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CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. The Foundation of Andhra Culture <i>By P. S. Naidu, M.A.</i>	.. 1
2. The Development and Fate of the Operculum and Gill- Chambers in <i>Bufo Melanostictus</i> Schneider <i>By A. Ramakrishna Reddy, B.Sc. (Hons.)</i>	.. 15
3. The Passive Voice in Tamil <i>By A. Chidambaranatha Chettiar, M.A.</i>	.. 22
4. Tholkappia Araichi—Ullurai <i>By S. S. Bharati, M.A., B.L.</i>	.. 35
5. Bhartṛhari a Pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin <i>By V. A. Ramaswami Sastri</i>	.. 42
6. The Daśa-Prakaraṇas <i>By B. N. Krishnamurti Śarma, B.A. (Hons.)</i>	.. 54
7. Nyāyakulīśa <i>By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A., and K. Srinivasachariar</i>	
8. Bodhavimarsa <i>By V. Subrahmanya Sastri</i>	
9. University Notes <i>By B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A.</i>	
10. Reviews :—	
1. Brahnavidyā <i>By R. R.</i>	
2. New Catalogus Catalogorum <i>By R. R.</i>	

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VOL. VIII.

OCTOBER, 1938.

NO. 1.

The Foundation of Andhra Culture

BY

P. S. NAIDU

(*Annamalai University*)

In a recent paper on 'A Psychological Orientation to the Concept of Culture' (published in *Prabuddha Bhārata*, Feb.' 1938), an attempt was made by the author of this article to coin an original formula for the understanding of 'Culture,' and for the interpretation of cultural objects. As the aim of this essay is to apply that formula to the elucidation of Andhra Culture, it is necessary to re-state that formula, and to summarise the arguments leading up to it.

Culture (like freedom) is a psychological term that has not been analysed with care. The haziest notion of the concept prevails in the minds of sociologists and political theorists. Contemporary Psychology has established beyond the shadow of any doubt that 'culture' is a characteristic of the activity of the human mind. A verb is the part of speech which denotes an activity ; so the word which denotes a characteristic of that activity should be an adverb. 'Culture' is, in reality, an adverb masquerading as a noun. The psychological analysis, to be essayed below, is proof positive of this contention.

Before we discuss the activity of the human mind, which results in culture and produces cultural objects, it is necessary to understand the *structure* of the mind. A question may be raised here as to the possibility of analysing the structure of something which, by its very nature, is intangible. Our answer is that we infer the structure from function. This procedure is justified by the established usage in the physical and

biological sciences. The atom and the gene, are, by their nature, intangible. Yet we have pictures, mathematically accurate, of their constitution. These pictures have been constructed solely by a process of inferential reasoning from data supplied by the observable behaviour of the atom and the gene under conditions artificially set up and controlled by the experimenter. Making use of this fruitful methodology, Professor McDougall, the leader of the Hormic School of Psychology, has analysed for us the structure of the mind as it reveals itself in concrete behavioral situations controlled by the experimental psychologist. The structural elements, as thus discovered by the learned professor, are described in the chapters dealing with 'Instinctive Dispositions,' and 'Propensities' in his three great works, '*Social Psychology*,' '*An Outline of Psychology*' and the '*Energies of Men*.' The elements that go to make up the complex structure of the human mind are the '*instinctive dispositions*' (or *propensities*, to use the latest term in psychology). This does not mean that the intellect is eliminated from the scheme of things. The intellect is a halo that plays round instinct, guiding the latter by shedding light in its path. An unlighted path is difficult to traverse; but a brilliant lamp without a path to be lighted by it, and with no one to go along that path is an absolutely useless thing.

The elemental propensities which make up the mind have a complex structure of their own. Each disposition is stimulated by an *objective situation*, gives rise to an *emotion*, and leads to a specific course of *action*. The instincts and their corresponding emotions are the elements of mental structure.

It is surprising to note that our Alamkara Sastra is based upon a psychology which bears a marked resemblance to Professor McDougall's Hormic Theory (vide Fig. I). As the purpose of this article is to analyse Āndhra culture, we shall make free use of Alamkara terminology.

The Emotions with their excitants, accompaniments and resultant activities constitute the foundation on which human experience is built.

Unlike the objects in the physical environment, the human mind, as it is a living dynamic entity, is constantly undergoing change. In this process of development, the elements are modified very considerably. With the steady growth of the child's experience of the world, the elemental propensities of mental constitution get organised into patterns of ever increasing complexity. Let us illustrate this point with reference to a 'talkie' of some repute—'Bāla Yōgini'—. Baby Saroja *hates* the lady doctor. *Hatred* is a *sentiment* composed of the two elemental emotions of *fear* (*bhayānaka*) and *anger* (*raudra*). One never hates a person of whom one is not afraid. A loathsome creature generates *disgust*

The elements of structure as discovered by careful scientific investigation are given in the following diagram :




FIG. I.
I.—(Alamkara list of) Rasas, and II.—(the corresponding Hormic list of) Propensities.

Note.—Corresponding to every element in I we have one or more in II. Analysis has been carried much further in II than in I, for the latter is mainly concerned with Poetics. Karuna, Vira and Bhaya have been further analysed in II into simpler elements.

Santa, as we know, is a doubtful element in Alamkara. It has a metaphysical flavour. There is nothing corresponding to it in Prof. McDougall's hormic list of instinctive propensities, unless we care to mention the physiological needs of rest, sleep, etc., which the professor adds, in the *Energies of Men*, to his original list.


(*bībhatsa*) in us, but when we begin to hate it, we may rest assured that fear has entered into our mind. Saroja's hatred for the woman is transferred to the doll presented by the latter. The child tramples the plaything under her foot in order to express her intense dislike of her mother's enemy. A concrete sentiment of hatred has been built by the baby round the doll.

In her telephonic conversation the baby imagines that her father is at the other end of the line; but she discovers to her dismay that it is the lady doctor who is attempting to cajole her. At this dramatic moment her voice and facial expression disclose the sentiment of scorn, a compound made of self-assertion (*vīra*), anger (*raudra*), fear (*bhaya-naka*) and disgust (*bībhatsa*). A concrete sentiment of scorn has been organised in Saroja's mind round Mrs. Bullock.

The baby's lame cousin Kamala is the object of pity, a very complex sentiment composed of the protective impulse, sympathy, *hāsyā* etc. (Fig. 2).

In the mind of a young child the formation of complex emotional patterns, called sentiments, is confined to the concrete level. As the child grows into youth-hood (or maiden-hood), and man-hood (or woman-hood) abstract sentiments are formed, wherein the centres of organisation are ideas or concepts. Loyalty, patriotism, honour etc, are abstract sentiments.

Complex sentiments, both abstract and concrete, are not structures lying loose, one beside the other, in the mind of the human adult. They are arranged into a scale of sentiment-values, with a master-sentiment at the top of the scale, controlling, in terms of its intrinsic worth, the descending order of values of the other sentiments down the scale. *CULTURE is the process of forming concrete and abstract sentiments, and then of organising them into a definite scale of values. Culture has been rightly defined as 'culturing' or 'cultivating' the mind. Such mental cultivation results in the formation of, what we have called, the scale of sentiment-values. He who achieves a permanent scale of values has won the most coveted thing in human experience, a stable character. But, with the vast majority of human beings the scale of sentiment values is a shifting thing. Do we not hear it said often of a man, as though it were a great achievement, that he is one person at home, another at the place of business, a third different man in his club, and yet a fourth personality in the games field. Our scale of values is constantly changing, because the master-sentiment at one moment yields place to another at the next. At home the master-sentiment may arise out of śṛṅgāra, at the office out of bhaya, at the club out of karuṇa, and*



in the games field out of *vīra*. Professor McDougall says that the *self-regarding sentiment* (in which self-assertion plays the most prominent part) is the master-sentiment for the Westerner. We hold that the *Brahman-regarding sentiment* (wherein *śāntā*, *karuṇa* and *śṛṅgāra* play the chief roles) is or should be the master-sentiment for us.

One of the inevitable consequences of the dynamic constitution of the mind is that it must express itself in some manner or other. For the ordinary individual the channel of expression is conduct. We judge a man by his conduct, for conduct is the expression of character. According as a man's conduct is consistent and reliable or inconsistent and unreliable do we judge his character to be stable or unstable. For the gifted and superior individuals, the channel of expression for their mental organisation called *culture*, is fine art. Poetry and drama, song and dance, painting and sculpture, science and philosophy, are expressions of superior culture.

As with individuals, so with nations and groups. National or racial culture is merely the manner in which the national mind has created its sentiments and organised its scale of sentiment-values. Such national culture finds expression in cultural objects, such as, social institutions, traditions and customs, costumes and ornaments, folk-lore and dance, domestic and sacred architecture etc.

II

ĀNDHRA CULTURE

Culture, as we have analysed it, is a term indicating the psychological fact of the organisation of the elements of mental structure into a scale of sentiment-values. From an analysis of cultural objects, which are the aesthetic expressions of superior culture, both individual and racial, we can infer with confidence the structure of the mind which created those objects. Armed with the hormic formula of culture, we shall analyse the Āndhra cultural objects in order to get an insight into the manner in which the Āndhra genius is attempting to organise its sentiment-values.

At the outset, the significant remark ought to be made that sophistication is utterly alien to Āndhra culture. Nothing suspicious is hidden underneath a smooth and glossy outer surface. The cultural objects in the Andhradesa are the direct and unvarnished expressions of the way in which the Āndhra mind has been organised. In them there is not to be found any trace of that brand of hypocrisy mis-named civilisation. This characteristic straightforwardness is, in a sense, helpful to the analyst of culture.




Fig. 4. Stupa from Amarāvati.




Fig. 5. Foliated Arches on the roof of Vijayanagar Temple.

THE FOUNDATION OF ANDHARA CULTURE

The conclusion that we shall essay to establish through an analysis of the cultural objects produced by Āndhra genius is that *there has been and still is a perpetual conflict between self-assertion (vīrya) and sympathy (karuṇa) in the Andhra group-mind.* (Occasionally one of the components dominates over, and temporarily assimilates the other).

FIG. 3.

Diagrammatic Representation of the Conflict between Vīrya and Karuṇa.

VĪRYA	vs.	KARUNA
(the elements entering (into this sentiment)		(the elements entering (into this sentiment)
Raudra		Śṛṅgāra
Vīra (dominant)	Hāsyā	Karuṇa (dominant)
Bhayānaka	(neutral element)	Śānta.
Bibhatsa		
Adbhuta.		

ANALYSIS OF THE CULTURAL OBJECTS OF THE ĀNDHRADESA

Sculpture and Architecture

The earliest remains of the cultural objects of the Andhra nation are the sculptures at Amarāvati, and the frescoes at Ajanta. Amarāvati, as we are aware, represents a more important city—Dharanikota dating back to 200 B.C. Historical research bears testimony to the indigenous nature of the Amarāvati sculptures. Vincent Smith is of opinion that these sculptures owe nothing to Gandhara influences. Speaking of the Amarāvati stūpa, the learned historian says in his *Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, ‘The authority of the Kushan kings, however, did not extend as far south as Amarāvati, which was then within the dominions of the powerful Āndhra dynasty of Deccan.’ We may take these stupas as typical expressions of early Andhra culture.

In the first specimen (Pl. I Fig. 4) chosen here for analysis, we notice a central uprising dome, surrounded by a writhing mass of men and animals. The former is suggestive of the sentiment of *vīrya* with its dominant emotion of *vīra* (*self-assertion*), while the latter points to the primitive passive sympathy of the *elan vital* with itself. The life-energy having first scattered itself in innumerable centres of animal organism, is drawing these towards itself through the psychic force of sympathy. Already at the commencement of Andhra cultural evolution, we notice the conflict between *vīrya* and *karuṇa*. A similar conflict is to be found in the stupas (also dating back to the second century b.c.) at Jaggayyapet, 30 miles N.W. of Amarāvati. ‘The adoration of the throne,’ and ‘The Chakravartin,’ the two

representative samples found in the Madras Museum, reveal the struggle for supremacy over the racial mind between self-assertion and sympathy. The throne and the chakravarti are typical of *virya*, while the suppliant figures in the posture of adoration, and the royal women are embodiments of sympathy. The conflict reveals a tendency to sink down to the unconscious level of the group-mind. In interpreting aesthetic works the sub-conscious and the unconscious levels of the mind will have to be taken into consideration, and often it will be necessary to refer to the elaborate symbolism of psycho-analysis behind which the psyche entrenches itself. The apparent and the trivial details acquire tremendous significance when we delve into the unconscious levels. But luckily the specimens that we have chosen are comparatively easy to interpret.

The intriguing term 'Ajanta' is usually associated with Buddhistic culture in the minds of historians. But we should remind ourselves that it is Āndhra Buddhism that created the marvellous frescoes at Ajanta. The earliest Ajanta art is the expression of Andhra mental organisation. Fuller in his *Studies of Indian Life and Sentiment* says, 'At the commencement of the Christian Era the Āndhra dynasty had for nearly two centuries held sway over the northern part of the peninsula. It adopted Buddhism, and left its memory enshrined in a stupa of extraordinary magnificence and elaboration.' Dr. Ananda Coomaraswamy, in his introduction to *Indian Collection*, remarks that Barhut railings, Amarāvati stupas, sanchi rails, and toranas, and the *earliest Ajanta paintings* were all executed under Āndhra patronage in the period between 220 B.C. and 236 A.D.

The earliest Ajanta frescoes, which are characteristic expressions of Āndhra culture, are found in caves ix and x. Figures 6 and 7 in plate II are fairly typical of the paintings in these caves. In Fig. 6, we have an amazon-like figure, with bold and firm lines, seated in an attitude of great determination indicating assertion; yet her hands are folded in Añjali, a pose typifying submission and craving for sympathy.

In cave X panel after panel is filled with rows of elephants (Pl. II. Fig. 7) drawn bold and austere. What is it that tempted the artist to paint these massive creatures in wild profusion? Was it the presence of these animals in the Ajanta region? The insight of the psycho-analyst helps us to solve the problem. The elephant by its nature, especially as depicted in these panels, is the very embodiment of *virya* (domineering self-assertion). When roused, he is the typical representative of uncontrolled outburst of passionate energy. Yet, how mild, how kind and sympathetic he is in his gentler moods! Which of




Fig. 6.
Seated Women (cave ix)




Fig. 7.
The Ajanta Elephant (cave x)

us who has read Kipling's stories can forget the pathetic scene where the raging beast is tamed into passive submission by the mahout's baby? Truly may it be said that the Ajanta elephant is a strange mixture of *vīrya* and *karuṇa*.

Not only in sculpture but in architecture too the same conflict is evident. We shall now take a very wide stride, and land in the xvi century when the prosperity of Vijayanagar reached its peak. Commenting on the architecture of this period Havell remarks, 'In the ruins of Hindu—Vijayanagar will be found not only the prototypes of Muhammad Bijapur, but illustrations of the process by which the Arab architecture of the vi, vii and following centuries gradually became the style of the pointed arch.' Havell is here describing the outward symbol of what was taking place within the Āndhra mind. In the foliated arch (Pl. I. Fig. 5) we note how the unrelieved Muslim semi-circular dome is relieved by the elongation. The pattern is the same as that of the Amaravati stupa, but with this difference that here the Muslim bondage is broken through. The uncompromising self-assertion of Muhammadan culture is being toned down here by the innate sympathy of the Āndhra mind.

So far as the plastic arts are concerned we hold that they are the expressions of the struggle between *vīrya* and *karuṇa* in the Āndhra group-mind.

A Western aesthetic critic who has travelled widely in our country, studying our sculpture and architecture, observes, while commenting on the striking features of Āndhra culture, 'This tone.....changes at Amaravati.....It is only now that the understanding for the powerful emotions of the human heart manifests itself. The elementary weight of the latter is now being recognised, and the artist is able to illustrate and to depict *passionate out-bursts, ecstatic devotion, the mildness of man and motherly solicitude.....*' What is vaguely and inarticulately conveyed by the observation of this accomplished critic, is clearly and succinctly expressed in our hormic formula for the interpretation of Andhra aesthetic works:

Āndhra Culture=*vīrya* x *karuṇa*.

THE ANDHRA SCRIPT

From the great and massive monuments of the Andhradesa, we shall now pass on to, what appears to be microscopically small and insignificant, the Andhra Script. To the psychologist of the twentieth century nothing is insignificant. Psychoanalysis has taught us the profound significance of what common sense (or popular ignorance) con-

siders to be insignificant. Even such apparently trivial acts of behaviour as biting the nails, scratching the head frequently, making explosive noises through the nose, are symptomatic of deep seated conflicts and repressions in the human mind. The script of a nation, when viewed phylogenetically, reveals the hidden tendencies of the group-mind. The evolution of the three letters, A—K—R, of the Andhra alphabet indicates the conflict that has taken place in the Andhra mind. (Vide Fig. 8). Each one of these letters starting with a high domineering tendency in the Vengi stage, and passing through several stages wherein their assertiveness was gradually toned down, finally ends in the Telugu xv century stage in which the rounded form clearly denotes the unmistakable influence of sympathy. Here too, in this apparently trivial expression of Andhra culture, we notice the conflict between *vīrya* and *karuṇa*.

FIG. 8.

STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF SOME LETTERS OF THE ANDHRA ALPHABET.

(From the Andhra Encyclopaedia.)

		ॐ	ॐ	ॐ	ॐ
VENGI	V CENT.	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
VENGI	VI „	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
BADAMI CALUKYA	VI „	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
VENGI CALUKYA	VII „			ॐ	ॐ
DO	X „	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
RAJA RAJA	XI „	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
TELUGU	XIII „	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
DO.	XIV „	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
DO.	XV „	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ

TELUGU LITERATURE

For purposes of our analysis, we should have welcomed indigenous Andhra literature of the pre-Nannayya period. But unfortunately Telugu literature is silent about the most glorious period of Andhra history. It is, as Mr. Chenchaiya remarks, 'a remarkable instance of national loss of memory.' We have to content ourselves, therefore, with the mere mention of the two outstanding men of letters in the age of translation. Srinatha, the typical man of the world, *the vira par excellence*, was the prosperous author who knew how to get on in this world. Potanna, on the other hand was pre-occupied with the world beyond. He typifies the *karuṇa* rasa. Between them they illustrate the relationship between the two tendencies that we have been emphasising.

ANDHRA TRADITIONS AND CUSTOMS

The traditions and customs of Andradesa bristle with illustrations of the conflict between *vīrya* and *karuṇa*. We have selected two examples, at random, to emphasise our contention.

The legend about the origin of the Baliya sect runs thus: Goddess Parvathi desires to beautify herself, but finds that she has no ornaments. She prays to Siva for the fulfilment of her desire. Siva consults Brahma, who suggests a severe course of penance for the former as the only means for securing what his consort desires. The penance is performed, and as a result of Siva's austerities there springs into existence a Mahapurusha (the primeval Baliya) bearing all the articles necessary for a sumangili's toilet. The great Purusha presents these along with innumerable ornaments to Parvathi.

Vīrya is represented by the Mahapurusha himself. *Karuṇa* is revealed in his attitude to Parvathi. It is his sympathy with the mother of the worlds that made him bring her the welcome gifts.

Thurston describes nearly thirty different varieties of Gauri Vratam, a ceremony dear to the heart of the Āndhra ladies. The elaborate technique of the Vratam invariably involves gifts to sumangilis given with the hope of an adequate return from the presiding deity, Sri Gauri. Self-assertion, sympathy and even touches of fear are all suggested by the ceremony of bestowing the gift on the married women.

MUSIC

One has to be very guarded in speaking about Āndhra music. Though Mr. V. Subba Rao remarks in the Four Arts Annual for 1935 that the Āndhras are most emotional and sensitive to new impressions,

and allow few innovations....' yet the increasing tendency to make an alarmingly free use of the Hindustani style, reveals the successful efforts of self-assertion to subdue *karuṇa* and assimilate it so completely as to destroy all traces of its influence. We remarked at the outset that one of the components of the psychic complex may occasionally annihilate the other. Here, in Andhra music we witness the beginnings of such annihilation of *karuṇa* by self-assertion. If the Arab influence filtering through the Hindustani style of music is not controlled, as it was controlled in Vijayangar architecture, we shall soon witness the annihilation of classical Andhra music.

PAINTING

The crowning phase of Āndhra culture is to be found in, what we consider to be, the high water-mark of Andhra painting, the paintings of Damarla Rama Rao. We are impressed with the profundity of *karuṇa* rasa portrayed, for example, in the masterly depiction of the scene in which the exiled Yakṣa in Meghadhūta appeals to the passing clouds to carry his message of poignant grief to his beloved in the far distant land. The aesthetic genius of Mr. Rao has caught and fixed on the canvas for us the depth of the feeling of the primitive passive sympathy of the hero. In the case of painting sympathy has over-mastered self-assertion. This subduing and assimilation of *vīrya* is a step in the right direction in which Āndhra culture ought to develop if it is to be true to the highest ideal of our national genius.

III

If the main contention of this essay, that Andhra Culture is the result of a conflict between *vīrya* and *karuṇa* be granted, then two questions of supreme importance present themselves to us and demand satisfactory answers. How long should this conflict be permitted to last? And, in what manner may the conflict be resolved? We are prepared to grant that conflict is the very essence of life on this earth, and that the resolution of one conflict will lead to the generation of another. But every single conflict resolved represents a step taken in the direction of progress. So the conflict in Āndhra culture should be resolved as soon as possible.

'Man has the mystical intuition of universal transformism. Through transmigrations, by passing from one appearance to another, and by raising within himself, through suffering and combat, the moving level of life, he will doubtless be pure enough one day to annihilate himself in Brahma.'

This significant statement of Elie Faurie in the History of Mediaeval Art, suggests the direction in which the conflict should be resolved. Vira (and the sentiment of virya generated by it) should first be annihilated, and whatever be the psychical force that may oppose the elements left over, successive annihilations should take place until pure Brahma Ānandam results.

The sole aim of the purest type of culture should be to enable man to attain Brahmānandam.

The Development and Fate of the Operculum and Gill-Chambers in *Bufo Melanostictus* Schneider

BY

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INTRODUCTION

This aspect was studied in *Rana* by Marshall (1882), Helft (1926) and Brock (1929). But none of them stated at what stage exactly the ventral communication between the right and the left gill chambers closes and whether the primary branchial aperture contributes to the formation of the secondary branchial aperture of the left side or not. In *Rhacophorus* (Reddy 1938) these two points were studied. The present paper is an investigation into the formation and subsequent fate of the operculum and gill-chambers in *Bufo melanostictus* Schneider.

MATERIAL AND METHOD

I am very much indebted to Mr. K. V. Reddy, B.A., B.Sc., (Edin.), Forest Officer, Jeypore, who kindly supplied me with all the stages of *Bufo melanostictus* employed in this work.

Bouin's fluid was used for fixing the material. After washing in 70% alcohol and dehydration, the material was cleared in cedar-wood oil. The advanced stages were decalcified by leaving the material in 2.5% nitric acid in 70% alcohol for about 15 days. It was subsequently washed in 70% alcohol till there was no trace of acidity. The material was embedded in the usual way. Transverse longitudinal and sagittal sections of 10 μ to 12 μ were cut. Delafield's haematoxylin with eosin as counter stain was employed.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND FATE OF OPERCULUM AND GILL-CHAMBERS

A. Formation of Operculum and primary branchial aperture:—

The operculum arises as a fold of skin from the sides and the ventral surface as in the case of *Rana* and *Rhacophorus*. The growth of the operculum behind is almost uniform. At a slightly later stage the ventral region and the ventro-lateral region of the left side do not




Fig. 1. Showing the lagging behind of the ventral flap of the opercular fold and the ventro-lateral region of the left opercular fold in *Bufo melanostictus*.




Fig. 2. Showing the formation of the primary branchial aperture in *Bufo melanostictus*.

keep pace with the rapidly growing opercular fold of the right side (Fig. 1). The opercular fold on the right side fuses with the body-wall while the ventral fold (V.O.F.) grows backwards as a free flap for some distance and then fuses with the body-wall posteriorly (Fig. 2). On the left side the opercular fold (L.O.F.) does not grow uniformly. As a result towards the ventro-lateral region an aperture (P.B.A. Fig. 2) is left within the fold. The fold itself subsequently fuses with the body-




Fig. 3. Showing the ventral communication between the right and the left gill-chambers in *Bufo melanostictus*.

wall behind at about the same time as the ventral flap of the opercular fold. The ventro-lateral aperture (P.B.A.) is the primary branchial aperture or the spiracle which keeps the gill-chambers in communication with the exterior.

Though the primary branchial aperture is formed on very much the same lines as in *Rhacophorus* its position is different in the two genera. In *Rhacophorus* it is more towards the side while in *Bufo* it is nearer to the ventro-median line. This difference in position of the primary branchial aperture in the two genera is entirely responsible for the difference in the function and fate of the primary branchial aperture as exhibited by these two genera.

B. Formation of the secondary branchial apertures:—

As in the case of *Rana* and *Rhacophorus* the anterior limb bud of the right side is liberated by the histolysis of the opercular fold of the right side (R.O.F. Figs. 5 & 6) and at the base of the leg the secondary branchial aperture of its side is formed (Fig. 6). In the case of the




Fig. 4. Showing the growth of the median ridge on the ventral flap of the opercular fold closing the ventral communication in *Bufo melanostictus*.

liberation of the left limb the primary branchial aperture is of minor importance. This is due to the ventro-lateral position of the primary branchial aperture. In *Rhacophorus* where the primary branchial aperture is towards the side the liberation is mostly brought about by the primary branchial aperture and to a slight degree by the histolysis of the opercular fold. In *Bufo* the lower half of the primary branchial aperture exhibits partial closing up even before the emergence of the left anterior limb. The limb is liberated entirely by the histolysis of the opercular fold. The rupture does not close up entirely; but the secondary branchial aperture is left at the base of the limb. The primary branchial aperture does not contribute towards the formation of the secondary branchial aperture. Such a contribution is rendered impossible by the primary branchial aperture being located nearer to the ventro-median line unlike that of *Rhacophorus*.

The two secondary branchial apertures are of the same size.




Fig. 5. Showing the anterior limb buds in the gill-chambers just before their liberation in *Bufo melanostictus*.




Fig. 6. Showing anterior limb buds and the primary branchial aperture in *Bufo melanostictus*. The positions at which the secondary branchial apertures appear are indicated by 'X' marks.

C. The fate of the gill-chambers:—

After the liberation of the anterior limbs and the formation of the secondary branchial apertures the ventral flap of the opercular fold (V.O.F.) shows a longitudinal median ridge (Fig. 4). This grows upwards and fuses with the body wall. Thus the ventral communication between the left and right gill-chambers is closed (Fig. 5). Each gill-chamber communicates with the exterior independently by its secondary branchial aperture as in *Rana* and *Rhacophorus*. The closing up of the secondary branchial apertures is brought about on exactly the same lines as described for *Rhacophorus*.

SUMMARY

1. The general development and fate of the operculum and gill-chambers is similar to those of *Rana* and *Rhacophorus*.
2. The primary branchial aperture or spiracle is formed nearer to the ventro-median line.
3. The primary branchial aperture begins to close up even before the emergence of the anterior limbs.
4. The primary branchial aperture is in no way concerned in the liberation of the anterior limb of its side and it does not contribute towards the formation of the secondary branchial aperture of its side.
5. The difference between *Bufo* and *Rhacophorus* in the function and fate of the primary branchial aperture is entirely due to the different positions of the primary branchial aperture in the two genera.
6. The secondary branchial apertures are formed by the histolysis of the opercular fold of the right and the left sides.
7. The right and the left secondary branchial apertures are of the same size.
8. The secondary branchial apertures persist till the disappearance of the tail.
9. The two secondary branchial apertures close up at about the same time.
10. After the liberation of the anterior limbs and the appearance of the secondary branchial apertures a median ridge grows upwards on the ventral flap of the opercular fold and fuses with the body wall, thus closing the ventral communication between the right and the left gill-chambers.

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EXPLANATION OF FIGURES

G.—Gills; L.A.L.—Left anterior limb; L.G.G.—Left gill-chamber; L.O.F.—Left portion of the opercular fold; L.S.B.A.—Left secondary branchial aperture; O.F.—Opercular fold; P.B.A.—Primary branchial aperture; R.A.L.—Right anterior limb; R.G.C.—Right gill-chamber; R.O.F.—Right portion of the opercular fold; R.S.B.A.—Right secondary branchial aperture; V.C.C.—Ventral communicating channel; V.O.F.—Ventral portion of the opercular fold.

The Passive Voice in Tamil

Dr. Caldwell's Statements Considered

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Dr. Caldwell said "none of the Dravidian dialects possesses any passive particle or suffix."¹ But it was shown in a previous issue of the Journal² that "paḍu" has assumed the rank of a morpheme in Tamil. Expressions such as "satyamba palkambaḍun",³ "vāni reṇṇi jayīṇchina vāḍu gāni endu barama dharumikuḍenē ennabaḍadu"⁴ found in the Telugu Bhāratam and "eydappaḍuvār" and "eriveppaḍuvōr" found in the Kannada inscriptions⁵ of the 7th century A.D., though not sufficient in themselves to warrant the conclusion that these languages too have a passive particle in paḍu, suggest that if the literature and inscriptions of the other Dravidian languages are explored it might sometime be possible for someone to show that paḍu is a regular passive particle of the Dravidian languages. The fact that paḍu had some semantic value at one time does not stand, as we know, in the way of our accepting it now as a particle in Tamil at least. When it is said at one breath that there is a passive voice in Sanscrit formed by means of annexing the particle "Ya" which itself might have once had a semantic value of its own and that there is found a passive voice in several languages of the Uralo-Altaic family because of the employment of the particle "il" in Turkish, "et" in Finnish and "at" in Hungarian,⁶ how could it be said at another that there is "no passive voice, properly so-called" in Tamil,⁷ especially after having witnessed the process through which paḍu has become a morpheme?

Dr. Caldwell, probably not stopping to inquire whether paḍu was a particle or not, expressed the view that paḍu was an auxiliary verb (= to suffer or to experience) added to the infinitive form of the Verb

or to the ultimate base of a Verb.⁸ In conformity with this view he regarded expressions such as "aḍikkappaḍu" rather as phrases⁹ than as single words. But it is possible to show that every one of these expressions is only a single word. Expressions such as "aḍikkappaṭṭān" probably arose at one time as a result of compounding two words, one of which was "paṭṭān." This should have happened however at a time when paḍu had not become the characteristic mode of expressing the passive sense and when it retained its sense of "to stay" or "to obtain." For instance, that was the time when one could understand by means of the expression "aḍikkappaṭṭān" "he got a blow." "Aḍikka," the modern infinitive form of the verb, is but a representative of perhaps an older form "aḍikkal"¹⁰ or "aḍittal" (= a beating). And "aḍikkal", to be sure, was a verbal noun. This verbal noun could adequately stand for "aḍi" (= a blow), another noun formed without any change from the root "aḍi" meaning "to beat." Thus, what was "aḍipaṭṭān" (= got a blow) at one stage could easily be replaced by "aḍikkappaṭṭān" at a subsequent period. And as long as forms of the type "aḍikkappaṭṭān" remained, one was justified in regarding them as compounds of two words or as phrases.

But when "aḍikkal-paḍu" (= to get a blow) took the shape of "aḍikkappaḍu" (= to be beaten), that is to say, when these two elements after floating at first in close proximity were welded into one, it must have ceased to be reckoned as containing two words. Aḍikka, Aḍikkappaḍu, Aḍikkappaṭṭa, Aḍikkappaḍukinra, Aḍikkappaḍum are all different words even as do, did, does and done are in English.¹¹ The form "aḍikka" by having dropped the final "l" in "aḍikkal" has tended to partake more of the character of the verb. And on being joined to the passive implement paḍu it has become a different word, "aḍikkappaḍu", from which paḍu itself could not be separated in order to be treated as an isolated form. Here paḍu, though conveying a passive sense, is not a free form in itself but occurs only in construction as part of a larger form. There was however a transitional stage when a form like "aḍikkappaṭṭān" itself could be treated as a phrase. That was when it occurred with an interruption in the middle as "aḍikkavumpattān."

8. Comp. Gram., p. 466.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 467.

10. Cf. Tirunāvukkarasar Tēvaram (S. S. Samāja edn., 1930), p. 21, St. 6: "ceyalpaḍuvatu ariyēn nān"; also Kural, St. 40 and 437; cf. also karayalpaḍa (= to be called) in Kanarese and hand-al(le) (= to go) in Gond.

11. Cf. Bloomfield's "Language", p. 178: "In our school tradition we sometimes speak of forms like do, does, did, done as different forms of the same word. Of course, this is inaccurate . . . they are different words."

1. Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages, p. 463.
2. Vol. VII, No. 2.
3. Telugu Bhāratam—Āraṇya. IV Canto. 191.
4. *Ibid.*, V Canto, 42.
5. Epigraphia Carnatica VI, edited by Lewis Rice, p. 323.
6. Caldwell's Comp. Gram., p. 463.
7. *Ibid.*

Thus, forms such as “*ēttavumpaḍumē*”¹² and “*taḍiyavum-paṭṭāṇaṇ*,”¹³ where “um” adds nothing to the sense, lay on the border line between words and phrases. But when no interruption could be thought of in such expressions as these, when for instance one could not say “*aḍikkanaṇrākappaṭṭāṇ*” as one could say “*naṇrāka aḍikkappaṭṭāṇ*,” the stage had been reached when “*aḍikkappaṭṭāṇ*” could no longer be regarded as a phrase. “The principle, namely that a word cannot be interrupted by other forms (whereas a phrase could be), holds good almost universally” says Mr. Bloomfield.¹⁴ If, as he says, “jack-in-the pulpit”—a plant name—because it cannot be interrupted in the middle as “jack-in-the *little* pulpit,” should be regarded as a word and not a phrase, there can be little doubt that “*aḍikkappaḍu*” (= to be beaten) is a word.¹⁵ And Sivañāna Swamigaḷ, an able exponent of Tolkāppiyam, has regarded such forms as this only as stems equivalent to the verbal themes.¹⁶ Parimēlalakar, the masterly commentator of Tīrukkuraḷ, has similarly treated such expressions as “*uyttuviḍum*,” “*kāṭṭiviḍum*” etc., as single words rather than sets of two words.¹⁷ It must be noted here that paḍu occurring in passive connections is different from paḍu occurring independently, for the Tamil language has adopted this expression from its hereditary stock to be turned into a grammatical instrument for the formation of the passive stem. Even as “*iḍu*” in “*uḷḷiḍappaṭṭa arasaṇai*”¹⁸ and “*cey*” in “*uraiseyappaṭṭavarṇuḷ onṇum eydātattillai*”¹⁹ are different from “*iḍu*” and “*cey*” occurring independently, paḍu here is different from paḍu which may occur independently in the sense of “to be able” or “to suffer.” Paḍu here is not a free form in itself and is therefore not a word. It is not a word forming part of a phrase but a linguistic form occurring as part of a bound form. So the welding of the passive particle to a verb in the infinitive yields only a word and not a phrase.

Dr. Caldwell’s view that *aḍikkappaṭṭāṇ* was a phrase was forestalled in his statement “the ultimate base of a verb is sometimes used instead of the infinitive or verbal noun in construction with this auxiliary (paḍu), in which case the base is regarded as a noun—e.g. instead of

12. *Puraṇānūru*, St. 1.

13. *Manimēkhalai*, Chap. XXII, l. 79.

14. “*Language*” (1935 edn.), p. 180.

15. Cf. also “*Blackbird*” in Archbishop Trench’s *Study of Words*, p. 130 and Bloomfield, p. 180.

16. *Mutal Sūtra Virutti*, p. 40: *enappaḍu—mudal nilait taṇmaip paṭṭu*, etc.

17. *Vide Kural*, 121, 168, 28 and 167.

18. *Kalittogai*, St. 139.

19. *Cikāḷattippurāṇam*, St. 121 (See also “*iḍu*” in *Chintāmaṇi*, St. 181 and *Peruṅkatai*, p. 95, l. 21.).

‘*aḍikkappaṭṭāṇ*’ we may say ‘*aḍipaṭṭāṇ*’; and where this form can be used, it is considered more idiomatic than the use of the infinitive.”²⁰ The point he appears thereby to emphasise is that the phrasical nature was consciously and ardently kept up. But the history of the language as evidenced by literary documents does not show that forms like “*aḍipaṭṭa*,” where they could be used, were preferred to forms like “*aḍikkappaṭṭa*.” Several instances can be cited which run counter to Dr. Caldwell’s view. In “*Kaḷavaḷinārpatu*”²¹ by Poigaiyār and “*Peruṅkatai*”²² by Koṅguvēḷ for instance, we find the expressions “*tuṇikkappaṭṭu*” and “*tuṇiyappaṭṭu*” occurring where “*tuṇipaṭṭu*” might have as well been used. “*Tuṇi*” (= a chopping), a noun, has not been preferred here to “*tuṇikka*” or “*tuṇiya*” (= to chop) the infinitive. And where “*Vaḷai-paṭṭu*” might have been used, “*Vaḷaikkappaṭṭu*” has been used by Tōlāmōḷittēvar;²³ and where “*piṇipaṭṭāṇ*” might have been used, “*piṇikkappaṭṭāṇ*” has been employed by Tīruttakkatēvar.²⁴ Instances wherein “*koḷappaṭṭa*” (infinitive + paḍu + a) has been preferred to “*kōtpaṭṭa*” (noun + paḍu + participial ‘a’) are found in abundance. One has only to refer to *Kalittogai* (e.g. St. 7), *Nāḷaḍiyār* (e.g. St. 8), *Tīrukkuraḷ* (e.g. St. 699) and *Civakachintāmaṇi* (e.g. *Maṇmakal ilambagam* St. 207) for a verification of this statement. Truly, the authors of these works, by their use of the infinitive, were not less idiomatic than those that would have employed the nominal form instead!

So Caldwell’s conclusion²⁵ that “it is only when combined with nouns that its (= paḍu’s) use is thoroughly allowable” does not appear to carry weight. On the contrary, the infinitive it is that seems to have gained preference in the course of the development of the passive formation in Tamil. The reason is to be sought for in its characteristics which befit it much better than a noun for use in a voice of the verb. By representing the verbal idea shorn of all accessory and adventitious elements, by indicating neither person nor number and by being able to express an exclamation, a wish or an order,²⁶ it is indeed well-suited for employment where a verbal aspect is concerned. By being half substantive and half verb, it could very well play the role of a locum—tenens of the nominal form. If in forms such as “*aḍipaṭṭāṇ*” (blow got he) and “*aḍipaḍukirāṇ*” (blow

20. *Comp. Grammar*, p. 467.

21. St. 14.

22. p. 204, l. 9.

23. *Chūḷamaṇi—araciyaḷ carukkam*, St. 329.

24. *Chintāmaṇi—Kuṇamālaiyār*, St. 283.

25. p. 467. (This is his last word on the subject of the Dravidian passive voice.).

26. Cf. Breal’s *Semantics*, pp. 79-80.

gets he) the root is not expressive of the verbal element, it is because it is not a verb but only a noun which could serve as the object of the old independent verb "paṭṭān." But when the Tamils gradually developed the use of the old word paḍu to such an extent as to make it the special implement of the passive voice of the verb, little by little they appear to have dropped the nominal form in favour of the infinitive. And as the infinitive is a part of the hierarchy of verbal forms,²⁷ nay, as it is the most general form of the verb,²⁸ as it is the name of the action, it not only effectively replaced the older nominal form but appropriated to itself the place where it came in as a substitute. Thus, in harmony with having proved in the earlier part that paḍu is a passive particle in Tamil, it is now shown that it is not an auxiliary verb occurring in combination with a noun, nor a free word forming part of a phrase as taken by Dr. Caldwell.

