

The POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. X. No. 1

JANUARY-MARCH, 1939

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SOCIAL CHANGE—PEACEFUL OR VIOLENT?

By THE RIGHT HON. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P.

The Political Quarterly Volume. X.

No. 2. April to June. 1939. is wanting.

There was a book published after the war surveying the
written constitutions of the post-war democratic states of
Central Europe. It was inevitably a dull affair. Unhappily
many of these constitutions have been blown up, either by
Fascist revolutions or Fascist aggression. A number of
them were supposed to be modelled on the basis of British
parliamentary government, and yet how different they really
were.

These constitutions were set out in chapter and verse.
Each organ of government, the legislature, the executive
and the judiciary had its defined rights and limitations. Pains
were taken to prevent any one organ of government having
too much power. The checks and balances were defined.
Even proportional representation—that mathematical product
of the minds of political abstractionists—was featured in
order that every element of the community should have its
say in parliamentary debates. Political liberty was duly
provided for. So anxious were the framers to set out the
written details of democratic guarantees that some far bigger
things than written detail were forgotten. Among the
forgotten things were perhaps history, economics and social
development; the necessity for authority in government
and the final unity of government; the need for national
constitutional authority to be able to defend itself effectively

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against the incursions of unconstitutional agitation and rebellion. In some cases it was overlooked that the personnel of an aristocratic or absolute monarchist regime is unsuited to the functioning of a democratic regime which overnight has succeeded to an undemocratic order.

Of these new democratic states, Czechoslovakia survived with credit until the betrayal of Berchtesgaden, Godesberg and Munich. And now the democracy of Czechoslovakia itself is in a state of dissolution. That country, which I hold was the best success of the post-war democracies, appears now to be in process of being wholly or semi-Nazified. It is a sad story.

Is it that these constitutions were divorced from political reality? Were they elaborated before their time? Or is it that the human material within these states was inadequate to the difficult tasks of the post-war period, of which, it must not be forgotten, economic difficulty was a conspicuous feature? Doubtless, the clumsiness and injustice of Versailles treaty and the foolish selfishness of the victors in the great war had something to do with the break-up of democracy in central Europe. But I am inclined to think that more important factors were the multiplicity of parties, aided by proportional representation, the weakness of democratic leadership, practical difficulties in working rigid constitutions and, of great importance, economic and financial complications.

Successful democracy cannot be divorced from political ability and economic well-being. Democracy is a thing of the spirit no less than of the written word. A muddled democracy is a threatened democracy.

That great country, the United States of America, has, however, been working a written constitution for a long time and, for practical purposes, with democratic success. But the United States is nearer as a problem of government

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to the whole of Europe than to that of any single European state. For remember that the term United States is in the plural. There are 48 states, and the government at Washington constitutionally takes second place as compared with each of the 48 states. The states vary; the population is varied; so that what is appropriate to a single European country would almost certainly be inappropriate to the U.S.A.

After its own fashion the American constitution has worked, and even though we may take the view that it would not do for us, there is much to be said for the American constitution in the practical political conditions of that great country. Even so, the supremacy of law is not so unquestioned in America as it is here. The long fight with gangsterdom and other flagrant illegalities; the miscarriages of justice and the notorious evasions of justice; the extensive (though, I hope, decreasing) corruption—these are not pleasant features of the United States. Nevertheless, we must not over-estimate them, for the United States has a less long experience of self-government than we and its population is more mixed; and let us not forget that it is not so very long ago that corruption and patronage were widespread in British administration, and that they have not yet been entirely eradicated.

Under President Roosevelt, America is on the move, and I am not a pessimist about its political future.

Meantime, the British constitution continues to function and to adapt itself to changing conditions. Of all the great countries in the world we are, I think, so far, the most successful in the art of self-government and the most capable in the day to day practice of public administration. This constitution of ours is still functioning smoothly in the midst of a dangerous world. A large part of Europe is governed by dictatorships of one sort or another. The Fascist dictatorships of Germany and Italy, the semi- or

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75 per cent-dictatorships of other countries, the Communist dictatorship of the Soviet Union—these facts, together with the political stresses being experienced by a number of the European democracies, bid us “to keep our eyes skinned” and ask ourselves whether in this confused world the relatively smooth running of British democracy can be maintained.

This big query mark stares at us again and again from the pages of two constitutional studies which have just been published by George Allen & Unwin. One is *Parliamentary Government in England*, by Professor Harold J. Laski (12s. 6d.), and the other is *The British Constitution*, by H. R. G. Greaves (7s. 6d.). These books are not identical: they are both worth reading for their own sakes and each of them covers territory which is not wholly covered by the other. Both authors are associated with the London School of Economics and Political Science. Indeed, Mr. Greaves dedicates his book to “Harold J. Laski; his teacher, colleague and friend.”

Both authors pose the query again and again, “Will British democracy stand the strain of the transformation from capitalism to Socialism?” To this issue I propose to devote the remainder of this essay, for I am not reviewing these two excellent studies of the British constitution.

Mr. Laski has been putting this query with varying degrees of pessimism over a number of years. Perhaps the volume in which he discusses it with the deepest degree of cheerlessness is *The State in Theory and Practice*. But there can be no mistaking his apprehensions in this new volume, *Parliamentary Government in England*. He is almost certain that the privileged classes will resort to Fascist or other unconstitutional action in order to prevent the final and complete triumph of the Labour Party and its ideas. He appears to be almost hopeless about this being prevented

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through parliamentary democracy. At the same time he advances no policy whereby what he regards as an almost certain catastrophe can be avoided. Which is rather disappointing.

Unless the reader has strong faith and is in possession of that glorious intelligent optimism without which great changes cannot be made, he will stand a fair chance of being driven to the conclusion that he had better sit back in his chair and be comfortable while he may, or that he had better prepare for the inevitable and make terms with Fascism or some other tyranny, which I am sure is the last thing that Mr. Laski would wish him to do.

Let us, however, consider the alternative to parliamentary democracy for utilization by the advocates of fundamental change. So far as I can see it can only be force of some character; and if we come to the conclusion that the privileged classes will, with a good prospect of success, resort to methods of violence and dictatorship in order to prevent the complete triumph of Labour, and that parliamentary institutions and the will of the people cannot prevent it, then it seems to me there are only two consequences. One is that we must acquiesce in the present social order, which is unthinkable for any socialist. The other is that the Left should resort to violence and dictatorship first, so as forcibly to crush the other side before they begin. But at that point we have to consider the probabilities of success, for the man who starts an unsuccessful revolution will not be kindly thought of by his followers when the reaction comes; nor will he hold a very high place in history.

It is more serious than that: for if we resort to violence and dictatorship and do not succeed, then, in company with millions of innocent people we may become the victims of that very Fascist violence and dictatorship which we shall have precipitated and provided with an excuse for its terror.

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And if we seriously ask ourselves what are the prospects for the success in Britain of a violent revolution of the Left, surely we must answer that there are no such prospects of success.

The triumph of Bolshevism in Russia gives us little or no assistance as an analogy. Russia was economically undeveloped; it had no great and powerful middle-class; and its government was both corrupt and inefficient. Revolution in Russia was child's play compared with what it would be here, where none of these factors obtain. We can learn from our experience of the General Strike in 1926, which was a magnificent demonstration of working-class solidarity and was not without its beneficial effects on the political consciousness of labour. Magnificent as it was as a demonstration, the fact has long since been recognized by responsible trade union leaders that after the General Strike had been called, those responsible for its calling were not clear as to what to do with it; and that when the Government resisted and, with the aid of the great middle-class, proceeded to the maintenance of services, the strike was doomed to failure unless it had promptly been converted into general revolution, in which case all the grave risks I have indicated would have had to be considered. As it was, the General Council of the Trades Union Congress decided to find means of calling the strike off, which left the miners with a considerable feeling of bitterness, secured from the Communists a great deal of abuse, and from Mr. Baldwin one of his fatherly speeches, followed by the Trades Union and Trades Disputes Act, 1927, and a limited amount of victimization.

It may be argued that the actual or threatened industrial action of Labour's Council of Action soon after the war respecting British intervention against the Soviet Bolshevik revolution was successful, and that that experiment could be repeated on other issues, including those of Spain and China.

SOCIAL CHANGE—PEACEFUL OR VIOLENT?

With respect, I do not agree. The Council of Action effort against intervention in Russia came at the end of a long war in which millions of British families had suffered heavily. The nation was in no mood for starting up another military adventure. Ninety per cent, of the people—possibly more—were against Mr. Churchill and the Government. Consequently the Council of Action was implementing an overwhelming public opinion, and—who knows?—it may well be that a political campaign in the country would have been quite effective for the purpose without industrial action. I was a party to the work of the Council of Action. I agreed with what it did. I reserve the right to advocate similar action where a government, on big issues, is acting in defiance of overwhelming public opinion, and certainly if a Government was proposing to destroy our constitutional liberties; for Governments that are unconstitutional have no moral right to constitutional respect.

If the people of Germany or Italy wished by forcible means to over-throw their dictatorships, they have every moral right to do so, for dictatorships provide no constitutional means for the proper functioning of public opinion.

With us and other democratic countries it is different.

Are we, however, bound to accept the view that there is little or no possibility of peaceful, fundamental social change? I think not; although I fully agree with Mr. Laski and Mr. Greaves that there is no certainty that the change will be made peacefully. I agree that our reactionaries and our privileged classes are capable of anything, provided they think there is a good chance of success.

The democrat who trusts in the democracy of our Chamberlains is a fool. There is need for vigilance, for looking ahead, for being, as far as we can, ready for trouble. But in the meantime, if we assume that the great change can

only successfully come by violence, because otherwise successful violence will be resorted to by the opponents of change, then the parties of democracy must seriously overhaul their tactics and organization and put the inevitability of violence right in the front of their political propaganda. In that case, however, we shall be asking for trouble: we shall run the risk of making inevitable the violence we all wish to avoid.

It is, I suggest, best, therefore, while remaining alert and receptive as to the significance of events as we proceed, that the parties of the Left should stand firm by the principles of parliamentary democracy and be ready to take all practicable steps to increase the difficulties of reaction in resorting to violence. To this end it is necessary that we should, by our propaganda, maintain a lively, virile democratic public opinion; that we should do everything we can to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of parliamentary institutions and all branches of public administration; that we should cultivate a healthy democratic constitutionalism in the armed forces; that we should put our foot down firmly on jobbery and corruption; that we should develop the political and economic education of the people and intensively educate Labour's rank and file for the tasks of government; that we should seek ability and public spirit in our parliamentary and municipal candidates, rather than put the money consideration first which is too often the case to-day; that we should welcome, rather than discourage, courageous and decisive political leadership and expect individuals to carry their responsibilities rather than to bury them overmuch in committee; and finally, but by no means least important, is the need for Labour in power to achieve things in harmony with the best aspirations of the public and to earn for itself a reputation for capacity and uprightness in the art of government, nationally and locally.

Policies are not enough; for policies have to be implemented by the brains and work of individual men and women. I think a lot of the British Civil Service and of our municipal officers, but the politician who expects the officers to carry him through is asking for trouble, for the politician has, or ought to have, qualities of public leadership and of interpreting the mass mind which public officials are not paid to possess, and in a large proportion of cases do not possess. And if we earn public respect; if we act like a Government as well as merely being a Government as a matter of official fact; if we carry public opinion with us; then, if reaction engages in sabotage or in violence, reaction can be crushed with all the power and authority of government and with the support of the general body of citizens. Whether a constitution is written or unwritten, whatever its guarantees, it will not be saved if unlawful violence is not sternly repressed and if government is weak and inefficient.

The power of a Government to govern, to maintain order, to command respect, in the end depends upon public opinion. That is even true in the long run of dictatorship, for if and when German and Italian public opinion becomes sufficiently strong against Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini, and that public opinion can maintain itself, then those two gentlemen will have to look out for other fields of employment. So it is with us. If we do well, if we are capable, if we do not get demoralized by inferiority complex, we shall stand a good chance of coming through. But if we falter, if we muddle, if we steer the ship of State on to the rocks, then anything may happen.

That is how I feel about these things. Neither I nor anybody else can give a 100 per cent. guarantee of success, but I believe that along that line is the best hope of that peaceful social change which will bring untold blessings to mankind.

MUNICH: AMERICAN OPINION AND POLICY

By LINDSAY ROGERS

MORE than three centuries ago the Pilgrims, after their first harvest, designated a day for thanksgiving. The custom was copied in other sections of a growing and prosperous country. For the last seventy-five years annual proclamations by the President of the United States and the governors of the commonwealths have set apart the last Thursday of November for a national festival. Twenty years ago the thanks were particularly fervent, for the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month had marked the end of a war that was to end war.

In November, 1938, a leading American cartoonist publishes a drawing of Uncle Sam carrying home the viands for a thanksgiving feast and smiling somewhat uncertainly because he is flanked by two dark clouds, labelled "Japanese aggression" and "European turmoil and oppression." The caption of the cartoon is: "If you think things are far from perfect here, remember what the rest of the world is going through and be thankful." This cartoon is, I think, an accurate epitomization of America's reaction to Munich's aftermath. What the effects on American policy will be is as yet far from clear. That they will be profound is certain.

The thankfulness, such as it is, comes after a period of tension which was not hospitable to calm judgment. With the tension over, intellectual and emotional recovery takes time. The relief is so profound that one is inclined to welcome it rather than to complain that the terror should have been avoided. Thus on the morrow of Munich, in an editorial entitled "The Price of Peace," the *New York Times* declared:

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"Let no man say that it would have been better to resist and to fight it out 'now rather than later,' unless he himself would have given the order that would have sent young men marching into the dreary hell of war," with the result of "whole cities laid waste by high explosives and seared with poison gas." But Munich—one of the decisive, albeit bloodless, battles of the world—can hardly be considered save in terms of its past. Over this the historians will wage an endless debate. American opinion is now more concerned with the future, and this seems exceedingly grim.

On the past, Americans should hesitate to be ungenerously critical for the reason that we bear some responsibility. In 1918 the United States helped to defeat Germany. Now Germany, having lost the war, has won the "peace," and is even more dominant, cruel and threatening than would have been the case had the central powers secured victory twenty years ago. Is this not partly our fault? An American president helped to frame and even decisively influenced the terms of the Covenant and the peace treaties which have now become scraps of paper. Has not the tearing process been the easier because the United States refused to join in the efforts for "collective security"? Had the United States been at Geneva, European deterioration might well have been less rapid. Our influence would almost certainly have been in the direction of loosening the strait jacket which was put around Germany, so that she would have had less of a case for a forcible breaking of the bonds. Knowledge of American policy and intentions would have permitted England to commit herself on the continent and thus to exert a more restraining influence on France when that state was still a great power and unmindful of the responsibilities that go with greatness. American isolation enabled Great Britain to explain, although not to excuse, a foreign policy that was indecisive. In the era of Stresemann this policy permitted

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French intransigence that led directly to the rise of national socialism and to the emergence of Hitler. Thus American isolation was in part responsible for the situation that preceded Munich.

Realizing this, Americans have hesitated to pronounce severe judgments on a tragedy they helped to write but in which they refused to play any of the rôles. Moreover, the fact that, for the time being at least, geographical isolation, great natural resources and a high standard of living combine to make the United States favoured among nations should bring, and has brought, humility. In New York, in Washington and in San Francisco, we cannot as yet even vaguely sense the nervousness and fear which have hovered over Paris and London. Committed to neutrality legislation which, although fumbling and inadequate, attempts to make it certain that we can stay out of a European conflagration, it ill behoves us to criticize the European democracies because they have refused to seem to be willing to risk war in support of their vital interests.

But despite these inhibitions, American opinion has been articulate. It confesses to a long-standing bewilderment as to the objectives and methods of British policy which, on two occasions, rejected offers of joint action. In 1931, Great Britain refused to support Secretary of State Stimson in his desire to restrain Japan. Great Britain, whose interests were far greater than American interests, was indifferent. Indeed, at Geneva the Japanese representative could thank Sir John Simon for having said in twenty minutes what he had been trying to say for several days. Four years later, American opinion thought it fashionable to gibe that Great Britain had suddenly become enamoured of the collective system when it could be used to protect important imperial interests to which the challenge was more direct than it had been in 1931. For a time Great Britain seemed to be in earnest and the

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United States was prepared to endeavour not to thwart efforts to restrain an aggressor. Had the oil sanction been imposed, the United States would not have hampered its effectiveness. Even without Congressional action, moral suasion would have sufficed to check the bulk of oil exports. But for reasons which doubtless seemed good and sufficient to Great Britain, determination was lacking. Aggression was successful and the strategic situation in the Mediterranean underwent profound changes.

Nor, in that critical period, could the United States understand the attitude of France. Surely Monsieur Laval should have seen that his wiser course was to give ardent support to the British, even though the issue was not one that France would have chosen. If he had given such support, he would have made it certain that when French interests were really involved, British assistance would have been forthcoming. Great Britain could not have been so indifferent when Hitler marched into the Rhineland. Had France stood with Britain at the time of Abyssinia, the Rhineland bluff would certainly have been postponed. Americans, therefore, think of Sir John Simon and Monsieur Laval as the principal architects of the Japanese and Italian empires, and indirectly of the German empire. Great Britain and France abandoned the collective system. They permitted the dictators to establish themselves in Spain. To the United States, accustomed to think in terms of the Monroe Doctrine, such tolerance was almost incomprehensible. It was as if a European army had been fighting in a civil war, say, in Venezuela or Nicaragua. Then Herr Hitler annexed Austria and confronted Europe with an accomplished fact: one method of effecting "peaceful change." At Berchtesgaden Mr. Chamberlain yielded to a threat to use force: a second method of peaceful change. After Godesberg, Great Britain and France seemed prepared to resist Herr Hitler's demand that the results of his threat

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to use force become an accomplished fact at once, rather than, as Mr. Chamberlain described it, in accordance with "a reasonable and orderly procedure." The United States found it difficult to believe that on such an issue Europe might be plunged into war.

In this rapid survey, I have, of course, shown my own bias, but what I have said is not far from the prevailing American opinion. On the manœuvres which immediately preceded Munich, American discussion has been heated and uninfluenced by party allegiance. One wonders how much of Mr. Chamberlain's support resulted from the fact that critics would risk excommunication from the Conservative party. In the United States the press has asked the same questions that have been asked in Great Britain. When did the Conservative government decide that it would not oppose the partition of Czechoslovakia? What was the theory underlying the Runciman mission—to put pressure on Czechoslovakia or to produce a plan for autonomy without territorial changes which Herr Hitler would be urged to accept? Was Great Britain or France the more vacillating member of a shaky entente? Why the refusal to bring Russia into the circle of powers whose interests were going to be sacrificed by the extinction of the one democracy east of the Rhine? Was Herr Hitler simply gambling on the weakness of the democracies or did he know that Britain had determined not to oppose the cession of territory? In the latter case, why did not Great Britain and France let Czechoslovakia make her own terms? They would have been far better than those that the ambassadors in Prague forced her to accept. Could Britain and France and Russia and the smaller states have kept Hitler from going beyond the Henlein demands? If this had happened, would economic pressure by Germany have meant Czechoslovakia's gradual extinction?

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All these questions have been argued over, and the debate will continue. So much is known of so many things but so little is known of many more important things. Speeches have been broadcast. The strident tones of Hitler have been heard by housewives throughout the world. Americans could almost be present in Prague during the mobilization. They heard over the wireless the terms of the Munich Agreement a few minutes after they had been agreed to. But what of the motives and purposes of the statesmen? What of the considerations and discussions that led to particular policies? In this respect the White Papers are singularly unilluminating. Only one or two of the diplomatic telegrams have been published.

But far more important than American opinion of Munich are the effects of Munich on American policy. These, as I have said, are certain to be profound. They will run along several lines. Clearly, in so far as Europe is concerned, the United States will be more isolationist than ever. In his eloquent radio address to overseas listeners, Mr. Winston Churchill declared that he had no doubt where American sympathies lay, and asked: "But will you wait until British freedom and independence have succumbed and then take up the cause when it is three-quarters ruined yourselves alone?" There is no likelihood of a sympathetic response. There might well have been if, say, from 1931 on, the European democracies had shown themselves anxious to restrain febrile imperialisms. Now the Pan-Germany and the Mittel-Europa which the United States fought to prevent have come about. They have been achieved not by a warlord and military leaders, but by a messiah whose further ambitions are yet to be satisfied. Within the United States there are few who see how England and France can hope to resist those ambitions. To be sure, as Lord Strabogli has just reassured us in an eloquent newspaper article, England

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controls the seas. But she did so before Munich. The air threat against London was greater than any naval threat against Germany. Will it not always be so? If, in 1914, Britain and France—with Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Japan, Italy, Roumania, Greece and the United States—were barely able to conquer the Central Powers, what is the outlook for England and France, no matter how feverishly they now build 'planes? They are bereft of allies, and the anti-comintern powers form a coalition far more formidable than were Germany and Austria in 1914.

Holding this view of Europe, the United States will develop far more actively than ever before a policy of rapprochement with the Latin and South American states. Munich has made the Pan-American Conference at Lima take an added significance, and President Roosevelt has defined national defence as a problem of "continental solidarity" from Canada to Cape Horn. For the time being, at least, in the light of what has happened in Europe, the United States will be more concerned than ever before by civil disturbances in the southern continent. She will anxiously watch for the first effort by one of the totalitarian states to gain any foothold which would change the strategic situation. The Monroe Doctrine has become more important and more rigid. American policy will have constantly in mind Herr Hitler's formula which he stated in *Mein Kampf* of "imposing his demands on the conquered by degrees," of counting on another state "never finding in any particular act of oppression a sufficient excuse for taking up arms."

In so far as domestic policy is concerned, Munich has been a godsend to the Roosevelt Administration. The President's spending programme was under attack. Now the government can pour out huge sums and can plead its justification that they are for defence preparations. Who can raise a voice in objection? Money can be spent on the

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railroads, on arterial highways, on air ports, on the merchant marine—all in the name of defence. But only an incorrigible optimist would dare to hope that the expenditures will be in accordance with a well thought-out plan of national defence. Huge sums will go to the army, but we shall probably leave undetermined the question of whether we want an army only for defence or whether it shall be so organized as to constitute a possible expeditionary force. Naval building is likely to be in terms of possible engagements in the Far East rather than merely the defence of the Continent from Canada to Cape Horn. Production of air-craft will proceed apace but without, I suspect, much prior thought on the relative claims of the navy or the army and on where the force may have to be used.

As yet, the United States has practically no machinery for co-ordinating defence policies. "War," Clemenceau declared, "is far too important a business to be left to the Generals and Admirals." American preparations for war are left almost entirely to the generals and admirals. Their only checks are from the President in the moments he can spare for his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and from the niggardliness of Congressional appropriations. Now Congress is likely to be generous, and that will make for ampler but not necessarily more efficient preparations. Civilian control of the War Department and of the Navy Department is almost non-existent. Since the executive does not have to defend itself in Congress, neither the Secretary of the Navy nor the Secretary of War is required to familiarize himself with the matters over which he nominally has charge, and it happens that, at the moment, these two gentlemen are the weakest members of the President's Cabinet. Neither Department has anything resembling the British Army Council or the Admiralty Board which, in theory at least, require discussion and

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agreement between service men and civilian ministers. There is no separate Air Ministry, and this most important—some would say, all-important—service has to take its chances as the step-child of the Navy and the orphan of the Army. There is no American counterpart of the Committee of Imperial Defence. There is no ministry to coördinate defence, although it must be confessed that, to Americans, the achievements of all these British devices did not in the recent crisis seem overwhelmingly impressive. Hence when America confronts its crisis there is likely to be unpreparedness in vital spheres.

Meanwhile, there is uneasiness concerning the political and economic effects of rearmament. Inevitably there will be a larger measure of governmental control of economic life. For some time the General Staff of the Army has had plans for industrial mobilization which would be put into effect if the United States went to war. Those plans go much further than the machinery of controls which sufficed in 1917 and 1918. They would virtually put the country and the whole of its industry under a rigid dictatorship. The danger is that some of these measures may be argued for now on the ground that they would hasten the preparations for national defence. In 1933 the world spent about four billion dollars on armament. In 1938 it spent more than seventeen billions. American expenditures have not increased in the same proportion. We now spend annually twice as much as we did five years ago. We shall spend more—perhaps three times as much, or one thousand five hundred millions. Will there be any money left for the increasing needs of social services? Will these be starved and will the masses who thereby suffer do so quietly?

In certain other respects Munich and its aftermath have been a source of disillusionment. The United States has always had a good deal of admiration for British political

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institutions: a cabinet system which permitted the ablest of the party leaders to emerge to positions of power; broad policies debated and determined by the House of Commons; permanent officials of great integrity and high abilities. Within those institutions and without consulting Parliament a prime minister and an inner Cabinet (which included two ex-foreign secretaries who had been driven from office because of disapproval by the House of Commons), decided to scrap the foreign policy which for two hundred and fifty years Great Britain had consistently maintained. They did this against the advice of the permanent officials of their foreign office. A British Prime Minister, an amateur in diplomacy, without an interpreter of his own, and attended only by a civil servant whose competence, however great in industrial questions, had not been known to extend to international affairs, reached an agreement with the German Führer. The gibe that it was an instance of "the blind leading the blind" may be too cruel, but Americans rubbed their eyes and asked certain questions: Is this British Democracy? Is this the way the British Cabinet system works? Without the weapon of party discipline, would the House of Commons have voted its confidence in the Government?

Across the Atlantic, also, there has been uneasiness, because while the British press is "free," some sections of it have apparently been persuaded to be discreet in their factual accounts and tolerant in their judgments. What the British people could see in their cinemas and hear over the wireless was not uninfluenced by the Government. If Mr. Chamberlain proposes to preserve peace in agreement with Germany and Italy, will members of the House of Commons and editors be able to continue to say the truthful things about German policy which men of conscience must insist on saying? In his speech in the House of Lords, the Archbishop

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of Canterbury hoped that he would not be "introducing a jarring note if for one moment I say that I trust among friends, since there is this new friendship, it will be possible without being misunderstood to make remonstrances from time to time against blatant (*sic*) infringements of religious or civil liberty, because what is the worth of friendships if they have no place for candor?" Since November 10th the whole civilized world has made remonstrances. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany are estranged and may be broken.

For this reason the President's political subordinates have stopped arguing that his appeals for peace were influential in preventing Europe from plunging into war. Given the results of Munich, who would wish to derive credit for having helped to bring it about? Practically nothing is known of the influences, if any, which, during the summer, the United States attempted to exert. President Roosevelt's address at Kingston, Canada, extended the Monroe Doctrine to the Dominion north of the United States. Ambassador Bullitt made a speech which expressed sympathy for the democracies. But we know nothing of what foreign diplomats in Washington were saying to their governments. It must have been that there was no American sympathy for Hitler; that the United States saw no reason why the Sudetens could not have everything to which they were entitled without a disturbance of the frontier, and that, if war actually came, efforts to keep the United States out would probably be futile. Shortly before the Nuremberg speech, President Roosevelt, at a press conference, expressed some such feelings. There were repercussions from isolationist quarters, and so the President felt compelled to explain that he had not attempted to indicate any change in the traditional American policy of aloofness. That, of course, was worse than if he had said nothing at all. In diplomacy it is better

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to remain stationary rather than to take a step forward and then to retreat. Appealing to Hitler, President Roosevelt said: "Should you agree to a solution in this peaceful manner, I am convinced that hundreds of millions throughout the world would recognize your action as an outstanding historic service to humanity." He would not say this now.

Nevertheless, the United States maintains its faith in democracy. It hopes that when the test comes, American democracy will not be found wanting. It will have one advantage over European democracies. Because of its size and strength, because the Monroe Doctrine is the common policy of the Western World, the United States can determine its course without waiting for prior approval from its sister democracies. Pan-Germanism now dominates the European continent and will influence its way of life. The United States prays that Pan-Americanism can preserve a different way of life in the Western Hemisphere.

THE NEED FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL

A FACTUAL STUDY

By S. K. RUCK

THE headlines in the popular Press on the new Criminal Justice Bill were not such as to commend it to the ordinary taxpayer, who read that penal servitude and hard labour were to be abolished, flogging done away with, young men under twenty-one exempted from imprisonment and things generally apparently made rather pleasanter for the criminal¹. If he troubled to explore what were to be the effects of the Bill on the pockets of himself and his fellow taxpayers, he found the estimated cost to be something like a million pounds in the first year, and about a quarter of a million annually afterwards. And he probably reflected that, while he was not anxious to see the social services curtailed as a result of rearmament, there were other categories of the population he would like to see getting the benefit of his million pounds sooner than the criminals, whom he regarded as being somewhere near the bottom of his subscription list.

On the other hand, a really thoughtful taxpayer may have considered that crime is very expensive to the community, and that if crime is increasing, if present penal methods are failing to stem the increase, and if the proposals in the Bill offer a hope of remedying that failure, his million pounds would be well spent.

Is crime increasing? Are existing penal sanctions ineffective? Does the Bill offer prospects of an improvement?

¹ Throughout this article, "crimes" means "indictable offences"; "crime," the commission of indictable offences; and "criminals," persons committing indictable offences. Moreover, since male criminals outnumber females by seven to one, generalisations based on criminal statistics of persons in effect relate to males only.

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I

Although the Home Office issues annually a 200-page volume packed with statistical information about crime, it is by no means easy to answer the question whether crime is increasing. It is within every individual's experience that a very large number of crimes cannot be recorded because they are not brought to official notice. The greater the confidence in the efficacy of the police and the administration of justice, the greater the probability the crime will be recorded, so that the apparent increase may be purely statistical. This tendency, however, mainly affects the less serious offences, since serious offences are likely to be notified at all times.

The following figures show the number of crimes known to the police per million of the population in quinquennial averages from 1900 to 1929 and annually since.

CRIMES KNOWN TO THE POLICE.

Quinquennial Periods	Total Crimes	Crimes per Million of Population	Year	Total Crimes	Crimes per Million
1900-4 ..	84,247 ..	2,557	1930 ..	147,031 ..	3,694
1905-9 ..	99,141 ..	2,857	1931 ..	159,278 ..	3,983
1910-4 ..	97,924 ..	2,696	1932 ..	208,175 ..	5,178
1915-9 ..	84,616 ..	2,510	1933 ..	227,285 ..	5,633
1920-5 ..	106,837 ..	2,800	1934 ..	233,359 ..	5,767
1925-9 ..	127,640 ..	3,249	1935 ..	234,372 ..	5,766
1930-4 ..	194,765 ..	4,845	1936 ..	248,803 ..	6,092
			1937 ..	266,265 ..	6,489

Even in face of what has been said above, the recent increase appears alarming, and the jump between 1931 and 1933 is especially noticeable. There is a strong inducement to regard this as being due to the slump, since unemployment reached its maximum in the year 1932. In fact, however, the explanation is quite different. The following paragraphs appeared in the Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for 1932.

"In every police station there has been in existence for many years what was known as a "Suspected Stolen Book."

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Into this book were entered reports of cases in which property had disappeared in circumstances which suggested that it might have been stolen.

Although the circumstances might point fairly clearly to theft, such cases would frequently not figure in any return as crimes, unless subsequent evidence or the conviction of a person by a court removed any further possibility of doubt.

Under this system much discretion was left to local officers to decide in individual instances as between crimes and suspected crimes, and the natural inclination not to ascribe to the district for which they were responsible more crime than undoubtedly existed, produced a general tendency to decide in favour of suspected crime wherever possible.

This tendency, spread over a large number of stations, reproduced itself in a magnified form in the centralised statistics based on station returns, and it became evident that an erroneous picture of the actual state of affairs in the Metropolitan Area was being presented to the public.

The Suspected Stolen Book has, therefore, been abolished and . . . all cases reported have to be dealt with . . . either as crimes or . . . as "property lost."

The result of this change was that the returns of indictable offences in the Metropolitan Police District rose from 26,192 in 1931 to 82,846 in 1933—about 5 per cent of the increase being real and the other 300 odd per cent statistical.

The figure for 1936 was 81,993. Thus at least 50,000 of the 90,000 increase since 1931 in the number of crimes known to the police is due to a statistical change in London.

In other words, the change in the figures is the result more of an increase of honesty in the police, than an increase of dishonesty in the rest of the population.

It is evident that the returns of "Crimes Known" are not a reliable index of the movement of crime, because, while the total number of crimes can never be recorded, various

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influences have been at work in recent years, tending to secure the record of a progressively increasing number.

An alternative index of the movement of crime is the number of persons brought before the Courts. The limitations here are obvious. If in the incessant warfare between criminal and police, the police for any reason lose ground (for example, by reason of the diversion of a substantial portion of their forces to deal with other duties), crime may increase without any increase in the number of persons charged. Similarly, an increase in the number of persons charged may indicate not an increase in crime but an increase in police efficiency.

For purposes of comparison with the figures of "Crimes Known" the relative figures of persons tried are given below. It is worth remembering that persons tried frequently admit to a series of offences.

PERSONS TRIED FOR INDICTABLE OFFENCES.

Quinquennial Periods	Persons Tried	Persons Tried per Million of Population	Year	Persons Tried	Persons Tried per Million of Population
1900-4	56,911	1,727	1930	64,046	1,609
1905-9	63,438	1,828	1931	66,984	1,675
1910-4	63,613	1,751	1932	72,513	1,804
1915-9	57,814	1,715	1933	70,465	1,746
1920-4	58,857	1,542	1934	72,938	1,802
1925-9	64,001	1,629	1935	76,902	1,892
1930-4	69,389	1,726	1936	79,525	1,947
			1937	83,997	2,047

The two tables taken together suggest that, with the growth of population and various statistical considerations taken into account, there has been a definite increase in crime, as compared with the early part of the century, but that such increase has only become really noteworthy in the past few years.

Among specific classes of crime it is certain that crimes of violence have not increased since the beginning of the

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century, and that sexual crimes have increased. Any figures produced in support of these arbitrary statements might be misleading, because thirty years ago many crimes which can now be dealt with by Courts of Summary Jurisdiction then had to be tried at Assizes or Quarter Sessions. As a result, the less serious examples of crimes which to-day would be dealt with as indictable offences (e.g. wounding, indecent assault) were then reduced to non-indictable offences (e.g. common assault) in order to save congestion in the Higher Courts. Hence slight statistical increases in these crimes do not represent real increases.

Crimes against the person, however, whether of violence or sexual, represent only some 4 per cent of all crimes committed. Of the crimes against property there has been a decrease in burglary—which is a comparatively skilled crime—and an increase in house and shop-breaking—which are the sort of crimes any amateur can commit.

	CRIMES KNOWN.			PERSONS TRIED		
	1900-4	1925-9	1936	1900-4	1925-9	1936
Burglary	1,314	1,260	1,247	539	361	351
House and shopbreaking	6,808	17,146	30,450	1,667	3,461	8,041

As to larcencies (generally still more elementary crimes which constitute 71 per cent of all crimes committed, and for which are tried 72 per cent of all persons appearing before the Courts, it is impossible to say with certainty whether there has been an increase, although all the indications suggest that there has. But in four-fifths of all the larcencies committed, the value of the property taken is less than five pounds.

What seems to emerge is that it is not the skilled professional criminal who is on the increase, but the petty thief.

When the age distribution of offenders is examined, the reason for this is apparent. It is among the young that the rise in numbers has been taking place.


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Another set of figures has to be taken for this analysis—that of Persons found Guilty. For certain technical reasons these figures are available for only one year (1907) before 1929, but they have been published every year since. The change that has taken place is most strikingly brought out by the fact that while in 1907 persons under 21 represented less than a third of all persons found guilty, to-day they constitute almost exactly one half, the figures being 16,520 out of 50,271 and 39,493 out of 77,529. Put in another way, the number of persons found guilty under the age of 21 has increased by about 130 per cent in 30 years. Much of the increase has taken place quite recently, as indicated in the attached chart.

Undoubtedly part of this increase is due to the institution of Juvenile Courts (by the Children Act of 1908), to the increasing use made of them, especially in recent years, and to the extension of their scope by the Children Act of 1933, to deal with cases up to the age of 17 instead of 16. Employer and parents and others who would have hesitated to bring a child before an ordinary police court are prepared to make use of the Juvenile Court. Moreover, before the Juvenile Courts existed, and even afterwards, it was not uncommon for the police to deal with young offenders at the police station as they thought fit. Some chief constables even held a kind of small court of their own. The Report of the Departmental Committee on Young Offenders (1927) commented unfavourably on this practice, and it has diminished under official disapproval. These changes have all meant that children who at one time made no appearance in official statistics, now figure as guilty persons.

With all allowances made, however, the conclusion is inescapable that there has been a serious increase in juvenile crime, and the position has now been reached that to-day one child out of every eighty throughout the country


PERSONS FOUND GUILTY OF
INDICTABLE OFFENCES
by age groups



NUMBER OF MALES FOUND GUILTY OF
INDICTABLE OFFENCES

per 100,000 of population in each of certain age groups

1907 & 1929-1937



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between the ages of 10 and 14 is found guilty of an indictable offence.

II

Granted that there has been an increase of crime, more especially among juveniles, how far is it possible to attribute it to the ineffectiveness of existing penal sanctions?

Retribution apart, which concerns the moralist rather than the social administrator (except in so far as lynch law must be kept at bay) any penal sanction is effective in so far as it relieves society from the attentions of the criminal—either by eliminating him, by reforming him or by deterring him from a repetition of his offence and others from imitating him.

Complete elimination can only be secured by death or exile, but a near approach to it can be effected by long term imprisonment. The Prevention of Crime Act (1908) provided that "if a person convicted on indictment of a crime and sentenced to penal servitude is an habitual criminal, the court, if of opinion that by reason of the offender's criminal habits and mode of life it is expedient for the protection of the public that he should be kept in detention for a lengthened period of years, may order that upon the termination of penal servitude he undergo a period of preventive detention, not exceeding ten years or less than five years."

During 1937, 13 criminals were sentenced to preventive detention. During the same year 472 persons were sentenced to penal servitude who had previously served two or more sentences of penal servitude, 66 of them having already served upwards of four sentences.

Clearly this particular sanction is ineffective, simply because it is not being used. The reason for this is that, in addition to the restrictions imposed by the Act itself, the view taken by the Courts as to what constitutes habitual criminality

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has been so narrow that it has been found possible to secure a sentence of this type in only a minimum of cases.

Penal servitude is also eliminative in origin, having been invented as a substitute for the hulks, which in turn were a substitute for transportation. Fourteen years' penal servitude was an ordinary sentence when the system was first introduced. Three years, which is the minimum sentence, is also the median sentence to-day. There has, in fact, been a strongly marked tendency since the beginning of the century to inflict fewer and shorter sentences of imprisonment generally. This has necessarily meant that at any given moment there are more convicted criminals at large in society to-day than there were thirty years ago, a fact which the police emphasise when attention is drawn to the increasing disproportion between crimes known and persons brought to justice.

The reduction in number and length of prison sentences must also have reduced to some extent their deterrent effect, especially as public opinion has brought about a very considerable alleviation of prison conditions.

On the other hand, strenuous and devoted efforts have been made to secure and increase the reformatory effects of imprisonment, especially upon young offenders, in conformity with the growing discredit attaching to Lombroso's theory that crime is congenital, and the increasing tendency to attribute it to environmental causes. These efforts have, to some extent, been thwarted by the difficulties of providing inspiration in the excessively dispiriting surroundings of the old deterrent prison buildings. New buildings have of recent years been provided for the Borstal System, but the great majority of prisoners are housed in buildings erected when penal theory was at its grimmest and most oppressive.

Some indication of the effectiveness of imprisonment in securing immunity from the attentions of the individual prisoner, is given by figures showing what proportion of

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persons sentenced to any particular form of imprisonment are not again convicted within specified periods of time. It is, of course, impossible to affirm that anyone not convicted has not again offended, or to state whether such success as may be claimed is due to reformation or deterrence.

Persons serving penal servitude sentences are divided into three classes: "stars" first offenders, "intermediates" younger men serving their first term of penal servitude who have had previous convictions, and "recidivists" or habitual offenders. In an investigation made a few years ago it was found that at the end of five years after release, 5 per cent of "stars," 50 per cent of "intermediates" and between 80 per cent and 85 per cent of "recidivists" had been reconvicted.

At the end of December, 1937, 45 per cent of Borstal boys discharged in 1933 and 25 per cent of boys discharged from Home Office schools in the years 1931, 1932 and 1933 had been reconvicted. No results of imprisonment in local prisons (except the Star prison at Wakefield) are available.

The decrease in the numbers sentenced to imprisonment in the present century has been accompanied by a great increase in the numbers dealt with under the Probation of Offenders Act, with or without supervision.

From the outset, preposterously high claims have been made for the success of this method of treatment.

It is commonly asserted that 90 per cent of those placed on probation do not offend again, and even in the latest report of the Children's Branch, just published, the figure given is 88 per cent, though it is at least made clear here that this figure represents the proportion of cases it was not necessary to bring again before the Courts "at any rate within 12 or 18 months of the making of the probation order." The wording does not inspire confidence in the figures. To the best of the writer's knowledge publicity has only once been given to

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any set of carefully and honestly compiled statistics on this subject. That was in the 1928 report of the Children's Branch, which gave the following percentages of Cardiff Probation cases who again appeared before the Courts within five years 1919, 44.82; 1920, 57.78; 1921, 47.82; 1922, 54.66; 1923, 41.78. The figures relate to a difficult district during a difficult period, but they are authentic, and even with these circumstances taken into consideration, they should have sufficed to shatter complacency, and to stir up a little more official curiosity as to the real results of the system.

There is one other set of figures which throws some light on this question. In 1933, in connection with the chapter on Crime, the *New Survey of London Life and Labour* instigated a new statistical investigation by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. The records of all those found guilty of indictable offences for the first time in 1927 were examined, and their ages, offences and nature of the sentences and reconvictions within the next five years recorded. The value of this enquiry was officially recognised and the investigation was subsequently extended to the whole country the results being published in 1934 in *Criminal Statistics for 1932*. These showed the following percentages of reconvictions of males of all ages.

(a) Those sentenced to imprisonment	19.1
(b) Those bound over (with or without supervision or dismissed)	25.2
(c) Those fined	20.0

A further analysis by age groups gave the following results:

	(a)	(b)	(c)
Under 21	31.3	31.1	26.7
21-30	23.9	25.8	23.6
Over 30	14.2	15.9	15.7

Category (b) was not subdivided to show any differences

there might be between the results of probation proper, involving supervision by a probation officer, and the mere binding over on recognisances. But in view of the Cardiff figures above, it is not to be assumed that supervised probation would necessarily show better results. Since it is understood this survey is to be carried out quinquennially, the result for the period 1932-1937 should therefore soon be to hand, and it is likely that the distinction between supervised and unsupervised probation will henceforward be kept. The results should be interesting. Whatever the 1932-1937 figures may show, the 1927-1932 figures are certainly disappointing as regards conditional liberty. Imprisonment is nearly always reserved for those regarded as the least hopeful cases, yet the effects were better than probation, etc., in the older age groups, and practically as good in the age group under 21.

There is much to be said, and much has been said, in favour of reform as against deterrence in dealing with the criminal. A reformed offender will wish to be a useful and productive member of society: one merely deterred may be content to remain a parasite still, though a parasite of another kind. But the figures above suggest that deterrence fulfils a useful function among those who have committed crimes and certainly it plays a part in discouraging first essays in crime for fear of unpleasant consequences.

The chart and diagram on pages 28 and 29 support the theory that existing penal sanctions, while they may be on the whole effective in reforming or deterring the individual who is directly subjected to their influence, are not deterrent enough to that class of offender, generally young, who has come to consider that every dog has one free bite. There are far more young offenders than there used to be; that is, more youngsters are trying it on once. But since the number of older offenders has grown in nothing like the same proportion, it is reasonable to assume that the treatment meted out to the

young once caught has on the whole persuaded them not to continue in a criminal career as they grow up. The problem therefore is to provide reformatory treatment of the young offender in a form likely to deter his would-be emulators.

III

Since it is to those under 21 that the majority of the increase in crime appears to be attributable, and for whom existing penal sanctions appear least adequate, it is to the provisions of the Criminal Justice Bill dealing with the young offender that the greatest interest attaches.

In the first place, the Bill proposes the abolition of imprisonment of all persons under the age of 21 without cause shown, and foreshadows its complete abolition. It also proposes the abolition of corporal punishment for all persons over the age of 17, it having already been abolished for persons under that age. These provisions are clearly in the direction of a lessening of deterrence. In compensation, two new methods of treatment are proposed, viz.: Howard Houses and senior and junior compulsory attendance centres.

Howard Houses are to be establishments where persons aged 16 to 21 are to serve sentences of "residential control." These sentences will be of six months, with six months' supervision to follow, but release on licence may be granted after one month, in which case supervision will still continue to the end of twelve months from the date of sentence. If the licence is revoked, the licensee may be recalled for the unexpired period of his supervision, or six months, whichever is the greater. Persons under residential control will normally be permitted and assisted to engage in ordinary outside employment and will be required to contribute to their maintenance out of their wages.

Compulsory attendance centres are to be non-residential establishments. The senior centres for those aged 17-21 are

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to be provided by the Central Government, the junior centres for those aged 12-17 by the local authorities, but local authorities are not compelled to provide them, their powers being permissive only. At these centres offenders are to attend to receive appropriate occupation and instruction under supervision at such times as will not interfere with their school or other work, for an aggregate number of hours not exceeding sixty.

Howard Houses seem admirably conceived to secure for a youthful offender, not considered in need of Borstal training, any of the benefits a short sentence of imprisonment might be expected to give, without the accompanying disadvantages. If the houses are competently managed, the loss of liberty they involve should still impose an effective deterrent, while satisfying the modern demand for reformatory effort. Their effectiveness will depend to a large extent on the willingness of the Courts to inflict sentences of residential control in substitution not only for sentences of imprisonment, but also for probation, binding over and fines.

It is not possible to feel so optimistic about the compulsory attendance centres. Apparently the maximum restraint they will impose is what a keen youth would impose on himself by attending twice weekly at one session of evening classes, and any keen youth knows that attendance at one session only is of very little use to him. Their reformatory value is thus likely to be nil, and it is questionable whether they will prove much of a deterrent. This is the more serious since the ages which just escape eligibility for Howard Houses are those in which crime has most rapidly increased and is now most prevalent. The latest statistics show the incidence of crime among the young in 1937.

It will be seen that the proportion of offenders at the ages of 14 and 15, by which time boys and girls are normally wage earners, is greater than at all those subsequent ages from 16-20

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Age	Number of Persons Found Guilty per 100,000 of Population at the Age	Age	Number of Persons Found Guilty per 100,000 of Population at the Age
8	216	14	1,124
9	475	15	1,126
10	714	16	1,021
11	961	17	827
12	1,178	18	808
13	1,358	19	681
		20	578

at which offenders are eligible for Howard Houses. It therefore seems mistaken to leave these age groups without any sanction between compulsory attendance and admission to a Home Office school.

Presumably the reason for not enlarging the Howard House age limits is that it is considered undesirable to mix "young persons" of 20 and "children" of 14. Persons of 16 are also "children," however, and the proper solution seems to be to provide for age segregation within the houses, or, preferably, to provide two groups of houses, for those 14-17 and those 17-21, since in any case it will be desirable to keep the units small.

There are a number of other sections of the Bill which concern the juvenile offender. It is proposed to give Courts of Summary Jurisdiction the power to commit to Borstal detention, presumably in order to increase the use of this method of treatment. There is much to be said for such increasing use, but less to be said for the competence of some of the lower Courts to assess suitable cases. The Bill also provides, however, that before proceeding to a Borstal sentence *any* Court shall consider the report of the Prison Commissioners regarding the offender's physical and mental condition and general suitability for such sentence. The Commissioners have long made a practice of submitting to the Courts the result of expert lay and medical examinations (made during the period of prison remand), of each potential Borstal case, but the Senior Courts have not always seen fit

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to concern themselves with them. Since prisons are no longer to be available for the remand of such cases in future, State remand centres are to be provided where these examinations will be made henceforth.

A modification is also proposed of the law regarding detention in police cells under the age of 17, which at present permits continuous detention up to four days. This may mean that the offender will be made more anti-social than before by losing his job, and the sanction has not been popular, only 333 persons over and twelve persons under 17 having been so treated in 1937. Henceforward the detention is to be for not more than four nights from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m. with at least four clear days between each night of detention. In its revised form the provision may well form a useful deterrent in the more trivial cases and may be more widely used than the previous similar provision.

There is little in the Bill of major importance regarding probation, but what there is is likely to assist to make it more effective. A clear distinction is to be made henceforth between probation under supervision on the one hand and binding over and dismissal under the Probation of Offenders' Act on the other. Only probation under supervision is to be termed probation in future, which should assist in removing the impression that probation means a "let off." Furthermore, each probation area is required to appoint a sufficient number of probation officers, and the recently instituted central scheme for the training of probation officers is given statutory recognition. Since the unadmitted failure of probation up to the present to achieve what was hoped of it is largely due to the fact that probation officers have in the past been over-worked and under qualified, it is to be hoped that these provisions will help to accomplish a real improvement.

The provisions of the Bill in relation to persons over the age of 21 are in the main limited to implementing the recom-

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mendations of the Departmental Committee on Persistent Offenders. Broadly speaking, this committee took the view first that it was desirable to keep confirmed criminals under lock and key for periods as long as public opinion was likely to stand; and second that where an offender other than a confirmed criminal (including persistent offenders aged 21-30) had committed a crime for which the law provided a severe sentence (i.e., penal servitude or 2 years' imprisonment), the offender should be given a sentence in the nature of Borstal detention instead of being committed to penal servitude. The opinion of the committee was that penal servitude in its present form was not calculated to fit a man to take up normal life on discharge.

Accordingly the Bill prescribes (a) "Sentences of corrective training for a period of not less than two and not more than four years on persons between 21 and 30, whose records, characters and habits are such as to make such a sentence expedient for the training of the offenders; (b) sentences of preventive detention for a term of not less than two and not more than four years on persons over the age of 30 if by reason of the person's criminal antecedents and mode of life such a sentence is expedient for the protection of the public."

Furthermore, any person convicted of certain serious offences (including all felonies) who has already been thrice convicted of such an offence or of any offence for which he was previously sentenced to corrective training or preventive detention can be sentenced to preventive detention for a term not more than ten years.

The phraseology of the Bill leaves the impression that long-sentence preventive detention is embodied somewhat as an afterthought, and that the 2-4 years sentence is to be regarded as the norm, which certainly was not the intention of the Departmental Committee. Moreover, the shorter detention may lead to administrative difficulties since public

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opinion would hardly tolerate for short sentences of detention the amenities and material comforts which it would quite freely extend to the long-sentence "detainee" in exchange for prolonged freedom from his attentions. However, the long-term provision is there, and it is to be hoped it will be used, "for the protection of the public."

As in the case of Borstal detention the Courts are required to consider representations from the Prison Commissioners before passing sentences of corrective training or preventive detention. "Trainees" or "detainees" may be released on licence after serving three-quarters of their sentence and remain on licence until its expiration. A person released from training or detention may also be required to furnish an address for twelve months after release and may be prohibited during that period from holding a driving licence.

To sum up, the Bill cuts away a good deal of dead wood, gives authority to much that is current unofficial practice of an enlightened and progressive Prison Commission and contains some innovations which should prove valuable if they are properly implemented; but it gives evidence in places of a rather sentimental optimism where unpleasant facts appear to call for drastic action. This is especially conspicuous in the absence of any effective provision for that age group 12-16 in which the marked and rapidly increasing incidence of crime constitutes a major problem.

This article is limited solely to a consideration of the effectiveness of existing and proposed penal methods in combating the increase of crime. Such questions as whether the increase is mainly due to other causes, like unemployment, a general lack of discipline, a failure in religious teaching, smaller families leading to the spoiling of children, the decay of apprenticeship and the shortcomings of our educational and industrial system in regard to the adolescent, do not come within its scope.

PRIMITIVE DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND

By SIR ERNEST SIMON

LÖTSCHENTAL is a narrow and most lovely valley running east and west between two ranges of high snow mountains, impassable except to mountaineers. Till the last generation, the only access was up a steep path from the Rhône Valley. It is said that of old the whole of the imports for the thousand persons living in the valley were brought in on the back of one mule once a year!

Recently a railway has been built to Goppenstein (4,000 feet) at the west end of the valley, and a road has been made three miles eastwards along the valley.

During the last thirty years tourists have begun to frequent Lötschental, and a few small hotels have been built. Their money has helped somewhat to raise the standard of living of the peasants, but has so far not seriously affected the traditional ways of life.

The peasants have to contend with severe natural difficulties. For six months of the year the whole valley is under snow. During summer the weather is so dry that artificial irrigation is necessary for all the fields. There is very little level land, so that agriculture is carried on under great difficulties. But the most grievous harm is caused by avalanches. Bridges, dams, roads and fields are constantly damaged. There are so few spots which are not liable to avalanche that the villages have to be crowded closely together on the safe spots; so much so that only narrow spaces are allowed between the houses and farm buildings. The paths are dirty and often soaked in manure. The whole arrangement is most insanitary.

The residents belong to the Roman Catholic Church and

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the Catholic Conservative Party. The priest boasts that every single one of the 400 voters in Lötschental invariably votes for that party.

Everybody shares these faiths, everybody regards them as the only basis of a good life. Every leader, whether priest or teacher or politician inculcates them continually and automatically. All the varied ceremonies, drama, singing, processions, and the constant wearing on Sundays and holidays of the ancient local costume, tend to maintain and strengthen the old customs, traditions and beliefs. Disturbing ideas seem to be effectively excluded: the radio is hardly known; only rarely is a cinema shown; nearly everybody reads the local Catholic Conservative paper. Those who leave the valley and return seem to accept the local customs as fully as those who have never left it.

Economically, there seems to be no desire to change. Every peasant owns his own land, buildings and stock. There are no rich residents; the priest and schoolmaster are no better off than the "rich" peasant; and he only owns half a dozen cattle. There is no unemployment, little serious poverty, no exploitation; the peasants not only know, but themselves determine, exactly how their taxes shall be spent.

The peasants are poor, but live a varied and interesting and friendly life. They are proud of the beauties of their valley; proud of their independence. Every citizen is a self-respecting man living his life in security, his firm faith in his religion and in his political party untouched by modern doubts. "Nerves" are unknown; quarrels, of course, occur, but rarely last a fortnight. Progress is exceedingly slow. It is a conservative civilization and wishes to remain so. In spite of increasing tourist traffic, in spite of all the inventions of modern science, the valley is still almost as securely protected from disturbing thoughts as it was 500 years ago.

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BLATTEN.

The valley is divided into four communes, Blatten being the largest, situated at the top end of the valley. The population of Blatten is about 340, including 110 men of twenty years or over, all of whom are Swiss citizens and voters.

The women play no public part in the valley. Their time is fully occupied looking after their houses and their children, helping on the land, spinning and weaving and making clothes both for themselves and the men. On holidays and on Sundays they still almost invariably wear the traditional costume, and the priest informed us that this would certainly not be changed so long as he was alive.

When we were passing through the village, just after Mass on a Sunday morning, we found most of the male population listening to a visiting band; there was not one single woman. When we asked the reason, we were told, with an air of surprise at our question, that "naturally" every woman wanted not to amuse herself but to go home and cook the Sunday dinner.

The houses nearly all consist of two living-rooms, a kitchen and an attic. Each peasant has also a simple house on the grazing alp and various farm buildings, cow-sheds, hay-barns, food-stores, scattered about in the village, on the fields and in the alps. The amount of good land owned by each peasant varies from about one to four acres, and is said to be split up on the average into no less than 71 small plots! The peasants own, on the average, two-and-a-half cows, five sheep, two goats and half a pig. The great bulk of the land is under grass for hay or pasture, but in the tiny arable plots they grow their own potatoes and a good deal of rye.

The only way in which the peasants get money is by the sale of a cow or calf and a certain amount of butter; these

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sales have to pay for the whole of the imports into the valley.

The standard of living is, of course, exceedingly low, but it is a good deal better than it was thirty years ago. No fruit grows in the valley; last year there was considerable import of apples. Coffee is also now widely drunk, as against buttermilk, which was almost universally drunk thirty years ago. Practically nothing is spent on alcohol, because they have not the necessary money.

The only people who have salaries in the village are the postmaster, the priest (who gets 3,000 frs. a year and 60 kilos of butter), the teacher (who gets 2,000 frs. for six months' work and usually works on the land in the summer). There are three or four who live by trading, shopkeepers and inn-keeper (dependent on tourists); nine of the peasants are guides, and about seven own mules and live by transport.

DEMOCRACY.

The commune is governed by the Communal Assembly, which consists of all the male citizens of twenty and over, of whom there are 110. The assembly elects an executive of five persons, including a President and a Vice-President, for periods of four years. The executive is responsible for all routine administration and calls the assembly together whenever it considers it necessary. The assembly usually meets after Mass at eleven o'clock on Sunday mornings. All matters involving an expenditure of over 1,000 frs. must be submitted to the assembly; in practice, everything of any importance is put before them, so that every voter in the village has an opportunity of hearing about and helping to take a decision on all matters of any importance.

The executive nominates a considerable number of committees, each consisting normally of a president and two other members. The principal work carried out by the executive and the committees consists of finance, justice, fire

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prevention, poor relief, public works, health and education. Much of the work is interesting, but there is no space to describe it here, except to mention one point.

The biggest problem at present before the commune is the question of extending the existing road by about three miles from the lower part of the valley up to Blatten.

The Canton and the Bund have now offered each to pay grants of 45 per cent to extend the road to Blatten. There has been an interesting controversy in the matter. In the first place, the lower villages, who already have the road, are now by no means anxious to pay their share towards extending the road up the valley. They think this will take the tourist traffic past them and actually damage them. There is further opposition from the seven Blatten residents who make their living by mule transport and who would be ruined if motor-cars were allowed up to Blatten. On the other hand, the average resident of Blatten expects benefits owing to the reduced cost of transport, and the hotel-keepers in Blatten would naturally benefit most of all.

Blatten has, therefore, its "pressure groups," the rich hotel-keepers wanting the road, the muleteers opposing it. But the motives of each group are perfectly well known to every voter; the hotel-keepers would never think of using their money power, nor, in fact, would they be able to do so, owing to the honesty of the people and the fact that such transactions could hardly be kept secret; so that the different interests are freely open to work for their own aims. There is no danger in Lötschental of the serious distortion of public opinion which is often done by rich pressure groups in large democracies like England or America.

Education is given in two schools, each consisting of a single room; 25 boys under a master in one, and 25 girls under a mistress in the other.

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The school year consists of six months' continuous work during the winter and six months' holiday. It is an eight-year course from the age of seven to fifteen, followed by a compulsory continuation course of 120 hours a year for four years. This includes twenty hours of religion given by the priest; of the rest, given by the teacher, history, law and citizenship are major subjects.

The one teacher is thus responsible for teaching the children for twelve years. Each year he has about three new boys who stay with him from the age of about seven to nineteen. The priest told us that this system, which, of course, prevails only in remote rural areas, gave excellent results. The six months' work with the family, on the land and in the house, during the summer, gives them practical experience, teaches them responsibility and is admirable from the health point of view. The six months' steady intellectual work during the winter prepares them for examinations so well that they can hold their own with the children from the towns. This must, of course, depend on the quality of the teacher. The teacher of Blatten, who has for the last ten years been President of the commune, is a man of high quality, and no doubt capable of carrying this very heavy responsibility effectively. When I asked him how many of the citizens of Blatten would be able to keep the somewhat elaborate accounts of the commune in order, he said that in his opinion the majority could certainly reach this pretty high standard successfully.

"BURGER" ASSEMBLY (BÜRGERGEMEINDE).

Nearly all the forest land in the commune, as well as a little grazing land, belongs to the so-called "Burger" Assembly. Membership has to be gained by inheritance or by purchase. All the sons of a Burger are automatically qualified. Membership gives rights to timber, mainly for

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purposes of firewood, and involves duties to maintain the forests and other land. Every year, on Whit-Sunday, the Burgers meet together for a feast and merry-making; also they meet occasionally as a body to decide what is to be done about the forests. Every year the members spend about two days in large groups clearing the forest, cutting and carrying the hay—without remuneration.

The routine administration, which is not heavy, is carried out by a President and two other elected members; it is interesting to note that the present President is only thirty-two years of age. He is a guide, a captain in the Swiss Army and an inn-keeper. He is a man of considerable qualities; for instance, he is perturbed that the forests have been going backward in recent years and is trying hard to develop a scheme of afforestation.

The Canton is offering a 50 per cent grant towards an afforestation scheme. But the poverty of the citizens is such that they can only provide their share by unpaid labour, on which there will, of course, be no return for twenty years. Yet he hopes to get the scheme through. This indicates a fine public spirit. I wonder what the citizens of Manchester would say if they were asked to give two days a year of free labour towards the afforestation of their water works?

THE GRAZING CO-OPERATIVE.

The various grazing alps on the hillside have from time immemorial been owned co-operatively by a number of peasants; every peasant belongs to one of these groups. The co-operative as a whole has grazing land for a certain number of cattle. Each individual peasant may have the right to graze anything from one-quarter of a cow up to, say, five cows. Each peasant has part or the whole of a simple house and cow-shed. The agricultural operations are

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rather complicated ; but, broadly speaking, the cows are grazed for about two months in the summer and sometimes also in the autumn. During the summer the cows are milked and looked after generally by the women ; often the women and children spend two pleasant months of what is practically a summer holiday on the alp.

The management of the alp is in the hands of the whole of the peasant owners, who meet early in June to discuss arrangements for the year and spend generally about two days as a group clearing up the winter damage and preparing the alp for its year's work—each peasant, rich or poor, spends the same amount of time in this common work ; again without remuneration.

RELATIONS WITH THE CANTON.

The Canton plays a considerable part in the life of the commune by way of supervision and subsidy. It pays three-quarters of the salaries of the teachers and inspects the education. It has a professional forester to advise the commune and strictly controls all cutting down of trees. It is prepared to subsidize a proper scheme of afforestation. The Canton and the Bund are offering a large subsidy for the new road, and the Canton occasionally offers grants for rebuilding after disasters due to avalanche. There are other small subsidies, as, for instance, one towards the expenses of a midwife. But, on the whole, it can fairly be said that as regards local self-government the bulk of the responsibility falls on the commune itself.

Cantonal or national politics play only a small part in the life of the commune. The members are such unanimous and wholehearted supporters of the Catholic Conservative Party that serious discussion of the larger aspects of politics seems to be rare, though on occasions there may be a good deal of discussion on some important referendum.

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THE EDUCATION OF THE CITIZEN.

Let us consider how far the education and experience of the citizen of Blatten enable him to judge wisely of measures and of men ; for this is probably the best test of the efficient working of a democracy.

Practically every peasant is a member of three bodies :

The Communal Assembly.

The "Burger" Assembly.

A Grazing Co-operative.

The Communal Assembly is the governing body of the commune ; all matters of any importance come before it. As a member, the peasant not only knows everything that is being done, how almost every franc raised by the taxes is being spent, but personally helps to take every decision.

The "Burger" Assembly and the various Grazing Co-operatives between them control the whole of the public forests and grazing lands. Each peasant takes part in their various meetings and decisions ; and each peasant has to put in three or four days' free work in the year repairing the damage of the winter and doing the many jobs which are necessary to put the land into good working order.

Every peasant therefore spends a considerable amount of time on the ordinary business of democracy : discussing and making decisions on public affairs. Meetings of the whole of the citizens are held perhaps on twenty Sundays each year to vote on national or cantonal affairs, or to deal with the affairs of the commune. The attendance varies from 50 to 90 per cent according to the importance of the agenda. In this way every citizen acquires the habits of discussion and persuasion, of reaching agreement, of the good-humoured acceptance of the decision of the majority, which is so fundamental to the effective working of democracy.

Further, every citizen spends several days in the year actually doing work with his own hands for the public

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benefit. If that work is done less strenuously than the work on his own plot, if there is something of a holiday atmosphere in this public co-operative work, that is no bad thing. The work is done and done voluntarily by the whole of the peasants, equally by the rich and the poor, without any pay.

But apart from all this experience of public work in which every inhabitant plays his part, those who have any capacity for public leadership do far more; for almost the whole administration of the affairs of the commune is done voluntarily by unpaid leaders. There are about forty administrative posts, divided at any one time between about twenty-five citizens. They administer the finances, including the preparation of the budget and of the annual accounts, the assessing and collection of the taxes, the police, fire brigade, education, health, relief of poverty, control of roads, paths and bridges, irrigation, hydro-electric plant, and many other things; in fact, the whole of the complex work necessary for carrying on even so small and simple a community as Blatten.

Occasionally, where the work takes a man away from his own job for half a day or more, he is paid at the fixed rate of 50 centimes per hour. Last year the amount so paid amounted to a total of 160 frs.; surely the cheapest administration in the world!

The President is the school teacher; he was elected at the surprisingly young age of twenty-four, and is now serving his third four-year term of office. He lives in the same type of house as the peasants; he is in the closest possible touch with them. Educated in the local school, he went for three years to the Cantonal Teachers' Training College. He has general control of the administration; he himself keeps the main accounts, which are somewhat complicated, and in the most perfect order. We had long discussions with him, and were much impressed by his

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public spirit, his common sense, and his ability. He would certainly be an outstanding member of the Manchester City Council.

None of the other four members of the executive is over forty years of age; it has in recent years been the custom in Blatten to elect young men to office, which they usually hold for two periods, or eight years. Generally they then retire, having done their share, and remain as ordinary but experienced members of the communal assembly. Not less than half the citizens have passed through the executive and have therefore held responsible office.

The assembly must be one of the best-informed and most responsible electorates in the world. A potential leader is tried out in some small job; his work is critically watched; if well done, he is gradually promoted. There is no hope for the tub-thumper. A candidate is judged, not by oratory, but by his personal character and practical work.

On the other hand, it seems to be the invariable rule that those who are capable of leadership are willing to give the necessary time and thought to the work at least for a period of years. It would seem that the problem of selecting the best leaders in a democracy is solved so far as Blatten is concerned.

There can be no doubt whatever that democracy works well in Blatten. The whole civilization is stable; people do not move, ideas do not change. The people know one another intimately; the problems are simple. Blatten offers a unique example of a small, stable and simple community, carrying on its affairs by the most completely democratic methods. Under these conditions, the voters of Blatten do undoubtedly judge wisely of men and measures, in a way which is utterly impossible in a modern industrial city of one million inhabitants.

Blatten is an example of Swiss democracy at its simplest.

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In other communes there are divisions of race and religion, but even in these cases a surprising degree of tolerance and friendly co-operation seems to exist. For instance, I visited a village called Murg on the day of a Catholic holiday. The Protestant President of the commune told me that the Protestants were also celebrating the holiday; it was a friendly rule in their commune that the members of each religion joined the others in all their celebrations! In some cantons, Catholics and Protestants go so far in mutual friendliness as to share the same church.

Many people hold that the English village was in the past the foundation of British democracy. To quote A. L. Smith: "Nowhere was the village community so real and so enduring a thing as it was in England for at least twelve centuries of its history. In every parish men met almost daily in humble but very real self-government, to be judged by their fellows or fined by them, or punished as bad characters, to settle the ploughing times and harvest times, the fallowing and the grassing rules for the whole village. To these twelve centuries of discipline we owe the peculiar English capacity for self-government, the enormous English development of the voluntary principle in all manner of institutions and the aptitude for colonization. Our politics, our commercial enterprise, our Colonial Empire, are all due to the spirit of co-operation, the spirit of fair play, and give and take, the habit of working to a common purpose which tempered the hard and grim individuality of the national character."

The difference between the English village and Blatten is that the former was always subject to a lord; the latter has no lord whatever. The village members own the whole of the land; their democracy is complete, and should be an even better foundation for a national democracy than the English village can ever have been.

PRIMITIVE DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND

Every thoughtful person I met in Switzerland agreed that the commune was the very basis of Swiss democracy. The experience gained in these small councils has made the Swiss masters of the art of living peacefully together: as Lord Bryce puts it, one can rely on "the good sense and good temper of the Swiss people as a whole." The smooth and effective working of the referendum in Switzerland is in striking contrast with the farce of the town's meeting in England. Swiss citizens are so well educated that there is an effective public opinion, which almost invariably overrides interested groups. In the English city no such effective general opinion can be relied on.

The Swiss have two great democratizing forces in the schools and the military service system. With insignificant exceptions, all go to the same schools on terms of absolute social equality, and military service is universally compulsory on rich and poor, who are treated exactly alike. One striking proof of the responsibility of the whole of the citizens of Switzerland is that every man at the age of twenty is given a rifle, which he keeps for the rest of his life in his own house. Never has possession of a military rifle been abused in Swiss history. What would any dictator think of a suggestion that all his citizens without exception should have their own rifles?

To quote Salvador de Madariaga: "In the midst of a Europe in which the conflicting characters and ambitions of Germans, French and Italians are a constant source of irritation and war-mongery, Switzerland has become a haven of peace composed precisely of Germans, Frenchmen and Italians who have decided to build up a commonwealth across their differences, as if to show the world that it can be done and how. Switzerland is the prototype of our Western civilization and the masterpiece thereof."

The fact that the striking success of Swiss democracy

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depends so much on local self-government cannot fail to make one anxious about the state of affairs in England. Our village democracies may have been wonderful for a thousand years; to-day they are unsatisfactory, and the cities are worse; nor is it easy to find a remedy. The scale, pace and complexity of affairs in an English city are as different as anything that can be imagined from the quiet stability of Blatten. The weakening of responsible local government in England may be one of the greatest dangers to our democracy. Can we revive it? Even though we can hardly expect to make any close copy of Swiss methods, surely their outstanding success makes it worth while to study what they are doing far more closely than we have done hitherto.

NAZI ECONOMICS

HOW DO THEY MANAGE IT?

By G. D. H. COLE

IN one sense what I am about to write may be out of date before there is time for these words to appear in print; for the Nazis are always working out new expedients, and the situation of Germany has been radically altered by the Munich "settlement." Nevertheless, it seems worth while to consider the working of the Nazi economy during the period of intense activity leading up to the crisis of September, 1938. Broadly, the question which I am trying to answer is this: How have the Nazis managed so thoroughly to defy, to all appearance, the alleged laws of economics and to procure results which go some way towards justifying Hitler's sneering reference to his willingness to leave the "democratic countries" to glory in their own triumphs of unemployment.

It has been a fashion, especially among Socialists, to assert that Fascism is merely capitalism in its final phase, and therewith to imply that there is no essential difference between the Nazi economic system and other forms of capitalist industrialism. Capitalism, it has been said, is inherently unstable, and grows more unstable from each crisis to the next; and it is suggested that Fascism as the "final form of capitalism" must be even less stable than capitalism in its earlier forms. Accordingly, there have been many prophecies of impending breakdown.

I hold that this view, though it contains, of course, some elements of truth, is profoundly erroneous and leads to dangerously false practical deductions. During the past two years, so far from the German economic system having come to be more seriously threatened with early collapse, it has, on the contrary, become economically less unstable. There is no reason—from the narrowly economic point of view—why the Nazi system should not continue on its present lines for a considerable time to come. Political causes of instability there are—above all, the increasing drive of the régime

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towards actual war. But apart from actual war the German economic system is not less but more stable than the systems of the non-totalitarian capitalist countries.

For, to begin with, in Germany there is no longer a "Trade Cycle," or anything at all resembling one. Production is maintained at the highest level consistent with the available supply of national resources, irrespective not only of what is happening in the rest of the world, but also of any fluctuations in the profit-expectations of the German capitalists. Or, rather, the only limitation on maximum production arises out of the deliberate preference of the Nazi régime for producing certain things rather than others which would from the standpoint of welfare have a higher economic value—i.e. guns rather than butter, and home-produced substitute materials rather than goods exchangeable by way of export for imported materials of superior quality.

Obviously the gain from continuous full use of the available productive resources is very great. It is, indeed, two-fold. It serves to offset, and in periods when economic activity is declining in the rest of the world, more than to offset, the losses due to the autarkic policy of producing at home inferior substitutes for goods which were previously imported. And it also practically eliminates from the minds of workers and capitalists alike that peculiar form of insecurity which is characteristic of normal capitalist production. The worker, unless he be a Jew, or some other sort of pariah, need not fear unemployment, though he must fear war, and is compelled to face loss of liberty, very low wages, and actual shortage of goods; and the capitalist, though he may to a great extent lose his chance of making windfall profits, is practically assured that he will not incur actual loss. In effect, the maintenance of economic activity at a continuously high level makes the Nazi system, in comparison with the British or the American, almost riskless. The standard of living is very low; but apart from political uncertainties, which are of course very important indeed, and the complete loss of economic and social freedom, it is sure. For the capitalist, the net profits which he is free to spend at his own discretion may be small in comparison with the gains possible in ordinary capitalist countries; but some sort of profit is

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practically assured because there is a certain market at a price fixed under State control for almost every type of output that German industry or agriculture is allowed to produce. In effect, the State determines the permitted level of profit; and the capitalist who carries out the State's orders can be pretty sure of getting some sort of return.

How is this secured? Socialists have habitually argued that economic insecurity is inherent in the capitalist system because of the working of the profit motive. Capitalist expectations of profit are bound to vary, and therewith the will to invest, to produce, and to employ is bound to vary also. When capitalists, or a number of them, lose "confidence," the contagion is bound to spread to the entire economic system; and it has been argued that there is no way of escape from this inherent instability save by abolishing capitalism. But in Germany, although capitalism has by no means been abolished, what is to be produced is determined no longer by the individual capitalist's expectation of profit, but by the decision of the all-powerful State. The State itself so arranges matters that the individual capitalists secure, as a return for producing what they are told to produce, what the State deems a sufficient profit. But this answer fails fully to explain the position. In Germany to-day the State itself is the "consumer" of a remarkably high proportion of the total output, in the form of armaments and other types of public works. The State is also the direct employer—in the armed forces, the expanding Civil Service and the countless auxiliary agencies of the régime—of a remarkably high proportion of the total working population. Moreover, the State is in complete control of international economic relations. It rigidly controls the means of payment abroad, and all forms of foreign exchange; and it also controls all imports and exports—imports by direct rationing, and exports because German export trade is dependent on subsidies which only the State can authorise. The control of foreign exchange is thoroughly effective against any large-scale flight of capital and has been used as an instrument for confiscating most of the foreign capital lent to Germany; and the special measures adopted for taxing and, over and above the nominal rates of taxation, largely confiscating,

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fortunes belonging to Jewish and other *émigrés* have caused huge blocks of privately-owned capital to be transferred to State ownership. Foreign investment being banned, the German investor is confined to the home capital market; and this market is completely dominated by the State. Nor must we omit to notice that the control of imports, together with other measures, is used to establish an effective check on the consumption of the German people.

Then, again, the State is in complete control of wage-rates, and in almost complete control of the selling-prices of goods at every stage of production and distribution. Besides fixing wages, it drastically regulates the supply of labour, free movement and choice of occupation as well as the right of collective bargaining having been taken away from the German working class. In conjunction with the control of interest rates through the banking system, the control of wages and of the labour supply confers on the State practically complete power to determine the costs of production; and this, in conjunction with the control over selling-prices and a highly-flexible system of discriminatory taxation, confers control over the level of business profits. Thus, the German capitalist makes what profit the State lets him make; and in effect the State guarantees to each capitalist what it considers his appropriate share in the total profit which the system can afford.

The Nazi capitalist, however, is not free, like the capitalist of Great Britain or America, to dispose of his profits as he pleases. The dividends which companies may distribute to their shareholders are strictly limited, and any surplus profits must be either lent directly to the State or invested in new capital goods under the directions of the State organs of economic planning. A good deal of new investment has been made in this way—by the State-directed allocation of reserved profits to approved extensions of plant. The State has, moreover, as we have seen, established so tight a hand on the investment market that private savings can be invested only in State loans, which in fact absorb most of the available money, or in forms of enterprise which the State desires to foster and therefore allows to appeal to the public for capital. The capitalist cannot even leave his surplus profits idle: the

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State will compel him to invest them where it thinks fit, whether he wishes or no. Nor can he go to his bank and ask for short-term accommodation with any hope of success, unless he can carry with him the assurance that the State approves his project; for bank advances as well as new capital issues are firmly under totalitarian control.

Under these conditions the rate of investment is kept permanently high, though, in consequence of the use of a great deal of the money for buying armaments, the net rate of accumulation of productive capital assets may be relatively low. The high rate of total investment involves, of course, a corresponding depression of total consumption, on account of the limitations of total productive power. But, within the limits of human endurance, a system which achieves complete State control of wages and profits and interest rates on the one hand, and of selling-prices on the other, can be used to fix consumption at whatever level its rulers may think fit. Actually, the real spending power of the average German worker, very low before the advent of the Nazis, has been further reduced, despite the rigid control which has been maintained over the cost of living. Hourly wage rates have been kept unchanged over a long period despite the growing shortage of labour; but the taxes and the various special contributions levied upon the wage-earners have become more onerous, and in addition the quality of many of the goods supplied has fallen off, so that real purchasing power has been much reduced. The total burden of taxation has been immensely increased in the past few years; and, on the whole, the effect has been to make the tax system bear even more hardly than before upon the working classes.

Low consumption is, of course, consistent with maximum production only on condition that an outlet is provided for the goods which the people are not allowed to consume. Under ordinary conditions a high level of investment can be maintained only if consumption can be expanded as actual productive power increases. But this condition obviously ceases to operate if the State itself "consumes" the surplus in the form of unproductive armaments, or indeed in any form at all. In practice, armament activity has provided the

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Nazis with the means of maintaining full employment while actually lowering standards of living. In doing this it has necessarily caused the productive structure to become adapted to producing armaments, and proportionately ill-adapted to producing increased supplies of consumers' goods; for new investment has been directed mainly to the armament-making industries, and in many other branches of production plant and equipment have been allowed to deteriorate, and have been expanded only in order to provide home-produced substitutes for goods which were previously brought in from abroad. Thus although theoretically the methods used could be so applied as to raise the standard of living, by stimulating continuously high production of consumers' goods irrespective of the profit-expectations of the entrepreneurs, it would in practice be difficult for the Nazis, having adjusted their economy to the intensive production of armaments, to shift over to producing consumers' goods instead. At the very least the shift would involve an exceedingly awkward period of transition; and having started to produce armaments, they find that the line of least economic resistance is to go on producing armaments on an ever-increasing scale.

It is often asked whether this process of continually increasing expenditure for unproductive purposes will not before long drive the Nazi State into bankruptcy. Every month the German Government is piling up additional debts. Until quite recently the financing of the State's needs took certain peculiar forms. In addition to long-term loans and ordinary short-term borrowing the State was providing itself with money by the issue of special bills (*Sonderwechsel*) which were freely eligible for discount by the Reichsbank, and therefore were providing the German economy with a large supply of additional credit. In February, 1938, the Reichsbank announced the discontinuance of this form of finance; and it appears that the German State is now meeting its need for money by more ordinary methods—that is to say, by short-term market borrowing which is funded at intervals by means of conversion loans. Without taking account of the special bills, the total quantity of which is unknown, the State debt has been increasing very rapidly indeed. From

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about 9½ billion Reichsmarks in 1929 it had risen to over 17½ billions in 1937; and loans to the amount of 8 billions had been issued between 1935 and 1937. Of this total of 8 billions something under 5 billions had been offered to the public, and the balance had been taken up and held by banks and other financial agencies. In the case of long-term public loans the rates of interest in 1937-8 were round about 4½ per cent. Over this same period there has been a steep increase in taxation. Total tax receipts were at the rate of 764 million Reichsmarks a month in 1929, and 958 million in 1936. In 1937 they reached a substantially higher level, estimated at about 11½ billions for the year 1936-7 as a whole. But even this steep rise in taxation went but a little way towards meeting the growing expenses of the Reich. Heavy borrowing at short term with frequent conversions into long-term loans forms an essential element in the maintenance of the Nazi system. It is the only way in which the State can meet its expenses without recourse to directly inflationary measures.

The State, however, is able to conduct this large-scale borrowing on favourable terms because it not only controls the rates of interest, but also constitutes itself (and such enterprises as it desires to foster) the only available borrowers. In ordinary capitalist countries the Government is always afraid of a "strike" of capital-owners; but the German capitalist cannot effectively go on strike against his Government, because (a) he cannot take his money abroad, (b) there are no alternative borrowers at home, and (c) if he refuses to lend, the Government can promptly create in its own favour enough additional bank money to neutralize his refusal—even if it does not resort to stronger measures against him. It is true that the mounting national debt continually imposes additional interest charges on the budget. But a State which controls wages, profits and rates of interest need find no difficulty in raising by taxation over an indefinite period the sums required for meeting these charges. The worst that can happen is that, as a larger proportion of the tax yield has to be paid out in interest, a larger part of the State's other expenses falls to be met by borrowing. Moreover, the State can even, by depressing interest rates, prevent the total

debt charge from rising as rapidly as the total debt, and indeed, perhaps, prevent it from rising at all. It is most unlikely that, for a long time to come, the Nazis will be brought down by budgetary difficulties. On the contrary, with the discontinuance of *Sonderwechsel* and the increased reliance on ordinary borrowing they have strengthened their position during the past year.

The difficulties arising out of international economic relations are a good deal more serious; for the huge diversion of man-power to unproductive activities makes it difficult to provide an adequate supply of goods for export, in relation to the quantity of imports needed in connection with the armament programme and for the supply of essential raw materials. But here again the completeness of State control is a great source of strength; for it ensures that the level of German exports is practically released from limitations arising out of German costs of production as compared with costs outside Germany. All German export trade is carried on to-day by means of an elaborate system of subsidies carefully graduated so as to ensure the sale abroad of whatever goods the Germans can spare. The internal costs of producing these goods thus become practically irrelevant; and any commodity which appears able to stand the charge can be subjected to a special impost to be used in subsidizing any other commodity. The home market subsidizes the export market under a highly-complicated system of differential subsidies drawn from many sources. This, of course, means that the German public has to foot the bill; but it places foreign trade on what is in effect a barter basis, so that, if the Germans get less for the goods which they export, all that happens is that their power to purchase imports is correspondingly decreased, unless they can increase the quantity of exports. It does not matter to the individual producer—to the producer of Opel cars, for example—that his wares are sold at a loss abroad, because the loss falls not upon him, but upon the German economy as a whole.

Naturally, this system of rigidly controlled foreign trade has led to a considerable diversion from country to country. German trade has been best maintained with the countries of South America, into which there has been a considerable

penetration of German economic influence, whereas there has been a tremendous falling off of trade with France, Holland and Switzerland, and, above all, the United States. German imports from the United States have fallen in value by about five-sixths since 1929, when, of course, they were being largely financed by means of American loans to Germany. In the case of Great Britain the position is somewhat more complicated. German exports to the British market have fallen in value by about two-thirds since 1929, whereas German imports from Great Britain have fallen rather less. On the other hand, German imports from countries in the British Empire have fallen almost as heavily as German exports to Great Britain, whereas German exports to Empire countries have fallen much less—by rather over one-third in value. But Europe is Germany's chief market and source of imports. Europe as a whole accounts for over two-thirds of all German exports, and for nearly three-fifths of all German imports; and the falling off in trade with the countries of Western Europe has been largely offset by the rapid development of barter arrangements with countries to the South and East.

The shifts of foreign trade from country to country could, if space allowed, be profitably studied at greater length; for they illustrate most interestingly German skill in the art of bilking creditors, either by not paying at all for imports, or by making payment only in various kinds of blocked marks or in heavily overpriced German goods which the creditors are compelled to accept. At present, South America having grown somewhat weary of these methods of payment, the German drive is mainly towards Southern and Eastern Europe; and the success has been greater than before since the Munich victory.

