir William argues, without Afghan-British co-operation there can never be any peace on the Indian frontier, and "with Britain eliminated" no security ultimately against an Afghan invasion of India. One may not agree with all the views Sir William expresses in his comprehensive survey of the frontier situation, but his book is unquestionably an able and helpful contribution towards the solution of an extremely important and difficult problem.

CLIVE RATTIGAN.

### THE GOVERNMENT OF LONDON.\*

An important work on *The Government and Misgovernment of London* has been written by Dr. W. A. Robson whose reputation as an authority on questions of local government is well known. It is a closely reasoned and documented book

\* Allen & Unwin. 15s. net

divided into three parts. The first two provide highly critical sketches of London administration during the last century and of the existing situation and form, as such, the background to the author's constructive proposals. His main overriding complaint is the lack of a regional authority for the whole metropolitan area entrusted with full powers to direct a common policy and co-ordinated development over the entire region. He condemns "the anarchy of autonomy" whereby the Metropolitan Police District, more commonly known as Greater London, is ruled by 117 separate authorities. Even within the Administrative County of London, which covers a mere sixth of this area, the L.C.C. itself has no general co-ordinating control. The Metropolitan Borough Councils are independent units, each responsible in their individual territories for services such as highways and public cleansing which essentially are of a regional character. In Outer London the chaos is infinitely worse. For example, there are some seventy-five different town-planning authorities and seventy-one engaged in providing working-class houses. Some services, of course, are under a single unified control, such as the Metropolitan Water Board and the London Passenger Transport Board. In general, however, Dr. Robson objects to the *ad hoc* authority on two main grounds. First there is no co-ordination with the related activities of other bodies. For example, there is no correlation between transport developments and town planning and housing schemes. Incidentally it is for this reason that he criticises the recent Bressey Report. Secondly, services administered by an *ad hoc* body are likely to be more costly than if provided by a general local authority, and he cites as an example the Metropolitan Water Board. Apart from the need for planned development Dr. Robson urges unity on other grounds, including the consequent reduction in the cost of municipal services and a more equitable distribution of the burden of taxation. He considers, however, that the increased charge on the rates in Outer London would be offset by an increase in rateable values.

Dr. Robson's proposals include the creation of a Greater London Council administering an area roughly equivalent to that of the Metropolitan Traffic Commission which covers territory within a radius of twenty to twenty-five miles from Charing Cross. He would exclude from this area all

jurisdiction now exercised by county authorities, and thus incidentally abolish altogether that "anachronism" the Middlesex County Council. All large-scale services would be administered by the central organ, including housing, highways, water, drainage, medical services, police and, at first, all education. Local services would be administered by subsidiary borough councils which would supersede the multitude of existing authorities, cover wider areas and enjoy uniformity of status. They would be subject to financial control by the Greater London Council and also be under the latter's supervision in performing most of their administrative functions. Of the existing *ad hoc* authorities only the Port of London Authority and the London Passenger Transport Board would remain, and in the membership of the Board the regional authority would have a voice.

Dr. Robson regards as "an absolute necessity" the creation of a Greater London Planning Authority which could not only formulate plans for zoning and future development but also enforce them, subject only to their adoption by the Greater London Council or the Ministry of Health. The need for effective planning is fundamental to the argument of the writer, who declares that "the preposterous system" of compensation raises an "almost insuperable" obstacle. He urges the system, adopted in America, of assessing part of the cost of improvements on sites which have received thereby an enhanced value.

In estimating the chances of radical reforms along the lines urged in these pages Dr. Robson points to the obstructive tactics so successfully employed by sectional interests, both public and private, in the past. Incidentally in this respect he is particularly critical of the City Corporation. It is the compelling need for security in war-time which provides the best hope for early reorganisation.

### JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU.\*

Professor Mowat writes of Rousseau, as he tells us, *con amore*, and this love comes from a life-long friendship with one who proved the regenerator of Europe, the man who stirred the depths and brought new things into being. Like Lafontaine and Cowper, Rousseau was forty years of age

\* *Jean Jacques Rousseau: A Biography*. By R. B. Mowat. Arrowsmith. 15s.

before he sought success as an author. Up to that time he had wandered and enjoyed, brooded, dreamed, and, without consciously observing, had let a good many truths sink into his mind unawares. Of this formative period the author has given us an account which we admire for its insight into the mind of a man by no means easy to know. Neither at Geneva, his native place, nor in Venice or Turin, had he appeared remarkable for anything save a sort of timid graciousness. He had little conversation and stammered sometimes in trying to say too many things at once. As he did not then write, it was difficult to gauge the intensity and complexity of the feelings which Professor Mowat piercingly reveals to us. In his pages we perceive that the disorder of Rousseau's speech and a certain incoherence were due, in fact, to the extraordinary vivacity and mobility of his sensations, as also to a lack of mental and moral co-ordination. He is the spiritual father of all who pursue the art of self-confession. Perhaps indeed his greatest achievement, greater than the *Contrat Social*, is that he inaugurated a new state of mind. We are too apt to forget that our feelings, no less than our sciences, are conquests and acquirements. Some great individual enlarges the hereditary domain, and thenceforward a novel region is within the reach of all. A great man no less than a great landscape is an *état d'âme*. Rousseau invented a new fashion in feeling like a discoverer who brings an ultra-violet ray within our vision. He projected upon life the rays of a mind which lit up hitherto invisible summits and abysses, and impressed upon the outer world the fresh form of an original understanding. He saw things, not as they appeared to his contemporaries, nor as they appeared to his ancestors, but in accordance with some inner image, still fragmentary, slowly formed, of which he elaborated the conception, and then imprinted it on society. He furnished a new sentimental medium, he discovered a new ideal. And this is his principal title to fame. He was not merely a man of letters, a novelist, a philosopher, and botanist, a musical composer, a social reformer, an apostle, and, as the author insists, a prophet; he brought into our ken a new sphere of sensibility. Rousseau was emphatically an initiator. It is not the least of the merits of this fine book that it reveals the many-sided man as well as the thinker.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

## STENDHAL.\*

Professor Green's book on Stendhal is written for scholars and literary *gourmets*. It is a brilliant combination of Taine's slogans "*race, milieu et circonstances*," as applied to the scientific study of literature, and Jules Lemaitre's expressionist presentation of an artist's personality. In both methods Professor Green has been particularly successful, thanks to his grasp of details, his colourful style and psychological insight into Stendhal's complex character, constantly keeping, to borrow an expression of his own, "the general picture in focus." We have to be grateful to him for demolishing the legend still current in text-books concerning Stendhal's "dry" style, and explaining, without whitewashing it, his supposed amorality. Stendhal's syntax is certainly not a model for candidates, but neither is Saint-Simon's or Balzac's who are nevertheless incomparable masters of French style.

Regarding Stendhal's amorality we must not forget that, owing to his constant financial worries and his constitutional predilection for Italy where his innate hedonism found full scope, he had become a *déraciné* in his own country. Though a romantic by nature, he was averse to the technique of the Romantic school, the *étalage du soi*, thus becoming a forerunner of naturalism, but too much of an artist to share its passion for the "notation" of sordid details. (Armance!) His *Julien Sorel* is much more closely related to Robert Greslou (Bourget's *Disciple*) than to any of Zola's creations. A veritable examining magistrate of the soul of his heroes, he was also a pitiless anatomist of his own personality, his book *De l'amour* being a Confession in the Goethean sense. Two other characteristics, aptly emphasised by Professor Green, make Stendhal almost a contemporary of our own: his genuine *Naturgefühl* without any romantic exuberance of rhetoric (*Mémoires d'un touriste*, *Voyage dans le midi*) and his passionate love for music.

The influence music exercised upon Stendhal, alluded to by Professor Green, when discussing the writer's regrettable act of plagiarising Carpani, in his Essays: *Les vies de Haydn, de Mozart et de Metastasio*, had probably its root in the same curious, almost pathological disposition to which Nietzsche was subject. Just as the acquaintance with Bizet's *Carmen*

\* Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

created a revolution in the author of *Zarathustra*, so Stendhal was electrified by the first performance he witnessed of Cimarosa's *Il matrimonio segreto*. In both cases works of a distinctly sensuous character, written by composers of Latin race, reacted powerfully upon two minds impervious to any intellectual appeal of music. Just like the later Nietzsche, Stendhal would have repudiated Wagner and programme music. The problem is discussed by Romain Rolland in a little-known article, tucked away in the *Wiener Neue Freie Presse*: *Stendhal und die Musik*.

Professor Green's book is not only an admirably scholarly achievement, it is also a tacit plea for the recognition of Stendhal in England. Being almost as great an optimist as the Syndics of the Cambridge Press, I should like to suggest three possible improvements for the next edition: First, a bibliography, second a biographical index giving chronologically the chief events in Stendhal's evolution, and third, a more systematic arrangement of the first chapter (Young Henri) would still enhance the value of the work. It is to be hoped that it will induce English readers to become acquainted with Stendhal's work, at least with his two great novels which are, besides being literature, quite as exciting as any detective story. The subject of *Le Rouge et le Noir*, like Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, is based upon incidents in real life.

M. JOUBERT.

## SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

In *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe*\* a much-needed volume has been prepared by Mr. M. Oakeshott at the suggestion of Professor Ernest Barker. He has collected selections from authoritative texts and documents which expound the doctrinal bases upon which, in theory at least, the principal régimes of modern Europe purport to rest. In addition to the four doctrines of Representative Democracy, Communism, Fascism and National Socialism, Mr. Oakeshott has included that of Catholicism which has shown its influence in Portugal and Ireland and may well affect the new Spanish

\* Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

constitution. He notes that "the debt of the modern authoritarian doctrines to Liberalism is impossible to conceal" and also that the former's relevant criticisms are "absurdly small." However, this volume is not intended as a critical work but simply to provide sufficient material for an elementary study of the leading ideologies. As such it is extremely valuable and Mr. Oakeshott is to be congratulated on the difficult task of selection and compression within a volume of some 220 pages.

It may be criticised that the selections on Representative Democracy are confined to nineteenth-century writings only, containing in particular passages from J. S. Mill's essays *On Liberty* and *Considerations on Representative Government* and quotations from Tom Paine, T. H. Green and Abraham Lincoln. Upon the Catholic doctrine founded in natural law, the author has included passages from the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI, in particular *Immortale Dei* (1885), *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931). A third of the volume is devoted to Communism "from which we have most to learn." In spite of numerous restatements it "has shown remarkably little power to grow." The selection opens with the greater part of the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 and includes passages from Lenin's *State and Revolution* and nearly the whole of his pamphlet *The Teachings of Karl Marx*, being "the best introduction to the doctrine." In the section on Fascism Mr. Oakeshott has reprinted in full Signor Mussolini's article "La Dottrina del Fascismo" in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, published in 1932 and which "remains the sole reliable statement of the doctrine." In presenting the Nazi thesis Mr. Oakeshott has been much handicapped in being refused permission to publish a translation of doctrinal passages in *Mein Kampf* which are only to be found in the German edition. However, he has substituted a very useful analysis of Herr Hitler's fundamental beliefs and has included quotations upon racial theory from Herr A. Rosenberg's *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Mr. Oakeshott has added extracts from constitutional documents and social and political programmes as illustrative of the doctrines inherent in the theory, if not the practice, of the different régimes. All passages, where necessary, are translated into English. There are also short book lists for further reading.

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The latest addition to the official *History of the Great War* dealing with *Military Operations*\* is the second volume on 1916, compiled by Capt. Wilfrid Miles with a preface by Brig.-General Sir James E. Edmonds. The maps and sketches are compiled by Major A. F. Becke. It is principally devoted to narrating the Battles of the Somme from the evening of the first day of the great offensive, July 1st, until its eventual termination in the following November. The average reader

\* Text 12s. 6d. net; Maps and Appendices 10s. net. Macmillan.

will be more interested in the volume's general conclusions than in the detailed account of the fighting which must appeal particularly to the military student and those who took part in the actual operations. Much criticism, of course, has been levelled at both the conception and attempted execution of the offensive which planned originally to break through the immensely strong German defences by frontal attack, thus creating an internal flank, and then to roll up the enemy northward from flank and rear. The official *History* describes the plan as proving "an impossible task" "in view of the tactics adopted in 1916, with the resources then available." The British guns, in essentially an artillery action, were inadequately supplied with the requisite shells and were "only partially successful" in neutralising the enemy batteries. The infantry, largely half-trained, were without sufficient artillery support and also too few to maintain a sustained impetus and thus achieve a real "break-through." Emphasis is laid upon the deadly effect of German machine-guns in stemming the advance. It is pointed out that "despite the results of the fighting in 1915, the power of the enemy machine-guns in defence was not fully realised throughout the higher commands." After the limited success of the first day's attack "it was not practicable to transfer within a reasonable time the offensive to another part of the front "in accordance with the tactical principles of 'siege-warfare in the field'"; and thus there developed for five months the long struggle of attrition.

On September 15th tanks, some thirty-six in number, first went into action, "but there was no sign of widespread demoralisation." To the criticism that the new weapons should have first appeared by hundreds in mass attack the official *History* replies that by then the element of surprise and secrecy would have been lost. Upon the number of casualties the *History* is at pains to correct a common opinion and estimates from analysis that Allied casualties at 630,000 were less and not more than the German losses, at 660,000 if not 680,000. The offensive, if it failed in its immediate purpose, at least "laid the foundations of the final victory." Haig's "amateur army" inflicted upon the foe "a moral and material loss from which he never fully recovered."

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Miss Dalglish is to be congratulated on the deep sincerity of her tribute to Quaker heritage and the literary gift which helps to make her tribute arresting.\* She discovered and joined the Society of Friends "after a good deal of exploration" and finds it "a positively romantic phenomenon in English religious history," being the only mystical community which has survived in England "to give corporate expression to that way of life which is neither Catholic nor Protestant." George Fox, she insists, never repudiated a single article of the Apostles' Creed; and his Society could not have survived as it has without

\* *People Called Quakers*. By Doris N. Dalglish. Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d. net.

"basic principles stronger than subjective opinion." But modern Quakers, she considers, have abandoned the essentials of their faith for "a pale reflexion of Protestant Nonconformity." The contention is illustrated by the pictures she paints of Quakers who did not: Thomas Story, John Woolman, Sarah Grubb, Thomas Wilkinson, Stephen Grellet and Caroline Stephen. The author challenges the religion of contemporary Protestants, which is endangered, she maintains, by Modernism and pseudo-mysticism. Her attack on Modernism is marred by unjust assumptions and regrettable allusions to eminent Modernists: and her challenge would be more effective if she were better acquainted with the heritage of Protestants who affirm her conviction that "the belief that increase of knowledge must automatically quicken the soul reduces religion to the level of a physical element or a human invention," and her contention that

The New Testament is not oxygen, and study circles are not mysticism. One act of contrition has more force than half a dozen arguments.

Such Protestants too can realise with St. John of the Cross that

An instant of pure love is more precious to God and the soul, more profitable to the church, than all other good works together, though it may seem as if nothing were done.

Of Sarah Grubb she aptly writes:

That very starvation of the mental powers which we associate with her environment fed the spirit so well that it could absorb into itself the energies of the mind, transform them, and exhibit them finally in a spiritual intelligence of power. . . . Sarah Grubb was no philosopher according to reason, but she had the understanding of faith; and it may be better to be, intellectually, a little unsure of what one means than to be quite sure of it, when all that one means is some striking piece of "modern thought."

The author in her reaction against intellectualism appears to forget that a present danger is not the exaltation of reason but the reverse; and her acquaintance with Catholic thinkers may suggest that a task of modern Christians is to uphold the claims of human reason in turning men not to God but towards Him. She rightly condemns those who identify their religion with philanthropic causes, but, to a non-Quaker, her passionate advocacy of pacifism seems to merit at times her own indictment.

D. P. H.

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On studying the bibliography at the end one would hardly think there was room for a further book on *Beethoven*.\* But this is certainly an excellent guide to the understanding of Beethoven's greatest works for the amateur who will take the trouble to study a little. There is a glossary of musical terms to help him. The opening chapter is a brief account of the great composer's life, mostly well known, but with many interesting points. In his introduction Herr Wilhelm Furtwängler

\* *Beethoven*, translated from the German by G. D. H. Pidcock. M. C. Forrester. 10s. 6d.

compares the different estimates of him and says: "One thing, and one thing alone, will help; to hold fast to the musical reality of Beethoven's works. In them Music and Soul are one in a manner that is only possible in the works of a truly great musician. Even to attempt to separate the one from the other is an offence." The author of this book, Walter Riezler, has given forty years of study to "the Beethoven problems." He describes the slow coming of the appreciation of absolute music. "There was no public audience of any size for a composer of absolute music. . . . London was the only city in which things were different. . . . For this reason Beethoven rarely played in public during his early years in Vienna." His compositions were first played before the nobility and at court concerts. But his ideas gradually prevailed among the more cosmopolitan music lovers of Vienna. And his appreciation of real applause, rather than emotionalism is expressed in his saying: "Music must strike fire from a man's mind." The effect of his increasing deafness is described and reference is made to the *Heiligenstädter Testament* into which he "poured all the grief and despair that had gathered in his soul." But his phrase "we must grip fate by the throat" shows his true spirit. In an account of the first performance of the Ninth Symphony "Beethoven, who according to the announcements took part in the direction of the concert, stood watching in the orchestra, deep in thought. Frau Unger, the singer, turned him round so that he could at least see the applause he could not hear."

The title of Part II of this book, "Beethoven and Absolute Music," sufficiently indicates its deeply interesting subject. Part III is devoted to the Works, seven chapters on the first eight Symphonies, then Concertos, Sonatas, Chamber Music, Songs and Choral works, *Fidelio*, and the *Mass in D*, and finally the Ninth Symphony has a chapter to itself. There is added an appendix on *The Eroica* Symphony, "An Analysis of the First Movement," which goes into more detail than is possible generally in the 244 pages of which the main part of the book consists.

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*Benjamin Waugh*. \* This little book by his daughter, Rosa Hobhouse, tells a wonderful tale of the growth of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. As a Congregational minister in East Greenwich Mr. Waugh began to see into the depths of the wrongs done to children. Loving them as he did he saw that it was not sentiment that was wanted but a righting of their wrongs. His was the framing of the Children's Charter, embodied in Bills which were pushed through Parliament in 1889 and again in 1904, the foundation of a subsequent Act in 1908. Mr. Waugh was a delightful father of eight children, as well as a reformer; he lives warmly in the memory of the older generation.

\* C. W. Daniel Company Ltd. 1s.

## THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MAY 1939.

### THE IDEAL AND THE REAL.

IT would be waste labour to dwell in detail on any one phase of the international situation in an article which is not intended for the next day's breakfast table. Prophecy has been called the most gratuitous form of error, but comment on what is supposed to be fact is equally beset with pitfalls at a time when assurances given by a Minister to an Ambassador on a Tuesday morning are found to have no validity by Friday midday. We may note these circumstances as part of the rapidly mounting indictment against the present state of international relations, but they carry their own warning against the rash expression of day-to-day opinions.

There are, nevertheless, certain general aspects of the present situation which it is important to bear in mind, whatever may befall, and time can scarcely be wasted in devoting a little thought to these. Broadly speaking, what we are now witnessing is the liquidation of the Treaty of Versailles and other post-war treaties with all the wrath and bitterness accumulated in the subsequent years. There is a certain parallelism between the story of these years and that of the period following the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1 which throws some light on present events. Just about twenty years after the German victory, the League of the three Emperors upon which Bismarck had relied as his form of "collective security" against a French *revanche* came to an end and was followed by the division of Europe into the two camps of Dual and Triple Alliances. In almost exactly the same period the League of Nations upon which the Allies of the Great War relied for their security has dissolved into a new division between the armed nations of post-war Europe. The immediate question before us is whether this will produce a new equilibrium on which we may start again on the quest of permanent peace, or whether it will break down in the immeasurable calamity of another world-war.

The disappointment of the second period is far greater than that of the first. Up to the year 1914 all but an insignificant minority had accepted force as the fated and inevitable foundation of international politics. The test of statesmanship was whether it had amassed or attracted sufficient force

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to make it reasonably sure of victory in another war. But in 1919 the nations believed that they had seen a great light, the light of the League of Nations, and to see this gradually eclipsed if not altogether extinguished is a bitterness far exceeding that of any ordinary political disappointment. We have here one of the great catastrophes of history and we may well ask how it has come about.

The League of Nations, as originally designed and embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, was intended to provide "collective security" for the whole family of nations—security for all against war and for each against aggression. All the great nations were to belong to it, and together they were to command such power that any would-be aggressor would be unable to resist their judgment or, if he tried to resist, be compelled to submit by economic sanctions without war. The League was never able to realise this ideal, which required that the United States and Russia should come into it, Italy and Japan remain within it, and Germany after an interval be brought in. After the Locarno Treaties of 1925 this did not seem impossible, but the hopes then raised were shortlived. Disarmament failed; Germany came in and went out; Russia was a doubtful adherent; the League quarrelled with two of its members, Italy and Japan. By the year 1935 it was—for the purpose of keeping international order—little more than a combination of two Great Powers, Great Britain and France, and these two were often at variance about their policies. Speaking generally, France regarded the League as the guarantor of the *status quo* laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, while Britain looked to it for Treaty-revision and disarmament. Nevertheless, immense numbers continued to talk of it as the embodiment of "collective security" and omitted to observe that it lacked the power needed to give meaning to this idea. From 1935 onwards it was no longer a question of curbing an aggressor without war; it was only a question whether the two principal League Powers would be willing to fight an aggressor if he defied their sanctions. It could still be said that the League contained fifty-two nations, but it was certain that, if war had to be contemplated, many of these would be more concerned about their own safety between rival pressures than about supporting the League.

A preliminary shock had come in 1932 with the defiance of Japan. Then it was suddenly discovered that the League had almost no power outside Europe and that if Japan chose to

say that she would regard sanctions as an act of war, no one knew how to coerce her. Ten years earlier at the Washington Disarmament Conference the great Powers had put her into an impregnable military position by the self-denying ordinance whereby they pledged themselves not to construct advanced fortified bases in the Pacific. There was no reasonable hope that diplomatic pressure would induce her to withdraw; only the British fleet could even have attempted the desperate task of challenging her fleet without bases or repairing stations, and no sensible man could have expected a British Government to take that risk. In the circumstances the League decided not to try the dangerous experiment of applying its sanctions, and it is now generally agreed that it could have done nothing else.

The League, nevertheless, suffered a serious blow to its prestige. Would-be aggressors everywhere had learnt the lesson that the League could be defied. The question now was whether the League Powers were strong enough—not to keep the peace in the manner originally intended but to risk a war, which in quite probable circumstances would be a world-war, to make their will prevail. The hostility of Germany was certain; it only awaited an opportunity to declare itself. Japan had to be counted an enemy. Russia was doubtful.

This was the situation when the next trial of strength came with Italy over Abyssinia. The old diplomacy would have taken this question in its stride. It would have been raised at the Stresa Conference in the spring of 1935 (as in any case it ought to have been) and after a period of bargaining something like the Hoare-Laval compromise would have resulted. The Negus would have retained some part of his country; the Italians would have controlled the rest; the other Powers concerned would have obtained "compensation" or at least guarantees for their special interests, as happened when Italy marched into Tripoli in 1911. But when the conduct of Italy had been denounced to the League as an act of aggression, compromise became impossible, and, as Sir Samuel Hoare discovered, was liable to be denounced as compounding a felony. Had the League possessed the power necessary to a high moral authority, this might have been wholly salutary, but since it did not, the result was fiasco and disaster, especially for Abyssinia.

During the critical months France and Britain, the two agents and trustees of collective security, were deeply divided. I visited Paris in the early autumn of 1935, and after hearing



the views of my political friends came definitely to the conclusion that the French would never carry sanctions to the point of war with Italy. Their attitude was reasonable enough from their own realistic point of view. With a formidably armed Germany waiting for her opportunity on their eastern frontier, could they be expected to devote their military forces to saving Abyssinia? In the next few months Signor Mussolini found himself faced with two opponents, one of whom had led him to believe that he would not fight at all, and the other of whom had said, as he was entitled to say, that he would not fight alone. Three years later when the Italians had loosed their press campaign upon France, French newspapers retaliated by reproaching Italy with base ingratitude for having forgotten the service rendered to her by France in saving her from Britain in 1936. An oblique reference was made to the same occasion in the French official note on December 25th, 1938, in reply to the arguments used by Count Ciano. The Count was reminded that "on several occasions Signor Mussolini had told the French Ambassador how much he appreciated the moderating action of France and the constant effort made by the French delegation to carry out the obligations of the League Covenant with due regard to French-Italian friendship." This "due regard" was fatal to the coercion of Italy.

Thus again, when the test came, collective security was reduced to the possibility of Great Britain alone, or Great Britain dragging a reluctant France with her, engaging in a war which might easily have spread to the whole world. Just as was the indignation with Italy and generous the sympathy with Abyssinia, the right criticism of this operation is not, I think, that British statesmen declined a risk so remote from any contemplated by the founders of the League, but that they put themselves in a position from which they had to make so mortifying a retreat.

What seemed at the time to be merely a side-issue of the dispute with Italy became in the sequel its most disastrous result. This was that, while they were busy with Abyssinia, the League Powers had permitted Germany to re-militarise the Rhineland. The net result of the failure of 1936 was thus not merely that Italy had had her way, but that Germany had greatly strengthened her position both by refortifying the Rhineland and by detaching Italy from the League. The chief obstacle to the annexation of Austria and all that

followed from it in Central Europe, was now removed, and the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis now stood in formidable opposition to the League Powers.

Immense numbers, however, were unaware of this change and continued to think of all the obligations attaching to the unrealised original League—the "collective security" of 1919—as incumbent on the group remaining within the League, i.e. mainly on France and Britain. Whatever others might do, these were to maintain the original Brother's Keeper doctrine and to resist aggression everywhere. Failure to do this was said to be not merely political shortcoming, but betrayal of conscience and duty. The successive failures of the League were marked down as blots on the moral scutcheon of Great Britain. We were said to have won our peace by betraying China, Italy, Spain; the plea that we had not the power to do what was demanded of us, or that in attempting to cure one evil we should have plunged into the much greater evil of a world war was regarded as evasion of plain moral duty. It was this imputation of guilt surpassing all political errors which imparted such bitterness to the controversies of these times.

We must recall these circumstances to understand what happened at Munich. By all the standards of pre-League politics, it would have been agreed that Mr. Chamberlain had made the best of a bad business. Great Britain had (by these standards) no special obligation to Czecho-Slovakia except, as one of the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, to see that changes some of which she had admitted to be necessary were made in an orderly way. Her chief concern was to prevent a situation arising in which it would be necessary for her to go to the help of France. From all these points of view she did well enough in checking Hitler's obvious intention to destroy Czecho-Slovakia and gaining time. Criticism of Mr. Chamberlain would have been confined to a few points of language and behaviour, such as that he had expected too much from what proved to be only a temporary patch-up. But from the League point of view this was wholly inadequate. Once again—from that point of view—he had shirked a moral duty, thrown a little nation to the wolves, purchased peace for Great Britain by another cowardly surrender. To the true Leaguer Munich was "nauseating."

There was no meeting-ground between these points of view. Pleas of safety first are no answer to a charge of betrayal of

principle ; what in other circumstances might be a reasonable exercise of prudence is a crime *in foro conscientiae*. Generous emotions and all natural sympathy and pity had been on the side of the victims of aggression—China, Abyssinia, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia—and one after another they had been betrayed and deserted. The answer of the Governments that they had no means short of the incalculable hazard and probably much greater evil of a world war was rejected as irrelevant to the indictment. Their critics professed to know that the risks could have been taken in the sure and certain expectation that the aggressors would have given way. Their policy, they said, was a policy of peace as well as of justice and righteousness.

For years past debates on foreign policy in Britain and in America—though scarcely anywhere in continental Europe where the old standards had survived—have been involved in this confusion between the ideal and the real. The friends of the League have continued to speak and think of this balance of power as if it were “collective security,” and could be relied upon to do what was originally designed for a League of all the Powers. It would be well if the phrase “collective security” could for the time being be banished from the language, for the use of it in different and conflicting senses has been one of the principal causes of confusion in recent years. The groups and alliances on which we are now thrown back are not “collective security,” as intended by the authors of the League, but the exactly contrary system—the balance of power politics—which they hoped to supersede.

Incidentally, the failure of 1936 disclosed the fact that in respect of certain vital armaments both France and Great Britain had fallen dangerously into arrears compared with their principal opponents. A heavy indictment may be drawn against the Government which allowed this position to arise, but it is fair to remember that up to this time all parties had relied on disarmament as a moral factor and had continued to hope that the “collective security” guaranteed by the League would be an alternative to the renewal of the arms competition. Loyalty to the League in these years required persistence in disarmament. “We have an immense moral authority to assert,” said Sir John Simon in the House of Commons in November 1933, “for Britain has disarmed and has a right to speak. We seek to use that authority in the only way open to us, by making no special or select alliance with any Power but by working for friendship and peace between all.”

It was an entirely laudable object ; but pursued beyond the point at which others could be relied upon to co-operate, it led the country into a position of temporary inferiority which was bound to govern policy until at least our defensive preparations guaranteed a reasonable security against unnecessary disasters at the beginning of a war. To make all possible speed in overtaking the arrears and in the meantime to keep policy within the bounds of prudence were necessities for a British Government, until this danger-zone was passed. Mr. Chamberlain had the Fabian qualities most serviceable at this stage. He was patient and cool-minded ; he did not much care if Mr. Lloyd George called him a coward. I think he might reasonably have expected that Opposition leaders would understand the circumstances and consent to, if not connive at, the limits set on policy during this period, but once more the dictators were improving the occasion ; indignation at their behaviour was strong and just, the idea that we were under moral obligations which could not be weighed in the same scales with ordinary expediencies was deeply established. Spain was coming into the picture rousing new emotions. Ardent and generous young men asked : “Shall we refuse to launch the lifeboat, for fear it may be swamped ?” The reasons which made this a dangerous analogy in international affairs were many and weighty, but they did not lend themselves to public debate.

Herr Hitler himself provided the French and British Governments with the opportunity of recovering the initiative in March of this year. Strategically speaking, the weakness of their position in September 1938 was that they could not rely on the co-operation of other Central European States in resisting a German attack on Czecho-Slovakia. In March, however, Herr Hitler not only broke his pledges to Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier, but roused all the surrounding countries, and especially Poland and Rumania, to a sense of their danger. This opened up new possibilities to the Western Powers. The guarantees to Poland, Greece and Roumania followed quickly.

In dismembering Czecho-Slovakia, Germany had turned a potential enemy into a vassal and provided herself with an important new source of munitions supply. These advantages must not be underrated, but on the other hand she had made new and formidable potential enemies ; and in the breathing space since September British defensive armaments had

greatly advanced and France had made a remarkable recovery from the economic depression and internal troubles which had made her action seem tortuous and hesitating in September. At the same time President Roosevelt had rung a bell from the other side of the Atlantic, intimating that the United States was by no means to be ruled out, if liberty and democracy were in danger in Europe. Equally important, the case which was only constructive in September had become brute fact in March. In September Hitler might have said with some plausibility that the Western Powers were waging war against Germany to prevent three million Germans rejoining their fatherland and in the teeth of his promise to respect other races. In March it was clear that his promise was worthless, and that unless he were resisted there would be no limit to the aggression which first stirred up trouble and then exploited it to the undoing of helpless neighbours. From this point of view it was worth Mr. Chamberlain's while to have been called a dupe and a simpleton for his policy of "appeasement." All through Europe and even in Germany and Italy he had won the reputation of being the leading protagonist of peace, and it was clear that, if war came, it would only be after he had, like Sir Edward Grey in 1914, exhausted all the possibilities of peace.

The Italian stroke in Albania has warned us that there is no move without a counter-move and that in any move we take we must always look two moves ahead. Before this article appears the reader will know better than I do what the next moves will be. Had we been living in the year 1912 and Venizelos been on the scene, Signor Mussolini would have provided him with a splendid opportunity of rallying a defensive Balkan League. Unfortunately, between that time and this there have been wars and treaties—the treaty of Bucharest after the second Balkan war in 1913 and the treaty of Trianon after the Great War—which have sown a crop of jealousies and rivalries that greatly complicates this problem. At the end of every Balkan vista stands Russia. Her ultimate action is immensely important, and to keep close touch with her is essential; but we have to remember the susceptibilities of the little peoples who desire to be independent of both their great neighbours.

These and most other problems with which we are now faced require a fine balance of skill and daring. The Fabian tactics which were well justified in the former phase will not

suffice for what lies ahead. We must keep our nerves steady in a time of dangerous decision. There is, happily, nothing in our past differences which prevent the closest co-operation between parties; these differences have been about methods, never about the great aims of British policy. But in looking back we may, I think, learn something from the past.

As the first of all the lessons I would place the need of intimate daily contact between ourselves and the French—between both ministers and experts—the lack of which has caused so much last-minute confusion in recent years and might even, if it continued, lead to unnecessary military disaster as in August 1914. In entering into an alliance we necessarily part with some of our freedom, and critics of the Government must disabuse themselves of the idea that the British Prime Minister is master of the whole situation and can dictate to his partners what they shall do. But they may reasonably ask for assurance that there are concerted plans agreed between the Governments concerned.

That policy must be related to armaments and those who call for strong action must accept the corresponding national organisation. We are in a situation in which to prepare for the worst is the one way of enabling us to hope for the best.

*April 12th, 1939.*

J. A. SPENDER.

*P.S.*—The great new move since this article was written has come from President Roosevelt, whose intervention is a novel and most courageous departure from the conventional ways of diplomacy. It is something that Herr Hitler promises a reasoned reply in a speech to the Reichstag after ten days' reflection, and I will not speculate upon what the reader will know before these words can reach him. The President's message has had two immediate and very useful results. It has defined the issues on which Europe is divided before an audience of the whole world, including the German and Italian peoples. It has brought into sight the eventual resources with which the Dictators would have to reckon if they persisted in violent courses. We need to bear in mind that the American President is not a Dictator and that all final decisions rest with Congress. His message, however, seems to have won a much greater measure of assent from his countrymen than observers of American politics would have thought possible a few weeks ago.

J. A. S.

## THE CHALLENGE OF GERMANY.

AS I write, Italian troops are invading Albania in defiance of pledges given. The Axis is advancing again, this time from the other end. It is not easy to write for publication weeks ahead when events are moving so rapidly. But of one thing there can be no doubt. When German troops began their march into Czechoslovakia, they set in motion a train of events which has fundamentally altered the whole situation and is likely before it is completed to change the face of Europe and the world.

The abandonment of the racial or "folk" principle by the incorporation of Czechs in the Reich, even with a show of autonomy, means the removal of the only limiting factor on the drive of Nazi Germany towards domination, a factor which has been stressed over and over again by Germans, from Hitler downwards. In the face of this act the British Government has revised its whole policy towards European commitments, and is endeavouring to organise the collective resistance of all peace-loving Powers to acts of aggression. Though we may well feel, like Martin Luther at Wittenberg, that "here we stand; we can no other," it is wise to face at once the full implications of our decision.

On the morning after the occupation of Prague, I lunched in Berlin with an old friend, a sincere and efficient propagandist of the view that the territorial ambitions of Nazi Germany were limited by the racial principle. His bewilderment was pathetic. The whole basis of his thought had been knocked away. The same afternoon I saw the editor of a leading Berlin newspaper, a man who has done a good deal of earnest work for Anglo-German understanding. He, too, had nothing to say, except to suggest that we might take comfort from the fact that Germany had abandoned her opposition to the common Polish-Hungarian frontier, so that further expansion did not seem to be intended. Bewilderment, astonishment and nervousness were the reactions of nearly everybody to whom I spoke.

Yet barely three weeks later the same journalist is accusing Britain of cant and joining wholeheartedly in the chorus of abuse of the British Government's new policy of "encirclement"—a chorus which, according to the Berlin Correspondent of *The Times*, is having an evident effect on public opinion,

previously well-disposed towards us. It would certainly be a mistake to attribute the present tone of the German Press and the movement of public opinion merely to the automatic working of Dr. Goebbels' propaganda machine. Nor is it fair to take the easy line of denying all sincerity to Germans, or even to German journalists. Whatever happens, public opinion in Germany will play a not inconsiderable part, and it is well to understand it.

There is no doubt that the "liquidation" of Czechoslovakia was regarded by many thinking Germans, including plenty of loyal Nazis, as a serious blunder. But few can have expected it to provoke such a tremendous reaction abroad and the complete reversal of British policy towards commitments. Just before Mr. Chamberlain's promise of support to Poland, I met in London an important German industrialist, who was visiting some business associates. Everybody tried to persuade him not to go home and say that England would not intervene on behalf of Eastern Europe, but without result. Nothing would induce him to abandon his belief: firstly, that Eastern European countries would not risk taking a stand against Germany, and secondly, that the British Government were not really in earnest on the point. "For after all," he said, "you English are business people. The Führer only wants vassal states in the East; Germany has neither the intention nor the power to attack the West. Why interfere, since you know that war does not pay?"

The prevalence of this belief in Germany is not really surprising. In the November number of this REVIEW, I explained that Munich was universally assumed to mean the final abandonment of French Eastern policy and the tacit recognition by the Western Powers of German predominance between Russia and the Rhine. This was clearly a more important objective of German policy than the self-determination of the Sudetens; it was widely canvassed in the German Press and the term *Lebensraum* was coined to cover it; it also represented the fulfilment of the old dream of *Mittel-europa*, which can be traced back to long before the war. Whatever may have been said by the negotiators at Munich, in private conversation Germans were generally given to understand that Great Britain was prepared to recognise their country's prior interests in Danubian and Eastern Europe,

at any rate as far as economics were concerned, and even to welcome the reorganisation under German auspices of an area to which the Versailles settlement had signally failed to bring prosperity. In an informal talk to the Anglo-German Society, Dr. Silex of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* gave an account of a visit to England last October, and of his conversations with leading men of all parties. While he had been sharply attacked about German methods, he said, nearly everybody had admitted that Germany's aims, including the *Lebensraum*, were not unreasonable. He had retaliated by asking what other methods would have been effective, and no one had been able to give him a satisfactory answer.

After the destruction of Czech freedom by methods about which many Germans have misgivings, one might perhaps expect a wider comprehension in Germany of the British point of view. Certainly hardly anybody would fail to understand the redoubling of British armaments. But when it comes to action which in effect is likely to render the domination of the *Lebensraum* impossible, so many interests are affected, so many of the old chords of resentment and jealousy touched, that before long that sentimental feeling for England, that *unglückliche Liebe* (as an old friend of mine puts it), may well be changed into its opposite, as at the outbreak of the War. Industrialists, with their visions of markets and raw material sources, young men of the middle classes, with their hopes of Danubian jobs vacated by Jews, enthusiastic Nazis of all classes who believe in the rejuvenating mission of their Revolution in Europe and the world—all are ready subjects of the propaganda against "encirclement"; all are ready to believe that the British Empire, which they are quite genuinely unconscious of threatening, is out of jealousy and misguided fear denying to Germany that influence and scope which it has so successfully (and unscrupulously) secured for itself. In the resulting surge of feeling the abandonment of principle and betrayal of promises in Czechoslovakia will be forgotten, and, at any rate if the quarrel starts in the East, the German people are likely to enter another war reluctantly perhaps, but with much the same sense of the justice of their cause as they had in 1914.

The tragedy of the new situation is that it seems finally to put an end to dreams of the peaceful reconciliation of the German and British peoples. It may be that it was impossible

in any case once Hitler came to power. The great dynamic force of what is usually called the Nazi Revolution, but which is better styled the German Revolution since it is at once fundamentally German and a genuine revolution on the grand scale, might well have gone on expanding until England was forced to take up the challenge or abdicate; and those who hold this view will probably welcome the shock administered to the democracies. But as things are likely to develop now it is Hitler who may first be in a position where he has little choice but to act or abdicate.

If Britain's new policy is to be effective, it will involve substantial economic support to the Eastern and Balkan States. We must help them to maintain their economic independence. We must see to it, for example, that they buy their armaments from us and are not dependent on German sources. In order to make this possible we shall buy Roumanian oil, Yugoslav grain, and other Balkan products which Germany badly needs. At the same time, the world boycott of German goods, which though mainly Jewish is by no means exclusively so, is likely to be greatly intensified as a result of recent events and increasing tension—President Roosevelt has already clapped prohibitive tariffs on German products. Thus the German economic position, already seriously strained, is likely to grow rapidly worse unless the rate of rearmament is drastically reduced, while the democracies, who have hardly begun to mobilise their resources on the scale needed for modern warfare, will catch up more and more.

Only a radical change of policy, indeed perhaps only a change of régime, would suffice to alter this situation. But no such change is likely. The stories of discontent in Germany have always been grossly exaggerated. The hold of the Nazi régime on the masses of the German people is based as much on solid achievement as on the Gestapo. The standard of living may be low, but as consumption statistics show it is higher than during the depression, and the practical benefits given by Nazi organisations like "Strength through Joy" should not be underestimated. The mass character of the Nazi movement and its effect on relations between the classes have given the workers a new self-respect. And, above all, the abolition of unemployment has produced a general sense of security which makes up for a great deal. Although the

vast majority of Germans dislike the thought of war as much as the democratic peoples, if they can be persuaded that they are threatened they are no less likely to support their leaders than are the latter.

If there is still a chance of peace, it can only lie in a twofold policy of making clear to Germany the probability of defeat, while at the same time keeping open with calmness and sincerity an alternative to war for the German people. The military leaders of Germany have still considerable influence and they are hard-headed, calculating men. How does the military situation appear to them?

While a massed attack before the West is ready is not out of the question, according to all accounts the main military effort will be directed towards securing the *Lebensraum*, which is likely to be extended to include the Baltic States and Scandinavia, with its ores and dairy products; incidentally in Berlin last month a leading Nazi made a significant remark to me about the importance of Scandinavia as opposed to the Balkans. The Italian position is more difficult to assess, and General Franco's is obscure; obviously the Mediterranean is the weakest part of the Axis. Russia is rather an incalculable factor, and in any event powerful forces in Poland and the Balkans may be inclined to prefer German occupation to the assistance of Russian armies. With German organisation and methods the whole structure should be able to last out for a long time against any blockade, and the Germans may be counting on the Western Powers exhausting their strength in attacks on impregnable positions and on the effects of intensive bombing, combined with a long and apparently ineffective war, on the morale of the civil population.

It is essential to realise the full strength of the German position in order to draw the proper conclusions for our own actions. We must prepare for a long and grim struggle with all the dangers to the home front which such a struggle brings. Whatever allies we may secure, we shall have fundamentally to rely on our own strength, both military and moral. Allies are not substitutes for effort, and it is sometimes rather alarming to hear the faith put in the Russian, or even in the Balkan armies. Above all, we shall need national unity; not the emotional unity of a crisis debate in the House, but the quiet and determined unity which is prepared to organise at whatever sacrifice the whole effort and resources of the people

for the purposes of the nation. More than anything else this would impress both potential opponents and allies.

National unity, however, cannot just be secured by "National Service." No one who has talked to working-class audiences recently can mistake the strength of the feeling that if men are to be conscripted, wealth must be conscripted too. Compulsory service now would split the country, and in any case there is as yet neither organisation nor equipment for it. To agitate for conscription is to begin at the wrong end. Modern warfare does not demand vast masses of men, but ample mechanised armaments efficiently handled. Germany to-day has far fewer trained reservists at her command than she had in 1914. She is rendered so formidable by the enormous supplies of armaments which she has piled up during the last few years, coupled with the complete working organisation of her economic resources for war purposes. As Mr. Thomas Balogh has shown in the *Economic Journal* and in *International Affairs*, she has been able to spend for years far more on armaments than we are spending even now in the face of considerable foreign trade difficulties and without seriously affecting the standard of living. She has done this by controlling rather than expropriating her capitalists, throwing financial orthodoxy to the winds, and thus putting fully into operation all idle production factors including above all her unemployed. And in so doing she has gone far towards solving many of her most serious social problems.

Whatever we may think about Germany, nothing could be more foolish than to refuse to learn from her experience. To adopt the best features of this policy, not by dictatorial methods but by free agreement, would show what democracy can do and would impress the working classes and secure national unity more effectively than anything else. Then training for youth and National Service could be introduced as needed with no fear of splitting the country. I have before me a manifesto on these lines issued by a group of Trades Unionists, which ends as follows:

This means first that money shall no longer call the tune—that profits shall be rigidly restricted, and while expenditure on armaments goes even higher, that social services shall be expanded too. It means that as much energy as is spent on armaments shall be spent on providing work for the unemployed, and that decent wage levels shall be established in every industry, with trade

unionism established as the workers' right. It means that whatever service is required shall be required of all, whatever their class or income, and that ability, not class or income, shall be the test of leadership, whether in the ranks of warfare or of industry. *We should demand universal service, under these conditions, now!*

Utopian though some of this may sound—for example, the expansion of social services as well as of armaments—I do not believe it is wholly impossible. The example of our own achievements during the war shows just as much as that of Germany to-day what can be done with proper organisation, and our potential resources are much greater than those of Germany. We must not forget that many social services—education, health and physical training are obvious examples—are an essential part of rearmament in the wide sense. While such a policy involves letting down the barriers of finance, with exchange control and all the rest of it, if there is one thing we should have learnt since the depression it is that we know very little about money and its potentialities. Quite apart from the German example, many of our own economists have been clamouring for bold measures of monetary experiment to cure unemployment, and here the whole future of the nation is at stake. There is a vast volume of energy in the country only waiting to be liberated, and if rearmament is interpreted really widely the challenge of Germany may in the long run prove a blessing in disguise. For the prime need of to-day is for the free peoples to show that the ideals and methods of freedom are more capable of inspiring efficiency and enthusiasm than those of dictatorship.

Finally, cannot the free peoples, sure of the justice of their cause, meet the challenge without recourse to the motives of hatred and fear? The other day I discovered a passage in *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, where Lawrence was writing of a certain General Barrow, whose ideas were those of much of our war propaganda :

Years before, he had published his confession of faith in Fear as the common people's main incentive to action in War and Peace. Now I found fear a mean, over-rated motive, no deterrent, and, though a stimulant, a poisonous stimulant, whose every injection served to consume more of the system to which it was applied. I could have no alliance with his pedant belief of scaring men into Heaven : better that Barrow and I part at once.

The propaganda of the Great War was largely responsible for the mistakes of Versailles. Are we to fight for another Versailles, which in time will produce the same result? For a nation of eighty million people cannot be wiped out like Carthage. As long as peace prevails, let us try to keep open every line of approach to the German people, refuse every temptation to boycott them or to put them in Coventry. Let us remember that they must trade or fight, and remain prepared to discuss every possibility of fitting their totalitarian economy into the world system. And if the worst comes to the worst let us fight without hatred, determined to establish justice for all and in full realisation of the responsibilities of great possessing nations. May it not be that this, rather than Pacifism, is the true meaning of the command to love our enemies? For one thing is certain : unless the German people can ultimately be fitted peacefully, and with scope for their energies, into the framework of European civilisation, that civilisation will inevitably be doomed.

H. POWYS GREENWOOD.



## FRANCE AND THE CRISIS.

TOO much emphasis cannot be laid on the fact that France has now completely recovered from the social disorder that called itself the Front Populaire. For nearly three years the attention of the country was diverted from the grave happenings in Europe—or, at any rate, they were seen only through an “ideological” screen. The agitation had begun some time before the 1936 elections, and when the results were foreseen and an interim Government, without real authority, occupied the scene, Germany seized the opportunity of re-militarising the Rhineland. The British were concerned with the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, while the French were interested only in the anticipated success of the strange combination of Socialists, Communists and Radicals at the polls. Yet that audacious move of Herr Hitler which, in other circumstances, could certainly have been prevented, marked the turning-point of European diplomacy. It is incredible, looking back, to see how easily it was effected. There was virtually no opposition, though it is well known that the Germans were ready to retreat if seriously challenged. France was thus cut off from her European protégés, and Germany rapidly constructed fortifications along the “Siegfried” line. Although “sanctions” shortly afterwards ended, the Front Populaire Government, which was definitely “anti-Fascist,” withdrew the French Ambassador from Rome. Italy was forced into the German camp, and with the creation of the Rome-Berlin axis the fate of Austria, hitherto successfully protected by the armed might of Italy, was sealed. The *Anschluss* was actually accomplished at a moment when France had no responsible Government. Two of the leaders of the Front Populaire happened to be changing over, and the *Anschluss* appeared to be a minor matter. Then came—as was inevitable—Munich and the dislocation of Czecho-Slovakia. France became aware of her weakness, was conscious that while she was indulging in disruptive politics Germany was going from strength to strength. Edward Daladier, in whom the country began to place high hopes, was already Prime Minister, but he was still comparatively helpless. The reaction was not complete. The lesson had not been learned. Two months later, the impenitent apostles of disunion ordered a general strike

which was calculated to paralyse the country at a time when Europe was menaced. It was then that M. Daladier, supported by the French people, began to show his metal. The general strike, thanks to the energetic measures taken, and thanks also to the change of sentiment of the French masses, was a total fiasco.

The recovery of France is indeed remarkable, and it must be reckoned with by the Dictators. It will be remembered that the cries of Montecitorio for Corsica, Nice and Tunis, were raised on November 20th—the day of the proposed general strike. Obviously Italy, like Germany, regarding the record of the disastrous years, concluded that France was hopelessly divided. The same mistake has been made many times in the history of France, and France has always astonished her friends, and disconcerted her enemies, by a sudden reawakening. It was to be so once more. All that lamentable story of incessant strikes, of illegal occupations, of class hatreds, of clenched fists, of red flags, of “Internationales,” of street demonstrations, of organised idleness, of decreased production, of the flight of capital, of the perpetual fall of the franc, of a pre-revolutionary situation which left France short of the means of defence—especially of aeroplanes—precisely when the totalitarian Powers were sacrificing everything to the increase of armaments: all that lamentable story was now ended. France faced realities. She saw that, while she was undisciplined and divided, many of her friends had left her or had sought refuge in neutrality. She saw that Germany had taken advantage of her aberration to destroy the bastions of Central Europe. The conviction became blindingly clear that this was no time for political and social strife, or for the foolish repetition of meaningless so-called “ideological” phrases. One stark problem—and one only—confronted France, confronted Europe: the problem of setting bounds to the ambitions of Germany. The final destruction of Czecho-Slovakia was found unspeakably shocking. There had hitherto been plenty of excellent reasons for the undoing of the Treaty of Versailles, and however much the methods of Herr Hitler were to be deprecated, excuses could generally be found in the admitted grievances of Germany. But the demolition of Czecho-Slovakia was entirely unjustified. It was in contradiction with the professed racial doctrine of Herr Hitler. It ran counter to the specific promises

of Munich; and it turned the French and the British, who had advised Czecho-Slovakia to accept a compromise, into unwitting accomplices of a crime. It stiffened French no less than British resistance to the now undisguised design of Germany to achieve the hegemony of Central and Eastern Europe.

The new unity of France has already immensely increased her strength. Workers and employers are no longer antagonists. Workers not only voluntarily work as many hours as are necessary for proper French production and for the purposes of national defence, but they put their heart in their job. They are, as they used to be, industrious and conscientious. French finances have been put in order. Treasury difficulties have vanished and the franc is practically stabilised. Capital has returned. As by magic, France is laborious and prosperous again. She is making up for lost time in the aeroplane and munitions factories. Even more important than the material change is the moral change. There is a stern resolve to meet any emergency with courage and competence, and to prove that France has not—as some Frenchmen themselves feared—fallen to the rank of a second-rate nation without influence or power in Europe.

The question is often debated whether countries under a dictatorship are not inherently stronger than countries which cherish democratic institutions. The question is, of course, over-simplified. There is no country in which there are not differences of opinion and a clash of wills; the decision may be taken by one man, but only after the more or less free play of rival forces has brought the matter to an issue. And in democratic countries, although there is an unhappy tendency to avoid responsibilities, there are moments when one man must decide. The French are ready to recognise the disadvantages of prolonged Parliamentary deliberations in exceptional circumstances, and in view of the imminent danger, the Deputies, undoubtedly backed by the people, have voted full powers to M. Daladier and his Cabinet until December, and have virtually put an extinguisher on themselves. Almost at the same time, the President Albert Lebrun, whose septennat had expired, was re-elected by the Deputies and Senators in National Assembly at Versailles. This is an unusual step. In the early days of the Republic, Jules Grévy was re-elected, but the precedent thus set was exceedingly unfortunate, and Jules

Grévy was soon obliged to resign. Although there is nothing in the Constitution to forbid the re-election of a President, it has generally been accepted that it is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. The movement which induced the National Assembly to retain M. Lebrun had its origins in the need for some striking manifestation of national unity. It was felt that in the hour of crisis there should be no struggle for the supreme post; the continuance of M. Lebrun in office has a symbolic significance.

It not only denotes the reawakening of France to a sense of national unity, but it denotes the solidarity of the Franco-British partnership. The personal merits of M. Lebrun, and the effective power of the President, are irrelevant: what is particularly relevant is that M. (and Mme) Lebrun received the King and Queen of England in Paris, and returned the visit to Their Majesties in London. They forged a new link in the relations of France and England. It is agreed that France and England must now pursue a single policy in Europe—and, indeed, in the world, where their interests are similar and are similarly menaced. There cannot any longer be the smallest debate about the association of the two countries. Their divergences in the past have been great and grievous, and it is possible that in the future there will be divergences. But in the present state of the world, and doubtless for a long time to come, they are, and must be, indissolubly joined together, and must act as one in the foreign field. It is difficult to conceive of their separation, but if they were, in some unimaginable way, separated, the consequences to Europe would be incalculably catastrophic. There is not a Frenchman in any walk of life, of any political complexion, who does not believe that the keystone of French, of British, and of European security, is the synchronisation and the identification of French and British policy. There must now be no pulling in different directions. The diplomatic alliance must not be perfunctory on any point. It must be whole-hearted or it will fail.

And, although the French are reluctant to intervene in the internal arrangements of England, I should be guilty of a serious omission were I not to make it clear that the French consider a diplomatic alliance without a military alliance is altogether inadequate, and a military alliance implies far greater military resources than England possesses under

a voluntary system. If England takes engagements on the Continent she must have sufficient man-power immediately to fulfil her engagements. It is not enough to speed up the manufacturers of aeroplanes. England, which has a larger population than France, should be able to furnish man for man. She cannot hope to use the armies of other countries as her soldiers. She cannot hope for time in which to create an army of her own. In the opinion of the French, the British must have, in all honesty, the army of their policy; and this means conscription. The French, of course, have conscription, and they do not consider that they are deprived of democratic liberties by the obligation to serve two years under the colours. Very efficient too is the French army. On that, all expert testimony is unanimous. Not enough attention was called to the remarkable smoothness of the partial mobilisation of last September when, in a few days, nearly a million men were sent to their posts, and preparations for the mobilisation of as many more were completed. France could do this—and perhaps the fact weighed in the balance at Munich—but England could not do it. If England now decides on a Continental policy, say the French, she must possess an army on the Continental model.

There are, as I write, curious nuances in the sentiments of France and England in face of the two totalitarian countries. The British were undoubtedly far more excited than the French at the latest action of Germany in dismembering Czecho-Slovakia, in wresting Memel from Lithuania and thus acquiring a stronger footing in the Baltic, in negotiating economic agreements with Rumania that give Germany all the wheat and oil she wants and impose German control over the whole life of the nation. The French were scarcely surprised, and were much less righteously indignant than the British. They had never expected Germany to behave otherwise, whereas a considerable section of British opinion apparently expected Germany to settle down as a good neighbour after Munich. The French would like to proceed calmly and cautiously. Before any step is taken its consequences should be carefully studied. The French have had unhappy experience of grandiose plans for constructing defensive systems; such plans have hitherto failed because every country, small or large, has its own viewpoint, its own objectives, which are incompatible with those of others. The

French are fully in accord with any attempt to set up so-called "collective security"—or, to employ plainer words, a chain of alliances—but they are not without scepticism. Having observed that "ideological" politics have badly served their interests in Spain, where French and Russian aid to the defeated Government gave a golden opportunity to Germany and Italy, and in Italy, where their anti-Fascism worked for Germany, they are certainly not disposed to use expressions that are devoid of political sense. It is not true that the struggle is between two theories of government. However democracy may be defined, it cannot possibly include Russia as well as England, Poland as well as France; neither Turkey nor Yugo-Slavia can be held up as a pattern of democracy. But a number of countries, democratic and dictatorial, have the same interest in defending their frontiers and their sovereign rights against the aggression of other countries which frankly exalt and brutally employ force, and which launch a new *diktat* in Europe at intervals which become shorter and shorter. François I accepted the Turks as allies while remaining a very Christian King; and Richelieu, Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, accepted the aid of Gustav Adolphus and the Protestant Princes of Germany against a Catholic Emperor. So to-day it would be wiser to drop propaganda based on "ideology" and take up a realistic position. This means not only that help should be obtained from any quarter, but also that there should be no confusion of countries under a common label.