He next proceeded to say²⁹ "paḍu is often added not only to active but also to neuter or intransitive verbs, and the addition of the passive auxiliary does not alter the signification—e.g. there is no difference in Tamil between the intransitive "teriyum" (= it appears or it will appear) and "teriyappaḍum." He is probably emphasising here his view that paḍu was not the characteristic implement to form the passive. To start with, "teriyappaḍum" is not a common occurrence. If that occurrence however is found anywhere, it is possible that there "teri" has already become a transitive verb in analogy to "ari" (= to know).³⁰ If it has become a transitive verb and if to it has been added paḍu there is hardly any doubt as to the passive purport of paḍu. The following remark of Mr. Vendryes lends authority to this view: "In the course of the development of any language these constructions are seen to change, intransitive verbs becoming transitive and *vice versa*."³¹

Next, the statement of Dr. Caldwell "in ordinary use paḍu conveys the meaning of continuous action or being, rather than that of passivity—e.g. irukkappaṭṭa is vulgarly used for "irukkira," "that is"; and I have heard a Tamilian say, nāṇ naṇṇāy cāppiḍappaṭṭavan, meaning thereby, not 'I have been well eaten' but 'I have been accustomed to eat well' "³² may be considered. Without discussing the propriety of generalising

27. Vendryes' "Language", p. 120.

28. Breal, p. 80.

29. Comp. Gram., p. 467.

30. Jaffna T. Ramanatha Pillai in Yavana Mañcari, p. 52: Teriyappaḍum poruḷum onrē.

31. Language—A Linguistic Introduction to History, p. 106.

32. p. 467.

from the vulgar speech of Caldwell's time and without seeking to know whether what a Tamilian was heard to say to Caldwell was the norm in the Tamil language, let us see whether the word paḍu occurring in these expressions is the same as the passive particle paḍu. The word paḍu which, as was shown before, originally started with the meaning of "to appear" and passed on to assume the meaning of "to stay", probably had analogous extensions such as "to be inured", "to be able" etc. And thus "irukkappaṭṭavan" (= one inured to stay) contains a paḍu which means "to be inured" and "cāppiḍappaṭṭavan" (= one able to eat) a paḍu which means "to be able." Expressions such as "uḷḷiḍappaḍāta tiruvuvuvu"³³ (= the great figure (of god) which is not able to conceive) and "uṇṇappaḍā nañcam"³⁴ (= the poison that cannot be eaten) containing a paḍu which means "to be able" are enough to show that in "cāppiḍappaṭṭavan" also there is a paḍu which may mean "to be able." Then this word paḍu is entirely different from the paḍu which at the stage of possessing the meaning "to get" was seized upon and turned into a passive particle.³⁵ It is not therefore fair to argue that paḍu ordinarily expresses the meaning of continuous action or being rather than that of passivity. The fact that paḍu expresses continuity in certain places may be conceded; but the view that it is the same word as paḍu, the passive particle, cannot be countenanced. Even as "Yām aruntappaṭṭa"³⁶ uṇavu iṇku amutu ceyap paruvam idu" contains a paḍu, (= to be inured to or to be fit) which is different from paḍu, the passive particle, in "eṇṇāl uṇavu aruntappaṭṭadu," the paḍu occurring in "cāppiḍappaṭṭavan" is entirely different from that which may be found in such expressions as "adu avanāl cāppiḍappaṭṭadu." Similarly, the paḍu occurring in "nam napi.....kāṇiḍai viḷaṅkappaṭṭa"³⁷ kāraṇam evaikol" in the sense of "to appear" is completely different from the one found in "napiyāl kāṇ Viḷakkappaṭṭadu." Viḷaṅkappaṭṭa" in the foregoing passage only stands for "viḷaṅkiya" the active form but it is more expressive. Likewise, "irukkappaṭṭavan" and "cāppiḍappaṭṭavan" are only as good as "irukkiraṇ" and "cāppiḍukiraṇ" with the qualification that they have more expressive value. On close scrutiny we find moreover that it is not after all paḍu that conveys the meaning of continuous action in these places but that it is something else that does so. It is but reasonable to regard "v" the future tense-infix occur-

33. Tiruvāchakam—Tirukkōtumbi, St. 16.

34. Nakkīrar : kailai pāti kāḷatti pāti antādi, St. 75.

35. Vide A. U. Journal, Vol. VII, No. 2, p. 131.

36. Villi Bhāratam—Duruvāsamuni carukkam, St. 3.

37. Cīrāpurāṇam—Hijarathukkāṇḍam—Cūṛākkattut toḍarnta paḍalam, St. 10.

ring in these expressions as denoting the aorist. But if we still assume that *paḍu* in *cāpḍapattavaṇ* and *irukkappattavaṇ* conveys the sense of continuous action or being, that however does not preclude the existence of a passive *paḍu*. And the passive *paḍu* is as entirely distinct from this *paḍu* as the “ing” in “the house is building” is from the “ing” in “the man is building.”³⁸ It is an expression as very distinct as “has” occurring in two places³⁹ in “He *has* lost all he *had*.” Viewed in this way, *paḍu*, the passive particle, is found to be an expression of a distinctive species, having nothing to do with the continuity attributed to it. If we attempt to show then that *paḍu* cannot by any means be taken to indicate continuous action in such an expression as “*kollappattavaṇai erittārgaḷ*” (=They burnt him that was killed), we would be simply flogging a dead horse.

Dr. Caldwell said “It (=this compound of *paḍu* with an infinitive or noun of quality) is rarely found in the classics; and idiomatic speakers prefer the other modes of forming the passive.”⁴⁰ There is no gainsaying that it is rare in the classics. But the reason for this rarity probably lies in the rarity of ancient Tamil prose works. Not even one prose composition of the Sangam period⁴¹ has come down to us, whereas several poetical works are available. If we do not find in abundance passive forms with *paḍu* occurring in the poetical literature of the Sangam days, it is probably because the poets cared more for the dramatic way in which they could express the subject as active by means of employing the neuter or intransitive form of the verb.⁴² This will be borne out by a comparison of the occurrence of this form in Tamil prose on the one hand and poetry on the other of any given period. In *Bhārata Veṇbā* (of about the 8th or 9th century A.D.)⁴³ for instance, there is not even one passive form with *paḍu* in the verse part, whereas in the prose part of the same work by the same author there are, within the first hundred pages, no less than five times when “compounds of *paḍu* with an infinitive” for expressing the passive have occurred.⁴⁴ Taking a book of the present day whose verse-composer and commentator are one and the same person, we find further support for the reason now suggested.

38. Lounsbury : History of English Language, pp. 170-173.

39. Cf. Breal, p. 210.

40. Comp. Gram., p. 467.

41. Not even *Takaḍūr Yāttirai* prose is available.

42. Vide A.U.J., Vol. VII, pp. 126-127.

43. Mr. M. S. Purnalingam Pillai's History of Tamil Literature (1929), p. 54 and late K. Srinivasa Pillai's Tamil Varalāru, II part (1930), p. 210.

44. *Bhārata Veṇbā* (edited by Mr. A. Gopala Aiyar), pp. 8, 17, 70 and 71.

*Pārikātai*⁴⁵ verse no. 236 has only one *paḍu* as a passive form, whereas the commentary of this verse alone has three. And we find that, whereas in this book of about 660 verses there are no more than 10 places where *paḍu* as a passive form occurs, there are no less than 10 within the first five pages of “*Sētunāḍ and Tamil*,” a prose book⁴⁶ written by the same author. To bring home the truth of the statement that the apparent rarity in the classics of “*paḍu* compounds with infinitives” is due to the fact that prose compositions of the ancient days are not available to us, one more book will now be instanced. “*Iraiyānār Kaḷaviyal*,” a grammar which runs in a metre akin to that of poetry, bears only one passive *paḍu* in the first rule (*sūtra*) as against nearly 60 *paḍus* in the commentary of this single rule. And this entire commentary, which is in prose, is as old as the 8th century A.D., even although parts of it could be assigned to earlier periods.⁴⁷ When, as is seen from the first 34 pages of this book, *paḍu* with a passive import has occurred at the average rate of two per page, it is impossible to maintain that the occurrence of the passive *paḍu* is rare in that period. If only prose writings of earlier periods were available to us, we would not have had any difficulty in showing that passive *paḍus* were by their nature employed then also more largely in prose than in poetry. In the absence of the earliest prose writings which, if available, might show a large use of the passive *paḍu* and in the face of such a super-abundant use in the prose of medieval and modern periods as contrasted with the use which is not so frequent in the poetry of the same periods, it is not unreasonable to put forth the view that if passive *paḍus* are found only occasionally in the classics it is because what we have of the classics is poetry alone and not prose. Then it would not be fair to agree with Dr. Caldwell that the writers of the classical period preferred to avoid “compounds of *paḍu* with the infinitives.” If the classical writers of poetry, however, made only a sparing use of this method, they did so probably because of their tendency to be more dramatic and imaginative.

But that they did not make a large use of it because it was unidiomatic to them is suggested by Dr. Caldwell. This cannot be sustained. If an expression is unidiomatic, it is reasonable to regard it as having come out, escaping the attention of the writer.⁴⁸ But if an expression

45. Annamalai University Publication, 1937.

46. Madura Tamil Sangam, 1928.

47. Vide Srinivasa Pillai's Tamil Varalāru II, p. 25 and Mr. V. C. Chengalvarāya Pillai's History of Tamil Prose Literature, pp. 24-26.

48. Cf. Breal (p. 72): “With the ordinary man an infringement of what he supposes to be the rule provokes either laughter or contempt.”

occurs several times in the course of a brief while in one's writing, no one would be justified in saying that that expression has escaped one's attention. On the other hand, that expression would be treated as having deliberately come out as the result of a habit.⁴⁹ And what has become the habit of a nation or a community can hardly be considered unidiomatic. For instance, in seven consecutive lines of a classical verse⁵⁰ *paḍu* occurs seven times consecutively in conjunction with the infinitive form of the verb "en" meaning "to say."⁵¹ The passage runs:—

"Paṇṇu eṇappaḍuvatu pāḍarindu oḷugudal
Aṇbu eṇappaḍuvatu taṇ kiḷai ceṛāmai
Ceṇivu eṇappaḍuvatu kūriyatu maṛāmai
Aṇivu eṇappaḍuvatu pēdaiyār col nōṇṇal
Nirai eṇappaḍuvatu maṛai pirar ariyāmai
Muṛai eṇappaḍuvatu kaṇṇōḍātu uyir vauval
Porai eṇappaḍuvatu pōṛṛāip poruttal."

To regard this form then as unidiomatic is utterly to disregard evidence from literature. When we notice the adoption of the active form in two places alone⁵² as "Āṇṇtū eṇpaṇu onru alantavarkku utavutal, Pōṇṇutal eṇpaṇu puṇarntāraip piriyaṇmai" as against the use of 7 passive *paḍus* in the same setting and in the same context, we cannot but question the theory that compounds of *paḍu* with infinitives are rarely found in the classics because of their unidiomatic nature. The common occurrence of the passive *paḍu* in all the five parts of *Kalittogai*,⁵³ a classical collection of the five authors Pālai Pāḍiya perunṇaḍuṇkō, Kapilar, Maruṇṇaṇ ḷanākanār, chōḷaṇ Nalluruttiraṇ and Nallantuvaṇār is so significant as to challenge the statement of Dr. Caldwell.

"And idiomatic speakers prefer the other modes of forming the passive" said Dr. Caldwell.⁵⁴ That this is not correct is apparent from what we have seen in the preceding paragraphs. In order to show the fallaciousness of his theory further examples can easily be cited. Where

49. Cf. Mr. L. R. Palmer's Introduction to Modern Linguistics (1936), p. 63: "As far as mere morphology is concerned, speaking involves mere reproduction of inherited speech-forms."

50. *Kalittogai*, St. 133, ll. 8-14.

51. See Mr. Ramakrishnaiah's Studies in Dravidian Philology, p. 133.

52. St. 133 of *Kalittogai*, ll. 6-7; cf. Caldwell, p. 466, "Iyēsu enbavar."

53. Vide Appendix I.

54. Comp. Grammar, p. 467.

active forms themselves could have been used with equal force we find the passive forms in the following⁵⁵ instances:—

- (1) Pallār nakku eḷappaḍum maḍal mā ēri
- (2) Tēvar toḷappaḍuvānaik kāṇa
- (3) Uraiyaḷ uṇarappaḍāta aḍi
- (4) Mulai Maraiḷkappaḍu nīrāḍip peṇkaḷ tiṇḍi
- (5) Kāḷatti kāṇappaḍu kaṇa nāthan kāṇ
- (6) Nālantān paravappaḍuṇṇa nāṇmaṛai nāvaṇ
- (7) Tuṇai eṇru nāṇ toḷappaḍu oṇ cuḍarai
- (8) Karṇavar paravappaḍuvānaik kāṇa.

In each one of these examples the authors, if they chose, might have employed the active forms themselves which would have brought out the passive sense by the mere connection. It is here that Caldwell would have said⁵⁶ in accordance with his own view that "so distinctively in these cases is the passive sense expressed by the connection alone, that the use of the more formal modern passive would sound awkward and foreign." And yet the forms used in these instances are passive forms with *paḍu*.⁵⁷ How they could sound awkward or foreign we are unable to find. When on the one hand Caldwell says that this is awkward and foreign and when on the other we find that one of those that have adopted this use is Kapilar, a Tamil poet of the 3rd Sangam Age held in great esteem and reverence by his contemporary men and women for his very idiomatic use of expressions⁵⁸ and that the other three persons just cited in this behalf are those that spoke out their feelings and Revelations in hymns (7th century to 9th century A.D.) which are considered sacred by the Tamils, we have little to pick and choose. If after reading Caldwell's statement and if after being told time and again by other great scholars following him⁵⁹ that it is unidiomatic in Tamil to use *paḍu* as a passive auxiliary, certain Tamilians are found to avoid it, it would not be more surprising than the artificiality that would creep in if they were

55. (1) by Kapilar in *Kalittogai*, St. 61; (2) by Sambandar in *Tēvaram* (S. S. Samāja edn. 1927), p. 427 St. 1; (3) to (5) by Tirunāvukkarasar in *Tēvaram* (ibid., 1930), p. 326 St. 7, p. 321 St. 11, and p. 329 St. 1 to 3; (6) to (8) by Sundarar (ibid. 1929 edn.), p. 105 St. 10, p. 112 St. 2 and p. 121 St. 10.

56. Cf. Comp. Gram., p. 465.

57. Only they are not modern!

58. Vide *Paḍirupattu*, St. 85 by Perunṇuṇṇar kiḷar, *Puṇam* 53 by Poruntal ḷankiraṇār and *Puṇam* 174 by Marōkkattu Nappasalaiyār.

59. Dr. I. S. Taraporewala in his "Elements of the Science of Language", p. 349 and Dr. S. K. Chatterji in his "Origin and Development of the Bengali Language", Vol. II, p. 925.

to avoid, following the statement of the commentator⁶⁰ of "Prayōka Vivēkam," the use of the pronominal termination of the verb "an" in places where an action for one's own self has to be indicated (i.e., in expressions corresponding to the ātmanēpadas of Sanscrit). The commentator of Prayōka vivēkam says that *camaikkirāṇaṇ* means "he cooks for someone else" and that *camaikkirāṇ* means "he cooks for himself". This artificial restriction, which he thought was existing in Tamil, does not at all exist in it. Similarly, what Caldwell considered as unidiomatic in Tamil is found to be not unidiomatic after all. Our sense of fairness would no doubt revolt against the venturesome implication that the revered Kapilar or the three great Saiva hymnists and others employed the passive form so that a scholar like Dr. Caldwell coming several centuries after them might be justified in putting them down as employers of a form that is "foreign, modern, awkward and unidiomatic."

And Dravidian languages are said to resist every effort to bring *paḍu* into general use.⁶¹ How far is this true in Tamil? A part of the verse cited before from Kalittogai⁶² was found to have made a general use of *paḍu*. And a very common, repeated use of it is found in Tiruk-kural, Tirumantiram, Tirunāvukkarasar Tēvāram, Tiruvāchakam, Chintāmaṇi, Chūlāmaṇi, Kambarāmāyaṇam, Yāpparuṅkalakkārigai, Taṇikaippurāṇam, Tāyumāṇavar pāḍal, Minakshisundaram Pillai's poetical works and Ramalingaswami's poems.⁶³ And Aḍiyārkkunallār, commentator of Chilappadikāram, who has used it 6 times within 8 lines,⁶⁴ cannot by any means be considered to have made a restricted use of it. In fact Tamil has not resisted the coming of *paḍu* into common use. If it resists, it resists only so far as *paḍu* is tried to be employed in the *impersonal* forms of the verb. That is because impersonal forms⁶⁵ such as "It is requested", "it is stated" etc. are as unidiomatic as "it rains" itself in Tamil. To say this is not to concede however that the Tamil language wants a passive voice properly so-called.

Next it is said⁶⁶ that efforts are constantly made to bring *paḍu* into general use "by foreigners, who are accustomed to passives in their

60. p. 66: "Camaikkirāṇaṇ eṇa aṇ irāy uraittāl piṇarkku."

61. Caldwell, p. 467.

62. (St. 133) supra, p. 30.

63. Vide Appendix II.

64. Vide Chilappadikāram V—commentary on ll. 105-110 at p. 163 (of the 3rd edn.).

65. Cf. Paul's Principles of Language, p. 119 and Vendryes, p. 103.

66. Comp. Gram. of the Drn. Langs., p. 467.

own tongues, and fancy that they cannot get on without them". But on examination of certain books written in Tamil by foreigners we find that this is probably not correct. The Rev. Mr. Beschi, the Italian missionary and author of the famous Tēmbāvaṇi, has not used *paḍu* in the passive sense in more places than ten in that book. And Māthai Tiruvēnkaṭa-nātha Aiyar has not employed this *paḍu* more than five times in his Prabōdha Chandrōdayam, adapted from the Sanscrit original. These two great scholars, despite being accustomed to passives in their own tongues, do not appear to have made any effort to bring *paḍu* into a larger use than that by the Tamilian writers themselves. Not that they consciously guarded against a larger use; but that the form of their writing being verse, the active forms were more suitable. This again lends support to the point suggested before that if in the classics much use of the passive *paḍu* is not found it is because the classical writings available to us now are all poetical compositions. And the prose works of any modern foreign writer contain only as many *paḍus* as the prose of any Tamilian writer himself.

"Nothing sounds more barbarous to the Dravidian ear than the unnecessary use of *paḍu* as a passive auxiliary" concluded Caldwell.⁶⁷ He has used the word "barbarous" apparently not in the sense of uncivilised, rude or savage but in the sense of foreign or incorrect. A form that has been in vogue ever since the extant Tamil literature arose, a form which has not been resisted but adopted throughout the twenty centuries and more,⁶⁸ a form which has now become the characteristic symbol in Tamil for expressing the passive, is far, far from being barbaric to the Tamilians. Unnecessary use of *paḍu* as a passive auxiliary, it is true, will sound barbarous to the Tamilian ear. Only *necessary* use of anything whatsoever will not be ugly! But the places where the unnecessary use of *paḍu* will thus be condemned are those where it may be sought to be used as an impersonal passive form in such an expression as "ellōrum kūtṭathirku varumāru kēṭṭukkoḷappaḍukiradu" (=It is requested that all will come to the meeting) which is un-Tamilian. "Ellōrum kēṭṭukkoḷappaḍukirārkaḷ" (=All are requested) however is not barbarous to the Tamilian ear, but if it is less used than the active form "ellōrum varumāru kēṭṭukkoḷkirēn" (=I request all to come) that is because the Tamilians prefer to give a personal touch to such situations as this. Thus the abhorrence, if any, for *paḍu* arises not at all from any desire of the Tamilian to resist its entry as a passive element proper, but from the

67. Comp. Grammar, p. 467.

68. Vide Appendix III.

genius of the Tamil language which does not permit *impersonal* forms themselves, *whether passive or active*.

In the light of this inquiry, Caldwell's statements that the Tamil language is destitute of a passive voice properly so-called, that there is no passive particle in Tamil, that *paḍu* is an auxiliary verb forming part of a phrase, that *paḍu* is more idiomatic when combined with a noun rather than with an infinitive, that it expresses continuous action rather than passivity, that idiomatic speakers prefer other modes of forming the passive than by means of *paḍu*, that the Tamil language resists efforts to bring *paḍu* into general use, that it is foreigners that try to make a large use of it and that its use is barbarous to the Tamilian ear do all require to be revised and rewritten.

தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி

உள்ளுறை

உள்ளுறை என்பது புதை பொருள். சொற்களின் சொற்பொருளன்றிக் கூற்றினகத் தடங்கிநின்று உய்த்துணரத் தோன்றும் மறைபொருளை உள்ளுறை என்பர் தொல்லைநல் இயற்றமிழ்ப் புலவர். உள்ளுறை என்பது வெளிப்படையின்றிக் கூற்றினுள்ளே குறிப்பாய் உறைவது (அல்லது தோன்ற நிற்பது) எனப் பொருள்படும். எனவே, கூறிய சொற்பொருளின் புறத்தே குறிப்பிற் கொள்ளுமாறு கூற்றினுள்ளே எஞ்சி நிற்கும் பிறிதொரு கருத்தே உள்ளுறை அல்லது எச்சம் எனப்படும். இவ்வாறு செய்யுளில் புலவர் தங்கருத்தைப் பட்டாங்குக்குக் கூறுவது தவிர, மறை பொருளாகத் துறைபல புனைந்து உய்த்துணர வைக்கு முறைகளைத் தொகுத்து, அவை தம்மியல்பால் இருதிறப்படுமெனவும், கூறும் புலவர் குறிக்கோள் கொண்டு ஐந்து வகைப்படுமெனவும் தொல்காப்பியர் விளக்கியுள்ளார்.

I. செய்யுளுறுப்பாம் எச்சம் என்னும் உள்ளுறை தம்மியல்பால் இருவகையாமாறு :—

(1) சொற்பொருளின் வேராய்க் குறிக்கும் மறை பொருளை, கூறும் சொற்றுணைகொண்டே, நுனித்தாய்வோர் உய்த்துணரத் தோற்றுவிக்கும் கூற்றைச் “சொல்லொடுமுடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி” எனவும், (2) புலவன் நோக்குணர்த்தக் கூற்றுச்சொல் நுணையாகாமல், கூறும் முறை ஒலி முதலிய பிறவற்றால் அதனை உய்த்துணர வைக்கும் கூற்றை “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி” எனவும் தொல்காப்பியர் செய்யுளியலில் விளக்கினார்.

“சொல்லொடும் குறிப்பொடும் முடிவு கொளியற்கை

புல்லிய கிளவி எச்சமாகும்.”

(செய்யுளியல் சூ. 198)

என்பது இதுபற்றி அவர் கூறும் சூத்திரம்.

இச் சூத்திரத்திற்கு, “பொருள்முடிக்க வேண்டப்படும் பிறிதொரு சொல் எஞ்சி வருவது சொல்லெச்சம்” எனவும், ‘பிறிதொரு சொல் வேண்டாமல் கூற்றுத் தானே நின்று சொற்பொருளன்றிப் பிறிதொரு பொருளில் முடிவது குறிப்பெச்சம்’ எனவும் ‘எச்சம் இருவகைத்தாம்’ எனப் பொருள் கூறுவர் பழைய உரைகாரர். அவ் வெச்சங்கள் சொல்லளவில் அமைவனவாய் சொல்லதிகார எச்சவியலில் விளக்கப்பட்டுள்ளன. இங்குச் செய்யுளில் கூறப்படும் இவ்வெச்சங்கள் குறித்த பொருளை முடிய நாட்டும் யாப்பின் வழித்தாய் செய்யுளுறுப்பாம் ஓர் கூற்றின் பார்ப்பும். [கூற்றெனினும், கிளவி யெனினும் ஒக்கும்.] இவை சொல்லளவு குறியாமல் கூறியசொற்களின் உள்ளுறையாம் பொருளெச்சத்தையே குறித்துவரும். சொல்லும் குறிப்புமாய் சொல்லதிகார எச்சங்கள் சொல்லளவில் அமைந்து, “பிரிநிலை முதல் பத்து வகைப்படும். செய்யுளுறுப்பாம் உள்ளுறைப் பொருளெச்சங்கள், சொல்லோடு முடிவு கொளியற்கைய (1) குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கைய (2) என்றிருவகைத்தாம். சொல்லெச்சங்களை, அவைதாம் தத்தம் குறிப்பின் எச்சம் சுட்டும்’ என முன் எச்சவியலிற் கூறிய

தற்கு மாறாக, இங்குக் குறிப்புப் பொருளெச்சங்களைச் “சொல்லொடும், குறிப் பொடும் முடிவுகளியற்கைய” எனவும், “எழுத்தொடும் சொல்லொடும் புணரா தாகிப் பொருட்புறத்ததுவே” எனவும் செய்யுளியலில் தொல்காப்பியரே கூறுதலா னும், இவ்வீரெச்ச வகைகளும் வெவ்வேறின மென்பதே அவர் கருத்தென்பது தெற்றென விளங்கும். இவற்றுள் சொல்லளவிற்கு முன்னவை பத்தும் சொல் லதிகார எச்சவியலில் “பிரிநிலை வினை” என்னும் 34-வது சூத்திர முதல் “சொல் லெனச்சம்” என்னும் 45-வது சூத்திர மீறாகப் பல சூத்திரங்களால் தெளிக்கப் பெற் றிருப்பதாலும், அவற்றுள் சொற் குறிப்பெச்சம் “அவை தாம் தத்தம் குறிப்பின் எச்ச மாகும்” எனும் 44-ஆம் சூத்திரத்திலும், சொல்லெச்சம் “சொல்லெனெச்சம், முன் னும் பின்னும் சொல்லள வல்லது எஞ்சுதலிலவே” எனும் 45-ம் சூத்திரத்திலும் தனித்தனியே விளக்கப்பட்டிருப்பதாலும், சொல்லிலக்கணத்தின்பாற்பட்ட அவ் வெச்சங்கள் இவ்வாறு அமைவுபட ஆண்டுச் சொல்லதிகார எச்சவியலில் கூறப்பெற்ற வற்றையே ஈண்டுப் பொருளதிகாரச் செய்யுளியலில் மீண்டும் கூறும் குற்ற முடையர் தொல்காப்பியர் என்பது பொருந்தாமையாலும், இச் செய்யுளியற் சூத்திரத்திற்கு பழைய உரைகாரர் கூறுவது பொருளன்மை அறிக.

II. இனிச் செய்யுள் ஆக்கும் புலவனின் நோக்கங்கொண்டு உள்ளுறை ஐந்து வகைப்படும் என்பதைத் தொல்காப்பியர் “உடனுறை, உவமம், சுட்டு, நகை, சிறப்பெனக் கெடலரு மரபின் உள்ளுறை ஐந்தே” எனும் பொருளியல் 46-ஆம் சூத்திரத்தால் விளக்கினார்.

(i) இவற்றுள் உடனுறை என்பது இறைச்சியாகும். ஒரு கூற்றில் வரும் சொற்களின் வெளிப்படையுள்ளபொருளொடு அதனின் வேறாய் அக்கூற்றில் உள்ளுறைத் திழுவது “இறைச்சி” அல்லது “உடனுறை” எனப்படும். இவ்வதல், இறைச்சி என்பன ‘தங்குதல்’ அல்லது ‘அடங்கி அமைவது’ எனும் பொருள் தரும். எனவே, ஒரு கூற்றில் அதன் மொழிப்பொருளின் புறத்தே “நிறத்திபல் மருங்கிற்றெரியு மொர்க்கே” உய்த்துணரப் புலனும் பொருளை இறைச்சி எனவும், உடனுறை எனவும் வழங்குவர் பழம் புலவர். அது, “இறைச்சி தானே பொருட் புறத்ததுவே” (சூ. 33). ‘இறைச்சியிற் பிறக்கும் பொருளுமாருளவே’ (சூ. 34) “அன்புறு தருந்”... (சூ. 35) எனும் பொருளியற் சூத்திரங்களால் கூறப்படும்.

(ii) உள்ளுறை உவமமாகவு, ஒப்பும் பொருளும் ஒருங்கு புலப்பட வரும் எனே உவமம் அல்லது செவ்வொப்பணி போலவது, கூறப்படும் கருப்பொருட் செய்தியி னகத்தடங்கி, அச்செய்தியே ஒப்பாய், அது விளக்கும் பொருள் கூறக் குறிப்பாய், உய்த்துணர்வோரால் மட்டும் அறிய நிற்பது.

உள்ளுறை உவமம், அகத்தினை இயலில்,

“உள்ளுறை உவமம்”—49

“உள்ளுறை தெய்வம்”—50

“உள்ளுறுத்திதீண்டு”—51

எனும் மூன்று சூத்திரங்களால் தெளிக்கப்பட்டது.

(iii) சுட்டு என்பது ஒரு கூற்றின் வெளிப்படையான சொற்பொருளன்றி அக் கூற்றின் உள்ளுறையாகப் பிறிதொன்றைக் குறிப்பால் உணர்த்துவதாகும்

கருதிய பொருளைக் கூற்றின் சொற்றுணைகொண்டே சுட்டுவதும், சொற்பொருளின் புறத்தே குறிப்பால் உணரச் சுட்டுவதும் எனச் சுட்டு இருவகைத்தாம். இவை முறையே ‘சொல்லோடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி’, (1) குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி, (2) எனக் கூறப்பட்டன.

(1) இவற்றுள் முன்னது கூற்றின் சொற்றுணைகொண்டே செய்யுளில் புலவன் உட்குறிப்பை உணர்த்துவதாகும்.

“ஒப்பொடு புணர்ந்த உவமத்தானும், தோன்றுவது கிளந்த அணிவினனும்,” என் றிருவகைத்தாம் பிசி நிலைகளும் “சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கையவாம் சுட்டி லடங்கும். ‘பிறை கெளவி மலை நடக்கும்’ என்னும் ஒப்பொடு புணர்ந்த உவமம், அக் கூற்றின் சொற்றுணையானே யானையைச் சுட்டுவதாயிற்று.

இனி, “நீராடான் பார்ப்பான் ; நிறஞ்செய்யான் நீராடின ஊராரும் நீரிற்சாக்கை.”

எனும் “கூறுவோன் உள்ளத்திற் தோன்றுவது கிளந்த அணிவுறு” கூற்றும் அதன் சொல்லாற்றலாலேயே நெருப்பைக் குறிப்பதாயிற்று. இவ்வாறு இவ்விருதிறப் பிசினிலை வகையும் சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவியாதல் கண் கூடு. உற்று நோக்கின், உள்ளுறை உவமமும் எச்சம் அல்லது சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளி யற்கை புல்லிய உள்ளுறையேயாம்.

(2) இனி, “எழுத்தொடும் சொல்லொடும் புணராதாகிப் பொருட் புறத்ததுவே குறிப்பு மொழியாகும்” (செய். சூ. 172) என விளக்கப் பெற்றவை “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய” சுட்டு வகையாகும். ‘கற்கறிக்க நன்கட்டாய்’ என்பது போல்வன இவ்வகைச் சுட்டாகும். உறந்தையைப் ‘பறவாக் கோழி’ என்பதும் சேரர் பேருரைப் ‘பூவா வஞ்சி’ என்பதும் போல்வனவும் இதன்பாற் படும். இவையே போல் இறைச்சி வகையும் “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய” உள்ளுறையே, யாகும்.

(iv) ‘நகை’ என்பது பழிசரக்கு மொழிகரந்து, வசையோடு புணர்ந்து வரும் அங்கதச் செய்யுளும், (செய். சூ. 122) அதுபோல்வன பிறவுமாகும். இது செய்யுளிய லில் விளக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

(v) சிறப்பென்பது, “புகழொடும் பொருளொடும் புணர்ந்தன்றி”, வெளிப்பட விரியாது (124), கூற்றானன்றிக் குறிப்பாய் உணர்த்தும், ‘நசையொடு புணர்ந்த அங்கதச்’ செய்யுளும், அன்ன பிறவுமாகும். இதுவும் செய்யுளியலில் “நசையொடும் புணர்ந்தன்றியின், அங்கதச் செய்யுள் என்மனார் புலவர்” (செய். சூ. 12) “புகழொடும் பொருளொடும் புணர்ந்தன்றியிற் செவியுறைச் செய்யுள் என்மனார் புலவர்” (செய். சூ. 124) எனும் சூத்திரங்களால் தெளிக்கப் பெற்றது.

III. இனி, உள்ளுறை உவமம், இறைச்சி, இவை தம்முள் அறியக்கிடக்கும் வேறு பாடுகளும் (i), இவற்றிற்கும் சுட்டு என்னும் உள்ளுறைக்குமுள்ள ஒற்றுமை வேற்று மைகளும் (ii), பற்றிப் பல்காலும் பலவாறு மயக்கம் நேருகின்றது. அதனால் அவற்றின் இயல்பையும் சிறிதாராய்ந்து தெளிய முயல்வது ஈண்டு வேண்டப்படுவதேயாம். ஆகவே, இவற்றினியல் விளக்கும் தொல்காப்பியச் சூத்திரங்களால் தேறத் தருவன வற்றைத் தேர்ந்து தெளிதல் இன்றியமையாதது.

III. (i) (1) உள்ளுறை உவமத்தை அகத்தினை இயலில் மூன்று சூத்திரங்களால் விளக்குவர். “உள்ளுறை உவமம், ஏனை உவமமெனத், தள்ளாதாகும் நினைபுணர் வகையே” (அகத். சூ. 49).

குறிப்பால் வரும் உள்ளுறை உவமம், செவ்வொப்பப்போலானது, காதலொழுக்கம் உணர்த்துதல் தவிராது, என இச் சூத்திரத்திற்குறி, இவ் வீருவமங்களுள் உள்ளுறை உவமத்தின் இயல்பை அடுத்த சூத்திரத்தாற் கூறுவர்.

(2) “உள்ளுறை தெய்வம் ஒழிந்ததை நிலனெனக் கொள்ளும் என்ப குறியறிந் தோமீர.” (அகத்தினை சூ. 50)

என்பது அச் சூத்திரமாகும். இதனால் தெய்வம் தவிரப் பிற கருப்பொருள்களுள் ஒன்றைக் களனாகக்கொண்டு உள்ளுறை உவமம் வரும் என்பது பெறப்படுகின்றது. கூறப்படும் கருப் பொருட் செய்தியே ஒப்பாய்க், கூறக் கருதிய பொருள் அவ் வொப்பின் உள்ளுறையாய், புலனன் குணர்வோர்க்கு உய்த்துணரத் தோன்றும் கூறுக்குறிப்பாய்க் கருப்பொருளில் மறைந்து தோன்றுவதே, உள்ளுறை உவமத்தின் இயலாதலின் கருப்பொருட் டொடர்பு இதற்கு இன்றியமையாததாகும்.

(3) “உள்ளுறுத்தித்தேடு ஒத்துப் பொருள்முடிசென உள்ளுறு த்திருவதை உள்ளுறை உவமம்.” (அகத்தினை சூ. 51)

என்பது இவ் உவமம் பற்றிய மூன்றாம் சூத்திரம்.

உள்ளுறை உவமத்துக்குக் கருப்பொருட்சார்பு இன்றியமையாததென முன் சூத்திரத்திற்குறி, பின் கூறப்படும் கருப்பொருட்செய்தியே வெளிப்படு பொருளாய் நிற்க, அதனகத்தடங்கி அச்செய்தியையே ஒப்பாக்கி, அதை ஒத்துக் கூறக் கருதும் பொருள் குறிப்பால் உணர நிற்பதே உள்ளுறை உவமம் என்பது இதில் விளக்கப்பட்டது.

எனவே, இச் சூத்திரங்களால் உள்ளுறை உவமம், (1) கருப் பொருட் செய்தியுள் கூறுக்குறிப்பாய் அடங்கி நிற்பதும், (2) அக் கருப்பொருட் செய்தியே ஒப்பாவதும், (3) அவ்வொப்புக் கேற்ப அதை உய்த்துணர்வோர்க்குக் கருதிய பொருள் புலப்படுமாறு அமைவதும், இவ் உவம உள்ளுறையின் இயலெனத் தெளிக்கப்பட்டது. சுருங்கக் கூறின், உள்ளுறை உவமம் (1) ஒப்பு அல்லது உவமத்தின் ஒருவகை என்பதும், (2) அது தெய்வம் தவிர யாதாறும் ஒரு கருப்பொருளைப் பற்றியே வருமென்பதும், (3) அமைவுபடக் கூறப்பட்ட கருப்பொருட் செய்தியினடங்கி அதுவே ஒப்பாக அவ் வொப்புக்கேற்ற பிரிதொரு பொருளாய்க் குறிப்பால் உணரத் தோன்றும் என்பதும், இம் மூன்று சூத்திரங்களின் சுருத்தாகக் காண்கின்றோம்.

“இருஞ்ராயன்ன செருந்தியொடு வேழம் கருப்பின் அலமரும் கழனி ஊரன்.” (ஐங். 18)

‘செருந்திப் பூவொடு குறுக்காந்தட்டை கரும்புபோல அலமரு மூரன்’—என்றதனால் ‘தன் பாங்கியொடு பாத்தையர் குமைகளிர் ஒப்பச் சொம்மாக்க ஒழுநும் தலைவன்’ என்பது குறித்தலால், இது கருப்பொருளை நிலனாகக் கொண்டுவந்த உள்ளுறை உவமமாயிற்று.

III. (i) (2) இனி, இறைச்சியாவது ஒரு கூற்றின் புறத்தே அதன் மொழிப் பொருளின் வேறும் நுனித்து நோக்குவார்க்கு மட்டும் குறிப்பால் அறியத் தோன்றும்

மறைபொருளாம். இதனை ‘வியங்கியம்’ எனவும், ‘தொன்யார்த்தம்’ எனவும் கூறுவர் வடநூலார். இவ் விதைச்சியியல் (அ) “இறைச்சிதானே பொருட்புறத்ததுவே” எனும் பொருளியற் சூத்திரத்தால் பெறப்படுகின்றது. இதில் கூறப்பட்ட ‘பொருள்’ என்பது கூற்றின் சொற்பொருளையே குறிக்கும். “எழுத்தொடும் சொல்லொடும் புணராதாகிப்—பொருட் புறத்ததுவே குறிப்பு மொழியாகும்” என்பதனாலும் ஆசிரியரின் இச்சுருத்து வலியுறுதல் காண்கலாம். இது கருப் பொருளைச் சுட்டுமென யாண்டும் தொல்காப்பியர் கூற்றாலும் குறிப்பானும் உணர்த்தாமையின், அதேவர் கருத்தன்மை அறிக. “இறைச்சிதானே உரிப்புறத்ததுவே” எனும் பாடம் ஒரு பெயர்த் தெழுதுவோர் பிறழக் கொண்டதாகத் தோற்றுகின்றது. உரிப்பொருட்சிறப்பை விளக்குங் கருவிகளுள் அகப்பகுதிச் செய்யுளில் உள்ளுறை உவமம்போலவே பெருவழக்காய் ஆளப்படுவது இறைச்சி. இறைச்சியால் உணர்த்தப்படுவது உரிப்பொருளே யாகும். அதனால் உரியையே நிறப்பாய்க் குறிக்கும் இறைச்சியை ‘உரிப்புறத்தது’ எனக் கூறுவது அதனியலுக்கு முரணாவதால், அப்பாடம் பொருந்தாமை அறிக.

இச் சூத்திரத்தின் நேரிய பாடங்கொண்ட நச்சினர்க்கினியர், ‘உவமம் சுட்டாக் கருப் பொருளால் அதன் புறத்தே பிரிதொரு பொருளைக் குறிப்பது இறைச்சி’ என இச் சூத்திரத்திற்குப் பொருள் கூறுவர். கருப்பொருளின் சார்பு உள்ளுறை உவமத்துக்குப்போல இறைச்சிக்கு வேண்டப்படுவதான குறிப்பே இறைச்சிபற்றிய தொல்காப்பியச் சூத்திரங்கள் ஒன்றிலேனுமில்லாதது கருதற்பாலது. கருப்பொருட் சார்பு இறைச்சிக்கும் வேண்டப்படுவதாக இவர் கொண்டதல்லேயே, கருப் பொருளையே பற்றுக்கோடாய்க் கொண்டுவரும் உள்ளுறை உவமத்துக்கும், அது வேண்டப்படாத இறைச்சிக்கும் வேறுபாடு காணாமல் மயங்க நேர்ந்தது.

(ஆ) “இறைச்சியிற் பிறக்கும் பொருளுமாருளவே திறத்தியல் மருங்கில் தெரியுமோர்க்கே.” (பொருளியல் சூ. 34)

எனும் பொருளியற் சூத்திரத்தையும், இறைச்சியினியல்பே கூறுவதாகக் கொண்டு வேறு பொருள் கூறுவர் நச்சினர்க்கினியர். இவர், இறைச்சி கருப்பொருளைச் சார்ந்தே வருமெனக் கருதினாதலின், இச் சூத்திரம் கருப்பொருட் டொடர்புடைய உள்ளுறை உவமத்தினின்றும் இறைச்சியை வேறுபடுத்திக் கூறவந்தது போலக் கொண்டு இதற்கும் பொருந்தாப் பொருள் கூறுவாராயினர். அது சூத்திரச் சொற்போக்குக்கும், நூல் நோக்குக்கும் ஒவ்வாது. “முன்னேச் சூத்திரத்திற்கு கூறியான்கு, ஒரு கூற்றில் அதன் சொற்பொருளின் வேறும் இறைச்சி எனும் உள்ளுறை அல்லது மறைபொருள் தோன்றுவதும் தவிர, அவ்விதைச்சி அல்லது மறை பொருளினின்றும் நுணுகி ஆராயும் திறனுடையார்க்குப் புலனாகும் மற்றொரு மறைபொருட் குறிப்புத் தோன்றுவதும் உண்டு,” என்பதே இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குரிய நேரிய பொருளாகும். இதற்கு இளம்பூரணர் தரும் உரையும் இக்கருத்தையே வலியுறுத்தும். “இறைச்சிப்பொருள் வயிற் றேன்றும் (பிரிதுமோர்) பொருளும் உள, பொருட்டிறத்தியலும் பக்கத் தாராய்வார்க்கு” என்பது இதற்கு அவர் கூறும் உரையாகும். எனவே, (1) ஒரு கூற்றின் சொற்பொருளின் வேறும், அதன் புறத்தே குறிப்பிற்றேன்றும் பிரிதொரு பொருளே உடனுறை அல்லது இறைச்சி எனப்படும் என்பதும், (2) அவ் விதைச்சியினின்றும் உய்த்துணர்வோர் அறியக் கிடக்கும் உட்கருத்து இன்னும் ஒன்றாவதுமுண்டு என்பதும், முறையே இவ்விரு பொருளியற் சூத்திரங்களானும் விளக்கப்படும் பொருள்களாகும்.

“ அம்மவாழி, தோழி! இன்றவர்
வாராராயினே நன்றே. சாரற்
சிறுதினை வினைந்து வியன்க ணிரும்புனத்து
இரவரி வாரிற் றெண்டகச் சிறுபறை
பானுள் யாமத்தும் சுறங்கும்,
யாமங் காவல் ரவியா மாறே.”

(குறந். 375)

இதில், இரவுக் குறிபெற்று வரையாறு வந்தொழுகும் தலைவன் சிறைப்புறத் தானாக, அவன் கேட்கத் தலைவிக்குக் கூறுவான்போலத் தோழி, ‘யாமங் காவலர் அவிமாமாறு தினைக்கதிர் அரிவோரின் பறை யாமத்தும் சுறங்குதலால் இரவு வருதல் நன்றென அவனுக்கறிவுறுத்துவது இச்செய்யுட் கூற்றின் சொற்பொருளாகும்.

இனி, “சிறு தினை வினைந்து முதிர்ந்ததால் அதனை அரியப் பகல் போதாமல் இரவுமரிவாரின் பறை யாமத்தும் சுறங்கு, அதனால் காவலர் அவிமார் (அதாவது உறங்கார்) எனக்கூறி, அதனால் பகலுமவன் வருதல் ஒல்லாதெனவும், இவ்வாறு தினையரிந்து முடிந்ததும் தலைவி புனங்காவல்லாழிந்து இற்செறிக்கப்படுவாளாகவே “இனி நீ இரப்பகலிருப்போதும் வாரற்க ” எனவும் அறிவிக்கும் குறிப்பு இக்கூற்றின் சொற்புறத்தே தோன்றும் இறைச்சியாகும்.

இதனால், “ இவ்வாறு களவொழுக்கம் தடைப்படும்; இனி நீ இவ்ணலம் நுகர்விரும்புவையெல் தாழாது விரைந்து வரைந்தெய்துக ” என வரைவு கடாவங் குறிப்பு இக்கூற்றின் இறைச்சியில் உய்த்துணரக் கிடக்கும் பிறிதொரு பொருளாம் உட்கருத் தாகும்.