Nevertheless, the difficulties of foreign trade are serious, for in spite of most rigid controls and of the pushing of the policy of export subsidies to the furthest possible point it is not easy for the Germans to find means of financing their purchases of indispensable imports on the scale required by their rearmament programme. The excellent harvest of 1938 has indeed placed them in a very favourable position in respect of wheat, this year's total cereal crop being estimated

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to exceed by more than two million metric tons the average of recent years and to be even more in excess of the bad harvests of 1936 and 1937. In respect of food generally the German position is stronger this year than it has been at any time since the advent of the Nazis to power; but there remains even here one outstanding difficulty which there seems to be no prospect of overcoming in the near future. This difficulty is in respect of fodder. Every attempt to increase materially the home production of foodstuffs has to some extent encroached on the acreage available for the production of fodder, and has accordingly increased Germany's dependence on fodder imports. This, however, is regarded by the Nazis as the equivalent of the policy which they have pursued in industry, of concentrating imports upon raw materials to be worked up at home. The importation of fodder instead of meat is the equivalent of the importation of oil in an unrefined rather than a refined state.

Nevertheless, the fodder difficulty is serious, and there is also the problem, which became so acute during the last war, of the supply of fats. In this field the Germans have resorted to a number of special expedients: one which is of special interest is the development of a supply of soya beans from Rumania. The Germans found themselves in possession of a large supply of Rumanian currency which was blocked under Rumanian currency regulations. They set to work to liquidate these credits by establishing in Rumania a special company, a subsidiary of I.G. Farbenindustrie, which persuaded the Rumanian peasants to take to the cultivation of soya beans by offering them a highly remunerative price in their own money. By this method Germany has succeeded in realising her blocked assets, and at the same time in building up a large reserve supply of soya beans, valuable both as fats and for a variety of industrial purposes.

Apart from the fodder shortage, which connotes a short supply of meat and dairy produce, the German food situation, though difficult, constitutes no immediate danger to the régime. The essential weakness lies much more in the shortage of industrial raw materials, with oil as the outstanding problem. The Nazis have done their best both to stimulate the production of oil from coal, and to reduce the

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cost of oil imports by substituting unrefined for refined oil. But there are great difficulties in pushing the production of oil from coal very far; and the importation of unrefined oil, while it eases the financial problem, does nothing to make Germany more self-sufficient in time of war. Total German petrol consumption was already at the rate of about 5 million tons in 1936, and since then it has risen sharply. In war-time it would certainly be at once doubled. To produce even the 5 million tons of oil would take at least five times as many tons of coal, and would involve colossal expenditure on plant. But the Germans cannot at all rapidly expand their output of coal (in time of war it is much more likely to fall off very greatly); and they have already a use for all their current output. Accordingly they must remain dependent on imported oil supplies to a very great extent—a factor which has a considerable bearing on German relations with Rumania.

A second instance of extreme dependence is that of iron ore. Germany has now acquired the Austrian resources of iron, and both in Germany and in Austria the new Goering company is making intensive preparations for additional output. But it will take some time for the Goering works to get into full production; and the greater part of the Austrian supply was going to Germany before the *Anschluss*. At the present rate of output Germany needs to import over two-thirds of her total requirements of iron ore; and the Swedish iron supply is indispensable to her. No measure would do more to weaken the German rearmament programme than a British decision to purchase the entire available output of Swedish ore. Non-ferrous metals constitute a further source of dependence, and an economic reason for Germany's desire to master Czechoslovakia and penetrate into South-Eastern Europe, where there are large resources of many metals awaiting exploitation. But as long as an actual state of war does not exist Germany can find means of purchasing these supplies in the world market—largely from sources within the British Empire.

In effect, from the standpoint of purely economic stability, the system of "National Socialism" has very considerable advantages—provided that its reactions on the standards of

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living of the main mass of the people are left out of account. It possesses, in fact, certain of the advantages which Socialists have been accustomed to regard as the prerogative of Socialism. It eliminates the trade cycle, and makes possible a near approach to continuous full employment: it emancipates itself from the profit incentive as the determinant of economic activity; and it creates therewith a general condition of economic security, at however low a level. The fundamental difference between "National Socialism" and Socialism is simply that the former is run not in the interests of human welfare, but as a servile State, in which the end aimed at is national "glory" and aggrandisement, and the political instrument is not democracy, but the unquestioned leadership of a privileged class of party members, militarists and great landlords. This class, in order to maintain its hold, must possess the support of a sufficient section of influentially-placed persons. It must apply the leadership principle throughout the economic as well as the political system. It must therefore award the capitalists and directors of business large enough incomes in the form of interest and profits to solace them for their loss of effective control over the productive process; and in order to do this, and at the same time afford to divert a high proportion of its resources to unproductive expenditure, it must keep the general standard of living exceedingly low. As long as it can do these things it can remain economically stable—at any rate over a considerable period—despite the growth of debt. The chief risk, in an economic sense, comes to it from the fact that it cannot, even by the most extreme measures, eliminate its dependence on essential imports of raw materials. It can provide itself, by means of its control over exports, with enough resources in foreign money to buy these indispensable imports in time of peace; but it cannot, even if it controls South-Eastern Europe, secure itself against the danger of being cut off from some of them in time of war.

Is it possible for a system thus constituted to change its character so as to cease piling up armaments and resort instead to the production of goods which will raise the internal standard of life? One great difficulty in the way of such a change is that it would involve a transitional period

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of very serious dislocation on account of the over-development of productive capacity in the industries producing armaments and the under-development of the industries producing consumers' goods. But this difficulty might conceivably be overcome if there were no other obstacles in the way. In particular, it is not so difficult to expand the output of free services as to increase the purchasing power which consumers can spend as they please. This line has, indeed, already been followed in the free services provided by the German Labour Front and by other agencies, just as the Fascists in Italy have pursued a similar policy through the *Dopolavoro*. The tendency in totalitarian States, where anything is done to improve the standard of living, will be to prefer the offer of increased collective services which can be used as instruments of totalitarian propaganda to the expansion of the consumers' individual purchasing power.

But no considerable rise in the standard of living is possible without a corresponding increase in the supply of finished commodities for individual consumption. Where the standard of living is as low as it is in Germany to-day, what consumers most want is more and better food and clothing and other absolute necessities of life. But there are very considerable difficulties in the way of offering these, even if the rulers of Nazi Germany were willing to do so. It is much easier to expand the supply of guns than the supply of butter; and it is far from easy to improve the supply of clothing without giving up the attempt to substitute *Ersatz* materials for materials of better quality which would have to be imported from abroad. A reduction in armament activity would doubtless bring with it some expansion in the supply of goods available for consumption; but it would not bring anything like an equivalent increase. It would be far more likely to produce either a rapid return of unemployment or, as the means of preventing this, a fantastic expansion of relatively useless types of public works. Even from an economic point of view the Nazis would be taking very considerable risks of economic collapse by attempting to change their objective in the direction of increased welfare.

It is, however, manifestly unrealistic to consider such an

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issue in purely economic terms. For the fact that the aim of National Socialism is *not* welfare is not a purely economic fact. Nazism wants to preserve the class system; that is what it is for. But the methods which are best calculated to improve the relative incomes of the privileged classes are highly unfavourable to any general expansion of the standard of living for the mass of the people. If they involve holding down the levels of profits and interest in order to supply the State with cheap capital, they also involve keeping earnings low for the mass of the employed population. Economically as well as politically, Nazism wants and intends to keep the main body of the working classes in a condition of assured subjection. Nazism is the Servile State—the universal destroyer of economic as well as political liberty for the mass of the people. It binds the agriculturist to the soil, and conscripts the industrial worker in the service of the Four Year Plan. It confiscates the property of Jews and other “enemies of the régime,” bilks and swindles its creditors, and relies on terror to keep its victims quiet abroad as well as at home. The pursuit of welfare as an end is utterly alien to its nature—as alien as any conception of law or impartial justice. For such a system, armament is not a mere means of making work, but an inherent necessity; for force is its instrument of exploitation, both in Germany and in the rest of the world. “Appeasement” is impossible to it; for if it once accepted the conditions of appeasement its foundations would be destroyed. But, unhappily, as I have tried to show in this article, it is not, at any rate economically, anywhere near the end of its shifts.

NORTH-SCHLESWIG NEXT?

By JOACHIM JOESTEN

NOW that Austria and Czechoslovakia have been safely digested, the Nazi lion, we are officially informed, doesn't want another meal in Europe. No—if and when ever that rapacious animal feels hungry again, he will obligingly content himself with niggers and Indians, may be also a few Chinamen for a dessert. Europeans, henceforth, are sacred to him.

When the happy news of Herr Hitler's assurance that he had “no more territorial claims in Europe” had come over the wires, Germany's remaining neighbours heaved a deep sigh of relief. Some people were moved to tears by such generosity, others wistfully set about consulting the list of broken promises. Only a very small number of persons were sufficiently well informed to be simply amused and nothing else. These irreverent sceptics were the local *führers* of German minorities such as still exist in Lithuania, Belgium, Denmark and so forth. “That's a good one,” they would say, “and our clever Führer *did* put it over to them. Ha, ha, ha!”

Take, for example, North-Schleswig. The Danes, who are past masters in wishful thinking, were ready to build lofty dream-castles of peace and security upon Herr Hitler's assurance. Why, they said, if he has no more claims in Europe, that settles the Schleswig dispute for ever. And we have been trembling all the time—for nothing! Now, everything is going to be all right. Let's have a good time!

They did not have to wait long for an authoritative reply. It was delivered to them, pungently, on October 10, by Dr. Jens Möller (Graasten), leader of the *National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei Nordschleswigs* (N.S.D.A.P.N.), which is now the official organ of the German minority. Addressing,

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at the *Deutsches Haus* at Aabenraa, a "victory meeting" of his six hundred local sub-leaders (Amtswalter), Herr Möller presented the Danish Government with a number of "points" that smelled ominously of Carlsbad. To make it quite plain that he meant business, the speaker added significantly that his demands were raised "in the name and as an integral part of the united German nation," and intimated that Denmark, if she failed to comply with them immediately, might not "celebrate this Christmas as a sign of Peace"!

Nobody will be surprised to learn that the Herr *Landesführer* demanded, among other things, full cultural autonomy, indemnities for a long list of alleged losses, and a pro-Nazi censorship over the Danish press. Such trifles are now current demands of any German minority anywhere. But one cannot help finding point No. 1 of the ultimatum both original and expedient: Danish Civil Servants in North-Schleswig who are, in the eyes of Herr Möller, "Nazi-baiters" shall be, forthwith, punished and then expelled—by the Danish authorities! Needless to say, that Herr Möller regards all loyal officials as Nazi-baiters.

In other words, the official spokesman of the *Führer aller Deutschen* tells the Danes to get out of North-Schleswig and be quick about it! (after due self-castigation). That this and nothing short of it is the idea, anyone who reads regularly *Nordschleswigsche Zeitung*, the daily paper of the N.S.D.A.P.N., should be able to attest. To be sure, the demand for retrocession of North-Schleswig has not yet been formally raised by Berlin, but Rome wasn't built in a day and Czechoslovakia has been disposed of in a swift climax: the eight points of Carlsbad—autonomy—plebiscite—Nazi control of the whole country.

That the North-Schleswig Nazis would content themselves with nothing short of a return into the Greater Reich has been manifest ever since the annexation of Austria. One

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need only scan the speeches made at the last congress of N.S.D.A.P.N. at Haderslev (April 14, 1938) to be aware of that. As the motto of that rally, Dr. Möller, the party leader, proclaimed the irredentist slogan: "The Swastika up to the Kongeaa" (Kongeaa is the river which marked, from 1864 to 1920, the frontier between Denmark and the Reich). Still more provocative, if possible, was the address delivered by Dr. Harboe Kardel, editor of *Nordschleswigsche Zeitung*, who set as the chief goal of all party members: "To conquer North-Schleswig for Nazism, as we have done in Austria, in spite of prohibition and trickery" (sic); and a third orator, Dr. Clausen, added: "We do not discuss frontiers: we conquer them with the forces of our nation." The congress was wound up with the dispatch of a telegram to Herr Hitler saying: "One thousand six hundred party members in North-Schleswig salute the Führer with the motto: *Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer*."

Just how well-founded, the reader may wonder, is this agitation, to which every successful Nazi coup anywhere has given new fuel? Do the Nazis have any legitimate claim on North-Schleswig? Is there an oppressed German minority living in that country? The answer is, categorically, in the negative.

While I cannot venture to discuss here the controversial question whether the Danes or the Germans have, historically, a better claim to North-Schleswig, the matter is easy to decide after the principle of self-determination.

North-Schleswig, or South-Jutland as the Danes prefer to call it, covers an area of 3,891 square kilometres. It is the Northern half of the territory which Denmark lost, by the peace of Vienna (October 30, 1864) to Prussia and Austria. At the time of the province's return to Denmark (July 10, 1920), North-Schleswig numbered 163,000 inhabitants; the last census, in 1935, showed a total population of 184,700.

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Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany handed over to an international commission the former duchy of Schleswig, which was divided into two plebiscite zones. The first (North-Schleswig) went to the polls on February 10, 1920; 75,431 persons voted for Denmark (74.2 per cent of the votes cast) and 25,329 for Germany (24.9 per cent). In the second zone (South-Schleswig), where the plebiscite was held on March 14, 1920, the opposite trend showed: 51,309 votes (79 per cent) were cast for Germany, and 12,859 for Denmark. Accordingly, the southern zone remained with Germany, while the northern was awarded to Denmark.

Could any decision have been fairer? An act of force—the cession of the Northern Duchies in 1864—was rectified, by means of a thoroughly honest plebiscite, in so far as it had been conflicting with the principle of self-determination. That this necessary rectification could be brought about only under the Treaty of Versailles may be a distasteful accident to the Germans, but it does not affect the essential fairness of the boundary as it is drawn at present.

If the plebiscite had shown, for North-Schleswig, a 3-1 Danish majority, the present state is 6-1. Contrary to the fantastic statements currently made by the Nazis about an alleged German minority of 50, 60 or even 70,000 people, it can be said that the German element in North-Schleswig does not represent now more than 30,000 at the most. At the last general elections (October 22, 1935), the German party polled 12,621 out of 81,412 valid votes cast, i.e. 15.5 per cent. Approximately the same percentage appears from the last school census, which shows that, at the end of 1937, only 14.2 per cent of North-Schleswig's children attended German schools.

However, by far the most interesting fact about the Germans in North-Schleswig is that they do not really represent any "minority" at all. At least, not in the

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current acceptation of that term. From the point of view of race, the population of North-Schleswig is as homogeneous as any that can be found on the globe. But even that other, most generally accepted, criterion, language, shows little diversity.

Indeed, a large majority of the "Germans" in North-Schleswig are of Danish descent, have arch-Danish names (even the most rabid Nazi leaders!) and speak German only—if they speak it at all—when making public speeches; at home, in public-houses and on other informal occasions, even the most intransigent "irredentists" can nearly always be heard talking Jutlandish, which is a Danish, not a German, dialect! Perhaps the best illustration of this amusing fact is provided by the German revisionist publications themselves, which periodically exhort their readers to speak German! The *Deutschtum* of these people, whom the Danes have dubbed *Hjemmetyskere* (literally, Home-Germans), is a merely psychological product of historical circumstances combined with economic conditions and social preferences. The number of full-blooded Germans in North-Schleswig hardly exceeds at present some 10,000.

But even with the addition of all the *Hjemmetyskere*, the German element represents less than one-sixth of North-Schleswig's population, and less than 1 per cent of the total population of Denmark. It takes a good deal of Nazi cheek to call this tiny fraction a *Volksgruppe* and demand autonomy or even the right of secession for it! The more so as these Germans, far from being oppressed or in any way discriminated against, enjoy probably the best living conditions any minority in Europe ever has got or is likely to get.

Consistency has never been a distinctive feature of Nazi politics. Least of all in relation to Denmark. Ever since Herr Hitler's rise to power, there has been a fierce battle, in the Nazi's own camp, about the policy to be adopted in the

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North-Schleswig "question." The fight is between two major currents, respectively called the "Berlin" and the "Flensburg" line, around which are grouped half a dozen minor variations.

First the "Berlin line." It represents the views of the Reichswehr, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the economic circles under the lead of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, who is himself a native of Tinglev in North-Schleswig. Even the Nazi Party's foreign department, the *Aussenpolitisches Amt* headed by Alfred Rosenberg, holds with the *moderately* revisionist Berlin line.

In these quarters, North-Schleswig is currently regarded as a matter of secondary importance and, above all, *not topical* yet (*nicht aktuell*). They have still many other fish to fry; besides, these people argue, there are at least two good reasons for shelving for a while this Northern frontier business.

In the first place, the very existence of a German revisionist claim, founded or unfounded, has proved such an effective means of squeezing Denmark that it would seem a pity to spoil the racket by rash action before the juicy orange has been pressed stiff and dry. How many times, these last years, has not a timely hint about "raising the North-Schleswig question" sufficed to scare Denmark into any desired concession, political as well as economic! How often did it not help the Danes to steer the "right course" in world politics!

Deep traces of this blackmail diplomacy can be found in the cut-throat sort of trade agreements which Copenhagen was compelled to sign in 1936 and 1937; or in the timid, not to say vassal-like, stand the Danish representatives chose to take on many vital issues at Geneva; again in the seemingly unaccountable rudeness with which Premier Stauning, last year, brushed aside the idea of a Nordic

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Defensive Alliance; and last but not least in the many unofficial attempts at muzzling the press and censoring the expression of anti-Nazi feeling in Denmark. On all these and many more issues North-Schleswig has been used as an unfailing means of pressure. To keep this great blackmail alive as long as possible is the leading idea of the "Berlin line" supporters.

There is, however, another consideration of no less weight. Hitler Germany, as everyone knows, is committed to the "Nordic idea." That means, in terms of *Realpolitik*, that the Nazis rightly regard Scandinavia as an invaluable asset in the event of another great war. Berlin expects every Dane or Swede to do his duty; if not with arms, then by supplying the Reich with agricultural produce, iron-ore and other essentials.

Obviously the worst method to achieve this purpose would be now to stir up trouble over the Schleswig issue. Sweden, in particular, which is the most important factor in the scheme, would be deeply shocked, for she has many times expressed her own interest in the integrity of Denmark. To her, as to nearly all Scandinavians, the inviolability of the Schleswig boundary—"the southern frontier of the North" they call it—is a matter of deep concern. A wanton attack on it, by the Nazis, might well mean the end of Germany's rapprochement with Scandinavia and entail very serious consequences.

For both these reasons, Berlin, while obstinately refusing to renounce any of Germany's alleged claims on North-Schleswig, prefers to postpone settling the Danes' account until the day when the Northern problems can all be solved in a more rounded and high-handed manner. But Berlin is a long shot from the frontier. Much nearer is Flensburg, which has also an important say in the matter.

I wonder whether there is anywhere a town quite like

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Flensburg. Not for beautiful sights or architectural curiosities I mean, but for the monumental, shall we say *sans-gêne*, with which the highest authorities of that German frontier town interfere daily in the affairs of a friendly neighbour state, namely Denmark.

Ever since Herr Hitler's advent to power, supreme control of the organization and all activities of the German minority in North-Schleswig has been vested in two high Reich officials: Herr Hinrich Lohse, *Oberpräsident* and Nazi district leader of the German border province, Schleswig-Holstein; and Dr. Ernst Kracht, Lord Mayor of Flensburg and chairman of a powerful association called *Schleswig-Holsteiner Bund* (S.H.B.). If the former is the directing brain, the latter acts as the executive hand of the "Flensburg line."

Long before Hitler, the S.H.B. had already been a centre of German irredentist propaganda. Its origins, indeed, go back to the very year 1920 when the Northern part of the province was reunited with Denmark. If Berlin accepted, momentarily at least, the verdict of the plebiscite, Flensburg never did. Nor did the S.H.B., which with its 330 local associations, 1,250 school-groups and 2,300 agitators spread throughout Schleswig-Holstein, is a formidable instrument for the recovery of North-Schleswig. In summer, 1933, the S.H.B. was integrated into the big semi-official *Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland*, which is the chief agency of pan-Germanism.

The Schleswig-Holsteiners are not concerned with what they contemptuously call the *nordischer Fimmel* (Nordic craze) of the Berlin officialdom. They do not import any iron-ore from Sweden, nor are they starving for Danish butter. What they want is recovery of the lost territory in the North of which they have been for centuries the economic overlords and the actual rulers from 1864 to 1920. They hate and

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fight the Danes both north and south of the Versailles-made border. Whatever the momentary policies of the Wilhelmstrasse, the Schleswig-Holsteiners want a *revision*. And so their banners, posters, handbills and publications flaunt, in the face of Berlin and Copenhagen alike, the famous motto: "*Schleswig-Holstein: up ewig ungedeelt*" (never to be divided!).

Notwithstanding this age-old antagonism, a state of comparative harmony reigned, on either side of the frontier, until January, 1933. With the advent of Hitlerism, however, the truce came brusquely to an end. Wave after wave of unleashed irredentism, stirred up in Flensburg and Kiel, surged over the frontier, threatening to sweep it away. A climax was reached in Easter, 1933, when feeling ran so high that it appeared to be a miracle that the dams held.

Overnight, Nazism raised its head in North-Schleswig, and the two nationalities, waking from a long peace, confronted each other in defiance. Neighbours no longer greeted each other; whole families were split up by racial, or rather pseudo-racial, hostility. Every meeting-place, club or public-house was turned into a battlefield. On the peaceful streets of Aabenraa, Sønderborg, Tönder, appeared groups of S.A. and S.S. swaggering about in brown and black uniforms. On the highways, Nazi *Motorstürme* (motor sections), doing courier-service for the Reich, made traffic unsafe.

Meanwhile, the leaders of the Schleswig-Holstein clique, and in particular a man called Dr. Sievers, who was the predecessor of Dr. Kracht in the double capacity of Lord Mayor of Flensburg and president of the S.H.B., did their utmost to whip up discontent and rebellion in North-Schleswig. "We are not going to tolerate the injustice of 1918-1920 any longer," exclaimed Dr. Sievers in a speech at Schleswig, on March 24, 1933, and threatened: "We will never recognize this shamefully imposed frontier, but sweep it away. . ."

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How despotically the men in Flensburg and Kiel rule over the German subjects of King Christian X, may be gathered from the following authentic incident. During his two and a half years' term as Flensburg's Mayor, Dr. Sievers appointed and deposed no less than four Nazi *Landesführer* for North-Schleswig, without even asking the advice of the local Nazis. And when at last a deputation of these went to see him about his latest protégé, who had turned out still more of a failure than the preceding ones, Herr Sievers shouted at the perplexed North-Schleswigers: "And if I were to appoint the idiot, Meier, from the State Lunatics Asylum to be your Landesführer—you still obey and like it!" (*sic*). That is the *Führerprinzip*.

At long last, on February 1, 1936, the pocket-despot Sievers was kicked out of office by Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick, without any reasons given. But the day before, Denmark had signed a Treaty of Commerce with the Reich, which proved soon to be a very one-sided business—all to the benefit of the Germans. That was the price—a usurer's price—Denmark had to pay for the head of her arch-enemy. And, naturally, to little avail. For only a few months after this momentary appeasement, Dr. Kracht began to tread into the footsteps of his predecessor, heaping provocation on provocation.

This led, in due course, to one of the two grave incidents that have recently marked the Schleswig question. When the S.H.B., under Dr. Kracht's direct responsibility, published a viciously anti-Danish and irredentist pamphlet entitled "*Schleswig und Versailles*," the organ of the Danish minority in the German South-Schleswig, *Flensburg Avis*, protested, with other Danish papers, against these attacks.

Dr. Kracht's answer to this "insubordination" was a new series of reprisals against the Danish citizens of Flensburg, including the permanent suppression of *Flensburg Avis's* daily

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German supplement, *Der Schleswiger*. While this incident may seem trivial so far, it had a very significant aftermath which also provides a striking illustration of the constant tug-of-war between the "Berlin" and the "Flensburg" lines.

After a prolonged controversy and diplomatic parleys, Berlin agreed at last to settle the conflict at a conference between the spokesmen of the Danish minority in South-Schleswig and leading officials of the German Ministry of Propaganda. At the end of this conference, Ministerialrat Berndt made a conciliatory declaration, saying among other things, he did not think there was any "irredenta" in Schleswig.

At this statement, Copenhagen felt overjoyed. It was considered the final triumph of the Berlin moderates over the intransigent Flensburg clique. But, alas, the joy did not last long. In great hurry, the Schleswig-Holsteiners dispatched a deputation to Dr. Goebbels, with the result that Herr Berndt was granted leave and a new statement issued: The "irredenta" which the Ministry of Propaganda had declared to be non-existent did not refer to the *Germans* in North-Schleswig, but to the *Danes* in South-Schleswig!

Thus Denmark was notified, in the most official manner, that the Reich Government recognizes a German irredenta in North-Schleswig. When and by what means this is to be "liberated" by Herr Hitler, no one can foretell. In the meantime, however, the Nazis spare no effort to prepare the ground for such a liberation, pacific or otherwise. The most important factors in this methodical attempt to Germanize North-Schleswig are, in addition to and under the lead of N.S.D.A.P.N., the *Deutscher Schulverein* and *Kreditanstalt Vogelsang*.

The Danish State, which is anything but oppressive, never even thought of denationalizing the German element

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in the recovered province. Whenever 20 per cent of the constituents, in a given school district, or else the parents of at least 24 school-going children, demand establishment of a German communal school, State and Municipality are legally bound to provide one and support it. At present, there are in North-Schleswig 33 German-teaching communal schools with 1,942 children. This should compare most favourably with the conditions enjoyed by any German minority anywhere in the world.

What for, then, are all the *private* German schools which *Deutscher Schulverein* is so busy setting up, under the direction of Rector Koopmann (Tinglev), with Reich German money and Reich German teachers? Manifestly because the communal schools, if they teach German culture as well as and even better than those of the *Schulverein*, are not concerned with spreading Nazi propaganda. Hence the methodical and largely successful efforts to draw the children away from the State schools and send them instead to private schools. It is not by chance that the number of the latter jumped sharply, between January and September, 1933, from 30 to 45! At present, there are 52 of these private schools with 1,484 children.

Hand in glove with the *Schulverein* works *Kreditanstalt Vogelsang*, a mortgage bank founded in September, 1926, at Haderslev by a German lawyer from Brandenburg, Herr Georg Vogelsang. Prime purpose of the bank is to buy and "store up" as much of Danish-owned land as it can get. Once Vogelsang has got hold of an estate or farm, generally by outbidding all private buyers, he will not sell it again, however tempting the price offered. For he and his backers—Reich interests camouflaged as private firms—are not concerned with business deals. They want to reconquer the soil of North-Schleswig first by economic penetration, later by other means. So Vogelsang keeps the land in store,

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regardless of interest, until he finds a full-blooded Nazi settler to take it over. In this manner his bank has become the biggest landowner in North-Schleswig, holding at present some 4,000 hectares.

Kreditanstalt's mortgage policy is as little inspired by business considerations as is their buying policy. The first thing a needy farmer has got to do if he desires a loan is to produce a certificate of Nazi loyalty from his local N.S.D.A.P.N. leader. In certain cases, however, even *Danish* applicants are considered by the *Kreditanstalt*, namely, on condition that they undertake to send their children to a German private school. Sometimes they are even asked to haul down their Danish flag! Though it has not been very successful so far, this policy of bribing Danes to turn Germans, Germans to turn Nazis, is very significant. More than nine million kroner have already been spent on such patriotic loans.

Where *Schulverein* and *Vogelsang* fail, undisguised terrorism has the last word. This is the business of the so-called *Schleswigsche Kameradschaften* (S.K.) and other more or less cleverly camouflaged Nazi storm-troopers. The most serious example of this terrorism is the so-called *Stollig affair* which has, with its many ramifications, poisoned the Danish-German relationship for the past two years.

Stollig is a small town north-east of Aabenraa. There, a young German farmer, Thomas Pörksen, being unable to pay his debts, was forced to sell his estate which passed into the hands of a Dane, Jörgen Warming. Trivial as it may seem, this change of hands, under the sting of necessity, gave rise to a furious uproar among the local Nazis, who decided to make an example, to teach the Danes to keep their hands off German farms. Repeatedly gangs of young Nazis mobbed the farm and its new owners, destroying implements, smashing windows and daubing the walls with insulting

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inscriptions. Finally, after the farm's well had been purposely poisoned, the police put an end to these demonstrations, arresting three of the gang-leaders. When these, in May last year, were sentenced to various terms of prison for sabotage and rioting, the German press lashed itself into a frenzy of hysterical accusations, talking of "judicial murder" in North-Schleswig, corruption, etc., etc.

This is the atmosphere in North-Schleswig to-day. The stage has long been set for eventual action. As yet, incidents are sporadic and of minor importance, but uneasiness is general. The day Berlin no longer can or will curb the turbulent elements in Flensburg, the smouldering fire is bound to burst into open flames.

HITLER, GOEBBELS, and the MINISTRY FOR PROPAGANDA

By CHARLES H. WILSON

THIS article has two intentions. First, to disparage, in a technical sense, the utterances of Hitler and Goebbels on the theory of propaganda. Second, to exhibit their technical achievement in the field of propaganda with respect only, however, to the Ministry of Propaganda. In the opinion of the present writer, what Hitler and Goebbels have to say about propaganda has relevance only to the revolutionary phase of National Socialism when propaganda was still competitive; with the era of monopoly propaganda, however, their utterances have little contact. Moreover, all that they have to say bears only on the style, or modes, of propaganda, whereas their technical innovations are almost entirely in the choice of vehicles and in the construction of administrative machinery.

For a long time before the recent crisis the outside world had been aware that public opinion in Germany was the product not of free development, but of deliberate manufacture. Only in the last few months, however, have the comprehensiveness and intensity of that official control of opinion forced themselves upon the general attention of the Western democracies. Among other things, the certainty that the attitude of the democracies to Hitler's foreign policy was concealed from the German public, and the apparently successful suppression of all news of the American President's appeal for peaceful negotiation made it startlingly clear that the German Government possessed a complete monopoly of the means—press, film, wireless, exhibition—by which public opinion is created. The achievement of such a monopoly

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was from the first the declared purpose of the author of *Mein Kampf*.

It is not intended here to go into the justifications for this monopoly, which are advanced by official and semi-official apologists. Justifications are not hard to find—whether in Aristotle's and Plato's demand for an identity of political sentiment among the governed, or in the claim of the idealists that the State possesses the supreme insight into the good life. The main argument is that of the Greek defence of slavery—not only is it natural and therefore good that the people should be led by those who know better; it is also profitable for them to be so led. I rely, says Hitler, on the fundamental aristocratic principle of nature.

The main interest just now, however, is less the apologetics of National Socialism than its methods. What follows is a résumé, drawn from Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Goebbels's various writings, of what the two great propagandists of the regime have to say about the methods of controlling public opinion.

"In my attentive observation of all political processes," writes Hitler, "I had already become inordinately interested in the activity of propaganda. . . I saw clearly that the correct use of propaganda was a real art, one which was as good as unknown to the middle-class parties. . . Only during the War, however, did I realize what tremendous results could be achieved by a properly directed propaganda. Unfortunately, however, the material for study was all on the other side, for on our side the activity in this respect was more than modest." In bitter terms he goes on to denounce his home government for its complete failure to grasp the importance of a mighty political instrument. It was, for example, a fundamental fallacy to represent the enemy as ridiculous, as the German and Austrian propaganda (*Witzblattpropaganda*) attempted to do. It was a fallacy because

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as soon as the troops came to actual grips with the enemy forces they experienced a brutal disillusionment. This disillusionment had terrible results, for now the German soldier felt himself deceived by his superiors; far from experiencing a reinforcement of military morale, he became afraid.

On the other hand, the war propaganda of the English and Americans was psychologically correct. By representing the Germans as barbarians and Huns, they prepared their men for all the horrors of war. The most frightful weapons which could now be used against them appeared only as confirmation of their established conviction, and strengthened, therefore, their belief in the rightness of their leadership.

The German war propaganda offered an incomparable example of a propaganda defeating its own ends through a total lack of a psychologically correct endowment. On the very first principle of propaganda there was no clarity. Is propaganda a means or an end? It is a means, and must therefore be judged from the standpoint of the end. The German people was engaged in a struggle for its existence; in such a struggle all considerations of humanity and æsthetics must go by the board, overridden by the fatal character of the struggle. Beauty and humanity are no criteria for a war propaganda.

The second question for a theory of propaganda, Hitler goes on, is the question of destination. To whom is propaganda addressed? To the scientific intelligence or to the masses? "We live in an age," replies Goebbels, "when behind a politics there must stand the masses." The task of propaganda is not the education of the individual, but the direction of mass attention to certain definite facts and necessities. Its art consists in doing this in such a way that there arises a general conviction as to the significance of the facts, the reality of the necessities.

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Propaganda must, above all, be simple and popular. Its intellectual level must be that of the narrowest mind of the crowd; the greater the crowd, the lower the level. It follows that a propaganda directed to war, a propaganda which must embrace an entire nation, can hardly sink to too low an intellectual level. It is the task of a State propaganda, says Goebbels, so to simplify complicated thought processes, that in the last resort the smallest man in the street can understand them; all ideas must be reduced to their primitive and original forms.

Further, it is a gross error to think that propaganda must have the variety of scientific instruction. The receptivity of the masses is small; their ability to forget is, however, correspondingly great. To be effective, therefore, propaganda must concentrate upon a very few points and drive these home again and again. Persevering repetition is the first and last condition of success. The masses, in their heavy immobility, require always time to apprehend a matter; only thousandfold repetition can eventually inscribe it on their memory.

Effective propaganda is not only simple, concentrated and repetitive—it is also subjective, one-sided and categorical. The task, says Hitler, of propaganda is not to evaluate different rights and merits, but to emphasise exclusively the aspect it desires to advance. It is aimed, not at objective truth, but at the advancement of its own interests. It is addressed, moreover, to an entity, the people, which is for the main part so feminine in its make-up that its opinions and actions correspond not to deliberate consideration so much as to plain feeling: it must be approached, therefore, dogmatically.

How is propaganda related to the organisation of a political movement? "If the propaganda has imbued a whole people with one idea, then organisation demands only a handful of

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men to look after the consequences. Propaganda and organisation, adherents and members, stand, therefore, in a mutual relationship. The better the propaganda, the smaller need be the organisation; the greater the number of adherents, the more modest need be the number of members. The most complete triumph for a revolutionary idea will be accomplished when the new *Weltanschauung* has been taught and, if necessary, forced upon all men, while the organisation of the idea, i.e., the movement, includes only as many as are absolutely necessary to occupy the nerve centres of the State."

II

The above represents the gist of what Hitler and Goebbels have to say about propaganda. The years since Hess took down the Landbergh-am-Lech document have seen much repetition and illustration, but not any substantial alteration of these views nor any significant addition. It is clearly not a very adequate account of propaganda. There is little in it that might not have been thought out by a perspicacious and sufficiently worldly schoolboy—some tags of commercial wisdom, perhaps one fundamental question, but the analysis never gets beyond the starting-point; it is all opening remarks. There are some interesting omissions, one of which is of major significance. It is the omission of the distinction, fundamental to propaganda, between the mass, or crowd, and the organised group. The two Nazi writers think only in terms of the crowd, whose responses are conceived of as uniform, immediate and uncritical. But a nation is not a crowd. It has crowd aspects, but in the main it is a complex of groups; it presents to propaganda not a single but a plural destination. To a certain extent the Nazi leaders have got round the distinction by simple annihilation; by every physical technique known to them

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they broke down the groups and created the national crowd (*Volksmasse*). This, however, was a success, not of propaganda, but *des brutalen Willens*. It was, in fact, a failure of propaganda, as the still unfinished history of the struggle with the great religious groups shows. From the technical point of view there is a necessary and effective correlation of force and positive propaganda, but when force becomes excessive it is indicative of weaknesses in that propaganda. Again and again Nazi propaganda has been defeated by the unlooked-for, mediated reactions of organised group opinion; the history of the church struggle is the major case in point, the history of the film censorship a minor one.

It would be naïveté, however, to suppose that what Hitler and Goebbels have to say about propaganda adequately represents their understanding of that instrument. Their practice speaks very much louder than their words. In the view of its authors the Nazi regime is dependent for its continued existence upon the successful dissemination of a single, uniform, political philosophy, and to this purpose the whole machinery of state is geared. In order to be complete, therefore, a study of German propaganda machinery would have to embrace all the departments of State and Party. Only a very modest part of such a study is here attempted, the description and analysis, namely, of the activities of a single department, the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda.

In March, 1933, Goebbels made a speech to the German Press on the aims of the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda which was shortly to be set up. "The modern leaders of the people," he said, "must be the modern kings of the people: they must understand the masses. It is their task to make clear to the people what they desire, and to see that they are understood." A Decree of June 30, 1933, set up the new Ministry in these terms:

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"The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda is responsible for all factors influencing the mental life of the nation; he is responsible for winning allegiance to the State, its culture and its economy, for the conduct of internal and external publicity, and for the administration of all institutions contributing to these ends."

It was clear that the new department involved definite incursions into the jurisdictions of several of the traditional departments. The Decree, therefore, went on to delimit its competence. The following matters, it said, were now to come under the Minister for Propaganda:

- (1) From the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office:
Control of news and publicity abroad. Art, art exhibitions, film and sport abroad.
- (2) From the jurisdiction of the Home Office:
General internal publicity, political training colleges, national holidays and state occasions, press, wireless, national hymns, the Book Centre in Leipzig, art (including copyright in literary and artistic works, protection of works of art and monuments, etc.), music, drama, films, prevention of public nuisances.
- (3) From the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economics and from that of the Ministry of Agriculture:
Exhibition and advertisement.


The administrative machinery of the Ministry follows lines of functional and regional organisation. It is a huge department, employing thousands of officials (See Fig. 1).

From the point of view both of the Decree and of subsequent legislation the activities of the Ministry may be said to fall into two main groups—publicity (internal and external) and culture.

In the field of internal publicity there has been a good deal of legislation. The subjects covered include national holidays and state occasions, titles and orders, flags (an

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extensive series of ordinances) and symbols of the national honour. Two examples will suffice to show the chief



- (a) Offices immediately under the authority of the Ministry: Reich Literature Office, Film Censor's Office, German Opera House, etc.
(b) Under supervisory control: Reich Association of the German Press, Broadcasting Company, etc.

characteristic of this legislation, the drive for *detailed* uniformity. The first example is the Decree of Mourning on the Death of Reich President von Hindenburg, which ran as follows:

ART. I.

All public buildings of the Reich, the States and the Communes, along with the buildings of public corporations and of public schools, shall, from now and each day until the day of interment inclusively, set their flags at half-mast.

The German people are required to co-operate in this flag-mourning.

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ART. II.

To-day and on the day of interment all public meetings and arrangements are cancelled.

ART. III.

Church bodies of both confessions shall order, until the day of interment inclusively, a daily mourning peal of one hour, from eight till nine in the evening.

ART. IV.

Until the day of interment inclusively, all musical performances of whatsoever nature in places selling spirits . . . shall be cancelled.

ART. V.

During a national mourning period of fourteen days, reckoned from to-day, all officials of the Reich, the States and the Communes shall wear a mourning band on the left arm.

ART. VI.

On the day of interment, at a time to be determined later, traffic will stand still for one minute. Work will simultaneously cease in factories.

ART. VII.

The German wireless will take the national mourning into consideration in its programmes from all stations. . .

The Holidays Acts and the Protection of National Symbols Act impose uniformity mainly by prohibition. Thus on national holidays, prohibition is made of "all public works calculated to impair the peace of the day, exception being made only for the Post Office, the railways, works of special urgency, and light work in house-gardens." On Easter Eve, Christmas Eve, Easter Day and Christmas Day all public entertainments and dances are forbidden with the exception only of those at which exclusively German folk-dances are used.

From an anthropological viewpoint the publicity legislation of the Propaganda Ministry appears as the official organisation of the ritualistic side of magic. What is aimed at is not only the uniform observance of a common ritual,

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but also the creation of a uniform ritualistic environment for all public occasions. On such occasions the mass uniformity of ritual gesture and the unbroken and unvarying observance of the tribal symbolism provide the setting within which the evangelical aspect of magic can have the fullest effect. This evangel, the dissemination of belief as contra-distinguished from knowledge, is the basis of the second and major group of the Propaganda Ministry's activities—the organisation of *Kultur*.¹

In the organisation of culture the Propaganda Ministry is the author of a series of experiments of quite first-class political interest. Their novelty consists in the employment of a special administrative technique, the effect of which has been not only to obtain the required centralisation of power, but also to exhaust as nearly as possible the whole field of national cultural activity. The technique employed is to organise each of the main cultural activities into a professional public law corporation, entry to which is strictly controlled by statute. Codes of professional behaviour are then laid down, departure from which may mean permanent exclusion from membership of the profession. All the corporations, finally, are grouped together in a central, composite body.

The Act for a Reich Culture Chamber was made law on the 22nd September, 1933. The preamble stated the intention. "In order to pursue a politics of German culture, it is necessary to gather together the creative artists in all spheres into a unified organisation under the leadership of the Reich. The Reich must determine not only the lines of progress, mental and spiritual, but also lead and organise the professions." This first Act was merely an outline of intention.

¹ When, in what follows, *Kultur* is translated as Culture, it must be remembered that in the German language the term has a connotation more like the anthropologist's use of the word than like ordinary English usage. It covers not only the artistic and æsthetic expressions of a people, but their whole civilised achievement, as well as what is racially and nationally unique in that achievement, their *ethos*.

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The detailed provisions followed shortly in the First Decree for the Execution of the Reich Culture Chamber Act on 1st November, 1933. Art. I designated the seven new Culture Chambers. Art. II laid down that these seven Chambers should be united in one collective public law corporation, the Reich Culture Chamber. There followed detailed provisions for constitution and functions, the main element in which was the strict centralisation of power. The chart on the following page shows the new machinery.


The Minister for Propaganda is the President of the central Chamber. He appoints the Presidents and Presidential Councils of the individual Chambers, and determines the general policy. His competence covers "not only the cultural activities themselves, but also all such activities as are concerned with the mere reproduction, the technical preparation, the dissemination, the preservation and distribution of cultural goods" (preamble).

In this immense scheme, under which every single cultural profession and trade has been reconstructed from top to bottom, the present article devotes its attention only to a small part, the Press Chamber, which, by reason both of its intensive organisation as well as of its international repute, raises points of special interest.

The present valid press law dates from the famous Journalists' Act of 4th October, 1933. In his preamble Goebbels expressly repudiated the liberal notion of freedom of the press. "Such an idea," he said, "proceeds not from the people collectively, but from the individual, and in its exaggerated form it has increasingly made it evident that freedom of opinion, the more it was conceded to the individual, the more it reacted to the prejudice of the general good of the whole people." Now, however, "we want no opinionated nonsense; we want frank and honourable utterance." The Press will now "be 'monoform' in

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Fig. II.



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- (a) Each Chamber has a President, Vice-President, Presidential Council, and 31 Regional Departments.
- (b) The chart does not distinguish between newly-created divisions in the separate Chambers and divisions made up by the incorporation of hitherto independent associations, many of which retain their own functional and regional sub-divisions. For example, of the 14 divisions of the Press Chamber, 9 are incorporated associations having between them 236 sub-divisions.

will and 'polyform' in the expression of that will." The Act, therefore, set up a State control of the Press, and a strict code of professional practice for journalists. Entry to the profession was confined to those inscribed on a *Berufsliste*, a list of members whose statutory qualifications, apart from journalistic experience, were the possession of German citizenship, Aryanism, and "the characteristics demanded by the task of spiritually and intellectually influencing public opinion." "Consciousness of responsibility to State and People, and personal purity, shall decide the entry to the profession of journalist." The code of professional practice was composed mainly of prohibitions on editors, designed to eliminate political variety.

The organisation to effect the Press censorship is a complex one.

Fig. III.

ORGANISATION OF THE PRESS.

- I. Reich *Leiter* for the Press. } Chief Party Bureaux.
 - II. Reich Press Office. }
 - III. Press Division of the Reich Government.
 - IV. Press Division of the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda.
 - V. Reich Association of the German Press (guardians of the *Berufsliste*).
 - VI. Reich Press Chamber.
- I and II represent the Party control, III to VI the State control.

To determine the precise relations of function between these different bodies is quite impossible for the external observer. Co-ordination is largely in terms of day-to-day contacts, demarcation of function largely a matter of the conflict of personalities. The relations between Party and

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State control are peculiarly difficult to follow. This is a standing problem in every department of government and not peculiar to the Propaganda Ministry. The chief administrative device to co-ordinate State and non-State (i.e. public and Party) bodies seems to be, quite simply, the identification of key members of the personnel. Thus the Minister for Propaganda is Party Leader for Propaganda. He is, further, the President of the Central Reich Culture Chamber; his Permanent Secretary is its Vice-President; his 31 Regional Heads of Department its 31 Regional Culture Administrators. Similarly, the Party Press Leader is President of the Press Chamber, and the Party Press Chief its Vice-President. But the Government Press Chief, while he is Permanent Secretary of the Propaganda Ministry, appears to have no status in either of the Party Bureaux. The difficulties of analysing such relations are clearly formidable. The chief characteristic of the administration seems to be a profound but not consistent passion for Pooh-Bahism.

III

What have been the effects of this large-scale machinery for the regimentation of opinion? Here we must distinguish between the effects upon the professions thus reorganised and the effects on general public opinion. As regards the former, there has been considerable attempt at resistance on the part of the professions involved to the various propaganda measures. In the case of the film producers, the initial absolute censorship had to be relaxed in face of what the Ministry described as "their failure to avail themselves of the assistance and co-operation of the Reich Film Dramaturge." In the case of the artistic professions generally, there was widespread objection to Goebbels's programme of "workers of the forehead and the fist unite for all eternity." The only effect, however, of their objection was to produce a seeming

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concession in the form of a Senate to the Central Chamber, a cultural council, membership of which conferred a sort of aldermanic dignity upon the aged and élite of the world of art. No concessions at all, however, were made to the journalists, whose sporadic attempts at initiative produced only more stringent and retributive action on the part of the authorities.

Of the effects of these propaganda organisations on the general public it is very much harder to speak. In general the absence of any vehicle of overt dissent makes it quite impossible to measure the amount of consent. The screen of compulsory acquiescence obscures the real structure of public judgment. One can only offer an opinion. Two considerations affecting such an opinion should be clearly held in mind. Firstly, as was said at the beginning, Goebbels's department is only one part of a very much more extensive propaganda machinery. Though his powers reach into the other departments, no other is under his direct control. Such basic propaganda departments as Education, and the Labour Front, have a history of their own. Secondly, the strength, or success, of official propaganda can really be estimated only in terms of contending influences upon public opinion. It is impossible to do more than mention this consideration here.

Within the narrower field of the Propaganda Ministry's activities the development of the newspapers throws perhaps the most light on public opinion. What have the reactions of the German newspaper public been to the "monoformity" of political journalism? That public is, of course, small in comparison with its counterpart in this country. It is not possible to make strict comparisons, but an imperfect indication may be gleaned from the estimates of newsprint consumption per head which appear in the *P.E.P. Report on the British Press*. The estimated figures for 1936 were 57.8 lbs.

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for Great Britain, 57.0 lbs. for U.S.A., 18.1 lbs. for France, and 11.4 lbs. for Germany. These figures take no account, of course, of the distribution of newsprint among different classes of reading material. A further pointer, however, in the same direction is the total absence in Germany of any papers remotely approaching in circulation the great dailies of this country. As regards internal comparisons, the following figures for some representative papers may be considered.

Fig. IV.
CIRCULATION OF SELECTED NEWSPAPERS.

	1933	1937
<i>Der Angriff</i>	125,000	100,684
<i>Berliner Allgemeine Zeitung</i>	45,310	40,000
<i>Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger</i>	—	194,343
<i>Berliner Montagspost</i>	174,070	134,492
<i>Berliner Morgenpost</i>	434,730	400,000
<i>Berliner Nachtausgabe</i>	—	237,006
<i>B.-Z. am Mittag</i>	146,160	100,000
<i>Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung</i>	63,000	60,000
<i>Völkischer Beobachter</i>	110,000	300,175
<i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i>	—	71,099
<i>Hamburger Anzeiger</i>	160,000	156,552
<i>Hamburger Fremdenblatt</i>	150,000	118,037
<i>Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten</i>	180,000	145,154
<i>Der Stürmer</i> (weekly)	20,000	486,000
Total number of political newspapers :		
1933 ..	3,607	
1935 ..	3,232	
1937 ..	2,671	

(The figures are all taken from *Sperlings Adressbuch*.)

What emerges from these figures? If the circulation figures alone be taken into account, it may be said that there has been little change in the penetration of the major papers; only a slight, but general, decline is noticeable. But if the decline is taken in conjunction with the very sharp drop in the total number of newspapers carrying political matter, then we must say that there has been a marked decline in the penetration of the political newspapers under the Nazi

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regime. This coincides with the opinions expressed by many competent foreign observers. A major part of this decline must be attributed to the deterioration in quality consequent on the regimentation of the Press.

There are two minor points of interest in the above figures. It is interesting to note that the circulation of Goebbels's paper, *Der Angriff*, has dropped considerably, while that of Hitler's paper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, has almost trebled. Secondly, the largest circulation of all goes to *Der Stürmer*, the weekly organ of Julius Streicher, Statthalter of Bavaria.

Finally, what light does the description of this leviathan administration throw upon the original theory of propaganda of Hitler and Goebbels? The picture shows that their expressed views are in the main no longer applicable to their own practice. What the Propaganda Ministry and its satellite organisations illustrate is the total inadequacy of the "simple, categorical, and repetitive" type of propaganda under monopoly conditions. Contrary to the general impression, monopoly propaganda is over a long period much more difficult to handle than competitive propaganda. It requires, not monotonous repetition, but variation, both of address and of content. It requires to be circumscribed in physical mass to avoid overwhelming the attention of the average consumer. It requires considerable psychological subtlety. While the German machinery appears to be feeling its way through a variety of administrative forms towards these canons, in the quality of its output it falls far short of meeting them.

PUBLIC OWNERSHIP FOR CIVIL AVIATION

By ERNEST DAVIES

IS the decision of the Government to form a public corporation to take over the two subsidised air transport companies of Imperial Airways and British Airways, proof that no successful compromise between public ownership and capitalist enterprise can be found? Certainly in this case the outpouring of Government money without effective control has failed in its desired objectives of retaining the advantages of both the free competition and initiative of private enterprise on the one hand and of Government protection and assistance on the other.

After ten years of monopoly, Imperial Airways, confronted already with heavily subsidised foreign competition, had to meet the added competition of British Airways. Accusations of inefficiency, particularly as regards slow services carried on with obsolete planes, lack of enterprise, and victimisation of staff were levied against it. Much of this criticism aired during a debate on civil aviation in the House of Commons a year ago, was confirmed in the report on Civil Aviation by a Government Committee under the Chairmanship of Lord Cadman.¹ This report, while criticising the relations of Imperial Airways with the Air Ministry, laid the blame on personnel and management and failed to suggest public ownership as a way out. In fact, apart from the detailed suggestions for improving the Air Ministry administration and appointing a full-time Chairman of Imperial Airways, the specific recommendation was the subsidising of a number of companies and the allocation of spheres of development between them. Although, in March, 1938, the Government accepted much of the Cadman report, nine months later has

¹ Report of Committee of Inquiry into Civil Aviation. Cmd. 5685. March, 1938.

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come the decision to abandon this proposal, and instead it is intended to buy out the existing companies and to create a public corporation to operate, presumably, with monopoly powers.

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The story of Imperial Airways is far from being a story of failure. In the development of passenger and mail services between Great Britain and the Empire, wonders have been achieved. In ten years a network of first-Imperial communications has been built up and is now operated at a high level of safety by some of the finest flying boats in regular service; an "all-up" mail service has been instituted, whereby all first-class mails are carried without surcharge between Great Britain, Africa, India, Australia and other parts of the Empire; services are operated between New York and Bermuda, and experimental flights, preliminary to the establishment of a regular service, have been successfully carried out across the North Atlantic. With such achievements to its credit, how is it that Imperial Airways has been subject to a fire of criticism, and why is it to be converted with its British competitor on European routes into a public corporation? The immediate explanations are, first, that in developing this Empire service, the European routes have been neglected; second, British aircraft manufacturers have failed to design, construct and deliver the necessary equipment for Imperial Airways to compete effectively on the European routes; third, full co-operation with the Air Ministry was lacking and a narrow commercial view of its responsibilities was taken by the Imperial Airways Board; fourth, there had been suspicion of unfair dealings with the staff, including alleged victimisation of pilots and restriction on free association and collective bargaining.

Such may be actual cause for criticism, but the real reason for the failure of Imperial Airways under private enterprise is not concerned with this situation, which could be remedied

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within the present framework of the Imperial Airways constitution on the lines of the Cadman recommendations. The real reasons for the proposed transfer of Imperial Airways to public ownership include, first, lack of Government control over the expenditure of public money meted out in the form of subsidies: only two out of the ten directors are appointed by the Government, and their responsibility to the Government is undefined. Second, the confusion between the strategic development of air communications for Imperial reasons and the desire eventually to make Imperial Airways a profitable commercial concern financially independent of subsidies. These two objectives are incompatible, for if an airways company is to become a commercial success, it must be free to develop only those routes which can ultimately pay. It cannot afford, for reasons of Empire defence or the carrying of mails, to expend vast sums on experimental or unremunerative services. Imperial Airways was expected, on the one hand, so to order its affairs that it would become self-supporting as quickly as possible, and, on the other, to develop at all costs air communications throughout the Empire. To achieve the former has become more and more impossible with increased competition from heavily subsidised foreign lines. This incompatibility of objectives was realized by Sir John Reith during the few months that he has been Chairman of Imperial Airways. In his speech to shareholders on November 15th last he stated:

"Imperial Airways is a national service of first importance, and it must know where it stands in the political and economic life of the nation. The present position is neither commercially nor constitutionally satisfactory. The company is neither wholly free nor wholly secure. Relations with the State were not as they should be. In every activity much depends on the personalities involved, but it was the system far more than anything else in this case which provoked dissension."

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A third reason is that civil aviation is still in its development stage, and therefore continually in need of new capital. To raise that capital on reasonable terms a company must be financially successful and have a good record of dividend payments and a prospect of maintaining its profits. Believing it would be left to itself to raise its capital, Imperial Airways paid high dividends out of its subsidy. Because of the criticism these high dividends had evoked, the Cadman report suggested that they should be restricted to the limits associated with public utility companies. The Committee did not realize if this were done the raising of fresh capital would be much more difficult. In an industry in the pioneering stage of development the risks are such that they will not be undertaken by the investing public unless there is a reasonable prospect of a high reward. To limit the reward and still expect the risk to be undertaken is to ask the impossible. Civil aviation in this country will require considerable capital expenditure over the next decade. With a view to facilitating overseas development of air services, the Government on the recommendation of the Cadman report is to increase the annual subsidy to £3,000,000. To carry out this new programme much capital will be required, and can now only be raised on reasonable terms if there is Government assistance. To enable this to be given the Government is to buy out the existing shareholders of both Imperial Airways and British Airways and to raise the necessary capital cheaply by giving a Government guarantee to the corporation's stock.

The final decision to bring civil aviation under public control and ownership is therefore mainly due to the acceptance of the position that Imperial air communications must be developed, operated, and maintained irrespective of their profitability. This is outside the ability of private enterprise even when State-aided, partly because the raising of capital would be too costly, and partly because of the

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investors' demand for too high a return on an investment in so uncertain an undertaking as civil aviation.

The history of Imperial Airways throws some light on the defects of State-aided private enterprise. Imperial Airways was formed as an amalgamation of existing companies in 1924 as the result of the recommendations of the Hambling Committee, which was set up in 1923 to consider the best ways of subsidising air services.¹ By agreement with the Air Ministry it was given a ten-year monopoly, and subsidised for its European services. The subsidy started at £137,000 and was to fall to £32,000 by the tenth year, by which time it was considered civil aviation should be self-supporting.

Until 1926 Imperial Airways confined its services to Europe, but a service between Egypt and India was then contemplated, and the first stage from Cairo to Basrah was opened in 1927. From then on Government policy was to encourage concentration on the great Imperial routes, in particular from England to India and South Africa. As a consequence, additional subsidies were received for the Imperial routes, and the least profitable of the continental routes were closed down. A fresh agreement was entered into in 1929, and the total subsidy was increased. For the next six years, while steady development proceeded with Empire services, the European position became more difficult, owing to greater competition from foreign subsidised services. With the end of the monopoly, granted by the original agreement for ten years, further competition developed with new British services also. The position required investigation. A standing inter-departmental committee under Sir Warren Fisher recommended that Government support should be given to more than one company, each to have its own sphere of operation. British Airways was given a subsidy for a service to Scandinavia and its sphere of operation limited to a line north of London to Berlin. Exceptionally, however,

¹ Report of Civil Air Transport Subsidies Committee. February, 1923. Cmd. 1811.

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it was allowed to continue to operate on the London-Paris route where it competed with Imperial Airways. This meant two subsidised companies were competing on the same route, but under circumstances more favourable to the one than to the other. Under its agreement with the Government Imperial Airways was banned from buying machines of foreign manufacture without the Air Ministry's consent. British Airways, on the other hand, had bought fast modern machines from America, which made the Imperial Airways' planes on the Paris route seem slow and obsolete.

Imperial Airways was now under a severe handicap. It had placed orders for modern machines in 1934, but only recently has delivery begun. The fault lay with the aircraft manufacturing industry which had been slow in delivery and for some time behind its foreign competitors in construction and design. As the Cadman report pointed out, there was not at that time a medium-sized air liner of British construction comparable to the leading foreign type. Owing to unequal competition (the foreign companies, on a comparable basis, being more heavily subsidised), Imperial Airways took a back seat on the continent, but led the world on long-distance Imperial routes.

The financial history of Imperial Airways is also of interest. At the outset the public was invited to subscribe to its shares, and did so in the belief that a profitable future lay ahead for civil aviation. Were it not for Government assistance, the shares would have proved a poor investment as profits have never equalled the subsidy, there being annual losses on trading after allowing for obsolescence, very heavy in the case of aircraft. Nevertheless, thanks to the subsidy, dividends were paid from 1928 on, being as low as 3 per cent in 1931 and 1932, but rising to 9 per cent in 1937, and falling to 7 per cent in 1938. Partly, no doubt, because the amount of the subsidy was not disclosed in the company's accounts,

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the investing public continued optimistic, and in 1936 and 1937 valued each share on the Stock Exchange at over £3.

The Government's participation on the financial side was at first confined to payment of subsidy. The arrangement was that after a 10 per cent dividend had been paid to shareholders, the balance was divisible into three parts. One was to go to repay the subsidy, one for development and improvement of air services, and one for additional distribution amongst shareholders. Under the 1929 agreement the Government received £25,000 of £1 Deferred Shares, which were entitled to half of the balance of profits after 10 per cent had been paid on the Ordinary Shares. The shareholders' position was thereby in theory improved, as it meant that if they received a 10 per cent dividend they would thereafter share equally with the Government. Under the current 1937 agreement, the all-up Empire air mail scheme was instituted. A further 1,000,000 shares were issued to the public, bringing the total issued capital up to the present amount of £1,648,869. The price of issue, which was thirty shillings, invoked much criticism in view of the higher market price. Questioned in Parliament why the offer was not made at a higher price, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury replied that the Board had decided what was the highest price at which they could properly invite the public to subscribe. The public scrambled for the shares, but a few months later they were selling several shillings lower. Capital held by the Government remained unchanged, which means that its proportion declined. In normal commercial practice the Government would have been entitled to increase its holding proportionately, but as the Financial Secretary said in the House of Commons:

"It is not the duty of the Government to look for investments, but to further the policy of imperial air communications."

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Under this 1937 agreement the subsidy was increased to £1,650,000 for the first three years, declining to £1,350,000 for the last three years of a fifteen-year contract. This included payment by the Post Office for carriage of mails, which was to be of a minimum of £900,000.

The actual amount paid in subsidy to Imperial Airways since 1924 has been £5,058,408. For the year to March 31st last it was £535,000, which does not, of course, include payment for carriage of mails. During this same period, the stated profits, after obsolescence of Imperial Airways, including the subsidy, were £865,016. If the subsidy is deducted the actual net loss amounted to £4,193,392. Nevertheless, dividends during this period have fluctuated from 3 to 9 per cent and cost £463,396. Had more publicity been given to the amount of subsidy in the company's accounts, the optimism of investors might have been less and the demand for high compensation, now that the company is to be acquired, less vociferous. As it is, the issue of shares at 30 shillings in July, 1937, is used as an argument for this being the minimum price per share which should be paid by the Government as compensation.

Although the Government has paid out five million pounds in subsidy during the last fourteen years, its control of the company has been remote. From the first, the Government has appointed two directors to the Board—two out of ten. They have not always been selected from those who are experienced in Government administration or policy, often being more representative of the commercial world. The present Government directors are Air Marshal Sir John Salmond and Sir Francis L. Joseph. The latter is a colliery magnate and a director of a number of concerns.¹ Of the relationship between the Government and the company, the Cadman report was particularly critical:

¹ See my Survey on Government Directors of Public Companies in *Political Quarterly*, July-September, 1938.

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"Not only had it (the management of Imperial Airways) failed to co-operate fully with the Air Ministry, but it has been intolerant of suggestion and unyielding in negotiation. Internally its attitude in staff matters has left much to be desired. It appears to us that the Managing Director of the Company—presumably with the acquiescence of the Board—has taken a commercial view of his responsibilities that was too narrow, and has failed to give to the Government Departments with which he has been concerned, the co-operation we should have expected from a Company heavily subsidised and having such important international and imperial contracts."

Government directors should normally be appointed for the maintaining of this contact. Nevertheless, this view does not appear to be shared by the present Chairman of Imperial Airways, Sir John Reith. At the shareholders annual meeting on November 15th last, he stated that once Government directors were appointed they, like the other directors, were responsible to the shareholders and would always act in their interests. As long as this is the case, Government directors will be of little use in protecting the community's interests. Certainly there are grounds for believing that the Government directors on the Imperial Airways Board failed to exercise control over the company and to act as a liason between the company and the Government.

The Cadman report recommended a full-time Chairman. The then Chairman and Managing Director, Sir J. George Beharrell, was also Chairman of Dunlop Rubber Company and director of other companies. Sir John Reith was, with the approval of the Government, invited to become Chairman. At the same time Sir James Price, an ex-Government civil servant, with experience in labour matters, joined the Board. Previous staff difficulties at the B.B.C. did not inspire confidence in Sir John Reith's ability to handle the delicate staff situation of Imperial Airways.

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British Airways, like Imperial Airways, arose out of a merger to obtain a Government subsidy for the carriage of mails to Germany and the operation of services to Scandinavia. It was formed in 1935 by Whitehall Securities Corporation, a City finance house, whose Chairman, The Hon. Clive Pearson, is also Chairman of British Airways and a director of Lazard Brothers. British Airways capital of £363,204 is held by only nine shareholders, who are largely representative of City finance houses. The company has not yet operated at a profit, but since 1935 has been receiving a Government subsidy which was increased to £66,000 last year. The Government in addition pays the cost of the company's training school and the surveys of proposed air routes to West Africa and South America. For the year ended September 30th, 1937, there was a net deficit (after allowing for obsolescence) of £177,975. The Government has appointed two directors, namely, Viscount Monsell, formerly First Lord of the Admiralty, and Mr. Ernest H. Murrant.

In acquiring these two companies, both operating at a net loss, what price should the Government pay? The Government has expressed the hope that it will be able:

"... to fix with the directors of the two companies a fair and reasonable price for each undertaking which can be submitted to the shareholders for approval, and, if agreed, can be inserted in the Bill. If agreement cannot be reached, the Bill would provide for the price to be fixed by an independent arbitral tribunal."

Funds for the purchase are to be obtained by the issue of fixed interest stocks of the new corporation guaranteed by the Government. In arriving at a fair and reasonable price, all the relevant facts must be taken into account. These should include losses suffered, the value of the assets and the nature of the agreements with the Government, including subsidies received. Holders of shares in Imperial Airways

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purchased them on the basis of subsidies being paid in accordance with the agreements with the Government. They are therefore entitled to the capitalised value of the income that on the basis of these agreements they could normally expect to receive. In view of the increased competition and the uncertainty surrounding an enterprise in such an early stage of development as civil air transport, the risk, as undertaken by private enterprise, has justified the high yield. The corollary of this is a low capitalised value. In other words, because of the risk high dividends have been claimed, and, in assessing the value, the number of years purchase applicable to the anticipated revenue should be few. In the case of Imperial Airways, for instance, last year's earnings (including subsidy) were 7.8 per cent on the capital. The dividend paid was 7 per cent. With full knowledge of the Government agreements, the latest profits of the company and the dividends paid, the Stock Exchange value of the shares prior to the Government announcement of intended acquisition was only 25 shillings per share, inclusive of the 7 per cent dividend. Allowing for the payment of this dividend, the yield is the equivalent of nearly 6 per cent, which would appear to be commensurate with the risk. The price the shareholders paid for their shares is immaterial as the Government purchase now contemplated has to be made on the basis of the value to the holder at the time of purchase and not on the basis of past values. The fact that Imperial Airways shares were at one time quoted at 68 shillings and that an issue was made eighteen months ago at 30 shillings is irrelevant. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see any justification for paying a higher price than that at which the Stock Exchange valued the shares. Stock Exchange values are not necessarily correct and should not, as a matter of course, be taken as a basis of valuation when Government acquisition takes place, but the value it placed on Imperial

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Airways shares appears to approximate to a fair and reasonable price. If the Government decides to pay more than this price, it would seem that the shareholders are being treated too generously.

The case of British Airways is different, as this is a newer concern, its capital is not publicly held and its shares are not quoted on the Stock Exchange, but are in the hands of nine shareholders, largely members of the finance company which launched it. In order that the public may be sure that only a fair and reasonable price is paid for these shares an assessment should be made by an independent arbitral tribunal. Otherwise, if the Government and the company agree on a price by negotiation, the public being in the dark as to the finances and value of British Airways would be unable to judge whether the agreed price was just or not. The Government appears to have learnt a lesson from past transfers from private to public enterprise. Since, for the first time in the case of a large transfer from private to public enterprise, a Government guaranteed loan is to be issued to meet the cost of compensation. This at least eliminates the difficult and controversial task of fixing the income to which holders of public corporation stock are entitled, and reduces the burden of interest to the minimum.¹

Past experience in the matter of public corporations calls for definite safeguards being laid down in the Bill which will create the new Airways Corporation. In order that the Corporation shall be responsible to Parliament, the Board should be appointed by the appropriate Minister, to whom the Board would be responsible and through whom it would be answerable to Parliament. Members of the Board should be removable by a resolution of the House of Commons. The importance of appointment by the Government cannot be over-emphasised. Only through the check of Parliament

¹For full discussion of this intricate subject of compensation, see *How Much Compensation?* by Ernest Davies (Gollancz, and New Fabian Research Bureau).

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the vicious circle of poverty, overcrowding, disease, under-nourished and under-developed children, and loss of earning power. It is from this environment that the next generation of workers in England will be recruited.

Most of the statistics relate to 1936, and with the continual efforts for the restoration of the economic life of the districts and for amelioration, some improvement has probably taken place. Also to take the South-East of England for comparison is to set a high standard; comparison with earlier years would show that the losses due to poverty and unemployment are not new in kind or quantity. But the concentration in particular districts has had cumulative bad effects; for example, the local rates cannot bear the expense of remedies. The main service of Mr. Titmuss's book is to emphasize the problems at a time when there is danger of their being forgotten. No remedies are suggested by the author, presumably because no one remedy can be found; but it is ungracious not to refer to the great efforts that have been made to probe the difficulties and ameliorate the economic conditions, if only in a piece-meal way. Under these circumstances it is perhaps unfortunate that he appears to deprecate transference from these areas on the ground that the remaining population, having lost their most active members, will deteriorate further. If industry cannot be brought to a district, it is evidently essential that the population of working age must leave it or never be self-supporting. Whatever the future difficulties, the author cannot desire that children shall continue to be reared in the conditions he describes.

The problems connected with poverty are, of course, not confined to these areas, and we find an attempt to give a more general view in Mr. J. Kuczynski's *Hunger and Work*.¹ While it is well to emphasize the conditions of distressed districts without much reference to what has gone before, it is necessary in a more general study to put the facts in a proper perspective. The standard on which Mr. Kuczynski bases all his calculations is that computed by Mr. Rowntree in his *The Human Needs of Labour*. At the prices of 1936 this was 53s. per week for a family of man, wife and three young children, reduced to 41s. in agricultural districts.

¹ Lawrence & Wishart, 1938.

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Three children are included, because that is taken as the minimum at which the population can be renewed. No one can hold that this standard errs on the side of luxury, but it is considerably higher than has been reached by unskilled or agricultural labourers here or in Europe at least till recent times. The peculiarity of the standard is that only 38 per cent is allotted to food, which is cut down to a minimum below what are considered modern requirements, and nearly to that of Booth's poverty line. More is allotted to clothing than has been usual, and 9s. is given for personal expenses. This standard may be compared with that used in the *New Survey of London Life and Labour*, with allowance for change of prices, and with Mr. George's estimates¹ on the basis of the B.M.A.'s report with an additional ration of milk.

Weekly expenditure of a family of man, wife and three children:

	Rowntree			Poverty Line			George		
	s.	d.		s.	d.		s.	d.	
Food	20	6	..	19	0	..	26	4	
Rent	9	6	..	9	6	..	n.s.		
Clothing	8	0	..	4	4	..	3	4	
Fuel, cleansing, etc. .. .	6	0	..	4	1	..	3	9	
Personal	9	0	..	2	4	..	n.s.		
Total .. .	53	0	..	39	3	Say	45	3	

It will be remembered that the "Poverty Line" was used for definition and comparison with Booth's work, not in any sense as a desirable standard. The last column includes adequate expenditure on food, but no allowance is made in the total for any personal expenditure except on insurance and travelling. With such an income the family would almost certainly spend more on less directly necessary objects and less on food.

At the beginning of this century it was commonly said by the less careful writers that a third of the population was below the poverty line; the proportion, in fact, was not known and there was probably some exaggeration. Now

¹ *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1937, pp. 74-86.

SURVEYS

CURRENT SOCIAL STATISTICS:

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IT is generally known that the population of the United Kingdom is now increasing very slowly, and that, unless there is a sudden and quite unexpected change in the birth-rate, a maximum will be reached within a very short time and then there will be a slow decline. It is also known that a change is taking place in the age-distribution, so that the proportion of old people is increasing, that of the young decreasing, and that of the men and women of working ages remaining in the aggregate nearly the same, though on a closer view some increase is to be anticipated during the next ten years. Within the working ages, however, there will be a shifting towards higher ages, as the deficiency of births after 1921 has effect. If we confine ourselves to a relatively short view, say twenty years, before the possible actual diminution of population is at all considerable, there is no *a priori* obstacle to the adaptation of industry to the changing conditions. Unless men over sixty years old are actually less effective than boys under twenty, the working strength will not diminish in this period. The non-effectives needing support will be the old rather than the young, and instead of the increase of capital goods to provide for a growing population, there is the possibility of improving the equipment of the present number, or, if that is unnecessary, of shortening the hours of work or lowering the age of retirement. The consequent difficulties of adjustment have been discussed by economists; in brief they may be said to arise from the unemployment that results from any re-orientation of industry.

Mr. R. M. Titmuss, in his book, *Poverty and Population*,¹ has little that is new to say on these general topics, and the purpose of his book is rather to analyse and assess the waste of health and life that takes place in existing conditions, which has an additional importance when people and especially children are becoming scarce. The most prolific section of the population is that which can least afford to

¹ Macmillan, 1938.

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bring up children, and the most prolific regions of the United Kingdom are said to be precisely the "special areas" where unemployment and poverty are most prevalent. Of all the counties of England and Wales it is recorded that only Durham had in 1931 a net reproduction rate above unity. The future population will come predominantly from the North and from Wales, while the more prosperous South depends on immigration from other districts. Mr. Titmuss bases his study on a comparison of two areas—North (1), consisting of Durham and Northumberland, and Wales (1), consisting of Monmouthshire and three South Wales counties—with the South-East of England, being that with the lowest death-rate in the Registrar-General's grouping. The crude death-rates do not show very much difference between these special areas and England and Wales as a whole.

	Death-rates	
	1921	1935
England and Wales ..	12.1	11.7
North (1)	13.8	12.2
Wales (1)	11.6	12.1

But when we take the standardised death-rate for 1935, we find that in North (1) and Wales (1) are 16 per cent higher than in England and Wales and 35 per cent higher than the South-East, excluding London. Infant mortality (the number of deaths of children under one year per thousand births) was, in 1935, 57 in England and Wales, 42 in the South-East, 76 in North (1), and 63 in Wales (1). But it was 83 in England and Wales in 1921, and the diminution has been at not far from the same rate in the fourteen years in the selected areas and the whole country.

Whether there has been improvement or not is irrelevant to the argument, which depends on the amount of avoidable loss of life at the present time. It is shown that, especially in the younger age groups, the death-rates are considerably higher in the selected areas than in the South-East, and a detailed analysis is given of the heavy incidence of those diseases which are connected with poverty. In all a very gloomy picture is presented, and adequately documented, of

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Fuel, cleansing, etc. .. .	6	0	4	1	3	9
Personal	9	0	2	4	n.s.	
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¹ *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1937, pp. 74 seq.

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Mr. Kuczynski finds about 77 per cent *above* Rowntree's standard. From other unpublished data I should be inclined to put it at higher than 80 per cent. He does not, in fact, put his results in this way; his summary is "10,000,000 working men, women and children are living under such conditions that they cannot even keep fit for work, they are not able to recuperate completely from the exhausting work half of them are continuously doing, and they have to spend more strength than they can get back through the purchasing power they earn."

Since there is no published investigation of wages other than averages, and nowhere any analysis of family earnings in relation to needs except the most general average, it is impossible to substantiate or to contradict this estimate. Mr. Kuczynski, in spite of his care, is obliged to make very bold hypotheses. It is not, however, necessary to have detailed statistics to know that a great number of families live below this standard. Those dependent solely on unemployment insurance or allowances, broken families depending on relief, the majority of agricultural ordinary labourers and a smaller proportion of unskilled labourers who have a family of more than two children solely dependent on them, and some other classes, are known to earn less than the standard here considered to be a grudging poverty line.

From Mr. Titmuss's analysis and from other sources it is known that the proportion of children that are in families with dangerously narrow means is greater than that of adults. Here is the practical line of approach. In existing conditions it is possible to take care of children who are in danger of under-nourishment, at an expense which could be borne without serious difficulty. Another, and less popular, line of approach is education in food values—not to make people scientific experts, but in the light of common sense—so that pending the arrival of Socialism, or whatever organization will bring the millennium, the best use can be made of existing resources. For it is not practical to say that every male adult should earn 60s. a week and every adult woman at work 30s. In Mr. Kuczynski's rough estimates, the industries in which the deficit is greatest are coal-mining,

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agriculture, building and public utility services. The next in numerical importance are textiles and railways. Of these, coal-mining, railways and cotton are carried on in great financial difficulties, agriculture is continually asking for increased subsidies, building is so dear that housing is subsidized, railways do not earn enough dividends to make $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on their capital, and indeed in other countries they need subsidies. The high figure stated for public utilities is not at all well substantiated; the deficit of the average from the Rowntree standard is quite small, and it is assumed that 15 per cent of the men had three or more children to support, and that none of these earned more than the average of the occupations. In any case, with the present height of rates, it is not practical to suggest a substantial increase for publicly employed labour, when other workmen keep to their present wages.

Exaggeration of the amount and stress of poverty, and its measurement against an unrealizable standard, may tend to defeat its purpose. If the trouble is too great to remedy, people may be more inclined to leave it alone; while if there is proved deficiency in limited numbers of cases, the effort for amelioration is worth while. The lacunæ in public statistics encourage inaccurate and alarmist estimates, and, while crudities in detail can be exposed, it is not possible to make precise statements of the facts. There is, fortunately, some prospect of obtaining the necessary data through inquiries now being carried out by Government Departments. The Cost of Living investigation will show what food is, in fact, purchased by various sections of the working class, the Ministry of Health has undertaken other analyses, and the Ministry of Labour is now collecting data of individual, as contrasted with average, earnings for the first time since the year 1906.

A. L. BOWLEY.

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ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONS

THE Anglo-American Trade Agreement signed on November 17, 1938, is the product of recent drastic changes in British and American commercial policy.

Up till 1931 the United Kingdom was the great stronghold of free trade, while the United States had the highest tariff in the world. But British commercial policy was reversed with the introduction of a preferential tariff in 1931-2, while American policy turned in the opposite direction with the passage of the Trade Agreements Act in 1934.

American protectionism reached its climax in 1929-30 with the introduction of the famous Hawley-Smoot tariff. The Hawley-Smoot tariff raised the average duty on agricultural imports from 20 per cent to 34 per cent *ad valorem*. This increase was at least understandable in view of the prolonged depression in American agriculture in the previous decade; but there was no such justification for the increased protection granted to American industry, which was at that time enjoying exceptional prosperity. In fact, the chief consequence of the Hawley-Smoot tariff was to encourage the growth of retaliatory tariffs in many other parts of the world just at a time when international trade was already beginning to contract.

Some Americans were very conscious of this fact, and also realised that, although less than 10 per cent of American production as a whole is exported, certain branches of American agriculture and industry are completely dependent on export markets. In 1933 between 25 and 70 per cent of the American output of lard, dried and canned fruit, leaf tobacco, raw cotton, lubricating oil, refined copper and various classes of machinery, was exported.

Following the Democratic victory in 1933, Mr. Cordell Hull, the new Secretary of State, drastically reversed his country's commercial policy by securing the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934. This authorised the President to negotiate commercial agreements with foreign countries "for the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of the United States." As a bargaining weapon the Act gave him the power to reduce or raise particular duties by not more than 50 per cent. Its

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great significance lay in the fact that it represented the first large-scale experiment by the American Government in tariff bargaining; for hitherto American duties had been fixed without negotiation with other countries. Twenty Agreements have been negotiated under the Act, culminating in the Agreements just signed with the United Kingdom and Canada, with which two countries nearly one-third of American foreign trade is conducted.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, too, had reversed her commercial policy, but in the opposite direction. The depreciation of the pound sterling in September, 1931, was considered by the British Government to be insufficient to correct the deficit in the country's current balance of international payments, and early in 1932 a preferential tariff was introduced—a system consolidated for a minimum of five years by the conclusion of the Ottawa Agreements in the autumn of that year. British imports from the United States were affected even more by the fact of Imperial Preference than by the absolute height of the tariff, and without the assent of the Dominions—and particularly Canada and Australia—to the modification or abolition of certain preferences it would never have been possible to conclude a worth-while Agreement. Such assent was only forthcoming after the complete defeat of Mr. Bennett by Mr. Mackenzie King in the autumn of 1935 and the re-election of the Australian Government to power in the autumn of 1937.

The Anglo-American Trade Agreement has, therefore, a special significance as representing the first step towards a modification of the system of Imperial Preference established at Ottawa. In any case, Anglo-American trade is of quite outstanding importance. The United Kingdom and the United States represent 17 per cent and 11 per cent respectively and together nearly 30 per cent of the world market, while if the rest of the British Empire is included the proportion is over 40 per cent. The only countries whose foreign trade is of comparable importance are Germany and France; the value of Japanese trade is only one-third that of American and less than one-quarter that of British.

Even more striking is the Anglo-American dominance of the market for certain commodities. The United Kingdom

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takes virtually all the bacon, hams and mutton and nearly all the butter which enters into international trade, whilst she imports something like half the timber, cotton, tobacco, oil, wheat and tea. Similarly, the United States takes at least half the world's exports of rubber, tin, sugar, cocoa, coffee and other commodities.

No less important is the volume of trade between the two countries, which is only exceeded by that between the United States and Canada, who also signed a new agreement on November 17. The United Kingdom is the chief market for American exports, taking 16 per cent of the total in 1937, and the third largest source of American imports (7 per cent). Similarly the United States is the fourth largest market for British exports (6 per cent) and the chief source of British imports. Yet the American share of the British market declined strikingly in recent years, from 17 per cent in 1929 to 12 per cent in 1931 and 11 per cent in 1937.

Meanwhile the proportion of the United Kingdom's foreign trade conducted with Empire countries rose appreciably, from 29 per cent in 1931 to 39 per cent in 1937 in the case of imports—Canada more than doubling her share—and from 44 per cent to 48 per cent in the case of exports. It is extremely difficult to say how far this represented diversion, and how far simply an expansion of trade with the Empire unaccompanied by any such expansion with foreign countries. In the case of food imports, however, there is fairly clear evidence of diversion. Between 1931 and 1935 British food imports as a whole fell by 12 per cent; but while imports from foreign countries fell by 30 per cent, imports from Empire countries actually rose by 17 per cent.

Before proceeding to examine the general nature of Anglo-American trade, it is important to note that the Agreement covers the Colonial Empire and Newfoundland; for the United States is a large importer from the Crown Colonies—75 per cent of these imports consisting of rubber and tin from British Malaya. Indeed, Malaya was second only to Canada as a source of American imports in 1937. Moreover, American purchases in that territory were over twenty-five times as great as American sales. Consequently the large American import surplus with the British Colonies

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very largely offsets the enormous American export surplus to the United Kingdom.

Indeed, when "invisible" as well as Colonial trade is considered, *The Economist* estimates that the balance of payments between the two countries is actually unfavourable to the United States.

U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH U.K. AND COLONIES.
(In \$ millions. A plus sign indicates a net balance to the credit, a minus sign a net balance to the debit, of the United States.)

	United Kingdom	Crown Colonies	Total
Merchandise (including silver) ..	+298	-174	+124
Freight and Shipping	-34	..	-34
Tourists	-36 ¹	-15	-51
Immigrants' Remittances	5	..	5
Insurance	-28	..	-28
Interest and Dividends	-50	..	-50
Total, invisible items	-153	-15	-168
TOTAL	+145	-189	-44

Of British exports to the United States, amounting to £31,000,000 in 1937, by far the largest item is whisky (£6,000,000); this enormous trade has all been built up since the repeal of Prohibition in 1933. The remaining items chiefly consist of a wide range of manufactured products, and particularly certain high-grade textiles—linen, woollen, cotton and jute. Re-exports are also important (£10,900,000 in 1937); half of these consist of fur-skins, in which the British trade has greatly expanded since the world market was transferred from Leipzig to London.

The duty on the largest item—whisky—had already been reduced under the Canadian-American Agreement of November, 1935, and in the new agreement the existing duty is now consolidated. The largest group of products on which the duties are actually reduced consists of textiles. The reduction on linen goods is of particular importance, since the United States is already the largest export market (£2,750,000 in 1936). The reductions on woollen and

¹ Including sums spent on British cruise ships and by permanent residents in Great Britain.

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worsted products are also important, although it has been suggested that semi-manufactures will benefit more than finished goods, since the reductions of duty on the former will reduce American manufacturers' costs. As regards cotton goods, only certain expensive classes will benefit, and according to one expert "it is foolish to suggest that what has happened is going to make any important difference to the Lancashire cotton industry." Other British exports for which concessions have been granted include china clay (for which the United States is a very important market), earthenware, glass, leather goods and certain metal manufactures and foodstuffs (including herrings, jam, biscuits and mustard). These reductions are welcome, but it must be remembered that the American President had no authority to reduce duties by more than 50 per cent and in most cases the reduction (if any) is considerably less. Since some of the Hawley-Smoot duties on British goods were above 90 per cent *ad valorem*, even a 50 per cent reduction may not be sufficient to render British competition feasible.