Thus although Italy has made direct claims on France, while Germany has not, there is a widespread desire to make a reasonable arrangement with Italy, if it be possible. In the "ideological" drive of the past few years, it is peculiarly unfortunate that it should have been directed against something known as "Fascism." Fascism is doubtless a more convenient word than Naziism, but the result of mixing up the names has been to create a solidarity between two systems that are by no means the same, and between two countries whose interests are in reality opposed. There is a certain immobility in the character and aims of Germany; whereas Italy is essentially mobile. Instead, therefore, of treating Italy and Germany as a single potential enemy, the French are, on the whole, desirous of entering into conversation with Italy on the specific questions that have been raised

by Signor Mussolini—namely Djibouti, the Suez Canal, and Tunis. Nearly all the newspapers of the Right openly advocate negotiations—that is to say, concessions. They are anxious to make the most of the smallest word of encouragement spoken in Italy. In political circles only the Socialists and Communists are hostile, just as they are hostile to the Spain of General Franco. In Nationalist quarters, it is not overlooked that the task of France in a European war would be rendered much more difficult if she had three frontiers to protect, and she is now not so foolish as gratuitously to stiffen her task.

Naturally we cannot expect to return immediately to the Stresa front—that front of France, Italy and England, which successfully “contained” Germany, and would have continued to “contain” Germany had it not been broken. It will take a long time to forget the insults that have been hurled across the Alps. It is represented that if France were to show eagerness in coming to terms with Italy, the price demanded by Italy would be raised. Against Italy, as against Germany, France must now stand firm. M. Daladier includes in all his speeches the refrain: “Not a foot of our territory, not a single one of our rights.” That appears peremptory and final, and in present circumstances it will be hard to change the formula. Yet there is, of course, no virtue in a negative. France has said No many times since the war, and her No’s have often turned to her disadvantage. Territory has been given away—even to Italy—since the war, and Turkey has already obtained rights in the Sandjak of Alexandretta that were French. The matter is one of expediency, not of principle. The *Temps*, which may be taken as the voice of the Quai d’Orsay, lays special stress on M. Daladier’s reference to “the spirit and equivalence of the 1935 accords.” In 1935 M. Laval made a bargain with Italy which then satisfied Signor Mussolini. It was assumed that the secret promises of the London Treaty of 1915, which brought Italy into the war, were fulfilled. Now these accords are denounced, because they were never implemented or ratified, because they were set at naught by French participation in the “sanctions” imposed on Italy, and because new needs have arisen with the establishment of Italy’s African Empire. France cannot admit the validity of these reasons, but France does not refuse to talk. She even invites proposals “in the spirit and

equivalence of the 1935 accords.” The *Temps* declares that the phrase signifies “that the balance of concessions made by the two parties to the Laval-Mussolini arrangement must be maintained, and that every Italian claim should have a counterpart in some advantage granted to France, so that, on the whole, new accords would ensure the full equivalence of those concluded four years ago.” This authoritative statement certainly does not shut the door—it opens it fairly wide. Everything depends on whether Italy is prepared to risk a stupendous adventure with Germany. I cannot pretend to know what is in the mind of Signor Mussolini, but I do pretend to know that the Italian people would infinitely prefer negotiations to a war in which they would march on the side of Germany against France. After all, the prosperity of the port of Djibouti, and the Djibouti railway to Addis-Ababa, depends on the use made of them by the Italians, and it would be to the mutual benefit of the parties to make a fair business deal. As for the Suez Canal, since Italian traffic is second only in importance to that of Great Britain, it would not appear unreasonable that Italy should have some say in the fixing of the tariffs and in its general management. The question of Tunisia is more prickly, but the precise nature of the status of Italian settlers—already there when the French established their Protectorate—is surely a proper subject for discussion. There are, in fact, no insuperable difficulties in the restoration of Franco-Italian friendship, which would not imply the dissolution of Germano-Italian friendship. The aim of good statesmanship should not be to separate Italy from Germany, but to make use of Italian influence over her formidable partner.

The British chose to begin with Poland. (Unless, perhaps, the fuss about a purely hypothetical aggression was intended to divert attention from an accomplished aggression—a magnificent diplomatic red-herring?) The ultimate results of this policy are unknown to me as I write, but the difficulty of constructing an Eastern barrier to German ambitions without first securing the friendly offices of Italy is apparent to the French. Poland must always be reluctant to assume an antagonistic attitude towards Germany, or to anticipate the antagonism of Germany to Poland. Poland, on whose behalf we are now active, was the first to profit by the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia, and to take Teschen by force from

her unhappy Slav sister. Poland has a traditional distrust of Russia, rather than of Germany, and has always affirmed that she would defend herself alone rather than accept the assistance of Russia. Indeed, Poland has a pact with France which has been left in abeyance precisely because France made an alliance with Russia. That Russian alliance is hotly disputed in France. There are two schools of thought, one of which pins its faith to the Russian hordes and the Russian aeroplanes, the other of which recalls the Russian collapse of 1917, doubts the military value of the Russian army, of the Russian equipment, of the Russian roads, and above all questions Russian intentions which are not, it holds, to help any country to win a war, but to conduct all countries through defeat to universal revolution. The Polish alliance with Rumania is, be it remarked, at present directed against Russia, not against Germany, much less against Hungary, whose claims on Rumania may be pressed. To dispel completely the suspicions of Poland and Rumania will not be easy, whatever form of pledge is finally given; nor will it be easy to reconcile friendship for Hungary with a guarantee to Rumania.

Poland, in the break-up of Czecho-Slovakia, endeavoured to join hands with Hungary and so with Italy; they wished, by attributing Ruthenia, or sub-Carpathian Ukania, to Hungary, to have a common frontier. It was well known that Italy favoured this design, that Germany opposed it, and that France and England were unfavourable to further Czecho-Slovakian sacrifices. Yet these sacrifices were inevitable, and have since been realised. What was the purpose of Italy, Hungary and Poland? It was, while remaining friendly to Germany, to draw a line in Central Europe beyond which Germany could not advance. Under the leadership of Italy, Hungary and Rumania would, it was hoped, have effected a *rapprochement*. The route to the East would thus have been barred. But our diplomacy made yet another blunder. It was at this time, as French political diplomatic commentators acknowledge with regret, that Italy should have been supported. Since then much has taken place to our detriment. Germany has made giant strides towards hegemony. The problem, the only problem that matters, is seen in France, as I trust elsewhere, to be the problem of setting bounds to Germany's ambitions. With the goodwill of Italy—if it can still be obtained—it is

possible to counteract whatever is illegitimate and aggressive in Germany's Central and Eastern European policy; for with Italy we are assured of Yugo-Slavia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania so far as she is still economically free. The strength of such a combination lies in the fact that it need not be unfriendly to Germany, and would co-operate with Germany as, let us hope, with France and England, for the consolidation of a peaceful and prosperous Europe. I would not imply that there is anything like unanimity in French diplomatic thought, but I believe that it is on these lines that most people with diplomatic knowledge, and who are free from diplomatic "ideology," are now thinking. They start, as they must start, with the postulate that everything must be subordinated to the necessity of setting bounds to Germany's ambitions.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

*P.S.*—After the first shock of Italy's rather unnecessary conquest of Albania, and Britain's distribution of pledges to Greece, Rumania, and doubtless others, French diplomatic thought has returned to the position I have indicated. The newspapers are full of articles on the need of distinguishing between Italy and Germany. President Roosevelt's plea for a plain statement of intentions is entirely endorsed. Yet France is grimly getting ready for a struggle if struggle there must be.

S. H.

## ITALY, ALBANIA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.

IN its context the Italian adventure in Albania was given an importance even bigger than it deserved. It appeared to be just another step in the quickening tempo of the dictators' progress: of their onslaughts upon the property and the sovereignty of the small states that constitute the Central European belt between Germany and Italy on the one side and Russia and Turkey on the other.

The fact that Italy had herself undertaken formally to respect and even to protect the independent integrity of Albania was in the prevailing circumstances regarded as a matter rather of academic and historical than of practical interest. The dictators, obviously, no longer even pretended that engagements, undertakings, agreements, treaties, words of honour and the like were of the slightest consequence to them except as a means to an end: the end namely of a bandit's ambition. If Herr Hitler by the well-advertised Agreement of Munich could lull the public opinion of Great Britain and of France into a degree of insensibility deep enough to enable him to prepare and execute the sudden and total rape of Czecho-Slovakia before the said public opinion could recover its breath; if Signor Mussolini could rely upon the sacred rites of the Holy Catholic Church and of all other Christian Churches far enough to feel confident that while Christendom was on its knees before the Cross, he could himself make use of Good Friday to dash across the eighty miles that separated Brindisi from Durazzo and swiftly invade Albania: then the Agreement of Munich on the one hand and the Holy Catholic Church on the other had fully justified their existence in the eyes of the Führer and the Duce. If, moreover, the incidence of holiday with Christian Sacrament had taken the Prime Minister of Great Britain away to Scotland for a short relaxation and rest, then the occasion was twice blest in the strategy of the Duce's mind.

But the Duce never had much luck. His luck has been as consistently bad as the Führer's has been good. In the present instance public opinion in Great Britain was running so fast that European events were no longer considered on their merits. They were considered only for their comparative weight as a potential occasion for British intervention.

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The emotion was such that reason no longer played the leading rôle. Herr Hitler was regarded as a half-insane gangster, a public danger who must at all costs be suppressed. Signor Mussolini was regarded as an object rather for pity than for anger as a minor racketeer trailing ignominiously at the heels of the Big Shot. And lo! the trailer suddenly and somewhat pathetically tried to cut a figure on his own account by pouncing with all his killers, guns, tanks and aeroplanes upon a puny, helpless neighbour, not of great economic nor even strategic value to himself. It was, moreover, well enough known that public opinion in Italy was anti-German, and ever since the Starace essay in Jew-baiting had been increasingly anti-Mussolini. Signor Mussolini himself, warped as he might now be in his judgment, could not believe, and as there was evidence to show, did in fact not believe, that his association with the more powerful gangster could in the end encompass anything but his own ultimate extinction.

In short his well-known hatred and (which is the same thing) fear of Herr Hitler coincided with the clear interests of Italy. Could he be helped to break away from the clutches of Berlin? Count Ciano, Signor Starace, Signor Farinacci and his own daughter Edda, wife to Count Ciano, were all so compromised as to be virtually in German pay. How, therefore, could he break the Axis? Could the history of 1915 be repeated and Italy be bribed by an offer of territory to break away from Germany? Not very obviously. The promised bribe of 1915 had not been delivered. In 1939 Signor Mussolini would clearly need payment in advance. Jugoslavia? Or at any rate the Dalmatian Coast? The *mare nostrum*, the *mare clausum* of Italy's dreams? Impossible. When British and French opinion were incensed against Germany for the rape of territory in Central Europe and had even given a pledge to Poland of support against the sort of menace that had devoured Czecho-Slovakia, it was clearly fantastic that the British and French Governments should be expected themselves to hand over another territory in Central Europe with the crude object of splitting the gangsters. Not that such a form of crudity, camouflaged as it might be, is unknown to the practice of diplomacy, even in our time. We ourselves did it in 1915, when we offered Italy a part of Abyssinia, and in 1925, when we offered Italy

a still greater part of Abyssinia in return for our own annexation of Abyssinia's Lake Tsana. Abyssinia was no more ours to give in 1915 and 1925 than Yugoslavia was in 1939. The difference was the degree of alertness in public opinion. It is still the case that British opinion is largely ignorant of British official cynicism over Abyssinia in relation to Italy during the past quarter of a century. But the "jitters" and the resultant rousing of public curiosity about the elementary facts of high diplomacy have put such cynicism outside the scope of high diplomacy in its present practice.

Italy's incursion into Albania on Good Friday brought down the maps from the shelves. People looked at the sinister outlines of what we know as Danubian and Balkan Europe. Albania gone, Salonika was less than a hundred miles away. Hungary was already a signatory of the anti-Comintern Pact, though Magyar and German be ultimately unmixable. Yugoslavia was now caught between the pincers of Germany in the north and of Italy in the south. Rumania was the only territory that now kept Germany from the Black Sea. Greece alone now stood between the achievement of an Ægean-Mediterranean-Ionian-Adriatic-Tyrrhenian sea coast for the Axis Powers. Was then the occupation of Albania a deliberate strategic move, concerted between Berlin and Rome, towards such an end. The danger was increased by the fact that on April 7th the new Spain also signed the anti-Comintern Pact. Gibraltar was thereby called in question. The whole 3,000 miles of the Mediterranean were now at stake.

In passing let us frankly face one of the big facts. Since the beginning of the present century the focus of British diplomatic thought has been the power, the ambition and the character of Germany. During the half century that preceded 1914 Germany started a colonial empire in Africa and made so successful a drive in international commerce that the serene and exclusive majesty of the British Empire was forced to sit up and take notice. Britain and France had long ago composed their own historic quarrels and now accepted each other, *beati possidentes*, as partners in the spoils of the Old World. Until Germany arose as a challenge there was no competition. United by Bismarck under the stimulus given by Napoleon, Germany now burst forth in ruthless power. By 1914 she had galvanised against herself not only Great Britain and France and their empires, but Russia and Japan,

who were shortly to be joined by Italy and ultimately by the United States. Great Britain had the most to lose. She duly lost it. To those who are in the position of *beati possidentes* the mere fact of war is disastrous. The difference between "victory" and "defeat" in the military sense is a matter of only subsidiary importance. Though we "won" the war, we lost our majestic strength.

The devastation is still obvious, twenty years after, in every field of British life. It is not merely that we pay tribute to misfortune in the form of an income tax for ever multiplied by five. We have suffered in brains and in quality. One out of four of our men between the ages of twenty and forty was killed: the best of the four. A link in the traditions of British civilisation was broken. The standard of our national quality was set on a lower level. We are not so clever. We make blunders in diplomacy. The children of our land go to cinemas and are impregnated with the morals and technique of American gangsterdom as their daily entertainment. That is one of the financial results of Great Britain's squandering a century's reserves and America's taking the resultant opportunity for a virtual financial annexation of Great Britain. These American films are a factor of tremendous consequence. Every few minutes somebody socks somebody on the jaw. They all carry cosh up their sleeve and gats in their hip pocket as the normal accoutrements in civil life. Motor-cars fitted with machine-guns are shown as the normal police technique. We shall pay, are already paying, for this sort of education vouchsafed to our children. It is one of the results of the last war.

Despite the difficulty of making any sort of agreement or reaching any sort of understanding with a people so unbalanced and so pitiless in prosperity as the German, it was probably a first-class blunder on our part in 1914 to accept battle. Peace at any price would have worked out at a much smaller price than we have in fact paid (and not finished paying) for victory in war. And we wholly failed to achieve the purpose of victory in war. We took away Germany's colonies and hemmed her in by a series of encircling small sovereign states in Central Europe. The result within twenty years was an ebullient Germany made strong by the very concentration of her powers within cramped frontiers. The encircling small Powers went down like ninepins. We weakly protested.



Now the position of Italy is obviously cardinal. She is Germany's channel to the Mediterranean. On our side, Italy could both block Germany's access to the Mediterranean and make the decisive psychological difference to German public opinion and to Germany's gangster leaders. In 1915 we had Italy on our side, partly because it was in Italy's own interest to be on our side, partly because, with our then superior brains, we made it our business to have Italy on our side. With the damaged brains left us by the war, we mismanaged Italy. We started by not honouring the 1915 pledge to Italy. Despite that fact, and because Italy's true interests coincided with our own, Italy was still our friend.

And then came the fatal year 1935. If 1914 was an outstanding date in the history of the present century, 1935 was perhaps even more momentous. It is an appalling and incredible memory that in the spring of 1935 Italy was a member with Great Britain and France of the "Stresa front" against Germany. By the end of that year we had lost Italy. She joined the German camp. The moral ground of British indignation against Italy over Abyssinia was at best a muddy ground. Our own record in that very matter could not bear a moral examination. On the ground of common sense we committed an historic blunder. At all costs we ought to have kept Italy on our side. When instead she joined Germany, left the League of Nations and fashioned the Berlin-Rome Axis, Europe began a process of deterioration which has ever since gathered momentum.

Why was it that Germany failed in 1934 to obtain a hold over Austria? Because Italy opposed her. Why was it that in 1936 she succeeded in that object? Because Italy no longer opposed her. The current of Europe's decisive forces had been diverted. The whole pitiful story of the European chaos that is now our daily preoccupation was made inevitable in 1935 by the policy we know as Edenism. Big things depend upon small accidents. If Sir Samuel Hoare in December 1935 had not been hounded out of office by a British public opinion whose heart was sound but whose head was weak; if he had been enabled to carry through the Hoare-Laval proposal, the whole disastrous avalanche of European affairs that has since overwhelmed us would have been averted. The German lien established over Austria in 1936 led fatally to the full annexation of Austria in 1938.

The annexation of Czecho-Slovakia and of Memel in 1939 were the further inevitable consequence. Italy's annexation of Albania in 1939 was another of the series of disasters produced by the headlong avalanche started in 1935; whether it is to prove a major or a minor disaster is yet to be seen.

Of Albania herself, the contemporary story is one of the unhappy chapters in modern Europe. Italy's action on Good Friday last was not an isolated nor a disjointed enterprise. Even before the Great War, Albania was an object of Great Power interest and therefore of Great Power rivalry, intrigue and bribery. In the present phase of European crudities little is to be gained, and little even conventional satisfaction to be obtained, by mincing words. Before 1912 Albania was a part of the Turkish Empire, but had a distinctive enough character to excite the competitive instincts of Italy on the one hand and of Austria-Hungary on the other. Greece, Serbia and Montenegro had their acquisitive eyes upon the country as a normal routine. During the Balkan War of 1912 it was the joint influence of Italy and of Austria-Hungary that saved the country from dismemberment, the saviours' motive being not an altruistic devotion to their protégé's interests, but a quite impure determination that no third party should appropriate the spoils. For obvious reasons Austria-Hungary cast covetous and possessive eyes upon the little country. From Italy's point of view Valona was a valuable harbour within sixty miles of the Italian coast, sixty miles moreover which constituted the gateway between the Adriatic and the Mediterranean seas. On November 28th, 1912, therefore, Albania was granted "independence" by Ismail Kemal Vlora, who was egged on to that end by the diplomacy of Italy and Austria-Hungary. The proclamation of independence was made, as though symbolically, at Valona. But life could not be made so simple. Russia and France as well as Italy and Austria-Hungary were actively interested in the fate of Albania, and threw their influence on the side of the Balkan States, whose object was to divide Albania among themselves. So pretty a mess was solved by a Conference of Ambassadors, sitting in London, who first (December 20th, 1912) recognised in principle the "autonomy" of Albania, and next (July 29th, 1913) declared Albania to be an independent sovereign State, the element of

compromise being introduced by making the boundaries of the new Albania include fewer than half of the Albanian race.

Nor could the Great Ambassadors themselves impose finality. Prince William of Wied, appointed by them to be Albania's ruler, no sooner landed at Durazzo (March 7th, 1914) than he found himself enmeshed in the wild intrigues that came over the frontiers. A month after the Great War started he left Albania (September 3rd, 1914) although he did not abdicate. Greece was thereupon authorised by the Allied Powers to occupy southern Albania. Italy occupied Valona (December 1914) and after joining the war on the Allied side proceeded in 1916 to occupy most of southern Albania.

The modern problem of Albania therefore is neither a new nor an unexpected development. After the armistice of 1918 Italy occupied most of the country, small parts being occupied by France and by the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. There was trouble in Albania. Acting on the good old diplomatic ideal of "*J'y suis ; j'y reste*" Italy not only prolonged her occupation, but engaged in sundry diplomatic manœuvres with the Jugoslavs at the Albanian expense. The frontier question was not finally closed till August 2nd, 1926, when a Protocol was signed in Paris confirming Albania's sovereign integrity within, more or less, the 1913 frontiers. Italy had "recognised" the Albanian Government, and evacuated the country, on August 2nd, 1920.

The "Albanian Republic" was proclaimed on January 22nd, 1925, when Zogu was elected President for seven years. Italy had by then established strong commercial interests in the country, and made use of Jugoslav menaces against the country to effect a diplomatic deal. By the Treaty of Tirana, concluded on November 27th, 1926, and registered with the League of Nations on February 8th, 1937, Italy and Albania agreed that any menace to the *status quo* of Albania was a menace to their reciprocal political interests and undertook to safeguard each other against such menace by their mutual support and cordial collaboration. When the Treaty was registered at Geneva a supplementary letter explained that Italy could not interfere in Albania's affairs, internal or external, except at Albania's request. Jugoslav agitation against Albania gave Italy the pretext and the opportunity still further to cultivate her own interests in Albania, with the result that on November 22nd, 1927, a defensive alliance was

concluded at Tirana between the two countries. It had been preceded by a general diplomatic storm over alleged Jugoslav attempts to overthrow President Zogu and by a Franco-Jugoslav treaty of friendship signed on November 11th, 1927. Ahmed Zogu was proclaimed King on September 1st, 1928.

In some ways, therefore, Italy's relations with Albania have had a veneer not only of correctitude but of good feeling. That veneer was heightened on November 9th, 1921, when the British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments signed a declaration in Paris to the effect that Italy had a dominant interest in Albania, and that if Albania should ever appeal to the League of Nations for the preservation of her territorial integrity, the said Powers would recommend that the preservation of that integrity should be entrusted to Italy.

The historical background would not be complete without some reference to the famous Corfu incident of 1923. The full story of that incident was contained in a pamphlet, *The Janina Murders and the Occupation of Corfu*, by the present writer, published by the Anglo-Hellenic League in 1923. It contained the full text of the famous cynical report drawn up at Janina under the date September 30th, 1923, by the representatives of Japan, Italy, France and Great Britain. It happened that on August 27th, 1923, General Tellini, two officers, an interpreter and a chauffeur, who were engaged in the Italian section of a commission sent out by the Ambassadors' Conference to delimit the Greco-Albanian frontier, were murdered near Janina in Greece. Signor Mussolini at once sent an ultimatum to the Greek Government, assuming that Government's responsibility for the murders, making demands that no Government could accept, including an indemnity of 50 million lire to be paid within five days. The Greek Government (1) expressed its regret, (2) undertook to do honour ceremonially to the Italian flag, (3) refused to put to death "all who are found guilty" and (4) refused to pay the 50 million lire but promised "a just indemnity" to the bereaved families. The Italian fleet moved even before the Greek answer was received. The Greek island of Corfu was occupied on August 31st. After a violent diplomatic storm the Conference of Ambassadors drew up an agreed solution (agreed to by Italy and Greece), one provision of which was that the 50 million lire should be "deposited" as security by

Greece pending a decision on the dispute by the Permanent Court of International Justice. And then within a few days, without waiting for the decision of the Court, the Ambassadors demanded the immediate payment of the deposit to Italy. Without frills, what had happened was that the Ambassadors decided to make the victim pay the aggressor for evacuating the territory occupied: a remarkable chapter of European post-war diplomacy.

The circumstances of the latest chapter in the history of Italo-Albanian relations are at any rate clear and simple, though they manifest the normal latter-day technique whereby the dictators use surprise and quick work as one of their instruments. Italy being the guarantor of Albanian territorial integrity against external aggression, she herself invaded and captured the whole territory. Immediately before the event took place British and French opinion was concentrated on the aftermath of Herr Hitler's latest coup. It was on March 15th last that Herr Hitler's troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia and he announced that "Czecho-Slovakia ceases to exist." On March 22nd Herr Hitler annexed Memel (the German Government in 1928 having signed a treaty with Lithuania undertaking for ever to recognise Memel as part of Lithuania). Colonel Beck, Polish French Minister, arrived in London on April 3rd. On that same day it was reported that Italian troops and transport were concentrating at Bari and Brindisi.

In advance of Colonel Beck's journey to London the British Government had given a pledge to Poland of support against aggression. Speaking in the House of Commons on March 31st Mr. Chamberlain made the announcement in these words: "Certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. . . . In the meantime, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power."

The position therefore when Colonel Beck left London on April 7th (which was Good Friday) was that the British Government had broken its traditional policy of refusing commitments in advance of contingencies, had chosen to regard Poland as the limit beyond which German aggression

should not proceed without British intervention, and had given Poland a formal and clear commitment in that sense. On the very day when Colonel Beck left London Italy landed troops at four points on the Albanian coast: Durazzo, Valona, San Giovanni di Medua and Santi Quaranta. The ports of Durazzo and Valona were bombarded and destroyed. By the end of the day the whole coast was in Italy's hands. On the following day (April 8th) the invaders occupied Tirana, the Albanian capital.

Six weeks earlier King Zog (as his name now was) had begun negotiations with Italy for the purpose, as Italy claimed, of enlarging in present dangers the scope of the Italian support which was provided for in the treaty signed at Tirana on November 22nd, 1927. During the course of those negotiations Italian official propaganda threw suspicion on King Zog's motives. In the *Giornale d'Italia* of April 7th (the day of the invasion) Signor Gayda, the Duce's normal mouthpiece, declared that the Italian troops "had been called there by Albanian patriots who could no longer tolerate the misgovernment of the King." He gave as a further motive the defence of "the lives and property of Italian citizens who were threatened and attacked by armed bands." The grievances of heavily armed dictators against small neighbours, as the preliminary propaganda to the annexation of those small neighbours, are not likely now to surprise many people over the age of ten. In this case King Zog was given the dual propagandist rôle of simultaneous oppressor and traitor. The prompt comment came in the spectacle of King Zog leading the tiny army of Albanian patriots in battle against 30,000 Italian invaders, the while his Queen and her two-day old son were evacuated over the frontier by ambulance.

A few days before the Italian troops were landed in Albania the German newspapers pooh-poohed the rumours of such impending action as "an invention of the British Government" designed to frighten the small Powers of Central Europe into following Poland's example and seeking refuge in the British group. When the actual news of the Good Friday's enterprise was made known a semi-official German statement protested Germany's "full understanding for the necessity of protecting Italian interests in Albania"; added that Germany "would neither understand nor approve interference by the Western Powers"; and affirmed "the

juridically incontestable position and action of her Axis partner."

Another nerve storm at once developed in Great Britain and France. It was made worse by the news (April 7th) of Spain's joining the Anti-Comintern Pact. Moreover, the Italian troops were still in Spain, though the official announcement that "the war is over" had been made a week before (April 1st). It was announced in Burgos on April 7th that the evacuation of the Italian troops was to be expected "soon after" General Franco's ceremonial entry into Madrid. It was now remembered that an Italo-German staff consultation had been held at Innsbrück during the two days (April 5th and 6th) before Italy landed her troops on the Albanian coast. General Keitel, Chief of the German Military High Command, and General Pariani, Chief of the Italian General Staff, had attended that consultation. For the rest, the normal devices and reactions were duly manifested. On Good Friday morning Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, gave "assurances" about Italy's intentions to Lord Perth, the British Ambassador. He no doubt assured him that Italy's military action was wholly pacific in purpose and that her invasion and occupation of Albanian territory was designed to safeguard Albanian integrity. That particular type of heavy-going flat contempt of the very purpose of language is no longer remarkable. "Assurances" were also given in Belgrade, and the Yugoslav Cabinet solemnly met to ponder them.

The Rumanian Foreign Minister left Bucharest for Istanbul on April 7th to meet the Turkish Foreign Minister: and that was a fact of greater interest because it was at once obvious that as a result of Italy's action Turkey was driven firmly into the anti-dictatorship camp, and that by the same token Mohammedan feeling was galvanised against Italy—a result that would have important repercussions in North Africa. It was at least arguable that from the Italian point of view the occupation of Albania was a first-class blunder. If only Yugoslavia did not exist, the day when the rivalry between the two "rockets" of Berlin and Rome must issue in open war between Germany and Italy would probably be near at hand.

High diplomacy now concentrated upon the Mediterranean in its widest scope. On April 13th Germany informed Britain and France that the customary "Spring exercises" of the

German fleet would take place this year off the coast of Spain. When that information was given Field-Marshal Göring was in Libya, whence he next visited Rome. On that same day the British Government announced the extension of the British pledge to apply to Greece and to Rumania as well as to Poland. M. Daladier in Paris made the like declaration on behalf of the French Government. Mr. Chamberlain refrained from denouncing the Italo-British Agreement on the ground that Italy might possibly fulfil "the remaining provisions of that Agreement." She had already broken her undertaking to respect "the *status quo* as regards national sovereignty in the Mediterranean area." On April 14th Italy accepted an "offer" by the "Albanian Constituent Assembly," with the result that the King became "the King of Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia." As this paper was written steps were being taken with good promise of success to include Turkey in the League of Powers consolidated and guaranteed against aggression.

No less vital an issue was joined than the whole future control of the Mediterranean. Italy had been virtually annexed by Germany. Was it really impossible to rescue her? If the achievement of 1915 could be repeated in 1939 the whole problem not of the Mediterranean only, but of Europe would be transfigured.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

*April 17th, 1939.*

system of collective security was adopted only after the *coup de grâce* had been given to that system which was already in existence. British unpreparedness will never explain the necessity to hand over to a potential enemy, forty motorised Czech divisions, the biggest armament works in Central Europe and a tidy air force; nor will a sudden British preparedness explain the later plunge into military guarantees for countries without these resources or equipment of their own. Logical inconsistency has long been the characteristic, if not the pride, of the English; but criminal negligence and irresponsible ignorance have more than once brought members of the British Cabinet to be impeached at the bar of the House of Commons. The time for this has not yet arrived—but when it does arrive, month by month the situation will be reconstructed. The growing Nazi threat will be shown in its consistent and consequential advance. The evacuation of one position after another by the peace-loving Powers will be shown in their miserable retreat. Finally, the months of September 1938 and April 1939 will be compared; and from the ranks of those who were defending the public law of Europe, one country will be missing: a country which fulfilled to the last its international obligations, based its internal policy on democratic rights, and brought to the defence of its allies an army of two million men and an alliance system which made it not only the focal point of resistance in Central Europe, but the bridge which united Eastern and Western Europe and made collective security a reality.

Czechoslovakia was sacrificed at Munich—the fate which befell it six months later was not the reversal but the conclusion of the Munich policy. At Munich, every one of the Czech fortifications was handed over to Germany and effective resistance in Central Europe to the most powerful military Power on the continent was quite deliberately broken. Yet the plan to extend the German frontiers to include a vast Germanic Empire was known to be far older, far more consistent and far more consequentially proved than the spasmodic Nazi renunciations of further territorial ambitions. There was hardly reason to believe that Hitler would renounce his further ambitions because his capacity to achieve them had so signally increased.

By the German Government it was said, and by the British Government it was believed, that Hitler was exclusively

interested in the well-being of the Sudeten German minority, that all he demanded was their right of self-determination and that when this had been granted, "We do not want any Czechs any more." It did not take the German occupation of Bohemia in March to prove that Hitler was lying, and that his chief concern was not the welfare of the Sudeten Germans but the downfall of the Czechs. Within a fortnight of his declaration and with the full assent of the International Commission and its British representative, Sir Neville Henderson, Germany had annexed 726,000 Czechs or more than 10 per cent. of the entire Czech nation.

The Berlin Commission, like those similar commissions which had studied this question for the Paris Peace Conference, found in practice that it was impossible to apply the principle of self-determination. It therefore accorded to Germany, as before had been accorded to Czechoslovakia, the frontier which was desired for political, strategic and economic reasons. But there was one vital difference between the German and the Czech desires. At Versailles the Czechs demanded a frontier which would give them military security, political independence and economic coherence. At Munich, Hitler dictated not a defensive but an aggressive frontier. He ordered that the Czechs be given a frontier which made them militarily defenceless, politically disrupted and economically crippled. This was the Munich frontier—decided by "agreement," "by negotiation." All the main communications of the Republic by road and rail were intercepted by prongs of territory occupied by the German army. The electricity supply of the capital, Prague, the water supply of the capital of Moravia, Brünn, were both seized by the Germans. The German army installed itself on the right bank of the Danube opposite Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. The capital of Ruthenia was handed to Hungary by the Vienna award. Mineral deposits were seized upon and vital economic units were systematically broken up. Industries were cut off from the means of supply, factories were cut off from their workers, railway stations from the towns they served. In short, Germany was given a strangle-hold on Czechoslovakia which enabled her, when the moment came, to occupy within a few hours and with no fear of resistance, the length and breadth of the country.

Yet even the Munich frontier did not bring all Germans

within the Third Reich; over 300,000 remained within the rump of the Czechoslovak Republic. This number was artificially maintained and all Germans were given strict orders not to opt for German citizenship. "For us Germans," Kundt—Herr Henlein's successor—explained to them, "the Czechoslovak passport is only a formality. In reality we remain members of the German Reich with a special mission to perform." It was on this principle that the Germans acted. In defiance of the laws of a democratic Republic, the laws and customs of the Third Reich were introduced. The Nuremberg laws were applied to all German schools and institutions and racial and political persecution was let loose wherever two or more Germans were gathered together. The "self-determination" of the Germans amounted in practice to the claim for the right to dominate "inferior races"—among whom, of course, were the Czechs. "It is high time," said Kundt threateningly, "for history does not wait."

The internal decomposition of the Czechoslovak Republic was the fatal and inevitable consequence of Munich. For the twenty years of its existence that Republic had been based on collaboration with the Western Powers in foreign affairs, on Western political ideas in internal affairs. The Munich Agreement was the bankruptcy of both and exposed the total inadequacy of this policy to secure the safety of the Republic. President Beneš, who, in the mind of every German and every Czech, had been the main protagonist of this policy, was forced to resign, and those who had long been his political opponents came to power. Beran, who had advocated co-operation with the Nazi wing of the German minority, became Prime Minister and Chvalkovsky, who as Minister in Berlin and Rome had advocated co-operation with the axis, became Foreign Minister. The complete and disastrous failure of these two to establish cordial relations between Germany and an independent Czechoslovakia came as a melancholy justification of the policy of resistance pursued by Beneš. From Germany they met with constant demands which subordinated all the vital interests of the Czechs, in every sphere of activity, to the primary desires of the Germans. Inside the country they met with overwhelming suspicion and the deep-seated repugnance of the Czech people for everything Nazi. Democratic and parliamentary government on the old party lines was obviously out of the question, yet the attempt to break

down the old democratic political system proved completely futile. Behind the façade of a two-party system and "an authoritarian democracy," the old party leaders co-operated together to prevent a popular rejection of the pro-Nazi, semi-Fascist and anti-Semitic policy which alone the Germans would permit to the so-called independent Czechoslovak Government. The Government of the second Czechoslovak Republic was faced with the superhuman task of governing a country, all of whose traditions and ways of life were democratic and anti-Nazi, in a manner agreeable to the Nazi Reich. That the Government of Beran and Chvalkovsky failed through no fault of its own would explain its maintenance in power even after the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.

The exigencies of the Nazis were considerable, however, and to the tune of a new anti-Czech press campaign at the end of January, M. Chvalkovsky was summoned to Berlin. He was told that it was intolerable that the Czechs should still appear not to draw the consequences of their defeat or still seem to harbour a faint hope that the situation would once more change in their favour. For the moment, M. Chvalkovsky was told, it would be well if they acceded immediately to the following practical demands:

1. That the wishes of the German minority in Czechoslovakia should be immediately and fully granted. These included full permission to organise Nazi propaganda, Nazi troops and Nazi methods within the Republic, to eliminate all Jews from "any connection with the relations between Germans and Czechs," and for the Czechs to "allow to take place smoothly" the adoption of a "common ideology between the Czech and German people."

2. That the adherents of Beneš in the public services or any sphere of public life, the administration, the army and the press, should immediately be "liquidated."

3. Radical measures against the Jews.

4. A reduction of the Czechoslovak army to 30,000—in the pre-Munich Czechoslovak army there were 30,000 officers and non-commissioned officers alone.

5. The immediate handing over of a proportion of the gold supply.

At the same time it was intimated that "political" co-operation on the basis of the anti-Comintern Pact should

be "spontaneously" demanded by the Czechs; while "economic co-operation" should prevent the Czechs from reconstructing any of their industries which might compete with German firms. The Czechs, after having given the Germans in October the right to construct through Czechoslovakia a strategic road with extra-territorial rights, were now informed that all their roads and railways would be expected to be at the service of the Germans and that sealed trains carrying troops should be allowed to pass without comment.

Chvalkovsky returned to Prague. The Czech public was never informed of the details of his interviews with Hitler and Ribbentrop. A guarded Government statement was issued which said that relations with Germany were in an "experimental stage" and there were "an almost unlimited number of complex questions which present the most various difficulties which will have to be overcome patiently, step by step." In some quarters, it has since been said that the German demands were couched in the form of an "ultimatum" which was to expire on March 15th. This would appear, however, to be a reconstruction of the event after it had taken place. In fact, the sole explanation of the behaviour of the Czech Government during the March crisis, the sole explanation of President Hacha's hurried visit to Berlin on the night of March 14th, is that the Czech Government refused to believe in the possibility of German occupation. Most Czechs were of the opinion that Germany would occupy the country only in the event of general European war.

Yet signs were not wanting that this was intended. The Czechs were even informed at the beginning of March by competent French quarters of the full details of the plan—the outbreak of "incidents" between Czechs and Germans, the declaration of "independence" by the Slovaks, the massed approach of German troops towards all Czech frontiers. The Slovaks were known to be in close and direct contact with Berlin and the exorbitant demands which they had been raising steadily since January should have warned the Czechs of the treachery which was being prepared. The Czechs, however, knowing that the majority of Slovaks, even of the Hlinka party, were for the continued co-operation of Czechs and Slovaks within the same State, discounted the effect on the Slovak leaders of the German threat to partition Slovakia between its neigh-

bours. Under this threat, the Slovaks preferred to hand over the Czechs to Germany and preserve Slovakia intact as a German protectorate.

To-day the tragic history of the first and second Czechoslovak Republics is closed. The Czech Government which has remained on since March is as discredited in the eyes of the Czech Republic as it is illegal in the eyes of the Western world, which has refused to recognise the annexation against which it has never once publicly protested.

The last, however, has not been heard of the Czechs, and the extinction of Czechoslovak liberties is a temporary period in the history of a people long accustomed to suffering but never reconciled to slavery. Pre-war Pan-Germans of the school of Mommsen and Lagarde wrote even in a period in which the Czechs had been under foreign rule for three hundred years of the necessity "to break the hard skulls of the Czechs." To-day this is a yet greater "necessity" for the Nazis and a necessity which twenty years of Czech independence and the somewhat tardy realisation abroad of the Nazi danger to the world has not made any easier. If the Nazi terrorisation of the world at large is finally to be exterminated, this will still have to be done with, and not again without, the Czechs.

S. GRANT-DUFF.



## POLAND AND GERMANY.

IT is the tragedy of many neighbouring nations that, although dependent on each other, they live in constant feud, for instance, the Germans and Poles, despite the fact that the former have been the teachers of the latter not only in the economic but also in the cultural sphere. German colonists founded towns and villages, cleared forests and ploughed fallow land. German architects built churches and town halls; the first printers and publishers of Poland were of German extraction; German law was valid in all towns of the old aristocratic republic. At the same time the Knights of the Cross devastated the country and wanted even to destroy the *natio polonica*. The Hohenzollerns were in this respect the only too eager disciples of the Orders, notwithstanding their humaner methods. This policy caused feelings of resentment and distrust among the Poles, the more so, as the Germans despised their Eastern neighbours and denied their ability to govern a State of their own. When Poland was restored, they spoke of a *seignior-State*. This caused great psychological misunderstanding which made a *rapprochement* much more difficult. Even more unfavourable was the fact that it had not been possible to reconcile the State interests. It was certainly no mere coincidence that the rise of Prussia in the second half of the seventeenth century began at the same moment, when the decay of the old aristocratic republic became obvious. If we follow up the histories of Poland and Prussia in modern times, we are surprised to see that the rise of one country always caused the weakening of the other. This knowledge inspired the Polish policy of Bismarck and Bülow, who were the greatest adversaries of a restitution of the old aristocratic republic. This fact, which is conditioned by geography, will not disappear so long as Germany contemplates the domination of the East, the more so as the way to the Ukraine goes through Poland.

There were certainly times when we could not only speak of an approach of the two peoples, but even of a German-Polish friendship; but these were only episodes. It is characteristic that it was generally the fear of Russia that formed a bond between the two nations. This was the case in 1848, when the Frankfurt Parliament favoured a reparation of the wrong done to the Poles. At that time German democracy

felt itself endangered by the Tsar Nicholas I, and thought that a free Poland would be a valuable ally. When the Great War broke out, the part of the Polish population that followed Pilsudski declared themselves for the Central Powers, because they regarded Russia as the more dangerous enemy. After the outbreak of the second Russian revolution, however, Pilsudski recognised that not Moscow but Germany stood in the way of an independent Poland. This continuous oscillation between East and West, which is a result of the geographical situation of the Republic on the Vistula, is one of the characteristics of Polish foreign policy. The Polish-German non-aggression Pact of January 1934, and the approach of Warsaw towards Moscow which took place in November 1938 are proofs.

When making the non-aggression pact with Hitler, Pilsudski was led by various motives. First, he wanted to normalise relations with the Reich and to end the tariff war which had lasted since 1925. Further, it was necessary to modify Polish foreign policy in view of the changes caused by Hitler's coming to power, especially as it became clear that France was a not very reliable ally. Already the conclusion of the Locarno pacts aroused some bitterness, for when Germany recognised the situation on her Western frontiers, as it was created by Versailles, Poland was not mentioned as one of the contracting parties. This was the result of Stresemann's refusal to renounce once for all Upper Silesia, Pommerellen and part of Posen. The distrust flamed up afresh when some French circles began to advocate the restitution of Pommerellen to Germany, or even called Poland the "mar-peace" of Europe who stood in the way of a Franco-German *rapprochement*. When in the spring of 1933 it became known that France was about to sign a Four Power pact, the leaders of Polish foreign policy decided to emancipate themselves. Owing to the protests of Poland and the Little Entente the articles of the Four Power pact referring to the revision of the frontiers were so formulated as not to menace the existence of any of these States; but the fact remained that France agreed to Poland being excluded from the concert of the Great Powers. Of course, this influenced Franco-Polish relations in an unfavourable sense. Moreover, the continual change of Ministers, the party strife and the fact that France had not herself undertaken the defence of Austria against the Third Reich, but had

left it to Italy, were regarded as signs of weakness and as symptoms that she intended to retire from Central Europe. Furthermore, Poland was convinced that Germany would re-arm also against the will of the Great Powers.

On account of all these considerations Pilsudski had no longer any great confidence in the League of Nations and in collective security, and tried to come to a direct understanding with Germany. The emancipation from France and the League were not the only aims of Warsaw, when it came to an arrangement with Germany. Through the non-aggression pact the danger of a Four Power pact and a second Rapallo, which oppressed Poland like a nightmare, was to be banned. Finally, Poland, by arranging with one of her mightiest neighbours—at the end of 1932 she concluded a non-aggression pact with Soviet-Russia—sought a free hand in order to be able to consolidate and develop her position as a Great Power.

Also from the standpoint of home policy the non-aggression pact was to bring about a relief of tension, especially with regard to the German minority, who stood in sharp opposition to the Polish government till 1934 in the country itself as well as in Geneva. The result was that they showered complaints against the Polish State upon the League and that Poland was continually the accused, the more so, as the Reich supported not only the Germans but also the Ukrainians. This policy of Germany caused the minority treaty of June 28th, 1919, which was rightly felt as a discrimination and annulled by Poland in 1934.

The Polish-German *rapprochement* was fostered by the political and psychological attitude of certain Polish circles, though these elements advocated an alliance with Hitler more from opportunism than from love of Germany. Very significant in this direction was the attitude of the National Democrats, who up to the very moment when Hitler came to power had been the worst enemies of Germany, had regarded the Western neighbour as the mortal foe, and had desired an alliance with Russia. This change in Dmowski's followers, however, was caused principally by internal political reasons. Their ideology shows many features—especially with respect to the Jewish question, intransigent nationalism and the problems of leadership—similar to National Socialism, and they believed that an alliance of Poland with Hitler would

smooth their way to power. The pact of 1934 was also welcomed by the Conservatives, who wanted to defeat Soviet-Russia with the help of the Third Reich and to annex parts of the Ukraine to Poland. Whilst the Conservatives, who were recruited principally from the great land-owners, preached a crusade against Russia from material reasons—wanting to get back in this way the land seized by the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine—part of the Polish youth which believed in Pilsudski's programme pursued the political aims recommended by him.

These adherents of Pilsudski believed that Poland will only be able to assert herself as a Great Power if she will form one federal State with the Ukraine. Also the Ukrainians living in Poland who wanted to save their suffering brethren in Russia with the help of Poland, and Hitler, believed in this theory. Youth also decided for Hitler, because they were impressed by the dynamism of the totalitarian States. One of their leaders declared: "You cannot go with a France that does not want to fight."

A special group of the advocates of a *rapprochement* with the Third Reich was formed by those who cherished the illusion that Prussia, but not Hitler, is an enemy of Poland. But as Prussia has been absorbed by Greater Germany, there is no danger from this side. A glance into *Mein Kampf* will suffice to prove how unsound this argument is. Hitler glorifies Prussia and her ideology and says literally: "Prussia proves with wonderful exactness that not material qualities, but ideal virtues alone are able to form a State." And Hitler's Eastern plans are aiming at areas that go far beyond what Germany had gained by the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Budapest. The same spirit appears in the works of Alfred Rosenberg, who calls the National Socialists the Prussians of the twentieth century. These are only part of the Polish population. The great majority wanted a normalisation of Polish-German relations, but not an understanding with Hitler. Of course in this case also ideological motives were of influence. The Left parties were against the non-aggression pact, the Right were for it.

There were various reasons for Hitler to conclude a non-aggression pact with Poland. On the one hand, he wanted to free himself from the isolation from which he had suffered after leaving the League of Nations, and to be safe in the East

at the moment when about to annul the disarmament clauses of the peace treaty and to annex Austria. On the other, the pact with Poland made it easier for him to effect the first breach in the system of collective security. Moreover, the non-aggression pact of 1934 is very vague and, indeed, does not bind Germany in any way. It only determines that all questions touching both States should be solved in common agreement. In any case it rendered invaluable service to Germany. Thanks to Poland's attitude the Third Reich was not only able to mobilise an immense army, but also to militarise the Rhineland and to annex Austria and Sudetenland. Poland, it is true, on March 7th, 1936, declared her willingness to march with France against Germany. So the pact with Germany did not hinder Poland from fulfilling the treaty concluded with France. Poland thwarted the conclusion of Barthou's Eastern pact which aimed at encompassing Germany. In this case Warsaw pursued purely national aims, as it did not want Poland to become the battlefield of Europe and the Soviet Union to take root in the Danubian basin.

The advantages that the non-aggression pact had brought to Poland were less than modest. Whilst the Third Reich has increased its area by more than 100,000 square kilometres, and its population by more than 10 millions, Poland was only able to win back a small strip of land which had wrongly been adjudged to Czechoslovakia. So the policy of balance pursued by Warsaw became completely illusory. Much more important is the fact that till now Warsaw has neither succeeded finally in inducing Hitler to recognise the present Polish-German frontier nor to alleviate the situation of the Polish minorities. There was an agreement in November 1937 permitting the minorities the free use of their mother tongues in speaking and writing and the establishment of schools of their own; but these regulations, as far as Germany is regarded, were perfectly ignored. Very informative in this respect is the memorial which the League of Poles in Germany addressed to the German Government in June 1938. From this it is evident that in the Third Reich the national rights of the Polish minority are trampled upon and that it is very badly treated in all spheres of social, religious, political, cultural and economic life. Certainly not all the complaints of the Germans living in Poland are unfounded; but the

Polish minority would be very happy with a small fraction of the rights the Germans have in Poland.

While Hitler has often assured France as well as Italy that he recognises their present frontiers as definitive, he has never said the same about Poland. In the propaganda literature and in the school books we read that the Vistula is a German river and that the Corridor must disappear. Immediately after the annexation of Austria Hitler declared to a representative of the *Daily Mail* that the existence of the Corridor was filling every German with bitterness. Still more frank was Goering, who on January 25th, the day when Ribbentrop arrived at Warsaw, declared in the *Essener Nationalzeitung* that there was still great antagonism between Germany and Poland as to the frontier in the East and the Corridor.

At the same time the Third Reich did everything to isolate Poland. This fact became quite evident during the Czechoslovak crisis. Poland was neither admitted to the Munich nor to the Vienna conference, and was not able to influence the shaping of Central Europe.

The gulf between Poland and Germany widened with the failure of Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw and of the negotiations concerning the respective minorities. Equally unsuccessful was his attempt to persuade Poland to remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and the Western Powers. For on the eve of his visit Beck had declared that the alliances with France and Rumania formed the basis of Poland's policy. After the occupation of Bohemia, Moravia and Western Slovakia and the annexation of Memel, the Polish-German frontier stretched from the Baltic to the Pruth, while the fortification of Memel constituted a threat to Poland's north-east provinces. This point was stressed by the *Deutsche Diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz* and Goering's organ the *Essener Nationalzeitung*, obviously with the intention of strengthening the German demands. What these demands were we do not at present know. Harmless they were not, for Poland felt compelled to take various military precautions, and the British Prime Minister felt bound to give his pledge of support on March 30th, which corrects the injustice of Locarno, and signifies the victory of the notion of the indivisibility of peace.

JAKOB RAPPAPORT.

Zbaszyn, Poland.

## KANT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

AT first sight it may seem futile, or at best of merely academic interest, to study the views of an eighteenth-century philosopher upon a problem with which present-day statesmen have failed to cope. And it is true that Kant in his little treatise, *Towards Perpetual Peace*, published in 1796, expressly states that his theories are not applicable to the condition of the world in his own day. This does not mean, however, that he regarded them as devoid of practical value. Though his primary aim in this and all his writings is the discovery of truth, the establishment of ultimate principles, it is doubtful whether he would have written a word if he had not believed that a grasp of these principles is the safest guide to right conduct both in the individual and the State.\* Though he denied the wisdom of placing philosophers in the seat of power, yet since men's actions are largely determined (consciously or unconsciously) by their philosophy of life, he was concerned to make that philosophy a sound and consistent one. And he knew well that no real harmony, either national or international, can be hoped for, so long as men differ so widely in their views of human welfare and human happiness.

The special interest which Kant's treatise holds for us lies in the fact that it advocates as the surest guarantee of peace a plan of action which, though it has been conceived and formulated by thinkers both before and after him, has never been put into practice until our own day. A federation of the nations of the world, animated by a common purpose, the desire for permanent peace, and binding themselves freely by a solemn promise to work for that end—such is, in Kant's view, the only effective method of solving the problem. In the League of Nations we have seen an attempt to give practical effect to the same ideas. That attempt has to all intents and purposes failed, and it may be pertinent to consider whether Kant furnishes us with any clue to the reason of that failure.

The statement that the League has failed perhaps needs some qualification. It has helped in the settlement of certain international disputes, and has some other minor achievements to its credit. The very fact that it could be founded at

\* "To make mankind contented with his lot is the whole object of philosophy." Kant's *Perpetual Peace*.

all, continue to function for so many years, and serve as a rallying-point for the forces making for world-unity, is all to the good. But the fact remains that as regards the central purpose of its existence, it has, on the few vital occasions which have really tested its worth, proved wholly inadequate: so that it has become doubtful whether its continued existence is not more detrimental than helpful to the cause which it was created to serve. The high hopes which accompanied its inauguration and early existence—especially in our own country, and among the younger generation whom the experiences of the Great War had scarcely touched—have given place to disillusionment and often to cynicism. Many now cry for its total abolition: and even those who still pin their faith to it believe that to be effective it must be drastically reconstructed. And there are others who from the first have believed that, human nature being what it is, such an institution was doomed to failure—especially since, as they would point out, men invariably adopt, and sometimes openly advocate and defend, a lower standard in their political morality than in their morality as private individuals.

A dispassionate consideration of the history of the League certainly seems to justify the second point of view. Indeed, from the outset the omens were more than unfavourable. For the men who framed its constitution and gave it their blessing were the same who imposed upon Germany the Treaty of Versailles, one of the most vindictive peace treaties in history. It can hardly be supposed that in the interval they had suffered a change of heart and mind. Even if we grant that in both cases they were inspired by the same motive, the preservation of peace, it seems evident that while in imposing the treaty they willed both the ends and the means, in framing the League they willed the end alone. Not perhaps consciously: they may have deceived themselves into thinking that they were prepared to make the sacrifices which the effective implementing of the provisions of the League entailed. Anyhow, the testing moment, when it came, soon revealed where the fundamental weakness of the whole conception lay. The Japanese found themselves unable to renounce their ambitions in China, and Italy to abandon her designs in Ethiopia: while as for the nations whose duty it was to punish the defaulter, they failed equally to respect their obligations. In their defence it is urged that they were

debarred from action by fear of a world conflagration ; but even if this were true as regards England, it seems certain that less worthy motives dictated the policy of France. And while there are many who would deny the disinterestedness of our own action or inaction, there are still more who would question its wisdom. So far from precipitating a world-war, the imposition of sanctions would, in the opinion of many well able to judge, have averted the Abyssinian carnage and sealed the doom of Fascism. Thus it seems clear that if the machinery of the League was in some respects faulty and inadequate, its failure was not primarily due to these defects, but to the weakness of the human nature which lay behind it. Its successful working presupposed a mentality and a moral outlook to which mankind has not, in fact, attained.

Kant, too, was fully aware that the chief obstacle to the success of any scheme for perpetual peace lay in the imperfection of human nature, but he did not therefore despair of its ultimate practicability. His outlook was a blend of realism and idealism, of soberness as regards the present and hope for the future. "Utopia is a sweet dream," he wrote, "but we must none the less work earnestly for its realisation." The justification for this attitude lay in his conception of man as a being who continually strives towards self-realisation, and who is continually thwarted in this purpose by his own selfish passions, which bring him up against the will of his fellow-beings, and thus limit his freedom of action. As long as men lived in a state of nature there was merely perpetual conflict without the possibility of progress : progress began when they entered into social relations with one another, in doing which they recognised that only by voluntary submission to law could they obtain the freedom necessary to self-development. The course of history shows that the gradual recognition by the individual of the necessity of self-limitation has led to the formation of law-abiding communities, in which each member acknowledges the existence of duties as well as of rights, or, rather, that every claim to a right involves a corresponding duty to his fellow citizens. In order to preserve these rights and to carry out these duties, the individuals voluntarily submit to a common authority, and are prepared, if necessary, to be coerced into fulfilment of their duties or punished for transgressing them.

Thus Nature (as Kant, avoiding the word Providence, prefers to name the prime agent in terrestrial things) having endowed man with reason has made him altruistic by force of his very egoism. As he puts it, "the mechanism of Nature, by means of those selfish proclivities which naturally stand in external opposition to each other, can be used by reason as a means of paving the way for its own ends of moral legislation : " since Nature "wills irresistibly that justice shall triumph in the end."

Thus the formation of the ordered community or State secures, or should secure, for the individual the conditions under which he can develop his personality freely. But this is not enough. The single State is but one among many, and thus the relation of States to one another has to be considered. If that relation is one of antagonism or conflict, the well-being of each State is threatened and impaired, and it is no longer able to provide its citizens with the ideal conditions for self-development. Thus the State in its external relations is faced with the same problem as individual members of the same State ; like them, it has to respect the rights of its neighbours if it is to secure its own. States, therefore, like individuals, must voluntarily enter into a self-limiting agreement.

In this way Kant arrives at the conception of a federation of States or nations as the basis of perpetual peace. But the analogy between State and nation cannot in his view be pushed to all lengths. For while the individuals in a State agree to submit to a common authority which can forcibly impose its will upon them, each State is in its nature sovereign and can acknowledge no power above itself. Thus a federation of States must depend for its success upon the willingness of each member to enter freely into certain obligations and, what is much more important, to abide by them. This, however, presupposes a recognition of the moral view as binding upon all men, in their corporate as much as in their individual capacity, and as over-ruling all merely political and selfish considerations. But Kant knew well enough that political morality had not yet advanced to that stage in its slow yet inevitable development.

It is sufficient merely to glance at some of the preliminary articles for perpetual peace to which the members of the Federation of States are to subscribe, to see how far removed

is the mentality they presuppose from that of Kant's day, and no less of ours. Thus one of the provisions which Kant considers indispensable is the abolition of spies and spying, since an atmosphere which fosters and is fostered by such a practice is wholly inimical to the spirit of peace. The century and a half which has elapsed since he wrote, so far from seeing a diminution of this practice, has witnessed its steady growth in extent and systemisation: and that not merely between nations at war, but also in time of peace between countries which presumably have nothing but peaceful intentions towards one another. Who can doubt that he is right in denouncing such an institution as wholly incompatible with a true will to peace, whether between nations or individuals? To spy upon our neighbour is only justified, if then, when we distrust him and suspect him of evil intentions towards ourselves; and to know that we are spied upon begets the same distrust and suspicion in us. To accept the practice of spying (as public opinion does accept it) as a normal and legitimate activity of States in their relation with one another is to regard that relation as one of present antagonism and potential warfare.

Another of Kant's preliminary articles provides that no State, however small, shall be acquirable by another by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or deed of gift. This follows logically from his daily conception of a State as "a society of people over which no one but itself has the right of command or disposal." How far the world is from the spirit of this provision, recent events in Europe and the far East show only too clearly. The same is even more true of the following article, which provides that standing armies are to cease to exist: and the reasons given are so apt a comment on the folly of the armaments race that they may be quoted in full. "They (standing armies) are a perpetual menace of war to other States through their readiness always to appear armed for it. They incite these others to outbid each other in unlimited numbers of armed forces, and as peace finally becomes more costly than a short war on account of the expenditure on armies, these themselves become the cause of wars of aggression undertaken in order to reduce this burden." It may be objected that no war nowadays is likely to be a short war: it is pertinent, however, to note that there are to-day many advocates of the *Blitzkrieg* or "lightning-war" as the

only mode of aggression which, under modern conditions of warfare, has any chance of success.