III. (i) (3) இறைச்சி, உள்ளுறை உவமம், இவற்றுள் வேறுபாடுகள் :—

(1) கருப்பொருட் சார்பே வேண்டாமல், சொற்களின் சொம்பொருளின் புறத்தே ஒரு கூற்றில் புலன் நன்குணரும் புலவர்க்குக் குறிப்பாற்றேன்ற செய்யுளில் புலவன் கருதியமைக்கும் மறைபொருளே இறைச்சியாகும்.

(2) கருப் பொருட் சார்பு வேண்டாதாகவே, இறைச்சிக்கு எவ்வகை ஒப்பு அல்லது உவமத் தொடர்பும் இன்றாகும். இது இவற்றிடைபுள்ள மற்றொரு வேற்றுமை என்னலாம்.

(3) இன்னும் ஒரு வேறுபாடும் இவற்றிடைக் காணலாம். உள்ளுறை உவமம், கூறிய கருப்பொருட் செய்தியையே ஒப்பு அல்லது உவமையாகக்கொண்டு, தான் அதன் வெளிப்படக் கூறப்படா உபமையமாகக் குறிப்பிற் புலப்படுவதாகலான், உள்ளுறை உவமம் கருப்பொருட் செய்தி கூறும் “சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கைப் புல்லிய” கிளவியாகும். இறைச்சியோ, கூற்றின் சொற்பொருளின் வேறாய், அதன் புறத்தே தோன்றுமாதலின், அது “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய” கிளவியாகும். (கிளவி எனினும், கூற்றெனினும் ஒக்கும் என்பது முன்னும் விளக்கப் பட்டது.)

“ வர்கோட்டு வயத்தகர் வாராது மாறினும்

குருமயிர்ப் புருவை ஆசையின் அல்கும்

மாஅல் அருவித் தண்பெருஞ் சிலம்ப!

நீயிவண் வருஉங் காலே

மேவரு மாதோ இவணலனே தெய்யோ.”

(ஐந். 238)

இச் செய்யுளில் முதன் மூன்றடியும் உள்ளுறை உவமம்; பின்னிரண்டும் இறைச்சி. முன் மூன்றடிகளில் நீண்ட கொம்புடைய வீறுகொள் பொருதகரான யாட்டுக்கடா தன்னைவிரும்பி வாராமல் வேறுபட்டாலும், மென்மயிர்ப் பெட்டையாடு ‘கடாவரும்’ என்னும் நகையால் தங்கும், கரிய நீரருவி குளிர்விக்கும், பெருமலை யுடையோனே ” எனக் கூறப்பட்டது. இதனால், “தலைவன் தலைவிபால் வாராமல் தவறிழைக்கும் தறுகண்மையன் ஆயினன் எனினும், தன் மலையருவிபோல் தட்ப முடையனாகவே தலைவி இன்னும் தன்னைத் தலையளிக்க வருவனென நம்பி உயிர்வாழா நின்றான் ” எனக் குறிப்பாற்றேன்றும் உள்ளுறை உவமம், இச்செய்யுட் கூற்றினுள் ளடங்கியதாய், அக்கூற்றின் செய்தியோடொத்ததுப் பொருள் முடிவதாயிற்று. எனவே, இது உள்ளுறை உவமமாதல் காண்க.

இதன் பின்னிரண்டடியில், தலைவன் வரையா தொழுகும் வன்கண்மையைச் சுட்டி, விரைவில் தலைவியை அவன் வரையுமாறு தூண்டவேண்டும் தோழி “நீ வருங்கால் தலைவி உன்னைக் காணும் மகிழ்ச்சியினால் இழந்த அவள் பொலிவு உன்னுடன் வரும் ” எனக்கூறி, “ உன்பொருட்டே உயிர்வாழும் தலைவிபால் வந்து நீ காணுவது அவள் பொலிவொன்றே; நீ வாராமையால் இவள் நலனழிந்து மெலிவது நீ அறியாய்; அவள் நலன் அழியாமற் பேண விரும்புவையேல், விரைவில் இவளை வரைவாயாக ” எனக் குறிக்கின்றாள். இக்கருத்து, அத்தோழி கூறிய சொற்பொருளின் வேறாய், குறிப்பாகத் தோன்றுதலால், இஃது இறைச்சியாயிற்று.

இதில் கருப் பொருட் சார்பு ஒன்றுமின்மையும் கண்கூடு.

III. (i) (4) இவ்வாறு தம்முட் பல வேறுபாடுடைய வேனும், இவற்றிடைபுள்ள சில ஒற்றுமைகளும் கருதற்குரியவாம்.

(1) இவ்விரண்டும் உள்ளுறை வகைகளாதல் ஒன்று.

(2) இன்னும் இவை இரண்டும் அகப்பகுதியில் பெருவழக்காய் வழங்கிவரும் செய்யுளுறுப்புக்களாம்.

III. (ii) (1) இனி, “எழுத்தொடும், சொல்லொடும் புணராதாகிப் பொருட் புறத் ததுவே குறிப்பு மொழி என்ப ” என விளக்கப்பெற்ற “சுட்டு” என்னும் உள்ளுறையும் இருவகைத்தாம். (1) ஒன்று, உள்ளுறை உவமம்போல, ஒப்பொடு புணர்ந்த உவமத்ததாய் வரும் பிசிபோல்வன “சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி” மேற்றும். (2) மற்றொன்று, இறைச்சிபோலத் “தோன்றுவது கிளந்த துணிவினல்வரும் பிசி” போல்வனவும், “கூற்றிடை வைத்த குறிப்பாம்” அங்கதம் போல் வனவும், “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புலிய கிளவி” மேற்றும்.

III. (ii) (2) சுட்டுக்கும், இறைச்சி உள்ளுறை உவமங்கட்குமுள்ள வேற்றுமை யாதெனின், (அ) உள்ளுறை உவமமும் இறைச்சியும் எழுநிலத் தெழுந்த செய்யுள் வகையில் பெருவழக்காய் அடிவரை கொள்ளும் பாட்டிற் பயிவது. குறிப்பு மொழி யாம் சுட்டு அவ்வாறன்றி உரை, பிசி, அங்கதம் முதலியவற்றிலும் வருவதாகும்.

(ஆ) இறைச்சியும் உள்ளுறை உவமமும் புறத்துறையில் விலக்கில்லை எனினும், அகத்துறைகளுக்கே சிறப்புரிமை கொண்டு வழங்கும். சுட்டு புறத்தும் அகத்தும் ஓராங்கு ஒத்தியலும்.

Bhartrhari A Pre-śāṅkara Advaitin

By

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It was maintained¹ that Bhartrhari, the author of the *Vākyapadīya*, was not a Buddhist. It is proposed in this paper to show that he was one of the earliest Pre-Śāṅkara exponents of the doctrines of the Advaita system in Indian Philosophy.

The *Vākyapadīya*, though chiefly a treatise on Sanskrit grammar, contains explanations of many genuine philosophical questions. What is the ultimate reality is the foremost question in philosophy that has puzzled and is puzzling still the mighty intellects of the world; and the Brahmakāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya*, as the title suggests, deals with the *śabdabrahman* as the ultimate reality. Bhartrhari refers to the ultimate reality by terms like *śabdabrahman* and *śabdātattva*. He describes it as devoid of beginning and end and as the origination of the *śabdaprapaṇca* and *arthaprapaṇca*, both being the manifestation of the Supreme Being when it assumes the power of *Kālaśakti*, with the result that the *śabda-brahman* is also known as the *vivartopādāna* of this phenomenal world—

“ अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥ ”

(*Vākyapadīya*, kāṇḍa 1, verse 1)

The term *vivarta* is explained by Śāstrakāras in many ways.² Bhartrhari's explanation is contained in the following passage:—

“ एकस्य तत्त्वादप्रच्युतस्य भेदानुकारेणासत्यविभक्तान्यरूपोपग्राहिता विवर्तः ।

स्वप्नविषयप्रतिभासवत् ।

(*Ibid*-Tīkā on Verse 1, Cārudeva Sastri's edition p. 5).

The appearance which is called *vivarta*, has no reality other than that of its substratum, which is no doubt real. This is illustrated by the

1. Vide the writer's paper *Bhartrhari—a Bauddha?* submitted to the eighth session of the All-India Oriental Conference, Mysore, 1935.

2. (1) अतात्त्विकान्यथाभासो विवर्तः ।

(2) सोपादानसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताशून्यो विवर्तः ।

popular instance स्वप्नविषय—the objects of a dream. The objects of a dream are called *vivarta* of *caitanya* in that they have no reality separate from that of their substratum (*caitanya*), which has real existence. Similarly, the *nāmarūpaprapaṇca* is the *vivarta* of *śabdabrahman*, so much so, that the universe in its twofold form of *nāman* and *rūpa* has no reality other than that of its cause—*śabdabrahman*.

“ तत एव हि शब्दाख्यादुपसंहृतक्रमाद्ब्रह्मणः सर्वविकारप्रत्यस्तमये संवर्ताना-
कृतात्पूर्वं विकारग्रन्थिरूपत्वेनाव्यपदेश्याज्जगदाख्या विकाराः प्रक्रियन्ते । ”

(*Ibid.*, Tīkā, C.D.S's Ed. p. 6).

The *śabdabrahman* is devoid of any property, when all seeming changes vanish; and before the manifestation process comes into effect, it is not at all to be spoken of in terms of phenomenal objects, which are unreal. The *Brahmavivartatva* of this universe is one of the fundamental doctrines enunciated by all Advaitins including Bhartrhari and Śāṅkarācārya in order to establish their Advaitic conception of ultimate reality.

This *vivartavāda* is viewed as better and more satisfactory solution of the question of world-creation than the two other well-known vādas—*pariṇāma-vāda* and *ārambha-vāda*. The advocates of these vādas admit of the reality of the phenomenal world. The *ārambhavādins* explain the creation of the *kāryaprapaṇca* out of eternal atoms which, on the will of God, begin to act, produce *dvyaṇukas*, which in their turn produce *tryaṇukas* (triads) and so on. They accept the view that the *Kārya* is a new entity when it is produced by its causes and that the very production implies its previous non-existence. It is in this sense that they are *asatkāryavādins* who accept separate existence of the effect from its cause. The *pariṇāma-vādins* are opposed to the *ārambhavādins* in that they are *satkāryavādins*. By *satkāryavāda* they mean that the *kārya* is the *kāraṇa* itself in a new garb and that its *utpatti* is nothing but *pariṇāma*—transformation of the cause into the effect. Hence there is no non-existence of the *kārya* even before it is made visible to us. Yet they differentiate *kārya* from its *kāraṇa* by the different properties they possess. Thus they establish separate existence of the *kārya* from that of its cause. So in this point the *pariṇāmavādins* agree with the *ārambhavādins* though the former differ fundamentally from the latter in their conception of *kāryotpatti* from *kāraṇa*, as noted above.

The *vivartavādins* are no doubt *satkāryavādins*. The Advaitins among them attribute to the *vyāvahārika prapaṇca* a relative *satyatva*, which is superior to the *prātibhāsika satyatva* of the silver in nacre

(śūktirūpya). Since they have accepted one entity only as the real ultimate being, the phenomenal world is described by them as a seeming manifestation of that ultimate being, without any reality outside that of its *upādāna*. They are also *pariṇāmanavādins* in the sense that the phenomenal world is *avidyāpariṇāma*—the transformation of *avidyā*, so much so, that the reality of the universe is only so long as *avidyā* exists or till the realisation of the Brahman.

The conception of one ultimate reality, be it *śabdabrahman*, *sattā-brahman*, *ātma-brahman* or *viṣṇāna-brahman*, led all the exponents of advaita philosophy to conceive in it a power called *māyā*, *ajñāna*, *avidyā* or *kālaśakti*, which is unique in its nature and is capable of creating what we call the phenomenal world—the *bāhyaprapaṇca*. Bhartṛhari calls it by the term *kālaśakti* and *avidyā*,³ the chief function of which is to conceal the ultimate truth and present to us things unreal and different in form and essence. He is particular in saying that the *kālaśakti* is *aniruktā* or *anirvacanīyā* which cannot be said as identical with or different from the *śabdabrahman*, but is capable of presenting its own substratum in different forms of *bhokṭṛ* (enjoyer), *bhokṭavya* (enjoyable object) and *bhoga* (enjoyment). Here, it may be observed that the way in which Bhartṛhari equates *māyā* with *kālaśakti* would lead one to surmise that phenomenal existence (व्यावहारिकसत्ता) is to be understood as nothing more than time-relation (कालसम्बन्ध).

“ एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चैयमनेकधा ।

भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगरूपेण च स्थितिः ॥

एकस्य हि ब्रह्मणः तत्त्वान्यत्त्वाभ्यां सत्त्वान्यत्त्वाभ्यां चानिरुक्ताविरोधि शक्यु-
पग्राह्यस्यासत्त्वरूपप्रतिभागस्य स्वप्नविज्ञानपुरुषवदबहिस्तत्त्वाः परस्परविलक्षणाः भोक्तृ-
भोक्तव्यभोगग्रन्थयो विवर्तन्ते । तस्य च ग्रन्थन्तररूपसमतिक्रमेण विवृत्त ग्रन्थिपरिच्छेदस्ये-
यमनेकधा लोके व्यवहारव्यवस्था प्रकल्पते ॥ ”

(C.D.S's. ed. *ibid.*, Verse 4. p. 12)

It is just like the mist in the horizon. The mist completely enshrouds the rising sun and though it cannot shine by itself it appears to be shining with the help of the sunshine behind it ; and people who

3. Vide Bhartṛhari's *Tikā*:—

१ “ एवं ब्रूह—मूर्तिक्रियाविवर्तौ अविद्याशक्तिप्रवृत्तिमात्रम् । तौ विद्यात्मनि तत्त्वान्यत्त्वाभ्यां
अनाख्येयो । एतद्धि अविद्यायाः अविद्यात्वम् । ”

(*ibid.*, ed. p. 5.)

look at it fancy that the mist shines—नीहारः प्रकाशते. This *Kālaśakti*, other-
wise known as *avidyā*, is nothing but *Kāla*. So says Bhartṛhari in the
Kālasamuddeśa of the *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa* of his *Vākyapadīya*—

“ निर्भासोपगमो योऽयं क्रमवानिव दृश्यते ।

अक्रमस्यापि विश्वस्य तत्कालस्य विचेष्टितम् ॥⁴ ”

(Trivandrum Ed. p. 66 V. 46.)

It has three properties or powers—*atītatva*, *anāgatatva* and *vartamānatva* ; by the first two *kāla* conceals or destroys objects while by the last it manifests or creates them—

“ एकस्य शक्तयस्त्रिभिः कालस्य समवस्थिताः ।

यत्सम्बन्धेन भावानां दर्शनादर्शने सताम् ॥⁵

द्वाभ्यां स किल शक्तिभ्यां भावानां वरणात्मकः ।

शक्तिस्तु वर्तमानाख्या भावरूपप्रकाशिनी ॥ ”

(*Kāla-Samuddeśa*, Verses 49-50).

Bhartṛhari further adds that the two *śaktis*—*atītatva* and *anāgatatva*—possess the properties of *tamas* in that they conceal objects, while the *vartamānatvaśakti* is of *sattvaguna* and so illumines the objects. The *Kāla* itself is said to possess the property of *rajas* in view of the fact that it acts persistently by the twofold power—*pratibandha* and *abhyānujñā*—

द्वौ तु तत्र तमोरूपौ एकस्थालोकवत्स्थितिः ॥

(*Kālasamuddeśa*, V. 53).

4. Vide Helārāja's Com., p. 66. ‘ कालाख्या हि ब्रह्मशक्तिरविद्यैव क्रमावभासकारितया
जीवात्मसु सफला । ’

5. Vide *ibid.*, p. 67— ‘ कार्यभेदे कारणभेदानुमानम् ; शक्तिभेदेदेव च कार्यभेदोपपत्तेः,
कालाख्यस्य जगत्कारणस्य मुख्यो भेदो नास्ति । तथाहि—वर्तमानशक्तिसम्बन्धेन भावानां सतामेवाभि-
व्यक्तिर्जन्म । अतीतानागतकालशक्तिसम्बन्धेन तु सतामेव तिरोभावः । अदर्शनमनमिव्यक्तिर्विनाशः
प्राक् प्रध्वंसाभावश्च इति शक्तिभेदात्कार्यभेदोपपत्तौ कालभेदकल्पना निर्निमित्ता । ’

6. Vide *ibid.*, p. 67. ‘ अतीतानागतशक्तिभ्यां वरणं तिरोधापनं भावानां सतां कालः
करोति । वर्तमानशक्त्या दर्शनं भावरूपप्रकाशनम् । ’

“ अतीतानागतांवध्वानौ भावावरणहेतुत्वात्तमःस्वभावौ । आवरणं हि तमो-
धर्मः । गुरुवरणकमेव तम इत्युक्तम् । वर्तमानोऽध्वा प्रकाशतुल्यः सत्त्वसदृशः । सत्त्वं
लघुप्रकाशकमिष्टमिति । रजस्तु प्रवृत्तिसामान्यं कालस्वरूपं सर्वत्रान्वयि । प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनु-
ज्ञाभ्यां प्रवर्तकं प्रेरणानुरूपं रजः कालात्मकमेव । ”

(Helārāja's Com. Verse 53. Tri. Ed. p. 68).

These two powers of *Kālaśakti*—*pratibandha* and *abhyānujñā*—more or less correspond to the two powers—*āvaraṇaśakti* and *vikṣepaśakti*—of *avidyā* or *māyā*, as described by the later Advaitic writers. They say that *avidyā* is *anirvācya*—सदसद्ब्रह्मनिर्वाच्यां तामविद्यां प्रचक्षते—that which cannot be identified with *sat* (*caitanya*) and with *asat* (*śaśaśrṅga*) but is *sadasadbhinna*, different from both *sat* and *asat*. This *avidyā*, they add, with its two powers—*āvaraṇaśakti* and *vikṣepaśakti*—is responsible for the creation of this entire universe which also thus acquires the property of its *pariṇāmikāraṇa* viz., *avidyā*. This explanation of the *bāhyaprapaṇca*, as *anirvacanīya* on a par with *avidyā*, is a necessary outcome of the *vivartavāda*, which the advaitins including Bhartṛhari have expounded. To them, *sat* ever exists and never becomes the object of negation, while *asat* never exists and never becomes the object of a valid cognition—सच्चैत्र बाध्यते ; असच्चैत्र प्रतीयेत । But the phenomenal world exists and at the stage of one's *Brahmasākṣātkāra*, becomes the object of negation—प्रपञ्चस्तु अस्ति, बाध्यते च. This idea is explained with some emphasis by Bhartṛhari in the *dravyasamuddēśa* of the third *kāṇḍa* of his *Vākyapadīya*—

“ न तत्त्वातत्त्वयोर्भेद इति वृद्धेभ्य आगमः ।

अतत्त्वमिति मन्यन्ते तत्त्वमेवाविचारितम् ॥ ”

(Chaukhamba Ed. Verse 7 p. 89).

7. Vide Helārāja's Commentary on verse 7, Chan., Ed., p. 89.

“ नेहाद्वैतनये सत्यासत्ये द्वे रूपे स्तः, अद्वैतहानिप्रसङ्गात् । किन्तु पारमार्थिकं एकमेवाद्वयम् ।
तच्चानादिसिद्धाविद्याविलसितसहं प्रमातृविषयतया यथातत्त्वं अनवभासमानमनेकविकल्पपरिघटिता-
कारूपतया व्यवहारमवतरति । तथा च तदेवाकारनानात्वोच्यमानस्वरूपभेदं चकास्ति, नान्यत् ।
तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्यान्यस्याभावात् । तत्र च योऽयं प्रकाशः स विद्या । अप्रकाशस्तु तमोऽविद्या । न च
प्रकाशाभावोऽप्रकाशो नाम कश्चित्प्रमाणसिद्धो निरूप्यः । ततश्च योऽयं भेदप्रकाशः सैवैकघन
प्रकाशाभावः प्रकाशविच्छेदोऽविद्या तत्त्वमेव यथाप्रतिभासं भेदेन चकासदविचारितरमणीयं
प्रपञ्चोऽतत्त्वमिति व्यवहियत इति ब्रह्मविदः । ”

According to the Advaitins there cannot be two entities—*satya* and *asatya*, while they accept one ultimate reality which they call *satya*, the so-called *asatya* is explained by them as the manifestation of this *satya*-*vastu* in the diverse but unreal form of the deep-rooted *avidyā* that completely enshrouds its substratum, the *satya*; and when that veil of *avidyā* is removed for ever, the knower, the *satya*-*vastu*, reveals himself in his own form of illumination. Such an omniscient reality is known as *vidyā* (supreme knowledge) and its reverse is *avidyā* (ignorance), the latter of which resembles only a pitch of darkness. So *avidyā* is not true entity like *vidyā*.

How these manifestations are called unreal is explained by Bhartṛhari in the verse—

“ सत्यमाकृतिसंहारे यदन्ते व्यवतिष्ठते ।

तन्नित्यं शब्दवाच्यं तच्छब्दतत्त्वं न भिद्यते ॥ ”

(Ibid, Verse 11).

While commenting on this verse Helārāja says that this *Kārikā* is based on the passage in the *Mahābhāṣya*—

“ तदेव हि नित्यं यस्मिन्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते ” ।

He further explains that just as gold though it is given different shapes and is called by different names like *rucaka* is one entity, so also the eternal Brahman is the only uniformity in all experiences presenting different phenomenal objects. No doubt, the generalities like *gotva* (cowness) are eternal when all their substrata—individuals—perish; but when these particular generalities are ignored and a higher generality like *prthivīva* (earthness) is predicated, it is understood that only *prthivī* is real; so when all high generalities are also completely ignored the objects are experienced as *mere vastus*. This uniformity in experiences is nothing but Brahman which is identical with the *Śabdatattava-parā* or *paśyanti*.

That one and the same *Ātman* is manifested through *avidyā* in diverse forms is pointed out by Bhartṛhari in the verse—

“ तन्नास्ति विद्यते तच्च तदेकं तत्पृथक् पृथक् ।

संसृष्टञ्च विभक्तञ्च विकृतं तत्तदन्यथा ॥ ”

(Ibid, Verse 13.)

This phenomenal world is a bundle of manifestations of *Ātman*. They possess diverse and sometimes inimical forms and properties like

bhāva and *abhāva* through the agency of *avidyā* which delimits *Ātman*. Hence the only truth is *Ātman* and *avidyā* and its *pariṇāmas* are illusions.

“ विद्या सा सर्वशब्दानां शब्दाश्च न पृथक् ततः ।
अपृथक्त्वे च संबन्धस्तयोर्नात्मनोरिव ॥
आत्मा परः प्रियो द्वेष्यो वक्ता वाच्यं प्रयोजनम् ।
विरुद्धानि यथैकस्य स्वमे रूपाणि चेतसः ॥
अजन्मनि तथा नित्यं पौर्वापर्यविवर्जिते ।
तत्त्वे जन्मादिरूपत्वं विरुद्धमुपलभ्यते ॥ ”

(Ibid : Verses 16-18).

Even *śabda* and *artha* are the vivartas of *Ātman* and their separate existence is only empirical. As in a dream which presents *Ātman* with diametrically antagonistic properties like *priyatva*, *dveṣyatva*, *vaktṛtva* and *vācya*, He, though ultimately eternal and devoid of states like birth, is known in the state of *vyavahāra* as possessing birth, existence, destruction and many other properties of mutually inimical character.

Thus all *Sāstras* including the *Vedas* describe in detail the nature of *avidyā* and its work in diverse ways by adopting different methods of explanation:—

‘ शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते । ’

(*Vākyapadīya-kāṇḍa* 2, verse 136).

And the knowledge of *avidyā* and of its functions in making up the phenomenal world is quite essential for a distinct understanding and realisation of the ultimate truth, though *avidyā* and its work are ultimately unreal:—

“ उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामुपलब्धनाः ।
असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥ ”

(Ibid, verse, 240).

The realisation of *śabdabrahman* by the total removal of the bondage of *avidyā* is the final aim of mankind; and *Bhartṛhari*, like other *āstika* *Ādvaitins*, exhorts people to study the *Vedas* which explain the true nature of this universe and the ultimate reality:—

“ प्राप्स्युपायोऽनुकारश्च तस्य वेदो महर्षिभिः ।
एकोऽप्यनेकवर्त्मेव समाम्नातः पृथक् पृथक् ॥ ”

(*Vākyapadīya*, *Kāṇḍa* 1, verse 5)

The *Vedas* are the only means of the knowledge of *śabda-brahman*; hence they are called *anukāra—brahman in miniature*. Those who have realised the ultimate truth call these *Vedas* the first *vivarta* of *śabdabrahman* (compare the *Brahmasūtra*, ‘*शास्त्रयोनित्वात्*’ I. 1.3), which have, owing to the incapacity of mankind, subsequently been divided into four branches, each with numerous *śākhās* or recensions. So the formal manifoldness of the *Vedas* does not in any way hamper the inner unity in the text, namely, that they uniformly expound the nature of the ultimate reality:—

“ एकोऽयं वेदाख्यो दर्शनात्मनि स्थितो दृश्योऽर्थः, स महर्षिभिर्भेदेनाभेदस्य प्रतिपादयितुमशक्यत्वादभिव्यक्तिनिमित्ताल्लब्धक्रमे वागात्मरूपे प्रापितः एकत्वानतिक्रमेण संहितापदक्रमविभागेन प्रविभक्तमागोऽध्ययननिमित्तमध्येष्टां चरणसमाख्यां व्यवस्थापयद्भिः समाम्नातः । ”

(Ibid., *Ṭikā*, p. 14).

Even the different *darśanas* which seek to explain the true nature of this universe are started on the basis of some Vedic texts which the *Darśanakāras* interpreted differently. *Bhartṛhari* says that there cannot be different interpretations of the Vedic texts emphasizing dualism or monism and that those advocating dualism mistook some *arthavādas* for *vidhis* or took those Vedic passages in their literal sense in spite of the established fact that those *arthavādas* praise or condemn things that are enjoined or prohibited by the adjoining *vidhis* or *niṣedhas*. Even among the advocates of monism, *Bhartṛhari* adds, some have fancifully suggested on the basis of *arthavādas* like “*असद्वा इदमत्र आसीत्*” praising the *cayanasthāna*, that *asat* is the only reality and that this phenomenal world, being the manifestation of that *asat*, is also *asat*—unreal, in view of the fact that the properties of the cause are transmitted to its effect.

“ तस्यार्थवादरूपाणि निश्चिताः स्वविकल्पजाः ।

एकत्विनां द्वैतिनाञ्च प्रवादा बहुधा मताः ॥

अर्थवादानर्थवादप्रकाराणि श्रुतिवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाः प्रवादाः प्रायेणानुपपन्नो दृश्यन्ते । पुरुषबुद्धिभेदाच्च प्रवादभेदास्सम्भवन्ति ॥ ”

(Ibid., *Ṭikā*, Verse 8, *ibid*, p. 17).

While there is no agreement among the *darśanas* in their explanation of the nature of this universe, *Bhartṛhari* suggests the final solution that there is only one reality which appears in diverse forms, so much so, that the ultimate truth is *advaita* and that the *dvaita* is only

its vivarta. In the Vedas there are many passages like 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' and 'आत्मैवेदं सर्वं'—expounding the nature of one ultimate reality. They cannot be set aside as mere arthavādas. The passages dealing with the dualistic aspect of this universe can be well taken in their literal sense in as much as they emphasise the empirical reality of the phenomenal world.

The ultimate truth, according to Bhartṛhari, is *śabda-brahman*. Its true symbol is the *praṇava* (Ōmkāra) which contains the essence of the Vedas. It is only through the *upāsana* of Ōmkāra that mankind can aspire for the realisation of the ultimate Brahman. It admits of both *diversity* as found in the phenomenal world and *unity*, in the ultimate truth. Those who follow the *path of Karman* or *avidyā* view diversity as real while those who transcend *Karman* and march through the path of *jñāna* see the unity through diversity.

“ अत्र प्रणवः सर्वाभ्यनुज्ञाविषयः सर्वश्रुतिरूपः प्रकृतिसर्वनाम सर्वदर्शनोदय-
प्रत्यस्तमययोनिः सर्वविरुद्धार्थोपग्राही सर्ववेदं ब्रह्माभ्यनुजानाति । सर्वथा च प्रतिषेधति ।
न च प्रतिषेधाभ्यनुज्ञयोः अस्य प्रवृत्तितत्त्वं विकल्पते । तथाह्याहुः—

तदेतदेकं नैकञ्च तथोमे नाप्युमे न च ।

कर्मस्था विषमं ब्रूयुः सत्त्वस्थास्समदर्शिनः ॥ ”

(Ibid., *Ṭikā*, Verse 9, pp. 20 & 21).

The greatness of Ōmkāra, the essence of the Vedas, cannot be over-estimated. From it, not only all *darśanas* are developed, but also all other *vidyās*—the six *vedāṅgas* beginning with the *śikṣā* and the various *upāṅgas* like the *purāṇas* and *dharmaśāstras*—thus constituting the main basis of the Hindu culture and the sole means of supreme knowledge.

“ विधातुस्तस्य लोकानामङ्गोपाङ्गनिबन्धनाः ।

विद्याभेदाः प्रतायन्ते ज्ञानसंस्कारहेतवः ॥ ”

(Ibid., *Kāṇḍa* 1, Verse 10.)

Ōmkāra or the Vedas are called the very creator of this mundane world in that all *vidyās* of both spiritual and temporal utility do not transgress the path of the Vedas. “ वेदो हि लोकानां प्रकृतित्वेन चोपदेष्टृत्वेन च विवर्तेषु व्यवस्थासु च विधाता । प्रणव एव वेद इत्येके, स हि शब्दार्थप्रकृतिरिति । एतस्मिंश्च दर्शने विद्याभेदाः प्रणवात्मतया वेदतत्त्वत्रातिक्रामन्ति । तदाहुः—सर्वा वाचो वेदमनुप्रविष्टाः; नावेदविन्मनुते ब्रह्म किञ्चित् ।”

(Ibid., *Ṭikā*, Verse 10, p. 21).

And mankind has to rely on the Vedas alone in order to seek the knowledge of the Absolute and consequently its eternal emancipation.⁸

Like other Āstika philosophers Bhartṛhari emphasizes the fact that all *smṛtis* including the chief *vedāṅga*, *vyākaraṇaśāstra*, codified by great Seers and the practices or customs of the *Śiṣṭas* are also authorities on dharma in that they are composed or practised by them after their understanding the hidden or scattered truths of the Vedas.

“ न चागमादृते धर्मस्तर्केण व्यवतिष्ठते ।

ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् ॥ ”

(Ibid., Verse 30)

The knowledge of dharma and other supernormal things like Mokṣa can be obtained only by a careful study of Āgamas (Vedas, Smṛtis and *śiṣṭācāras*.) Logical arguments cannot enlighten mankind on the supernormal questions. Even on matters perceptible and inferable, Bhartṛhari says, human logic miserably fails in giving a proper explanation.

‘ को ह्यनवस्थितसाधर्म्यवैधर्म्येषु नित्यमलब्धनिश्चयेषु पुरुषतर्केषु विश्वासः ? ’

(Ibid., *Ṭikā*, p. 46, V. 30).

So superiority of Āgama to tarka (logical arguments) is one of the fundamental doctrines that all Advaitins have emphasised; and Bhartṛhari, in the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of his *Vākyapadīya*, devotes a major section to this topic. Man generally relies on his special gift, viz., reason, but it fails in giving true solutions for the puzzling problems like the nature of the ultimate reality and its relation to the phenomenal world. Tarka leaves always a residue of doubt in man, with the result that he is disinclined to accept even the solution given by Āgama, which alone, as true revelations and invaluable records of truth, is the infallible authority on those supernormal matters. It is therefore laid down that on questions


8. Here some Vedic passages explaining the true nature of *śabdabrahman* may be noted:

“ वागेवार्थं पश्यति वागेवार्थं ब्रवीति वागेवार्थं निहितं सन्तनोति । वाच्येव विश्वं बहुरूपं निबद्धं तदेतदेकं प्रविमल्योपपृच्छते । ओमित्येददक्षरमिदं सर्वं, वाचो ह वाक् । ”

These explain the nature of the *śabda-brahman*, as *satya*, *eka*, and *ananta*, and as the creator of this phenomenal world.

‘ तमेव भान्तमनु माति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विमाति । ’

describes the *svaprakāśatva* of Brahman.



of supernormal characters like dharma, Āgama, Vedas, smṛtis, etc., generally known as *śāstra*—is the only authority.

“ तस्माच्छास्त्रं ब्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थिते ”

(Bh. Gītā. Chap. 16. Verse 24.)

and tarka—reasonable arguments chiefly in the form of syllogism—is unreliable, for, however great might be a man's intellectual attainments, his well-thought-out syllogism will in no time be proved fallacious by a greater intellectual giant.

“ यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।

अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपाद्यते ॥ ”

(Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa 1, V. 34.)

Bhartrhari compares the man who relies simply on his reason in *alaukika* topics to a blind person who, when he touches only with his hands the slope of a huge precipice and advances further, is doomed to death by an instantaneous fall—

“ हस्तस्पर्शादिवान्धेन विषमेऽप्यभिधावता ।

अनुमानप्रधानेन विनिपातो न दुर्लभः ॥ ”

(Ibid., Verse 42.)

Bhartrhari does *not*, however, completely set aside *tarka* as *apramāṇa*. His famous dictum is:—

“ वेदशास्त्राविरोधी च तर्कश्चक्षुरपश्यताम् ॥ ”

Tarka which does not go against the Vedas and Śāstras, is really helpful to those who seek the realisation of the highest truth. It may be noted here that this doctrine, namely, that tarka which has the support of Āgama, is an authority, is further elaborated and used by all Advaitins as one of the powerful arguments against the exponents of bhedavāda—the doctrine of dualism. It is even said:—

“ यस्तर्केणानुसन्धते स धर्म वेद नेतरः—”

He alone understands dharma, who makes a judicious use of tarka. So tarka is of paramount importance in that it is of great use to mankind for understanding the true import of Āgama; but it must be remembered that it cannot enlighten mankind against the authority of Āgama on all matters on which it cannot be considered an infallible and ultimate authority.

Not only in the glorification of Āgama as an independent and infallible authority does Bhartrhari wax eloquent, but also in the glorification

of Śabda. It has already been said that Bhartrhari conceives it as the ultimate reality. He says that Vedic seers call Śabda, the inner Soul of the speaker and the *Divine Bull* which has come down from heaven to bless mankind—

“ अपि प्रयोक्तुरात्मानं शब्दमन्तस्वस्थितम् ।

प्राहुर्महान्तमृषम्⁹ येन सायुज्यमिष्यते ॥ ”

(Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa I, Verse 131.)

Hence the importance of Śabdopāsti and Ōmkāropāsti which lead one to the spiritual path of the realisation of Śabda-brahman.

Equally important is Śabda in the *vyavahārāvasthā* also. Bhartrhari emphasizes the fact that there is no cognition without the accompaniment of a Śabda and that all cognitions get their property of illumination through Śabda—

“ न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यश्शब्दानुगमादृते ।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥ ”

(Ibid., Verse 124.)

The true nature of knowledge is *prakāśa*—illumination and this illumination of knowledge cannot be effective if all knowledge is deprived of its expressive element of Śabda—

“ वाग्रूपता चेदुक्तामेत् अवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।

न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥ ”

(Ibid., Verse 125.)

That Śabda is self-luminous and that it gives illumination to all objects is well explained in the following passage—

“ इह त्रीणि ज्योतीषि तयः प्रकाशाः स्वरूपपररूपयोरवद्योतकाः । तद्यथा—
योऽयं जातवेदाः यश्च पुरुषेष्वन्तरः प्रकाशो यश्च प्रकाशाप्रकाशयोः प्रकाशयिता शब्दाख्यः
प्रकाशः तत्रैतत्सर्वमुपनिबद्धं यावत् स्थासु चरिष्णु चेति । ”

(Ibid., Tīkā, p. 24, Verse 12.)

The fact that all cognitions involve a word-element led all grammarians to believe, that all cognitions are only determinate cognitions; but it must be said that this view has reference and application to cognitions of *vyavahārāvasthā* (empirical stage) and not to the *Brahmasākṣātkāra*.

9. Compare the Rk.

चत्वारि शृङ्गास्तयो अस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासो अस्य ।

त्रिधा बद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्त्या आश्रितः ॥

The Daśa-Prakaraṇas

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CHAPTER IV.

i

‘Daśa Prakaraṇas’ is the name collectively given to ten minor philosophical tracts of Madhva. They are (1) the *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* (PL), (2) the *Kathā-Lakṣaṇa* (KL), (3) the *Upādhikhaṇḍana* (UK), (4) the *Māyāvāda-Khaṇḍana* (MK), (5) The *Prapañcamithyātva-numāna-Khaṇḍana* (PMK), (6) the *Tattvasamkhyāna* (TS), (7) the *Tattva-viveka* (TV), (8) the *Tattvodyota* (TD), (9) the *Viṣṇu-Tattva-nirṇaya* (VTN), and (10) the *Karma-nirṇaya* (KN). They deal with various aspects of the Dvaita system, its logic and ontology, its theology, theory of knowledge, etc. Five of them are refutations of the monistic idealism of Śaṅkara from various points of view. Nos. 6-9 above, may be described as constructive works devoted to the exposition of Madhva’s Cosmic scheme and ancillary matters. The language of these Prakaraṇas is throughout tough and terse. But for the lucid commentaries of Jayatīrtha on them, they would still have remained obscure. Excepting the VTN., all the other Prakaraṇas are short ones.

(9) The *Pramāṇa-Lakṣaṇa*.

In traditional accounts of systems of Indian philosophy, it is usual to begin with a statement of the number and nature of *Pramāṇas*, i.e., sources or guarantors of correct knowledge, recognised in any given system. Max Müller expresses great admiration for this practice of Indian writers as it removes a good lot of misunderstanding and makes the task of philosophical assessment of a given system, easy.

Following this time-honoured practice, Madhva indicates in his *PL.*, the number of *Pramāṇas* admitted by him, their definitions, mode of functioning, and the nature of reality apprehended by them. We are told at the end of the work that the exposition has been based on the *Brahma-tarka* of Vyāsa, not now extant

ii

(1) The attacks made by the Advaitins pursuing the dialectic method of inquiry and refutation of the Buddhists, against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

realism, its categories and thought—measuring devices, seem to have been responsible in turn, for the composition of such works as the *PL.*, by Madhva, in an attempt obviously at protecting his own system from similar attacks.¹ He has therefore taken due cognisance of the criticisms of Advaitic Dialecticians like Vimuktātman and Anandabodha, against various types of realism and has endeavoured to discard much that was superfluous or illogical in the older systems of realism, while improving upon all that was of permanent value and metaphysical merit in them.

(2) The Naiyāyikas themselves had, as a result of outside criticism, introduced many new changes in the *minutiae* and methodology of their system. Much of the old looseness of thought and vocabulary had been shed and a new school of Logic inaugurated by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, with a staggering paraphernalia of technical jargon, had come into being.

(3) Tho’ a realist himself, Madhva had his own differences with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.² It was forced upon him therefore, to traverse the entire field of realism from a newer angle of vision. A certain amount of constructive exposition of one’s own views becomes necessary in such cases. It is to these tasks then, that Madhva addressed himself in his *Prakaraṇas*.

iii

A *Pramāṇa* as originally understood is a means or guarantor of valid knowledge : प्रमाणं प्रमाणम् । But to Madhva it has another and a higher connotation also, viz., the core of reality itself : यदार्थं प्रमाणम् । प्रमाण embraces within its fold, both reality and knowledge as well as the means of such knowledge. True knowledge *per se* is “Kevala-Pramāṇa.” What leads to it is “Anu-Pramāṇam.” Sense perception, Inference and verbal testimony, come under the latter head.

Madhva accepts but *three*³ *Pramāṇas* as fundamental : प्रत्यक्ष (sense-perception), अनुमान (Inference) and आगम (Verbal testimony sic. Scripture). The additional *Pramāṇas* recognised in other systems such as the उपमान of Gautama and अर्थपत्ति are subsumed under Inference. “अनुपलब्धि” of the Bhāṭṭas is subsumed partly under Inference and partly under sense-perception, and “सम्भव” and

1. It is significant that one of Vimuktātman’s works bears the title of “*Pramāṇa-vṛtta-nirṇaya*”. (See his *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 37, G.O.S.).

2. See Part III, Chap. i.

3. Like the Sāṃkhyas (*Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 4) the Yogas and Bhāsarvajña among the Naiyāyikas.

“परिशेष” under Inference. The scheme of Pramāṇas is thus considerably simplified, and reduced to the barest limits of logical necessity. The subject of Fallacies is similarly treated. The number of अवयव s, terms or members indispensable for an adequate syllogistic statement, is cut down to the barest minimum. Madhva makes no fetish of the exact number of Avayavas that will have to be recognised for a complete syllogism. As a general rule, he is for three: प्रतिज्ञा हेतु and दृष्टान्त and dispenses with the well-known scheme of five-membered syllogism (Pañcāvayava-vākya) of the Naiyāyikas.⁴ Even a bare proposition implying a probandum (hetu) will do; or even an instance involving a major term (pratijñā) and a probandum. The subject of “Nigrahasthānas” (points for closure of a debate) is also similarly treated. The Nyāya definition of Pramāṇa as “सम्यग्नुमत्साधनम्” is analysed and refuted. The validity of Smṛti (recollection) denied by some philosophers, is resolutely maintained.⁵ Madhva says in this connection that the very edifice of Experience must collapse if the validity of our recollections is impugned: अप्रामाण्याङ्गीकरे, अनुमत्तं सयेत्यत्र प्रमाणभावात्”. To try to establish a validity for our past experience through Inference, involves needless strain and violence to facts: लिङ्गत्वेन प्रामाण्यकल्पने कल्पनागोरवे, दृष्टहानिश्च । The domain of Prameyas is then exhaustively dealt with. The number of granthas in the PL., is 50.

(10) The Kathā-Lakṣaṇa.