As regards the enormous British imports from the United States, amounting to no less than £114,000,000 in 1937, these consist predominantly of foodstuffs and raw materials. Indeed, raw cotton, tobacco and mineral oils alone accounted for £42,000,000. Wheat used to be an equally important item. It then disappeared almost entirely, thanks to drought and other factors, but in 1938 it has regained a large part of its former importance. Other agricultural imports include soft timber, pig products and fruit, all much affected by the Ottawa Agreements. Only a comparatively small part of British imports from the United States consist of manufactured goods; but certain types of machinery and motor-cars are important items.

None of the three chief imports is seriously affected by the Agreement. Raw cotton already enters free; mineral oils continue to be taxed highly, but chiefly for revenue purposes; and the existing preference on Empire tobacco remains, although the British Government has agreed to re-examine the position in 1942 when the present guarantees of Imperial Preference are due to expire.

The main reductions of duty affect wheat, soft woods,

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apples, pears and lard (on which the duty is abolished). In addition the quota for American hams has been increased. The concessions on lard and ham benefit the Middle Western States. In all these cases it is the Empire rather than the home producer who stands to lose most. Reductions of duty have also been granted on about one-eighth of British imports of manufactured goods from the United States, notably office, laundry and printing machinery, certain electrical goods, typewriters and track-laying tractors. One striking omission from this list is motor-cars. An undertaking has, however, been given not to raise the duty on motor-cars of over 25 h.p.—thus leaving the door open for increases of duty on small cars from Germany and elsewhere. Moreover, in the case of motor-cars and also of tobacco the United States has secured some compensation through slight reductions in the margin of preference in many British Colonies.

The effects of the new Agreement are concisely indicated by a small table based on statistics given in the official summary of the Agreement.

U.K. TRADE WITH U.S.A., 1936.

	Imports £	Exports £
Total	93,200,000	40,000,000
Duties reduced on	10,000,000	11,000,000
Duties stabilised on	14,000,000	6,000,000
Free entry stabilised on	20,000,000	9,500,000
Other concessions	16,000,000	—

It is interesting to note that the value of the imports into both countries on which duties have actually been reduced is almost exactly the same—£10,000,000 in the case of British imports, £11,000,000 in the case of American. These figures refer, however, to 1936; in 1937 British imports rose while American fell. On the other hand, the actual extent of the American reductions of duty was greater than the British.

To complete the picture, account must be taken of American trade with the Colonial Empire. Most Colonial products already enter the United States duty free, and the chief concessions consist of a stabilisation of free entry or the existing duties on £35,000,000 of Colonial Empire exports to

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the United States; actual reductions of duty only affect £210,000 of trade.

Concessions by the Colonial Empire to the United States take the form of a stabilisation or reduction in the margin of preference rather than of the actual duty. This is because most Colonies derive the bulk of their revenue from Customs duties and an arbitrary reduction of tariff rates might endanger their budgetary positions. Out of total Colonial Empire imports amounting to £11,000,000 in 1936, the margin of preference is actually reduced on only £757,000 and is stabilised on £2,159,000, whilst continued equality of tariff treatment is guaranteed on £1,552,000.

One point which should emerge from this analysis is that the Dominions, and particularly Canada, have made certain definite sacrifices for the sake of the Agreement. In return, Canada has received compensation in two forms. In the first place, Great Britain has agreed to a modification of certain preferential rights in the Canadian market. In particular, a reduction in the preference from 20 per cent to 17½ per cent *ad valorem* for tinplate of a kind made in Canada accounts for a trade of slightly over £1,250,000. But other concessions as regards guaranteed preferences affect less than £1,000,000 of British exports.

Far more important are the new concessions which Canada has secured in the American market under the new Canadian-American Agreement signed on November 17, over and above those secured in the Agreement of November, 1935. The United States has reduced the duties on 129 items and stabilised them on 73—these changes chiefly affecting agricultural produce, fish, timber and mineral products. In return, Canada has reduced the duties on 283 types of American products and stabilised them on 146 more—in this case primarily manufactured goods, including textiles and machinery. Perhaps even more important, Canada has abolished the 3 per cent excise tax on American products.

The Anglo-American Agreement (like Mr. Cordell Hull's other agreements) is to run for an initial period of three years, and will thereafter be denunciable after six months' notice. It is, however, provided that if "a wide variation should occur in the rates of exchange between the currencies of the

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United Kingdom and the United States of America" the Agreement may be modified or terminated. This is another standard clause in all the American agreements, but it may prove significant in view of the depreciation of sterling against the dollar recently. Another "escape" clause provides that either party may withdraw or modify any concession if it appears that the major benefit has accrued to a third party and has threatened serious injury to domestic producers. This amounts to an official admission that in this, as in other commercial agreements, every attempt is made to minimise the benefits to be derived by third parties through their most-favoured-nation rights. This is done by confining concessions to items of which the other party is already the "principal supplier," where necessary narrowing the classification of tariff items. Finally, it is important to note that the United States does not extend most-favoured-nation rights to countries whom she considers to discriminate against her exports. The only country at present on the "black list" is Germany who will, therefore, actually lose ground in the American market as a result of the Agreement. This will particularly affect the Sudeten industries, which had built up large and expanding markets in the United States whilst they were still a part of Czechoslovakia.

Nor has the political significance of the Agreement been missed in Germany. This aspect has been even more strongly emphasised in the United States. According to the *New York Times*:

The Treaty marks a closer union between the two most powerful democracies, achieved at a particularly decisive moment in the world's history. . . The truth is that there can be no return by the totalitarian nations to the principles and the ways of international economics without something amounting to an overthrow of the regimes under which those nations live to-day.

The *New York Herald Tribune* asserts that:

It is a sign of solidarity between the English-speaking democracies addressed plainly to Berlin.

Finally, the London *Economist* has pointed out that:

Its long-term effects in the purely political field can be negatively assessed by imagining the derisive joy in certain European capitals and the profound depression in others that would have been produced by a failure of the negotiations.

B. S. KEELING.

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PUBLIC OPINION: CENSORSHIP DURING THE CRISIS

A LONG series of incidents have created a very general impression that the present British Government have been insidiously destroying the traditional liberties of Britain out of a desire to appease the dictators. The resignation of Mr. Eden in deference to Mussolini's demands, the transference of Sir Robert Vansittart to a Propaganda Committee which has never functioned, the Sandys case which showed that the Government was prepared to use the Official Secrets Acts to check informed criticism by Members of Parliament, some remarks by Mr. Chamberlain about the advantages of Totalitarian States where critics did not "foul their own nests," and a variety of incidents that occurred between the Government, the Press and the film industry during the crisis—all these have created a *prima facie* case against the British Government. To-day, more than two months after the Munich crisis, it has become possible to review the facts in some detail. The whole question was discussed in an interesting debate in the House of Commons on December 9, when Mr. Mander moved a resolution in support of the maintenance "of British democratic traditions, of the liberty of expression of opinion both in the press and public meetings, and also in other media such as cinema films." He suggested that the Government had attempted to set up what amounted to a political censorship during the Czech crisis. He was supported by Mr. John Parker and others; Sir Samuel Hoare defended the Government. Opinions will differ about the substance of the charges and the success of Sir Samuel Hoare's defence. It should, I think, be admitted at the outset that if there had been unity of opinion about Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy instead of the sharpest division which has ever been known in this country, the Government's actions in regard to the Press and the cinema would have passed with little comment. The force of the attack on the Government arose from the belief that in pursuance of the policy of appeasement England might be brought, as many other countries on the Continent have been, to surrender its liberties in order to please Germany. It may be interesting to summarise the charges brought against the Government and the defence of

CENSORSHIP DURING THE CRISIS

Sir Samuel Hoare and to comment from personal knowledge on some of the controversial points.

After referring to the German pressure throughout Europe and its effect on democratic freedom, Mr. Mander gave examples of the determined libertarianism of the British Press in the past, and then proceeded to illustrate the way in which, in his view, the Government had recently attempted to use undue influence over the Press and the film industry. He was compelled in citing these examples to rely on confidential information. On a number of counts, therefore, Sir Samuel Hoare was able to avoid detailed reply on the ground that Mr. Mander was quoting mere gossip. The whole debate, however, served the purpose of clearly bringing out what the charges were and of obtaining from the Government a number of admissions and contradictions of considerable importance. Mr. Mander's charges were:

(1) That the free and frank relations between Press correspondents and the Foreign Office, which had existed under Mr. Eden, had disappeared since foreign policy was taken over by Mr. Chamberlain. In particular he quoted a Press Conference on March 8, when he stated that Lord Halifax had suggested to the newspapers that "it would be in the general interests of the country if pin-pricking of Hitler and Mussolini should cease during the period of the talks, and that currency should not be given to unsupported rumours which have emanated from European capitals." He added that Lord Halifax had given the impression that Britain did not intend to interfere between Germany and Austria, and that in the case of Czechoslovakia "if the conquest were of a peaceful penetration type the British Government would probably do nothing." On this point Sir Samuel Hoare suggested to Mr. Mander that he had no better evidence than that of "an anonymous person who was present at the confidential interview."

I may add from my own knowledge that a number of journalists after this interview expressed surprise at the attitude of Lord Halifax; they complained that he had in effect accepted the necessity of the Anschluss. It is certain, in any case, that the Press did not warn the British public of the imminent German attack on Austria. The Anschluss

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was expected by the Government and by individual journalists, but the public was taken by surprise.

Mr. Mander was also on safe ground in referring to the changed atmosphere in the Foreign Office, which during the last nine months has been much less informed and informative about foreign affairs than ever before. Such well-known journalists as the diplomatic correspondents of *The Manchester Guardian* and the *News Chronicle* have referred to this change. Since the retirement of Mr. Eden routine work has been left to the Foreign Office, while matters of high policy have been taken over directly by the Prime Minister, who seems to have relied on Sir Horace Wilson rather than upon experts in foreign affairs. In a moderate and English way the conduct of foreign affairs has been assimilated to the Nazi practice, the Foreign Office continuing as the Wilhelmstrasse continues, while the actual conduct of foreign affairs has removed to the control of people who have not formerly been concerned with international politics.

(2) Mr. Mander suggested that while "normal contacts" between Government departments and the Press were necessary and desirable, the Government had recently developed a technique of "direct approaches" to the proprietors of newspapers, and that Sir Samuel Hoare had become during the crisis "a sort of Propaganda Minister," seeing important personages in the Press world and tactfully suggesting that particular lines of policy were desirable and certain criticisms damaging to the public interest—or to the Government. He added that the newspapers were well able to take care of themselves, but he quoted a warning in the *Evening Standard* against official restriction of the publication of news. He went on to ask whether the Home Secretary was prepared to deny that special Governmental influence was brought to bear during the crisis upon the *Daily Mirror*, which was conducting an anti-Chamberlain campaign, upon the *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily Mail* and *Daily Herald*. Sir Samuel Hoare did not deny these suggestions in detail, but he challenged Mr. Mander and declared that he was paying attention to irresponsible gossip and making statements "without any foundation at all." I have myself evidence of attempted interference with the *Daily Mirror* by a Cabinet

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Minister, and I have been told on good authority that the type of pressure Mr. Mander described was in fact exerted on other newspapers.

(3) Mr. Mander gave examples of censorship over the films. He asserted "that there is, in connection with the news reels, definite political censorship which is hostile to the Opposition and friendly to the Government." He pointed out that though the executive in the matter was the British Board of Film Censors, it was easy for the Government to influence this Board, which is supposed to deal with questions of morals, and so indirectly to exercise a political censorship over the film industry. He instanced a film of scenes of "The Relief of Lucknow," which was banned by the intervention of the India Office, and referred back to 1936 to the case of a peace film which advanced League of Nations views possibly displeasing to the Government. It was first held up as "controversial," but later published as the result of protests. He instanced several other cases of political censorship; more than one issue of the *March of Time* had been censored, films called *Arms and the League*, *A Threat to Gibraltar*, *Crisis in Algeria*, *Inside Nazi Germany*, *Nazi Conquest No. 1 (Austria)*, and *Croix de Feu*, had been banned or cut. *Spanish Earth* had been cut because "it contained the outrageous suggestion that Germany and Italy were intervening in Spain," while *Britain's Dilemma*, which dealt with the programme of *Mein Kampf* and British policy since 1931, was cut and retitled *Britain and Peace*. In all these cases, Mr. Mander argued that the British Board of Film Censors acted on behalf of British Government policy. He concluded this part of his indictment with the case of a Paramount picture on Czechoslovakia, which contained a dialogue by Mr. Wickham Steed, Mr. A. J. Cummings and Mr. Hodge. This film was only allowed to appear once, on September 21, because its criticism of Government policy and support of the Czech cause were held to be internationally dangerous. Mr. Mander complained, however, that four other news reels supporting the Government's point of view were being freely shown at the same time.

The manner of intervention in the case of this Paramount film was particularly interesting. Mr. Mander described how

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a telegram was sent by British Paramount to all their news theatres, saying: "Please delete Wickham Steed's and A. J. Cumming's speeches from to-day's Paramount news. We have been officially requested to do so." Later they denied that they had been officially requested, but in the House of Commons on November 23, Sir John Simon admitted that the Government regarded certain passages in this news reel as prejudicial to the Prime Minister's negotiations at Godesberg and that the Ambassador of the United States communicated this view to America, where the necessary excisions were made. This, for better or worse, was clearly a case of political censorship, and in his reply Sir Samuel Hoare, while denying that any censorship was exercised by the Government over either the Press or the films, seemed to contradict himself when he admitted that, in view of the extreme danger of the European situation at the time, a Cabinet Minister had informed the American Ambassador that this film might do harm and that the Paramount Company had agreed to withdraw the offending film as a result of his intervention. Sir Samuel Hoare held, however, that "there was no censorship, there was not undue pressure." Similarly in the case of the *Siege of Lucknow*, he admitted that the Secretary of State for India advised the promoters not to proceed with the film on the ground that it would make bad blood between India and Britain. He raised the matter with the Board of Film Censors, discussed it with the film promoters and induced them to withdraw the film. As far as the March of Time films went, Sir Samuel declared that the Board of Film Censors had acted entirely upon their own responsibility.

The least easily explicable passage in the debate arose when Mr. Dingle Foot reiterated a point raised earlier by Mr. Parker about the action of Sir Samuel Hoare when he was Foreign Secretary at the time of the Hoare-Laval plan. It was asserted that Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Laval tried to induce newspaper correspondents in Paris not to reveal any details they heard about this plan on the day on which it was agreed in Paris. Sir Samuel Hoare replied:

"As far as I am concerned, I had no responsibility whatever for what happened. On the day following the

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Hoare-Laval agreement I went to Switzerland, and on the next day I had the bad luck to fall on the ice and break my nose; and, as to any dealings with the Press, I never had any at any time."

This is a most remarkable statement. I have already described this incident in an article that I contributed last July to *The Political Quarterly* on the Freedom of the Press. The details of his interview with the Press have been recounted to me personally by the well-known Paris correspondent of one of the leading English newspapers. He described to me his embarrassment when requested by Sir Samuel Hoare not to say anything about the proposed terms with Italy. He was in possession of the terms at the time of the request and felt it his duty as a journalist to send them to his paper. He also regarded them as a shocking departure from the policy recently stated by Sir Samuel Hoare at Geneva. At the same time he felt it difficult totally to disregard the Foreign Secretary's personal request at a time of international tension. He solved his dilemma by sending a colourless and uninformative message to his paper, enclosing under the same cover the details of the Hoare-Laval plan and an explanation of the situation for the benefit of the editor. The editor, who could scarcely believe that the story of the plan was accurate, withheld publication, and so did the whole British Press. Pertinax and Mme. Tabouis, however, revealed the details in the French Press; they were promptly taken up by the British Press, and a subsequent outcry defeated the proposed agreement. In view of the circumstantial story told me by a participant in the events, I am at a loss to understand Sir Samuel Hoare's denial, and I can only assume that his memory was at fault.

When we survey this debate, supplementing it as I have done with knowledge obtained from other sources, the situation becomes fairly clear. It still remains true in this country that apart from particular provisions of the Official Secrets Acts and the Incitement to Disaffection Act, there is no legal power in the Government's hands to censor newspaper or film material before it is published. In general, the rule laid down by Blackstone 150 years ago still remains valid—that the liberty of the Press consists in the absence of

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any prior censorship, though, of course, the Government can punish a variety of offences after they are committed. This is the basic principle of law on which most of our liberties depend—the right to act in accordance with conscience and judgment, restricted only by the knowledge of the legal penalties that may follow breaches of particular statutes or offences at Common Law. As long as there is open and fair trial and a free House of Commons, legislation to punish overt acts can never endanger freedom as much as prior censorship, which acts in the dark and precludes popular judgment of the rights and wrongs of the case. While the law remains as it is, censorship can only be effectively carried out by indirect intervention and the use of cajolery or threats behind the scenes. Clearly, in a country where the Press is mainly in the hands of a few rich men, and the cinema controlled by a Board of people friendly to the Government, this may prove a very effective censorship. The Government propaganda organisation was, in fact, able to arrange that films supporting the Government's policy were widely shown everywhere and that films that challenged this policy were stopped. As regards the Press, unusual efforts were made to see to it that national organs of opinion were brought into line, and there is no doubt at all that Sir Samuel Hoare and other members of the Government took great pains to "noble" proprietors and other influential persons in the Press world. It may be added that a government of the Left would not find the same channels of influence so readily accessible, and that a good deal of the resentment felt against the Government methods of indirect influence is due to the profound dislike of the Government's policy by a very large section of the nation, and to a realisation that this method of control is a weapon in the hands of Conservatism which would not be available for their opponents should they be in office.

KINGSLEY MARTIN.

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POLITICAL ARITHMETIC: A SYMPOSIUM OF POPULATION STUDIES. Edited by LANCELOT HOGBEN, F.R.S. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1938. 531pp. 30s. net.)

THIS book is a collection of twelve studies relating to various aspects of the population problem, carried out by some seven associates and pupils of Prof. Hogben at the London School of Economics during the period of his tenure of the chair of Social Biology in that institution. About half of the material has already appeared elsewhere, while the remainder is here published for the first time. In view of the fact that the editing of this volume was presumably done in the midst of the period of extraordinarily active literary catharsis through which Prof. Hogben is currently passing some minor evidences of haste and failure of closely integrated synthesis are doubtless excusable in a bustling "age of plenty." But the absence of an index in a book so packed with details as this one constitutes a really serious flaw.

The material is assembled in two parts, each of which is separately introduced by an essay from the Editor's skilled and entertaining pen. The first and longer part, under the general heading "The Survival Minimum," included seven papers on human fertility in one or another of its aspects. Part II, "The Recruitment of Social Personnel," contains four studies aimed at the problem of supposedly remediable social and biological wastage "due to defective social organization and the loss of social efficiency resulting therefrom," and arising in part from the existence of differential fertility. The last chapter deals with blood groups and race, and has only an exiguous connection with the rest of the book.

Prof. Hogben's introductory essay to Part I, "Prolegomena to Political Arithmetic," is a gem, and constitutes intellectually the high spot of the book. It combines a delicious diatribe against academic economics, and indeed all formulated economics, and sociology as these disciplines now exist and operate, with a vigorous plea for a *monde meilleur*. The central thesis is that no significant progress is going to be made in the so-called "social sciences" until they really adopt the viewpoint and methodology of the natural sciences instead of merely talking about them. The development of

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the argument is historical, and done with consummate insight and understanding in respect of the nature and methodology of science and of the essential social problem. Graunt, Petty, and Halley are the heroes of the piece. They are hailed as the founders of British demography. All three were in the original list of Fellows of the Royal Society, and by that token in the authentic "British empirical tradition of naturalistic inquiry." Malthus is the villain, and as arch symbol for economic and sociologic villainy generally is of great service. At first glance it is a bit odd and shocking to find him called (p. 32) "celibate," but after pondering the matter one concludes either that Prof. Hogben has inside information not yet revealed to the rest of us as to the worthy parson's sex behaviour both before his marriage and between that event and the successive births of his son and daughter; or else that he merely meant obliquely to convey the information that the first two editions of the *Essay* appeared while Malthus was still unmarried. Perhaps a little more careful writing might have clarified the point for a curious world.

But, leaving aside such fooling, the contrast drawn between the orderly development of natural science under the aegis of the Royal Society and the scholastic devotion of economics to the arid verbalism of logic, even down to the present day, is an illuminating one presented with telling force. Furthermore, the author's brilliant argument for a development of truly scientific social sciences to the end that the potential plenty envisaged through our present knowledge of physics, chemistry, and biology may be released and intelligently distributed, is very persuasive, not to say seductive. Whether the actual outcome of a rejuvenated Political Arithmetic would be quite all that is suggested is perhaps open to some doubt. At least opinions will differ as to this. But since no one can justly appraise the results in advance of the trial, all sensible people should support Prof. Hogben, and aid and abet him in every possible way, in his crusade for more and better political arithmetic based on sound biology. His buoyant enthusiasm and optimism are refreshing and stimulating in a weary world.

In the underlying philosophy there is plainly apparent, however, a point that may disturb some of his more critical

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scientific colleagues, and particularly those in the field of population. This point is that Prof. Hogben is overtly trying to be both an investigator and a crusader at the same time. Long experience has indicated that the biological limitations of human beings—even of the most talented—are such that this attempt rarely if ever leads to the happiest results. Prof. Hogben wants not only to study population to the end of describing accurately and fully the phenomena exhibited, but he also wants to stir people up to do something right here and now about populations to the end of making this a better world. Other students of population, perhaps equally competent, certainly longer experienced, and as well aware of the social problems involved, incline to the view that broad population policies and social planning based upon them may wisely wait a little for the wider and deeper knowledge that will accrue from the further research now being so actively prosecuted in various parts of the world. Such an attitude is not reactionary, though it is easy and cheap to label it so. Rather it is precisely of the essence of the truly scientific social engineering for which Prof. Hogben so eloquently pleads.

Of the factual contributions included in the volume, those of Drs. Enid Charles, D. V. Glass, and J. L. Gray are of the greatest significance. In the chapters on differential fertility (urban versus rural, and occupational), and the decline in reproductive rates, the heavy emphasis is upon the predicted consequences in the future of these present trends. While the actual results of these fertility studies bring out little in principle that is not already familiar to students of population, it is of great value to have the record of such careful detailed analyses of particular groups. The originality and intelligence displayed in studies of the second part dealing with the general theme of ability and educational opportunity are impressive. Sound and penetrating judgment contributes significantly to the discussion of the old problem of nature and nurture. Some of the results are quantitatively striking.

"The offspring of larger business owners and higher executives and of the professional classes are proportionately five times more numerous in schools providing a higher education than they are in the general school population. Those of unskilled wage-earners are proportionately only one-fifth as numerous.

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"Nearly one-half of all the children of larger business owners and 35 per cent of those of professional workers fall below the level of achievement [of the top 50 per cent of fee-paying pupils]. Nevertheless they receive the opportunity of higher education. Only 1 per cent of the children of skilled wage-earners and of smaller business owners and 0.4 per cent of the children of unskilled wage-earners with opportunities for higher education fall below the same level of achievement."

The most noticeable defect of the book as a whole is perhaps a certain intellectual provincialism that results in little or no attempt to correlate and compare the factual findings of this group of British workers with those of students in other parts of the world. In particular there is, in this general connection, one point that cannot be permitted to pass without protest, namely, the allocation to Dr. R. R. Kuczynski of much credit that properly belongs to Dr. Alfred J. Lotka for the development of modern methods of measuring fertility and the true rate of natural increase of populations. In general, however, there can be no question that students of population everywhere are under a large debt of gratitude to Prof. Hogben and his co-workers; first, for promoting and carrying through these important studies, and, second, for making them conveniently accessible for reference in this single volume.

RAYMOND PEARL.

The Johns Hopkins University.

SOVIET TRADE AND DISTRIBUTION. By L. E. HUBBARD. (Macmillan & Co. 12s. 6d.). THE RED ARMY. By ERICH WOLLENBERG. Translated into English by C. W. SYKES. (Secker & Warburg. 10s. 6d.). FROM TSARDOM TO THE STALIN CONSTITUTION. By W. P. COATES and ZELDA K. COATES. (George Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.). THE PLOT AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND WORLD PEACE. By B. PONOMAREV. (Lawrence & Wishart. 1s.).

THE first twenty-five chapters of Mr. Hubbard's book give a historical picture of the methods of distribution, wholesale and retail, in Soviet Russia. We suspect that trade is an even harder task than production for a Socialist Government; and it was made all the harder in Russia by a traditional contempt for the *Kupets* and the Jew, and by a revolutionary enthusiasm for the glories of production. How to price the goods when both rationing and

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competition are ruled out? How to train managers and subordinates, and make the profession a skilled and an honourable one? How to concede a local discretion in the choice of stocks without sacrificing central control? How to overcome natural indolence, and make the salesman study the customer? How to finance the hungry interval while the trading concern is holding its stocks, and yet retain financial discipline? Such are some of the problems with which Mr. Hubbard shows the Soviet Government grappling. The very failures are valuable for the lessons which they convey and, in the exposition of his subject, he gives us glimpses of the actual working of a Socialist system. The machinery is oiled by lubricants borrowed from an earlier world. The immemorial Russian *artel*—the workers' co-operative fellowship—has its own retail shops, and meets much of the demand for high-class footwear, furs, bespoke tailoring and costumery, furniture, toys and knick-knacks. There are *Goods Exchanges* which perform some of the functions of the British *Exchange and Mart*. Private individuals, working under license, make and supply certain goods and services, including tailoring, upholstery, cabinet-making, plumbing and repairs. The Collective Farm markets and animal fairs help out the food supply: and the interstices between the official and the co-operative shops and the needs of the consumer are thus filled in. We get a clear picture of the differentiation of income scales, which has been brought about by the extra remuneration of the super-piece-workers and of the Soviet bureaucracy: and of the attempt in the high-class shops, such as the central *Univermag* which occupies the premises erected by the Whiteleys of Tsarist Moscow to cater for this élite. "Purchases are wrapped in paper and can be delivered to the customer's address." We do not hear much of advertisement: but it is a growing practice, especially for prepared foods and for luxury goods.

Erich Wollenberg served in the Red Army from 1921 to 1936 and finished his book on the subject in March, 1938. He wrote it in German and evidently published it outside of the U.S.S.R. This was necessary, for his sympathies are with Trotsky. The translation is efficient. In the first four chapters the author sketches the history of the Red Army up to the

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end of the fighting in 1920. The smallness of the proportion for which arms could be provided, and the huge number of desertions, are very striking features.

In Chapter VI there is an account of the military and political organisation, of the controversy between the militia system and regularisation, and of the part played by the Communist cells. We see what Soviet democracy meant at an early stage of the revolution, when we learn that in 1925 an officer had to justify himself before the Party for allowing a private to black his boots: and that officers had no separate mess of their own. That is all over, the author says, with an evident sigh. A whole chapter is devoted to the Polish campaign: and Lenin's miscalculation in sending the Red Army across the racial border, and the indiscipline of Stalin and Voroshilov in diverting their forces from the main attack, are—correctly, as we think—emphasised. The defeat outside Warsaw quite deserves to be reckoned, along with the repulse of the Mahommedans at Tours, among the decisive battles of the world. The author does not tell us what is the fighting value of the force now: and since he left it before the purge of 1937 and 1938, he is hardly in a position to do so.

The rest of Messrs. Hubbard's and Wollenberg's books, and the whole of Mr. and Mrs. Coates' book and of Mr. Ponomarev's pamphlet on the Plot, fall into the province of controversy. Mr. Hubbard thinks that the Soviet Government pretends to be infallible: but it frequently proclaims and corrects mistakes. It was Trotsky who pulled the leg of the Communist Party by suggesting the idea of its infallibility, and Stalin at once saw that game was being made of him. Mr. Hubbard has a poor opinion of the economic achievement, and forecasts a future of unemployment. He also makes the interesting suggestion that the political importance of the Communist Party is declining, and that the purge of 1936-8 is the writing on the wall. Mr. and Mrs. Coates, in an industrious history which will be useful to the discriminating reader, demonstrate that all is well in Soviet Russia.

"Every goose a swan, lad:
And every lass a queen,"

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and ably expound their conviction that the persons who have been publicly condemned in the last two years did all that they said they did: and—by implication—that the multitudes who were condemned less publicly equally deserved their fate. They are so certain that Trotsky did no service worth mention that they do not even refer to his part in the organisation of the Red Army. Mr. Wollenberg counters here with a chapter in which he quotes what Lenin—and Stalin himself—said on the subject *at the time*. Mr. Wollenberg tells us, too, that Marshal Tukhachevsky and Commander Gamarnik lost their lives because they were champions of Soviet democracy and internationalism, which is another way of saying that they sympathised with Trotsky: that they actually took money from the German Government, but that it was by way of payment for training facilities on Soviet soil given to enable the German Army to evade the provisions of the Versailles Treaty: and that *Stalin knew it*. Mr. and Mrs. Coates think, on the other hand, that the dead officers had hoped to lead a section of the army against loyal Soviet troops.

Mr. Ponomarev has chosen an effective title. The plot against the Soviet Union *and World Peace* conveys the desired impression that the whole world was threatened by the machinations of the offenders. He provides us with handy extracts from the verbatim record of the trial of March, 1938, with its disclosures of the proceedings of Lady Muriel Paget and the rest: and a running commentary of invective and explanation. Well, well! It will be useful to those who can believe it. These are days of relativity: of the relativity of truth, among other things. With one statement of Mr. and Mrs. Coates we can completely agree. "Yagoda was a traitor and adventurer if ever there was one"; and Yagoda was the head, or deputy head, of the political Police for many years, with a power and a prestige which can be measured by the terror which he obviously inspired in the instruments of his murders. "With a man like this," they say, "at the head of the O.G.P.U. it was no wonder the crimes had such a long free run." No wonder, either, if unspeakable horrors of fabrication were perpetrated.

There is only one way of arriving at a likely hypothesis

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respecting the trials: and that is to base ourselves upon the whole record of Trotsky's life and writings, including the certain fact, stated by himself in *The Revolution Betrayed*, that he intended to make a fresh revolution as soon as the time should be ripe for it. There is the solid core: and there is the justification for the Soviet Government's elimination of persons who were likely to be dangerous. As for the details of the specific charges, they are from Cloud-Cuckoo-land, where policemen are the artists. But we think that the story of an intended military *coup* on the Kremlin, forestalled by the arrests, is, on the whole, not impossible.

JOHN MAYNARD.

THE MIDDLE WAY. By HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P.
(Macmillan. 5s. net.)

THE history of the past century presents many cases of courageous conservatives promoting what may be termed "radical" reforms in the attitude of the State towards economic situations. Here Mr. Macmillan presents an exceedingly valuable proposal for a consciously-ordered reconstruction of the entire industrial, commercial and financial system of Britain, and of its relation to foreign countries. The experience of recent years, with its world-wide unemployment, intensification of economic restrictions and the embitterment of class and industrial relations, have brought into clear perspective the failure of all expectations of a natural automatic recovery in accordance with the teaching of the *laissez faire* political economy.

What is needed is a new doctrine and a new policy based upon it. Mr. Macmillan approaches the problem from the standpoint of a firm believer in democracy. He perceives that the freedom of the individual which is the foundation of democracy demands the security of life and livelihood which does not exist to-day in those countries which profess to be democratic in their government. Revising in careful detail the operation of existing social services and then finance, he shows that they are far from solving the problem of personal freedom and that they cannot suffice for industria

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recovery. Neither the humanitarianism embodied in these services nor the public enterprises and regulations applied to a few monopolies and combinations suffice for the government of industry that is now required. The various committees and other public authorities for dealing with the especial difficulties and deficiencies of separate trades need to be brought into systematic correlation, if the potential productivity of our economic system is to be realised in quantity and in right distribution.

Rejecting as inimical to liberty the complete Socialist policy, he builds his "Middle Way" upon a distinction between the prime needs of life which are common to all members of society—food, clothing, housing, etc.—and those secondary demands which express the needs and desires that differ among different persons and give expression to their individuality. Hence his three-fold policy:

"(1) That new industries in the early stages of their development and during the period of their rapid expansion are best left to the vigorous initiative of private enterprise and uncontrolled competition; (2) that in the later stages when they have become more or less fully developed, and when their productive capacity begins to threaten to outstrip market demand, they require to achieve integration and to adopt a new form of corporate organization making self-discipline and self-government possible under the statutory provision of an Industrial Reorganization (Enabling) Act; and (3) that certain industries and services which are of key importance to the vigorous economic life of the community, and which have reached a stage of development when this conduct requires to be governed by much wider social considerations than the profit-making incentive alone will provide, should be brought under either some suitable form of public ownership or management, or, in certain cases, a form of statutory control or supervision which may not involve public ownership." (Page 238.)

Democracy, as Mr. Macmillan sees it, is not merely a political system but a way of life which requires security and progress in livelihood as a first condition. There are, of course, grave difficulties in the successful application of this "Middle Way" and to many a more complete public control

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of the entire economic system will seem easier in spite of the dangers of bureaucratic dominion and enforced uniformity in consumption it may involve. Other critics will complain that Mr. Macmillan has not adequately realized that a common international policy is indispensable for the success of his national system in its trading and financial relations. But the author is entitled to reply that some nation must take the lead and that the fairly successful application of his policy in this country will stimulate other nations to an imitation which will be mutually advantageous.

Perhaps the least convincing chapter is that dealing with finance. For Mr. Keynes's policy, to which the author on the whole inclines, does not win the assent or the understanding of many economists and ordinary readers, though it is evident that the danger of "hoarding" which is its core plays a vital or mortal part in the economic troubles of our time. Mr. Macmillan's book ought to exercise a determinant influence upon thousands of doubting minds.

THE MORAL BASIS OF POLITICS. By NAOMI MITCHISON.
(Constable. pp. xxi. 37s.)

THIS is an intriguing yet illuminating book, well worth reading and well worth writing; but it is not about what one would suppose from the title. It is a Socratic discussion of the moral basis of political and particularly left-wing political agitation; very interestingly and candidly carried out, but it has nothing to say about government—or hardly anything; hardly a word about law. There is much interesting discussion about social ends, of the different kinds of society different people are working for and the moral ideas behind such ends, but no discussion at all of how far such ends are to be attained by political action and how far by other means.

To one who belongs to an older generation it reads as though Mrs. Mitchison's generation have found the bath-water so intolerably dirty that they have emptied it with quite a lot of babies at the same time; and now here is Mrs. Mitchison starting to pick the babies up again; but though she picks up a baby called morality and even, scrubbing

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its face so that it is almost unrecognisable, another called religion; there is one baby which she finds so intolerably dirtied with the discarded bath-water of an earlier generation, that she can't bear to handle it; and that baby curiously enough is called the state. There is less than a page in the book about the state, a section which begins "While we are about it, is not this the moment to suggest that it would be wise if we could stop talking so much about 'the state'?" 'State' is one of the words which has accumulated a distressingly large tail or aura of attached meanings, muddles, mental pictures and so on. . . . I am not sure what we ought to talk about instead of the state!" It is just as though Mrs. Mitchison said to herself "I expect some time or other I shall have to clean that child's face, too, but it is so dreadfully dirty and in any case it doesn't look anything like so interesting a child as the others." This seems to me odd in a person writing about politics. It would have been quite easy for someone as skilled as Mrs. Mitchison in making words real to explain what we ought to mean by the state.

I emphasise this omission because I think it has serious effects on much of what Mrs. Mitchison says. She doesn't discuss this odd thing we call government; she does not, therefore, ask what it can do and what it can't. She has an admirable discussion of what force can do in revolutionary action, in which she shows that the point of armed force is not to have to use it; but she doesn't think of applying this to the organised force behind government. She is less than fair to her political opponents because she doesn't see that people may agree on the kind of society they would like to help come into existence and yet may differ in their estimation of the power of government to produce and maintain such a society. Political differences are not always moral differences or differences in vision as she seems to assume.

She is, I think, more than fair to Russia and much more than fair to the technocrats, because she won't see that large scale industry implies government and that the power of men over men which is thus necessarily implied raises just as many problems as inequalities in ownership. The Russian admiration for planning and large scale industry must have political consequences.

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It is surely childish of Mrs. Mitchison to say, as she does on page 8, "What I would emphasise is that planning need not and should not be a *political* activity. It is not directly to do with people; it is to do with things." There can be no planning without orders and government and consequently, I should suppose politics. No doubt the innocent young technocrats only think of things. That is why planning is such fun. But it is unlike Mrs. Mitchison's ordinarily swift perceptive mind not to see that the vice of the scientific planning mind is just this thinking always in terms of things and never in terms of persons unless the persons are your fellow planners. Yet, when you are planning about things, you are in effect determining how countless other people shall behave. Technocrats are apt to be most inhuman in their readiness to regiment other people without acknowledging that they are doing so.

The explanation, I imagine, of all this lies in the fact that, as anyone really inside it knows, the Labour Party is both a church and a political party; or, if the word church is taboo, a fellowship and a political party. Any decent person experiencing the delight and equality of the comradeship of the party, naturally says "Why can't all society be like this?" The next step is to say with exhilaration, "But to make all society like this is precisely what we are trying to bring about." It is there that Mrs. Mitchison seems to me to begin, and she faces all manner of difficulties, dilemmas and what she calls lumps, in the task before us. She discusses them with a clear, honest, concrete mind so that it is a delight to follow her arguments. No one need be expected to agree with it all but anyone will want to join in the argument and I am sure that is the effect Mrs. Mitchison mainly wanted to produce.

But the fact that she has never asked the elementary question what is the difference between a fellowship of this kind and a government leaves it all to my mind very elementary; and far too simple, and in any case not much about politics. Perhaps I am mistaken in this. It may be that she is deliberate in refusing to distinguish between society and the state; or voluntary and non-voluntary associations; or, to use both the taboo words, church and state. No Scot can possibly

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be unaware of the problems involved in the distinction. Perhaps her revolt from the ideas in which we were brought up has made her a convinced totalitarian, or perhaps she is just sick of the whole question. But Mrs. Mitchison has quite enough historical imagination to reclothe in modern terms the voluntarist controversy in which her Haldane forbears were so prominent. If only she would, she could pick up that remaining baby, called the state, wash its face and then put it in its place, possibly in the corner.

A. D. LINDSAY.

GLADSTONE. By ERICH EYCK. Translated by BERNARD MIALL. (*Allen & Unwin*. 1955.)

THIS is an admirable example of political biography and is extremely welcome at the present time, for a revaluation of Gladstone's career and a serious study of his statesmanship are overdue. The book probably gains by the fact that its author is not English, for he is free from the inevitable biases and prejudices which beset the native historian as near as we are to the events of Gladstone's life. Dr. Eyck not only has this advantage; he seems to be entirely without the disadvantages of a foreigner; he is as much at home in English politics and with English institutions as if he were an Englishman. This is not unimportant in a work of this kind, for it means that he does not fall into those little errors and slips about names, titles, institutions, or customs which can be so irritating in history written by foreigners.

Dr. Eyck's biography is solid and sensible, without being heavy or dull. It enables the reader to see for himself and to judge for himself the career and achievements of one of the most remarkable and most English of our statesmen. At the same time Dr. Eyck has wisely not attempted to be too "objective." He gives his own view, where and when appropriate, of persons and events, and he has not attempted to conceal his own admiration for Gladstone. The last twenty-five years have not produced a generation sympathetic to one of the most Victorian of the Victorians, and one would have expected some of the many "debunkers" of

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Victorians to get their teeth into him. The only attempt, however, of which we are aware was singularly unfortunate, and the fact that Gladstone has passed scatheless through this generation to find in 1938 a whole-hearted admirer needs explanation. The explanation is, we believe, a simple one. Unlike most people who rise to the highest posts in politics and leave a name in history, he was a very remarkable man and has a claim to real greatness. The greatness began in his character. There was something of the finest tempered steel in his character, something which made even his faults, follies, and stupidities alarming rather than petty. The present reviewer once, when a boy, saw Gladstone driving in an open carriage on the front at Brighton. The impression which he made is still vivid, and it is primarily that of the most formidable person whom the reviewer has ever seen. This formidableness was so much a part of him that it has persisted after his death. It is what has made him an impossible quarry for the "debunker." He possessed intellectual powers of a high order, a powerful and subtle brain. He belonged to the highest class of both parliamentary and platform orators and he was such a master of debate that Chamberlain said: "Gladstone is the only man I am afraid to have follow me." He had the will and the power which makes it possible to lead men and even to some extent to control events. These gifts, fires, and forces made him the only statesman of the nineteenth century who can stand on an equal footing with Bismarck and Cavour.

One of the most remarkable of Gladstone's qualities was of course, his intellectual and moral courage, a characteristic not encouraged by politics. He showed it at the very outset of his career by resigning from Peel's Cabinet over the Irish Church question, a step which Peel himself and the whole House of Commons found ununderstandable. It was due to this high standard of intellectual integrity which again and again forced Gladstone to support, with his own peculiar passion, measures which he considered to follow logically from principles in which he believed, though they were contrary to his political interests, distasteful to his own political supporters, or even opposed to his own inclinations and prejudices. One of the best examples, as Dr. Eyck's narrative

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shows, is the comparatively unimportant point raised by the Budget of 1863, when Gladstone, in the teeth of opposition from "all the most respected personalities in religious and social life," headed by a royal prince and two Archbishops, insisted on the proposal to extend the income-tax to charities. Another notable example was his attitude throughout the conflict between Bradlaugh and the House of Commons. The note of this stubborn and formidable courage, which went deep down with its roots in Gladstone's character, can be heard in the devastating reply which he made to the Nonconformist Miall when, over the question of the financial amendments of the 1870 Education Bill, he threatened that the Radicals would move a vote of no confidence. "I hope," said Gladstone, "my honourable friend will not continue his support to the Government one moment longer than he deems it consistent with his sense of right and duty."

Finally, one may hazard the conjecture that it was from this stubborn streak of intellectual courage that the most remarkable of all Gladstone's characteristics derived. By nature and inclination, there can be no doubt, Gladstone was a conservative, a Tory of the Whig school. This type of mind normally hardens at the age of 30 or 35, and from that moment never admits a new idea. If the possessor of this type of mind happens to begin his career as a member of the Tory or Conservative Party, he dies a Die-hard; if he happens to begin as a member of the Whig, Liberal or Labour Party, he dies a member of the Tory, Conservative or Liberal-Unionist Party (or to-day of the National Government). The history of Gladstone was the precise opposite; the older he grew the more open his mind became and the more he moved to the Left. There is no other statesman of the first rank of whom it can be said, as Acton said of Gladstone, that he maintained to the end "the vigorous and perpetual progress of his mind. Later ages will know what in the critical autumn of a famous year is only guessed, that even now at seventy, in his second Ministry, after half a century of public life, his thoughts are clearing, moving, changing, on the two highest of all political questions."

LEONARD WOOLF.

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of the necessity of a general control, but makes this control dependent, not upon the action of armed forces, as the classical theory, but primarily upon advantages of geographical position and upon the hydrographical configuration of the sea areas in question. "In other words, the commercial communications of Northern Europe were in our hands, not because our fleet was powerful, but because the convulsions of the earth's crust, millions and millions of years ago, had placed what is now known as the British Islands across the area of water now called the North Sea" (page 43).

That statement is perfectly correct, as far as the peculiar case of the World War is concerned; but the main criticism that must be put forward against Commander Bell is precisely that he bases his conception of naval warfare exclusively upon that exceptional case without any regard either for the rest of naval history or naval theory—the very existence of which he emphatically denies, as in his opinion the varying character of the geographical setting would preclude the establishment of any general theory. If instead, he had taken the trouble to set the World War in its proper place within the evolution of naval warfare, he could not have overlooked the fundamental fact that the control, which the Grand Fleet was able to exercise in virtue of its superior geographical position alone, normally would have had to be fought for either through battle or at least by close blockade, and that the limitations of its control over the High Seas Fleet, which he is at pains to elaborate in his second chapter, are not typical of naval warfare in general, but only of that new form of long-range geographical blockade, inaugurated at Scapa Flow. For, even if that form of long-range control should prove in future alone applicable, a real understanding of its nature, functions and limitations can only be achieved and transmitted by remembering its evolution out of the older close form of blockade.

This lack of a really profound analysis, which thus detracts so much from the value of Commander Bell's thoughtful and stimulating observations, unfortunately is equally perceptible in his analyses of the various naval campaigns likely to occur against Japan, against Germany and against Italy, which form the second half of his study.

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AN AFRICAN SURVEY. A Study of Problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara. By LORD HAILEY. (*Oxford Press*, 21s.)

THIS book of over 1,800 pages is the product of the African Research Survey Committee and is issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Chairman of the Committee is Lord Lothian, the Director Lord Hailey, and the Secretary Miss Hilda Matheson. The work was only made possible by grants from the Carnegie Corporation and the Rhodes Trustees. The report itself is the work of Lord Hailey, and opinions expressed in it are his, though certain recommendations in Chapter XXIV are endorsed by the Committee. These facts are highly relevant to any appreciation or criticism of the book. The task which Lord Hailey undertook was gigantic and his achievement is remarkable; he, his Committee, the Secretary, and others who helped him, deserve the highest credit. The result shows what valuable results can be achieved by a large-scale survey or investigation conducted by private persons working in and financed by voluntary organizations. It is, however, essential in using or criticizing this survey to remember the private nature of the survey and the limitations of such investigations. One can hardly avoid the reflection that, if the British Empire took its imperial obligations seriously, the collection of the data contained in this book and consideration of their significance in determining colonial policy would not have been left to private enterprise.

The book is, in the main, a survey of the government and administration of France, Britain, Belgium, Portugal, and the Union of South Africa in the various African possessions or territories south of the Sahara. The first 130 pages contain four chapters in which the geography, ethnology, languages and population statistics are briefly dealt with. The rest of the book is devoted to a survey of the governmental organization of the various territories. The method adopted is to consider in separate chapters particular functions or activities of government, e.g. law and justice, native administration, taxation, land, health, education, agriculture, and so on. In each case the facts with regard to each

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African administration and a general account of its policy and achievement are given, and this is followed by a comparison of the policies and their effects with a certain amount of criticism and suggestion. Lord Hailey has endeavoured to keep the survey as "objective" as possible and so to confine it mainly to statements of fact; he was probably wise, but the general effect upon the critical side of the survey has inevitably been to give it a tone of what used to be called *meiosis*. Its chief value is that of a handbook. Anyone, for instance, who wishes to know what, e.g. the Union of South Africa, Northern Nigeria, Kenya, and French West Africa, have done respectively about the education of the African can now turn to Chapter XVIII in this book and he will find there a vast number of relevant facts and figures; he will also find some discussion of the educational policy of the British and the French in Africa and a demonstration and explanation of the fact that the objective of education appears to be more clearly defined in French than in British colonies.

As a quarry of facts, the basis of knowledge and therefore of policy, the book is invaluable. That does not mean that it is beyond criticism. It is a pity, for instance, that the information regarding the French, Belgian and Portuguese territories is meagre compared with the treatment of the British, for at the present stage in Africa nothing is more important than a detailed comparative study of the different ways in which the various national administrations have attacked the same administrative problems and the same large questions of policy.

LABOUR AND COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

By R. H. S. CROSSMAN

A SHAM OPPOSITION.

THE country has accepted compulsory military service with an apathetic equanimity impossible a year ago. The campaign, launched by all the forces of organised Labour, has fallen flat; only in Scotland have the Trade Unions shown any serious desire to use industrial action to prevent its accomplishment. Elsewhere those who preached blank intransigence when the Government first announced its decision, have now accepted the fact of conscription. The T.U.C. has not even withdrawn its support from National Service and is prepared to collaborate on the Tribunals and Hardship Committees; the Parliamentary Labour Party, finding the Government in a conciliatory mood, has introduced many improvements into the Bill, while Labour candidates in the crop of May by-elections soon discovered that an attack on the "bob a day for militiamen" was more effective than mere protestations against the principle of compulsion.

And yet, when the announcement was first made, Labour decided, with a concord unique in the past four years, to oppose compulsion blankly. The *Daily Herald* and the *Daily Worker*, Mr. Bevin and Mr. Pritt, united to denounce the Premier's broken pledges, and even Sir Stafford Cripps found himself in momentary agreement with his late colleagues on the Executive. In this babel of unanimity, only the modest voice of the *New Statesman* and the abstentions of a few Labour M.P.s indicated the doubts which existed, unvoiced but widely felt, throughout the movement. Even if a few courageous individuals had dared

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to express their doubts publicly, they would have endured three weeks of intense unpopularity; and when their diagnosis had been proved correct, they would have gained no credit for it inside the Party. This was probably the reason why the gap between opinions expressed privately and publicly was more than usually large upon this issue. Many prominent Socialists who held blank opposition to be mistaken, considered that the movement must be allowed "to let off steam"!

But the opposition, though unanimous, was half-hearted. The nation-wide campaign petered out into expressions of pained but harmless protestation, and the Labour Movement got the worst of both worlds. For to the rest of the country, it was only too apparent that Labour was opposing "on principle"; and the Government was delighted to assume an air of kindly toleration and to say in effect: "Poor fellows, they have got to make their protest, but they will be quite all right when it is over." The spectacle of an opposition, encouraged to let off steam by their opponents, was too humiliating to be funny; and the electorate indicated its judgment by mass abstention from the May by-elections. What is the good of voting when your choice is between a professional government and a professional opposition?

THE CAUSES OF COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE.

It is the self-induced hallucination of many Socialists that Mr. Chamberlain willingly introduced compulsion as a first step to Fascism. To believe this is to misunderstand the whole philosophy of the National Government. The drift towards appeasement, which had already begun when Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden were foreign secretaries, gathered speed in February, 1938, when Mr. Chamberlain personally took over the direction of foreign affairs, and became a definite policy of Anglo-German co-operation. This policy

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received the support not only of the City but of the F.B.I. which envisaged an arrangement with the Nazis on the political side similar to that which exists between Imperial Chemicals and I.G. Farben. The deficiencies in our defences, disclosed by the Munich crisis, proved conclusively that no one in control had envisaged a war with Germany; and the consultations of representatives of the F.B.I. with Nazi industrial leaders at Dusseldorf during the week of Hitler's occupation of Prague showed that British capitalism was prepared, on the economic side, to support the Nazis in their trade-war, even where this meant the violation of American interests.

Mr. Chamberlain's sudden protestations of horror in Birmingham on March, 1939, were in marked contrast to the resignation with which two days previously he had discussed the Czech crisis in the House. Almost overnight, apparently, he was converted from implicit confidence in Hitler to a belligerent distrust, and the cautious observer was bound to note a close parallel between the Birmingham speech and Sir Samuel Hoare's Geneva oration in 1935. Once again British statesmanship had connived for years at aggression and then suddenly turned round and condemned the aggressor in tones of injured innocence. But here the parallel ends. In the case of Abyssinia, the National Government was able to combine ineffective sanctions with tacit consent and so to permit Mussolini to defeat the League as well as Abyssinia. But in March, 1939, the machinery of the League had been smashed and the only alternatives were an anti-Nazi alliance or an Anglo-German alliance. For now the nations of Europe had learnt that the British Government would slip out of any system of collective security in which it was not explicitly pledged to defend the victim of aggression. If Mr. Chamberlain wished to give up appeasement, he must be prepared not only to express indignation

and horror but to accept the conditions of alliance which any future allies would demand.

When therefore the Premier and Lord Halifax suddenly agreed with the Opposition that Hitler could not be trusted, and began casting round for countries to guarantee, this was no mere modification, but a complete and absolute reversal of policy, fraught with every possible danger and vitally affecting not only politics but industry and finance. The completeness of the reversal and the extent of the danger was not, however, apparent for the reason that the previous Anglo-German collaboration had been studiously concealed. Thus while the public believed we were merely changing from "appeasement" to collective security, we were actually cutting adrift from Fascist friends before we had found new ones, far less considered the conditions of their friendship. Once the Roumanian guarantee had been added to that of Poland, there was no possibility of a return to appeasement without a split in the Tory Party. The only choice was between an alliance, including Russia, which would be strong enough to defeat the Nazis and an alliance, excluding Russia, which might well be defeated by them. From now on Mr. Chamberlain's personal sympathies were immaterial: though he loathed and detested it, he would be forced into opposition to the men whom he still believes to be the bulwark against Bolshevism.

Moreover, whichever alliance he chose, he would be compelled to contribute his share to the pool of defence, and the more he rebuffed Russia, the greater the share would be. Up till March, 1939, the Government had only envisaged the employment of an expeditionary force to defend France and the Empire. But now, if Poland or Roumania were to have a chance of survival in war, a British force on the western front, sufficient to immobilize a large section of the German Army, was an immediate necessity. And that

expeditionary force was not in existence. Thus the ultimatum demanding conscription, which Mr. Chamberlain received in April from his new allies and from France, was a necessary result of his decision to throw up appeasement. When the Labour Party, in Mr. Attlee's absence, had welcomed the new policy of guarantees without asking what the cost in terms of British defence requirements would be, it had delivered itself into the Premier's hands. For having approved the end, it could only deny the means by a supreme piece of self-contradiction. Only by opposing all the Eastern European guarantees until an Anglo-Russian alliance had been signed, could it have found a foreign policy compatible with opposition to conscription, and even then its case would not have been overwhelmingly strong.

The Military Service Bill was not a brilliant coup for Mr. Chamberlain or an insidious piece of Fascism. On the contrary, it was an admission that the whole policy of appeasement had failed, that the League must be re-created, and that Britain had at last taken the place which Labour policy assigned her, and become a continental power. At the eleventh hour history had compelled Mr. Chamberlain to eat not only his hat but his umbrella as well.

The Government's decision gave Labour a supreme chance. If France demanded conscription as a proof of Britain's good faith, the Opposition could reasonably argue that an even more effective proof would be a Government addicted not to "Runcimanades" but to the League. If compulsory military service was necessary for the fight against aggression, then economic mobilization must be necessary too. By welcoming gladly the principle of compulsion, Labour could have wiped out Mr. Greenwood's unfortunate enthusiasm for the Polish guarantee, and extorted from an unhappy Government the most stringent conditions for its acceptance of the Bill. Once it had approved the

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principle, it could have dared Mr. Chamberlain to face the country's wrath if he refused the conditions it proposed. But Labour did not take this line: instead it opposed the principle.

ANTI-MILITARISM.

The conscription issue exposed once again the divorce between Labour's defence and foreign policies. Since the War Labour has gradually adopted a highly realistic foreign policy, based on the fact that Great Britain can no longer achieve security either by splendid isolation or by manipulation of the balance of power. In advocating collective security, it has thrown off our native insularity, and grasped that we are now a continental nation with the same urgent need of collective defence as France; and it has correctly predicted that the Fascist International would not be softened by appeasement and could only be blocked by an overwhelming combination of force. Unfortunately, however, this policy was hatched in the conceptual heaven of Geneva politics, and was never adequately related to the problems of defence. We have behaved as though Fascism could be stopped by resolutions, protocols, pacts and covenants; and whenever anyone has enquired what force would be required for the job, we airily totted up the populations of the "good" countries and their mineral wealth. And we have always avoided consideration of these naval and military technicalities by repeating (in words lately borrowed by Mr. Chamberlain) that what we wanted was not an alliance to fight a war, but a Peace Front to prevent it. Such an argument may be good enough for an English audience, but it neither consoles the French and Russian General Staffs for the deficiencies of our Territorial training nor does it in the least impress Herr Hitler, who has called the bluff of enough "collective pacifists" to know their measure.

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Any party which advocated League action against aggression should, ever since 1933, have been demanding the formation of a People's Army and Air Force in this country. A democratic policy of collective security could only have been enforced by a people trained in warfare, and denouncing the high treason of its Government's "pacifism" and appeasement. But you cannot put over a realistic foreign policy of mutual democratic defence, when your own attitude to defence problems is based on anti-militaristic sentiment and a suspicion of the fighting services. To put it briefly, the only logical consequence of Labour's attitude to compulsion is appeasement: the only logical consequence of its foreign policy is the demand for the mobilization of the nation's man-power, finance and industry for peace or war.

It may be answered that Labour's Defence Policy, as defined by official statements and programmes, has never been pacifist and since the Bournemouth conference has been positive in its approval of rearmament. To this I would agree. But, unfortunately, to adopt a programme is not to work it; and it became clear last April that Labour's conversion to the use of armed force was only skin deep. Underneath all the trappings of collective security, a pacifist heart still beats. In spite of the talk of a Peace Front and the adulation heaped on the Spanish Republican Army, the ideology of the Party springs from the Utopian Liberalism of Bright which Marx and Engels condemned so fiercely. The opposition to conscription which united the movement last April was not really the result of fears of Fascism or industrial conscription or a dislike of broken pledges, nor did it have anything Socialistic in it: on the contrary it sprang from the peaceful sentiments of an island people, guarded for generations by a strong navy, and governed by an adroit ruling class, which could afford to pay men to do

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its fighting instead of compelling its subjects to do so. Anti-militarism was the luxury of the Whigs, of the Liberal free-traders and of the nonconformist masses in the days when we possessed a monopoly of naval power. Apparently it still inspires many Labour leaders in 1939.

Nothing shows more clearly the sentimental character of the opposition to compulsion than the sudden enthusiasm for the Territorials evinced by many spokesmen of the Party in the last few weeks. Men and women who until last April were refusing to make recruiting speeches have been weeping their eyes out at the demise of the voluntary system. Men and women who, as Socialists, demand equality of opportunity and sacrifice, and are prepared to use compulsion where such equality is not obtainable by voluntary means, now proclaim their fervent belief in a reactionary professional army and a Territorial service which ensures that the majority of the population shall be untrained in arms and both physically and psychologically defenceless against their rulers, or their foreign enemies. And yet these same people demand a Peace Alliance against Fascism. No wonder the Frenchman whispers: "The English Socialist will fight to the last French conscript."

THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE.

The peculiar tragedy of the conscription issue is that it occurred at the moment when the man in the street had at last been converted to collective security and the need for a Russian alliance. Ever since the Abyssinian fiasco Labour had been fighting against heavy odds. The Government, by disguising the policy of co-operation with the Nazis under the slogans of peace and conciliation, had been able to accuse Labour of war-mongering and urging the nation to interfere in other people's affairs. The occupation of

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Prague not only destroyed Mr. Chamberlain's pretensions; it suddenly made the British people realize that the "war-mongers" were right and the "pacifists" frauds. Labour's stock was rising steadily. There is nothing better in politics than to run an unpopular policy for years and to be proved right.

But simultaneously with the public's conversion to the need of collective defence came a second conversion. If the water-logged trenches throughout last winter served no other purpose, they made the people conscious of their danger. In the six months since Munich millions of people slowly saw that they no longer lived on a happy island in the Atlantic; and the occupation of Prague clinched the argument. With a correctness of judgment which most party-politicians do not share, the non-political voter realized that, if Hitler was to be stopped, he must do something himself about it; and, since he knew that *he* would not do anything till he was forced, he concluded that compulsion would have to come. He did not want to fight nor would he advocate a war, but, if the Government said the word, he would obey unenthusiastically but with resignation.

In my experience the non-political voter was completely baffled by the Labour reaction to compulsion. Once again he found to his dismay that common sense and nonsense were shared equally between Government and Opposition. If Mr. Chamberlain was right in resisting Germany now, why was Munich peace with honour? If Labour was right in its foreign policy, why did it suddenly turn round and refuse the means to carry it out? As ignorant as many Socialists of the requirements of military training, he could not be convinced that Labour opposed conscription because it seriously believed that the Territorials were a better form of defence. Without many ideological scruples, he could not see the obstacles to a Russian alliance which weighed with

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Mr. Chamberlain. So condemning both sides as party-politicians who disagree for the sake of disagreement, he gave up politics altogether. In Labour meetings up and down the country, the politically-conscious minority made speeches to each other. The people stayed away, their distrust of politicians confirmed.

Blank opposition to compulsion not only contradicted the Party's foreign policy and Socialist principles, but was also unpopular in the country. Moreover it prevented the Party from effectively demanding that "conscription all round" which should be the Socialist policy in time of war. The admirable scheme for a National Defence Levy could not be pressed, while the democratisation of the armed forces could hardly be urged persuasively by a party whose will to fight Fascism seemed weaker than its desire to remain in opposition.

THE FUTURE.

Political memories are fortunately short, and it is still possible for Labour to recover the respect of the country and to put forward a positive policy with regard to compulsion both as a part of defence and as a factor in social life. Indeed one of the most important results of the Military Service Bill may well be its effect on Labour policy. Until conscription had actually been introduced, it would have needed real courage for Labour spokesmen to support it. But now it has been accepted not only by Parliament but by the nation, the Party must either discard its negative attitude to the fighting services or lose the support of youth. Conscription will in a very short time expose the deficiencies of our existing military methods, just as in the industrial sphere it is already clear that "business (and profits) as usual" is a slogan incompatible with genuine defence.

In these circumstances the task of Labour is clear. It is

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to demonstrate that the great problem of resistance to Fascist aggression can only be solved on Socialist lines and by the extension of compulsion beyond the sphere of man-power. The statement on defence presented to the Southport Conference was both constructive and moderate, and it should be supported by a further programme for the national mobilization of finance and industry. But, above all, Labour must show a real understanding of the needs of the new militiamen. To remove men of twenty from their homes, even for a short six months' period, is to introduce a revolutionary change. If genuine educational opportunities are obtained, and if young men of ideas use their influence while serving, the period in the militia may well be a turning-point for thousands who have taken no interest in social or international problems. One reason for the hold which the social oligarchy has upon this country is the parochial life of the working class. The militia will not only remove something of the immobility from the labour market, it will produce a social ferment among the boys who, coming for the first time from South Wales or Lancashire or Glasgow, return to see their home environment with different eyes. While they are in the army they will have complaints which should be remedied; but even more important, when they return home, they must find ready for them if they wish it, a political organisation adapted to their new outlook. The Labour Party would do well to consider the formation of militiamen's clubs as a link between the League of Youth and the constituency party organisation.

Lastly, the Party should rid itself of that prejudice against the soldier which still lingers in its rank and file. To desire peace is human, to despise the soldier and his profession is not only undemocratic but downright silly. For years Labour has tried to put forward a sensible policy on defence and foreign affairs and at the same time to retain

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the pacifist vote. By so doing it has succeeded in alienating forces far more valuable to Socialism. Now is the chance to turn over a new leaf and to say frankly to the pacifists: "Though we respect you, we cannot for your sake, destroy the basis of our foreign policy and of our Socialist faith"; and to concentrate every effort on the exposure of the deficiencies of the class-army and to the demand for a people's army and a planned economy fit to defend democracy.

I do not for a moment underestimate the change I am suggesting. One of the difficulties of a democratically organised party is that it is more conservative of traditions and ideas than a party which, like the Conservative, is merely the electoral machine of its leaders. In one sense Labour's opposition to conscription was one of the most democratic things which it has lately done, since it really reflected the sentiments of the Party members. But a party of the Left cannot survive if it advances only at the pace of its slowest member, or even of its majority. The Labour leadership acted democratically on this issue only in the sense that Earl Baldwin was a democrat when, in deference to the wishes of the electorate, he disguised the need for rearmament; and it is doubtful whether the rank and file are really grateful for an anti-conscription campaign which, like sanctions, was never meant to succeed. What we now need are leaders who will dare to speak not only to the Party members but to the nation, and have the will to win a majority, not at a Party Conference but at a General Election. To do that the Party must be anti-Fascist not by resolution but in action and must be prepared to say to the people that under its leadership, whether in peace or in war, Fascism will be defeated. Mr. Chamberlain has reluctantly introduced a measure which can be used to undermine the class-system and to give the people a new awareness both of their own power and their own subjection. He has reluctantly adopted

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a foreign policy which must end in defeat without a wholehearted co-operation with Russia. He has in fact brought the country to a plight in which only an anti-Fascist Government of the Left can save the peace or win the war. If Labour can see conscription not as a defeat but as an opportunity, an apathetic public would turn to it as a deliverer from trouble.

THE CONSCRIPTION OF WEALTH

By R. F. HARROD

THE subject of the conscription of wealth falls into two parts. There is, first, the mobilization of those particular commodities which are of vital importance to the nation, directly or indirectly, in the waging of war, and there is, secondly, the mobilization of purchasing power in general which the state requires in order to pay for its purchases and for the services of citizens.

The first of these problems is highly complex in administrative detail, since each essential commodity requires separate consideration, and plans should be carefully laid beforehand, but the economic principle is simple. Compensation must be paid at prices not inflated by any element of surplus profit. The paying of compensation for goods commandeered and taken over by the government for its purposes follows from the obvious principle that the cost and burden of the war must be distributed equitably over the whole body of citizens. It would obviously be grossly unfair that one man should have to surrender his assets unrequited, while his neighbour, whose assets did not happen to be urgently needed for war purposes, should be left to enjoy their possession and the profit derivable from them. There will be an element of compulsion present, since the owner will be required to surrender his assets at prices determined by the government whether he wishes to or not. Since payments must be envisaged, the finance required for this first type of mobilization intensifies the problem to be considered under the second head. The mobilization of purchasing power in general must be sufficient to cover all the compensations required for the mobilization of particular commodities.

With regard to the mobilization of particular goods and

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services it must suffice to make a few general observations. Here again a two-fold division may be made. There are the goods and services directly required by the state for the prosecution of its belligerent activities; and there are the goods and services in which, though in certain instances it may not handle them itself, it is none the less vitally interested, namely, those which are needed to sustain the health and efficiency of the whole population in all cases when the supply of them is in danger of running short.

In the case of the first of these, the state may take over the whole supply outright. For instance, one envisages a general mobilization of all means of transport. In certain cases the government may hope that even in war conditions private enterprise, functioning as at present, may suffice to maintain a sufficient supply of the finished goods needed; the compulsory element may be limited to shutting out all rival demand for such goods and determining the purchase price. Or it may seem wise to mobilize the raw materials needed for their production, still leaving the processing in private hands. Or the state may take over the whole process of production. In every case what is to be done must be decided by administrative convenience; in every case administrative effort must be reduced to the least possible. There will be no room for any general principle, such as the nationalization of armament production, which requires the leisure of peace time for consideration and application. Indeed it may be thought that our condition is already too war-like for such a general proposition to be still worth considering. Emergency reduces us to short-term expediency. *Per contra* the state will have to have, and probably already ought to have, the power to take over production and monopolize supply in any field it wishes.

The maintenance of the supply of vital commodities to the whole population involves different problems. Here the

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most important device is the ration card. If the supply of any article runs short of normal requirements, there is a tendency for its price to rise, thus restricting demand to the available supply, with the result that only those with longer purses can satisfy their needs. But in the case of essential commodities this result is highly undesirable. The method of the ration card makes it illegal for any individual to buy more than his family quota and thus ensures that the available supply is distributed among rich and poor alike. An objector might ask why the same effect should not be secured by legal price regulation. But this still does not secure that a "good customer" will not get more than his fair share, and leads to the demoralizing and time-wasting phenomenon of queues. The supply instead of going to the longest purse goes to the most patient housewife or the one least occupied with other matters. With a sufficiently comprehensive system of rationing, queues should be made altogether unnecessary. The ration card should be regarded as the fundamental measure and price-fixing and subsidies to production only as ancillary devices to be adopted as sparingly as possible.

We may now turn to the second problem of how the state is to provide itself with sufficient purchasing power to finance its manifold activities. To facilitate discussion it may be well to take a rough and ready figure, say £5,000 million, as representing the annual value of the whole national output of goods and services assuming that the nation is working to full capacity. The government is at present spending about one-quarter of this. In war it might find it necessary to spend considerably more, for instance, one-half or three-fifths. Making an initial assumption that there is no inflation of prices during the war, three-fifths would be represented by the figure of £3,000 million. Even this might prove too low. It is necessary to be clear what are the expenses covered by this expenditure. They include the value of all

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goods produced for and bought by the government, such as munitions, food and clothing for the troops, etc., and the value of services directly rendered to the government, such as those of soldiers and all war workers directly paid by the government. But the production of goods and services not included in government expenses is bound to go on, namely the production of food, clothing and other necessities for the whole population including government employees, excluding only those goods paid out as rations to employees such as soldiers' food and uniforms. Thus if the community is to continue to function, production must continue outside the scope of government employment and contracts and some part of the total income must be left to individuals to expend on themselves. Thus if £5,000 million represents the total value of the maximum national effort, and this figure is not enlarged by an inflation of prices, there is a maximum annual expenditure by the government, say £3,000 million, beyond which it cannot go. Such a maximum would of course be increased if there were an inflation of prices or if the government took to paying larger classes of employees in kind. And if the circumstances of war became sufficiently desperate, still further inroads might be made on the standard of living of individuals.

This money may be raised by taxation or borrowing (capital levy is a special form of taxation, which will be discussed subsequently). Money can be taken outright, or taken with a promise of repayment; there is no other way. I put forward as an initial proposition that it is desirable to raise the greater part of this money by taxation, staggering though the burden may seem. This would involve taxation at about three times its present level.

It would be desirable to obtain some money by borrowing. But if borrowing exceeds certain limits, which may be defined, an inflation of prices must ensue. And the choice is then

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between taxation and inflation, for which borrowing is a deceptive euphemism.

The limits within which borrowing may be resorted to without causing inflation are set by the willingness of people to save, i.e., to spend less than their incomes. The present level of annual saving may be about £500 million. But with the crushing burden of taxation it is hardly likely that saving would be maintained at this figure. Thus if £2,500 million were imposed in taxes on the assumption that the remaining £500 could be secured by borrowing the available savings, £500 would probably not be saved and the attempt to borrow so much would cause an inflation of prices. In that case it appears that to prevent inflation more than £2,500 million would have to be taken in taxation.

Furthermore, the whole amount of the national savings can only be borrowed by the government without causing inflation, if the savings are not applied to other capital purposes. This could be secured by making both new issues of securities and extensions of plant illegal. It might not however be possible to go so far, since the firms fulfilling government contracts might have to raise new money and extend plant; the government pays the current value of orders fulfilled and not the capital sums needed to extend plant in order to fulfil them, and thus some savings would have to be left available for that purpose. As against this it is possible that firms normally producing peace time goods may find it unnecessary to keep the capital value of their plant and stock in trade intact and be able to invest their accumulating depreciation funds in government loans.

Crushing though the taxation required to avoid inflation would be, it is not to be supposed that the flow of savings would entirely dry up. Individuals would make great efforts to maintain life insurance policies; companies might continue to accumulate some reserves. Nevertheless it may safely be

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held that the total amount available would fall considerably below £500 million and this would be the limit of non-inflationary borrowing.

The case against inflation is extremely strong. It is highly inequitable as between rich and poor, as between holders or of fixed interest securities and ordinary shareholders, and as between those whose investments benefit in consequence of war activities and those whose investments are injured, and it leaves behind an aftermath of confusion, which was severe in this country after 1918 and was dire in other countries, and has been thought by many to have been largely responsible for the instability of the peace. The injustices and dislocations may be seen to be serious on first inspection but they appear still more so when the inflationary influence of excessive borrowing is examined in detail.

At this point an objector may urge that the proposed burden of taxation would be insufferable and impracticable. No doubt it would be extremely onerous, but that is the inevitable consequence of such a war. The idea that the burden can be lessened by resort to inflation is illusory.

The amount of goods available for consumption cannot be greater than the productive resources, left free from government employment, are capable of turning out. The real degree of hardship is precisely proportionate not to government taxation but to government expenditure. The more people there are in employment on the business of war and the production of arms, the less the goods that can be produced for consumption. The amount of scarcity of goods caused by equal amounts of taxation or inflationary expenditure is the same, though the incidence may be different. Under taxation people have to go short of the goods to which they are accustomed, because the government takes from them the money with which they would otherwise have bought them. Under inflation they go short, because, though their money

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incomes remain, the prices of goods are higher. Once it is grasped that the actual shortage of goods is the same in either case, it is plain that inflation does not provide a way of escape from the burden.

It has been laid down that inflation will occur if the government borrows a larger amount than the public, including individuals and companies, would be prepared in the absence of inflation to save. The process by which this occurs has not always been completely understood. When inflation takes place spending is restricted by reason of the fact that people find that their money will not go so far; purchases are cut down because with higher prices people cannot afford to buy more; this restriction of expenditure by ordinary people is balanced by the excess expenditure of the government; command over productive resources is transferred from the one to the other. So much is generally understood.

But how is the purchasing power transferred from one party to the other? In these circumstances the ordinary citizens do not surrender means of payment to the government, for their expenditure is cut down precisely because they lack means. The purchasing power cannot be spirited across as by magic. Nor does the government acquire it by using the printing press—this is discussed below—because the excess borrowing, that is, the inflationary expenditure, often far exceeds the number of notes printed.

No; what happens is that the flow of the extra purchasing power into the market for goods causes prices to rise and to rise relatively to costs. The real essence of inflation is not a rise of prices *simpliciter*, but a rise of prices in relation to costs. If all prices rose equally, including those prices which go to make up costs, the specific injustices and distortions of inflation would be avoided; everyone would indeed be handing to each other more tokens in exchange for goods and

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services, but the relative positions of people would not be altered; no one would find that he was better or worse off than before. And since what are costs from one point of view are incomes from another, the incomes of ordinary people would rise fully in proportion to prices, no hardship would accrue, and the government would not have squeezed out any command over resources to use on its own account.

The excess of prices over costs necessarily produces excess profits and it is these which, directly or indirectly, the government borrows. Thus the excess borrowing or inflation produces a windfall excess of income to certain members of the community, which is surrendered by them in return for government paper, most of it bearing interest. The burdens of war rest on the community as a whole as before; it can buy less because prices have risen; but one section of the community, that which is doing good business during the war, receives a windfall and the right to be paid interest on it, as and when it is lent out, by the community at large. (Of course the holders of War Loan at the end of the war are not necessarily the profiteers; the profiteers may invest their surplus in quite other securities and the War Loan be taken up by the sellers of those securities; but it is the existence of surplus profits which provides the surplus of money in the market that enables the War Loan to be floated.) When this mechanism is considered, the gross injustice of the inflationary method of finance is seen to be even greater than at first appears. It may be noticed that in a regime of inflationary finance it is idle and foolish to legislate against profiteering; for the profits are the inevitable outcome of the inflationary borrowing; the one entails the other. The most law-abiding members of the community may indeed forego their profits, but, in doing so, only divert them into less law-abiding channels, and the injustice is thereby rendered greater.

So far it has been assumed that costs will not rise; but

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it is extremely likely that they will do so. Under the pressure of the rising cost of living, claims for wage and salary advances are likely to meet with success. But this will not remedy the evil. We shall then have the familiar phenomenon of wages following prices and prices following wages; the gap between them will remain; however high wages are set the surplus government expenditure will force prices higher still. Government employees not making consumption goods will compete in the market for them and force their prices above the costs of production. If the excess borrowing of the government, with its attendant gap between costs and prices, is called real inflation, this state in which wages endeavour unsuccessfully to chase prices, causing their cumulative rise, may be called pernicious inflation. The injustices of real inflation are not abrogated; but there will be additional injustice at the expense of those who for one reason or another cannot secure an increase in their money incomes.

The moral of the argument is that borrowing should be held within narrow limits during the war, within the limits, that is, of such surplus of the voluntary savings of people as is not required for capital outlay for essential services, and as they will be disposed to make in the absence of inflation. I belong to a group of economists which has for more than ten years been strenuously advocating government borrowing to finance public works. It may seem vexatious that, just when people are likely to accept borrowing as a *pis aller*, one should turn round and strenuously oppose it. There is good reason in this apparent change. Since the last war our economy has been suffering from insufficient scope for capital outlay, and this has been the basis for recommending that the government should take steps to make up the deficiency of private enterprise and provide useful channels of capital outlay in the form of public works. Its failure to do so has left a large proportion of our productive resources unemployed. But in war there

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is an excessive pressure on productive resources and the reverse policy is required. Those whose perceptions are so dull that all is black or white to them, may not perceive the force of this argument. A man who recommends expansion is dubbed an inflationist and if in other circumstances he resolutely combats it he must have been converted to deflationism. But in truth the man who seeks the greatest amount of stability in the system, the full employment of its productive resources and a steady value of money, is bound to make these seeming changes as circumstances change. Look below the surface and you will perceive that he is consistently pursuing the same objective. The commonly held view that budgets should be precisely balanced in peace time and that borrowing is a legitimate expedient for war is probably the reverse of the truth, at least in the modern world. The sluggish conditions of peace may require the stimulant of public borrowing; in war time no stimulant is required and the more strongly it is applied the greater the confusion that will be caused. The citizen may legitimately be asked to bear his burden fairly and squarely as it arises.

So far inflation has been discussed as the proper designation for excessive borrowing; there has been no reference to the printing press or "excessive borrowing from the banks" which are often regarded as of the essence of inflation. Government borrowing may take various forms; it may borrow interest-free by printing notes, or it may borrow at varying rates of interest at short, medium or long term, from the banks, the short-term money market or the corporate or private investor. The rise of prices will occur if there is excessive borrowing in any form; it is a mistake to attach special significance to the operations of the printing press.

The maxim of action here is that the government should issue its certificates of indebtedness, whether currency notes,

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war loan, etc., in the proportions most convenient to the public. If the public is anxious to keep its assets in a liquid form, the proportion of borrowing from the banks and of short-term loans should be correspondingly high. If the government fails to satisfy the public desire for liquidity, it will have to offer higher rates of interest on its long-term loans. I suggest that the government should tilt the balance in favour of short-term borrowing and particularly borrowing from the banks. The excess deposits thus created will make their holders, the public, anxious to exchange them for more remunerative assets and so keep up the prices of long-dated government securities. Indeed one might venture the maxim that the government should borrow exclusively from the banks so long as the yield on its long-dated securities was above three per cent.

There does not appear to be any case for expensive borrowing during the war. The high rates established in the last war left an aftermath of trouble, reflected in high unemployment, which lasted until 1932 and was not fully overcome then. The high rates are a burden to the exchequer and would entail still further increasing taxation, already quite high enough! The normal function of a high rate is to keep rival borrowers out of the market; but, as on this occasion a rigid embargo on new issues is to be envisaged in any case, the high rate of interest being far too weak a deterrent, it will not be required at all for this purpose and becomes meaningless. Nor would it be effective in stimulating saving, since the types of saver who survive the exigent conditions of war, individuals maintaining life insurance premiums or building society payments and companies increasing reserves, are not likely to be affected by the rate of interest. Furthermore, if some inflation does occur, and it is heroic to hope that it will be avoided completely, the high rate would increase the windfall gains of the profiteers. And again the high rate, by increasing

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government expenditure, would in these abnormal conditions, make inflation more difficult to avoid.

Thus to those for whom the hall-mark of inflation is government borrowing from the banks, I am pleased to be able to affirm that I am still in that sense on the inflationary side of the fence. If it were really possible to keep total borrowing down within the non-inflationary limits, i.e. to between £300 and £500 million p.a., it might well be the best course to obtain the whole of the finance required from the banks during the first year or two of war.

Meanwhile some readers may be saying to themselves, what of the conscription of wealth, which is the title of this article? We have heard much of taxation and borrowing, but surely this has left out the one subject on which we were expecting to be instructed. The answer is that there is no such additional subject. Taxation is conscription. And to suppose that there is any other kind of conscription is a complete illusion.

It is felt that while men are being compelled to do military service, property owners should be called upon to make a corresponding sacrifice. But they will be under the system of crushing taxation. It is only if the war is financed by inflationary borrowing that they—or some sections of them—will escape. Thus, if the introduction of conscription entails an implicit pledge that wealth shall be conscribed also, that pledge will be fully implemented if the war is financed mainly by taxation. The rich will inevitably have to shoulder the greater part of the burden. Indeed the burden of such taxation will be so tremendous that some words of consolation to the rich seem in place, for they may feel that such a catastrophic change in their situation would make it impossible for them to carry on their normal duties. They must remember that their expenses will be drastically reduced—servants will have to be released for national service; motor-cars must be

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released ; old clothes must be worn for the duration ; entertainments other than the minimum required to maintain the moral of those actively engaged must be eschewed. And if they plead that the cost of the decent maintenance of property often far exceeds what the income-tax authorities allow, it must be urged that even that duty must give place to the greater needs of the emergency.

If crushing taxation implements the pledge to make property bear its share of sacrifice, some may ask whether it ought not to be imposed at once, since we already have conscription. But the scope of conscription is still moderate and there has been a moderate increase in taxes. And whether the increase is regarded as sufficient to be equitable or not, there is an over-riding argument of expediency. We have not yet reached the pressure on productive resources caused by war. So long as there is still considerable unemployment, there is a paramount case for finance by borrowing. To increase taxes further at the present juncture would be tantamount to condemning the unemployed to remain in unemployment, to their own detriment and that of the nation.

But surely, the reader may persist, there is a thing called a capital levy, which may be made a source of funds for the government. This idea also is illusory. The income of the community, divided as it is between saving and spending, is the sole source which the government can tap. It can increase its purchasing power by stimulating the system to earn more income (this it does by borrowing), by reducing the spending of individuals (by taxation), and by deflecting their saving from all other forms of capital outlay (by embargo on such outlay). It cannot melt down the capital that has been created in the past and turn it into purchasing power for its own purposes. Of course if the capital takes some form, such as a munitions or textiles factory, which it needs for its own purposes, it may commandeer such capital equipment ; this

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matter has already been dealt with in the first section of this article.¹ If the government endeavoured to raise by capital levy a greater sum than can be squeezed out of current income, it would fail. Property owners selling property to pay the levy would find no buyers. In a desperate attempt to meet their obligations they might all sell all their property, but the total sums realized would not exceed the sum which represents the current saving of the community. Thus chaos would be introduced into the existing system, and the government would in the end get no more than it would by the taxation of income. There is, however, something to be said for an increase in the margin, if and when higher taxation becomes necessary, between income-tax on un-earned (property) income and that on earned income.

There is one case in which extra funds can be obtained by a capital levy and that is when the proceeds are used to pay off debt. Such a levy does not provide additional sums for government expenditure, but constitutes an equitable scaling down in the capital claims of the community. The property owner who sells in order to meet the levy finds a buyer in the person who is at the same time receiving cash from the government in lieu of government stock.

Thus the time for the capital levy is at the end of the war. Imposed at that time it would appropriately round off the implementation of the implicit pledge to conscribe money as well as men. If the maxims here enjoined have been put into operation, and the increase in the National Debt has been moderate, a moderate levy on all property would be appropriate. But if after all inflationary borrowing has occurred, with its corollary of war profiteering, then the levy should be imposed solely on those the value of whose property has been increased during the war. The greater the inflation the more

¹ In equity compensation must be paid for all capital equipment commandeered ; if compensation is paid in the form of government scrip, this need not be reckoned as part of the quota of borrowing allowed to the government by the principles already formulated.

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imperative this recommendation becomes. It is now generally regretted that such a measure was not adopted, when circumstances were still propitious, in 1919.

A few words should be said on the possibility of aid from foreign sources. The ban on excessive borrowing does not apply to loans from abroad if these can still be negotiated after our recent default. Conscription should be applied to British-held foreign securities. But of course under the principles of our first paragraph compensation, in the form of British government stock, would be paid. It would be inequitable to seize the property of one particular class of people, namely those holding foreign securities at the outbreak of war, without compensation. British government stock issued to these in compensation need not be counted as part of the quota of borrowing allowed to the government by the principles already formulated. (Cf. footnote to p. 14.)

It may be well to conclude with a reference to our gold stocks. These should be used at once (i.e., in advance of war) to buy essential commodities and provide a very adequate reserve of them. The benefits may be set out seriatim.

1. If there is no war and international tension is somehow brought to an end, the stock of commodities may be sold again over a ten-year period. It should be possible for the government to hit the high points in the cycle of their price fluctuations and so secure a profit—many of the commodities are cheap at present—or at worst avoid loss, save that resulting from the cost of storage, a moderate price to pay for the greater security resulting.