Equally in advance of his and our times is Kant's insistence upon the ultimate identity of public and private morality. Until the politician ceases to found his maxims of action upon his empirical knowledge of human nature, and substitutes for them the unconditional obligation of the moral law, peace, so Kant assures us, must remain an empty dream. Had he lived to-day, he would doubtless have been discouraged (but not shaken in his faith) to see how widely the Machiavellian conception of political morality still obtains. To quote one only of these maxims, as they are elaborated in his treatise: *Fac et excusa*: "Seize any favourable opportunity for appropriation of power for the State: the justification and whitewashing will be much easier and more seemly after the accomplished act of violence than the previous search for convincing reasons for, and the weighing of reasons against, action. The very boldness of the deed gives an appearance of inner conviction of righteousness, and the god of success is the best advocate after the event." Kant would not have had to look far to find practical illustrations of the successful application of this maxim in the modern world.

Further quotation would merely serve to confirm Kant's initial warning that his proposals are only applicable to a state of society from which we are as yet far removed. One criticism, indeed, which may suggest itself is that a society which could successfully adopt such a scheme as he propounds would be one in which the danger of warfare would have already ceased to exist; in which, therefore, federations and covenants for the perpetuation of peace became superfluous. Such a criticism would, however, have left him unmoved; for he would be the first to allow that in the end it is only the spirit that counts. "There is nothing good but a good will." The whole problem, indeed, is for him a moral problem, and this is for him the conclusion of the whole matter: "Seek first the kingdom of practical reason with its justice, and your aim—the blessing of perpetual peace—will follow of itself."

What assistance does Kant lend us in solving the problem of the future of the League of Nations? To those who wish to reconstruct it radically, and who consider that to make it effective the most urgent need is the establishment of a central executive supported by an international armed force,

he would object that this is inconsistent with the sovereignty of the individual State, which itself is necessary for the free self-development of its members, and that peace can never be secured by force, but only by the compulsion of obligations freely entered into and binding upon the individual conscience. If, however, he could be confronted with the fact of our existing League of Nations, grounded upon a covenant actually in force, we can hardly doubt that he would welcome it and do his best to ensure its survival. Even to unilateral treaties between single States he was not opposed, for he considered that on the whole they counteracted the tendency to war, and helped as it were to advertise the conception of public right. Much more then would he have approved of the League as an expression, however premature and in some respects ill-conceived, of his ideal of a world-federation. Those whose hopes for the League are still strong would derive encouragement from his firm and rational faith in the gradual progress of mankind, in the slow but inevitable growth of the spirit of justice and mutual tolerance among men. To promote that spirit is, in the words of the Joint-President\* of the League of Nations Union, the League's "normal method of averting the fear of war." Force, he tells us, is only to be resorted to as a desperate remedy when all others have failed: the normal method is one which works "by steady co-operation for the common good, by frank and frequent consultation, by open, just and honourable diplomacy": in a word, by "the building-up of that 'social justice' without which international peace becomes precarious." To all such endeavours Kant would doubtless have given his blessing.

J. SHAWCROSS.

\* Dr. Gilbert Murray.

## ITALY'S CLAIM TO JIBUTI.

JIBUTI is one of the smallest colonies of France. Its surface is only about 15,000 square miles and its population about 65,000. The territory is poor and, with the exception of some salt-works, does not produce anything remarkable. Before the Abyssinian War its name was not very familiar to French people, but since 1935 it has become widely known. This is due to the aspirations of Italy which, as will be seen later, has always claimed this territory, many years before the conquest of Abyssinia and ever since the end of the Great War. In regard to Jibuti Signor Mussolini continues a policy which had been established by former Italian Governments for a long time before the rise of the Fascist movement.

The settlement of France in this region dates from 1860. When in 1858 it became sure that the Suez Canal would be really constructed and the importance of the Red Sea would be greatly increased, the attention of France was drawn to the possibility of securing a foothold in this part of the world. A French naval detachment under the command of an admiral was sent to the Red Sea in order to take possession of the then unoccupied Isle of Perim. But while the French fleet sojourned in Aden an inconsiderate remark of a French officer revealed the intention of France. Immediately a British cruiser was sent to Perim, and when the French arrived they found the Union Jack already planted on the shore. Two years later the French captain Fleuriot bought, in the name of his Government, a small territory from the Danakil tribes who were settled around Obock. The price was £2,750. Nothing remarkable happened during the first years of the occupation. France, under the reign of Napoleon III, was too much engaged in other affairs to be able to pay much attention to the new colony. Only after the war of 1870 and the establishment of the new Republic some French pioneers sailed to Obock with the hope of finding new possibilities there. These hopes were disappointed, because Obock was a very bad harbour and possessed no possibility for developing an important commerce. This disadvantage became very clear when, in 1885, France entered on a conflict with China, and Great Britain, in view of her neutrality, refused to let the French ships coal in Aden. This was a rather serious menace to the relations of France with her new colony Indochina,



and the French Government was therefore on the outlook for a remedy. It was found on the opposite side of the Gulf of Tadjura, where Jibuti seemed to be in a much better position than Obock. In 1888 the French bought this site from the Sultan of Zcilah, much to the displeasure of the British Government, which did not like a new French settlement on this side in the immediate neighbourhood of Somaliland. It even lodged a protest with the French Government, but finally the question was settled by an agreement. Jibuti became the new capital of the French colony. Later also the northern frontier was definitely fixed by the French and Italian Governments. Soon friendly relations were established with the Abyssinian Emperor Menelik, who signed a commercial agreement with France. The port of Jibuti was completed, and the great French shipping companies constructed coal and water reservoirs.

In 1894 the Swiss engineer, Alfred Ilg, a technical adviser of Menelik, had the idea of constructing a railway connecting Jibuti with the new Abyssinian capital Addis-Ababa. He obtained a concession, and together with his French colleague Chefneux worked out the plans. They founded the *Compagnie Impériale de Chemin de Fer Ethiopien*. Once more Great Britain raised difficulties. The City did not like this railway, and the new Company met with unexpected obstacles. There were rumours that the technical difficulties would never be overcome and, even if they were, that the railway would never produce profits. The capitalists became very cautious, and it was only in 1897 that the work was started. In 1900 the first 108 kilometres were completed. But after this first success a new period of stagnation followed which was only overcome in 1908. A new agreement was concluded with Menelik according to which a new *Compagnie des Chemins de Fer Franco-Ethiopiens* was founded, with the guarantee of the French Government. When the Great War broke out, the line was not yet finished. The work continued, however, and was completed in 1917. Addis-Ababa was now connected with the coast by railway, and the new line proved a success. The revenue increased rapidly, and in 1924 part of the loans could be repaid.

The Great War was not yet ended when the Italian Government made known astonishing claims. On October 30th, 1918, a few days before the armistice, Sonnino, the Italian

Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a memorandum to Colonel House. It was obvious that Italy wished to establish her position in view of the victory of the Allies and the expected gains. Sonnino claimed no less than the whole French colony, Jibuti with its railway, and the British colonies of Somaliland and Jubaland. Italy based these claims on Article 13 of the Anglo-French-Italian agreement of April 26th, 1915, which decided Italy to take part in the war on the side of the Allies. This article said: "If Britain or France obtain an increase in their colonial possessions in Africa, Italy might in principle claim equitable compensation, particularly in the shape of a favourable settlement of questions affecting frontiers between Eritrea, Somaliland, and Lybia, and the adjacent British and French colonies." The Italian aspirations were immediately rejected by Clemenceau. Mr. Lloyd George was not entirely unfavourable and suggested the cession of Jubaland. The Cabinet, however, did not follow him, and Lord Milner pointed out that the Italian claims meant the complete isolation of Abyssinia. If Jibuti, Somaliland and Jubaland were ceded to Italy, Abyssinia would be completely surrounded by Italian possessions, and the interests of other Powers in that country would be endangered. Sonnino frankly avowed that Italy wished to obtain a preponderant influence in Abyssinia, and that for this purpose she needed the railway connecting Jibuti with Addis-Ababa in order to cut off supplies of arms and munitions.

This rather naïve confession was too much for Britain, France and President Wilson. They were of opinion that already the other demands of Italy were hardly reconcilable with the Fourteen Points which Italy, like the other Powers, had approved. To grant Italy South Tyrol, which was purely Germanic, as well as large territories purely Slavonic, and the Dodecanese with a pure Greek population, was scarcely in accordance with the newly proclaimed right of self-determination. It was further argued that Italy, while insisting on the agreement of 1915, had not fulfilled her own obligations. She had pledged her word to declare war on all the enemies of the Allies, but had only done so in regard to Austria. During a whole year she had refrained from declaring war on Germany. The Italians declined also to fall in with the arrangements entered into by the British and French fleets for the control of the Mediterranean and the protection

of that sea route against German submarines. They were not prepared to risk their fleet in a common endeavour under a united command. They argued that they were fully discharging their obligations by holding up the Austrian army on the Italian frontiers. In 1917 they even refused a powerful reinforcement of their artillery offered by Britain and France on the condition that they should conduct an offensive against the weakening Austrian front.

Italy got the Tyrol, the Croatian and Greek minorities, but her other claims in Africa were rejected. They were, however, never forgotten. The Fascist régime inherited them from its predecessors. In 1924, Great Britain ceded Jubaland, which made Italy renew more than ever the demands in regard to French cessions. A few months before Laval went to Rome, where he signed a new Italo-French agreement, an important review, of which the director was Signor de Vecchi, a Fascist Minister, published an article describing Jibuti as an arrow directed against the Italian possessions in Africa. It concluded: "As long as this question is not settled no real and durable peace is possible between France and Italy." When Laval arrived in Rome it appeared that the conclusion of an agreement was uncertain until the last minute. With the exception of the granting of 2,000 shares of the French railway from Jibuti to Addis-Ababa, no other mention was made of Jibuti. After this agreement, the name of Jibuti disappeared from the Italian press, and it was later inferred that Laval had given his agreement to the extension of the Italian influence in Abyssinia, although he might not have thought of a war.

Now the situation has changed once more. Since 1935 Jibuti has become of increased importance to France as well as to Italy. The Italian troops in Addis-Ababa would have starved without the French railway. Although the Italians have constructed new roads from the sea to the capital, transport is very expensive and necessitates large quantities of petrol, which Italy lacks to a great extent. During the first months of the occupation Italy boasted of her so-called independence of the French line. To-day the railway is claimed as indispensable. Italy pretends also that Italian anti-Fascists and Abyssinian chiefs who have escaped to Jibuti have started a violent anti-Italian propaganda from Jibuti, exciting the natives to revolt. It is also known that great quantities

of Italian *lire* are smuggled out of Abyssinia and sold at any price in Jibuti. On the other hand, France has made a great effort in ameliorating conditions in Jibuti. The port has been enlarged and is now accessible to the biggest liners. Many new buildings have been constructed, and the town has much improved. Franco-Italian relations in this region have become openly hostile. The Italians have established military outposts in a territory which, according to the French, belongs to the colony, while Italy pretends that the frontier is uncertain. The French have now copied the Italian procedure and established a line of similar outposts. As persistent rumours speak of the concentration of Italian troops near the French frontier, the French Government decided to reinforce the garrison and to send several warships to Jibuti. The railway continues to work, but the station of Addis-Ababa is surrounded by barbed wire in order to render it inaccessible to those who want to know what the Italians import. The French flag flies no longer on the building. Most of the French who had settled in Abyssinia before the war have been forced to leave the country. Even a venerable French missionary who has lived there for over forty years, and is adored by the natives, has been expelled.

Though the atmosphere is very unpleasant a Franco-Italian agreement is not impossible if Italy does not claim what France cannot concede. France might grant an increased influence in the administration of the railway without ceding it completely. Such an agreement would perhaps lead to tariff reductions. But it is out of the question to cede the whole colony. When in 1935 Laval ceded about 20,000 square kilometres in the north of the colony and the island Dumeirah to Italy, these concessions were strongly criticised by the Parliamentary committees. The cession of Jibuti would deprive France of an intermediate station of the traffic with the Far East and especially with Indochina. It is inconceivable that a French Government would ever take such a step. Only the French Parliament can renounce French territory, and it is out of the question that the French Parliament would vote for such a proposal.

R. A. FRIEDMAN.

## THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION OF SWITZERLAND.

THE events of Munich and afterwards have created a situation unique in the history of Europe. The revolutionary National Socialist Movement has won a position of political and military supremacy comparable only with that of Napoleon. Even experienced observers did not realise the revolutionary character of this powerful force. Thus the profound miscalculation could occur which took most of Hitler's declarations at their face value, for instance the racial principle, though never carried out in any respect either in letter or in spirit, and the principle of anti-Versailles, which was equally incompletely applied and only made understandable to hard-boiled politicians on the other side of the fence by hypnotic persuasion.

In this development Switzerland constitutes a threefold problem. Firstly, it is a thoroughly democratic country, one of the oldest and best-working democracies. Secondly, it is a wealthy country. Thirdly, it is the key to Italy and a wide door into France. That is quite enough to attract the attentions of such an enterprising neighbour as Hitler, particularly since there is now, from his point of view, a definite danger that Mussolini may awake to the risks of his Axis policy. Therefore, Hitler calculates, it may well happen that Mussolini will try to change sides before he has incurred the fate of Beneš. A move by Hitler against Switzerland seems almost the only effective direct means to prevent this. He does not believe in Italy's military strength. But he thinks that her nuisance value against France in the Mediterranean and as interceptor of France's and Britain's vital lines of communication justifies an energetic action on the northern frontiers of his Fascist "allies."

These three aims—smashing the democratic system in a German-speaking nation, securing the wealth of the Swiss banks, and the occupation of a wide strip of Italian frontiers, can only be achieved by swift and unforeseen actions. These actions do not need better justification than the conquests in the Slav world: Switzerland still harbours a few hundred thousand German residents, a few thousand Swiss Nazis, and a democratic people. The trick is easy and well known. The democratic people are declared Bolshevik and dominated by

Jews, the German residents will call for help against the Bolsheviks, and the Swiss Nazis—though only a few lost sheep with doubtful personal records—will set up an independent government somewhere in the mountains and will declare Switzerland as part of Greater Germany, as she was some three or four hundred years ago.

No, our Nazi friends are never lacking in "justifications," and they will probably always find fools in all parts of the world to believe their stories. That does not matter. What matters is that if Switzerland goes under it will mean the final and unchallengeable hegemony of National Socialism in Europe. This prospect is not so remote as some optimists may be inclined to believe. There already exists a sort of standard work which mentions Switzerland as part of Greater Germany. The well-known publishing house of geographical works, Mittler & Son, in Berlin, has printed a handbook on *Air-Navigation*. The author of this remarkable work is Captain Sönnichsen, and a man of no less importance than Air-Marshal Christiansen has written an introduction to it. The author demands quite reasonably that a flying officer should know his own country, and proceeds to define the geographical structure of Germany. He declares as part of Germany the Alps between Aare and Hungary, and includes the Upper Rhine, the Splügen Pass and the valleys of the Aare, Reuss and Upper Rhine. This is certainly not a mistake, since Captain Sönnichsen happens to be a leading member of the Military Flying Schools in Berlin, and an expert on these matters. No wonder that the Swiss feel threatened, even if they only dare draw the conclusion that the author and those behind him are trying to cloud the knowledge of the German people concerning their frontiers, and to diminish their respect of foreign soil.

This thorough-going method of interference by written words has been constantly followed in Nazi pronouncements. They are usually clothed in the form of essays and articles on the question of "Neutrality" as such. Indeed, there is no neutrality for totalitarian ideology, nor is there neutrality for Nazi foreign policy. The revolutionary element rules out any form of disinterested tranquillity, any personal sphere of life. It is from these revolutionary sources that we see the justifications and claims drawn denouncing the very life and soul of Switzerland: neutrality. The *Berliner Börsenzeitung*

undermines the conception of neutrality in its article of December 6th, 1938, under the typical headline "Crisis of Neutrality." The *Völkischer Beobachter* continues this preparatory propaganda attack on December 12th, 1938. The vague and hypocritical title of the *Berliner Börsenzeitung* has already been changed into a much more dangerous one: "Integral Neutrality." This is the old Nazi method: if the first comparatively careful step in an attack does not take effect immediately and decisively, they resort to the utmost ruthlessness.

The third, and now completely open, attack is launched in the January issue of Rosenberg's *National-Sozialistische Monatshefte* (*National Socialist Monthly*). Here the Nazi expert on anti-Neutrality, Dr. E. H. Bockhoff, explains Hitler's conception in full. Under the title, "Neutrality and Democracy in the Twentieth Century," this most eloquent writer brings into line Neutrality and Democracy. His statements amount to the declaration that neutrality is a democratic conception, based on free speech, free assembly, and so on. Democracy, however, is a form of life which is not tolerable to Nazism. On the contrary, not only democracy but all its fruits and consequences are to be regarded as hostile. Indeed, neutrality is almost an absurdity. It can, however, be regarded as something which can be tolerated by Nazism, if and when the neutral State refrains from all comment on happenings, institutions and persons of the totalitarian régime. The neutrality of Switzerland is especially mentioned and is described as of a singular and special character. It was established as early as 1815, and was solemnly proclaimed by the signatories of the neutrality treaty: Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia and Russia. Switzerland accepted its new status as a neutral State, and kept it faithfully even through such turbulent times as the World War.

Switzerland has only once limited its status as a neutral State: when it joined the League of Nations. And when the League collapsed it denounced the obligations under Article 16, and sent notes to the various Powers declaring that it was now again a completely and permanently neutral State. This note was also directed to Berlin, and was answered on June 21st, 1938, in rather ambiguous terms, recognising the will of the Swiss Government and drawing special attention to

the fact that Switzerland's Government (Der Bundesrat) would have to observe very strictly its obligations as a neutral Power.

This was at the time when Hitler, as he has told us, was preparing the first steps towards the rape of Czecho-Slovakia (not the liberation of the Sudeten Germans, be it well understood). He still had to be careful not to stir up too much suspicion regarding his real intentions. But the article in his "fashionable" monthly adds the necessary comment. It now explains in full what exactly has to be understood by these "obligations" of the Bundesrat. The commentator starts the famous lament of pessimistic Nazi *Weltanschauung*: everybody is hostile until Hitler's methods teach him the right way to be friendly, gentle and kind. It seems impossible, declares the author, that all these Swiss papers and speakers who denounced the actions of the Nazis during the September crisis can become neutral in case of war. This hate campaign in "peace" time has shown how the newspapers and the people of Switzerland will think in case of war. This makes it impossible for Nazism to regard Switzerland as a neutral country.

Here follows a lecture on genuine neutrality. If a country wants to be regarded as neutral the Nazis demand that the government should forbid any remarks critical to Nazism, for it is fully responsible for every word of every citizen. This would, of course, make a democratic form of life illusory. If, indeed, a government, and through the government the whole of a nation, were forced to take the responsibility for every spoken or written word, the only possible course would be to decide that there should be no opinions expressed, either spoken or written. In the end it would lead to complete domination such as the new form of "liberation" now applied to Czecho-Slovakia. The German and Italian Ministers at Bern recently made it clear that the Axis regarded the attitude of public opinion in Switzerland as not sufficiently friendly, and advised the Government to do something about it, i.e. to introduce a Press censorship to the advantage of the Axis. This official comment on the conception which Hitler and his men hold in regard to Switzerland and its neutral status makes it understandable that it should look to its own resources and try to build up a defence force as strong as possible.

The most far-reaching measure taken in consequence of this situation is the reorganisation of the Reserves. The age limit is to be fixed at 60. Everybody who is not sufficiently able-bodied for military service will be enlisted in the Reserves. Those who have done their military training and retraining service are also transformed into Reserve units. The Reserves, till now an unorganised mass of some 200,000 men, are to be organised in military units under military leadership. These Reserve units have to undertake various fixed tasks. Firstly, they have to take over the duties allotted in this country to the various branches of A.R.P. Then they are enlisted for First Aid and for Auxiliary Fire Service. Thirdly, they will have to do police duties of various sorts. In addition, they will now have to perform road services, veterinary services, engineering duties, installation and building tasks; even such remote necessities as outfitting, bakery, butchery, cooking and postal services will be covered by this institution. There is practically no section of public life which will not be taken over by this emergency organisation on military lines.

The whole group of people to be enlisted in this way is divided into four main defence lines. Firstly, those who have to join the colours immediately an emergency arises. Secondly, those who are not engaged in any vital industry or profession and can be called to the colours immediately afterwards. Thirdly, those whose profession is vital to the upkeep of national defence, but who are only engaged in administrative work, and therefore, should the need arise, can be replaced by others. Finally, there are the experts, technicians and so on, whose services are indispensable. Women are also regarded as liable for national service. We have to recognise the importance of these institutions which are imposed compulsorily (just as the army service is compulsory in Switzerland) in a democratic country by a democratic government on a democratic people. These duties are more and more regarded as privileges of a free people. The example of Nazi suppression in the conquered Czech State shows that the Dictatorship, when victorious, deprives its victims of the *right* to bear arms. Once more in history the democratic movement and the national movement go hand in hand, or rather are moulded into one solid force.

The organisation of the country for the hour of danger would not be sufficient if it did not include elaborate

precautions for the maintenance and efficiency of the military apparatus. Switzerland's excellent heavy industry is working at top speed in order to provide the necessary material. The country is not able to provide its industry with all the raw materials it needs even for armaments alone. There are practically no iron ores or other minerals, nor are the coal deposits very extensive. In order to escape, at least to some extent, the necessity of coal and oil imports, Switzerland has developed its electric power stations since the World War by using its huge waterfalls and rivers. But since these electric power stations are liable to destruction from air attack, the country has always developed its rolling stock and continues to do so. The import of coal, which before the war came mainly from Germany, has since been reorganised so that now Great Britain and France, as well as Belgium and Holland, rank high in the list.

This is particularly important since, in case of a European conflagration or even only an attempt to "protect" the Swiss, as the Czechs are now being protected against themselves, the people and government of Switzerland could obtain their necessary materials from the same sources as before. It is important because it draws our attention to the fact that, whatever reason or pretext for an invasion of Swiss territory may be sought by the Neo-Napoleons, this little country cannot fight for its independence single-handed. It has to rely on substantial support from the democracies. Every Swiss citizen is a soldier, yet these few millions cannot resist a joint attack from the Axis Powers. All they can do is try to defend themselves for a few days, perhaps weeks. The position is easier on the southern frontier, where huge mountains protect the country and the few passes and tunnels can easily be blown up and blocked.

The position is much more difficult on the Nazi side. Open country has to be defended. There are a few thousand specially selected and trained men always stationed on the frontiers, special Frontier Guards. Only some 30,000 men stand behind them in peace time. To these we have to add, of course, ten times as many and more in case of mobilisation. But there is little time to lose should the need arise to defend the integrity and neutrality of the country. There are careful studies worked out by military experts considering the position in case of a sudden attack by mobilised forces. Specialised

troops, tanks and so on, might cross the Rhine late one evening and try to break through the first defence lines of the Swiss in an attack in the early morning. That means that a surprise attack may well succeed in depriving the defenders of their natural frontier, the Rhine between Lake Constance and Basle. In such a case it is thought that it would be necessary to keep out the invaders, or rather to stop them near the frontiers, for at least six or seven days until general mobilisation could be effected. The small streets, the many bridges across rivers, wide and narrow, constitute obstacles in the way of a mechanised force. The Swiss themselves have abstained from obtaining quantities of tanks and armoured cars, since they are only concerned with tactical and strategic defence, and want to make use of their hilly country, as well as to blow up all bridges, streets and roads leading into the interior should the need arise. They have, therefore, some advantage against the mechanised army of an invader, which would be bound to stick to roads and to use bridges.

It would be an impossible situation, however, if the sort of persuasion which has now become almost familiar to the heads of smaller countries should be applied. The Führer may well think it possible to invite some more heads of States to his presence, and threaten to bomb cities mercilessly unless a protectorate or some other form of suicide is adopted. In that case the nations of Switzerland, the old and holy democratic people of that brave little country high up in the mountains, will know how to act. Let us hope it will never come to that. But if it should come let us hope that not only will enemies be enemies but friends be friends.

IGNIS.

## ANGLO-POLISH CULTURAL RELATIONS.

IN the present critical situation in international affairs the saying of Napoleon that Poland occupies a key position among the countries of the continent is being remembered anew by Europe. The truth of it was apt to be forgotten during the nineteenth century, in particular by England in her position of "splendid isolation." It is only now, when the cause of endangered peace and freedom creates new bonds of interest and sympathy between those two nations, that memories of manifold connections in the past begin to revive on a larger scale. The significance of those connections, whether intellectual, religious, commercial or political, is being brought to light by the labours of such contemporary Polish scholars as Professor Stanislaw Kot and Dr. Wacław Borowy, and will now be more widely realised.

Situated at opposite ends of that organic whole into which Europe was welded by the unifying forces of Latin Christianity during the Middle Ages, England and Poland developed for a long time on somewhat similar lines. Both possessed parliamentary systems at a time when representative institutions were scarcely known to the other peoples of the continent. Again, the commercial interests of England in the Baltic region created definite links between the two countries in the later Middle Ages, and those interests continued to be cultivated through numerous British business men settled in Poland—especially Scots—in the early modern era. At the same time Poland's ancient University of Cracow, founded in 1364, which even in its medieval period had been in constant contact with English philosophical thought at Oxford, now entered into still closer relations with English learning under the common inspiration of Renaissance humanism. It is in the midst of a Cracow circle of admirers of Erasmus that we meet an Englishman, Leonard Coxe of Salisbury, who lectured in the University in 1519, and again after 1525, and published at Cracow several of his philological works. Coxe was followed by a number of other British scholars during the century of humanism.

Besides commercial pursuits and humanist learning, there was the great religious movement of the Reformation which led to closer relations between England and Poland in the early modern era. Poland in the sixteenth century, under the

rule of humanist kings of the Jagellonian dynasty, became known as a home of religious toleration; and it was accordingly fervent Roman Catholics and extreme Protestants by turn who flocked into Poland in the course of those vicissitudes through which the cause of religion in England passed between the time of Henry VIII and that of Cromwell. Under the influence of Cardinal Stanislas Hosius, who became a great protector of English and Scottish Catholic refugees, the Jesuit priest Peter Skarga, the greatest master of religious prose in the Polish language, devoted a generous amount of space in his *Lives of the Saints* to the Saints of England, Scotland, and Ireland. On the other hand, Poland herself, from among those many sons of hers who embraced Reformed religious creeds in the sixteenth century, gave to England a prominent figure in the person of Johannes Laski (a Lasco), who, during two sojourns in England about 1550, made his mark in English Church history both as a fellow-worker of Cranmer's and as the organiser of a religious community composed of all the foreign Protestants then resident in London. Decades later, when the Counter-Reformation movement had definitely re-established the supremacy of Catholicism in Poland, England in turn became the refuge of many members of the sect of "Polish Brethren," whose doctrines served as one of the principal foundations for modern British and American Unitarianism.

After the stormy seventeenth century, during which Poland's last great victories over Islam—especially Sobieski's rescue of Vienna in 1683—called forth sympathetic echoes in Britain, the old Poland entered on the period of her political decline; but at the same time on an age of great national revival in all domains of civilising effort. Under the influence of Western European thought in the Era of Enlightenment, many eminent Poles followed in the footsteps of Voltaire and went to England for lessons in national culture. The last King of Poland, Stanislas Augustus, visited England in his young days and became Poland's earliest translator of Shakespeare; the educational organisers John and Andrew Śniadecki, and the great social, political, and economic reformer Stanislas Staszic, owed much to their first-hand acquaintance with English and Scottish life and learning.

The nineteenth century was necessarily rather unfavourable

to closer relations with Britain. Debarred from immediate connections with the West by Prussian, Austrian and Russian domination, the Poles, when they tried to break through these barriers, naturally reached out rather in the traditional direction of France for sympathy. England, however, after the disaster of the Polish rising of 1831, also offered hospitable refuge to Polish soldiers and political exiles. The generous relief activities of "The Literary Association of the Friends of Poland," founded by the poet Thomas Campbell and others, as well as the noble political efforts made on behalf of the Polish cause by men like David Urquhart and Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, are gratefully remembered by the Polish nation. On the other hand, one eminent Polish emigrant at least in early Victorian England became entirely identified with English life and earned fame in his new country. This is Sir Paul Edmund Strzelecki, honoured in the history of the British Empire as a pioneer in the exploration of Australia, and commemorated as a Pole by the name of "Mount Kościuszko" which he gave to the highest mountain in the Australian Alps.

Apart from such new links created by emigration, English influences on Poland's national culture were steadily widening and deepening even in the period of Poland's captivity, in spite of all the obstacles interposed by political conditions. In the early part of the century, the leaders of the Romantic revival in Polish poetry—Mickiewicz, Slowacki, and Krasiński—all began their career under the star of Byron, which then was shining so powerfully over all the literatures of Continental Europe; and one of the three at least—Slowacki—was inspired by Shakespeare for some of his greatest poetic dramas. Sir Walter Scott became the model for the lifelong activities of Poland's most prolific historical romancer, J. I. Kraszewski, and, after him, for the greater work of Poland's first Nobel Prize laureate, H. Sienkiewicz. In the second half of the nineteenth century a gifted Polish journalist who spent many years of exile in England, St. Koźmian, found material in his observations not merely for a two-volume work, *England and Poland* (1862), but for the political programme of modern Polish conservatism. A political writer of even greater importance, St. Szczepanowski, having worked for a number of years as a railway engineer in England, derived from the Victorian atmosphere much of the inspiration for his classic



writings on nationalism and internationalism, on economic progress, on the religious and moral factors in national civilisation. Finally, a learned literary critic of the early twentieth century who became a Socialist theoretician, St. Brzozowski, wrote, with an insight hardly achieved by any Pole before him, on the "educational values" of English literature, and on humour as an essential feature of the English genius.

For all these manifold inspirations from the English world of ideas and of letters, Poland repaid England by one outstanding gift only, but that a truly royal one: she gave to England a great man in the person of Joseph Conrad, whose amazing genius so unaccountably prompted him, the son of generations of Polish country gentlemen, to "throw himself"—in his own words—"into an unrelated existence"; and to become, first a Master Mariner in the British Merchant Service, and then, far more astonishingly still, a master of English style, one of England's supreme writers of fiction in modern times.

With Conrad we have entered our own age. As we approach it, fervent admirers of British civilisation become more and more numerous in Poland. In the heroic era of nineteenth-century scientific discovery and technical invention, some of those who were to become latter-day Poland's leading scientists (such as Smoluchowski and Natanson) received their schooling from great British teachers. In the Poland of our own day, literature, learning, and art, are equally potent factors in the progress towards closer relations. English books now head the list of foreign works translated into Polish; and they range from the novels of Galsworthy and Wells to those of Aldous Huxley and Virginia Woolf; from the science and philosophy of Bertrand Russell and Sir James Jeans to the constitutional theory of Sir Maurice Amos and the study of national character by Professor Ernest Barker. Polish theatres have never, since the later eighteenth century, ceased to play Shakespeare, and the great Helen Modrzejewska (Modjeska), who died in 1910, was a star in Shakespearian parts both on the Polish and the British and American stage. At the present time, side by side with Shakespeare, modern British dramatists make a frequent appearance on Polish stages, *facile princeps* among them being, of course, Bernard Shaw, some of whose latest plays

were even produced in Warsaw earlier than in London. As Paderewski did perhaps more than any other man to make audiences in the English-speaking countries familiar with the great Polish music of Chopin, so, in recent years, the beneficial activities of the "British Council" have been making Poland more and more familiar with the best in English music and English song, both old and new; and more recently also with English painting and engraving, through an excellent exhibition held in Warsaw early in the present year. To the British Council also Poland is indebted for greatly increased facilities offered to Polish students for study in British universities. Students from Poland had, indeed, been flocking to English institutions in growing numbers since the early days of our century; and two of them at least, the late Mlle M. A. Czaplicka and Dr. B. Malinowski (now Professor in the London School of Economics) achieved a high reputation by their English research work in the field of social anthropology. At present, increasing numbers of eager students of English literature and of future teachers of the language are being trained by the holders of the four Chairs of the subject in Poland's universities. One of the occupants of these Chairs—the present writer—has thought it his duty to devote part of his time in the post-war years to the writing of books on Poland for English readers; but his labours in that field are likely soon to be superseded by the rapidly growing number of studies of Poland and her problems by British writers. The work of such pioneers of the study of Polish history and literature in England as Miss Monica M. Gardner and Professor A. Bruce Boswell has now found a worthy sequel in the writings of the present Director-elect of the School of Slavonic Studies in the University of London, Professor W. J. Rose, a Canadian by birth. A forthcoming co-operative *Cambridge History of Poland* in two volumes—the joint work of British and Polish scholars—will, it is hoped, definitely "put Poland on the map of Europe" for the English, not only in the geographical sense, but in the way of historical acquaintance with the thousand-year-old existence of a nation now once more in the foreground of international interest.

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## THE CLASSICS AND POLITICS.\*

THE subject of this address is "The Classics and Politics," a very wide theme. I shall plunge at once *in medias res*. In much of what I shall say I shall have Greek literature chiefly in mind.

Among the supreme qualities of the Greeks was brilliance of expression. They invented all the styles and brought them to perfection. I am aware that a great many English people distrust style: they would say that they prefer sound matter and the truth. But what does this style of the Greeks mean? For it is not mannerism. It really means simplicity, clarity, logical order, brevity, exactitude, sincerity—in sum, a well-bodied beauty. Everything is in its place, and nothing superfluous is there at all. Much is there by implication. In this beauty there is a variegated turn of music, a sheer grace of diction, easier to feel than to describe, a delicate flexibility, and a sort of tenderness towards that which has to be expressed. It is as if the writer first loved what he had to say, caressed it, shaped and reshaped it with delicate touches, polished it into artless charm, and only then said it. He eyed his matter with searching insight and vivid imagination, with all the instincts of the finest intelligence, and then, with a wonderful language at his command, he said it. After all that happy travail, that intense effort of searching, proving, shaping, he said it or wrote it for other Greeks, like himself, who could appreciate it. That and nothing less was his style. It was no personal mannerism, or any screen to hide emptiness or insincerity. It was justice done to the subject-matter in the hearing of the most exacting audience. It had almost the flavour of a revelation.

What this comes to is that understanding and expressing stand very close together. A fault that might seem to some to be on the one side only, really infects the other as well. The best writing, according to Greek standards, involves the hardest thinking. The lesson of the Classics is "*Beware of bad writing or speaking: the thought is probably as bad as the expression, or worse.*"

There must be a lesson or suggestions here, I feel sure, for politics. In no sphere are the hardest thinking and the finest expression more needed. How are politicians and political

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writers to be given or to give themselves this training? It used to be done in the days when the Classics were the only literary education of the educated classes. A politician had to be able to quote Horace and scan Homer. Nowadays what do they read? Each other's speeches, and works on political economy, and they quote from bluebooks. Could anything be less like Greek? They may answer that the Greeks after all had a wonderful language, which in itself was their collective security for all the merits of style, while they have only English. But the Greek language was no accident. It was made by the Greeks. It was made by their double genius for seeing and saying. After all there are several sorts of English. If a classical education cannot now be expected in politicians, the strictest standards and the severest discipline in our native language might be made to improve our politics. Democracy means Government by discussion, and discussion means speechifying, and speechifying should mean eloquence, and eloquence means a fine language finely and sincerely used to express the truth of great matters and to persuade persons of knowledge and taste.

But let me return to the Classics. These historic books were made rather to be read aloud or recited, time and time again, than to be perused in solitary silence. Reading aloud is a severe test of writing. For the turgid or the insincere the ear has no mercy. The various jargons, such as that of the economists, it turns into a sort of joke. In silent reading we all make our way through paragraphs and pages and whole books, which if read aloud would provoke the instant rejoinder, "*Now, put that in plain English.*" There are the faint stirrings of Greek instinct in all of us. In some Englishmen there is much more than the instinct. As I read the Prime Minister's deliverances during the September crisis, and especially his speech in the House on the crucial Wednesday, I seemed to hear his very voice, and I found myself reading him aloud. The speech had the Greek qualities of vivid insight, of intensity of realisation, and of a mode of speech exactly responding to the matter to be expressed. He aimed to bring back peace into a Europe from which it was fast slipping away. He brought back Greek qualities into political oratory. An intense vivid objective sincere gift of thought gave him, as it gave the Greeks, the Greek style.

It is remarkable in Greek literature that so much of it is

poetry. It is still more remarkable that so much of the prose has poetic quality in key or in manner, or in the arrangement of the parts, or in the movement, or in artistic wholeness. Thucydides' history is crabbed in diction here and there and even stodgy at times, but it is really drama and great drama. Hardy's *Dynasts* has some analogies with it. The archæologists, the anthropologists, and the historians are not too well satisfied with Herodotus, the Father of History. But at his best he reads like a song. Plato gave philosophy the form and quality of art. Prose came late among the Greeks. Sheer prose hardly came at all in classical times: not what we, because we absorb streams of ugly and muddled writing, might call prose. Aristotle, a Father of Science, served an apprenticeship in dialogue-writing on Plato's model, and his philosophical writings that survive have brevity, finish, compactness, an exact adequacy and a subdued glow. In Aristotle nothing is vague, or muddled, or superfluous. An unflinching intelligence orders and harmonises all: the nicest sense of proportion rules: reticence and a scrupulous plainness inform the style: and there is the subdued glow. Even at his most scientific Aristotle has something of romantic flavour, the joy of intellectual mastery.

For the discerning reader the poetic élan and the artistic sense pervade Greek literature. There have been English writers of whom this is true, and perhaps periods, e.g. Milton's *Areopagitica* and the seventeenth century. Are we to regret the Greeks and the seventeenth century? Or shall we acquiesce in prose that has no tincture of poetry? Each must answer for himself. For my part I think that a great imagination and a refined technique of expression are a minimum equipment for handling great matters. The faculties of the author are thus best concentrated on his task, and he is surest thus of making a full contact with his hearers. The poetic bias, even if it is deep below the surface, opens minds and hearts and imaginations. It brings men together on an inspiring and instructive level: as the late William Watson wrote of the poet, "*he binds the scattered ages with a song.*" The poetic bias, in so bringing men together, winnows away much that is technical, or specialist, or partial, or somehow irrelevant. And it is a corrective for all the jargons, and the clichés, and the question-begging phrases that encrust and impede thought. There is a great deal of modern prose that

would not have been written if the authors had read and imbibed good poetry.

The culture of Greece was manifested in its literature and sustained by it, and the literature was sustained and pervaded by the poetic bias. That is an argument from authority against our present-day tendencies and preferences. I venture on another argument from authority. Two years ago the Empire University Congress was held in Cambridge, that home of science, and, I suppose, of prose, and the Chancellor of Cambridge, Lord Baldwin, addressed it. His text surprised his hearers, but I thought he won them. It was, "*Send us more poets.*"

"*Send us more poets!*" We might answer, "*Send us more Baldwins!*" England has been well served by a long succession of outstanding men whose education was classical. But I shall not parade great names, or praise colleges or universities. It is enough to indicate the scope of classical education. Let me name the items: a superb outburst of imaginative literature portraying a most diverse life, a political record of the utmost variety and suggestiveness, and a brilliant philosophising of it. The great books display the people fully, in their gifts, in their changeful and arresting history—for they were a very political people—and in their thought. Greek literature is a unique epitome of human nature, of social forces, of political forms. It is not necessary to agree entirely with Pope that "*the proper study of mankind is man,*" except, perhaps, in the case of poets and politicians. For political work a sense of the people is essential. A thorough steeping in the humanities would seem, therefore, to be the best preparation. The best form of this preparation, I suggest, is the classical education long current in this country, and by that I mean more particularly Greek literature. It comprises imaginative and historical and philosophical works: and they have a unique unity as phases of one national life that blossomed in a brief period, and they make one fruitful study. They are not the whole preparation for politics. Technical and specialist knowledge is also necessary. And various modern books seek to evoke, too, a just sense of the people. A recent American book, *The People, Yes*, by the poet Sandburg is well worth study. It is startling at first sight to find the American democracy made the subject of an entire book of poetry. But Walt Whitman trod the same path

in poems that are still in some ways the best introduction to America. I hope that Sandburg's book is a sign of the times, and will have successors, and not only on the other side of the Atlantic. The poetic approach might rehabilitate politics.

Let me come closer to the actual study of Greek Literature. The language itself is entirely strange, and it is difficult. The writers had no thought of comparatively stupid English boys who should pore over their pages—puzzling, wondering, spelling it and re-spelling it, reading and re-reading in the long labour of mastering it. Those writers wrote for a small but cultured and indeed brilliant audience, mostly of men, and therefore wrote their best. Most modern English books are written for the mass of middle-class and upper-class women who have time on their hands. It is enough to skim most of them. The great Greek writers require repeated reading, and they repay it. They are to be dwelt on, and absorbed. It is a moral responsibility to read a Greek book. The habit of reading them imparts certain qualities of mind—patience, thoroughness, exactitude, sincerity, flexibility, tenderness, humour and alertness! Such a discipline concentrates the faculties, and also toughens the will. This hard training has made men of countless English boys: and these influences, impressed uniformly on generation after generation of the educated, gave English life and politics a certain unity. The Classics as the common culture did what any common culture would have done: it facilitated cohesion. But it did more. It was a cohesion of enlightenment and inspiration for those who by hard effort shared in an incomparable inheritance. Without being a Nazi or a Fascist one can realise the value of a common body of doctrine and a characteristic outlook for national life. What the Germans seek to do, along their lines, by unsparing propaganda, was done in England last century by the curiously indirect and trustful method of making the governing classes learn Greek, or at least learn from the Greeks. On the continent the influence of the Classics on politics has been chiefly through Roman law, a very different thing.

I have been praising the Greeks for their gifts and their achievements. But it is not only their successes that have lessons for us. The glory of Greece was brief. Her early decline was due to outside factors, the rise of Macedon, and the rise of Rome, but also to her own poverty and disunion.

There is an analogy between Modern Europe and Ancient Greece, the cradle of much of modern civilisation. Ancient Greece was a variegated and crowded area of active gifted and creative populations. Having a vast sea-coast and many mountain ranges it nowhere lacked natural frontiers. Nature had carried the demarcation of areas to an extreme: and in these areas there developed autonomous States, and distinctive societies, and divergent dialects. The love of local autonomy pervaded the history of Greece, and the life of the autonomous groups was inspiring and satisfying to a degree, for some at least of the social classes. The pattern of peacetime life in Greece was a rich spectacle, richer perhaps than any before or since, though maintained on slender means. But though in certain relations the Greeks could think of themselves as one people, they never learned to act in that sense. Besides the love of autonomy other things pervaded their history—the passion for intrigue, the partisan temper, and the perverse lust for the conquest of neighbours. The wars of Greeks against Greeks weakened and undid them all: their divisions prepared the way for conquest first by Macedon and afterwards by Rome, and their freedom and power and civilisation were eclipsed together. They were too ready to lay hands on each other, and they fell.

The parallel in modern Europe hardly needs enforcing. Diversity is the most obtrusive characteristic of Europe. The seas, the rivers, and the mountains give it many frontiers, though not enough for the many groups that inhabit it. It comprises many climates, many races, tongues and religions, many phases of economic activity, many forms and scales of political organisation, and many standards of culture. It is the continent of all the talents and of all the temptations. If it had the keys of peace, it would long since have been a Paradise.

Diversity enlarges and enriches the potentialities of corporate life. And the nemesis of diversity, too often, is dislike and strife. The history of Europe teems with intolerance and quarrels and fights. It is ancient Greece over again. It was customary in the past to attribute wars to the Devil, but now to economic causes. But these range widely, as anyone may verify, from naked need to overweening greed. Need may be a pure motive; greed is usually a complication. Pure need is a rarer ingredient, perhaps, than pride, envy, the love of

power, or the taste for violence. Bullying and boycotting, the vices of boyhood, loom large in the history of Europe, and revenges recur and recur. Primitive brutishness can still make the different groups and types an offence and a provocation to each other.

Europe is the scene of an unique civilisation, the strongest, the most variegated, and in some ways the most creative of the modern age, or of any. Its populations are peculiarly well endowed and provided for building up the good life. But antagonism is in their blood, and they are equipped with all the means of maiming and destroying each other. The tradition of fighting still blesses in advance the wars that are to come.

It is not necessary to condemn all wars, or accurate to deny to warfare upon occasion some good results, direct or indirect. Out of the greatest evils human nature can yet bring some good. War can be a means. But how seldom is it the best means! It is the rough-and-ready means of mankind and the brutes, though more of mankind. Whatever may be thought of the fighting in the past of Europe, the rough-and-ready means seems no longer to be safe or tolerable. The pattern of European life needs gentler handling. The patchwork of the peoples shows now little overlapping, little mixture of shade, little running of the colour at the border lines. Homogeneity rules the groups in general: the discordancies are on too small a scale to need or justify the rough-and-ready means, and the use of it would ruin the entire texture. Consider the patchwork of nations: organised, ambitious, over-conscious and nerve-ridden, they stand to their rights, armed or arming, closing their frontiers or their minds. Europe is too crowded, too proud, too suspicious, too much at the mercy of partisan entanglements to permit the hope of localising war. The choice is between drifting on a sudden into general war, or finding a technique for peace in the true spirit of peace.

Ancient Greece on the small scale and Modern Europe on the large exemplify the crucial need in human affairs. In Europe, where the texture of life has come to be what we can see it only too clearly to be, the sentiments of membership must reconcile and guide, and no narrow membership either but a fellowship as wide in principle as humanity.

JOHN MURRAY.

## A GERMAN MINORITY IN ROUMANIA.

TRANSYLVANIA, the green rolling country of fields, vineyards, meadows with large forests in the middle and on the steep slopes of the curve of the Carpathian mountains, has a population of about 2·7 millions, of which about 240,000 are Germans, 830,000 Hungarians, 62,000 Jews as against more than one million and a half Roumanians. The German settlements are dispersed over the country, mainly in three large agglomerations.

Before the middle of the twelfth century Flemish and German peasants were called by King Geza II of Hungary into the then "desert" country to cultivate and defend it, *ad retinendam coronam*, as the oldest coat-of-arms of the Saxons says. Other colonists followed in due course of time, especially after the long and disastrous Turkish wars. United by language, religion and defence against a common enemy as well as by commercial intercourse, they formed the German minority of Siebenbürgen. They are called the "Saxons," a name given to Germans abroad during the Middle Ages; racially they belong to the stock of Rhenish Franks whose dialect, resembling that of Luxemburg, they are still speaking. Their colourful and ancient costumes are partly adapted from the neighbouring Hungarians, but show typical German elements as well. These pioneers, a strong and hearty stock, have made good not only as peasants but as fighters, city builders, craftsmen and prosperous merchants. In their villages, laid out in the manner of the Franconian districts, stands the huge church where the population often had to take refuge and defend themselves. A number of fortified towns witness to the culture and wealth of the country, the profits of home industries, and the trade with the East that passed through Transylvania. In the Black Church of Kronstadt as in many a lesser town you may still admire a collection of beautiful old Turkish rugs brought home by the pious merchants from their voyages to the East.

It is this German civilisation mainly that made Transylvania a rich and flourishing region: a civilisation rather stern and soldierlike and which strikes the visitor as being more Eastern than Southern, reminding him more of the frontier towns of the Baltic districts than of the gayer towns of South Tyrol in the same latitude. The German minority of the "Saxon

Nation" is unique as the one minority of German extraction organised as such since ancient times. In 1124, the Hungarian King Andrew II, as overlord, granted them national and religious autonomy and made the Saxon Community owner of the land they were settling. Since the fourteenth century they chose their national leader, had their own jurisdiction, and even the Sultan recognised their freedom when making Transylvania a tributary State. After 1867 the region finally became part of the Kingdom of Hungary. In January 1919, when the Roumanian majority of Transylvania had already declared their allegiance to the Roumanian king, the German and Hungarian minorities voted the union with Roumania, accepting the decision of the war. The Peace Treaties, together with the Minority Treaty of 1919 and the Roumanian Constitution, promised equality and political rights as well as autonomy of religion and education to all minorities.

Here, as a matter of course, the difficulties only began. The contentions of both parties are often contradictory. It seems fair to believe the Germans' assertion that many expectations and promises have not been fulfilled; that the Roumanian State has not contributed its full legal share to the schools as bound by the Minority Treaty; that the examination rules and practices for schools and civil service very often tend to disqualify non-Roumanians; that—perhaps the worst complaint—the century-old self-government of the Saxon municipalities and of the whole district has been destroyed so as to exclude most German aldermen and mayors; that the Roumanian agrarian reform undermined the Commonwealth of the Saxon nation, the *Universitas Saxonum*, which of old contributed the greatest share to all cultural institutions secular and religious. There is no end to the lesser grievances of a racial minority about the strong nationalistic feelings of a young and overgrown State such as Roumania, grievances more or less inherent in the system of government of any country which comprises minorities, and especially if their average level of civilisation is superior to that of the people constituting the majority. On the whole, however, one is led to the conclusion that the German minority in Transylvania (and the same could be said with regard to the four other, and partly rather "primitive," German groups within the Roumanian State, those in the Banat, Bucovina, Bessarabia and

the Dobrogea) has been treated in a relatively fair way and has certainly been better off than some minorities of the German race in other countries.

The Saxon minority has always been a corporate body. This tradition and political experience gave them a rather strong card in their dealings with the Roumanian State. Besides, one cannot understand the minority's organisation without taking into consideration the rôle of their Church. When King Andrew's charter gave them autonomy, they were granted the right of electing their clergy and collecting the tithe. After the Reformation, the Saxon-Lutheran Church became an autonomous Church and has always remained in the closest contact with all political and home affairs of the Saxon Community. The schools, early foundations in all villages and towns, were so much the work of the Church that up to a very recent time all clergy had first to serve as teachers. Even to-day the parson is the moral and often the administrative and economic adviser of his village. He was also the administrator of the income from the sometimes considerable landed property belonging to the Church. Since the Magyars dissolved the *Universitas Saxonum* in 1876, distributing the property of the "Saxon nation" to the separate counties, leaving only 60 per cent. of the income to the Saxons, and giving 20 per cent. each to the Hungarians and the Roumanians of the county, the income from Church property meant still more for the upkeep of the educational and religious institutions. There has never been a separation of State and Church for the Saxon minority. Secular and religious affairs, sufferings and successes alike, have always been closely connected.

This is the double strength of the Saxons. The minority joined the rather poorly organised Roumanian State with a century-old organisation in the political and the cultural sphere. Their schools, belonging to the Landeskirche, were in a certain degree safeguarded. If the Roumanian agrarian reform destroyed a great deal of the old income of the "Nation," there still remained a fund for the upkeep of schools and other institutions, such as Training Colleges for teachers. It is also certain that the Saxons suffered very badly from the same hardships as to language and national freedom under the Magyar crown after 1867. This seems more or less forgotten now. The explanation is twofold: social and economic.

Till 1919 the Saxons formed the leading group of their country both socially and culturally. They are a population partly peasant, partly urban. It was the pride of the peasant to have his younger son go to town to learn a craft. An antagonism between town and village is not known in Transylvania, where the towns are the market centres and where the villages are fortresses. There is no Saxon aristocratic land-owning class, as the Germans have always been the free owners of their land. If there were for some time before the war strong tendencies to magyarise the German-speaking part of the population, the "converting" nationality was always one of equal social rank, while the Roumanians—poor shepherds, illiterate to a great extent—played the part of "poor white trash" and enjoyed the lowest possible esteem. Now the "underdog" has become the master. To be fair, the resentment of these Germans brought under Roumanian rule is far from the haughty superiority shown by the expropriated barons of the Baltic provinces, and their fate is less deserved through century-old misuse, because the Saxon never had "enslaved" his Roumanian neighbour. The Saxons had simply kept the Roumanians segregated, excluding them either as "foreigners" from their own towns, or letting them settle at the outskirts as shepherds. The Saxon Church did not even try to convert the Orthodox Valachian, very probably from a just feeling that by doing so they would undermine their own national and religious unity. The superiority to the "Valachian" felt by the Germans (and the Hungarians) was mostly cultural and moral. The Transylvanian Germans, especially in their flourishing towns, kept pace with modern cultural progress, while at the same time sticking faithfully to the old dialect, the old garments and habits. This stubborn, though politically wise conservatism, has naturally been far stronger in the rural districts, where you still can find wooden ploughs and a rotation of fields as in the times of King Geza.

Together with an old and firm tradition, with the wealth brought into the country through commerce and transit, the German Community had developed a sound administration. Being used to self-government, to the election of their executive and judiciary and to the control of their own affairs by a national democracy, they must feel the transition to Roumanian rule rather as a social downfall; a downfall not only because the less cultured race—whatever that may mean—is

now the master of the State. More important and bitterly felt is the undeniable fact that Roumanian administration and civil services are among the most corrupt on this side of the globe. Add to this the fact that real, liberal minority-politics, as conceived by the advocates of the idea of national self-determination underlying the Covenant, is possible only under a decidedly democratic system. For a short time, when a Transylvanian party under Maniu had come into power, the hopes of the minority ran high. One of them was made head of the new Office for Minority Questions; but this was closed down in 1932, and there does not seem to be much hope for another period.

The merging of Transylvania in the Roumanian State did not as such deeply affect the economic situation. In agriculture the great and fertile plains beyond the Carpathian mountains brought competition with Transylvanian products. But as there ought to have come at any rate a reorganisation and modernisation of the old-fashioned methods of the Saxon peasantry, the difficulties felt by them in recent years cannot mostly be attributed to the change of sovereignty. In industry the change may even be considered useful. Old Roumania had practically no industry of its own, except the petrol production of the Prahova Valley, while various kinds of industries were to be found in Transylvania. The development of industrial establishments all over the realm after the war may have been a disappointment to the new subjects. But the Roumanian still lacks experience, steadiness and efficiency as an industrial employer and worker, and thus the Transylvanians have a great advantage and are indispensable. Transylvania's position as a country of trade and transit suffered badly: but the days of slow overland trade with the Near East, when the Kronstadt merchants brought home their rich brocades and damascene work, were past.

The worst effect of absorption into Roumania was in Saxon finance. The banks, savings banks and rural mortgage institutes, had a very good reputation on the bourses of Budapest and Vienna. With a small capital these banks enjoyed a big and flourishing market, mainly through their reputation for honesty and fairness. In 1912, forty-two Saxon banks had not more than 10·5 million Krs. capital, but 350 million in foreign deposits. It was their rule that only 10 per cent. of the profits, after deducting for reserves, went to the shareholders,



while the rest was to be used for cultural and educational institutions of the community. When the connections with the greater money markets of the Hapsburg Empire had been broken off and the Roumanian currency depreciated, this ruling to keep the profits low had to be abandoned while the capital of the banks had to be enlarged. New shareholders and new savings bank accounts could only be found when the rule as to the distribution of the dividend was abolished. Thus, while formerly only 10 per cent. of the profits were given to shareholders, now about 70 per cent. goes to them, constituting a new and indirect burden on the already impoverished minority schools. All this does not make feelings towards the new State any more friendly, though it is no fault of the latter.

The insecurity of internal politics in Roumania reflects upon the economic situation of the minorities. Already before the last depression there were enough complaints about corrupt practices of an administration that still works under the rule of "backsheesh," as in the times of the Sultan. Rules were issued that the employment of foreigners or of persons not speaking the native language well was allowed only to a small extent, transferring the fascist idea of a *numerus clausus valachicus* into the economic field. As the Roumanian language has but the one word *străin* for a foreign subject and a person of non-Roumanian tongue, the way was open to all kinds of abuses and oppression which were felt very strongly by minority establishments. The minorities thus suffer relatively more from a general economic depression and from political and social unrest than the rest of the population, which had a lower standard of life. The coming of National-Socialism changed the whole outlook in Roumania, as it did in every country where there were German minorities whom Hitler might claim, and actually claimed from the beginning, as belonging to the new "Holy Roman Empire" of his day-dreams. The fear of Nazi Imperialism and of Germany's expansion into Eastern Europe made the Roumanians reluctant to grant unrestricted liberty to their minorities. On the other hand, grave internal struggles began to rage within the Saxon community as well as within the other German minorities in Roumania, who mainly follow the lead of the Saxons as the oldest and longest organised group of German extraction. The older generation supported by most of the

Lutheran clergy resisted the *Gleichschaltung*. They had hesitations on religious grounds. Taught by history and experience that the relatively small Saxon group had to accommodate itself to the political situation as it were and to remain loyal to the actual ruler, they objected to a chauvinistic policy which, by its very nature, could strive for nothing else but to disrupt the Roumanian State. The younger generation and the many elements that felt the brunt of the increasingly unsatisfactory economic conditions at large flocked to the new creed, and this trend was backed by the lavish expenditure of money for cultural and economic activities, for physical training and propaganda.

The seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany brought the different currents to a head. As for the future of Roumania, the main consequence of these revolutionary changes was that a chauvinistic German minority group, definitely hostile to the State and organised on strict Nazi lines, has been set up. Resistance from within the German minority ceased to exist, and that part of the Germans who so far had resisted the Berlin command now joined a common and most elaborate organisation under Nazi leadership which covers all activities of everyday life. The extensive rights which Roumania had granted to her minorities by the Statute of Nationalities of August 1938 proved of no avail in circumstances which had so fundamentally changed politically. When King Carol set up the one-party system in his country, he had to grant the German minority, and a little later a newly organised Hungarian one, the right to join corporately his "Front of National Renaissance." In every town and in every village the German organisations, even those of economic or professional character, remain independent groups handling their affairs autonomously, though still within the framework of the general laws. A State within the State has been created and its existence might still prove to be no less dangerous to Roumania than that of a similarly organised group in Czechoslovakia has been for that unfortunate country.

G. O. GARDENER.

## THE NEW NARCOTIC PERIL.

THE tide has turned. Formerly Europe supplied the world with opiates. She flooded the East with morphine and heroin. Within the last few years the flood has diminished to a trickle; there is now a flood in the opposite direction. And it is hard to say whether Japan's chief menace to the safety and happiness of the world is military or narcotic. One of the world's greatest crusaders against drugs is Brigadier-General T. W. Russell, Commandant of the Cairo Police, Director of Egypt's Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, and a leader in the League of Nations Opium Advisory Committee. His services to the Egyptian Government have won him the title of Pasha. Russell Pasha is in the anomalous position of a man who has just won a great battle, yet is worried about it. He is not sure that it will stay won. Anxiety was evident in his speech and manner as he talked with me in his office at police headquarters in Cairo. He traced the unique history of the fight against narcotics in Egypt. Until two decades ago the Egyptians were not addicts. They received a little hashish from Greece, but opium and its derivatives were not used except in city slums. The peasantry of Egypt did not know the vice.

When the Great War ended certain European chemists, who had been busy with the manufacture of the deadly chemicals of war, were suddenly unemployed. A number of them turned their attention to the manufacture of white drugs. Legislation was imperfect in Europe at that time. Certain drugs were forbidden by name—the clever chemists simply changed the names. A supply often creates a demand. Drugs in plenty and at a low price attracted the attention of Egyptian importers. The cheap "medicine," guaranteed to cure all ills, found a ready sale among the fellahin of Egypt. Addiction spread rapidly. In 1929 Egypt's addicts numbered half a million. It was then that Russell Pasha began his campaign. He was an Egyptian official; yet he insisted upon taking a world view of the situation. His purpose was twofold. First he must trace the drugs to their sources, and stop those sources through legislation in Europe. Second he must push the price of opiates so high that peasants could not buy them. At that time a kilogram of heroin might be had in Egypt for £60. To-day it costs £600. Even this does

not represent the increase in price, since the heroin of to-day is 99 per cent. adulterated by the middleman who uses boracic, quinine powder, etc., to increase the bulk. The result is that the consumer must pay one or two shillings for a pinch of stuff that contains 1 per cent. of dope. Thus it is very difficult for the peasant to buy enough to do him any harm.

In seven years 27,000 traffickers and addicts in Egypt were sentenced to imprisonment under the narcotics law. The situation rapidly improved. In 1930 traffickers in prison numbered 5,500; in 1937 it was necessary to imprison 2,292. In 1929 imprisoned addicts numbered 5,000; eight years later, 372. As importation became more difficult, efforts were made to cultivate poppy within Egypt. The poppy fields were artfully concealed. They were not to be seen from roads or railroads, nor from the decks of Nile steamers. A small boat exploring the shores and many islands of the great river might find a few; I saw some of them during a two-months voyage down the Nile by felucca. Such a method would be too laborious to adopt as standard practice. Extend the shoreline, including island shoreline, of the Nile, and it would reach round the world. Many of the islands are five to ten miles in diameter. As you skirt them, you see nothing but onions and wheat. But if you walk across them you discover that within these innocent crops are concealed fields of white-flowering poppy.

The police cannot locate these fields by inquiring among the villagers. No one will tell. Russell Pasha ingeniously solved the problem. His men located a few fields; then took off by aeroplane and guided the pilot to these fields. At a height of 400 to 600 feet the masses of white and mauve flowers were easily seen. Proceeding on the basis of this experience, the plane flew on, identifying many hitherto unsuspected fields cleverly concealed within other crops and not visible from the roads or river. Other planes of the Egyptian Army Air Force were enlisted in this work. A systematic search was conducted, hundreds of fields were located, photographed, and marked in on the Survey map. Then police forces were dispatched by lorry to the points indicated, the crops were pulled up and necessary *procès-verbaux* made. Aeroplanes move fast. Nevertheless it will take time, even by this efficient method, to stamp out poppy cultivation in Egypt.

The game is too profitable to abandon easily. Whereas the profit on an acre of poppy a dozen years ago was about £40, the profit to-day on one acre, thanks to the high price of contraband opium, is £550. But on the whole home-growing is a problem under the hand, not so hard to control as smuggling from abroad.

The way of the foreign transgressor was made easy by the Capitulations. Egyptian authorities could not search the ship of a foreign country except in the presence of the Consul. If they found an offender they could not deal with him according to Egyptian law under which he would have been liable to five years' imprisonment and a fine of £1,000. The foreigner, protected by the Capitulations, was considered to have committed a mere "contravention" and was bound over to the Mixed Contravention Court, where he could not be sentenced to more than a week's imprisonment or a fine of £1. Thus it was an advantage of a thousand to one to be a foreigner. Foreign criminals could proceed with impunity—for what was a week or a pound? This absurdity was corrected to some extent when Egypt persuaded the nations which benefited from the Capitulatory system to apply their own narcotics laws in Egypt's consular courts. But these laws were weaker than Egypt's. And confusion and inequality arose from the circumstance that a gang of criminals of a dozen different nationalities must receive a dozen different sentences—for the laws of the various countries differed widely.

Russell Pasha, through Geneva, helped to bring about a general overhaul of narcotics laws in Europe, and after 1930 penalties were increased in nearly all European countries and brought nearer to uniformity. Finally the abolition of the Capitulations in 1937 empowered Egypt to apply her own law and penalties to all offenders, native or foreign. Hence Egypt has come to be considered the world's worst spot to be caught in with a beltful of drugs. Yet the demand remains so strong that there are adventurers who will risk anything to fill it. Why this insistent demand in a country which a few decades ago took practically no interest in opium and its children, morphine and heroin? Russell Pasha has developed the interesting theory that the increase of the intestinal parasitic diseases bilharzia and ankylostoma, occasioned by the perennial moisture of Egyptian soil accomplished by scientific irrigation, has so weakened the peasantry that they

turn to opium, believing it to be a "medicine" that will restore their lost energies. When drainage projects are finished, and parasitic diseases defeated, there should be a sharp reduction in drug addiction.

But that is for the future. At present the demand remains intense. And with this sucking vacuum within has come a new pressure from without. A pressure from the Far East. Egypt's danger from the Far East may be taken only as typical of the similar danger of Europe and America. As a matter of fact, the chief market of oriental heroin is America. Once Europe was the source of supply. Through the League and by the labour of such men as Russell Pasha, that was stopped. Then the foreign concessions of China began sending opium. That was stopped. Then Bulgarian factories supplied it. That was stopped. Then Japan-controlled China began to ship it in a volume never equalled in the history of the drug traffic. Can that be stopped? Not so easily perhaps, since Japan prides herself upon her independence from all international influence or control.

Japan proper keeps her skirts clean. Laws are strictly enforced within the home islands. But in Japan improper (Manchukuo and North China), Japan is conveniently able to profit by any transgressions and at the same time disown them as no affair of hers. "The world source of illicit white drugs to-day," says Russell Pasha, "is China north of the Wall and for some distance south of it. These areas are either under direct or indirect Japanese control." The phrase, "some distance south of it," refers of course to Hopei Province. One day I visited a temple fair in a remote village of this province in the company of an English missionary. The villagers followed us about for half an hour as if expecting something of us. Finally one of them said:

"So you're not selling medicine?"

"Why should he think we are selling medicine?" I asked.

"Because they do not see foreigners here except Japanese, so they suppose that we are Japanese. And 'medicine' means opium."

Japanese (including Korean) itinerating "doctors" scour Hopei selling the "medicine" that will banish any pain. Close by is their base of supplies, the heroin factories of Tientsin and Peiping. Mr. Stuart J. Fuller, American representative of the League of Nations Opium Advisory Committee,

has justly referred to Hopei as "the seat of the world's most extensive manufacture of illicit heroin." When Japanese troops advanced into Chahar after their conquest of Manchuria they immediately forced the use of larger areas for poppy cultivation and established morphine factories in Kalgan and Changpeh. One of these factories alone produces fifteen times the world's legitimate supply of heroin.

As for Manchuria itself even some conscientious Japanese have become greatly disturbed by the fact that the Government reaps large profits from the narcosis of the native population. The courageous Japanese editor of the *Sheng Ching Shih Pao*, Chinese language paper in Mukden, declares: "It is, after all, a shame for any civilised country to permit the open sale of narcotics." Not only is the sale open but it is backed by the Government—and the Japanese editor explains the Government system and how it has worked:

After the establishment of Manchukuo the Government adopted the licensed opium house system to prohibit opium smoking gradually, as it was feared that opium addicts of long standing could not stop smoking immediately. Simultaneously, opium addict sanatoria were established in various places for curing the habit and restoring normal health. . . . Contrary to expectations, after several years of enforcement of the opium retail system, none of the opium addicts have stopped smoking, and, in addition, a large number of young people have become opium smokers.

And he considers that this is only a natural result of "the freedom allowed the people to smoke opium as they please in licensed opium houses."

The area designated by the Government for opium cultivation was increased 17 per cent. from 1936 to 1937, rising from 133,333 acres to 156,061. In the one year 1937 the Government's gross revenue from opium sales increased by more than 25 per cent. Fukien, as it has slipped under Japanese influence in recent years, has begun to manufacture heroin in large quantities. Before hostilities broke out last year, Foochow was credited with 319 opium dens kept by Japanese subjects, and Amoy with 323. The traffic here and elsewhere in Japanese China has been disturbed by war, but only awaits "peace" to be extended and developed on a generous scale. China is an appropriate field for such development since Chinese resistance to opium is slight. In Szechuan, Kansu and other back provinces where Japanese have not penetrated,

Chinese farmers and manufacturers continue to turn out "black base." Nevertheless the Chinese Government's efforts in recent years to abate the drug traffic have been sincere and, on the whole, effective. Production in both Szechuan and Yunnan was, in the crop year 1936-7, only half the usual output. This trend is likely to be reversed if the Japanese invasion is successful. As Mr. Fuller has said: "Where Japanese influence advances in the Far East, the drug traffic goes with it."

The self-centred West might be complacent about all this if it were only the Far East that would suffer. But, roughly, 80 per cent. of the Orient's production of heroin and morphine is sold not in the Orient but in the United States, South America, England, Europe, Egypt and the Near East. In many countries importations of opium are steadily climbing. In Egypt a most determined effort is being made to keep it out, yet the fact that the pressure is steadily growing is reflected in Russell Pasha's statement: "Seizures of imported opium are increasing." More branches of the Narcotics Bureau are being opened, more men being trained. On the other hand, the smuggling organisations are becoming more ingenious in their methods of getting drugs past the Customs and police. Drugs are concealed under the arm-pits, round the waist, within the rectal cavity, inside shoe soles, in large hollowed nails, in the walls of trunks or pieces of furniture, in preserved dates or candies, in bicycle bells, in shipments of tea, wheat, rice. And the smuggler is of a higher grade than formerly. The business has become big enough and profitable enough to attract "the best brains."

The traffic is due for expansion. The world market calls and Manchurian heroin manufacturers are eager to respond, but to do so they must have more raw opium. Japan will see that they get it. Chosen (Korea) has been pressed into service, and a programme extending into 1939 formulated for increased poppy cultivation to supply Manchukuo's factories. In February 1937 the Director of the Chosen Monopoly Bureau announced to the press:

About 41,335 pounds of opium have been exported annually to Manchuria. At a conference of departmental opium secretaries in Tokyo it was recently decided to increase this volume pursuant to demands from Manchuria as well as to demands for increased cultivation of poppies in North and South Kankyo provinces.

And he went on happily to estimate that the increased production would bring Chosen's poppy growers more than one million yen per year. A few days later he published the three-year programme adopted for the extension of poppy growing :

Poppy cultivation : added area of 2,457 acres in Keiki, South Kankyo and Kogen provinces, to be developed ; 492 acres in 1937, 1,228 acres in 1938, and 737 acres in 1939. Opium manufacturers guilds to be established, to be provided with Government subsidies and be made responsible to the Monopoly Bureau authorities for direction of poppy growing, manufacture and delivery of crude opium, and advancement of loans to poppy growers.

Paradoxically, the Japanese Government in Chosen continues to deal severely with drug addicts or traffickers, at the same time encouraging poppy cultivation. But Japan has it clearly in mind that her heroin production is not for her own people but for Americans, Europeans and Chinese. There has been too much indiscriminate vilification of the Japanese and I do not wish to add to it. The Japanese, I dare say, are the match in morals and integrity of any other people. There have been other nations that have sinned in the name of profit—yes, even in the name of opium. And the common people of Japan who have been my neighbours—the professors, students, merchants, carpenters, fishwives, kindly priests at the Shinto shrine—are lily white in comparison with American and European dealers in oriental drugs. As for Japanese officials who tolerate the traffic, they know that their country is desperately in need of revenue. But these extenuations do not alter the fact that every effort must be brought to bear by Geneva, individual governments and by public-spirited citizens including those of Japan, to stamp out the Japanese drug menace.

WILLARD PRICE.

## COLOUR CHANGES IN FISH.

OVER a hundred years ago it was discovered that the animals which show changes in colour shades possess, in their integuments, a multitude of minute bodies in which the protoplasm apparently retains the amœboid powers of contraction and expansion, and are thus able to alter the colour of their possessors, the most common forms of the changes being a blanching and darkening of the base colour. In fish, these minute bodies, the chromatophores, lie in two layers beneath the epidermis, an outer and an inner layer ; they are formed from the connective tissue cells of the dermis. The varied markings in individual fish are resultant of the variation in the quantity and position of the two layers.

There are several distinct classes of the single cell chromatophores, the colours in which are apparently the result of the oxidation of organic substances. They are : (1) The melanophores containing dark pigment granules ; (2) the xanthophores and erythrophores, in which are yellow, orange, black, red and perhaps blue carotenoid pigments ; and, although this may not conclude the list, (3) the leucophores and iridocytes. The iridocytes are small opaque greyish plates, possessed of strong reflective power. Their colour tone alternates between bright silver and white according to light reflection. The scales of fish, formed of bony substances, contribute little to the coloration of fish, but they do, however, reflect light rays at varying angles, thus adding to the glass-like sheen which is a characteristic of many fish.

The foregoing, in barest outline, deals only with the actual facts of colour change and pigment cells. We can now approach the most interesting and controversial questions : What is responsible for the colour change or shade variation ? and How is the change effected ? In the matter of the responsibility of colour change there are two schools of thought.

- (1) That the change is effected as the result of colour vision.
- (2) That the responsibility for the colour control is with the end organs and the substances directly affecting them.

Joseph Lister, in 1858, published an interesting paper on the colour changes of the common frog. In this work he maintained that in any animal possessing the tint-changing properties, the eyes "were the only channels" through which the light rays could gain access to the nervous system and thus induce changes of colour in the skin. In 1876, Pouchet, who conducted many experiments on this subject, stated that he had proved that the fish perception of colour was controlled by the eyes. He cut the optic nerves of fish, and the fish thus treated ceased to appreciate the colour changes of their surroundings.

There can be little doubt that the peculiar structure of the fish eye, nature of lens, etc., must be of service in the refraction and dispersion of the light rays. In the case of those fish which live near the surface, or in shallow water, it may follow that the image on the retina is a coloured one, for these fish appear to possess an acute and delicate sense of colour. Exhaustive experiments in the direction of the end organs and the substances directly affecting them have not conclusively demonstrated that there is a differential reaction in the chromatophores to the action of drugs. Therefore, the most satisfactory explanation, or theory, is that the responsibility of the colour control rests with the central nervous system, in which there is a *discriminating centre*, which Mast suggests is situated in the brain—"the natural region for such an organ." The majority of scientists who have conducted original research in this very interesting subject hold the view that fish are possessed of an acute and highly responsive colour vision, and that by this means they are capable of adjusting the relationships between the erythrophores, xanthophores and melanophores, the size of the light and dark areas of the background and the amount of surface covered thereby having a definite marked effect on the skin pattern produced.

From experiments made by Frisch (1912) and more recently by Schiemenz (1924), Mercer (1937) and myself (1937-8) we know that some fish are able to distinguish colours. Frisch gave some specimens of *Phoxinus* variously coloured meats and found that red was not favoured, the yellow and grey colours being preferred. This is doubly interesting because in my own experiments, covering a wide range of British fresh-water fish, red has proved to be a much favoured colour.

My personal opinion on the responsibility of colour change, based on a long period of interesting research and observation, is twofold:

- (1) That fish are possessed of a colour vision, with the resultant power of shade adaptation. (The quality and strength of that vision differing, not only in the cited species, but also in the individual fish.)
- (2) That pigmentation is increased during periods of high nervous stress, irrespective of environment or colour vision. (The stimuli of this stress may produce an effect, or reaction, on the end organs, through the hormones, or it may be found in a complicated nerve control.)

Having discussed very briefly the fact of colour change, and the controversial nature of the "how," we can now ask "Why?"

To-day considerable doubt is expressed by the scientific mind of the theory that colour-changing qualities in fish are used for "concealment and protection." The reaction against this theory, which has been termed a romantic, sentimental method of interpreting the colour change of fish, is, like most reactions, capable of over-emphasis. Stark, who had studied the colour change in a number of river fishes such as the perch and the minnow, observed, in 1830, that when these fishes were on a light background they were wan in tone, and when they were on a dark one they were of a deeper shade. He advanced the theory that this "agreement," by which the fish merged into its own background, was an advantage to it in its escapes from enemies. This, and other instances of a similar nature, resulted in the theory of protective coloration, or a system of animal camouflage illustrated in the colour and forms of a great variety of living creatures. If one accepts this colour camouflage theory, the importance of the eyes, the vision, is manifest, for it is clearly apparent that the fish must see that which it tends to resemble before assuming the likeness.

One point that both the devotees and the detractors of this "protective-colour-change" idea frequently overlook is that the colouring of such predatory fish as the perch and pike can be an aggressive advantage, for in both fish the base colouring blends to some extent with their habitat. Where possible my

experiments of the last eighteen months have been confined to fish taken from natural waters. There is no doubt that in some species of fish both physical and psychological conditions have their effect on colour change. A healthy fish, and one bearing some evidence of individual "character," has been found to be definitely more prone to colour change, whereas a bullied fish has been anæmic as regards colour variation, showing little ability to darken in response to environment.

I have always found the flounder to be possessed of excellent vision, and this lends strength to the theory that shade change is dependent on vision, since the majority of the flat fish family, *Pleuronectidæ*, show great aptitude to changes of environment. On gravel in which there was a predominance of yellow-orange colour the shade adaptation was more rapid, the orange spots showing noticeable expansion, than when the fish was placed in a tank the bed of which was a monotone of colour. The under-surface of the flatfish is normally white, and it has been stated that it becomes coloured when rays of light are brought to bear on it. Experiments have revealed that yellow, and to a slight degree, red, were the only colours to cause a slight marked differentiation. As it is generally accepted that the marine fishes are much more prone to colour changes than fresh-water fish, I think it is interesting and significant to record that a tiny, flat fish, almost transparent, with the fragile bone structure like a network of silk around a scarlet smear of belly, which was picked out of a shore pool in Anglesey, and kept in a sea-water tank for some months, did not show the same adaptability to environment as did the flounders which had been adapted to fresh-water conditions.

It is my belief that the most nervous, individual fish are the most prone to colour change. Fish kept in tanks for a good length of time, sufficient say to become finger-tame, do not show the same degree of speed in colour change in respect of fear, or when removed to other tanks of completely different setting and colour background; but, contradictorily, they have been found to be more subject to a darkening of spots and blotches on the body when subjected to exciting influences such as the sight of food.

The pike is probably the most highly nerve-sensitive of fresh-water fish. One specimen, the most interesting of the hundreds of fish I have had in my tanks, possessed very high

powers of colour change to environment. The pike was housed in a twelve-gallon tank, and when the bulk of the water was changed about every fourteen days the fish was placed in a shallow white enamel dish. On each occasion the skin of the pike paled considerably within two or three minutes of immersion in the bowl, the green shades of the body becoming even more wan than the anæmic green of preserved olives. For some considerable time it had been known that red and blue were colours particularly attractive to perch and pike. Experiments with this pike confirmed the opinion. Pieces of bright red and blue wool were twirled rapidly through the water, and, at first, the pike took them eagerly. This was doubly interesting in view of the fact that this fish would not normally take any manner of dead food, no matter how life-like the presentation. The woolly fragments were immediately spat out in disgust. Dull shades of wool such as maroon occasioned no response, nor did yellow or bright green attract the pike. After two days it no longer soared to the strike when the red and blue wool was passed quickly through the water. But when dyed maggots, red and blue, were introduced suspended on thread, they were taken instantly even though their convulsive action was not nearly so violent as the wool, cut to the same shape and size.

Young tench in a tank surrounded by crimson boards, and a bed of the same hue, have changed to a shade almost akin to that rose colour which characterises the rainbow trout. Any colours of the red shade—crimson, purple, orange—appear to have an effect on small tench. Young fish on the whole have shown a greater faculty for colour change from the environmental point of view; but adult fish a more pronounced change of pallor arising from nervous disturbances. Gudgeon when placed in a white bowl have shown a definite shade-change, in some cases becoming almost transparent. Despite statements to the contrary, however, this great colour-change ability is not an attribute shared by all the bottom fishes. Trout have not shown a great deal of tone differentiation when subjected to the various colour tests. But although not decidedly marked, there was certainly a lightening or darkening of the base shades in accordance with the respective bright and subdued colour boards. Minnows were more responsive to bright shades of blue and green; it was interesting to note also that these fish appeared to be



more active when in the coloured walled tanks. The action of the colour tests on bream were similar in effect to those on carp, the blanching (against backgrounds of yellow and white) in particular being a slow process. The brightly coloured boards seemed to have a torpid and frightening effect on bream, and they lay close to the bed of the tank in a lethargic state. The base tones of carp are subject to most blanching against a background of bright silver and steel shades.

Some fish are heliotropic; others negatively heliotropic. There is no doubt that in many cases light plays a very important part in stimulating pigment development. Excessive light sometimes results in a widespread blanching. Rise and fall of temperature also has some effect. It has been frequently noticed that an increase in pigmentation of fish has coincided with a uniform increase in temperature. But neither light nor temperature must be carried to an excess, otherwise blanching results. This is most apparent in the case of some tropical fish, which have been known to lose a good deal of colour when a temperature of 80 degrees F. was maintained, and yet to retain the intense pigmentation when kept in water at a steady 70 degrees F. Goldfish brought indoors from an outside tank, and exposed to an increase in temperature and strong artificial light, in addition to a more rapid growth revealed a tendency to richer colour development. It is perhaps worthy of mention that brightly coloured fish, under natural conditions, appear to be immune from the parasitical fish louse, *argulus foliaceus*. Hundreds of carp were taken from an industrial canal infested by this parasite, and although practically every normally dull-coloured carp had one or more lice adhering to the body none were found on the vividly coloured (bright gold and intense red) specimens. These highly coloured carp were always found in close proximity to the higher temperature sections of the canal, near the hot water and steam outflows from mills situate on the banks, a significant confirmation of the matter discussed above.

Colour changes are not confined solely to the body of the fish. There is a frequent colour variation of fins. For instance, the colour range of the pelvic, or ventral, fins of perch in the experimental tanks was one extending from a true bright orange through red to a Tyrian purple. The colour changes which occur during the breeding seasons of fish confirm to

some extent the suggestion that the responsibility of colour control depends on the central nervous system, and in particular, on the brain. The experiments mentioned here have not been conducted during the breeding seasons when the colour change in many species is an accepted sex fact.

There is also the question of that colour variation between the young and the adult fish of the same species which does not appear to be dependent on environment. For example, the young black bass has a longitudinal dark double zig-zag marking which breaks up with maturity; again, in the young bass the base colour is frequently one of brown-green; this colour in the ageing fish shows a gradual emergence to the pale matt green of the adult.

In the length of time which fish have existed it might be suggested that there is, or should be, a complete negation of character; that there should exist a Utopian state of un-individuality. But it is easy to prove that there is a good deal of that which may pass for character and individuality in the fish world, and that it is impossible to generalise. The non-acknowledgment, or ignorance, of these factors has marred a great deal of the research into fish life. Many men who have worked on the question of colour change in fish have apparently omitted to take into consideration this factor of individuality. To illustrate the fallacy of this omission it is only necessary to point out that experiments with two species alone, perch and pike, have shown that whereas out of five fish of the same species, four may only show a slight colour change to environment, the other may possess a far greater vari-pigment power.

CLIFFORD BOWER-SHORE.

## THE BIRTHPLACE OF THE BRITISH NAVY.

A THOUSAND years ago uninvited guests entered England through its natural gateway, the south-east coast. These marauders from Europe forced the early English to protect themselves. Therefore, the English established a series of small naval settlements along the shores of East Sussex and Kent then known as "The Saxon Shore." Originally the first five maritime towns were the Cinque Ports, but successive monarchs, recognising the need for additional naval bases which could harbour mobile fleets in readiness to repel the Channel pirates, added two more towns to the number. However, these ports continued to be designated by the half-French title, Cinque Ports, which is still used in our own times. The original group of Cinque Port towns comprised Hastings, Romney, Hythe, Dover, and Sandwich. To these were afterwards added Winchelsea and Rye. For five hundred years the Cinque Ports were powerful strongholds on England's southern frontier. Thereafter their naval and military importance declined. However, many of their traditions have survived and few English towns are richer in historical interest.

The Count of the Saxon Shore of a thousand years ago is known to-day as the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. His official residence is Walmer Castle, a fine old building standing on the coast between Deal and Dover. Originally it was one of the coastal fortifications built by Henry VIII and it has been maintained in a good state of repair by the Crown. The Cinque Ports cradled the British Navy. Until the reign of Henry VII it was their duty to furnish nearly all ships and men for the king's service. In return for their aid the Ports enjoyed extensive privileges. The first fleet comprised a number of twenty-ton fishing craft fitted fore and aft with "castles" from which the crew shot arrows from their long bows. To-day the Cinque Ports still have replicas of these boats incorporated in their borough seals. The fishermen who manned those ancient craft were very similar in type to many of the men I met when recently visiting the Ports. The English Channel is a savage mistress at most seasons of the year, breeding men as boisterous and as truculent as her dominant moods.

The coast-line of the Cinque Ports varies from the dead-flat marshlands and sand dunes of Sandwich, Romney, and Winchelsea to the majestic white chalk cliffs of Dover and Hastings which form a rocky rampart that for centuries has been a terror to shipping during Channel storms. The twenty-one miles of the Straits of Dover during a storm are rough and dangerous. Little wonder that in the heyday of the Cinque Ports the seamen of the small warships were sometimes forced to fight their battles on shore or up-river! During a Channel storm with its plunging broken seas the crudely designed craft of those early days could not have kept afloat; even modern Channel ferry steamers of two thousand tons carrying trains are awash from stem to stern in a howling sou'wester.

The Cinque Ports present a fascinating study in the evolution of townships. Dover and Hastings have grown into big towns housing thousands of people. Hythe has stood still, resigned and dignified like a graceful dowager. Rye, Winchelsea, Romney and Sandwich refuse to give up their medieval atmosphere and remain ruggedly independent, mocking at modern progress. Geographically the position of the four smaller Ports has altered. They are now two miles inland, due to the silting up of their harbours and the receding of the shore-line. The larger Ports have clung tenaciously to the water-front, favoured by a kindlier action of the sea which has had little effect upon the rocky foundations supporting the towns. Because of its nearness to London the Romans made Sandwich their principal gateway into England. Before the bay silted up it boasted the finest anchorage of these Ports. I found it the most fascinating town in Kent, a bit of old England which persists in retaining its traditional personality, refusing to be elbowed off its ancient path by modern civilisation. From Sandwich to Dover is a journey across typical Kentish countryside of orchards and hop gardens, through Deal, past Walmer Castle, over high, round-bosomed downs reaching to the famous white cliffs of Dover, by the massive Dover Castle, and downhill again into England's modern Cinque Port, the active town of Dover.

Few would fall in love with Dover at first sight. The town appears drab and not too well kept, but initial impressions are misleading, for the place grows interesting during extended exploration. The harbour built in the middle of the

last century is alive with a variety of ships and seamen of every nationality. The surrounding hills of Dover afford magnificent views, especially the impressive panorama that may be seen from the towering rampart on which the Castle stands. In 55 B.C. Julius Caesar arrived off Dover and tried to land his army from a fleet of galleys. Caesar found the Britons more than a match at this point of the cliff-bound coast and made a further attempt to land at Deal, where his men were more successful in storming the low-lying beach which gave the defenders no shelter. In vivid contrast to the bow and arrow army of old England a regiment of British soldiers garrison the Dover Castle to-day, and the Pharos, an ancient watch-tower piled up among the earthworks, still serves as landfall for ships in the Channel. Dover Castle Keep, a colossal one-hundred-foot square pile built of flint rubble, is the first Norman heritage of England. The foundations of the castle are hewn from the solid chalk dome of a nine-hundred-foot high green hill. The edifice dominates the town from its hilltop and from most of the streets one can look up to view the Castle silhouetted on the skyline.

Modern Dover is a busy town quite apart from its passenger shipping. The discovery of coal a few miles outside in the Kentish hills has given an army of miners from England's distressed areas new life and new hope.

Because of its nearness to French soil the Cinque Port of Dover during the Great War pursued its traditional defensive role of a thousand years ago. Its great harbour sheltered 300 naval craft of all types and tonnage and was the key to the English Channel, closing the water-door to and from the North Sea. In the worst Channel storms the harbour is a safe anchorage, the immense concrete breakwaters giving every protection from the smashing seas. I have seen the artificial harbour as unruffled as a pond when the seas outside were lashed with the fury of a seventy-knot gale.

Westwards, a few miles' tramp or a short car ride over the chalk hills from Dover, is the little Port of Hythe. The Anglo-Saxon name for this snug township was "Hithe," meaning "haven," and its situation endows it with a mild equable climate. The narrow High Street of the modern town contains a medley of architecture reminiscent of Tudor, Jacobean and Georgian periods. Many of these buildings have been renovated several times, but their owners have

insisted on retaining their original architectural characteristics. The most imposing building in modern Hythe is St. Leonard's Church dominating the town, a modern structure somewhat out of keeping with the surrounding buildings.

From its tower-top one gets a bird's-eye view of all the Cinque Ports, and on a day of moderate visibility the shores of France loom above the Channel horizon. Architecturally the choir of the church offers a striking similarity to that found in Canterbury Cathedral. Below ground the crypt contains a gruesome collection of some thirteen hundred skulls of ancient British folk which have been dug up from the various earthworks in the vicinity. Hythe boasts the smallest public railway in the world, which took me on to the Cinque Port of Romney, now two miles from the coast and situated in a delightful multi-coloured marshland. The gauge of this miniature railway is fifteen inches only and the locomotives are about one-third the size of an ordinary engine, the latest being a model of a Canadian prairie express. These toy engines pull twenty-five coaches, "closed" or "open" to suit the climate.

The original Romney was destroyed by a great storm which altered the mouth of the river Rother. Near the site the little country town was built and called "New" Romney. The museum in the main street affords an adventure in retrospect; the past is materialised and made alive by a unique collection of relics. In a corner I found an old chest which did duty in the Cinque Port days and can be opened only by the application of three keys, each under the separate ownership of the ports of Hythe, Winchelsea, and Romney!

Across the border into Sussex is Rye, its Cinque Port glory long departed. Rye is built on a sandstone bluff and no place along these shores gives lovelier views of the ever-changing Channel seascape, or more extensive landscapes both east and west. The eastward aspect is considered one of the grandest in England, stretching across the marshes towards New Romney, its neighbouring Port; and from Watchbell Street the western view across the flats to ancient Winchelsea, nestled on a tree-clad headland and surrounded by rainbow-hued marshes, is one beloved by artists. A wise local authority has restrained the mass-production villa builder from ravaging the highways and byways of Rye with his atrocious modern artistry in brick and stone. One

of the last remaining bits of an ancient England must not be marred by energetic jerry-builders. Mermaid Street, Watch-bell Street, Rope Walk, and the maze of little cobbled lanes running up hill and down, fringed with houses each of which reflects the independence of its owner, are thoroughfares of unusual charm and beauty. As he walks along them the visitor must rub his eyes to make quite sure he has not fallen asleep to dream of having strayed into a snug port on the shores of the Mediterranean.

Modern visitors to Rye still follow Thackeray's example and search for the haunts of smugglers where the lawless shore-dwelling Englishmen of the Port so often outwitted the authorities. The descendants of the smugglers can still be seen in Rye at work now on another interesting job with the keddle-net. Dozens of fishermen carry on this unique way of catching fish along a ten-mile stretch of coast on the sands of Rye Bay. Nowhere else along the Channel coast does the keddle-net fishing exist on such an extensive scale. Netting carried on posts is taken seawards at low tide and stretched out along the still uncovered sands facing the shore. On the flood tide the fish come inshore through the openings made in the nets, looking for food in the broken shoal water. When the ebb sets in, the fish attempt to swim seawards, but find themselves securely trapped in a maze of netting. The tide recedes, disclosing the nets heavy with shining fish. Keddle-net fishing is so lucrative during the summer and autumn months that it pays the railway to run special fish trains from Rye for London's market.

At every corner of Rye's streets there is something to captivate interest. Through the six centuries' old Land Gate pilgrims passed on their way to London. Near the ancient twelfth-century Watch House known as Ypres Tower stands old St. Mary's Church, whose clock is said to be the oldest in England. If you would know why this Cinque Port was once an impregnable fortress view Rye from the tower-top of St. Mary's Church: its position was unassailable to bow and arrow armies.

On the Sussex marshlands west of Rye lies Winchelsea, the last of the smaller Cinque Ports. I found it a charming English village, unsurpassed for the enchantment of its gardens. The only modern touch about Winchelsea is the fact that its streets run at right angles to one another as in

modern American cities. This form of planning enhances the delightfully rustic cottage architecture. Old Winchelsea lies buried beneath the sand dunes two miles south of the site on which the second town of that name was built after the first had been totally destroyed by the Homeric storms which demolished Romney. The first Edward, a student of town-planning, chose the site and had a great deal to do with the laying-out of the new Port; town-planners in all parts of the world waited many centuries before following the successful royal example. With the receding of the sea since 1287 the glory of Winchelsea departed. The inhabitants, undaunted by "an act of God," took to smuggling, and the industry became a highly profitable one.

The most westerly Cinque Port is Hastings, the cradle of modern English history. A town of vivid contrasts, it has an old quarter revealing the life of those who go down to the sea in fishing smacks, and a gay, up-to-date quarter which would certainly make the Conqueror blink if he stepped ashore on a moonlight night to renew acquaintance with the battlefield. A wit has called it "The 1066 town with the 1966 outlook."

There is much of interest in the modern town, but it is the historic old Hastings of Cinque Port fame that intrigues the imagination. Romance has lingered here for many a century. The artist is entranced by the rugged, primitive atmosphere of this ancient habitation of fisherfolk with its narrow, tortuous streets and tiny homes. The fishermen of Hastings speak very broad Sussex, a dialect hard to understand. They also bear a physical resemblance to past generations; and when one considers that this place was a wide gate into England through which during many centuries poured Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans it is little wonder the inhabitants appear different from the modern visitors of New Hastings. The fishermen belong to the seas, the steep Channel seas, and are justly proud of the forebears who gave them courage and strength of will and purpose. In Cinque Port days the older Hastings boasted of a good harbour and a ship-building industry; to-day the harbour has been flattened into a level shore by ceaseless Channel storms from the south-west, and the fishermen now beach their craft on top tide, discharge their catch and refloat on the next tide. Several attempts have been made to build an artificial harbour at Hastings, but winter storms smashed up the structural

concrete piles on every occasion. William the Conqueror's castle on West Hill has lasted longer than the harbour for whose defence it was built. A picturesque ruin to-day, it stands to tell the story of the Norman invasion when a new phase of English life sunk its first deep roots.

A mile westward of old Hastings thrives the modern town with dazzling, multi-coloured lights and jazz bands, where everybody is determined to live gaily during the long spring and summer days. One old chap in the fishermen's quarter held strong views on the "goings-on" of new Hastings. "The young 'uns yonder are jus' 'eathen," he said. I did not dispute his opinion as he had admitted to me he was "well win'ard of eighty." Modern Hastings has 70,000 inhabitants and is one of the healthiest, all-year-round holiday resorts on England's Channel coast. The local council spent over three million pounds sterling to gain this distinction and recently spent another fifty thousand pounds on an airdrome for the service of travellers who cruise the sky-ways.

The transformation of this ancient Cinque Port into a residential and holiday resort has been a work occupying thirty years. It is no accident, however, that a mere fishing village has grown into a big town in so short a time. The climate, the annual hours of sunshine, the natural geographical position, and the surrounding beautiful Sussex countryside are assets not made by man, though wise men have used these natural gifts for the service of their fellows. Having won fame among England's health resorts new Hastings has not forgotten its thousand-year-old Cinque Port origin—its borough arms is still the Cinque Ports' seal.

ARTHUR LAMSLEY.

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## LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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### PILSUDSKI.\*

The publication of the first authoritative biography of Pilsudski in English comes at an opportune moment, for all eyes are fixed on the country which he helped to create. The main outlines of his romantic career are generally known, but here we are also introduced to the man. Mr. Reddaway, as befits the editor of the *Cambridge History of Poland*, has mastered all the Polish material relating to the life and work of a very great personality. The result is a fascinating narrative, quiet in tone but warmed by obvious sympathy with his theme. It is more than a personal record, for Pilsudski's achievements during and after the war made him a European figure of the first magnitude.

The book is well constructed, and the formative years receive due attention. Like most Russian Poles he learned to hate the Russian yoke and to dream of liberation. His socialism was a phase, while his nationalism was a consuming passion. Five years of exile in Siberia and eight months in a Warsaw prison hardened his resolve, and when the world war gave him the chance of striking at Russia he seized it with both hands. The legions which he raised and commanded

\* *Marshal Pilsudski*. By W. F. Reddaway. Routledge. 15s.

were too small to play much part in the struggle, but they prepared the way for his leadership when Russia was defeated and dismembered. The Washington of the new Poland emerged from his German prison at Magdeburg when Germany laid down her arms, and returned to build up an independent State. Hardly had the foundations been laid when Russian troops swept up to the suburbs of Warsaw in 1920 and were driven back in what Lord D'Abernon called the sixteenth decisive battle of the world. It was a triumph of strategy.

Pilsudski possessed neither political experience nor the patience needed for the government of men. Mr. Reddaway has an immense admiration for the hero, but he describes his relations with the Parliament as his bitterest disappointment and his greatest failure. It was very far from being all his fault, for, as our author reminds us, no national emergency could induce the Poles to lay aside their divisions. But his temper was rough, his tongue was sharp, and he identified patriotism with allegiance to himself. There will always be two opinions about his revolt against the Government in 1926, followed by his virtual dictatorship for the rest of his life. His supporters claim that he rescued the country from the anarchy of Parliamentary strife. His critics reply that he destroyed the chances of Poland developing on constitutional lines. Mr. Reddaway points out that he was never a believer in the totalitarian gospel, for he was as anxious to work with Parliament as Cromwell had been in somewhat similar circumstances. The problem was as insoluble after 1926 as before. Henceforth the country was governed by the army, with the Marshal sometimes in the centre of the stage, sometimes in the wings.

Mr. Reddaway portrays a great patriot, a considerable soldier, an unskilled statesman, and a man with a heart beneath the rough exterior. On occasion, we are told, he could be a perfect brute. His invective was sometimes indecent, and his boasting intolerable; yet he was normally a man of distinguished humanity and courtesy, and he inspired intense devotion among his soldiers. He was also an author, and one of the most valuable features of this book is the analysis of his autobiographical and military writings. The story ends on a note of hope, with the excellent President Moscicki, a devoted friend and life-long comrade of the hero, to guide the ship of State. When Pilsudski died of cancer in

1935 he had done his work, and his passing eased the situation. A brief final chapter, entitled *The Standpoint of 1939*, argues that his labours were not in vain. The Lithuanian intransigence has been overcome, Teschen has been added, "the Pilsudski solutions of the German and the Russian questions have held good. . . . The first days of 1939 suggest that the sequel will be no less happy." Our author's cheerful forecast has been nullified by the German dictator. Poland has known many sorrows, and it may be her fate to know many more. Her consolation and ours is that her soul is indestructible, and that the nation which survived a century of partition is unlikely once again to vanish from the map of Europe. If new trials come, the memory of Pilsudski will help his country to bear and overcome them.

G. P. G.

### A TRACTARIAN BISHOP.\*

The biography of Bishop Henry Luke Paget should be in the hands of every clergyman and minister of religion. The book is described by Mrs. Paget, the author, as "Portrait and Frame." This is an admirable description of the life-like picture that is presented of one who, while ceaseless in his activities, won the unbounded reverence and affection of all who knew him, not so much for what he did as for what he was.

Bishop Paget is described as the last of the Tractarian bishops, and this is perhaps true. It may be added that if any perhaps prejudiced person desires to be able to appreciate what was highest and best in the early Tractarians, he should study the description given in this volume of the home life of Sir James Paget, father of the Bishop, and take account of its lifelong fruits in the character and service both of Luke Paget and of his brother Francis, Bishop of Oxford. Reverence, devotion, self-discipline, and loyalty to our Lord could not have been more completely combined than in this great family record. Granted that Luke Paget was a Tractarian, yet he was still more profoundly Evangelical, as is clearly shown by the way in which, suspected at the first, he won the unstinted confidence and regard of his parishioners at St. Pancras, loyal and accustomed Evangelicals as they had

\* *Henry Luke Paget*. By Elma K. Paget. Longmans, 8s. 6d. net.

been under previous vicars, notably Thorold, afterwards Bishop of Winchester.

The life, while admirably and vividly written by Mrs. Paget, owes much to the inclusion of autobiographical notes by her husband, and to accounts of him by colleagues and friends. It is an exceedingly human document, illustrated by many racy stories of East End and country life, all of them revealing the real nobility of the poor, as appreciated by the loving insight of a Bishop who regarded his ministry as a commission to display in character and conduct the loving-kindness of his Lord.

Paget had a genius for friendship. He was a great human, enabled to enter wholeheartedly into the joys and sorrows, the pursuits and amusements of all with whom he came in contact. The way in which he won the confidence and friendship of the East End Jews as Bishop of Stepney, the respect he paid to them, and the services he rendered to them are not the least striking of the countless evidences of Paget's rich and gracious humanity. Yet this natural endowment of love was so uplifted and transfigured by the constraining love of Christ that the Divine became manifest in the human, alike in his public ministrations and in the personal relations which he so sedulously cultivated in Oxford, Leeds, St. Pancras, Ipswich, Stepney, and finally as Bishop of Chester. By ceaseless self-discipline and unreserved self-giving he gave an ideal illustration of the true character of a Christian pastor at every stage of his ministry from youth to revered and beautiful old age. His genius for friendship always led unfailingly to the highest and best, alike in personal character and in the fellowship of the Church. Wherever he went Paget transformed churches, parishes and neighbourhoods through the depth of self-giving and the unstinted devotion of a Christ-filled man. As his successor at Chester said of him, "He was a man shaped by the love of God, who lived by love and inspired it."

It is impossible within the limits of this notice to enter into the absorbing details in which this portrait abounds. It must suffice to say not only that the book teems with interest, but that no one can read it without being inwardly enriched and strengthened by this record, which shows what Christian ministry can become when inspired by unbounded love of Christ and love to the brotherhood of men in Him.

J. S. L.

## DEMOCRATIC UNION.\*

Mr. Clarence K. Streit has written an arresting and stimulating work on peace, progress and government which is the more significant for its American authorship. His main theme is the need of civilisation for a world federal system, and he appeals for a federation of democracies as its nucleus and, more immediately, as the only certain method of ensuring peace. As a first step he proposes a Union of fifteen "North Atlantic or founder" democracies to include the United States, the United Kingdom and each of the self-governing Dominions, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. This selection is not exclusive but intended simply at the outset to incorporate the most soundly established democracies whose inclusion would be non-controversial. Their combined financial, monetary, economic and political power if subject to unified direction is such as to assure peace "by sheer overwhelming preponderance and invulnerability," and "practically to end the monetary insecurity and economic warfare now ravaging the whole world." Mr. Streit anticipates that the attraction of the Union would be so powerful as to ferment democratic revolution in the autocratic States with their consequent adhesion. He also argues that differences of race and language do not prevent democratic union, citing examples such as Switzerland, Canada and the Union of South Africa, but on the contrary add to it weight and balance.

Mr. Streit stresses, as the basis of his argument, that the individual and not the State is the true political unit, and in consequence alliances and leagues formed to safeguard national sovereignty cannot permanently preserve peace or promote freedom and progress. A league is essentially undemocratic since the individual's inalienable rights are sacrificed to the State for its preservation while in a union they receive greater protection from the latter's united strength. Moreover, a league based on nationality cannot avoid the unanimity rule and even if united is inevitably slow and cumbrous in action compared with a union which acts by a majority through a central executive. Unable to arrest the wrongdoer before the crime, a league encourages the aggressor to swift action and thereafter the former can only condone the offence and attempt

\* *Union Now*. By Clarence K. Streit. Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d. net.



to restrict its extension. A union "isolates the germ" and can draw support from individuals in the guilty State who otherwise in a nationalist system would rally to the law-breaker in the name of national independence. In the realms of social and economic affairs Mr. Streit emphasises that no progress is possible where the touchstone of policy is national self-sufficiency and exclusiveness. As a concrete historical example of the contrast between leagues and a union he points to the early League of Friendship between the thirteen American States. Until the Union they were stricken by acute political and economic rivalry and tension, each State striving for itself. For the United States to-day there is "a peculiar urgency" for a wider and greater measure of international union. Anarchy and the triumph of dictatorship abroad will destroy the high standard of her material civilisation which is dependent upon her foreign economic relations. Faced by social and economic chaos Americans will be in real danger of losing their liberty "to some home-grown autocrat." Mr. Streit logically condemns isolationism as leading to conflict and he criticises American policy for its withdrawal from co-operation for peace after the war.

Many of the views expressed in this book upon the inherent dangers of nationalism are of course not new, but Mr. Streit's powerful reiteration is none the less to be welcomed. The especial value, however, of the work is that this expression of opinion is linked with a definite scheme by an American for a democratic union at a time when the League of Nations has completely failed and an effective peace system in the face of ruthless aggression is a stark and desperate need. No doubt it is easy to find fault with his proposals, as for example the suggested structure of his federation. While based upon the American model it endeavours to associate an elected chief executive board with defined powers and a separate Cabinet for "detailed and short-term duties" responsible to the legislature. Criticism may also be levelled upon some questions of historical interpretation; and above all many will turn aside the work as Utopian. It is impossible, however, to reject the principle of union; and in its realisation, dependent purely upon the concerted will of the democracies, may be found the only practical method of permanently averting war, or, if too late, of thereafter building perpetual peace.

A. G. de M.

### A SOCIAL SURVEY OF OXFORD.\*

This is the first volume of a more complete Survey which will be forthcoming during the next twelve months. The present volume deals with Economics and Local Government in Oxford and the area adjacent to it. That area does not extend more than about six miles from Oxford and does not include places as far away as Didcot. The Chairman of the Committee responsible for the Survey was the Warden of All Souls', Dr. W. G. S. Adams, who has for years past given much of his spare time to safeguarding the amenities of Oxford.

The main object of the Survey is to study the social and administrative implications of the industrial changes in the area surveyed and the method employed has been under the editorship of Miss Bourdillon to utilise the services of many experts in such departments as economics, local government and industry generally. The value of taking in a somewhat wider area than merely the County Borough of Oxford is that the investigations make clear the effect of the growth of Oxford on such municipal boroughs as Abingdon and Woodstock.

One of the most important chapters in the Economic Section is that on Industrial Immigration. There has been a net emigration to Oxford between the years 1921-37 of over 10,000 insured people. If we include the non-insured people the net emigration into the area has probably been not less than 22,000 and including dependants it has been calculated that the increase is as much as from 34,000 to 36,000. We naturally turn to the chapters on Industry and Unemployment for information as to the nature of this migration into the given area and the effect is seen when we study such questions as the fluctuations in the motor industry which is responsible for so much of the increase in population in Oxford and the surrounding districts. The volume of unemployment in the area is largely due to fluctuations in this industry. Mr. Ackroyd, who is responsible for the chapter on Industry, also points out, when he is dealing with Retail Shops, an important change which has taken place affecting the tradespeople of Oxford. Oxford fifty years ago was remarkable for the intermittent nature of its retail trade since very few University people remained in residence during the vacations,

\* *A Survey of the Social Services in the Oxford District.* Oxford University Press. 15s. net.

but to-day not only do a large number of senior members live in Oxford during the greater part of the year, but in addition the custom of holding Conferences in the colleges during the vacations has grown to such an extent that these conferences may be said to be a continuous source of custom for the tradespeople.

The chapter on Agriculture by Messrs. R. L. Cohen, M.A., and K. H. Murray, M.A., both connected with the Agricultural Economics Research Institute of Oxford, shows very clearly how Oxford has become industrialised owing to the establishment of the motor industry and how this change has reacted on local agriculture. There is a decrease in the number of men engaged in agriculture who are attracted to the motor factories by high wages, and there is also the important fact that many villages around Oxford which were entirely agricultural in nature have now become suburban settlements owing to the large amount of building which has taken place.

It is difficult to overestimate the value of this Survey which is increased by the many maps and diagrams which are too often lacking in a work of this description. One may express the hope that the example of Barnett House and the Survey Committee at Oxford will be followed by other equally important towns and areas, and we may look forward to the time when the sister University of Cambridge will set on foot a no less valuable Survey of the many problems that concern that University town.

PERCY ALDEN.

### A GREAT ENGLISH PROSE MYSTIC.\*

The fame of William Law as a religious writer has rested on his "Serious Call" rather than on his mystical treatises, which were for long out of print. Yet their literary excellence had impressed John Wesley, who severely criticised some of the contents. Dr. Inge regards Law as quite the greatest English prose mystic; and Miss Underhill considers him "the only spiritual thinker of the first rank among the English mystics of the post-Reformation Church." Thanks largely to Mr. Hobhouse, who edits the present volume,

\* *Selected Mystical Writings of William Law*. Edited with Notes and Twenty-four Studies in the Mystical Theology of William Law and Jacob Boehme. By Stephen Hobhouse, M.A. The C. W. Daniel Company Ltd. 8s. 6d. net.

and the support of his friends, Law's contribution to Christian Mysticism has been revealed and made accessible. His blend of emotion with reasoned argument produces at times a prose which recalls the solemn harmonies of an organ fugue. Like him, Mr. Hobhouse seeks to provide a better understanding of Christian faith, "which will nourish a confident hope for the future of all mankind despite the dangers and disasters of the present time." He admits that Law's attacks on the guidance of human reason were excessive and largely due to its exaltation by eighteenth-century contemporaries, who maintained that a natural religion was discoverable by reason and independent of revelation. But his method of countering their claim was misunderstood by the orthodox.

He fearlessly claimed "natural religion" and "nature" as belonging to Christ and to Christianity, but insisted that, far from conflicting with the revelation of Scripture, nature could only be interpreted by the contents of that revelation as mystically understood. . . . There was indeed a true "natural religion," not at all the self-sufficient, rationalistic religion exalted by the Deists, but that nurtured by the "Light which lighteth every man," when humble, obedient attention is paid to it.

Law compared natural religion to the light of daybreak and the Gospel to the light of noonday.

It is true that he often harshly opposed the "natural" to the "spiritual" man, but he gradually discarded the tradition of absolute opposition; as the result, his editor suggests, of Boehme's teaching that "the hungry, restless life of nature is, when duly subordinated, a quite necessary foundation for the divine life."

To Boehme also he owed his doctrine of God's wrathless love which scandalised the orthodox.

There is no wrath that stands between God and us, but what is awakened in the dark fire of our own fallen nature; and to quench this wrath, and not His own, God gave His only begotten Son to be made man.

On the one side, fire and wrath . . . and on the other side, the meekness of the Lamb of God, the patience of Divine Love coming down from Heaven to stop and overcome the fire and wrath that is broken out in creature and in nature.

Nothing but the incarnate life of His eternal Son, passing through all the miserable states of lost man, could regenerate his first divine life in him.

He emphasises the cosmic significance of sin, affirming like Berdyaev a pre-human fall.

All the disorder and corruption and malady of our nature lies in a certain fixedness of our own will, imagination and desire, wherein we live to ourselves, are our own centre and circumference, act wholly from ourselves, according to our own will, imagination and desires.

That Hell as "an inner state of the soul" could become permanent and irremediable was believed by Boehme for various reasons, in "his all too human reaction to the persecution and cruelty of his day," but Law finally abandoned his teacher's conviction.

As for the purification of all human nature either in this world or in some after-ages, I fully believe it.

Above all he stresses the indwelling of Christ in the soul as the means of atonement, which is supremely revealed to Christians in the holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

Because they were apostles of a Christ within,

so many eminent spirits, partakers of a divine life, have appeared in so many parts of the heathen world; glorious names, sons of wisdom, that shone as lights hung out by God in the midst of idolatrous darkness.

Law's view of the Atonement, as his editor notes, was very similar to that of the early Greek Fathers and Irenæus. Mr. Hobhouse is to be congratulated on the learning and discrimination which have inspired a scholar's "task of love."

D. P. H.

## A NEW SURVEY OF WORLD HISTORY.

Dr. Veit Valentin's *History of the World*\* meets a deeply felt want. Our old standards no longer suffice, and we are in search of new ones in order to understand our own history, our own destiny. Treaties, political forms, the boundaries of states—nothing seems stable any longer. The author is close to history and close to nature. He cites innumerable historical pictures and holds our absorbed attention whether he is

\* *Weltgeschichte; Völker, Männer, Ideen.* Albert de Lange, Amsterdam.

picturing for us Egyptian civilisation, the Czech Emperor Charles IV, or the development of Japanese power.

We have at once the broad lines of treatment which give character to the whole and a wealth of detail which creates the very atmosphere of historical reality. The writing and characterisation are wonderfully timeless, that is, free from any taint of party feeling. A cheerful wisdom pervades the whole; the hard spade-work of the learned mole is never visible. We participate in the untiring freshness and delight with which he beholds the panorama. The unfailing realism with which the mean, the unsuccessful, the unripe is displayed to our gaze is without bitterness, free from malice or moral indignation. We know what we have to expect of mankind. But the book shows that we have no reason to capitulate in despair. The wind of circumstance is always blowing just above the scene, and suddenly we are face to face with fresh turns of fate which inspire us with new courage. On the whole, life is worth while. As we see that again and again, it ascends to peaks of glorious perfection, as in the vital civilisations of the Chinese, the Egyptians, the Greeks.

What we present-day dwellers on this planet have to expect, according to Dr. Valentin, is a unique new goal; the first union of planetary humanity since the appearance of our species 100,000 years ago. Through the wonderful achievements of technique, science and the arts, human powers of organisation, reason, invention and constructive imagination, humanity since the Renaissance has become increasingly uniform and history to-day is already the history of civilised humanity. The basic problems of all nations, states and kingdoms of this planet, the problem of a new order of international law, a new social order, a new economic order which will overcome the world economic crisis—these are problems of all humanity to-day. In all the abasement and humiliation through which we have to pass, we have the blissful consciousness of being part and witness of the most tremendous and revolutionary epoch in the history of the world. It may well be that we shall enter upon a new age of culture and civilisation, if humanity succeeds in securing the legacy of this rich and stormy past. Then, perhaps, the social order of old imperial China, the joyous vitality of Egypt, the architecture of Rome and of the Middle Ages, might even be surpassed.

HUGO FISCHER.

## HEALTH AND NUTRITION IN INDIA.\*

The importance of this book as a contribution to the understanding of the Indian problem from an unfamiliar angle cannot be exaggerated. Not *even* freedom first, but milk, butter and eggs! This is the crying and urgent need of India, and this is the message of this vital survey of nutrition and health in a sub-continent teeming with hundreds of millions for whom "for every three mouths there are only two rice-bowls."

Dr. Gangulee has excellent qualifications for the exposition of a subject the main significance of which for India lies in its application in a field abounding with battling conditions, social, politico-economic and even religious. Approaching the problem of nutrition from the crucial related problem of agricultural productivity, Dr. Gangulee, a member of the 1928 Royal Commission on Agriculture, writes as an expert. The main importance of this comprehensive survey may well concern India; but as long as the British association in India remains, this authoritative work must be commended in this country at least as warmly as it must also be commended to the political and social leaders and workers in India to-day.