This is a metrical monograph in 25½ anuṣṭubhs, devoted to an exposition of the art of debate, the rules and regulations governing its conduct. Here also, the exposition is said to follow the *Brahmatarka*.

Debates and disputations for the purpose of settling doctrinal differences and for the ascertainment of truth, were common enough in the intellectual life of the 12th and 13th centuries, in India. In the ancient days, the Buddhists, Jains and the Naiyāyikas had been the makers of Logic and the leaders in debate. Between the 10th and 12th centuries, the shield was entirely with the Advaitins. Madhva's object in writing the *Kathālakṣaṇa* must have been to train his disciples to become adepts in the art of debate as well as to be able to carry fire and sword into the enemies' camp. Some of his peculiar views on the different items of the subject also called for a suitable medium of presentation.

4. *Nyāyasūtra*, i, 1, 32.

5. On the validity of Smṛti-cognition see Umesh Miśra's article in the *Pāṭhaka Com. Vol.*, pp. 177-86.

ii

Madhva insists upon the recognition of three species of Debate: वाद, जल्प and वितण्डा, rejecting the other classifications attempted by the Buddhists, Śrīharṣa and some Naiyāyikas. Vāda is the purest form of debate carried on solely for the ascertainment of truth. Jalpa is a less exalted form of it which may be indulged in either as a test of ability or for victory (जयपराजय)⁶ etc. “Vitaṇḍā” is cleansed of much of its bad odour and raised to the rank of an independent species of debate perfectly legitimate and laudable where an honest soul is confronted with a particularly vicious or villainous opponent: वितण्डा तु सतामन्यैः । It is merely an occasion where one refuses to throw pearls before swines. In such extremities, the Siddhāntin merely adopts a destructive attitude, demolishing the arguments of his adversary and exposing their hollowness, without in any way disclosing his own views: तत्त्वमेव निगूहितम्. Such a procedure may not be flattering to one's higher ideals of truth-determination, but it takes all sorts of men to make a debate. Vitaṇḍā is the honest man's armour against villainy and falsehood masquerading as goodness and truth. It is a safeguard against unscrupulous argument: कण्टकशाखावरणवत् (*Nyāyasūtra*, iv, 2,50).

(11) The Upādhi-Khaṇḍana.

This is a short metrical tract in 20 granthas, criticising the concept of “Upādhi” (the pluralising agency) which plays so large and necessary a part in the ब्रह्माज्ञानवाद of Śaṅkara. The world of plurality is believed by the Advaitin to be the outcome of fontal ignorance playing upon the One Real. The oneness of existence is the truth of things and all plurality is ascribable to this fontal ignorance: अनाद्यविद्या. Madhva naturally opens his attack by pointing out that the very idea of such a Nescience descending upon the Brahman is unthinkable, unaccountable and impossible: अज्ञताखिलसंबन्धेर्घटते न कुतश्चन । If Brahman is the only thing that is, where and whence does Ignorance come in? If it is to be rendered possible by the intervention of an Upādhi, the question naturally arises as to how this Upādhi itself is to be conceived of,—whether as a real and essential feature of the Brahman or as itself being due to an earlier layer of ignorance. A real Upādhi spells danger to a Monism. To rely upon a previous ignorance to create a subsequent Upādhi is court the double fallacy of a *regressus ad infinitum* and mutual interdependence in reasoning. It is thus impossible to make out any rational and intelligible relation between the Upādhi and the Brahman. The progress

6. ख्यातिलामपूजा etc.

of Ignorance being thus arrested at the very outset, there is no individual soul resulting therefrom. There is thus no ignorant Adhikāri, nothing unknown and no fit subject for metaphysical investigation.⁷

A Dualism has no such difficulties. In it, a spiritual aspirant (not identical with the Brahman) knowing *something* of the Brahman, and wanting to know *more*, is the proper person (Adhikāri) to undertake metaphysical quest, undergo the necessary discipline laid down in the Śāstras, and reap the benefit of his labours. Everything is thus intelligible in a Dualism.

(12) *Prapañca-Mithyātvānumāna-Khaṇḍana.*

The well-known syllogism of the monist: विमतं मिथ्या । दृश्यत्वात्, जडत्वात्, परिच्छिन्नत्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यत्वात् । intended to establish the unreality of the world, is analysed and refuted, in minute detail, in this Prakaraṇa of twenty-nine lines.

The minor term of the syllogism itself is shown to be built on quicksands. The concept of Anirvacanīya is *avowedly* irrational^{7a} and no inference can be based upon it. Criticisms are urged from the point of view of both formal and inductive logic.

(13) *The Māyāvāda-Khaṇḍana.*

In this Prakaraṇa of 20 granthas, Madhva contends that none of the fourfold requisites of traditional system-building, viz., the अधिकारी, विषय etc., can be satisfactorily made out on any kind of Monism, much less in the निर्विशेषाद्वैत of Śaṅkara. The identity of Jīva and Brahman which is the central thesis of Advaita, is shown to be riddled with contradictions. How is this identity to be conceived of? Is it anything *other* than the Brahman, or *one with it*? If the former, we have a dualism. In the latter case, there is a "Siddha-sādhana". For, the Brahman is conceived by the Advaitin as essentially self-revealed (स्वयंप्रकाश), in that it is outside the pale of Pramāṇas and unknowable: अवेद्यत्वे सति अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वम्. (Citsukha).

If then, the identity that is the विषय (thesis) of Monism were *one* with the Brahman, it would, like the Brahman itself, be equally self-revealed and outside the pale of any Pramāṇa or Śāstra like

7. Cf. न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः न बद्धो न च माधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ (Gaṇḍapāda-Kārikā, ii, 31).

Also: यद्येवं प्रतिबुद्धोऽसि नास्ति कस्यचिदप्रबोधः । (Śaṅkara, B.S.B., iv, 1. 3.)

and: यद्यद्वैते न तोषोऽस्ति मुक्त एवासि सर्वदा ॥ (Vācaspati on ibid.).

7a. Cf. दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दूषणम् ।

कथंचित् घटमानत्वेऽविद्यात्वं दुर्घटं भवेत् ॥ (Iṣṭasiddhi).

the Advaita-Vedānta. There would thus be no need or justification for any Śāstra of the monist. A Pramāṇa, moreover, is (admitted by the Advaitins to be) what makes the unknown, known:— अनधिगतार्थगन्तुः.⁸ The Advaitaśāstra cannot surely be claimed to be valid (प्रमाण) in *this* sense. So long as Advaitism stands committed to the निर्विशेषाद्वैत of Śaṅkara, there is no way out of the difficulty. Since ऐक्य is necessarily characterless, there can be no point in saying that Scripture enables us to know those *aspects* of the Brahman which are not already known: निर्विशेषत्वादात्मनो नानधिगतो विशेषः.⁹ One can also raise the question if the identity preached by the monist is real or fictitious. Neither alternative can be welcome to him. The impossibility of Ignorance affecting the Brahman, vitiates the whole of monistic metaphysics: अज्ञानासम्भवादेव तन्मत्तमखिलमपि निरस्तम् । In view of the said identity, there can be no real Adhikāri entitled to philosophise or undergo spiritual discipline. For this same reason, Mokṣa cannot be the goal of metaphysics, as on the monistic doctrine, everybody is free *here and now* and release is not a state to be attained in the hereafter: स्वरूपत्वान्योक्षस्य पूर्वमेव सिद्धत्वात् । Cf. Śaṅkara: मोक्षस्य अकार्यत्वात् (G.B. iii, 1). अस्माकं तु न मोक्षः साध्यः । अपि तु, ब्रह्मस्वरूपं, तच्च नित्यमिति ॥ (Bhāmātī, II, 3, 40.)

Towards the close of the MK., Madhva refutes briefly the view of Śrīharṣa that अविद्यानिवृत्ति (cessation of Ignorance) is indistinguishable from the Ātman: आत्मब्राह्मणहानिः; as well as that of Vimuktātman that it belongs entirely to a fifth order of prediction: पञ्चम-प्रकारताः—

न सन्नासन्न सदसन्नानिर्वाच्योऽपि तत्क्षयः ।¹⁰

यक्षानुरूपो बलिरित्याचार्याः प्रत्यपीपदन् ॥

(Ānandabodha, Nyāyamakaranda).

These defects and pitfalls of Monism, force a Dualism upon us.

8. This is the Bhāṭṭa definition of Pramāṇa, which is admitted by the Advaitins for all "practical purposes": व्यवहारे भट्टनयः ।—See also: Bhāmātī on B.S. II, 1, 14.

9. This disposes of the plea raised by Śaṅkara under B.S. i, 1. 1. तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा and his reply to it.


10. Cf. न सन्नासन्न सदसन्नचाप्यनुसयरूपकम् ।

चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं तत्त्वं माध्यमिका विदुः ॥

(Buddhist Kārikā, quoted by Vedānta Deśika, in his Śatadūṣaṇi, p. 85, S. S. Muktāvali Series.)

(14) *The Tattvasamkhyāna*¹¹

The *Tattva-samkhyāna* (11 granthas), enumerates the categories recognised in the Dvaita system. Here, reality is dichotomised into 'Sva-tantra' (Independent) and 'Paratantra' (Dependent). This is the highest metaphysical classification in the Dvaita system, from which evidently it derives its name. Viṣṇu is the highest Independent Real. All else is dependent upon Him, including the Goddess Lakṣmī. Dependence does not mean unreality. The finite creation is always dependent on God, but is none the less real, even as *He* is. The inner ramifications of finite creation are then set forth in detail. The author emphasises that difference and disparity are found everywhere among the finite selves, in constitution and equipment which points to a hierarchy (तारतम्य) among gods, demons and men. A detailed cosmic scheme from the Supreme Lord down to inanimate creation is then put forth. Three classes of souls are distinguished among those that are now in bondage: Muktiyogya (salvable), Tamoyogya (those that will eventually qualify themselves for eternal perdition) and Nityasamsārins (those that will always be subject to transmigration). Those who want to be released from bondage must learn to look upon God as the One Being who is responsible in various ways, for the preservation, control, absorption, enlightenment, etc., of the world.

(15) *The Tattvaviveka*

This, in 13 granthas (metrical), covers the same ground as the *TS.*, and need not therefore be separately noticed.

(16) *The Tattvodyota*¹²

This is one of the fighting treatises of Madhva in which he has discussed and refuted some of the leading doctrines and fundamental con-

11. Not "Tattva-samkhyāyana" as it is given in Dr. Saletore's *History of Tuluva*, p. 441. Poona, 1936.

12. Not "Tattvadyota" as it is called by Dr. Saletore : *History of Tuluva*, p. 441.

cepts of the Advaitavedānta. It is traditionally believed to embody some of the arguments actually employed by *Madhva* in his historic debate with the two celebrated Advaitins of his day : Puṇḍarīka Puri¹³ and Padma Tīrtha, recorded in the *Madhva-Vijaya*, xii, 1-54.

i

The author maintains at the outset that "Difference" (भेद) is the fundamental concomitant of nature. It persists even in Mokṣa, between the Brahman and the freed souls, and amongst the latter. The more should it hold sway on this side of release (saṃsāra-avasthā). It is hardly convincing to dismiss it as an unreal projection of the mind. The concept of Anirvacanīya is warranted neither by the facts of life nor by the force of logic. It is a figment of the monist's imagination having no support in the Scriptures. *Madhva* denies that there is any basis for this idea in the Nāsadiya Sūkta (R.V. X, 129). If what is left over (परिशिष्ट) after the denial of "Sat" and "Asat" (in R. V. x 129, 1) were to be viewed as necessarily अनिर्वचनीय, one would have to characterise the Brahman also as अनिर्वचनीय for, its existence is affirmed : आनीदवाते स्वधया तदेकम् । immediately after a series of denials : नासदासीन्नो सदासीत् तदानीम् '.....earlier.¹⁴

ii

Syllogisms advanced by the Monist in support of the unreality of phenomena (मिथ्यात्व) are shown to be full of fallacies and contradictions : दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानेऽपि एतद्वदोषाः । The minor terms and grounds of inductive generalisation in these cases, are refuted in great detail. The reality of the world which is borne in upon us by our own consolidated experience cannot be suppressed by any amount of specious reasoning. If the verdict of experience is to be set aside, it can only be on the strength of a more powerful and subsequent experience (बाधकानुभव) now and here. And we know only too well that such is never the case.

13. See also *Madhvaviṇayaabhāva-prakāśikā* and Jayatīrtha's com. on the *Td.* (end).

14. Cf. "Moreover, it ignores the previously postulated 'That' which by its terms eliminates non-being. The poet here unquestionably entangles himself in sham profundity." Bloomfield, *Religion of the Veda*, 1908, p. 238.

iii

Long before *Madhva*, the Advaitins had been suspected of inward leanings to Buddhism.¹⁵ Advaita was openly denounced as Buddhism in disguise, by such early writers as Bhāskara¹⁶, Parthasārathi Miśra¹⁷ Yādavaprakāśa¹⁸ and Rāmānuja.¹⁹ From the early days,²⁰ the Advaitins had been vehemently protesting²¹ that theirs was certainly not a Buddhism. The prejudice and antipathy to Advaita was very strong in *Madhva's* days. It is not to be wondered if he chose to exploit this prevailing antipathy of his times, to the Advaita, both in learned quarters as well as amongst the people,²² to further the interests of his own faith. What is important however is that unlike most of his predecessors, he took it upon himself to substantiate his allegations against the Advaita, with chapter and verse, in his *Tattvodyota* and to a lesser extent elsewhere. So much so that academically speaking, we have to look up to *Madhva* for a really exhaustive treatment of this question. The charge of crypto-Buddhism was certainly not invented by *Madhva*.²³ But he shared the general belief of scholars then as now, that it bore a very strong family-resemblance to Buddhism and that for all practical purposes, it was but a restatement of Buddhistic

15. See *Gaudapāda-Kārikā*, iv, 99 and the remarks of Śaṃkara and Anandagiri thereon.

16. विगीते विच्छिन्नमूलं माहायानिकबौद्धाश्रितं मायावादं व्यावर्णयन्ती लोकान् व्यामोहयन्ति । B.S.B., Chouk. S. S., 15, p. 85 and op. cit., p. 124.

17. तद्वरं मायावादमाहायानिकम् ।

18. वेदोऽनृतो बुद्धकृतममोऽनृतः प्रामाण्यमेतस्य च तस्य चानृतम् ।
बौद्धानृतो बुद्धिफले तथा नृते यूयं च बौद्धाश्च समानसम्पदः ॥"

quoted by Deśika, in his *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1900, p. 363.

19. *Vedārtha-samgraha*, Pandit Rep., p. 86.

20. Vide *Gaudapāda* : नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् (iv, 99) already referred to, f.n. 15 above.

21. See *Vivaraṇa* : यस्तु कश्चिज्जल्पति—सुगतविज्ञानवादसमानोऽयं वेदान्तवाद इति..... Viz., S. S. 1892, p. 84 and *Samkṣepasāriraka*, ii, 25-27.

22. As reflected in the verses of the *Padma-Purāṇa* : मायावादमसत्कारं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमुच्यते । etc.

23. Nor has *Madhva* used the odious expression प्रच्छन्नबौद्ध in any of his works, though he has made it quite clear that in his opinion, the Advaita is indistinguishable from Buddhism, in its metaphysics. So far as I am aware, the term first occurs in the *M. Vij.* (i, 51) of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita and secondly in the *Śatadūṣaṇi* of Vedānta Deśika who calls upon the followers of Rāmānuja to gird up their loins and fight the "Pracchanna-Bauddhas" to the finish : प्रच्छन्नबौद्धविजये परितो यतश्चम् ।

ideas in Upaniṣadic and Vedāntic phraseology. Madhva makes this the vantage-ground of his attacks on the Advaita. He quotes profusely from the standard Buddhistic works of his days²⁴ and from well-known Advaitic works like the *Samkṣepa-Sārīraka*²⁵ (i, 1) : अनृतजडविरोधिरूपमन्त-यमलबन्धनदुःखताविरुद्धम् ।

Madhva contends²⁶ that the attributeless Brahman of the monist can hardly be distinguished from the शून्य of the Buddhistic Nihi-

24. Unfortunately, the names of these Buddhist works (metrical) from which Madhva has quoted passages in his *Td.*, are not ascertainable. It is thus difficult to trace the passages; but I have it on the authority of Syt. Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya of Santiniketan, that though the passages cited by Madhva could not be traced in the Buddhist works now available to us, the ideas have many clear parallels in the extant literature of the Buddhists. One or two instances may be given:

अपरप्रत्ययं शान्तं प्रपञ्चैरप्रपञ्चितम् ।

निर्विकल्पमनानार्थमेतत् तत्त्वस्य लक्षणम् ॥

Mādhyamaka Kārikā, 24, p. 372, which may be compared with No. 8 of Madhva; द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य . . . (*Mādhyamaka Kārikā*) with No. 1; नैव भावो न बाभावः न पृथक्त्वेकलक्षणम् । *Madhyāntavibhāgasūtra*, i, 14(text) and Sthiramati's Com. thereon: तत्र लक्षणं भावाभावप्रतिषेधात्मकं शून्यतायाः C.O.S., 24, p. 38 ab. (cf. No. 5. of Madhva).

25. Not from "*Murāri Śataka*" as stated by Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma in his *Reign of Realism in I. Phil.*, 1937, p. 207.

26. There are altogether eight verses quoted by Madhva from Buddhist sources They are:

सत्यं तु द्विविधं प्रोक्तं सांवृतं पारमार्थिकम् ।

सांवृतं व्यवहार्यं स्यान्नित्यं पारमार्थिकम् ॥ १ ॥

विचार्यमाणे नोऽस्तत्वे सत्त्वे चापि प्रतीयते ।

यस्य तत्सांवृतं स्यात् व्यवहारपदं च यत् ॥ २ ॥

निर्विशेषं सत्यं भातं निर्लेपमजरामरम् ।

शून्यं तत्त्वमविज्ञेयं मनोवाचामगोचरम् ॥ ३ ॥

जात्यसंवृतिदुःखान्तं पूर्वदोषविरोधि यत् ।

नित्यभावनया भातं तद्भावं योगिनं नयेत् ॥ ४ ॥

भावार्थप्रतियोगित्वं भावत्वं वा न तत्त्वतः ।

विश्वाकारं च संवृत्त्या यस्य तत्पदमक्षयम् ॥ ५ ॥

नास्य सत्त्वं न वासत्त्वं न दोषो गुण एव वा ।

हेयोपादेयरहितं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ ६ ॥

अवाच्यं सर्वशब्दैस्तद्वक्ष्यते चाखिलैः पदैः ।

अज्ञेयं ज्ञानलक्ष्यं च तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ ७ ॥

यदखण्डं पदं लक्ष्यं सर्वैरपि विशेषणैः

सर्वैर्विशेषणैर्मुक्तं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ ८ ॥

lism.²⁷ Both are अखण्ड ; beyond thought and word (अवाच्य) ; and can only be expressed through negatives (व्यावृत्ति = अपोह). The so-called व्यावहारिकसत्य of the Advaitin is nothing but the संवृतिसत्य of the Buddhist,²⁸ writ larger. The ideal of "Nirvāṇa and the goal of Brahmanbhāva" are nearly the same. In view of so much striking affinity in doctrines, Madhva asserts that Advaita is indeed Buddhism: न च शून्यवादिनः सकाशाद्वैलक्षण्यं मायावादिनः । The Advaitins' belief in the Veda turns out to be a veritable imposture when it is remembered that they dismiss the entire Karmakāṇḍa and all those dualistic texts in the Upaniṣads as "not-truth-declaring" (अतत्त्वावेदक).²⁹ Madhva naturally protests against such high-handed treatment to the Vedas which is worse than the Buddhists' open abjuration of them. The attitude of the Advaitin is, moreover, inconsistent : (नहि कुक्कुट्या एको भागः प्रसवायापरः पाकाय कल्पते). If one part Scripture can speak untruth (अतत्त्व) what guarantee is there for the other parts alone ? Madhva winds up with the observation that the refutation of Buddhist Idealism and nihilism in the *Vedānta Sūtras*, is thus tantamount to a refutation of Advaitism itself.³⁰ 'नासतो दृष्टत्वात्' 'नाभाव उपलब्धेः' 'वैधर्म्याच्च न संप्रादिवत्' इत्यादि भगवद्वचनेनापि निरस्ताः । न च शून्यवादिनः सकाशाद्वैलक्षण्यं मायावादिनः ॥

iv

There is a constructive side to the *Td.*, wherein Madhva quotes many passages to show that Theism is the only philosophy accepted by the Śāstras. Such texts as have been claimed by the Advaitin to support the अखण्डार्यवाद (Tattvam asi) according to which passages of the śruti are believed somehow to refer to an attributeless Absolute, are reinterpreted in conformity with Theism. The work concludes with a brief criticism of the एकजीवाज्ञानवाद। The last seven stanzas do not belong to Madhva. They are in the nature of a tribute paid to him by the admiring witnesses to his debate with Puṇḍa-

27. Das Gupta, *I. Phil.*, i, p. 493-4.

28. द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।

लोके संवृतिसत्यं च, सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥ (*Mādhyamaka Kārikā*, xxiv, 492).

This Kārikā of Nāgārjuna is quoted by Jayatīrtha in his com. on *Td.* but the Buddhist verses quoted by Madhva do not, so far as at present ascertainable, appear to be those of Nāgārjuna as Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma (*Reign of Realism in I. Phil.*, p. 209) would have us believe.

29. Vide *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, ii, 43; iii, 287.

30. Cf. Bhāskara on the Sūtra वैधर्म्याच्च न संप्रादिवत् ॥

ये तु बौद्धमतान्तरि नो मायावादिनः, तेऽप्यनेनैव न्यायेन सूत्रकरणेन निरस्ता वेदितव्याः॥ (p. 124).

rika Purī, and were incorporated into the body of the Td., at the special request of these disciples.³¹

(17) *The Viṣṇu-tattva-Nirṇaya.*

i

This is the longest (540 granthas) and most important of the Prakaraṇas and contains an exhaustive refutation of Advaita. It is divided into three Paricchedas. The scope of the work is thus indicated at the beginning of the work :

सदागमैकविज्ञेयं समतीक्ष्णक्षरम् ।
नारायणं सदा बन्धे निर्दोषशेषसद्गुणम् ॥
विशेषणानि यानीह कथितानि, सदुक्तिभिः ।
साधयिष्यामि तानीह कमात्सज्जनसंविदे ॥

Preparatory to establishing the thesis that Nārāyaṇa is the highest subject-matter of the Vedaśāstra, Madhva discusses the question of the place and importance of Śabda among the Pramāṇas, and argues a strong case for the infallibility of the Vedas. They are self-valid सतः प्रमाण and cannot be ascribed to any known author, human or divine.³² The eternity of the Vedas is built on the eternity of Śabda.³³ It is convincingly shown that no system of philosophy can do without some kind of 'Apauruṣeyavākya.' Even the Buddhists and the Cārvākas are forced to admit some kind of Śabda-pramāṇa which is incapable of being ascribed to any author.

ii

Madhva pleads strongly that ineradicable difference between God and Man is the central theme of the Śāstras :

अतः सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वाभावेदे तात्पर्यं वाक्यस्य । किन्तु, विष्णोः सर्वोत्तमत्व एव महातात्पर्यं सर्वांगमानाम् ।

With cogent reasons he repudiates the Advaitic view that all those Scriptural texts which speak of difference are to be looked upon as being merely अनुवादक, repetitive in spirit. Our knowledge of the existence of God is derived solely from Scripture (B.S. i, l. 3).

31. See Jayatīrtha's com. on these verses (in his Td.-tīkā).

32. तत्प्रामाण्यं च सत एव सिद्धम् । वेदकर्तृप्रसिद्धेः । (VTN).

33. अत आकाशगुणे शब्दे व्यज्यमाना वर्णादयः तत्कमात्मको वेदश्च नित्य एवेति सिद्धम् ॥
(op. cit.)

Such being the case, it will never do for Scripture to cut the ground from under its own feet. The monistic texts are considerably weakened by their conflict with the consolidated experience अवाधितानुभव of humanity and Inference. Tho' it is no doubt true that Āgama has, as a rule, precedence over other means of proof, it cannot be considered valid when it goes against its very prop and support : उपजीव्यश्रुति—viz., those which establish the Brahman *ex hypothesi* to be Sarvajña (all-knowing), Sarva-vit, etc., in contra-distinction to the human soul. It is equally absurd to dismiss the difference between God and man taught in such Śrutis as दासुपर्णा as an ignorant doctrine. If śrutis can play false, what guarantee is there that the monistic texts can be relied upon to speak the truth? Madhva is honestly surprised how a person with such a low opinion of the Śruti can claim to be Veda-vādin ! कथं चैववादिनो वेदवादित्वम् ? It is thus extremely unlikely that the identity between God and man can be the ultimate teaching of Scripture. Texts which appear on a superficial view to favour such an identity, are shown on closer scrutiny to emphasise the unutterable majesty of God and the complete and absolute dependence of all else upon Him : तद्वशत्वमेवोक्तम् । तद्वशत्वज्ञापनार्थं च 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्...' इत्यादि सृष्टिकथनम् ।

An implicit and ineradicable dualism is shown to underlie all the well-known Upaniṣadic texts paraded by the Monist. Madhva gives a brilliant analysis of the "Tattvam asi"³⁴ and "Vācārambhaṇa-texts"³⁵ and lays bare the defects in the Advaitic interpretation. Many other passages from several other Upaniṣads, are similarly discussed : अहं ब्रह्मास्मि । ब्रह्मवित् ब्रह्मैव भवति । परेऽप्ये सर्व एकीभवन्ति । प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत³⁶....." etc.

iv

The reality of the world and of difference is clearly taught in many passages of Scripture, even as admitted by the monist. Madhva repudiates the suggestion that this reality is of a *lower order* : न चात्रान्तर-सत्यमिदम् । and cites passages to show that difference persists even in Mokṣa. Individual consciousness is inalienable and indestructible in release : अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा (Brh. Up. iv. 5, 14) इति तद्वर्माणामप्यनुच्छित्तेः प्रस्तुतत्वात् ।

34. See Part I, page 20-21, 177-80.

35. See p. 176 and Part III, Chap. 5.

36. See under Māṇḍūkya Up.

v.

The VTN., gives the most classical exposition of the concept of Bheda as developed by Madhva. A 'Pluralistic Universe' is grounded on the reality of difference. The concept of Bheda has been severely attacked by hosts of Absolutist writers from the days of Śamkara. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism had been the chief target of attack of the early Advaitic dialecticians. The *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman has a powerful critique of Bheda.³⁷ Other writers like Ānandabodha,³⁸ Śrī-harṣa^{38a} and Citsukha followed suit. Among the philosophers of the 10th-12th century, a heated controversy was raging over this concept. Madhva took note of the criticisms poured forth by the Advaitic dialecticians. He had to draw and defend the concept of Difference which was so near and dear to his heart and on which the entire edifice of his radical realism rested. The monists had placed many obstacles in the way of a really valid definition of the idea of difference. It was impossible said they, either to give a satisfactory and logically commensurate definition of Difference or demonstrate its reality in any metaphysical sense. Any attempt to conceive of it in a logical way is doomed to failure. The idea of difference is thus riddled with all kinds of fallacies and contradictions: अनवस्थादयो दोषाः सत्तां निघ्नन्ति वस्तुनः ।

Difference is *not cognised by itself but only in relation to its terms* either as qualifying them or as being qualified by them. It may be looked upon as residing in either or both the terms. But in any case, unless the terms are previously grasped, their difference from each other which is either attributive or is bound up with the cognition of the correlate and counter-correlate, cannot be. But then, the cognition of the terms is dependent on that of the difference referred to. There is thus mutual interdependence in any attempt to define the concept of difference.

Madhva refutes the contention by pointing out that difference is not an attribute of *both* correlates, but of only *one* of them *signalled* by the other. This difference is of the nature of the subject itself. To

37. भेदस्य वस्तुनो भेदे भेदाभेदे च तस्य तस्य, भेदात् वस्तुनश्चान्योऽन्यो भेद इति अनवस्थानाच्च कश्चिदभेदो वस्तु संस्पृशेत् । अभेदेन, एकमेव ; तच्च वस्तुमेव, न भेद एव । वस्तुभावे तस्याप्यभावात् ।
p. 23, G.O.S., lxv, '38.

38. भेदस्य विदारणात्मनो वस्तु स्वरूपत्वे, न किञ्चनैकं वस्तु स्यात्
एवं च, शून्यतैव तात्त्विकी विश्वस्यापद्येत ॥ (Nyāyamakaranda, p. 45-6).

38a. यदि च स्वरूपं भेदः स्यात्, तदा धर्मिणि दृष्टे स्वरूपं दृष्टमिति क्वचिन्न सन्देहः स्यात् ।
(Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍakhādyā, i, p. 210).

क्वचिदपि गत्वा भेदभेदाश्रययोः भेदास्वीकारे च तदैक्यद्वारिका मूलपर्यन्तमेकता धात्रेत् ।
(Khaṇḍana, i, p. 212).

know a subject is to know its difference from another. Hence there is no interdependence here.

It may be objected that a subject is cognised independently but *not so its difference from another*. If difference were the same as the subject, it should be capable of being perceived *independently of its relata*. Madhva answers this by pointing out that there is no such absolute necessity. The 'thing in itself' may be perceived independently but its difference from another may yet be cognisable only *mediately thro'* the relata. There is nothing illogical in this. The Advaitin himself recognises that the cognition of the self is immediate, but its identity with the Brahman, tho' not essentially different from the Self,³⁹ is yet only *mediately realisable thro'* the terms: Jiva and Brahman. What applies to identity can hold good in the case of Difference which is as much a relation as its opposite.

The Advaitin advances a further argument objecting to Difference as Dharmi-svarūpa, that if the thing and its difference are one and the same, they must always be cognised *together*. The admission of Viśeṣa however, helps Madhva to account for the perception of an object without involving a specific perception of its difference from another. Difference is only *सविशेषाभिन्न* from its धर्मि । Even here, the monist can have no cause for complaint as he admits that tho' the self is established in all cognitions, its identity with the Brahman (which is the same as the self) is *not* : न च, धर्मिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदस्यास्वरूपत्वम् । ऐक्यवत् स्वरूपस्यैव तथात्वात् । स्वरूपसिद्धावपि तदसिद्धिश्च जविश्वरेक्यं वदतः सिद्धेव (VTN). This is indeed a penetrating argument that confutes the monist with one of his own admissions.

From one point of view it may be asserted, says Madhva, that when a subject is cognised, its difference also from other things, is cognised *in a general way, and for the most part*. Otherwise, one may even mistake his own self for any one of the numerous objects surrounding him. None ever falls into such an error. It therefore follows that difference is cognised *simultaneously with the perception of the subject*. It may be objected that if it were so, all doubts and misapprehensions would be impossible. Since doubts and imperfect cognitions do arise at times, it could not be that difference is part and parcel of the 'thing itself.' Madhva answers this by saying that Difference is only *one* in a given thing. But it has innumerable shades such as that of being the

39. cf. तच्च द्वैतं—'ब्रह्मवेदं सर्वं' इति श्रुत्यर्थेन सहेक्यमापन्नं ब्रह्मैव स्यात् ।

(Khaṇḍana, i, p. 220).

counter-correlate of X or Y or Z. Where in a particular case, this *particular* shade of difference is missed with reference to a *particular* (counter)-correlate, on account of such factors as resemblance, doubts arise. The *particular* doubt however, does not mean that Difference in general has not been grasped at all.

It has been contended that if Difference were of the nature of the subject, it would in effect abolish either its own self or the subject or it may mean that difference is synonymous with the subject.⁴⁰ Madhva points out that such antinomies are avoided on his view which recognises only a *Sa-viśeṣābheda* (colourful identity) between the subject and Difference conceived as *Dharmisvarūpa*. The identity prevents the possibility of such mutual interdependence in perception as has been referred to and the *Viśeṣa* guarantees the existence and reality of both the subject and the difference. *Viśeṣa* is just the representative of Difference, not difference by itself. मेदप्रतिनिधिः न तु स्वयं मेदः । There are reasons why such *Viśeṣas* should be recognised in all objects commonly regarded as undifferentiated. Even the Advaitin cannot altogether evade them. For, in such texts as नेति नेति Brahman is said to be different from all else. This distinction can neither be different from the Brahman nor partly different and partly identical with it, as the judgment arising from the sentence is admitted to be in the form of an undifferentiated cognition: अन्वयवृत्तिः. If therefore, in these circumstances, absolute and colourless identity were assumed it would be futile to have a number of terms in the negation (as in नेति नेति; सत्यज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म) Just as identity is recognised between Brahman and its attributes (whether negative or positive) to avoid conflict with the नेह नानास्ति text, even so, *Viśeṣa* must be recognised to prevent overlapping among the things negated and the faults of redundancy and synonymy (पर्यायत्व).

It can make no difference to the question of overlapping whether the Brahman is regarded as वाच्यं (expressible by words) or as merely लक्ष्य (only suggestible). For, in any case of elimination, there would be no point in resorting to more than one elimination if the subject thus marked off from its opposite does not gain or assume a new aspect or additional significance every time a fresh elimination is brought about:

व्यावृत्ते निर्विशेषे तु किं व्यावृत्त्यवहुत्वतः ? ।

This argument of Madhva is hard to rebut.

Lastly when difference is presented to cognition, it cannot be denied altogether on the ground of interdependence: स्थितस्य गतिश्चिन्तीनीया.

40. अमेदे त्वेकमेव, न मेद एव । वस्त्वभावे तस्याप्यभावात् ॥ (Iṣṭasiddhi, p. 23.)

Interdependence, even admitting there is one, cannot annul the reality of things so interdependent⁴¹: अन्योन्याश्रयस्य प्रमात्वाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् (Jayatirtha Com. VTN.). One must try to explain the process of the perception of difference but failure or inability to do so cannot mean that the thing itself is unreal. There is of course no cause for anxiety or interdependence if Difference is recognised as धर्मस्वरूप but yet “सर्वविशेषाभिन्न” from it.

Madhva has thus really gone a long way in clarifying the concept of Difference and demonstrating its reality. He enunciates the doctrine that Difference is “*Dharmi-svarūpa*”,⁴² part of the ‘thing itself.’ It is perceived simultaneously with the perception of an object, a relation or a concept. In one and the same act of perception, the object and its individuality (which is the same as its difference from all else that is) are both perceived, in a flash as it were. If it were not so, the question will have to be answered why and where that individuality had been lurking and how it comes to be apprehended later on. Madhva says that because of this flash-like simultaneity of apprehension, there is hardly any time, at the moment, to frame linguistic expression for the adequate expression of the experience of individuality. When we know a thing we know it *qua* distinct from everything else, in a general way. Closer thought and ratiocination reveal further items of difference, light and shade. Otherwise, one may even expect to mistake the perceiving self to be something other than what it is: यदि न स्वरूपं मेदः, तदा पदार्थे दृष्टे प्रायस्तस्य सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं न ज्ञायेत । अज्ञाते च वैलक्षण्ये, आत्मनि घट इत्यपि संशयः स्यात् । नहि कश्चित् संशयं करोति । ज्ञातवैव प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं कस्मिंश्चिदेव सदृशे संशयं करोति..... (VTN.). [Vide *Khaṇḍana*, i, p. 210: यदि स्वरूपं मेदः...

Śamkara has nowhere given any evidence in support of his doctrine of “*Adhyāsa*.” He merely asserts that erroneous transference of the qualities of the Ātman to the Anātman and *vice versa*,

41. The idea of “father” and “son” is for example intertwined. You cannot know X as father unless you know his son Y. But you cannot know Y as the son unless you know his father. But no one asserts from this that both the father and the son are unreal unaccountable beings!

42. This coupled with the doctrine of *Viśeṣa* with which the perception of difference is linked up in Madhva’s epistemology would be seen to effectively dispose of the difficulties and antinomies raised by *Vimuktātman* and others in their critique of Difference. The Advaitin is purposely perverse in his attitude to *Bheda*: मेदस्य वस्तुस्वरूपत्वं वा, तद्धर्मत्वं वा नास्माकं सम्मतम् । किन्तु वस्तुस्वरूपातिरिक्तो मेदः प्रामाणिको नास्तीति ॥ (Rāmātirtha, com. on *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, p. 59.)

“इतरेतराध्यास” is *natural* in life and is beginningless and endless : सौख्यमनादिरनन्तः नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः । When one asks for proofs, only excuses are given. Illusions and dream-phenomena have been cited by monistic writers *ad nauseum*. This is most unsatisfactory. Even these illustrations betray certain unmistakable realistic foundations. They are only exceptions to the rule. It is no use to say that because our senses have deceived us once or twice, they must altogether be put down as untrustworthy. In that case, even Scripture would be in no better position ; for some of its statements are according to the *Advaitin*, obviously untrustworthy at the ultimate resort.

vii

No scheme of illusions can be demonstrated *without* the aid of at least two *distinct* reals : आत्मिककल्पितत्वे च जगतः सत्यं जगद्व्यमपेक्षितम् (VTN., p. 286). As a matter of fact, illusions are as *impossible* without the *reality* of an आरूप्य (elsewhere) as without that of the अधिष्ठान । The Advaitin is thus guilty of an ‘अश्वजर्तीय’ when he grants the necessity of the latter alone and denies the former : आरूप्यस्य प्रतीतिरप्युच्यते न वस्तुसत्तेति॥ (Bhāmātī introd., p. 17. Bby. 1917). On all occasions of normally constituted perceptions, the subject and the object are grasped distinctly. Madhva denies that there is any proof for the assumption that Adhyāsa is double-edged इतरेतर. The Ātman has never been mistaken for the not-self, in the wildest of our Adhyāsas : Na cātmani anātmabhramah kvāpī dṛṣṭaḥ. Na hi kaścid ‘Aham na bhavāmi’ iti bhrānto dṛṣyate” (VTN., p. 27). The bottom is thus knocked out of Śaṅkara’s sweeping remark : एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यक्षात्मन्यप्यनात्माध्यासः । अन्योऽन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकता-मन्योन्यधर्माश्रयस्य । which is itself inconsistent with his own plea : सर्वोऽप्यनात्मस्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न नाहमस्मीति । The author concludes the first Pariccheda after criticism of the एवजाव and बहुजावाज्ञानवाद ; मिथ्यात्वं ; उपाधि ; औपाधिकभेद and अविद्यादुर्बलत्वम् ।

viii

The last two Paricchedas deal with Madhva’s conception of God-head. The second Pariccheda emphasises the lordship of Viṣṇu over the kṣara (souls) and Akṣara (Prakṛti) Puruṣas. Passages from the *Rg-Veda*, the *Taitt. Āraṇyaka*, the *Bhāllaveya* and other Khilas are quoted.

In the last Pariccheda, God is taught to be absolutely free from all taint and imperfection [Cf. अपह्नपाम्ना विजरो विमृन्तुः]. He is full of an infinite number of infinite attributes [Cf. सत्यसङ्कल्पः सत्यकामः सर्वस्य वर्धनी सर्वस्येशानः]. The limitations to divinity seen in the Avatars

are explained on the basis of certain widely accepted theological and Purāṇic fictions and conventions.^{42a}

ix

The question of the exact relation between the Personality of God and His moral and metaphysical attributes has always resisted the ingenuity of Theists all the world over. No close student of Madhva can fail to see in him one of the foremost of the world’s Theistic Thinkers who has successfully tackled the problem of the Divine Person, its nature and constitution. God in Theism is *ex hypothesi* unlimited by Time and Space and Attributes. He is One ; but many are His attributes. This raises the question of how far God is homogeneous in constitution. Is God different from His attributes ? If not, what is the basis of the mutual distinction among His various attributes ? If there is no such distinction, how is the multiplicity of the attributes to be established ? By what law of harmony are these attributes equally poised and manifested at different times ? How does God manage to retain His unity amidst a sea of attributes ? These are some of the questions which confront all Theists and all kinds of Theistic approaches, be they logical, religious or metaphysical. Madhva has answered them in his own way with the help of his peculiar doctrine of Viśeṣas which he has developed in the last section of the VTN., and elsewhere and his solution is perhaps the best that could be thought of.

Viśeṣa is a distinct thought-category that is entirely self-sufficient and wholly self-determined and self-determining. It comes in handy in many a metaphysical exigency. It is Viśeṣa that bridges the gulf between Substance and Attributes, Kriyā and kriyāvat etc. It connects God with His Infinite attributes and the attributes mutually. But it is not different from the nature of God Himself or distinct from His personality. It is भेदप्रतिनिधि (representative of Difference) not भेद itself, in short, a thought-fiction. It is an altogether internal relation capable of working both ways. It is capable of connecting substance and attribute without being external to either. Madhva refuses to recognise any distinction between God and His attributes, activities and will. Absolute identity reigns between God and His innumerable attributes as well as among the attributes themselves. There is not even a *semblance* of differentiation, no element of heterogeneity in the Deity. He threatens those who set up such barriers between God and His attributes, with the horrors of hell-fire : नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ; मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति (Kath. Up.) एवं धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यन्तानेवानुविधावति

42a. See *Bhāgavata*, XI, 3, 39; V, 19, 3-6; IX, 10, 11.

The doctrine is known as सविशेषाभेद or अचिन्त्याभेद and language secular and scriptural has many instances of it: राहोःशिरः; पुरुषस्य चैतन्यम्; समवायस्य एकत्वम्; सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म; आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् and so on:

भेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः ।
विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुत्वशेषतः ॥

Madhva shows that it would be impossible to do justice to such texts as: सत्यं ज्ञानम्.....without the help of the said Viśeṣas. For fear of synonymy (पर्यायत्व) even the Advaitin, says Madhva, would have to recognise Viśeṣa.⁴³ Viśeṣa in short is to be a सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः । He has cited passages from the *Brahmatarka* and the *Paramopaniṣad* (Pāñcarātriṇa), elucidating “Viśeṣas.” Apart from the authorities quoted, the concept itself ranks as one of the important contributions of Madhva to Indian philosophic thought.⁴⁴

(18) The Karma-Nirṇaya

Next in extent to the VTN., comes the KN running to 270 granthas. Tradition has it that this work was composed by Madhva in reply to a challenge from certain contemporary Pandits to exhibit his proficiency in the ritualistic portions of the Vedas and their exegesis.⁴⁵ The ultimate object of the work is to work out and illustrate the attunement of the Karma-Kāṇḍa too, to the Brahman which the avowal of the Brahman as the highest and most intimate subject-matter of the Vedas, necessitates. The work deals thus with the higher interpretation of certain abstruse and complicated sacrificial hymns such as the Mahānāmni (A.Ā. IV)—verses to be recited in connection with the Prṣṭha-Stotra at the Niṣkevalya Śāstra, consisting of Khaṇḍas 1-4 of the IV Pañcīkā of the XVI Adhyāya of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*; and various groups of ṛks to be used in the Śoḍaśī Śāstra: R. V. i, 16, 1-3; i, 82, 1-3; 4; viii, 12, 25-27; iii, 44, 1-3; vii, 34, 4; viii, 6, 21; vii, 29, 2; X, 96 1-3; ii; 22, 1-3; X, 133, 1-3 viii, 58, 1-3; viii, 58, 8-10.