2. It may be urged that the gold would be needed during a war. But it will be needed the less to the precise extent that it has already been used to buy from abroad the commodities which we shall then want. Moreover, it can be used to better effect now, since the gold prices of all the vital commodities will certainly be higher in a war. Indeed it is doubtful if the

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gold would itself be a marketable asset during the war. Its present marketability depends on the buying policy of the U.S. which would then probably be terminated. In that case our gold asset would be almost worthless. Let us use it now while it is still valuable. To this must be added the great difficulties which would occur in war in the shipping of gold and in the shipping of the commodities which it is used to buy.

3. If it is not used for the purpose suggested, it has no other use. But there is a grave danger of its continuing to be frittered away covering the transfer of private funds from British into foreign assets. The government is already taking informal steps to check such an outflow. In so far as the gold is used for this purpose it is contrary to national policy, and in so far as it is not used we are gaining no benefit from continuing to hold it.

THE ANSWER TO GERMANY

By SIR JOHN MAYNARD

THE theses of Mr. Leonard Barnes in his *Empire or Democracy?*¹ are that colonial empires were begotten in violence and reared and maintained in rapine; that they are as incompatible with democratic freedom in the motherland (or stepmotherland) as with justice to the areas colonised; that good intentions, whether in the national or international field, are inevitably frustrated by the economic interests which are the true sources of power; and, therefore, that the moral duty of the colonising Power to the natives can be performed, the emancipation of the masses at home be made possible, and the claims of Germany be convincingly answered, by a single operation, the purging of the original sin and the universal application of the principle of self-government. This principle can be applied at once, or after a very short interval, in the Asiatic dominions of Great Britain, and in the West Indies.

In Tropical Africa an interval is necessary in which imperialism, modified by an extended and strengthened mandate system, must survive: for Mr. Barnes deprecates "a return to the anarchy of the scramble period," when "round every seat of native authority the blue-bottles and the scallywags would come buzzing again." But, he argues, the inevitable interval before self-government must not be filled by a system of international control, which would certainly degenerate into an inter-imperialism equivalent to joint exploitation by a reinforced tyranny.

The present writer believes that it is possible to set up, in the inevitable interval which must precede self-government, an international control which will not degenerate into joint

¹ *Empire or Democracy?* By Leonard Barnes. (Gollancz. 7s. 6d.)

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exploitation; which will furnish guarantees of the advance towards self-government in colonial areas; and will palliate, if it does not wholly remove, the grievance of Germany and other states having unsatisfied colonial ambitions.

The method is not applicable to units such as India, Burma and Ceylon, which are already so far advanced on the road of self-government as to resent international control. It is realistically conceived, and is not proposed for adoption in areas where the settlement of various European races has been considerable; nor in areas in which any State has already adopted the practice of recruiting for its national armies. For these, an extended and strengthened mandate system, along with equality of economic treatment, but with an exception for military recruitment where that at present exists, and with international supervision and publicity, rather than international control, is at present appropriate. But there remains a block of territory in Africa (and there may be other colonial territories elsewhere), which will benefit by the direct government of an international authority. This block in Africa extends southward and eastward of Senegal, as far east as the western boundaries of Uganda and Tanganyika, and as far south as the northern boundary of South-West Africa. It includes British, French, Belgian and Portuguese, colonies and mandated areas, and a small Spanish colony, Rio Muni; and there seems no reason for excluding from it the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia and the Somalilands; though it is likely, in existing conditions, that Italy would decline to include any of her possessions.

For the present purpose it is unnecessary to question any of Mr. Barnes' major theses, except the one which asserts the impotence of good intentions against economic interests. I fully admit that conscience often gets the worse in the encounter; but I think this is because conscience is so seldom equipped with the two instruments—the Webbs call

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them *measurement* and *publicity*—which constitute the necessary armament for the struggle. The facts must be known and they must be made public. Except in so far as the interests succeed in smothering or distorting the facts, conscience will then sometimes have the better of it. This is not Marxian; but I think it is true; and I do not prefer to err with Marx rather than to be right. Mr. Barnes himself seems to admit it when he says that a democratic government in Great Britain would do this and that for India: and when he assumes that a generalised franchise in India would achieve something which he knows that a generalised franchise in Great Britain has not been able to achieve. From my own point of view, the statute which set up a degree of responsible government in the provinces of India and Burma, and the other which did something similar for Ceylon, were successes—qualified successes, perhaps—for conscience in its conflict with material interest. I assume, therefore, that the international government, which I propose, has a chance of success, even though the economic interests in some of the participating “mother” countries will not like it.

If, under all external forms, the dominant interests must always and everywhere be the sole transmitters of power, then there is no means of establishing, in the inevitable interval of tutelage, a just régime for a colonial people. Even Trade Unions, whose complete impartiality Mr. Barnes assumes, may discover that wages in the home country depend upon markets abroad, and be deflected from strict rectitude. The truth is that authority must lie somewhere, that human institutions are imperfect, and that the problem is to discover the agency which is least likely to be deflected by interest. It appears to me that the nearest approach to what we seek is to be found in an authority so widely based, and so subjected to the impact of a universal publicity and the mutual criticism of rivals, that the hole-and-corner intrigue

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will run great risk of discovery and frustration. An international commission, drawn from all the peoples, or from as many of them as are willing to co-operate, gives the best promise of this: so long as publicity is secured by the local visits of an inspectorate of not smaller cosmopolitan calibre, and the circulation in all the principal languages of its reports, after their submission to a reformed and strengthened league. But, to strengthen the position of my international governing commission, I would give it also a sound basis of property in the governed area, and secure to it control of the natural resources.

Beside this question of economic interest as a “driving-belt” for power, there are three points which will naturally arise in the mind of the critic. First, for what motives should the Powers who are to be asked to pool some of their possessions agree to what looks like a sacrifice? Secondly, what chance is there that Germany will regard the plan as a palliative for her grievances, seeing that they rest largely upon national pride and strategical aims? Thirdly, will the natives, particularly educated natives, who either hope to qualify as French *citoyens* or to attain to British self-government, acquiesce in an untried system under new masters, bearing the name (in some respects a suspected one) of internationalisation?

The first question is complicated by the fact that the different Powers (on the conscientious side of their operations, which is of course only a part of the whole) have set before themselves different ideals of native development. The British (true to type) have two ideals, not clearly distinguished, and one of them having ultimate implications not clearly thought out: represented by the aim of self-government, on the one hand, and by the actual operation in many areas of the system of indirect government—what a witty Frenchman called *administration à parapluie*—on the other. The

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French aim is the assimilation of an *élite* to French citizenship and culture. But if there is to be co-operation in an international system, there must be more than one sacrifice of a national idea. If Russians participate, they will not be expected to establish Soviets without international concurrence. Nor must a German international Civil Servant inculcate the Führer principle upon the pygmies of the Equatorial Forest or start Jew-hunts at Timbuctoo.

These three questions will in some measure answer themselves, as I describe the proposed system, and to this description I now proceed.

It is proposed that the international governing commission shall be appointed by a League of Nations—not necessarily identical with the existing League—and shall depend for its authority ultimately upon that body, somewhat in the same way in which a national ministry in a constitutional country of the British type depends upon a parliament. The initiation of the scheme must also be preceded by a resolution in the Assembly of the League of Nations, and a report by one of its permanent commissions. If the reception is favourable, the next step will be for a Power which is prepared, upon conditions, to pool a part of its colonial possessions or mandates, to issue an invitation to other Powers to participate in the pooling of territory when they have any to pool, and to concur in the system of international government of the pooled areas under the supervision of the League of Nations. One of the conditions must be that each participating and concurring Power shall become a member of the League. It is a question for further consideration whether membership of that branch only of the League which will be concerned with international government should be accepted as sufficient. On the one hand is the consideration that acceptance of a general framework of collective security is important to the success of international

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government. On the other hand, it is undesirable to exclude from participation particular States which may not wish to associate themselves with all the proceedings of the League. At present, I favour an arrangement which will enable a State to associate itself with a part only of the League's activities, as the United States are at present associated with the International Labour Organisation.

The balance of advantage inclines towards world-wide participation; for world-wide, or nearly world-wide, co-operation, making its appeal to the sentiment of common humanity and widening the basis of publicity, is one of the means of escaping the danger that internationalisation may degenerate into inter-imperialism, a mere agreement peaceably to divide the colonial booty, such as a treaty between a few Great Powers would tend to be. It is of particular importance that the United States of America and the German Reich should participate, though they bring no colonial territories to the pool: the one for sake of the indomitable idealism which is one side (admittedly one side only) of the national character, and the other because a salve may be applied to injured pride by association in a great international enterprise.

When a sufficient number of States, bringing a sufficient territory to the pool, have agreed upon the conditions, the case goes back to the League: which thereupon appoints the international governing commission, giving some seats to representatives of the races which are to be governed, if and when suitable representatives can be found, and a permanent seat to each of the Great Powers whether colony-holding or not, and to each of the smaller Powers, South Africa, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, which hold colonies or mandates. In this proposal I include Japan, in spite of her very obviously anti-international attitude and predatory performances, provided that she shows willingness again to

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treat her mandated territories as such ; but not otherwise. As in the League Council, temporary rotational seats will be provided for the lesser Powers which agree to participate in the scheme but have no colonies or mandates. For the purposes of this paragraph I am assuming the scheme to be at present limited to Africa. If it is extended further, the claims of Holland, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand, to permanent seats would require consideration.

Subject to the control of the League, which will have power to dismiss as well as to appoint members, and before which the reports of the proposed international inspectorate will be laid for discussion (but not for orders), the international governing commission will be, as it were, the Ministry for the international area. The governing commission will be the guardian of the proposed native charter ; will have the final voice in legislation and finance ; and will appoint governors and judges. In the appointment of officials it will normally follow the recommendations of its Public Services Commissions : a small body, to be selected also by the League.

If the state of the world should be such as to promise security to the smaller nations, Geneva is the suitable headquarters ; if not, I think the headquarters should be located in the United States. In any event, Geneva is the appropriate location for the College, the Research Institute, and the Bureau of Information, of which I conceive as part of the scheme.

The cost of these central institutions, Governing Commission, Inspectorate, Public Services Commission, College, Research Institute, and Bureau of Information, must be defrayed by the League by collection from the participating Powers in proportion to their revenues. The fact that this cost will be incurred will doubtless deter from participation some of the smaller states which do not expect to benefit

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by the equal access to the external trade of the internationalised area of which I shall presently speak.

African boundaries are at present arbitrary. The first task of the International Commission will be to redraw, after survey, the boundaries of the future governorships, to coincide with tribal limits and administrative convenience.

Complete equality of access to the external trade of the area (which is likely to increase in value as the education and well-being of the natives advance) will be secured by tariff equality, by an international bank issuing an international currency, and by appropriate measures in such matters as the acquisition of land for offices and business premises, equal freedom of advertisement, policy in government-purchase of foreign machinery and products, concessions for construction of public works, and so forth.

Raw materials available for export, should be rationed among the nations desiring to purchase them. To meet the case of states lacking foreign exchange, suitable schemes for exchange of goods and services should be entertained. If private foreign capital is admitted, the International Governing Commission should retain a controlling interest in the concession. There should be a free use of Government capital for enterprise ; and native co-operative societies should be encouraged and assisted by a Government Co-operative Department till they are able to stand on their own legs.

Much capital is necessary for the proper development of the colonies ; and some of that which has hitherto been available has been contributed by particular states for the sake of national prestige, or for the reproduction, in *partibus*, of home institutions. Internationalisation will close this source of supply. The establishment of a League Loans-authority to provide capital to mandated territories has been suggested. The crux, however, is not the definition of the lending authority, so much as the provision for the security

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of the loan. An attempt might be made, in some cases, to obtain the guarantees of the participating powers, on the ground that development would benefit external trade. At the worst, the international governing commission must do what it can with the local resources. All the natural resources of the internationalised territory should be vested either in the League, or in the governing commission which it appoints, as trustee for the native community, pending self-government: existing large-scale private interests being bought out, so far as may be desirable, by an issue of interest-bearing securities. The rate of interest will naturally be higher than in the case of a loan guaranteed, for instance, by the British Government; but by no means all colonial loans at present carry an Imperial guarantee.

The maximum possible advance of the natives towards self-government is fundamental to the plan: both on general grounds, and because ultimate emancipation from tutelage, guaranteed by something more effective than promises, is one of the marks by which internationalisation is to be distinguished from that inter-imperialism which has been ruled out. The guarantee is the world-wide publicity to be given to the steps taken towards performance; to secure which the International Inspectorate must periodically report on the form of self-government preferred in each unit of territory and the steps taken to make it possible. The reason for putting the case in this way is that it cannot be assumed, without more knowledge, that self-government of the British parliamentary type is everywhere preferable to the development of the powers of the Chief-in-Council, with the Native Treasury; though we may suspect that the latter is only appropriate to a static society, and that it should be, at most, transitional. Room must therefore be left for both alternatives, and for periodical consultation of the natives to ascertain what their own choice would be. By choice, I do

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not mean formal plebiscite: but informal discussion, carried out in many local centres by a visiting authority having a sympathetic outlook, such as the International Inspectorate should be. To ensure the right kind of consultation, the Inspectorate should include educated natives.

I will not attempt an exhaustive list of the points to be included in the charter, because the crucial point is the means by which its promises are to be realised—local visits and discussion at one end, and world-wide publicity at the other. But, beside provision for advance towards self-government, there should be embodied in the charter prohibitions of all discrimination according to race or colour, except protective discrimination in such matters as Liquor Laws and native rights in lands and in minor offices; of obstacles to the association of labour; of the imposition of taxation as an incentive to wage-labour; of criminal penalisation of breach of contract of service; and of pass-laws. There must also be an express undertaking that the periodical reports of the Inspectorate will include notice of the progress of education of all types, including broadcasting, and of the health services, and of the distribution of Government expenditure between European and native needs respectively.

As to the executive agencies through which the policies of the international governing commission will be carried out: a much extended use should be made of African subordinates both in general administration and in the medical, health, education and other special services; and these services should be supplemented from Asia, till more Africans are available. But there is also need of an international Civil Service and of international employees in medicine, education, and other special lines, to fill posts for which suitable Africans are not yet qualified. The Civil Service cannot be recruited by competition, because of the

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different types and media of education prevailing in different countries. A world-wide roster of Universities, of high standing in the world of learning, which will exercise in turn the right of nominating candidates for the approval of the international public services commission, is a device that naturally suggests itself.

But the task of moulding this heterogeneous material into the elements of a service inspired by international ideals must be assigned to an international College at Geneva, where approved candidates will undergo a two years' period of training in close association with the I.L.O. and the other international institutions now proposed to be created.

The actual internationalisation of the personnel of the services will be gradual; for the obvious reason that, for the first fifteen years or so, all the senior officials will date their appointments from the epoch prior to internationalisation, and will be, almost without exception, subjects of the State which was formerly sovereign of the territory concerned. The new international service will be, so to speak, pieced on to the old national one; and members of the latter will keep their places unless they prefer to retire on proportionate pensions.

An obvious difficulty of the future is the reconciliation of lifelong careers for the men who have devoted their powers to a highly-specialised purpose, with the aim of self-government for the natives of the international territory.

There must be, from the outset, a clear understanding that the period of tutelage will not be extended in order to guarantee the careers. But, if the system is applied to the territories which I envisage for internationalisation, there are wide variations in the conditions and capacities of the natives, and the stage of self-government will be reached at widely varying intervals. The system of periodical reporting will make possible the planning of recruitment, and the

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gradual reduction of the personnel. At the end, when the last territory is being emancipated, those employees who cannot be provided for must be paid off with appropriate pensions.

I return to the three questions which I formulated on an earlier page. The Powers which are asked to pool some of their possessions have certain things to gain by doing so. The proposed plan will minimize the causes of war arising from the monopolisation of great areas by particular Powers, and therefore tend to the reduction of the cost of armament. Through the application of the principle of international co-operation in one branch of world-affairs, it will favour the growth of the conception of a more effective League of Nations: and so again tend to prevent war. If the present situation should result in war, the plan will provide a portion of the material for the formulation of the terms of a juster peace hereafter. Few of us can suppose that, after a new world war more disastrous than the last, the world will not be looking eagerly for any and every means of neutralising the disease of hypertrophied nationalism.

Nazi Germany will not obtain from this scheme of internationalisation that pride of place among subject races or those military and strategic advantages, for which there is reason to believe that she is looking. While she retains her present racial ideals and her present ambitions of domination, it is, in fact, impossible to hand over other people to her sole control or even to her control subject to international supervision. Britain's record is far from blameless; but, here, it is at least possible to speak for the oppressed, and sometimes—as in the case of India—to carry a subject people along the paths towards self-government. These things are not possible in Nazi Germany; and conscience will ally itself with imperialistic sentiment in refusing to transfer colonies to her. But it is possible to

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salve her pride by an arrangement which places her in a position of complete equality with other powers in one great block of territories, in which government as well as supervision will be international: and more nearly approaching equality in the colonies generally, where international supervision will exist together with national administration: which makes her a co-worker along with others in securing the welfare and ultimate emancipation of backward people, a noble task, indeed, if the end be not wholly selfish: and which secures to her an equal share in the benefits of external trade over a large portion of the earth's surface.

To the natives of the territories to be internationalised, the scheme offers the dignity of participation in the international commission which will govern their kinsfolk; a charter against humiliation and exploitation; a prospect of a more active policy of native welfare secured by the enlargement of publicity to the international field; opportunities of choosing between different forms of self-determination; and ultimate emancipation and nationhood.

A delicate question remains: how is the international area to be defended? I do not think that the prospect of an effective system of collective security is a near one. It is necessary to contemplate the possible enterprise of the robber-state. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations appears to admit, for B Class mandates, the establishment, *for defence of territory*, of fortifications and military or naval bases, and the military training of the natives. At all events, I hold this to be necessary to the system of internationalisation which I contemplate. The participating Powers, or the stronger of them, must defend the international territory. They can only do so, in the conditions of modern warfare, if local defence forces, providing fortified harbours and aerodromes, co-operate with the defenders. Arms are still the price of peace.

GREECE FACES THE AXIS

By VANDELEUR ROBINSON

THE first approach to consideration of the political situation of any East European country lies through the enquiry as to its relationship with Germany. The current outlook in such matters may be summarised in a paraphrase of Gilbert's well-known doggerel:

Now every little Balkan folk
That's born into this world of greed
Is either beneath the Axis yoke,
Or else by Britain guaranteed.

There is good reason to make such an enquiry in the case of Greece. In the first place, Germany is Greece's largest customer and supplier; in 1938 she supplied 29 per cent of Greece's imports, and took 38.6 per cent of her exports. These figures are not so great as the German share of Bulgarian trade, for example; but they are sufficiently important. Secondly, Greek territory along the North of the Aegean extends to the neighbourhood of Adrianople, which is on Germany's route to Istanbul. Thirdly, Bulgaria, a possible ally of Germany, covets an outlet to the Aegean coast. Fourthly, a German army in Yugoslavia might well seek to push down the Vardar Valley to establish a German Aegean port at Salonika, in fulfilment of the policy of Aehrenthal.

The present Greek Dictator is well-known for his admiration for Germany. The King is a nephew of the ex-Kaiser, and was passed over during the war, as a possible successor to King Constantine, on account of his pro-German attitude. The pro-German tendencies of the Royal clique have often been at variance with the Anglophil sentiments of the Greek people.

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There are two factors, however, which distinctly modify the simplicity of an analysis of Greek foreign policy along the lines of pro- and anti-German attachments. The first is the fact that the *immediate* danger to Greece does not come from Germany at all, but from Italy. The second is the post-war growth of Balkan feeling, which disturbs the basis of pre-war calculations; "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples" is a doctrine which only recently attained serious support.

Can the danger from Italy be distinguished from the menace of Germany? There are several reasons for saying that it can. Italy, situated just across the Strait of Otranto, in occupation of the Dodecanese, Rhodes, and Albania, and on friendly terms with a revisionist Bulgaria, puts Greece in somewhat the position that England would occupy if she had to face a hostile France, which had occupied Ireland and Wales and procured the neutrality, at least, of Scotland. If Greece had not strong allies in Britain, France and Turkey (or if ever these allies should fail her), Italy might conceivably endanger Greece without any assistance from Germany. The Fascist era was inaugurated by the bombardment of Corfu, and an attempt to annex the island altogether; this outrage was followed up by the definite annexation of Rhodes and the Twelve Islands, all of them of Greek population; and in the present year the Italians have occupied Albania. It only requires "Non-intervention" by the Western Powers for Greece to be in a tight corner if attacked by Italy; and in the event of Germany beginning a war which involved the Western Powers, some new Treaty of London or of St. Jean de Maurienne might be devised, for the purpose of procuring (at the expense of cessions by Greece) the neutrality of Italy, or her secession from the Axis to the "Peace Front." Therefore, unless and until the Axis Powers go to war in partnership, or Italy receives, like Bohemia-Moravia, a

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"Reich Protector," there exists an Italian danger, independently of the ultimate threat from Germany herself.

The Balkan States, with the exception of Montenegro, all obtained their liberation from the Turkish yoke with a greater or less degree of assistance from some of the Great Powers. At least until the year 1918, the Great Powers used their clients in the Balkans for the furtherance of their game of Power Politics; the Balkan States in turn used the protection of their several patrons to secure the largest possible share of the Ottoman inheritance. Thus, in the Great War, Serbia depended upon France and Russia; Bulgaria and Turkey upon Germany and Austria; in Greece and Roumania the Kings were pro-German and the people pro-British and pro-French. When the pro-German Kings were removed (in Roumania by death and in Greece by Allied intervention) the two countries straightway joined the Entente side. The Balkan situation, however, is very different to-day from what it was twenty-five years ago.

Except for Bulgaria, none of the Balkan States has much to gain from a disturbance of the *status quo*. Certainly, none of them desires to pick the Great Powers' chestnuts out of the fire. The tendency is for the Balkan States to try to form a neutral "bloc"; to remain neutral, if possible, in a conflict between the Great Powers; and if this attempt fails, to stand together against invasion from outside the Peninsula. Only Bulgaria may be tempted, and Yugoslavia may be induced by threats, to engage in war against the neighbouring Balkan States.

Apart from the Dodecanese—and Cyprus ought not entirely to be forgotten—Greece has reached saturation. The territories which she once coveted in Asia Minor and on the Bosphorus are now definitely Turkish, and the Greek populations (except in Istanbul) have been evacuated. The Treaty of Lausanne substantially settled the age-long quarrel

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between Greece and Turkey, and the exchange of populations removed the last occasion for hatred. Venizelos, during his last spell of power, made pacts of friendship with Yugoslavia and Turkey, and incidentally settled the question of the Yugoslav Free Zone in Salonika and the control of the Djevdjeli-Salonika railway, which had caused disagreement between Greece and Yugoslavia. Subsequently, a series of unofficial "Balkan Conferences," begun in Athens, led to a general rapprochement between the Balkan States, and eventually to the conclusion of the Balkan Pact, and the formation of the Balkan Entente as a close-knit political grouping, similar to the Little Entente. The process is not complete, because Bulgaria's revisionist claims have not been satisfied; but even so, Bulgaria has signed with her four neighbours the Pact of Salonika of July, 1938, establishing friendly relations. (Incidentally, it was General Metaxas who, as President at that time of the Balkan Entente, signed the Pact of Salonika on behalf not only of Greece but also of Roumania, Yugoslavia and Turkey.)

The beginning of the present year saw the Balkan States to a great extent "dwelling together in unity"; a condition of affairs of which they, like the psalmist, perceived the essential blessedness. It is since the events of March and April that there have been signs of a radical disturbance of this happy situation. Since Germany invaded Bohemia, and Italy occupied Albania, the threat to the integrity of the Balkans has become much more marked from both the foci of the Rome-Berlin Axis.

The Balkan Entente, which was, until April, the central pillar of Greek policy, had two facets. On the one hand, the four States surrounding Bulgaria were pledged to assist each other in the event of an irredentist war begun by Bulgaria. Such a war was unlikely, in face of the unity of the Entente States, and Bulgaria successfully improved her

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relations with her neighbours, and her chance of some accommodation of her grievances, by concluding first the pact with Yugoslavia, in January, 1937, and then the Pact of Salonika, in July, 1938. The latter Pact was, indeed, an example of peaceful revision; for Bulgaria's neighbours agreed to the removal of the restrictions imposed by the peace treaties upon Bulgaria, as upon the other States defeated in the Great War, in respect of her armed forces. It was thus always possible, given generally peaceful conditions, that the Bulgarian claim against Greece for an outlet to the Aegean would be accommodated, if ever Greece could be got to concede the slightest cession of territory, however narrow; or, alternatively, if Bulgaria were to drop her territorial claim, and be satisfied with generous provision for her commerce in a Free Zone and an internationally supervised railway connection. The moving of the zone of European tension into closer proximity to the Balkans has no doubt reduced the likelihood of any such retreat upon the one side or the other, though it cannot be said to have diminished its desirability.

The other aspect of the Balkan Entente was the protection of Balkan integrity in general against any threat by a Great Power, acting in conjunction with a Balkan State. Greece is already threatened by the Italians across the water and in Albania; Roumania sees the irredentist claims of Hungary backed by a Germany which is ready to occupy Hungary if necessary, and would be able to overrun Transylvania; Yugoslavia is grievously encircled, having land frontiers with Germany herself, with German-protected Hungary, and with Italian-occupied Albania; unable or unwilling to come to a satisfactory agreement with the Croats, who constitute a deadly internal peril in case of war, Prince Paul makes his pilgrimages to Rome and to Berlin, while the Serbs express, in face of police repression, their hatred

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of Italy and Germany and their affection for France. How is the Balkan Entente standing up to this new situation?

To meet an immediate peril, Great Britain and France gave their guarantees to Roumania and Greece, and negotiated treaties with Turkey. Three of the four Balkan Entente States have thus found powerful allies. Turkey, in addition, was already on friendly terms with Soviet Russia, and the two Western Powers are at the moment of writing in the midst of a negotiation with Russia; this, if successful, will bring to the other guaranteed States a support which, whether they welcome it or not, may be instrumental in saving their independence. Only Bulgaria remains unsatisfied, in face of a dogged refusal by Roumania to cede the South Dobruja; and Yugoslavia dares not approve of the moves which might secure her own salvation.

Germany is an extremely jealous Power; her friends must have no other friends but her. Since Yugoslavia is maintaining, of necessity, an attitude of friendship towards the Rome-Berlin Axis, Germany contends that she cannot remain in treaty relations with another State, Turkey, which has accepted a military alliance with Germany's enemies. It is an interesting question which of the two States, Yugoslavia or Turkey, has acted contrary to the spirit of the Balkan Entente. It is certainly not Turkey who, by her alliance with the West, is endangering the principle of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples!"

The former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Roumania, Mr. Nicolas Titulescu, in an illuminating letter in the *Times*, explained the nature of Turkey's action in relation to the Balkan Entente. When the Entente was formed, the German menace was already beginning to loom upon the horizon, and Italy's ambitions were no secret. The Balkan States, therefore, according to Mr. Titulescu (who was the principal author of the Entente) wanted to combine against extra-

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Balkan aggression, and ardently desired to find some Great Power or Powers which would act as patron and friend-in-need of the whole Entente; but at that juncture, no great star was willing to have the Balkan waggon hitched to it.

Now that the rape of Czechoslovakia and of Albania has shaken the Western Powers out of their apathy, the long-desired powerful allies have become available. Turkey, as the most secure of the Balkan States, and the custodian of the strategically vital Straits, has made the alliances desired by them all. Mr. Titulescu is prepared, in the name of the Balkan Entente, to accord her a hearty vote of thanks.

Apart from the intention of the Entente agreements, political events compel a rallying to the Peace Front. The possible defection of Yugoslavia to the Axis, the seizure of Albania, and the general inquietude of the times, have greatly increased the likelihood that Bulgaria may lend herself to Axis schemes, in the hope of recovering the territory which in 1918 she either lost or failed to acquire. This possibility of Bulgarian enmity has greatly increased the risks of all the Balkan States, and incidentally brings the danger for the first time to the doors of Turkey. In this situation, it is an irresistible conclusion for Greece and Roumania, both encouraged by British and French guarantees, to range themselves firmly with the strongest member of the Entente, and not with that member which shows plain signs of walking out of the arrangement.

What are the courses open to Greece? In the event of war, she cannot conceivably range herself against the Powers which control the Mediterranean. The British alone, and the French alone, and *a fortiori* the two combined, have naval superiority over the Italians. Turkey being friendly, the Russian Black Sea fleet could enter the Mediterranean to support the democracies. Thus, short of some extraordinary coup at Gibraltar, the anti-axis Powers are not likely to be

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ousted from their control of the Mediterranean. Probably their shipping will be sunk in serious quantities by German and Italian submarines and aircraft; but it is the British, not the Italians, who would have the opportunity, if it came to the point, of shelling once again the royal palace in Athens. If Greece were not attacked, she might possibly cling to neutrality, notwithstanding her treaties, as happened in the last war; but the secession of Greece to the Axis side would not be contemplated by the most blood-thirsty pro-German. A German or Italian drive to the Aegean would assuredly be resisted by Greece; and the Anglo-French guarantee would presumably assure her of an Allied army and fleet to help her defend Salonika. Thus, Greece can take up arms to defend herself and her partners against attack by the Axis; or she may be able to remain neutral. To side with Germany is practically impossible.

The early years of the Metaxas dictatorship were characterised by a Greek rapprochement with Germany. The man who had made himself master of Greece was well-known as a lover of Germany. His training in the *Kriegsakademie* had inculcated in him a respect for the German military machine of pre-war days; his service as Chief of Staff to a King with a German wife (and a King, moreover, who was driven from the throne by British and French guns) no doubt intensified this feeling. Furthermore, an astounding piece of tactlessness on the part of a British General served to imbue Metaxas with a strong animus against the British. It appears that when the Dardanelles campaign was in preparation, Metaxas prepared a memorandum for the information of the British Command. This memorandum was based upon his own intimate knowledge of the terrain of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and was designed to facilitate the contemplated operation; Metaxas was not yet anti-British. The memorandum, in a sealed envelope, was enclosed with a

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covering letter in an outer envelope, and sent to the British Command. It was returned unopened; for the British General considered it derogatory to the majesty of the British Imperial Power to accept advice from a neutral Balkan General. The campaign proceeded, in the absence of Metaxas' advice, and was a costly failure; perhaps two years of war and several million lives paid the immediate price. And twenty years later a gravely insulted man became the head of a State with which we desired to be on friendly terms.

On reaching power, what did Metaxas do? He professes a philosophy as authoritarian as that of Hitler himself. He proceeded to rearm his country with German weapons, and (very reasonably) to fortify the neighbourhood of Athens, the Piraeus and Corinth against a repetition of maritime pressure against the capital. German governesses were imported for the children of the well-to-do; the English-run public school at Spetsai was partially Germanised; the heir to the throne married a German Princess. German salesmen and propagandists have visited the country, including Schacht, Goering and Goebbels. Metaxas thus began by playing the Germans' game.

The late Lord Byron rendered his country a greater service by his death than even by his works, well-known as these are on the Continent. He, and with him the sailors and the soldiers who lent their aid to Greece during the desperate struggle to assert her independence against the Turks, planted in the hearts of all Greeks a sentiment of respect and affection for the British people. The Greeks respect the British Constitution, whatever failings may have characterised their efforts to govern themselves under a democratic system. Individualist and freedom-loving, peasant, artisan and road-mender would discuss international politics with zeal and with understanding, before the dictatorship deprived them of this liberty. However much

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their loyalty, under a pro-German régime, may have led them at times to oppose British wishes, there nevertheless exists as a real factor in the make-up of the citizens an affection for Great Britain. In these circumstances, Metaxas, even more than King Constantine, did violence to the national sentiment in pursuing a pro-German, anti-British policy. The desire to work with Britain, moreover, depends upon calculations as well as upon sentiments.

The Greeks were gravely disturbed at Metaxas' conduct of foreign affairs, and the democratic statesmen, who were in a position to know what was going on, took alarm even before he assumed supreme control. Mr. Kaphandaris, a former Premier, mentioned this disquietude in his "Manifesto to the Greek People," issued early in 1938. Before the installation of the dictatorship, foreign affairs were habitually discussed by a conference of the heads of all the political parties, in order that policy might be taken above party strife, and given a steady direction. This conference was abolished by Metaxas when he became Dictator; but Kaphandaris asserts that the party leaders were so appalled by Metaxas' activities, as reported by him to their conference after the Balkan Entente meeting in April, 1936 (at which Metaxas, as Premier and Foreign Minister, represented Greece) that if the seal of confidence had not prevented the publication of their transactions, the Greek people would have demanded Metaxas' removal from the conduct of foreign affairs. Since the dictatorship was established, Metaxas has been his own Foreign Minister.

Kaphandaris was writing before the recent events, which have compelled many States to sink the antipathies engendered by their ideological differences; he naturally brought against Metaxas the criticism, no longer valid, that he had forfeited the confidence of the Western Democracies, and had thus deprived Greece of her most valuable support. In the light

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of this complaint, it may be realised with what relief the Greek people at large, and the students of foreign affairs now driven out of politics, welcomed the announcement of the Anglo-French guarantee.

Much anxiety was aroused by the principal event in the Balkans between the establishment of the Greek dictatorship and the preparation of Mr. Kaphandaris' Manifesto, namely, the conclusion of the Bulgar-Yugoslav Pact of Friendship of January, 1937. This anxiety is to be found in Mr. Kaphandaris' Manifesto, and was also expressed to me by Mr. Sophoulis and other Greek statesmen with whom I conversed a few days after the announcement that the Pact was to be signed. Indeed, the Dictator himself was anxious, for he sent his Under-Secretary to consult secretly with his opponents. The anxiety sprang, not from any desire to see bad blood between Greece's two neighbours, but from the fear that, with the Macedonian question between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria put into cold storage, pressure would be brought to bear upon Greece to grant to Bulgaria a territorial corridor to the Aegean. To this demand Greece is not disposed to accede, for several reasons. First, the territory claimed is inhabited almost exclusively by Greeks, since the movements of population in the post-war years. Secondly, the common frontier with Turkey is valuable, as was proved when the Turks mobilised to discourage the Bulgarians from intervention in the Greek rising of March, 1935. Thirdly, Kaphandaris in particular feared that the grant of a narrow corridor would be followed by a demand for its enlargement, or for the grant of a second corridor.

One cannot deny the possibility that Britain and France, even now, might urge upon Greece an "Aegean Munich" with regard to the Bulgarian Outlet; especially by virtue of the promises made, not by Greece but by the former Allies, at Neuilly, in regard to Bulgaria's "economic outlets

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to the Aegean." Nor can one neglect the danger of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian "bloc," under Axis patronage, attacking Greece along the whole of her long Northern frontier from the Corfu coast to Adrianople. Metaxas, therefore, ought to have known all about the Pact while it was in process of negotiation; it was essential to secure its discussion by the Balkan Entente as a whole; and he should have ensured that the problem of the Aegean Outlet was disposed of at the same time. Yugoslavia was bound by the Balkan Pact not to conclude an agreement with another Balkan State without first consulting her partners; in fact, she only consulted them at the last moment, when they had little option but to give their approval. The burden of the criticism of Metaxas was thus that he allowed himself to be hoodwinked.

Greece has been exceptionally lucky in, as it were, backing the wrong horse and getting her money returned. The Balkan Pact pledged its members to fight to defend each other against an attack by any Balkan State, or by a Great Power in conjunction with a Balkan State. Thus, Greece might have to go to war against Italy, if Italy and Bulgaria were ever simultaneously at war with Yugoslavia. It would not matter whether Italy or Bulgaria had made the first attack, or both simultaneously; as soon as both had attacked the Yugoslavs, the other members of the Balkan Entente would have to fight. This seemed to Greece a dangerous entanglement, and she took pains to obtain specific exemption from the obligation to go to war against a Great Power. But recently the situation has changed, and it is Greece herself who may be directly attacked by a Great Power, in conjunction with Bulgaria. Yugoslavia, possibly partly because of lack of encouragement from Greece (which, after all, betrayed a similar alliance obligation in the Great War) seems to have gone over to the Axis. Greece is therefore

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very lucky indeed not to find herself almost isolated, through having chosen to limit her commitments. In the event, two Powers of great importance have, though ideologically opposed to her, offered their services in her defence.

After the rape of Albania, Italy assured Greece that she had no designs upon her—not even upon Corfu. General Metaxas, who dare not offend Italy until Anglo-French help is absolutely certain and effective, accepted this assurance with a decent show of gratitude. With, no doubt, much greater enthusiasm, he accepted the British and French guarantee. Now he has something to work upon, and he has it without any inconvenient reservations about the Outlet, or concessions elsewhere. The changed circumstances give point to the Dictator's oft-repeated assertion: "Greece is not pro-German; it is a question of finding a market for her tobacco." It is to be hoped that Sir Frederick Leith-Ross has been able to sweeten the change of policy.

One figure remains to be more particularly considered in regard to the position of Greece *vis-a-vis* Germany. King George the Second of the Hellenes had a German mother and a German up-bringing; but he passed the years of his exile in England. On his return to the throne, primed by good advice from his English friends, he professed (no doubt quite sincerely) democratic principles, and practiced "appeasement" between the rival factions of Greece. His insistence upon a proper amnesty for those punished for the rebellion of March, 1935, won him the confidence of his former Republican opponents, even including Venizelos; and the most disgruntled people were the intransigent Royalists, who had hoped to have the new King in their pocket. But in the space of eight months he came to feel that freedom was less important than efficiency, and that efficiency could be secured by short cuts. He therefore installed Metaxas as Dictator, and has since consistently supported him.

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In considering this sympathy of the Greek King for German methods and German authoritarian ideas, one should follow some of the ramifications of his family. To speak only of those recently alive and influential with him: one of his uncles was notoriously pro-German; a first cousin is married to a German nobleman who is a member of the Nazi Party; another cousin is consort of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia; not so long ago the King's brother, who is heir to the throne, married a Princess of the House of Brunswick. Even some of the King's English personal friends, who visit him from time to time, are not conspicuous for their democratic outlook. Family ties and the influence of friendship can do much to deflect the policy of a ruler; but after all, King George, like King Carol, may reflect that the German Napoleon prefers Gauleiters to Kings.

LONDON GOVERNMENT

By MARY STOCKS

WHEN John Stow, Citizen of London, surveyed our Metropolis in 1598, he was conscious of certain encroachments in "the Suburbs Without the Walls" which suggested undisciplined growth. Things were not quite as they had been in FitzStephen's time, when the scholars and youths of the City walked forth on summer evenings to take the air at Clerkenwell and St. Clements in the days when their wells were "sweet, wholesome and clear." To the North towards Soers ditch there had grown up "all along a continual building of small and base tenements, for the most part lately erected"; while to the East the City was exuding another "continual street, or filthy strait passage, with alleys of small tenements, or cottages, built, inhabited by sailors' victuallers, along by the river of Thames, almost to Radcliff, a good mile from the Tower." Altogether John Stow observed that there was a lot of building going on, much of it of a decidedly mean order. Indeed it was not easy for him to answer "the accusation of those men, which charge London with the loss and decay of many of the ancient cities, corporate towns, and markets within this realm, by drawing from them to herself alone both all trade of traffic by sea, and the retailing of wares and exercise of manual arts also." He had to admit that the Court was a considerable magnet. At any rate, for whatever cause, it was impossible to deny that "the gentlemen of all shires do fly and flock to this City; the younger sort of them to see and shew vanity, and the elder, to save the cost and charge of hospitality and housekeeping." It was regrettable—but as John Stow points out, "the daintiness of men cannot be restrained,

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which will needs seek those things at London," and it is clear that he was not without a Londoner's pride that it should be so. His City of London was a great city, a rich city, a strong city, and withal a beautiful city; a city to inspire not only praise but prayer. So thus he ends: "Almighty God, grant that her majesty evermore rightly esteem and rule this City; and be give grace, that the citizens may answer duty, as well towards God and her majesty, as towards this whole realm and country. Amen."

Two centuries later this City had become, in William Cobbett's eyes, a Wen past praying for. His difficulty was, once in, to get out of it. "From St. George's Fields, which are now covered with houses, we go, towards Croydon, between rows of houses, nearly half the way, and the whole way is nine miles. There are, erected within these few years, two entire miles of stockjobbers' houses on this one road, and the work goes on with accelerated force!" "And how," he asks, "is this Wen to be dispersed? I know not whether it be done by knife or by caustic; but dispersed it must be!"

But it has proved to be no easier since Cobbett's time to restrain "the daintiness of men." The Wen has gone on growing. The years which immediately followed his Rural Rides carried it out to the edge of what is now the Administrative County of London. The stupendous economic expansiveness of the late Victorian Age carried it far beyond. In our own time, the slowing down of that expansiveness has not reflected itself in a corresponding slowing down in the growth of the Wen. On the contrary, it is exuding along all the highways of the Home Counties. Croydon is engulfed. The London Passenger Transport Board serves the tidal ebb and flow of some nine and a half million souls and cries hungrily for more. But now at long last modern civilization appears about to provide us with the answer to Cobbett's question: "how is this Wen to be dispersed?" And the

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suggested method is one which will doubtless at long last and quite effectively "restrain the daintiness of men."

But while the problem of London's growth and its restraint has received on the whole little serious thought, the problem of London's government has, during the past hundred years or so, received a great deal. In his comparison between the town planning of Moscow and the non-town planning of London,¹ Sir Ernest Simon points out that the effective planning of a city as a whole is only possible when the planners know what the ultimate area and population of that City are to be. Thus the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars decided by decree in 1935 that the population of Moscow should be stabilized at five and a half million, and that this stabilization should be obtained by the threefold method of direction of factory location, passport control, and judicious eviction for slum clearance. But whether the "daintiness of men" is less insistent in Moscow, or whether some quality other than "daintiness" is stronger there than elsewhere, the fact remains that in no other great city of the world has this essential background been provided for good government; and those who are grappling with the problem of London to-day lack that fundamental element of control: the power rationally to determine the size, shape and density of the area to be governed. The reasons for this deprivation are deeply rooted in the structure of our social system. The nature of our property rights and certain limited conceptions of political liberty, which are closely bound up with them, would doubtless, if examined, provide the explanation. But though they may provide the explanation of London's chaotic and unbridled growth they do not, without a certain amount of historical analysis, provide the explanation of why the machinery of London's Government is so inadequately

¹ *Moscow in the Making*. Chapter VII.

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framed to perform the tasks presented by that growth. For such an analysis we must turn to two books whose publication coincides with a contemporary intensification of interest in London problems. The intensification of interest is due partly to the celebration of the L.C.C.'s fiftieth birthday and a focussing of public attention on its achievements, partly to the current deliberations of the Royal Commission on Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population. The two books are William Robson's *Government and Misgovernment of London* (George Allen & Unwin, 15s. net) and Gibbon and Bell's *History of the London County Council* (Macmillan, 21s.). Of these two books, the first is the more constructive and thought-provoking work, for it analyses defects and suggests remedies. The second is sufficiently infused with the Jubilee spirit to allow its authors to concentrate with greater gusto upon the excellence of what they describe as "the splendid edifice of London Government." But taken together, these two considerable volumes make an effective contribution to our understanding of London.

Sir Gwilyn Gibbon and Mr. Reginald Bell concentrate, as the title of their book suggests, on a single organ of London Government: the L.C.C. Beginning with an admirable and not wholly uncritical group of chapters on its origins, they carry us through the brief but inspiring history of the Metropolitan Board of Works to the passage of the fateful legislation of 1888. That done, they concentrate upon the machinery and functions of the L.C.C., carrying each section up to date and thus presenting a comprehensive and really impressive picture of the ramified workings of a single vast unit of local government. It is only in the last concluding section, covering less than 100 of the 663 pages of their text, that they stand back from the picture and fit this single unit into the structure of national and local government of which it forms so strangely maladjusted a part. It is not, of

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course, their business, as the L.C.C.'s Jubilee celebrants, to be acutely conscious of this maladjustment. Yet at moments, as in their satisfaction (indicated on p. 306) with the existing *liaison* between borough child welfare services and the L.C.C. school medical service, or in their avoidance of any reference to awkward demarcation problems of U.A.B. and P.A.C. in their section on training and employment of the able-bodied, one is tempted to complain that the Jubilee spirit has got a little out of hand. That should not, however, blind the student of local government to the value of their labours. They have provided him with an incomparable text book: "a splendid edifice" of descriptive writing. He will find himself returning to it again and again for information, and always he will find, with the help of its admirable maps, index, and appendices, the information that he wants.

But Dr. Robson's *Government and Misgovernment of London* remains the more serious work. Its scope is broadly indicated in his brief preface: "I regard the metropolis as a vast and difficult problem in municipal administration, different both quantitatively and qualitatively from anything we have previously known. In order to discover how it should be dealt with it is necessary to study the working of the present machinery with care and in detail. But the present organization cannot be understood without a knowledge of the manner and causes of its growth. Hence, the book is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with the past, the present and the future."

It is, of course, the past which conditions the awkward pattern of London Local Government to-day. It is a story, dating from the exclusion of London from the Great Municipal Reform Act of 1835, which is in its main lines fairly familiar to students of Local Government. But seldom has it been told with deadlier precision than in the first fifteen chapters

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of Dr. Robson's book. Reference has been made to property rights and certain limited conceptions of political liberty which are bound up with them, as the great barriers to any wholehearted attempt to limit the size or control the shape of the great urbanized area which is vaguely described as "London." Dr. Robson analyses in his opening chapters the manner in which such property rights and conceptions of political liberty have operated, not so much to stultify any rationalized direction of population movement—with that larger aspect of social planning he is not here concerned—as to prevent the pattern of local government from responding to the insistent demands of such undirected movement. They have, in fact, so operated as to prescribe as the administrative area for which the largest single London local governing body is to-day responsible, an area whose size and shape was conditioned by the convenience of the Registrar-General in respect of the Census of 1851. They have further so operated as to prescribe for that authority a sharing of functions with subsidiary local authorities such as is not required of the County Borough Council of any provincial town. Cabined and confined within its 1851 frontiers and deprived of its golden heart of rateable value, the L.C.C. shares the business of government with 28 Metropolitan Boroughs, and a tangle of *ad hoc* regional authorities representing a succession of makeshift attempts to provide for half a dozen different conceptions of Greater London those vital services which even with the worst will in the world, our legislators could not adapt to the frontiers of an early Victorian registration district. The result of this ill-conceived and stultifying balance of power are described in the second section of Dr. Robson's book. The way out is indicated in his third and last; and it is here in this third and last section that he presents his formidable challenge to contemporary administrators. Let them accept his plan of

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action or think of a better. His plan is roughly as follows:

Let us, he says, begin by recognizing three categories of services: those calling for direct regional administration; those suitable for local administration under regional guidance; and those which can be left entirely to local control and administration. The first comprises territorial planning, the larger housing projects, drainage and sewage disposal, main roads and bridges, water, fire brigades, hospitals and specialized medical services, education (with certain reservations), aerodromes, open spaces, preservation of ancient monuments and smoke abatement. This does not exhaust Dr. Robson's list, but it will serve to indicate the principle on which he works.

The second category comprises services which could be administered by local authorities acting under regional supervision: *i.e.*, public libraries, child protection, ambulance, ferries, inspection of nursing homes, registration, baths and wash-houses, inspection and regulation of various food services, weights and measures, the licensing and inspection of nursing homes. Again the list is not exhaustive, but it will serve. Meanwhile, we have here the *raison d'être* of the directly elected Greater London Council which he proposes as his regional authority. It should, he thinks, consist of not more than 150 members. This would mean, of course, large constituencies—but not larger than those which at present elect M.P.'s for Outer London. At any rate, size would indicate importance; importance would in its turn attractable and energetic men and women to its membership.

And what are the alternatives? Either an indirectly elected body representing for specified purposes all or some existing authorities in the region—and as such, reproducing many of the defects of "secondary responsibility" so sadly illustrated in the history of the old Metropolitan Board of Works between 1855 and 1888—or a joint committee or

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board with irresponsible financial powers or no effective financial powers at all. Or, third alternative, a series of *ad hoc* regional authorities.

But in fact, a series of *ad hoc* regional authorities is precisely what we have evolved since 1839 when the Commissioners of Police for the Metropolis were first established. The creation of an *ad hoc* body has always proved the line of least resistance when a new regional service had to be performed—only to prove itself the line of maximum resistance when reform was in the air. And Dr. Robson has much to say concerning the lack of co-ordination which has resulted from the separate administration of a number of regional services ministering to the co-ordinated needs of a great urban area. He is therefore prepared to transfer most—but not all—of the existing functions of *ad hoc* regional authorities to his Greater London Council. And he believes that in the interests of “education for citizenship” as well as those of immediately efficient local government such a step is desirable, since it transfers important functions of government to the sphere of such live democratic control as is typified by the L.C.C. as we know it to-day.

There is no doubt that a regional authority capable of absorbing most if not all of our existing Greater London regional services is going to cover a considerable square mileage, but for this Dr. Robson is prepared. His proposed area is no less than the 2,419 square miles of the Metropolitan Traffic Commission. In fact, however, the boundaries of his area have been determined by the “daintiness of men” operating without restraint through the centuries. The size of the problem is none of his choosing. Nevertheless, it is going to eat up the County Councils of London and Middlesex, and a great part of those of Surrey, Hertfordshire and Kent. And for this absorption he is prepared, since his scheme is based upon a double-deck structure of regional and district

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authorities to which the addition of an intervening layer—producing a triple-deck structure of region, county, and district—would be a costly, cumbersome and inefficient intrusion. Nevertheless, he is sufficiently conscious of the obstinacy of county conservatism to suggest a mild compromise on this question: an inferior alternative, or, as he terms it, “a feeble palliative . . . suited not to the sickness of the patient but to the weakness of the doctor.”

Meanwhile there remain the minor or “lower deck” authorities within the region, to whom are entrusted the administration of certain regional functions indicated as Dr. Robson’s second category, not to mention those of the third category of which no mention has yet been made. Here we have in the inner ring of the Administrative County of London, twenty-eight Metropolitan Boroughs of widely varying rateable value, historical tradition, class composition, shape, size, and density, grouped round the innermost ring of the ancient City. We have also, given our Greater London Regional Council, a heterogeneous encirclement of County Boroughs, Boroughs, and Districts. His handling of these areas and their existing authorities is drastic but not wholly merciless. For the City of London he prescribes a change of electoral system and of rating and valuation in relation to Greater London which would rob it of much existing privilege; and a change of ceremonial which would transform its Lord Mayor into the representative of Greater London. For the Metropolitan Boroughs he prescribes a process of consolidation so designed as to produce a dozen large local authorities within whose areas, classes and rateable values would be judiciously mixed. Thus the respectable affluence of Hampstead would be diluted by the poverty of St. Pancras. The “out-county” authorities would be treated on roughly similar lines, which would, however, in view of their present diversity of status, involve an even more drastic operation.

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The purpose of the change is, of course, to secure the creation throughout the metropolis of a uniform type of secondary authority capable of administering "category two" services under the direction of the Greater London Council. In regard to the third category of services, those which the subsidiary authorities would administer at their own unfettered discretion, Dr. Robson has less to say. They are relegated to half a paragraph at the end of Part 3, Chapter VIII. There are not many of them and they are not exciting. They include the destruction of rats and mice and the provision of public conveniences.

It is impossible, in so bare a summary of Dr. Robson's plan, to convey to the reader the force and momentum which his carefully-integrated edifice of fact and analysis, built up through 469 closely-reasoned and documented pages, lends to it. His destructive case against the present make-shift muddle is irrefutable and will not be generally disputed. His bold scheme for reorganization, though it may not be generally disputed, will, of course, raise up an army of separatist defenders on behalf of each function, each frontier, and each tradition that he challenges. And these will make, as they have made heretofore, common cause against the onset of reform. But if ordered government, the preservation of beauty, health and social justice are among "those things which men seek at London" let us endeavour to believe and act on the belief that, as in the days of John Stow, "the daintiness of men cannot be restrained."

ULSTER AND EIRE

By TOM WILSON

THE English Conservative Party can no longer be regarded as a major obstacle to Irish unity. There is still, it is true, a strong Unionist element, which would receive the support of a section of the English Press, but the proposition, profoundly believed in Irish Republican circles, that the policy of the English Government is still the old one of *divide et impera* is scarcely plausible. It would be more true to say that the English Conservative Party and, *a fortiori*, the other parties, would be much relieved if the whole dispute were settled. In time of war a friendly Ireland would be a useful neighbour, but so long as the country is disunited the policy which Eire would adopt in such circumstances is very problematic. On the other hand, no English party is prepared to use coercive methods towards the North, and partition therefore continues. It is true that England could do more to improve the situation by encouraging friendship between North and South and by restraining the ruling class in Northern Ireland from infringing the political liberty of its subjects. But the complete solution of the problem lies beyond her powers.

It is necessary however to consider the contention that the English Government subsidises partition. Northern Ireland, as a part of the United Kingdom, is expected to make an annual contribution towards Imperial services. The figure at which this contribution was originally fixed (£7,920,000) proved too high and the contribution is now determined every year by the Joint Exchequer Board, whose deliberations are always shrouded with mystery. The contribution is the amount of the surplus revenue after all social expenditure has been met on a level similar to the English. In years of depression Northern Ireland has been

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able to avoid to a considerable extent an increase in taxation or borrowing or a reduction of expenditure by the simple expedient of reducing her imperial contribution. Moreover the English Exchequer makes contributions to various funds in Northern Ireland, most notably to the Unemployment Insurance Fund. As a result Northern Ireland's net contribution to the imperial exchequer has been negative for several years. The figures for 1936-37 were as follows: £1,139,919 received by Northern Ireland; £900,000 paid by Northern Ireland; balance £239,919. The excess balance received by Northern Ireland has never exceeded £400,000. Over the whole period, 1922-37,¹ Northern Ireland has made a net contribution to imperial services of only £7 millions. The arrangement can be criticised because it sets no adequate check on the extravagance of the Northern government, but can it be regarded as a means of subsidising partition? It could be more fairly described as the necessary assistance given to a special area. Ulster is not, as the imaginative Unionist propagandists declare, a rich prize sought after by

¹ The balance of accounts between England and Northern Ireland is as follows:

Year	Imperial Contribution	Payments to Northern Ireland
1922-23	6,685,600	3,994,200
1923-24	4,517,900	3,321,100
1924-25	3,175,000	1,420,800
1925-26	2,275,000	2,073,700
1926-27	1,350,000	1,012,300
1927-28	1,450,000	421,300
1928-29	1,175,000	667,100
1929-30	855,000	588,200
1930-31	545,000	827,400
1931-32	298,000	474,900
1932-33	75,000	182,800
1933-34	76,000	43,700
1934-35	24,000	500
1935-36	365,000	753,600
1936-37	900,000	1,140,000
	<u>£23,766,500</u>	<u>£16,921,600</u>

A balance in excess of receipts, amounting to £6,844,900, has thus been paid by Northern Ireland. Land annuity payments (£660,000 a year) are also retained by the Province.

(The figures are taken from *Hansard*, May 6th, 1937, and from the *Ulster Year Book*, 1938.)

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the rapacious Southern politicians. The province is, rather, a grave liability and Eire would be seriously embarrassed if the anti-partition propaganda were to succeed. A certain amount, it is true, could be saved by abolishing the local legislature and reducing the Civil Service—possibly about £150,000 a year—but that would be inadequate. The improvement in economic conditions would not be a sufficient compensation, for Ireland is not an economic unit artificially divided by the Border. Trade between North and South will always be less important than trade between both parts of the country and the United Kingdom. It is therefore not very plausible to accuse the English Parliament of subsidising partition because it did not embark on a policy which would have led to serious disorder in Northern Ireland and which would have achieved no very great result. At most the province might have been forced to abandon autonomy and return to Westminster.

The main obstacles to union are in Ireland itself. The Unionist Government, which has been in power since the Parliament was set up, is resolutely opposed to change of any kind. How far, it may be asked, does this Government represent the will of the Ulster people? Its majority is, of course, exaggerated by the system of single-member constituencies and by skilful gerrymandering. The Nationalist minority has been virtually deprived of political representation and the strength of the other parties is negligible. Few measures have caused more ill-feeling in the North than those, such as the abolition of proportional representation, which have been designed to exclude all critics from the House. Nevertheless, when all due allowance has been made, it must be admitted that the majority of the people are opposed to an All-Ireland policy. It is essential to appreciate the intensity of the alarm with which most Protestants regard the prospect of Catholic rule. Contrary to the frequent

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statements by Southern propagandists the primary difficulty is, I believe, fear of religious persecution. In some measure this fear is the sign of a guilty conscience. The Presbyterians, it is true, should have no guilty conscience. They too suffered under the Ascendancy and some of the greatest leaders in the struggle for independence have been Protestants. But the Ascendancy, at that time the Episcopal landlord class, always alarmed by the prospect of an attack by united Irishmen, was fully capable of exploiting the religious bigotry, which was always strong, and dividing the Catholic and Protestant allies. The Loyal Orange Order proved a useful instrument for this purpose and partly as a result of its activities the nineteenth-century land reforms were much delayed. Finally the ranks of the united Irishmen were completely broken and in their place there are to-day the united Catholics and united Protestants. The Presbyterians have long since had their more serious grievances removed and since the memory of the persecution suffered under the Ascendancy has been forgotten, they are prepared to unite with the representatives of the Ascendancy, in its present form, against the common danger of inclusion in a Catholic State. This sectarian bigotry and fear would be difficult to overcome by the most enlightened government, but in fact they are fostered and kept alive by the present governing class, which has taken the place of the old land-owning Ascendancy. During an election these feelings, which would be strong enough in any case, are worked up into a kind of hysteria. Independent parties, which are not primarily interested in the question of partition but prefer to turn to other problems, such as unemployment, have small chance of success, however loudly they proclaim their willingness to accept the territorial *status quo*. They are condemned because they threaten to divide the Protestant ranks and by this means the Unionist government secures

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two objects. It frees itself from the embarrassment of independent criticism of its social and economic policy and it perpetuates the public hysteria necessary for its survival. Ulstermen are calm and hard-headed in business matters. If the Irish question could be shelved temporarily for the first time in history and they could turn to other problems, the psychological effect would be profound. If the people could learn to bring to bear on political issues something of the calm judgment they exercise in business the Irish Question would, in a large measure, solve itself. There is wisdom in the official Unionist slogan that "every vote for an independent Unionist is a vote against partition", and it may be that Mr. De Valera and the Northern minority are profoundly wrong in constantly repeating their claims, instead of allowing the political ferment to subside.

This is, in effect, the policy of the Northern Ireland Labour Party, but one small group is powerless so long as the Nationalists and the Eire Labour Party continue to play into the hands of the official Unionists.

The position of the independent Unionist is made difficult and that of the Protestant Nationalist is often made impossible. It is the latter who suffers most in Northern Ireland, not the Catholic. The belief, frequently held outside Ulster, that the Unionist government only retains its position by using terrorist methods against the Catholic minority is, indeed, quite false. Occasionally alarming reports have appeared in the English and American press which describe the ill-treatment of this large minority, usually in rather vague terms or by the method of generalising from a few particular instances. Northern Ireland has been described as a semi-Fascist state where the fundamental British liberties have been lost and the freedom of Protestants in the South has been contrasted with the misery of Catholics in the North. So far, however, as I have been able to discover there is

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small ground for many of these accusations, with one exception. By a notorious Special Powers Act the government possesses the most arbitrary powers of arrest and detention. The excuse put forward, even by Cabinet Ministers, that these powers will never be used against law-abiding citizens is scarcely worthy of repetition. It may, however, be argued that the disordered condition of the country makes the Act necessary and it must be borne in mind that, at times, the executive in the Free State made use of similar measures. Moreover the Constitution of Eire provides for the setting up of military tribunals and adds to the clause providing for the issue of the writ of *habeas corpus* the qualification that this guarantee of the individual's liberty must not be allowed to interfere with the preservation of law and order in a time of general unrest. At the time of writing, Mr. De Valera is about to introduce two Bills to empower the executive to deal more effectively with the I.R.A. It is doubtful whether these powers are necessary in either part of the country. It might have been more politic for the Northern Government to combat the "dangerous elements" by the ordinary methods, rather than to add a further cause of discontent, although the frequent attempts to intimidate witnesses made it difficult to rely upon those methods. Worst of all, the Act has been made permanent since 1933. It is true, of course, that the vast bulk of the Catholic minority is unaffected by the Special Powers Act, but the Act nevertheless indicates a semi-Fascist tendency which is rightly condemned. Now that the South is adopting similar measures these complaints from the Catholic side will carry less weight.

The Catholics complain that they do not receive fair treatment when appointments to the Civil Service are being made. It is impossible, of course, to get much accurate information but, if one may judge by the pronouncements

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of the Unionist leaders, discrimination is to be expected. The Minister for Agriculture declared some time ago that no Protestant should employ a Catholic and that advice is not untypical. On the other hand it must be remembered that some of these remarks were made during Twelfth of July celebrations and although they do illustrate the way in which the members of the Government encourage, rather than resist, the wild bigotry of the Orange Order, it must not be assumed that they themselves are so harsh in their treatment of Catholics as their words suggest. In fact a considerable number of Catholics do appear to be employed in the Civil Service, although it is no doubt true that the Protestants are in a more favourable position even in the lower ranks. In private business there is unquestionably some discrimination on the part of employers against employees of a different religion, and since most of the employers are Protestants it is the Catholics who suffer most. This discrimination is not altogether the result of bigotry but is partly due to the belief that Catholics are gradually moving into the Province from Eire in order ultimately to outvote the Protestants. There is no evidence in support of these fears and the notion that the necessary half a million people could migrate secretly for this purpose is, to say the least of it, absurd. Yet it is seriously believed.

It should be noted that the difficulty of finding employment in an area where for years some 20 per cent of the insured population has been unemployed, is one of the reasons for continued ill-feeling. The competition for jobs soon ceases to be a competition between workman and workman and becomes a struggle, in the traditional way, between Catholic and Protestant. A Marxian interpretation, based on this fact of the conflict between the two religious groups would be over-simplified, but it would contain an important truth which must be borne in mind.

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Fair treatment has been accorded to the minority by the Unionist Ministry of Education. Whereas the majority of elementary schools formerly under Protestant control have been brought under government management, the Catholics have been permitted to retain their position without sacrificing all official financial support. Together with those Protestant schools which have not yet been transferred, they receive grants for new buildings and extensions, which are, of course, less than the grants given to transferred schools, and half the running and maintenance costs. All teachers are paid by the government. Irish is taught in the Catholic schools and is included as a voluntary subject in many public examinations. Education, in the narrow sense, compares very favourably with educational policy in the South where a knowledge of Irish is necessary for most public appointments—although the number of true native speakers is extremely small—and an attempt is being made to teach other subjects through the medium of Irish to children, the overwhelmingly majority of whom are obliged to learn Irish like any foreign language.

It would seem, then, that the grievances of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland are less serious than is sometimes supposed. There is freedom of speech,¹ of worship and of the press—and the Catholic press in Belfast is extraordinarily outspoken in its criticism. There is, however, a kind of cultural persecution. Catholics are despised and distrusted by the Protestant majority and are made, in many small ways, to feel their "inferiority." Where two classes so distinct as the Protestant Unionists and the Catholic Nationalists exist side by side, it is, perhaps, natural, though none the less deplorable, that this should happen and the

¹ Since this was written nearly all anti-partition meetings have been prohibited, and a magazine called *Irish Freedom* has been banned. The policy of the Northern government is tending to become more repressive. Under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, freedom of speech and of the Press may be abolished.

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Protestant minority might be in a similar position in a United Ireland, with this difference, however, that a part of it would continue to be the controlling business class.

It would, indeed, be impossible to explain the supposed anti-Catholic terror in the North, unless it were entirely the result of bigotry and sadism, for the Unionist government would have nothing to gain from such a policy. The minority is not likely to abandon its opposition to the Border, but it would be unwise to increase its discontent with the present state of affairs. The minority is too small to change the status of the North and it is deprived of what representation it should have. When that has been done it can be allowed comparative freedom of expression, for Nationalist meetings are only attended by Nationalists and the Nationalist newspapers do not find their way into Protestant homes. So long as there is no defection among the Protestant majority the Unionist position is therefore secure. It is the Protestant Nationalist who is regarded as the greatest danger, for he might succeed in dividing the Protestants and reviving the old ideals of the United Irishmen. He is subjected to pressure in many ways. It will be difficult to find, or to retain, employment. (By these means many liberals have been forced to leave the country.) The Protestant press will reject his articles, and in many ways he will find that he is being cut off from other Protestants. The study of Irish history is discouraged in the schools. It is never an important subject in public examinations and only those Protestants who are prepared to read on their own account have any understanding of the Irish Question. It would be wrong, and, indeed, absurd, to say that the division of the Irish people is entirely due to the work of an Ascendancy, past or present; but it can be said, with complete justice, that the Belfast Government makes no attempt to improve the situation by an enlightened educational policy

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and the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust continues to exist largely as a result of its activities.

There is little in the treatment of Protestants in the South to justify the Northern Protestants' fear. The position of some Protestants was made very difficult in the early days of the Free State, which was natural enough after a civil war, but the gloomy predictions made by Unionists everywhere in 1921 have been almost completely falsified by events. At the present time Protestants, who were believed to have been "surrendered to an evil fate" in 1921, are constantly declaring that they are well treated. To quote from a Methodist paper: "We (the Protestants in Eire) enjoy a liberty of action, of speech, and of worship denied to many Europeans." Two points, however, must be borne in mind: (1) the Protestant minority is very small and it is easy to treat it generously; (2) the minority is often loud-voiced in its praise of the Dublin regime, whereas the larger minority in a united Ireland would take a strong line on matters of policy and would be less sycophantic. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that the old party divisions would necessarily continue in a United Ireland—the parties in the South have been divided on somewhat different lines since 1922. A new alignment of interests might take place.

Many of the Protestants who advocate unity believe that the vigour and initiative which enables the small Protestant minority in Eire to play an extremely important part in the business world would enable a larger minority to retain an ever stronger position in a united country. The Orangeman would predict that, if this were to occur, it would provoke a severe and discriminatory policy on the part of the government. Moreover, since most Civil Servants in Eire must have some knowledge of the Irish language, the present generation of Protestants would be excluded from administrative positions. He would also point out that the Catholic

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religion is recognised in the new Constitution to be, in a special sense, the religion of Eire and in this he would discern a sinister threat. He would ignore the fact that other creeds are also recognised in the Constitution and that no church can be State-endowed. (Constitution of Eire, Article 44.) He would not pause to consider that the Establishment of the Anglican Church in England is, on the same grounds, still more unjustifiable. On the other hand he would be little concerned by the influence of Catholic morality on the law of censorship or on laws relating to divorce and birth-control. The Northern Puritan and the Catholic moralist have much in common and it is the liberals, who welcome union on other grounds, who would suffer most in these respects.

Mr. De Valera has offered, as a concession to Protestant fears, to allow the North to retain its autonomy as a safeguard against Catholic discrimination. Proportional representation would, however, be introduced for the Belfast as well as the Dublin Parliament. This would strengthen the position of Catholics at Belfast and of Protestants at Dublin. He demands, moreover, that there shall be adequate safeguards for the Northern minority and this guarantee might give him a right of interference with the Belfast Parliament which would reduce accordingly the value of the concession as a safeguard for Protestants. The importance of the offer is, however, very great and if union is ever achieved it will probably be on these lines. In the past, however, the North has been offered more than its due representation in a Dublin Parliament, but the offer was rejected at once. Even if both areas retained complete internal independence and returned an equal number of representatives to a common Parliament dealing with matters of mutual concern, it is not likely that Unionist fears would be overcome for some time. Moreover if these fears could in some way be satisfied, another difficulty,

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almost as serious as that created by sectarian bigotry, would have to be faced, namely the attitude of a united Ireland to the British Empire.

There is still strong anti-British feeling in Eire. During the last election, which took place after the Anglo-Eire Agreement had been signed, some candidates stressed the importance of English friendship, but others used more normal language and boasted of the triumph of Irish diplomacy over the traditional foe. In the words of Mr. Sean T. O'Kelly, they claimed to have "whipped John Bull right, left and centre." These sentiments are not merely the result of the past. So long as partition remains it is difficult for any Dublin Government to establish close relations with England. (It should be noted that Mr. De Valera's friendship with Mr. Chamberlain provoked critical comment in Dublin.) On the other hand, friendship with England is necessary as a first step towards union with the North and thus the vicious circle is joined. The Agreement may be regarded as an attempt by Mr. De Valera to break that circle. The other conditions of friendship have already been fulfilled. England and Eire can meet as sovereign states on a footing of equality. Every sign of imperial domination has gone. England has abandoned the policy, described by Griffith in 1921, "which threatened war if Ireland declined to join voluntarily a free association of free nations."

"Bond from the toil of hate we may not cease:

Free we are free to be your friend."

Tom Kettle.

We are, however, caught once more in a vicious circle. In order to reach the position of independence necessary before an *entente* with England could be made which would not involve a sacrifice of national pride, it was believed to be necessary to remove various symbols and ceremonials and strategic rights which indicated political inferiority. In

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the North, however, these things are regarded as absolutely essential. The flag, the Oath, and the national anthem are therefore very serious obstacles in the way of unity, for Eire cannot retrace her steps. In 1932 Senator Douglas warned the Government that "the real issue which we have before us is not the merits or otherwise of the Oath in the Constitution. Far more serious issues are involved, and the passing of this Bill not only raises the question of our Treaty obligations but may also affect our position in the British Empire—our trade and commerce and last but not least the ultimate political unity of Ireland." If a less doctrinaire Republican policy had been followed the situation would have been less difficult to-day. Both sides respond to all suggestions with a blank *non possumus*. In the words of Mr. De Valera, "a certain treaty of free association with"—not within—"the British Commonwealth group, as with a partial League of Nations" . . . "is in my judgment the farthest distance that the majority of the people of Ireland will ever go to meet the sentiment of the majority in the Six Counties."¹ If some method can be found of satisfying sectarian fears, the most likely solution of the Irish Question would be a close form of Dominion Status for the whole island. For that step, it would seem, Eire is not prepared.

The division in the country is thus very deep and not something entirely due to the activities of the Northern Ascendancy. It has been said that the explanation is racial. The races, however, are no longer distinct—if they ever were! Moreover, why should the same racial problem be surmountable in, say, Leinster, but not in Ulster? It would be more true to say that there are two nations in Ireland separated in the first place by religion, but possessing different cultural backgrounds and brought up to accept different political beliefs, as well as different theological creeds. The

¹ *Evening Standard*, October 17th, 1938.

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Northern Protestants are Loyalist and the old Protestant Republican tradition is so dead that they have no sympathy with the Irish patriotic movement, which they regard as an evil plot inspired by the Vatican to weaken the Empire. The Southern Catholic would describe in similar language the British nationalism of the North. Educational policy in Eire is, indeed, as anti-British in its bias as is Ulster's educational policy in the other direction. The problem is to find some means of bringing both "nations" to understand and respect each other's cultural background and to foster the feeble sense of common nationality which still exists. Neither the Dublin nor the Belfast authorities are making any serious attempt to perform that task.

In conclusion, however, I believe that the forces making for unity will ultimately prove the stronger. With the passage of time old and bitter memories of the Civil War will be forgotten and new currents of thought will do much to modify the traditional attitudes of both sections of the people. Increased friendship between England and Eire will be a deciding factor. England for her part might use her influence to modify public opinion in the North and she might well use her financial power over the Unionist Government to check any anti-liberal movement. Both sides in Ireland have much to learn and both must move a long distance, but a solution should not in the long run be impossible in spite of the policies of their respective governments.

A gradual solution of this kind is, I believe, preferable. Mr. De Valera, however, will try to force the issue immediately if war breaks out in Europe. He has recently declared that he will make unity a condition of his co-operation with England. If the Northern Loyalists, it has been argued, are really concerned for the safety of the Empire they will surely not deprive it, through their obstinacy, of

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valuable support. On the other hand, Mr. De Valera's position is not as strong as it might appear to be. On October 17, 1938, he conceded that "it is possible to visualise a critical situation arising in the future in which a United Free Ireland would be willing to co-operate with Britain to resist a common attack," but "if British forces were in occupation of any part of Ireland, Irish sentiment would definitely be hostile to any co-operation." But in the circumstances visualised, namely, a common attack, he would be obliged to co-operate whether partition were abolished or not. If only England were attacked he does not promise assistance and Ulster might thus "surrender" herself for no purpose. His government has "definitely committed itself to the proposition that this island shall not be used as a base for enemy attacks upon Great Britain" and the pledge holds whether partition remains or not. Indeed her geographical position makes it improbable that she could maintain her neutrality for long. Mr. De Valera has recently admitted as much (16th February, 1939). Moreover, the defeat of England would mean for her, as for the other small states of Europe, the end of political freedom; for England, whatever she may have been in the past, is now the protector of Irish liberty. The North would therefore have some grounds for refusing to yield and the negotiations would only have the effect of widening still further the gap between the two sections of the Irish people. To be part of a state whose support of the Empire was not unconditional would be intolerable to the ardent Northern imperialists. If, on the other hand, the people in the South could be induced to co-operate fully with Great Britain from the outbreak of war, the two sections of the country would be brought close together in the common struggle and many old prejudices would be overcome. A policy of this kind would do much to solve the Irish question. Unfortunately it is unlikely that

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such a policy would be acceptable to the Southern people. They still have bitter memories of the policy of England, "the protector of small nations," and the employer of "the Black and Tans," and they, themselves, it must be remembered, got very little credit for the support given to England in the last war, whereas the North, whose number of ex-servicemen per head of population was about the same, got all the praise and glory. It is not surprising that Mr. De Valera would have a difficult task to induce the people to fight at once along with the English. The situation, indeed, might become very serious in the event of war for Mr. De Valera would be obliged to control an extreme section which would certainly try to prevent co-operation with England and to act according to the slogan that "England's extremity is Ireland's opportunity" by seizing the North by force. Such a policy could only have disastrous results, and would be resolutely opposed by Mr. De Valera. It is not very likely that he would be forced to yield or to give place to a less statesmanlike leader. The recent outrages have at least had this good result, namely, that strong measures have already been taken against the extremists by both English and Irish governments and the danger would, therefore, be less in time of war. It is fairly certain, however, that violent disturbances in both parts of the country could not be prevented and this would increase the friction engendered by Mr. De Valera's negotiations with England. It is therefore to be hoped that a crisis will not occur and that the intransigence of North and South will ultimately be worn down by peaceful methods.

SOUTH AFRICA: DOMINION OF RACIAL PROBLEMS

By NORMAN BENTWICH

THE Union of South Africa is ironically named. For while the older Federations of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia, are relatively free from racial and national antagonisms, the federation of South Africa, which was formed by a stroke of imaginative statesmanship after the Briton-Boer war, and which has proclaimed itself by Statute a Sovereign independent nation, has throughout its thirty years of history been rent with national division and racial feuds. The genuine union has still to be achieved. There is the feud between white and native, British and Dutch, white and coloured, Gentile and Jew. And those feuds and strifes seem to gain in intensity, and to prevail over any policy of appeasement.

South Africa is unique among the British Dominions in that the great majority of its inhabitants are British neither in blood nor in sentiment. Of a population of nine and a half millions, over seven millions are non-Europeans; and of the white population only one-third are British in descent and feeling, while more than half are Boers. The two streams of European culture flow in parallel beds without intermingling. There are equal rights and opportunities for both, and two official languages both of which Civil Servants are required to know. There have been bitter controversies over the national flag and over the use of "God Save the King" as a national anthem.

Last year, indeed, the Government of General Hertzog, which stood for the political co-operation of Boer and Briton, won a signal victory in the General Election, and returned to

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office and power with an increased majority. That victory might be interpreted to mark the rejection by the bulk of the electorate of the extreme nationalist programme, which was put forward by Dr. Malan, the Leader of the Opposition, and was directed with equal bitterness against the British, the natives and the Jews. But the respite was short. A fresh opportunity for working up Dutch nationalist feeling against both British and natives presented itself at the end of the year, and was seized to the full. It was the celebration of the Centenary of the Grand Trek of the Boer farmers from the Cape Colony, which, designed originally to be a national thanksgiving, and to bring together all parties in commemoration of a remarkable historic episode, was turned into a sectional demonstration and a means of exciting feeling against other sections. The Vortrekker waggons processed through the country to every village and every town; they were accompanied by Boer men and women dressed in the picturesque garments of their ancestors of a hundred years ago; and by the Dutch Predikants, who stirred up the bitter memories, which were better forgotten, of the struggles of a hundred years ago.

The historic exodus of the Boers from the Colony, and their movement from camp to camp in the unexplored wilds of what are now Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, recall, in spirit as well as in extent, the exodus of the Children of Israel from Egypt and their wanderings in the Wilderness of Sinai. And the Boers cherish "all the memories of revenge and immortal hate." They celebrate Dingaan's day when their commandos destroyed the forces of the Zulus in the Battle of the Blood River, and so revenged the treacherous massacre of the first Boers who entered Zululand. That memory again is bound up with resentment against the British, who, after the first Boer Republic in Natal was proclaimed, asserted British sovereignty over a country

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in which hitherto they had merely occupied one port—then Port Natal, now Durban—and so led to the further Trek to the Transvaal. The Zulus appear to the Boers as the Amalekites, the British as the Edomites. The relations of Boers and British are like those of Irish and English; the one people cannot forget what the other people will not remember. The Dutch, it is said, are still trekking in spirit, and wish to keep themselves to themselves.

The spread of Nazi doctrines, which have found a fruitful soil in South Africa, has stimulated a fresh racial strife, against Jews in the Union who number about 100,000. The doctrine of racial superiority appeals to the Dutch in their relation both to Jews and British; and the economic jealousy against the commercial success of Jews is sedulously worked up by the new ideas of race-hatred and made to look more respectable. The feeling is expressed in successive legislative measures. In 1930 the Quota Act restricted the number of immigrants coming from certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe, on a basis similar to that applied to all immigration in the United States. The Act did not apply to a person coming from Germany; but when the Nazi persecution of Jews and non-Aryans in Germany led to the immigration of a few thousands of refugees into the Union, a raging and tearing campaign against the alien immigrant was directed by the Nationalist opposition. The late Government, in order to counter the more radical and definitely anti-semitic proposals of Dr. Malan, passed an Aliens Act in its final year of office. The Act was designed to restrict immigration generally; and provided for the examination by a Selection Board of all immigrants other than those of British origin. Its passage through Parliament was attended by anti-semitic agitation of the Nationalist Party throughout the country. The Act has not satisfied the opposition; and this year one of Dr. Malan's followers,

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Mr. Louw, has introduced a Bill directed to complete exclusion of Jewish immigration, and to the restriction of the rights of the Jewish community now in the Union.

The renewed agitation against the Alien Immigrant is a minor issue in South African politics ; but it is symptomatic of that reactionary trend which in South Africa, as in Europe, threatens the fundamental principles of democracy. It has caused men like Smuts and Hofmeyr to warn the people against the sapping of those foundations on which the freedom of South Africa has been built. Political history in South Africa has a way of repeating its disappointments. Each successive effort for conciliation between the Dutch and British is defeated by the breaking away of "a more urgent" Dutch patriotic party. Just as General Hertzog split off from the Botha Cabinet after the War, and formed the Dutch Nationalist party, so two years ago Dr. Malan, author of the most significant measures of the old Nationalist party, broke away from the Hertzog Cabinet and formed the new Nationalist party. And as the Liberal Smuts some years ago joined forces with Hertzog, so now it seems possible that the more Liberal Hertzog may join forces with the more extreme Malan. He has appealed, indeed, for a period of political truce between the two big parties, but in order that they should act as one Afrikaner family. If there should be a fresh alignment, it would leave the English voice and the still small voice of the Boer Liberals crying in a wilderness of racial hatred. The Afrikaner exclusiveness in South Africa illustrates the definition of Nationalism as the illegitimate child of patriotism out of inferiority complex. What drives it constantly to intransigence, and threatens to drive it to racial persecution, is the fear that the Afrikaner heritage, language, culture and manners will be ousted by English, or partly by English and partly by other alien influences. The enthusiasm of the Boers and of the Nationalist party for the Afrikaans language is

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healthy and honourable. But the hatred which is worked up against any elements of the polity which are not Dutch menaces the freedom and self-government which South Africans have held so dear.

The same inflexible memory which stands in the way of complete conciliation between Boer and Briton embitters the relations between Boer and Bantu. It is the obstinate Boer insistence on the segregation and suppression of the natives which stands in the way of justice to the vast majority of the people of South Africa. For the Boer farmer the separation and the degradation of the native are ordained by God, and it is crime and blasphemy to argue to the contrary. The rightlessness of the large majority of the population of the Union is incredible in a democracy. The native is socially excluded, and economically limited to manual, unskilled labour. The last Government, in its last year of office, passed an Act for the representation of natives in the Union Parliament, which, while miles from according equality of franchise, yet gives some chance of expressing grievances. The Legislative Assembly now includes three white representatives of the natives, elected by those in the Cape Province ; and the Senate includes four white Senators chosen by electoral Colleges of natives throughout the Union. The Act provides also for two white members to represent natives in the provincial council of the Cape Province, and a Native Representative Council consisting of the Secretary for Native Affairs, five native Commissioners, and sixteen Bantu members, of whom twelve are elected by electoral colleges.

Besides the four Senators elected by the native colleges, four Senators are nominated by the Prime Minister, with the qualification that they should be thoroughly acquainted with the wants and wishes of the natives of South Africa. And it was the appointment by General Hertzog of a Senator who had no outstanding qualification of this kind that led

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Jan Hofmeyr, the most forthright Liberal in the Cabinet of General Hertzog and the former Minister for Native Affairs, to resign his post last autumn. That is a sign of growing recognition amongst statesmen of the need for justice to the native. Although Mr. Hofmeyr has not broken away from his party, or sought to lead a party in Opposition—perhaps because he feels that it is no time for dissentient groups—the time will come when the spirit of liberalism which he represents will be asserted in the Government.

The previous Government pressed a step further the segregation of the natives from the white inhabitants by its legislation which restricted the purchase of land by natives in urban areas and prohibited native rural townships in European areas. There are, however, some indications that the public conscience is being gently roused on behalf of the native peoples, at least in the Cape Colony, where the principle of keeping down the native has never been completely accepted. In Port Elizabeth, which is today the most progressive city of the Colony, a native "location" and a coloured "location" are being built by the municipality, which are in striking contrast with the incredibly wretched conditions of the old locations. In place of the ramshackle tin huts and dark cellars in which the families of the unprivileged classes were huddled, each coloured family and each native family is being enabled to acquire for the same rent as it paid before a neat house, equipped with the gadgets which a modern European flat can boast, and set in a little garden. The municipality erected last year a thousand houses of which 600 are for the natives. It required 125 of the houses to accommodate the families who were living before in fifteen slum tenements. The scheme will eventually provide for 30,000 persons, and there will be 3,000 houses for natives, 1,500 for coloured, and as many for poor whites. A community hall and a school are rising in each location; there will

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be a separate swimming bath and social centre for the natives, and a head-man who will have employment under the municipality will be responsible for the good condition of each group of twenty houses. The money for this large enterprise is derived in great part from a loan by the Government given at a low rate of interest; and for the first time the Government funds are being used to improve the housing, not only of the "poor whites," but of the coloured and the native workers. No compensation was paid to the slum landlords, because their tenements were condemned as unfit for habitation.