Nutritional research has advanced far enough even in India to establish that under-nourishment is the most prolific predisposing cause of the great increase in tuberculosis, blindness, rickets and certain nervous and gastric diseases. No statistics are available for the millions who exist on the threshold to epidemic-infection and specific diseases. With the 0.01 per cent. of the total revenue of India allowed for expenditure on Public Health, it can be appreciated that the utmost that public services could do in the direction of preaching nutrition reform to a hungry peasantry (incidentally, treating them to free shows of educational films) is being done. In reference to Indian mortality and morbidity, Malthus and the Indian climate have been two well-seasoned apologists for an economic system that is not primarily interested in the adequate production of essential food-crops. Landlordship, as the inescapable creditor to the rural and industrial masses, is not interested in the prosperity of tenants whose vast numbers—irrepressible in death and disease—are

\* *Health and Nutrition in India*. By N. Gangulee, C.I.E. Faber & Faber. 15s.

his bulwark. In spite of the rapidly increasing birth rate and despite the apparently insoluble larger problem which Dr. Gangulee uncovers as being primarily the problem of a radical overhaul and readjustment of the economic system and feudal landlordism, this book examined with courage and vision the whole ground of nutritional reform. In this courageous labour the author comes forward as among the first Indians to support the lead given by Lord Linlithgow in a speech at Simla inaugurating a scheme for providing milk for children. "What indeed, is the use," asked the Viceroy, "of spending public funds on objects such as education, welfare schemes and the like if the people have not the health and vigour of mind and body to take full advantage of them and to enjoy them?"

The original merit of this work is in the relating of a technical enquiry to the human background: Dr. Gangulee knows both his West and his East and writes with the freedom of easy scholarship, taking his authorities and culling his quotations from both the modern medical world and the ancient Hindu sages. The chapters on Indian regional diets, the diets of industrial workers, the discussion of diets in relation to the physique of communities and the chapters on agricultural improvement, including animal husbandry, fisheries and horticulture, bring together much newer research material.

FREDOON KABRAJI.

## SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

*The True India*,\* a Plea for Understanding, by C. F. Andrews, has been prompted in its writing by the "desolating harm" which has been done to India's reputation in a large part of the world by Miss Mayo's *Mother India* and other similar publications. Mr. Andrews is at great pains to refute some of the charges, and in a chapter on "Glaring Misstatements" and at other points he goes into many difficult questions. But Miss Mayo's statements were gathered in a "cold weather" visit in 1925-6, thirteen years ago, and many new movements have arisen since then. The National Awakening has come and the most remarkable thing is the awakening

\* Allen & Unwin. 6s.

of the women. Most of the social questions depend entirely on the women for their advancement. "What has truly amazed me," says Mr. Andrews, "has been to see young men and women who have had great possessions, gladly changing their daily habits of luxury for a life of extreme hardship with the joy of new-found freedom." He describes a struggle which took place in Travancore State to throw open a high road to the depressed classes, and the hundreds of volunteers who came forward to offer passive resistance to the Brahmins. At the bidding of Mahatma Gandhi they stood opposite the police day by day in an attitude of prayer. In spite of the road being flooded waist-deep in water during the monsoon they continued standing there, until after more than a year there was some sign of relenting, and with another season the road was thrown open. These struggles and conquests from within are what count in India.

After dealing with village India which in its vastness presents such a problem, Mr. Andrews considers the joint family, the caste system and its origin, child marriage, women's rights and the depressed classes, poverty and over-population, one of the most baffling of India's difficulties. But the interesting analysis of Indian character is perhaps new to many. "One of the greatest faults . . . is the habit of submissiveness and apathy in face of wrong, instead of its fearless, active condemnation." Mr. Andrews notes with "intense thankfulness" how this fault is being recognised at last and steps are being taken to overcome it. Another characteristic discussed is the family system which leads a family to work for itself to the exclusion of public service, and the consequent lack of cohesion in any great public cause. In a very eloquent chapter these points and the questions of caste are treated until the idea of the unity of India is reached and a common language is suggested.

Mr. Andrews attributes the major part of the new best influences to Mr. Gandhi and to the poet, Rabindranath Tagore.

In her *Light and Shade in France*,\* Mrs. Clarke writes charmingly and from intimate knowledge of that land and its people. She has been welcomed in circles—aristocratic, middle class or peasant—each of which in its own way is usually considered exclusive. Her position as a *Times* correspondent and dramatic critic, and as English delegate on the Committee of the Femina Vie Heureuse Prize, brought her into touch with leading writers, actors, and artists, of many of whom, e.g. Anatole France, Rodin, Coquelin and Réjane, Colette, Hélène Vacaresco, Maurois, she gives vivid impressions. Mrs. Clarke has been at home also among the fashion dictators of the Rue de la Paix; these last, and their staffs, impressed her by the serious enthusiasm with which they regard their work. She describes her

\* John Murray. 9s.

students' pension of forty years ago; her housekeeping experiences as a young married woman; her travels all over France—the Basque country, Normandy, Provence, the Dauphiné, Touraine—and her life in a country cottage (rented at about £5 a year) and village friendships. She contrasts the homes of the *petite bourgeoisie* in France and England; the former are tidy, the latter, comfortable. In more serious vein, the author writes of war conditions; of the bewildered and resentful Paris of the Peace Conference; the post-war *débâcle* of the middle classes and the decay of the artisan; the gulf between the old and new generations. All will agree with her conclusion that France's greatest need to-day is unity and leadership.

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From Taunton to Sedgemoor, the fateful midsummer of Monmouth's regal progress among the enthusiastic townsmen and gentry of Somerset, at the head of his ill-equipped peasant army, followed by its final rout—such is the setting of Joyce Collard's admirably constructed novel, with its Shakespearian title, *To Touch the Crown*.\* The Duke's power of attraction is well conveyed. While the historical tragic ending is, of course, foreknown, there is unflagging suspense and excitement over the adventures of the private characters in the foreground; a series of treacheries cast a skilfully conceived net of unjust suspicion round the quiet merchant, John Hucker, and the mysteries involving Harry, who bears the same name, are only revealed in full towards the end. John's highborn bride, a gallant, tawdry actress, and a suave courtier-spy, play their parts effectively. The author's language is vivid and direct, with an absence of what R. L. S. called "tushery."

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Major C. S. Jarvis has written a very interesting book in *Desert and Delta*† dealing with life in Egypt since the war from many points of view. The short historical prologue is a good introduction to Egyptian politics for the general reader, and succeeding chapters show Egypt to be too often her own enemy in the realm of politics. The many changing governments, rival parties, student interference and the attitude of students towards those in authority have consistently added to the difficulties of British officials. The brief character studies of King Fuad, succeeding High Commissioners, Egyptian Ministers and other administrators make interesting reading and show the effect of different personalities on the same country. The greater part of the book deals with Arab life as it comes in contact with the administration, and so with both Egyptian and British officials. Major Jarvis, as Governor of Sinai for thirteen years, knew the Arab in many walks of life, and he gives a very clear impression of Arab mentality and outlook. The chapters on fishing, water engineering, agriculture, roads

\* Herbert Jenkins. 7s. 6d.

† Murray. 10s. 6d. net.

and the discovery and filling of a Roman reservoir, show something of the excitements of life in the desert and its attendant troubles and joys. The book is well illustrated and includes seven interesting Egyptian cartoons.

*Library Local Collections*,\* by Mr. W. C. Berwick Sayers and published in the Practical Library Handbooks series, should be of interest to all concerned with local history as well as to librarians. It aims at showing the purpose and scope of local collections, what to collect, how to do so, and methods of arrangement and cataloguing. The range of material of such collections is very wide, including deeds and manuscripts, pictures, books, maps, plans and regional surveys, and all requiring independent treatment for reference and other purposes. The use and value of photographic records and their proper preservation by the public library are well illustrated in the work of the Photographic Survey Record of Surrey formed in 1902. The brevity of the book is an advantage, for it is possible to view the whole of a vast subject as one unit, each section important in itself but part of the whole collection.

A recent addition to *The Face of Britain* series is a delightful illustrated volume on the *West Country*,† by Mr. C. Henry Warren who sketches his "personal picture" of Somerset, Devon and Cornwall. With a large measure of success he imparts to the reader the general atmosphere and peculiarities of each county and describes in simple, vivid prose places and objects of outstanding interest, whether for beauty in landscape or architecture or for their historical appeal. Incidentally, Mr. Warren's statement that the Romans withdrew from Britain about A.D. 350 is presumably a slip for 410 or possibly the 420's. While in no way an exhaustive guide-book, this is the sort of work which may well entice the holiday maker and become a volume of enduring interest to the lover of the West.

It must suffice here to note with interest and appreciation Miss Ruth Clark's recent work, *Sir William Trumbull in Paris, 1685-1686*.‡ Following the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Sir William was British Ambassador in Paris for less than ten months during a period of strain and stress between the two countries. Miss Clark has made use of the abundant material available to provide a detailed account of the ambassador's determined, if unsuccessful, labours. This is particularly a work for the student of the period who will appreciate the material conveniently collected and marshalled together in this study.

\* Allen & Unwin. 5s. net.

† Batsford, 8s. 6d. net.

‡ Cambridge University Press, 12s. 6d. net.

## THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JUNE 1939.

### WHAT OF BRITISH POLICY?

HOW much easier would it be to say what is wrong with the world, and to see what should be done to put things right, if one knew for sure what British policy really is! When American or other foreigners ask what the British people stand for, the answer is simple. Ordinary folk, the "common people," say and think and mean: "It is time the Dictators were stopped!" (By "the Dictators" they understand Hitler and Mussolini; they rarely mention Stalin.) Much harder is it to say what the British Government stand for. Here doubt persists at home and abroad. The more I look into this doubt the stronger grows my belief that in it lies the germ of the creeping paralysis from which so great a part of the world has been and is suffering.

The doubt itself springs from varying degrees of disbelief that Mr. Neville Chamberlain means what he says. Other members of his Cabinet are bracketed with him, especially Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare, though the Prime Minister naturally draws most attention. And, as regards British foreign policy, it is useless to warn foreign observers that they should pay more heed to public feeling in Great Britain than to the words even of the Prime Minister. Sometimes I doubt whether he knows how much he is doubted. Had he known, for example, what was being written and said of him in the United States by the friendliest critics of this country he could hardly have spoken on January 28th as he spoke to the Birmingham Jewellers' Association. He said:

A great deal of criticism, mostly, I think, *in this country* (the italics are mine) has been directed against that (the Munich) Agreement and against the action I took in attempting by personal contact to obtain a peaceful solution of a problem which very nearly involved the world in a catastrophe of the first magnitude. . . . But there is one feature common to all the critics. None of them carries the responsibilities that I do, and none of them has that full knowledge of all the circumstances which is only open to the members of the Government. A combination of ignorance and irresponsibility may conduce to a freedom of mind which may be cheerful or gloomy according to the temperament, but I rather

doubt whether it constitutes a satisfactory foundation on which to build a sound judgment. For myself, looking back, I see nothing to regret nor any reason to suppose that another course would have been preferable.

Later in the same speech he said :

... I recall the fate of one of the greatest of my predecessors, the younger Pitt. His interests lay at home in the repair of the financial system and in domestic reforms. But events abroad cut short his ambitions and, reluctantly, after long resisting his fate, he found himself involved in what was up to then the greatest war in our history. Worn out with the struggle he died before success had crowned our efforts, to which his own steadfast courage had contributed so much.

I trust that my lot may be happier than his, and that we may yet secure our aim of international peace. We have so often defined our attitude that there can be no misunderstanding about it, and I feel that it is time now that others should make their contribution to a result which would overflow with benefits to all.

"Defined our attitude," forsooth! Why cannot Ministers say plainly what they mean to do? Even Lord Halifax has told the House of Lords that "we must re-think our attitude." How on earth does one "re-think" an "attitude"? Must we always have slipshod talk to hide a slipshod policy?

By a curious coincidence, I had hardly read Mr. Chamberlain's speech on Monday, January 30th, when the American mail brought me a scholarly study entitled *From Versailles to Munich, 1918-38*, by the professor of Modern History in the University of Chicago, Bernadotte E. Schmitt, whose *The Coming of The War, 1914*, is a classic. It is issued by the University of Chicago Press as "Public Policy Pamphlet No. 28." On page 56 I found this passage, which also referred to William Pitt and to Mr. Chamberlain :

Germany enjoys one advantage never vouchsafed to Napoleon : the tolerance of her ascendancy by Britain, or at any rate by Mr. Chamberlain. For the first time, England has repudiated the balance of power, and one wonders if Mr. Chamberlain will figure in history as the Lord North of the twentieth century. But here again history sounds a warning. After 1783 British power seemed as broken and British prestige as vanished as in 1938. Perhaps a new William Pitt the Younger will rise to galvanise England to new life. And France? After every great defeat in her history she has exhibited extraordinary powers of recovery; she may do so again.

In the United States Lord North is remembered—oddly enough, without admiration or gratitude—as the British statesman whose policy lost England her American colonies and so helped to establish American independence. Professor Schmitt obviously wrote as a historian, without malice, weeks before Mr. Chamberlain compared himself to Pitt. But I wondered whether he would have spoken quite so complacently at Birmingham on January 28th if he had known that a well-disposed American scholar thought his "appeasement" had left British power "as broken and British prestige as vanished" in 1938 as they had appeared to be after 1783.

At the end of January and until mid-March this year "appeasement" appeared in the eyes of Mr. Chamberlain and his admirers to have suffered no serious setback. The tree was still green. Nay, it was thought ready to bring forth flowers and what an earlier Prime Minister might have called "rare and refreshing fruit." As late as March 9th the Prime Minister is understood to have informed the lobby correspondents of various newspapers that things might soon take a decided turn for the better. On March 10th the press dutifully reflected his optimism. The same evening Sir Samuel Hoare spoke publicly of the restoration of political confidence to Europe, of a "five-year plan immensely greater than any five-year plan that this or that particular country has attempted in recent times," and of a space of five years in which there should be neither wars nor rumours of wars.

"Could we not then," he asked, "devote the almost incredible inventions and discoveries of our time to the creation of a Golden Age in which poverty could be reduced to insignificance and the standard of living raised to heights that we have never been able to attempt before? Here, indeed, is the greatest opportunity that has ever been offered to the leaders of the world. . . . Our own Prime Minister has shown his determination to work heart and soul to such an end. I cannot believe that the other leaders of Europe will not join him in the high endeavour upon which he is engaged."

The rosy forecasts of the British press and the Home Secretary's lyrical outburst were flashed round the earth. Few people then guessed that they were "airy nothings," inspired by the calculated vapourings of Dr. Robert Ley, a German Nazi Minister, during a visit to London, and that only the "strong imagination" of British Ministers had given



them "a local habitation and a name." Up to March 15th Mr. Chamberlain was still in his January mood, still convinced, as he had said at Birmingham, "that there are no differences, however serious, that cannot be solved without recourse to war, by consultation and negotiation, as was laid down in the declaration signed by Herr Hitler and myself at Munich." For on the afternoon of March 14th France and Great Britain had been informed by the German Foreign Office that Germany "intended no drastic move whatever"—at the very moment when German troops were crossing the "Munich" frontiers of Czechoslovakia on the way to relieve that stricken State of the burden of existence and to capture its armaments and arsenals. On the morning of March 15th *The Times* (which had doughtily defended Mr. Chamberlain against his critics on March 13th) called its leading article "The Destruction of Czechoslovakia"!

At first the Prime Minister was reticent though not unperturbed. As he explained in his second Birmingham speech on March 17th, he lacked "official" information. By March 17th he was indignant because, apparently, he had "not been consulted." How anybody who had studied Hitler's character and methods could expect any other sequel to "Munich" I fail to understand. I myself had learned on good authority in mid-December 1938 that Hitler meant to be in Prague on the night of March 15th, 1939. In mid-January this was confirmed from another source. Is it conceivable that Mr. Chamberlain with the "full knowledge of all the circumstances which is only open to the members of the Government" did not know these things? It seems highly improbable. What is possible, nay, probable, is that he had heard them and had brushed them aside as incompatible with his faith in the word which Hitler had given to *him*. Not otherwise can one explain Mr. Chamberlain's question to his audience on March 17th: "What reliance can be placed upon any other assurances that come from the same source?" The real question was and is: "How could a British Prime Minister put any faith in any assurance from Herr Hitler seeing that Hitler's record in public life has been an unbroken sequence of broken promises?"

This is precisely the question that puzzles the world and undermines its confidence in the straightforwardness, let alone the wisdom, of British policy. At a loss for a satisfying

answer, our foreign critics ascribe to us a subtle design which has somehow gone wrong. Utterances attributed to British Ministers last spring, and widely reported in the United States and elsewhere, created an impression that British policy intended all along to throw Czechoslovakia to the wolves, and to let Hitler "eat his bellyful of Europe" in the hope that he would at once get indigestion and cease to threaten us. In the light of this assumption the Runciman mission was regarded as a characteristic piece of British hypocrisy. And to-day many of the smaller nations in Northern and South Eastern Europe, to say nothing of the people of the United States, are unwilling to take any British assurances at face value.

But, it may well be asked, have our rearmament, our pledges to Poland and Roumania, our adoption of the principle of conscription no effect upon these doubters? Do they not understand that at last we are in earnest? Have they heard nothing of our A.R.P., nothing of the swift growth of our territorial forces? If these things do not convince them, what can? Did not our Government accept "with full approval" President Roosevelt's masterly message to Hitler and Mussolini? Are we not now striving to set up an international front against aggression with the help of Turkey and even of Soviet Russia? Have we not departed so drastically from British traditions that we have left it to the Polish Government to decide whether or not the vital interests and the independence of Poland are threatened, and whether we shall or shall not have to come to the help of Poland with all the means in our power?

These things have assuredly impressed a doubting world. If doubt nevertheless persists it is not because other peoples and Governments lack faith in the determination of the British people or in the value of our armaments. It is because they are not sure whether British Ministers are whole-hearted in a resolve henceforth to make the Dictators feel that any act of diplomatic or military aggression will be unwaveringly opposed by the British Government. There have been rumours of private messages through unofficial channels from Mr. Chamberlain to Mussolini and *vice versa*. There was the sudden and unexplained return to Berlin of the notoriously pro-Nazi British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, who had been "recalled to report" after March 15th. There have been

suggestions in the British press—not unlike those that spread well-founded dismay on September 7th, 1938—that only Polish “independence,” not Polish “integrity,” has been guaranteed by Great Britain, and that “Danzig is not worth fighting for.” Worse still, some British public men, and several of the “news letters” which now inform British and foreign readers who have lost confidence in the British press, have alluded to the operations of a “Fifth Column” which is alleged always to find a way of ensuring that our resistance to the Dictators shall be half-hearted, and that “appeasement,” on the Munich model, shall again be our “attitude.”

In “political and diplomatic circles” talk of this “Fifth Column” is so general that those who speak of it imagine that everybody knows what they mean. They are mistaken. Only a small minority of our people have the faintest notion of what a “Fifth Column” is. The term is derived from an expression which General Franco is said to have used at a time when four of his columns were vainly endeavouring to capture Madrid. Their offensive, he explained, would be validly supported by a “Fifth Column” of his supporters inside Madrid. Nor was it only in Madrid that his “Fifth Column” was at work. It had counterparts in Valencia, Barcelona and other Spanish Republican cities. The organisation of “Fifth Columns” seems, indeed, to be an essential part of Nazi-Fascist strategy. Their task is to neutralise, from within, resistance to Nazi-Fascist designs. So the question arises whether Hitler and, to some extent, Mussolini, have a “Fifth Column” of open or clandestine supporters in this country.

I am not now concerned to affirm or to deny the existence of this “Fifth Column” in Great Britain. It may have existed or it may still exist. Sir Samuel Hoare, as Home Secretary, was recently moved to order the departure from London of a number of Germans who have long been known as active Nazi agents, and one of whom at least was looked upon by his fellow Germans in England as the representative of Herr Hitler’s Gestapo or Secret State Police. These men may or may not have been the nucleus of a “Fifth Column.” If they were, their efforts were certainly seconded by a number of British defeatists and other volunteer auxiliaries who have lost no opportunity of putting forward in the press, and of urging upon Ministers, suggestions at variance with any straight-forward

British policy. The echoes of these suggestions are carefully noted abroad; and in so far as the acts or words of British Ministers appear to be inspired by them, belief not only in the existence but in the paralysing influence of a British “Fifth Column” is strengthened. I am convinced that nothing short of a change in the composition of the British Cabinet would avail to dispel these doubts and to induce foreign countries which are potentially friendly to put their trust in us.

The importance and the urgency of such a change can hardly be overstated. It might save us even now from drifting farther into a predicament out of which the only way of escape would be war. War may not yet be inevitable. It will become inevitable if lingering shreds of “appeasement” continue to clog the wheels of our diplomacy, if Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues are still unrepentant about “Munich,” if they still appear to hope that with a little clandestine jogging of the elbow of Providence something may turn up to prove them to have been right after all. Despite our rearmament it will be long before we can be militarily as strong as we should have been in September when the Czechoslovak fortifications were intact, the Czechoslovak army in being, the Czechoslovak arsenals working for us and our friends; and when, at a word from us and France, Poland would have been on our side and Soviet Russia would have stood behind the Czechoslovaks. Then, as our Government knew, or should have known, Hitler lacked artillery for more than half the reserve divisions of his army. To-day he lacks it no longer, thanks to the booty he captured in Czechoslovakia after March 15th. So while we are seeking at great cost and by diplomatic effort to regain the forces, material and moral, which we threw away at Munich, it is a matter of truly “vital importance” that we should not fail to enlist all the moral strength we can muster at home and abroad.

By “abroad” I do not mean only those countries that have cause to fear Nazi-Fascist aggression. I mean Germany and Italy as well. Millions of Germans and Italians are eagerly looking for some sign that the hour of their deliverance may be approaching. They are heartened by every symptom of British firmness, disheartened by every piece of truckling to the Dictators. By themselves they can do nothing. In Germany the firing squad, the headsman, or the worse

terrors of the concentration camp await the openly disaffected. But the disaffection is real in both countries. Because Hitler and Mussolini know this they are constantly impelled to seek fresh spectacular successes as by the suppression of Czechoslovakia or the annexation of Albania. And meanwhile Goering and Brauchitsch hurry from Berlin to Rome, Lybia and back, Ciano and Ribbentrop confer in Milan upon the terms of an Italo-German military alliance in anticipation of the day when, as Goering said in a speech last year, Italy shall become "the German bridge to the riches of Africa and to the great oceans beyond."

Should war be averted, our escape from it will be due no less to the marshalling of moral forces than to our rearmament. Quite apart from its crippling military and political effects, the impolicy that led us to Munich threw away the only cause superior to national considerations that could have kindled the moral fervour of our own people and of the civilised world. This cause was that of the security of all peoples against lawless and predatory violence. It was nothing less than the maintenance of the rule of law and of the sanctity of international obligations in despite of armed blackmailers who scorn both. When the British Government spurned the Czechoslovak appeal to the Czechoslovak-German treaty of arbitration, signed at Locarno in October 1925 and expressly recognised as valid by Germany last year, when it curtly summoned the Czechoslovak Government to surrender without ado on pain of being abandoned by Great Britain and France, it helped to destroy far more than the only free and democratic State in Central Europe. It began to undermine the very principles upon which the British Commonwealth of Nations is established.

To-day we are in danger of war and, we are told, of a war which an unacceptable German demand upon Poland may let loose without our having any say in the matter. So startling an abdication of British sovereignty is surely without precedent in our history. Did not successive British Governments wreck at Geneva every effort of the League of Nations to provide collective security against war on the plea that we could not and would not incur "automatic commitments"? Moreover, as Mr. Lloyd George has rightly urged, our pledges to Poland and to Roumania can hardly serve their purpose without the help of Soviet Russia whom we have been handling

with the tongs. If this be a "British policy" I fail to understand it. Nor does the world understand it. It sees us trembling and finicking on the brink of a struggle which, whether we lose it or win, would spread ruin far and wide.

It was the poignancy of this prospect that inspired Mr. Clarence K. Streit, a former American Rhodes Scholar, and for many years Geneva correspondent of the *New York Times*, to write his impassioned plea for "Union Now," as the only way for the free democracies of the world to save the peace, and themselves from overthrow in isolation. No book in my time has shown so much constructive imagination. None deserves to be read more carefully—I would almost say, devoutly. To all the details of his plan for a union, not a league or an alliance, of democratic peoples in which they would merge their respective national sovereignties over armaments, foreign affairs, trade and currencies one need not subscribe in order to realise the potency of his idea or the force of the analogy he draws between the chaotic predicament of the thirteen American States after they had won the War of Independence and the plight of the democracies now. Between 1787 and 1789 the American States saved themselves by union. The United States was born. In 1939 Mr. Streit proclaims the imperative necessity for union between the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, France and other democracies in Europe. Together, he argues, they control already two-thirds of the material resources of the world. Union would give them overwhelming moral force and would make of them the nucleus of a world federation which would grow as country after country should qualify for admission to it by recognising, in practice no less than in theory, that the State is made for man, not man for the State.

This epoch-making book has hitherto received too little attention in this country. Some writers have dismissed it as pure fantasy. Others, notably an editorial writer in the *Manchester Guardian*, have seen it in truer perspective. His reasoning deserves reproduction. It runs:

The world has to learn to think on new and larger lines if civilisation is to survive. Democracy and freedom cannot be defended forever by the method of building greater and greater armaments. The aggressive Powers have shown more initiative and energy since the war than the democratic peoples, and pacific methods for building up civilisation have suffered discredit in consequence.

Necessity puts men and peoples on their mettle. If a great war should break out, what kind of world would there be after it? To what remedies would that world turn? How would it improve on the remedies that failed after 1918? If we put ourselves in that world we can well believe that plans that seem wild to-day would seem practicable then. Mr. Streit, full of foreboding for the Europe he has watched from Geneva in her hours of hope and her hours of despair, is warning all men of serious mind that they must begin to think now as boldly and as intensely as if another war had already shattered their world, and that civilisation may depend on their ability to escape from the circle within which their ideas move to-day.

This, and nothing less, is the task of those who would frame a British policy worthy of the part this country has played in the political development of men and nations. We have to think of the world as it would be after a catastrophic struggle. National sovereignties might vanish, or remain only as relics of a bygone age. If to-day we have, with the approval of Parliament, abandoned our national sovereignty to the extent of making Poland mistress of our fate, we can surely conceive of a wider, more stable and worthier system in which our national sovereignty would be merged with those of other free countries for the sake of saving mankind from war and of giving it a chance to harness its scientific and mechanical achievements to the work of constructive and creative peace. Things have now come to such a pass that half-measures can no longer serve. Should war come, and were the democracies to lose it, Stygian darkness might brood for decades or centuries over the souls of men. Should the forces of freedom triumph they would still be faced by the perennial problem of Germany, and of preventing ideas that have run like a strain of homicidal madness through her political thought, from Fichte to Adolf Hitler, from working to enthrone a world hegemony of the German sword upon the belief that brutal might is right. It is not enough for the free nations recurrently to arm themselves against this peril. It would not even be enough for them to crush Hitlerism by force. Their aim must be the redemption of the German, the Italian and other misguided nations by the force of example in the pursuit of a loftier conception of human destiny.

A British policy that should avowedly and deliberately aim at these things would be a policy the world could trust and would soon come to support.

WICKHAM STEED.

## SIR JOHN SIMON'S SECOND BUDGET.

### APPEARANCE AND REALITY

AN unparalleled deficit, disguised by the invention of an extraordinary Budget, yawns between revenue and expenditure, and its chief moral for us all is that our fate depends, not on the Chancellor of the Exchequer but on the Foreign Secretary, or rather in strict accuracy on the foreign policy of the Government. For more than ninety years after Waterloo it was otherwise. It would be more true to say of the England of Peel and Gladstone that the Treasury ruled over foreign and colonial policy than the reverse. So long as the Navy was strong enough to secure the safety of Great Britain and the Empire, our statesmen usually followed the policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and refrained with one exception—the Crimean War—from taking part in any of the wars that vexed the European Continent between 1816 and 1914. The idea of attempting to become a great military as well as a great naval power, and of preparing in time of peace a powerful army to fight abroad, was not seriously entertained by any responsible Minister; and even the small but efficient force organised by Haldane was not generally connected by Parliament or the people with the purpose for which it was used in August 1914. When Asquith's Cabinet decided to join with France and Russia in the Great War, they took a decision which put an end not only to the theory and practice of Gladstonian finance but eventually also to the Free Trade system under which we had gained unexampled prosperity as well as a large measure of goodwill, mixed with occasional envy, for our great Open Door Empire.

Whatever view may be taken of the Treaty of Versailles or of the handling of the new Europe by French and British diplomacy since that time, it will not be contested by either the supporters or critics of our present National Government that the Budgets of the last three years have been dominated by a foreign policy which requires war preparations on a gigantic and unparalleled scale, or that we have now reached a Defence Budget of such magnitude that, unless a peaceful solution of the European crisis can be found before very long, British capital and labour will be conscripted in peace time

and all our ideas about the standard of living and the comforts of life will have to be revised downwards. There must soon be a rude awakening for all classes including even the bureaucracy. Three years ago I wrote after Mr. Chamberlain's fifth Budget :

It marks a new crisis in national expenditure ; it promises a succession of unbalanced Budgets ; it is framed to provide for the most gigantic expansion of armaments in peace time that has ever been dreamed of, much less planned, in British history. From the taxpayers' point of view it has rightly been described as a Budget of shattered hopes and disappointed anticipations. The general income tax payer is only better off by threepence than he was when Snowden balanced the Budget in 1931, and the indirect tax payer is much worse off than he has ever been since Peel and Gladstone swept away the old protective and preferential tariff, and established Free Trade.

Gloomily as I wrote, I never imagined then that the situation could come to be what it is to-day. Before the Great War our total expenditure on armaments was 77 millions. In 1932 it was 103 millions. Mr. Chamberlain estimated for an expenditure of 178 millions in 1936 ; Sir John Simon's estimate for the three defence services in his Financial Statement of April 25th was 630 millions : " It is this stupendous figure," he said, " that I wish to compare with the figure of £400,000,000 for defence last year, and £265,000,000 the year before. It measures the size of the effort that has to be made and I think it measures the determination of the whole country to make the effort."

In February the Chancellor of the Exchequer had issued a White Paper stating that the Defence Estimates amounted to £580,000,000 and that the taxpayer would only have to contribute £223,500,000 ; the remainder would be borrowed and added to the National Debt. The City and the Press were overjoyed ; they calculated, correctly, that the Ordinary Budget would be nearly balanced and consequently there would be no need to increase the income tax.

But what about this extra sum of at least £50 millions for which he had to provide somehow or other in the present financial year ?

" It would be a very simple method," remarked the Chancellor, " and one which might give some temporary relief and even a

brief popularity, to add the whole £50 millions straight off, without more ado, to the loan figure, making the total approximately £400 millions of loaned money in a single year, thus exhausting the whole of the additional borrowing power for which I got authority in the Defence Loans Act two months ago." He could not consent to so simple a solution. " If there is a limit to what can be conveniently or tolerably raised by taxation, there is also a definite limit to what can be wisely and successfully raised by borrowing."

By calling on the taxpayers for further sacrifices they would improve the National Credit for borrowing purposes and mark the determination of the people to face the realities. Accordingly he proposed that twenty of the fifty millions should come out of revenue, which would provide a margin of that amount for supplementary Defence estimates. It may be added that this margin was swallowed up on the very next day by the Prime Minister's announcement that he had withdrawn his pledge not to introduce any form of compulsory service during peace time. The Military Training Bill will not only remove a large number of young men from productive industry, but will cost, I am afraid, £20,000,000 or more, which will be added to the National Debt, and will exceed by that amount the " definite limit to what can be wisely and successfully raised by borrowing."

The result of all this is that by dividing the Budget into an Ordinary Budget and an Extraordinary Budget the Chancellor of the Exchequer had only to call upon the British taxpayer for £942,000,000, though the Extraordinary Budget of borrowed money will add £380,000,000 without counting the cost of conscription and will so raise the total expenditure for the financial year to £1,322,000,000!

I wish the Chancellor of the Exchequer had conveyed to the House of Commons and the country what that sum will mean in taxation if it becomes the permanent annual expenditure. Perhaps the simplest way of translating the real Budget, i.e. our whole expenditure on debt, civil services and defence, into terms that can be understood and appreciated, is to state what addition to the income tax would have been required this year if the Chancellor of the Exchequer had decided to balance his Budget. Taking the deficit at 400 millions and a yield of a shilling in the income tax at 50 millions, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have been compelled to add eight shillings to the standard rate of income tax, making

it 13s. 6d. in the pound. But as the income and super tax on the highest incomes are already 14s. 6d. in the pound this change would mean that the income tax on the income of millionaires in peace time would be 22s. 6d. in the pound! No doubt if, following the example of totalitarian States, we were to start the income tax with incomes of say fifty pounds a year, a very large additional revenue could be netted, and it might even be possible to balance the present Budget with a standard rate of ten shillings in the pound. In that case a millionaire would only have to pay nineteen shillings in the pound income tax. Mr. Douglas Jay, the ingenious, if slightly academic, city editor of the *Daily Herald*, wrote on May 3rd an article entitled "Call up the Nation's wealth" underneath a cartoon entitled "March Past," representing a bloated armaments profiteer with a huge cigar sitting in a motor car in which Mr. Chamberlain stood watching boys of twenty marching past. Some members of the Labour Party have a curious idea that the evils of military conscription would be cured by conscription of wealth. As if a mother who has lost her only son would be comforted by being told that a rich neighbour had been sent to the workhouse.

Perhaps if the leaders of the Labour Party felt sure that the boys of the rich would not only be conscripted and trained to arms but forced to fight for foreign countries in foreign trenches just like the boys of the poor, they would not be so much concerned about the conscription of wealth; for that will certainly come, and is already on the way, seeing that the largest incomes now pay 14s. 6d. in the £. No doubt huge profits are being made out of armaments, but before long the profiteers will be forced by public opinion and by the law to recognise that the principle of *richesse oblige* has been substituted for the principle of *noblesse oblige*. This marks the contrast between modern industrial society and the old feudal society in relation to war. Knight service was a very different thing from conscription.

But it is time to turn from these reflections to the framework of the Budget; that is to say, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's plan for covering with taxes the quite arbitrary ordinary deficit which he had uncovered in expenditure. He began with adding to his deficit by a repeal of the Medicine Stamp Duties, which will cost £590,000, and by a reduction of the Entertainments Duty, to help the living theatre, which

will cost £190,000. This raised the deficit to £24,980,000. He filled up the chasm as follows—I take the additional taxes in the order of yield:

The tobacco duties, already very high, are raised by 2s. a pound, the yield for the present financial year being estimated at £7 millions. Another stiff increase is an addition of 10s., which raises the horsepower-duty on private motor-cars from 15s. to 25s. as from January next. This is expected to yield £6½ millions.

A yield of £4 millions apiece is expected from surcharges on incomes subject to Surtax and from an addition of a farthing per pound to the sugar duties. An increase of 10 per cent. in the Death Duties on all estates of over £50,000 will provide another £3 millions, and the list of new or additional imposts ends with a tax on photographic films—excise and customs—which is expected to yield £800,000.

By these changes the Chancellor of the Exchequer hopes to get an additional revenue of £25,050,000 in the present financial year and of £36,505,000 next year. If his estimates prove correct, and we are mercifully preserved from war, there will be an ordinary surplus on the ordinary Budget, when the financial year ends, of about £150,000.

The House of Commons was so much relieved by the announcement that there is to be no increase in the standard rate of income tax—which all the Members would have had to pay—that the Budget was received with quite remarkable acquiescence. A friend, who had listened to almost as many Budgets as I have, remarked to me that he had never seen so listless a House of Commons on an important occasion. Certainly very little interest was manifested. There were few cheers, few groans, few interruptions and no enthusiasm. It could not be denied that the new burdens had been distributed fairly, and this was the view taken by the City, the Stock Exchange and most of the newspapers on the following day. The complaints against the horsepower duty cannot be sustained, once it is admitted that a private luxury of this kind ought to be restricted in an emergency when all the spare engineering and mechanical skill of the country must be diverted to the building of aircraft, aerodromes, ships, etc., etc. Had this line of thought been followed up, an addition to the petrol duty might well have been imposed. If war broke out it would probably be doubled or trebled, and private motorists would be lucky perhaps if they were allowed any

petrol at all. Such a luxury would probably be confined to Ministers and a vast swarm of officers and officials.

People with small incomes, who neither smoke nor take sugar in their tea, make practically no contribution to the Budget. When I heard it, I felt that the addition to the Sugar Duties was a mistake ; for it is a tax not only on an essential food but also on the raw material of such valuable industries as jam and confectionery. It comes, too, at a most unfortunate time when the price of sugar has been forced up by a stupid restriction scheme. It is also hard upon our fruit growers, many of whom were half-ruined last year by one of the worst seasons in living memory. An addition to the Tea Duties would in my opinion have been far preferable.

In the course of his financial statement, as I have noted, the Chancellor remarked very truly that there are limits to borrowing as well as to taxation. If the armaments race continues at the present rate, £400 millions will have to be raised this year by loans or by additions to the short-term debt. That will almost certainly exceed the savings of the country, and would tend to some form of inflation and to a rise of prices. Most Socialists would in that case clamour for Government measures to control prices in imitation of the totalitarian States, and also to control rates of interest. The result of controlling prices is to shorten supplies and produce queues, as well as to cause a deterioration in the quality of food, clothing and the other necessities of life. That is the bitter experience of Germany to-day. The effect of issuing loans at less than the market rate of interest is to dry up offerings of private capital. Such an effort to save public money would only lead to much greater mischiefs. If Treasury loans are skilfully issued on terms which will attract private savings, with suitable rates of redemption, the debt can be converted back after the conclusion of the armaments race to lower rates of interest. No greater mistake could be made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer than to impose restrictions of this kind, which would hamper business, reduce the revenue and create general discontent.

The people of Great Britain depend for their happiness and prosperity on freedom. It is a national instinct. An Englishman cannot work in chains. If you want him to be happy and to do his best, you must not multiply bureaucratic rules and regulations. The Government official who tells private

employers how to carry on their business, or tries to instruct farmers in agriculture, is an expensive public nuisance. Those who doubt it should read the recently-issued " Report of the Departmental Committee on the Imposition of Penalties by Marketing Boards and other similar Bodies." It is no accident that in the last few years, while our agriculture, our overseas trade, our shipping and most of our great staple export industries have been declining, the staffs of the Boards of Agriculture and Trade and of the Overseas Department have been expanding at a prodigious rate. While imports and exports have been shrinking, it has been necessary to augment the Customs staff in order that they may exact thousands of petty duties, which hardly provide enough revenue to pay cost of collection. A time will come, I hope, before very long when the common sense of our business men will insist on a radical reduction of these duties and a purging of the tariff, like that which was undertaken by Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Gladstone in the middle of the last century. If all quotas and subsidies and prohibitive duties were abolished we should witness a great expansion of trade and revenue.

Is it not a monstrous absurdity that, when we are bound to France by a close military alliance and by an identical foreign policy, the Governments of England and France should be engaged in a war of tariffs and quotas which prevents the two peoples from exchanging freely the products of their labour ? The reciprocity treaty with the United States was a friendly gesture, though most of the tariff duties on both sides of the Atlantic have been but little diminished. But if our Government thought the reciprocity treaty with the United States politically as well as economically desirable, it ought surely to conclude without delay a similar treaty with France, which would at least extend to the French the same preferential treatment which the Ottawa Agreements gave to the British self-governing Dominions and Colonies with the idea of excluding foreign countries from empire trade.

My last but most important criticism of the Budget is that Sir John Simon's financial statement failed to recognise the fact that this immense expansion of national expenditure on armaments has naturally been accompanied by a vast amount of waste on which the existing Treasury control provides no adequate check. Before the Budget, at my suggestion, the Public Economy League made representations to the



Chancellor of the Exchequer, and we referred to precedents during the war, when a Select Committee of the House of Commons was set up to examine the war expenditure and report upon possible economies. The result, as the *Economist* has since pointed out, was that valuable savings were effected without any diminution in efficiency. Mr. Maurice Lubbock, a member of our deputation, suggested that a small staff of experts should travel up and down the country visiting the factories and other works connected with the output of war materials in order to increase the efficiency of Treasury control. Another of our recommendations was that the practice of subsidising local authorities, in order to promote local expenditure on luxuries which increase the burdens of taxpayers and ratepayers simultaneously, should be abandoned until the armaments race is arrested. Private members of Parliament might well be asked to report on unnecessary or wasteful expenditure taking place in their own constituencies. If Parliament and the local authorities would join in a general movement for economy, millions might be saved and the finances of the country would be visibly and substantially strengthened. There is a great mass of unnecessary officialdom, not only among local authorities but in connection with the Marketing Boards. This incubus ought to be diminished. If these superfluities cannot be dismissed, they might at least be transferred to the new officialdom of Defence, and thus save taxpayers, ratepayers and public debt from an unnecessary burden. I hope that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will now turn his attention from the revenue he is extracting by new taxation to the much greater revenue which he might derive from economy.

An admirer of Charles James Fox once burst into poetry because

Whenever a tax in the House was projected,  
Great Fox he got up and always objected.

What we want now is a leader of the Opposition who will show similar courage in denouncing unnecessary expenditure.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

## PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY.

MR. ROOSEVELT'S appeal to the Dictators for conference and peace was issued on April 14th, six days before Herr Hitler's fiftieth birthday. As to the compelling reason for the President's decision to release the note on that date there can hardly be any difference of opinion. One month earlier the diminished republic of Czecho-Slovakia had ceased to exist, and the peoples of Europe were in a state of unsurpassed anxiety. Success had attended every stroke of the Nazi technique from the *Anschluss* onwards. Mr. Roosevelt had been receiving reports of the gravest kind from his ambassadors, particularly Mr. Kennedy in London and Mr. William Bullitt who, on leave from Paris, was known to be spreading the worst alarm in Washington. The President had reason enough for his conclusion that there was no time to lose. Europe after the disaster of Prague was perilously near midnight. It was being taken for granted by the American press that Danzig would be Hitler's birthday gift to the Reich on April 20th. The President could not misread the signs; and since he is the elected head of a democracy with a gift for timing not inferior to that of the Dictators, he could be relied upon not to miss the moment. We cannot as yet measure the full effect of his action; that it was of the greatest value in mid-April we may be assured.

The message had a remarkably good press in the United States. If we consider only the newspapers that are habitually quoted as representative of sober American opinion, we may put the point more strongly and say that the President was accorded an impressive vote of approval. The main reason for this is entirely clear. America is overwhelmingly hostile to the Nazi-Fascist doctrine and methods; and although the large and varied body of isolationists have been suspicious of the President's foreign policy ever since the famous "quarantine" speech of October 1937, an unmistakable majority has welcomed Mr. Roosevelt's successive manifestos against aggression and intolerance. Beginning with the message to Congress at the new year, these pronouncements have come at frequent intervals during the past five months, and in America, as on our side of the Atlantic, they have been all the more effective because there is no comparable European voice

enunciating the same ideas and convictions. When speaking upon the all-important matters of government in relation to justice and human freedom, Mr. Roosevelt expresses the common thought and feeling of all democratic peoples. He cannot do other than make a straight moral appeal; and as more than one prominent American publicist has lately reminded us, the American nation is not able to remain unmoved whenever the central problem of world affairs appears as a moral issue.

The position of the President in times such as these is subject to the quickest changes. Six months ago Mr. Roosevelt's loss of prestige with Congress seemed to be reflected in a similar decline in the country. But his power of recovery is extraordinary, and to-day his pre-eminence is universally acknowledged. Until the end of 1937 it would not have been difficult to argue that in foreign policy he was taking great risks. But since March 1938 the American public has wanted the President to speak out loud and clear—in reaffirmation of essential American principles, and in judgment against the violation of treaties, the breaking of pledges, and the rape of small peoples. The results, as seen in the consolidation of public opinion, have been most noteworthy, and the successive actions of the Dictators, without exception, have tended to strengthen the President's authority. He is to-day, in his foreign policy, far more representative of the American nation than he was twelve months ago, while he is now in possession of one advantage which few political observers in the United States could have looked upon as possible until recently. The conspicuous fact of the past two or three years has been the unanimity of opposition to the President's domestic policies on the part of the business and professional classes. It was difficult to see how this could be altered, for, as Mr. Roosevelt's friends were compelled to realise whenever the White House made a move towards co-operation with business, the powerful interests were markedly cool in their response. The situation as regards international affairs is strikingly different. The President there is supported by large sections of the public which had become virtually irreconcilable in home affairs, and we should be accurate in reckoning on this side the important influences centred in the universities and the churches. Few indeed, moreover, are those who could have foreseen that Mr. Herbert Hoover would become

sympathetic with Mr. Roosevelt or that Mr. Henry L. Stimson would come out as a determined supporter.

We have, however, to recognise—and indeed to emphasise—the central difficulty, or contradiction, of the American attitude at the present stage. The American people, taken altogether, have never been more isolationist in theory and sentiment than they are to-day. With every new outrage or complication in Europe, every fresh manifestation of the racial or political bitterness which the average American believes to be an ineradicable evil of our continent, we may see a reinforcement of the popular belief that the United States will have to keep its distance from Europe. In the Capitol at Washington, or in any public meeting, the one thing that is certain to meet with full impassioned agreement is a declaration to the effect that America must be kept out of war in Europe and that American soldiers will never again be sent to fight the battles of the old world. This resolve—singularly unaffected as it is by the facts of a world never free from war—explains the state of mind which accounts for the confused neutrality legislation, to which I will come in a moment. Isolationism is by no means the monopoly of the Middle West. It exists in varying degrees throughout the country and, as the evidence clearly shows, it persists along with an increasing realisation that in the event of a second world war full abstention on the part of the United States will be an impossibility.

In this connection the Gallup tests of public opinion appear to be conclusive. They indicate that a majority of American citizens are thinking of war in Europe as virtually certain, and that those who retain the hope of America's being able to keep out altogether have now to be regarded as a diminishing minority. Accordingly, we need not look further afield for an explanation of the recent enormous appropriations for the defence services or the rapidity with which the Houses of Congress have acted during the present session. In January the President wrote his defence message. It was a startling document, composed in downright Rooseveltian terms and dealing in figures which as recently as two years ago would have seemed almost impossible. After the election reverses of last November Mr. Roosevelt was assumed to have lost his authority with Congress. He had to be prepared for resistance to his calls upon the public funds, particularly in the province

of work-relief. But there was no reason for any anxiety on his part as regards money for the defence programme. Of course there is always the easy and effective argument that in a time of huge expenditure for unemployment expanded armaments mean work and immediate wages. But even so, it is impossible to miss the significance of the speed with which Congress voted the estimates, or the complete ineffectiveness of the opposition which, until the past year or two, has always been able to keep up the fight for a moderate scale of armament. There are at present no groups or interests in the United States which can make a strong or even tolerable showing in Washington along that line. The majorities in both Houses have been overwhelming. Congress voted funds not far short of 400 millions' sterling to be spent in the coming fiscal year, thus backing up the President to the limit set by himself, and putting the seal of its approval upon a policy which implies a course of action in international affairs, in both hemispheres, which cannot by any means be made to harmonise with the still vocal isolationism of the Senators from Missouri and North Dakota, Wisconsin and California.

The American problem of neutrality is one of the greatest difficulty, and we cannot wonder that Congress and the general public should be baffled by it. The cash-and-carry provisions of the Neutrality Act expired automatically on May 1st, and the present article is being written before any steps have been taken in Washington to restore or replace them. For some time past the whole subject has been under investigation by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate. The hearings before this body have produced a welter of opinions and proposals. The question obviously is urgent. Congress can hardly avoid making some fresh and important decisions before the end of the present session. And yet so confused are the issues, and so various the minority groups, that it is quite possible for the Legislature to disperse without having corrected a state of affairs which satisfies nobody and is the cause of increasing anxiety to serious citizens of all parties.

The Neutrality Act does not prohibit all trade with belligerents. It requires, in the case of declared or recognised war, a complete embargo upon "arms, ammunition, and implements of war," while allowing the purchase in the United States of all other supplies, provided the buyers pay

cash and command other than American means of transport. But this cash-and-carry clause has already lapsed, leaving the embargo clauses unaffected. What this means in actuality we have seen in Spain, where the Government forces were deprived of aid by the embargo, or we may see now by looking at the working of formal neutrality in the Far East. The war between Japan and China is undeclared and unrecognised, and hence the Act has not been applied. American trade with the belligerent able to do business goes on without restriction. Japan is obtaining more than 50 per cent. of her essential war material from the United States. Without American petroleum and scrap-iron the invasion of central and southern China could not have been continued, and yet, as every visitor to the United States can verify for himself, at least 90 per cent. of the American people are sympathetic with the Chinese in their struggle for national independence. What, we may well ask, is legal neutrality amid conditions such as these?

There are at present before Congress two amending Bills which divide the attention of the newspapers and of the increasing public that is actively interested in this discussion. The first is sponsored by Senator Key Pittman of Nevada, who is close to the Roosevelt Administration. This measure would abolish the absolute embargo on munitions and permit war supplies of all kinds to be purchased in the United States by any nation paying cash and capable of managing its own deliveries. For example, it would allow Britain and France to obtain the war-planes they have ordered in America (a matter which provoked a violent controversy and the harshest attacks upon the President last winter), and to order as many more as they wanted. Senator Pittman has no objection to maintaining theoretic neutrality, but his assumption is that the removal of the embargo would mean a positive advantage for Britain and France, since it is assumed that their sea-power would be maintained. In answer to questions from isolationist colleagues, Senator Pittman admitted that this was the governing reason for his suggested alteration in the law.

The second Bill is submitted by Senator Thomas of Utah. His leading proposal is that the President should have power to name the aggressor and to put an embargo upon all supplies of arms and munitions ordered on its behalf, while allowing unimpeded shipments to the other side. Mr. Roosevelt

and the State Department, naturally, approve of the Thomas proposals, but these involve the complete abandonment of what America has hitherto meant by neutrality. The passing of the Thomas amendment would result in a decided enlargement of the President's discretion in time of war, and opinion in Washington upon that important point has of late been hardening. Congress in its present mood wants to hold on to the traditional restrictions upon presidential authority. The Pittman Bill would seem to have a fair chance of getting through. On the other hand, it is possible that the conflict of opinion may prevent further legislation unless, or until, Congress is faced with the necessity of a fresh definition of neutrality under the pressure of war emergency. Nor must we overlook the complication of the Johnson Act, which prohibits the making of loans to nations that are in default on their war debts. After the revelations of the Nye Committee (which Hitler in his Reichstag speech of April 28th referred to as having been appointed by the President, instead of by the Senate) no party or group in America could advocate loans to a belligerent country; but it is manifest that the question of credits in wartime would emerge as cash payments were coming to an end. The outbreak of war in Europe would force a stupendous expansion of American productive power, and distribution overseas would be inevitable.

In considering the United States to-day, as regards world affairs no less than those comprised within the New Deal, we must bear in mind that 1940 is presidential year. Every important question that comes up is of necessity discussed in relation to the possibilities of next summer, when the two party candidates for the November election will be chosen. Writing in this REVIEW in September 1938, I ventured the assertion that a third term for Franklin Roosevelt was most unlikely. That opinion still holds, with one proviso—that if war should break out Mr. Roosevelt would be nominated by the Democratic party and almost certainly re-elected. The Republic does not possess a rival national leader, and the emergence in the interval of a candidate on either side capable of challenging the President is almost unimaginable. Mr. Roosevelt himself can hardly be wishing for four more years of the White House burden, despite his enjoyment of everything belonging to the highest office. He is, however, concerned for the fulfilment of his policies; the field does not contain

an appropriate successor, so far as anyone can see; and in a recent speech the President made guarded reference to the circumstances which governed the retirement of George Washington after his second term. These points are not without significance, but none the less may we assume that if by June 1940 Europe should still be engaged in the avoidance of war Mr. Roosevelt's party will face the necessity of making another nomination.

There remains one matter of the greatest importance for the people of Britain and France upon which a few words, and those of the plainest, need to be said. The United States is a republican democracy. Its people are, to an overwhelming extent, hostile in feeling to the totalitarian States. And, one may add, they are to-day, more perhaps than at any time within memory, actively sympathetic with those European peoples which hold to the ideas and methods of political freedom. But we should make an enormous mistake if we were to conclude that in consequence of this popular sympathy the French and British Governments can count upon American agreement with their European policy. Nothing could be much farther from the truth. The public excitement throughout America in the autumn of 1938 was an extraordinary phenomenon. It was created in great part through a continuous broadcast commentary upon the news from Prague and the other Central European centres—the most complete radio build-up in connection with international events that has so far been achieved. The unbroken service of news and exposition had seemed to be preparing the American public for a collective stand by the democratic Powers, when the news of Munich destroyed the immense illusion. A second Munich, we may assume, is not to be envisaged as a possibility. But this is undeniable: that President Roosevelt's declarations and American public sentiment can be expected to merge in a foreign policy for the United States, only in so far as the Governments of France and Britain give proof of their resolve to stand by the common heritage of free institutions and international good faith.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

## LITVINOV AND AFTER.

THE sudden removal of Maxim Litvinov from the international arena has certainly startled the world and has set it guessing. Outside Soviet Russia this event has been taken rather dramatically, while inside the U.S.S.R. it seems to have passed virtually unnoticed. Stalin evidently does not think that his citizens have any right to know why a man who was, after all, a leading member of the Government has suddenly been dropped. Indeed, no explanation has been given at all and the very announcement of the Foreign Commissar's "resignation at his own request" appeared somewhere on the back pages of the Soviet press.

Quite apart from any other considerations, the striking thing about the replacing of one Foreign Commissar by another is this: this is the first case for a long period that a leading member of the Soviet administration is allowed to leave his post without promptly being put on trial for sabotage, wrecking and espionage or other alleged misdeeds; without being imprisoned or shot. It may well be, of course, that at some future date Litvinov shall be put through the usual procedure—firmly established during the great "purges" of recent years. But for the time being at any rate he appears to have been allowed to withdraw into obscurity relatively unmolested.

Various interpretations have been sought for Stalin's decision to change his Foreign Commissar while in the midst of important negotiations with Great Britain. But while this move has certainly increased what is so often described as the "Russian mystery" or the "Russian riddle," the question of Soviet Russia's foreign policy is not really as mysterious as all that.

While the "ramifications" and "trimmings" of this policy may be offering a confused and confusing picture, the "trunk" is fairly clear. It has been discernible for a long time, and not even the most deliberate obscuring of the diplomatic poker game that is being played on an international stage can hide the fundamental issues involved.

Whatever one may feel about the Soviet régime, with its uninterrupted twenty-one years of terrorism and dictatorship in Russia, not even the worst enemy of the bolsheviks could claim that they have territorial aspirations. Soviet Russia is

neither expansionist nor does she cherish any kind of aggression on neighbouring or other States. Indeed, her internal political and economic situation makes the maintaining of peace and the present *status quo* absolutely essential.

This may not always have been the case, and in the Rapallo days when the Soviets were siding with revisionist Germany they may have felt differently. Although it is by no means certain whether even then they would have welcomed a clash of arms in which they might have been involved.

To watch an international conflagration from a safe isolationist position and then to establish communism on the ruins of a democratic capitalist world that committed the folly of destroying itself, may have been their original ambition. Some people even assert that it is still. But whether that is so or not, this ambition is now a theory entirely divorced from the realities of the international situation, and the bolsheviks are nothing if not realists.

Whatever else he may be, Stalin is one of the most adroit and opportunistic practical politicians of our time; he does not deal in abstractions.

In an article entitled "Germany and Russia" which appeared in *THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* of December 1936 the present author pointed out how for a number of years Stalin and Hitler managed to live on fairly friendly terms despite the mutual diatribes in which both were indulging from time to time.

The "Great anti-Communist Crusader" or "Herald in the battle against bolshevism" as Hitler repeatedly described himself even renewed the 1926 Berlin Treaty of friendship between Germany and the Soviet Union. Indeed, as pointed out in the article mentioned above, the Germans under Hitler extended large new credits to Soviet Russia and generally showed the utmost willingness to continue the long-established collaboration despite all "ideological differences."

Only when the Franco-Soviet *rapprochement* began in 1934, which eventually led to the signing of the famous pact, did the Germans finally turn against Russia and begin a war that is as yet purely diplomatic, or at any rate, not yet being fought in the field of battle.

But the question may be asked: what was it that induced Stalin to give up his collaboration with Germany, which had

proved so infinitely useful to the Soviet régime since its very inception?

It has already been stated that the Russian dictator is a *Realpolitiker* and does not deal in abstractions. At the same time no one is better qualified than he to understand the working of other dictators' minds (incidentally, is it not astonishing how much the dictators are continually learning from each other?), and that is why the importance he attaches to the words and actions of Hitler is very different from similar reactions of democratic politicians.

He knows the value of political programmes and manifestos. Unlike the leaders of the western democracies, Stalin has never dismissed *Mein Kampf* as the ravings of a lunatic or the irresponsibilities of an untrained political mind with a grievance.

There can be little doubt that in Moscow Hitler's book has not only been carefully studied and digested, but that the Soviet authorities have from the beginning been shrewd enough to discern in it a political programme, a definite plan of world-wide importance. They saw that since Hitler's advent to power that programme was carried out point by point without any opposition by the rest of the world. Rearmament, the tearing up of the Versailles Treaty, the annexation of Austria and later of Czechoslovakia, indeed, the creation of "Grossdeutschland," the encirclement of France, and the disruption of south-eastern Europe—such are some of the developments they observed, and from which they drew the only logical conclusions. They did not go about repeating *ad nauseam* that "if" Germany is really expansionist, that "if" she is seeking world domination, then of course the other powers must consider their course of action.