43. अस्मण्डवादिनोऽपि स्याद्विशेषोऽनिच्छतोऽयमो ॥
व्यावृत्ते निर्विशेषतु, किं व्यावृत्त्यवहुत्वतः ?
सच्चिददेरपर्यायसिद्धयर्थं मायिनापि हि ॥
अङ्गी कार्यो विशेषोऽयं ॥

(AV., p. 37b).

44. For further light on the doctrine of Viśeṣas see Part III, Chap. 4.

45. See M. Vij., XVI, 42-5. The KN was evidently the last of the Ācārya's works and was probably composed while he was camping at Uccabhūti or Ujher in S. Kanara.

The author shows himself fully conversant with the genius of the Vedic language and its idiom. His interpretations have a ring of confidence and originality.

ii

Taking his stand upon the mystic doctrine enunciated in A. Ā. ii, 2, ता वा एताः सर्वा ऋचः सर्वे वेदाः सर्वे घोषाः प्राणकच इत्येव विधात्; एतं ह्येव ब्रह्म (iii, 2, 3) etc., Madhva insists upon interpreting the whole of the Scripture (not excluding the so-called Karmakāṇḍa)⁴⁶ directly as a glorification of the Supreme Being. The Mahānāmni are but an instance in point, of the possibility of such an interpretation: ताश्च ‘विदा मघवन्’ इत्याद्याः Once the general principles of such a higher interpretation are laid down, it would not be difficult to tackle particular hymns or groups of hymns. Let us take Rg. Veda viii, 58, 8 for example:—

अर्चनं यज्ञादि । प्रार्चनं ज्ञानध्यानादि । ‘श्रेयान्द्रव्यमयज्ञानज्ञानयज्ञः’ (Gitā iv, 33) इति भगवद्वचनात् । ‘प्रियमेधासः’ प्रियज्ञाना अर्चत । ‘पुत्रका’ अल्पज्ञाना⁴⁷ अप्यर्चत ‘न बुद्धिमदं ‘जनयत्’ (Gitā iii, 26) इति च । ‘उत’ शब्दात् ज्ञानिना अर्चनं युक्तं साश्रमासुराणेति— ‘अथाति विष्णो विदुषा चिदर्घ्यः.... (R. V. 1, 156, 1) इति श्रुतेः । ‘धृष्णु’ वासुदेवाख्यं । ‘पुरं’ देहं नार्चत—प्रत्युद्गमप्रश्रयणाभिवादनं विधीयते साधु मिथः सुमध्यमे । प्राज्ञैः परस्मै पुरषाय वेधसे गुहाश्रयायैव न देहमानिनः (iv, 3, 22) पुनरर्चं तति तात्पर्यार्थः ॥

As a preliminary to such higher interpretation, Madhva vigorously assails the doctrine of the Nirguṇa Brahman, in the opening section of the KN. Passages ascribing various attributes to Brahman are quoted in profusion. There is good reason to suppose that an Intelligent Creator like the Brahman must indeed be Saguna: कर्तृत्वात्सगुणं ब्रह्म पुरुषं पुरुषर्षभ (Bhāg. iii, 33. 12). The denial of attributes to Brahman in certain passages of scripture must be interpreted in terms of the purely Prākṛtic attributes: न च—‘एको देवः....’ सत्त्वादिगुणभावोक्तेरनेन । अन्यथा ‘एकोदेवः सर्वभूतेषु गृहः इत्यादीनामपि गुणत्वात्, स्वोक्तिविरोधः ॥ (KN).

46. Cf. वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः । (Gitā)

वेदा ब्रह्मात्मविषयास्त्रिकाण्ड विषया अपि । (Bhāg.)

अवस्तराति गर्गरो..... ॥ (R.V. VIII, 69, 9).

47. Cf. Manu Smṛti, ii, 151.

The concept of "Nirviśeṣa" is then dialectically refuted. The predication of Nirviśeṣatva involves a contradiction :—

निर्विशेषत्वेन विशिष्टं तत्, न वेत्युक्ते, यथाविशिष्टं तर्हि न विशेषनिराकरणम्, विशेषत्वमेव भवति । यदि तेन विशिष्टं स एव विशेष इति व्याहृतिः ।

It cannot also be a negative elimination :—

व्यावर्त्यविशेषः तद्वत्वावृत्ते ब्रह्मणि विशेषमापादयति चेद्विचित्रा वाक्यार्थता ।
न चैव ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थिने पदान्तरं वाच्यम् । असङ्गतत्वात् ॥

Madhva emphasises that Karma can never be regarded as the terminus of Scripture as is contended by the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas. The Veda, by its very nature, stands for the achievement of happiness eternal, by man and such eternal happiness is obviously and admittedly beyond the power of Karma. In this connection, Madhva repudiates tooth and nail, the Prābhākara doctrine of कर्मे व्युत्पत्ति The KN. shows Karma its proper place, remarking :

ध्यानं त्वखिलकर्मभ्यो ध्यानञ्च ज्ञानमुत्तमम् ।

न ज्ञानसदृशं किञ्चित्पुरुषार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥ इति प्रवृत्ते ॥

दूरेण ह्यवरं कर्म बुद्धियोगाद्धनञ्जय (Gītā, ii, 49)

अशेषकर्मपूगोऽपि न विष्णुध्यानलेशमाकु ।

तच्च ध्यानं हरेर्ज्ञानकोट्यंशाय न पूर्यते ॥ इति कर्मविवेके ॥

तस्माद्विरुद्धव्यवर्तयमानानि प्रशंसादीनि ज्ञानसहकार्यपेक्षया योजनीयान्ति ॥ (KN).

Rituals have to be performed in a spirit of devotion, discrimination and detachment : Bhagavad-bhakti-jñānavairāgya-pūrvakam Karma Kartavyam || The work is wound up with an indication of texts to this effect.

NYĀYAKULIŚA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI

PREFACE

In preparing the text of *Nyāyakulīśa* for the press the following manuscripts have been collated.

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| 1. R. No. 3290. Paper. Grantha script. 12 Vādas | } Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. |
| 2. R. No. 4910. Devanagari script. 12 Vādas | |
| 3. 36 A. 4. Grantha script pp. 368 | } Manuscripts Library, Adyar. |
| 4. A. 355. Telugu script. pp. 75. 8 Vādas only | |
| 5. 3727 Grantha script pp. 107. 8 Vādas only | } Mysore Manuscripts Library. |
| 6. A palm-leaf MS. in Grantha script kindly supplied to us by Mr. D. T. Tatachariar, Principal, Śrī Venkateśwara Sanskrit College, Tirupati. | |
| 7. A MS. in Telugu script obtained from Nellore. | |
| 8. A transcript made for the use of His Holiness Paramahansa Parivrājaka Srinivasa Mahā Deśika. | |

Suggestions for filling up the many lacunae in the text have been made in square brackets ; and suggestions of better readings have been given in round brackets.

His Holiness Paramahansa Parivrājaka Rangarāmānuja swami, Tarkārṇava T. Viraraghavachariar, Professor of Nyāya, Śrī Venkateśwara Sanskrit College, Tirupati, Panditarāja D. T. Tatachariar, M.O.L., Principal, Śrī Venkateśwara Sanskrit College and Mr. T. E. Viraragavachariar, Professor, Rājāh's College of Sanskrit and Tamil Studies, Tiruvadi have throughout taken a very kindly interest in this work and helped us in manifold ways. To them we express our deepest sense of gratitude. We acknowledge also the very great debt we owe to Mahāmahopādhyāya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, M.A., I.E.S. (Retd), for the facilities he gave us for consulting the manuscripts lodged in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, for the helpful suggestions given to us from time to time and for his kindness in writing a Foreword to this book. Our sincere thanks are due to Professors M. R. Rajagopala Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., and K. R. Applachariar, M.A., L.T., for having read the Introduction and made valuable sugges-

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We cannot adequately thank the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, P.C., C.H., LL.D., Vice-Chancellor of the Annamalai University, for the kind permission he gave us for editing this work.

Annamalainagar,
November 18, 1938.

R. R.
K. S.

FOREWORD

By

Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati

PROF. S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRIAR, M.A., I.E.S. (RETIRED).

The *Nyāyakulīśa* is a rare, authoritative and scholarly handbook of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta. Its author, Śrī Ātreya Rāmānuja, otherwise known as Vādihamśāmbuvāha, was the maternal uncle and teacher of Śrī Vedānta Deśika, who flourished in the last quarter of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century A.D. If Bhagavad Rāmānuja is the leading exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine and the great Bhāṣyakāra of the Vedānta-darśana in the Viśiṣṭādvaita setting and if the credit of preparing his way belongs to Bhagavad Yāmūnācārya, it may be said that, in a closely similar manner, Śrī Vedānta Deśika stands out as the greatest champion of Viśiṣṭādvaita polemics and Śrī Deśika's mainstay in his polemics is the unfailing *Lightning-shaft of dialectic*, which his elder contemporary and teacher, Śrī Ātreya Rāmānuja, has provided in the *Nyāyakulīśa*.

Any systematic study of Vedāntic thought would be impossible without a comparative study of at least the three chief schools of Vedānta—Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita. The *Nyāyakulīśa* is very useful for this purpose. This treatise discusses the chief tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school under thirteen dialectic heads, in a polemical style. The incisive logic of the author's criticisms, particularly where he deals with the views of the Advaita school, is admirable and compels a very respectful consideration.

This important and valuable treatise was hitherto known only through a few manuscripts here and there. The credit of bringing out a reliable and carefully prepared edition of this rare Viśiṣṭādvaita manual, for the first time, belongs to my learned colleagues—Pandit K. Srinivasachariar of the Sanskrit Department and Professor R. Ramanujachariar of the Philosophy Department, Annamalai University; and the world of scholars and all interested in Indian culture ought to feel grateful to the learned editors for the substantial contribution they have made to the study and appreciation of the Vedānta, by bringing out a good edition of this important work, the *Nyāyakulīśa*. The lucid summaries in English and Sanskrit, which the editors have prepared with great care and prefixed to the text of the work, will considerably enhance the usefulness of this publication.

Annamalainagar,
1—8—1938.

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

INTRODUCTION

Nyāyakulīśa occupies a prominent place in the development of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy after Rāmānuja. Its author, Ātreya Rāmānuja, was the *guru* and the maternal uncle of the famous Vedānta Deśika (1268-1369). He was the fifth in the succession of illustrious Viśiṣṭādvaitic teachers (*guruparamparā*) commencing from Bhagavad Rāmānuja, the author of *Śrī Bhāṣya*. It is noteworthy that, in the apostolic succession, the great Rāmānuja was followed by three members of the family to which Ātreya Rāmānuja belonged, namely, his great-grandfather, his grandfather and his own father. Thus Ātreya Rāmānuja and his lineal ancestors enjoyed the proud privilege of being the accredited exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought to the four successive generations that followed Bhagavad Rāmānuja. Some of the most eminent thinkers and men of letters of later days were also scions of this illustrious stock. The celebrated Gopala Deśika of Kumbakonam and the poet Venkatādhvarin may be cited as examples. Among the chief contributions of the former to philosophic thought the most important are *Sārāsvādīnī*, a brilliant commentary on *Rahasya-traya-sāra*, a classic exposition of Viśiṣṭādvaitism, and *Nikṣepacintāmaṇi*. Śrī Gopāla Deśika had the unique distinction of being the preceptor of three *sannyāsins*. Venkatādhvarin, the author of the justly famous *Viśvaguṇādarśa*, so original in its conception and execution, was a prolific writer. *Mīmāṃsā-makaranda*, *Vidhitraya-paritrāṇa*, *Śravaṇānanda*, *Lakṣmīśahasra* and *Uttara-campū* are among his compositions.

The materials for writing Ātreya Rāmānuja's biography are disappointingly scanty. It is, however, learnt on reliable authority that he was born at Conjivaram in the year 1220 A.D. (Kali era 4322 ; month of Citra in the year Vikrama). At the close of each chapter of *Nyāyakulīśa* he mentions himself as the son of Padmanābhārya. His father must also have been known as Raṅga Rāmānuja, as is evident from the traditional account.

caitrārdrāsambhavam kāñcyām Raṅgarājagurossutam |
supratīṣṭhāmsāmātreyaṃ Rāmānujagurum bhaje ||

His great-grandfather, Praṇatārtiharācārya, also called Kaḍāmbi Acchān, was an able exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. So great were Praṇatārtiharācārya's scholarship and his powers of argument and exposition that he was named 'Vedāntodayana' (the Udayana of Vedāntic thought). He was the most trusted and loyal disciple of Śrī Rāmānuja, the author of *Śrī Bhāṣya*. Finding that his enemies were

secretly plotting to poison Rāmānuja, Goṣṭhipūrṇa, one of his five great ācāryas, was casting about for a devoted and trustworthy disciple who could be safely entrusted with the duty of protecting Rāmānuja's person, and at last found the man he sought for in Praṇatārtiharācārya and appointed him as the guardian of Rāmānuja's person. He assigned to him the responsible duty of preparing food for Rāmānuja. Hence, he came to be known as Mahānasācārya.

From his father, Ātreya Rāmānuja learnt the inner significance of the *mantras* held sacred by the Vaiṣṇavites. The eminent Vātsya Varadaguru, otherwise known as Naḍādūr Ammal, taught him the *Śrī Bhāṣya* and other Vedāntic works. Ātreya Rāmānuja was a bold and original thinker. In recognition of his remarkable skill in dialectics, the title 'Vādhamsāmbuvāha' was conferred upon him.

Tradition, as preserved by his descendants, speaks of him as the author of three books. But of these *Nyāyakulisa* alone is now in existence, the others having been irretrievably lost. It is a matter for great regret that even the names of these books have been forgotten. In his *Tātparyā-Candrikā* the famous gloss on Rāmānuja's *Gītā-Bhāṣya*, Vedānta Deśika quotes, in the course of his comments on verses 14-15 of Chapter XVIII, Ācārya Vādhamsāmbuvāha as saying :—

Vaiṣāmye sati karmaṇāmaviṣamaḥ kim nāma kuryāt kṛtī
kimvodāratayā dadīta Varado vāñchanti cet durgatim |

Evidently this is a quotation from one of the missing books. Judging from this fragment, one is led to believe that the work from which this has been extracted was, in all probability, a religious lyric (*stotra*) in praise of the Lord.

Vādhamsāmbuvāha was fortunate in his pupil. His nephew and disciple, Vedānta Deśika, again and again speaks of his own extraordinary good luck in having had such a preceptor and expresses his deep sense of gratitude for what his guru had done for him. In one place in the *Rahasya-traya-sāra* he says that his guru trained him as the trainer of birds would train a parrot. In another context in the same work he owns that in his own writings he is merely giving outward expression to what his ācārya had inscribed in his mind. Even when due allowance is made for Vedānta Deśika's self-effacing modesty, the fact still remains that he owes much to Ātreya Rāmānuja. Readers of *Rahasya-traya-sāra* will remember that its author refers to the great knack that his uncle and guru had of expressing highly abstract thoughts in an exceedingly simple manner with the aid of homely similes that enabled the listener to go straight to the heart of the matter. To explain the mystic signi-

ficance of the *praṇava* he would ask his pupils to remember the oft-quoted verse from the *Rāmāyaṇa*—

Agrataḥ prayayau Rāmāssitāmadhye sumadhyamā |
Prṣṭhatastu dhanuṣpāṇiḥ Lakṣmaṇonujagāma ha ||

First went forth Rāma ; Sitā, with her delicate waist, in the middle ; Lakṣmaṇa, bow in hand, brought up the rear. The three letters of the *praṇava*, अ, उ, ऋ, respectively stand for the Lord, His consort and the individual soul.

The author of the *Gītā* declares that he who shrinks away from God thinking that He, by His infinite perfections, is far above finite souls is the worst of men (*narādharma*). Ātreya Rāmānuja was likewise convinced that we should approach the Lord in the spirit of the *gopīs* of old who entertained no doubts about His accessibility. He used also to express his agreement with the passage in the *Gītā* which condemns faint-heartedness on the part of the devotee.

Nyāyakulisa (the lightning-shaft of reason) is written in stiff prose interspersed with verse. It is frequently referred to, and cited as an authority, by Vedānta Deśika in his *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, *Nyāya-parīśuddhi*, *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* and other works. It consists of thirteen vādas and establishes, for the most part, doctrines acceptable to all schools of Vedāntic thought. *Siddhārtha-vyutpatti-samarthana-vāda*, *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*, *Svayamprakāśa-vāda*, *Īśvarānumāna-bhaṅga-vāda*, *Dehātirikātātmā-yāthātmya-vāda*, *Sat-kārya-vāda* and *Śakti-vāda* are in support of doctrines shared in common by all schools of Vedānta. It is only in a few chapters that he crosses swords with Advaitins and Bhedābheda-vādins in seeking to establish views peculiar to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. *Khyāti-nirūpaṇa-vāda* and *Sāmānādhikarāṇya-lakṣaṇa-vāda* carry on the controversy with the Advaitins and Bhedābheda-vādins.

Since his style of exposition and argument is extremely terse and is loaded with the technical terms of Sanskrit logic, *Nyāyakulisa* may appear obscure to readers who have not made a special study of Indian logic. A summary is, therefore, given here of the main contentions of the author, and of the arguments which he cites in their support.

ARGUMENT

1. *Siddhārtha-vyutpatti-samarthana-vāda*.

From the point of view of any school of Vedānta the most important problem is perhaps the question whether the upaniṣadic texts which speak of what exists as a fact (*siddhārtha*), Brahman or Ātman, are authoritative or not. If, as the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā maintains,

something to be done (*kārya*) is the ultimate significance of every proposition, the Veda must have such a thing (*kārya*) or an action for its final import. The entire body of the upaniṣadic texts dealing with Brahman or Ātman would lose all validity, and the ground would be cut from under the feet of the Vedāntin. Hence, the first chapter addresses itself to the task of refuting the Prābhākara view.

The Prābhākaras maintain that each word denotes not, as it is commonly supposed, the thing standing by itself, but always the thing as related in some manner to action. And the proposition which is merely a group of such words must, if it is to be intelligible at all, refer to some action. The aim of the proposition is not to communicate an idea, but to convey a command or injunction directly leading to the accomplishment of something. Those who believe that words do also denote existent entities must say that in the child's presence the father, mother, teacher or other elderly person points with the finger to different objects in the environment and at the same time also utters their respective names; the observant child learns in course of time that these words of themselves denote the several objects in the environment and that the application of such and such words to such and such things is based on the denotative power of words and that the meanings of words do not include a reference to actions. But this view, say the Prābhākaras, is not tenable. Of the three factors involved here—(i) the uttering of a name, (ii) the action of pointing with the finger, and (iii) the meaning conveyed—it has to be considered whether the sound uttered must be included, along with the significance conveyed, in what is to be taught (*bodhya*) or whether it is to be classed, along with the act of pointing, in that which teaches (the *bōdhaka*). As it is accepted by both the parties that pointing with the finger is the instrument for denoting existing things, it is needless to regard śabda also as an instrument (*bōdhaka*) serving the self-same purpose. It would appear from this that śabda does not convey any significance. Hence, in respect of existent things (*siddhārtha*), śabda is not authoritative.

Again, the view that each word denotes an existing entity comes into conflict with the doctrine which we have accepted already, namely, that every word conveys a significance related to that of the other words in the sentence. For example, in the proposition 'Lift the table', 'table' does not denote the bare table as such, but the table associated with the act of lifting, and 'lift' does not refer merely to lifting in general, but to lifting as related to the table.

It is observed that a child gets to know the meanings of individual words by comparing and contrasting commands like 'Fetch the cow'

(*gām ānaya*), 'fetch the horse' (*aśvam ānaya*) and 'tie up the cow' (*gām badhāna*) and so forth which elderly persons use in daily intercourse. Since this is the natural process of learning a language the meaning of every word comes to be associated in the child's mind with some action or other. It follows, therefore, that every word has the power to signify an action, but never the mere capacity to signify existent things.

As against this view the author urges that it is not without a purpose that when an elderly person tries to teach the young the significance of words he both points to objects and utters their names. It is only when the object denoted by the word, rather than the utterance of the word itself, is considered as the *bodhya* (what is made known), entering upon any activity in regard to that object or refraining therefrom would be possible. Therefore, śabda cannot legitimately be treated as the *bodhya*; it can only be regarded as the *bōdhaka*. While the act of pointing with the finger will quite suffice for awakening a knowledge of the object, the utterance of the word is not altogether superfluous. It serves to fix the matter durably in the mind; just as the use of different synonyms helps to din the idea into the mind of the pupil.

There is no truth in the charge that the belief that words denote matters of fact comes into conflict with the doctrine of *anvitābhīdhāna* (i.e. the view that any word in a sentence conveys something, not as an isolated unit, but as closely bound up with that of other words in the same sentence). For what really happens is this: each word in a sentence at first recalls to mind something. E.g., in the judgment 'Fetch the cow', the term 'fetch' recalls to mind some significance and 'cow' revives some past impressions. Whether the revived elements fit into an intelligible whole of meaning is next considered by taking note of factors, such as *yogyatā* (congruity), *ākāṅkṣā* (the demand for a word or words to complete the sense) and *sannidhi* (proximity). It is only after the syntactical, logical and phonetic connections of words have been taken into account that each word in the sentence can be said to express a meaning—a meaning associated with what the other word has recalled. 'Fetch,' for example, conveys a meaning associated with what 'cow' has recalled; and 'cow' denotes something related to what 'fetch' has revived.

A similar explanation holds good of assertive propositions also. In the proposition 'This cow is white,' 'this cow' denotes something related to the significance recalled by the term 'white'; and the word 'white' has a meaning closely bound up with what the term 'cow' has recalled to mind. Thus, in no case need we give up the doctrine of *anvitābhīdhāna*.

2. *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*.

To prove that the Vedas are in their very nature (*svataḥ*) valid, the author, in the manner of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, seeks to establish in this chapter the doctrine known as *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* (the self-validity of knowledge). In demonstrating this position the main controversy is with the Naiyāyikas who are advocates of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* (the theory of validity from outside).

The Naiyāyika contends that both in respect of its origin (*utpattau*) and in respect of discovery (*jñaptau*) validity is extrinsic, and not intrinsic, to the judgment. Taking the question of how knowledge comes to be true or false (*utpattu*) it must be conceded, says the Naiyāyika, that validity or invalidity depends respectively upon the honesty and competence of the speaker (*vakṛ-guṇa*) or his ignorance, deceit and other defects (*vakṛ-doṣa*). It is of the very nature of knowledge to be revelatory of reality (*arthaprakāśatva*); and this character of revealing the reality is a general feature (*sādhāraṇa-dharma*) found in valid and invalid cognitions alike. Validity and invalidity, however, are special features (*viśeṣa-dharmas*) met with in certain judgments alone. Though each of these may co-exist with *jñānatva*, each is yet different from the latter. Hence it follows that whether a given judgment is true or false depends entirely upon circumstances other than those that account for the genesis of the the judgment itself. The following analogy illustrates this position. While *vrkṣatva* (tree-ness) is a wider generality present alike in the *śimśapā*, *palāśa* and other trees, *śimśapātva* and *palāśatva* are narrower generalities present only in a limited area. Tree-ness may co-exist with *śimśapātva*. None the less, the two are considered distinct.

Coming to the question of how we become aware of truth and falsity, in order to ascertain the validity of a judgment it is necessary to take note of external considerations, such as awareness of (i) the honesty and competence of the speaker (*guṇa-jñāna*), (ii) the consensus of opinion (*samvāda-jñāna*) and (iii) its capacity to lead to fruitful actions (*artha-kriyā-kāri*).

The Naiyāyika goes on to point out that on the view that the very factors which enable us to apprehend the knowledge itself must also reveal its *prāmāṇya*, there would be no possibility of doubt regarding the validity of judgments.

He thinks that there is no danger of the authoritativeness of the Vedas being sacrificed if the doctrine of self-validity is not accepted. For on the doctrine of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya*, invalidity must result from the defects of the source. Since the omniscient Lord, the author of the Vedas,

possesses infinite perfections and can have no defects of any kind, the Vedas cannot be invalid. Therefore, in order to establish that the vedic teaching is valid, it is needless to subscribe to *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*.

This may be expressed in syllogistic form as follows:—Validity is dependent upon circumstances other than the causes of knowledge; for, while being an effect, validity, like invalidity, is a particular mode of knowledge.

The main point of the refutation is that *jñānatva* and *prāmāṇya* are not separate, but identical. *Prāmāṇya* is merely the power of revealing the thing as it really is. In other words, it consists in taking note of the thing possessing qualifications (*viśeṣya*), the qualifications (*viśeṣaṇas*), and the relation between these (*sambandha*). Just as the power to burn things is inherent in fire, even so *prāmāṇya* belongs to the very essence of *jñāna*. It is present in true judgments as also in false ones; for even in the illusion 'idam rajatam' (this is silver), so far as the subjective element 'idam' is concerned there is *prāmāṇya*.

Even if *jñānatva* and *prāmāṇya* were different, it could not be suggested on reasonable grounds that *prāmāṇya* is a special feature (*viśeṣa-dharma*) like *palāśatva* or *śimśapātva*. For, just as a certain bodily form or structure (*samsthāna*) is present in all cows and serves to manifest *gotva*, *prāmāṇya* is present in knowledge and serves to reveal *jñānatva*. Even when the form or structure of a particular cow does not conform in every detail to the type, for the reason that the given animal is hornless, blind or otherwise defective, the name 'cow' is not denied to it. Similarly, in the case of the illusory cognition, even in the absence of *sambandha*, the remaining two factors do suffice for manifesting *jñānatva*. Just as a certain structure or form (*samsthāna*) which serves to reveal *gotva* is considered a general quality, even so *prāmāṇya* which helps to manifest *jñānatva* may quite well be a common feature. But for *prāmāṇya*, knowledge would cease to be knowledge.

Next it is shown that the analogy of 'treeness' is not apposite. In the *śimśapā* tree there are two aspects—(1) certain features common to all trees indicative of *vrkṣatva* (treeness) and (2) certain features peculiar to the *śimśapā* tree revealing *śimśapātva*. But in the case of *jñāna* apart from the general feature, namely, *prāmāṇya* which reveals *jñānatva*, no special feature revealing *prāmāṇya* is met with. Therefore, on the analogy of tree-ness and *śimśapātva* which stand respectively for wider and narrower generalities, we cannot treat *jñānatva* and *prāmāṇya* as *sādhāraṇa* and *viśeṣa dharmas*. Hence, in respect of origin (*utpatti*), besides the causes of knowledge no other factors are needed to account

for *prāmānya*. In a word, *prāmānya* is inherent in the very nature of knowledge.

Again, the truth of a judgment cannot be said to be discovered from a knowledge of the merits (*guṇa*) of the speaker. When the knowledge of an object arises in the self, the object comes to be endowed with an illumination, known as *jñānatva*, *prakāśa*, or *artha-prakāśa*. Validity is simply the power of *jñāna* to produce this *artha-prakāśa*. From the *artha-prakāśa*, the effect, its cause, namely, *jñāna* is inferred. The inference which reveals *jñāna* must also make known its *prāmānya* (validity). When the discovery of truth is said to be intrinsic (*svataḥ*) all that is meant is that the validity of knowledge is understood from the very inference whereby knowledge itself is inferred, and that no additional factor is required therefor.

The charge that on *svataḥ-prāmānya-vāda* there would be no room for any doubt regarding *prāmānya* (validity) in any circumstances is met by saying that one may believe in self-validity and still entertain doubts. Belief in self-validity does not obviate doubt. As long as there is room for suspecting that there may be factors leading to *aprāmānya*, doubts are bound to arise even though there is belief in validity. To illustrate the point.—Even though it is well known that the seed has the power to produce the sprout, one may yet entertain doubts about a particular seed, for who knows it has not lost its power to germinate on account of its proximity to fire. It is only when the person can be sure that the seed could not have been placed by the side of the fire that he could give up this doubt. This doubt does not lead one to abandon the general belief in the power of the seed to sprout. Similarly, even when it is known that judgments are in their innate nature valid, yet doubts concerning the validity of particular judgments may arise, so long as the possibilities of their being invalid are not ruled out. The existence of doubts does not necessarily lead to the rejection of the belief that the discovery of validity is intrinsic (*svataḥ*).

In conclusion, it is shown that the argument advanced by the opponent is liable to be charged with the fallacy of *hetva-siddhi*. *Prāmānya*, as indicated already, is a general feature and not a special quality requiring a special cause.

3. *Khyāti-nirūpaṇa-vāda*.

In this chapter the author repudiates the *akhyāti* of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and the *Anirvacanīya-khyāti* of the Advaitins and maintains the *Anyathā-khyāti* of the Naiyāyikas and *Yathārtha-khyāti* advocated by the Viśiṣṭadvaitins.

The Prābhākaras contend that in the erroneous cognition 'This is silver' there is no sensory contact with silver. 'This' is a presented fact; and 'silver' is a memory experience. There are thus two elements—(i) experience of present object and (ii) memory—and not a single psychosis as the Naiyāyika supposes. But against this, the Naiyāyika urges that, if the representative element concerns silver in the shop (*āpanasta*), there could only be the judgment 'There is silver in the shop' and not 'This object on the roadside is silver.' The Prābhākara answer is that owing to certain defects (*doṣa*) the real location of silver is lost sight of. A person proceeds to pick the object on the road side, not because he perceives the silver element therein, but because he fails to notice the difference between the memory of silver and the presented object.

The very existence of differences of opinion among rival thinkers may be said to point to *anyathā-khyāti*. Take the two statements: 'Sound (*śabda*) is eternal' and 'Sound is non-eternal.' Since two mutually contradictory qualities cannot reside in the self-same object, the person who believes in the eternity of sound thinks that eternity is present in sound, and that, consequently, his opponent has understood the nature of sound differently from what it is. Similarly, the believer in the perishability of sound thinks that 'non-eternity' dwells in sound and that, therefore, his opponent has misunderstood the nature of sound. Hence the quarrel between the two. But on the Prābhākara view that error is not a unit of knowledge but a composite of two *jñānas*, the judgment 'sound is eternal' would consist of two items of *jñāna*—(i) *śabda* and (ii) eternity; and the judgment 'sound is non-eternal,' conveys knowledge of sound and also knowledge of non-eternity. In either case, the judgment does not assert that eternity or non-eternity is present in sound. And so long as this is not so, there is no room for dispute.

A consideration of the way in which the subsequent judgment falsifies the earlier but erroneous cognition would serve to show that in the first cognition the mind must have understood the thing differently from its real nature (*anyathā*). The sublating cognition, 'This is not silver; it is only shell' presupposes an earlier judgment 'This is silver', where the silver element is erroneously synthesised with 'this'.

Further, so long as the silver element is not perceived in 'this' that is, so long as the nature of the object on the roadside is not grasped differently from what it is (*anyathā*), there will not arise the activity of picking the object. On the Prābhākara account the activity of picking the object, as though it were silver, is due merely to our failure to notice the difference between the memory element (i.e., silver) and the

perceived element (*bhedāgrahaṇa*). If so, we must also react to it as shell, because in it we do not perceive the difference from the shell. Should it be said that the difference from the shell is perceived, clearly there is *anyathā-khyāti* or wrong synthesis.

Bhrānti or illusory cognition is a particular mode of knowledge and is a mistake of commission, and not one of omission. It is the mere failure to apprehend difference. If so, as there is non-apprehension of difference in deep sleep, deep sleep would have to be treated as *bhrānti*. Hence, it follows that illusion involves *anyathā-khyāti*.

It is *anyathā-khyāti* rather than *akhyāti* that does justice to the nature of experience. When a person realises his mistake, he is found to confess 'I mistook shell for silver'; he is never found to say "I failed to keep apart the memory of silver from the perceived object on the road."

The advocates of *anirvacanīya-khyāti* assert that *jñāna* is the only ultimate reality. Since it is quality-less, the character of apprehending the object which is ordinarily ascribed to *jñāna* cannot, strictly speaking, be attributed to it. The objects apprehended are neither *sat* nor *asat*. For, if they were unreal, they would not be perceived; and if they were real, they would not be sublated. But they are perceived and later sublated. Hence, they are indescribable or *anirvacanīya*. This pure consciousness or *jñāna* is no other than the substrate (*āśraya*) of illegitimate transference (*adhyāsa*).

In refutation of *anirvacanīya-khyāti* it is first pointed out that as knowledge is said to partake of the characters of being *parokṣa* (indirect), *aparokṣa* (immediate), *anubhava* (experience), *smṛti* (memory) and so forth, *jñāna* cannot be said to be *nirbharmaka* (without qualities). Secondly, as objects of experience are known, they are *sat*; and as they are later contradicted, they are *asat*; and they would thus be both *sat* and *asat* and not *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* or *anirvacanīya*. Moreover, it cannot be said that *jñāna* is merely the *āśraya* of illegitimate transference (*adhyāsa*). On the contrary, it really points to an object outside. It is the very nature of knowledge to point to really existent things.

The doctrine of quintuplication (*pañcī-karaṇa*), according to which all objects of the perceptible world contain all the five elements (*bhūtas*) though in varying proportions, lends support to *yathārtha-khyāti*. On this view, the object concerning which the illusory judgment 'This is silver' arises contains silver as also shell. The silver element is, however, very slight, the shell element predominating. It is the failure to

note the slowness (*alpatva*) of the silver element and the preponderance of the shell element that accounts for the illusion. The subsequent judgment "This is not silver" arises when the dominance of the shell element is realised, and it inhibits the activity which was prompted by the failure to notice this dominance. The assertion that the erroneous cognition 'this is silver' disappears when the subsequent judgment "This is shell" arises does not mean that the former judgment is abandoned; it only signifies that the activity prompted by the earlier cognition is arrested. Thus, all judgments reveal only what exist.

4. *Svayamprakāśa-vāda*.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the establishment of the doctrine that *jñāna* is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*). The ground is prepared for this doctrine by the refutation of the views of Kumārila, Murāri Mīśra and the Naiyāyikas in regard to this matter.

According to Kumārila *jñāna* has the power to reveal other objects excepting itself. It does not, however, mean that it is unknowable. Though it cannot be grasped by the senses, it is inferred from the illumination (*prākāṣya*) which it generates in objects that are known. Thus it is not self-luminous. This view is rather far-fetched. For explaining why vision apprehends only the colour of objects and not their smell, even though colour and smell are equally inherent in the objects that are seen, the aid of *prākāṣya* (power of manifestation) is invoked. It is said that the visual mechanism has a power in virtue of which the knowledge it generates has the peculiar property of producing an illumination with regard to colour alone. A simpler explanation, says Murāri Mīśra, would be to recognise that visual knowledge has merely the power to apprehend colours, and dispense with the notion of *prākāṣya*. Even after positing this mysterious *prākāṣya* for which there is no warrant, it may be asked why *prākāṣya* is generated in regard to colour and not to smell. The only possible answer would be that visual knowledge has this special power of producing an illumination in colour alone. With the denial of *prākāṣya*, the theory that knowledge is inferred therefrom falls to the ground.

Nor can it be contended that knowledge is self-luminous. For if it is self-luminous, it must illumine itself, just as it manifests other things; that is to say, it will be its own object (*viśaya*). Since the object (*viśaya*) is considered the cause of perceptual knowledge, this line of argument would lead to the self-refuting position that knowledge is the cause of itself. Therefore, it has to be concluded that *jñāna* is grasped by *anuvyavasāya* (reflection upon experience). This reflection is of the form 'I know the pot'.

The view defended by the author is that *jñāna* is like the lamp which dispels darkness and reveals objects and does not require for its own manifestation another lamp. Similarly, by its conjunction with objects, *jñāna* reveals objects; but in regard to its own manifestation, *jñāna* does not require another *jñāna*. The objection that, since *jñāna* is a quality, it cannot come into conjunction with objects is not valid; for, as it is said to be subject to expansion and contraction, *jñāna* must be treated as a substance. When *jñāna* is said to be self-luminous what is really meant is that *jñāna*, unlike other objects, does not require for its own manifestation conjunction with another *jñāna*. This may be expressed in syllogistic form. This *jñāna* does not require for its manifestation anything other than itself; for, like the lamp, it manifests objects.

5. *Īśvarānumāna-bhanga-vāda*.

Unless the view that God is inferred (*ānumānika*) is abandoned the scriptures would lose their authority. On the well-known principle that the *śāstras* are valid only with regard to matters lying beyond the scope of the other *pramāṇas* (*aprāpte śāstram arthavat*), if God is known through inference, then, in respect of God, the scriptures are futile. It is not helpful to point out that, while reason establishes only the existence of God, the scriptures are necessary for giving information about those who attend upon him (*parijana*), his dwelling place and so on. For the scriptures would then be dependent upon reason and cannot contradict its verdict. It is only after the existence of God has been established by reason that one may proceed to inquire into His attendants, abode etc., from the study of the scriptures. When reason tells us that God is endowed with infinite perfections, how can the scriptures convey the opposite teaching that his attendants, abode and so on add to his glory? Nor is it possible to obviate this difficulty by saying that while God's existence is inferred from reason, His being the material cause of the world is learnt only from the scriptures and that, in this sense, the scriptures are not robbed of their usefulness. For if so, He must act as the material cause of the world either by being endowed with a body or by remaining without one; and either alternative would lead to an unwelcome result. On the former alternative, He would become a *samsārin*; on the latter, the view accepted by us, namely, that God is the material cause only through His body, would have to be abandoned. Thus, so long as it is not admitted that the scriptures teach the existence of God, they cannot be assigned an intelligible purpose. To establish their prime usefulness it is necessary to demolish the view that God is *ānumānika*.

The main argument by which the Naiyāyika attempts to prove God's existence is the following:—Like the jar, earth and other objects

are effects; because they point to an agent. As the finite soul is incapable of producing them, this agent must be a competent maker, that is, God. That these objects are effects is vouched for both by perception and by inference. The argument takes the following form:—Earth and the like are effects; for, like the jar, they possess parts. Against this argument it may be urged that the relation between 'being an effect' and 'pointing to an agent' is far from being universal and that it is really dependent upon the accidental feature (*upādhi*), namely, *śakyakriyatva* (capacity for being produced), and that consequently the argument is liable to be charged with *vyāpyatvāsiddha*.

But this objection is valueless, because *śakyakriyatva*, though not perceptible, is yet inferred to exist wherever the *sādhana*, 'being an effect,' is present. Therefore, the argument is free from the charge of *vyāpyatvāsiddha*.

The futility of the argument advanced by the Naiyāyika is exposed by showing that when he argues that earth and other objects point to an agent, he must mean by 'agent' either the bare self as such or the self endowed with volition (*yatna*) alone or the self endowed with a volition which is associated with auxiliary causes, such as, knowledge and power. On the first alternative, his argument becomes vitiated by the defect of *bādha*, in as much as it would only establish that the cause of the world is a self devoid of volition and other qualities and not an Omnipotent Lord. A further defect of the argument is that the *sādhya* is not present in the illustrative example cited. The second alternative fares no better; for on this view the self is the cause of the world either in virtue of its bare volition or through the outward activities in which the volition expresses itself. If the former is correct, there is the old difficulty of the *sādhya* not being present in the illustrative examples adduced. The mere volition of the potter, for example, would not suffice for the production of the jar. If the latter view is advocated, the Naiyāyika would be guilty of contradicting his theory that the tendency of fire to proceed upwards or that of wind to blow side-ways is all due to *adrṣṭa* and not to any volition and its expression in outward act. Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that a self endowed with such a volition as expresses itself in outward activity is the cause of the world all that the argument could prove is that the maker of the cosmos is an intelligent person and not that he is omniscient. Volition could only indicate that its possessor is endowed with intelligence; it need not point to omniscience. Should it be said that since volition takes different forms according to the effects intended to be produced, and is dependent on the knowledge of the particular thing to be produced and that, in the case of the creation of the world, its maker should be all knowing, it is replied that volition need not depend upon knowledge. Take for example, the

case of deep sleep; here the effort to live is not dependent upon any knowledge. The third alternative is equally faulty. There is no point in saying that the maker of the world is a self endowed with volition found along with knowledge, power and so on which are auxiliary thereto; because, as pointed out already, volition is not necessarily dependent upon knowledge. If it be said that, as volition exists along with knowledge, knowledge is inferred from volition, it is replied that by parity of reasoning one should infer the existence of a body, since volition is associated with the presence of a body.

Not only this; there are arguments proving an opposite conclusion. Eg., if earth and other objects point to an agent at all, that agent must be an embodied person, an individual possessing knowledge which is non-eternal and an ordinary person like any one of us, and not possessed of omniscience.

6. *Dehādyatiriktātma-yāthātmya-vāda*

That the soul is an entity different from the body, senses, mind (manas), vital breath (prāṇa) and intellect (buddhi), that it is distinct from the Supreme Soul, that each soul is distinct from every other soul, that it is an agent (kartā), a knower and the object of self-consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*) is the teaching of this chapter. As a preliminary to the establishment of this thesis, the Cārvāka and the Advaitic conceptions of the soul are subjected to a rigorous examination.