The example of Port Elizabeth should affect the housing and social conditions of the natives in the other towns. It will influence, in the fullness of time, the municipality of Johannesburg, where the need for improvement is greatest because of its great mass of Bantu workers, both in the surrounding mines and in the town itself. The native township of Orlando, which the municipality is erecting, and which already contains some 30,000 inhabitants, may come to reflect something of the progressive and human spirit that marks the new quarters of Port Elizabeth.

Another legislative measure, the Native Land and Trust Act, 1936, marked a step forward in the provision for natives on the land. It set up a South African Native Trust to buy fifteen million acres at a cost of £10,000,000 and released considerable areas of crown land for the native reserves. The present parliamentary session is to consider three bills concerning native matters. One aims at the improvement of the method of native taxation, on which the social services for natives, such as they are, exclusively depend. The taxation bears so hardly on the native population that in recent years 60,000 have been arrested annually for non-payment, and half of them have suffered sentences of imprisonment. The bill proposes to allow payment by instalment, and also, as an alternative to imprisonment for non-payment, work service

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by the person in default, either for the Government or for approved private employers. This bill, though open to objection in principle, may bring some alleviation in practice. Another bill, though in principle fair as between white and native, is likely in practice, if it is passed, to aggravate the discrimination against the native. It proposes to give the Administration large powers as regards the boundaries of native areas, and will enable the expropriation of native lands surrounded by white settlements. It will enable, also, expropriation of the land of white settlers surrounded by native land, but that power is not likely to be effective.

The problem of native reserves is bound up with the problem of the native protectorates, Swaziland, Bechuanaland and Basutoland, which the Union Government insistently demands of the British Government to hand over for complete incorporation. They are at present administered by a British High Commissioner, who applies the principles of a paramount trust for the natives which are embodied, also, in the Mandates of the League of Nations for the former German colonies. The British Government is reluctant to renounce its trust for the natives in the Protectorates until it can obtain a firm assurance that they will not suffer from the transfer. On the other hand, the Union Government take up the standpoint: If not now, when? They regard it as anomalous that nearly half of South Africa is outside the control of the Union, while more than half the natives in the Protectorates obtain their living from work in the Union. A year ago, Mr. Malcolm McDonald announced that further steps were to be taken to increase the co-operation between the Union Government and the Protectorates; and a standing Joint Advisory Conference has been established to study openings for co-operation in matters affecting the development of the protected territories. The solution may perhaps be found by the application to the native protected areas of the principles of

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the Mandate for Tanganyika. And it is interesting in that connection that General Smuts derived in part his original plan for the international mandates from the provisions in the schedule of the Union of South Africa Act concerning the natives.

The sincere adoption, however, of the principles of the Mandates towards the natives—and the adoption must be sincere—would require a change of heart on the part of the majority of the white citizens of South Africa. The totalitarian doctrines professed by Dr. Malan and his followers are not encouraging. On the other hand, the threat to the independence and integrity of the Union of South Africa, which is manifest on the part of the Nazi minority in South West Africa, as well as the economic conditions in the Rand, may bring it home to a section of the Boers as well as to the British that the security and wellbeing of the country cannot be any longer based on the suppression and exploitation of the great mass of its working population. The Bantu can only be expected to stand with the Boer and the Briton for the defence of the country against an external foe if he has a square deal. The application of the principles of the Mandate concerning Native land and Native rights, which might start in the protectorates, would gradually be extended to the rest of the Union. If, then, the Government of the Union and the British Government agreed that the Union should receive a mandate for the three territories, and be responsible for its administration to the Permanent Mandates Commission, in the same way as it is for South-West Africa, the responsibilities of the Union and of the British Government might be reconciled.

HOW CAN WE TEACH POLITICS?

By FREDERIC EVANS, M.B.E., M.A.

(*Director of Education, Erith, Kent*)

NO question is more full of controversy than that concerning the teaching of politics and economics in our schools. No subject needs more urgently to be taught and in no subject is it more difficult to reach general agreement as to what to teach.

There is first the old problem of whether the schools exist to perpetuate existing conditions in society or to act as dynamic aids to social progress. If the former, then progress in thought becomes greatly handicapped even if complacent minds are undisturbed. If the latter be the spirit of the teaching, then the schools will come in for much misunderstanding and hostile criticism. In this dilemma what are teachers to do?

Furthermore, there is the urgent need, in view of the trend towards the standardisation of the educational process in the totalitarian states, for keeping alive at all costs a system of education which has regard for opposing or divergent points of view and is designed to develop individual thought and opinions. This is the British tradition in education and it permits of the encouragement of the many individual growing points of mental enterprise harmonised in a freely co-operating community.

There are some who say that we should teach the facts and leave the children to form their own judgments without pressure or emphasis by the teacher. That arouses the question—What are the facts? It is abundantly clear that our mental processes are much less intellectual than we once thought they were and much more emotionally conditioned than we had ever dreamed. What is fact to the Conservative may be rank heresy to the Socialist.

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Even descriptive matter of current affairs and historical material can be presented perfectly sincerely by different people in a variety of lights. The eye tends to see what we wish it to see and the tongue to stress what we wish it to emphasise. This is a human weakness present in all partisans alike. There are therefore few absolute and objective facts, especially in human affairs.

This is not to say that the teacher should not, in using his material, attempt to be as dispassionate and as objective as possible. That is essential, but if he is to obtain this objectivity he must be able to present *all* the facts and not the conventional set which custom has usually prescribed.

In the study of economics, for example, the Soviet plan of the Communistic State or the Fascist plan of the Corporate State is just as much fact as our own state based upon private enterprise controlled to some extent in the public interest. Varying views on economic theory are as much fact as the particular economic system under which we live. It is quite a mistake to think that all economic "laws" are unchangeable—immutable. Most of them are "laws" for just so long as the people concerned wish them to be "laws." Indeed, many economic obstacles are not fundamental but psychological obstacles. For instance, the value of gold in a currency is basically a psychological one—it has value because people believe it has value, though this value is related to the amount available or in circulation at a particular time.

We come therefore to the inevitable conclusion that the bar to human progress is mainly one of the mind, for otherwise would not the abundance which technology has brought mankind be used in the general interest of human well-being and happiness? The age-long idea of scarcity in human necessities persists into the psychology of a society which has, actually, through its science and technology brought plenty into the world.

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But the trouble is that our social sciences have lagged behind our technology so that we are not psychologically prepared to make full use of the real wealth which the physical sciences have made available to the world. Surely the correction of this lag is the task of education and therefore a concern of the schools.

When, however, we come to consider ways and means of bringing this about we have to break new ground and become subject to the criticisms which usually assail the pioneer. One teaching approach to the problem is fortunately little open to controversy—and that is the indirect approach. The physical sciences which gave us the industrial age and a plenitude of this world's goods, but gave these things without soul, have long held an honoured place amongst the subjects taught at school. There is now the need also to give the same emphasis to the human sciences such as biology, economics, psychology, hygiene, etc. These being concerned with human life and relationships, their study may serve to redress the balance in the scientific studies and make humane what has hitherto been mechanical.

But what of the direct approach—that is—an understanding of the various political programmes which aim to bring about what their advocates believe to be the most advantageous conditions of life in the respective communities? Here is the very essence of controversy. How are these opposing political faiths to be presented?

I have postulated, first, the indirect approach afforded by the study of the generally accepted facts in the social sciences, these being treated as objectively as possible. This background of knowledge will help to stabilise and make less violent the subsequent choice of political opinion which will be made in due course by the pupil. When this ground has been well prepared, the presentation of a reasoned statement of the political faith of all the great political parties should

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be made. These statements should be concise, objective, and made without prejudice to the other parties.

These outlines of political faith should be prepared by responsible groups in each party in consultation with representative teachers. The statements should be carefully checked and revised and also submitted to all the other political parties for comment before the text is finally adopted. All three great parties should be asked to do this. It may be doubtful to some at this stage whether a Communist statement on the one hand and a Fascist one on the other should be included, although it would be as well—for the unknown often presents to seekers after knowledge an unusual fascination.

Having got these statements, restrained, balanced, and free from mud-slinging at other parties, the teacher should present them to his class.

“This is the Conservative view—these are their reasons”—and so on.

It will be important to emphasise, in presenting these statements, that the views are sincerely held and by people generally equally virtuous and well-meaning. One of the great tragedies in human controversy is the ease with which we can turn our dislikes of opposing points of view to intense personal hatreds. It is this fact which underlies all the attempts to standardise opinion, whether Communistic or Fascist.

This dispassionate discussion of opposing or divergent views and the emphasis upon the right of people to differ, would go a long way to counteract the all-too-prevalent hatred between classes and parties. The teacher would say: “There are the different programmes—try to understand all you can about them and choose which you will, but whatever you accept see that you try to obtain all the facts and be ready to believe that people may hold, in all sincerity, the opposite opinion, and to respect them for it.”

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When should this be done? It must be done, if at all, in the Secondary, Technical, Senior or Central Schools. The political comparison should come in the last year—or even term—at school and the raising of the school-leaving age, if this can be made effective, will make this possible, more than hitherto, in the Senior Schools. It is work also specially suitable for the Evening Institute. The capable teacher will adjust his indirect and direct approach to the study of politics to the age and capacity of his pupils—that aspect of the work is not discussed here.

In a world of change, of the attempts by types of political opinion to exterminate all others, some real effort to produce in our schools a sane, tolerant and yet critical understanding of the essentials of the chief types of political thought is very necessary. I have suggested a way in which a beginning might be made.

JEW IN ITALY

By ISRAEL COHEN

IF there was any country in Europe that was free until a couple of years ago not only from Jewish persecution but even from a Jewish problem, it was Italy. The Jews had enjoyed the fullest political equality since the declaration of the Union of Italy in 1859, and the Fascist Government, particularly since the Nazi Revolution, had repeatedly proclaimed its fidelity to the principle of racial tolerance. But in 1938 Italian policy underwent a radical and reactionary change. The Jews were utterly stripped of their civil rights, reduced to the status of second-class citizens, and subjected to a multitude of oppressive laws and humiliating restrictions. This change of treatment was not due to any disaffection on the part of Italian Jewry: it was only one of the consequences of Italy's alliance with Germany. The political union alone did not content the Nazi Government: it had to be supplemented by an ideological compact consisting of the adoption of the "racial" theory, in order to give proof of its sincerity. So Jews were sacrificed upon the altar of the Berlin-Rome Axis—a calamity that has not only blighted the lives of the oldest Jewish community in Europe, but also besmirched the name of Italy.

The persecution that has overtaken the Jews in Italy is all the more remarkable in view of the antiquity of their domicile, their complete identification with the national life, their fewness in number, and their loyal and distinguished services to the country. Although dating back over two thousand years (for there were Jews in Rome long before Titus overthrew Jerusalem and brought home a band of captives), they remained fairly constant in number for centuries, indicating a ceaseless process of intermarriage, religious conversion, and assimilation. According to the census of 1931, they did not exceed 48,000, and even according to the special census carried out in 1938 there were only 57,425 Jews throughout the country—surely no formidable aggregation in a total population of 41,000,000.

The champions of "racialism" in Italy cannot urge the

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specious pretext originally advanced by the Nazis, that the Jews occupy too influential a position in political and public life, for if it could have been said that there was such a period in Italy, it was before the War. Of all the eminent sons of Israel in Italy, the most distinguished was Luigi Luzzatti, who for half a century played a prominent and beneficent part in the political and economic life of his country. He was the first Jew in Europe faithful to the religion of his fathers who rose to the position of Prime Minister (1905-11) and his versatility was displayed by the fact that he had previously served as Minister of Finance on six occasions, besides holding other posts in the Cabinet. Another Jew, Ernesto Nathan, was Lord Mayor of Rome from 1907 to 1913 without arousing any question as to the fitness of a Jew to direct the affairs of the metropolis of the Catholic world. There were at least four other Jews who attained Cabinet rank: Baron Sidney Sonnino was also Prime Minister, besides occupying the posts of Finance Minister and Foreign Secretary; Carlo Schanzer was likewise Foreign Secretary; Leone Wollemborg was Finance Minister; and General Giuseppe Ottolenghi was Minister for Works; while Giacomo Malvano was for many years Secretary General of the Foreign Office.

If any evidence were wanted that the Jews were quite as keen to serve their country in the waging of war as in the arts of peace, it has been given in ample measure. Long before the Great War they had displayed their gallantry in defence of the country. Garibaldi was always supported by Jewish volunteers; and one of the most redoubtable of Italian patriots was a Jew, Daniele Manin, who distinguished himself in the defence of Venice against the Austrians and became President of the Venetian Republic (1848-9). The part played by Italian Jews in the Great War is sufficiently attested by the fact that they received over 3,000 medals for bravery—an unusually high number, considering how small a proportion they form of the general population. Perhaps most remarkable of all is the number of military officers of high rank that they have produced. During an audience that the King of Italy gave the late Zionist leader, Nahum Sokolow, in 1932, he mentioned that in his Army there were not fewer than eleven Jewish Generals. One of these,

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General Modena, Commandant of Sardinia, was particularly mentioned by Signor Mussolini in his talks with Emil Ludwig two years earlier, when he poked fun at the "racial" theory and paid a tribute to the part that the Jews had played in the public life of the country.

When the Fascist Revolution took place, the attitude of Jews was determined by the same considerations as those that influenced their Christian fellow-citizens. Indeed, quite a number of them took an active and prominent part in the movement from the very beginning. Among them were men like Massimo de Castiglioni (at one time Commander of the Eighth Fascist Militia Legion), who, in his capacity as Commander of the Military Garrison in the capital, threw open the city to the black-shirted cohorts of the Duce on their March upon Rome in 1922, and was thus partly responsible for the success of the enterprise. Mussolini's trusty lieutenant was Dr. Aldo Finzi, a redoubtable airman, who suppressed the revolt against Fascism in Milan, took part in the March on Rome, and later became Assistant-Minister of the Interior. Then there were Edoardo Polacco, General Secretary of the Fascist Party in the Province of Brindisi, who also took part in the March; Professor Carlo Foa, an impressive orator, who became editor of the "most Fascist" Review, *La Gerarchia*, and several others.

Jewish sympathy for Fascism was also displayed in other ways than political. When Mussolini set up a Commission of fifteen learned jurists to make changes in the Italian Constitution, in order to bring it into harmony with Fascist principles, he included three Jews—Professors Arias, Barone, and Levi, whom he entrusted with a particularly delicate part of the difficult task. One of the Duce's closest friends was the Jewish authoress of Milan, Margherita Sarfati, who collaborated with him for a time in editing the official organ of the Fascist party and afterwards became famous as the writer of his biography. In recent years at least two Jews have held high offices of State—Guido Jung, who was Finance Minister until 1935, and Senator Lodovico Mortara, who was Lord Chief Justice and First President of the Court of Appeal, and there have been a number of Jews in the Fascist Grand Council.

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It should follow from this array of facts that Italian Fascism is officially not opposed in principle to Jews or Judaism, but it was not long before certain Fascist journals began to publish articles suggesting a contrary view. One of the earliest anti-Semites was Giovanni Preziosi, who first published an Italian version of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in 1921, and began an anti-Jewish campaign in his review *La Vita Italiana*. Another journal, *Rivista di Milano*, in 1923, repeatedly accused Signor Toeplitz, managing director of the Banca Commerciale Italiana, "of association with Bolshevism." These ebullitions of intolerance caused the then Chief Rabbi of Rome, the late Dr. Sacerdoti, to obtain an official declaration on the matter from the Duce. The result was an interview, published by Dr. Sacerdoti himself, in the Rome *Epoca*, in which "Mussolini expressed his astonishment that these views of the anti-Semitic attitude of Fascism should have obtained currency abroad. Anti-Semitism, he said, is a plant which cannot obtain a foothold in Italy, where the Jews are citizens with full equality of rights with other citizens." (*Manchester Guardian*, January 1, 1924.)

The Duce himself, on more than one occasion and in more than one way, gave evidence of sympathy with Jews. His Government not only accorded friendly asylum to some thousands of Jewish students who had been barred or driven from the Universities in their native countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but also permitted them to attend the Universities, either free or at half-fees, while some of them were even given monetary grants. But perhaps the most striking instance of his friendship was shown when the Nazi Government, at the end of March, 1933, decreed a three days' boycott against Jews in Germany, for it was due to the personal intervention of Mussolini with Hitler—as I was informed by the late Dr. Sacerdoti when I was in Rome a few months later—that the boycott was reduced to one day. He also opened his frontier to a few thousand Jewish refugees from Germany who were allowed to settle in Milan and other industrial centres.

These various acts were in harmony with a number of statements made by Mussolini at different times. In 1932,

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in a conversation with Emil Ludwig on the question of race, the Duce expressed himself in the following emphatic terms:

"There are no pure races left. . . . I shall never believe that it can be proved biologically that a race is more or less pure. No such doctrine will ever find acceptance here. National pride has no need of the delirium of race. Anti-Semitism does not exist in Italy. Italian Jews have shown themselves good citizens, and they fought bravely in the War."

In May, 1933, Herr Theodor Wolff, the former editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, had an interview with Mussolini, who said: "Italian Fascism knows nothing of anti-Semitism, which is the shibboleth and the chief sound and fury of the German organisation." A year later, at Bari, in opening the Levant Fair, Mussolini spoke even more contemptuously of the tenets of Nazism:

"Thirty centuries of history allow us to look with supreme pity on certain doctrines upheld beyond the Alps by the descendants of those who were illiterate at the time when Rome had Cæsar, Vergil, and Augustus."

Official relations between the Government and the Jews, during Mussolini's first fifteen years of office, were invariably friendly. A new Statute for the regulation of Jewish affairs was decreed in 1930, whereby all Jewish communities of the Peninsula and the Colonies were combined into a "National Union of the Italian Israelite Communities." This Union, presided over by a Rabbinical Council which was recognised by the Government, was allowed a wide measure of autonomy. The Government—until recently—showed sympathy with the Zionist movement and permitted Jewish delegates to attend both the Zionist Congress and the World Jewish Congress. The Duce has received the President of the Zionist Organisation, Dr. Weizmann, as well as other Zionist leaders, such as the late Lord Melchett (Sir Alfred Mond), and repeatedly expressed his satisfaction at Jewish progress in Palestine.

Not only did Mussolini display a friendly attitude towards the Jews in Italy, but he evinced a particular concern for the Jews abroad—especially those in the Mediterranean area who

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could be used, however indirectly, as agents of Italian propaganda. Thus, the Italian Consuls in the Near East (for example, in Greece and Egypt) were instructed to encourage the descendants of former Italian Jews to apply for or to retain Italian nationality; a Readership in Italian was maintained at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and a Rabbinical College was established at Rhodes in order that its graduates might disseminate Italian culture amongst Jewish communities of the Near East.

With such an impressive record of philo-Semitism to his credit, the conversion of Mussolini to the Nazi brand of anti-Semitism may well arouse surprise. His conversion was due primarily to two factors: his desire to pose as the "Protector of Islam" and, above all, his alliance with Germany. Embittered by the sanctions imposed on account of its war against Abyssinia and for which it principally blamed Great Britain, Italy played an active part, with money and otherwise, in inciting the Arabs of Palestine against British rule; and since Jews were regarded as supporters of British interests, they were also looked upon as an enemy. The friendship with Germany necessitated the suppression of any criticism of Nazi policy, for which the ill-treatment of Jews had been partly responsible; and the intimacy of the alliance involved the adoption not only of a common policy in the political sphere but also of a common ideological platform. Hence Jews in Italy were subjected to a code of persecution. But before this was drafted, or even conceived, Mussolini made one final essay as a friend of the Jews. He had a special pamphlet published on "The Jews in Italy," consisting of a panegyric on the liberal treatment of the Jews in Italy, which was contrasted with the persecution of those in Germany. The purpose of this brochure, which was written by an Austrian Jew, Eli Rubin, and was published in Vienna in 1936, was explained in a second pamphlet entitled *Mussolini: Raciste et Antisemite*, which appeared in Paris at the end of 1938. This second pamphlet was by the same author, who had meanwhile become a refugee from the Nazi terror. In it he describes how, on December 20, 1935, he paid a visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome, where it was arranged that he should issue a pamphlet only

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in English, which should be distributed under the direction of the Italian Embassy in Vienna throughout the world, but especially in English-speaking countries. Its object was to influence public opinion, particularly in Great Britain and the United States, in favour of the policy of Mussolini, who was then waging war against Abyssinia. The Duce imagined that by widely advertising the equality that Jews in Italy then enjoyed he would not only undermine the general hostility to his campaign but also secure Jewish support in London and New York for a loan of which he was in urgent need. The result of this costly propaganda campaign was an utter fiasco, and from the summer of 1936 Mussolini began to tread along the road of anti-Semitism.

The new course was signalled by acts of intolerance against the Jews in Tripoli and by press and literary propaganda in Italy. Marshal Balbo, Governor of Tripoli, expelled the Chief Rabbi of the province, Dr. Castelbolognesi, because he refused to annul a marriage that had been contracted in accordance with Jewish law. More outrageous, however, was his action in decreeing that Jewish tradesmen must keep their shops in the centre of the city of Tripoli open on Saturdays, and in threatening with severe penalties those who refused thus to desecrate their Sabbath. About a hundred Jews were for a time under arrest, many were deprived of their trade licences, and two were sentenced to be flogged in a public square.

When the Duce in 1936 visited Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and proclaimed himself "Protector of Islam," he allowed himself to be presented by the Arab chiefs with a magnificent "Sword of Islam," which had been provided by the Italian Government itself at a cost of £2,000. Then he visited the Jewish quarters of Benghazi and Tripoli, and was received with an enthusiastic ovation. At Benghazi Jews presented him with an old silver citron-holder (an article for ritual use on the Festival of Tabernacles) and 20,000 lire, while those of Tripoli offered a massive golden "Menorah" (seven-branched candlestick) of the value of 70,000 lire: the gifts being provided by the Jews themselves. And after the Chief Rabbi had expressed the loyalty and goodwill of the Jews and their hopes that Italy would continue her tradition of

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religious tolerance, the Duce replied that his Government would respect their religious traditions and feelings.

The process of conversion was initiated by Dr. Goebbels on the occasion of his visit to the International Film Exhibition in Venice, in August, 1936, when he had a long discussion with his opposite number, Signor Dino Alfieri. Their meeting was followed by the visit of an official delegation of the Fascist Party to the Nazi Congress at Nuremberg, and there burst forth a veritable spate of anti-Semitic articles in the press, as well as a crop of books on "raceology." The plague first broke out in *Il Regime Fascista*, a paper issued in Cremona by Roberto Farinacci, who was Secretary of the Fascist Party for several years. An attack upon Jews that appeared in the *Popolo d'Italia* of December 31, 1936, and that caused a sensation because it was attributed to Mussolini himself, included a disparaging reference to M. Leon Blum, then Premier of France. The press campaign was resumed in March, 1937, by *Il Tevere*, which advocated the Nazi race theory as based upon the "biological dignity," which Italy particularly needed while pursuing her "imperialist expansion." Fuel was added to the flames by a number of books, of which the one that attracted the most widespread attention was *Gli Ebrei in Italia*, by Paolo Orano, who wrote:

"In Italy, too, the Jews regard themselves in the first place as Jews, this attitude being reflected in their Zionism and their sympathy for refugees from Germany, while they are entirely indifferent towards the purpose of the regime. Briefly, they are anti-German on the one hand, and in full agreement with the British policy on the other hand. Fascist Italy is in danger of harbouring another dangerous enemy within its fold."

Other works were the more direct offspring of Nazi inspiration, and expressed approval of the German racial theory.

In consequence of this persistent crusade, the Chief Rabbi of Rome addressed an inquiry to Count Ciano who assured him that no change of any kind had taken place in the attitude of the Italian Government towards Jews. The Ministry of Popular Culture (formerly Ministry of the Press) officially declared that there was no anti-Semitism on the part of the

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State. But despite these assurances the first acts of discrimination were announced in February, 1938: no book by an Italian Jew was to be published without special authority, no book by a foreign Jew was to be translated into Italian, no play of a foreign Jew might be produced, and no Jew could broadcast. In May, 1938, Hitler paid a visit to Italy, after his annexation of Austria, and in his conversations with Mussolini doubtless demanded an alignment with Germany on the Jewish question, for shortly afterwards a delegation of German experts on race, headed by the Chief of the Office of Race Policy, Professor Walter Gross, visited Rome, and Roberto Farinacci, the arch-Jew-baiter, was appointed Minister of State without portfolio.

A decisive step was then taken in the instruction given to a group of University teachers to draw up a report on the problems of race, which was issued anonymously on July 14, 1938. This document declared that the Italian people was of Aryan origin, that Jews had remained an alien and unassimilated element, and that it was time that the Italians proclaimed themselves "racialists." Even then official circles claimed that the document was only of academic interest, but Mussolini, in addressing a meeting of Federal Secretaries on July 30, 1938, declared: "You shall know, and every one shall know, that in the question of race we shall go straight ahead—*noi tireremo diritto!*" The Ministry of the Interior promptly established a special "Bureau of Demography and Race Protection," and a new review *La Difesa della Razza* was published under its auspices for the purpose of vilifying Jews in a pseudo-scientific fashion. An announcement soon followed in the *Informazione Diplomatica* that Jews were to be discriminated against in Italian public life, although this discrimination was not to be persecution.

The first decree of the Council of Ministers, published on September 1, 1938, declared that all Jews who had settled in Italy, Libya, and the Italian possessions in the Aegean, since January 1, 1919, must leave those territories within six months, that is, by March 12, 1939, and that all those who had acquired Italian citizenship since the beginning of 1919 must lose it. This decree affected about 15,000 Jews, one-third of whom were settled in Milan and its vicinity. It struck a

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particularly cruel blow at refugees from Germany and Austria, numbering about 4,000, who had been enabled to transfer to Italy a far larger proportion of their property than was allowed in the case of any other country. The only foreign Jews who were specifically exempted from this order of expulsion were those above the age of sixty-five and those married to persons of "Italian nationality" (while the United States Government effectively intervened on behalf of American subjects).

A Royal Decree was issued on September 5, 1938, forbidding Jews to hold any sort of position in Government schools and universities, or in those under Government control. It also prohibited the admission of Jewish pupils or students to any type or grade of school that was legally recognised. Jews were allowed to set up their own schools, but this was a concession of which no advantage could be taken in the many small communities and, until they were opened, Jews attending Italian schools had to use a separate entrance. Furthermore, Jews were banned from all academies and institutes, and from all learned and scientific societies.

On October 7 the Fascist Grand Council issued a further batch of decrees in which the definition given of a Jew was by no means as far-fetched as in the Nazi code. A Jew was one whose both parents were of the Jewish race, even if he did not profess the Jewish religion, or one born of parents of whom one was of "Jewish race" and the other of foreign nationality, or one who, although born of a mixed marriage, was Jewish by religion. But a person was not considered of Jewish race who was born of parents of Italian nationality, only one of whom was of the Jewish race, if they belonged to some other religion than Judaism before October, 1938. By these decrees Jews were exempted from discrimination—except in regard to education in schools of every kind and grade—who belonged to families of those who had fallen in Italy's four wars (Libyan, Great, Abyssinian, and Spanish), or of those who had fallen or were injured in the Fascist cause, or who had been inscribed in the Party before 1924. Those who did not belong to any of these categories could not be inscribed in the National Fascist Party, own or manage

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business firms employing 100 persons or more, own more than 50 hectares of land, or take part in military service in peace or war.

These various enactments were supplemented by a number of others. Jews were forbidden to be owners or managers of any enterprises concerned with the defence of the nation; they must not own rural lands yielding an income of more than 5,000 lire, or urban property of a combined taxable value exceeding 20,000 lire. They were expelled from the Stock Exchanges. They were compelled to liquidate their financial firms and forbidden to open any new business. They could no longer be employed in the civil and military administration of the State, in the Fascist Party and its organisations, in the administration of the provinces, the municipalities, public institutions, semi-State agencies, banks of national importance, or private insurance companies. They must not act as guardians or trustees of minors of "Jewish race," nor employ as domestic servants "Italians of the Aryan race"—an offence punishable by a fine of 1,000 to 5,000 lire. They must not slaughter animals in accordance with the principles of Jewish law, although they were expressly promised the free exercise of their religion. No book by a Jew might be published, and text-books by Jewish authors must be banned. Jews must be excluded from all social and sports clubs, they must not advertise in the press, they must not even announce a death in the newspapers, and their one and only weekly paper, *Israel*, was suppressed.

This avalanche of decrees had a crushing effect upon a community that had always prided itself upon its perfect liberty and its absolute identity with the national life. About one-fourth of the native Jews—3,522 families out of a total of 15,000—were exempt from these oppressive disabilities, though not from the laws excluding them from schools and universities, nor were they quite immune from social persecution, for even those entitled to belong to the Fascist Party were barred from the Party's reading-rooms and conferences. Those who could not claim exemption were indeed in a sorry plight. They were discharged wholesale from their various positions: officers from the army, navy and air forces, including six Generals and even Admirals (among

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them Admiral Paolo Maroni, formerly in command at Majorca), and officials from the Government and municipal services. Nearly a hundred professors and lecturers were dismissed from the Universities. A thousand families were affected by dismissals from shipping companies, although Jews were retained on the lines trading with Palestine, as the Jewish custom on these ships was far too profitable to lose. An impetus was given to the "Aryanisation" of businesses, and notices with the inscription *Negozio Ariano* made their appearance, in Nazi fashion, in many shop-windows. Tens of thousands were reduced to distress and destitution, compelled to seek relief from their community. Many, unable to bear the agony of degradation, sought escape in suicide, among them being General Ascoli, Colonel Segre, and the well-known publisher, Angelo Formiggini, who threw himself down from a tower in Modena, holding a copy of a letter that he had written to Mussolini.

The Government established a special board for the purpose of purchasing and reselling all property which Jews had to surrender above the maximum they were permitted to retain. Official appraisers assessed the value of all such property, whether land, houses or business, and the owners were given thirty-year 4 per cent. Government bonds, which were not negotiable abroad. Following the Nazi example, the Government issued a further decree ordering all Jews to report to the fiscal authorities details of all their property and of their commercial and industrial undertakings. The purpose of this enactment, as in Germany, was clearly to enable the Government to enrich itself at the expense of its Jewish victims. Those who were obliged or who wished to leave the country were not allowed to take with them more than 2,500 lire, which scarcely sufficed for more than a few weeks. They had to hand over all their assets to a Refugee Committee, which was authorised to organise their transfer by a system involving dealings in specified merchandise and entailing a loss on the capital concerned that ranged from 25 to 90 per cent.

Of the 15,000 foreign Jews, about one-half had succeeded in leaving the country before March 12, 1939—the day fixed for their departure. As that day approached, the Consulates

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of many countries were besieged by crowds of desperate Jews anxious to obtain permits for some land of asylum before falling liable to expulsion. Those who had failed to leave by the appointed date appealed for a respite, which was granted if they proved that they were making every effort to emigrate. Those who had come from Germany or Austria were in deadly fear of being sent back. Hundreds who had abandoned all hope of getting permits for other countries contrived to cross the frontier into France, after a perilous climb across the Alps; many arrived frost-bitten and had to be taken to a hospital; others sustained serious and even fatal injuries in their attempts to escape. An order has now been issued that over 3,000 foreign Jews must leave by the end of June.

Jews in Italy's oversea possessions were likewise in a sorry plight. In Libya, where there is a Jewish population of 33,000, a few thousand were drafted into labour battalions to work on the new fortifications on the Tunisian frontier, from where many succeeded in fleeing into French territory. The Falasha communities in Abyssinia had at first received lavish promises from the Government, but now they were dissolved, and the Falashas were treated as the lowest of natives. In the Island of Rhodes there was a Jewish population of 4,000, of whom 500 were under sentence of expulsion. A hundred emigrated to Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo, but the rest have been allowed to remain for the present.

Both Government and Fascist Party took systematic steps to supplement the oppressive legislation by vigorously propagating Jew-hatred. The Propaganda Ministry instructed the press to reprint articles on the Jewish question from the German papers. Publishers were ordered to withdraw all books containing references to Jews that were not in harmony with the new racial theories. A hunt was made after all copies of a pre-Fascist pocket-dictionary which defined anti-Semites as "people scarcely civilised, who are hostile to the Jews"; but students could still read in the monumental Italian Encyclopædia an article on anti-Semitism, which said:

"Among us the tradition of our national Risorgimento, in contrast to the events in Germany, was for national reasons entirely favourable to the emancipation of the

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Jews and their incorporation in the State. . . . In Italy, moreover, there are lacking the economic and social motives which, while they do not justify, do explain in part the success of anti-Semitism in other countries."

The Fascist Party even opened special courses in many towns to teach members the anti-Jewish theories, and made attendance compulsory. Warnings were issued that all who sympathised with Jews would be punished, but so unpopular was the new ideology, not only among the general public, that a thousand Fascists, rather than bow the knee to Baal, submitted to expulsion from the Party.

The most valiant and outspoken antagonism to the Government's policy was waged by the Pope and all the leading dignitaries of the Catholic Church. The organ of the Vatican, *Osservatore Romano*, wrote: "The victorious advance of anti-Semitism is a disgrace." It stigmatised Nazi racial theories as "a negation of science and of Christian civilisation, and an insult to the religious conscience of the Italian nation." It rebuked Italian scholars in particular, and pointed out that "even from the patriotic and the nationalist points of view one should not remain indifferent in face of the invasion of doctrines that are apt to mislead and end in moral and material slavery." The Archbishop of Milan condemned the policy as "an international danger not less grave than Bolshevism itself." In many towns thousands of leaflets were circulated, appealing to the people to counteract the anti-Jewish propaganda, and containing the exhortation: "Catholics must be philo-Semites!" But the Government, having surrendered ignominiously to the Nazi Führer, has ridden roughshod over all sentimental opposition and applied itself ruthlessly to the degradation and pauperisation of the helpless Jewish community, whose only means of salvation, like that of the more sorely persecuted Jewry of the Greater Reich, lies, so far as one can at present foresee, in exile.

SURVEYS

STATE ASSISTANCE IN THE SHIPPING AND SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIES

BEFORE the last war this country owned about half of the world's merchant marine and was building approximately three-fifths of new tonnage. Today these proportions have declined to approximately one-quarter and one-fifth respectively. This change has come about because the building of merchant fleets and the choice of ships for carrying world trade is governed no longer by economic laws or business considerations, but by strategic and nationalist interests. The havoc that the aeroplane and submarine can play on merchant fleets in times of war has greatly increased the important role of shipping in national defence. At the same time the closed economy of the totalitarian states has necessitated the use of their own vessels for carrying their trade, irrespective of cost, to eliminate paying out foreign exchange. These two factors have led to the building up of national fleets by countries who were previously dependent upon British ships. A further cause of Britain's decline in importance as a carrier on the high seas is that comparable costs here both of shipbuilding and the shipping industry are higher than those of our competitors owing to tariffs, which served to build up a monopoly in the steel industry, and, in some cases, better working conditions. The carrying trade of British ships has declined also owing to loss of export markets by British manufacturers.

It is still true that, at least as far as cargo vessels are concerned, British ships are preferred when they can be obtained on equal terms. Often they cannot, not only because of the difference in cost, but because of both the direct and indirect assistance given by foreign governments to build up national merchant fleets. The net result is that the proportion of British owned ships is lower than it has been for generations. At the end of 1938 the United Kingdom had only 26 per cent of the world's tonnage against 42 per cent in 1914. While the tonnage owned by this country has

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declined, total world tonnage has increased more rapidly than world trade. Since 1913 world trade has risen by about a quarter, but total shipping by nearly one-half. The Board of Trade estimates British shipping carried 40 per cent of the world's trade in 1936 compared with 48 per cent in 1912.

Faced with these conditions British shipping finally impressed upon the Government the need for State assistance. It was given in the form of a subsidy in 1934 when a prominent shipowner, Mr. Walter Runciman (now Lord Runciman) was at the Board of Trade. In that year freight rates had fallen so low that many British shipping companies operated at a loss and few were able to provide for the depreciation of their fleets. The Board of Trade index of freight rates, taking 1929 as 100, was down to 74½. To meet this situation the Government proposed a subsidy at the rate of £2,000,000 a year for three years, the subsidy to cease if the freight rate average rose to 92 per cent of the 1929 level. This it did, and the subsidy was only paid for two years, 1935 and 1936. The Government gave the subsidy for defensive purposes against foreign subsidies, and it was only for tramp steamers trading as tramps. Assistance was granted on condition that the industry so organised itself that it would be self-supporting when the subsidy expired. Responsibility for drawing up such a scheme and for administering the subsidy was placed on the shipowners themselves. A Tramp Shipping Subsidy Committee was appointed and consisted of seven members interested in shipping and one independent member who had been head of the Mercantile Marine Department of the Board of Trade. The Tramp Shipping Administrative Committee was composed entirely of shipowners and was given the task of framing the scheme of organisation. This it did by getting the shipowners to agree on minimum freight rates as well as on restriction of available tonnage. The subsidy was paid only to shipowners who accepted these two schemes and abided by the National Maritime Board agreements, such as those relating to conditions of employment.

The subsidy coincided with a period of world trade revival and freight rates rose to an average of 131.5 during 1937. Emphasis was continually laid by the Tramp Shipping Administrative Committee on the fact that the rates fixed

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should only be considered as minimum rates. The Committee wrote :

"At the present moment market rates are in excess of the minimum which are thus left to serve their purpose of a ratchet."¹

Mechanically speaking a ratchet allows motion in one direction but checks it in the contrary sense. This was the basic policy pursued by the subsidised shipowners in administering the scheme demanded by the Government in return for the subsidy. The method employed was the frequent raising of the minimum rates above which prices rose, but below which they never fell. Again in their final report the Committee wrote :

"Actual market rates have at times considerably exceeded these minima. It has throughout been a principle of the Committee's administration to impress upon shipowners that the minima are intended only as a rock bottom safeguard for the Industry. The increased demand for tonnage which continued during the first nine months of the year warranted rates of freight well in excess of the minima."²

At the same time profits rose and the Tramp Shipping Administrative Committee published figures to show that the tramp owners were able to cover the increased cost of operation and provide for current depreciation and a small return on capital. The Committee gives the aggregate profits of a number of companies for 1937 and compares them with 1936. Reports of 41 tramp companies published during 1936 owning 309 ships with a gross tonnage of 1,464,487 made a profit on voyages of £1,082,889. The 1937 accounts showed that 40 companies with 294 ships and proportionately less tonnage made more than double that profit on voyages, namely £2,237,009. Out of these profits dividends equivalent to 2.1 per cent were paid for 1936 and twice as much, 4.2 per cent for 1937.³ In view of the rise in freight rates and the improved profit position, the Tramp Shipping Administrative Committee, composed as it was of shipowners, considered the policy of the Government in the granting of subsidy to be fully justified by results. They claimed that it had saved British tramp shipping from collapse and restored confidence

¹ Report of Tramp Shipping Administrative Committee for six months ended December 3, 1936.

² Ibid for six months ended December 31, 1937.

³ Ibid to December 31, 1937.

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to the industry; that it had stopped the abnormal sale of British tramp ships abroad, increased employment on British tramp ships, and almost eliminated unemployment amongst British seamen. No foreign crews could be carried on a ship in receipt of subsidy, with the result that while unemployment fell among British seamen, it rose among foreign seamen. The Committee, presumably without conscious irony, wrote:

"The position is better than it would appear from the unemployment statistics as many of the displaced foreign seamen domiciled in this country are included in the unemployment returns."¹

In its final report, the Committee waxed eloquent over State assistance. The British tramp shipping industry had been saved from threatened ruin by the subsidy which was enabling it to move towards prosperity. The subsidy had fulfilled the purpose for which it was temporarily set up, namely the bridging of the gap between the period of depression and returning prosperity.²

Subsequent events showed that the enthusiasm of the shipping interests was premature. The subsidy was not alone responsible for this improvement. With better trade the demand for shipping increased and world shipping, irrespective of whether it was subsidised or not, was well employed at remunerative rates. The conditions of 1935-1937 were favourable to the operation of the minimum freight rates and restriction schemes. With increasing demand, charterers had little choice of ships, so that the rise in freight rates was following normal economic laws. In 1938 world trade began to decline, freight rates fell, and by 1939 the shipping industry was once more suffering from surplus tonnage and falling freight rates. This was despite the voluntary scheme of co-operation, and minimum freight rates which were supposed to be honoured by certain foreign competitors. In practice the minimum freight rates scheme, as far as international co-operation was concerned, became practically a dead letter. Ways and means were found by foreign shipowners of getting round the minimum rates to the disadvantage of British shipowners. Attention is drawn to this because minimum freight rates, depending as they do on international co-operation for effectiveness, can only work

¹ Ibid to December 31, 1935. ² Ibid to December 31, 1937.

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when world trade is good and the supply of tonnage bears some relation to demand. In the present state of economic nationalism and totalitarian governments, international co-operation appears impossible of achievement. For these reasons it is highly probable that the prosperity enjoyed by the shipping industry, in as much as it was governed by freight rates, during the subsidy period was due far more to improvement in world trade than to the subsidy itself. The subsidy enabled shipping companies to make greater profits than they otherwise would have done during the good years, but the reorganisation of the industry did not prevent the full brunt of the decline in world trade which followed being felt. There is no logic in arguing from the prosperity of the subsidy years, and from the depression that followed, that subsidies are essential to the British shipping industry. Nor can the subsidising of British tramp shipping effectively prevent competition from foreign subsidised shipping or more cheaply operated foreign ships. Other governments in their turn increase their subsidies, so competition in State aid resembles the race in armaments.

When the freight index, with 1929 as 100, fell during 1938, approaching 90 by December, the shipowners renewed their pressure for a subsidy. The President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Oliver Stanley, stated in Parliament that the Government recognised the vital importance of the shipping industry to this country and were prepared to help it in any way satisfactory, even if help involved financial assistance. The Government felt that the first move should come from the industry. Mr. Stanley assured the industry that when it had performed this task and brought its results to the Board of Trade, it would not find the Government unsympathetic to the claim of an industry upon which the greatness of Britain was built in the past and upon which it must rest in the future. Accordingly, the industry undertook the reconsideration of the whole question of shipping policy and appointed a series of Fact Finding Committees. They put forward schemes for a subsidy of £2½ millions for deep sea tramps, £500,000 for the near continental routes, and another £500,000 for the coastal trades. They also suggested a liner defence fund of £5 millions to support British liner services. Cargo

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liners had co-operated with the tramps over the matter of minimum rates but their position, as well as that of the passenger trade, was also affected for similar reasons. Passenger liner competition has developed particularly in the Far East where Japanese competition has become very great and threatens to increase once the war in China ends.¹ Indirect assistance has been given here in the form of mail contracts, but in recent years payment for carriage of mails has tended to be on amount carried and not by contract.

These demands were largely met by the Government—£2½ millions for deep sea and continental trades for five years and an advisory committee to consider assistance to liners. Only the coastal trades were left out and that no doubt because it would have brought protests from another set of vested interests, the railways. As before, the subsidy is to be reduced and finally to cease if freight rates rise to a certain level, but it is expected the level will be adjusted to a rise in costs. The President of the Board of Trade also stated that it was conditional on the industry organising itself. This had been a condition of the previous subsidy, and was supposed to have been achieved. It therefore brought some protest from shipowners who considered nothing further could be done in the way of reorganisation.²

No less important than the new subsidy is the assistance given to the shipbuilding industry. The chief difficulty here is high cost in British yards, due largely to the higher cost of raw materials protected by the tariff wall. This applies particularly to steel. The prosperity of the shipping industry is closely related to the cost and extent of shipbuilding. In fact, the difficulties of the shipping industry have been as much due to subsidising of shipbuilding by foreign governments as to the subsidising of the shipping industry itself. Ships built with State assistance start off with an advantage over existing fleets in competing for available trade. At the same time shipping subsidies themselves tend to lead to uneconomic construction because a shipowner, assured of a subsidy for a number of years, will increase his fleet where he otherwise

¹ Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on "British Shipping in the Orient." 1939 deals comprehensively with this problem.

² Notably from Mr. Philip Haldin, deputy-chairman of the Coast Line at its annual meeting of shareholders May 1, 1939.

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would not. Strategic and economic interests conflict. For purposes of national defence it is necessary to have a large merchant marine, but by this uneconomic addition to existing tonnage, the surplus is increased, competition intensified, and profitable operation made more difficult. Nevertheless, the Government has given more assistance directly and indirectly to shipbuilding than to the shipping industry, and only in its latest proposals has an attempt been made to reconcile these opposing interests. By asking Parliament to make £2 millions available for the purchase of suitable vessels, which though still capable of service would otherwise be sold to foreign owners or be broken up, the Government will remove some surplus tonnage and at the same time be able to build up an emergency fleet.

The first post-war attempt at rationalising the shipbuilding industry was under the aegis of the Bank of England early in 1931 when an attempt was made to reduce the number of shipbuilding yards available. National Shipbuilders Security was formed to purchase and dismantle yards, the cost being met by a one per cent levy on all construction. An annual construction capacity of some 1,350,000 gross tons was permanently destroyed in this way.

The first Government scheme was introduced in 1934 under which assistance was given shipowners to replace old tonnage by new. For every two tons of old ships scrapped, one new ton could be built, while one old had to be scrapped for each one modernised. Ships for scrapping could be bought from foreign owners as well as British. Assistance was in the form of loans at a low rate of interest or through Government guarantee, but although £10 millions was set aside for this purpose, only £3½ millions were borrowed. The scheme had several drawbacks, especially as the Board of Trade gave permission for the ships to be demolished abroad. Thus, out of ninety-four vessels demolished, thirty-nine were dealt with in foreign yards. Under this scheme only fifty new British ships were built of a gross tonnage of 186,000 for which £3½ millions were borrowed. No money was borrowed for modernising ships, mainly because all ships requiring modernising were over-borrowed on from bow to stern. These 50 new British ships replaced 97 of 386,625

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gross tons, but of these only 49 were British (238,467 gross tons), the remaining 48 being foreign (148,158 gross tons), and of these no fewer than 15 were Greek.

This attempt to help the shipping industry to modernise the British merchant marine had so little result partly because it coincided with the rearmament boom which sent up demand for scrap. There were now two competitors for ships, the steel makers and the shipowners. Another cause for failure was the high cost of construction in British yards in comparison with costs elsewhere. This difference has become greater, and this is one reason why many ships are being built for British owners abroad. High costs are due to tariffs and rearmament. The one has caused high prices of materials, particularly steel, by protecting the home market, and enabling prices higher than the world level to be maintained. Previously as a free trade country we had an advantage over our competitors. A similar effect has been caused by rearmament, which has led to delays in delivery of materials and put up prices of scrap which has so important a bearing on the price of ships. It is estimated that in the spring of 1939 there was a difference of some 17 per cent in costs at home and abroad in favour of the latter. The cost rose from about £9 per ton before the rearmament boom to between £12 and £13 at the end of 1938. The net result was an unprecedented decline in the proportion of new tonnage being built in British yards. At December 15, 1938 it was less than a third compared with one-half in 1929. By March, 1939, it was only just over one-fifth.

The latest proposals of the Government are an attempt to meet this situation by in effect paying a proportion of the difference in costs between British and foreign yards. No attempt is made to remove the real cause of the difference. Instead it encourages building at the high cost ruling. For this purpose £500,000 a year is set aside for five years for owners who placed orders within a short time of the Government's announcement on March 28, 1939. While in the first place no date was fixed, the rush to place orders was so great that the Government had to limit the period. The amount of orders placed so quickly will not only tax the capacity of British yards but may reduce the subsidy per ship built.

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Further, to encourage British shipowners to build at home, the Government is to lend up to £10 millions at cheap rates. This will also help to meet to a large extent the difference in costs, as the ability to borrow cheaply makes a considerable difference in the ultimate costs to those placing orders.

An isolated instance of Government help is that given to the Cunard Line in connection with the building of the *Queen Mary* and *Queen Elizabeth*. For some two years the huge skeleton hull of Cunard No. 534 stood untouched in a berth in John Brown's shipyard on the Clyde. Neither the Cunard Company, which had ordered the world's largest liner, nor its builders could afford to pay for its completion. Thousands had been thrown out of work, and distress, always tragic on the Clyde, became more acute. Owing to the persistent efforts of Mr. David Kirkwood, M.P., backed by the pressure of public opinion, the Government, after months of delay, provided the means for work to be started again. More than two years after work had ceased, the Government announced it would come to the aid of the Company, but only when a virtual monopoly of the British passenger liner trade between Great Britain and the United States had been created by the merger of the two largest British companies operating in North Atlantic Service.

With the amalgamation of the Cunard and White Star Lines in February, 1934, help came. The Treasury was finally authorised to advance up to £9½ millions of which £3 millions went for the completion of the *Queen Mary*, £1½ millions for working capital, £4½ millions for the construction of the *Queen Elizabeth* and the balance to cover excess expenditure on the *Queen Mary*. The advances were secured on debenture on the stocks of the company. This public money was given to private interests without any definite control over the company. True, one condition had been attached to it, the merging of the two largest British lines engaged in North Atlantic trade, but they still remained under private enterprise without Government control, representation on the Board, or influence through shareholding. The Government paid the piper but does not call the tune. When this policy was criticised the Government's answer was that it had, "Perfect confidence in the company."

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The main criticism that can be levelled against the Government's shipping policy is that it had made no contribution towards a permanent solution of the industry's problems, which have increased with the spread of nationalism abroad, rising costs at home and the decline in international trade. To the shipping industry it has handed over public money and exercised no effective control over it, but the resolving of the difficulties can only come with an increasing measure of State control and international co-operation.

ERNEST DAVIES.

PUBLIC OPINION: DISTRIBUTION OF SPACE IN BRITISH AND SWISS NEWSPAPERS

AN Anglo-Swiss journalist with whom the present writer happened to share a railway compartment recently between Zurich and Paris, spent the best part of the night abusing the Swiss Press. He had just paid a visit to his country of origin, after long years spent in the service of Fleet Street, and now gave vent to a bitter resentment at what he called the backward methods of Swiss newspaper editors. Swiss papers were not at all what he had come to believe the gentle art of newspaper-making ought to be. No splashy headlines giving you the gist of the matter in a nutshell—or less; no “human interest” stories; next to no pictures; and, above all, a great deal of editorial and correspondents’ opinion, in the place of a snappy summary of facts. No, Swiss newspapers were no good, he was through with them. Nor would this seem to be an exceptional attitude to take, for are not the same arguments implied, whenever the Swiss Press, along with the Swiss in general, are reproached with being dull and lacking in imagination?

On the other hand, Swiss newspapers have come in for a great deal of praise, too, from foreign observers. People out of sympathy with the “lay-out” of the popular press issuing from Fleet Street have found in the sober make-up of Swiss dailies a relic, as it were, of a kind of newspaper that elsewhere is fast going out of existence or at any rate is hard put to it to keep alive the tradition of catering for

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readers who take an intelligent interest in things. The opinion of F. S. Smythe, the English mountaineer and writer, may be quoted as coinciding with the view taken by the average Englishman when faced with Swiss newspapers for the first time. He writes in his book, *An Alpine Journey* (p. 197): “While at Andermatt, I read both Swiss and British newspapers. Swiss newspapers, owing to their limited circulation and their small revenue from advertisements, are shoddy in appearance and are printed on paper of an inferior quality, but they have a great virtue, they are newspapers. They give the news of the day with few editorial blatherings and embellishments. They eschew scare headings, as a rule, and do not seek to bolster up their circulation by feverish sensationalism or heartless scandal-mongering. Doubtless the sensation-loving Englishman would find them unexciting, but he cannot fail to be impressed by their accuracy and sincerity.”

Apparently there are two sides to the question; and there is a good deal of truth on either side. Swiss newspapers do give the news. The reputation of the Swiss Press for presenting the news in as unbiassed a manner as is humanly possible, has been enhanced of late, owing to developments in an opposite direction in other countries.

At the same time, the most characteristic feature of Swiss newspapers lies in the fact that they are still, as newspapers generally were in the 19th century, organs of opinion.¹ That they are not so much concerned with fact-finding as an end in itself, but address themselves to an audience of definite political opinions—opinions the newspapers have done much to create, in the past. No attempts at trustification have so far been made in Switzerland, and the so-called “commercialized press” is a variety unknown in a country where there is a general belief that it is better for a newspaper to be dependent on party politics than to be dependent on commercial interests and controlled by advertisers, which implies the touting for more and more readers by means of a great many extraneous attractions. It has also been said² that

¹ “Die Schweiz. Land, Volk, Staat und Wirtschaft,” by Oscar Wettstein. Aarau, 1934, page 158.
² “Charakterzüge der schweizerischen Presse,” by Karl Weber (Offizieller Pressa-Katalog, der schweizerischen Abteilung an der Internationalen Presse-Ausstellung in Köln, 1928.

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the influence of the Press upon the Party often exceeds that of the Party on the Press. A forceful personality at the head of a newspaper can often turn the scales.

If Switzerland still adheres to a system favouring a multitude of small and independent newspapers rather than the big newspaper concern, this is not only due to the relatively small size of the country, but quite as much to the marked regionalism which is so prominent a feature of political life in Switzerland.

Newspaper statistics are compiled only at infrequent intervals in Switzerland. The latest figures available, those compiled for the International Press Exhibition at Cologne, 1928, showed one political newspaper for every 9,557 inhabitants, or 406 papers (116 of which were dailies) for the whole of a country numbering, then, 3,880,320 people. According to later surveys¹, these figures still apply; Switzerland is one of the countries showing the highest national penetration of newspapers.

This implies a great number of independent newspapers with relatively small circulations. No Swiss newspaper has a circulation of more than 100,000 copies; the only newspaper which gives its circulation figure at the head of each issue, the *Tagesanzeiger*, of Zurich, has a circulation of 90,000; most of the other important dailies (which in England would be called "class" newspapers) hover around half that figure, 12 daily newspapers having a circulation of 50,000 or over, which they have reason to believe to be as near saturation point as can be reached. The figures, it may be noted, are approximately those of the "provincial press" in England (*Manchester Guardian*, *Yorkshire Post*, etc.) with which, in fact, the Swiss Press has many traits in common. There is no "popular press" in Switzerland in the English sense of the term. The daily which comes nearest to being popular in that sense is the *Tagesanzeiger* just mentioned. Most of the leading dailies look back on a century or more.

This variety of newspapers addressing themselves to the politically-minded is in keeping with the general structure of Swiss democracy and its institutions. It has been maintained

¹ Cf. "Die Entwicklung der politischen Presse in der Schweiz," by Karl Weber, in *Die Schweizer Presse*. Festschrift zum 50 jährigen Jubiläum des Vereins der Schweizer Presse. Luzern, 1933.

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by foreign observers—notably Lord Bryce and Robert Clarkson Brooks—that Switzerland approaches more closely to the ideal of pure democracy than any other country, if one takes democracy to mean the responsible participation of every citizen in government matters. This has been well expressed by Sir Arthur Salter (*Constructive Democracy*, p. 206), who refers to the Swiss Constitution as one "which, with its federal system, its cantonal system, and its municipal system, and helped by the relatively small total population, gives a very much larger proportion of the ordinary heads of families the opportunity and the experience of a part in the actual government of their country." By the referendum and the frequent polls on minor matters, the political activity of the Swiss goes far beyond the mere election of representative authorities. The Press therefore has an important part to play as mediator between the authorities and the voter, a part which is as much informative as it is propagandist. Swiss newspapers cannot avoid the task of giving a lead in a great number of minor or major issues.

It may be significant that of the editorial staff of Swiss newspapers, 66% come from the Universities, 49% having taken a degree; only 39% of Swiss journalists have no academic training. The ratio is in accordance with the greater importance attached to cultural questions, such as literature, the drama, art, music and economics, which has been noted as a general characteristic of Continental newspapers.¹ The recognition of their cultural task, as far as Swiss newspapers are concerned, goes back to the changes brought about since 1848, and finds its most conspicuous manifestation in that part of a Swiss newspaper set apart from the rest of the paper by a horizontal line and known as the "feuilleton," a term difficult of definition, but originally being just additional matter of educational or entertainment value.

There is a subtle emotional difference between what appears above and below that line (*unter dem Strich*), but its actual implications are most elusive, as not only dramatic criticism, book reviews, etc., are ranged below the line, but also reports of scientific discoveries, congresses, etc., matter

¹ See "Report on the British Press," published by P E P, London, 1938, pages 54-55.

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which cannot be regarded as "non-news" in a strict sense. Neither is it a difference between the political and the non-political, as a great deal of non-political news appears above the ominous line, such as motion picture criticism, news from the courts, *faits divers* (accidents and crimes). But short stories and serialized novels are a regular feature appearing in that part marked off by a line ("Feuilleton," in fact, often stands for "fiction"), and from that constituent part the term has acquired its slightly suspect connotation. The serialized novel, a comparatively recent innovation with British daily papers, has always been one of the main attractions of Swiss dailies, *i.e.*, ever since the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* started it first in 1830. Other papers have not been slow in recognizing that this retailing of fiction in instalments may be the mainstay of a newspaper, especially where women readers are concerned. In England, apparently, the inclusion of fiction is not considered compatible with the standards of a class newspaper; in Switzerland, no such discrimination attaches to that feature.

The first fact, then, to note about the Swiss Press is that there is no such thing as a national newspaper in Switzerland, all newspapers being more or less of regional or even local distribution. And they all belong to the category of "class" newspapers. Switzerland has so far had very little of that cheap journalism which has led even confirmed democrats like Wickham Steed to take the fact of an "unthinking majority" and an "intelligent minority" for granted,¹ which would not seem to be orthodox democracy. Whoever gave utterance to such an idea in Switzerland, would make himself very unpopular indeed. The Swiss are all "class." Their newspapers show it.

While, according to the same author, the place given to politics in the British Press has steadily declined,² Swiss newspapers are still organs of political opinion first and foremost. What, now, is there besides that to give Swiss newspapers their different look and their different character? The first question, as to looks, is soon answered; the second requires a different method of approach. In English news-

¹ "The Press." (A Penguin Special.) By Wickham Steed, London, 1938, pages 22-23, 41.
² *ib.*, page 170.

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papers, up to one-fifth of total space is devoted to headlines¹. The extensive use of headlines and the development of headlines as a special jargon is, of course, carried to an extreme by the popular press, but is by no means confined to it. The function of headlines as used by English newspapers can no longer be said to be that of characterising news as sensational; to a great extent they just give a summary of contents and tell the reader whether a column is likely to appeal to him or not. Swiss newspapers, with their sparse use of headlines, seem to expect that every reader reads every article right through before making up his mind about it, and indeed no other choice is left to him. It is this conservative layout of their pages, which presupposes the leisurely newspaper reader of the last century, which gives Swiss newspapers their sober look and distinguishes them from most of their contemporaries abroad. As Swiss newspapers rely on regular subscribed readers and sell only a minor fraction of their circulation in the streets, the incentive for using headlines to increase sales has been said to have been absent in their case. But as headlines have long passed beyond the stage of mere "*Blickfang*," this accounts only for a small part of that reluctance to use them, and the claim that the conservative attitude springs from a greater intellectual awareness and a dislike of sensation-mongering is certainly made in ignorance of headlines as used by English class newspapers. The austere outward appearance of Swiss newspapers is also due to an equally conservative use of pictures, and of photographs in particular. Swiss newspapers present a serious, even solemn face to the world; they have a superior, very superior look "on the face of it," but this first impression has to be substantiated by a closer investigation of their subject matter, before any conclusions can be drawn.

I have made a comparison between a number of English and Swiss newspapers as to the relative space allotted to the various subjects dealt with, similar to the analysis of Distribution of Space carried out by the authors of the P E P Report.² For this purpose, the issues of the six leading German-Swiss dailies for the week of July 11 to July 17,

¹ See "Newspaper Headlines," by Heinrich Straumann, London, 1935.

² *Id.*, pages 126-9.

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1938, have been chosen. French-Swiss papers are almost identical with German-Swiss papers in their make-up and character,¹ so that such an analysis would hold good for the whole of the Swiss Press. Only 26% of Swiss dailies appear in French, as 70% of the Swiss population are German-speaking. The fact is mentioned here, because misconceptions on this point are met with in England. In the case of English newspapers, where previous statistics exist, two issues have been deemed sufficient, the dates being Thursday and Friday, July 14 and 15, 1938. The newspapers singled out for the purpose are: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Der Bund*, *National Zeitung (Basle)*, *Basler Nachrichten*, *Volksrecht*, *Tagesanzeiger*; *The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *Evening News*, *Daily Express*, *News Chronicle*, *Daily Mirror*. The compilers of the P E P Report thought a week "too short a period to justify any but the broadest generalizations,"² and the same reservations apply in the present case, with the difference perhaps that even in so short a period any national divergencies between English and Swiss newspapers are likely to make themselves felt. It is with these national divergencies that this investigation is mainly concerned, rather than with the differences between the various papers among themselves. The six papers chosen may safely be regarded as representing the press of their respective countries, but they do not constitute the whole of it, and the figures arrived at and conclusions drawn from them must be taken for what they are worth.

Swiss newspapers, then, are smaller in size and less bulky, the six papers analyzed running to a daily average of 7,352 column inches, while the six English papers under review covered a daily average of 18,767 column inches; *i.e.*, the daily consumption of newsprint by an English newspaper is, on an average, about 2.55 times larger than that of its Swiss counterpart, Switzerland using about the same amount of newsprint as Scandinavia.³

As to the daily average distribution of space in the six principal Swiss and English daily newspapers, the figures arrived at are as follows:

¹ Cf. Weber, "Die Entwicklung der politischen Presse," etc., page 91.

² Page 126. ³ For Scandinavia, see P E P Report, page 59.

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TABLE I

	English		Swiss	
	col. inch	%	col. inch	%
Advertising	7,578	40.38	2,414	32.84
Pictures	1,123	5.99	190	2.58
General News	5,567	29.66	2,261	30.75
Leaders	221	1.18	139	1.89
Specialized News ..	2,089	11.12	1,379	18.76
Features	2,189	11.67	969	13.18
Total	18,767	100.00	7,352	100.00

In the first place, the salient features of the Swiss Press as compared to that of Great Britain are thus borne out by figures. While about 6% of total daily space in English newspapers are, on an average, given over to pictures, Swiss newspapers show themselves more conservative in admitting pictorial adornments to their pages, the daily average being only about 2.5%. This is no doubt traceable to a different attitude of editors who are unwilling to sacrifice space to mere pictures and so make a *biblia pauperum* of their papers. The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* introduced photographs for the first time as late as the 1930's, the first photograph being, of course, that of a London policeman. Public demand for pictorials, however, is shown by the popularity of low-priced illustrated papers, continental fashion.

English newspapers are more dependent on advertisements, which take up an average of 40% of total space,¹ as against an average of 33% in Swiss newspapers where one page of advertisements to every two pages of editorial matter is the rule. In the figure for the British Press the influence of the popular press makes itself felt—*The Times* does not carry more than about 33% of advertisements. Swiss newspapers do not find their budget balance entirely in the amount of advertising; the price of the paper is never below production cost, as with some English newspapers, but an essential consideration. Bought singly, the three editions that make up one day's issue of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* are 45 Rappen (4½d.), as against 1d. for most

¹ The P E P Report also gives 40% as the space filled by advertisements, page 8.

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English papers. The result is a greater freedom from advertisers' influence, as well as from political backstairs influence, as with French papers. It may be noted in passing that many Swiss newspapers have found it profitable to lease out the whole or part of their advertising space to publicity agencies which buy up in advance the available space. This division of labour goes back for some time, the first publicity agencies having been founded in the second half of last century. The tendency is towards more and more newspapers leasing out the whole of their advertising space to these agencies.¹ Distributing agencies, however, are unknown in Switzerland, as there daily newspapers can be sent out to subscribers by post, and so distribution presents no problem. The lesser importance of advertising in Swiss newspapers is also emphasized by the fact that no Swiss newspaper so far has resorted to the practice of giving up the front page to advertisements, a practice to which Swiss readers would not easily reconcile themselves.

Leading articles seem to occupy more space in Swiss newspapers, on the whole, although the difference is slight, if sufficient to point to what has been said about Swiss papers being above all organs of political opinion. The fact that about 8% more space is taken up by "specialized news" (i.e., "any news which can be found regularly in a particular part of the newspaper," P E P Report, p. 126) in Swiss newspapers, points in the same direction, for it has been remarked that in the two class newspapers included in the P E P analysis of Distribution of Space (*The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph*) much more news was specialized than general, this being therefore an indication of "class."

For these broad outlines, the period covered has proved ample; the results yield nothing out of the ordinary, nor was this to be expected. For a closer examination, however, the figures are apt to become too small to bear very detailed analysis. Some hints, nevertheless, may be gathered from them.

The space filled by general news is about 30% in both English and Swiss newspapers, but there is a considerable difference, inasmuch as "General News" for English readers

¹ Cf. Weber, "Die Entwicklung der politischen Presse," etc., page 88.

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TABLE II

	English		Swiss	
	col. inch	%	col. inch	%
General News ..	5,567	—	2,261	—
Home News ..	1,212	21.77	320	14.15
Foreign News ..	576	10.35	933	41.35

means home news first and foremost and foreign news only a long way after, whereas in Swiss newspapers there is a striking preponderance of foreign news over home news. This is a fact visible to the naked eye, as foreign news is, more often than not, given on the front page, but it is also strongly brought out by the figures shown. Of what has been classified as general news, 21.77% are home news in English newspapers, as against 10.35% for foreign news. The respective figures for Swiss newspapers are 14.15% for home news, and 41.35% for foreign news.

In these figures, Switzerland's lack of specific weight as a political entity manifests itself. Swiss readers' interest is focussed on world events abroad to a far greater extent than that of English readers. One of the first impressions of Swiss newspaper readers when confronted with the press of a foreign country is that those activities in the world at large which they are accustomed to regard as front page news, are much less in evidence, home news taking precedence over what goes on abroad. A certain universal open-mindedness (*Weltoffenheit*) has been claimed as a constituent part of a Switzer's mental make-up; newspapers are holding up the mirror here to his nature. Switzerland may easily be the only country where a foreign daily newspaper (the *Paris Soir*) has a larger circulation than any one Swiss newspaper, with the sole exception of the *Tagesanzeiger*. In the streets and cafes of Zurich, more people can be seen reading the *Paris Soir* than any Swiss newspaper, surely a unique state of affairs.

It is also noteworthy in this connection that all the Swiss newspapers under review have their own correspondents

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in the capitals of most neighbouring countries. The proportion of foreign news supplied by correspondents, and that supplied by the agencies, is variable; with the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* the former far outnumbers the latter. It is true that, in Swiss newspapers, the percentage of foreign news supplied by their own correspondents is only 37.3%, as against 84.2% in British newspapers, but considering the small size and presumably small resources of Swiss newspapers, the figure is still a high one, even if the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* stands alone in getting most of its foreign news from its own correspondents.

More home news, of course, is printed as specialized news by Swiss papers which would seem to lessen the validity of the above figures. But as less importance is usually attached to specialized news, the preponderance of foreign news over home news holds good in any case. Even if the columns of specialized home news in Swiss newspapers (31.14% of general news space) are added to general home news, the figure—45.29%—would be only slightly higher than that of foreign news, while in the British Press the figure for home news is more than twice that of foreign news from the outset, *i.e.*, without counting the home news column of *The Times*, the only English paper having a specialized heading here. Thus, compared to English newspapers, the Swiss would still attach twice as much importance to foreign news. Not so much importance, on the other hand, is attached to sport, the percentage (of general news space) being 16.31% in the case of Swiss, and 29.21% in the case of English newspapers. More space is given to rifle shooting in Switzerland, where this is a national recreation, but the difference is not so striking as might have been imagined, as some big rifle shooting events in England at the time in question and the lack of any such events in Switzerland have somewhat obscured the issue.

As for the financial news, that of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has as high a reputation in Switzerland as that of *The Times* in Great Britain. The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* gets many of its regular subscribers on the strength of its city news alone. During the period covered, financial news in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* was 6.59% of general news space, while

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the corresponding figure for *The Times* was but 4.74%.

The total amount of general news space, then, is about the same in both countries, and so is the space filled by features and articles. As we have seen, Swiss newspapers carry about 8% (of total space) less advertisements than English newspapers. If we want to know what is done with this surplus space in Swiss newspapers, the figures in Table I provide the answer: Swiss newspapers contain just about 8% more specialized news than English dailies. Among the separate items that specialized news consists of, one item remains to be looked into. Popular opinion on the continent has fastened to the sensation-mongering of a few English dailies and Sunday papers, and likes to think of English newspapers as chiefly composed of reports of crime, news from the courts, accidents, divorce, etc. In the very week the analysed papers are taken from, a Swiss lady journalist speaking in Edinburgh said that "crimes and accidents occupied comparatively little space in Swiss newspapers compared with the space occupied in the Press of other countries" (*News Chronicle*, July 15, 1938). The absolute figures are 169 column inches in Swiss, and 974 column inches in English newspapers occupied by the kind of news referred to, or 12.25% and 46.58% respectively of specialized news space. This is in accordance with the findings of the authors of the P E P Report, whose enquiries into reader interest in news items give accidents as topping the list, with crime and divorce as fourth in reader interest (Cf. tests, p. 249 ff.). It should, of course, be borne in mind that crime reporting at great length was popular long before any of the so-called popular newspapers came into being, the first successful crime reporter having been Daniel Defoe.¹

The only other item which may call for comment, is that headed "The Swiss Abroad," a regular column which takes the place of the column headed "Empire" in English papers, and no doubt occupies a similar place in the minds of Swiss readers.

It is when we come to feature space that the alleged superiority of Swiss newspapers in cultural matters ought to show itself, for here are included books, the theatre, art,

¹ See also "Press Parade," by Hamilton Fyfe. (London, 1936.) Page 65.

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music, and articles on cultural subjects in general, but the figures arrived at are not altogether conclusive, as some of these features appear once a week only and may therefore have escaped registration, as far as English newspapers are concerned. On the other hand, the theatres in Swiss towns were closed in the month of July; such theatrical news as has entered the statistics is news of theatrical events abroad. The figures (256 column inches for Swiss, and 416 column inches for English newspapers) therefore do not warrant any deductions being made from them. One thing worth noting is that the extensive book reviewing to be found in Swiss newspapers is not backed up by publishers' advertisements, as in English newspapers where they are so much in evidence. The most noticeable point, the inclusion of serialized fiction as a regular feature and the absence of it in English class newspapers, has already been remarked upon.

The subdivision of advertising into display, classified and financial, does not give rise to much comment. If Swiss newspapers carry comparatively few classified advertisements, it is because in all Swiss towns there exist daily newspapers consisting exclusively of classified and display advertisements, and enjoying, moreover, the monopoly for publishing official announcements for local authorities—mostly papers of an enviable financial position. Also, it is not always easy to draw the line between display and classified. Deaths, in English newspapers, clearly belong to the second category, but in Swiss newspapers they might also be regarded as belonging to display, as a single Death Notice runs to about 7 column inches, on an average. A feature exclusive to Swiss advertisement pages is, moreover, the weekly marriage mart, consisting of one or two full pages of "Wanted" and "Vacant" matrimonial jobs. If women newspaper readers in England like nothing so much as an elaborate wedding, Swiss women carry their enthusiasm even further, to a premarital stage; the advertisements of weddings-to-be are not only read by those they may concern.

If the comparison between English and Swiss newspapers has sometimes been stated in terms of superiority or otherwise, the analysis made has not brought forth much to give substance to these popular notions. The differences that

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exist and are obvious enough, are differences of kind rather than of quality. There are many aspects, of course, which do not enter mere analysis of distribution of space, one of them being the relation between the press of a country and its government. It has been alleged by Wickham Steed that the British Press is "on the road that leads to totalitarian servitude" (p. 249), because it has "sacrificed its freedom to a mistaken notion that it must share the responsibilities of statesmen" (p. 80). The notion of newspapers co-operating with the authorities for the common good of the country may be a mistaken one, or again it may not; in any case, no such claim is likely to be made as regards the Swiss Press, since no privilege is more jealously guarded by the Swiss than their right to tell the powers at Berne what's what. The authors of the P E P Report have also put it on record that the development of the press into a large-scale, highly capitalized industry results in the freedom of opinion being jeopardized: "We doubt whether a Press subject to these conditions can fully satisfy democratic needs" (p. 34). Owing to its decentralized character which precludes any probability of concentration after the English example, the Swiss Press has so far successfully escaped both government and big business interference and is in no imminent danger of losing its freedom for any of these reasons.

Fritz Guttinger.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE POWERS. By MAX WERNER.
(Gollancz. 7s. 6d.)

"MAX WERNER'S" analysis of the leading military powers, directly or indirectly involved in the present crisis, owes the very considerable amount of attention, which it has so far aroused in this country, to more than the mere timeliness of its appearance. Within a comparatively limited compass it presents British public opinion, hitherto accustomed to view Imperial Defence, if at all, *in vacuo*, as a self-contained problem, entirely divorced from the realities of Continental struggles, with a striking picture of the forces and trends determining the military map of Europe at this moment. About two-thirds of the total are devoted to the two leading protagonists, Russia and Germany. The superiority of the ultra-modern highly-mechanised armies and air forces, which these two countries have been able to build up during the last few years, over those of all other powers, constitutes the central theme of "Max Werner's" book. The picture he draws of the Red Army of to-day as an ultra-modern force literally bristling with technical equipment of all kinds and of the highest quality: machine-guns, guns, tanks, tractors, a most highly-efficient chemical service, led by young, ambitious, diligent commanders may appear fantastic; but it will not come as a surprise to those who have watched the rise of the Soviet Union to the rank of a leading, and in many respects the most progressive, industrial power of the present day or has had occasion to witness the esteem in which the Red Army is held by competent Reichswehr observers.

It is when we turn to the latter, better-known force that our doubts of the author's reliability begin seriously to be aroused. The blank statement that "no other army in the world attaches such supreme importance to the air arm as the German Army" (p. 137) hardly does justice to the embittered opposition of the German General Staff to the "Douhetist" leanings of Goering and his Air Force, an opposition which has found most unmistakable expression within the last few months. Similarly, it is difficult to

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conceive how the new German Army could take over from the old Reichswehr between 300,000 and 350,000 professional soldiers (p. 144) if the total strength of that force amounted to 100,000 men, with no reserves, nor would it be easy to infer from the author's description of the "complete motorisation" of the German Army (p. 147) that this force still retains—and means to retain permanently—a great part of its artillery and almost the whole of its first-line transport on a horse basis, and on the whole is far less "mechanically minded" than, for instance, the British Army.

These, however, are matters of detail, however significant. Our real suspicions of the author's accuracy arise when we come in the following chapter to his exposition of "the new National Socialist War Doctrine" as a strategy of "lightning decision," which in another passage (p. 115) is claimed to constitute "the very spirit of German strategy." "Victory must be won in the first phase of the war, and the German Army is being prepared to take the utmost advantage of its initiative, the suddenness with which its blow will fall and the complete surprise of the enemy (p. 159).

This interpretation incidentally is not quite easy to reconcile with the statement three pages before that "the new German war doctrine which was already developed in its essentials before National Socialism came to power declares that military warfare brings no final decision" (p. 156). It leads the author to compare, to its disadvantage, this German with Red strategy in a passage, which clearly constitutes the centrepiece of the whole study: "the weakness of the German war doctrine is obvious: it concentrates essentially on the first frontier battle and it identifies the strategic offensive and, in fact, the prosecution of the war as a whole with the first act of invasion. In a rather arbitrary fashion it presupposes the culmination of future warfare to be at the very beginning of the war, and it appears to ignore altogether the 'gradation of effort' for which Red strategy is preparing. German strategy is concentrated on a one-act war; it is a strategy of defective endurance" (p. 163).

And further on the same page: "Whilst German strategy stakes everything upon a sudden surprise attack and a sudden

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overwhelming blow to obtain a decision, Red strategy reckons with the possibility of a long resistance on the part of the enemy, and it therefore prepares to increase its own war effort steadily as needs arise. Unlike German strategy, Red strategy does not think in terms of a one-act invasion, but in terms of a whole series of battles and campaigns. It is prepared to envisage a protracted war, and this is the standpoint from which Soviet military experts criticise Germany's war doctrine."

It is not without interest to compare this interpretation of the new German strategy with the German General Staff's view of these issues as expressed in the comprehensive survey of present-day German military thought published a few months ago under the title "The art of war to-day and to-morrow" by Colonel Foertsch of that body. We find there on p. 130: "Taken as a whole this (the vital character of modern conflicts) cannot mean anything, but the struggle of all against all forces. If that should be true—and all opinions hitherto expressed on this point are in complete agreement—then this means further that such wars will in future be wars of long duration. Certainly this cannot and will never be the wish of the belligerents themselves. Each side will attempt to shorten the struggle and will adopt the most effective and radical means to bring about such shortening. The use of the most extreme methods on one side will entail the same on the part of the other and lead to that desperate struggle, which we have mentioned above in a different connection. It appears to be an error to assume that modern weapons would provide particularly favourable conditions for a short, lightning-like war."

The same statement "that the motorisation and mechanisation of arms is again going to make rapid decisions possible appears to be an error" is repeated by Colonel Foertsch (p. 233) in his discussion of the battle of the future, which he goes on to picture "as a long, protracted struggle in which more or less great pieces must be broken out of the enemy's defence, a struggle wearing down the opponent. . . . Not one battle alone, but the successive series of battles and operations, perhaps only a whole series of campaigns, will decide between victory and defeat" (p. 235). Similarly,

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mobilisation is described as "no longer a single short act beginning from a certain date," but as "a protracted process no longer allowing the enemy as in 1914 a precise calculation as to its duration. Mobilisation presents the picture of a succession of waves" (p. 241).

As for the problem of opening a future war by a surprise attack, Colonel Foertsch emphasises that such surprise "as tempting and as hopeful as it may appear, will not be easy to achieve" and can only be considered as a rational undertaking if its success would be likely to achieve really decisive results (p. 242) to which end, however, strong forces would be necessary, the concentration of which could hardly be kept secret. To start the war by a sudden attack in the air would probably be the rule in future wars, but as such attacks would hardly come like a bolt from the blue, here again the attack would in all probability meet the defence prepared. Surprise attacks by land forces on the other hand entailed the danger that the forces entrusted with them might be beaten before the mass of our own forces would be ready to support them. Either they would have to be strong, therefore, in which case a surprise would become very difficult, or else they would have to retire back again upon their main body after the first onrush, thus making their impact of little effect. The dread of a surprise attack would therefore be greater than the actual danger of one (p. 243).

What are the inferences to be drawn from these passages, which by no means constitute isolated remarks, but are fully in agreement with the whole of Colonel Foertsch's extremely solid and sober study, condensing the views expressed during the last few years by the leading exponents of German military thought into a representative survey? Certainly not that Germany is going to renounce the attempt to win a war by a lightning blow, if any chance of bringing it off successfully should present itself. But there could be no more fundamental and, indeed, more fatal error than to imagine with the author the present German strategy as nothing but a strategy of "defective endurance" ignoring the possibility of a protracted struggle, staking all upon a lightning decision, and doomed to collapse as soon as it fails to bring that off.

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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY IN GREAT BRITAIN. By H. CAMPION. *With an Introduction by* PROFESSOR J. JEWELL. (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 8s. 6d. pp. xvii. and 138).

THIS important book summarises the results of what must have been several years of very hard work and thorough research. It is astonishing how much important and relevant material has been compressed in such a short space.

The essay is not directly concerned with what is usually regarded as "welfare economics"; it does not deal with the growth of real capital, but analyses "the kinds of property in public and private ownership before and after the War." Mr. Campion distinguishes between Total Private Property and Public Property; the former represents the total of property owned privately, both individually and corporately, and is more comprehensive than what the author calls Property in Private Hands, which is not only owned by individuals, but is capable of complete individual disposal, and excludes the property of friendly societies, co-operative societies and other institutions, the right of ownership in which is not assignable in definite proportions. Public property, on the other hand, represents the aggregate of the property belonging to the State, local authorities and charities. It might be thought that these totals are absolutely comprehensive, and so they would be under normal circumstances. There exists, however—temporarily at any rate—a piece of no-man's-land in the reserve fund of the Agricultural Marketing Boards. No arrangement has yet been made regarding the ownership of the Boards.

In ascertaining the aggregate value of Private Property two methods are used; the Estate method, based on the open market value of all property annually passing at death; this value is multiplied by the reciprocal of the estimated proportion of total property which so passes every year. Due allowance is made for the complications introduced by changes in age and sex composition, and by differential mortality associated with differences in social class and occupation. The second, Giffen, or Income, method, has been used for estimating Total Private Property, and is based upon the annual income derived from a piece of property which is

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capitalised at different years' purchase according to the prospects of continuance. For Public Property the first method is evidently ruled out, and wherever possible the Giffen method has been used, supplemented by direct valuation.

The result of the investigation can be summarised briefly, and rather inadequately, as follows: Public property in the strictest legal sense (i.e. property to the ownership of which no private individual has any claim) increased from 6.8 per cent of the total in 1911-13, to 8.12 per cent in 1932-34 (no figures are available for Public Property after that date). Roads and armaments were excluded from the calculation, since their valuation would have raised unsurpassable difficulties. If they had been included at an estimated value of £1,000 m. the latter proportion would be raised to 11.17 per cent. A substantially larger figure is reached if, instead of legal ownership, administration is taken as the basis for comparison. Public Property in this wider sense of property administered by public authority, has risen from 7½-11 per cent in 1911-13, to 10-16 per cent in 1932-34, again excluding roads and armaments. There has thus been a small, but definite and measurable, increase in the relative importance of Public Property which is especially marked, as the table on page 98 shows, in the field of Public Utilities. Private Property still represents five-sixths of the total, and on the distribution of this Mr. Campion adds very considerably to our knowledge. Over 60 per cent of Private Property in this country today consists of contractual rights as distinct from tangible property, which leads the author to conclude that "income from property may perhaps now be said to be, in a truer sense than before the War, unearned income." The extremely unequal distribution of property continues, though it is somewhat reduced. One per cent of the persons over the age of 25 own 55 per cent of the total of Private Property; in 1911-13 they owned 70 per cent. In 1936 three-quarters of the adult population owned 5 per cent of the aggregate of Private Property. As the proportion of unearned to total income is roughly one-quarter, the 1 per cent owning 55 per cent of the property of the country are assured of one-seventh of the total national dividend, exclusive of anything they may obtain as earned income, which of course they will do more easily than

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if they were deprived of the backing of property. The responsibility of property in producing inequalities of income is also brought out by the fact that as recently as 1927, 70 per cent of the income over £10,000 was derived from property. An interesting consideration emerges from the table on the different kinds of Private Property. Land and Farmers' Capital together represented in 1932-34 4.5 per cent of total Private Property, as against 9.1 per cent in 1911-13. Yet not since the 1820's did British agriculture enjoy State assistance on a scale comparable to that which it receives today; this clearly suggests that the correlation between economic possession and political power is not so simple as some writing on this subject would have us to believe. Interesting estimates are given of the number of people owning different kinds of property. Royalties and wayleaves are the most unequally distributed form of property but land is more equally distributed today than it was in pre-war days. It is perhaps a pity that no estimate has been given for the number of people owning securities; a study similar to that carried out by Berle and Means for the United States should be most instructive. Mr. Campion rightly points out the great importance of the development of the public corporation such as the London Passenger Transport Board or the Central Electricity Board. The merits of these schemes are widely recognised, but attention should be paid to the price at which they are taken over from the previous owners; if the incomes of such companies are artificially augmented before they are taken over by a public authority, the resulting inflation of values might enhance, rather than reduce, the unequal distribution of property.

In his analysis as well as in the conclusions Mr. Campion is cautious and careful to point out the limitations imposed upon him by his data. In its thoroughness and lucidity the book is an excellent piece of work, which nobody interested in any of the numerous problems discussed in it can possibly afford to neglect. An appreciation of this essay would be seriously incomplete without a reference to Professor Jewkes's Introduction, the breadth of view, penetrating insight, and eloquent style of which greatly add to the value of the book.