They knew from the start that Germany was both these things, and that there are no "ifs" about it. Moreover, it was cool comfort to them that according to Hitler's programme the desired destruction of France takes precedence over the eventual conquest of Russia (being only a preliminary step in that direction) and that the Ukraine was left *pour la bonne bouche* at the end of Hitler's projected repast. For a while they had been willing to wait, for they had hoped, or logically assumed, that the western democracies were equally aware of Hitler's programme and would take steps to prevent him from carrying it out.

As long as that feeling lasted they were even prepared to be quite friendly with Germany, or to be neutral.

Perhaps they had yet another hope, but it soon vanished. Lenin once remarked that "It would not matter a jot if three-quarters of the human race perished; the important thing is that the remaining quarter should be communist."

While lip-service is still being paid to Lenin and his doctrines, Soviet Russia has travelled a long road during the fifteen years that have elapsed since her founder's death. It is significant that for a number of years whatever Stalin did, he always invoked some suitable quotation from his master's writings in support. And only when celebrating the fifteenth jubilee of Lenin's death, on January 21st, 1939, was it for the first time suggested that "comrade Lenin" might have been "theoretically correct" in all he said and did but that in practice he was a little bit of a dilettante and that all the achievements of the Soviet Republic were due to "the leadership of Comrade Stalin." World communism as the result of war is an ephemeral hope; the wiping out of, or threat to, existing achievements is a very real thing.

Not any ideological differences, therefore (the two régimes being almost identical in their methods of government), but solely the realisation of the growing military danger prompted Stalin to take up an active anti-German attitude. And no man could have been more suitable for carrying out this policy than Maxim Litvinov, the Foreign Commissar of the U.S.S.R., who had virtually been in charge even during the last few years of the Chicherin régime.

Litvinov had always been a "Westerner." Though relations with Germany when he succeeded Chicherin in 1930 were quite cordial, he did nothing to promote personal friendship with German ministers and officials. That does not mean, however, that he got on well with the British, who in those days scarcely concealed their loathing and contempt for him. But he did make an effort, and a successful one, to get on with the French. He never much fancied the spirit of Rapallo of which he was anxious to free Russia at the first suitable opportunity. And Geneva, where he first represented Russia on the Disarmament Conference, provided him with a unique opportunity of making important international political contacts and gradually to assert his own as well

as his country's prestige with a lot of sceptical and personally antagonistic statesmen and diplomats.

Small wonder that when Stalin decided to join the anti-German camp he employed this man, who was only too willing to carry out his master's instructions to that effect. It was Litvinov who made Soviet Russia what is known in Germany as diplomatically *salonfähig*, i.e. internationally acceptable from a social point of view; who led her into the League of Nations, and who concluded vital agreements with France and Czechoslovakia. Stalin's most adroit commercial traveller in diplomacy, he travelled from capital to capital and became the most successful collector of pacts of every nature. He coined the phrases of "collective security" and "indivisible peace" or the classical definition of the aggressor.

In an article entitled "The International Position of Soviet Russia" which appeared in THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW of February 1934 the present author tried to explain both the causes and the effects of Russia's apparently triumphant return into the *Comitas Gentium*. Internal weakness and fear of war forced Stalin to seek the friendship of the capitalist democracies, while they, in their turn, found Russia a useful counterpart to the totalitarian and other countries that were dropping out of the League.

When on July 17th, 1936, Litvinov celebrated his sixtieth birthday, the Soviet press made a quite unusual fuss over him. Few bolsheviks, excepting Lenin and Stalin themselves, were ever so honoured during their lifetime; in fact, a document signed by Stalin and Molotov described him as "the senior member of the bolshevik party." Special tributes were paid by all his leading collaborators who welcomed in him the greatest fighter for international peace.

That was Litvinov's apotheosis, and the present developments would be hard to understand if this were not mentioned.

For there followed a twofold process which deeply affected Russia's international situation. In Russia herself a tidal wave of "purges" rose which swept away even the most conspicuously successful of Litvinov's collaborators. He lost practically all his best ministers, ambassadors and high officials, and how he himself survived is something of a miracle.

Simultaneously there happened the collapse of Geneva and all that it stood for, Abyssinia, Spain, the Far East, the

*Anschluss*, etc., etc.—a whole series of calamities which England and France proved unwilling and incapable to prevent.

It must have become clear to Stalin that nothing further could be gained from his endeavours to work in with the western democracies. The Litvinov method had obviously failed. Isolation might have been the logical result of this disappointment. Yet when the September crisis over Czechoslovakia broke out only Soviet Russia—Benes himself has confirmed it—offered to fight. By doing that she not only carried out her promise but actually went beyond her legal obligations, which were conditioned by France fighting too. It was certainly not sympathy for democracy nor any "ideological" consideration that prompted this course of action. But even in those days Moscow seems to have seen clearly what Paris and London refused to see: the inevitability of war, unless German aggression were resisted at once. They saw no good reason for surrendering the Czechoslovak bastion to an enemy who would not hesitate to advance further as soon as he was ready. And though they did not particularly cherish a fight, they were prepared to meet the challenge.

What followed is recent history. Not only was no use made of their readiness to play their part, but they were completely cold-shouldered by Britain and France.

Within a very few months these same Britain and France had to seek their support.

The present author has never concealed his profound antagonism towards all forms of dictatorship, whether the colour of the shirts be red, black or brown. And he would have preferred to see the democracies in the past twenty years expressing their condemnation of Soviet terrorism rather than attempting to do business with the bolsheviks. But since such an attitude was never adopted and since the Soviets were brought into the game of international diplomacy, it is nothing but suicidal madness to treat them as they were treated at Munich and after.

The rape of Prague made it clear to Britain and France that a "peace front" against Germany must be built. Hence the agreements with Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey. Hence also the negotiations with Soviet Russia. These have now lasted for two months, without any tangible results—except Litvinov's dismissal right in the middle of them.



Writing about Britain's new commitments in Europe, Mr. Garvin in the *Observer* of May 14th made the following observations :—

We would have gone much too far on this line unless we now went farther so as to restore an undoubted equilibrium in the interests of peace and safety. Half-and half measures in a matter of this magnitude would be fatal. They would incur the maximum risk of attack without creating full force to resist it. Of two things one. We might have continued—suicidal as the choice must ultimately have proved—to decline all obligations on the other side of Europe. But if immense Eastern commitments are to be undertaken at all, then it would be stark folly not to ensure the co-operation of Russia on an equal basis of reciprocal security.

The whole problem of the long-drawn-out negotiations with Russia seems to be the finding of a solution for this last point : an equal basis of reciprocal security. Having been snubbed and ignored, the Russians are suddenly asked to come in ; yet not on any terms of equality, but in some form that is qualified by the *desiderata* of Poland and Rumania. It is for these two countries to decide when and how Russia is to help. The whole matter is presented in a way as if no end of a compliment were paid to the bolsheviks in allowing them to come in at all.

Stalin is a man of logic. If he is to join in a new arrangement, then he wants to do so on terms which are compatible with a great country's dignity. He also wants "honourable amends" for the isolation to which he has been subjected for so long. And, chiefly, he wants no loopholes that would enable the western democracies to get him involved in a war with Germany and then leave him to fight alone. This, he suspects, was the intention of the British and French cabinets all the while and he wishes to take no risks in that direction. It may be an *idée fixe* with him, a nightmare, but if a satisfactory result is to be achieved in the negotiations with Russia, that nightmare must be removed. At the time of writing nothing definite is known ; it looks, however, as if the British cabinet were moving nearer to Russia's formula and a solution were on its way.

But, it may be asked, why has Litvinov been dropped at the very time when a "western orientation" once again becomes possible ? Indeed, when the essence of "Litvinovism" is on the point of being realised ? No one really knows what

dictated this step. But probably it is quite wrong to ascribe it to just one consideration and put a label on it. There is not that much finality even in the dictators' minds these days.

Litvinov's fall may be due to each one of the following considerations, but probably to a blend of all of them :

1. A desire to force Britain and France to hurry up in their decisions by removing the Soviet personality that is most congenial to them, and the hope of a better bargain in consequence.
2. A desire, arising out of the above consideration, to show the world that unless Soviet Russia's legitimate aspirations are gratified the policy of the chief protagonist of a western orientation can be replaced by isolationism.
3. A wink to Germany that the way to a possible understanding has been cleared of one of its main obstacles ; if a *rapprochement* ever were to take place it presupposes a modicum of anti-semitism in Russia and anti-capitalism in Germany—an "adjustment" that Hitler and Stalin could carry through without much difficulty.

These three reasons are only guesses, and as already stated there is probably a little bit of each in Stalin's mind. Moreover, Litvinov was ready for a fall since the "purges," and if he had been dismissed then this would have surprised no one.

But two facts are certain : Stalin has always determined his own foreign policy and Litvinov was only an instrument. It remains to be seen in what way the dictator will use the new instrument, whether this be Molotov, Potemkin, or someone else. And the second certainty is that without the full adhesion of Russia the present system of guarantees built up by Britain and France is rendered not merely useless but most dangerous to ourselves and our new allies.

Whether Russia's military preparedness is as good as claimed by some or as bad as asserted by others, she would in all circumstances be a formidable link in the anti-German chain. As a neutral (perhaps an unfriendly one) she would be harmful. But if she were driven to side with Germany, that would be a disaster whose consequences cannot even be estimated.

GEORGE SOLOVEYCHIK.

## DANZIG, POLAND AND GERMANY.

DANZIG was once known as Gdańsk. It is still so called in the Polish language, the language of a country whose fate, for good or ill, is linked with it. It was once a purely Polish city, and was only Germanised in the course of centuries through the operation of the German "Drang nach Osten." To-day Danzig, though German as regards the overwhelming majority of its population, is *the* great port that (apart from Gdynia) is available to Poland, Poland's gateway to the Baltic, Poland's lung by which she breathes.

Danzig is an old, venerable, architecturally very beautiful patrician city. It first began to play a rôle of some importance as early as the tenth century. In the twentieth it has become a bone of contention, though still retaining its medieval romanticism—at least architecturally. Unfortunately the intolerance which has become the principle of government in the Free City is also medieval. However, what the League of Nations defines as Danzig comprises more than the Free City. There is, in addition, the well-known seaside resort of Zoppot, two small towns, Tiegendorf and Neuteich, and a large number of villages. The total population of the area is 410,000 souls.

Danzig—or Gdańsk—fell to Prussia at the second partition of Poland in the year 1793. During the Napoleonic wars, from 1807 till 1814, it was a Free City under French sovereignty; then it became Prussian again.

The present status of Danzig must appear rather complicated to anyone not familiar with the complexities of Eastern European conditions. The Free City has its own currency—the Danzig Gulden—but is linked with Poland in a Customs Union. It has its own government, the Senate, which is elected by a Parliament of seventy-two members, the President of the Senate being the supreme head of the government. There is also a League High Commissioner, though his power to-day is only of a theoretical nature, the League itself having been reduced to a shadow of its former self. (It was not always so; in 1933, when the situation in Danzig was critical, Mr. Sean Lester, the High Commissioner of that day, enforced respect for the League status of the Free City.) But that is not all. There is also a representative of Polish interests in Danzig who during the last few years has collaborated, without friction on the whole, with the

Senate. And finally, Poland is entitled to maintain a military detachment in the Bay of Danzig. With a single insignificant exception, this circumstance has never been the cause of conflict. The diplomatic representation of Danzig abroad is in the hands of Poland, but in all internal matters Danzig enjoys complete freedom of action. The Czech "Protectorate," no less than the nominally independent Slovakia, would no doubt welcome even a fraction of the internal independence of the Free City.

The Danzig question has, characteristically enough, come to the forefront after the success of German aggression in Central Europe. It can be viewed through three different pairs of spectacles—Polish, German and Danziger. As far as the Polish attitude is concerned, history, as well as economic exigency and economic law, speaks clearly enough. Even German historians, when they choose to be objective, admit that Danzig was part of the Polish Kingdom for centuries. But even if history is left out of account, on the principle that "once upon a time" has no relation to the present, the same method cannot be applied to geography. Geographical facts and their geo-political concomitants have an eternal validity and are not a product, but the cause of political events. One unalterable geographical factor is represented by the fact that Danzig is situated at the mouth of the Vistula, a river that is 100 per cent. Polish. There is hardly another great river in Europe, apart from Russia, which is so completely and intimately linked with the history and the life of the country as the Vistula is linked with the history, government and life of the Polish nation. The Danube is an international river, common property of many peoples—Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Roumania; the Rhine is a boundary river, and therefore automatically associated with war and warring interests; the Elbe, though a German river, lacks the great significance of an only great German river, while the Oder flows through Germanised territories which were once Slav. But that the Vistula is as Polish as the Thames English, or the Volga Russian, or the Mississippi American, is a fact that admits of no doubt whatever. With the Vistula, which flows from South to North, Poland gravitates towards the Baltic. And at the mouth of the Vistula lies Danzig. The attitude that it would be possible to remove the mouth of the Vistula from the sphere of Polish influence, could only

serve one ultimate purpose—to sever a vital artery in the body of Poland and thereby slowly but surely ruin the country as such.

A country of 35,000,000 inhabitants wedged in between two great and mighty powers cannot survive without access to the sea. And it is hardly likely that Poland could retain for long her present path to the sea—the Polish Corridor or, more correctly, the Province of Pomorze—if Danzig were embodied in the German Reich. It is a characteristic feature of the régime of the Third Reich, well known by now, never to stand still, but always to press on and on. The Treaty of Versailles may rightly be reproached for many an injustice that held the seeds of conflict, but the creation of a path to the sea for the resurrected Polish State was certainly one of the wisest and fairest acts of the Peace Conference. Poland's lung—like the anatomical one—has two parts, one of which is represented by Danzig, the other by Pomorze (with the newly created port of Gdynia). A glance at the map is sufficient to show that if the "living space" theory of the present German régime is justified, then the application of this principle to East Prussia would irresistibly lead to the conclusion that that territory lies within the Polish "living space." This conclusion would have at least as much force as the assertion that Bohemia and Moravia, and in fact the whole of Czechoslovakia, represented a foreign body within the sphere of the most vital German interests, and must therefore disappear. However, Poland has never laid claim to East Prussia, although there was a time when that province was inhabited by non-German, mainly Slav, tribes, and it still has a numerically considerable, though badly oppressed, Polish minority. Poland recognises the fact that to-day East Prussia is overwhelmingly German. But we must not confuse causes with effects, and suppose that the awarding of the purely Polish Pomorze to Poland and the creation of the Free City of Danzig, whereby East Prussia became separated from the rest of Germany, constituted an injustice. Looking at the matter objectively, the real position is that Polish interests were only partially satisfied, while Germany was shown every consideration in that East Prussia was left within the Reich. The "fanatics of justice," who attach greater importance to the doctrinaire interpretation of self-determination than to all the dire consequences that are bound to arise when this

principle is abused by aggressor nations, should remember that it was an imperialistic Prussian King—Frederick the Great—who laid it down in his political testament that, "He who holds the mouth of the Vistula and Danzig, has greater power over Poland than the King of Warsaw." Comparison of this dictum with that of another German, and its working out in practice during the past year or so, is very illuminating. Bismarck, another imperialist, said that he who held Bohemia was master of Central Europe. But in order to become master of Bohemia it is necessary first to possess the Sudeten Mountains. So the Reich—by a misuse of the principle of self-determination—secured possession of the Sudeten Mountains, then proceeded, by the application of the "living space" theory, to march on Prague, thereby realising Bismarck's pronouncement and establishing mastery over Central Europe. Is the Third Reich now to be permitted to translate the words of Frederick the Great into reality? Is an *Anschluss* of Danzig to the Third Reich to be allowed when it is quite certain that this would only be a first step and would present a grave menace to the independence of Poland?

That, briefly, is the Polish attitude. From the point of view of the Free City as such, an examination of the Danzig question points to the conclusion that the interest of the population lies in the preservation of the *status quo*, and would incur serious loss through an *Anschluss*. Danzig to-day enjoys a privileged position which offers very positive advantages to it. A considerable part of Poland's exports pass through the Port of Danzig. An *Anschluss* would lead to a fundamental change in this connection, and Danzig would sink to a second or third class German port. It would be incapable of competing not only with Hamburg, but also with Bremen or Stettin. The Danzigers may be good Nazis, but they are certainly good business men and arithmeticians. If propaganda and political pressure, which to-day dominates all Germans wherever they live, were eliminated, and the Danzigers dared to open their hearts, they would have to admit that the present situation is far more desirable to them than incorporation in the Reich. Indeed, it is an open secret, despite the efforts of the Nazi leaders to deny it, that the population of Danzig take that attitude. That portion of it which has adopted the Nazi gospel are quite content that Danzig should be ruled according to Nazi principles. There

are an S. A., an S. S. V. "Gauleiters" and Gestapo officials, and Führer worship is a prevalent sentiment. From the party point of view Danzig is a Nazi Paradise, no less than Berlin. But Danzig has one advantage over the cities of Germany—thanks to its Polish Hinterland, the Free City is economically far better off. But in addition to the economic reasons, there are certain psychological factors which confirm the Danzigers in their unwillingness to be reunited with the Reich. They have the example of Memel before them, the majority of whose inhabitants have become disillusioned since the *Anschluss* and realise that it was better for them to live in a Memel which was the only port of peaceful Lithuania than in a Memel which is to serve as the gateway for military attacks eastwards. The Danzigers fear both economic ruin and militarisation, both of which would come to pass if Danzig were joined to Germany. We must not allow ourselves to be misled by appearances. True, Danzig is to-day completely Nazified, at least outwardly, owing to the extermination or suppression of all political opponents; but to conclude from this that the Free City genuinely desires the *Anschluss* would certainly be wrong. That is a fact which could not be affected even by a 98 or 99 per cent. vote in favour of it which would certainly be cast in case of a plebiscite. The world has learned by now what value to attach to such plebiscites. Incidentally, the fact that a régime of totalitarian oppression and regimentation could be introduced in Danzig without any objection from Poland, which has certain rights in the Free City, may be regrettable from the idealistic and even from the practical political point of view; but, on the other hand, this only proves that not only is Danzig governed by Germans and according to German principles, but that it is also free, completely free, and that Poland is careful not to interfere in its internal concerns. In the case of Austria, the Sudetenland and Memel, the Reich could support its demand for an *Anschluss* by claiming that "Germans are living under foreign domination," for although Prague and Kaunas granted a large measure of freedom to their German minorities, they were nevertheless foreign governments, while Schuschnigg's government was regarded as "foreign" owing to their refusal of Nazi principles; but in the case of Danzig there is not a shadow of justification to raise this argument. Danzig is not only a Free City in name;

it is really free. Moreover, it is essentially a self-governing state, though subject to certain international obligations. It may be unfortunate for Nazi propaganda, but not even the Nazis, who are otherwise so inventive, are able to tell the world that the Danzigers are not allowed to live a full German life.

Finally, there is the German point of view. Characteristically enough, the Nazi Government attached no value to Danzig for years. As little was said by the Germans about Danzig as about the Southern Tyrol, whose German inhabitants are certainly not free, but about whom Germany preserves a dead silence, in order not to anger Italy. The silence about Danzig was due to a desire on the part of Germany not to upset her good relations with Poland, as expressed in the Non-Aggression Pact of 1934. On the rare occasions when Danzig was mentioned, the Nazis swept it aside as a secondary problem, saying that Danzig was only a provincial city. It was only recently that the question of Danzig was brought to the forefront, i.e. when other German aspirations had been realised. The Pact was a piece of opportunism on the part of Germany, to which she adhered so long as it suited her purpose. The fact that the Pact was unilaterally abrogated, without any valid reason, by no means proves that Danzig has suddenly become a vital problem to the Reich. What it does prove is that it is now the turn of Danzig to experience the force of the apparatus of aggression. The economic importance of Danzig to Germany is more than doubtful. If, after the *Anschluss*, it loses its Polish customer, it must suffer defeat in the competition with other German ports, and would then prove to be a burden rather than an asset, like Austria. Nor can it be a question of Nazi prestige, since, as we have seen, Danzig is free, German and Nazi. We could go further and say that it would be possible to believe a peaceful and static Germany, but not the "dynamic" Germany of to-day, that she has no other object than to unite Danzig with the Reich. But as to the Third Reich, it is quite certain that it would regard the *Anschluss* of Danzig not as an end in itself, but merely as a first step towards further aggression. Once the heavy batteries of the German Army are erected in Danzig, once its peaceful port is turned into a naval port—and who doubts that it would be so, in view of the Memel example?—the days of the Polish Pomorze would

be numbered, and this old Polish province would be crushed between Germany and East Prussia. And once the Third Reich cut off Poland's access to the sea, Warsaw would soon come under the "protection" of Hitler and Poland would become a vassal of Germany. It is clear that Danzig to Germany is an apparently harmless means for the attainment of an imperialistic goal. Is it to be wondered at that while Poland is prepared to negotiate on the question of Danzig, she will only agree to do so if the negotiations are to be negotiations and do not involve an armed threat, and that she regards the problem as vital to her very existence.

To sum up, it may be said that the Polish attitude is just, both from the historical and geo-political points of view; the attitude of the Danzigers must, for economic, as well as psychological reasons, coincide with that of Poland; while the Nazi attitude conceals grave dangers not only for Poland, but also for the peace of the world. The Danzig question is certainly "highly inflammable" but it can be rendered harmless with a little genuine good will on the part of Germany. But we must beware of the "sense of justice" of certain doctrinaires who in their blindness support claims which upon closer examination prove to be both unjust and dangerous. The history of the past few months is a grave warning that cannot be ignored.

S. WOLF.

## THE UKRAINE.

WHAT was for many centuries a sort of No-Man's land, raided intermittently by Mongols and Turks from the East, and Slav peoples from the North and West, stretches from the Carpathians to the Volga Heights. In between, where flow the familiar Dnieper, Dniester and Don, all is so flat that the little hill of some 300 feet from which famous Kiev overlooks the Dniester becomes a striking object in the monotonous landscape. It is the land of the "black earth" whose reputed fertility makes it one of the goals of hungry Germany's expansive policy. She has an outpost there already, for between Samara and Saratov on the Volga, round about the region where one can begin to distinguish the "black earth" from the poorer brown soil of the North, there is a German Republic, an autonomous region now, within the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Its German colonists came there in Catherine the Great's time. There were Protestants and Roman Catholics and Mennonites amongst them. (The latter were a sect resembling the Baptists.) Their hard struggle with climate, soil, and Tartar raiders gave them a unity, however, which endures to this day. But the Soviet Government has adopted a policy of infiltration with Slav elements, so that the Germans now only represent some 64 per cent. of the total population (some 600,000) of the region. A recent German investigator\* has noted gloomily that the "young people especially, who have no doubts," are beginning to acquire the Bolshevist mentality. But he expresses a hope that they may yet be saved for *Deutschtum*. Significant, but perhaps over-ambitious, for the Republic is far away beyond that broad flat stretch of "black earth."

Ideas about the remarkable fertility of that "black earth" are perhaps somewhat exaggerated. It is more fertile certainly than the thin wind-blown soil of North Russia, but that is not saying a great deal. Its formation has been explained as follows. During the short spring the land where not cultivated becomes covered with a mass of weedy growth. The fierce dry summer dries it all up to powder, and the winter snows make of it a fertile compost. But the snow never lies thick,

\* *Die Deutschumsinsel an der Wolga*. Lothar Koenig. Duellmen in Westfalen: Laumann, 1938.

because the winds blowing continually from the Asian steppes scatter it, and the soil with it, laying the latter as a thin surface manure which gives the characteristic black colour. But fertility does not go deep. Hence the soil is easily exhausted. And summer drought is a terrible curse, continually bringing the famines that have always vexed the land at recurring intervals. The Soviet Government have hopefully proposed deep ploughing, and there are extensive tractor factories at Stalingrad (formerly Tsaritsyn) on the Volga, and at Kharkov, the administrative capital of the Soviet Ukraine. The Collective Farm (which is not a Communist, but a Co-operative enterprise run for the private profit of its members) with its 6,000 acres or so of flat fields, is well adapted to giving a long run for the tractor. But if the theory about the formation of the "black earth" is correct, deep ploughing in itself is not going to help much, and, indeed, reports as to recent yields have been disappointing to Russians—though doubtless Germans aren't told so! In his speech to the eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party last March Stalin significantly observes that the "base of market grain has shifted from the Ukraine . . . to the north and east, the R.S.F.S.R." Russian scientists are said to have produced a long-rooted drought-resisting wheat, adapted to standing the hot summer sun, and no doubt science has not said the last word on the matter. "Party" enthusiasts in Germany, anyhow, claim to be very sure of what their scientists will be able to do. On the other hand, doubts as to the "loot" value of the Ukraine (in spite of Donbas coal, and other sources of mineral wealth) have certainly contributed to the rise of a "Western" group (chiefly "Junker") opposed to the "Eastern" adventure, and advocating an understanding with Russia. Meanwhile in another significant passage of the above-quoted address, Stalin alludes contemptuously to those in England, who (he says) hope to profit by embroiling Russia and Germany for their mutual exhaustion. M. Litvinov's subsequent resignation lends significance to this observation.

The Russian Ukraine covers an area of about 178,000 sq. miles, and has a population now of about 36 millions.\* The Polish Ukraine, of East Galicia, with its capital at Lwow—the Lemberg of War memories—contains some 4 millions of "Ruthenians," Little, or Red Russians, as they have been

\* Exact figures of January census not yet available.

variously designated. But the area contains also a number of Poles, especially at Lwow, and of course Jews. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia\* lies to the south of the Carpathians from Galicia, and was for centuries under Hungarian rule, to which it has just reverted. Its Slav population consisted almost entirely of oppressed peasants and wood-cutters. About three-quarters of them are Greek Orthodox, the remainder Russian Orthodox. The urban population is largely Jewish. The Bukowina, which contains about 400,000 Ukrainians, was incorporated in the province of Galicia in 1786, and became part of Greater Rumania after the Great War. In the Russian portion of the Ukraine, however, you may still distinguish such racial types as Mongol, Turkish, Caucasian. You hear a lot of German spoken, and not only by Jews. And along the Don there are of course the Cossacks. You may see the latter now riding proudly over the Don bridge at Rostov in their traditional uniforms (slightly altered to meet Republican exigencies), the Soviet Government having by a decree of April 20th, 1936, restored the right to wear them, as well as other traditional privileges of these former warriors of the Czars.

The Cossacks have of course played a notable part in the history of the Ukraine since the sixteenth century. They were the frontiersmen of what might be appropriately called the Wild East of Europe, and their standard was adorned with horses' tails. Incidentally, the horse is still preferable to the motor-car as a means of getting about this roadless country, a point for prospective invaders to note. On the other hand there are plenty of landing grounds for aeroplanes. . . . But the old Cossack bands rode freely and vigorously, raiding the Turks and Tartars and being raided by them. They soon began to form regular self-governing communities, and to develop in consequence the independent democratic outlook which still distinguishes them and makes them fit somewhat uncomfortably into the Bolshevik edition of totalitarianism. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government sets great store by their warrior qualities for the forthcoming contest. But there are not a great many of them. There were only some 3 millions recognised as Cossacks in Czarist times.

The communities were eventually settled as "frontiers-men"

\* For a description of this country see the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for December 1938.

along the Don, in Kuban, in Astrakhan, by the Urals, in Siberia. Their independent spirit expressed itself by frequent revolts in Czarist times. Subsequently they acquired their privileges in return for giving the faithful military service that for long upheld the internal power of Czardom. They received State grants of land, which were held on a communal tenure similar to that of the *mir* pertaining in other parts of Russia. Each community had extensive rights of self-government, and there were grants of money, pensions for officers, and so on. Profits from the farms, with those from trading, rents, fisheries, etc., were put to communal uses—costs of administration, and various "social services." In fact, the institution by the Soviets of the Collective Farm has made less difference in the life (and outlook) of the Cossack than is generally supposed.

The present division of the Ukraine lands and people derives from old history. In the fourteenth century the Grand Duchy of Lithuania reached down to the Black Sea, whilst East Galicia (Red Ruthenia) had been annexed to Poland by King Casimir the Great in 1340. East of all that was a Slavdom still disorganised and depopulated after the great Mongol raids. Lithuania became joined to Poland in 1386, and the middle of the sixteenth century still saw all the western Ukraine, beyond Kiev, under the Polish crown. Then Russia began to expand to the west. By 1740 her borders had crossed the Dnieper, taking in Kiev. The partitions gave all the western Ukraine (Podolia and Volhynia) except Eastern Galicia to Russia.

By this time, however, Ukrainians had achieved a measure of national consciousness. For one thing, many of them had joined the Uniat Greek Church founded in 1595 at Brest Litovsk, a name to-day with other tendentious implications! And their outlook had already become westernised before the days of Peter the Great. So the Russian Ukraine retained its unrestful reputation. There were Cossack rebellions, and peasant rebellions, and nationalist movements resentful of Czarist tyranny. In the horrible catacomb prisons of the Pecherskaya Lavra (monastery) at Kiev they will show you to-day a huge hecatomb of some 2,000 skeletons, said to be the victims of one of those rebellions. In the somewhat more civilised times of the nineteenth century the Ukraine produced its Nationalist poet, Shevchenko.

Shevchenko's life was typical of the old régime. He was born a serf on March 9th, 1814, and Soviet Russia has just witnessed the official celebrations of the 125th anniversary. A *Russian* version of the poet's works, as well as an English translation, have been published, and the Soviet press has been full of somewhat over-anxious applause of Ukrainian patriotism. As in all totalitarian countries facts are made to accord with desires—not the reverse. But certainly Shevchenko's life is inspiring evidence of the triumph of the spirit over circumstances. He was eventually redeemed by purchase (the money was raised by the lottery-sale of a picture painted by Prof. Karl Brullov of the Arts Academy at St. Petersburg), a number of poets and intellectuals having discovered his talents. His work was naturally concerned with the woes of the down-trodden, and it was not long before it attracted the attention of the "authorities." As a consequence he was in exile in Siberia from 1847 to 1857. The resulting hardships caused his death in 1861 at the age of 47. Even in those tyrannical days the people could express their feelings by the mass demonstrations they gave at his funeral. It was the year of the "Emancipation," so disillusioning in its results! Shevchenko's burial-place is at Kanev, on a hill overlooking the Dnieper to the south of Kiev, and a large cairn marks the spot. It used to be known as the "Mecca of the Revolutionaries," for these made pilgrimage there in Czarist days. There is now a "Shevchenko Museum" in the little town itself. In the central park at Kharkov there is a fine statue to him, by a Soviet sculptor, Monezdo. The base is surrounded with vigorously executed figures representing, congenially to the Bolshevik mind, the oppressed and exploited classes—serfs, labourers, proletarian workers, in one group in chains, in another, "freed," with arms in their hands. The Ukraine indeed was more ripe for revolution than even the north, but was not quite certain which way it wanted to go. Its ideas of freedom did not always fit in with the Bolshevik interpretation of that difficult term.

Meanwhile East Galicia, under Austria, was enjoying a relatively spacious time. The Austro-Germans, indeed—a point to be remembered to-day—managed to assume the guise of friends for Ruthenians oppressed by Polish landlords. It was they who assiduously exploited the conception of a Ruthenian nationality and culture, distinct from that of



“those others” over in the Russian Ukraine. Thus they hoped to get the best of both worlds, dividing the peoples—Poles and Ruthenians—under their own rule after the well-tried Habsburg tradition, yet putting a check on any possible irredentist movements from over the border. It was a delicate and not altogether successful task. The 1870's saw much unrest amongst the Ruthenians, only appeased by substantial concessions. But these did help to maintain the fiction of a separate national entity, to the annoyance of Poles and Pan-Slavs generally. By 1891 there was a Ukraine Party in the Austrian Reichsrat. Its pretensions became alarming to Russia. The year 1908 witnessed the intriguing spectacle of a Slav Congress demanding the union of Poles and Russians against the Ukraine movement. The Ukrainians of Galicia retaliated by entering into ominous relations with the Prussian Ostmark-verein. The Archduke Ferdinand was understood to be supporting them over against the Poles of Galicia.

Nineteen-seventeen brought the first realisation of the hopes of Shevchenko. There seems to have been no question of a union with the rest of Russia at first. An independent republic was proclaimed by a Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists at Kiev, and recognised by the Provisional Government at Petrograd in August. But then came portentous November. The Rada, or Council of Government, proclaimed a People's Republic on November 20th, 1917. Characteristic differences of interpretation, however, remained. By January 1918 relations between Kiev and Leningrad had been broken off. Fighting followed between Bolsheviks and Ukrainians. But many of the latter began to be attracted by the slogans of Communism. The Rada appealed to the Central Powers, and was recognised by them at the first Treaty of Brest Litovsk signed in February. The actual result was the German occupation (sometimes spoken of hopefully as “the first” in Germany to-day) for the Rada could not hold its own against the gathering forces of Bolshevism. The German occupation, indeed, served chiefly to throw nationalist sentiment on to the side of the Soviets. There was a general rising of peasants. The German Governor was assassinated at Kiev in June. By December the Cossack Petlura had overthrown the Rada now deprived of German support, and proclaimed an independent Ukraine united with East Galicia.

The birth was premature. There were too many divergences—of culture and religion; social and economic. Many were bitterly against Communism. Others were enthusiastically in favour of it. Petlura himself is designated in Russia to-day as an incipient “Trotskyist,” “Fascist spy,” “interventionist,” and the other varied and rather meaningless terms of Soviet political abuse. There was savage fighting with the Soviets all through 1919, but by the end of the year the Bolsheviks were definitely on top. Kharkov and Kiev were occupied by them. In February 1920, on the fall of Odessa, the third Ukrainian Republic was proclaimed. It was a Soviet one and Petlura had a price on his head. He got assistance from the Poles who occupied Kiev for a moment, only to be expelled again by the Bolsheviks. The Treaty of Riga (Poland and Russia) recognised the independence of the Soviet Ukraine. It entered the Union with the other autonomous Republics on July 6th, 1923.

But the Russian Ukraine has maintained its tradition of unrestfulness. It has been a fruitful field for the O.G.P.U., and the European tourist is sometimes startled to see chained unfortunates being taken through the streets in open carts under guard. Such are all described as Trotskyists, but actually the matter is more complicated. Some are just disappointed careerists, others (amongst whom some of the first doubtless appear) are really paid spies or wreckers working for “a foreign Power”; others again are the real idealistic communists such as Trotsky, indeed, claims to be. These last resent the imperfect communism of the Stalin régime and justify almost any counter-action, from treachery to assassination—*more Russico*. There are certainly lots of “grumblers,” who, fearful of their own folk, must pour their woes into the ears of sympathetic and apparently (they seem prepared to take the risk!) trustworthy foreigners. They grumble about the food, the price of it and the quality, about the taxes and loans required by the Government, about the price of clothes and boots, and their quality. After all, it is a healthy if dangerous practice.

In the Polish Ukraine meanwhile, appetites whetted by that brief rise of a new nation have never been appeased. The Poles have certainly not been anxious to appease them, which is no doubt natural enough. In September 1922, indeed, a Statute for East Galicia was drawn up. It was certainly not very satisfying to Nationalist aspirations. It proposed three

"little Seyms" (parliaments) for each of three autonomous counties into which the region was to be divided, with power to deal with local affairs. Poles and Ukrainians in these "County Councils" were to form separate curia, sitting apart except for matters of common interest. There were to be safeguards to secure the familiar "rights" of fair treatment in matters of language, schools, official posts. And the Central Government was to set up special departments for public instruction and the Uniat Church in the Polish Ukraine. But the thing was never implemented.

Hence sempiternal unrest, continuing to this day, and regarded hopefully by enthusiastic believers in Germany's "mission." Land reform, too, has not worked out satisfactorily in the Polish Ukraine, nor in White Russia, with its million or so of inhabitants—a further pregnant cause for discontent, fruitfully exploited by the intellectuals. And as a Polish Parliament does not give much scope for the expression of grievances, these have been put forward more forcefully in the first place by an underground body, the Ukrainian Military Organisation (U.W.O.) usually accused of receiving funds from both Berlin and Russia, though presumably not for entirely the same purposes. This body is supposed to have been responsible for the frequent disturbances, culminating in bloodshed, and sometimes ruthlessly suppressed by the Poles. The other body is a constitutional one, the Ukrainian National Democratic Organisation or U.N.D.O. (initial letters are fortunately the same in our language). Its aim is an independent national State, united eventually with the Russian Ukraine, and, now apparently, with White Russia too.

In 1931 U.N.D.O. asked to enter negotiations with the Polish Government. The latter required first a declaration of loyalty, and the withdrawal of "minority petitions" to the League (not that these had been of much account). U.N.D.O. refused, and there were a good many more petitions in 1932. The League condemned the activities of U.W.O. but held that the Polish reprisals had been excessive. Appeals for goodwill, and Polish assurances of better treatment have produced the usual unfruitful results in a world becoming more "realistic." Terrorism and reprisals continued. In September 1934 another attempt at conciliation was made. The Ukrainians demanded the dropping of the name "Ruthenian." They asked for an equal footing in schools and offices, and financial

assistance for their co-operative societies. They required a University at Lwow, and grants for cultural and scientific purposes; agrarian reform which would be effective and prohibit Polish settlement in Ukrainian lands. And finally they asked that the whole region be made a separate autonomous unit, with its own Diet. The atmosphere was somewhat spoiled by the contemporaneous trial of U.W.O. terrorists, accused variously of conspiring with Berlin, Moscow and Lithuania. All twelve were found guilty, and three condemned to death, though the latter sentences were commuted. Nevertheless, Kosciolkowski, the then Prime Minister, in an Accord of December 5th, 1935, agreed to examine the demands in a friendly spirit, and the Ukrainian Party helped to vote the Army Budget the following January. But in October of the same year a conference of U.N.D.O. at Lwow expressed disappointment with the results of the "Gentlemen's Agreement," and dissatisfaction with the progress of agrarian reform. It demanded improved opportunities for the Civil Service, and significantly declaimed against the spread of Communism, a statement that perhaps sounded gratefully in the listening ears of traditional individualists across the Eastern borders. But anyhow, Poland was under the "Colonels," and they were all for unity—for good military reasons. In the spring of 1937 the attempt was made by Colonel Koç to form a Camp of National Unity as the nucleus perhaps of a unified totalitarian State. But it has fallen somewhat flat. The Slav, in fact, is not quite so docile as his race name suggests. The Cracow Congress of February-March 1938 denounced totalitarianism. But external menace is now successfully emphasising the need for unity. Meanwhile, however, there was another Ukrainian Congress at Lwow in January 1938, attended by 200 delegates, who found little else to do but declaim against the non-implementation of the Pact of 1935. Another Congress in May decided to abandon co-operation.

On December 9th, 1938, an Autonomy Bill was tabled by the U.N.D.O. leader Mudryj. It asks for a wide autonomous area to include the White Russians of Poland, with authority over local forces, and recognition of both Polish and Ukrainian as official languages. The Central Government is conceded control of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance. However, the Speaker disallowed the Bill as one not having the support

required for a Constitutional amendment. U.N.D.O. called an Emergency Conference of Ukrainian leaders at Lwow at the end of the year. But there were other "emergencies" in the air, perhaps producing that good that comes proverbially out of evil. Anyhow Mudryj, after some opposition from the "irreconcilables," was given powers to make a final attempt to negotiate. The conciliatory atmosphere was, however, disturbed by repressive measures against White Russians in January 1939, and the police actually fired on a Ukrainian mob at Urman (Galicia) on the 15th.

It is clear that the situation offers plenty of scope for disruptive intrigue, and German "expansionists" have been taking full advantage of it, hoping to exploit the discontents of both the Russian and Polish Ukrainians so as to induce them to unite in a vassal State under German tutelage. The new British policy will certainly check these designs, but last December soothsayers in Germany (there appears to be a recrudescence of them there) were foretelling that things would begin to move towards the end of February. There was some disagreement as to the outcome, but those who propounded "ruin" for Germany might now justly claim to be true prophets of her moral downfall. Ukrainian nationalists, anyhow, should ponder the prospect. After all, the moral principles of justice, truth, liberty and human rights matter more than mere political "nationalism." Given the former, national idiosyncrasies, fructifying in characteristic cultural contributions to the common stock, will find scope and welcome. Without those basic necessities, all culture and civilisation must die. The real "ideological conflict" to-day, about which so much cant is spoken, is not over political forms of government but between those who stand for basic moral principles and those who oppose them. Shevchenko's own appeal was primarily for their establishment amongst his own people. In the present challenge to them Ukrainians would do well to join themselves to those striving to uphold them. Afterwards it will be the task of the triumphant forces of liberty and justice to provide cultural opportunities for all the Slav peoples within the framework of some wider union of civilised mankind.

A. S. ELWELL-SUTTON.

## FIGHTING CANCER.

THE fate of people suffering from cancer is decided at the moment they are put under appropriate treatment. How many cancer patients could be saved by radiation or operation at the very beginning of their illness! But generally they die for being treated too late. Thus the most important practical problem in fighting this widespread disease is *early diagnosis* and early treatment. For the prevention of cancerous diseases and their preliminary stages an annual preventive examination of the healthy and their conditions of life and work is indispensable.

Goethe's fear that the world would one day be a big hospital and we should all be nursing each other is characteristic of health conditions in his time. Then (about 1808) there were 36.3 deaths a year per thousand in London. How different it is to-day! By personal and public modern hygiene, by the higher standard of life, by the energetic measures against infants' and children's diseases and epidemics, particularly tuberculosis, the general death-rate during the last hundred years has been reduced by more than two-thirds. Accordingly the average term of life has been increased. In England the probable duration of life for a boy (1930-2) will on an average be 58.74 years, for a girl even 62.88, whereas in the decade 1871-80 it was only 41.35 and 44.62. Unfortunately, however, this increase of longevity means *new biological dangers* for civilised humanity, especially as the Great War thinned out the flower of European youth, and increased birth control deprives the world of further millions. Parallel to the shrinkage of youth and the widening of the older groups goes an increase of illnesses of age, above all of cancer. In 1936 77,271 died in Great Britain of malignant tumours. About every seventh male and every sixth female death was due to cancer. Approximately about 2½ millions perish every year on the globe from this fell disease. It kills more people in civilised countries than tuberculosis and all infectious diseases together (in Great Britain in 1936 54,433 against 26,544 of tuberculosis of the lungs). The number of cancer cases still living is much greater than is to be gathered from official statistics. Of the inhabitants of Great Britain living to-day, according to the latest statistics, about 6½ millions are to die of cancer, if—to quote Wells—this "not only

most difficult but also most important problem of humanity" is not more successfully resisted.

These facts caused a fatalistic conception of cancer, the only illness without the power to cure itself, especially as even surgery seemed to hold out little hope. Even in the world of science a sterile scepticism was spreading. As late as 1931 a well-known doctor and statistician wrote: "Cancer must indeed be regarded as the most important regulator of the stock of those over fifty . . . its task seems to be that of thinning out among the still healthy!" This conception of cancer as an incurable disease of old age, even as "a physiological cause of death," not only paralyses all endeavours of resistance but also contradicts facts. "Physiological death" is caused by a cessation of the vital functions, as a rule an inevitable consequence of the wearing out of highly organised cells in the nervous, vascular and glandular system. But cancer is in many cases not inevitable and in its preliminary stage no more an incurable illness. At this early stage, which is local and mostly painless, Röntgen and radium therapy can cure without operation almost all kinds of skin and lip cancers, more than one-third of all mouth and laryngeal cancers, almost two-thirds of all uterine cancers and, in combination with surgery, as many cancers of the breast. Also in the sphere of stomach and intestinal cancer the successes of surgery are increased with the development of early diagnosis.

Thousands of sufferers from cancer could have been saved if they had received competent treatment at the very beginning of their disease. But even in Paris, even in the Cancer Institute which is famous for its successes with radiation, despite the untiring investigations of the *Ligue Franco-Anglo-Américaine contre le Cancer*, 20 per cent. of the women with uterine cancer could not be treated because of the advanced stage of their illness; of the remaining 80 only a fraction, 6.7 per cent., were in the early and most curable stage.

Cancer is not merely an "illness of old age." It occurs also at an earlier age, especially at full maturity. Before their fifty-ninth year almost as many people die from cancer as from sixty upward. About half of all death cases from cancer in women of the age of 30-49 are due to breast and uterus. In Germany about 25,000 women die of cancer every year. It is also very sad to learn how many men qualified to be pioneers of culture and civilisation have been cut off by cancer before

their time. How wrong is the "heroic conception" of the task of cancer being to "thin out those over 50"! Very many geniuses have produced important works in all spheres when already in the so-called "cancer-age." From Plato (92) to Kant (80), from Michelangelo (89) to Titian (99), from Hippocrates (about 83) to Pawlow (87), from Newton (85) to Alexander von Humboldt (90), from St. Paul (64 ?) to Albertus Magnus (87), from Plutarch (about 80) to Ranke (91), from Solon (about 81) to Franklin (84), from Euripides (74) to Goethe (83), from Archimedes (75) to Edison (84), from Haydn (77) to Verdi (88), we can call up an army of immortals who in their old age have been important factors in the development of our civilisation. Especially at the present stage of science, civilisation and technique, when decades of preparatory study are necessary for the mastering of a subject, and as a compensation for the lost generation, the preservation of the creative power in maturer years up to the natural limits of life must be one of the main objects of modern medicine. To attain this end it is above all necessary to fight against the diseases of old age, in particular to solve the cancer problem.

Recent experimental and clinical research has revealed for several kinds of cancer a number of causative factors, and so opened the way to prevention. For instance, the kinds of occupational cancer caused by frequent or prolonged slight irritation of textures could almost certainly be prevented. An example of the long gestation of the cancer caused by irritation is the soot-cancer described by Percival Pott in 1775. At that time five-year-old children, "climbing boys," were employed to clean chimneys. They suffered from chronic skin ulcers, the so-called "soot-warts" which after a latent period of twenty to thirty years became real cancerous ulcers. By the law for the protection of children chimney-sweeping was permitted only after 16. Henceforth chimney-sweepers became ill with soot-cancer showing the same symptoms and after the same latent period, namely between the thirty-fifth and forty-fifth year. Thanks to the new Russian chimneys and to the use of brooms in ball form as well as greater personal cleanliness chimney-sweep's cancer has almost disappeared.

A more recent example of the fact that occupational cancer is only the last stage of a process lasting many years is "Röntgen-cancer." Thousands of sufferers to-day owe their

lives to the appropriate intensive Röntgen-depth-therapy without having incurred any damage by the rays. But it was different at the beginning of the Röntgen era. Not knowing the biological effect of these invisible rays, experimenters, doctors and assistants exposed themselves for years and repeatedly without any protective devices to the then still very primitive apparatus. After a latent period of four to twenty years there appeared proliferations, badly healing ulcers and at last real skin-cancers which have killed more than 200 persons of 35 to 50. Thanks to the—also legally prescribed—protective devices (such as filters, leaden walls, lead-glass screen, protection of pipes and of body, limitation of working-time), ray-cancer is made almost impossible.

These observations teach us that occupational cancer develops on an originally normal ground. The first stage is characterised by harmful and repeated slight irritation which, often prolonged for many years, permanently damages the texture. This long exposure to irritation which precedes the formation of these kinds of cancer explains the fact that it appears more often at a maturer age, when the protecting and resisting functions of the organism are getting weaker. Everywhere in pathology we see that the young organism reacts against damage caused by irritation with an acute inflammation, nature's great biological remedy, whereas the older organism cannot—or does not sufficiently—react in this way. The irritation is not a specific one causing cancer, but all energies of weak intensity can produce it. Even sunlight can cause premature ageing of the skin in occupations especially exposed to weather, as with farmers or sailors. The ultra-violet chemical part of light which, correctly dosed, produces in the skin the antirachitical vitamin D, produces in higher concentration through over-stimulation the poisonous *Toxisterin*, which eventually causes chronic skin-inflammation, rank, horny, cellular growth which at last, after a latent period of decades, can degenerate into skin cancer. On the same principles as applied in Röntgen-protection, simple remedies, such as protection against concentrated sunlight by yellow or red veils, screens, application of cream and general care of the skin, careful treatment of skin diseases, can prevent cancer.

Only a fraction of the people suffering from damage by irritation get cancer, namely those who have a constitutional

or an acquired disposition towards it. There is, for instance, a constitutional disposition to cancer attached to a very rare skin disease which may occur with children of closely related parents. With them the still imperceptible irritations of regular daylight may lead to incurable ulcers and wart-like formations on the exposed parts of the body which are developing into cancer, and generally end with death before the school age. As prophylactic measures the prohibition of marriage between consanguineous people and permanent protection against the light of the exposed parts of the body would be advisable.

The fight against cancerous diseases must also be directed against those factors which are able to weaken the resistance power of the organism against carcinogenous irritations in general, such as chronic poisoning with alcohol, tobacco, arsenic, and especially against a syphilis which may have occurred many years before, which can be proved in 10 per cent. of all cancer cases. With cancer of the tongue a syphilitic infection can be proved in 60 to 80 per cent. of cases, particularly if there is also excessive use of tobacco. Thus the investigation of causes of mouth cancer shows the direction of prophylaxis—fight against venereal diseases and abuse of tobacco (lip cancer of pipe smokers), cleansing of the cavity of the mouth, timely removal of the white plaques (leukoplakia), particularly in former syphilitics, careful treatment of syphilis, general strengthening, avoidance of *overfeeding* and of extreme irritations, such as chewing betel which causes the frequent cases of cancer of the mouth among Hindus. Not less than 1,207 cases of mouth cancer were described among 1,700 cancer cases in South India. The three factors: syphilis, abuse of tobacco and concentrated alcohol explain the more frequent localisation at the entrance ducts in the cancer cases of men. During the years 1911-20 there died of lip cancer 2,361 men compared with 180 women in England, and 10,114 compared with 1,009 of cancer of the tongue. With the male sex laryngeal cancer is about five times, cancer of the bladder and of the lungs about three times as frequent as with females.

Contrasted with the relative frequency of these male cancers is the almost exclusively female cancer of the breast. Here again the preliminary causes could not seldom be prevented. How often an obdurate eczema on the nipples, a

benignant swelling, a chronic inflammation of the breast, as happens so often with unmarried women who have not nursed, develops into cancer! Cancer of the gall bladder is three times as frequent with the female sex, in accordance with the more frequent gall-stone diseases and chronic inflammation. With its prevention and careful treatment the frequency of cancer of the gall bladder will be reduced. Cancer of the thyroid gland, formerly so frequent in Switzerland, has largely decreased since the reduction of goitres as a consequence of the prophylactic delivery of iodised salt and operative removal. Uterine cancer is often developed on the basis of inflammatory irritation in connection with repeated injuries at confinements, neglected chronic catarrhs, erosion by pessary pressure, polypuses, white plaques. The first signal, irregular bleedings after the fortieth year, is often disregarded. All these kinds of cancer, where lasting damage is causing the illness, are easily recognisable with the modern methods of examination and therefore curable in time. The causative factors of cancer are more frequent with the working classes, and since they pay no attention to the painless preliminary stages, death caused by cancer is more frequent with them.

This greater percentage of mortality of the poor, especially with the more easily recognisable cancers, is to be seen from some English statistics in which mortality from cancer is systematised into five social classes. It is highest in the lowest social class. With 100,000 men over 45 the proportion in 1921-3 is as follows: There died of cancer of the skin 6 (rich): 20 (poor), of the lips 1: 10, of the tongue 14: 41, of the jaws 4: 18, of the mouth (pharynx, tonsils) 12: 28, of the larynx 13: 19, of the œsophagus 14: 28, of the stomach 66: 117. Also the death-rate of uterine cancer is indubitably greater with the working classes. How men's professions influence their fate is likewise shown by English statistics on mortality in different professions. In 1921-3 the standard death-rate of cancer was 68 with clergyman, 102 with physicians, 159 with tobacco workers, 179 with tin and copper miners, 180 with brewers, 212 with cotton spinners, 230 with waiters and 231 with basement barmen. The different professions are exposed to cancer in particular parts of the body according to the impact of the cancer-producing factors.

Workers in the following industries are liable to skin cancer:

briquettes, coke, lighting-gas, petroleum, mineral lubricating oil, pitch, tar, unrefined paraffin, shale-oil, roofing-felt, cork-dust, furnaces (stokers), cotton spinners (jenny machine), workers in arsenic foundries, sheep dipping, copper foundries, tin foundries, Röntgen and radium industries (dial painters), farmers, sailors, fishermen, especially in hot countries like the Nile valley. For many years cancerous degeneration is preceded by obdurate eczemas, knotty growths, rank flesh, badly healing ulcers, pigment warts, fistulas and breaking scars. By repeatedly painting a rabbit's ear with coal-tar, and especially with *benzpyren* (a product of coal-tar), it was possible to produce, after a period of three to six months, typical cancroids of the skin. Kangri cancer, which the inhabitants of Kashmir get on their belly by carrying their baskets (kangri) filled with glowing pine-wood, is due to a combination of chronic burning and the effect of tar. No less than 842 kangri cancers were operated within twenty years at the mission hospital at Kashmir. All these damages could easily be avoided. Likewise avoidable are chronic cauterisation by inorganic acids and alkalic lyes or prolonged application of arsenic, especially with those who suffer from cutaneous affections (psoriasis) and whose skin has become more sensitive owing to often-repeated Röntgen treatment. Particularly tragic is the endemic lung cancer of the miners in the Schneeberg mines (arsenic, cobalt, nickel, sulphur, bismuth, radon), where work usually began at 16. After fifteen to twenty years endemic cancer of the lungs appeared which generally resulted in death in the forties. About 71 per cent. of all deaths among the Schneeberg miners were caused by lung cancer. For this reason the mine was recently closed.

Cancer of the lungs is undoubtedly increasing. From *post mortem* statistics we learn that in the last twenty-five years it has grown from 4.34 per cent. of all cancer cases to 13 per cent. This increase is said to be due to working in the dust of tarred roads, in garages (carbonic oxide, automobile disease), in the dust of metal grinding, in smoky plants, and in the manufacture of gas for war purposes. The cleansing of air is no less important than that of water. The following reliable health regulations are necessary: protection against dust, acids, poisonous gas, excessive exposure to sunlight; application of air-filters, ventilation, respirators, exhausters, wearing working clothes that are cleansed of poisonous matter, having

wash-rooms, baths, dining-rooms, in the factories, mechanisation of the methods of production, regular change of work from closed to airy rooms, limited working hours, etc. The same applies to cancer of the bladder which has been observed in dye-works. In Basle there died of cancer of the bladder (after a latent period of fifteen years) thirty-three times as many aniline workers as from the average of the whole male population of Basle. With aniline workers and cloth-dyers a regular hygienic control, frequent change of work and examinations of the bladder are necessary; and if catarrhs, chronic growths, polyps, stones are manifest, the dyeing work should be stopped immediately. Cancer of the bladder also occurs frequently with the fishermen of the Nile and ploughmen in Egypt, among whom the eggs of Bilharzia-parasites locate themselves in the bladder.

Cancer of the œsophagus and the stomach is not seldom found in persons who get burns of the mucous from too hot food and drink as well as hot alcohol. The stomach cancer of cooks is due to the tasting of hot dishes, and the œsophagus cancer of the Chinese—almost always with men—to the frequent swallowing of boiling rice. The stomach is especially sensitive to mechanical, thermic or chemical irritation. Often cancer of the stomach is preceded by chronic catarrh, chronic gastric ulcer, polyps or scars. It is remarkable that during the times of bad nourishment in the war a reduction of cancer in the stomach was observed.

The rules for the prevention and fighting of cancer can be formulated in ten commandments:

I. *Personal Hygiene.* The individual is not only the captain of his own destiny and that of his family. As a member of the community he has also the social duty, by obeying hygienic commandments, to keep his producing power to the maximum age lest he and his family become a public burden before their time. It is not enough to observe the general rules, such as suitable nourishment, moderation, care of the skin, extreme cleanliness, fresh air, light, sun, exercise. To keep one's power of resistance, above all against the danger of cancer, it is especially necessary to avoid carcinogenous diseases as far as possible, particularly syphilis and the abuse of alcohol and tobacco. Moreover, members of families affected with cancer in the same region should not inter-marry. Long life would be a fatal gift if it were not a life of health.

II. *Hygiene of Environment.* Lifelong prevention of harmful chronic or recurring irritations.

III. *Industrial Hygiene.* The maximum elimination of carcinogenous chemical, thermic, actinic and mechanical irritation. General hygienisation of industrial plants, particularly safety regulations in dangerous trades.

IV. *Social Hygiene.* General control of industrial enterprises including the very small uninspected ones and home industry. Regular examinations by insurance doctors with instructions to report.

V. *Frequently repeated personal information* by the family doctor and general enlightenment through health specialists. The terrible fate of cancer sufferers is due partly to the nature of the disease, which creeps on painlessly, partly to neglect and indifference. From the first signals of the preliminary stages till the outbreak of the illness precious years often elapse, during which people enjoying good general health could have been rescued from the danger zone, especially as many cancers, thanks to modern diagnostic and therapeutic methods, are already recognisable in the preliminary stage.

VI. *Special curative prophylaxis of the predisposition to forerunners of cancer* by most careful treatment of all acute illnesses from childhood onwards, so that they do not reach the chronic stage.

VII. *Early radical removal of all weak points*, such as chronic ulcers, tissue growths, white plaques (leukoplakia), polyps, growing warts, innocent ulcers, especially if they are exposed to irritation.