The Cārvāka accepts the view that the soul is the object of self-consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*), but draws therefrom the conclusion that the soul is identical with the body; for there arises the cognition 'I am a man', 'I am a deva' and so on. The soul is not to be identified with the senses; for no one ever gets the cognition 'I am the nose', or 'I am the ear'. Nor is it to be equated with the mind (manas); for the mind, being an instrument of knowledge, cannot also be its agent (*kartā*). The soul is not the vital breath (prāṇa) either; for when vital breath continues to be active even when the body is at rest, there arises the cognition 'I am wholly inactive'. It is equally impossible to equate the soul with consciousness (buddhi); for, since jñāna comes from the root *jñā* (to know), it refers to something to be accomplished and not to the soul which is an existent entity (*siddhārta*). Thus by a process of elimination also it is shown that the soul is no other than the body. It may be asked: Does not the cognition 'This is my body' mark off the soul from the body? The Cārvāka replies that this difficulty is not peculiar to him, but that the cognition 'This is my self' creates a similar difficulty for his opponents also; and that the escape open to them, namely the device of understanding this proposition in a figurative sense, is open to him too.

Though the elements (*bhūtas*) which compose the body are severally insentient, consciousness, the Cārvāka argues, may still emerge from their peculiar concatenation. It may be likened to the emergence of the intoxicating quality from the mingling of certain ingredients which separately do not possess it. As infancy, youth, manhood and so on are merely different states of the self-same body, there is nothing improper in a person in middle age remembering what he experienced in infancy and youth.

The Advaitins assert that the soul is an inner (*pratyak*) principle distinct from the body and that it is not to be confounded with the knower. To say that the soul is *pratyak* is to assert that it is self-luminous. As knowledge alone is self-luminous, the soul must be identified with *cit* (consciousness). If the soul is described as a knower, it would be the possessor of knowledge. In other words, it would be different from jñāna. If so, the soul would become external (*parāk*); for whatever is different from jñāna is *parāk*.

Some of the outstanding difficulties in the way of the Cārvāka doctrine are the following.—On the view which identifies the soul with the body, either the body is an aggregate of parts or it is something additional to the parts that enter into its composition. In any case, consciousness must be admitted to reside in the parts; because it is well-known that the special qualities of the whole (*avayavī*) are dependent on those of the parts (*avayava*); and because there could be no consciousness in the aggregate when the parts composing it are devoid of consciousness. But the parts do not possess it; for, if they did, they would be equated with the self and there would arise cognitions such as 'I am the foot,' 'I am the hand'. Judgments such as 'I feel pain in the eye', 'I have a comfortable feeling in the head' cannot be said to indicate the presence of consciousness in the bodily parts; for they only show that the self experiences pleasure or pain in the regions mentioned. Further, if some part of the body alone possessed consciousness, with the loss of that organ, consciousness would be altogether lost. If each of the bodily parts were to possess consciousness, there would be several conscious entities in the same body and these would, like the residents of a village, be constantly warring with one another. For the conscious entity is notorious for its self-regarding impulses.

It is untenable to argue that just as the betel leaf, areca nut and lime, which do not separately possess redness, yet produce the red colour when they are chewed together, consciousness may emerge from out of the factors that constitute the body, even though taken severally these factors are insentient. What really happens is the particles of the betel

leaf, the nut and lime first acquire the red colour on account of the heat engendered in the act of chewing. Thus the red colour in the effect is accounted for by the causes themselves acquiring it. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that a property not present in the causal factors severally may well emerge when they combine together in certain special ways.

Besides, if this materialistic doctrine were true, all religious duties such as, *yāga* (sacrifice) and *dāna* (gift), performed for the sake of rewards to be reaped after bodily death would be labour wholly lost, and the *śāstras* prescribing such duties would become meaningless.

In refutation of the Advaitic doctrine the author points out that knowledge cannot be the self, because the judgment 'I know' clearly shows that knowledge is an attribute of 'I' rather than the self itself. Again, knowledge is well-known to have a beginning and an end; and it cannot, therefore, be identified with the eternal self. The real meaning of *pratyak* is not 'being self-luminous' as the Advaitins contend, but 'shining forth for the sake of oneself'. As *jñāna* shines forth for the sake of the self and not for its own sake, it must, with pots and other objects, be treated as *parāk*. The self alone can be said to shine for its own sake. Therefore, it alone is *pratyak*. Again, if the *śāstras* which prescribe several duties for the realisation of different benefits are not to be robbed of their meaning, the soul must be admitted to be an agent and an enjoyer. *Kartṛtva* (being an agent) and *bhokṛtva* (being an enjoyer) cannot be explained away as being due to limiting conditions.

7. *Sāmānādhikaraṇya-vāda*

For a proper understanding of Vedāntic passages, such as 'satyam jñānam anantam Brahma', it is essential that the true nature of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (the grammatical co-ordination of words in a sentence) must be grasped at the very outset. Consequently, the author takes up for consideration the definition of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* laid down by the grammarians, examines the interpretations put on it by the Bhedābheda-vādins and Advaitins, and in the end establishes what he considers the correct interpretation.

Sāmānādhikaraṇya is defined by the grammarians as follows. Words having different *pravṛtti-nimitta* (reasons of application or significations) but referring to an identical object (i.e. words having connotational difference and denotational identity) may be said to stand in the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. The Bhedābheda-vādins believe that this definition accords best only with their own fundamental philosophical creed—the doctrine that a substance is different and yet non-different

from its *viśeṣaṇas* (qualifications). Take, they say, the judgment 'This is a cow'. The words 'this' and 'cow' have different reasons of application or significations (*binna-pravṛttinimitta*); 'this' stands for a particular object (*vyakti*) and 'cow' for the *jāti*, 'cow-ness'; and they refer to an identical object, since *jāti* and *vyakti* are not altogether different. In the judgment 'This is white', the words 'this' and 'white' have different meanings, the first word referring to an object in front of the speaker and the second to whiteness; and both refer to the identical object, since *guṇa* and *guṇi* cannot be said to be altogether different.

A possible objection to this view is that in the judgment examined the term 'cow', like the word *daṇḍi* (person wielding a stick), refers to a *vyakti* (a particular animal possessing 'cow-ness') and not to mere *jāti* (cow-ness), and that, consequently, this equation cannot teach that *vyakti* and *jāti* are non-different. The Bhedābheda-vādin meets this objection by pointing out that *jāti* is nowhere found separately from the *vyakti* in the manner in which the stick is found in isolation from the person wielding it, and that the word 'cow' does not denote an entity possessing cow-ness. Further, if *vyakti* and *jāti* were different, they must, like the stick and its possessor, be known in isolation from each other. But as they are not apprehended separately, they must be identical.

Moreover, since two objects having different shapes cannot occupy the same place, the whole (*avayavī*) and part (*avayava*) residing in the same region must be understood to be non-different. The Bhedābheda-vādin claims that on the basis of the doctrine of simultaneous difference and non-difference it is easy to assign an intelligible meaning to the upaniṣadic passages equating Brahman with man and material nature.

Briefly stated, the advaitic position is this.—A statement of co-ordination is incapable of expressing the fact of one thing possessing several attributes (*viśeṣaṇas*); on the other hand, it aims at teaching the bare existence of an indivisible whole of reality (*akhaṇḍasvarūpa*). It cannot signify the qualifications alone; for in that case the qualifications being numerous, the belief that the statement refers to a single object must be abandoned. Nor can it refer to an object possessing *viśeṣaṇas*. Since it is the very nature of a *viśeṣaṇa* to mark off or distinguish one object from another, the several qualifications must differentiate the objects qualified by them. And, as a consequence, the view that the statement expresses one object must be given up. Hence it follows that a statement of co-ordination refers to a partless whole of reality.

If the statement refers to *akhaṇḍasvarūpa*, what becomes of that part of the definition of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* which insists that the differentiated words must have their separate significations? The Advaitin

brushes aside this difficulty by saying that this part of the definition is merely intended to exclude tautologous statements like 'The jar is a pot'. It is unnecessary, he contends, that the words should convey different meanings within the given statement. It is enough if they are already understood elsewhere to have different connotations. Therefore, vedic texts such as 'satyam jñānam anantam Brahma,' must be taken to teach the existence of an indivisible, featureless (nirguṇa) Brahman, rather than a Brahman possessing qualities.

The main counts in the indictment against the Bhedābheda-vādin are—(i) Since *bheda* and *abheda*, which respectively take on a positive and a negative expression 'This is x' and 'This is not x', are contradictory features, they cannot be attributed to the selfsame object. (ii) It is unreasonable to contend that for the reason that jāti and vyakti are not observed separately from each other, the term cow does not denote an animal possessing cow-ness. For in order that anything may be treated as a viśeṣaṇa it is not essential that it should be observed separately or that it should have a shape of its own different from that of the object which it qualifies. When the viśeṣaṇa is known to have an independent existence and is found to qualify an object only occasionally, the suffix *matup* is added to the word denoting this viśeṣaṇa. But when the viśeṣaṇa has no independent existence of its own and is always found along with the thing which it qualifies, there is no need of that suffix. Therefore, in the statement 'This is a cow' the term 'cow' may quite well signify an animal possessing the viśeṣaṇa, 'cow-ness'. (iii) The belief that the invariable presentation of jāti and vyakti together points to their non-difference (*abheda*) is erroneous; for the very fact of their universal concomitance would only establish their separateness. (iv) For the simple reason that there is no warrant for positing a whole (*avayavī*) over and above the parts (*avayava*), the argument that since the whole and part occupy the same area they must be at once different and non-different is unsustainable. These considerations suffice to show that the attempt to interpret the definition of sāmānādhikarāṇya from the standpoint of Bhedābheda is thoroughly unconvincing.

The Advaitic interpretation of sāmānādhikarāṇya lakṣaṇa also labours under great difficulties. For one thing, on the view that the different words co-ordinated do not refer to the relation of several attributes to the unitary reality, but signify only the thing itself, any one word out of the group would suffice, and there would be no sense in employing several words. Again, of the two requirements mentioned in the sāmānādhikarāṇya lakṣaṇa—(1) that the words should have different significations and (2) should refer to an identical object—it is not known why the advaitin accepts the second and slurs over the first.

Nor is it reasonable to contend that if the several co-ordinated words refer to different viśeṣaṇas, they would mark off the viśeṣyas (things qualified by them) from one another. For only contradictory qualities (e.g. having crumpled horns and having straight horns) which cannot reside together in the selfsame object differentiate their viśeṣyas. But where the different qualities are not opposed to one another, but may well exist together in the same object, there is no danger of their pointing to different objects. Take for example the proposition 'Devadatta is dark-complexioned, young, red-eyed, not stupid, not poor, of irreproachable character'. There is nothing contradictory in the several attributes being present in a single individual. Thus co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing being characterised by several attributes. The upaniṣadic text 'satyam jñānam anantam Brahma' must be interpreted to teach that the unitary reality, Brahman, is characterised by several attributes, and not to assert that Brahman is nirguṇa (without qualities).

After a critical consideration of the views of the Bhedābheda-vādin and Advaitin, the author sets forth what he considers to be the proper interpretation of sāmānādhikarāṇya lakṣaṇa. Different words may stand in the relation of co-ordination, if there are different reasons for their application and if they refer to one and the same object. The first part of this definition aims at showing that there can be no co-ordination between synonyms like 'pot' and 'jar'; because the reason for applying the term 'pot' to an object is not different from that prompting the use of the word 'jar'. The second part serves to point out that there can be no co-ordination between words referring to wholly different objects, e.g., pot and cloth. It rules out such meaningless co-ordinations as 'The pot is cloth'.

8. Sat-kārya-vāda

The problem of causality which has evoked very keen controversy is next tackled. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of causality known as *asat-kārya-vāda* (the view that the effect has no existence before it is brought into existence, but originates afresh) is subjected to a penetrating criticism and *sat-kārya-vāda* (the doctrine that the effect pre-exists in its cause in a latent form) established.

Asat-kārya-vāda teaches that the cause and effect are wholly disparate. Of the several arguments advanced in support of this thesis one is that the cause and the effect give rise to altogether distinct cognitions (*buddhi*). If the cause and the effect were different names for what is substantially the same, the cognition of any one of them must mean the cognition of the other. But, as a matter of fact, their cognitions are quite

different. The cause and the effect are referred to by different words (śabda). Their number varies; e.g., the threads are many, but the cloth is one. They serve different purposes; e.g., threads are serviceable for producing cloth, while the cloth is useful for wearing. They have different forms (ākāra) and exist at different instants of time (kāla); the cause (e.g. threads) is an earlier occurrence; but the effect (e.g. cloth) is a subsequent event. They arise from different causes; e.g. threads have cotton for their cause, while the cloth has threads as its cause.

A second argument is that if the effect pre-exists in the cause, there will be no need to admit several factors conducive to the production of the effect. If, for example, the cloth exists in the threads, the weaver would have no function.

A third reason is that if effects do not come into being but always prefigure in their causes, there will be no basis for the familiar distinction between things eternal and things non-eternal. The Naiyāyika thinks that there is no force in the objection that differences of buddhi, śabda, and so on existing between the cause and the effect do not indicate that they are altogether distinct, but only show that such differences arise only from the different states (avasthās) assumed by what is substantially the same entity. For the opponent must say either that a given avasthā is present in both the cause and the effect, or that it is present in the one or the other, there being no fixity in regard to this matter, or that it is present as a definite rule in one of them. On the first alternative, the identical state will exist in both, and cannot, therefore, account for differences in jñāna, śabda, etc. On the next alternative, kāraṇāvasthā may as well be found in the effect and the kāryāvasthā in the cause, and there will, thus, be no basis for the differences in question. On the last alternative, kāraṇāvasthā will always be met with only in the cause and the kāryāvasthā in the effect; and hence there would be no warrant for asserting the substantial identity of cause and effect. To say that they are one would amount, it is alleged, to attributing contradictory qualities (kāraṇāvasthā and kāryāvasthā) to the self-same object.

In reply to the Nyāya arguments it is first urged that the Naiyāyika assumes it as a self-evident fact that we have two wholly different cognitions about cause and effect, and that, on the strength of this gratuitous assumption, he argues that they are different. This argument falls to the ground when it is shown that we do not get two wholly distinct cognitions about them, but usually experience them as being non-different. We often remark "what was once a lump of clay has now become this pot", "what was formerly a bundle of threads has now become this cloth." This co-ordination of cause and effect and the fact that no one

is ever found to say "This is a new substance where, however, the *upādāna-kāraṇa* (material cause) persists" clearly point out that there is no warrant for saying that the effect (e.g. cloth) does not pre-exist in the cause (threads), and that it is really a new substance wherein, however, threads continue to exist.

Again, there is little difficulty in accounting for differences of jñāna, śabda and the like on the basis of differences of state (avasthā). The cause has, as a definite rule, a state of its own, and the effect its own particular avasthā. To say so would amount, it was urged, to ascribing contradictory qualities to the selfsame thing, and would only strengthen the case for the distinctness of the cause from the effect. But this difficulty is wholly imaginary. For, unlike the mutually opposed attributes of white and not white which cannot reside in an identical object but point to two different substrates, kāraṇāvasthā and kāryāvasthā may well belong to the identical object but at different times. Hence, there is no need to assert that cause and effect are wholly different.

Further, the conjunction (*samyōga*) of threads is admitted by the Nyāya-Viśeṣika to be the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of cloth. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends that, since this conjunction itself suffices to explain the differences of jñāna, śabda and the like, it is unnecessary to posit for this purpose an effect (cloth) wholly different from its cause (threads). It is only in virtue of this conjunction that the threads so conjoined get the name, and occasion the knowledge of, 'cloth'.

Besides, sat-kārya-vāda has the support of the scriptures. The upaniṣadic text declares that by knowing one thing everything becomes known; and, in illustration of this, takes the case of clay and says that by understanding it all objects made out of clay, such as pot and cups, are understood. Clearly, the idea conveyed here is that when the material cause is known, its manifold effects are thereby known. And this would be impossible if the cause and the effect were totally different.

9. Samsthāna-sāmānya-samarthana-vāda

The question of the precise nature of sāmānya (universal) has long been the battle-ground of philosophers. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins have identified sāmānya with samsthāna (structure). But the Naiyāyika has elevated jāti to the rank of a distinct principle. On his view, jāti is the generic property perceptible equally in all the particulars (*vyaktis*) of a class. It is eternal, unitary, ubiquitous (*anekānugatam*) and directly apprehended. It is not a mere product of the imagination as the Buddhists contend, but a factor of reality existing out there in the objective world. When we describe an animal as a cow

we are said to affirm the presence therein of a generic feature called *gotva* (cow-ness), a feature present in all cows, whatever be their colour, stature and the like, and absent in all animals other than the cow (*gavētara*).

A person perceiving an animal for the first time, e.g. an elephant, tells his friend, "Look here! this is a strange animal." Though the latter has not seen this particular elephant before, he replies, on the strength of his knowledge of other elephants, "Why, there is nothing strange in this; it is an elephant and I have seen this before." This reply is intelligible, we are told, only on the view that he is acquainted with elephant-ness as a *jāti* distinct from the *vyaktis* wherein it is present.

On meeting several instances of a class, e.g. cows, a person remarks 'This is a cow', 'That is a cow', 'That other is a cow' and so forth. The rise of such a cognition can be explained, it is said, only on the hypothesis that he recognises 'cow-ness' (*gotva*) as being present in each of these instances. If, however, he does not notice 'cow-ness' in the different particulars and has merely learnt that a given *vyakti* (object) is a cow, he will not be in a position to say 'That also is a cow', 'That other also is a cow', and so on. A possible objection is that in order to account for this cognition it is unnecessary to posit the category of *jāti* and that the *upādhi* (same adventitious feature which does not amount to a *jāti*) would quite suffice. E.g., to say X, Y, Z and so on are cooks it is needless to posit a *jāti* called *pācakatva*. These persons could be treated as forming a class merely with the aid of the *upādhi*, namely, 'engaged in cooking'. This objection is lacking in force, because, so long as the concept of *jāti* existing in *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), and *karma* (action) is not admitted, the *upādhi* (adventitious circumstance) alone would be incapable of bringing together several particulars under a common head. Taking the very example adduced by the objector, it could be shown that the act of cooking could not bring together all persons engaged in this act into a single class, until the *jāti* of *pācakatva* is admitted to exist in the several acts of cooking. Therefore it must be concluded that terms, such as cow and horse, are employed for the reason (*pravṛtti-nimitta*) that in the objects in question 'cow-ness', 'horse-ness' and the like are present. It cannot be contended that the reasons for employing these words is the presence of certain appropriate forms (*samsthāna*) in the objects. For this view would imply that the *samsthāna* is either one or many. If the former, *samsthāna* would merely be *jāti* under a different name, and the dispute would centre round the name alone. If the latter, there would be a plurality of reasons for employing the same word (*pravṛtti-nimitta-bheda*). Thus either alternative leads to an unwelcome result. To obviate this difficulty if it is said that any one of the several *sams-*

thānas constitutes the *pravṛtti-nimitta*, then, the position is liable to be charged with *vyabhicāra doṣa*. For, taking each one of the *samsthānas* it could be shown that in its absence the name could still be employed.

The Naiyāyika further urges that the very possibility of inference would be jeopardised if *jāti* is not accepted. For the *vyāpti* (universal relation) which is the very basis of inference is not the statement of relation between one particular and another, but an expression of universal connection between two sets of particulars, each set having same common property (*jāti*).

An examination of the way in which children learn the significance of words from the commands of elderly persons is said to reveal the fact that children come by concepts (*jāti*) by the abstraction of particular features and the fixing up of common qualities.

The *siddhāntin* is of opinion that *jāti* or *sāmānya* is closely similar *samsthāna*. *Sāmānya* literally means 'the nature shared in common by similar objects' (*samānānām bhāvassāmānyam*); it denotes the nature of objects coming under a common group. Since it is possible to account for the cognition 'This is a cow' 'That is a cow' 'That other is also a cow', with the aid of the closely similar feature present in several *vyaktis*, a *jāti* distinct from *samsthāna* need not be posited. Even those who hold *jāti* to be something distinct, admit that there is such a thing as form.

When *samsthāna* is said to constitute the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of a word what is really meant is this. At the time the second, third or subsequent instance of a class is perceived, there is, in addition to the awareness of the *samsthāna* of that *vyakti*, the recollection of closely similar instances perceived before and their *samsthānas*. The *samsthāna* perceived together with those recalled constitutes the *pravṛtti-nimitta*. Any one of these taken in isolation cannot serve as a *pravṛtti-nimitta*. Hence, the charge that there would be a plurality of *pravṛtti-nimittas* for each word falls to the ground. Since objects belonging to different classes (e.g. *go* and *gavaya*, or cat and tiger) may exhibit structural similarity, it will not do to say that having a similar *samsthāna* is the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of a word. Hence the insistence on 'very close similarity in structure'. Otherwise, there is the danger of mixing up objects resembling one another only remotely. That the *samsthāna* of different classes of objects admits of several degrees of similarity has to be accepted by those who believe *jāti* to be a distinct category; otherwise they cannot satisfactorily explain why, for example, *gotva* is not present in the *gavaya*.

By *samsthāna* is meant the peculiar or distinctive structure or pattern of anything. In the case of objects endowed with form, the con-

junction of the several component parts constitutes the *samsthāna*. E.g. the collection of the dewlap is the *samsthāna* of the cow. But in the case of formless entities, their peculiar properties (*asādhāraṇa-dharma*), which mark them off from other things, constitute the *samsthāna*. E.g., *jñāna* and other qualities of the soul form its *samsthāna*.

The doctrine identifying *sāmānya* with *samsthāna* has not only the merit of economy of thought (*lāghava*), but has also the support of the scriptures. The famous *Chāndogya* text, 'eka vijñānēna sarva vijñānam', teaching *sat-kārya-vāda* shows unambiguously that effects, e.g., pots, cups, plates and so forth, are in substance one with their cause, namely clay. The underlying substance being unitary, the plurality of bases required for positing *jāti* does not exist. Hence it is concluded that *sāmānya* and *samsthāna* are identical.

10. Śakti-Vāda.

The tenth chapter takes up the question whether *śakti* (potentiality) should be recognised or not, and answers it in the affirmative, after refuting the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments in favour of the opposite view. In this regard the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is at one with the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. The Nyāya denial of *śakti* as a separate entity is mainly based on the following considerations.

1. The absence of the effect when apparently all the causal factors are present is explicable, it is sometimes said, only on the hypothesis that the *śakti* present in the cause is rendered inoperative by counter-agents (*pratibandhaka*). Rather than positing a *śakti* and saying that it is counter-acted by impediments it would be more reasonable, says the Nyāya-Viśeṣika, to trace the absence of the effect to the absence of one of the elements constituting the full complement of causal factors (*kāraṇa-sāmagri*). The absence of counteracting circumstances (*pratibandhakābhāva*) is an essential factor included in the totality of causal conditions. Hence, in its absence (i.e. when counter-acting forces prevail), the effect cannot occur. The mere presence of fire, for example, does not suffice to account for burning. There is need of the negative factor, namely, the absence of counter agents. That is why in the presence of *maṇi* (a gem which is fire-proof) fire fails to burn objects.

2. The believer in *śakti* as a distinct category cannot give a consistent account of its origin. For, when counter-acting circumstances destroy *śakti*, it is possible to revive it with the aid of the *uttambaka* (factors that could override the counter-agents). In such a situation, he must treat the *uttambaka* as the cause of *śakti*. But when both the *pratibandhaka* and the *uttambaka* are absent, he must maintain that the very thing which causes an object also generates its *śakti*.

Since the effect may quite well occur even in the presence of the *pratibandhaka*, provided it is associated with the *uttambaka*, the negative condition may be expressed in more comprehensive terms as follows: "The absence of the *pratibandhaka* which is not associated with the *uttambaka* (*uttambhakābhāva-viśiṣṭa-pratibandhakābhāva*)."

This view of *śakti* is subjected to severe scrutiny, and it is first pointed out that the negative factor, 'absence of the *pratibandhaka*' cannot be included among the causal conditions; for it will be shown presently that significant negation is never purely negative, but always carries a positive import. Again, if the absence of the *pratibandhaka* is an essential causal factor, it must, with consistency, be maintained that the absence of the person who could apply the *pratibandhaka* is also a causal condition; for, equally with the *pratibandhaka*, the person bringing it into operation prevents the occurrence of the effect. Not only that; but the *uttambaka* also must be included in the cause; for it overrides the *pratibandhaka* and facilitates the occurrence of the effect. If it is said that it cannot be a causal factor, because it is not invariable (i.e., in its absence too the effect occurs, on the strength of the absence of the *pratibandhaka*), the answer is that the effect produced by the *uttambaka* and that produced by the absence of the *pratibandhaka* are distinct from each other; even as the fire generated by rubbing *araṇi* sticks must be distinguished from that produced by *maṇi* (the lens), or straw. Thus, there are difficulties in including a negative circumstance among the causal factors.

Secondly, if a negative circumstance must be treated as a cause, when there are alternate causes for the same effect (when *araṇi* sticks or *maṇi* (lens) or *tṛṇa* (straw) can produce fire), instead of admitting differences in the effects produced by them, you might as well account for the fire arising from any of these causes by the single negative formula, namely, 'the absence of the non-existence of *maṇi* qualified by the absence of *araṇi* and *tṛṇa*'.

If the causal factor is expressed in this negative fashion when a positive formulation is possible, universally accepted inferences, such as the inference of smoke from fire, would be upset and it would be impossible to infer causes from a consideration of effects. The point of the criticism could be brought out with the aid of the following illustration. While common-sense thinks that fire is the cause of smoke, it is 'the absence of the non-existence of fire qualified in a specific way'. If the Naiyāyika is right, smoke must be inferred even when fire is absent; for when there is *vanyabhāva*, this causal condition is fulfilled (i.e. there is the absence of the non-existence of fire thus qualified). And if smoke could arise even in the absence of fire, the every day inference of fire from smoke would fall to the ground. Hence it has to be concluded

that only positive entities endowed with potency can be treated as causes. The tendency to make an object of this *śakti* must be resisted. Each object has a two-fold aspect—a perceptible and an imperceptible (latent) aspect. *Śakti* is to be identified with the latter aspect.

11. *Bhāvāntarābhāva-vāda*

In this chapter the Nyāya conception of *abhāva* (non-existence, negation) is criticised and the view that *abhāva* is not distinct from, and is merely a variety of, *bhāva* (existence, affirmation) is upheld. The *pūrvapakṣin* says non-existence is relative in its conception. Negation is of something or other, and never absolute nothing (*śūnya*), which is merely a meaningless concept. One may speak of the non-existence of a jar or cloth, but never of mere non-existence. Again, non-existence is expressible by negative judgments involving the use of the negative particle *na*. But the idea of existence is conveyed by affirmative judgments, and it does not presuppose a *pratiyogin* (counter-correlative). How, it is asked, can non-existence with its dependence upon the *pratiyogin* be treated as being on a par with *bhāva* which does not presuppose the *pratiyogin*?

If the objector says that the expression *nāsti* (does not exist) does not purport to convey the idea of non-existence, but really aims at denoting the presence of an *upādhi* (something positive), he must explain what precisely that *upādhi* is. Is it the bare region (*deśa*), or its awareness, or bare time, or space in association with time? On the first alternative, as the region (e.g. *bhūtala*) exists even in the presence of the *pratiyogin* (e.g. the jar), one must speak of the object as non-existent. Should it be said that mention of non-existence arises only when the *pratiyogin* is absent, it may be replied that, so long as the concept of *abhāva* is not admitted, there is no basis for speaking of *pratiyogin* at all. In fact, it is only from negative statements, such as 'There is no jar on the ground', 'This is not a cloth' that we come to speak of the jar or the cloth as the *pratiyogin*. It is no argument to say that an object comes to be regarded as a *pratiyogin*, not because of its non-existence, but because it is not adjacent; for 'not adjacent' (*asannihita*) itself involves a negative element. Thus the concept of non-existence is inescapable. The objector might still argue that an object could be treated as a *pratiyogin*, not because it is *asannihita* (not close by), but because it is in contact with a different region. This attempt to explain the *pratiyogin* on a purely positive basis, without referring to *abhāva* at all, is futile; because, if contact with a different region suffices to make anything a *pratiyogin*, then all-pervasive substances such as *ākāśa* would come to be treated as the *pratiyogin*. In other words, if the existence of the jar elsewhere suggests the judgment 'There is no jar on this spot',

the contact of *ākāśa* with a different region should lead to the judgment 'There is no *ākāśa* here'. The second alternative which identifies the *upādhi* with cognition of space fares no better; for cognition, being momentary, cannot be regarded as non-existence, because it is recognised on all hands that reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) is eternal. Nor can the expression *nāsti* denote *kāla* (time); for time being present universally in an identical form there would be no point in the negative judgment referring to the existence of bare duration.

The last alternative which says that *nāsti* denotes space associated with time is open to all the objections to which the first and second alternatives are liable. As the expression *nāsti* cannot be said to refer only to some *upādhi*, be it *deśa* or *kāla* or both, and as it is open to perception, it must be recognised, say the Naiyāyikas, that *abhāva* is a distinct category.

In disproof of this theory the author first urges that it is liable to be charged with the defect of multiplying entities. As the negative judgment may well be said to refer to particular spaces, instants of time and states associated with the cognition of the *pratiyogin*, it is needless to posit *abhāva* as a separate category. He who accepts *abhāva* as a different category thinks that non-existence relates to a particular place and time. For the sake of economy of thought the *siddhāntin* considers the very place and time as the significance of the negative judgment. Again, if the *siddhāntin* is guilty of treating what is negative as though it were positive, the opponent is equally guilty of the same mistake. Does he not say that *abhāvābhāva* (the negation of a negation) is positive? Even as the Naiyāyika does not treat *dhvamsa-prāgabhāva* as another kind of non-existence different from the four varieties already admitted and tries to show that it amounts only to the existence of the jar or its posterior non-existence, and just as he does not treat *prāgabhāva-dvamsa* (the subsequent non-existence of posterior non-existence) as being other than the jar or its subsequent non-existence, even so the *siddhāntin* says that the posterior non-existence of the pot amounts to the unending series of previous states, and subsequent non-existence is merely the unending series of successive states. If it be said that the Naiyāyika draws the line at these four varieties and refuses to admit further kinds of *abhāva* only for fear of being landed in an infinite regress, it could be said that it would be more sensible not to admit a few varieties and refuse to go further. Hence it is but reasonable to maintain that *prāgabhāva* is only another name for the unending series of previous states, and *dhvamsa* as the name for the unending series of subsequent states. If this theory is borne in mind, the scriptural passage "In the beginning this was non-existent (*asat*)" could be assigned its primary meaning.

12. *Śarīra-lakṣaṇa-vāda.*

The most prominent among the doctrines that differentiate Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta from all other schools of Vedāntic thought is its view that the entire cosmos comprising souls and matter constitutes the body (*śarīra*) of Brahman. For understanding the exact significance of this description of the cosmos it is necessary to know what precisely is meant by the term *śarīra* (body). In the *Srī Bhāṣya* the body is defined as follows—"that substance which, in respect of the activities in which it can engage, is capable of being completely controlled and supported by a conscious entity, and whose nature consists in being a source of glorification to that conscious entity is the body of that conscious entity." The question raised in this chapter is: Is this a single definition, or a collection of three definitions?

The *pūrvapakṣin* prefers the latter alternative, because he thinks that the three points mentioned in the definition *dhāryatva*, *niyantr̥tva* and *śeṣatva* are not at once necessary, and that any one of them suffices for making anything a body. He thinks that it can be resolved into the following three definitions.—(i) That substance which, in respect of the activities in which it can engage, is capable of being controlled by a conscious entity, is the body of that conscious entity. (ii) That substance which is supported by a conscious entity is the body of the latter. (iii) That substance whose nature consists in being a source of glorification to that conscious entity is the body of the latter. A close examination of these alternative definitions reveals that each word therein has a definite function to fulfil and none is superfluous. Take the first definition. But for the word *cetanasya* (conscious entity), *dharmabhūtajñāna* (attributive consciousness) would have to be regarded as the body of the soul. For *dharmabhūtajñāna* is controlled by the soul in itself, and not by the soul endowed with consciousness. The term *dravya* (substance) clearly shows that all other categories, such as attribute (*guṇa*), and activity (*karma*), cannot be treated as bodies. From the qualification *sarvātmanā* (always), it follows that the body of another, which a person may occasionally control, cannot be treated as his own body. The expression *svārthe*, meaning in respect of the activities in which it can engage, shows that the body cannot be controlled in regard to activities which lie beyond its powers. The human body, for instance, cannot be expected to fly. 'Capable of being controlled' (*śakyam*) suggests that the control need not always be exercised. In the second definition, the term *sarvātmanā* (always) precludes the possibility of our treating anything as the body which we may occasionally support. Similarly, in the last definition the word *sarvātmanā* serves to exclude the possibility of our treating servants and others, who occasionally minister unto their master, as body.

The view advocated here is that it is a single definition; for each of these three parts of the definition, taken in itself is found to be defective in some respect or other. Take the first definition which asserts that any substance can be treated as a body if it is capable of being controlled by a conscious entity in regard to activities which it can perform. This definition is liable to be charged with the defect of being too broad (*ativyāpti*). If this definition were acceptable, the axe would have to be regarded as the body of the person wielding it, since it fulfils the requirements of this definition. On rigorous scrutiny, the other two definitions are likewise found to be severally defective. Hence, it follows that *ādheyatva*, *vidheyatva* and *śeṣatva* are all essential elements in the definition of the body. That this is so would follow from a close study of the celebrated Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa where the doctrine that the universe is the body of God is clearly formulated. Take for example the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text: "He who stands in the earth (*pr̥thvī*), who is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is and who controls it from within—He is thy Self, the Inner Controller, the Immortal." Here the expression "He who stands in the earth and who is within the earth" teaches *ādheyatva*. By suggesting that 'the earth does not know Him' (i.e., does not know that it exists for the sake of the Indweller), *śeṣatva* is indicated. "Who controls from within" emphasises *vidheyatva*.

13. *Kaivalya-vicāra.*

Is it at all possible for the soul whose intrinsic nature is to be self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) to be entangled in *samsāra*? What precisely is the nature of *kaivalya*? These are the two questions raised in this chapter. Those who object to our view may argue that the soul (*ātman*) is, in its essential nature, blissful (*svatassukhī*) and self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*); and that there is therefore no possibility of its ever being involved in the miseries of earthly existence. They might also consider it impossible that when the blissful nature of the self is clouded, it should come to be implicated in matter. For, they may ask, "Will not the obscuration of the nature of the self-luminous entity amount to its destruction (*svarūpanāśa*)? How could the Viśiṣṭādvaitin object to the advaitic view and say that if *māyā* were to cloud *ātman*, the latter would be destroyed thereby; when the same objection would apply with equal force to his own contention?"

The author's reply to this objection is that on the advaitic conception *ātman* is a *nirviśeṣa-vastu*, pure consciousness, and, hence, with the obscuration of this consciousness, its very nature is in danger of being destroyed; but that, on the *viśiṣṭādvaitic* theory, the *ātman* is *saviśeṣa* (endowed with qualities). Among other things its essential nature, viz., *jñāna*, is the most agreeable kind (*anukūla*). This *anukūlya* admits of several degrees, and is always present in some degree, however slight. Hence the soul does not run the risk of being destroyed. When *anukūlya*

is present only in slight degrees, it is self-revealed, but is unable to arrest samsāric life. *Ānukūlya* of the most intense degree is apprehended from the scriptures. When it is veiled by *karma* and thereby reduced in intensity, mundane existence arises.

In the state of *kaivalya* (realisation of the nature of one's own self) the *Antaryāmin* (the Indweller) shines forth, but not as being the object of the utmost enjoyment. True, even the aspirant after self-realisation (*kaivalya*, *ātmāvalokana*) has to follow the path of self-surrender (*prapatti*) or loving devotion to God (*bhakti*) in order to remove the obstacles standing in the way of the successful fruition of *karma* and *jñāna*, the direct means to *kaivalya*. The devotion involved here is, however, only a means to an end (*aupādhika*). Long after *kaivalya* has been attained a person may experience *bhakti* in the true sense of the term as a result of either direct perception of the spotless nature of the self (*ātman*), or the merit accumulated through countless births. Thus the essentially blissful nature of the Lord is experienced in the fullest measure only in the state of final release (*mokṣa*), and not in the penultimate state (i.e. *kaivalya*). Hence the distinction between *kaivalya* and *mokṣa*. Though the former falls short of the ideal state, it may justifiably be spoken of as release; for in *kaivalya* the soul has experience of its own blissful nature, has no births and deaths and has obtained complete freedom from all bondage to *karma* which is the root cause of all the pleasures and pains of worldly life.

Since the thought of the Lord's blissful nature does not enter into the meditation (*upāsana*) of a person who has set up *kaivalya* as his goal, when his *upāsana* bears fruit he has an intuitive perception of the Lord, but does not yet grasp His blissful nature in accordance with what is known as *tatkratunīyāya*. The case is otherwise with the person who meditates upon the Lord as a blissful entity.

Bhagavad Rāmānuja, however, does not countenance the view that in the state of *kaivalya* the person is denied *Brahmānanda-anubhava*, and is confined only to *Brahmānubhava* or the direct perception of the Lord. For the realisation of one's own nature must, certainly, at some stage include the realisation that one exists only for the sake of the Lord. This must inevitably lead up to a fuller experience of the blissful nature of the Supreme Self. Since the scriptures say that he who follows the *arcirādi-mārga* is led up to the final goal, there is no warrant, he says, for asserting that the person aspiring for *kaivalya* is for ever condemned to an inferior type of *mokṣa*. In short, the distinction between these two forms of release may be expressed thus:—The soul may carry on meditation (*upāsana*) in one of two ways: It may meditate either on Brahman having the soul for its body or on the soul having Brahman for its self. The first type of meditation leads the *upāsaka* straight to *mokṣa*; the second leads up to it only after having traversed the stage of *kaivalya*.