P. T. BAUER.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE LOCATION OF INDUSTRY. *A Report by P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning. 303pp. 10s. 6d.)*

THE publication of this lengthy survey is of great public service at the present time, in view of the deliberations of the Barlow Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population. The fact that we have never before had an exhaustive enquiry into the subject of the location of industry, which is the key to territorial planning, is an indication of the rudimentary state of the planning movement in this country. Much legislation, feeble executive action, and little understanding of the technical and administrative fundamentals of planning: this summarises the position as it exists today.

The PEP Report is a devastating onslaught on conventional ideas and ignorant assumptions. It points out that industrial development, far from being the result of careful economic calculation, is often haphazard and ill-considered even from the point of view of the entrepreneur's own financial interests while from the community's point of view, it is sometimes nothing less than disastrous. "It is evident," the report observes, "that industrial development in the aggregate has been directly or indirectly responsible for much of the social distress and distortion, the wastage of land, and the destruction of amenity to be seen in Great Britain today" (p. 147). Factories located without adequate forethought have produced further industrialisation which owing to its unsound basis has in some cases collapsed. Local authorities in certain areas have been compelled to provide schools, hospitals, houses and other costly institutions which have subsequently become wholly or partly redundant, while similar institutions have to be provided elsewhere. The extreme case is, of course, that of the derelict areas; but there are many less conspicuous examples which attract little attention. The economic effects of such public and private mismanagement is obvious. Its social effects are only beginning to be realised. With a few exceptions, the report observes, those responsible for establishing or enlarging factories take little account even of such elementary necessities as the workpeople's housing needs. As a result, their health is injured by poor living accommodation or by long daily journeys to work imposing a heavy

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expenditure on fares out of the wage-earner's slender resources, and an unnecessary burden of fatigue on his health.

The report is no less outspoken and accurate in its diagnosis of the causes of these and other maladies. The control over the use of land under the Town and Country Planning Act, the authors declare, is not effective in view of weaknesses both in administration and in policy, added to defects in the Act itself. "The degree of restriction imposed upon the liberty of the individual to disregard the communal interest by the zoning provisions of many town plans is often, in practice, negligible." So long as there is no national direction in those fundamental questions which must be dealt with by an organ of the central government, such a condition of affairs is almost inevitable. Yet, despite this highly unsatisfactory position, the evidence of the Board of Trade before the Barlow Commission was mid-Victorian in its ignorance of the true causes of industrial location, the social effects of the entrepreneur's unfettered choice, and the fatuous complacency of its outlook. The PEP report deals faithfully with the Board of Trade.

On the positive side PEP proposes the provision of a central information service to advise industrialists in the selection of sites; and, secondly, a co-ordination of policies and actions on the part of central and local authorities. For these purposes an Industrial Development Commission is recommended, responsible to Parliament, and charged not only with remedying existing defects, but also with guiding future evolution on more desirable lines. In future, no new factory or extension would be permitted to be built without a license from the Commission. An appeal from a refusal would lie to the Railway and Canal Commission—a legalistic tribunal utterly unfitted to discharge such a task. The suggestions of PEP on this and other points are open to discussion and criticism; but the report stands both on its analytical and constructive sides as the first important contribution to a problem of the utmost public moment. Those responsible for its production may be congratulated on excellent quality of its factual documentation, its lucid literary presentation, and its bold and comprehensive sweep.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

BOOK REVIEWS

UNION NOW. By CLARENCE K. STREIT. (*Jonathan Cape*. 10s. 6d.)

FROM 1920, the year of its foundation, to 1936, the year of the fall of Addis Ababa, all those (apart from absolute pacifists) who sought to build a new and better international order based their hopes on the League of Nations. The Abyssinian affair, following on the failure to apply sanctions against Japan in 1931 and the failure of the Disarmament Conference, seemed finally to discredit the League, at any rate in its diplomatic aspect. About the value of its humanitarian work there is general agreement. But the League was not founded for the primary purpose of stamping out the White Slave traffic, and so on; it was founded with the primary purpose of preventing war, and it was in that purpose that it seemed finally to fail in 1936. The result has been a loss of faith in the League, not only on the part of Governments, but also on the part of peoples. In this country, for example, there has been a decline in the membership of the League of Nations Union, whose palmiest days were those of the Peace Ballot of 1935. In the last three years a large number of people have been wandering in a political wilderness, feeling no enthusiasm for temporary diplomatic groupings which did not contain in themselves the seeds of international government, anxious for some cause in the sphere of international affairs in which again to believe, and asking themselves why the League had failed and how best, either it could be revived, or a fresh start made on similar lines.

It is to this public that Mr. Streit's book will primarily appeal. It is a long book, consisting of some four hundred pages. It is not always eloquent, if sometimes a little prolix, pages. It is not always easy to read, much of it is platitudinous, and the difficulties in the way of the author's argument are made light of. But it is an important and remarkable book because of the important and remarkable proposals it contains. For what Mr. Streit proposes is not the revival of the League, but Union, with a Congress based on a direct popular vote, of fifteen democracies: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa,

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the United Kingdom and the United States of America. And Mr. Streit's is not the only mind which is working along these lines. Mr. Lionel Curtis, for example, at the close of his "Civitas Dei," proposes a federation of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, to which he thinks Egypt and India would soon wish to be added, and Mr. Curtis now warmly commends Mr. Streit's book.

Now the first reaction of any reader of *Union Now*, having regard to the existing state of the world, is to dismiss Mr. Streit's proposals as utterly impracticable. But that is really the reaction of a lazy mind. We can all easily subscribe to the view that, granted that it was impossible in 1919 to endow the League with the authority of a super-state, its lack of that authority has been one of the prime causes of its failure. The desirability of giving up the rights of national sovereignty is no longer a debatable question. The only question now worth debating is: why are we all in practice so unwilling to abandon those rights? The most formidable answer usually given is the Marxist one. But the institution of war long preceded the institution of capitalism, and in the long run capitalists lose as much from war as anyone else. There are conflicting capitalist interests inside the United States, but they do not result in war, because in 1787 men had the imagination and the will to step over their national boundaries and form a Union. No, the real reason why we seem incapable of forming a Union now is a comparatively simple one: our minds are too small. As one looks round the world to-day it seems an open question whether human beings are more stupid or wicked. In this particular matter it is their stupidity which is at fault, and—still more—their laziness. It is just possible that at the very last moment, and through fear for their own skins, which is the great new motive operating in international politics to-day, they may do something of the kind Mr. Streit so rightly suggests—just possible, but not very likely. Meanwhile Mr. Streit has unquestionably done us a great service, and he could do still more with a cheaper and a shorter book, which would get his message across to the unconverted.

FRANK HARDIE.

BOOK REVIEWS

FASCISM: WHO BENEFITS? By MAX ASCOLI AND ARTHUR FEILER. (*Allen & Unwin*. 12s. 6d.)

WHEN THERE IS NO PEACE. By HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG. (*Macmillan*. 6s.)

MEN MUST ACT. By LEWIS MUMFORD. (*Secker & Warburg*. 3s. 6d.)

SECURITY: CAN WE RETRIEVE IT? By SIR ARTHUR SALTER, M.P. (*Macmillan*. 8s. 6d.)

THE perplexed citizen of the British Isles who peers anxiously across the Channel and the North Sea—as so many of his ancestors have done, let him remember, ever since the time of Elizabeth—into a dark cloud upon the continent of Europe which threatens him with war and the loss of his liberties can be recommended to read these four books in the order in which they are listed above. Taken each by itself their merits and importance are unequal, but if read in the order indicated, they acquire an additional and composite value. The perplexity and anxiety of the perplexed and anxious citizen should, at least, be somewhat alleviated, for the books should help him to clear his mind, to see the problem and menace in their stark realities and their true proportions. The menace is fascism; the books should show him what fascism is. The menace of fascism is primarily to democracy and to the civilization or way of life to which democracy is a means; the books should show him the kind of reaction which fascism is raising against itself in the two great democratic countries of the world, Britain and the United States of America. Finally they may help him to understand the most urgent of the immediate problems created by this menace: how can the democracies meet the menace and, as Sir Arthur Salter puts it in the title of his book, retrieve the security which we and most of the world lost in 1933?

The reader should begin with *Fascism: Who Benefits?* for it will provide him with just the right background for his further investigations. There have been an immense number of good and bad books recently published on the meaning and nature of fascism. Some of them have analyzed or dissected fascism just as well as, or even better than, the book under review, but it has one peculiar advantage. It has been

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written by a German and an Italian who have had personal experience of the authoritarian regimes in their respective countries and can look back upon their experiences from the democratic haven of the United States. The German deals with the Nazi and the Italian with the fascist system, and they unite in the last part of the book to consider the international aspect, the menace to the democracies. Though they are exiles, they seem to have escaped the distorting effect which exile often has upon the mind. They give on the whole an objective picture and a fair analysis of the fascist systems. Their generalizations are often too facile—for example, the sweeping statement that “both in its national and international aspects fascism originates in the unfulfilled promises of democracy” is true only in the most superficial and unimportant sense, and even so it needs so many qualifications that, as it stands, it is simply untrue. But their facts are excellent and in their final pages they lead the reader up to the crucial question, the relation of the Nazi in Germany and the fascist in Italy to the individual citizen, his way of life and his government, in America across the Atlantic.

Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong takes us a step forward. We are still in the region of fact. Mr. Armstrong is an American and a very distinguished writer on foreign affairs. Those who are acquainted with the paper which he edits or have read his admirable book *We or They* already know him to be a man of wide knowledge and sound judgment and that he wields a powerful pen. In his present book he gives a detailed account of the events of 1938 which began with the resignation of Mr. Eden in February and ended with the Munich agreement and the disruption of Czechoslovakia in October. The two events are directly connected and Mr. Armstrong's book is thus a history of Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and of its result. The thing is done with great skill and economy. The facts are given clearly and impartially and there is little comment, but the story is amazingly moving and dramatic—it purges the passions by pity and terror—and at the same time it adds an important element to the reader's background. He can follow in detail fascism in operation and its methods of menace to democracy, and he will be able to study in detail the effect of one method

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of meeting that menace. The full effect of Mr. Chamberlain's policy was hidden from Mr. Armstrong, for when he wrote his book, the final destruction of Czechoslovakia and her democracy had not been completed, but that event would not have altered the views and judgments, which, though never obtruded, are allowed by him to percolate his narrative.

With Mr. Mumford we leave facts and come to opinion, which is just as important as facts. Here we can study the reaction of an American and a democrat to the facts dealt with in the two other books. Mr. Mumford is fully aware of the menace and he has a clear and an American view of how to meet it. His book is in certain respects rather foolish and exaggerated. Unlike Mr. Armstrong and many other people who are and always were just as opposed as he to the appeasement policy of Mr. Chamberlain, he allows his anger to distort his facts and warp his judgment. With the Atlantic between himself and Hitler, it is easy to be as certain as Mr. Mumford is of the duty and delinquencies of Europeans in fighting fascism and making the world safe for democracy on both sides of that ocean, but the European democrat with the bombers all but soaring overhead may be excused if he considers that that kind of delinquency is not confined to one side of the Atlantic. Mr. Mumford's accuracy of statement and judgment may be gauged from the following sentences:

“In neither England nor France may newspapers print freely facts or opinions about their German overlord . . .”
 “They (the fascists) have quenched in our generation the very hope of resistance in Europe.”

But Mr. Mumford's facts are not important; it is he himself who is important as a psychological exhibit. His state of mind is highly significant. It shows the reaction of an American to the menace which he rightly sees looming across the Atlantic upon American democracy. And he has a method of meeting that menace. He counts Britain and France as in the fascist camp—as craven camp-followers. His plan of campaign against fascism is pretty drastic. He proposes that the U.S.A. should apply against Germany and Italy a system of complete boycott and non-intercourse.

Sir Arthur Salter's book is much the most considerable of the four, both in depth and in width. It shows the reaction

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of a British liberal democrat to the fascist menace. Formally it deals with the question how we, France, and such other democratic countries as still exist may regain that security which we still enjoyed in 1930, but which the policy of the National Government is largely responsible for losing since that date. But its scope is so wide that it really includes far more than that. It is a remarkable book, because, while on one side it deals in considerable detail with the immediate measures necessary for the military and economic defence of the country and for rallying the democratic forces of the world in resistance to further aggression, on the other side it never loses sight of the larger and permanent problem of re-establishing international society on a basis of peace, law, and order. Sir Arthur Salter's analysis of the nature and effects of the National Government's policy, of the psychology of its leaders, of the relative strength and weakness of the fascist and democratic powers is masterly. His wide experience of administration, both in war and peace, give to his constructive proposals for retrieving security, nationally and internationally, a concreteness and realism of supreme value at the moment. What terrifies one is that at a moment when the country is in the greatest danger, such knowledge and experience are unutilized, while our security and our fate are left in the hands of the Simons, the Hoares, and the Inskips.

LEONARD WOOLF.

THE GOVERNMENT OF GREATER GERMANY. By JAMES K. POLLOCK. (New York, D. Van Nostrand Coy., Inc., 1938. pp. xiii—213. \$1.75.)

IN this compact and well-informed book, the author, whose name is familiar to students of government in connexion with some very useful translations of National Socialist documents, has produced an up-to-date digest of German Government. The analysis throughout is highly condensed, in the style almost of a civil service précis, with little comment, but with plenty of references to critical as well as partisan literature.

Within the general title of government the author aims at giving as full an account of his subject as the available

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information warrants. The plan of the book moves from the history of post-war Germany, Weimar—its rise and fall, to a detailed description of the National Socialist Party, its growth and chequered fortunes, the emergence of its Leader, its triumph, its present shape and functions, then to the political structure, constitution, distribution of law-making powers, ministries and ministers: there follows the main part of the book, the account of the administrative machinery, central and local, with sections on the civil service, the public corporations, the local and municipal authorities, the economic, social, cultural and religious organisations. Finally, there is a short chapter on external affairs. The author has inserted two interesting novelties. The first is an introductory chapter on the economic and political geography of Germany. Second, the inside front and back covers of the book are printed with maps of Germany.

In general, the information, with which the book is packed, appears reliable. The brevity of the treatment, however, has both merits and defects. It conduces to clear, sharp outlines in the analysis of administrative structure and in the demarcation of function. But it robs ideas of almost all their colour. This is particularly evident in the sections on the social and cultural services and in that on the political philosophy of National Socialism. This latter section is so slight that a reader may well be pardoned if he refuses to believe that any historical movement, however narrow, could be nourished on so thin a gruel. Nor can the author be allowed to excuse himself with a *sauve qui peut* quotation from Professor Roberts—"Even to-day there is no clearly analysable doctrine behind the Third Reich." German autocracy is at least no worse equipped in this respect than American and English democracy.

The concise method of interpretation succeeds very much better in the sections on administration. Here there is much that is not usually to be found in a general work of this kind. There is a very useful analysis of the new Civil Service Act, which the author regards as "the most complete and thorough code of personnel matters to be found anywhere in the world." There is, too, a most helpful guide to the maze of local and municipal administration, and to the National Socialist view

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of "genuine self-government," which seems to mean quite simply, that local officers are to be locally recruited. In the sections on the administrative machinery of the central government the multiple relations of party and government structure are very closely worked out, a service for which the author deserves our gratitude, as this special sphere—"the parallel administration of Party and State"—is one which to the external observer presents an impression of the maximum confusion.

There is one criticism of detail which seems to me worth making. At pages 72-74 the author discusses the position and functions of the cabinet. I take it that he is here discussing the body called the *Reichsregierung*. He compares the present cabinet system with that of the Weimar régime. The latter had "genuine importance." And he goes on: "Since 1933, however, the situation has been different. Without any legal provision, the members of the cabinet are now merely advisers to the *Führer*. They are responsible to him alone and they no longer possess an independent position with reference to their departmental functions." There are two comments here. One, there is "legal provision," of various kinds, for the cabinet, though not in the sense of a constitutional instrument fully setting out their place and functions. But they are, for instance, by the Enabling Act, the authority responsible for making constitutional law. Two, ministers never did possess, i.e. under the Weimar régime, an "independent position" in respect of their departments. They were responsible to a Cabinet and to a Reichstag. Now when their responsibility is solely to the *Führer* their departmental "independence" is, relatively, greater than before. Finally, the most interesting feature of the present constitutional structure of Germany, from the point of view of possible future developments, is its nearness to the Weimar model. Just as the latter could, by use of the famous Article 48, be readily adapted to presidential autocracy, so the former, given the necessary kind of personnel, could be made to revert to a kind of constitutional presidency. The cabinet is there, and there is even a vestigial chamber.

CHARLES H. WILSON.

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ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM. By OSKAR LANGE and FRED M. TAYLOR. Edited by B. E. LIPPINCOTT (University of Minnesota Press and Oxford University Press. 8s.)

EIGHT shillings is a stiff price for a volume of under one hundred and fifty pages, even as American prices go; but readers who have been concerned with the keen theoretical discussions that have taken place during the last few years about the pricing problem in a Socialist economy will be glad to have the articles of Professors Lange and Taylor in book form. It is, however, a misnomer to describe these articles as dealing with "The Economic Theory of Socialism" in any wide sense; for they are almost exclusively concerned with the issues raised by Professor von Mises and other orthodox economists in connection with the problem of the disposition of resources under a Socialist system. The argument of Professor von Mises, which has since been restated with certain variants by Professors von Hayek and Robbins and others, is, broadly, that a Socialist system would by its very nature be unable to establish any sound basis for determining the correct allocation of economic resources between alternative uses because of the absence of a competitive market in which goods could be valued. The discussion turned especially on the evaluation of the primary factors of production, Professor von Mises arguing that, even if under Socialism the consumers were allowed free choice between alternative final goods, there could still be no 'true' pricing in the absence of a real market for the primary factors of production.

As long ago as 1928 Professor Taylor made an answer to this argument in an address to the American Economic Association; and this address, together with the more elaborate treatment of the subject by Professor Lange in the *Review of Economic Studies* and an unnecessarily repetitive introduction by Mr. Lippincott, makes up the present volume. Broadly, the answer of these writers is that, even in the absence of a capitalist market, the primary factors of production can be evaluated and assigned to their correct economic uses by a process of trial and error, so that the choice between alternatives can be made fully as well under

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Socialism as under private capitalism—if not better, because, in practice, the capitalist system works subject to so many monopolistic influences as largely to distort the choices made.

In effect, what these authors suggest is that the managers of socialised enterprises should make their decisions as to production on a basis of "accounting prices" laid down by the planning authority, which would vary these prices in accordance with conditions of supply and demand, lowering prices wherever a surplus of any factor appeared, and raising them in case of deficiency, so as to achieve equilibrium.

There is clearly no reason why this should not be done, if those in charge of a Socialist economy wish to do it; and to this extent these authors can be said to have proved their case against Professor von Mises. But it does not follow that a Socialist economy would in fact decide to adopt this system, for it would involve a considerable limitation of the ability to plan effectively the course of production so as to avoid just those fluctuations which are the bane of capitalism. The point which these essays do successfully establish is that the directors of a Socialist economy would be in a position to make as much or as little use as they might think fit of the pricing system as defined by orthodox economists, in respect not only of consumers' goods but also of the factors of production. They would also, as Mr. Dickinson and others have suggested, be able to use a system of accounting prices, distinct from the prices actually charged, for the purpose of checking the economic advantages and disadvantages of alternative production plans.

In the concluding section of Dr. Lange's essay cogent arguments are put forward against the possibility of introducing Socialism by gradual stages, on the assumption that the unsocialised sectors of a mixed economy could continue to work effectively during a prolonged period of transition. But this part of the argument raises issues too complicated to be usefully discussed in a brief review.

G. D. H. COLE

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PEACEFUL CHANGE: PROCEDURES, POPULATION, RAW MATERIALS, COLONIES. *Proceedings of the Tenth International Studies Conference, Paris, June 28—July 3, 1937. International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, League of Nations, Paris, 1938.*

IF ACED with this solid volume of 680 pages, the reviewer whose primary interest is practical politics will ask what light is thrown on the main needs of the hour. To the present writer, at the present moment, the main need appears to be to ascertain, as distinctly as possible, what is the claim of the "Have-not" Powers—above all of Germany—and to what degree it could be met without war.

The function of the International Studies Conference is to prepare the way for the statesmen by examining this claim and the alternative solutions, and by devising procedures which would make it possible to meet the demands for justifiable changes in the international order, without sacrificing the claims of other states to their national security. It is an internationally co-ordinated investigation; the secretariat is provided by an organ of the League, the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. No less than 150 scholars and experts, nominated by committees or other institutions in each country, took part. Among the names are those of S. H. Bailey, Fritz Berber, Prof. Carr-Saunders, H. D. Henderson, H. Lauterpacht, Lord Lytton, C. A. Macartney, Prof. Manning, D. Mitrany, Prof. J. H. Richardson, Charles Rist, Prof. Georges Scelle, Dr. Drummond Shiels, Prof. Shotwell, Count Teleki, Sir A. Zimmern. The discussions centred in three main subjects—(1) raw materials and markets, (2) population-pressure and the demographic problem, (3) colonies, in so far as they bear on possibilities of peaceful change.

In the past, the demands of a rising great Power for an approximate equality with other Great Powers have been solved by war. No other way has ever yet been found of overcoming the rigidity of the *status quo*. Yet all that is best in us rises up in protest, and declares that the necessary changes ought to be made by the method of co-operation and impartial judgment. Between nations, as between individuals, there should be means of redressing inequalities and satisfying

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new needs. Rigidity should give way to elasticity. How is it to be done? That is the riddle of the modern Sphinx. We must answer it or perish. There is only one way in which the situation to-day differs from similar situations in the past. It is that the claim on the part of Great Powers to a living space (*Lebensraum*) is approaching nearer to exact definition—largely in economic terms—than ever before.

The nation which, in the name of peace and order, claims to retain a privileged position in the world—especially if it fails to use to the full the resources of its territory, while others who could use them are denied the opportunity—must be held no less to blame than the dispossessed nation which challenges the *status quo*.

One's final impression of this exhaustive Report is that the scholars and experts have little difficulty in showing many ways by which peaceful change could be achieved; and that is, surely, a solid gain, a mighty reinforcement to the champions of peace. But the terrible question remains—will the temper of the peoples allow it, and will the statesmen have the power and the foresight to lead the peoples away from those dangerous catchwords which develop into war-cries?

C. R. BUXTON.

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By LEONARD WOOLF

THE rat caught in a trap, once he finds that he cannot get out of it, if he were an intelligent rat, would withdraw into a corner at any rate for a few minutes and try to discover how he got into it. The catastrophe which has been hanging over us for over five years has now fallen; the waters are closing over our heads and, as we go down into the depths, it might be well to follow the example of the intelligent rat; before the fog, fury and fuss of war overwhelm us, we might withdraw from it all for a few moments and try to consider objectively what has really brought down upon our heads for the second time in a generation the worst of all social catastrophes. The question is not purely an academic one. The answer to it on this side of the battle-front is already accepted: the war has been caused by the "senseless ambition" of one man, Hitler. There is a sense in which the answer is true; the final decision with regard to war or peace lay with Hitler and the motive or objects which led him to choose war can be accurately defined as senseless ambitions. But if there is one certain fact about the determination of historical events in the past, it is that the individuals, who at first sight appear to be the ultimate causes, in reality played a very minor role. A Napoleon and a Hitler, even a Pericles and an Augustus, were the puppets or symbols of deep social forces; their strength and their weakness in action came to them from these forces. If you want to know why things happened or why they did not happen, you must investigate not the individuals, but these forces which jerked their arms and legs and minds in one way rather than another. The terrible results of the jerks and senseless ambition of Herr

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Hitler must not delude us into thinking that he is the only cause of our calamity.

There is another reason why at the beginning of a war—and indeed all through it—it may be useful to take a wide and objective survey of its causes. War begins where peace ends; the failure of peace and the triumph of war are one and the same thing, but the object of every war is again peace. Those who lived through the years 1914 to 1918 know, however, that very soon a terrible delusion falls upon the combatants. Every effort of the entire nation has to be directed to winning the war and to avoiding defeat. The object is necessarily and rightly victory. Gradually a war psychology establishes itself everywhere on both sides of the trenches; people believe that they have only to win the war in order to win peace. The belief is a dangerous delusion, as the last twenty-five years has shown us. Or rather it is one of those dangerous, superficial half-truths or truisms which so often bring disaster upon human beings. It is true that by winning the war you can probably get peace, just as you can also get it by losing the war. But though it is true that war begins where peace ends, it is not true that peace begins where war ends. The so-called peace which has ended so many wars was not peace at all, but a truce. The war of 1914 ended, as everyone can see to-day, not in peace, but in a truce; it was a truce which differed from that truce which contemporaries called the Peace of Amiens only by a rather longer duration. The reason why war does not necessarily end in peace, even though our own side or the right side wins, is that war settles so very few things upon which the firm establishment of peace depends. I believe that resistance to the Nazi system and to the "senseless ambitions" of Hitler was right, for peace in Europe is incompatible with them, and that if the French and British governments had honestly organized that

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resistance through the system of collective security, while there was still time, there would have been no war. When the Chamberlain policy of appeasement had brought us to the desperate pass in which we found ourselves at the beginning of this year, we were still left with no alternative to a policy of resistance, for the Nazi system and Hitler's ambitions were still incompatible with peace and civilization in Europe. We were already caught in the trap, even if we did not know it, for resistance now meant almost certainly war. Now that we are in the war, the defeat of Hitler and the elimination of the Nazi system are a condition precedent to peace.

This shows clearly the limitations of war and victory as instruments for the establishment of peace. At the best their effects are negative. War may eliminate a cause of war and so lay the basis upon which peace might be built, but whether war is followed by a real peace or only a truce depends upon what is done immediately after the war. The building of peace depends upon eliminating all the fundamental causes of war and giving to international society a structure which will allow the inevitable strains and stresses to be borne or resolved peacefully. That is why at the beginning of the war and all through it a steady concentration upon its causes and upon our "peace aims" is not academic, but essential. For it is not victory, but the use which we make of victory which can give us peace.

I am concerned in this article with the fundamental causes of our catastrophe, for at this stage, in the first week of war, to consider peace aims particularly or in detail would be academic. From this point of view, the problem of war and peace in Europe is, like most political problems, extraordinarily difficult and complicated and yet at the same time extraordinarily simple. In the last seventy years there have been three serious European wars—1870, 1914 and 1939.

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They are interconnected and each is progressively more menacing to the whole existence of civilized life in Europe. The fundamental causes of these three wars are the same, and they are really simple and easy to determine. If the European was rational and civilized, it would even be easy to eliminate them and to build up a peaceful society in Europe; the reason why the problem of war and peace is difficult is that other people besides Hitler have "senseless ambitions" and are neither rational nor civilized.

The fundamental causes of the modern European war are partly economic and partly political. In the nineteenth century there developed the portentous phenomenon of the modern thickly-populated, highly-industrialized national state, and the problem which confronted Europeans was to develop simultaneously a system through which the economic and political relations of these communities could be regulated equitably and pacifically, i.e. an international economic and political system of "justice, law and order." Such a system failed to develop and the three wars are the inevitable result of that failure. Unless an international system based upon both economic and political justice, law and order is established, there can be no peace in Europe; there can indeed, as we are now seeing, be no civilization. If in this war peace is the object for which we are fighting, then our war aims should be rigidly confined to the establishment of such a system. The elimination of Hitler and the Nazi government of Germany are necessary only because they are themselves incompatible with such a system.

The system under which Europeans have regulated their international relations during the last one hundred years has been one of both economic and political anarchy. The unit and instrument in that anarchy is the national sovereign independent state. The economic anarchy and the political

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anarchy are each symptoms of the same disease, for it is a delusion to think that either economic or political causes are primary. What it is convenient to call the industrial revolution opened up for European man immense material possibilities, a great potential increase both in wealth and power. The problem which faced him then was how should that wealth be distributed within communities and between communities and—an equally ominous question—how should the power be distributed or controlled within communities and between communities. There were only two possible answers to these questions. The one was that of socialism and democracy, which the early Social-Democrats rightly recognized as the economic obverse and political reverse of the same coin. Such a system required within the community both economic and political democracy, i.e. control of the means of production by the community in order to ensure equal distribution of wealth among individuals and strict communal control of the enormous potential power which the industrial revolution had placed in the hands of governments. But the corollary of internal social-democracy was international social-democracy. This meant that there must be an equitable control and distribution of wealth between the communities or states just as between individuals, and a real international control of the potentially devastating power now in the hands of national states and their governments. In other words this was the obvious, common-sense, rational method of obtaining a system of justice, law, and order both within states and between states under the new conditions imposed upon Europe by the industrial revolution and the age of scientific invention.

The alternative system was to base social organization upon "free competition" instead of socialism and internationalism and upon strong or authoritarian government instead of upon democracy. This meant within the state

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great inequalities in the distribution of wealth, and therefore in the economic and political power of classes, and the concentration of uncontrolled power in the hands of "the government," i.e. of individuals or small groups or classes. Internationally it meant exactly the same, except that the units of competition and anarchy were not individuals or classes, but sovereign independent national states. These states were engaged in embittered, uncontrolled economic and political competition for wealth and power. The enormous power which the competitive and undemocratic system concentrated within the state in the hands of individuals and small groups, miscalled governments, was used externally as an instrument of "national policy" in the form of war and the threat of war. There was no international control of national power, no international organization for preventing war or settling differences or for establishing even the beginnings of international justice, law and order.

Hitler and Nazism are really only the logical result of this latter system. It is an insane system, and the logical result of insanity is a *reductio ad absurdum*. If we are thinking in terms of peace and of socialism and democracy, Hitler and Nazism are "insane ambitions," but if we are thinking in terms of the other system, they are logical. It follows that if this war is to end in peace, victory and the defeat of Hitler are not enough; peace depends upon the complete eradication of the system of which Hitler was the logical conclusion or the *reductio ad absurdum*.

Here there enters another consideration. It is not only Hitler who is afflicted with insane ambitions. Are we sure that we ourselves and our own rulers have been entirely free from them? The international system of which Nazism is the *reductio ad absurdum* is insane, because it attempts to ignore the logic of facts and events. The large-scale

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industrialization of production¹ has made the economically autarkic sovereign independent state an anachronism and an impossibility, because it created a society which depends for its existence upon a complicated co-operative, instead of competitive, exchange of commodities throughout the world. Such a society is incompatible with the autarkic sovereign state and therefore it must either be destroyed by or must destroy that form of state. This fact is ignored both by the Nazis and by other people. The free-traders of the middle of the nineteenth century had a glimmer of the economic truth through one eye, though they were stone blind in the other. They saw that modern society required international co-operation in the free exchange of commodities and that this must form the *sine qua non* of peace; they made the fatal mistake, being blind in one economic eye, of confusing free exchange with unregulated competition. What the nineteenth century Europe really required was a highly-organized international economic system in which the social units, the national states, co-operated to promote the maximum exchange of commodities between themselves. Such a system is the opposite of competitive free trade on the one hand and of the protectionist, autarkic or imperialist economy of competitive national states on the other.

But economics can never be separated from politics or *vice versa*. If the peaceful development of nineteenth-century Europe required a particular kind of international economic system, it also required a particular kind of international political system. In fact each system implied or was a corollary of the other. It is fantastic to believe that peaceful economic co-operation is possible between armed sovereign independent states, as we know them to-day, and it is fantastic to believe that in a world organized for unregulated

¹ People often overlook the important fact that this includes the large-scale industrialization of the industry of agriculture, so that the effect upon countries which are mainly agricultural has been the same as upon countries which are mainly "industrial."

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international economic competition the power of the armed sovereign independent state will not be used as the instrument of that competition. Looked at from one angle, the anarchic economic system creates the anarchy of armed sovereign states; looked at from the other, the anarchy of sovereign states creates the anarchic economic system. That is because they are the economic and political symptoms of exactly the same disease or the two sides of a single coin. In other words, the peaceful development of Europe required a highly-developed international political system, in which the organization and use of national power was controlled internationally and provision made for the regulation of international relations and the settlement of international disputes on a basis of international justice, law and order. This implied the limitation of national sovereignty and the acceptance of some such system of international government as was contemplated in the League of Nations.

Some people may regard these statements in the last paragraphs as truisms and others may think them "academic." Yet if they are not understood and if the truth in them fails once more to determine our actions during and after this war, peace will once more elude and delude us as it did in 1919. For during the last fifty or sixty years, though British governments and the British people have sincerely desired and pursued peace in Europe, they have never been willing to pay the price for it. That was the tragedy of the crucial years 1900 to 1914, of the Versailles settlement, of the British attitude towards the League, and of Mr. Chamberlain's fatal policy of "appeasement." Twice in a generation the Germans have been the chief active agents in bringing war upon Europe, and the British have been passive agents in both catastrophes. For while German governments have carried out a senseless international system to its logical conclusions and can be justly accused of

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"senseless ambition," we in our traditional way have attempted an impossible compromise; we have tried to get the best of both worlds, to eat our cake and have it.

A protectionist British Empire in a world of competing national states is not compatible with peace, because it accepts and is part of an international economic system which is incompatible with peace. That is why, though it is itself pacific, sooner or later it will be challenged by a competitor, and the menace of that challenge means war or the eternal threat of war. Or we can put the same thing in another way: the Empire envisaged by Joseph Chamberlain, which has now been brought into existence and is maintained and defended by his son, even if Hitler is defeated, will provoke the senseless ambitions of another Hitler and war, for essentially it is the stuff which such senseless ambition is made of. The British Empire of Chamberlain with its protection, imperial preference, tariffs and quotas is merely the British version of the economically autarkic sovereign independent state. It is an economic unit in an international system organized for economic warfare, and it is folly to believe that warfare between the modern states of Europe can be confined to economics or that, if they are organized to fight one another economically with tariffs and quotas, they will not sooner or later take to other and more lethal weapons. During this war and when the time comes for "making peace" we shall have to face the fact—which hitherto we have always refused to face—that the British Empire in its present form and a stable peace are incompatible. We must choose either the one or the other; we cannot have both. In other words, if there is to be economic justice, law and order or economic social-democracy in the society of nations and so an economic basis for peace, we shall have to agree to radical changes in the economic organization of empire.

Within the territory of national states the economic

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organization nowadays is almost always based on co-operation, not hostility, as between one geographical area or group and another. Difficulties and differences of interest of course arise, but they do not prove insuperable or lead to the kind of economic warfare which is considered normal or even inevitable between states. There is nothing in the geographical area of states which would make it impossible or very difficult to extend the co-operative and pacific economic organization of national societies to international societies. It is the senseless ambitions inside our own heads which cause the difficulties. If we want not merely victory but peace, one of our primary peace aims should be the eradication of such ambitions from our own minds and the extension of an economic system of co-operation from national societies to the society of nations.

The problem of ensuring peace in the political sphere is almost exactly the same as in the economic; the two, as was remarked above, cannot in fact be dissociated. The same problem states itself in one case in economic and in the other in political terms. It is almost true to say that in both cases the most important term is power, and that ultimately war and peace depend upon how economic and political power are organized, used and controlled. Internationalists and pacifists, even our rulers and statesmen, have hitherto paid much more attention to the political than to the economic side of the problem. The ordinary man is aware of its existence. The main lines on which it might be solved are known, and an inchoate, half-hearted or dishonest attempt—it depends upon how you look at it—was even made in the League of Nations to do something about it.

The kernel of the problem is the organization, use and control of political and therefore of military power. Are the inter-state relations to be regulated on a basis of law,

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order and justice or of power concentrated in the hands of the governments of independent, sovereign national states and operative in the last resort through armies, navies, and air-forces? Hitler and Nazi Germany have deliberately and openly chosen to adopt the second system and to carry it to its logical conclusion, to its *reductio ad absurdum*, if necessary. That is why they are incompatible with peace and threaten civilization. But when it comes to the peace-making at the end of the war, it will be more important to remember that it is the system itself which is incompatible with peace and threatens civilization, and further that this country has never wholeheartedly foresworn the system or honestly given the opposite system a fair trial.

For at least ten thousand years the human race has been experimenting in its own government. Already 2,500 years ago there were Europeans, highly civilized, living in states with systems of national and international government. The experience of those years has been sufficient to remove all doubt about the main problems of communal government. If we want to substitute peace for war and anarchy in the relations of European states, we know with absolute certainty the preliminary steps which have to be taken. The sovereign, the independent national state, as we know it, claims to be above the law; it is the judge of its own interests and "honour"; it enters into agreements with other states, but it insists upon being the interpreter of their meaning and the arbiter in any dispute which may arise about their fulfilment and it even claims the right to decide at a moment's notice that it is no longer bound by its obligations. The governments of these states are in control of armed forces and armaments infinitely greater and more destructive than the world has ever known in previous ages; unrestrained by any surely established system of law or contract, they jealously maintain the prerogative of the national state in its

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relations with other states at any moment in any difference or dispute to refuse agreement or compromise or any kind of pacific settlement and to resort to the arbitrament of force.

We know everything that there is to know about this kind of society. Human beings have tried to live in it unsuccessfully for over 3,000 years. The units have sometimes been individuals, sometimes villages, towns, corporations, classes, states or empires. The result is always the same. The society contains in itself the principle of its own destruction; its existence may be long or short, according to the destructiveness of its weapons or the ferocity of its manners, but whether it consists of individuals, villages, towns, states, or empires, it is bloody and barbarous.

If the bitter experience of history has taught us everything about social anarchy and its effects, it has also taught us how to get rid of it. We know that if we do not want a society ruled and ultimately destroyed by violence, we must have society ruled and preserved by law. There are certain elements in a pacific society of individuals or groups or communities which are constant and inevitable: a system of ascertained law and organs for making it; machinery for settling disputes between the social units and for common action in matters affecting their common interests; communal control of communal power and machinery for communal action against resort to force by any section of the community.

There is no doubt or mystery of the broad lines upon which this system will have to be applied to the states of Europe if war is to be prevented. There must be international law and a regular method for making it; there must be organs of international government and organs for interpreting the law and settling disputes; there must be the machinery and procedure for common international action and for making changes to meet changed conditions;

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there must be international control of national power and provision for common action in the face of a resort to war or the threat of war by any nation. All this implies an acceptance of limitation of the sovereignty and independence of states and the acceptance by each state of certain obligations with regard to "collective security."

Unless a system of this kind is accepted and established after the war, no stable peace of justice or democracy will follow; the war will again end, not in peace, but in a truce. About this two points may be noticed. The British people and their governments have for many years sincerely desired peace; but they have never honestly and wholeheartedly accepted the obligations of such a pacific international system. In the crucial years 1900 to 1914 the conservative and liberal governments entered the power politics system of continental Europe and played the game of power politics which ended in the war of 1914. After the war the conservative and national governments occasionally paid lip-service to the League, but in fact they played fast and loose with it. They used it as an instrument, not of international law and order and peace, but of purely national policy. In fact they admitted no limitation of the sovereignty and independence of their own state and no obligation to the common security.

The second point is this. The League was a real attempt to lay the foundations of a pacific system, based upon the limitation of sovereignty, international law, the settlement of disputes, political co-operation for common interests, and common action against aggression. If the time comes again for the making of a real peace, the League may not be resuscitated, but in that case something very like the League will have to be created. It may or may not be a full-blown federation of states. The idea of federation has received much support in recent months owing to the publication of Mr. Streit's important book. The federal system has proved

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to be one of the most effective systems of human government wherever it has been able to establish itself. If accepted and applied by the states of Europe, it would probably solve the problem of peace. But it is not the only possible system for limiting the sovereignty of states and inaugurating the rule of international law and justice. It implies a very advanced form of social co-operation and of communal psychology. It is by no means certain that it could be applied successfully on a wholesale basis to the states of Europe at the end of a devastating war. On the other hand, the idea that a League system, even if honestly accepted by governments, has some fatal defect, because it does not impair the sovereignty of states or could not be used to impair it, is a misunderstanding. While it might be possible to develop the federal system for parts of Europe, it might at the same time be necessary to combine it with some kind of League system for the whole. If we desire peace as well as victory, this is perhaps the most important of all the questions regarding our "peace aims" which we shall have to decide at the end of the war.

LABOUR AND THE WAR

By "POLITICUS"

THE FIRST STAGE

AS I write, the first stage of the war is nearly over. A highly-mechanised German army, with the help of overwhelming aerial superiority, has overrun Poland and routed her ill-equipped troops. The folly of the political guarantee given by Mr. Chamberlain last March to a wellnigh defenceless country and the criminal folly of not backing the political guarantee with immediate military assistance have been demonstrated. What has saved this first stage of the war from becoming an unrelieved tragedy is the behaviour of Russia. Moralising apart, we can now with some degree of assurance assert that Stalin's seizure of two-thirds of Poland heralds a new Pan-Slav movement which may make Russia at once the master and protector of the Balkans. By an ironic twist of fortune Ribbentrop's diplomatic masterpiece has not relieved Germany from the menace on two fronts or opened the way to a Nazi domination of South-Eastern Europe. It must be difficult for Hitler to decide whether he fears more his Anglo-French enemies on the west or his Russian allies on the east.

One thing is certain: the British government can claim neither responsibility nor credit for these surprising developments. Any advantages we have gained are due not to British diplomacy but to Stalin's supreme duplicity; and it is unlikely that we shall see in the near future any understanding between the Western powers and Russia. From our point of view the war is a Western war between the old empires of France and England and the new imperialism of Nazi Germany.

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So far the British and French governments seem to have decided that, if the war develops as they wish, it shall be one of siege and counter-siege. On the Western Front they are determined to sit tight while the navies tighten the blockade. The determination to abide scrupulously by the rules of war is no doubt partly due to their anxiety to preserve American sympathy on their side; but it is more deeply influenced by their anxiety to win the sympathy of the German people. It is a strange paradox that two ultra-Conservative governments should have decided to rely on social revolution as their chief weapon of war and to borrow the tactics of Lenin in their campaign against Nazi aggression. But there it is. Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier have chosen as their slogan the emancipation of the Czechs, the Poles and the Germans from Hitlerism and they are resolved, as far as possible, to take no military action which would antagonise the German working-class. With the partition of Poland, the first stage of the war is over and the long campaign for the internal disruption of Germany begins.

On the Home Front, however, the first stage of the war has scarcely begun. There seems to have been in the mind of the Government a dim belief that this country could "begin where it left off in 1918"; that we could "snap into" a war mentality and a war mobilisation of industry such as Lloyd George only achieved after Herculean labours. Huge ministries grew up over a week-end and were expected to deliver the goods in a fortnight. Mysterious controls stretched out their tentacles over commerce and business. No one quite knew how they were meant to function, least of all the Civil Servants who had been drafted in to run them. As a result there was a complete dislocation of business, a paralysing and totally unnecessary increase of unemployment, especially among the black-coated workers, and in spite of

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all the maze of new controls, a frantic, unrestrained and singularly unpleasant epidemic of profiteering, not only in small ware, but in every type of product where quick profits could be made. The Government, in fact, behaved like a sprinter notoriously slow off the mark. It got off the mark so soon that it fell down flat on its face, facing in the wrong direction.

In part, no doubt, this was due to the panic fear that the first day of the war would see London in ruins. The only real preparations, which had been made, had been based on this presumption; the only really efficient bit of work was the actual evacuation scheme, however harmful its after-effects may be. We are slowly recovering from the disastrous results of Hitler's decision to spare London for a time! Geared up to face an awful catastrophe with British stoicism, we have been faced instead with an unreal war and the awkward picture of Poland's agony while we—each dutifully carrying his or her gas-mask—go about our business, if we have the good luck to have any, unharmed. A humiliating experience to say the least of it.

But at least we have had the time to see one thing clearly. We have entered war under a government which has neither the courage nor the energy nor the knowledge of the people nor the understanding of modern politics nor the business efficiency to carry out the purpose it has set before itself and the people. Not one member of the Cabinet can out of his own head compose a fireside talk which would tell us in plain language what the Cabinet is about. Not one of them, with the ageing but still impressive exception of Mr. Churchill, can even make a speech which will rouse the spirit of Parliament. At present the conduct of the war by the politicians is in no way different from the conduct of the peace. They display their old tricks of vacillation and high-minded platitudinising and their old preference for any

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muddle however grotesque, for any risk of the civilian population, however great, which avoids an unpleasant decision. Such men are unlikely to make any decision great enough either to win or to lose a war. They are the perfect stalematers.

THE POSITION OF LABOUR

With such a government, the position of the Opposition in Parliament should be overwhelmingly strong. For years both Parliament and public opinion outside Parliament have been well ahead of the Government; and we have watched the edifying spectacle of a British Cabinet led by the people it was elected to lead. Those political theorists, who had announced that the days of Parliamentary government were over and the days of Cabinet dictatorship had come, have seen a refutation of their theories. They have seen Mr. Chamberlain pushed over the brink of war while Mr. Amery, red in the face, begs Mr. Greenwood to speak for England; and, since the war began, they have watched the Cabinet, as each new muddle was brought to the public gaze, apologising abjectly and promising that it would try harder next time. Never can it have been easier for an opposition to stop a government doing anything it had firmly decided to do; never more difficult to insure that the government did anything sensible.

In an extremely difficult situation, the Labour Party has acted with a rare combination of prudence and courage. In the days before the war, Mr. Greenwood, in person, and the National Council of Labour as a collective body, both demonstrated their power to lead a nation let down by its government. When, however, Mr. Chamberlain made a tentative offer to include certain Labour leaders in his Cabinet, the offer was wisely refused. Labour agreed to give a temporary and conditional support to the War Cabinet and achieved, in return for this bargain, a close liaison

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between the T.U.C., the National Council of Labour, and the Parliamentary Party on the one side, and the Cabinet and Government departments on the other. This means that the Labour Movement can demand and obtain the most intimate knowledge of the course of the war at home and abroad. Its leadership can know almost as much as if its members were in the Cabinet, and can exert vastly greater influence than any Cabinet Minister, precisely because they are not in the Cabinet. Such power, without Cabinet responsibility, has been offered to few political parties and it says much for the shrewdness of the Labour leaders that they have achieved and exploited it so successfully.

When we turn however to the position of the Party in the country we cannot feel the same satisfaction. Here, co-operation in National Service both before and during the war, in hardship committees, in evacuation plans and, above all, in the new Ministry of Information local committees has produced an extraordinary political confusion. The rank and file of the Labour Movement thinks its politics in terms of elections; it does not pay much attention to the niceties of Parliamentary procedure and has, as I write, received absolutely no explanation of the tactics of its leadership. It knows that Labour is not in the Government, but it can see no difference between the *Daily Herald* and the *Daily Express*. It is told that Labour is still independent, but rumours seep down to it that, in one room in the Ministry of Information, a Transport House official is working in co-operation with a senior paid official of the Conservative Party machine. The Party member is instructed to get into all the committees which are now springing up. He finds that, in the Ministry of Information, Lord Macmillan has an advisory committee of which Mr. Noel Baker, Mr. Charles Dukes and Mr. Alfred Barnes are members; furthermore that there are twelve regional advisory committees on each of which Labour is

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to co-operate with Conservatives; and lastly, to crown his confusion, he finds out that, in every constituency in the country, a local information committee is being formed, sponsored often by the joint activity of the paid Conservative and Labour agents.

It is beside the point to discuss whether this type of inter-Party co-operation is wise or not. What we must observe is that the rank and file of the Labour Party has been given no explanation of the reasons for Labour's participation in it, and is frankly worried. In Parliament the Opposition can co-operate extensively with the Government and still remain in opposition; but it is doubtful whether the Opposition parties in the country can do the same thing and retain their independence. They certainly cannot do it, if they are not told what they are doing and why they are doing it.

This position needs the immediate attention of the Labour leadership. Much of the good work which they have done, in building up their own position of power without Cabinet responsibility, will be dissipated if the Party in the country is permitted either to lose its identity in a welter of National Service Committees or, even worse, to lose touch with its leadership, to underrate its work and to suspect its motives. Even if the facade of national unity is thereby endangered and the Party endures a temporary unpopularity, Labour's position as an alternative Cabinet in Parliament and an anti-National Party in the country must at all costs be made clear. For if the war lasts any time, the present Cabinet must fall and it is vital that, in the crisis which follows its fall, Labour as an organised political unit shall be able to use its full weight.

WAR AIMS

If it is assumed that in the national interest a change of government is urgently required, it follows that Labour's

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chief objective should be, not the overthrow of the War Cabinet, but the achievement of a position which can be exploited when hard facts compel the resignation of Mr. Chamberlain. A frontal attack on the Government would be both unpatriotic and politically foolish. Until circumstances have made a large section of Tory back-benchers see the inadequacy of the old men of Munich, no change of Government is possible; and they will be led to see this, not by political speeches in Parliament and in the country, but by the course of the war. When the country's will to victory is irresistible and the Government's incapacity to achieve it irrefutable, then the Government will fall and Labour's chance will come.

It is being urged on many sides that the best way to overthrow the Government is to expose the inadequacy of its war aims; and that for this reason the Labour Party should make haste to announce precisely what sort of peace it is prepared to offer the Germans and the other peoples of Europe. So far the Labour leadership has resisted this argument; and it is to be hoped that it will continue to resist it for some time to come. For in the first place the international situation is changing with such rapidity that it is impossible for a responsible statesman to formulate precise promises or plans. If, as we must assume—though we may hope the assumption wrong—the war is a long one, peace aims framed this year will be proportionately more burdensome in the peace-making as they are more precise. In the second place, it is a delusion to assume that peace plans, however generously they are drafted, will have more than a minimal effect in undermining the Nazi regime. Those who believe that *Mein Kampf* will overthrow *Mein Kampf* are permitting their humanitarian sentiments to destroy their common sense. After five years of bloodless victories and a spectacular military success in Poland, the German people

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will not be tempted by any promises that, if Hitler is overthrown, they shall be received back into a new League of Nations or an even newer Federal Union. To the German in his present mood, even if he detests Hitler, such phrases reek too strongly of Wilsonism; and the social revolution in Germany has been deep enough to insure that liberal ideology makes nonsense even to Hitler's enemies. Propaganda never won a war until blockade and military defeat had undermined the morale of one side. It will certainly not do so this time when our moral position has been undermined by six years of appeasement, and Hitler's moral position has been strengthened by the contrast between his dynamic success and our lethargic impotence.

In the third place it is equally illusory to believe that the people of this country are crying out for Federal Union or any other peace plan. The man in the street has, as he always does, personified the issue. He knows that our job is to kick out Hitler and he is not worrying for the moment what is to happen after the job has been done. In this he is wiser than many who think themselves his betters, and are so busy asking what they will do with the victory that they hardly bother to win it. There is only one issue in this country to-day—the conduct of the war. Who succeeds Mr. Chamberlain will be decided not by Peace Plans or War Aims. The men with the will to victory, the capacity to achieve it and the ability to convince the masses that they are on the side of the people against the profiteer, are the men who will take the place of the present War Cabinet.

For all these reasons the Labour leaders will be well advised to keep their formulation of war aims within strict limits and to prevent at all costs giving the impression that they are resolved to rebuild those sovereign nation states which have been overthrown by Hitler and Stalin. Until the German will to resistance is broken, it is sufficient for

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them to make clear their resolve to overthrow the Nazi war machine and emancipate the peoples of Europe from the fear of war, and from persecution. If they wish to go further, they might well obtain the sympathy of neutral countries in Europe and across the Atlantic by pledging themselves to buy no allies at the cost of national rights and social justice; and in any event they should emphasise and re-emphasise their determination to root out in this country those elements which wrecked the settlement of Versailles, permitted the destruction of the League and connived at Hitler's bloodless victory. The determination to destroy British plutocracy is the main war aim which will really stir the German worker.

THE HOME FRONT

For this reason Labour's whole energy should be directed to the Home Front, to the mobilisation of our productive sources for war, to the achievement of a real will to victory and to the assuring of genuine social justice in the hardships which are bound to come. Let us take the mobilisation of industry first. It is not hazardous to prophesy that, in a not-very-distant future, there will be a munitions crisis such as Lloyd George had to face in 1915. It is not merely the egregious Mr. Burgin whose personality prevents the efficient working of the Ministry of Supply. Here the politician is insignificant in comparison with the tenacious and high-minded obstructionism of Civil Servants, whose expertise in the tactics of inter-departmental warfare is only matched by their inability to face the real problem of winning a war. We are paying now for a generation of complacency about our Civil Service. Admirable as a peace-time machine for maintaining the *status quo* without corruption, the mind of the Civil Servant is, as a general rule, totally incapable of the creative and dangerous planning which war demands. Sacrificing everything to correct routine, complacently

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unaware of his remoteness from the outside world, he is that most dangerous thing, a sincere obscurant. Far more than any single politician or any group of politicians, it is the Treasury with its dominant influence on the other departments which is responsible for the present confusion and will be responsible for the munitions crisis when it comes. Unless the Labour Party looks below the surface of politics and grasps this fundamental fact, it will be unable to cut the red tape and mobilise industry for war.

Second only to the obstructionism of the Civil Service are the vested interests of finance and industry; but in fighting these Labour will have the advantage of the expert advice of the Trade Union movement. It will need not merely to bring industry under efficient national control, but to insure that Labour interests are fully represented in all the Government's consultations. In a protracted war industrial morale can only be maintained by democratic participation. This participation must not be limited to a liaison with Trade Union leaders such as produced in the last war the Shop Stewards Movement. The Trade Unions themselves must make far greater efforts than they have made in the last six years to keep the closest contact between the branches and headquarters.

In the next place Labour should concentrate its attention on those endless social injustices which war has already produced. The inadequacy of the soldiers' allowances and of soldiers' pay, in comparison with the wages of the A.R.P. workers, the attacks on the social services, the exploitation of the National Emergency to demand unlimited overtime—these are only chance instances of injustices which the present cabinet will never seriously tackle. Again, the whole story of evacuation illustrates the lack of imagination in our ruling class. Granted the amazing efficiency of the actual evacuation, for which chief credit goes to Herbert Morrison and to the

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school teachers, the after-effects of evacuation have been harmful just because they have not been understood. It was a mistake in any case to separate wives from their husbands and expect them to stay separate for the duration of war, a mistake to throw the burden on the country people, to pay them 8s. 6d. for each child and to demand no payment from the parents left in the dangerous areas. Such mistakes were, however, excusable in the first rush of the crisis. What was inexcusable was the way in which these mistakes were not remedied in time.

With regard to the Ministry of Information the Labour Movement has already voiced its protest. It has wisely abstained from a general attack on the censorship or on the idea of the Ministry as such. And it has indicated that much of the blame is due not to the Ministry, but to service departments which regard civilian morale as the frills of war. But it should not be imagined that the demand for uncensored news has unrestricted mass support. The public has too long been sceptical of the radio and the press to be unduly disturbed by the inefficiency of this government department. All its complaints would disappear overnight if Labour, when it succeeds to power, saw to it that in regular fireside talks the Government took the people into its confidence and told them what it was about.

I have left the most important issue to the last. Perhaps by the time these pages are read, the inadequacy of the Government's civilian defence will have been already exposed. Here at least, the Labour Movement has a record of which it can be proud. It has consistently exposed the futility of each Government scheme as it was produced, from that early stroke of genius, the hot bath as the defence against air raids, to the proposal put forward at the end of September that householders should pile earth or sand outside the windows of their shelter room to at least a level of six feet

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above the floor level. It has patiently explained the futility of the presumption that Goering will limit his bombing to the areas labelled dangerous by the Home Office and pointed out that numberless towns in so-called neutral or safe areas are virtually without defence. But, here again, propaganda whether in speeches or in pamphlets will not change the Government. Grim though the thought may be, we must realise that not until the facts expressed in the death and mutilation of men, women and children have spoken for themselves will the country learn the lesson. For this time Labour must wait. However exasperating the delay will be, the opportunity for action will not come until the crisis demands a new leadership.

What is important, is that Labour should not come to the help of the Government too soon. False calls of patriotism will no doubt be made. Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues are well aware that although they are "indispensable" they are incapable of carrying through the war. They will soon be making tentative proposals for strengthening the Cabinet. But these proposals must be rejected so long as the balance of power in the government is still on the side of the Men of Munich. The country will have to pay a heavy price for the sins of the National Government; it cannot afford to underpin its slightly less inefficient members or accept another Government which is merely a reshuffle of the old forces. It needs tremendous courage in war-time for an opposition to permit a government to commit suicide; but it is precisely this courage which Labour will need in the coming months.

THE TRADITION OF BRITISH POLICY

By A. L. ROWSE

AT this time, when circumstances and Herr Hitler are bringing us up against the fundamental facts of the relations between this country and others, the foundations of British policy, it is very necessary that the British people should think clearly about them. And yet it is doubtful if they at all realise the full strength of their historic case. Indeed it is certain that they do not. In the years since the last war, and particularly in these last years before the present one, there has been a far too generous readiness on the part of many Englishmen to swallow German criticisms of our traditional policy through the centuries, quite unthinkingly. A real knowledge of our history, and not merely a superficial interpretation of it such as is current in some quarters on the Continent, would have shown how little these criticisms were justified; and clear thinking would usually have shown that their strongest root was in jealousy of our success as a nation, in *schaden-freude*—a word for which there is, by the way, no English equivalent.

Partly in consequence of their intensive propaganda, upon which the Germans at least have spent a good deal of money, and partly as the result of our mental laziness in thinking out our position, there has gained some currency even among ourselves, a view of our traditional policy which is at once by no means favourable and not at all justified by history. In fact, we have no reason to be ashamed of, or apologetic for, the long centuries of success which adherence to the fundamental line of our policy has brought us; when we have failed in the past it has been precisely when we have departed from that line or overstepped it. It is ridiculous to suppose, seriously, that that long record of success has been due to "English gold," or our "Machiavellianism," or

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our diabolical cunning in working the balance-of-power system against our enemies. One could well wish, as an Englishman, that we had a little more cunning, a spot more Machiavellianism; and we could all do with a little more gold! But, in truth, the success of British policy in the past, which has so concerned Continental and not merely German commentators (them it has mostly exasperated out of all sense) must obviously be due—it is only reason to suppose—to something much more fundamental than such considerations.

What these reasons are which really account for our success in the past, I hope to suggest; but I should say that I owe them to an intelligent Canadian of my acquaintance, who first put them to me. It may be that there are some advantages in viewing the growth of British policy and the position of Britain in the European scene objectively from that distance and in perspective. For the rest, a true view must rest upon a careful study of our history in the modern period, from the sixteenth century onwards.

But first let us take the hostile view as it is expressed in its latest and most powerful form by Herr Hitler. It is not that we expect from him a considered or even a competent judgment as to the course we have pursued historically: it would need a historian to do that. An autodidact himself, an autodidact of genius even for politics, he would not be qualified to give a judgment of any value on the history of British policy—though *Mein Kampf* has some shrewd *aperçus* on certain aspects of our politics. That consideration naturally does not deter one who aspires to lay down the law in matters of literature, art, morals, philosophy, biology, no less than in politics. Herr Hitler's characterisation of British policy in his self-justificatory message to the German nation on the outbreak of war may be taken as typical, crude and over-simplified though it is, of that hostile view which,

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based on history as it is supposed to be, a knowledge of history controverts.

Let us examine it. He says:

"England has for centuries pursued the aim of rendering the peoples of Europe defenceless against the British policy of world-conquest by proclaiming a balance of power, in which England claimed the right to attack on threadbare pretexts and destroy that European state which at the moment seemed most dangerous. Thus at one time she fought the world power of Spain, later the Dutch, then the French, and, since the year 1871, the German."¹

We do not, as we have said, need to take Herr Hitler as historian very seriously; it is only too obvious that his will be propaganda-history. But his view of the rôle of Great Britain in modern Europe needs only one question to show its one-sidedness and falsity: has it never struck him, and those who share his view, that if Britain has been successful in resisting and defeating those powers which were so strong as to challenge the security and independence of others in Europe, it was not so much due to the superior virtues of Great Britain as to the fact that her interest coincided with the interest of the bulk of those other, smaller powers who were threatened? Of course British policy has had to provide for the interest and security of the nation; there is nothing surprising in that: every nation has to provide for its own interest and security. It would be very disingenuous of Nazi leaders who believe in that and nothing else as a rule of state, who indoctrinate their people with the teaching that the interest of their own state is the alpha and omega of politics, that there are no principles higher than that and that beyond that there is no rule of law in international affairs, no question of justice and right, but only the arbitrament of force, the rule of violence and fraud and treachery, and that

¹ Published in the English newspapers of September 4th.

everything is justified in the pursuit of power: it is disingenuous in the extreme for such people to complain that British policy in the past has been conceived in the interest of Britain and to ensure her safety.

But the difference between this country and theirs is that it so happens that our interest has been the same as that of the bulk of other European countries. That is why they have been ready to join with us in coalitions and alliances throughout our modern history: because their security and independence were threatened by an overwhelmingly strong power, often more directly and dangerously than we were ourselves, as is the case with Poland to-day. Not all the gold in the world, let alone the fantastic resources of Machiavellian cunning with which we are credited, would have gained us the allies we have had in our history, if it had not been to their interest to fight with us. The simple truth is, providentially for us, that the interest of this nation and that of the great bulk of Europe are one and the same, as against that of any power so strong as to challenge the freedom and independence of the others. It is this which has been the sheet-anchor of our security in turn, the guarantee of our long record of success as a nation. When we have adhered to this line, it has guided us through great dangers to safety; it is when we have departed from it, or overstepped it, that we have failed.

The point may be proved historically. In the course of the sixteenth century, at the beginning of our career as a modern nation, it was Spain which rose to a position of such overwhelming power and predominance as to threaten the independence, and in some cases the very existence, of other states. Portugal, for example, was overwhelmed in 1580 and the Portuguese Empire annexed to the vast Spanish Empire which already spanned the world. The Portuguese did not relish the extinction of their independence; somehow

or other—it may be very unreasonable of them—peoples do not, witness the Poles and the Czechs; and the Portuguese kept alive their sentiment of independence until they won it back in 1640. Nor were they alone in being threatened: there were the Dutch, whose fight for existence is one of the epics of European history. France, too, was seriously endangered by Spanish power, not to mention the Italian states, which were too weak to resist, though they hated it. In reality all these states were more directly endangered by Spain than Elizabeth's England was. It was no less to their interest, but rather more, to join with us in checking Spanish aggression. The recurrent dilemma of British policy is perspicaciously expressed by the long-sighted, clear-headed Burghley (would that we had had a Burghley in these last few years!) in a memorandum before the outbreak of the war with Spain: should we wait until Spain had dealt singly with her opponents, had quenched Dutch independence and divided France, and was then free to turn her undivided attention to us, the last, not the first citadel of freedom in Europe; or should we join issue while we had allies to fight with us in a common cause, our own freedom and the freedom of Europe?

The situation has been essentially the same with France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as with Germany in the twentieth. No one would dispute, I fancy, not even a French historian—certainly not a German—that the enormous preponderance of France from Louis XIV to Napoleon, was a standing threat to the liberty and independence of others: in particular to Belgium, Holland, the Rhineland, Savoy, and at times to a wider circle of powers less strong than France, to Spain, Austria and, let it be noticed, even to Prussia. Great Britain had a common interest with them in resisting aggression, in preventing them from being overrun—as Holland was wantonly and without

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warning by Louis XIV in 1672, as Belgium and Holland were by the French Revolutionary armies in 1793-4, as almost the whole of Germany was by Napoleon, as Prussia was in 1806 and Spain in 1808. No wonder other countries could be got to form coalitions with us, time after time, to resist these onslaughts: it was even more directly their interest than ours. I do not go so far as to say that our own action was prompted by altruism; I content myself with affirming the obvious bond of common interest which bound us and the bulk of other European states against the aggressor.

Nor is the case at all dissimilar with Germany in this century. Herr Hitler is of course quite wrong in dating the turning-point in Anglo-German relations to 1871: he would be, since he knows no history, or has only a politically-motivated smattering of it. As a matter of fact, we ought to have been on our guard about Germany from 1871, and again from the moment Hitler came into power in 1933; but we were not. All historians know that the turning-point in our relations with Germany only came with the opening of the twentieth century, with the hostility displayed towards this country during the Boer War, the rejection of feelers for an Anglo-German understanding, the determination of the German Government to challenge our sea-power by building a great fleet. Herr Hitler himself has roundly condemned the course of pre-1914 German policy in antagonising Great Britain. Now he tells the German people in his proclamation: "We ourselves have been witnesses of the policy of encirclement which has been carried on by England against Germany since before the war" (*i.e.*, of 1914). The German propaganda-lie about encirclement has been judicially and coolly exposed by Professor Brierly in his Oxford pamphlet on "Encirclement."¹ It is sufficient to say here that if you antagonise everybody, threaten some

¹ Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs.

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people, blackmail others, conduct your policy by mingled violence and fraud, need you be surprised if the others come together to defend themselves against you? It is hardly likely that that power which is engaged alone in a struggle with several other powers is itself entirely in the right and they all in the wrong; it is more likely on reflection that there is something in its conduct and character which is responsible for the situation in which it finds itself.

So at least this country found from its own experience at the one period in our history when we were so strong as to be a threat to others. During the short time between the close of the Seven Years' War in 1763 and the outbreak of the American War of Independence, we were, with our lien upon the whole North American Continent, far too strong (and no doubt correspondingly arrogant) in relation to other European powers. And it produced a European coalition against us, very rightly, which defeated us and forced us to give up the American colonies. Most Englishmen since, and many of the best Englishmen at the time, thought it a very good thing that we should have been defeated in 1782. I wish as many Germans could see that it was equally right and proper that they should have lost their pre-1914 ascendancy (some of the best of them have done). Their post-1871 ascendancy was not a good thing for Europe. Even at its best and comparatively responsible under Bismarck, it was designed to restrict the liberty of action and independence of France as a nation. Once he threatened to let loose a preventive war on her; he kept her perpetually in terror. And what Germany was like under his more neurotic and pathological successors (if ever there were a gang of men more unfitted to govern Europe than William II, Holstein, Bülow, Tirpitz, it is only Hitler, Göring, Goebbels, Himmler: what an *embarras de choix* the Germans do present us with, to be sure); what pre-1914 Germany was for

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Europe we all know, with its designs for Mittel-Europa, its oppression of the Poles, its encouragement of Austria-Hungary to subjugate the Slavs of South-Eastern Europe. We all hear so much about the oppressiveness of the Versailles Treaty—which actually in its territorial clauses was not so bad—that we are apt to forget the positive evidence we have of what sort of treaty the German Imperialists would have imposed if they had won the war. Right up to within sight of the end, they would not give up their hold on Belgium; they intended to annex the coal-producing area of north-eastern France and help themselves to a share of the French colonial empire; as for the treaties imposed on Russia and Roumania, they showed that the Germans meant to extend their empire over most of Eastern Europe. If Herr Hitler finds that there is consistency in British policy to-day with that before 1914, it is because there is a still more striking consistency between his Germany and the Germany of William II. What difference there is was in favour of the latter; for as all Europe knows, Nazi Germany is more unreliable, more brutal and barbaric with its system of internal repression and torture, its unprovoked onslaughts upon the independence of Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and now Poland. Whatever disadvantages Versailles imposed upon Germany—and after all they asked for it: militarists and nationalists who believe in that sort of international order have no right to complain and whine when the game goes against them: only internationalists, liberal and socialist, have the right to criticise peace settlements on the Versailles model, for they have something better to offer;—however much, then, the Germans repine at Versailles, we have to remember that it gave liberty to more than 70 million Slavs. That was its historic achievement, which we are liable to overlook in sympathizing with the (now mythical) sorrows of Germans over it.

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Herr Hitler pipes to us the *leit-motiv* of *Mein Kampf*: "I have many times offered England and the English people the understanding and friendship of the German people. . . . I have always been repelled," he weeps. It is a case too much resembling the Walrus and the Carpenter:

" 'I weep for you,' the Walrus said:
 'I deeply sympathize.'
 With sobs and tears he sorted out
 Those of the largest size,
 Holding his pocket-handkerchief
 Before his streaming eyes."

The way to the understanding and friendship of the English people was for Herr Hitler to have been a better European: that way is now irrevocably closed to him—was closed from the very beginning by the nature of his régime, as some of us saw. It was not for want of trying to make him a better European that the British Government was driven to the conclusion it has arrived at, namely, that nobody can trust the word of the German Führer any more. Indeed, the criticism of one-half of the British electorate has been all along that their government was prepared to go to almost any length in concessions to Herr Hitler, if only he would keep the peace and abide by the rule of law in Europe. That very excess of patience and conciliatoriness, which we of the Left in this country criticised all along, strengthens the moral case of the British Government before Europe now: it is so very obvious that they did all they could to avoid a breach, and that Hitler's outpourings about British war-inciters plotting to encircle Germany from the moment the Nazis came in is so much nonsense unworthy of the intelligence of even the German people. That is what we *ought* to have done, alas, but did not do. No doubt there could have been an understanding with the Nazis on the basis of a share-out—

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“ ‘O Oysters,’ said the Carpenter,
‘You’ve had a pleasant run!
Shall we be trotting home again?’ ”
But answer came there none—
And this was scarcely odd, because
They’d eaten every one.”

But this procedure is not the British conception of international policy appropriate to the twentieth century.

A further criticism of British policy which we have heard frequently of late years from the Nazis by way of justifying their rapacious (they call it dynamic) conduct, is that ours was no better in the past and that the British Empire was built up in the same way. As a historian I should say that that is almost wholly untrue, besides being utterly unhistorical in its way of judging. As if the twentieth century in its code of conduct, its standards and manners, is the same as the sixteenth, or even the eighteenth century for that matter! One would have thought that human society had effected a good deal of progress since then—as indeed it has, in almost every sphere, except that these barbarians want to throw us back into a previous age, with its altogether more primitive standards and more brutal conditions. However, as a matter of fact, it is not true to say that the British Empire on the whole was built up in this way. Everybody knows that it largely grew up in consequence of the trading activities of a maritime and industrial people; and for the rest, what it acquired in war was mainly acquired as the result of our wars of successful defence against aggression. (Nor were others losers thereby: to those collective efforts in which we joined, Holland and Belgium owe their existence; so also, it is chastening to think, did Prussia, while Germany as a whole was delivered from the yoke of Napoleon.) Lastly, the facts of contemporary British policy towards the Empire are in themselves a sufficient answer to these unfounded

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criticisms: the whole direction of our effort for a century now has been towards conferring self-government upon our dominions overseas, and extending the principle of trusteeship in relation to native peoples.

There are those, mainly political defeatists like Bertrand Russell, who think it would have been better if we had never made the efforts we have done to secure the liberty of the lesser powers of Europe against the aggressor, and instead had permitted Europe to be united under Louis XIV or Napoleon. This is unhistorical to the point of being Utopian. It simply could not have been done, not even under Napoleon, who came nearest to achieving it, as any study of the period shows. Whatever may be the utilitarian arguments for a Europe controlled by a single strong state, the force of nationality is so great that the peoples of Europe would not tolerate it. Napoleon’s pursuit of European despotism was, as French observers like Talleyrand and Châteaubriand saw, a chimera: no sooner had he got Western Europe organised into the continental system than Spain revolted; then Prussia and Austria, and then the whole of Germany turned against him: for them it was the War of Liberation. That was the nearest that Europe has got to that form of unification; the moral is that that model is not likely to be successful. There will always be revolts in Europe against any one power that tries to exert a despotism over the rest. And that is likely to be as true for Germany in the twentieth century, perhaps also (who can say?) for Russia in the twenty-first, as it was for France in the early nineteenth and for ourselves from 1763 to 1776. Happily for us, this country, except for that brief period, has never been strong enough to attempt anything of the sort. That fact has enforced upon us moderation as to ends and co-operation with others as to means, and in that has lain our security.

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The whole lesson of modern European history is this: that no single great power is strong enough to dominate all the rest, and it really is not worth its trying. Even if it is successful for a time, the lesser powers that have been subjugated will only seize the first opportunity of revolting, and the decision will in all probability be reversed at the next war. But we cannot go on in Europe having wars at intervals of every twenty years or so, as in the eighteenth century—modern war is far too totalitarian and destructive. The moral is, then, that we have to achieve some functioning international order, in fact, a United States of Europe.

The traditional policy of this country is in no sense an obstacle to its achievement, in fact it points directly towards it; that end is its logical conclusion. It is simply not true that the past record of British policy has been to keep going an unprincipled and selfish balance of power in Europe, but rather to secure our own liberty along with that of the bulk of other European countries, whose interest is the same as ours. It is providential for us that our interest is one with the interest of Europe. That there is a widespread sense in Europe of the identity of our interest with theirs, that we are fighting their battle along with our own, may be gathered from the support that there is for Great Britain's stand and the sympathy that exists among the great majority of people in most European countries. And that has been so in all the past six years of struggle against Nazi aggression. It is probably true to say that if a vote could have been taken, or the wishes of the peoples themselves expressed, it would have been found to have been overwhelmingly on our side and that of the democracies.

It must now be our business not only to carry on the war against Nazi aggression, but to follow up the lines of our traditional policy, which has been so successful in the past, by organising the opinion of free Europe in favour of

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an effective federation of Europe as the proper objective of the war. It is the only way out for us all, the only real solution for Europe. The League of Nations, such as it was, was the best and most hopeful thing that came out of the last war. It very nearly achieved success. This is not the place to discuss where and why it fell short of our hopes. But it may be suggested that perhaps it attempted too much in extending across the world from China to Abyssinia and Peru. Since the root of our troubles is in Europe, it may be well to begin with the task of building a European federation, a United States of Europe—a less ambitious aim, in the first instance, upon a surer foundation. It will be sufficiently difficult in itself, but, if we make it our objective, it should not be impossible. There could not be a more fitting culmination to the centuries of success this country has had in piloting its course than in leading Europe to this so long-desired and so necessary a goal.



THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

By KINGSLEY MARTIN

IN the last war Germany relied on the overwhelming power of the finest fighting machine ever yet seen in the field. She neglected those moral and psychological factors which would count increasingly in any prolonged war. On the theory of Clausewitz, the enemy must be weakened and isolated so that the sudden attack, launched at the right moment, will be conclusive. But Clausewitz was thinking in terms of national diplomacy and military strategy. Hitler and Goebbels have improved on that theory. The art of conquest is to divide your potential enemies by propaganda and to destroy your victims by internal disruption. Indirect aggression may bring conquest without even the necessity for a lightning war.

The foreign propaganda technique of Dr. Goebbels is essentially the same as that which gave the Nazis power in Germany without civil war. It is a mixture of terror, cajolery and blackmail. Just as the Catholics and Conservatives and Social Democrats were divided by promises that it was only the Jews and the Communists and the foreign enemies of Germany who were threatened by a Nazi victory, so the external opponents of the Nazis were fobbed off by promises that Hitler only intended to attack the Bolsheviks and make certain territorial adjustments which would bring into the Reich Germans who had been excluded by the Versailles Treaty. These promises were designed to reassure the world while Germany re-armed and individual lines of propaganda were elaborated and applied to countries in every part of the world. Spain was a special case, because there the class war had already been openly declared. In every case Hitler has promised that this was the last aggression,

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the one little thing—to-day it is Danzig and the Corridor—necessary before settling down to—what? Austria was comparatively easy. The people were of German stock; and since it was the first victim, the world was slow to realise what the Nazis intended. Czechoslovakia was more difficult because of its alliances, and because the Czechs were not amenable to propaganda. Poland, with the fate of Czechoslovakia as a warning, proved completely intractable. Similar methods of disruption are at work in all the neighbouring countries—in Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Scandinavia and the Baltic and in the remaining states of Central and South-Eastern Europe. These are countries which Germany may hope to conquer or dominate without war. The object in the case of France, Britain, the United States, South Africa and other Dominions has been rather different. Germany hoped in time to dominate some of these countries, but for the time being the object was to keep them out of war while she destroyed her smaller neighbours. There is a third group of countries—Latin America and the colonial or semi-colonial States where the objective was to prepare the way for Germany's Empire, increase Germany's trade and stir up local and native patriotism against democratic Empires. Without attempting to examine the variation in technique required for these different groups and different countries one may notice a few general methods which could be applied very widely.

(1) Hitler has used the threat of war and made the startling discovery that to announce your aggressive intentions may be a way—for a time at least—not of warning people to provide against them, but of persuading them to submit. In any former period of history this threat would have speedily roused a corresponding bellicosity. It did so much more slowly in these days because of the hatred of war amongst civilised people and because the well-to-do who

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used to regard it with some equanimity are now alive both to its horrors in which they will be involved with the rest of mankind, and to its revolutionary possibilities which they fear almost as much.

(2) Hitler appeals to the world on the ground that Germany was wrongly treated at Versailles and lacks *Lebensraum*. The utility of this weapon has now been blunted by excessive use and by the general realisation that Hitler's policy goes far beyond a mere reversal of Versailles. Germany's *Lebensraum* seems to mean the world.

(3) Nazi propaganda has been designed to produce a "fifth column" in foreign countries. The method is to extol the virtues of Nazi discipline and efficiency, to call for a common crusade against Bolshevism and to induce the well-to-do to believe that Nazism threatens only Jews and Bolsheviks. The power of this weapon has been greatly decreased not only by the now undeniable threat of Nazi aggression everywhere, but also by Hitler's treatment of respected conservative leaders in countries which he has conquered and by the discovery, in financial circles and elsewhere, that the Nazi system is itself destructive of capitalism of the nineteenth-century type. This propaganda method has received a serious and perhaps final setback in the Russian-German Treaty. Hitler no longer stands as the head of the Anti-Comintern Block, but as the friend of the Bolsheviks. Catholics everywhere, who played so large a part in the "fifth column," have lost their principle reason for helping Nazism, which now stands, as much as Communism, in the light of the enemy of the Christian Churches.

(4) German propaganda has advanced with barter methods of trade. Bargains, often of a very dubious kind, are offered as an alternative to German hostility. An entire nation's economy may be brought within the German orbit and its system of government and mental outlook purchased at the

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same time. This method has been particularly successful in South-Eastern Europe; it is also used with great efficiency in Latin America.

(5) The grievances of the coloured peoples, particularly in India and in the Arab world, are exploited with the object of disrupting the French and British Empires. This is part of the grand propaganda which proclaims that the democracies are decadent and helpless against the new and all-conquering system of the Nazis.

All these methods, which could be elaborated at great length, may be summarised by saying that the Germans attempt to spread Nazi ideology everywhere and by exploiting existing class and racial differences to weaken their enemies, and prepare the way for world domination either with or without war. An important discovery, made by the Nazis before they achieved power in Germany and exploited fully by them since, has been that inconsistencies and contradictions do not spoil propaganda. War and Peace, Capitalism and Socialism, anti-Communism and pro-Soviet—all mix together for a time.

Those who have studied Nazi methods and Nazi literature have been well aware of all this for the last six years. Until last September no effort was made by the British Government to counteract this propaganda. It would take me too far afield to analyse the reasons for this: it is sufficient here to say that British policy was to keep on good terms with Nazi Germany. When war seemed likely last September a Ministry of Information was hastily improvised and a number of persons were approached to help in organising different departments. After Munich, when Hitler promised peace in Mr. Chamberlain's time, this organisation was put into cold storage. As a result of great pressure one change was made. The B.B.C., which was already broadcasting in Arabic to counteract the effects of the Italian radio in North

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Africa and Asia Minor, began regular broadcasts in foreign languages. These were at first strictly confined to short news bulletins. News talks were soon added.

After the seizure of Prague and the announcement of the Peace Front policy, preparations for war became far more serious. Until the outbreak of war the Ministry of Information had not functioned. It was British policy not in any way to "answer back" when Hitler shouted. A huge organisation now exists with Lord Macmillan as Minister, with Lord Perth with the title of Director-General, and with other well-known persons in charge of special departments. It seems clear that the present intentions of the Government are to maintain during this war the democratic institutions that survived the last war. The Censor, who will work in the Ministry of Information, will censor incoming and outgoing telegrams as it must do in war-time, if only to prevent the leakage of information to the enemy. It is announced that he will not *censor* opinion, though no doubt as in the last war, the necessity of obtaining information from the Ministry's officials, will often have much the same effect. The Ministry will "advise" the Press and hold Press conferences; it may adopt the technique that has always been so successful amongst gentlemen of imparting confidential information to responsible journalists who will be "on their honour" not to publish it. There will no doubt be legal methods of dealing with journalists who are regarded as unpatriotic. But the present intention of the Government seems to be to maintain the legal basis of free speech and publication. Britain will be "fighting for democracy" and must not surrender its forms. Moreover, it was proved in the last war that the British public will respond with patriotism and enthusiasm to a free appeal by politicians and journalists in whom they have confidence, while it would very quickly react unfavourably if the

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Government were to assume the dictatorial powers of Dr. Goebbels. It should be remembered that in the last war the Germans might well have been victorious if Lord Northcliffe had not exposed the shortage of shells and attacked Lord Kitchener. On the whole, with its many weaknesses, the system of Parliamentary and Press freedom proved in the last war more efficient than any dictatorship system.

II

The objects of propaganda in war-time are always the same. They are first to keep up the morale of your own soldiers and of the civilian population, secondly to keep the friendship or to secure the adhesion to your side of neutral countries, and thirdly to undermine the morale of the enemy. In 1914, neither Britain nor Germany had any organisation for these purposes, and Britain on the whole proved the more successful improviser. Britain began by setting up a variety of organisations and committees. There was the writers' committee quietly built up at Wellington House under C. F. G. Masterman; this was taken over by Lord Beaverbrook when late in the war he became Minister of Propaganda. For a time Lord Northcliffe dealt with propaganda in foreign countries. Britain had the great practical advantage of an almost complete control over the cable services. But wireless, with which Germany in the last war vainly tried to counteract this allied advantage, has now become a far more powerful factor than it was then. It would be difficult to say whether the Axis Powers or the Peace Front are the better equipped with the more effective radios—difficult because no one can yet tell what wireless stations in foreign countries may be available to one side or the other. Germany in the last war failed to co-ordinate her propaganda; the Service departments each had their own propaganda

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organisation and from the beginning of the war to the end, the German authorities were never successful in solving the problem of departmental jealousy and most important of all, in persuading the military and civil authorities to co-operate satisfactorily. These difficulties were present also on the allied side, and were particularly important in the early stages of the war when the military authorities viewed all journalists with the utmost suspicion.

Britain's real advantage lay in the greater intelligence shown in her propaganda. Germany was still dominated by the conception of a swift military victory, and in dealing with the United States especially showed a great psychological obtuseness. In the early years of the war American opinion was exasperated by the British insistence on the right of search on the high seas; this annoyance was transformed into enthusiastic espousal of the Allied cause by a number of events—for instance: the German U-boat campaign, the sinking of the "Lusitania" and the activities of Dr. Dernburg and von Papen. I am not sure, however, that the story has always been told correctly. Von Tirpitz persuaded the German High Command to adopt the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare not because he was under any illusions about its effect in America, but because he hoped to starve Britain out before America effectively intervened. He nearly succeeded. I think, too, that the effect of Northcliffe and other Englishmen in the United States has been exaggerated; the United States ultimately came into the war, not because of any propaganda but because American big business, and, indeed, the American nation as a whole could not afford to see Britain and France defeated. In any case, I am sure that there will never again be any British propaganda designed to bring America into the war.

When war broke out in 1914, both sides set to work immediately to present their case to their own people and to

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the world. The main lines of propaganda are well known; they were merely more elaborately and deliberately developed in the last war than they have ever been before. First, it was necessary to establish the war guilt of the other party. The British White Paper on the negotiations before the war showed that Sir Edward Grey had striven for peace, and that the Central Powers had been reckless. The invasion of Belgium made a strong *a priori* case for the Allies, and the German reply of "encirclement" was only successful inside Germany.