VIII. *Immediate removal of incipient cancer by operation, electro-coagulation, radium, Röntgen.* Increase of institutes equipped with the best staff and modern apparatus. No doubtful preliminary cures! Cancer therapy is full of unsubstantiated assurances. Every delay is a danger.

IX. *After-care for operated or radiated people*, partly to submit them to a longer after-treatment which increases the resisting power of the organism, partly in order to be able by regular observation to discover relapses in time and to submit them to a repetition of the treatment.

X. *Periodical Examination.* Popular enlightenment through physicians and nurses, through films and radio, through lectures, travelling exhibitions, leaflets, etc., has had only limited success. We need an organisation which has



proved itself in the fight against popular diseases: periodical examination of the state of health combined with a hygienic revision of our mode of life. In how many people believed to be healthy is there casually discovered a dangerous disposition to an illness, or already a serious disease, or harmful working and living conditions, for instance in recruiting, or before becoming insured. Many who do not know that they are ill could thus be cured in time. Even more necessary than the already customary dental examination is an annual systematic examination of all the important organs at least from our fortieth year, which means the beginning of the process of decline in the organism. This could be done by the family doctor, the medical adviser of the factory, the insurance societies and especially the hospital, as 10 per cent. of the population pass through the hospitals a year. In these already diagnostically equipped institutions prevention would be easy, and they could thus become effective organs of popular education and public health: "*Preventories*." They would, of course, charge no fees to the poor, as their health is their only property and the active man is the highest possession of humanity. The annual preventive examination of the healthy is the best weapon in the fight against the tragic "too late"! which is the fate of so many besides those suffering from cancer. It is due to the health education through the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company that the insured who have been making use for ten years of the privilege of examination in the Life Extension Institute have a death-rate 18 per cent. smaller than that of the best comparative groups.

From all these facts we see that the science of to-day possesses effective weapons for the prevention and cure of a number of cancerous diseases in their early stages. Those who know what misery this most disastrous of all illnesses has brought upon a great part of mankind are morally and socially bound to help in its restriction. As in the fight against plagues and epidemics, so in that against the widespread disease of cancer, individual and collective measures will result in preventive and curative successes. May the belief in the practicability of this lofty aim encourage the forces working towards its fulfilment!

PAUL LAZARUS.

## SCOTLAND AT THE CROSSROADS.

THE acceleration of the rearmament programme has not brought recovery to Scotland. It has not even brought improvement. In the year of her great Exhibition, Scotland showed signs of continued decline. Her leaders, fully conscious of the sad state of affairs, have been making real efforts to stem the tide; but the problem remains unsolved, and much greater efforts are needed. There is small hope, however, that these efforts will be made until Scotland's condition is viewed in true perspective. A radical change in outlook must come first. Common sense will then dictate a radical change in policy.

Scotland's unemployment total remains high. After a modest improvement it has been rising again during the past twelve months. In November 1938 the unemployment total was 253,892—20,000 more than in November 1937—and of these no fewer than 220,277 were "wholly unemployed." Throughout 1938 the total was approximately 20,000 higher than in the previous year. The total is 50 per cent. higher than in 1929. More than half of the total is concentrated in Glasgow and the industrial West. Glasgow alone, with 81,000 unemployed, has an unemployment rate of 17·2 per cent., compared with London's rate of 7 per cent.; and another black spot on a grey background is Dundee, where the unemployment rate is as high as 18·9 per cent.

The Poor Relief figures show a marked reduction compared with the total of two years ago; but the reduction does not, in fact, reflect an improvement, for the simple reason that approximately 100,000 cases were in 1937 transferred to the charge of the Unemployment Assistance Board. In 1929 the Poor Relief total, including dependants, was 192,098. By March 1937 it had risen to 337,915. The latest figure is 232,095, but bearing in mind that about 100,000 were transferred to the Unemployment Assistance Board when the change was made in 1937, and that the Board has since been dealing with many other cases that would formerly have claimed Poor Relief, it will be realised that the latest returns indicate no improvement.

Scotland's revenue, according to Dr. J. A. Bowie, Principal of the Dundee School of Economics, has fallen 30 per cent. in fifteen years. Her income tax receipts have declined to only

7 per cent. of the receipts for England and Wales, compared with 11 per cent. in 1919.

Complete figures of Scotland's exports are not available, because a large proportion of the shipments are made through English and Welsh ports; but it can safely be said that the decline in Scottish exports has been greater since 1929-30 than the decline in British exports as a whole; and the decline in exports from the Port of Glasgow of Scottish galvanised sheets from 44,838 tons in 1929 to 11,361 tons in 1937—a decline which is mainly attributed to the tariff on imported sheet bars, the industry's chief raw material—may be taken to illustrate the deterioration. British exports of galvanised sheets have declined heavily since 1929-30, and exports from Scotland's leading port now constitute only 5 per cent. of the diminished total.

The grave unemployment problem is due mainly to the decline in exports, and the deplorable state of housing may be attributed to the same cause. Sir William Goodchild, Secretary-General of the Scottish Economic Committee, recently referred to the condition of housing as "a national disgrace." No fewer than 250,000 houses are still needed in Scotland. One in four of the population of nearly five millions is (to quote Sir William Goodchild) "living under conditions which are fatal to moral and physical progress." No doubt much can be done, even in depression, to remove this blemish on Scotland's national life—the task of eradicating social evils cannot wait upon prosperity—but the real solution of the housing problem, which is only part of the greater problem of poverty, will not be reached until Scotland's export trade recovers and restores the buying power of her people. Then, and then only, will those who are badly housed to-day be able to buy or rent new houses to order.

Scotland has made little progress in the development of modern light industries. Her capital is mainly tied up in the heavy and primary producing industries. There is a real need for the development of new industries, and the authorities who have been studying Scotland's problem have been trying to stimulate activity in this direction. The new industrial estate at North Hillington offers tempting opportunities to enterprising manufacturers. Already fifty-five new factories have been opened, while 120 others have been or are in course of construction on the estate. But the development of new

light industries, while it will help, cannot solve the problem of industrial depression in Scotland, and probably the leading Scottish industrialists realise this. At all events, few new factories, apart from those recently opened at the North Hillington Estate, have been established in Scotland since 1931. In the years 1932-5, only seventy-four new factories were opened, and in the same period 102 factories were closed down. In 1936-7, forty-eight new factories were opened (as against twenty-eight closed down); but this compares very unfavourably with the progress made in England and Wales, where 1,044 new factories were opened in the same two years.

Scotland still depends, and I think must continue to depend mainly, upon her great heavy manufacturing and primary producing industries. More than half of her whole production is engaged in heavy iron and steel production, engineering, shipbuilding, coal-mining, agriculture and fishing. Her main industrial development has been based on her mineral resources, principally coal, and she must continue to capitalise these great natural assets. Unfortunately the effects of the War proved damaging. The military and naval demands of 1914-18 intensified activity in the manufacture of heavy equipment. There was too much specialisation; and as this type of manufacture involved huge capital expenditure Scotland's industry has been burdened ever since, in periods of depression, by heavy overhead costs. Capital which might have found its way into new kinds of production has remained locked up, often earning nothing, in industries for whose products the demand, both at home and abroad, has diminished.

To-day unemployment is particularly high in these industries, and it is still rising. In coal-mining last November, 14,552 were out of work—an increase of 807 compared with November 1937. In shipbuilding the total rose by 961 to 11,683. In general engineering the total rose by 3,558 to 9,143. And in iron and steel the total actually rose by 3,425 to 6,293.

These are the industries which one would expect to see improving in a period of unprecedented rearmament; yet they are still languishing. If our industrial leaders and economic advisers are wise, they will not encourage hopes in rearmament as a means of recovery, even though new orders serve to quicken the pulse of industry for a time. The lessons

of the past must not be forgotten. Greater capitalisation of our heavy industrial plant to cope with rearmament orders will mean a legacy of over-capitalisation in the future. Leadership has been sadly lacking in Scotland in the years since the War, and the timely warnings of Dr. Bowie have made little impression on the public; but in more recent times Sir Steven Bilsland, Chairman of the Scottish Economic Committee, and Sir William Goodchild have performed a national service in reminding both industry and the public of the danger of putting their faith in rearmament for recovery.

It would neither be in the tradition nor in the interests of Scotland (said Sir Steven Bilsland) to place reliance for the future on what may be a temporary, if feverish, rearmament boom. . . . In so far as activity is due to the rearmament programme, it is a recovery of a false type.

And Sir William Goodchild, in a recent address, elaborated the point :

Scotland (he said) depends for her prosperity on her export trade, and the diversion of the energies of Scottish industry to warlike things is a hindrance to the active development of the export trade, to which, in present circumstances, vigilant attention must be paid in view of the serious competition of totalitarian States using their full political and military power to reinforce economic penetration of foreign markets. There is a risk that Scotland, owing to the needs of a national emergency, will miss the opportunity of developing her foreign connections.

Rearmament encourages concentration, but it offers no help in reaching a permanent solution of the critical export problem; nor does it permanently help Scotland's internal consuming power. Political and international considerations combine to distract the minds both of our leaders and of the public from radical economic reforms. The needs of the moment must be served—but the dangers must also be observed if past mistakes are not to be repeated and if a false recovery is not to be allowed to blind us to the realities of the situation.

Scotland, then, dependent as she is upon a recovery of her export trade, should be vitally concerned with the movement to lower the barriers to international trade. At present neither the industrialists nor the public show any disposition

to place a return to freer trade in the forefront of a national policy, and the need for far-sighted planning, not only to stimulate internal development but to focus attention on the primary conditions of recovery and to co-ordinate the national forces in an effort to compel action along the necessary lines, is urgent. The Industrial Policy Committee appointed by the Scottish Liberal Federation have given a lead, and Sir William Goodchild and the Scottish Economic Committee have been urging the public to realise the need for a long-term, balanced economic policy to supersede the half-baked efforts of the present Government. The Scottish Economic Committee is at present handicapped by limited powers and resources. An Economic General Staff is needed, with powers and financial backing, to plan for the future along broad, generous lines. There is need for technical research into the possibilities of new industries and new methods; for economic study, the framing of a long-term national policy, and guidance in relating the technical research work to the national policy; and for financial accommodation to put the desired policies into effect. As an effective liaison body between the statutory power and private and public enterprise inside the country, the Scottish Development Council is a failure. It has neither the power nor the influence to compel action on a national scale—and after seven years it is doubtful whether it even has a policy!

The condition of Scotland's agriculture has not improved under the policies of State aid of recent years. One quarter of Scotland's territory is still under cultivation, but the area is steadily declining. During the past ten years 100,000 acres have gone out of cultivation. Year by year more workers leave the land. The evil of land monopoly is still with us, and even if purchasing power for the produce of agriculture were restored, farming could not achieve complete health until the power of monopoly was broken down by means of rating and taxation of the capital value of land, which would both make it uneconomic for private owners to hold land which they are not developing and also relieve buildings and other improvements of taxation. As an alternative to the Socialist policy of land nationalisation we must have a system under which the ownership of land ensures that the best possible use will be made of the land (which should be held in trusteeship for the nation), which will reward, instead of penalising, enterprise,

and which will encourage co-operation to reduce costs between producers and consumers, and the building-up of a credit system on the Danish model. At the present time credit is not easily procured by farmers, especially small farmers, because the demand for their products and the future outlook do not justify the granting of credit. The Scottish fishing industry suffers under the same handicap.

The truth is, the problems of agriculture and fishing cannot be solved independently, and the efforts to save these industries by the granting of subsidies are bound to fail, because the primary need of farmer and fisherman is markets. Without markets, subsidies are merely State "doles." Given buoyant markets, subsidies are unnecessary. The problems of the farmer and fisherman will be mainly solved when the problem of the heavy Scottish industries is solved, because the farmer's market and the fisherman's market are in the industrial areas. A revival in export trade which would cure the unemployment problem and put money into the pockets of the wage and salary earners in the thickly populated industrial areas would go a long way towards bringing new prosperity to agriculture and fishing.

Scotland stands at the crossroads to-day. She has to make up her mind whether, by a new awakening of national consciousness and healthy private enterprise, by voluntary co-operation, and by freedom of trade, both internal and international, she is to shape her own ends, or whether she is to sell her birthright of sturdy independence and lose her soul under a régime of rigid State control. It is the choice between enlightened private enterprise and Socialism.

To-day State intervention is increasing. It is not the Socialism of the Labour Party, but the Socialism of Protection, which takes the shape of monopoly. The public scarcely discern the danger. The protected industries are short-sighted enough to believe that once they are firmly in the saddle they will be able to keep a tight rein on the Socialist horse. They forget that they are liable to be thrown. If there is one thing that justifies Socialism, and which will win the support of Liberals, it is private monopoly. In Scotland to-day our greatest heavy industry, iron and steel, is a monopoly. Private competition has gone. The industry is ruled by price rings. There is a central control which has both producers and consumers at its mercy, although so far a Protectionist

Government, in dire need for supplies of armaments and in dread of a public revolt against profiteering, has been able, by holding out promises of large orders, to prevent the producers from making full use of their new powers. If the iron and steel industry, which incidentally controls also 50 per cent. of the fuel used in iron and steel production, does not return to the system of private enterprise, there are only two alternatives: (1) it may be converted into a public corporation, or (2) it may become nationalised under a Socialist Government. And it is worth bearing in mind that the Labour Party at the 1935 General Election came very near to getting a majority of votes in Scotland. The best safeguard against Socialism is enlightened private enterprise. Private monopoly invites Socialism, especially when it does not "produce the goods." At the present time the Scottish iron and steel industry is working at only between 50 and 60 per cent. of its capacity.

Apart from its influence in encouraging the growth of monopoly, the Government's policy for dealing with the problem of Scotland's depression is unsound, both economically and socially. Its Special Areas policy is based on the granting of funds and facilities to encourage manufacturers to settle in the distressed areas. There have been modifications in practice since the first Special Areas Act was brought into force, but the policy is still unbalanced. It is not a broad national policy. It encourages production in the Special Areas at the expense of other districts. Dundee, for example, has been hit by the policy of inducing manufacturers to settle in the West. The success of the Industrial Estate at North Hillington will be achieved at the expense of other areas. While planning the location of industry in times of depression, when there is a lag between productive capacity and effective consuming power, is not a policy of radical reform, it has much to recommend it, but the favouring of individual localities at the expense of others is to be deprecated, and all planning arrangements should be on a broad national scale.

The existing discontents in Scotland justify the growing demand for a Scottish Parliament to deal with exclusively Scottish affairs and, by making the voice of Scotland vocal, to influence British foreign and Imperial policy at Westminster. If the Scottish Home Rulers have made little impression in the past, it is because they lacked a policy. It will not solve Scotland's problem merely to have a Parliament in

Edinburgh. If the public are to be rallied to demand a Scottish Parliament they must be presented with a definite policy. The Scottish Economic Committee is giving a lead in this direction, and the final report of the Liberal Industrial Committee will present a concrete, constructive policy for Scotland which will, it is believed, help to convert public opinion to the idea of a Scottish Parliament. The rejection by the Parliament at Westminster of the Caledonian Power Bill, in spite of the fact that a majority of the Scottish M.P.s favoured the Bill, made a deep impression on Scottish public opinion. The opportunity will come again, however, because it is gradually being realised that the development of electric power can play a great part in Scotland's future recovery.

Scotland's most vital need is a revival of her export trade, and it is believed that a Scottish Parliament, fully conscious of Scotland's dependence on exports, could play a powerful part in influencing the Imperial Parliament to reverse the present economic foreign policy and lead the way boldly in organising a free trade (or freer trade) group of nations, or in some other way to move towards real free trade, in the knowledge that this would not only bring a revival of export trade but also contribute to a peaceful settlement of international discontents.

RANALD M. FINDLAY.

## GERMAN LITERATURE TO-DAY.

PERHAPS it may seem a trifle ludicrous that the Muse of Literature should be masquerading now among all the gay paraphernalia of swastikas, military bands and flag-waving. Through the post-war years, the years of Germany's vassalage, the creative spirit was crushed out of her: mankind was in fetters, like the fly incarcerated within the amber. Only beneath the new régime has there come a youth movement afoot, and like all youth movements it is charmingly confident, proclaiming to the whole world as a new-discovered truth that it is bliss in this dawn to be alive. History is indeed repeating itself with an intoxicating novelty. At least we cannot help admitting that these writers are interpreting the modern world to us where some of our contemporary English poets, with their incoherence and their laboured obscurity, have failed. For they have revived the whole domain of modern German literature. They have a dæmonic energy about them. They are drawn from all classes and ranks. There are, for instance, Dwinger the soldier, Kolbenheyer the thinker, Griesse the farmer, Lersch the blacksmith, and Hans Grimm the colonial pioneer, appealing for the expatriated. They are artists; their canvas is large, and they are not niggardly with the paint.

Let us approach Dwinger with a certain diffidence. For he voices all those same beautiful and noble sentiments which our own writers upon the War have expressed. There is no hatred here, as there never was among the actual Tommies who fought, no more sabre-rattling, no more clinking of spurs, no important goose-stepping. Indeed, for England he has an abiding love. It is fine writing, simple, stark and direct, and read everywhere—the copies in the public libraries are dirty and dog-eared—and Dwinger's ideal, in his own words "to lay the foundation-stone to a new Germany," to *Gemeinschaft*, that is, to brotherhood and a mutual understanding, has made widespread in his country the cause of peace. It is his fervent belief that "die einzige Idee, die uns hier helfen kann, ist die, dass die Leiden dieses ganzen Krieges sich nicht wiederholen dürfen."\* These words are like an unburdening—the unburdening

\* The one idea that can help us now is this, that the sufferings of the World War may never be repeated.

of a man who fought through three winters on the Eastern Front, and lived to suffer untold privations in Russian captivity. Had Germany won the war, surely she would have gained the whole world at the cost of losing her own soul. Now at last the old Germany, that is the Germany of tradition, is being revived—the Germany that has struggled for centuries for her liberty; the Germany of the Janus-head, looking East and West. The old Empire has almost been won back, but her people have adopted a new point of view. “Der alte Gott ist tot,” writes Dwinger; for it seems to him as though, in the time of their great trial, the earth was made new, and the God of his fathers was no more. “Brüder, lasst uns diese Zeiten nicht vergessen. Lasst sie einen Einfluss auf unser künftiges Leben haben. Nicht nur Erinnerung lasst es sein, sondern auch Signal zur Erneuerung.”\*

And so the new age has grown up, a robust age, an age of confidence, and youth is on parade. It has bred men with a blind faith in their calling, in themselves and in progress. Perhaps the awakening is justified. Perhaps some very young people, looking upon a member of the older generation, may see there a stiff-backed old gentleman, with a whitening Bismarckian moustache, a stern patriot of “Germany before all,” and bearing a little consciously the old trappings of a Prussian officer. That is all changed now, and they may be permitted a slight truculence towards a past age; modern ideas are less convinced of their own infallibility. The War was for Germany such a very bonfire of values. Now they are trying to rebuild on a more secure and lasting basis. It is not roses, roses all the way. But it is one version of a doctrine for the betterment of mankind.

With Kolbenheyer we find ourselves in the realm (a little, it must be confessed, out of our depth) of German philosophy. It is a vast heritage, and one which, as Kolbenheyer made out the creed for the movement, threatened to weigh down his shoulders beneath its load. A host of memories, whispers from the past, come crowding in: there is, for instance, the fanatical worship of the God-State by Hegel, Fichte and Schelling; the contempt of all material comfort of Schopenhauer; the restless seeking of an indeterminate

\* Brethren, may we never forget these times. May they have an influence on all our future life. May it not only remain a memory, but also a signal of our re-birth.

goal in the Faust legend of Goethe. Conscious of these shadows of an ancient wisdom, Kolbenheyer is attempting to weave an aureole of legend round the plain laws of the State-system. But these Nazi knights, surely they lack the romance, the chivalry of Siegfried? And these Russians, these Socialists, these non-Aryans, these devils incarnate, lose, to say the least, the charm of a Mephistopheles. Above all, this great Faust legend, the effort to cheat death, to overcome an incontrovertible evil with good—surely one of the finest themes of romance which comes within our human comprehension—is, one might say, almost being reversed! It is questionable, therefore, if it be in this way that the Führer will pass from history into folklore. There may come a time when the national vanity will be sated, and the people will have outgrown their national playthings. Broken, and old, and palsied, how shall they appear to the youth of the future, when they come to rout out of the lumber-room all the Nazi bric-à-brac? But if Kolbenheyer is apt to misinterpret and misrepresent Germany's great past, he is not, it must be admitted, blind to this other threat of the future. His doctrine is one of an ever-recurring fate. Each life accomplishes its “grenzenlose Fahrt.” Each age seeks and finds its own consummation. Kolbenheyer has reached his point: the indestructibility of the human soul, whether its life in this world be in bonds or not. Perhaps the régime may compel him to alter his words a little: the indestructibility of the Nazi soul would be more to the point. Perhaps. We do not know. We are still, confessedly, a little out of our depth.

But in Griesse we are touching ground again, and very solid ground too: the hard North German soil. For to Griesse, in a country of arbitrary frontiers, the earth is the very bond of union for the people. Here centuries long have dwelt the same families. For their very existence they are indebted to the land. It is theirs by right, and by heritage. They are of it. Not so much from the pressure of experience, as from the promptings of an intimate and lifelong knowledge, Griesse writes of the immemorial ritual of rustic life, the limited sphere of the peasant, the dullard, and the country bumpkin. He is almost, one might say, one of themselves. His books have a homespun texture. Indeed, did he not send the women-folk back to the spinning-wheel, and the men back to the

land? Like their Führer, they should be sons of the soil. "Die Menschen nennen sich Kinder der Erde," he writes, "und wie kann sie tot sein, wenn sie lebendige Kinder hat?"\* And again: "Das Korn war schon den Vätern, die in schlechten Erntejahren gewissen Hunger entgegengesehen, heilig gewesen."† This, the good earth, is indeed sacred. Its histories and its blessings are buried in the mythological past. Elusively there appears the Germany of tradition, the fairy-tale forests, where the branches are wild and satyrine. . . . But Time is not so cruel as he makes out, nor Chance so blind. The present lies with us to make or mar it. Germany in the twentieth century is farther away from being a gallant epic-story than he would have us think.

The peasantry form one-third of the nation. Yet still the great majority of the masses are employed in iron and steel works, in mines, in factories, and at machines. In Lersch they have found their spokesman. There are people who have qualms as to some subjects not being "poetical." That Lersch could have drawn inspiration from the factory and the labour camp they consider unthinkable. The one they find unlovely. The other merely ridiculous: this entertaining young soldier is shouldering his spade at the sentry-box with all the unflinching seriousness as if it were a rifle! How amusing is this military air united to so rustic an implement! Gay transatlantics even call it "cute"! They forget that for the worker himself this is the blessing of Adam. It is a form of service—service, that is to say, primarily to the German State. Lersch deifies work, because, since the War, work to the average German has signified life. The people have passed through times of bitter privation, times of complete chaos and collapse. Body and mind were exhausted, their values annihilated. To them was never applied that ladylike word the "unemployed." They were the "Arbeitslose"—the workless—and the starving. It was for them that Lersch began to write, even as it was for them that the new brooms of the régime have been set so furiously to sweep. He comes down to their own level:

\* Men call themselves the children of the earth—how can the earth then be dead when she has living children?

† To our forefathers who were faced with famine in the years of lean harvests, corn itself became sacred.

Ich bin wie du ein armer Knecht,  
Bin ein Prolet von Gottes Gnaden.  
Mit allem was da gut und schlecht,  
Bin ich ein Mensch von Gott beladen.\*

Lersch was indeed one of themselves—before the War a simple blacksmith, and his writing is all forged at his own anvil. He himself is the workman in the blue cotton tunic, with horny flesh on his knuckles, and his hands scarred with weals. His is simplicity, with something of the rough and unruly and intractable about it. The metallic ring of his words echoes back to us; they seem to awake the pulse of engines, the smell of oil, the sound of voices, the stir of living. For in a world where the pianola has replaced the lyre, it is the machines that sing rather than the birds, and it is the machines that have caught mankind up into their rhythms, and fettered him, not only in reality, but also spiritually:

O Mensch, wo bist du? Wie ein Käfertier  
Im Bernstein eingeschlossen. . . .

Again the fly in the amber.

Lersch has naturally become the model for a whole school of very inferior output—the *Arbeiterdichtung* or worker's poetry. This type of literature, of the masses and for the masses, is a widespread stimulant. It is full of promises for a rosy future. It raises the mind of the worker out of its all-paralysing inertia. It offers him the priceless gift of being able to live for the moment. He is led to believe that the winter of their discontent is at an end, that Germany is a land of wide horizons and far-reaching possibilities, a land which has suffered an ignominious downfall. His ideas and conceptions become warped; he begins blindly to follow an enthusiasm—and so a National Socialist comes into being. He sees himself as an embryonic force in *die neue Sachlichkeit* (the new realism), which has become a catchword. In this somewhat fanatic year of grace 1939, Youth is still at the prow, but Work, not Pleasure, at the helm. And as in the moments of rest that come his way, he blows the froth from

\* I am, as you are, an insignificant worker; in the sight of God just one of the proletariat; neither better nor worse than my fellows, but with my task laid upon me by God.



off his beer-mug and drinks deep, it never so much as crosses his mind that life holds graver issues than are dreamed of in his philosophy. . . .

Wir dienen dem Volke mit Herzen und Händen,  
Wir wollen am Werke uns göttlich vollenden.\*

And so the versifiers jingle on, with a monotony satisfying to the needs of the age—rather like a barrel-organ playing its tunes over and over again, or like a Japanese harp hung up before the open windows. Indeed, so much of the manifestation of this creed seems to blow in from the streets. Like mountebanks of old, they hawk round their beliefs. There is a suggestion of the Salvation Army about them, and the lure of the big drum—though the salvation they force upon their adherents is of a strangely differing quality. For mankind is making a god of work. Is not their Führer himself popularised into very human attitudes?—the laurels and the purple have never been hired from the costumier. At least, if man himself is not a mass-produced article, the background of his life is one where the power-house stacks are belching forth smoke, and the girder-ribs are throbbing to the rhythm of the machines.

Last, and perhaps most salient of all at this particular time, there is Hans Grimm. As Kipling stood in his day in literature for Imperial England, Grimm stands to-day for the Reich to the expatriated German. Now that the Eagle is spreading its wings again there is a knitting together of spiritual bonds between Germans within and without the frontiers. That significant old adage "in Austria beats the German heart, in Berlin the German brain" has once again been brought into the realms of possibility. The writers have long been agitating for unity, urging the people to cling to their remnants of nationality: in Rumania, Zillich, in Brazil, Blunck, in Russia, Ponten, and in South Africa, Grimm. From our dispassionate English point of view, comfortably secure that South Africa is best as it is, we treat Grimm a little impatiently. Surely his is the old Bismarckian dream of a "place in the sun," without any very clear idea of those stony, sun-baked wastes, mile upon mile, the verisimilitude of a wilderness. Besides, he envisages a Utopia, where a free

\* We are serving the nation with our hearts and with our hands. Through work we are seeking to perfect ourselves.

people may live in a free country, without stating how this dream State may be brought into existence. Where is that correct pose of arrogance, adopted by the English so successfully in their colonies? The German, *per se*, is such a very plodding Dobbin, and Grimm, after all, is but a German. Yet, nevertheless, here is the writing of experience. His greatest book—*Volk ohne Raum*, a people without room—deals with the pressing and vital need for expansion for these people, irked as they are by cramping restrictions. His book blazes the way towards achievement and a better understanding: "Wozu schickt Gott einen nach Afrika? Er soll näher an die Dinge heran, er soll Echtheit und Wahrheit unbedingt ertragen lernen,"\* and again: "Die Geschichte jedes Mannes fängt bei seinem Volke an."† These, the expatriated, have managed to preserve their national way of life, in their schools, in their Church, in their businesses. Their soul is German. Grimm does not plead for a return of the colonies, but he pleads for a greater freedom for his people.

What, then, is the character of modern Germany as seen through her new literature? The writer views his task as a training of the mind as severe and ascetic as the training of the body of the young German athlete. And he is being trained to seek after the liberation of the German spirit, and through Germany the liberation of the spirit of mankind. In fact, rather an elderly bee has been roused after a long sleep and is buzzing very furiously again. First it was Luther's mission, then Kant's, now the moderns'. This virtuous desire on the Germans' part to save our souls is just perhaps a trifle boring. We cannot feel as grateful as they might legitimately expect. However, if so much new wine has gone to the new generation's head, the ideas themselves are quite sober, essentially material, and essentially national. The slogan is "Deutschland." For Germany needs above everything a spiritual bond to weld together the people as one, and "Deutschland" is at the same time a symbol and a reality. It is in the sense that they give us of being committed absolutely to Germany, of following wherever Germany leads with a complete and even reckless confidence, that the great charm of these writers consists. In Lersch's fine words: "Deutschland

\* Wherefore should God send a man to Africa? That he may get into closer contact with the heart of things, that he may learn to face fact and reality.

† The story of every man begins with his nationality.

muss leben, und wenn wir sterben müssen,"\* and later: "Ich glaub' an Deutschland wie an Gott."† Under the dictates of treaties Germany has been cut up, and cut to pieces. There are still millions living without her frontiers. She herself is not girt about by any convenient silver sea. Centuries long there has always existed a strange, mystical conception of the Fatherland. And if this same illusion is partly created by those thumped-out patriotic catches, sung by the Hitler Youth as they tramp the streets, what of it? Indeed, let us not forget that it would never do to be out of step with the times—that would be at the risk of blackest oblivion—and the times are undoubtedly on the march.

So much for the new movement. The whirligig of time must bring in his revenges before it can be surveyed in any perspective. It presents in all an extraordinary unity of thought, aim, philosophy—*Weltanschauung*. Germany has been yearning and struggling for unity for a century. Now she is trying to build up a new structure on the foundation of *Kameradschaft*. A new *Zeitgeist* is afoot. And if this does not go to form what we call culture, then it is a new *Kultur*, which perhaps is the highest point to which the pure Aryan brain may aspire to rise.

E. R. HODSOLL.

\* Germany must live, even if we must lay down our lives.

† I believe in Germany as I believe in God.

## CALVINISM IN PRESENT-DAY HOLLAND.

FOR some years now a "renaissance of Calvinism" on the European Continent has been capturing the attention of the theological world. English thinkers as a whole, however, have not as yet followed this development very far beyond Germany and Switzerland. We are tolerably familiar with the work of Barth and Brunner in this country, but still have no general knowledge of the forms which this Calvinistic revival has taken in other parts of Europe. Among these generally neglected regions where Calvinism is acquiring a new importance is the country of Holland.

It is true that most Englishmen who follow Continental theological trends are acquainted with the work of at least one distinguished Dutch exponent of the theology of Barth and Brunner, Dr. W. A. Visser t'Hooft. The "theology of the Word" has had no more effective populariser, in the best sense of the term, than this leader of the World Student Christian Federation. To his name we may add that of Dr. Hendrik Kraemer, the author of *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World*, who has been described by the Archbishop of York as "one of the statesmen and seers" of missionary enterprise.

The genuinely "indigenous" type of Calvinism which is awakening an increasing interest in religious and theological circles in Holland is by no means a mere sub-species of "Barthianism." It has arisen independently of the Swiss movement and has many highly distinctive features of its own. It does not, for example, generally share in Barth's rejection of "natural theology" or even in Brunner's suspicion of all natural theology except of a very tenuous, subtle and "negative" kind. At the same time, it is on the whole much more conservative and less friendly to Biblical criticism. In Holland Calvinism is identified with what we would regard as "Fundamentalism" to a much larger extent than in Switzerland or Germany.

The association of theological conservatism with an eager defence of "natural theology" is, of course, by no means peculiar to Holland. Even in English-speaking countries, Fundamentalism has never shared the Barthian suspicion of natural theology but on the contrary has always put a very

high value on "Christian evidences" of a rather old-fashioned kind. It is instructive in this respect to compare the addresses given to the International Congress of Calvinists at Geneva in 1936 by Dr. Peter Barth and by the highly conservative Scottish Free Churchman, Dr. Donald Maclean.\* Dr. Barth was only interested in the "Biblical" basis of Calvin's doctrine of predestination; but Dr. Maclean, for all his keenness on our adherence to the very letter of Scripture, spent a great deal of time in tracing the adumbrations of the Calvinistic doctrine in ancient Greek and Roman fatalism. He did not so much as mention John Knox's vigorous insistence that Christian predestinarianism has nothing whatever to do with "Stoicall Necessitie," or even the equally distinct affirmation of the nineteenth-century Scottish Free Churchman, John Duncan, that predestination is a "theologeme" and not a "philosophical postulate."

Nor is the connection between Fundamentalism and a high valuation of "Christian evidences," either in Holland or elsewhere, a purely fortuitous one. The Fundamentalist handles his Bible in an essentially "rationalistic" fashion; and his "cut and dried" interpretation of Christianity quite naturally goes hand in hand with the equally "cut and dried" approach to it furnished by the "Christian evidences" which he values. "Natural theology" plays a very similar part in Roman Catholicism, where also the interpretation of Christianity and the approach to it are alike of a rigid and "rationalistic" character.

If Dutch Fundamentalism in this respect is at one with Fundamentalism all the world over, it presents itself in other ways as most decidedly a "Fundamentalism with a difference." The extent to which it may develop marked idiosyncrasies of its own cannot be better illustrated than by an outline of some of the peculiar tenets of the small but influential group which has brought into being the "Free University" at Amsterdam. The attitude of this group towards Biblical criticism is sufficiently indicated by the following words from an address which one of them, Professor F. W. Grosheide, delivered at London in 1932: "All things written in the Bible are true because they stand in the Bible. Calvinism accepts without exception all that Scripture contains, history

\* Reported in the Proceedings of that Congress, published by Éditions "Je Sers," Paris, under the title of *De l'Élection Éternelle de Dieu*.

and prophecies, the teaching of Jesus and of His apostles. And if the Scriptures speak about matters relating to science and geography, Calvinism readily accepts such statements."\* With views of this character most of us are familiar enough. The peculiarities of the "Free University" group appear when we consider their attitude to the doctrine of God's Sovereignty and their view of the wider significance of Calvinism.

It is very commonly said that the Sovereignty of God is the central doctrine of Calvinism, and there are not many Calvinists who would object to this statement. Among the few who do are the Barthians, Dr. George Hendry, for example, asserting that "It is caricature to represent the doctrine of the sovereignty of God or the doctrine of double predestination as the fundamental principle of Calvin's theology; his principle is the Word of God, and his method is faith."† With the Barthians on this point stand the "Free University" group, but their reasons are entirely their own. They deny that the Sovereignty of God is "the essence or basic principle of Calvinism" in the first place because, in the words of Professor V. Hepp, "the essence of Calvinism does not lie in a certain dogma, but in the fact that it is the most consistent and harmonious Christianity. . . . It follows," not one, but "all the divine truths to their final consequences."‡ This ideal of "consistent Christianity" which the Free University group regard as the only possible formulation in a single phrase of the true ideal of Calvinism, in some ways recalls the thought of F. D. Maurice. Maurice denounced all the schools and sects and parties which attempted to build their Christianity around any single isolated principle, and insisted on the importance of giving every principle—the sovereignty of God, the unity of God, the authority of the Church, justification by faith, the "Christ within"—its due and distinct place in the Christian "organism." The same idea governs the "Calvinism" of the Free University group.

Their objection to giving a central place to the Sovereignty of God goes farther than this, however. Even when it is granted that some of the "principles" of Christianity have a

\* *The Reformed Faith*. Proceedings of the First International Congress of Calvinists, published by the Sovereign Grace Union, London, p. 74.

† (1) *De l'Élection Éternelle de Dieu*, p. 75. (2) Proceedings of the Second Congress of Calvinists, published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p. 20.

‡ *Op. cit.*

greater importance than others, the Sovereignty of God does not find a place in the first rank. The reason for this is that God's Sovereignty is an aspect of His relation to other beings, and that the most important doctrines of Christianity are those which deal, not with God's relations with His creatures, but with God as He is in Himself. Far more important than the doctrine of His Sovereignty is the doctrine of His "aseity," His complete self-sufficiency. Here the Free University group mark off their position both from that of Schleiermacher's school and from that of the followers of Kierkegaard. Schleiermacher stressed God's intimate connection with the world, Kierkegaard His "disconnection" from it, but both viewpoints are built up around a "relation" of one sort or another between God and His creatures, rather than His own intrinsic nature.

In its repudiation of all "theologies of relation," says Professor Hepp, "reformed theology is sharply distinguished from all others in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."\* Such a statement surely expresses a curious historical judgment. It ignores the stress that has always been laid by the Roman Catholic Church on the primary importance of doctrines about God's "essence"—such doctrines as that of His "aseity." The very word "aseity" is drawn from the armoury of Roman Catholic scholasticism. This was, moreover, a point on which Calvin himself thought Roman Catholic theology decidedly open to criticism. In the opening chapters of his *Institutes* Calvin again and again refuses to "pry into" questions concerning God's "essence," and insists on simply considering God as He is "in relation to us," "in order that our acknowledgment of Him may be more a vivid actual impression than an empty visionary speculation."† The Amsterdam group are here unquestionably going back behind Calvin to Aquinas.

That the thought of this section of Dutch Calvinism represents a "Protestant Catholicism" is also indicated by their views on the all-embracing nature of their creed. Not only is Calvinistic theology taught in the Free University, but also Calvinistic philosophy, Calvinistic law, Calvinistic politics, and even Calvinistic grammar and Calvinistic science. The correspondence with Roman Catholicism is here frankly

\* Second Congress Proceedings, p. 20.

† Calvin, *Institutes*, Book I, ch. x, sec. 2.

admitted, and the claim is even made to go much farther than Rome in this direction.

"A Lutheran science," says Professor Grosheide, "does not exist, but there is a Roman Catholic science as well as a Calvinistic science. There are no Lutheran universities, but there are Roman and Calvinistic universities. . . . The Lutheran system of the *duo hemispheria* is well known. . . . The Lutherans accept a very superficial connection between faith and science. At the utmost it may have enough influence to make scientific investigators pious men. The Roman system is . . . a negative one. Their motto is: don't harm the Church. Allow science to have a free run as long as it does not conflict with the interests of the Church. But Calvinism, and this constitutes its individuality and strength, puts forth a positive system. I am a Professor in a university which has chosen as its device: 'Our help is in the name of the Lord, who made heaven and earth.' It is its aim to build up a Calvinistic system of science, not only theology, but also physics, philology, law. Calvinism has the power to accomplish this."\*

It would probably not be difficult to argue that the ideals of Roman Catholicism offer a much closer parallel to those of Professor Grosheide himself than he here admits; and it is certainly true that if the word "Bible" be substituted for "Church" in his description of the Roman Catholic attitude, it forms an exceedingly accurate description of the attitude, not of Catholicism, but of ordinary conservative "Calvinism" in English-speaking countries. English or American Fundamentalism keeps a watchful eye on the advance of science, questions its findings if they conflict with what is assumed to be the teaching of Scripture, and makes eager use of them if they can be turned to Scripture's defence; but it certainly does not attempt to erect a scientific system of its own.

Least of all would English and American Fundamentalists approve of the Free University group's frank interest in politics; and here they are against not only this group but the general body of Dutch Calvinism. No Dutch Calvinist will admit for a moment that "religion and politics have nothing to do with one another"—he knows the history of his own country too well for that. At the Calvinistic Congress at Edinburgh this year, quite a decided difference on this point emerged between Dr. Maclean of Scotland and the Dutch delegate Dr. V. H. Rutgers. Dr. Rutgers, who represents Holland at the League of Nations, is but one of a number

\* *The Reformed Faith*, pp. 78-9.

of modern Dutch Calvinists who have achieved distinction both as theologians and as statesmen. The present Prime Minister of Holland, Dr. Colijn, is another, and the most noteworthy of them all was the late Dr. Abraham Kuyper—another Prime Minister, and a representative in theology of very much the same type of learned conservatism as that which found a voice in America in Dr. Benjamin Warfield.

The influence both of Dr. Kuyper and of the Free University has been most widespread in the Free Church, but to-day the National Church of Holland is also being recalled to its original Calvinism by a vigorous "Confessional" movement. This movement, in characteristically Dutch style, identifies fidelity to the Word of God with an anti-critical attitude to the Bible, to a far greater extent than is done in the "Confessional Churches" in Germany. It is interesting to observe that Dr. Kraemer is not associated with it, but finds his place in what is called the "Ethical" party of the National Church—a party which the "Confessionals" regard as "Broad." The "Confessionals" themselves, however, have acquired a certain breadth as compared with other Dutch Calvinists through their membership of an established Church. One of them, Professor Haitjema of Groningen, has been very deeply influenced by Barth, though he does not share Barth's friendliness to Biblical criticism.

One section of the Dutch Confessional movement has been profoundly influenced by the nineteenth-century "free-lance" theologian Hermann Friedrich Kohlbrugge, whom Barth also regards as important. Kohlbrugge began his career as a Lutheran minister, but after studying Calvin and the Reformed Confessions of Faith he became convinced of the superiority of Calvinism, and applied to be received as a minister of the Reformed Church in Amsterdam. His application was, however, refused, and he later obtained a congregation at Elberfeld, Germany. His sermons on the First Epistle of Peter were published in English in 1856; and it is not difficult to discover from their perusal the secret of his appeal for Barth. Kohlbrugge's sermons manifest a very "high" Calvinism indeed, and the doctrine of predestination is preached in them with the utmost rigour. He has a very keen eye, nevertheless, for the manifold tendencies of men to make this doctrine an excuse for a very terrible and inhuman pride and self-confidence, and he attacks these tendencies at

every turn. He insists that the "elect" man is still a sinner, and that if he looks for grounds of "assurance" in his own soul he will never find them there, but only grounds for terror and apprehension—from the beginning to the end of his life, he must trust in God and in God only.

In view of Kohlbrugge's personal history, and his very definite conviction of the superiority of Calvinism to Lutheranism, it is curious to find that Dutch Calvinism in general is suspicious of his teaching as "Lutheran." In order to understand this reaction, it is necessary to say a little about the essential elements in the Calvinist-Lutheran controversy. The central doctrine of Lutheranism is the doctrine of "Justification by Faith" as opposed to that of "Justification by Works." With this doctrine in itself Calvinism is in hearty agreement—man does not earn his salvation by the "works" he does, but receives it by "faith" as God's free gift. Lutheranism tends, however, to regard faith as a species of "passive" co-operation in the work of salvation, and this has the double effect of qualifying the character of salvation as a "free gift," and of exalting "passivity" over "activity" on man's part. The Calvinistic protest has the correspondingly double aspect of intensifying the Lutheran insistence that salvation is the gift of God, and showing far less preference for mere "passivity" in itself—it is in practice a decidedly more "energetic" creed. Thus it sometimes appears as an intensification of the Lutheran doctrine of Justification, and sometimes as an assertion against that doctrine of the relative value of "works," "activity" and "energy."

Kohlbrugge's Calvinism was almost entirely an "intensification of Lutheranism," and Calvinists who have been accustomed to stress the other aspect of their protest are naturally inclined to see a "betrayal" of it in an emphasis such as Kohlbrugge's. There is no doubt that they have laid their finger on a genuine fault in Kohlbrugge here. The emphasis on social, political and economic "submissiveness" which is found in some of his sermons is certainly not characteristic of Calvinism at its best. On the other hand, there is every indication that Dutch Calvinism as a whole stands badly in need of Kohlbrugge's sharp reminder of our own worthlessness, of the folly of imagining that Christians are intrinsically superior people to non-Christians or Calvinists to non-Calvinists, and of our lifelong dependence on "the gift of God."

ARTHUR N. PRIOR.

## WHAT BRITAIN'S YOUTH IS THINKING.

ORGANISED youth movements have been making themselves felt lately. Gone are the bright young things, the frenzied pleasure-seekers of the nineteen-twenties, and a more serious-minded, responsible generation has taken their place. It is not unusual nowadays for a young man or girl to spend four or five nights a week at political meetings, in committees, in distributing leaflets or selling journals. The explanation is not far to seek. A challenge to freedom and liberty never goes unanswered in this country. Herr Hitler and his friends may have succeeded among some sections in this and other countries in undermining belief in democracy, but he has also succeeded in arousing youth to an awareness of and passionate belief in the democratic ideal. There is a growing realisation that if democracy is to survive at all, it must be more active and mean something far greater in the ordinary lives of the people than it does at present. More and more young people are asking themselves the question, "Is Great Britain in fact a democracy at all?"

This feeling of responsibility is not confined only to the so-called left wing movements. In one sense, indeed, all the thinking youth are "left wing" since this phrase is usually applied to all those who refuse to accept the complacency of the "right wing." At the first National Parliament of Youth, which took place in London in March, bills were debated on social problems, on national service and on colonial policy. Most of the big Christian and Social Youth Movements took part and among the six hundred "members" the vast majority supported a progressive policy. Even had it been thought desirable at this Parliament to divide the House into an official "Government" and "Opposition," in practice such a division would have been unworkable because of the fundamental unity which existed.

One political issue has roused youth as never before. Sections of the press and prominent individuals and organisations have for months been calling for conscription with every weapon at their disposal, but the mass of the youth show little disposition to line up blindly behind this leadership. Now that compulsory military training has been introduced, hot controversies wage as to what attitude should be adopted. There is no lack of readiness to give national

service, but it is felt that one of the responsibilities of democracy must be to demand that the cause for which this service is to be given shall be a worthy one. The youth of 1914-18 joined up with a fine enthusiasm to fight in defence of democracy and freedom; the survivors have lived to see every ideal for which that generation fought betrayed, while the one positive good resulting from the Great War, the League of Nations, has been paralysed, because of the lack of will of politicians to work it. The post-war generation have never known normal conditions but have been brought up in a war-scarred world; and to them the ideals enshrined in the Covenant seem natural and necessary. Whatever the outlook of the individual, there is a widespread suspicion among young people of the motives behind British Foreign Policy during the past eight years. Vast numbers maintain that there is only one cause for which military service should be given—the building of a true League of Nations, based on resistance to aggression and the rule of law.

A growing section of young people have therefore been forced to relate the giving of service to foreign policy. A Government which has accepted and encouraged the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia and opened the vast resources of Eastern Europe to Hitler's onward march, which has stood by while Germany and Italy pour troops and war material into Spain to batter down the resistance of a liberty-loving people and which has failed to assist China in its struggle against Japan is not likely to get support for conscription at home. Every advance of Fascism has undermined the defence of Britain and inevitably many have come to regard the Government as sympathetic to Fascist aims as against popular movements which are based on democracy. Thus it is felt that conscription for such a Government would destroy the very democracy which it is intended to preserve. The policy of a peace bloc, based on full co-operation between France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and with the greatest possible co-operation from the United States of America, gains its best support from young people, since it is believed that only through such a policy can war possibly be prevented. For such a policy, these young people proclaim, there is no limit to the service which youth will give voluntarily. The example of the sacrifices made by the youth of Republican Spain show clearly that service can and will be given voluntarily

for a cause in which the youth believe. Conscription is not necessary to secure the active service of Britain's youth. The fact that 2,500 people found the means to come to London on February 19th of this year to take part in the National Youth Pilgrimage to put this point of view shows the extent of the feeling which exists on this point.

One reason why youth maintains its belief in the voluntary system is that it considers that a people which is fighting voluntarily for its own cause is doubly strong. They believe that democracy will win the struggle now going on against the Fascist powers only because of the readiness to serve and the determination of a free people. The regimentation of the youth in Germany and Italy may create a temporary strength, but, should war come, this strength may prove only an illusion. It is true that the youth of China and of Spain themselves demanded conscription for the sake of greater efficiency, but conscription in these circumstances is very different from conscription imposed from above by people who for the greater part are themselves well over military age. The schedule of reserved occupations means that modern war is a young man's job—and young woman's job also for that matter—and in considering the best tactics for war the opinions of the young people themselves should not be forgotten. It is the task of this section of the Youth Movement, led by the National Youth Campaign, to see that the point of view of youth is made known.

Among all organised youth movements there is a further motive for taking up this position. The feeling of brotherhood and friendship for the young people in other countries exists very strongly among their ranks. One of the most sensational and significant events in the history of the youth of the world was the holding of the Second World Youth Congress in New York State in 1938. Gathered there at the invitation of the American Youth Movements were 800 responsible youth leaders of nations from all five continents. This Congress was the outcome of three years' work and co-operation and as a result there exists a real feeling of personal friendship for the young people now victims or threatened victims of aggression. These ties were very strong between the youth of Great Britain and of Czechoslovakia, since many exchanges of delegations had taken place between the two countries. They were also strong between Spanish and British youth, although personal

contacts were more difficult since during the war all the youth leaders of Spain were in the front line. As practical evidence of this friendship the British Youth Peace Assembly, the British section of the World Youth Congress Movement, has raised by the work of affiliated movements £50,000 to help the Spanish children, while the same body has now set up a special refugee committee to help youth leaders from Czecho-Slovakia to begin a new life among friends in this and other countries.

The atmosphere necessary to make this sort of work possible has been created by the growth during the past thirty years or so of vast international youth organisations. Such movements as the World Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, the International Christian Fellowships and the Young Socialist Internationals have brought a realisation of the brotherhood of youth. The persecution of leaders of these movements in fascist countries, and the example of their work in China where they play an important part in the struggle for national independence, has made it impossible for the youth of Great Britain to be indifferent to their fate. One coming event of great significance may be mentioned here. This summer in Amsterdam a World Conference of Christian Youth will meet, at which 1,500 young delegates from every Christian Church and Social Movement in the world will discuss the task of the Christian community in the Modern World. Youth is building its own League of Nations based on an understanding between the different peoples of the world.

Many efforts have been made to establish contacts with the youth of fascist countries. Invitations are constantly extended to them to join in various activities, such as for example the World Youth Congresses. There is no feeling of hatred now for German youth and it would require much atrocity propaganda and the exploitation of the lowest war passions to gain acceptance for another "Versailles Treaty" should war finally break out. There is a general realisation that the motives which induced these young people to accept the Nazi creed were and are idealistic ones, that the victorious allies by their post-war policy created conditions which made such acceptance possible, and that only through an understanding of the problems and needs of these youth can permanent peace be attained. It is firmly believed that the Nazi Government does not represent the true German people.



The study of conditions leading to fascism has resulted in far greater study of how democracy works at home. The Youth Charter of the British Youth Peace Assembly is now known and accepted amongst most of the leading Youth Movements. Exhaustive investigation has been conducted into conditions of youth in industry and agriculture, into unemployment, medical services and cultural facilities. The opinions of teachers, club leaders and probation officers have been considered, and as a result a brief survey has been produced. Local youth organisations have studied conditions in their areas and the evidence they have produced was sifted and considered by the "Commission of Enquiry" which sat at the request of the British Youth Peace Assembly during February and March this year, under the chairmanship of Mr. A. S. Comyns Carr, K.C. The evidence brought out very clearly the undoubted facts that proper training is not being given to youth and as a result blind-ally jobs are increasing, that in general far too long hours are being worked by young people for their physique and age, and that facilities for fitness, even after months of the existence of the National Fitness Movement, are still sadly lacking. Anyone who has practical experience of the normal life and work of youth in Great Britain must realise that no country can afford to exploit its young people from the age of fourteen upwards in the way that British youth are now being exploited.

As a result of these investigations the twelve points of the Youth Charter have been drawn up and young people all over the country are pressing for their recognition and adoption. In this field the youth of the Christian Movements play a leading part. The twelve points represent no more than the moderate demands of modern humanitarian thought and include, for example, the raising of the school-leaving age, a normal forty-hour week, vocational training in employers' time, the extension of medical services and the proper facilities for cultural and physical training. The support for the Charter now extends far beyond the Youth movement and comes from all sections of the nation. Indeed, few who study the problem can doubt the need for reform.

The main reasons why youth are putting forward their Charter are twofold. First because they believe that if democracy is to be worth defending it must show a positive record superior to any that can be claimed by the totalitarian states.

The scar of unemployment and the economic insecurity which the mass of the workers experience create conditions which can be exploited by fascism, as the example of Germany shows only too well. They believe that these evils are avoidable, but feel no confidence that the problems will be tackled unless the young people themselves lead the way. Secondly, the granting of the Charter would release at once masses of young people who could make a positive contribution to the service of the community. After a long day's work, often for insufficient wages to provide proper nourishment, the average boy or girl is unable to do any active work inside a youth movement or in any useful service. Life becomes a dreary routine of working, eating and sleeping, relieved by an occasional cinema. This is the difficulty which the Fitness Movement has had to face. Club leaders, for example, know too well that it is useless to organise strenuous physical jerks or games for young people in these circumstances. If the conditions of the Youth Charter were made general, fitness would follow naturally, just because the average young person wishes to be fit if he has the necessary health, nourishment and facilities to achieve this end.

The building of different sections of the Youth Movement would have been quite impossible had there not been a spontaneous demand from youth for such an organisation. Most of the work described here has been voluntary and only very rarely has enough money been raised to pay full-time workers. Perhaps when the history of this time is written it may be found that the emergence of organised youth opinion has created a new factor in national life. The enthusiasm and determination which have led to this development may well be the rock on which the forces of fascism and reaction will finally founder. The willingness to work together shown now by young people of very differing points of view should help in the future to overcome obstacles and to build a better Britain. The broad Youth Movement is too firmly founded at the cost of too great a personal sacrifice to give up blindly its claim to speak for the youth and to work for the ideals which inspire it.

JUDITH CORCORAN.

## AN INCREDIBLE COMMONPLACE.

I FEEL as if I had just returned from the moon and had found that people refused to believe me when I assured them that after all the moon was not made of green cheese. Yet I have only been on a Surrey common and examined with my own eyes a little silken artifice, exquisite in its delicacy and mathematical perfection, of which countless millions are produced every year, but which evidently nobody but myself has ever seen. Hence the unbelief, which in the circumstances, I must admit, is pardonable. I refer to the *sanctum sanctorum* of *Agelena labyrinthica*, one of our commonest British spiders and a close relative of our well-known house spider.

The snare of this creature, which is very remarkable, must be familiar to everyone with eyes who has walked in an English lane or across a heath or a common in August. It consists of a dense sheet of white silk with a circular opening in it somewhere near its centre. This opening is the entrance to a silken tube an inch or more in depth which is the den of the spider. Inside she sits, a sinister figure, waiting for prey and ready to pounce out and secure any unfortunate insect that may happen to come into contact with the sheet. Remarkable though this snare undoubtedly is, however, there is nothing in its design to justify the name *labyrinthica*. There is a confused maze of threads above it in which flies become entangled and it has been assumed by writers who have dealt with this spider that the name refers to this. I prefer to believe that it is derived from another structure, a large more or less superficially formless bundle of silk about the size of a hen's egg, which the average observer would naturally assume to be a spider's nest. It is the nest of *labyrinthica* and it is sometimes attached to the snare, though more often in my experience is separate from it even to the extent of some inches. This nest is the labyrinth. In its centre is the *sanctum sanctorum*, described by Staveley as a tubular chamber, in which the egg cocoons are hidden. On either side of this chamber and communicating with it there are tubular or rather arched passages leading from the front to the back entrance. The name was, therefore, well chosen and is descriptively accurate.

The design of the nest can be ascertained by dissection.

This process, however, though it demonstrates the facts, does not reveal the actual form or beauty of the structure, which by then is obscured by quantities of superimposed silk, and owing to the nature of the material of which the nest is built, the tube is liable to collapse as soon as the staylines have been cut. It would seem that with such a conspicuous object this difficulty could be overcome by patient observation of the building process from beginning to end and by making photographic records of the structure at various stages as the work proceeded. Unfortunately, however, the most important operations are carried out during the hours of darkness.

Last century J. H. Fabre, the famous French entomologist, became interested in *Agelena labyrinthica*, and in order to study her methods and to watch the construction of her nest, he kept one of the species in captivity. The results of his observations are recorded in his book *The Life of the Spider*, but though his account of the work in general is interesting and illuminating, his description of the *sanctum sanctorum* gives no conception of the real thing. He says :

Behind the soft milky opalescence of the wall glimmers the egg-tabernacle with its form vaguely suggesting the star of some order of knighthood. It is a large pocket, of a splendid dead white, isolated on every side by radiating pillars which keep it motionless in the centre of the tapestry. The pillars are about ten in number and are slender in the middle expanding at one end into a conical capital and at the other into a base of the same shape. . . . Apart from its pillars the egg-pocket is an inverted conoid.

The definition of a conoid is a "solid formed by the revolution of a conic section about its axis," so the term conveys nothing to the majority of people and to the best of my knowledge it is not accurate. I presume that in the process of dissecting his nest the egg-pocket had become distorted.

Mr. Cecil Warburton, whose interesting book *Spiders* was published in the Cambridge Scientific Series, devotes a whole chapter to *Agelena labyrinthica*. He also kept one of the species in captivity and had the patience to sit up during the night and watch her at work. His chapter consists almost entirely of a detailed record of his observations during those night watches, but all he says of the *sanctum sanctorum* is that "it gradually became evident that the eggs were being enclosed in a wonderful transparent box of filmy silk with the

egg-bearing sheet for its roof." This description conveys no idea of the form of the box, but that word "wonderful" suggests that it must be well worth seeing. In spite of his own patience, however, which deserved a much better reward, I am convinced that he did not witness the construction of the *sanctum sanctorum* but only the formation of one cocoon. Though he assures us that a captive *Agelena labyrinthica* very soon makes herself at home in her cage, I have the best reasons for believing that both Fabre's prisoner and his own were not in their right minds when the records of their operations were made.