॥ श्रीः ॥

॥ विषयानुक्रमिका ॥

सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनवादः प्रथमः (१-१५)

	PAGE
मङ्गलाचरणम्	३
सिद्धे व्युत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिरिति पूर्वपक्षः	॥
साङ्गुक्तिनिर्देशं शब्दप्रयोगे निर्देशस्यैवार्थप्रतिपत्तिहेतुतया शब्दस्यातत्परत्वशङ्का	॥
प्रत्येकपदव्युत्पादनाङ्गीकारेऽन्विताभिधानसिद्धान्तविरोधप्रदर्शनम्	४
सिद्धान्तारम्भः	५
प्रत्येकपदार्थज्ञानस्य स्मृत्याकारतया अन्विताभिधानाविरोधसमर्थनम्	॥
शब्दस्य बोधकत्वेनैव विवक्षा न बोध्यत्वेनेति निरूपणम्	॥
अव्युत्पन्नानां शब्दानां वाक्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वप्रसङ्गस्तत्परिहारश्च	७
अभिहितान्वयकटाक्षेणापि भाष्यनिर्वाहः	॥
शब्दस्यानुमानाद्वैलक्षण्यनिरूपणम्	॥
शब्दस्य कार्यान्वितार्थपरत्वासम्भवप्रदर्शनम्	८
शब्दचेष्टयोरेकजातीयप्रमाणत्वनिरसनम्	॥
लिपेरनुमानविधया अक्षरप्रतिपादकत्वोपपादनम्	१०
शब्दस्यानुमानात्मकत्वनिरासः	॥
भाषान्तराणामारोपितं बोधकत्वमुपजीव्य व्यवहारसमर्थनम्	११
अनादिशब्देषु सङ्केतासम्भवोपपादनम्	॥
नित्यानित्यशब्दविवेचनम्	॥
साङ्केतिकशब्देषु सङ्केतयितुर्वश्यज्ञेयत्वनिरूपणम्	१२
ईश्वरसङ्केतनिषेधः	१३

	PAGE
वेदशब्दस्य सर्वत्राविसंवादित्वम्	१४
वेदे स्वतःप्रामाण्यायतो विश्वासभूमा	१५
अन्विताभिधानपक्ष एव शब्दप्रामाण्यमिति निरूपणम्	१५

स्वतःप्रामाण्यनिर्णयवादो द्वितीयः (१७-४०)

प्रामाण्यादौ स्वतस्त्वपरतस्त्वयोर्वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरूपणम्	१७
प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ययोर्द्वयोस्वतस्त्वमभिप्रयतां साङ्ख्यानानां निरासः	१८
नैयायिकमतरीत्योभयोः परतस्त्वप्रतिपादनम्	१८
गुणात्प्रामाण्योत्पत्तिकथनम्	१९
प्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिः गुणसंवादार्थक्रियाज्ञानानामन्यतमेनेति निरूपणम्	२०
प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	२०
स्वतःप्रामाण्यस्य वेदोपयोगाभावप्रदर्शनम्	२१
वेदस्य नित्यत्वे प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिप्रतिपादनम्	२२
प्रमायाः परतस्त्वानुमानप्रयोगः	२३
अर्थप्रकाशरूपं प्रामाण्यं स्वत उत्पद्यत इति सिद्धान्तारम्भः	२४
वस्तुप्रकाशत्वस्य ज्ञानलक्षणत्वसमर्थनम्	२५
वस्तुप्रकाशत्वस्य ज्ञानलक्षणत्वाक्षेपस्तत्परिहारश्च	२६
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वयोः ज्ञानावान्तरविशेषत्वनिरासः	२८
सत्तया गुणानां प्रामाण्योत्पादकत्वनिराकरणम्	३३
प्रामाण्यज्ञानस्य परमनुव्यवसायापेक्षणान्नानवस्थेति निरूपणम्	३४
अनवस्थापरिहारार्थस्य परकीयानुमानस्य निरासः	३५
उदयनाचार्योक्तानुमानदूषणम्	३६
स्वतःप्रामाण्यस्य श्रीभाष्यकाराभिमतत्वप्रदर्शनम्	३७
काचित्प्रामाण्यसन्देहोपपादनम्	३८
अप्रामाण्यस्य स्वाभाविकत्वनिरासः	३९

ख्यातिनिरूपणवादः तृतीयः (४२-६८)

	PAGE
गुरुमतानुसारेण यथार्थख्यातिनिरूपणमन्यथाख्यातिनिरसनञ्च	४१
अन्यथाख्यातौ सामग्र्यभावनिरूपणम्	४२
इदं रजतमिति बुद्धेः अनुभवस्मृत्युभयरूपत्वोपपादनम्	४३
शुक्तिरजतप्रवृत्तिनिर्वाहः	४४
वादिविप्रतिपत्त्यादिभिर्हेतुपञ्चकैरन्यथाख्यातिसमर्थनम्	४६
प्रतिज्ञानन्तरं हेतूपन्यासोऽन्यथाख्यातिपक्ष एव युज्यत इति निरूपणम्	४७-५१
बाधादन्यथाख्यातिसमर्थनम्	४८
भेदाग्रहणस्वरूपशोधनम्	४८
असंसर्गाग्रहस्वरूपशोधनम्	४९-५३
व्यवहारादन्यथाख्यातिसमर्थनम्	५२
भेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्तौ शब्दाप्रामाण्यप्रसञ्जनम्	५३
भ्रान्तिशब्दात्प्रतीतिस्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिसमर्थनम्	५४
इन्द्रियासन्निकृष्टस्यापि दोषाद्भानोपपादनम्	५५
संशयात्मकज्ञानस्थापनम्, ज्ञानयाथार्थ्यानुमाननिरासश्च	५५
सिद्धान्त्यभिमतयथार्थख्यातिनिरूपणम्	५७
ज्ञानसामान्यस्य यथार्थत्वेऽपि बाध्यबाधकभावव्यवस्थोपपादनम्	५८
भेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्त्युपपादनम्	५८
संसर्गज्ञानोपयोगनिरूपणम्	६०-६८
प्रतिज्ञानन्तरं हेतूपन्याससमर्थनम्	६१
अनिर्वचनीयख्यात्युपन्यासस्तन्निराकरणञ्च	६२
प्रपञ्चस्य सद्विलक्षणत्वनिरासः	६५
विशेषतोऽनिर्वचनीयख्यातिपक्षानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	६५
प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वस्य अनित्यत्वे पर्यवसानम्	६५

	PAGE
स्वाप्नप्रपञ्चस्यापि पारमार्थिकत्वसमर्थनम्	. ६६
विश्वमिथ्यात्वानुमानदूषणम्	. ६७
अनिर्वचनीयस्यान्यनुपपत्तिनिगमनम्	. ६८

स्वयंप्रकाशवादः चतुर्थः (६१-८३)

ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वखण्डनम्	. ६९
ज्ञाने सत्ताप्रकाशयोर्भेदः	. ७०
ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशमित्युक्तेर्वानुपपत्तत्त्वप्रदर्शनम्	. ७०
ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वे व्यवसायानुव्यवसाययोरर्थज्ञानयोश्चावैलक्षण्यप्रदर्शनम्	. ७१
ज्ञानतया ज्ञानानुमानमिति भाट्टमतोपमंहारः	. ७१
मतान्तरैणापि ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वखण्डनम्	. ७२
ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वानुमानदूषणम्	. ७३
ज्ञाने मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यमेवेति निगमनम्	. ७४
स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमिद्वान्तरागम्भः	. ७५
ज्ञाने सत्ताप्रकाशयोरेक्यम्	. ७५
जीवाणुत्वज्ञानविभुत्वयोरुपपादनम्	. ७५
स्वप्रकाशत्वस्वरूपनिरूपणम्	. ७६
स्वप्रकाशत्वेऽनुमानोपन्यासः प्रकाशशब्दार्थवर्णनञ्च	. ७७
अनुभूतिरनन्यार्थानप्रकाशा इति प्रयोगस्य सम्भावनामात्रपरत्ववर्णनम्	. ७८
अस्वयंप्रकाशत्वस्थापकवस्तुत्वानुमानखण्डनम्	. ७८
भाट्टाद्यभिमतस्वयंप्रकाशत्वप्रतिक्षेपः	. ७९
ज्ञानस्य मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यत्वेऽनुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	. ८०
अस्ति नास्तीति सन्देहाभावाज्ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वसमर्थनम्	. ८१-८२
व्यवहारविसंवादाभावात् स्वप्रकाशत्वस्थापनम्	. ८३
ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वेऽर्थज्ञानयोरेकप्रसक्तिपरिहारः	. ८३

	PAGE
ज्ञानस्यैवात्मनोऽपि स्वप्रकाशत्वस्थापनम्	. ८४
मुख्यमहमस्वाप्नमिति परामर्शस्वरूपनिरूपणम्	. ८५

ईश्वरानुमानभङ्गवादः पञ्चमः (८७-२०३)

ईश्वरस्यानुमानिकत्वे शास्त्रप्रामाण्यासम्भवात्पादनम्	. ८७
अनुमाननिषेधपरतया सूत्रं व्याकुर्वतां श्रीभाष्यकारमिश्राणामाशयविष्कारः	. ८८
नैयायिकाभिमतस्येश्वरानुमानस्य निर्दुष्टत्वनिरूपणम्	. ८९, ९०
ईश्वरानुमाने प्रतिप्रयोगसम्भवनिरागमेन पूर्वपक्षोपमंहारः	. ९१
ईश्वरानुमाननिगकरणम्, विकल्प्य सकर्तृकत्वदूषणञ्च	. ९२
कार्यस्य विलक्षणात्मान्तरममेवेतदगुणान्तगनुमापकत्वनिरागः	. ९४
सकर्तृकत्वानुमाने सिद्धमाश्रयाप्रदर्शनम्	. ९५
आनुमानिकेश्वरस्य मार्गज्ञे प्रमाणाभावोपन्यासः	. ९५
नित्यप्रत्यक्षस्य विषयव्यवस्थार्थं न ज्ञानापेक्षेति निरूपणम्	. ९६
अजसंयोगसमर्थनम्, नित्यप्रत्यक्षनिगकरणञ्च	. ९७
सकर्तृकत्वानुमाने विशेषविरोधसमर्थनम्	. ९८
सकर्तृकत्वानुमाने सोपाधिकत्वनिरूपणम्	. ९८
कार्यत्वात्कारणविशेषरूपकर्तृत्वानुमानप्रतिक्षेपः	. ९९
तस्मिन्नेवानुमाने व्यतिरेकस्याप्यसम्भवप्रदर्शनम्	. १००
प्रतितर्कोद्भावनम्	. १०१
शास्त्रगम्येऽर्थे प्रतिनर्काणामदूषकत्वोपन्यासः	. १०२
ईश्वरस्य श्रोतत्वे सङ्कटराहित्यवर्णनम्	. १०३

देहातिरिक्तात्मयाथात्म्यवादः षष्ठः (१०५-१२६)

आत्मन इन्द्रियातिरेकसमर्थनम्	. १०५
आत्मनो मनःप्राणबुद्ध्यातिरेकसमर्थनम्	. १०६
चार्वाकमतेन देहस्य ज्ञातृत्वसमर्थनम्	. १०७

	PAGE
समानाधिकरणवाक्यस्य अखण्डार्थपरत्वोपन्यासः	१३७
सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यादीनां अखण्डार्थपरत्वप्रतिपादनम्	"
समानाधिकरणवाक्यस्य अखण्डार्थपरत्वनिरासः	१३८
समानाधिकरणवाक्य इव व्यधिकरणवाक्यस्थानाच्च पदानामैकार्थ्यप्रसङ्गनम्	१३९
समानाधिकरणवाक्यस्य विशिष्टैकार्थपरत्वाभावे लक्षणायाः प्रसङ्गनम्	१४०
लक्षणवाक्यसिद्धयोर्निमित्तभेदैकार्थयोरविरोधप्रदर्शनम्	१४१
सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यादौ व्यावृत्तिलक्षणाया निरासः	"
कारणवाक्यैकार्थ्यादखण्डार्थपरत्वशङ्का, तत्प्रतिक्षेपश्च	"
समानाधिकरणलक्षणवाक्यस्य सिद्धान्त्यभिमतार्थवर्णनपूर्वकं तत्तद्गुणविशिष्ट एव परमात्मा सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यैस्सिद्धयतीति निगमनम्	१४२

सत्कार्यवादोऽष्टमः (१४३-१५२)

एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं वदन्ती श्रुतिः सत्कार्यवादं प्रस्तौतीति प्रतिज्ञा	१४३
तस्यां श्रुतौ हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्य अविशेषेति निरूपणम्	"
तार्किकमतेन बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादिभिः कार्यकारणयोः भेदोपपादनम्	१४४
अवस्थाभेदेन बुद्धिभेदादिरूपपद्यत इति शङ्कायाः परिहारः	"
अवस्थाभेदस्य संयोगादिरूपत्वेऽनुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	१४५
कार्यकारणयोरभेदेऽणूनां स्थूलानाञ्च प्रत्यक्षत्वाप्रत्यक्षत्वयोः प्रसङ्गनम्	१४६
सत्कार्यवादे पृथिव्यादीनां परस्परभेदानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	"
प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलेन कार्यकारणयोरैक्यस्थापनम्	१४७
पूर्वपक्षोपन्यस्तबुद्धिभेदादिहेतोरसिद्धत्वप्रतिपादनम्	"
कार्यद्रव्येष्वेकत्वस्थूलत्वयोस्समर्थनम्	१४८
विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाद्भेद इति पक्षस्य निरासः	"
अणूनां स्थूलानाञ्च प्रत्यक्षत्वाप्रत्यक्षत्वयोस्समर्थनम्	१४९
अवस्थातद्वतोर्भेदवर्णनम्	"

कार्यकारणयोरैक्ये भेदाभेदप्रसङ्गपरिहारः, नित्यानित्यविभागोपपत्तिनिरूपणञ्च	"
असत्कार्यवादेऽमूर्तानां महदादीनामुत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	१५०
उपादानाभेदे आकाशाद्वायुरिति श्रुत्यर्थानुपपत्तिशङ्का	"
तस्याश्शङ्कायाः परिहारः	१५१

संस्थानसामान्यसमर्थनवादो नवमः (१५३-१६०)

अनुगताया जातेः प्रत्यक्षत्वोपन्यासः	१५३
शब्दानुमानप्रवृत्तीनां सामान्योपजीवित्वनिरूपणम्	१५४
सादृश्यसदृशसंस्थानयोः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वनिरासः	१५५
सिद्धान्तरम्भः	१५६
अयमपि गौरिति प्रतीतेरतिरिक्तजात्यविषयकत्वसमर्थनम्	"
संस्थानस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वे आनन्त्यव्यभिचाराभ्यां व्युत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिशङ्का, तत्परिहारश्च	१५७
गोवययोस्सदृशसंस्थानयोरेकजातीयत्वप्रसङ्गपरिहारः	१५८
संस्थानस्वरूपनिष्कर्षः	१५९
सादृश्यपदार्थशोधनम्	"
संस्थानजातिपक्षे श्रुत्याद्युपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	१६०

शक्तिवादो दशमः (१६२-१७४)

शक्तिपदार्थस्यावश्यकत्वोपपादनम्	१६१
उदयनाचार्यमतेन अतिरिक्तशक्त्यभावपूर्वपक्षः	"
अभावस्य कारणत्वोपपादनम्	१६२
मण्यादेः प्रतिबन्धत्वमेव न प्रतिबन्धकत्वमिति निरूपणम्	१६३
शक्त्यनुमानखण्डनम्	१६४
कारणत्वं भावानामेवेति समर्थनम्	१६५

	PAGE
अभावस्याकारणत्वोपपादनम्	. १६६
सम्प्रतिपन्नकारणस्वभावातिक्रमान्नाभावस्य कारणत्वमिति प्रतिपादनम्	. १६७
अकरणस्य प्रत्यवायजनकत्ववाचोयुक्तात्पर्यम्	. ”
उत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टाभावस्य कारणत्वासम्भवनिरूपणम्	. १६८
मण्यादेः प्रतिबन्धकत्वस्थापनम्	. १७०
शक्तिनाश इत्यादिव्यवहारनिर्वाहभेदाः	. १७३

भावान्तराभाववादः एकादशः (१७५-१८५)

भावान्तरमेवाभाव इति सिद्धान्तोपक्षेपः	. १७५
नञर्थस्य भावातिरिक्तत्वपूर्वपक्षः	. ”
भावात्मक उपाधिरभाव इति पक्षस्य विकल्प्य दूषणम्	. १७६
ज्ञानकालादिरूपस्योपाधेः नञर्थत्वनिराकरणम्	. १७७
देशसम्भिन्नस्य कालस्य कालान्वितस्य वा देशस्य नञर्थत्वनिराक्रिया	. १७८
कालभेदविशिष्टस्य देशभेदस्य नास्तिशब्दप्रयोगोचरत्वसमर्थनम्	. ”
अभावस्य भावान्तररूपत्वप्रतिपादनम्	१७९-१८५
सिद्धान्ते ‘असद्वा’ इत्यादि श्रुतिर्मुख्यार्था भवतीति निगमनम्	. १८५

शरीरलक्षणवादो द्वादशः (१८६-१९०)

यस्य चेतनस्य यदद्रव्यं सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं धारयितुं च शक्यं तच्छेषतैक- स्वरूपञ्च तत्तस्य शरीरमिति शरीरलक्षणोपक्षेपः	. १८६
व्यवच्छेदासिद्धेः यस्य चेतनस्येत्यादिवाक्यस्यानेकलक्षणाभिप्रायकत्ववर्णनम्	. १८७
प्रथमलक्षणे दोषोद्भावनपूर्वकमनेकलक्षणत्वासम्भवनिरूपणम्	. १८८
द्वितीयतृतीयलक्षणयोर्दोषप्रदर्शनम्	. १८९
समुच्चितान्येवैकं लक्षणमिति सिद्धान्तोपसंहारः	. १९०
अस्य लक्षणस्य श्रुतिप्रसिद्धत्वनिरूपणम्	. ”

त्रयोदशो वादः (१९१-१९८)

	PAGE
स्वप्रकाशस्याप्यात्मनस्संसारोपपादनम्	. १९१
आत्मगतानुकूल्ये तारतम्योपपादनम्	. ”
आनुकूल्यविशेषसङ्कोचाज्ज्ञानसङ्कोचवर्णनम्	. ”
स्वप्रकाशात्मगतस्य स्वरूपानुकूल्यविशेषस्याप्रकाशसमर्थनम्	. १९२
अन्तर्यामिनिष्ठानुकूल्यस्य कैवल्येऽप्रकाशवर्णनम्	. १९३
कैवल्ये निःशेषकर्मक्षयोऽस्ति नेति विकल्पः	. १९४
पञ्चाग्निविदो ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारमात्रमेव, न ब्रह्मानन्दानुभव इति निरूपणम्	. ”
तस्यापि ब्रह्मानन्दानुभवोपपादनम्	. १९७

॥ श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

। बोधविमर्शः ।

। वे. सुब्रह्मण्यशास्त्री ।

। अण्णामलैविश्वविद्यालयः ।



शक्त्या लक्षणया वा पदैः स्मृतानां पदार्थानां संसर्गं वाक्यार्थाभिधमवगाहते शाब्दबोधः यं वाक्यार्थबोधं संप्रचक्षते । स च बोधः लिङादिघटितादिव तदघटितादपि वाक्याज्जायते इत्यनुभवसिद्धोऽयमर्थः । तत्र प्राथमिकशाब्दबोधकारणतालाघवं मूलयुक्तिमवलम्बमानाः के चन दार्शनिकाः आख्यातार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकमेव सर्वत्र बोधं मन्यन्ते । अन्ये तु निरुक्तमहाभाष्यादिवचनं प्रमाणीकुर्वन्तः तदुपोद्बलकयुक्तिजातञ्च निरूपयन्तः प्रायः धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं बोधं नञ्घटिताच्च वाक्यान्वयार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं बोधं प्रतिपन्नाः । परे तु व्यवहारातिप्रसङ्गाप्रसङ्गवारणे बद्धदृष्टयः पदोपस्थापितानां अनेकधा एकशाब्दबोधीयसांसर्गिकविषयताविद्वेषिणः योग्येन साक्षात्संबन्धेन तत्तत्पदार्थस्य तत्र तत्रान्वयं स्वीकुर्वन्तः अनुभवञ्च प्रमाणीकुर्वन्तः प्रथमान्तपदसमभिव्याहारे प्रायः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं कचिन्निपातार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं कचिच्च धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं कचिदाख्यातार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकञ्च बोधमुपपादयन्ति । वर्णयन्ति च तात्पर्यं तदनुसारेणानुशासनादीनाम् ।

सर्वदार्शनिकानाञ्च बोधः आख्यान्यतमामेव सरणिं गाहते इति स्वमतिशुद्धये पक्षत्रयमपि संगृह्यते । अत्र मीमांसकाः,

तण्डुलमित्यादीनि द्वितीयाद्यन्तानि पदानि क्रियापदं विना न निराकांक्षशाब्दबोधं जनयन्तीत्यविवादम् । न हि तण्डुलमिति पदेनैव वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिर्दृश्यते । अतो ज्ञायते क्रियापदं द्वितीयाद्यादिपदार्थस्य विशेष्यसमर्पकमिति । द्वितीयाद्यर्थश्च प्रातिपदिकार्थस्य विशेष्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सहा र्थं ब्रूतः तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति

व्युत्पत्तेः । तिङन्ते च धात्वर्थस्य आख्यातार्थ एव विशेष्यः निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तेर्ग्व । आख्यातस्य च कालः संख्या कृत्यपरपर्यायभावना कर्तृत्वादिरिति सन्ति बहवोऽर्थाः । तेष्वपि भावनैव विशेष्यः । तत्रैव आख्यातार्थकालसंख्यादिकं विशेषणतया भासते 'भावप्रधानमाख्यातम्' इति निरुक्तात् । इदञ्च न प्रत्ययार्थभावनायाः धात्वर्थनिरूपितविशेष्यत्वं बोधयितुं प्रवृत्तम् । प्रकृतिप्रत्ययो सहार्थं ब्रूतः तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इत्यनेनैव सिद्धत्वात् । नापि 'धात्वर्थः केवलशुद्धो भाव इत्यभिधीयते' इत्युक्तभावपदार्थताकस्य धात्वर्थस्य तिङ्ार्थापेक्षया प्राधान्यं बोधयितुं प्रवृत्तमिति शक्यते वक्तुम् । तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धार्थकल्पनायाः अयुक्तत्वात् । अपि च भावपदं धात्वर्थे वैयाकरणैः परिभाषितम् । सा च परिभाषा व्याकरणशान्त्र एव भावे घञ् इत्यत्र प्रवर्तते न भावे त्वतलावित्यत्र । निरुक्तस्थभावपदञ्च धात्वर्थपरमित्यत्र नास्ति प्रमाणम् । तस्मात् तत्र णिजन्तभूतोरुच्चप्रत्ययान्तत्वव्युत्पत्त्या भवनानुकूलव्यापाररूपा भावनैव भावपदेनोच्यते । आख्यातार्थेषु भावनाकालसंख्यादिषु कस्य प्राधान्यं कस्य गुणत्वं इति विचिकित्सायां भावप्रधानमिति निरुक्तमृतिः भावनातिरिक्ताख्यातार्थं प्रति आख्यातार्थभावनाया एव प्राधान्यं ब्रूते । एवञ्च धात्वर्थादीनां विशेष्यभूता भावनैव वाक्यजन्यबोधे मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते । न च द्वितीयाद्यन्तपदस्य क्रियापदसाकांक्षत्वेऽपि प्रथमान्तपदस्य तदाकांक्षायां प्रमाणाभावेन प्रथमान्तार्थस्य क्रियाविशेषणत्वं नास्तीति वाच्यम् । यतः चैत्रः इत्येतावन्मात्रोक्तौ न निराकांक्षशाब्दबोधो जायते । किं करोति इत्याद्याकांक्षाया नियमेनोत्पादात् । न च चैत्रः इत्येतावन्मात्रस्य शाब्दबोधाजनकत्वेऽपि चैत्रः पण्डितः इति वाक्यात्पण्डिताभिन्नश्चैत्रः इति निराकांक्षबोधोदयात् प्रथमान्तार्थस्य क्रियासाकांक्षत्वे प्रमाणाभावः इति वाच्यम् । 'अस्तिर्भवन्तीपरः प्रथमपुरुषः अप्रयुज्यमानोऽप्यस्ति' इति कात्यायनस्मरणस्यैव प्रथमान्तपदस्य क्रियापदसाकांक्षत्वे प्रमाणत्वात् । न च तत्र तत्र योग्यतानुसारेण अस्त्यतिरिक्तक्रियापदाध्याहारस्यावश्यकत्वात् अस्तिर्भवन्तीपरः इति व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । वेदे अस्त्यध्याहारनियमार्थत्वात् । सर्वत्र क्रियापदमस्ति प्रथमान्तपदमपि क्रियापदसाकांक्षमेव अतः प्रथमान्तार्थः न वाक्यार्थबोधे विशेष्यः इति सूचनेन प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकत्वभ्रमनिरासस्यैव तदनुशासनफलत्वाच्च । न चोक्तानुशासनबलात् चैत्रः इत्यादिप्रथमान्तपदानां

अस्तिपदसाकांक्षत्वेऽपि अहं पण्डितः, त्वं पण्डितः, इत्यादौ प्रथमपुरुषभिन्नस्थले प्रथमान्तपदस्य क्रियापदसाकांक्षत्वे प्रमाणाभावः इति वाच्यम् । प्रातिपदिकार्थप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन सुबजन्योपस्थितिः कारणं, लिङ्संख्याव्यतिरिक्तसुबर्थप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति क्रियापदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणं, इति क्लृप्तकार्यकारणभावयोरेव तत्र क्रियापदसाकांक्षत्वे प्रमाणत्वात् ।

प्रथमाप्रकृत्यर्थः प्रथमार्थे विशेषणम् । प्रथमार्थश्च क्रियायां विशेषणतया भासते । न च प्रथमा न संख्यातिरिक्तार्थवती संख्या च प्रकृत्यर्थे विशेषणतयैवान्वेति इति प्रथमाप्रकृत्यर्थः कस्मिन्प्रथमार्थे विशेषणतयान्वेतीति वाच्यम् । प्रातिपदिकार्थलिङ्गपरिमाणवचनमात्रे प्रथमा इत्यनुशासनबलात् प्रथमायाः संख्यातिरिक्तार्थवत्त्वात् । ये मन्यन्ते प्रथमा साधुत्वसंपादिकेति तैरपि तस्यास्संख्यावाचकत्वं स्वीकृतमेव । एवञ्च लिङ्संख्यावाचिका प्रथमा, प्रातिपदिकार्थे प्रातिपदिकेन विवक्षिते तदुत्तरं प्रथमा भवति इति चार्थवर्णने वैरूप्यापत्तिः । तस्मात्प्रातिपदिकार्थ एव प्रथमार्थः । न च तस्य प्रातिपदिकेनैव लाभात् प्रथमायाः तदर्थे साधुत्वार्थं तदर्थानुवादकतेति युक्तम् । चैत्रपदोत्तरप्रथमायाः चैत्ररूपार्थविशेषतात्यर्थाहकं चैत्रपदम् । अवश्यञ्चैवं स्वीकरणीयम् । अन्यथा प्रकृतिप्रत्ययार्थयोः न भेदसंबन्धेनान्वयः अभिन्नत्वात् । नाप्यभेदसंबन्धेन, तयोरभेदेनान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात् । उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकवैलक्षण्याभावेन तथा बोधासंभवाच्च । एवञ्च प्रथमार्थ एव चैत्रादिः आख्यातार्थभावनायां प्रकारतया भासते ।

अपि च, प्रातिपदिकस्य व्यर्थत्वापरपर्यायतात्यर्थाहकत्वकल्पनममृष्यमाणो वार्तिककारः 'अभिहिते प्रथमा' इत्यनुशासनम् । अभिहितकारकवाचिनी प्रथमा इति तदर्थः । एवञ्च चैत्रः पचति इत्यादौ कर्तृत्वं प्रथमार्थः । तत्र चैत्रः प्रकृत्यर्थः आवेयतासंबन्धेनान्वेति । कर्तृत्वञ्चाख्यातार्थभावनायाम् । न च कर्तृत्वादेराख्याताभिहितस्य भावनायामन्वितत्वात्पुनः प्रथमया कर्तृत्वबोधनं व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । आख्यातेन न चैत्रत्वावच्छिन्नवृत्तित्वेन कर्तृत्वं बोध्यते । अतश्चैत्रवृत्तित्वेन कर्तृत्वबोधाय प्रथमया कर्तृत्वाभिधानमावश्यकम् । न च प्रथमान्तपदेन चैत्रत्वावच्छिन्नवृत्तित्वेन कर्तृत्वबोधनात् आख्यातेन

सामान्यतः कर्तृत्वबोधो निष्फल इति वाच्यम् । आख्यातेन कर्तृत्वे अभिहित एव चैत्रादिपदोत्तरप्रथमायास्साधुत्वात् । यद्वृत्तिकारकत्वं स्वान्वयिक्रियाप्रतिपादकेन पदेन वृत्त्या प्रतिपाद्यते तत्त्वं प्रथमाप्रयोजकमभिहितत्वमित्युक्तं भाट्टदीपिकायाम् । अतश्च प्रथमायाः साधुत्वाय आख्यातेन सामान्यतः कर्तृत्वाभिधानमावश्यकम् । कर्तृत्वश्चाखण्डो धर्मः नानुकूलकृतिमत्त्वम् । तथा सति चैत्रेण पाकः क्रियते इत्यत्र चैत्रेण पाकः इत्येतावतैव पाके चैत्रकर्तृत्वबोधसंभवात् क्रियते इति पदप्रयोगोऽनर्थकः स्यात् । अखण्डस्य कर्तृत्वस्य तृतीयाबोधत्वे तु कृतिसाध्यत्वं क्रियते इति पदेन बोध्यते इति तत्प्रयोगो नानर्थकः । कृत्यभिधानञ्च न प्रथमाप्रयोजकं चैत्रेण मुप्यते इत्यत्रापि चैत्रपदात्प्रथमापत्तेः । तत्रापि चैत्रेण स्वापः क्रियते इति विवरणानुसारेण आख्यातस्य कृतिरूपभावनाबोधकत्वावश्यकत्वात् । अतः अखण्डकर्तृत्वाद्यभिधानमेव प्रथमाप्रयोजकम् । आख्यातेन बोधितं कर्तृत्वं प्रथमार्थः । सुबर्थप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति क्रियापदजन्योपस्थितिः विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन कारणं इति कार्यकारणभावबलेन तदपि भावनायामन्वेति ।

(१) एवञ्च सुबन्तपदानां स्वार्थविशेष्यसमर्पकं क्रियापदम् । तत्रापि धात्वर्थस्य आख्यातार्थो विशेष्यः तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति व्युत्पत्तेः । आख्यातार्थेषु च भावनाया विशेष्यत्वं भावप्रधानमाख्यातमिति निरुक्तस्मृतिबोधितम् । अतः वाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधे भावनैव मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते ।

(२) अपि च ओदनं पचति इत्यत्र प्रथमान्तपदाभावेन भावनाप्रकारकशाब्दबोधासंभवेन सामग्रीवशात् भावनाविशेष्यकबोधे बाधकाभावः । एवञ्च भावनायाः कुत्रचित् मुख्यविशेष्यतया भानस्य सिद्धत्वात् सर्वत्रैव बोधे तस्या एव मुख्यविशेष्यतया भानं युक्तम् ।

(३) 'तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः' इति सूत्रयन्महर्षिर्जैमिनिः क्रियापदबोध्यभावनामुख्यविशेष्यकं बोधं स्वानुभवसिद्धं ब्रूते ।

ननु तिङुपात्तसंख्या तावत्प्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्ये चैत्रादाबन्वेतीत्यत्र नास्ति विवादः । चैत्र इव मैत्रो गच्छति इत्यत्र इवशब्दार्थसादृश्यविशेषणीभूते चैत्रे तादृशसंख्यान्वयो नास्ति । अतः तिङुपात्तसंख्या अन्याविशेषणीभूतप्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्ये अन्वेतीति

ल्लितम् । एवञ्च आख्यातार्थभावनाया अपि आश्रयतासंबन्धेन तत्रैवान्वयो युक्तः । गालादिव्यतिरिक्ताख्यातार्थप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति अन्याविशेषणीभूतप्रथमान्तपदजन्योपस्थितिः विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन कारणमिति कार्यकारणभावकल्पने लाघवात् । तथा च वैत्रः पचति इति वाक्यात् पाकानुकूलकृतिमानेकत्वविशिष्टश्चैत्रः इति प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः स्वीकरणीयः ।

अपि च पण्डितश्चैत्र इत्यत्र पण्डिताभिन्नश्चैत्रः इत्याकारकः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको बोधः अकामेनापि स्वीकरणीयः । नह्यत्राख्यातमस्ति यस्यार्थो मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते । चैत्रादिपदोत्तरप्रथमा च न विशेष्यतया प्रातिपदिकार्थान्वययोग्यमर्थमभिधत्ते । एवञ्च प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधस्य सिद्धत्वात् सर्वत्रैव तस्य मुख्यविशेष्यतया भानमुचितमिति चेत् ।

(१) न, यथा आख्यातार्थो वर्तमानादिकालः आधेयतासंबन्धेन तदर्थकृताबन्वेति । तथा प्रथमान्तार्थश्चैत्रादिरपि तेन संबन्धेन कृतावेवान्वेतीत्यपि वक्तुं शक्यम् । एवञ्च आख्यातार्थकृतिः प्रथमान्तपदार्थे विशेषणतयैव भासते इत्यत्र नियामकाभावात् निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावो निष्प्रमाणकः । न चास्माकमनुभव एव नियामक इति वाच्यम् । जैमिन्यादिमहर्ष्यनुभवविरुद्धानुभवस्य शपथैकनिर्णयत्वात् । न हि न्यायदर्शनकारो महर्षिः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधस्य स्वानुभवसिद्धतां सूचयत्यपि ।

(२) किञ्च तिङुपात्तसंख्या प्रथमान्तपदार्थे अन्वेतीत्येवासङ्गतम् । चैत्रः इति सुबेकवचनादेकत्वस्य शीघ्रमुपस्थितत्वात् तस्य चैत्रे अन्वयेनैव निराकांक्षत्वात् तिङुपात्तसंख्यान्वये आकांक्षाविरहात् । न च चैत्रो मैत्रश्च गच्छतः इत्यत्र सुबिभक्त्या द्वित्वस्यानुपस्थितिः आख्यातोपात्तद्वित्वस्य प्रथमान्तार्थे अन्वय आवश्यक इति वाच्यम् । तत्र आख्यातेन द्वित्ववत् सुपा एकत्वमपि बोध्यते । एकत्वान्वयानुभवस्य द्वित्वान्वयानुभवस्य वा अशाब्दत्वं वक्तव्यम् । तत्र च सुबुपात्तैकत्वान्वयबोध एव शाब्दः । न पदान्तरोपात्तद्वित्वान्वयानुभवः इत्येव कल्पयितुमुचितम् । वस्तुतः आख्यातार्थसंख्यायाः निरुद्धलक्षणया आख्यातेनोप-

स्थापिते कर्तर्येवान्वयः एकपदोपात्तत्वादिति न कुत्रापि आख्यातार्थसंख्यायाः प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वयः । अतश्च निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावकल्पनं न युज्यते ।

(३) अपि च कालाद्यतिरिक्ताख्यातार्थनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन आख्यातपदजन्यशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति प्रथमान्तनामपदजन्यान्याविशेषणीभूतार्थविशेष्यकोपस्थितिः विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन कारणमिति कार्यकारणभावो न संभवति । तथा सति चैत्रो न पचति इत्यत्र आख्यातार्थभावनायाः चैत्रे अन्वयापत्तिः । भवन्मते हि पाकानुकूलकृत्यभाववांश्चैत्रः इत्याकारकस्तत्र बोधः । तत्र च भावनाविशेष्यत्वं न अर्थाभावस्यैव न चैत्रस्य । आख्यातार्थसंख्या च चैत्र एवान्वेति । अतः आख्यातार्थसंख्याभावनोभयसाधारण्येन निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावो न संभवति । न च निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावे कार्यतावच्छेदककोटौ आख्याते निपातासमभिव्याहृतत्वं दीयते । तथा च कालादिव्यतिरिक्तनिपातासमभिव्याहृताख्यातार्थनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबुद्धिं प्रति तादृशप्रथमान्तपदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमिति फलितम् । एवञ्च चैत्रो न पचति इत्यत्र न प्रथमान्तार्थस्य भावनाविशेष्यत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । एवं सति निपातसमभिव्याहृताख्यातार्थसंख्यायाः प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वयो न स्यात् । तत्स्थलीयसंख्यान्वयबोधस्य प्रथमान्तपदजन्योपस्थितिकार्यतावच्छेदकानाक्रान्तत्वात् । न च निपातसमभिव्याहृताख्यातार्थसंख्यानिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबोधे प्रथमान्तपदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणम् । तादृशाख्यातार्थभावनानिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबोधे निपातजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमिति कल्पयित्वा संख्याविशेष्यत्वं प्रथमान्तार्थस्य भावनाविशेष्यत्वञ्चाभावस्योपपादयितुं शक्यमिति वाच्यम् । तथा सत्यनेककार्यकारणभावकल्पनया गौरवात् । अस्मन्मते तु नामार्थभिन्नः सुवर्थलिङ्गसंख्याव्यतिरिक्तस्वर्वोऽपि भावनायामेवान्वेतीति लाघवम् । एवं निपातसमभिव्याहारस्थले सर्वत्र नेयं रीतिस्संभवति । चैत्र एव पचति इत्यत्र निपातसमभिव्याहृते आख्यातार्थसंख्याभावनयोरुभयोरपि प्रथमान्तपदार्थे चैत्रेऽन्वयात् । एवञ्च तत्तत्स्थलानुरोधात् अन्यादृशकार्यकारणभावकल्पनाया आवश्यकत्वेन अनेककार्यकारणभावकल्पनाया आवश्यकत्वेन अनेककार्यकारणभावकल्पनागौरवं न केनापि परिहर्तुं शक्यम् ।

(४) अपि च चैत्र इव मैत्रो गच्छति इत्यत्र चैत्रे संख्यान्वयात् अन्याविशेषणीभूतप्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्ये संख्यान्वयः स्वीकृतो भवद्भिः । इष्यते च चैत्र एव पचति इत्यत्र आख्यातार्थसंख्याभावनयोरुभयोरपि चैत्रेऽन्वयः । तत्कथं संगच्छते । चैत्रस्य एवकारार्थान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदैकदेशे भेदे प्रतियोगितया विशेषणत्वात् । न च विशेष्यत्वाभावविशिष्टविशेषणत्वाभाववत्त्वमेव अन्याविशेषणत्वपदेन विवक्षितम् । निरुक्तवाक्याच्च चैत्रः पाकानुकूलकृतिमान् चैत्रान्यः पाकानुकूलकृत्यभाववानिति बोधो जायते । तत्र च विशेषणत्वविशेष्यत्वाभ्यां चैत्रस्य भानात् विवक्षितान्याविशेषणत्वमस्तीति तत्र संख्याभावनयोरन्वयोनानुपपन्न इति वाच्यम् । तथा सति मुख्यविशेष्यस्य चैत्रस्य तदन्यस्य च भेदेन वाक्यार्थभेदात् वाक्यभेदः प्रसज्येत । किञ्चैवं बोधस्वीकारे, चैत्रे पचति सति मैत्रे चापचति कीदृशौ चैत्रमैत्रौ इति प्रश्ने चैत्र एव पचति इत्युत्तरापत्तिः । न च निरुक्तवाक्यान्मैत्रत्वेन बोधाभावात्कथं तस्य उत्तरत्वमिति वाच्यम् । तथापि कीदृशौ चैत्रतदन्यौ इति प्रश्नोत्तरत्वापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात् ।

(५) किञ्च ओदनं पचति इत्यत्र भावनाप्रकारकबोधप्रयोजकस्य प्रथमान्तपदस्याभावात् कथं प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको बोधः । न चानुभवानुसारेण भावनाप्रकारकबोधत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रत्येव आख्यातपदज्ञानं कारणमिति कल्प्यते । तादृशबोधनिर्वाहाय च प्रथमान्तपदं तत्राध्याहियते इति वाच्यम् । भावनाप्रकारकबोधस्य शपथैकनिर्णयत्वेन तादृशकार्यकारणभावस्यैवाकल्पनात् । एवं तादृशकार्यकारणभावस्वीकारे चैत्रेण सुष्यते इयादौ भावाख्याते आख्यातार्थभावनाप्रकारकबोधनिर्वाहाय प्रथमान्तपदमध्याहियेत । यदि च तत्र आख्यातार्थविशेष्यक एव बोधः भावनाप्रकारकबोधं प्रति च भावभिन्नाख्यातपदज्ञानं कारणमित्युच्यते । तदा गौरवम् ।

(६) अपि च चैत्रः पचति इति वाक्यं यदि पाकानुकूलकृतिमांश्चैत्रः इत्याकारकं भावनाप्रकारकं बोधं प्रसूते । तदा चैत्रः कीदृशः इति प्रश्ने इदं वाक्यमुत्तरं प्रसज्येत । न च भावनाविशेष्यकबोधपक्षेऽपि कीदृशी कृतिः इति प्रश्ने चैत्रकर्तृका या पाककृतिः तद्बोधकं चैत्रः पचति इति वाक्यमुत्तरं स्यादिति वाच्यम् । स्त्रीलिङ्गविशिष्ट-

कृतिविषयकप्रश्नस्य श्रीलिङ्गविशिष्टकृतिबोधकपदघटितमेवोत्तरवाक्यं भवितुमर्हति । आख्या-
तोपात्ता कृतिस्तु लिङ्गानन्वयिनीति न तादृशवाक्यं उत्तरम् । अनया च सरण्या नापत्तिर्भव-
त्सक्षे वारयितुं शक्यते । मुख्यविशेष्यस्य चैत्रस्य लिङ्गसंख्यादिविशिष्टस्यैव चैत्रः पचतीति
वाक्येन बोधनात् । तस्मादाख्यातार्थभावनाप्रकारकप्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको बोधः न
संगच्छते ।

अपि तु आख्यातार्थभावनामुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः समुचितः । आख्यातार्थ-
संख्यापि सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेन तस्यामेवान्वेति । एवं कालोऽपि आधेयतासंबन्धेन
तत्रैवान्वेति । नश्यतीत्यत्र तु निरूढलक्षणया आख्यातेनोपस्थापिते प्रतियोगित्वे (भावनायां)
वर्तमानः कालः स्ववृत्त्युत्पत्तिकनाशनिरूपितत्वसंबन्धेनान्वेति । चिरध्वस्ते घटे नश्यतीति
प्रयोगविरहात् । एवञ्च संबन्धभेदेऽपि कालः भावनायामेवान्वेति । न च सर्वत्र विशेष्य-
भावनाया एकत्वेऽपि तत्र तत्र संबन्धानां विलक्षणत्वात् तत्तत्संसर्गिकबोधे तत्तत्समभिव्याहार-
ज्ञानस्य कारणताकल्पनेन कार्यकारणभावानन्त्यं दुर्वारमिति वाच्यम् । यथा वस्तुतः
संबन्धानां भेदेऽपि घटवद्द्रव्यमिति वाक्यात् मत्वर्थद्रव्यविशेष्यकः घटप्रकारकशब्दबोधो
जायते । तत्र च संबन्धः संबन्धत्वेन संसर्गमर्यादया भासते । न तु विशिष्य संयोगत्व-
समवायत्वादिना । अत एव संयोगेन घटाभाववद्द्रव्यमिति ज्ञानदशायामपि घटवद्द्र-
व्यमिति बुद्धिरनुभवसिद्धोपपद्यते । एतादृशवाक्यात्संबन्धसामान्यसंसर्गिकशब्दबोधे जाते
संबन्धस्य विशिष्य जिज्ञासायां प्रमाणान्तरेण तात्पर्येऽवधृते तत्र तत्र संबन्धे शाब्दबोधः
पर्यवस्यति । एवमेव वर्तमानकालवती भावना इति शाब्दबोधे संबन्धः विशिष्य न संसर्ग-
मर्यादया भासते अपितु संबन्धत्वेन । ततश्च विशिष्य संबन्धावगतो बोधस्तत्र पर्यवस्यति ।
एवञ्च संबन्धसामान्यसंसर्गिककालप्रकारकभावनाविशेष्यकबोधे तादृशसमभिव्याहारज्ञानं कारण-
मित्येक एव कार्यकारणभाव इति न तदानन्त्यम् ।

एवं कर्त्राख्यातस्य कर्तरि कर्माख्यातस्य कर्मणि च निरूढलक्षणा । पचतीत्ये-
तावन्मात्रश्रवणेऽपि पाककर्ता एको न वेति संशयो नोदेति । उदेति च पाककर्ता कः
इति जिज्ञासा । पचतीत्यतः पाककर्तृबोधं विना नैतदुपपादयितुं शक्यते । अतः कर्तृबोधाय

आख्यातस्य कर्तरि लक्षणास्वीकारः आवश्यकः । कर्तरि लकारबोधकं अनुशासनमपि संगतं
भवति । कर्तृत्वश्चाखण्डो धर्मः न कृत्याश्रयत्वमिति पूर्वमेव निवेदितम् । अत एव दम्पत्योः
कर्तृत्वं व्यासज्यवृत्ति इति सिद्धान्तः सङ्गच्छते । अन्यथा कृत्याश्रयत्वस्य पतिनिष्ठस्य
पत्नीनिष्ठस्य च भिन्नभिन्नत्वात् व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वं नोपपद्येत । आख्यातलक्ष्यः कर्तापि
स्वनिष्ठकर्तृतानिरूपकत्वसंबन्धेन भावनायामेवान्वेति ।

एवं पचतित्यादौ धात्वर्थः पाकः भावनायां कर्मतासंबन्धेनान्वेति । न त्वनुकूलता-
संबन्धेन पचतीत्यस्य पाकं करोति इति विवरणात् । ओदनं पचतीत्यादौ ओदनस्य
कर्मत्वेनान्वितत्वात् पाकः करणत्वेन भावनायामन्वेति । पाकेनोदनं करोति इति विवरणात् ।
न च पाकं प्रति कृतेः कारणतया कृतिनिरूपितं करणत्वं पाके न संभवति । अतश्च
कथं करणत्वेन भावनायां पाकान्वयः इति वाच्यम् । स्वनिष्ठकरणतानिरूपकोदनोद्देश्य-
कत्वसंबन्धेन पाकः भावनायामन्वेति । करणत्वस्य संसर्गघटकत्वात्संसर्गत्वव्यवहार
उपपद्यते । एवञ्च धात्वर्थः यथायथं कर्मत्वकरणत्वान्यतरसंसर्गेण भावनायामन्वेति ।