Secondly, in the comparatively calm world of 1914, atrocity propaganda was immensely successful; the Bryce Commission was a master-stroke because it came with authority. It is to be noticed that war always brings atrocities, real as well as fictitious, and that whereas the British public were regaled with stories about children with their hands cut off, soldiers crucified and all the rest of it, Germany was full of exactly similar stories—German soldiers having their eyes gouged out and of Belgian priests who encouraged civilians to snipe at German soldiers. Britain made great propaganda out of the shooting of Nurse Cavell; the Germans were slow to see the possibilities of the precisely similar shooting of German nurses by the French for exactly the same military reasons. Atrocities and counter-atrocities played their part until the end of the war. In the event of another European war, they are likely to count very much less, because the world is now surfeited with atrocities and because once the bombing of civilians has begun on a large scale popular fury is likely to reach such a pitch that no invented atrocities will be necessary.

It will be interesting but not within the scope of this article to examine the psychology of war in detail, and to show in particular how each side builds up for itself a stereotyped picture of its enemy as universally diabolic and of its

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own side as completely just. Each side believes its own intentions pure and peaceful, while those of its enemy are to destroy civilisation. Both parties in the last war attempted to persuade the world that they stood for culture and civilisation against barbarism.

In the war that has now broken out the situation is different. For whatever one may think of the causes of things, and however much we may feel to blame for the birth of the Nazi regime, it is now true, and known to everyone who cares to study the official literature of the Nazi party, that the present regime does in fact aim at domination and is in fact the aggressive party. British publicists will be spared the trouble they took in 1914 to build up the Kaiser as a diabolic figure. The satanic role is already adequately filled in 1939. There will be no reason for British propagandists to invent Nazi cruelties; the concentration camps, the persecution and expulsion of the Jews, the rape of Czechoslovakia are true and before our eyes. Nazi methods of penetration are known to every American who has read the newspaper reports of the spy trials in New York; and it may, I think, be said that in the last twelve months Dr. Goebbels has more effectively convinced the world of the case against Germany than any amount of British propaganda could have done. If Hitler over-played his hand in Prague, Dr. Goebbels has over-played his hand almost everywhere.

In these circumstances, the British Ministry of Information will begin with certain very important advantages. British policy will be in fact to avoid propaganda. Information is not only a less suspect word; it is also in 1939 a fairer description of British intentions. It is calculated in England, I think rightly, that almost everywhere in the world, Nazi broadcasting and propaganda of all kinds is widely discredited. It would be amusing to list the obvious and admitted lies told for propaganda purposes by Dr. Goebbels and the

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Nazi authorities, and to attempt to award prizes for the more impudent or the more gross. The Nazis have worked, and for a time with very considerable success, on Hitler's theory that the big lie pays well because the bourgeoisie which tells small lies themselves cannot believe that you will go so far as precisely to reverse the truth. Broadly speaking, the world does to-day understand the nature of Nazi propaganda, and there is evidence to show that even within Germany a very large number of persons are turning to the British wireless news simply because it states facts which can be verified and avoids suspect propaganda. If this tradition can be maintained in war time, it may be a most valuable asset on the democratic side. In the long run, no propaganda is successful which is not based on truth. Dr. Goebbels has exploited to the full the case that Germany had against the Allies, and is now left, when he has repeated the familiar story of Reparations and of the misdeeds of the British Empire, with the necessity of retailing propaganda of a type which the world has learnt to disbelieve. In regard to its own population, therefore, and in regard to neutral countries, the Ministry of Information is likely to stick to news and to quiet statements of the British case, and to leave atrocity-mongering and slogan-shouting to its enemies.

I am not, of course, suggesting that there will be no need during the war for the Ministry of Information to think out very carefully the types of information and the form in which it should be presented for the benefit of various foreign countries. But I do suggest that in its dealings with neutral countries and with its home population the more truthful its news is the more successful it will be. One of the great lessons of propaganda during the last war was that anything said by a neutral authority carried far more weight than if it came from one of the belligerents. The Nazis have now made themselves so much hated and feared in the world *that*,

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provided democratic policy is understood and its intention to overthrow the Nazis is assured, propaganda in neutral countries on behalf of the democracies can safely be left to the friends of democracy in those countries. But this is a very important provision and it introduces the main question which the Ministry of Information will have to face: what are British war aims and how are they to be presented to the population of the enemy countries and to the world as a whole?

On the technical side of the first problem, I am not qualified to speak. How far the German citizen will be able to hear the British, French or Russian radio in time of war, I cannot tell. Dr. Goebbels is reported to be alarmed at the large number of Germans who now listen in to foreign wireless stations, and to be erecting vast new stations capable of drowning all foreign radios. It is obvious that one feature of the war will be a war of rival wireless; the babel of voices on the air may be as effective in breaking down civilised standards and producing a mass hysteria as the war of bombs dropped from the air. I am sure that it should be democratic policy to avoid, even at great risks, the bombing of civilians and that correct policy is to substitute the leaflet for the bomb whenever possible. The experience of the last war is here very important. Once war starts, every nation tends to unite. Hitler has greatly exaggerated, for propaganda purposes, the effect of allied propaganda in Germany. The most successful disruptive propaganda in Germany was the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, when German workers discovered for the first time that they had been lied to about Germany's war aims. The world to-day has forgotten that there was a widespread strike in Germany against the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and that Lenin's appeal to the workers of all countries to overthrow their rulers was at least as important from the point of view of sowing dissension in Germany as President Wilson's fourteen points. Actually, the propaganda of

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Northcliffe and the appeal of President Wilson in Germany were only effective when *morale* had already been largely broken down by hunger and failure on the battlefield.

In trying to picture the circumstances of war in 1939, we realise that the Ministry of Information begins at a much later stage of national psychology than it did in the last war. A large number of Germans who have been critical of the Nazi regime must rally with enthusiasm to the Government because they have been told that they are attacked, that an effort has been made to encircle them and because a war with Poland alone is popular. If there is wholesale bombing of civilians, these feelings may swamp all others. Therefore the British and French Governments have wisely decided to begin flooding Germany not with bombs, but with leaflets. There are in Germany to-day many thousands, and perhaps millions, of men and women once members of various political parties in the old Germany who now hate the Third Reich with an intensity that only Spartacists reached in 1918 after four years of warfare. Many have actually prayed for war as the only release from the reign of terror. Clearly, the first object of the British Ministry of Information must be the emancipation of Germany.

To consider the form and technique to be adopted if the German citizen is to regard the democratic powers as its emancipators and not as its enemies would be the subject of another article. It is a grave disadvantage that Germany once trusted to promises of "no indemnities and no annexation." Germany is very thoroughly inoculated against *Wilsonism*, and that is one of the central problems that a Ministry of Information has to face. It must remember, above everything, that a Germany which has been defeated once and which has been through the horrors of revolution, civil war and inflation will fear, above all, an even more revengeful peace. Nothing, I am sure, does so much harm,

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or is in itself so wicked, as the talk of those who now declare, as the *Daily Mail* and *John Bull* declared in the last war, that there is no solution to the problem of Germany except its total destruction.

This brings me to my final point. In the last war, liberal feeling in England was satisfied by declarations that this was a war to end war, and unlike all other wars—a war for democracy, for civilisation against barbarism, and even a war for Christianity. These words will not again bear the strain put upon them. I have cited certain advantages with which the Ministry of Information will begin—the underlying conflict inside Germany and the hatred which the Nazis have inspired all over the world. But it has also a great handicap. British policy during the last eight years has been peaceful but not inspiring, and the greatest of all propaganda assets is strength, self-confidence and a belief in one's cause. No one, whatever his Party, will hold that Britain has recently displayed these qualities—at least until the German seizure of Prague. The British policy of retreat, whatever its real motives, has given the world a picture of Britain as a rich business Power clutching anxiously at its possessions and concerned with nothing but the preservation of the *status quo*. It is of incalculable value that the enemy should be the aggressor; but it is a great disadvantage to leave him all the initiative; and it was not until Britain responded to the German-Soviet Pact by a strong reiteration of her guarantee to Poland that she began to capture the world's imagination as the opponent of Nazism. Before the war the question most asked from the U.S.A. was what, in the event of war, would Britain fight for?

The principal vice of the Treaty of Versailles was not that the frontiers were badly drawn and that Germany was harshly treated. In terms of national sovereignty the minority and frontier problems of Europe are insoluble. Because the

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League of Nations made no real advance towards a European Federation, Germany, the strongest and most dynamic Power on the Continent, can attempt to "unite" Europe under her own tyrannical rule. Absorption, at the expense of all individual and group liberty, a vast slave system in which the masses are exploited under the absolute rule of a minority will take place, if Germany wins. We have to realise that the counter to this overwhelming threat is not again to rely on the demand for "self-determination"; it will be right and necessary, if there is a war, for the Czechs and other dispossessed groups to be promised a free existence. But it cannot be right to promise them once again to set up the Czechoslovakia that is gone. The great vice of Versailles was its disregard of the fundamental economic factors of Europe; and if there is war now, the one obvious benefit that may come from it is to do away with absolute national sovereignties. The war will produce a vast cauldron of seething people asking not for national but for individual *lebensraum*. The old leaders will go on talking, if they are allowed to, in terms of national revival and national sovereignty, just as they did in days before the clipper could cross the Atlantic in sixteen hours and wireless could girdle the earth in a twinkling of an eye. All that is out of date whether or not it needs a European war to show it. In any case, the objective of war must be to give men and women in Europe—Germans, Czechs, Poles, British and French alike—economic stability and individual freedom. If this is not understood from the outset and blazoned abroad before and during war, if, in fact, the Peace Front has no economic policy and far-sighted conception of the Europe to be, disaster lies ahead. At the outset of war, the first object will be to defeat the Nazis. Men and women everywhere unite, not on the basis of any ideology—the Peace Front is not easily placed in any ideological category—but simply

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because they prefer the horrors of war to tame submission to Germany. But that is not enough. Shall we fight again for a coalition of national States anxious only to restore a European system which has shown itself so unstable that it has to have a world war every twenty years or so to prevent Germany swallowing it up? We cannot again have secret treaties and a propaganda that is in contradiction to them. The story of H. G. Wells and Northcliffe at Crewe House is worth remembering. Wells preached the World State and a constructive and unvengeful peace. Northcliffe accepted his collaboration and circulated his propaganda in Germany. Wells then realised that he was being exploited and his words being used by Northcliffe simply to humbug and undermine German resistance; even while he was promising a fair peace to the Germans, the *Daily Mail* was pouring out a stream of hate propaganda designed to rouse the British public to the necessity of utterly ending German power and taking over her colonial possessions for ourselves. My conclusion is that in this war, the British Government must, at the beginning, formulate its war aims and base its propaganda on these war aims. Policy must shape propaganda; it is fatal, as we learnt in 1918, to let war aims be shaped by propaganda.

THE WAR AND IRISH UNITY

By FRANK MACDERMOT

A FACT brought out by the present crisis, and one to which British public opinion has been strangely blind, is that arrangements for co-operation in Foreign Policy and Defence have at times been considerably less close between the various autonomous members of the British Commonwealth than between Italy and Germany or England and France. The centrifugal tendencies of the past twenty years have reached a point where it is not difficult to understand the calculated indiscretion of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, who, shortly before leaving the Dominions Office, observed that he had sometimes been tempted to doubt the Commonwealth's durability. Perhaps the most striking instance of these tendencies is the Ireland of Mr. de Valera and indeed, to a lesser extent, of his predecessor in office. It has been treated there as an axiom that the dignity of the nation called for the maximum amount of dissociation from British policy that was compatible with enjoying the material advantages of Commonwealth membership, and even the supposedly pro-Commonwealth Opposition has shown itself ready to accuse the Irish Government of subservience to England when opportunity has offered, as for example, during the imposition of the League sanctions upon Italy.

The geographical position of Ireland is such that co-operation is more vitally important than in the case of any other Dominion. England cannot afford to let our country be used as a base of warlike operations by a continental enemy, and we are ourselves most anxious to escape an invasion from any quarter—all the more so that any striking illustration of our strategical importance might mean the

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permanent loss of our independence, supposing we had proved ourselves unable to defend it. The latest triumph for our nationalist ideas was the British evacuation of Cove, Berehaven and Lough Swilly. This, though gratifying to our pride, enormously increased our responsibilities. We have land forces, but by present-day standards their equipment is meagre, and we have no navy and only a miniature air force. In these circumstances British naval protection is vital to us. So also it is vital to us to sell our agricultural produce to England and to be able to import large quantities of raw materials and of manufactured goods not produced here.

In fact, the popular belief that there is a natural conflict of interest between Ireland and England will be shown up as the silliest of pretences by the sharp realities of war. Nevertheless, there are formidable political obstacles to effective co-operation. Of these the greatest is *partition*. It might indeed be said that partition contains within itself the seeds of all the other difficulties, so long as this is not interpreted as a hard and fast statement of cause and effect. The continuing illusions of revolutionary propaganda, the anti-British teaching in our schools, the celebration of patriotic anniversaries, the vested interests of politicians and pensioners whose "national record" must be shorn of none of its prestige—all these things, and, added to them, the force of habit, fill our speeches and our newspaper articles with a senseless hostility to England. It is senseless because it takes no account of our own material interests, because it ignores the Irish populations in Great Britain, Australia and Canada, but, most of all, because it tends to perpetuate partition.

There is much to be said for regarding this hostility as the cause of partition rather than its consequence, but in politics causes and consequences have a curious way of changing places, not merely in propaganda, but in reality. It should not be forgotten that Mr. Redmond, who had eighty per cent

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of Irish nationalists behind him thirty years ago, was far from being an enemy of the British Empire, and that in those days visiting British Sovereigns received tumultuously enthusiastic welcomes in this country. It needed the Curragh Mutiny and the encouragement of Ulster intransigence by British politicians to destroy the golden opportunity of reconciliation that then existed.

Partition is in fact the outstanding symptom of a deep-rooted and widespread disease, and to examine every aspect of partition is to examine every aspect of the disease. You will not effect a cure, either speedy or gradual, merely by a political change which severs Belfast from Westminster or by preaching peace and goodwill throughout the Ireland controlled from Dublin. There must be a concerted attack on the disease from several points simultaneously. England and Ireland will, from their geographical situation, always be a help or a torment to each other. The Governments of both countries should firmly and finally resolve upon a policy of friendship. The Government of Northern Ireland and their supporters should be worked upon continuously by British imperialists (I use the word as meaning "believers in the Commonwealth") until they too are brought to realise this necessity. The people of Eire, if they desire national unity as sincerely as they claim to, should approach the problem of converting the North with an honesty and a sympathetic understanding of which they have so far shown little trace.

After these preliminary remarks let us survey the Irish scene a little more closely, beginning with Northern Ireland. That expression is a misnomer, for nothing could be more northern than County Donegal, which is not ruled from Belfast. The name Ulster is worse still, for three out of the nine counties in that province are ruled from Dublin. So, too, Eire is an improper term for Southern Ireland, which, according to our Constitution, adopted two years ago, should

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be described as Eire only when speaking Gaelic, but as Ireland when speaking English. The least confusing plan is to refer to the northern and southern areas as the Six Counties and the Twenty-Six Counties respectively.

If the Six County area were the trim and well-kept garden that it is represented to be by some of its spokesmen, one could understand the existence of a strong prejudice against interfering with it, however loud the complaints of the South. It is, however, far from being anything of the kind. You have there an apparatus of government grotesquely out of proportion to the area administered. You have a third of the population violently hostile to the regime and waiting for an opportunity to smash it if they can. You have the remaining two-thirds disliking and despising the minority, harping upon their own Protestantism as a badge of superiority and frequently carrying out official or semi-official celebrations of a nature insulting to the minority. Such a state of things is as bad as can be for majority and minority alike. It can never lead to a rich and happy civilization. The ascendancy spirit is a curse both to those who exercise ascendancy and to those who have to submit to it. Racial and religious bigotries produce hardness and narrowness of outlook and a terribly dull and stereotyped sort of mind.

This ascendancy, like the Orange Order which sustains it, is not an aristocratic ascendancy. The further you penetrate to the plain people, the more bigotry you find, and Six County Ministers have to be constantly on the watch against offending their followers by exhibitions of broad-mindedness. The influence of the Orange drums has been to keep alive a violence of feeling about race and religion which before the emergence of the Nazi creed seemed to be a survival from the seventeenth century. The least affected are naturally those who spend a good part of their time away from Ireland, and it is among the most high-flying aristocrats that one finds the most

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reasonableness and spirit of conciliation. In general, however, prejudices blaze with an intensity which turns men, sensible in other respects, into the crudest of schoolboys when they climb on to an Ulster political platform. The saying of Dean Swift is well known that the presumably saintly persons appointed from the English Church to Irish bishoprics seemed to be waylaid, one and all, by highwaymen on their way across Hounslow Heath, who stole their clothes and came to Ireland to corrupt and scandalise the community by the spectacle of episcopal iniquity. Some such misfortune seems to befall many admirable men in the Six Counties at the moment of their entry into politics.

Perhaps I may be permitted to give an instance from my own experience. When I contested West Belfast in 1929, my opponent was a young man who had had an Eton and Oxford education and had travelled widely. He arrived in an aeroplane, accompanied by a friend of Sinn Fein antecedents who was actually a member of the Dail, and he placarded Belfast with posters declaring that he was a man with new ideas, who would bring a breath of fresh air into Ulster politics. A few days after the campaign began, I attended one of his meetings incognito in a Unionist quarter of the city, and what did I find? This apostle of enlightenment, bedecked with an Orange tie, was declaiming in the time-honoured style about King James II, the Battle of the Boyne, the Church of Rome and all the topics dear to Sandy Row. On this platform he was triumphantly elected! Some years later he withdrew from Parliament and from Ireland and he is today an opponent of Partition.

The real objections to the situation in the Six Counties are sometimes obscured by the exaggerations of nationalist propaganda and the silliness of such English busybodies as the gentlemen who call themselves the Council for the Protection of Civil Liberties. It is not, in general, true that Catholics

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are denied employment; indeed, at moments of tension, large employers have often shown courage and determination in preventing victimisation of Catholic employees by their fellow-workmen. It is true that at least one Northern Minister has made speeches which seem to encourage a refusal to employ Catholics, but in this they conflict with the actual practice of most employers and the Government itself. If few Catholics are found holding high positions, it must be confessed that it is hard to find among them men of the requisite ability and education. The greatest obstacle to the economic advancement of the minority is their bitterly hostile attitude towards the regime. A man who is in favour of the *status quo* does not like to be surrounded by revolutionaries.

Again, most of the attacks on the Northern Government for arbitrary measures against political offenders are misconceived. Indeed the bottom has been knocked out of them by the fact that Mr. de Valera and Mr. Chamberlain have had to do likewise. It is one of the oldest and most mischievous of British illusions that revolutionary conspiracy can be fought by the ordinary law in a country where any considerable proportion of the population is in sympathy with the revolutionaries or unwilling to give the Government active help against them. Even when these conditions are not present, the ordinary law will sometimes not suffice, as has lately been seen in England. In the last issue of the *Political Quarterly* Mr. Wilson suggested that there was no need for special measures in the Twenty-Six Counties; I assure him most earnestly that he is mistaken.

The accusation of gerrymandering is better founded. The Nationalists are given less than their proper representation in Parliament (whether Westminster or Belfast) and a great deal less than their proper representation in Local Government. There is only one excuse for the Unionists in this matter and that is the precariousness of their position, for which they are

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themselves to blame. The trouble is that under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 they bit off more than they could chew. They insisted on having the largest amount of territory that they felt they could permanently control, thus acquiring areas which ought to be under Dublin and inflicting upon themselves an acute minority problem. A minority problem could not have been avoided altogether; in Belfast, for instance, nearly a quarter of the population is Catholic, and in several country districts Catholics and Protestants are mingled inextricably. But if a plebiscite had been held on a county basis, there is no question but that Fermanagh and Tyrone would have opted out of the Six Counties, and even in the remaining four counties such a solid Nationalist area as South Down, adjoining the boundary, is clearly being detained against its will.

Some confusion has been caused by the fact that the Boundary Commission appointed under the terms of the Treaty to review the boundary failed to advise any important change, but the reason is that they considered themselves entitled to suggest minor adjustments only and debarred from proposing anything that would have made the continuance of the Northern Parliament impossible. For it must be admitted that if the Unionists had no more than their rights, they would be reduced to an area in which a separate Parliament would be unthinkable and they would therefore have to choose between being politically a part of Great Britain or joining the rest of Ireland. Anyone who does not wilfully deceive himself must know that under present circumstances they would choose the former alternative.

There is, then, a fundamental injustice in the situation, and there is no longer any great material prosperity to compensate for this. Shipbuilding and the linen industry have passed through difficult times and unemployment is worse than in the other part of Ireland. No imperial contribution

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is paid on balance and the Six Counties have to accept financial assistance from the British Treasury as if they were a distressed area in England. It cannot, however, be seriously maintained that the economic effects of partition have much to do with this. If union were to come tomorrow, it would involve the Dublin Government in heavy financial liabilities. Meanwhile it is unfair to attack the British Government for the so-called subsidising of the North or for keeping troops there as they would in any other part of the United Kingdom, especially as the removal of the troops would almost certainly mean civil war.

The dangers arising from the unhealthy state of things which has been described are naturally increased by the fact that the Six Counties border on another State to which their minority passionately desires to belong, and that that State looks with ever increasing exasperation upon the separation from it of a part of so definite a geographical and historical entity as Ireland. Thinking men, including Mr. de Valera, realise that the problem cannot be satisfactorily solved by violence. Nevertheless, if the fate of the Empire were seen to be hanging in the balance, the risk of a catastrophe here cannot be excluded. An outbreak of the northern Nationalists would be a possibility at the first favourable opportunity, and any Dublin Government would have great difficulty in resisting pressure to go to their aid. Some of us have been drawing attention to these perils for years past, but nobody much has seemed to care.

Those who find themselves disturbed by conditions in the Six Counties will be little reassured by a study of conditions in the Twenty-Six. From one listener at least Lord Halifax's allusion of some months ago to "a free and friendly Eire" drew a gasp of surprise. When one thinks of all the British money that is spent on an Intelligence Service, on the British Council, on the Royal Institute of International Affairs and

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so forth, one stands amazed at the lethargy which has left British Ministers so ignorant in regard to Ireland. A single civil servant charged with the duty of examining, collating and preparing extracts from Irish newspapers would perhaps have been of more value to Great Britain than the results of hundreds of thousands of pounds of more spectacular expenditure. It is true that at the moment of the settlement of the so-called economic war Mr. de Valera adopted a pleasant tone towards England in his public speeches and, it may be conjectured, a still more pleasant tone in private conversations in London. But there was never more than a faint echo of that pleasantness in Irish newspapers and on Irish platforms, and what there was quickly disappeared under the influence of the tearing, raging anti-partition campaign which his party set on foot. The mischievous character of that campaign has consisted in its reckless ignoring of the basic facts about partition, its heaping upon England of all the blame both for the creation and for the continuance of that grievance, its shrill accusations of continuing English aggression, and its general unscrupulousness and intemperance of statement and expression. As a result, it must be said quite frankly that there is no visible improvement in Irish sentiment towards Great Britain as compared with what it was before the settlement. Even the evacuation of the ports is sometimes spoken of as a clever way of throwing expenses upon our shoulders.

The country is not indeed in favour of the bombing atrocities in England, but there has been far too little explicit condemnation of them. It took six months and a Senate resolution to draw a reproof from Mr. de Valera, and his statement that the hopes of Irish unity had been set back by the outrages was soon angrily challenged by a prominent Parish Priest. Far more has been said against the punishments for the outrages than against the outrages themselves. Nor

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do we confine ourselves to complaining of British policy in regard to Ireland, but we seize every pretext to charge her with treachery and greed in every corner of the world.

There is, in fact, an almost unbelievable gulf between our behaviour as it is and our behaviour as it ought to be if we consulted our real interests. Lack of realism about our own affairs has always been our bane, and we have succeeded in muddling the British as well as ourselves. Instead of refusing us a republic in 1922, England should have eagerly pressed one upon our acceptance. Instead of Mr. Thomas constantly talking about his efforts to keep us within the Commonwealth, he should have invited us to go out of it. We should soon have not only received an invaluable object lesson ourselves, but have supplied one for the edification of South Africa and India. If there was to be anything in the nature of an economic war, it should have been a real one; instead of imposing just enough tariffs to raise a particular sum of money, England should have shut her ports to Irish goods altogether. Something extraordinary and dramatic will have to occur to make us fully understand that our interests are bound up with yours; once we do understand it we are at the beginning of the end of partition. It will be no more than a beginning, for it is not Southern Ireland alone that has to learn to listen to the voice of reason.

A European War is in all conscience dramatic enough for the purpose. One of the first results of it has been to place in high office a distinguished statesman who has come to be regarded as the special enemy of Irish unity. Mr. Winston Churchill, however, is a realist and a man of penetrating intelligence whose career has not been one of hidebound consistency. He has been more right than the optimists about the general drift of Irish opinion. A man may stand pat against half-measures and yet have the wisdom to apply a radical cure. The strategic arguments against the present

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situation must surely weigh very heavily with the First Lord of the Admiralty.

At first sight the neutrality of the Twenty-Six Counties at a time when Canada, Australia, New Zealand and even South Africa are declaring their solidarity with Great Britain digs a new chasm between North and South. On the other hand, public opinion would certainly not have supported Mr. de Valera in any other course. Whether or not it is found possible to maintain neutrality to the end, it is pretty sure to be demonstrated that differences of sentiment between Eire and Great Britain or between Eire and Northern Ireland have no basis in any difference of interest. We have just seen Hitler and Stalin lay aside a conflict of ideology carried on over a period of years with unsurpassed bitterness and brutality. It has been discarded in a moment in favour of a community of action which the two dictators believe will be of material advantage to each of them. Both parts of Ireland believe in democracy and liberty; both of them need British markets and the opportunities afforded to their young people by the British Commonwealth. In spite of all the talk about a Thirty-Two County Republic and the implication that we are merely waiting to declare one until we have acquired the Six Counties, that acquisition would enormously add to the difficulties of complete political severance from Great Britain. What Irish statesmen could afford to bring down in ruins Ulster ship-building and the Ulster linen industry, or to decree the strangulation of agriculture throughout Ireland?

It has been suggested that Mr. de Valera's proposal of some months ago to leave the North a Parliament of its own with powers similar to those it possesses at present, but to take over the reserve powers in relation to that area at present exercised by Westminster, indicates the lines on which this question may ultimately be solved.

I am sceptical about this. In the first place, the reserve

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powers include the power to abolish the Belfast Parliament, an agitation for its abolition would only be a question of time, and no assurance given by Mr. de Valera would be binding upon his successors in office. Moreover, the proposal does not go to the root of the difficulties. It severs the Unionists from the very things they value most highly—allegiance to the King, Commonwealth citizenship, the Commonwealth flag. The true solution must reconcile the maintenance of these with the ideals of Irish nationality, so that we become in very truth one people and one state. It is only in quite recent times that the ideals of the mass of the Irish people have been so narrow as to make that reconciliation appear difficult or unnatural. Extremists of both kinds have contributed to this disaster, but it is one that even now can be repaired by sustained effort on the part of men of goodwill.

THE SINEWS OF WAR

By WALTER HILL

B RITAIN has been able to support a rapidly growing population at a rising standard of living by her conversion from a mainly agricultural country into an industrial "assembly plant." This conversion was assisted by the concurrent development, with British capital or labour or both, of the mineral and agricultural resources of the British Empire and other "new" countries. As a result Britain secured an increasing flow of cheap raw materials and foodstuffs, not only for herself, but also for other industrial countries and, simultaneously, accumulated a large fund of overseas investments of a nominal value in excess of £4,000 million. Britain became the world's leading carrier by sea, while her commercial activities were extended to every part of the globe. As a consequence, she has come to be dependent, more than any of the other leading industrial countries, on international trade. Not being richly endowed with raw materials, with the notable exception of coal and iron ore, Britain has to draw virtually all her requirements from abroad.

Moreover, she depends on foreign supplies of foodstuffs to the extent of something like one half of her total requirements. For example, in Britain agriculture accounts for a much smaller proportion of the gainfully occupied population, and of the national income, than in France, Germany or the United States. In 1931, the proportion of Britain's gainfully occupied population engaged in agriculture and forestry was only 6.7 per cent, against 35.7 per cent in France, 28.8 per cent in Germany (1933), and 22.0 per cent in the United States (1930). Nor has the relative importance of agriculture undergone any significant change as a result of the protective measures adopted in recent years.

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Owing to the accumulation of a large fund of overseas investments, which yields an annual revenue of between £150 and £200 million, and to the income derived from shipping and other services rendered to other countries, Britain does not have to export goods equivalent in value to that of her imports. In 1937, for example, net imports of all commodities amounted to £952 million (including shipping charges and insurance); these were paid for by exports valued at £521 million (free on board ship), by the income from foreign investments valued at £210 million, by the revenue derived from shipping services rendered to other countries amounting to £130 million, by commissions earned by banks, insurance companies and other institutions amounting to £40 million, and by £5 million of miscellaneous receipts. The deficiency of £45 million was paid for by a draft on foreign assets.

In peace as in war Britain's very existence therefore depends on her ability to ensure a regular flow of raw materials and foodstuffs to her shores. In times of peace Britain's imports are limited only by the quantities available in exporting countries and by her capacity to pay for them. In war, however, imports not only depend on exportable supplies abroad and on the capacity to finance them, but also on the quantities which can in fact be transported to this country. The problem of keeping Britain supplied with raw materials and foodstuffs in war therefore has two aspects; the one is quantitative and the other financial. These are indeed the dominating considerations; provided overseas countries can meet Britain's requirements and she can finance them and bring them safely to her ports, the remaining task only consists of determining the nature and quantity of the individual commodities which are actually required from abroad. This, however, is a subsidiary, though, of course highly important and complicated problem.

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I

The quantitative problem, which consists of bringing the required supplies safely to port, may be examined first. The subsidiary problems concerning the availability of supplies of individual commodities in the exporting countries and the determination of import requirements will be considered later.

Broadly, the volume of commodities which can be imported depends (apart from the availability of supplies) on the supply of shipping tonnage and on the ability of the Navy to keep the sea routes open. More precisely, the volume of imports depends (a) on the initial stock of shipping capacity at the disposal of Britain and her allies, and (b) on the ratio between losses and replacements.

So far as the initial stock of shipping tonnage likely to be available is concerned this includes, besides the merchant fleets of Britain and her allies, vessels of neutral countries which can be bought or chartered. The following comparison of the number and tonnage of Allied and of certain neutral shipping in 1914 and in 1939 gives a broad indication of the position:—

TABLE I

STOCK OF STEAM AND MOTOR TONNAGE					
(a) Allies					
June, 1939					
	Number	Thousand gross tons		Change from June, 1914	
				Number	Thousand gross tons
United Kingdom ...	6,722	17,891	...	-1,865	-1,001
Dominions ...	2,255	3,111	...	+ 719	+1,479
France ...	1,231	2,934	...	+ 206	+1,012
Total ...	10,208	23,936		- 940	+1,490
(b) Neutral Countries					
June, 1939					
	Number	Thousand gross tons		Change from June, 1914	
				Number	Thousand gross tons
Denmark ...	705	1,175	...	+ 129	+ 405
Greece ...	607	1,781	...	+ 200	+ 960
Holland ...	1,523	2,970	...	+ 814	+1,498
Norway ...	1,987	4,834	...	+ 331	+2,876
Sweden ...	1,231	1,577	...	+ 143	+ 562
Total ...	6,053	12,337	...	+1,617	+6,301
U.S.A. (Sea) ...	2,345	8,910	...	+1,232	+6,883

Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Statistical Tables.

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It will be seen that the decline in Britain's tonnage, though not the reduction in the number of vessels, has been more than offset by the increase in the size of the fleets of the Dominions and France. But the fleets of the five neutral countries in Europe given in Table I, as well of that of the United States, are now much bigger, both in numbers and aggregate tonnage, than in 1914. Provided, therefore, that the Allies can draw on the resources of neutral tonnage, their position seems rather more favourable than before the Great War, even though the aggregate tonnage includes vessels like the *Queen Mary* and the *Normandie* which would offer easy targets to raiders. In fact, the present supply of shipping tonnage, augmented by the tendency to self-sufficiency, is in excess of recent peace-time requirements. But even if neutral vessels cannot be employed on a large scale, they are not likely to be kept off the high seas, especially as freight rates will rise; moreover, even if these vessels are only available for trade between neutral countries, which seems unlikely, their operation will reduce the pressure on the world's freight markets, and it will enable British vessels operating between neutral countries to be concentrated on the trade of the United Kingdom and her allies.

On the other hand, the aggregate building capacity of these countries, judged by the actual tonnage launched in the best of the five years ended 1913 and 1938, is now rather smaller than before the Great War, as the next table shows:—

TABLE II				
MERCHANT TONNAGE LAUNCHED (In thousands of gross tons)				
(a) Allies				
	1913		1938	
United Kingdom	1,932	...	1,050	...
Dominions	27	...	28	...
France	176	...	47	...
Total	2,135	...	1,105	...

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MERCHANT TONNAGE LAUNCHED (In thousands of gross tons)				
(b) Neutral Countries				
	1913		1938	
Denmark	41	...	158	...
Holland	104	...	240	...
Norway	51	...	55	...
Sweden	19	...	166	...
Total	215	...	619	...
U.S.A. (Sea)	228	...	(1)195	...

Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping, *Annual Summary of the Mercantile Shipbuilding of the World*.

Britain's output has been nearly halved, while the tonnage launched in France last year was less than one third of what it was in 1914. Although the combined output of Denmark, Holland, Norway and Sweden has been almost trebled, the expansion of the capacity in these countries has been quite insufficient to compensate for the decline in Britain and France. In contrast to the initial supply of tonnage, the building capacity likely to be available to the Allies at short notice is therefore smaller than in 1914. But given time, production can be increased very appreciably in the United States, as experience during the Great War showed. That country increased the volume of merchant vessels launched from 157,000 gross tons in 1915 to 821,000 gross tons in 1917, 2,602,000 gross tons in 1918 and 3,580,000 gross tons in 1919. In case of need the Allies may therefore have to look to the United States for supplementing their supply of tonnage.

It is of course quite impossible, at this stage, to estimate the probable rate of loss. It can be taken for granted, however, that Germany will spare no efforts in an attempt to blockade Britain and her allies by sinking their ships, either on the high seas by submarine and surface raiders or in port by bombers. As Mr. Chamberlain pointed out in the House of Commons on September 20, 17 ships of a tonnage of 95,000 gross were sunk in the week ended September 12, compared with a weekly average of 127,000 gross tons in April, 1917, when the German submarine campaign was at its height. During the

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week ended September 19, however, only 46,000 gross tons were sunk; the reduction is officially attributed in part to the introduction of the convoy system. Experts hold that the convoy system—which effectively countered the intense activity of German submarines in 1917—will keep losses within reasonable proportions. But the experience of 25 years ago is, not necessarily a guide to the future, and certainly does not justify complacency. In other words, while the initial stock of carrying capacity likely to be available to Britain and her allies is now bigger than 25 years ago, the ratio between losses and replacements, which in a prolonged war will vitally affect the volume of imports, especially if the former are heavy, is largely an unknown quantity. Only experience can supply the figures to the equation.

There is, however, a further set of considerations which will affect Britain's capacity to import. As in the Great War, a proportion of the available tonnage is likely to be requisitioned for the transport of troops and their equipment. But it would be futile to estimate now how much tonnage will in fact be required for these purposes. Secondly, the effective carrying capacity of the available shipping tonnage will be reduced, and in all probability quite substantially, by the introduction of the convoy system; there is bound to be delay in assembling some 25 ships, as well as a reduction in speed to that of the slowest vessel in the convoy. Thirdly, there is the possibility that shipping may have to be diverted from some of its customary trade routes; if trade which normally passes through the Mediterranean has to be directed round the Cape, for example, effective carrying capacity will be diminished. Fourthly, it may be necessary to import certain commodities from more distant countries than hitherto; for example, if more time is required to import timber from Canada than from Sweden, effective import capacity will be reduced.

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The blockade of Germany will of course release some neutral shipping for employment on other routes. Moreover, a good deal of shipping tonnage was laid up in the world at the outbreak of war. But there can be little doubt that Britain's effective import capacity will be reduced below recent levels, even on the assumption, whose validity only experience can prove, that replacements will keep pace with losses. But it is impossible to forecast by how much the volume of Britain's imports will have to be curtailed. In the Great War the reduction was quite substantial; according to a calculation made by Sir Arthur Salter in his book on Allied Shipping Control, the volume of imports fell from 52.8 million tons in 1913 to 42.3 million tons in 1916 and 34.4 million tons in 1917.

II

The problem of financing imports is likely to prove less difficult than that of maintaining their volume, but it is of the utmost importance for the future of Britain. The value, as distinct from the volume, of imports is determined by Britain's ability to pay for them. As has been shown in the first part of this article, Britain pays for her imports partly by exports of manufactures (again with the notable exception of coal) and partly by the income from investments, from shipping and from miscellaneous services rendered abroad.

But if the experience of the Great War is any guide, import prices are likely to rise. Thus, between 1913 and 1917, when the volume of Britain's imports fell by 35 per cent, their value actually rose by 38 per cent. A rise is all the more likely in the present war owing to the sharp fall in the exchange value of the pound in terms of dollars. On the other hand, Britain's capacity to export is likely to be reduced by the fact that a large proportion of her labour and industrial plant will be required for military purposes. In the Great War, the value of recorded exports fell from £525 million in 1913 to £384 million in 1915, but, largely because of the rise in prices, it

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rose to £527 million in 1917. The probable income from overseas investments cannot be estimated though they are unlikely to show a drastic decline. The revenue from shipping services rendered to other countries is equally unpredictable.

The probabilities, however, suggest that, as in the Great War, Britain will be unable to pay for her requirements in full by exports, the income from overseas investments, and by the revenue derived from shipping and other services rendered abroad. In the Great War the deficiency was bridged by the sale of foreign investments and by means of loans raised in the United States, though part of these were for Britain's allies.

While the raising of fresh loans in the United States does not seem immediately practicable, Britain fortunately still possesses substantial foreign investments and a sizable gold reserve which can be used to meet any likely deficiency in her current balance of payments. While the precise value of the gold stock is not known, it probably amounts to some £600 millions. Similarly, a calculation in *The Economist* of August 12, 1939, showed that "on a conservative reckoning it should be possible to mobilize total investments at least equivalent in value to those raised during the last war," when the Treasury handled some £623 million.

III

Finance is thus unlikely to be an important limiting factor; the problem is rather to conserve Britain's overseas investments as far as possible. But the volume of goods which can actually be imported is severely limited by carrying capacity. While the volume of imports can scarcely be maintained at recent levels, only the future can show how far they will have to be reduced.

Britain's requirements of individual commodities in war could be estimated on the assumption that the standard of living and exports are maintained, with some allowance for increased military needs. But such a calculation would be of

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little practical value. The plain truth is that requirements must be interpreted elastically in time of war and that they will have to be adjusted to the quantity of goods which can in fact be imported. In other words, the coat will have to be cut according to the cloth, and the difficulty is that the yardage of cloth is still an unknown quantity.

In the Great War imports of all commodities, with the exception of certain materials required for military purposes were substantially reduced, as the next table shows:—

TABLE III

Commodity	U.K. IMPORTS (In thousands of tons)		
	1913	1916	1917
Cereals, human consumption ...	8,094	7,532	7,003
Cereals, animal consumption ...	3,000	2,000	1,533
Peas, beans and dried vegetables ...	176	105	110
Sugar ...	1,969	1,537	1,391
Meat ...	1,186	1,175	986
Oils and fats (including castor oil)...	1,904	1,724	1,283
Other foodstuffs ...	3,502	2,924	2,010
Iron ore ...	7,565	7,004	6,205
Pyrites ...	782	951	854
Iron and steel, other metals and ores, guns, ammunitions, etc. ...	3,624	3,605	4,251
Nitrates, chemicals, tanning sub- stances, etc. ...	636	681	592
Mineral oils and lubricating oils not imported in tankers ...	267	327	427
Wool ...	434	305	334
Cotton ...	971	969	736
Flax, hemp, jute, silk and textile manufactures ...	756	631	433
Timber and manufactures ...	11,684	6,373	3,012
Hides, leather and skins ...	208	203	182
Tobacco ...	75	77	22
Paper and paper-making materials...	1,873	1,280	586
Miscellaneous, including certain munitions, etc., which cannot be separated in Trade Returns ...	4,087	2,923	2,467
Total ...	52,793	42,326	34,417

Source: *Allied Shipping Control*, by Sir Arthur Salter, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1921.

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Even the intake of commodities essential for human consumption such as wheat, sugar, meat and other foodstuffs was substantially curtailed. Mineral oils, iron and steel, metals, guns and ammunition, exceptionally, were purchased in larger quantities.

A similar policy will probably have to be pursued in the present war. Military needs will have to be given priority, while the intake of consumption goods (apart from the minimum necessary for existence) will have to vary with the available carrying capacity.

Whether, in fact, imports will decline less or more than during the Great War cannot be estimated at this stage, though it has been widely assumed that it will be less. The nature and quantity of some of the most important raw materials and foodstuffs imported in the past three years—a measure of Britain's peace-time import requirements in comparatively prosperous years—is shown in Table IV. (The list, unlike that given in Table III is selective and not comprehensive). It should be noted, however, that the figures relate to total imports and not to net imports.

The total quantity of the imports of these commodities varied between $38\frac{1}{2}$ and $41\frac{1}{2}$ million tons in the past three years, when domestic business activity was at a comparatively high level. If the quantity of materials brought to Britain's shores falls by anything like the amount it did in the Great War (see Table III), the intake of many commodities will have to be severely restricted.

Table IV should be read in conjunction with Table V (taken from *The Economist* of July 27, 1939, page 222) which shows how far Britain depends on imports in the case of certain important commodities.

The bulk of Britain's imports of individual commodities and the distance they have to be shipped varies considerably. Measured by weight, petroleum and petroleum products,

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TABLE IV

U.K. IMPORTS OF IMPORTANT COMMODITIES (In thousands of tons)			
	1936	1937	1938
Wheat	5,039	4,843	5,082
Maize	3,665	3,584	2,881
Barley	915	909	993
Oil-seed cake and meal	545	636	663
Molasses	386	493	608
Raw sugar	2,212	2,216	2,377
Meat	1,458	1,541	1,549
Butter	487	471	475
Tea	215	218	235
Wool	408	350	393
Cotton	690	742	540
Iron ore	5,961	7,039	5,167
Petroleum and products	10,997	11,577	12,029
Rubber	65	142	173
Tin ores	52	51	56
Tin blocks, ingots, etc.	12	21	12
Copper ore	31	28	30
Copper, unwrought	288	391	355
Zinc ores	129	151	158
Zinc or spelter, unwrought	171	177	165
Lead, unwrought	355	373	407
Soft wood, sawn, planed or dressed	5,930	5,980	4,440
Total	39,697	41,549	38,390

¹ Imports of all wood and timber in 1937 were 10,067,000 tons.

Source: Trade Returns; all figures have been converted into tons by the use of the appropriate conversion factors.

timber, iron ore, cereals and sugar are the biggest individual items. Thus a comparatively small reduction or increase in the imports of a bulky commodity would appreciably affect the carrying space that can be allotted to important, but relatively light, materials.

In the case of individual commodities, however, carrying space is not the only factor which determines the volume of possible imports. The quantities which can, in fact, be imported also depend on the supplies available in exporting countries to which Britain has access. For example, imports

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TABLE V

U.K. CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTANT COMMODITIES (In thousands of tons)

			Average, 1934-36		1937	1938
			Amount	% imported	Amount	Amount
Wheat	...	S	6,713	76	6,263	6,986
Maize...	...	S	3,147	100	3,465	2,714
Barley	...	S	1,610	53	1,517	1,897
Oil-seeds	...	S	1,452	100	1,622	1,630
Sugar ¹	...	C	2,246	74	2,314	2,302
Molasses	...	S	623	82	—	—
Meat	...	S	3,086	50	—	511
Butter	...	S	526	90	524	193
Tea	...	C	195	100	194	343
Wool	...	S	312	84	311	474
Cotton	...	C	563	100	617	16,347
Iron ore	...	S	15,884	29	20,136	12,604
Petroleum and Products ²	...	S	10,701	94½	11,965	107
Rubber	...	C	95	100	115	18
Tin ³	...	C	21	91	26	—
Copper ³	...	C	270	100	335	—
Spelter ³	...	C	200	99	225	—
Lead ³	...	C	333	87	340	—

S=available supplies, i.e. home production plus net imports.
C=consumption, i.e. available supplies adjusted for changes in warehouse stocks.

¹ In terms of raw sugar.

² Including also oil from coal.

³ Metal content.

from Germany as well as from countries (such as the Baltic States) which can be effectively cut off by her from Britain, will of course no longer be available and the question consequently arises whether production can be increased in other countries.

Fortunately the supply position is now much more favourable than 25 years ago. Before the Great War a substantial proportion of the imports of important foodstuffs and raw materials was derived from Central and Eastern Europe, and especially from Russia who soon found herself unable to maintain exports. The need for supplies from alternative sources led to the development of the production

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of foodstuffs and certain essential raw materials in other countries which are less likely to be cut off from Britain.

The cultivation of wheat, for example, has been enormously extended in North and South America and in Australia. During the five years 1909-13 the average production of wheat in Canada, the United States, Australia and Argentina was 1,125 million bushels; in 1938 the same countries produced 1,751 million bushels. Moreover, the size of the stocks held in exporting countries is such that a shortage is quite out of the question. The supply position in other cereals is also more favourable; in 1914 Britain imported about one-third of her requirements of barley from Russia. In 1938, when total imports were 20 million cwts., Russia supplied only 3.8 million cwts. Before the Great War Britain derived about two-thirds of her sugar imports from Germany and Austria-Hungary, but since then production has been considerably extended elsewhere, especially in the Empire, Cuba and Java. Again, in 1913 Britain obtained more than one-third of her requirements of manganese ore from Russia, while in recent years the Empire supplied virtually the whole of her needs.

Timber and timber products which are normally drawn in large quantities from Scandinavia, Russia (through the Baltic) and Poland, are among the few commodities of which supplies can be reduced, at least temporarily, by German action. But Canada is an alternative source of supply and that country, together with the United States, should soon be able to supply Britain's essential requirements. Nor is the absence of supplies of dairy products from Baltic countries likely to present any serious supply problems.

The overseas supplies of the majority of raw materials and essential foodstuffs on which Britain will be able to draw are thus likely to be ample and the major problem will be to bring them safely to port.

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IV

What has the Government done to ensure that Britain's supplies of essential commodities will not be interrupted in war?

Its policy has been directed chiefly to ensure Britain's command of the seas. To this end the Government has enormously increased the expenditure on the Navy, which is now probably stronger than at any time in its history. Moreover, Germany does not now possess anything like the naval strength she had in 1914 and special attention has been focussed on devising means to counter a submarine campaign as effectively as possible.

In view of the uncertainty of the probable ratio between shipping losses and replacements and because of the probability of a rise in prices during war, the accumulation of substantial reserves of commodities which Britain must normally import should have been high up on the agenda for preparedness. As goods and raw materials can serve civil as well as military needs, a substantial investment in stocks was justified even on financial grounds. (Both Germany and Italy, incidentally, have been importing and stocking raw materials to the limit of their financial capacity). Moreover, a sizable reserve of foods and raw materials, besides saving shipping space, would appreciably reduce the risk of an interruption of supplies in the early months of war. Actually, the machinery for accumulating stocks was set up as early as June, 1938, when the Essential Commodities Reserves Act was passed. The Service Departments have of course powers to acquire stocks for their own requirements. While the actual volume of purchases is unknown, Mr. W. S. Morrison stated in the House of Commons, on July 12, that trade stocks and Government reserves of nearly all essential raw materials were more than adequate for three months' consumption on the basis of estimated war requirements. But since trade stocks held

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in this country are on the average equivalent to about three months' consumption, the Government's outlay on stocks has probably been comparatively small in relation to the total annual value of imports; in 1937 and 1938 the total intake from abroad of food, drink and tobacco, raw materials, and of non-ferrous metals and oils classified as manufactures was £849 million and £764 million respectively.

The Government has also taken steps to increase the domestic output of agricultural products in war; but the extent to which production can in fact be increased is comparatively small in relation to total requirements.

In sum, the Government appears to have acted on the assumption that supplies from abroad are not likely to be seriously interrupted. Only time can show whether this assumption is justified.

Since the outbreak of war the control of many important commodities has been taken over, chiefly by the Ministry of Supply, while the import of many unessential materials has been prohibited except by licence.

V

This brief examination of the sinews of war reveals the magnitude and urgency of the task confronting the Government.

So far as the quantitative problem of bringing supplies safely to Britain is concerned, there is the probability that the total volume of imports will have to be curtailed owing to the reduction in the effective carrying capacity of the merchant fleet through the introduction of the convoy system and diversion and because of the Service Departments' additional demand for shipping for the transport of troops and their equipment and supplies. If total imports have to be reduced the Government will be faced with the problem of deciding which commodities, and what quantities of each, must be

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imported if Britain is not to be hampered in the task of maximising her military effort. This will obviously demand the elaboration of a system of priorities. The machinery required for this purpose should be set up without delay, especially as considerable time must elapse before it can function smoothly and efficiently.¹

Secondly, the Government should spare no efforts to keep costs down. For example, shipping should be requisitioned and freight rates fixed without delay, in order to prevent them from reaching the giddy heights of the Great War, when they added considerably to the cost of imported materials. As in the last war shipowners should of course be allowed to use any space surplus to the Government's requirements at the rates ruling in the free world market, but only on condition that the difference between the rates paid by the Government and those obtained on the free market were handed over to the Treasury. While Britain's ability to finance imports is unquestionable, everything possible should be done to prevent the unnecessary depletion of her reserves of gold and foreign investments, for their disappearance would reduce her capacity to import after the war and thus lead to a reduction in the material well-being of the people. Exports, consequently, must be maintained at the highest possible level; fortunately, recent discussions in the House of Commons indicate that the Government is alive to their importance.

¹ Since this was written, the Government has set up a Licensing Committee with the object of controlling that trade in essential commodities.

THE FATE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

By J. L. HAMMOND

OF the character and importance of Mr. Toynbee's magnificent enterprise¹ a reviewer need not speak at length in discussing his new volumes. His vast knowledge, and the skill and imagination with which he uses it to give space and shape to his great design, place his work, by universal consent, high among the triumphs of creative scholarship. The reader, guided through the dark mysteries of the birth and death of civilized societies, feels like a man for whom an immense and trackless forest is gradually breaking from shadow into light.

In his first three volumes Mr. Toynbee discussed the genesis and growth of civilizations. He discovered 21 societies in history which were independent entities and he asked what it was that within the last 6,000 years had shaken part of mankind out of the Integration of Custom into what he called the differentiation of civilizations. He considered two factors that have often been presented as the determining causes: race and environment, and he gave reasons for rejecting both. He showed in regard to race that a number of civilizations had been created by more races than one. In respect of environment he pointed out that the Minoan civilization emerged in a cluster of islands, situated in an inland sea, blessed with the climate of the Mediterranean. Why did not a similar environment evoke another civilization of the archipelago type round the inland sea of Japan? From these and a great wealth of similar instances he concluded that we must look rather to a relation than to an entity for the cause of the genesis of a civilization and he found that relation in what he called "Challenge and Response." The significance of this relation, its range and its various forms (the several stimuli, e.g. of pressure, hard ground, penalization, etc.), occupied the second volume and the third inquired into the problems of the growth of

¹ *A Study of History*, by Arnold J. Toynbee. Vols. 4, 5 and 6. (Oxford Press, Milford, and Royal Institute of International Affairs. £3 10s.)

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civilizations. Here, after describing the arrested civilizations, Mr. Toynbee discussed the nature and the criteria of growth and he examined in great detail the relation between growing civilizations and individuals and the interaction between individuals in growing civilizations, finding a convenient formula in "Withdrawal and Return": a formula that he illustrates from the careers of some thirty leaders, including St. Paul and Confucius, Solon and Julius Cæsar, Muhammad and Lenin.

Mr. Toynbee's new volumes discuss a theme directly and painfully intimate and haunting to the present age. It took no great courage to follow the story of the first three. Most of us read without flinching of the civilizations that died out or stood still. Few of us slept worse after learning for the first time of the arrested civilizations of the Afrasian steppes or the Eurasian Tundra. The story of the fatal consequences to Sparta of the unfortunate response she made to the challenge successfully met by Athens and Corinth interested us more than it distressed us. But in the new volumes we are studying not the growth of civilizations but their breakdown. Few of us, after studying here the laws that govern their disintegration, as revealed in this analysis, will ask the question that Gibbon asked at the end of Chapter Thirty-eight in his "General observations of the fall of the Roman Empire in the West" with a voice and pulse as steady as his.¹

Mr. Toynbee, as his readers know, is as much at home in any one corner of the world as in any other. Drop him from an aeroplane in Guatemala and he will have some happy compliments on the great days of the Mayas and hint politely at the mystery of their fall; in Yucatan, and he will resent, as warmly as the first man he meets, the disagreeable memories of the Toltec domination; in Lapland, and his voice and manner will speak his sympathy with the disappointments of the too precocious Esquimaux. Not many of his readers are equally fortunate. Some of them like the present reviewer are rather in the position of King Edward the Seventh when he was taken by Boni, full of enthusiasm

¹ One of Gibbon's reassuring reflections reads oddly to-day: "Cannon and fortifications now form an impregnable barrier against the Tartar horse; and Europe is secure from any future irruption of barbarians: thus, before they can conquer, they must cease to be barbarians."

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for his recent discoveries, over the Forum. Boni related once how his royal listener, swept through vast and bewildering spaces of unknown history, showed by a gentle pressure on Boni's arm when he caught the name of Julius Cæsar how gladly he felt the ground for a moment beneath his feet. So perhaps the reviewer may be forgiven if he passes by the lessons to be learnt from the adventures of the Mongols of Qipchaq in Russia or of the Eurasian Nomad Saljugs in Transcaspia or of the Katama Berber Highlanders under their Fatimid leaders in Egypt, to glance at Mr. Toynbee's analysis of the history of the Hellenic Society, in order to see what light he draws from it for our own comfort or the reverse.

How does a civilization disintegrate? It disintegrates not from a blow from outside but from a failure within. To understand that failure we must recall Mr. Toynbee's account of the genesis and growth of civilization. They were due to successful response to a challenge and that successful response was due to the creative power of individuals or minorities. But a civilization is constantly exposed to challenge. If a time comes when there is no creative minority able to meet the challenge that it receives, if, in consequence, the leaders of the civilization can no longer influence and attract the uncreative masses, the creative minority tries to maintain its position by coercion and it becomes instead of a creative minority a dominant minority. Resentment then produces a proletariat, a population, that is, which no longer feels itself to be part of the society. This proletariat is often a poverty-stricken population but its character is determined not by its conditions but by its temper. There may be an intellectual proletariat. In this way class war begins. "On this showing, the nature of the breakdown of civilizations can be summed up in three points: a failure of creative power in the minority, an answering withdrawal of mimesis on the part of the majority and a consequent loss of social unity in the society as a whole."

With this formula before us let us look at Mr. Toynbee's discussion of the history of Hellenic civilization. Gibbon observed, when summing up his theme in retrospect: "I have described the triumph of barbarism and religion."

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Mr. Toynbee takes this reflection as his starting-point. "The Hellenic society which was at its zenith in the age of the Antonines is thus represented as having been overthrown by the Northern Barbarians issuing out of the No-Man's Land beyond the Imperial Frontiers along the Rhine and the Danube, and the Christian Church emerging from the subjugated but never assimilated Oriental Provinces." So far from being the causes of the decline and fall, Barbarism and Religion in this sense are, in Mr. Toynbee's view, the results and signs of disintegration; they are the External Proletariate and the Internal Proletariate that are produced when a creative minority has become a Dominant Minority and societies are fatally disrupted. For the causes we have to go back several centuries.

In early days the Hellenic Society could provide for a growing population without abandoning the old-fashioned economy of subsistence farming. Under these conditions the City State was self-sufficient. By Solon's time the pressure of population on food created a serious economic difficulty. Solon solved the problem by changing over from subsistence farming to specialized production, agrarian and industrial. But this economic revolution demanded a political revolution, for the City State was clearly too small a political unit when the Hellenic Society was living by this large-scale exchange. The Greeks made the fatal mistake of keeping their politics on the parochial plane after their economic life had assumed this œcumenical character. The obstacle was the inherited political institution of the City State. The removal of that obstacle was the task set to the Hellenic Society when the fifth century opened. The most dramatic illustration of its failure was the Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C., "a crime perpetrated by the Hellenic Society against the cause for which their civilization had come into the world," which began a "Time of Troubles" which lasted for four hundred years before it was brought to a close by the Pax Augusta.

There was a moment in the career of Alexander when it looked as if the Hellenic Society might solve this problem by some better method than the crude method of the Roman domination. If Alexander had lived to join forces with Zeno and Epicurus, "the Hellenes might have succeeded in

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stepping straight out of the City State into the cosmopolis and in that event the Hellenic civilization might have been able to take on a new lease of creative life." But Alexander's premature death left the Hellenic world at the mercy of his ambitious and quarrelsome successors, and the consequence was a repetition in the third century of the catastrophe of the fifth, with the difference that Great Powers now took the place of City States. The wars between Great Powers ended with the triumph of Rome. Her grasp within her embrace of the entire Hellenic world was her crude and drastic response to the problem that had defeated the Athens of Pericles. The Pax Augusta put an end to the Interstate war and also to the terrible social conflicts of which the civil wars were the culminating horror. That Peace was ultimately broken by the Proletariates produced by that process of disintegration which had been arrested for a couple of centuries by the statesmanship of Augustus.

The social conflicts were of course part of this disintegration. The growth of class war is traced back to the economic Revolution that gave the Hellenic world its new opportunities and its new problems. As we have seen, the revolution associated with the name of Solon substituted specialized agricultural production for export for the old subsistence farming. This revolution had a great effect in stimulating the energy and imagination of the Hellenic world. Unhappily it had a disastrous consequence, seen most dramatically in Italian history. The Hellenic colonies in Sicily found a rich market for oil and wine among the barbarians of the Western Mediterranean who had not yet learnt to plant olives and vineyards. The great victory of 480 B.C. over the Carthaginians left these Greeks with thousands of Carthaginian prisoners on their hands and they used them partly for plantation agriculture for this export trade. So profitable a system was bound to spread. The Carthaginians adopted it and then it was introduced into the great area of Southern Italy left derelict after its devastation by Hannibal's army. All Roman history is darkened by the terrible consequences of the system to the social and political life of the capital, the citizens and the subjects of this great conquering Power. The destruction of peasant farming by the great latifundia

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worked by the slaves who were collected at the great market of Delos from all the countries ravaged by Roman arms; the story of the Gracchi; the great slave rebellions; the civil wars; the efforts of the best Emperors to revive the old agriculture by *alimenta* and other devices; the exhaustion of the supply of slaves with the suppression of piracy and the establishment of the Roman Peace; all these are common-places of history. The system collapsed when the money economy on which it depended collapsed. "Thus the social cancer of plantation slavery eventually extinguished itself by causing the death of the society upon which it had fastened." The evils so notorious in Roman history and so dramatic in their expression, were not of course confined to Italy and Sicily. Dr. Tarn shows us similar economic disturbances in the East. There were two revolutions at Sparta led by Kings Agis and Cleomenes; a Roman army was destroyed by the broken men and slaves whom Aristonicus, blessed by Blossius the Stoic idealist, summoned to his banner; Attica was ravaged by slaves from the mines of Laurium, whose predecessors had been the property of the blameless Nicias. The curse of Delos, where Strabo said you could land ten thousand slaves in the morning and sell them all before night, threw its shadow over the whole Hellenic world.

Let us now turn to our own Western Civilization. "A society breaks down," says Mr. Toynbee, "through a loss of harmony between its parts which is paid for by the society as a whole in a loss of self-determination. One source of disharmony between the institutions of which a society is composed is the introduction into the life of the society of new social forces—aptitudes or emotions or ideas—which the existing set of institutions was not originally intended to carry." "The obstructive institution may either be brought into harmony with the new force promptly and peaceably through some constructive social adjustment; or it may be eliminated tardily and violently through a revolution; or it may succeed in defying both adjustment and elimination, and in the last event some social enormity will result from the unnatural 'drive' which will now be put into the intractable institution automatically by the new force that has failed to master it." Our Western civilization is struggling,

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in his view, with the consequences of the introduction of two such social forces: industrialism and democracy. What has been their impact on war and slavery, the two evils that stand out so grimly on the record of the Hellenic Society?

Fortunately for our Western civilization plantation slavery had collapsed before our civilization began to emerge from the wreckage of the Graeco-Roman world in the seventh century A.D. There was of course a trade in slaves in the Middle Ages, chiefly from the countries fringing the Black Sea, of which Heyd gives an interesting account in his famous book on medieval commerce on the Levant. But this trade was trifling in comparison with the trade in the last centuries of the Roman Republic. Our Western Civilization was not challenged by a comparable evil until the sixteenth century when the great Slave Trade between Africa and the European colonies in the New World began. The trade grew rapidly and it acquired all the worst features of the old slavery of the Hellenic World. Mr. Coupland has put it that "in the southern parts of North America as well as in the West Indies and South America it was the worst kind of slavery which Europe had revived—gang slavery—a kind that demanded vast numbers of slaves, which precluded their natural increase, and which therefore required for its maintenance an increasing inflow of fresh stock." De Quincey remarked that slavery assumed "a far coarser and more animal aspect" in the West Indian slave trade than in the Roman world. For the horrors of the mines of Laurium or the gold-mines of Egypt or the great plantations in Italy and Sicily did not make up the whole tale of ancient slavery. There were pages in its history less sombre and hideous. The slave in the ancient world might be a doctor or a philosopher, an actor or a secretary, a singer or a clown, a teacher or a Civil Servant, and whereas in Britain's slave colonies master and servant were separated by the sharpest contrasts of colour, occupation and religion, the ancient slave world grew into the Roman world, and custom and religion helped in life to remove those fundamental distinctions as the law tended to modify them in the courts. In the Roman world slavery was softened by the teaching of the Stoics, but their influence was sharply limited. In the

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Western world Christianity had taken the place of the Stoic's philosophy. Bevan and Gore have shown that Christianity, coming into a world where philosophers were spreading far and wide a gentler spirit of brotherhood, gave an active sense of duty to the compassion that had left men sad but hopeless. (In Mr. Toynbee's last volume there is a most interesting discussion on the difference between the detachment of the Stoic with his "philosophic pride, by him called virtue" and the Christian virtue of love.) In some ways this new plantation slavery differed from its predecessor, for it never gained a foothold inside Europe, a distinction on whose importance Mr. Toynbee rightly insists.¹ But as an abuse of power it is not less monstrous, and for three whole centuries, during which Europe was spending much of her energy in ravaging one continent and corrupting another, Christianity could make little head against this evil. There is perhaps a sinister significance in the history of Sir John Hawkins, who was knighted for his energy as a slave kidnapper: one of his slave-ships, in 1565, was named *Jesus*. Hawkins chose for his crest a negro in chains. The final destruction of this trade and slavery itself was due to one of the two forces with which Western Civilization has to make its account. "For this mercy we have to thank the new force of Democracy, which came into our Western world a little in advance of industrialism. Since Democracy is the political expression of Humanitarianism, and since Humanitarianism and Slavery are obviously mortal foes, the new democratic spirit put 'drive' into the anti-slavery movement at the very time when Industrialism was putting 'drive' into the Peculiar Institution."

Industrialism and Democracy were in this case opposing forces. For if the Industrial Revolution had not happened, or had happened a century later, slavery might have died a peaceful death much earlier. In the course of the eighteenth century it had died out in several of the British colonies in North America. But the Industrial Revolution gave it the stimulus that slavery in the vineyards and olive-fields received

¹ In 1769, Granville Sharp read an advertisement in the *Gazette*: "For sale at the Bull and Gate Inn, Holborn, a chestnut gelding, a Tim Whisky and a well-made, good-tempered Black Boy." A small slave trade was growing up in England; a trade that was killed by Granville Sharp more than by any other man or set of men.

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in Sicily in the fifth century B.C. In the case of the great cotton belt in the Southern States of the North American Union where Whitney's invention of the gin had made slave labour particularly profitable, it lasted until 1863, when it was destroyed after a terrible and disastrous war. Mr. Toynbee argues that, if there had been no Industrialism, Democracy might have put an end to Slavery without a revolution, and if there had been no Democracy "our Western World would not have rid itself of slavery at the cheap price of a single revolutionary catastrophe." Indeed, it is only necessary to read the debates in the House of Commons to see that the blow struck by Fox at the slave trade in 1806 was only just in time, for so philanthropic a public man as the first Sir Robert Peel had changed his mind and turned against abolition in the name of the cotton industry. The Industrial Revolution was creating a new vested interest, which would have been more powerful than that of the Liverpool merchants, if industrial Lancashire had come to depend on the slave trade for feeding its looms. Perhaps the heroic temper shown by the Lancashire working classes during the American Civil War is the best illustration of the effect of democracy on slavery. Of the war that impoverished them they only remembered that it was a war of liberation.

In the case of war the position is different. Here, Mr. Toynbee argues, democracy and industrialism are forces on the same side. By a curious coincidence the American Civil War is the first great example of their combination. For the North mobilized both forces in its war with the South. "The Northerners fought the Slave Power with railways and with heavy artillery; but these weapons forged by industrialism would not have decided the issue of themselves if they had not been combined with the weapon of conscription, and conscription is a weapon that has been placed in a belligerent government's hands by Democracy." Why is it that we look back so wistfully to the wars of the eighteenth century as comparatively mild? Sterne, we remember, wanders about France not sure whether England and France are at war or at peace with each other. The answer is, as Mr. Toynbee shows, that the eighteenth-century wars were not wars of passion. From the Reformation down

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to the end of the Thirty Years War, war had been keyed up to an atrocious intensity by the driving force of religious fanaticism. The eighteenth century was free from this spirit. Then in the nineteenth century war was again intensified, in a material sense by industrialism, in a spiritual sense by Democracy.

Most people think that it is the mechanization of war that is the chief cause of this change, but Mr. Toynbee rejects this view. "Our second thoughts remind us that the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries came very near to wrecking our Western Civilization without any of these mechanical aids, and that a number of other civilizations—the Babylonian, the Hellenic, the Central American—have been completely successful in committing suicide through indulgence in a destructive militarism, though their technical equipment for the purpose would have seemed rudimentary even to a sixteenth-century Portuguese matchlockman. In all these cases the force which put the lethal drive into war was not material but spiritual; and in our own modern case in the Western world, where the material force of industrialism and the spiritual force of Democracy have both been engaged in keying-up our modern Western warfare, we shall see that Democracy has been the dominant factor."

Where do we get the first instance of the intensity brought by Democracy into war? Mr. Toynbee finds it in the treatment of the loyalists after the War of Independence. He contrasts the behaviour of the Americans at that time with that of the European Governments. Vergennes himself pressed the colonists to grant an amnesty. In Europe the new note of passionate concentration is sounded in the famous decree by which Revolutionary France met the challenge of Europe: *Dès ce moment jusqu'à celui où les ennemis auront été chassés du territoire de la République, tous les Français sont en réquisition permanente pour le service des armées. Les jeunes gens iront au combat; les hommes mariés forgeront les armes et transporteront les subsistances; les femmes feront des tentes, des habits et serviront dans les hôpitaux; les enfants mettront le vieux linge en charpie; les vieillards se feront porter sur les places publiques pour exciter le courage des guerriers, prêcher la*

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haine des rois et l'unité de la République. The wars of the nineteenth century revealed the passion and tenacity of the new national self-consciousness of which this is the earliest outburst. The last moderate peace terms were those imposed by Bismarck on the Hapsburg Monarchy in 1866. By 1871 the German nationalism that he had fostered was too strong for him. "In origin and essence democracy is not parochial but universal, not militant but humanitarian. Its essence is a spirit of fraternity which knows no bounds but those of life itself; and in virtue of this quality democracy exercises a compelling power over human souls—a power of evoking loyalty and devotion and enthusiasm—which the dynastic political dispensation of the eighteenth-century Western World could not have expected and perhaps did not ever even desire, to possess . . . *Corruptio optimi pessima.* Democracy imprisoned in parochial States degenerates into Nationalism."

At this point our Hellenic analogy assumes a terrifying look of reality. The parochial Sovereign State of our civilization is the parochial City State of that world. We are faced with the problem that defeated the Greeks in the fifth century. The likeness is painfully close. The Great War is the Peloponnesian War. Industrialism had thrown Europe in the nineteenth century into an all-enveloping economic order like that under which the Hellenic world was struggling for its livelihood. In both cases some political organization was essential. Our Great War marked the failure of our civilization to meet that demand just as the Peloponnesian War marked the similar failure of the Hellenic Society. In both cases we find attempts at some kind of larger co-operation. The Greeks have their Boeotian League, their Chalcidian Federal Commonwealth, their Ætolian and Achaean League, their Amphictyonic League, just as Europe had her Berlin and Brussels Conferences on the future of Africa, her Hague Conventions, her efforts to find safety in a Balance of Power, her Concert of Europe, her arbitration and her commercial treaties. In both cases the war reduced the civilized societies to the level of savages (compare the treatment of the Athenian prisoners in Syracuse with the merciless persecution of political opponents in Germany, Russia, Italy and Spain).

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Some might look on Napoleon as the possible creator of a Universal State, thinking that he might have unified Europe. Mr. Toynbee discusses this view and rebuts it, with the interesting reflection that whereas Rome accepted the ideas of the world that she took under her rule ("the statesmanship of the victors made use of the political inventions of the Powers annihilated by Roman arms in order to transform the Roman Commonwealth into a Hellenic Universal State"), Napoleon supplied the ideas as well as the administrative institutions and the military force on which his Universal State would have reposed. Those ideas, as we know from history, proved a most powerful stimulus, and therefore a most powerful solvent. For the same reason it is difficult to believe that a Universal State could be founded and maintained by any totalitarian ruler, as his rule would in this respect be more intolerable than that of Napoleon. Mr. Toynbee argues that if we are to escape the annihilation of our parochial sovereignty by a knock-out blow, the discovery of some new form of international association will come not from "the petrified devotees of National sovereignty" but from some body like the British Commonwealth of Nations "which has mated the experience of one ancient European National State with the plasticity of a number of 'new countries' overseas" or some body like the Soviet Union "which is attempting to organize a number of non-Western communities into an entirely new kind of polity on the basis of a Western Revolutionary idea." He compares the first to the Roman and the second to the Seleucid Empire. "Will these and such-like bodies politic, on the outskirts of our modern Western Cosmos of sovereign nations, eventually produce some form of political structure that will enable us to give more substance, before it is too late, to our inchoate League of Nations?"

At this point we may perhaps turn back and review our recent history from another angle in the light of Mr. Toynbee's analysis. It is possible to draw comfort as well as warning from his history. That war will become more and more terrible is likely enough. It is more terrible not only because industrialism has given it new weapons, but also because

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industrialism has given it a new seriousness. Cicero contrasted Rome's treatment of her Latin enemies with her savage treatment of Carthage and Corinth. Who was responsible for those brutalities? The hard-faced business men led by Cato. All that they valued in life seemed to them at stake. So in the last war each State believed that on its result depended the difference for each people between stability and distress, if not ruin. If men are convinced that war decides as between two peoples which of them shall have power over the new sources of material strength created by the industrial system, war is inevitably pitiless and impatient of any kind of restraint.

There is a second way in which industrialism has given war and all political antagonism a new malignity. Mr. Toynbee describes the defeat of slavery by democracy, showing that in this regard our civilization has been more successful than its predecessor. But, as he showed, slavery itself was only part of the social disease of the ancient world. Slavery is a vast evil in itself both because it deprives a man, as Homer put it, of half his virtue, because it inflicts widespread misery, and because it corrupts and brutalizes the free. But it was also one aspect of the general demoralization of social life. As we look at Europe to-day and consider merely the external phenomena of industrialism, as we look at the derelict areas in Great Britain, at the methods employed in Germany, Russia and Italy for averting the paralysis of unemployment, we can well understand why Europe to-day is cursed by a stasis, in comparison with which 1848, the year of red memories for our fathers, is little more than a disturbance in the street. The strife between Communist, Fascist and Nazi might thus recall the violence that Italy suffered at the hands of Marius and Sulla. Of that violence we might remember that if Sulla might look to Conservatives as respectable as Mussolini and Hitler look to the English rich, Cicero, Plutarch and St. Augustine all regarded him as the symbol of Rome's collapse into brutality. In Marxism we may see a revolt of the proletariat in which a ruthless religion like that which fired the two great revolts of Asia Minor has swept across two continents. A world that has never recovered from the shock of industrialism is sick with

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injustice and distress, like the world in which Aristonicus sought to avenge, while building "the City of the Sun," the unspeakable cruelties the East suffered in the days when Roman avarice was its own master.

Here then are two evils. There is a third. Different parts of Europe stand at different stages of history. The present reviewer has always remembered the remark made to him by a Balkan politician at Paris during the Peace Conference. "Your Western nations," he said, "think this is the end of war. They regard war as a great calamity. For us war is part of our life." Europe contains satisfied and peaceable States: Great Britain, France, Scandinavia; dissatisfied and ambitious States: Germany and Italy; and States that still nurse the fierce and passionate memories of primitive peoples. It is not difficult here to find the forces that Gibbon included under "Barbarism": the "external proletariat" of liberal and Western civilization.

Now nobody looking back over the half-century before the Great War could think that what was wrong with Europe was the love of war. Most peoples lived in dread of war. The ferocity with which war was conducted and the severity with which defeat was punished were both symptoms of that dread. What was wrong was its anarchy. Now in one sense that anarchy had been intensified by democracy, for it had been intensified by the more self-conscious nationalism of the nineteenth century. But there is another sense in which democracy may put an end to it. For this anarchy represents the failure of creative power. Before the war the world, thrown by this time into a universal economy, was still organized in a great number of mutually-suspicious political units. The war provided the opportunity for reconstruction. The three leading Powers at the Peace Conference were the three Powers who had had the chief share in creating the liberal institutions of the world: the United States, France and Great Britain. At the Peace they failed, for though they created a new institution in the League of Nations, they combined with this constructive energy a total and fatal inability to treat the immediate problem of the restoration of Europe with generosity, imagination or foresight. Europe was thus thrown into

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confusion. In that confusion two States have resorted to what Mr. Toynbee calls Archaism. Rostovzeff contrasted the new Empire in which Diocletian copied the State worship of Egypt with the noble ideas that had found expression in the civilization that Rome had shared with Greece. So Germany and Italy, repudiating all that Europe had learnt about human dignity and respect for freedom from her Hellenic and her Christian past, built up States on a primitive basis of racial and tribal exclusiveness maintained by mass excitement and mass fear. In this crisis the three Liberal Powers defaulted. What was wrong with Great Britain, France and the United States was not that they were war-like; far from it. What was wrong with them was that they all behaved like dominant minorities. They had neither the courage nor the imagination to defend the Christian and liberal inheritance of Europe, and to give strength and substance to the League of Nations. They relapsed into the nationalism of a selfish, ignominious and short-sighted prudence.

What then of the proletariat? Mr. Toynbee points out that democracy, though in one respect it gives strength to the dangerous spirit of nationalism, is in another respect international in temper. It destroyed slavery because it is "the political expression of humanitarianism." Nothing is more striking in recent history than the contrast between the ruling classes and the working classes in their view of European questions. One might have supposed that the most bitter differences at a time of widespread unemployment would be over domestic issues, but the question of our obligations to Europe has divided rich and poor more bitterly than any question of wages or hours or taxes, or even questions that directly affect dignity and pride as well as comfort. Throughout the nineteenth century a European sense has been much more active in the working classes than in the ruling classes, and Gladstone's power through the last phase of his career rested on the moral imagination of a democracy, like him, more eager for justice than for empire.

Of the unknown quantities in this anxious prospect the most important perhaps is the future of organized Christianity. Churches are subject to all the temptations and vicissitudes of political societies. (Mr. Toynbee's masterly study of the

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Papacy is one of his most fascinating chapters.) They are apt to find themselves in the hands of rulers whose spirit is that of a dominant and not that of a creative minority. When this happens, democracy, nursing the resentment of a proletariat, often takes to anticlericalism. Communism, though it is of course much more than anticlericalism, is in part an expression of this resentment. It is significant that as an anti-God movement it has been most violent in Russia and in Spain, the two countries where more than anywhere else the Church seemed to defend with all its special authority the abuses of the State and the coarse power of the rich. Mr. Toynbee shows in an interesting chapter that Marxism owes a great deal to Christian ideas, little as those who direct its attacks on Christianity would like to acknowledge any debt to such a source. M. Maritain puts this, too, in "True Humanism." "He (the Christian) knows that Communism is a parasite on the historic movement of emancipation of the wage-slaves of labour which is at once normal and inevitable in itself, and of those exigencies of justice which are like 'the indignant soul of nature,' truths of Christian origin which are worn by long waiting." To-day Christianity finds itself, in the view of such distinguished Catholics as Cardinal Verdier and M. Maritain, charged with the duty of defending ideas and principles that are common to the liberal tradition and the Christian tradition of Europe. If that spirit spreads under the pressure of persecution, and the Catholic Church learns the lesson, democracy may escape from what has been one of the main causes of its weakness and of its violence on the Continent. This may give a new and hopeful turn to the process described by Mr. Toynbee. For at one stage, as he reads history, the revolt produced by the failure that turns a creative into a dominant minority gives to the larger sympathies of the outclassed world a power that passes from violence to religion, from resentment to creation. This is what happened in the closing chapters of the Graeco-Roman world. The slave revolts live in the legends of massacre and of a punishment scarcely exceeded in horror by the vengeance that Carthage took on her mutinous mercenaries. Along the whole length of the Appian Way the traveller heard the groan of a slave

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stretched upon the cross. But in this same world of misery were bred and nursed the first religions of universal compassion, and the greatest of them kept alive the best tradition of the civilisation that was breaking down, and taught Europe to build upon its ruins. "Worlds," says M. Maritain, "which have risen in heroism lie down in fatigue, for new heroisms and new suffering to come in their turn and bring the dawn of another day."

MODERN SOCIETY AND THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM

By MARGARET COLE

THIS article is not a general article about the reform of the English educational system, about which a very great deal, most of it valuable, has already been written. It is only about the curriculum of education to-day; but it is not even about the whole of the curriculum. Its thesis is that no educational system, in any country, can be said to be doing its duty, either to society or to its pupils, unless it has fairly clearly, even if not explicitly, formulated to itself an idea of what it is setting out to teach—what things it considers the citizens of a modern, industrial, democratic or quasi-democratic community ought, as a basic minimum, to *know*; that our educational systems have signally failed to formulate such an ideal; and that, as a result, the content of our children's schooldays is still felt by many of them to be both more boring than it need be and also—which is a far more serious criticism—pointless. It is a consciousness of this, I believe, which causes many reformers, who on social grounds have earnestly supported the raising of the school-leaving age, to feel—even if they sternly repress them—certain lurking doubts about the educational value of prolonging for another year or two *the training which children are at present undergoing*; and interviews with representative school-leavers within a few years after their departure from school are not very encouraging.

I am, then, limiting myself to a discussion of the curriculum on its informational side—to a discussion of what information and on what subjects we, as a community, ought to require our citizens to possess. I shall not, primarily, be regarding education and educational subjects as a means of “training the character.” No doubt character-training is very important.

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But, in the first place, English schools, of whatever type, have for generations devoted more attention to character-training than to any other aspect of education whatever. This is no less true of the “modern” schools than of the ancient foundations, as anyone can discover by studying their programmes, ideals, and discussions; indeed, the impression occasionally created by some of the most modern is that a kind of inverted character-building is almost their sole concern. But it is not, I think, lack of character-training which is the chief defect in the ordinary English citizen of to-day; it is ignorance of so many elementary things which he ought to know.

I am, of course, aware that the answer I shall give to the question: “What ought an English citizen of to-day to know and to understand?” would, if put into practice, involve considerable changes in the time-tables, the teaching and (horror of horrors) in the examination systems appertaining to both classes of education, the education-for-the-rich which is called Public-school and the education-for-the-poor which is called State, and that to hope for immediate radical changes in these departments is to hope for the moon—or a revolution. But to work with some clear ideal in view is more encouraging than to work with none, and such an ideal, also, may provide a standard according to which other people's proposals (as, for instance, those contained in the Spens Report) can be measured, criticised, and possibly moulded. It is with this end in view that the suggestions which follow, for a minimum standard of educational acquirement, are offered.

I have said that we have at present no thought-out standard of modern educational needs; and it is very intelligible that we should not, for we have no national educational system. Not since the Renaissance, at least, have we as a nation felt the urgent need which came, for example, to the French a hundred and fifty years ago and to the Russians twenty years

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ago, of instructing the citizens of our country, definitely and precisely, on such matters as they must, for the safety and prosperity of the State, be made to understand; and the classical-grammar-curriculum of the Renaissance, however universal may have been its intentions, declined quickly into a preserve of the well-off—declined even before it became obsolete as an instruction in modern life. Obsolete as it became, however, it survived, and still survives, as the basis of the training of the governing class, even though it has to a certain extent, and reluctantly, been “modernised,” not in accordance with any rational plan, but as a result of the fierce pressure of reformists who have succeeded in spatchcocking into the curriculum some science, some modern languages, some music, etc.—often producing grave mental indigestion in the objects of their care. For since almost every subject, in order to be permitted at all, had to stand up against the claims of the classics, and to demand that an equal amount of time should be spent on it, it has too often happened that a child wishing to learn science, for example, was told that he could not unless he was prepared to devote as much time to it as his father in his schooldays devoted to Latin and Greek. No doubt that is true, if the aim is to turn out technical scientific experts, as the older education aimed at turning out specialists in apt quotation and the writing of Babu Latin—but is the aim of education primarily to turn out specialists? And, in any event, what becomes of the other subjects?

On the other hand, we have the State educational system, covering (at present) over ninety per cent of our school-children, whose aim, at its inception, was to do no more than provide the absolute minimum of technique (not of knowledge) necessary for a factory population in a “Christian” country. This system, it is true, has also been modified in the direction of wider culture by the unremitting efforts of

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elementary school reformers. But here again, no definite plan has been followed, and elementary school teachers who are enthusiastic about their work are quite understandably indignant at any suggestion that their curriculum should be firmly laid down term by term (as is common in many foreign countries) by the Board of Education.

This, then, is the historical background. But what do we want to-day? I am suggesting a *minimum* curriculum, and I am suggesting it, definitely, for all children, of whatever class. I think that the ignorance of the *average* public-schoolboy (I am not speaking of outstanding personalities) of things and facts which he ought to know is just as serious a problem as the ignorance of the child who leaves school at fourteen; that, however strong our class-system and its reflection in our school system, the *minimum* of education required is increasingly the same for citizens of all sorts; and that, accordingly, wherever the child is taught and whatever the method used, the basic minima (unless we are really going in for a caste-system plus umbrella-worship) should be the same for all. What should it be?