Fabre kept his spider in a cage which he describes as a wire gauze cage with a sprig of thyme growing in its centre, but which, however familiar she may have become with its boundaries, scope and features, nevertheless held her in solitary confinement. It is significant that his description of the nest was taken from a specimen which he obtained from a neighbouring hedgerow. Mr. Warburton prepared for his captive a box about a foot square with a gauze top and a movable glass front.

I have seen a photograph by Mr. E. A. Robins, who is well-known for his studies of spiders, showing the exterior of a nest constructed by a female *labyrinthica* which he had imprisoned in a celluloid container. He informs me that this nest took two months to complete and that in that period the spider consumed ten flies. In a state of uninhibited nature, however, the nest is begun and finished in a single night otherwise what I saw would be as familiar as the orb web of the garden spider and would long ago have been drawn and photographed. But it is true that for weeks afterwards the spider continues to add to the thickness of the walls and the internal supports.

My spider was free. She had taken up her quarters on a gorse bush, and I found her there by chance about midday. There were others of her species on the same bush, and hundreds more on neighbouring bushes, but they had either not begun their nests or had already finished them. She alone had allowed herself to be caught unawares with her treasure chamber completed but not enclosed. There it was, a perfect cylinder of white semi-opaque silk, an inch and a half high, about the diameter of a sixpence and as mathematically precise as the coin in its circumference, suspended in the centre

of a maze of transparent threads which were glistening in the sunshine, and exposed to the winds of heaven and to my prying eyes. It was open at the bottom but closed above. Inside and attached to the roof were the cocoons, which appeared to be creamy in colour, but this was no doubt an effect of their density illumined by the sun's rays reflected from the yellowish eggs within; and on the top, flashing and iridescent, were lying three wings of some kind of insect. The impression was irresistible that a dedicatory sacrifice had been performed to celebrate this triumphal achievement of the happy parents. I will discuss this point later, but meanwhile the important and significant fact is that both male and female were in the maze, apparently happy in each other's company unlike the male and female *Epeira* in similar circumstances, and were equally ready to defend their property, for they rushed to the edge of the maze and assumed a threatening attitude as I approached and stared in amazement at the miracle before me.

I took it for granted that both had been occupied in the construction, but in this I may have been mistaken. The labour was suspended while I was there and it was not till days later, after I had tried in vain to find descriptions of the nest in the standard books, or knowledge of the facts among experts on the subject, that I realised that I ought to have spent the rest of the day watching the remainder of the operations. The male may do none of the work, but in view of the crippled and abnormal results achieved by Warburton's spider, I am convinced that at least his presence is a necessary stimulus without which the female's instinctive processes cannot function perfectly.

The female bird, as a rule, executes the whole of the nest building, but she does not begin before she is mated. To the best of my knowledge there is not an instance on record of a spinster bird building a nest, but if there should be I should expect to learn that the result was very far from perfect. The sexual rhythm, of which nest building is one of the manifestations, being incomplete, the instinctive impulse would not be strong enough to compel her to carry through the necessary operations and she would stop after making a feeble and fitful start. Mr. Warburton ends his chapter by saying:

The spider has never seen a cocoon constructed and has no model to work by, and yet it performs with absolute precision all the

stages, in their proper succession, of a work which involves quite a number of different spinning operations, nor does the absence of light by which to work trouble it in the slightest. . . . Clearly as the egg-laying time approaches the spider feels an irresistible blind impulse to perform in a definite order certain complicated actions. It is like a machine actuated by an internal spring, and in the spider's case the internal spring is the inherited nervous mechanism we call instinct, which urges it to actions which it is not in the least necessary that it should understand.

But in the instance which he himself records something had gone far wrong with the internal spring. The blind impulse was there, but it was blinder than usual, for instead of actuating its owner to perform with absolute precision all the stages in their proper succession, and thus to create one of the wonders of the world, it caused her to fumble about for a whole day and eventually to produce a distorted something which, in the light of my experience, could reasonably be described as a bad dream.

In Mr. Warburton's words the spider wove "a hammock-like compartment from the roof of the box and above the sheet web. This chamber was about four inches long and was constructed precisely in the same manner as the sheet to which it was braced by lines from various points of its under surface." This hammock he illustrates with a drawing which shows the spider in the act of finishing the silken "box" in which she enclosed her cocoon. There can be no doubt, therefore, that he and I saw entirely different things, that the instinctive processes of *Agelena labyrinthica* are capable of acting without that "absolute precision" which is essential to our conception of the term "instinct," and that either his spider was "frustrated," as the psychologists express it, through the absence, owing to her imprisonment, of some normal factor, or through some morbid disability, or mine was individually and gloriously inspired. For there was no such object as the hammock in the much more advanced structure which I saw in its normal environment of gorse twigs. The only white silk employed in it was that of which the walls and roof of the cylinder were composed and the cocoons which they enclosed, and the cylinder was suspended in an elaborate cat's cradle of transparent lines for all the world like the coloured device in the centre of a piece of Bristol glass. One might in a drawing or a photograph give

an accurate representation of the cylinder's form and suggest the cat's cradle, but of course it would be impossible to depict the exquisite fairy-like delicacy of the fabric or the brilliant transparency of the supporting threads. It is the form of this wonderful nursery, however, for which its builder deserves renown. Other spiders make tubes. The dainty cocoon of *Agelena brunnea* which is well known, and has been photographed and which before it is caked over with mud is like a tiny fairy lamp, is more beautiful in design than the *sanctum* of *labyrinthica*. But *labyrinthica's* claim to distinction is one that places her on a higher peak in the realm of achievement than that which has been occupied so long by the much-lauded trapdoor spider. She is the supreme mathematician and artificer in nature. She not only weaves a perfect circle without the aid of compasses, but constructs the walls of a cylinder with equal precision using the flimsiest material in its texture and in its supports. There seems to be no practical reason for its peculiar form or for its unique technical exactitude except perhaps some wrangler urge in the constitution of the lady herself. Unlike the hexagonal cell of the bee, it cannot be accounted for as the natural outcome of a number of contributory circumstances.

The presence of the three insect wings on the roof of the example which I saw is also at first sight inexplicable, though it does emphasise the fact that the roof was flat. My own momentary inference that they were decorative trophies, "scalps" deliberately placed there to celebrate the great event, is, of course, most improbable, but we cannot rule out any possibility in nature until the phenomenon has been satisfactorily explained in some other way, and we know, for example, that the common buzzard, a bird of prey, brings fresh green leaves to its nest daily for no apparent purpose but the pleasure of having them there. Perhaps some early bee had blundered into the maze and had done so much damage by her struggles that after she had been suitably dealt with, the necessary repairs had prevented the owners from finishing their work according to schedule. This might account for my good fortune in finding the nest at such an early stage of its construction, but it does not explain the presence and situation of those wings unless *labyrinthica* has a habit of amputating the wings of her victims.

When a wasp captures a fly she nips off its wings and drops

them before carrying away the carcase, and if those spiders had done this at the top of their maze, three of the wings might have fallen on to the roof of the *sanctum* and the fourth might have dropped to the ground. This assumes that the insect had four wings, but though I could not identify the species to which they belonged, I noticed that they were all the same size and I formed the opinion that they represented at least two individuals. Further, I saw no evidence that the lines of the maze had been damaged and mended. The whole structure had an indescribable air of freshness and perfection.

Fabre states that, unlike the garden spider, *Epeira diademata*, and her relatives which swathe their victims in a thick coat of silk before dragging them off to the den for consumption, *labyrinthica* seizes hers and proceeds to suck its juices forthwith. He describes her method in detail and makes no reference to the wings, which I feel sure he would have done if it had been her habit to remove them before beginning the feast.

There is an opportunity here for some of our large and increasing army of enthusiastic field naturalists to undertake original work by studying the feeding habits of this spider. By doing so, I have no doubt that they will incidentally find an explanation of the three insect wings on the roof of the *sanctum sanctorum* which I had the good fortune to see. But above all I hope that my account of this marvellous contrivance itself will stimulate some of our excellent nature photographers to devote their skill, patience and endurance to securing records of it for our enjoyment and permanent fame for its creator.

CHARLES S. BAYNE.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

### THE RIVAL ANNEXATIONISTS.

THE score, up to the time when this paper was written, was not really impressive if one looked at it in a dispassionate spirit. Germany had annexed Austria (March 13th, 1938), the Sudetenland (September 30th, 1938), Slovakia (March 15th, 1939), Bohemia and Moravia (March 16th, 1939), and Memel (March 22nd, 1939). Italy had annexed Abyssinia (May 9th, 1936) and Albania (April 12th, 1939). Japan had annexed Manchuria (March 9th, 1932), and since then had been engaged upon a preposterous attempt to annex China.

That on the one side. On the other side the object was different; it was "dog-in-the-manger"; and therefore more difficult to achieve. It was the object of the British Government, for instance, in close harmony with the French Government, to prevent the German, Italian and Japanese Governments from making any further inroads. The Japanese element in the problem was submerged in the infinitude of China. The Italian had become merged in the German: for everyone knew that Italy was no longer directly to be regarded as a potential aggressor, but as an agent, through the traitorous subservience of Count Ciano, of Germany. In effect Italy was now almost completely annexed by Germany. Count Ciano took his orders, not from Signor Mussolini, but from Herr Hitler.

After the annexation of Albania there descended upon the European scene a lull so neatly balanced as to amount almost to a deadlock. It was well known that Germany's programme had been to annex Danzig at the same time as Memel. She was halted by the new British tactic of "guarantees." While, however, the spectators of the game, as it were, were concentrated upon the struggle for the small States of Eastern Europe, Germany was unostentatiously engaged upon the annexation of great States. Italy was annexed without notice and almost without comment. Spain was being subjected to the like treatment. In the case of Spain the method was to support a Phalangist plot against General Franco to the end that a virtually German creature should supplant him: a plot that duly made such progress that when this paper was

written General Franco's position could by no means be taken for granted. The feature of the period April 12th (when Albania fell to Italy) to May 12th, 1939, was that of manoeuvring for tactical positions on the two sides.

The British and French Governments had already given "guarantees" of integrity to Poland (March 31st) and to Rumania and Greece (April 13th); and on May 12th succeeded in concluding a pact of mutual assistance with Turkey. What was now in issue was the fate of the full belt of countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and in addition of Yugoslavia. Germany's ambition was to annex as many of them as possible; Britain's to prevent her from so doing, and thus to maintain the preponderance of the British sphere of influence over the German. In conformity with the famous British tradition the British method was hidden in fine words, such as "the defence of freedom," through the organisation of a "Peace Bloc." As the British annexationists in the past had conquered a quarter of the globe with a Bible in one hand, a sword in the other, and a prayer in their throats, so now the attempt to prevent Germany from conquering any part of the globe was conducted in the traditional manner of mixed cunning and holiness. In the resultant fray Russia and Turkey were to play an obviously important rôle.

One of the remarkable things was that the scene now unfolding was in certain essential respects a repetition of what had taken place a quarter of a century before. The rise of Germany as a colonial and commercial Power then led to her encirclement by Britain, France and Russia. When as a result, the trial of strength was engaged in the war of 1914-18, France and Britain attempted (and that time succeeded) in detaching Italy from Germany. Greece then was held, despite a German King. Greece again has a German King and a German Metaxas: and again the same issue is being fought. A quarter of a century ago it was wildly denied by the British and French Governments that they were "encircling" Germany, when that was precisely what they were doing. To-day Franco-British policy is again aimed at the encirclement of Germany, and Mr. Chamberlain gets up in the British House of Commons and denies it.

Yet in the repetition there are to be found certain changes at any rate in the form of the conflict. Owing perhaps to the fact that a world war of the type we had a quarter of a century

ago was a little too drastic in its havoc, and to the added fact that the development of aeroplanes makes it certain that the next war would be still worse in that sense, the present conflict is being consummated without open war. Herr Hitler has two main qualities: the one sane, the other insane. His insane quality is that of patriotism. He regards it as a fine thing that he should expand Germany to the utmost possible extent, by fair means or by foul. The other quality is an artistic spirit manifesting itself in architectural ambitions. He is rebuilding Berlin and other towns in Germany, and doing it well. He is as proud of his architecture as he is of his patriotism; but the one attribute being good and the other bad, they do not mix. If he lands Germany in war by his insane patriotism, his beautiful buildings will certainly be bombed. The result upon him, as is the normal affliction of people caught upon the horns of the perfect dilemma, is that of an unending devouring fury, blazing from his lips every time he has to make a speech.

Another new factor is Russia: new not in essentials but in style. It is the permanent ambition of Russia, flanked as she is on the one side by Japan and on the other by Germany, to make sure that in the event of open rupture Germany shall be reliably held in armed conflict with Britain and France, so that she herself shall be the freer to concentrate upon Japan. Her present contribution to the European game of high diplomacy is the suggestion that there should be a full Triple Alliance between herself, France and Great Britain, whose primary object would be war against Germany, that is, whose primary object from the Russian point of view would be that Britain and France should be engaged in war with Germany. The difference in style is due to the fact that Russia is no longer a quaint and muddled monarchy, but an iron dictatorship which deals with difficulties by shooting them at dawn. There was therefore no finesse in the Russian Government's proposals to the French and British Governments. Either there must be a full military alliance, with a frankly anti-German purpose, frankly "encircling," or nothing.

But there were two incidental difficulties that could not be shot at dawn. One was Poland, whose major fear was of a German invasion. Across the Polish frontier was a furious German Führer who had all his plans ready for taking over Danzig and for joining the Reich with East Prussia. His

lever, apart from the pure affection or the helpless fear of his people, was his pretension that he was saving Germany from one or another danger. His successive bogies had been bolshevism, democracy, and "encirclement." And by far the best of them was encirclement, partly because it constituted a more direct appeal to fear, partly because it also happened to be true. Truth after all is strong in almost all circumstances. Suppose the Franco-British-Russian Alliance were in fact constituted? Herr Hitler would be able to justify himself before the German people by pointing both to the accomplished fact of encirclement and to the bolshevik element in its make-up. The guarantee given by the Triple Alliance to Poland would have for its ostensible object the safeguarding of Poland against German aggression. Its effect might arguably be the opposite: namely to provoke the very thing it was designed to prevent. Such was one of the arguments which did in fact make Poland oppose the suggested Triple Alliance.

The other difficulty was Great Britain. There is normally a difficulty about Britain. It is the permanent legacy of a sticky past. When the leading annexationist Power tries to organise a campaign against annexation on the part of rival Powers, the rudder inevitably gets mixed with the bowsprit. When, moreover, the Puritan tradition, through its chronic dictate of self-deception (called abroad with more direct simplicity "hypocrisy") demands that British designs be clothed in sanctimonious garments, then the muddle is multiplied a thousand-fold. Probably the British Government is honest, or, so to speak, honestly believes itself to be honest, when it pretends that in encircling Germany its object is not to encircle Germany. Indeed, no other explanation than that of a masterly self-deception could explain the British attitude to contemporary Europe: the attitude of wronged indignation against Germany for annexing territory, against Italy for keeping troops in Spain (from whose sovereignty Gibraltar has been detached into the British Empire). I lately at dinner heard a distinguished Englishman explaining to an Italian friend of mine that the Englishman had an inalienable respect for contract; that if an Englishman gave his word to a certain undertaking, that undertaking would be carried out at all costs, if not by himself, then by his son, or his son's son. That particular monument of British self-deception was not even conscious (for facts go down like ninepins before the

steamroller of the Puritan tradition) that in the particular case of Italy British undertakings in the present century had up to 100 per cent. been precisely not carried out at all. He did not even know that by the secret treaty of 1915 we induced Italy to quit her alliance with Germany and to enter the war on our side by the promise that, if France and Britain as a result of victory increased their territory in Africa, then Italy should have two handsome slices of Abyssinia (with or without, be it explained, Abyssinia's consent); nor that by the agreement of 1925 we undertook after all to carry out the obligation of the 1915 treaty if only Italy would give to us the waters of Lake Tsana, which also was not Italy's to give.

When we talk of the "gangsters" who are attempting to organise a German "racket" in competition with our own, we are using language in a fairly descriptive way. But unless we recognise that there is not a pin to choose between Germany's present conduct and our conduct in the past, we are not making any businesslike contribution to the solution of the problem.

It is one of the remarkable truths of life that what is rotten does not prosper, and that prosperity induces rottenness. It is the principle of the fountain, or of the ebb and flow that maintains the balance in things. We see it in collective as well as in individual affairs. As a balloon bursts or deflates from the envelope's decay, so empires either burst or decay. The British Empire is typical both of the general principle and of the particular British character. It has been liquidated with excellent good sense so far as the method is concerned. Its component parts, most of them, or the biggest of them, have evolved into independent units. The British genius for self-deception can work, it seems, in a good as well as in a bad sense. But concurrently there was a process of rottenness in operation which was induced precisely by the unparalleled prosperity of the pre-war days. Its main effect was to blind us in our judgment. When we accepted war with Germany in 1914, the sub-conscious motive was to thwart Germany; in other words to indulge a quite stupid form of jealousy. To prevent Germany from building an empire, we risked our own. We sacrificed our best men in the resultant struggle. And we now find (as we should have known before, if prosperity had not sapped our intelligence) that we did not even achieve our object, though we paid the price. Germany



to-day is in fact expanding. In the light of the general principles thus broadly sketched what is at present happening in Europe becomes a little more understandable. The most recent details of high diplomatic activity in Europe are in truth not a disconnected haphazard muddle. They are part of a design on both sides in an enterprise of a somewhat sordid character.

After the Italian annexation of Albania (April 12th) the British Government began in greater earnest to fashion what was magnificently known as the Peace Bloc. On April 15th Sir William Seeds, British Ambassador in Moscow, went to see Mr. Litvinov, Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He conveyed a British proposal, to the effect that Russia should give to her European border States the same sort of guarantee against aggression that the British and the French Governments had given to Poland, Rumania and Greece.

On April 18th the Russian Government made counter-proposals: namely that a full Triple Alliance be formed with two objects: (1) to provide for mutual assistance between the signatory parties, namely Britain, France and Russia, on the continent of Europe; (2) to guarantee the sovereign independence and integrity of the belt of countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea: namely Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece. There was nothing else in the Russian counter-proposals. No mention was made of the Far East, although it was explained that if Britain and France wanted to extend the commitment to include the Far East, Russia would have no objection. Nor would Russia object if Britain and France wanted to include the semi-Baltic countries, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Western European countries bordering on Germany, namely Holland and Belgium, within the scope of the guarantee. Moscow further explained that she would be willing, after the Triple Alliance was concluded, to open negotiations with Turkey so that in some form later to be determined upon, Turkey should be a partner with the other three Powers. It was made clear that Russia was not disposed to accept Turkey as a partner on equal terms.

Germany's concurrent move took two forms. First, she started her routine propaganda about the grievances of German nationals in the Polish Corridor: a now classic technique. Secondly she informed the British and French

Governments (April 13th) that the customary "spring exercises" of the German fleet would take place this year off the coast of Spain. They would last about a month. When that information was given, Field-Marshal Göring was in Libya, whence he announced his further plan of visiting Rome, all in the day's work.

For its part the British Government was working at top speed. Both Houses of Parliament broke their Easter recess to meet on April 13th, when Mr. Chamberlain in the one and Lord Halifax in the other at once announced the extension of the British pledge to apply to Greece and Rumania as well as to Poland. M. Daladier in Paris made the corresponding declaration on behalf of the French Government. The formula of the pledge was that "in the event of any action being taken which clearly threatened the independence of Greece or Rumania" and which those countries "considered it vital to resist with their national forces," then the British Government "would feel themselves bound at once to lend [those countries] all the support in their power." Mr. Chamberlain took the occasion to confess his "deep disappointment" over the patent fact that it was "difficult in the extreme to reconcile Italy's action [in Albania] with her undertaking in the Anglo-Italian Agreement to respect the *status quo* as regards national sovereignty of territories in the Mediterranean area." Yet he decided not to declare that that Agreement was at an end; in other words, not on his initiative to sacrifice the possibility that Italy might fulfil "the remaining provisions of the Agreement."

He then launched what may perhaps be called a psychological offensive in these words: "Once again this House is facing grave and serious issues. Once again there has been brought home to all of us the intolerable nature of a state of things which keeps the whole world in a perpetually recurring series of alarms and crises, blighting commerce and industry, depressing social life and culture, poisoning every phase of human activity in every country. We have exercised patience for a long period in spite of many disappointments in our efforts to remove suspicion, to promote good will and to keep the peace. I am unwilling to believe that these efforts will not even yet bear fruit, however discouraging the outlook may seem at this moment. The events of which we have complained in the past, and those which we condemn to-day,

cannot have failed to stir the minds and consciences of all peoples, whether within or without the countries most concerned, and surely, if slowly, they are working towards a common recognition of a common danger. Let us, therefore, not put patience aside. . . . Without any prejudice, without any preconceived ideological notions, we are endeavouring to the utmost of our ability so to marshal the forces which are still in favour of peace, and which are willing to resist aggression, that our efforts may be successful. To-day we must stiffen our resolution—resolution not only to make ourselves strong to defend ourselves, but resolution also to play our part in aiding those who, if faced by aggression or threatened with the loss of freedom, decide to resist. In that resolution and in the steps which we have taken, and which we shall yet take to put it into effect, I am confident that we shall have the approval of this House, of this country, and of the whole Empire."

President Roosevelt rose nobly in support of Mr. Chamberlain. Speaking on April 14th to the Board of the Pan-American Union he said, "The issue is really whether our civilisation is to be dragged into the tragic vortex of unending militarism, punctuated by periodic wars, or whether we shall be able to maintain the ideal of peace, individuality, and civilisation as the fabric of our lives. We have the right to say that there shall not be an organisation of world affairs which permits us no choice but to turn our countries into barracks, unless we be the vassals of some conquering Empire." On the following day he telegraphed direct to Herr Hitler and to Signor Mussolini inviting them to give an assurance that for at least ten years they would refrain from aggression against certain States of Europe and the Near East: States which he grimly enumerated.

Herr Hitler's next step was dictated by the accident that he now had to celebrate his birthday. The ceremonies he staged in Berlin on April 20th were however more interesting from the curious than from the diplomatic point of view. He had reached his fiftieth birthday. His birthday party amounted to a tedious military parade. For four solid hours the long-suffering guests had to gaze upon goose-stepping or riding human beings in uniform; upon tanks, guns, motor cars, aeroplanes. Two aspects of those gaunt ceremonies illustrated the mixture of tragedy and comedy. On the one

hand Field-Marshal Göring in a message to the German people dutifully formulated the bogey that they were instructed to take so seriously. "Let the politicians and statesmen of the world," he said, "forge their plans and intrigues; let the journalists spout forth their poison and gall against us." On the other hand Adolf Hitler himself bravely attempted to show how unfair was the bogey, how gentle by contrast the German Reich. He invited to his party the small neighbours now guaranteed against his aggression, and asked them if they did not trust him?

In this amazing form of war now being waged, such devices were not to be despised. The diplomatic struggle now centred upon an attempt by the Axis Powers to undermine the Peace Bloc. After the Franco-British announcement of their guarantees to Poland, Rumania and Greece the dictators launched a campaign with the object of dividing and ruling the Balkan States. In conformity with that plan and on instructions from Berlin, Count Ciano on April 22nd met the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mr. Marcovitch, in Venice. The suggestion then planted was that Hungary should conclude a pact with Yugoslavia on the basis of a Slav predominance; that Yugoslavia should be guaranteed against Hungarian claims, and Bulgaria against Rumanian and Greek. Indeed it was even hinted that Yugoslavia might herself indulge a little expansionist appetite by incorporating Salonika and thus, at the expense of Greece, carry her frontier to the Aegean.

Both sides were now launching attacks without pause. On April 23rd, Mr. Gafencu, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, arrived in London to discuss the full implications, military as well as political, of the British pledge of assistance. After three days in London he announced his "general community of outlook with the British Government." Meanwhile the British and French Governments were trying to solve the preliminary difficulties against capturing both Russia and Turkey for the Peace Bloc. Both Rumania and Poland were vitally interested in the outcome of the negotiations with Russia. When Herr Hitler on April 28th denounced the Polish-German Treaty he had the effect, among others, of softening the Polish fears of communist infiltration from Russia, and therefore of making both Poland's and Rumania's adhesion to the Peace Bloc less problematical. The Peace Bloc had scored a minor success.

Herr Hitler had decided to convene a special meeting of the Reichstag on April 28th to answer President Roosevelt's appeal of April 15th. As usual he had the world for his audience. It is one of the major factors in the present conflict that Herr Hitler at any moment can rely upon receiving a hearing from almost every man and woman in the world. It must be confessed that to so practised a controversialist, unhampered by any regard for abstractions such as objective truth, President Roosevelt's contrastingly naïve appeal offered an easy target for a play of wit and heavy irony. The one word Palestine for instance was enough to bring the house down. The main thrusts executed by Herr Hitler in his speech were that he denounced two treaties, and in the same breath (nearly) invited negotiation for new treaties. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement had been expressly "permanent" in intention. It contained no provision for the contingency of denunciation. Herr Hitler denounced it because, he said, it had been based on "the will and the conviction that a war between England and Germany would never again be possible"; and because, as again he said, "such a conviction is no longer shared in London," and indeed because "no matter in what conflict Germany should some day be entangled, Great Britain would always have to take her stand against Germany." In a closely analogous formula Herr Hitler argued that the British guarantee to Poland would "under certain circumstances compel Poland to take military action against Germany in the event of a conflict between Germany and any other Power, and in which England in her turn would be involved." That obligation being "contradictory" to the obligations of the German-Polish Treaty of Non-Aggression, he announced that the treaty had been "unilaterally infringed by Poland and therefore no longer in existence."

By his usual technique he announced that, as he spoke, he had already sent communications to London and to Warsaw denouncing the two treaties. Having thrown down the existing naval treaty with Britain he made this cavalier, indeed frivolous, announcement: "Should the British Government however wish to enter once more into negotiations with Germany on this problem, no one would be happier than I at the prospect of still being able to come to a clear and straightforward understanding." In other words he

might have said: "I repudiate the clear and straightforward understanding I have made with England. If however England would like to negotiate with me another clear and straightforward understanding, no one would be happier than I." No doubt it would give Herr Hitler as much satisfaction to repudiate the second as the first. Similarly, having thrown down the Polish Treaty, he said he would "welcome" the negotiation of a new one. What was more remarkable, he expressed his willingness "also to fulfil" the new treaty. Had there then been no such willingness the first time? In truth, Herr Hitler's speech of April 28th was mainly remarkable for its ineffectiveness so far as the general situation was concerned. It altered nothing. It frightened no one. The war of words and of shadow force was now going rather against Germany.

On the other side, however, the problem of making a deal with Russia was making slow progress. Russia still held out for a full alliance. The British and French Governments held out for parallel guarantees by Russia to the border States. There appeared to be a certain quibbling in the issue. Did it really matter so much that the border States be guaranteed by the three Powers separately, rather than collectively, and that the guarantors be bound by formal alliance to do what they were anyhow bound to do? And did it matter if Herr Hitler could make any worse song about it, when the essence of encirclement was the same, and only the form was in question? There were many who argued that the British Government, having started the tactic of guaranteeing the small States against German aggression ought logically and wisely to decide against the half-measure, to go the whole way and frankly to announce that its purpose was to encircle Germany in an anti-German intention. Why not, when everybody concerned knew that such was the intention? Must the Puritan tradition in Britain for ever impose a crooked method of approach to every issue?

Mr. Chamberlain threw some light on what had been happening when he addressed the House of Commons on May 10th. He said: "His Majesty's Government recently accepted a definite obligation in respect of certain European States. They did this in pursuance of their declared policy of assisting those States to resist any attempt, if such were made, to threaten their independence. His Majesty's Govern-

ment undertook those obligations without inviting the Soviet Government to participate directly in them in view of certain difficulties to which, as the House is well aware, any such suggestion would inevitably give rise. His Majesty's Government accordingly suggested to the Soviet Government that they should make on their own behalf a declaration of similar effect to that already made by His Majesty's Government, in the sense that in the event of Great Britain and France being involved in hostilities in discharge of their own obligations thus accepted, the Soviet Government, on their side, would express their readiness also to lend assistance, if desired. Almost simultaneously the Soviet Government suggested a scheme at once more comprehensive and more rigid which, whatever other advantages it might present, must in the view of His Majesty's Government inevitably raise the very difficulties which their own proposals had been designed to avoid. His Majesty's Government accordingly pointed out to the Soviet Government the existence of these difficulties. At the same time they made certain modifications in their original proposals. In particular they made it plain that it was no part of their intention that the Soviet Government should commit themselves to intervene, irrespective of whether Great Britain and France had already, in discharge of their obligations, done so. His Majesty's Government added that if the Soviet Government wished to make their own intervention contingent on that of Great Britain and France, His Majesty's Government for their part would have no objection. Lord Halifax yesterday (May 9th) saw the Soviet Ambassador, who explained to him that the Soviet Government were still not clear whether, under the proposal of His Majesty's Government, circumstances might not arise in which the Soviet Government would be committed to intervention unsupported by His Majesty's Government or France. My noble Friend assured the Ambassador that this was definitely not the intention of the proposal made by His Majesty's Government."

Before the Russian reply was received, Mr. Chamberlain announced (May 12th) the important success of an achieved Turco-British agreement.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

May 12th, 1939.

No. 453.

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## LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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### ENGLAND AND THE DICTATORS.

Readers of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW will recognise certain passages and arguments in Mr. Glasgow's latest book,\* which is written with his usual incisive vigour and his habitual independence of mind. The whole volume is a sermon on the text: "In a world such as it is, it is arguable that the very worst catastrophe to be avoided, at all costs, is a war in Europe." For this reason he dedicates it to Neville Chamberlain, Cunctator, the man who helped to avert a catastrophe last autumn. For this reason he answers the question in his title in the affirmative. Peace with Gangsters? Yes, certainly; for their overthrow, even if it were accomplished, would be too dearly purchased at the price of the collapse of civilisation. He warns us against letting our moral indignation run away with us. Like the rest of us he loathes the Dictators, their lies, their cruelties, their aggressions; but he hates war still more. He is not a pacifist. He hates it with a cold intellectual contempt not only as pure savagery but as a transparent fraud. It pretends to settle questions, whereas it merely decides which side is the stronger at a given moment.

\* *Peace with Gangsters?* By George Glasgow. Jonathan Cape. 7s. 6d.

The victor of to-day may be the vanquished of to-morrow. He invites us to "use our brains through the economic and diplomatic channels to defeat the menace without ruining ourselves in the process. . . . If we are not clever enough to defeat the gangsters without accepting battle on the gangsters' terms, then we have lost." It is a supremely difficult task, but he does not consider it hopeless.

That we have created many of the difficulties which confront us is kept steadily in view. "The victors of the last war, by their short-sighted refusal of an equality in status to Germany, were responsible for the German temper that threw Hitler into power." We are reaping what we sowed. When we won our victory we did not know how to use it. We were obsessed by the illusion of finality. We—above all the French—believed that the *status quo* emerging from the Treaty of Versailles could be perpetuated, an omnipotent France facing a prostrate Germany. The inability of Bismarck, the greatest of all diplomatists, to preserve the *status quo* created by the Treaty of Frankfurt for more than twenty years should have taught us all a lesson. Great nations cannot be kept down very long. The greater the effort, the more inevitable and violent the rebound. Hitler determined to break the fetters of Versailles and he has broken them. That is the main source of his popularity and his strength.

That defeated Germany was handled without wisdom or generosity was confessed by the Prime Minister last year, and is now universally recognised. More novel is the argument that Italy had a real grievance in the distribution of the spoils. That she asked a high price for her aid in 1915 is clear enough, but promises ought to be kept. Both England and France promised her colonial territory in the event of the victory of the Allies, but they kept her waiting for years. We ceded Jubaland in 1924, and Laval consented to a transfer of 40,000 square miles on the southern border of Libya when he made his deal with Mussolini in January 1935. Neither of these crumbs was very appetising. Mr. Glasgow looks on modern Imperialism, namely the extension of rule over alien races, without the old Victorian illusions, half sentimental, half materialistic, about taking up the white man's burden. Yet if all or nearly all the Great Powers indulge their appetites, Italy could not be expected to stand aloof.

Believing that Mussolini had a case, namely inequality of

status as a colonial Power, Mr. Glasgow maintains that it was a mistake on the part of England and France, with the League at their back, to get in his way. The application of Sanctions failed to save Abyssinia and drove Mussolini into Hitler's welcoming arms. That the whole thing was shockingly bungled is clear enough. Either the policy of Sanctions should have been rendered effective by adding oil to the list, or it should not have been applied at all. Yet surely it is putting the cart before the horse to argue, as Mr. Glasgow does, that we and the League were responsible for the creation of the Rome-Berlin axis. That sinister instrument of aggression is the child of Mussolini's resolve as long ago as 1933 to attack Abyssinia. The responsibility lies with the man who committed that abominable crime, not with the nations which condemned it. Opponents of Sanctions in the Abyssinian conflict are committed to the proposition that it was our duty to supply the aggressor with the means to aggress. Mr. Glasgow also argues that it was a mistake to turn down the Hoare-Laval scheme, which would have left part of Abyssinia intact. Does he really believe that such a partition would have endured? Frontier incidents would have occurred or been manufactured, and the second bite at the cherry would have followed as soon as the first was partially digested. That international affairs cannot be run on principles of Christian ethics is the depressing testimony of history. The practical question is how far we should go in each emergency, how far *Realpolitik* should be the sole guide of our actions. The answer must be sought in the reason and conscience of every citizen in a free community like our own. In making up our mind we shall do well to weigh the considerations so powerfully advanced in this challenging book.

G. P. G.

### THE GOLDEN MIDDLE AGE.\*

Canon Lloyd claims for the twelfth century the title of the Golden Middle Age, though we should rather have assigned this title to the succeeding century, the greatest of all the centuries A.D. The thirteenth century was a century of great rulers like Philip Augustus and Louis IX, Frederick II, "the

\* *The Golden Middle Age*. By R. Lloyd. Longmans, Green. 10s. 6d.

world's wonder," and Edward I, Philip the Fair and Alfonso X; of great saints like Francis of Assisi and Dominic; of great Popes like Innocent III and Boniface VIII; of great institutions like the Parliament of England, the States General of France in 1308, the Cortes in Spain, and the Diet in Germany; of great codes of law like the revival of the Roman and the spread of the Canon law. Against such a bead-roll the author simply sets Henry II, Abelard, St. Bernard, Gerald of Wales, and the outstanding figure in his volume, John of Salisbury. There is a good account of this great thinker, though we cannot help believing that the author scarcely allows enough for the legalistic stamp of the twelfth century. F. W. Maitland deemed it to be the most legal of all centuries, and of course this legal frame of mind exercised its due effect on the conceptions of John of Salisbury. There is a profound pleasure in reading the writings of so single-minded a scholar as John, a pleasure the author contrives to pass on to his readers. As secretary to Archbishops Theobald, Thomas Becket, and Richard, he came into contact with men who influenced him to adopt the strong hierarchical position he adopted in his pregnant book, the *Policraticus*. His fundamental basis is the notion of equity as "the perfect adjustment of things" of which there are on earth two interpreters, the law and the civil ruler. The prince, moved by the love of justice, is as much released from the bands of the law as the philosopher-king of Plato. "His pleasure hath the force of law; because his sentence differs not from the mind of equity." Taking up the unusual view that the rank of the king places him in a co-ordinate position with the law, we learn that the sovereign is "an image of the divine majesty on earth. . . . All power is, therefore, in such wise of God that it is still his, though it be exercised through the hand of a deputy." The author admires the ability of John, and with this admiration we are in hearty agreement. What commends John so much to us is his open-mindedness. Does he not give us a long list of the matters on which he reserves judgment? With him freedom is the most glorious of all things, because it is inseparable from, if not identical with, virtue. Canon Lloyd so vigorously describes the battle for freedom of thought that it is a pity to read such English as "To John, Cornificus was a thoroughly bad hat."

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

## THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BALKANS, 1875-8.\*

*The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-8,\** by Dr. Mihailo D. Stojanović, is a scholarly analysis of a familiar problem from an unfamiliar angle. Much, indeed, has already been written on the Eastern Question in the 'seventies, and this book is in the direct line of succession to the classics of Professor Seton-Watson and Dr. Sumner, whose works are admittedly almost the last word on the subject as viewed from London or St. Petersburg. Dr. Stojanović, on the other hand, has not confined himself to the point of view of one capital. In his own words, "he has sought to determine how far those responsible for the conduct of affairs were conscious of the consequences of their actions, and how far they contributed to make the war of 1914 inevitable." He bases his study not only on the archives of London, Berlin and Vienna, but also on the little-used material of Belgrade, which he, as a Serbian, is qualified to utilise to the best advantage. After tracing the relations of the Great Powers and the Balkans before that year of destiny, 1875, he traverses in detail, and with many new side-lights, the well worn road of the Bosnian insurrection, the abortive attempts of Europe to reconcile the irreconcilable, the tragedy of the Russo-Turkish war and the unacceptable settlement that followed, up to the grand climax and the new situation created by the Congress of Berlin.

As the Balkan Question developed, crisis after crisis stimulated the ebb and flow of human motive and national interest. This ebb and flow, crossed and recrossed by counter-currents, is brilliantly portrayed in the body of this book, and in the last chapter its consequences for Europe are summed up in a masterly fashion. Amid all the obscurities and ambiguities of those four fateful years, the Great Powers, true to type and bound by the fluctuating necessities of the moment, pursued the policy dictated by their own national interests as they individually saw them, so that in the long run Berlin registered the fact that "the proportion of power of the Great Powers had to be preserved in the East despite the transformations that were taking place there." These transformations, none the less, could not themselves be

\* Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

stayed by the Powers. Their efforts to exploit them to their own national advantage, as Dr. Stojanović so clearly shows, created the very situation from which Europe in 1914 could find no other escape than the holocaust of the flower of her youth. This terrifying deduction, unfortunately justified up to the hilt by the evidence of the archives opened for scientific examination since the great catastrophe, is pregnant with warning for the present generation. It is not for the historian to judge the statesmen of a bygone age, who, acting from day to day in difficult circumstances, pursued the policy which seemed at the time the best one in the interests of the people for whom they were responsible. That is futile, and leads nowhere. It is his task to interpret those policies in the light of their results. Students of the present state of Europe are indebted to the author of this book for his illuminating interpretation of a vital period of European history.

WINIFRED TAFFS.

### DANUBIAN DESTINY.\*

What are we to conclude from the European after-effects of Munich? In his book, *Danubian Destiny*,\* Mr. Graham Hutton tries to answer this question which is being asked by everybody. Many books and other publications have been issued in these few months since the Munich agreement was signed. But this is of outstanding importance, written by an experienced economist as well as a publicist with first-hand knowledge of the various people of the Danubian basin, which he visited not only during the Czechoslovak crisis, but often in recent years. The expert knowledge he has gained gives his conclusions a coercive logic. He penetrates the veil of ideologies and seeks the real motives which lead to the policy of aggression. While Germany conducted her drive against Austria and Czechoslovakia with the slogan of "Emancipation of the Minorities," we learn from this book the camouflage for the aims of ruthless power policy. The "suppressed minorities" played only the part of pawns on the chessboard.

In this game of *Weltpolitik* Germany has won a decisive position. In the first chapter the author carefully describes the strategical gains in the communications, railways, highways and river connections, showing that the new borders of

\* *Danubian Destiny*. By Graham Hutton. Harrap. 7s. 6d.

Czecho-Slovakia have been drawn according to the strategical ambitions serving the German drive on the route Berlin-Bagdad. He then assesses the economic advantages and disadvantages of the annexation of Austria and Sudetenland. It seems to be a hard nut for Germany to crack, but in the long run the burden will probably turn out to be an asset. This leads to the political aspects of the drive south-east, and an investigation of the situation in all the countries concerned. Hence it follows that the "dynamic" of the Axis Powers is not able to put a stop to their aggressive policy, all the more as the Third Reich has reserved no place in Eastern, Central and South-Eastern Europe for Italy, who is to be compensated. This dilemma brings us to the question of the aims of the Axis Powers towards the great Western Powers and the alternative of war or peace in our time. Mr. Hutton describes the weakness of the economic and internal basis of the totalitarian states, which perhaps might risk a lightning war, but which never would stand a long struggle. Thus there is the possibility that they may unleash a war against the two Western Powers at almost any moment. However, at any rate for the time being, they lack the essential conditions necessary for a victory even in a lightning war: (i) Italian control of the entire Mediterranean; (ii) dependence of the Slav and Magyar dominions on the new Reich; (iii) adequacy of economic strength inside their countries and of supplies beyond their borders.

The great Democracies still have the fate of Europe in their hands. They have the decisive economic and financial advantages. Moreover, democracies can be as effective as dictatorships by voluntary and democratic totalitarianism if they close their domestic ranks. Yet a firm change of policy has to take place; for "the real danger to Europe—and it is an equally terrible thing to say—is not so much an immediate European war as a continuation of the kind of thing which has been called peace these last five years. If we cannot ensure the right kind of peace, we may be sure that what is being forged on the anvils of the Third Reich since Munich will turn out to be the European and not merely Danubian destiny. If the enterprise of the dictatorships is successful it will not be due to their own merits. It will be because of their opponents' shortcomings."

B. J. REICHENBACH.



# EXPRESSIONISM IN GERMAN LIFE, LITERATURE AND THE THEATRE, 1910-1924.\*

It has often been pointed out that the Revolution of 1789 occurred, not because social and political conditions were worse in France than elsewhere, but because intellectual activities had stimulated a more intensive re-valuation of all values in France than in other parts of Europe. A similar importance may be ascribed to intellectual activities, philosophical and literary, which prepared the German soil for the seed of National Socialism that eventually shot up in 1933. It is in the movement of Expressionism that a great many of those features which have since been puzzling Western observers of political Nazi-ism first gained their literary shape. In these circumstances, the striking illustration of German Expressionism by Messrs. Samuel and Thomas has a strong claim to the careful attention of students of contemporary politics as well as of modern civilisation in general. For the authors have not confined themselves to the literary aspect of their subject, but incidentally presented a vivid picture of its social, economic, and political background.

Expressionism, it is true, is best known as the literary and artistic movement which, from 1910 to 1924, was in the foreground of intellectual life in Germany. But from the beginning its standard-bearers aimed at something more revolutionary than the mere setting up of a new style of literature and art. General dissatisfaction with the attitude to life that the generation of 1910 found around them resulted with the early Expressionists in an ardent desire to overthrow the whole rubbish-heap of accumulated traditions as they saw it, and to create the New Man and the New Community. Such designs have been proclaimed in heated discussions of young highbrows more than once; and more often than not a few small-print lines in a history of literature are the only survival of high hopes and higher promises of this kind. What gave German Expressionism a more far-reaching effect is its causal connection with the Great War. Armageddon seemed to justify all the indictments against a generation which had been unable to defy the relentless powers of Evil which

\* *Studies by Richard Samuel and R. Hinton Thomas. W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., Cambridge, 1939. 10s. 6d.*

Expressionist writers had never tired of describing. Thus being justified in their apprehension of the "Day of Judgement" (as the title of a collection of poems of Franz Werfel runs), Expressionists were credited, or credited themselves, with an equally strong power to foresee a better future to spring from the gory battle-fields. Metaphysical solutions as suggested by truly great poets such as Heinrich Lersch, a coppersmith, and Fritz von Unruh, a Prussian officer, were soon superseded by political demands for a revolutionary transformation, not only of Germany but of the world at large. Ernst Toller, a second-rate poet but a vigorous political agitator, is perhaps the best-known of those Expressionists who played a conspicuous rôle in the revolution of 1918 and the Communist activities in the Weimar republic.

The same doctrines, however, that led some to an extreme pacifism and anarchism, gave others the spiritual platform for an equally radical nationalism and militarism: the bifurcation ended in either absolute negation or absolute deification of the State—just as, a century earlier, Hegel had been the godfather of both Marxian Socialism and Prussian Conservatism.

Whilst the vitality of Expressionism as a poetical phenomenon exhausted itself about the year 1924, that second trend acted as a virus of National Socialism. Leading Nazis reared on Expressionist ideas are for instance Hanns Johst, first president of the Nazi Chamber of *Kultur*, and Joseph Goebbels whose autobiographical novel *Michael* was at once banned when he became Minister of Propaganda.

Mr. Harold Nicolson recently enumerated some features which he considered typically German, viz. dynamism, mysticism, suicidal tendencies, a great capacity for hatred and a small capacity for reason, unplumbed depths of ambition and self-pity, all of them knit together by the leadership legend. It is most enlightening to find all these characteristics most powerfully used in the writings of the Expressionist period which, therefore, may aptly be described as a thoroughly German movement—though, inside Germany, this *recherche de la paternité* is forbidden. The present book shows once more that this country is well on the way to take the lead even in those spheres of science and learning which, in pre-Hitler days, were rightly or wrongly considered to be almost German monopolies.

H. A. L.

## CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE.\*

In *Modern Constitutions since 1787* Dr. John Hawgood has considered a subject of such magnitude that necessarily it can receive but limited treatment within the covers of a single volume. Nevertheless it is an important work which students will find of much interest and value. Dr. Hawgood has provided an analysis of constitutional structures current during the last century and a half, omitting, or only briefly mentioning, those of lesser significance such as most Balkan and South American States. The British Dominions are also very barely treated, particularly the Union of South Africa in view of its peculiar quasi-federal constitution. This work is, of course, much more than a mere historical gazetteer. The author has sought, and with much success, to place "political constitutions and institutions in their historical perspective and in their relationship one to another." He includes logically not only those structures which have enjoyed *de facto* operation, but also those constitutional forms which, if still-born, yet remained an inspiration and guide to later constitution builders. Dr. Hawgood, for example, relates the Polish constitution of 1791 to that of 1921, stresses the significance of the Jacobin system of 1793 and also the influence of the abortive Frankfurt constitution of 1849 upon the fatal Weimar structure.

While pointing out that the conditions governing constitutional change during the period under review varied widely and "are not safe subjects for generalisation," Dr. Hawgood emphasises the importance historically of "economic pressure and considerations of foreign policy," often closely related, as agencies of change. He points, for example, to the ideas emanating from the French Revolution and also to the character of the constitutional changes consequent upon the victory of the Allies in the Great War. The succession States all approximated, in varying degrees, to the French model of parliamentary democracy in a unitary system, all even rejecting "so obvious a solution" to their difficulties as federalism. Dr. Hawgood applies the argument of derivation to its limit in the case of Poland. He argues that the constitution of 1935, with its subordination of the Sejm to the quasi-autocratic powers of the executive, is related in substance to the Polish-German

\* *Modern Constitutions since 1787*. By John A. Hawgood. Macmillan. 16s. net.

Treaty of 1934 and that since then a "new isolationism" has kept Poland aiming "at a middle constitutional way between fascism and democracy." Will the new Anglo-Polish Agreement, it may now be asked, cause a reversion to a more democratic system? Incidentally Dr. Hawgood agrees that it is more difficult to explain on similar lines the spread of fascist and authoritarian institutions in the absence of war or alliance. While recognising the great influence of conditions and outlook peculiar to individual States and areas, there can be little doubt, of course, that types of government have been the consequence of, or subject to, prevailing political and social movements with their attendant doctrines. It is this which enables Dr. Hawgood to classify, subject to significant exceptions, broadly from period to period constitutional changes into distinct categories. Only a very few States have enjoyed a constitutional continuity of a century and a half and escaped, though not unscathed, the violent vicissitudes of change intermittently repeated through the period. Of these Great Britain and the United States, in spite of the Civil War, naturally predominate, and Dr. Hawgood includes an account of their internal constitutional development. The main interest and value of this work, however, rests in his very able analysis and interpretation of the constitutional systems, both transitory and as yet permanent, to which the political ferments of the period gave expression.

JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN AND  
MRS. O'SHEA.\*

Mr. Harrison, who half a century ago was a faithful follower of Parnell in the House of Commons, has considered it his duty to defend the memory of his leader against slander and evil reports, especially in connection with the fatal divorce case—O'Shea. In a former book, *Parnell Vindicated*, he has destroyed some mis-statements published in *The Love Story of Parnell*, which pretended to have been written by Katherine Parnell-O'Shea, a book of which Lord Morley told a friend that he would not touch it with a pair of tongs. The object of the criticism of his new publication is a work of quite

\* *Parnell, Joseph Chamberlain and Mr. Garvin*. By Henry Harrison, O.B.E., M.C. Robert Hale Ltd. 10s. 6d.

another character, Garvin's *Life of Joseph Chamberlain*. Mr. Garvin represents Chamberlain as unaware of Parnell's liaison with Mrs. O'Shea until very shortly before the beginning of the divorce suit in 1890. Mr. Harrison shows that this is irreconcilable with the Diary of Sir Charles Dilke, published by Gwynn and Tuckwell in their biography of Dilke, and that Chamberlain revised this Diary and approved it as correct. He gives photostatic copies of all the relevant documents. The reader will be convinced that Chamberlain was aware of the liaison since 1882, when Harcourt, then Home Secretary, told his colleagues, among them Chamberlain, what his police had detected, and that this knowledge did not prevent his intimate co-operation with Captain O'Shea. This fact is undoubtedly relevant in judging Joseph Chamberlain's behaviour in the Parnell tragedy. But Mr. Harrison tries to prove more, namely that Chamberlain was one of the instigators of the divorce proceedings. Though he attains a fair degree of probability and collects a good deal of evidence, one is bound to say that some doubt is possible. The great difficulty is that Chamberlain in two letters written to Captain O'Shea in October 1889 and January 1890 expressly denies any knowledge of his private affairs. These letters are printed by Mr. Garvin who considers them convincing evidence for his thesis. Mr. Harrison answers that they are "obvious show letters." That is possible, but not at all certain. Nevertheless, he is to be thanked for the painstaking energy and the veracity with which he has tried to throw light on a very difficult and interesting question.

ERICH EYCK.

## LIBERAL HUMANISM AND CHRISTIAN FAITH.\*

Miss Murray's testimony to Christian faith in *The Good Pagan's Failure*\* is an arresting tribute, the ability of which reveals indebtedness to early environment. A convert from Liberal Humanism to Roman Catholicism, she finds that "all the old values have to be discarded." While admitting that the Christian is far more Pagan than he knows, and the Pagan more Christian than he admits, she insists on the gulf

\* *The Good Pagan's Failure*. By Rosalind Murray. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. 7s. 6d. net.

between them. To a Christian the ultimate reality of life is God. He is theocentric, believing in "the supernatural order of being, transcending and outweighing the world of sense."

He is living always in a fifth dimensional world, and the existence of this fifth dimension changes and transmutes the other four.

To a modern Pagan, however good, the ultimate reality is Man. He is anthropocentric. Absorbed in ameliorating the lot of mankind he acknowledges no other world allegiance which transcends and transmutes human values.

It is Man that arbitrates. Man that chooses what of God's things may be of use to him.

The distinction needs emphasising; but when the author traces the world's present plight to the creed of Humanists, she surely overrates their powers and ignores the responsibility of others. They no more than theocentric Christians created the capacity to invent machines. They have failed, as she stresses, to redeem sinners, barbarians and outcasts, have erroneously conceived the equality of persons and predicted for them a perfection which temporal conditions do not permit. But Liberal Humanists have defended personal rights which are necessary implications of Christian, theocentric faith, although, as Mr. Walter Lippmann admits, in their "battle with the clerics," they ignored and misinterpreted that faith with disastrous results. Yet they have upheld inviolable rights which Christians were loath to grant and now claim as part of their heritage—as indeed they are. The revolt of the modern Christian conscience, whether Catholic or Protestant, against barbarian suppression of such rights is partly due to Liberal Humanism. The conscience of medieval Christians, although they acclaimed saints, was less exacting and quite insensitive often to *Jewish* personal rights. Two subversive human claims, the author omits to record, were not inspired by Humanism but by the Christian faith of Mrs. Josephine Butler and leaders of the anti-slavery campaign.

The Reformation, the Renaissance and succeeding movements arose, Miss Murray declares, from "the self-assertion of the natural man." The mystery which enshrouds the mingled motives and reactions of individuals is magnified when these coalesce to produce a dynamic epoch; and truly

to assess origins and consequences needs a longer and more comprehensive view than the author's. Her view, she pleads, is that of a "totalitarian Christian." But the adjective unfortunately recalls anti-Christian associations, suggesting the Pagan intermixture which she rightly discerns in the democratic faith of many compatriots.

There are anti-Christians profoundly indifferent to Christian revelation, who love the darkness which imprisons man in the here and now and hate or distrust the light which releases him. To them the author most impressively replies. But there are others whose hostility is not primarily due to rebellion of will or intellect. It springs from the refusal of Christians to believe, as they profess, in "the Holy Ghost Who spake through the prophets"—those seers who insisted that justice in human ordering was a divine concern. So Christians are accused of denying the promptings of the Holy Spirit, when they rely on a Fifth Dimension to transmute acquiescence in lagrant injustice. The co-operation of such critics in establishing "Christian principles" in "the temporal order" of civilisation is welcomed by M. Maritain, another Catholic convert, in his *New Humanism*. From premises similar to the author's he arrives at conclusions which differ from hers.

D. P. H.

### BEDFORD COLLEGE.\*

An account of Bedford College from its foundation to the present day was certainly overdue; it is now fitly supplied by the late Principal, Dame Margaret Tuke, under whose auspices the move to the fine site and premises in Regent's Park was accomplished in 1913. Bedford College was founded some twenty years before Girton and Newnham and, as with them, we read of heroic struggles against public indifference or prejudice, and lack of funds; of the encouragement and active support of a band of generous scholars and helpers. Among the earlier of these Bedford could number Erasmus Darwin, F. W. Newman, Anna Swanwick, Mrs. Jameson, Mark Pattison and James Bryce—to name but a few.

The opening chapters give an interesting account of the foundress, Mrs. Jesser Reid, a wealthy and benevolent

\* *A History of Bedford College for Women*. By Dame Margaret J. Tuke. Oxford University Press, 1939. 10s. 6d.

Unitarian widow, a close friend of Harriet Martineau's. She cherished a passion for improving the education of women, not so much for the love of learning in itself as for fitting them to be better wives and mothers. Mrs. Reid was determined that the College should have women members on its Council—an unheard-of idea in the 'forties—and should be undenominational; these two features distinguished it from Queen's College, founded about the same time. A start was made in 1849 in Bedford Square, a move to larger premises in York Place taking place in 1874. On Mrs. Reid's death in 1866 she left a Trust Fund for carrying on the work. She had inaugurated a system of "Lady Visitors," whose duties included chaperonage, and between whom and the Professors there was constant friction: the latter also complained, with justice, of the very inadequate previous education of the "pupils." A Junior School was opened in 1853 to remedy this. Space forbids tracing out the gradual scholastic improvement, but it was considerable, as Bedford students competed successfully in the London University examinations from 1878 onward.

The latter part of the book describes in detail the new buildings; the growth, development and modern student life of the College, including the War years; its recognition as a School of London University; its departments of study, and the distinctions gained by its members. Biographical notes on personages associated with the College, who are no longer living, form a valuable addition.

E. G. S.

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### SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

In this jubilee year of the County Councils, located by the Local Government Act of 1889, a valuable *History of the London County Council, 1889-1939*,\* has been written by Sir Gwilym Gibbon and Mr. Reginald W. Bell. Although not an official history the work has been produced at the instance of the Council and is largely concerned with facts avoiding expression of the authors' views upon highly controversial and fundamental issues in London government. A sketch of metropolitan administration of the nineteenth century forms a useful and significant background to the accounts of the developments and

\* Macmillan, 21s. net, illustrated.

work of the various services performed by the Council. The authors explain the general system of administration and the Council's procedure which is widely regarded as remarkably efficient. They would like to see a greater degree of delegation of administrative work. Packed with information and written in an agreeable style, this volume leaves the reader with a lively sense of the magnitude of the Council's work and achievement, but also with the hope that the next half-century may be even more progressive in the government of the whole metropolis.

*Documents in International Affairs in 1937\** is the latest of the annual volumes issued under the auspices of Chatham House and which are, of course, supplementary volumes to the *Annual Survey of International Affairs*. This new collection is edited, like its predecessor for 1936, by Mr. Stephen Heald and runs to eight hundred pages containing texts of principal speeches on foreign policy and published State documents and treaties. Apart from statements of general policy relating to non-intervention, documents on Spain have been excluded with a view to introducing them later as a separate volume covering the whole period of the civil war. Documents dealing with Palestine are also held over, and in a later volume will be grouped together with all those covering the period of unrest from 1936 to the eve of the London Conference last February. Where there is no official English translation of foreign texts a rendering in English is given unless a French official version can be printed.

Miss Dorothy Marshall's recent work, *The Rise of George Canning*,† is a most important biographical study of the young Canning up to the death of Pitt. It is based largely upon hitherto unpublished material which includes in particular an early diary and confidential letters to his wife. In printing extensive quotations, Miss Marshall lets Canning speak for himself and explain and clarify much in his early political career and outlook. The worth of this volume is succinctly expressed by Professor Harold Temperley in his appreciative Introduction: "The cause of Canning's success and his failure, the key to his aspirations, is to be found more fully presented in his own words in this book than in any other source that I know."

\* Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford Univ. Press. 4s. net.

† Longmans. 15s. net.

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