As I see it, the absolute essentials are five, which I will set down as they occur to me, not implying thereby any priority of importance:

(1) English. Under this heading I include both speaking and writing of English. Spoken English, judging by results, is very inadequately taught in most schools; and the writing of English, again judging by results, is in even worse case. It is impossible, within the compass of a short article, to embark upon discussion about the actual methods of teaching English—which, indeed, is difficult; but it should be possible, at least, to teach children to write sentences which express what the writer means, and do not, through incompetence, express the exact opposite, or, as so often happens,

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express nothing whatever. More than this I do not think it is practicable to demand of everybody. I should desire that those who are in charge of the teaching of written English in schools should so plan their instruction that it would provide a ground-work for (a) appreciation of literary style and (b) understanding of the basis of language, upon which a study of other languages could subsequently be built. The only justification for the subject which is called English Grammar, and the only way of teaching it which gives it any meaning, is to relate it to the structure of other languages which are nearly akin, that is, to teach it comparatively; and by this method quite young children can acquire an interest in foreign languages which is not roused by a study of elementary French and Latin as such. English Literature, as a compulsory subject, is an abomination.

(2) The language of numbers. In a civilisation based, as ours is, so largely upon calculation, it is essential that its citizens should understand the principles of mathematical calculation, and should know how to employ them. This means that mathematics must be a compulsory school subject; but it emphatically does not imply mathematics as at present taught. The mathematical programme of the ordinary school is meaningless; it does not make any attempt to show the child what mathematics are for, and it wastes a great deal of time trying to turn the non-mathematical mind, by incessant preoccupation with puzzles like quadratic equations, into a mathematical virtuoso; it is the equivalent of the endless scales and arpeggios which made up the music teaching of my youth. But it is not necessary, in order to understand and to appreciate music, to be a brilliant performer of arpeggios; nor should it be necessary, in order to understand the

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meaning and purpose of mathematics, to be a brilliant performer on the surds. It is a great pity that so many—not quite all—of those who have really interested themselves in the reformation of school curricula and school teaching have been entirely unmathematical. Fortunately, however, there is little need for any very difficult pioneering work; a thorough popularisation of Professor Hogben's *Mathematics for the Million* would do all that is necessary, for a generation or two, at least; I am sure that I am not the only moderate school mathematician to whom that great book brought unexpected enlightenment.

(3) The principles and methods of science and scientific thought. In a civilisation such as ours, I think few would dispute the desirability of this subject, though some might question its practicability. But here again I should observe that the purpose of including science in the curriculum is not to make, or attempt to make, the majority of citizens practising scientists, any more than practising mathematicians, and that, therefore, a lengthy repetition of technical exercises is not the aim. I would also, in passing, suggest that the "Nature Study" which is so often the opening of science in schools, is not necessarily the best. Botany is to many a very dull subject indeed; a better beginning might well be made with astronomy or biology.

(4) The elements of politics and economics, *i.e.*, how the country is governed and how the living of its inhabitants is provided. Of course these are "controversial" subjects, in the sense that a frank discussion of either politics or economics, in their moral aspects, soon raises questions which are very difficult to answer. The Socialist may feel that it is impossible to teach politics or economics honestly in a capitalist system and

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under capitalist paymasters; the Conservative that, if once these subjects are admitted into the school curriculum, the way will be clear for all manner of subversive propaganda. It may be for this reason that the Spens Report at this point threw up the sponge and stated that it was impossible to teach politics and economics, even for the School Certificate. But if that is really so, if our civilisation is so class-divided that there is really nothing, in politics or economics, that our children can safely be taught, then surely our civilisation itself has thrown up the sponge. I would rather suggest, not believing that we have yet reached that point, that there is a great deal, both about the facts and methods of government, and about the facts and methods of economic life, which we could teach all citizens, whatever their station in life, and whatever our own opinions, and of which they are now most disastrously ignorant. At any rate, I would with every confidence try.

(5) Finally, in an artificial town-dwelling society, it is obvious that every member of it should possess some clear and accurate knowledge of personal and public hygiene, should know how to keep himself in reasonable health, both by understanding of his own body and by suitable exercise; and should understand also how cities and large collections of humanity are kept in health. This involves some study of local government (which links on to the political instruction), some physiology (which could rationally be related to the biological part of item 3), and some definite physical training through games, camps, gymnastics, or other means. But physical training, however good and comprehensive, cannot of course be a substitute for proper teaching on health.

The above seem to me the essential subjects in which

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every citizen of our modern state, whatever his status, must be equipped with adequate instructions. I have, of course, omitted many subjects. For example, I have not included any language other than English, because I do not think it can really be argued that a foreign language—still less Latin—is *indispensable* to a modern Englishman; and in any case the majority of those who have had to study a second language at school turn out unable to read or speak it to any purpose. I have also, though with considerably more hesitation, omitted history and geography, because these subjects, while of immense interest to those who can appreciate them, are apt to prove a complete blank to those who cannot. (There is, however, a case for the blind learning, in a manner abhorrent to all true historians and geographers, of a few facts and dates, upon which a later study can be hung.) Furthermore, I have excluded art in all its forms, as a compulsory subject: singing might be an exception, but I think singing, if it is to include those many to whom God has not given a voice, should be classified with games.

The result, when all these other subjects are excluded, may seem a narrow curriculum. But I would ask those who make that comment to remember that my suggestions are for a *minimum*, a standard which is demanded of all. I do not for a moment suggest that this minimum requirement is all that should be included in the education, even of those whose education will cease at the earliest possible stage. One advantage of the early public-school "classical" education, before Arnold of Rugby got at it and established the principle that the young boy of the English governing class must be kept occupied all the time, lest he should get into mischief or corrupt others younger than himself, was that along with the classical grind it provided ample leisure for the prosecution of leisure activities such as bird-nesting or amateur science. (Let those who doubt this re-read the

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first part of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, before Arnold had really got under way.) I should like to bring back this ideal of leisure pursuits into the schools of this country. And I should therefore like to see—a proposal which I have not space to explain in full—a system under which there were a number of lessons in various non-compulsory subjects, such as history and geography, which children would in their early years be required to attend, but not to be examined in them unless they chose; in which, however, they could present themselves for examination. History, geography, English literature, and foreign languages, are subjects which might thus be taught, by lessons or lectures, wireless talks, films, gramophone records, and any other of the best modern methods; and while a distinction should be drawn between those pupils who are taking them seriously (as for examination purposes) and those who are not, this should not mean that a low standard of work should be permitted to the serious ones. It might mean a somewhat different standard than that now prevailing, as, for example, for history in the General Schools Examination; but that might be all to the good. For the purpose of this second class of subjects is not to begin training specialists—that is yet another stage—but to provide a cultural groundwork in various subjects which may be further followed up. With the ever-increasing volume of human knowledge, and the obstinate refusal of the human day to lengthen itself beyond twenty-four hours, we must realise that we cannot hope, in childhood and adolescence, to complete a really comprehensive education. Education must go on throughout life; what we need to do in youth is to decide upon our basic minimum, make sure that that is learned, and thereby provide full opportunity for the acquiring of what else is desirable, rather than attempt to cram the day so that there is no margin left for independent choice or independent thought.

DEMOCRACY AND DISSENT

By CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH

THE civic dissensions of our generation have, by a curious paradox, generated an increasing emphasis upon the necessity of agreement upon fundamentals as an essential condition of a working democracy. More than thirty years ago, Lord Balfour wrote: "Our whole political machinery presupposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker." In saying so, he summed up in a felicitous formula the political philosophy of British conservatives from Burke to Bagehot. The traditionalism of these writers always dwelt upon the wisdom of past ages, as contrasted with the present, and upon the wisdom of the intelligent and educated classes as the high priests of this precious heritage.

Agreement upon fundamentals has, however, been expounded with almost the same insistence by progressive critics of contemporary society. Harold Laski, in his *Parliamentary Government in England*, cites Balfour's view at least five times. But whereas the insistence of the conservatives upon homogeneity as a necessary concomitant of successful government was meant as an argument against such doctrines as the class struggle, Laski would stress it to buttress his contention that parliamentary government is doomed, because the class struggle is a "fact" with which you have to reckon. I myself, impressed with the readiness with which this argument could be employed to explain the breakdown of German constitutionalism, emphasized agreement upon fundamentals as a necessary condition of constitutional government.¹

It seems highly questionable whether fundamental agreement, or the absence of dissent in matters of basic significance,

¹ In my *Constitutional Government and Politics*, part chs. VIII-X.

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is really a necessary or even a desirable condition for a constitutional democracy. When one considers the frantic efforts which the totalitarian regimes are making to secure uniformity of opinion and belief,¹ one is bound to ask whether this insistence upon agreement on fundamentals, far from being an essential concomitant of democracy, is not really alien to its very conception.

A curious transformation of views, a gradual shift of emphasis and broadening of the frame of reference, can be observed in this doctrine of fundamental agreement. As we move from Burke to contemporary American views, we find this agreement to be considered essential now for the English government of the eighteenth century, now for democracy at large. For when Burke urged his traditionalism, he was thinking of "government by a territorial aristocracy," to use John Morley's trenchant phrase. Bagehot, in developing his doctrine of the English as a deferential nation², was preoccupied with English Parliamentarianism as it worked after the Reform Act—a government by the middle class, as he saw it. Balfour, no doubt, had somewhat similar matters in mind when he used his Balfouresquely vague "we." Harold Laski, in turn, speaks of *representative* government, a still broader category, and claims that it (even in Bagehot's view) is based upon the prerequisite of a body of citizens fundamentally at one upon all major objects of governmental activity.³ Others in England and America have gone so far as to extend this insistence upon agreed fundamentals to the party system, like G. D. H. Cole,⁴ or to democracy in general. Aristocracy, Parliamentarianism, representative government, party system, democracy—here

¹ These efforts are common knowledge, as far as the Hitler Reich and the Soviet Union are concerned. The same case is well made for Mussolini in Herman Finer's *Mussolini's Italy*.

² *The English Constitution*, ch. IX.

³ *Parliamentary Government*, pp. 4 ff.

⁴ See e.g. *The Intelligent Man's Guide through World Chaos*, p. 603.

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is a steady progression from the more limited to the more general statement of a principle. To complete the circle, it may be well to remind ourselves that absolutists like Hobbes and the natural law writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century generally insisted upon uniformity of views as the necessary condition of all government. But may it not be that modern constitutional democracy is the endeavour precisely to organize government in such a way that agreement on fundamentals need not be secured?

Balfour's formula recalls Rousseau's conviction that there must be some binding general views, a unity of outlook which constitutes the *real* constitution. Of this real constitution Rousseau had said that "it takes on every day new powers, when other laws decay or die out, restores or takes their place, keeps a whole people in the ways in which it was meant to go, and insensibly replaces authority by the force of habit." Rousseau is here speaking of morality, of custom, above all of public opinion. . . . In view of the fact that Rousseau is the philosopher of democracy *par excellence*, we might be tempted to consider this citation as a further bit of evidence in support of the contention that agreement on fundamentals is essential to democracy. But are we not justified in recalling that Rousseau is even more the philosopher of totalitarian nationalism, the inspirer of Hegel, and the prophet of Napoleon, of Hitler, even of Stalin?

Instead of extending this ideological inquiry, it may be more conclusive to consider some factual evidence. What are fundamentals, after all? R. Bassett has asserted that the English politician has a well-grounded distaste for such fundamentals. Most American politicians would probably agree. Bassett then cites Halifax: "Weighty as the word appeareth, no Feather has been more blown about in the World than this word, Fundamental."¹ Halifax, who played

¹ R. Bassett, *The Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy* (1935), p. 126.

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such a significant role in the Glorious Revolution, was known in his time as "The Trimmer." The gibe undoubtedly was inspired by the religious dogmatism of his time; for, as is well known, Halifax took a very broad view of religion. He is said to have remarked that he could not digest iron like an ostrich nor swallow all that the divines sought to impose upon the world. Religion certainly would be considered by most men a "fundamental." The bitterest conflicts have arisen over it in the totalitarian regimes. But as assuredly there has been no agreement on that fundamental under constitutional democracy. Both in Switzerland and in the United States, the two most markedly democratic countries in the world, the people have for a long time agreed to disagree on religious issues of the most far-reaching implication. All kinds of protestants, catholics, Jews, atheists and agnostics have participated in public affairs, and the principle of complete equality of rights for all religious views is laid down in the bill of rights. The federal organization of both countries has, to be sure, helped to neutralize this issue. But there can be little doubt that centralization would not alter the situation materially.

Another fundamental cleavage engendering bitter conflicts in our age is national cultural differences. In their attack upon Czechoslovakia, the Nazis continually harped upon the compound nationality structure of Czechoslovakia as a sure sign of the country's doom. From their totalitarian standpoint they could not imagine the peaceful collaboration of people "fundamentally at odds." But Switzerland is built upon an even more difficult nationality structure, since each of the component groups belongs culturally to one of the great aggressive nations of Europe. To enhance the difficulty further, these groups are also divided by religious differences. Still, constitutional democracy has flourished in Switzerland as nowhere else, suggesting that it is peculiarly adapted to

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countries which require a government of people divided upon fundamentals. We have to allow, of course, that the three distinct cultural groups are united by a long tradition of certain common political customs which through centuries separated them from the surrounding monarchical regimes. But the question remains: how could they develop such a political community, since they are so deeply divided, if fundamental disagreement is incompatible with constitutionalism? This case is strengthened further by a glance at the United States. The American melting-pot is proverbial. As in Switzerland, so in the United States it would be very mistaken to imagine that these distinct cultural groups embrace each other in loving affection. Far from it. As H. L. Mencken has shown in his *American Language*, Americans have coined a mass of derogatory slang words to designate these different nationalities: wop for Italian, chink for Chinese, limey for English, and a host of others¹. "The English have relatively few aliens in their midst, and in consequence they have developed nothing comparable to our huge repertory of opprobrious names for them." What is more, the difficulties which arose over Irish obstruction in the House of Commons persuaded many Englishmen (as well as such scholars as Redlich) that national cultural divisions were calamitous for representative government, when perhaps they only were so for that peculiarly sensitive mechanism, English parliamentary government. Redlich approached the problem with the nationality conflicts of the Austro-Hungarian empire in the back of his mind, and hence was perhaps too ready to generalize on that account; for parliamentarianism certainly worked badly in pre-war Austria. But it should be noted that both Switzerland and the United States have provided for a separate and distinct executive

¹ See op. cit. p. 294 ff. There are half a dozen for the Germans, the Jews, the Scandinavian, and as many as sixteen for the Negro. In a footnote, Mencken points out that "the effects of race antagonism upon language are still to be investigated."

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establishment which proposes to the representative and popularly-elected assemblies, but must submit to their shifting majorities. Writers contrasting the British parliamentary system with the American scheme have often failed to take this aspect of the matter into account.

A third, and probably to-day the most crucial, fundamental issue is now posed by views on property, that is to say, social and economic philosophy. It is at this point that Laski, Cole and other writers insist that the deepest cleavage exists and threatens the future of representative government, of the party system, of constitutionalism, of democracy. Without trying to settle here the tortuous question of which is the most fundamental, religion, nationality or property—which admittedly involves the broader question of one's interpretation of history—no reasonable doubt can be entertained at the present time that views on property are amongst the most explosive and in every sense fundamental. But can it truly be said that disagreements on this score have disrupted the working of constitutional democracy? I hardly think so. From the very beginning of American history, upward surges of democratic feeling have been associated with social radicalism. It was so with "Jeffersonian democracy," with the issues which led to the civil war, with the Granger movement of the eighties, and evidently with more recent developments. The civil war—the war among the states, as it is called in the South—is often cited as evidence proving the necessity of agreement upon fundamentals. This is misleading. For one of the most astonishing chapters of the political history of American democracy is the unquestioning, matter-of-course fashion in which everyone in the United States returned to their constitutional tradition, once the war was at an end, in spite of the fact the Lincoln had, in the course of four years of war, accumulated in his hands as much power as any human

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being ever possessed. The Swiss *Sonderbundskrieg* provides a parallel, though here civil war was the prelude to a comprehensive constitutional reform. What matters is the fact that fundamental disagreements on property are not fatal to the operation of constitutional democracy, though they may be to a parliamentary system in which a bare majority, as soon as they have secured a victory at the polls, can proceed to extreme measures.¹ In general, a system providing for government by a partisan majority is subject to greater troubles from fundamental disunity. It has to fall back upon voluntary self-restraint, an unreliable expedient at best.²

Many good men who look upon themselves as ardent believers in democracy do not realize that their counsels of perfection provide the very materials out of which the anti-democratic movements are forged. "We have to make the public interest conception supreme in our democracy over localism, pressure politics, and class struggle, if democracy is to realize economic security." But how are we going to accomplish that? The very man who cries out in this fashion, will in the next breath concede that Jim Farley is right in guessing how our democracy *does* work. A democracy is by its very definition a government in which the mass of ordinary men and women have an ultimate veto on all matters of general policy. Lofty sentiments about the public interest, about fundamentals and all the rest are usually coupled, whether explicitly or tacitly, with aristocratic notions about an elite which *ought* to guide the common man. Burke, whom we have seen to be one of our arch-fundamentalists, displays this contempt for the common man

¹ See "One Majority against Another," by C. J. Friedrich, in *The Southern Review*, vol. V, pp. 42 ff. for a critical estimate of extreme majoritarian ideology.

² Bassett, in the work cited above, seems to fall back upon this hope. It leads him to such unrealistic statements as "it is hoped that the Conservative Party . . . will appreciate the importance of dealing with this matter (the reform of the House of Lords) in a democratic spirit, and not with the partisan objective of crippling a Labour Government," p. 236.

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all through his writings. "Those who would engage in great public schemes must be proof against . . . what is worst of all, the presumptuous judgment of the ignorant upon their designs." Bagehot, likewise, is full of such judgments. The English he thought happily a "deferential nation" and hence by their inbred readiness to defer to the judgments of their betters eminently qualified for representative government: "In theory it is desirable that this highest class of wealth and leisure should have an influence far out of proportion to its mere number: a perfect constitution would find for it a delicate expedient to make its fine thought tell upon the surrounding cruder thought."¹ But, fortunately, Bagehot does not have to worry about the English. "It has been thought strange, but there are nations in which the numerous unwiser part wishes to be ruled by the less numerous wiser part. The numerical majority is ready, is eager to delegate its power of choosing its ruler to a certain select minority. It abdicates in favour of its elite, and consents to obey whoever that elite may confide in." Undoubtedly, there are quite a few people who still agree with Bagehot. When I was last in England an eminent American informed me that the clue to the superiority of British politics was his (I take it highly deferential) groom who, though miserably paid, would not vote for the Labour Party, because, says he, "that party is not fit to govern." I do not presume to render judgment in such matters of ultimate perfection. But I think it can be said without hesitation that if the eminent American is right about the groom, and the groom is typical of British politics, then Britain is a good long way from democracy, as that way of life is understood in the United States. I do not, however, believe that the seven-odd million voters of the Labour Party would quite agree with the opinion I have quoted. They are

¹ It will be readily recognized that this is rank Platonism, and implies the idea of a guardian class.

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much more likely to agree with the mass of Americans who believe that for democratic politics character and common sense and integrity are more important than intelligence and learning and all the wealth and leisure in the world. General policies which are so complicated that the average citizen cannot grasp them must, in a democracy, be foregone. A policy is either of such a clear and simple nature that it can be put into understandable terms or it is no good. What matters in a democracy is the common man. That does not mean the individual common man; it means the composite picture of common men in the aggregate. I do not hold that worker Jones or farmer Miller can out-argue a professor. But the fact of the matter is that it does not make much difference whether he can or not. What matters is that the millions of farmers and workers can out-vote, and ought to out-vote, the "elite" if they disagree with them. Americans are not a deferential nation, nor are the Swiss, nor even the French. That is why they are committed to the democratic way of life. Quite a few Britishers, at least, seem to be of the same opinion.

It is very striking that the anti-democratic philosophies whole-heartedly agree with Bagehot's emphasis upon the elite. The Nazis have their folkish elite, the Marxists their Communist elite. The mass of men, whether Germans or workers, are, according to them, too slow-witted to follow the gyrations of a super-mind, such as Hitler or Stalin. They must be led, if necessary by force, to perceive their "real" interest, the public interest. But suppose for a moment that the public interest is an imaginary value, a rhetorical formula? Has there ever been any substantial agreement as to what constitutes the public interest? In view of the vast amount of fundamental disagreement throughout the life of a working democracy in actual operation, could there ever have been any such agreement?

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What is in the public interest, can be known in a democracy only through the process of working out agreements as you go along. The *a priori* conception of a public interest goes with the idea of an elite, and hence with bureaucracy, aristocracy and the rest. What we need in a democracy is a working scheme as we go along, irrespective of our disagreement on fundamentals.

The foregoing brings us to the problem of method or procedure. The abuse of democratic procedures by anti-democratic movements has raised the question in its most perplexing form. In a recent discussion, Professor Hula, in insisting upon agreement on fundamentals, has said: "Democracy is doomed when there is not, or is no longer, common agreement at least on the point that political decisions have to be based rather on consent than on force. There can be no doubt that such an agreement presupposes in itself common fundamental objectives."¹ W. Y. Elliott added that "one of the most fundamental points of agreement is the ability to put up with disagreement." In speaking thus, Elliott and Hula undoubtedly expressed opinions which are widely held to-day. And there can be no argument that up to a certain point the disposition and readiness to agree to disagree is a concomitant of democratic life. But is not this true of all social life? It seems to me that what we are dealing with here is not a fundamental view on which people agree, but a behaviour pattern according to which people conduct themselves. Justice Holmes has eloquently defended this tolerance for the opinion we hate. But can this behaviour pattern comprehend its own opposite? What I mean is can this readiness to agree to disagree extend to disagreeing about democracy itself? If not, are we not justified in saying that the ability to put up with disagreement stops short of disagreement about democracy itself? This leads on to the

¹ See *Social Research*, vol. VI, p. 284, and compare pp. 269-272, as well as 301-2.

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conclusion that such "procedural" agreement cannot be a fundamental; for is it not the characteristic of a fundamental that it permits of no exception? A behaviour pattern, on the other hand, being a congeries of facts, ceases to be operative when the conditions for its existence cease. Thus the disposition to tolerate other views ceases to prevail when faced by intolerance for one's own views, and more particularly when faced by intolerance for tolerance. Likewise democracy, being a way of life as well as a form of government, will go all the way of force and violence in order to maintain itself. For life never ends until it has exhausted *all* the means at its disposal. It follows that the ability to put up with disagreement, though indeed central in the democratic scheme of things, prevails only up to the point of its own self-denial.

From this conclusion, I would argue that the failure of democracy in Europe suggests that democracy is doomed when there is *not* a sufficient sense of the vital necessity for meeting anti-democratic forces by force. It is simply a sign of the weakness of democracy itself. Indeed, it would perhaps be more correct to say that the attempt at democracy failed, rather than that democracy failed. As Rosenberg has so aptly remarked: "Wherever democratic self-government has . . . developed historically out of the life of the working people, it exhibits a remarkable power of resistance. In modern times, no real democracy has yet perished."²

It is curious that the willingness and ability to put up with disagreement should have been put forward so often as the ground for asserting that there must be agreement upon

¹ Bassett's above-cited volume puts it another way by drawing a distinction between "the methods of democracy . . . and the existing economic and social structure." He says that "it is the methods of democracy, or (if it is preferred) the methods hitherto employed in British politics, upon which general agreement is requisite." Bassett is groping in the right direction, but it is evident that "methods of democracy" is too broad, while "methods hitherto employed in British politics" is too narrow and conservative. See op. cit. p. 126.

² See Arthur Rosenberg, *Democracy and Socialism* (1939) at end.

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fundamentals. For what is the importance of being willing to put up with disagreement, if there are no really important disagreements? There must, of course, be common objectives. Democratic behaviour is pragmatic in that it tends to concentrate upon practical tasks in the realization of which men of very different general outlook can collaborate. Such common objectives as security and order permit of a large measure of effective collaboration, when the concrete aspects of their content are emphasized.

All that has been said forces us to the conclusion that democracy in its modern constitutional form appears definitely not to require agreement upon fundamentals. It does require a people who behave democratically, that is to say, co-operatively. But even this requirement is limited by the presence of advocates of force and violence in support of some scheme or other of their own; for any manifestations of such violence have to be draconically suppressed. Since certainly dictatorship of the modern totalitarian variety, and perhaps a good many other forms of government, require such agreement on fundamentals, constitutional democracy is possibly the only form of government which does not require such agreement. It is at bottom the same problem as that of peace and war. Only the pattern of constitutional democracy as a universally accepted system will ever give us the eternal peace we are longing for. Spinoza somewhere says that peace is not merely the absence of war, but a state of mind which through continuous effort at mutual accommodation builds anew the community within which it dwells. The realization that "fundamentals" are never known, demonstrably, but are matters of faith, and hence unproven premises, from a scientific standpoint, underlies this pacific state of mind. Upon it, true constitutional democracy has reared its governmental edifice.

SURVEYS

FOREIGN BOOKS

AFTER reading through a number of German books on history, constitutional law, politics, economics, and so on, one is tempted to exclaim: "Life is war!"

For all these books are concerned either with war itself, with preparation for war, or at least with the maintenance of an aggressive attitude towards all other than the totalitarian states and systems. Whilst the Leader and his henchmen are busy planning conquests or other forms of extension of their own power or that of the German nation, German scholars are plain-spoken in their interpretation of events and future projects. They are proud of being the rearguard or even of belonging to the vanguard of National Socialism and its ideals. The German scholars of to-day are at pains to be, or, at any rate, to become, "wehrhaft," i.e. capable of bearing scientific arms.

Here are a dozen books in none of which does one meet with the slightest scruple regarding the slogans used by Hitler and his Party. On the contrary, every one of these learned authors does his best to emphasize and even exaggerate—beyond all scientific limits—what the Leader has said on this or on that occasion. To them, his words represent Gospel truth. Thus, in actual fact, the Leader is also the leader of German scholarship and science, the representatives of which become his henchmen speedily and of their own free will.

One of them, a renowned Professor of the University of Kiel—Paul Rittersbusch—is the editor of *Schriften des Instituts für Politik und Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel* (Deutscher Rechtsverlag, Berlin, Wien). His own contribution is entitled *Demokratie und Diktatur* (75 pages). In the introduction, he accuses the democracies of "mental encirclement" of the totalitarian states, because, he maintains, they create an artificial antithesis between Fascism and Democracy. He calls the science of Western Europe as a whole, "uncritical and tendentious." In actual fact, from the outset, both Hitler and Mussolini have glorified this

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antithesis. But Professor Rittersbusch accuses the representatives of science in this country of "degrading the eternal striving of science towards truth and the perception of reality." Furthermore, he calls the new(?) division of Europe into democracies and dictatorships: "ein Angelsächsisches Geistesprodukt," or "a product of Anglo-Saxon mentality."

He then goes on to prove, or rather to contend, that among the Western Democracies, the "nation one and indivisible" no longer exists. According to him, "the social reality of the democracies in no sense represents an original community." Again, "the nation as a political unity is renounced"; and, finally, "the whole political doctrine and political philosophy of party government is nothing else than a more or less consistent interpretation, or misinterpretation, of the doctrines of the Jew Marx!" This, he concludes, leads to the dissolution of social and political unity with all its values and fundamental conceptions. And because he—the National Socialist—believes firmly in J. J. Rousseau as a democratic idol, he goes on to exclaim in deploring tones: "What an apostasy from Rousseau!" in order to reach the conclusion that National Socialism alone contains within it the essence of the true nation.

Another volume in this series is entitled *Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung*, or "International administration of territories on a large scale" (88 pages). The author is the famous *Karl Schmitt*, a Professor of Constitutional Law who was once a Democrat and Republican. In 1933, he suddenly became an enthusiastic partisan of Hitler's; but, on account of his doubtful past, he was nevertheless dismissed from a high position. If not a man of character, he is undoubtedly a very learned and gifted scholar. In the present booklet, he attempts to justify Germany's right to her drive to the East (Drang nach dem Osten), and to bring it into line with other facts and with the principles of constitutional law. He cites the Monroe Doctrine as well as Great Britain's principle of the security of highways within the Empire for his purpose; and very cleverly deduces Germany's right to protect German minorities in foreign countries according to the racial theories of National Socialism. He forgets, however, that, while the doctrines of Great Britain and the United States have always

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been, and still are, in the interests of self-protection only, those of National Socialist Germany are aggressive in their purpose. Finally, he develops a "concept of Empire" which is not concerned with boundaries. It is purely and simply the new German version of the Napoleonic conception of Europe and of the world. And of course, he advocates an "Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte" (Prohibition of intervention by Powers outside the Eastern European area). One sentence especially, deserves to be quoted here: "The title of Emperor of India, an invention of Benjamin Disraeli's, is direct personal evidence of the 'orientalism' of the inventor." Translated into the plain unvarnished German language of to-day, this means: "The title of Emperor of India is a typically Jewish invention." Sancta simplicitas!

In the same series, *Klaus Charlé* writes on *Die eiserne Garde* (The Iron Guard of Roumania)—112 pages—in a book which is chiefly based on the memoirs and proclamations of Codreanu, the founder and leader of the movement, who has since been shot. It is thus devoid of impartiality and merely glorifies Roumanian fascism, anti-Semitism and the dead leader. Another, more scientific work is *Der französische Nationalismus* (French Nationalism)—137 pages—by *Karl Heinz Bremer*. This author has made an effort to look at French developments from an unbiased standpoint. The object of both these books is to include the rest of Europe within the German horizon, which, since 1933, has become alarmingly narrow.

Finally, there are two books in this very significant series which deal with two entirely different subjects, but which, taken together, constitute the framework within which German developments to-day are taking place. They deal with war proper and with the internal war against the Church. The title of one of these books represents a German expression which, in its heroic meaning, is scarcely translatable. It is *Webrhafte Wirtschaft* (Economics of war—93 pages). The author, *Hugo Richard*, tries to co-ordinate immutable economic facts and their eternal laws with Germany's will to war even in face of these facts and laws. As a true German, he seeks to convert need into law and principle; and this is the only tendency of economic scholarship which is approved of in

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the Germany of to-day. The other book, which is also typically German, is by *Anton Baehr*, called *Katholische Solidarität und Volksgemeinschaft* (Catholic Solidarity and National Commonwealth—283 pages). It is, apparently, the flower of this series. With the erstwhile famous German "thoroughness and solidity," it starts with the early Christians and ends with a quotation from a speech of the Leader's together with another from the German poet patriot Ernst Moritz Arndt (of the Napoleonic era) which incidentally has another meaning from that which the author supposes. Actually, it runs: "To be a nation is the religion of our time."

The Crown witnesses called in this book are Friedrich Nietzsche, Houston Stewart Chamberlain and—of course—Alfred Rosenberg, the anti-Christ of Hitlerism. Phrases from poetical, philosophical and political works are quoted in profusion as well as scientific authors and sources. The background of all his judgments in his conviction that the Jews are guilty of everything. Thus he even goes so far as to maintain that the rise of Christianity represented the first attempt of Jewry to dominate the world. On the other, the German side, he proclaims: "The Church did not enter German territory in order to help countries in need but only because it itself needed the support of German strength." And—to what end? To the formation of a world-state without racial distinctions. Oh, what a crime!

I have seldom read a book equipped with a gigantic apparatus of notes, quotations, etc., which was so lacking in the scientific spirit as the present one. It is depressing because it demonstrates the extent to which German scholars have turned their faces from the truth. But I am of opinion that this series of books from Kiel is of real importance, inasmuch as they show very clearly the tendencies of scientific thought in Germany to-day.

Let us wander into other meadows!

Les Étapes de l'Économie Fasciste Italienne (La Librairie Sociale et Économique) quite rightly takes as its motto the words of the famous Italian historian, Guglielmo Salvemini: "We cannot be impartial—we can only be intellectually honest—impartiality is a dream, honesty is a duty." According

to this true scientific principle, the author, Louis R. Franck, deals with the economic foundations and developments in Italy. His book (281 pages) is substantial, interesting as well as enlightening. It presents an extensive picture of the bold experiment which is being conducted in Italy with currency, goods and human beings; and draws some drastic parallels. Statistics play a vital part in this book, which avoids theory as much as possible. Facts and figures guarantee a large measure of reliability; and as one reads them one seems to be looking into the very bowels of Fascism and to realize that they are not entirely healthy. Here also, the road leads from "corporations" to the previously mentioned "Wehrhafte Wirtschaft"; and this is indicated by the subtitle of the book: "Du Corporatisme à l'économie de guerre."

Very opportunely, the University of Louvain publishes a book entitled: *L'organisation corporative du Moyen Age à la fin de l'Ancien Régime* (265 pages) consisting of studies presented by the Membres de Conférences d'Histoire et de Philologie to the Commission Internationale pour l'Histoire des Assemblées d'Etat. For the mediaeval corporative organisation has been partially revived or copied by the Totalitarian States. The contributions to this work by Emil Coorneart, "Qu'est-ce qu'une corporation dans l'ancienne France," and by Heinrich Sproemberg, "Das Erwachen des Staatsgefühls in den Niederlanden" (Awaking of the political sense in the Netherlands), deserve special mention. A very topical contribution, almost applicable to the political aims and problems of to-day, treats of the "Rapporti fra le assemblee degli Stati della monarchia di Savoia e gli Stati generali e provinciali Francesi," by Armondo Tallone, of the Giunta Centrale per gli Studi storici d'Italia. Finally, in an essay on "The relation of English Members of Parliament to their constituencies in the 14th Century," Helen M. Cam of Cambridge draws attention to an anonymous poem by an English writer about a Parliamentary Session after the deposition of Edward II, in which the duties of the M.P.'s as well as the abuses practised by them at that time, are satirically described. Quite probably, the satirist himself had a seat in Parliament!

In the "Collection d'Études Économiques" (Les Éditions

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des Presses Modernes), Jean Paul Huetter is responsible for two books concerning the American problem of silver currency. *La question de la monnaie d'argent aux Etats Unis des origines à 1900* (493 pages) is a voluminous and scholarly account with an exhaustive bibliography of this subject. *L'incidence économique de la frappe de la monnaie d'argent aux Etats Unis de 1878 à 1893* (82 pages) is a necessary complement to the other; it describes the experiments made a few decades ago for meeting economic depressions by the issue of new currency.

A charming, moving and even exciting book is *Le paysage et l'âme Argentine* (Descriptions, récits et légendes du territoire) in Spanish and French (404 pages), published by the Commission Argentine de Co-opération Intellectuelle, Buenos Aires, and elected by Carlos Ibarguren, Antonio Aita, and P. J. Vignale. It consists of a collection of Argentinian chronicles and legends, both of the present day and of the last century. After reading a number of these narratives, one begins to understand something of that vast South American country which is still growing, blossoming, and teeming with life and activity. One gains also some idea of the men, language and destiny of that astounding continent the fate and future of which is perhaps more important for mankind than that of the whole of Europe. Indeed, we are far too liable to disregard that South American "hinterland" which may at any moment—from the historical point of view—awake from its cultural and political sleep. This book is a witness both of its sleep and of its awakening.

The finest tradition in French literature is still biographical. In France, there was, and still is, a special art of relating private matters and public affairs. And in this way a kind of biographical literature which contains within itself a mixture of history and of the "vie romancée" developed. Fleuriot de Langlé's *Alexandrine Lucien Bonaparte—Princesse de Canino* (1770-1885) (Librairie Plon, Paris, 429 p.) belongs to this category. It is an historical, and at the same time a very human, document. It describes the life and personality of Napoleon's sister-in-law, the wife of his brother Lucien who was persecuted by the hatred of the Emperor, because he refused to divorce "his Alexandrine."

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A strange fate! On account of his marriage, Lucien, Napoleon's favourite brother was disowned by the Imperial family and driven from one place of exile to another—the Pontifical State and England). Before his marriage, he had been offered the Crowns of both Italy and Spain. But, despite his personal ambition and avarice, he remained faithful to his wife. For her sake, this man who was probably the ablest of Napoleon's brothers, retired into private life. Hence the question: what kind of a woman was she? The answer to this question and the supplementary information given by Fleuriot de Langlé in his biography constitute a valuable supplementary chapter to the history and biography of the period. His heroine remains in the shadow of a Titan. But she manages to create sufficient light around herself to become a silhouette.

The late Queen Marie of Roumania wrote of the Duchesse d'Uzès, née Montemart: "She was such a wonderful old lady that somehow the world becomes poorer by her disappearance from amongst us." Her *Souvenirs* (Librairie Plon, Paris—202 p.) edited and prefaced by her grandson, the Comte de Cossé-Brissac, show that she was one of the most charming and distinguished representatives of the Faubourg St. Germain—that is to say, of Royalist French Society. The fact that she lived from the period of French Royalism to that of German Fascism is enough to endow her life and personality with historical interest. As a woman of wit and temperament and a figure in European society as well, her memoirs are permeated with the scent of history. Probably at the time of her birth even, her milieu was already obsolete. This is reflected in her style, which is not merely of yesterday but has something of the mediaeval about it. In spite of this—or perhaps because of it—her book has a certain fascination.

H. S.

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KAMAL ATATÜRK'S LAND. By AUGUST, RITTER VON KRAL.
Translated by KENNETH BENTON. (King, 283. 7s. 6d.)

THIS book on modern Turkey will come to most English readers as a new work. It is, in reality, a translation of the second edition of a work which first appeared in Vienna in 1935. The first edition of 181 pages, easily one of the best epitomes of the new Turkey, has been expanded to 283 pages in the present edition which retains the early excellence although much of the original material tends to be buried in the mass of facts and figures.

August, Ritter von Kral, whose acquaintance with Turkey and South-eastern Europe began before the war and who was Austrian Minister to Turkey for about ten years before the *Anschluss*, gives as his aim: "a fairly clear picture of modern Turkey and its political, cultural and economic conditions and aims." It is to be "neither a mere description of the genesis of the new Turkey nor a collection of impressions, nor yet a biography of Kamal Atatürk." This objective the author has attained. Here is no "gossipy" memoir of an ex-diplomat. It is a veritable mine of information on every conceivable aspect of the Turkey of 1937. Most of the author's judgments on social and political questions are penetrating although in some cases, perhaps due to a desire to show himself friendly to the new Turkey, his statements have the ring of official propaganda sheets.

The impetus to the creation of modern Turkey he assigns primarily to national consciousness awakened by attempts of the Allied Powers, among which he makes no discrimination, to partition the Ottoman Empire. Kamalism, embodying the principles on which the new state was founded and organized by Atatürk and his collaborators, is not a continuation of reforms as attempted by the Sultans nor a "new edition of the Young Turk movement" which von Kral stigmatizes as hardly differing from the Governments of the Sultans. It is a "new type of statecraft and government."

Few readers will fail to find something of value, so comprehensive is the range of subjects treated in the book. It

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contains, for example, one of the best existing accounts of party history although the essential connection between party and governmental machinery has not been adequately revealed. Excellent chapters are included on Cultural Regeneration, Progress in Agriculture, Fine Arts, Literature and the Press, in which the leaders in each field are named. The chapter on Communications contains the best summary of railway policy yet written. The chapter on Foreign Policy, largely new to this edition, reviews with considerable detail and insight Turkey's relations with other states, individually and collectively. In stating, however, that Turkey joined the League in spite of her friendship with Russia, the author overlooks what now seems to have been the case: the Soviet Union, as part of its developing policy of non-aggression and collective security, encouraged Turkey to join the League in 1932, although the Soviet authorities could not then, for a number of reasons, bring themselves to join.

As in other recent books on Turkey, the author, writing before the death of Atatürk, is concerned with the question "Is Atatürk a dictator?" The answer for him is plain: "One cannot . . . under the most severe and impartial examination, find in him the *characteristics of a dictator and usurper*." (All italics as in original). Yet his answer and his evidence are not wholly satisfying. He himself later points out, in regard to Atatürk: "He thus became . . . a pioneer and vanguard of the authoritarian régime which subsequently took root in Europe." He passes over in silence the importance of party organization and its control by the Supreme Council of three, composed until Atatürk's death of Atatürk, Ismet İnönü and the Minister of the Interior, without whose consent no candidates can be elected to the Assembly and whose directions guide the caucus of the Parliamentary group of the Party.

What the author seeks, as do many other writers on modern Turkey, is a new term expressive of the leadership aiming at complete regeneration of the Turkish people and at eventual achievement of democracy. Dictator, with the contemporary meaning it has acquired, cannot be rightfully and fully applied to Atatürk or his successor, but until another word is brought forward most writers will of a necessity continue to employ it.

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The translation by Kenneth Benton is straightforward and adequate. The frequent italicization of words and phrases serves no useful purpose and may irritate some readers. The use of Sumeric, Hettitic and Alautic for Sumerian, Hittite and Alaouite is somewhat disconcerting. There is no index—a serious defect in a book of this character. There is a good end-map.

This book, obviously written with great care and vast industry, must be regarded as one of the standard books on the new Turkey.

PHILIP WILLARD IRELAND.

FRANCE AND MUNICH. By ALEXANDER WERTH. (*Hamish Hamilton*. 12s. 6d.)

FRANCE. By WLADIMIR D'ORMESSON. (*Longmans*. 6s.)

MR. ALEXANDER WERTH, the well-known Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, gives us a picture of the last eighteen months in France which will be full of interest and instruction for English readers. Mr. Werth disclaims the polemical attitude. He wishes, he says, to be objective and dispassionate. But nowadays to be interested in public affairs is necessarily to be passionate, though the passions that move us may be, and nearly always are, confused and conflicting. The quarrel between *Munichois* and *Anti-Munichois* which envenomed the atmosphere of Paris after the signing of the Munich treaty was more violent than any since the days of Dreyfus. But which of us has not been, and is not still, torn and distraught among the issues in which we are involved? How are we to decide what price is worth paying for the doubtful preservation of good, what sacrifice should be made for the still more doubtful defeat of evil? And indeed this is what emerges most clearly from Mr. Werth's book—our statesmen, French and English alike, with their aggravated burden of responsibility, were at that time—perhaps still are—even more torn and distraught than the wretched people they are guiding. It is easy to see, however, that Mr. Werth is predominantly *Anti-Munichois*. He is so profoundly, and justly, shocked by the weakness and tergiversation of the French government and their desertion of the unhappy

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Czechs that he does not perhaps lay sufficient stress on what was in all probability the decisive factor in the case—namely the practical non-existence of the French air force, the disorganisation of their armaments industry, and the advice of their military experts. He is generally careful to substantiate his statements, but sometimes, carried away by a romantic talent, he slips in as facts statements which can only be purely imaginary and which beg the question. How does he know, for instance, that Hitler was bluffing at Munich and that after the mobilisation of the British fleet, he “wondered how he was to get out of the hole”? How does Mr. Werth know that but for M. Daladier's weakness Mr. Chamberlain could have got better terms? “The inside history of the Munich conference,” he very justly says, “remains to be written.” Why does he write it?

But the day to day accounts of those September days in the Paris which he knows so intimately are admirable: the violent cross-currents of opinion, the splitting of parties, fascists turned pacifist and pacifists shouting for war, the welter of the press, the hurtling accusations, the endeavours of France and England to make each other shoulder the blame and the responsibilities, the “fausses fausses nouvelles” the alternations of hope and fear, shame and relief, the reactions of the common folk, of the soldiers and women, stolidly determined to do their duty without fuss—all this is shown vividly and convincingly, with Mr. Werth's lime-light shed on the chief actors and M. Bonnet standing out as the principal villain. The portrait of M. Bonnet, vain and self-seeking, averse from no meanness which he hopes may gain him popularity or save him from exposure, is one of the best things in the book.

The pages on “after Munich” are more condensed. With more ground to cover, Mr. Werth covers it more rapidly. After the painful story of the Parisians'—some of the Parisians'—delirious joy at the signing of the agreement, comes the history of the reactionary evolution of M. Daladier's government, and of those crowded months in which the disasters of Barcelona, Prague, Memel and Albania followed each other with such startling rapidity. The divisions in the ministry and country which had long continued as violently

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as ever (witness the general strike) were at last abated, more by Italy's and Germany's own actions than by M. Reynaud's financial measures or M. Daladier's hectoring. A measure of unity, or at any rate of quiescence, was attained. It is this recovered unity which makes Mr. Werth hope that "la France immortelle" is re-emerging from the depths. But France never perhaps sank quite so low, nor is her recovery quite as satisfactory, as he implies. Her people, indeed, as he eloquently acknowledges, are as admirable, as lovable as ever. Does he remember what Montaigne said of them 350 years ago? "*C'est un bon peuple, guerrier et généreux, capable pourtant d'obéissance et discipline et de servir à quelque bon usage, s'il y est bien guidé.*" But the generous efforts of 1936 have been annulled, the Front Populaire destroyed, the great Trades Union movement half-shattered, the working classes disillusioned and depressed. France is governed now by Diktats; her liberties curtailed and threatened, her press unofficially controlled and her radio officially muzzled. This is the black side of the picture, and over all this, though he is certainly aware of it, Mr. Werth draws perhaps too discreet a veil. He takes events at their face value. It is no doubt not part of his aim to hint at profounder and more general causes of the world's disturbances.

M. Wladimir d'Ormesson is well known in France as a writer on current political affairs and as a highly distinguished contributor to the *Temps* and *Figaro*. He is also, as he tells us himself, the son of an ambassador; his book *France* is prefaced by an ambassador and is one of a series written for the enlightenment of English readers entitled *Ambassadors at Large*. With such credentials M. d'Ormesson naturally has an ambassadorial style and an ambassadorial point of view. He is diplomatic and adroit and non-committal, and has a studied appearance of fairness. But to write a fair account of the last forty years of French history in barely more than two hundred pages of good-sized print is impossible without omissions and suppressions. M. d'Ormesson is very skilful at them. In speaking of the great socialist victories which swept the country in the 1936 elections, M. d'Ormesson says: "If we examine the figures, we shall see that there were in France at this date more than five million anti-socialist

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electors (from the Right to the Radicals inclusive) while the Socialists and Communists together, as well as certain other less definable groups which revolved in the socialist or communist orbit, did not account all told for more than two thousand five hundred." What has been suppressed here is obviously several noughts. This is most likely a translator's error—not a misprint, for the words are written out at full length—but it is nevertheless symptomatic of the spirit in which the book is written. M. d'Ormesson is determined not to see what he would prefer to think does not exist.

D. Bussy.

THE PROBLEM OF MINORITIES, or COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION IN INDIA. By K. B. KRISHNA. (*Allen & Unwin*. 15s.)

WITH few exceptions, modern states include unassimilated, or partly assimilated, bodies, claiming rights, or emphasising corporate traditions, and a corporate unity, which the majority or the dominant minority is unwilling to admit. Ordinarily it is a minority which makes these claims, and a majority which resists them: and the introduction of democratic, or quasi-democratic, institutions or ideals has been the occasion which has brought the latent contradiction into activity. Only rarely can the problem be solved by a rearrangement of territories and the application of federal institutions: because the different sections live, for the most part, intermixed. India, like the rest, suffers from the presence of these partially assimilated bodies; and the device of communal representation, which makes each community a separate electorate returning representatives of its own sect or complexion, has been adopted in the process of setting up a quasi-democratic constitution. Communal representation began, in the eighties of the last century and in the smaller towns, as a means of keeping the communities from rioting together at the municipal elections. But it has been extended and developed until, in the constitution of 1935, it has encroached upon the share enjoyed by the Hindus, the most numerous and the wealthiest and most political-minded section of the people, in what should be the democratic representation of India.

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The first thesis of Mr. K. B. Krishna, in this able and earnest book, is that the so-called minorities of India, or at least the most important of them, are artificial creations in the interests of imperialistic counterpose. Britain called them into being in order that she might divide and rule. It may be so: but history has more than once illustrated the practical difficulty of eliminating separate minority representation. In the Lucknow Pact of 1916, Hindus and Mohammedans agreed together on its retention. By the Poona Pact of 1931, the leaders of the high-caste Hindus agreed with those of the depressed classes to increase the reservation of seats for the latter. This was done under the pressure of one of Mahatma Gandhi's ritual fasts: but it was done; and the British Government merely acceded to the proposal. In 1934, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress recorded a statement which might very well have been made by a responsible Government: "The Congress is pledged to accept any solution falling short of the national, which is agreed to by all the parties concerned." Separate representation has, in fact, come to be regarded as a sort of palladium by the so-called minority communities. So long as there is any remaining lack of confidence in the justice and good will of the majority community, this state of mind will continue. In India, *without the English*, the Hindus would have to reconcile their opponents or retain the safeguards: under penalty of a more drastic solution.

Every friend of India must earnestly desire the end of communal differences. Mr. Krishna is impressed by the example of the U.S.S.R. in dealing with the problem of nationalities, and he seems to suggest that India should follow it. The essential features of the Russian system are these. Provincial and regional autonomy are conceded to definite populations inhabiting separate territories; but there is no recognition of a nationality which has no territory; in other words, nothing corresponding to the communal representation of India. But the U.S.S.R., in introducing a socialist system, has eliminated the classes whose economic and social rivalries are the true bases of communal hostility in India. Mr. Krishna has justly observed that the differences

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are economic and political, and that religion only serves to demarcate the hostile camps and provide occasions for collision; and also that the interests of the immense majority of the masses, as opposed to the classes, are identical. Russia has ended the quarrels by taking away the bone of contention. The reviewer is not certain that Mr. Krishna's permanent convictions favour a similar course for India; but he has a mood in which he writes (page 302):

"All-India interests cannot prevail until after a tremendous struggle between the various classes. . . . That can be secured only by a revolution, and not by representation."

Is he quite certain that an India, which had fought out the quarrel, would adopt the socialist solution? There are powerful forces making for the other direction.

Mr. Krishna has given us a valuable study of the communal question in India, and has illustrated it by the history of Ceylon, Kenya and Fiji. He is a candid critic and does not suppress facts. The reviewer will look forward with interest to his next book.

JOHN MAYNARD.

THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION. By A. V. DICEY. *Ninth Edition. Revised and with an introduction by E. C. S. WADE.* (Macmillan. 15s. net.)

THE first edition of this celebrated work appeared in 1885; and such was its vogue until ten or fifteen years ago that there is scarcely anyone over 35 years of age who studied law, politics or constitutional history at a university or professional law school in this country who was not "brought up" on Dicey. "Dicey on the Constitution" was regarded for generations not merely as a perfect, accurate and comprehensive statement of the principles of the British system of government; but also as a reliable explanation of its superior virtues and liberties. The book attained an ascendancy over other treatises which amounted almost to a monopoly.

A book does not achieve such a position without substantial merits; and Dicey's merits are as obvious as his defects. For one thing, he wrote extremely well in simple and lucid English. For another, he had a breadth of view

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concerning the relations between law, politics and economics which contrasts favourably with the dry and pedantic legalism of Blackstone or Austin—a quality which comes out even more strongly in *The Relation between Law and Public Opinion During the Nineteenth Century* than in the present work. In the third place, he had a great facility for enunciating broad and easily remembered principles.

His besetting fault, which the passage of time tends to magnify, lay in a defective power of observation which led him, as Montesquieu had been led in the 18th century, to base high-sounding and far-reaching generalisations (so easily remembered, alas, by students and teachers alike) on inaccurate statements of fact. These two writers, the most celebrated exponents of constitutional government in their respective lifetimes, and for long afterwards, both made gigantic mistakes of fact. Montesquieu, misreading the British Constitution, attributed the liberties of England to a separation of powers which never existed here, and elevated the need for such a separation into a dogmatic principle of political theory. Dicey, equally misinformed about the French administrative jurisdiction, gave a totally false impression of *droit administratif* to the receptive minds of his young readers. The practical results of these misunderstandings have been of immense importance on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States is still struggling desperately to free itself from the yoke that Montesquieu laid upon its shoulders. While here, as Dr. Wade points out in his long and interesting preface, Dicey's "insistence (now widely rejected) upon the inadequacy of French administrative law to protect the individual has been largely responsible for the rejection of proposals for a final appellate tribunal with administrative experience to control public authorities and their servants in the performance of their duties. His faith in the courts as guardians of liberty has concealed the fact, upon which he did not dwell, that the Government departments enjoy under the common law wide immunity from process."

The text of the new edition has been left as it was in 1908, the editor having wisely abandoned an attempt to bring it up to date. In place of such an attempt he has written a

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preface of nearly 150 pages in which Dicey's views are critically examined in the light of modern developments and ideas.

The earlier part of the book consists of an exposition of the sovereignty of Parliament. This remains a leading principle of the constitution so far as the formal authority of Parliament is concerned; but Dr. Wade emphasises that the fact that the courts cannot question legislative power is not conclusive of the extent of that power. The growth of organised pressure groups, the practice of consultation by the government with sectional interests concerning Bills prior to their introduction into Parliament, the position in regard to Dominion powers resulting from the Statute of Westminster: these and other factors have tended to make the political supremacy of Parliament from the legislative aspect "more and more a fiction."

In Part III of the treatise, Dicey explained some of the conventions of the Constitution, and the relation between those conventions and the law of the Constitution. Here he was a pioneer whose efforts have been more than justified. For it is true, as Dr. Wade remarks, that conventions cover the entire field of governmental activity and alone make it possible to carry on the public affairs of the nation and the Empire. The weakness of Dicey's approach was that although he was willing to include conventions in Constitutional Law, he refused to admit politics into the discussion. But since conventions are at bottom political expedients, he robbed the subject of half its value. He was compelled to consider the ultimate sanction to conventions as residing in the law administered in the courts—one of the least important methods of securing compliance.

Dicey was essentially Austinian in his conception of law. He was unwilling to concede that any rule of conduct could be regarded as law unless it was enforceable in the ordinary courts of justice; and, strangely enough for a man who emphasised the sovereignty of Parliament, he almost entirely neglected the part played by legislation in his conception of the so-called rule of law. The new edition contains much sound sense on the subject of the rule of law as a defence against arbitrary government. Dr. Wade shows clearly that

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"the rule of law" signifies little unless we know the substance of the law. Law is no more than a mechanism. It may be the instrument for establishing autocratic government or for securing a democracy. To uphold the rule of law as such is to be either the dupe of mere legalism or the victim of sentimentality. "It is no help to an understanding of the legal principles of our own constitution to claim the rule of law—as a legal rule—as a unique feature of the British Constitution." Dr. Wade also explodes with quiet effectiveness the absurdities of Dicey's mania for regarding the courts as the only organs able or competent to restrain arbitrary or illegal action within the State.

Dr. Wade is by no means so clear or unambiguous on the question of liberty. On p. lvii he observes that liberty of the individual is nothing more than the residue of his conduct which remains unfettered by any law—a purely *laissez faire* conception. On page lxii he observes that in a federal state where legislation is subject to judicial review "it may be difficult . . . to achieve that new conception of liberty which is regarded as essential in modern civilisation. For liberty to-day involves the ordering of social and economic conditions by governmental authority, even in those countries where political, if not economic, equality of its citizens has been attained." There are obviously two distinct conceptions of freedom involved in these passages. The former implies that freedom consists in the mere absence of restraint; the latter that freedom requires the provision of opportunity through social and economic control of a collective character. One is negative, the other positive.

So many of Dicey's leading opinions and principles have been demolished by the kindly editor in the present edition that very little of his doctrine remains standing; and that which does remain has been modified almost beyond recognition. Through the ruins of his teaching, Dicey somehow manages to emerge as a great man. With the publication of the present edition his treatise ceases to be a public danger and a menace to realistic thinking about the British Constitution. It almost becomes possible to recommend the book to students of law and politics.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

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HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: REGISTER OF THE MINISTERS AND OF THE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES. (*H. M.'s Stationery Office*).

RATHER more than two years have elapsed since the appearance of the first volume of the History of Parliament, launched by the energy of Colonel Wedgwood, and sponsored by a Committee of both Houses. The present work is the second instalment of what promises to be an impressive series. Like its predecessor, it is concerned with the thirty Parliaments (of which only twenty-six actually met) summoned in the seventy years between 1439 and 1509; but it approaches the material from a different angle. The first volume contained biographies, arranged alphabetically, of the members of the House of Commons throughout the whole period. The present "Register," as it is called, deals with each Parliament separately in chronological order, giving a list of the principal Ministers, a brief diary of the proceedings with dates, a summary of legislation, and lists of members of the House of Lords and House of Commons. A lengthy and interesting introduction by Colonel Wedgwood underlines points of special importance, draws attention to problems, and suggests certain conclusions.

On many of the topics suggested by these pages, only a specialist can venture to offer an opinion. But the *personnel* of Parliaments is a field which has only recently begun to receive the attention that it deserves, and even a layman can appreciate the value of the new light thrown on it in the work now in process of publication. Hitherto the student has been obliged to rely mainly on the *Official Return* of 1878. That work, though extremely useful as far as it goes, suffers from somewhat serious limitations. The list of members contained in it is based principally on the returns in the Record Office made by the sheriffs to the writs directing them to have knights and burgesses elected. Certain Parliaments are omitted, while for others the returns are seriously incomplete. The names appearing in it are unaccompanied by comments or attempts at identification. For the later periods, it supplies a valuable foundation on which to work. For the earlier, and particularly, it appears, for the seventy years from 1439 to 1509, it is highly unsatisfactory.

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The names of members of the House of Commons contained in the present volume number 2,600. The figure, it is stated in the introduction, adds 50 per cent to the representatives hitherto known for the period, and amounts, perhaps, to between one-half and two-thirds of all who sat in the House. The increase is due to the use of sources not drawn on for the *Official Return*, and some of the names contributing to it are, it would appear, not wholly beyond question. In so far, however, as it can be substantiated, it is sufficient justification by itself for the laborious investigations that have gone to the production of the present volume. Nor is the mere addition of new names to those already known the only extension of his knowledge for which the student will be grateful. The analysis of the composition of the House of Commons which it makes possible is even more important. Due allowance must, of course, be made for gaps and ambiguities. The names of some 40 per cent of the members are still unknown; in some Parliaments knights of the shire, in others burgesses, are under-represented in the lists; while for only one Parliament in the last thirty years are the data complete. Nevertheless, when these deficiencies have been given their proper weight, what remains is no trifle. We can distinguish members residing in their constituencies from the non-residents; discover for certain Parliaments the relative numbers of new recruits and "old hands"; get some view, at least, of the social status and occupation of a large number of them; and thus obtain some clue to the degree in which the House was drawn from different social groups.

The picture which emerges must be set against a background in which family and feudal connections were more important than the political views—if there were views—of distant electors. It is not easily summarised, but certain broad tendencies stand out. The growing disposition of leading country gentry to seek election for boroughs, and the existence throughout the whole period, especially among the burgesses, of a small, but slightly increasing, group of "carpet-baggers", suggest that a seat in the House of Commons was, by the fifteenth century, a coveted position. A man once returned to Parliament appears to have been

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distinctly more likely to be re-elected than one standing for the first time; in the Parliament of 1450, 60 per cent of the shire members, and 52 per cent of the borough members, had already sat in the House of Commons, while the corresponding figures for 1453 were 62 per cent and 38 per cent. A large proportion of seats, varying, apparently, in the counties from slightly under one-third to 40 per cent, and in the boroughs from less than one-fifth to nearly one-quarter, were held by Crown officials. But the lawyers and squirearchy were gaining on the place-men; the former rose from one-fifth of the House in 1442 to one-quarter in 1491. The borough representation seems to have been surprisingly miscellaneous, embracing members of all the more important trades, and some "yeomen." The last term is an ambiguous one, and it may be questioned whether, in this context, it is always to be interpreted in the rural sense which Colonel Wedgwood (p. xc) ascribes to it; but his statement that "all sorts and conditions of men were seeking seats in Parliament" seems to be justified. Some of the evidence as to the composition of the House of Lords, in particular the attendance of peers not summoned by writ, and the considerable number of new creations—22 plus 44 resuscitations—is equally interesting. Altogether the book is a notable contribution to Parliamentary history, on which Colonel Wedgwood and his collaborators, Mr. K. R. Mackenzie, Mr. H. Instein, and Miss A. D. Holt, are warmly to be congratulated.

R. H. TAWNEY.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE. Edited by WILLIAM ANDERSON. (D. Appleton-Century Company. 16s.)
MUNICIPAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN. By GEORGE MONTAGU HARRIS. (P. S. King & Son. 15s.)
THE ADMINISTRATION OF PARIS AND MONTREAL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. By ALFRED JOHN PICK. (Gay Drummond Publications, McGill University.)

THE significance of local government in the State has become unmistakably plain in the present epoch of upheaval and reaction. A country which abolishes free institutions in the national sphere will inevitably lose its local liberties. Conversely, it is impossible to maintain a healthy democratic regime at the centre unless it is supported and nourished by vigorous self-governing communities in town and country. This truth is so obvious that it is a mere platitude. Yet platitudes in the field of local government are often overlooked because the subject is discussed in such a dreary and unreal way. Instead of attempting to infuse life into the picture by showing that the local authority is the organ by which a community provides—or fails to provide—much of the essential basis of civilization, writers frequently fill their pages with a barren account of the powers, duties and procedure whereby this or that function “may” be or “must” be provided, the manner in which the councils are formally constituted, and so forth.

The volume which Professor Anderson has edited contains five original studies dealing respectively with the local government of England, France, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Not all of them escape the particular vice which has been mentioned. In general, however, they bring out clearly the relationship between central and local government in each of the countries concerned. Apart from this common merit the studies are of unequal value.

The chapter on England by Professor R. K. Gooch is fair, accurate and reliable, though somewhat legalistic and lacking in “feel.” The author’s conclusion is that “local government is almost without restrictions in determining its internal structure; and, in respect of its functions, it need have little fear of outside interference so long as its accomplishments do not fall short of a certain minimum. In fine,

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England continues to be the foremost example and the principal model of a country in which genuine local self-government flourishes” (p. 86).

The contribution on France by Walter Rice Sharp reveals the mastery of French political institutions which is shown in Professor Sharp’s other works. He covers the ground comprehensively and concisely. The nature and strength of the *tutelle administrative* is clearly brought out, but the writer declares that “In spite of the multiple controls exercised, both legislatively and administratively, over governmental functions at the local level, there remains a substantial field of action for free local initiative” (p. 104).

The section on Germany by Professor Morstein Marx of Harvard is rather more interpretative in treatment than the others. The author strives to be impartial; and occasionally one feels he is almost over-conscientious in this respect and is in danger of leaning over backwards. The “new principles” of the Third Reich, he points out, are “the concentration of all responsibility in the person of the executive head of each unit (leadership principle); and second, the assignment to all autonomous bodies of especially authorized agents of the National Socialist Party, which . . . has become the sole lawful political organization of the German people and consequently claims to be the only representative element in the new unitary state” (p. 240). In view of the fact that the elected councils have been superseded by purely advisory bodies nominated by the local Nazi delegate, who also controls the appointment of all municipal officials, it is difficult to see what meaning can be attached to the words “responsibility” and “representative” in this connection.

Professor Marx observes that “whatever the merits of the leadership principle in the guidance of the nation, its application to every single authority has undoubtedly overtaxed the moral strength of many a mayor” (p. 272). The consequent weakness in local administration is apparently stimulating a return to the merit system in the appointment of officers. “The right creed is indispensable, but stress is increasingly laid on the requirement of a high-grade training background” (p. 271). One doubts if this is possible with such a creed.

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The chapter by Professor Steiner describes a similar downfall of the once proud and independent cities of Italy before the crude domination of the Fascist regime. To-day, the centrally-appointed *podesta* is everywhere in control of the communes; while in Rome similar powers are exercised by the Governor. As in Germany, there is a local advisory council, nominated by the syndical associations and appointed by the prefect. In no case, however, is the *podesta* under any obligation to follow the advice of the council.

The contribution on the Soviet Union by Professor Bertram Maxwell is the least satisfactory in the book. The author repeats a statement made in his earlier work, the truth of which has already been denied by the present reviewer, that there is a rigid supervision of all important activities on the part of the city soviets, and "nothing can be undertaken unless expressly permitted by higher soviets or their executive committees"—without giving a word of evidence in support of his contention. If Professor Maxwell still believes himself to be right, why does he withhold the information on which his opinion is based?

It would appear, however, that Professor Maxwell is misinformed on a number of important matters concerning the U.S.S.R. The method by which the city soviets "encourage the development of industry and trade" is by operating manufacturing and distributive trusts rather than (as he states) by "assisting co-operative organizations. It is absurd to occupy space pointing out that the city soviet is charged with the protection of labour in "private and public enterprise," and with the relief of unemployment by the establishment of employment agencies and public works, since there is no private enterprise and no unemployment. It is incorrect to attribute the city planning work to "the State Planning Commission at Moscow." The ten-year city plan for Moscow was not initiated by Gosplan but by the City Planning Commission of the Mossoviet, and similar organs exist at Kharkhof, Leningrad and elsewhere. It is not true to say that "desperate efforts" are being made to relieve the overcrowded living conditions in the U.S.S.R. Housing has, indeed, been given a back seat. One has only to note the immense diversion of labour and resources into

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the construction of the Metro, or the enormous Palace of the Soviets in Moscow, not to mention the vast school-building programme, to realize this.

Many other instances could be given of misleading or inaccurate statements in this contribution. Before committing himself to print again on the subject, Professor Maxwell would do well to reconsider thoroughly the sources of his knowledge.

Municipal Self-Government in Britain is an attempt to discover whether the modern town council in the larger cities of Britain is an organ of genuine self-government; and if so, in what manner it uses its freedom. For this purpose, the author (working in collaboration with a committee at Oxford) has conducted an enquiry into the practices of ten leading cities—namely, Birmingham, Bristol, Hull, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, West Ham, Edinburgh and Glasgow. Incidentally, Mr. Harris is President of the International Unions of Towns and is therefore well acquainted with foreign systems of local government; so in the course of the discussion he is frequently able to make shrewd and relevant comparisons.

The book contains much new or little-known information which has never before been assembled in a coherent form. The attempt was, indeed, well worth making; but the success which it achieves is necessarily limited by the method of presenting the material. The chapters are divided on functional lines. They are devoted to such subjects as the constitution and structure, the committee system, officials, functions, public assistance, public health, education and culture, trading undertakings, finance, relations with government departments, corruption and graft, the public, etc. The result is that although the reader receives a considerable amount of useful information on these topics, no picture is given of the city government as a whole in any one of the towns. Yet this is badly needed, for with the sole exception of Sir Ernest Simon's admirable work, *A City Council from Within*, which gives an unforgettable account of the civic life of Manchester, there is a complete absence of works showing the whole process of local government in our provincial cities. The need for this still remains.

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The conclusions at which Mr. Harris arrives are substantially the same as those of Professor Gooch referred to above. Although much of their administration is a matter of routine, laid down compulsorily by Act of Parliament, the town councils do, in addition to these obligatory duties, exercise self-governing powers on a very large scale (p. 162). Even in regard to the fulfilment of statutory obligations there is a measure of discretion as to the manner in which these services are carried out (p. 292). The local authorities are almost completely free of central control in regard to the formation and organization of the local administrative body. The election of councillors, aldermen and mayor, the appointment of officials, the making of standing orders, the setting up of committees is, except in a few cases, entirely in the hands of the town council. In the essential matter of finance, again, British local authorities enjoy an unsurpassed freedom. For "whereas in practically every other European country the estimates (budget) of each local authority must be submitted to a higher authority and often to the central government itself for confirmation before action is taken upon them, there is no such requirement in Great Britain" (p. 197). Local control of the police force is a further sign of local independence deserving of note.

Nevertheless, Mr. Harris is by no means complacent in his evaluation of the situation. He criticises with full justification the apathy shown by the voters at municipal elections and the general indifference of the public to the work of the local authority; he condemns the obsolete organization of administrative areas and the obstinate attitude of the authorities towards reform; he deplores the unsatisfactory character of both the district and borough audit; the lack of cultural amenities provided by the English and Scottish cities; the dangers underlying their continual demand for the central government to bear an increased proportion of the cost of municipal services; the impediments to progress raised by the limited powers of local authorities and the obligation to seek Parliamentary sanction for every new move forward; the lack of co-ordination between departments and officials; the absence of any long-term policy; the failure of councils to develop any regional

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planning or administration in the face of the obvious need for it.

Much remains to be done, then, though one would not always agree with the author's proposals; but he has undeniably proved that "the modern town council in the larger cities of Great Britain is an organ of self-government, subject always to the Rule of Law: that such limitations of the right of local self-government as exist are due to legislative enactment and not to unwarranted interference by government departments; and that, generally speaking, the relations between the local authorities and the central government are those of a partnership, in which each partner has his recognized rights and privileges" (p. 296).

Mr. Pick's book has the advantage that it deals with the subject in terms of a particular place: or, rather, in terms of two particular cities. It is easy to see why he should have chosen Montreal, for the study was prepared under the auspices of McGill University. It is not so easy to see why he should have also have selected Paris for purposes of comparison. Montreal and Paris share certain characteristics common to all metropolitan centres. Apart from that, the only features they appear to have in common is that a majority of their respective populations are French-speaking and that the municipal council is in each case exceedingly weak. Otherwise they are poles apart. Paris is administered almost entirely by the Prefect of the Seine and the Prefect of Police: it represents the climax of French prefectoral centralization. Montreal is governed partly by an executive committee of five municipal ministers chosen by the council from among their own members, together with a chief official known as the Director of Departments. Local government in Quebec—and, indeed, throughout Canada—has followed the English model rather than the French, although it has been greatly influenced by ideas derived from U.S.A.

The local government situation in Montreal revealed by Mr. Pick is distinctly unpromising, whether as regards its scope, integrity or efficiency. The city's functions are very limited. Education is entirely in the hands of separate ecclesiastical boards to which the city hands over the school taxes. Gas, electricity and street transport are all farmed out

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to business corporations. Officials are appointed entirely by patronage and there are no competitive or even qualifying examinations.

There is no system of audit or effective control over the civic finances by any outside body, with the result that they are in a highly unsatisfactory condition. The author devotes much space to the financial problem and is clearly alarmed at the irresponsibility and mismanagement which have produced a situation of considerable difficulty.

Montreal has already had fourteen different systems of local government. The present one is unlikely to be of long duration; but reforms more fundamental than a change of administrative machinery are required to bring stability, efficiency and integrity into the city hall. Mr. Pick has performed a useful service within the limits of his short study, though he would have been better advised to have omitted Paris and to have devoted himself entirely to Montreal. His treatment is scholarly and candid, though one feels sometimes he could have revealed more damaging facts than those which appear on the printed page.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

THE DIARY OF JOHN MILWARD, ESQ., MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR DERBYSHIRE, SEPTEMBER, 1666, TO MAY, 1668. Edited with some notes and an Introduction on his life by CAROLINE ROBBINS. (Cambridge University Press. 21s.)

PUBLISHED Parliamentary diaries are scarcer for the period following the Restoration than they are for the years from 1621 to 1660. That of John Milward, one of the members for Derbyshire, is a welcome addition to a scanty list. The day to day notes taken by busy men need more than most documents to be accompanied by complementary matter, if they are to yield their full light. Miss Caroline Robbins, who edits Milward's diary, has done her work well. Her introduction, notes on Parliamentary business, and calendar for the period covered by the diary, enables the reader to see its author in his setting.

Whatever else was not restored by the Restoration, the squirearchy was. Milward belonged to the upper stratum of

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country gentry, to whom a seat in Parliament came as a natural sequel to the discharge of public duties nearer home. Born in 1599 and dying in 1670, he had been sheriff of Derbyshire in 1635; was one of the local leaders on the royalist side during the first two years of the Civil War, making his peace for a fine of £1,000 in 1645; acted as deputy, when after the Restoration, the Earl of Devonshire became Lord-Lieutenant of the County; and served for a time as commissioner of taxes. He took his seat in the House in September, 1666, and, to judge by his notes, was an industrious member. His opinions on the issues of the late war were those to be expected in a man of his traditions. He has little patience with the "impertinent speeches . . . by the sectaries and those that affect the Presbyterians" against the Conventicles Bill; summarily dismisses an attorney accused of a breach of Parliamentary privilege as a "mischievous rascal, one that bought the King's lands," and finds an argument in favour of raising money by Privy Seals in the probability that it will hit hardest "those that have got vast estates in these times of rebellion." He was capable, however, on occasion, of voting against the Court, while in view of the part later played by William Cavendish, for a time his fellow-member in the House, his relations with the family are not, perhaps, without significance. He appears, in short, to have been one of the public-spirited conservatives who, if they hated fanatics, despised mere sycophants. In welcoming the return of the King, they had no intention that either his, or his father's, version of monarchy should return with him.

Some famous episodes find a place in these pages. The parliamentary proceedings leading up to the impeachment of Clarendon, the attempts of the House to fix responsibility for the mismanagement of the Dutch War, and two striking debates on toleration, are reported at length. The principal interest of the *Diary*, however, is of a different kind. It consists, less in its allusions to high politics, than in the picture which it gives of the ordinary run of Parliamentary business. The conflict between the Crown and the House of Commons had become by, at least, the twenties a struggle over the right to control policy. When the day of judgment came in November, 1640, the leaders of the latter had shown

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their political sense by concentrating their forces, not on the achievement of particular reforms, a struggle over which might easily have dissipated them, but on shattering the organs of government employed by the Executive, in the expectation that Parliament would pick up the powers which it dropped. That expectation was realised much more slowly than they anticipated; at the Restoration, and long after, ecclesiastical policy and international policy remained a debatable land. Economic policy, however, except in certain of its financial aspects—for example the raising of loans—had passed almost entirely into the control of Parliament. The interests concerned had grown greatly in strength since the forties, and were too powerful to be thwarted without danger. Charles, who wrote to his sister that the only topic about which the English public really cared was trade, acquiesced in the change, and gave them their head. He appears to have supposed that, soothed into agreeable torpor by commercial prosperity, the savage animal would not growl at attempts to acclimatise the counter-reformation in England with French money and French troops. It was the characteristic fatuity of a clever pseudo-realist.

The nemesis came long after Milward's death. What strikes one in his diary is the immense volume of business, mainly economic business, with which the House of Commons deals. A variety of topics which, before the Civil War, would have been the subject of Privy Council orders and proclamations, now come before the House as matters on which its opinion is of decisive importance, and a good many of them are the subject of legislation. Tariffs, monetary questions, Poor Law administration, patents and monopolies, the management of Crown forests, questions affecting the economic interests of particular trades, are cases in point. It is sometimes said that there is little difference between the commercial policy of the first forty years of the century, and that of the Restoration; but that verdict is superficial. Down to 1640, mercantilism—if that ambiguous term is still to be used—is largely a policy imposed by the government on the business classes; after 1660 it is one imposed by the business classes on the government. When conflict over it arises, it is a conflict, at the first date, between the Executive and the

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interests affected; at the second, it is a conflict of those interests with each other.

The relative merit—or demerits—of a land-tax, poll-tax and excise are hotly debated, those of the last till “after seven of the clock and the candles half-burned.” There is a long struggle over the Bill, prohibiting the importation of Irish cattle, the cattle breeding districts taking one side, the cattle-fattening another. The patents of the Wood-mongers' Company and the Canary Company are voted illegal, it being decided, in connection with the latter, that charters of companies shall be referred to a committee; while a measure removing the restrictions imposed by the company of silk-throwsters reveals a similar suspicion of the monopolistic practices of corporations. The fees levied by the Duke of Richmond in connection with the alnage of cloth had caused exasperation under Charles I; now a bill to confirm them is first accepted, and then rejected on the ground that the patent is in practice so abused as to make it a grievance. The laudable object of protecting the timber in the much plundered Forest of Dean is generally approved; but the House will not pass the bill in the form in which it was introduced, since a local landowner, Sir John Winter, proposed to secure 8,000 acres out of 22,000 for himself, leaving 10,000 for the King and only 4,000 for the commoners.

These matters seem small beer, but they are not mere trifles. They show the direction in which enterprise was moving, and the play of interests and opinions which it provoked in Parliament. The large number of Private Bills introduced, including two early enclosure bills, are instructive for the same reason. Private Bill legislation had not yet grown to the portentous dimensions which it was to attain in the eighteenth century, but it was rapidly increasing. It represented less a policy than the absence of a policy. Throwing the reins on the neck of the trades, localities or interests concerned, it was the characteristic device of an age at once intensely interested in economic progress, and increasingly disposed to find the secret of progress in a spontaneous, doctrineless individualism.

R. H. TAWNEY.

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THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF CLASS CONFLICT, AND OTHER
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY. By LIONEL ROBBINS.
(Macmillan. 6s.)

"WE did not expect a good book from Mr. Sadler," said Macaulay in a celebrated review of a work on political economy; "and it is well that we did not; for he has given us a very bad one." That is not quite the case with Professor Robbins, for one's expectations were not so dismal, and his book is not a very bad one. But it is a disappointing one, all the same. The Preface raised a distinct hope that the book would not be just the same old thing from Mr. Robbins, but display a more catholic attitude, a more understanding view both to the left and the right of himself. In that we are disappointed. "I am exactly the right height," said Queen Elizabeth: that is rather what Mr. Robbins feels, neither an inch taller nor an inch lower. And yet there are developments of the highest significance in economic and political affairs going on round us, which should have given some pause, one would think, to the cocksure certainty, the tone of theological confidence, the self-complacency so characteristic of his work. "We never met with a book," Macaulay continued, "which so strongly indicated that the writer was in a good humour with himself, and in a bad humour with everybody else" (in Mr. Robbins' case, always excepting Professors Hayek and Plant, of course). It is only fair to say that the book consists of papers written in the past twelve years; and it may be, indeed it is much to be hoped, that for the future Mr. Robbins may be able to learn something of the virtues of intellectual humility and scepticism without which it is not possible to profit from the illuminating, if terrible, experience of our time or even to make a really helpful contribution towards clarifying our difficulties.

Again in fairness it should be said that our disappointment may be partly due to the book's being mistitled. "The Economic Basis of Class Conflict": there is a subject of the greatest importance, the clue to so much in the struggles that rend the world to-day, and the very centre of the field of intellectual interest and discussion. Yet, in fact, almost the whole book is devoted to the familiar themes of economic

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restrictionism and monopoly: themes, it must be said, on which Mr. Robbins has much to say that is pertinent and salutary. But here we are not so much concerned with his economic views as such, as with the political and social aspects of them. And it is his leading essay on Class Conflict which is least adequate and worthy to fill the bill.

His treatment of the central theme of the conflict of interest between workers and employers is simply obtuse: the "alleged conflict of interest," he calls it. One needs to be very blind to contemporary events not to see that it exists. But the first consideration against the "plausibility" of the theory, he tells us, is that "the different groups of labourers in the different national areas do not supply services which the market treats as homogeneous." But that does not prevent them having a common interest as against property-owners; the fact that there are lesser conflicts of interest, some of them more apparent than real, between different groups of the working-classes, does not prevent them having a common interest as against the capitalists. Again, there may be conflicts of interest in the short-run between different groups of workers; and yet their interest in the long-run may be the same as against their masters.

Mr. Robbins has a glimpse of this when he says on the next page that "there is a sense in which . . . the long-run interests of the human race are not in fundamental disharmony." He would be saying something much more relevant and more actual if he said "the long-run interests of the working-classes of the world." It is the conflicts of monopoly capitalism, the struggles of rival pressure-groups of immense economic and propaganda power, their command of all the instruments to foment nationalist and racial manias in their interest to deflect the mind of peoples from their plain common-interest to raise their standards of living all through the world: it is these things that are the chief causes of the disharmonies that exist between the peoples at large. They are not necessarily inherent, though there are certain factors, e.g., geographical, difference of standards of living, and so on, which are real enough. But that there is a sense in which there is a fundamental common-interest among working-peoples, anybody capable of looking at the

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contemporary world should be able to see: that is what so much of the dust thrown up by Fascism is intended to disguise; that is why capitalists are so anxious lest the fact should transpire too obviously through all the welter. Though, of course, it transpires clearly enough to intelligent observers of contemporary history.

Mr. Robbins, however, cannot see it. He is so much obsessed, out of all proportion, with the thought that there are interests of labourers opposed to each other in different parts of the world—as anybody can see that there are—that he goes so far as to say that “measures which perpetuate the poverty of Japanese labourers are beneficial to the Lancashire cotton operative.” I should have thought that this was an elementary economic error, which revealed the unsoundness of the whole argument. Surely it is clearly to the interest of the Lancashire operative to raise the standard of living of the Japanese labourers, since (a) they would consume more goods and make better customers in the world’s markets and (b) in so far as their wages were increased they would compete less with the Lancashire operatives?

After that, the rest of the argument looks even less imposing. Nor is one in the least impressed by Mr. Robbins’ conclusion that such community of interest of the international proletariat as there is has been of a “subjective” rather than an “objective” nature. Is that in the least likely when you consider (a) the whole history of the working-class movement and its obvious internationalism, in the teeth of the greatest obstacles; (b) the character and record of Fascism with its deliberate intensification of nationalism to deflect the minds of working-people away from their obvious common interests; (c) the fact that so much of contemporary struggles all over the world is between these two. If Mr. Robbins cannot see how these things hang together, it is because his head is in the sand.

It is all the more a pity because there are some indications in the economic chapters of his book that he would welcome a rapprochement between liberals and socialists against the common enemy of monopoly and restrictionism. In this respect there is something salutary to socialists in what he has to say. But on the more fundamental issue, where he

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does not yet see daylight—there are many other important considerations which cannot be dealt with in a review when they are not mentioned in the book—he will have to be content on his side to sit down and learn. After all, it is not likely—in spite of the autobiographical notice he gives us in his Preface—that so many of the most brilliant and the most representative minds of our time have been on the wrong track all along, and Professor Robbins (with Professors Hayek and Plant) alone right.

A. L. ROWSE.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN AFRICA; ITS COURSE AND EFFECTS.
By S. HERBERT FRANKEL. (Oxford Press & Milford.
10s. 6d.)

THIS book is issued by the Committee of the African Research Survey under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. It was begun as a memorandum for Lord Hailey’s survey, but it grew in scope and bulk until it is now a volume of about 500 pages. It is in fact a most valuable second volume to *An African Survey* by Lord Hailey, which was reviewed in the January-March issue of *The Political Quarterly*. The twentieth century has produced a vast library of books on empires and imperialism, but it has produced few books like, or as valuable as, Dr. Frankel’s. Dr. Frankel is a well-known economist and a South-African; he is Professor of Economics in Johannesburg. He therefore knows both Africa and economics intimately from the inside. The value of his book consists in the fact that it is an intensive study of a particular series of economic facts and of their social effects. His main object is a survey of capital investment from abroad in Africa. He does this statistically, and his book is a mine of information not otherwise available. But it is much more than a mere quarry of facts. Capital investment is one aspect of a most important and complicated social phenomenon: the impact upon Africa of the European economic system and of European civilization. Dr. Frankel never forgets this wider aspect of the facts with which he is dealing; his object has been, not simply to produce a work of reference, but to

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trace the effect of "the modern economic forces associated with capital investment" upon the structure "of African economies" and so upon African society. In this he has succeeded admirably, and his book is invaluable for the student of imperialism and of colonial and imperial policies. Again and again in a sentence or two Dr. Frankel indicates the relevance of facts with which he is dealing to problems which every one who knows anything about Africa will recognize as crucial to-day. Thus on page 23 after dealing with the methods and achievements of Chartered Companies, he points out that the system failed to solve the problem of supplying long-term capital for territories in which production could not be made immediately profitable, and he adds:

"Those who suggest similar systems for the international development of African territories would do well to study the history of these companies. Even when they were successful, their very success finally brought them into conflict with innumerable private interests (or with foreign powers) and their authority had to make way for that of a Central Government."

Again the effect of the native land system in the Union is admirably dealt with in the section beginning on page 123; the system is intended to produce and does produce the maximum immobility of labour with disastrous economic and social results to the African. The two chapters which deal with South Africa are among the best in the book.

Another subject with which Dr. Frankel deals in an illuminating way is railway finance. He devotes to it a complete section in his fifth chapter. His analysis of the policy of encouraging exports at the expense of imports, a notable feature in the economy of the Union and Kenya, but prevalent in most African territories to some extent, is very interesting. Here again one sees clearly, after reading his book, the important political and social effects of what on the surface is merely a question of parochial economic organization. The fact is that empires are built and lost on such parochial economic questions. LEONARD WOOLF.