ओदनं पचति इत्यत्र द्वितीयार्थः कर्मत्वम् । तच्च परसमवेतक्रियाजन्यफलशालि-
त्वसमनियतमखण्डम् । तत्रैव द्वितीयार्थसंख्यापि सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेनान्वेति समानपदो-
पात्तत्वात् । कर्मत्वे च प्रकृत्यर्थः आधेयतया अन्वेति । तच्च स्वनिरूपकपाकानुकूलत्व-
संबन्धेन भावनायामेवान्वेति ।

न च द्वितीयार्थकर्मत्वं निरूपकत्वेन साक्षात्संबन्धेन धात्वर्थ एवान्वेतु इति
वाच्यम् । पाकं करोति, पाकेनोदनं करोति इत्यादिविवरणात् धात्वर्थः करोत्यर्थभावना-
कारकम् । धात्वर्थसाधारण्येन कारकप्रकारकशब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति भावनाविशेष्यता-
संबन्धेन लिङ्गानन्वयिपदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमित्येककार्यकारणभावकल्पने लाघवात् कर्म-
त्वादीनामपि भावनायामेव योग्येन संबन्धेनान्वयो युक्तः । अन्यथा अनेककार्यकारण-
भावकल्पने गौरवात् । एवं धात्वर्थपाकान्वयार्थमुपस्थितं भावनाविशेष्यत्वमिति तस्यैव
कर्मत्वादिप्रकारतानिरूपितत्वं कल्पयितुमुचितम् । न त्वनुपस्थितस्य धात्वर्थविशेष्यत्वस्य ।
एवं काष्ठैरोदनं पचति इति वाक्यं काष्ठैः पाकेन ओदनं करोति इति विवृण्वते । तत्र च

काष्ठकरणत्वादीनां करोत्यर्थान्वयित्वं संप्रतिपन्नमिति विव्रियमाणवाक्येऽपि विभक्त्यर्थकरण-
त्वादीनां करोत्यर्थभावनायामन्वयो युज्यते । एवमेव कर्तृत्वकरणत्वसंप्रदानत्वादिकमपि
अखण्डमेव तत्तद्विभक्त्यर्थः स्वनिरूपकधात्वर्थानुकूलत्वसंबन्धेन भावनायामन्वेति ।

न चानुभवमनुसृत्य व्युत्पत्तिभेदमङ्गीकृत्य तस्य तस्य पदार्थस्य योग्येन साक्षा-
त्संबन्धेन स्वस्वविशेष्ये अन्वयः समीचीन इति वाच्यम् । तथा सति राजपुरुषः इति
समासस्थले नामार्थयोरपि भेदेनान्वयव्युत्पत्तिं स्वीकृत्य राज एव स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन
पुरुषेऽन्वयस्वीकारसंभवात् नैयायिकैः तत्र पूर्वपदस्य राजसंबन्धिनि लक्षणा न स्वीक्रियेत ।
यजेत स्वर्गकामः इत्यादौ यागे प्रतीयमानस्य स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्य मानसबोधविषयत्वं स्वीकृत्य
कूलसव्युत्पत्तिबलात् इष्टसाधनयागानुकूलकृतिमानस्वर्गकामः इति शाब्दबोधस्य स्वीकारोऽपि
नैयायिकानां न संगच्छेत । तस्मात्प्रथमकूलसव्युत्पत्तिभङ्गेन व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पनं न
प्रामाणिकम् ।

चैत्र ओदनं पचति इत्यत्र चैत्रकर्तृका (अभिहितकारकं प्रथमार्थ इति पक्षे
चैत्रवृत्ति यत्कर्तृत्वं स्वनिरूपकपाकानुकूलत्वसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टा) सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेन
एकत्वविशिष्टं यदोदनवृत्ति कर्मत्वं निरुक्तेन धात्वर्थघटितसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टा स्वनिरूपक-
तानिरूपकोदनोद्देश्यकत्वसंबन्धेन पाकविशिष्टा सामानाधिकरण्येन एकत्ववती वर्तमानकालिकी
भावना इति बोधः ।

चैत्रेणोदनः पच्यते इत्यत्र एकत्वविशिष्टं यच्चैत्रवृत्तिकर्तृत्वं स्वनिरूपकपाकानु-
कूलत्वसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टा एकत्वविशिष्टं यदोदनवृत्ति कर्मत्वं निरुक्तसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टा
स्वनिरूपकतानिरूपकोदनोद्देश्यकत्वसंबन्धेन पाकविशिष्टा स्वाश्रयोदनवृत्तिविकूलत्तिजनक-
पाकानुकूलत्वसंबन्धेन एकत्वविशिष्टा वर्तमानकालिकी भावना इति बोधः ।

चैत्रेण सुप्यते इति भावाख्यातस्थले चैत्रकर्तृका एकत्वविशिष्टस्वापवती
स्वापभावना इति संक्षिप्तो बोधः । भावाख्यातादपि भावना बोध्यते चैत्रेण स्वापः क्रियते
इति विवरणात् । धात्वर्थस्वापश्च आख्यातार्थः भावे चाकर्मकेभ्यः इत्यनुशासनबलात् ।
सोऽपि भावनायामन्वेति । द्वितीयवारं धात्वर्थस्वापबोधः साधुत्वार्थः ।

चैत्रो न पचति इत्यत्र चैत्रकर्तृका भावना अभावप्रतियोगिनी इति संक्षिप्तो
बोधः । नञर्थः अभावोऽपि प्रतियोगितासंबन्धेन भावनायामन्वेति । न चैवं सति पचत्यपि
चैत्रे चैत्रो न पचति इति प्रयोगापत्तिः चैत्रकर्तृकपाकभावनायाः अन्यनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वेन
विषयाबाधादिति वाच्यम् । नञा लक्षणया चैत्रनिष्ठाभावो बोध्यते । स च प्रतियोगितया
भावनान्वयी । चैत्रकर्तृका पाकभावना चैत्रनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगिनी इति बोधः । इत्थञ्च न
पूर्वोक्तदोषः प्रसरति । अथवा नञ्समभिव्याहारस्थले आख्यातस्य कृत्यभावे लक्षणा ।
नञ्पदं तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । प्रथमान्तपदार्थोऽपि आवेयतासंबन्धेन अभावे अन्वेति । वर्तमान-
पाकानुकूलकृत्यभावः चैत्रनिष्ठः इति बोधः निरुक्तदोषास्पर्शी ।

चैत्र एव पचति इत्यत्र चैत्रवृत्तिश्चैत्रान्यावृत्तिश्चैत्रकर्तृका पाकभावना इति बोधः ।

नीलो घटः इत्यत्र अस्तीति क्रियापदमध्याहार्यम् । आख्यातार्थः आश्रयत्वम् ।
नीलपदार्थः घटपदार्थश्च स्वकर्तृकस्थितिनिरूपितत्वसंबन्धेन भावनायां (आश्रयत्वे) अन्वेति ।
नीलघटयोरभेदबोधो मानसः । यदि अभेदबोधस्य शाब्दत्वे आग्रहः । तदा नीलविशिष्टस्य
स्वाभिन्नघटकर्तृकस्थितिनिरूपितत्वसंबन्धेन भावनायामन्वयः । नीलविशिष्टा घटविशिष्टा च
स्थितिभावना इति बोधः ।

घटः पटो नेत्यत्र भवतीति क्रियापदमध्याहियते । घटपदस्य घटभिन्ने लक्षणा ।
नञ्पदं तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । तस्य च स्वाभिन्नपटनिष्ठकर्तृत्वघटितसंबन्धेन आश्रयत्वे
(भावनायां) अन्वयः । पटोऽपि स्ववृत्तिकर्तृत्वघटितसंबन्धेन तत्रैवान्वेति ।

एवञ्च प्रातिपदिकार्थव्यतिरिक्तः सुबर्थलिङ्गसंख्याव्यतिरिक्तश्च सर्वोऽपि भावना-
यामन्वेतीति व्युत्पत्तिलाघवस्य केनाप्यपलपितुमशक्यत्वात्सर्वत्र भावनामुख्यविशेष्यक एव
बोधः महर्ष्यनुभवसिद्धो युज्यते इति निरूपयन्ति ॥

वैयाकरणास्तु, सुबन्ततिङन्तचयात्मकं वाक्यं वदन्त्यभिज्ञाः । सुबन्तश्च नाम-
पदेन व्यवहियते । नमत्याख्यातार्थं प्रति विशेषणीभवतीति नाम इति, वाक्येऽख्यातं प्रधानं
तदर्थत्वाद्गुणभूतं नाम इति च निरुक्तभाष्यकारो वभाषे । सुबन्तार्थश्च आख्यातशब्दित-

तिङन्तार्थविशेषणतया भासते । तिङन्तजन्यबोधे च धात्वर्थो भाव एव विशेष्यः । तिङर्थस्तु कर्त्रादिः तत्र विशेषणम् । यद्यपि प्रकृतिप्रत्ययो सहार्थं ब्रूतः तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति व्युत्पत्तेः तिङर्थ एव धात्वर्थविशेष्यो भवितुमर्हति । तथापि भावप्रधान-माख्यातं इति निरुक्तस्मृत्यैः धात्वर्थस्य भावस्यैव विशेष्यत्वं सिद्ध्यति । तथाहि चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताः इत्युपक्रम्य सत्वप्रधानानि नामानि इति नामलक्षणं, भावप्रधानमाख्यातं इत्याख्यातलक्षणञ्च न्यरूपयन्निरुक्तकारः । “ प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययो विभक्तिरित्ये-तावन्नाम, सत्ता द्रव्यं लिङ्गं संख्यंति नामार्थः ” इति तद्भाष्यात् युवन्तं नामपदेन बोध्यते इति गम्यते । भावप्रधानमाख्यातमित्यत्र आख्यातशब्दः तिङन्तं बोधयति । आख्यात-माख्यातेन क्रियासातत्ये इत्यादौ तिङन्त एवाख्यातपदप्रयोगात् । सर्वमाख्यातजं नाम इत्यत्र तु आख्यातशब्दः लक्षणया तदर्थकदेशे धातो वर्तते । न्यायवार्तिककारश्च ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम् इति न्यायमूत्रविवरणे ‘ द्वयो विभक्तिः स्वादयः तिबादयश्च । तत्र स्वाद्यन्तं नाम तिबाद्यन्तमाख्यातम् ’ इत्यमन्दिग्रहं ब्रूते । पदजातं चतुर्धा विभज्य आख्यात-लक्षणप्रतिपादकस्य तदाख्यातं येन भावं सधातुः इति प्रातिशाख्यस्य विवरणावसरे सधातुरिति तृतीयार्थे प्रथमा इति तद्भाष्यकारो निरूपयति । ततः येन सधातुना भावमभिदधाति (पुरुषः) तदाख्यातमित्यर्थेलाभात् तिङन्तमाख्यातपदबोध्यमिति स्पष्टमेव । ‘ भावकालकारकसंख्याश्चत्वारोऽर्था आख्यातस्य, तेषु भावः प्रधानम् ’ इति निरुक्तभाष्यात् कारककालसंख्याविशेषणकभावविशेष्यकबोधजनकत्वमाख्यातस्य लक्षणमिति फलति । प्रत्य-यार्थप्राधान्यन्यायः सुवर्थविषयत्वेन संकोचनीयः भावप्रधानमिति विशेषस्मृत्यैः । न च भाव-प्रधानमित्यस्य धात्वर्थापेक्षया यत्र कृतिः भावना (भावः) प्रधानं तदाख्यातमित्यर्थः । अतश्च नैतद्वचनं धात्वर्थविशेष्यत्वे प्रमाणमिति वाच्यम् । प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानं स्यात्प्रकृत्यर्थो विशेषणम् इति न्यायसिद्धत्वाद्वचनमिदं व्यर्थमापद्येत । अपि चास्य आख्यातलक्षणत्वे भावाख्याते अव्याप्तिः स्यात् । सुप्यते इत्यादिभावाख्यातात् धात्वर्थविशेष्यतया भावनाया अवबोधात् । तस्माद्धात्वर्थप्राधान्यपरमेवेदं वचनम् । एवं निरुक्तसमानार्थकं क्रियाप्रधानमाख्यातं इति महाभाष्यमपि धात्वर्थप्राधान्ये प्रमाणं बोध्यम् ।

न्यायभाष्यकारोऽपि पञ्चमेऽध्याये ‘ प्रकृतादर्थसंबद्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् ’ इति सूत्रे

‘ क्रियाकालयोगाभिधाय्याख्यातम् धात्वर्थमात्रञ्च कालाभिधानविशिष्टम् ’ इत्याख्यात-लक्षणमाचष्टे । तत्र कालेन अभिधानेन-कारकेण च विशिष्टं धात्वर्थमात्रमाख्यातार्थः इति धात्वर्थमात्रमिति भाष्यार्थः । न्यायवार्तिककारः ‘ ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम् ’ इति सूत्रे ‘ क्रिया-कालयोगाभिधायि क्रियाप्रधानमाख्यातं यथा पचति ’ इति निरूपयन् पञ्चमाध्यायस्थं निरुक्तं भाष्यं व्याचष्टे इव । अत्र निरुक्तसमानार्थकमहाभाष्यसमानाकारेण क्रियाप्रधानमिति शब्देन निरुक्तभाष्यरीत्या प्रत्ययार्थकालकारकसंख्याद्यपेक्षया धात्वर्थस्य प्राधान्यं सूचितं भवति । अतः भावप्राधान्यं प्राचीननैयायिकाभिमतमेव । किञ्च ‘ पचति भवति इत्यादौ पचादिक्रियाः भवतिक्रियायाः कर्त्र्यो भवन्ति ’ इति भाष्याद्धात्वर्थस्य प्राधान्यं सिद्ध्यति । धात्वर्थस्य तिङर्थविशेषणत्वे एकत्र विशेषणतयोपस्थितस्य अन्यत्र स्वातन्त्र्येणान्वयस्य व्युत्पत्ति-विरुद्धत्वेन भवत्यर्थक्रियायां पचिक्रियायाः विशेषणतया अन्वयो न स्यात् । एवञ्च पूर्वोक्त-भाष्यादपि धात्वर्थस्य प्राधान्यं लभ्यते ।

न चाख्याताद्भावप्रधानशब्दबोधजननेऽपि प्रथमान्तपदसमभिव्याहारे एककर्तृ-विशिष्टपाकाश्रयो देवदत्तः इति प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोध उपेयतामिति वाच्यम् । तादृशस्य बोधस्याननुभवात् । ‘ यत्रोभे भावप्रधाने भवतः ’ इति समनन्तरनिरुक्तविरोधाच्च । अत्र निरुक्तभाष्यम् “ नामाख्यातयोः परस्परविनाभूतयोः स्वस्वपदार्थोक्तौ एकस्य भाव-प्राधान्यं अन्यस्य सत्वप्राधान्यम् । अथ पुनः यत्र वाक्ये ते उभे (नामाख्याते) भवतः । तत्र वाक्ये भावप्रधाने आख्यातार्थप्रधाने । वाक्येद्याख्यातं प्रधानम् । तदर्थत्वाद्गुणभूतं नाम । तदर्थस्य भावनिष्पत्तावङ्गत्वात् । एवं तावद्वाक्ये आख्यातं प्रधानम् ” इति । अतश्च ज्ञायते नामाख्यातसमुदायरूपवाक्यजन्यबोधे भावो धात्वर्थः प्रधानं विशेष्यः इति । एवञ्च धात्वर्थ-मुख्यविशेष्यकबोधः महर्षिसंमतो युज्यते न तु प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधः ।

अपि च धात्वर्थः सर्वत्र प्रथमान्तार्थे विशेषणमिति पक्षे पाकक्रिया भवतीत्यर्थे पचति भवति इति प्रयोगो महाभाष्यसिद्धो न स्यात् ।

किञ्च क्रियाविशेषणकप्रथमान्तार्थविशेष्यकबोधाङ्गीकारे पश्य मृगो धावति इत्यत्र एकवाक्यता न स्यात् । धावति मृगः इत्यनेन धावनानुकूलकृतिमान्मृगः इत्यवान्तरवाक्यार्थ-

बोधो जायते । धावनञ्च आख्यातार्थविशेषणत्वात् दर्शनक्रियायां कर्मतया अन्वेतुं शक्नोति । एकत्र विशेषणतयेति व्युत्पत्तिविरोधात् । तथा च धावनानुकूलकृतिमान्मृगः दर्शनाश्रयस्त्वमिति बोधो वाच्यः । वाक्यार्थस्य भेदात् एकमुच्यविशेष्यकबोधजनकत्वरूपमेकवाक्यत्वं न स्यात् । न च धावनानुकूलकृतिमान्मृगस्य विषयतापर्यवसिनेन कर्मत्वेन दर्शनक्रियायामन्वयः । धावनानुकूलकृतिमान्मृगविषयकदर्शनाश्रयस्त्वमिति एकमुच्यविशेष्यकबोधजननादेकवाक्यत्वं संभवतीति वाच्यम् । मृगस्य दर्शनकर्मत्वविवक्षायां मृगपदात् द्वितीयापत्तेः । कर्मणि द्वितीया इत्यनुशासनात् । न च प्रातिपदिकार्थविशेष्यतया कर्मत्वे विवक्षित एव द्वितीया भवति न तु कर्मत्वस्य संसर्गतया विवक्षणेऽपि । मृगस्य च कर्मतासंबन्धेनैव दर्शनेऽन्वय इति न द्वितीयापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तण्डुलस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन पाकेऽन्वयतात्पर्येण तण्डुलः पचति इति प्रयोगवारणाय नामार्थधात्वर्थयोः साक्षाद्भेदेनानन्वयव्युत्पत्तिः स्वीकरणीया । तादृशव्युत्पत्तिविरोधात् मृगस्य नामार्थस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन धात्वर्थे दर्शनेऽन्वयो न संभवति । एवञ्च मृगस्य कर्मत्वविवक्षायां मृगपदोत्तरं द्वितीया दुर्वारा । न च मृगपदोत्तरं द्वितीयाप्रसङ्गे अप्रथमासमानाधिकरणत्वात् लटः शत्रुशानचावप्रथमासमानाधिकरणे इति सूत्रेण शत्रुप्रत्ययापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । यतः शत्रापत्तिर्न द्वितीयावाधिका । अपि तु कर्मणोऽभिधानमेव द्वितीयां बाधते । तदभावाद् द्वितीया दुर्वारैव । एवञ्च मृगस्य कर्मतया धात्वर्थे दर्शनेऽन्वयोपगमे धावन्तं मृगं पश्य इति वाक्यमुचितं न पश्य मृगो धावति इति । न च तमित्यध्याहृत्य बोधो वर्णनीय इति वाच्यम् । तथा सति वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात् । अपि च वाक्यभेदेनापि निरुक्तरीत्या बोधवर्णने भाष्यसिद्धं धावनस्य दर्शनक्रियाकर्मत्वं नायाति । तथा हि भाष्यम् “क्रियापि कृत्रिमं कर्म । क्रियापि हि क्रिययेप्सिता भवति । कया क्रियया । सन्दर्शनादिक्रियया ” इति ।

ननु नात्र नामार्थो मृगः कर्मतया दर्शनेऽन्वेति । अपि तु धावनविशिष्ट-मृगरूपो वाक्यार्थः । वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मत्वे न द्वितीयापत्तिः । कर्मबोधकस्य वाक्यत्वात्तस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञाविरहात् अप्रातिपदिकाच्च सुबुत्पत्तेरसंभवात् । एवं वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन धात्वर्थे दर्शनेऽन्वयोऽपि न व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धः । नामार्थस्यैव भेदसंबन्धेन साक्षाद्धात्वर्थेऽन्वयं बाधते सा व्युत्पत्तिः न तु वाक्यार्थस्य । एवमेव ‘जानामि सीता जनकप्रसूता’ ‘श्रुत्वा

ममैतन्माहात्म्यं तथाचोत्पत्तयश्शुभाः’ इत्यादयः प्रयोगा उपपद्यन्ते । वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मत्वाद्वाक्याच्च द्वितीयाया अयोगात् । धावनविशिष्टमृगस्य दर्शनकर्मत्वबोधे विशेषणीभूतधावनस्यापि दर्शनकर्मतया बोधस्सिद्ध इति महाभाष्योक्तं धावनक्रियाया दर्शनक्रियाकर्मत्वं उपपद्यते इति चेन्न ।

एवं रीत्या वाक्यैकवाक्यताया उपपादनेऽपि भाष्यसिद्धायाः पदैकवाक्यताया असंभवात् । किञ्च नीलविशिष्टघटस्य दर्शनकर्मत्वे प्रतिपिपादयिषिते नीलं घटं जानाति इति प्रयोगो न साधुः स्यात् । विशिष्टस्य वाक्यार्थत्वात्तद्बोधकस्य पदसमुदायरूपवाक्यस्याप्रातिपदिकत्वेन द्वितीयाया अनुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्प्रथमान्तार्थविशेष्यकबोधस्वोकारे पश्य मृगो धावति इत्येकं वाक्यं न स्यात् ।

अस्मन्मते तु मृगो धावति इत्यतो मृगकर्तृकं धावनं बोध्यते । धावनञ्च कर्मतासंबन्धेन दर्शने अन्वेति । मृगकर्तृकधावनकर्मकं दर्शनमिति बोधः । अत्र च न कापि व्युत्पत्तिर्विरुद्ध्यते । कर्मबोधकस्य धातुत्वेन प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञाविरहान्न द्वितीयापत्तिरपि । न च मृगीयधावनस्य विशिष्टस्य कर्मत्वे विशेषणीभूतमृगस्यापि कर्मत्वात् मृगपदस्य प्रातिपदिकत्वात्तदुत्तरं द्वितीयापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । मृगस्य धावनविशेषणत्वेन तत्प्रयुक्तस्यान्तरङ्गसंस्कारस्य प्रथमारूपस्यानिवृत्तेः । श्रुत्वा ममैतन्माहात्म्यं तथाचोत्पत्तयश्शुभाः इत्यादिप्रयोगास्त्वार्षाः ॥

एतेन दृशिधातोः धावनकर्तृमृगकर्मकदर्शने, मृगकर्तृकोत्कटधावने वा लक्षणा । इतराणि पदानि तात्पर्यग्राहकाणि । अत्र च न कोऽपि व्युत्पत्तिविरोधः इति परास्तम् । उक्तरीत्या विनैव लक्षणां निर्वहि लक्षणाश्रयणस्यानुचितत्वात् । अनेकेषां पदानां व्यर्थत्वापरपर्यायतात्पर्यग्राहकत्वकल्पनाया अयुक्तत्वाच्च ।

न च भवन्मते आनय मृगो धावति इत्येकं वाक्यं न स्यात् । मृगकर्तृकधावनस्य आनयनक्रियाकर्मत्वेनान्वयायोगात् । अस्मन्मते तु धावनकर्तृमृगस्य आनयनकर्मतयान्वयसंभवाद्व्यत्येकवाक्यतेति वाच्यम् । यतः सविशेषणे हि विधिनिषेधौ विशेषणमुपसंक्रामतः

सति विशेष्ये बाधे इति न्यायेन मृगविशिष्टस्य धावनस्य आनयनकर्मत्वान्वयबोधः मृगकर्म-
कानयने पर्यवस्यति । तस्मात्प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधो न समञ्जसः ।

अपि च स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन राजविशिष्टः पुरुषः स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन
भार्याविशिष्टः इति बोधतत्पर्येण राजपुरुषो भार्यायाश्च इति न प्रयुज्यते । एवं घटत्वविशिष्टे
समवायेन द्रव्यत्ववैशिष्ट्यतात्पर्येण घटो द्रव्यत्वस्य इत्यपि न प्रयुज्यते । अतः
एकविशेषणवैशिष्ट्येनोपरिष्ठे तज्जातीयसंबन्धेन विशेषणान्तरान्वयो नेति व्युत्पत्तिः
स्वीकरणीया । स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन राजविशिष्टे पुरुषे सजातीयस्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन
भार्यावैशिष्ट्यं बोधयितुं न शक्यते इति तादृशप्रयोगो न प्रमाणम् । एवञ्च चैत्रः पचति
इति वाक्यात् समवायेन पाकानुकूलकृतिप्रकारकः चैत्रत्वविशिष्टविशेष्यकः शाब्दबोधो
न संभवति । उक्तव्युत्पत्तिविरोधेन समवायेन चैत्रत्वविशिष्टे सजातीयसमवायेन कृतिवैशि-
ष्टस्य बोधयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।

किञ्च धात्वर्थपधान्याभावे पचति व्रजति इति वाक्यं साधु संपद्येत । धात्वर्थ-
प्राधान्ये तु पाककर्तृकव्रजनस्य बाधान्न तद्वाक्यं साधु । अतः निरुक्तमहाभाष्यकारादि-
महर्षिसंमतः धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः समञ्जसः ।

चैत्रः तण्डुलं पचति इत्यत्र तण्डुलपदोत्तरद्वितीयाया आश्रयोऽर्थः । कर्मणि
द्वितीयेत्यनुशासनात्कर्म द्वितीयावाच्यम् । क्रियाजन्यफलाश्रयः कर्म । क्रिया फलञ्च धातुत
एव लभ्यते । जन्यत्वञ्च विनैव पदार्थतां संसर्गमर्यादया । अतः अनन्यलभ्यः आश्रयः
द्वितीयार्थः । तत्र प्रकृत्यर्थः अभेदेनान्वेति । देवतातद्वितादिस्थले प्रकृतिप्रत्ययार्थयोरभेदा-
न्वयस्य सर्वसिद्धत्वात् । आश्रयश्च स्ववृत्त्याश्रयत्वनिरूपकत्वसंबन्धेन विकृतिरूपे
अन्वेति । तच्च जनकतासंबन्धेन कृतिपर्यन्तव्यापारे धात्वर्थे अन्वेति । कर्त्राख्यातस्य
पूर्वोक्तन्यायादाश्रयः संख्या वर्तमानकालश्चार्थः । प्रथमान्तचैत्रपदार्थः अभेदेन आख्यातार्थे
आश्रये, संख्या समानपदोपात्ताश्रये, वर्तमानकालश्च धात्वर्थव्यापारे अन्वेति । तिङर्थश्च
धात्वर्थे इति तण्डुलाभिन्नाश्रयकविकृल्लक्ष्यनुकूलः एकचैत्राभिन्नाश्रयकः वर्तमानो व्यापारः
इति तद्वाक्याधीनो बोधः ।

चैत्रेण तण्डुलः पच्यते इत्यत्र कर्माख्यातस्य कर्तृतृतीयायाश्चाश्रयोऽर्थः निरुक्त-
न्यायात् । तृतीयार्थः धात्वर्थे व्यापारे, प्रथमान्ततण्डुलपदार्थान्विताख्यातार्थाश्रयश्च धात्वर्थे
फले अन्वेति । फलं च व्यापारे इति तण्डुलाभिन्नाश्रयकविकृल्लक्ष्यनुकूलः चैत्राभिन्नाश्रयकः
वर्तमानो व्यापारः इति शाब्दबोधः ।

चैत्रेण सुप्यते इत्यत्र तिङ् धात्वर्थानुवादकः लट्त्वादिना वर्तमानकालबोधकः ।
चैत्राभिन्नाश्रयकः वर्तमानस्वापः इत्यन्वयबोधः ।

चैत्रो न पचति इत्यत्र चैत्रकर्तृकपाफाभावः इति बोधः प्रकारतासंबन्धेन
नर्तकविशेष्यकबोधं प्रति धातुजन्यभावनोपस्थितेः विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन हेतुत्वात् । नीलो घटः
इत्यत्र प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितः नीलपदोत्तरप्रथमार्थः प्रातिपदिकार्थः अभेदेन घटपदार्थेऽन्वेति इति
प्राचीनवैयाकरणानुसारिणी बोधसरणिः ।

द्वितीयायाः कर्मत्वशक्तिमान्, विशेषणत्वं, क्रियाकारकभावसंबन्धश्चार्थः ।
क्रियाजन्यफलाश्रयत्वातिरिक्तैव कर्मत्वशक्तिः अवण्डा । अत एव क्रियाजन्यफलाश्रयत्वा-
त्कर्मत्वमिति प्रयोग उपपद्यते । अन्यथा कर्मत्वात्कर्मत्वमितिवदयोग्यं तादृशवाक्यं स्यात् ।
कर्मणि द्वितीया इति सूत्रस्वरसात्कर्मत्वशक्तिमानर्थः । ‘कष्टं श्रितो भवतीत्यत्र क्रिया-
कारकयोरभिसंबन्धस्य द्वितीया वाचिका भवति’ इति समर्थसूत्रभाष्यात् क्रियाकारक-
भावसंबन्धोऽर्थः । भेदसमानाधिकरणविशेषणत्वज्ञान एव संबन्धाकांक्षा जायते इति विशेषण-
त्वमपि द्वितीयावाच्यम् । कर्मत्वादिशक्तिश्च द्वितीयाद्योत्या प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषणमेव । पञ्चकं
प्रातिपदिकार्थं इति व्यवस्थापितत्वात् । आख्यातस्यापि कर्तृत्वादिशक्तिमानर्थः । कर्माभूत-
तण्डुलविशिष्टदेवदत्ताभिन्नकर्तृको वर्तमानः पाकः इति देवदत्तः तण्डुलं पचति इति
वाक्याधीनो बोधः ।

कर्माख्याते च धातुतः व्यापारावच्छिन्नफलमुपस्थाप्यते । धात्वर्थफलमुख्य-
विशेष्यकश्च बोधो जायते । अत एव ‘इष्यते पुत्रः इत्यर्थे पुत्रीयतीति न । भिन्नार्थकत्वात् ।
किन्तु पुत्रमिच्छतीत्यर्थ एव’ इति सुप आत्मन इति सूत्रस्थं भाष्यमुपपद्यते । उभयत्रापि


व्यापारमुक्त्यविशेष्यकबोधस्वीकारे तयोर्भिन्नार्थकत्वाभावात् । न पचति इत्यादौ धात्वर्थपाक-
प्रतियोगिकाभाव एव बुद्ध्यते । चैत्र एव पचति इत्यत्र एवकारार्थः अवधारणम् । तच्च
ज्ञानविशेषः अवधारणत्वेन भासते । अवधारणविषयचैत्रकर्तृकः पाकः इत्यन्वयबोधः इति
नव्यवैयाकरणानुसारी पन्थाः इति निरूपयन्ति ॥

चैत्रो न पचति इति वाक्यस्य चैत्रकर्तृकपाकाभावः इति शाब्दबोधजनकत्वे पचत्यपि चैत्रे
तथा प्रयोगावृत्तिः । तादृशपाकाभावस्यान्यनिष्ठत्वात् । अतः नञः चैत्रनिष्ठाभावे लक्षणा स्वीकरणीया ।
चैत्रकर्तृकपाकप्रतियोगिकः चैत्रनिष्ठाभावः इति बोधः । चैत्रे च पचति मति चैत्रनिष्ठस्य तदभावस्य
बाधान्न तथा प्रयोग आपादयितुं शक्यते । एवमपि यत्कर्तृकः पाक एवाप्रमिद्धः तादृशो राजा न पचति
इति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यं न संभवति । राजकर्तृकपाकरूपप्रतियोगिनिष्ठप्रमिद्धत्वात् तदभावाप्रमिद्धेः तदो-
धकत्वमभवत् । अतः नञ्ममभिव्याहृतपचधातोरेव पाकाभावे लक्षणा नञ्मन्तापर्यग्राहकता च
स्वीकरणीया । राजाश्रयकः पाकाभावः इति बोधः संभवति । राज्ञि पाकाभावस्य प्रमिद्धस्याबाधितत्वात् ।

परन्तु नव्यवैयाकरणैः प्रतियोग्यप्रमिद्धावपि त्रैलोक्यप्रतियोगिप्रमिद्धिमुपादाय अभावबोधो
समर्थयितुं शक्यते । शशशृङ्गं नास्ति इति वाक्यस्य त्रैलोक्यप्रतियोगिप्रमिद्धिमुपादाय शशशृङ्गाभाव-
बोधकत्वस्य तैर्युत्पादनात् ।

इयच्च रीतिः वैयाकरणसंप्रदायाधिकृता नवेति विद्वद्भिः परिचिन्तनीयम् ।

(अनुवर्ति ।)



University Notes

FOUNDER'S DAY

The ninth Founder's Day was celebrated on the 30th September, 1938 under the presidency of Sir M. Venkatasubba Rao, Retired Judge, High Court, Madras. Lady Venkatasubba Rao distributed the prizes.

CONVOCATION

The Eighth Convocation of the University was held on Tuesday the 1st November, 1938. His Excellency, the Governor of Madras, the Chancellor of the University, presided. The address to the graduates was delivered by Mr. K. Natarajan, Editor, *Indian Social Reformer*, Bombay.

CONFERENCE

Prof. C. S. Srinivasachariar and Mr. R. Satyanatha Ayyar were sent by the University as delegates to the Historical Conference held at Allahabad in October.

RESEARCH

Mr. C. Jagannathachari, who was working as a special Research Scholar to study the working of Prohibition at Salem, has submitted his report.

Reviews

Brahmavidyā--The Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. I, Part I.

This recent recruit to the ranks of journals devoted to Oriental culture is a vigorous infant and likely to thrive. It aims at making the priceless treasures of the Adyar Library known to the lovers of Oriental learning all over the world by publishing in its pages some of the rare manuscripts found therein. This number contains the first instalment of R̥gvedavyākhyā Madhavakṛta and Āśvalāyanagṛhyasūtra with Devasvāmibhāṣya. It also includes a translation of a few minor upaniṣads and a valuable article on 'The Name Kalki' by Prof. F. Otto Schrader. Research workers will be greatly interested in the manuscript notes given at the end.

R. R.

New Catalogus Catalogorum. Provisional Fasciculus. University of Madras. Editor-in-Chief: Mahāmahopādhyāya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, M.A., I.E.S., (Retd.)

When the late Dr. A.C. Woolner, Vice-Chancellor of the Punjab University, suggested that there was need of a complete up-to-date New Catalogus Catalogorum of Sanskrit manuscripts that have been brought to light during the three decades that have elapsed since Dr. Aufrecht completed his monumental Catalogus Catalogorum, the University of Madras readily fell in with the idea and wisely entrusted this stupendous work to Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, who was for several years the Curator of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. The fact that the New Catalogus Catalogorum is to be prepared under his supervision is itself sufficient guarantee that the work will bear the stamp of thoroughness, accuracy, reliability and usefulness. If this Provisional Fasciculus gives any foretaste of the work to be published, it indicates that the New Catalogus would for long be an invaluable guide to research workers all over the world.

R. R.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Brown University, Rhode Islands :

Selected topics in function theory of a complex variable by Otto Szasz.

Theory of Abstract spaces by David Tamarin

The Service

Lingnan Science Journal

The Modern Student

The Empire Times

Madras Y.M.C.A. Bulletin

Subodin

Government College Miscellany

Karnataka College Miscellany

Indian Swarajya

The Journal of Greater India Society

A Journal of Indian Renaissance

The Lingaraj Miscellany

The Madras Law College Magazine.

Rektorwechsel ander Universitet Leipzig

Travaux De L'Institut Mathematique De Tbilissi I

Academy Des Sciences De L'U. R. S. S.—Filial Georgienne

On the Devonian Coelacanthids of Germany with special reference to the

Dermal Skeletar (Stockholm).

Ethnology, Folklore and Archaeology in the U.S.S.R.

E. A. Weiss : Sinführung In Die Linien Geometrie Und Kinematik

Proceedings of the Durham Philosophy Society Volume 3 Parts 4-5

4 3-5

5 1-5

6 1-5

7 2-4

8 1-5

9 1-2

Osaka Imperial University : Collected papers from the Faculty of Science

Series A Mathematics Vol. IV.

B Physics " " "

C Chemistry " " "

Man in India, Volume XVIII, No. 1 (January-March)

Spolia Zeylanica.

Bulletin of the Calcutta Mathematical Society.

Scripta Mathematica.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS (Continued)

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
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
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	PAGE
1. 'On the Use of <i>Analysis Situs</i> in Contemporary Psychology' By P. S. Naidu, M.A.	.. 181
2. The Diamagnetic Susceptibility of Formic Acid-Water Mixtures By S. Ramachandra Rao, M.A., D.Sc., and S. Sriraman	.. 187
3. The Infinitesimal Flow on the Projective Plane By B. R. Venkataraman and A. Narasinga Rao, M.A., L.T.	194
4. Tholkappia Araichi By S. S. Bharati, M.A., B.L.	.. 199
5. Rajendra Chola III By V. Vridhagirisan, M.A., M.Litt.	.. 224
6. Economic Survey of the Weavers at Sulurpeta By N. S. Krishnamurthy, M.A., B.L., and P. Vaidyanathan, M.A.	.. 233
7. Nyayakulisa By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A., and K. Srinivasachariar.	
8. Nitimālā By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A., and K. Srinivasachariar.	
9. Mukura By K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastrigal.	
10. University Notes By B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A.	.. 251
11. Reviews :—	.. 253
1. The <i>Mēlarāghamālikā</i> By S. S. B.	

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OF THE
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**'On the use of *Analysis Situs* in
Contemporary Psychology'**

By

P. S. NAIDU

(Annamalai University)

Since the days of Weber and Fechner, when the first successful application of mathematics to the manipulation of results obtained from psychological (psycho-physical) experiments was made, the mathematical treatment of mental phenomena has been developing slowly sometimes, rapidly at other times, but certainly at all times. The London School, which has advanced from the correlational methods to the more rigorous tetrad-difference criteria,¹ has raised the status of mathematics, in the special field of its investigations, almost to that which it occupies in mathematical physics. Experimental psychology is becoming more and more mathematical in all its departments. Even in estimating the dimensions of personality attempts are being made to interpret the results with the help of correlational formulae.² The success that has attended the efforts of the psychologists to introduce mathematical conceptions in the interpretation of psychological phenomena, it is said, augurs well for the future of our science, for if psychology is to become a pure science, it cannot but use the mathematical method at certain stages of explanation. But there are some eminent leaders of psychology who seem to be calling a halt to mathematical psychology. They seem to cast grave doubt on the validity of the very conceptions which underlie the entire procedure of mathematical psychology.³ At the same time, there are other equally eminent

1. Thomas, F. C., *Ability and Knowledge*, pp. 223, 282, 284.

2. Freyer, *Measurement of Interests*.

3. Carr, H. A., *The Search for Certainty*, *Psychol. Rev.*, 44. '37., 274-296.

leaders whose faith in mathematics is unshaken, and who seem to believe that psychology can make no progress as a science unless it employs mathematical method.⁴ The object of this paper is to survey, very briefly, the nature of the mathematical method in psychology and to assess the value of the latest development in mathematical psychology, namely, Topological Psychology.

It goes without saying that the data gathered from any field of investigation should be quantitative before they can be manipulated mathematically. These data should be measurable and expressible in numbers. In the last analysis number turns out to be the desideratum for the mathematical treatment of facts. What then is the relationship between number and fact? Three conceivable modes of relationship exist between facts, and numbers professing to represent facts. The first is a purely arbitrary relationship similar to the relationship that exists in the Pythagorean system between numbers and the facts of the external world which they purport to represent. The second, which may be called the Monitorial, consists in arranging things, properties or events in an ascending or descending order, and then attaching the cardinal numbers to them. These two modes, the Pythagorean and Monitorial, do not lend themselves to mathematical treatment, because they are not based on the property of measurability. In the third or Mathematical mode of relationship the things, events and properties with which cardinal numbers are associated, bear among themselves the relationship which these numbers bear among themselves; in other words, they are additive. They are measurable in terms of suitably selected units or standards of measurement.

Are psychological facts capable of measurement in terms of a rigid objective unit? Some facts are measurable; some are not. Facts of sensation, for example are measurable, but those of drives, personality etc., are not measurable. In one important field, namely in Intelligence, elusive facts have been reduced to mathematical order by the application of a special technique. The manipulation of the statistical data obtained from experimental testing of intelligence and learning by the correlational method and the method of tetrad-difference, has yielded very fruitful results, and judged by their success in the practical field, these results must be considered to be thoroughly reliable and objective. Yet an experienced psychologist questions the validity of these methods even in the field of learning.⁵ 'The use of mathematical data', says

4. Johnson, H. M., Pseudo-mathematics in the Mental and Social Sciences, *Am. J. of Psychol.*, xlviii, 1936, 342-351.

5. Kantor, J. R., Concerning Physical Analogies in Psychology. *Am. J. of Psychol.*, xlviii, 1936,

Professor Carr⁶ 'in the solution of any psychological problem does not guarantee in any manner the truth of an interpretation of these data.' 'To attain any psychological conclusion from mathematical data, we must interpret these data in terms of the purpose and conditions of our experiment. In making this interpretation, we at once leave the field of mathematics and enter that of psychology.'

Professor Carr's observation is perfectly true, but his remark is applicable to all sciences that use the mathematical method, not excluding physics. There is first an abstract analysis of data to enable the investigator to apply mathematical formulae to them, and then the formulae are developed purely mathematically. The final result has then to be interpreted in terms of the particular science concerned. Surprising discoveries and forecasts of real events are made on the basis of pure mathematical calculations. Maxwell 'legislated' in this way for the wireless waves long before they were known, and similarly 'matrix' equations were worked out before they were needed by the physicist; in a small way in one of our local laboratories the solution of a particular equation turned out to be negative. This pointed to the fact that the electrical connection had to be made with the negative terminal. These facts, great and small, serve to indicate that the structure of the human mind, as well as the structure of the world which that mind knows, is mathematical. One need not, therefore, take objection to the use of mathematics in psychology on that ground.

Objection is taken to the application of the statistical method on another ground. The statistical average is unreal. It depends too much on the past and hazards a vague guess about the future. Besides, it is well known that 'figures' may be made to tell any tale. It is possible to manipulate the figures in such a manner as to make them yield just the result desired by the investigator.

We do not fail to see the force of these arguments, but it is worth noting at the same time that physics has passed from the stage of the so called strict measurement to the statistical stage. Statistical averages and probabilities are considered to be perfectly orthodox in pure science. Psychology does not stand to lose by using these methods.

The main point of the argument against mathematical psychology seems to be this. Psychological facts are not quantitative, hence the mathematics used in psychology is merely pseudo-mathematics. Professors Carr and Kantor are very vehement in denouncing the intentions of the psychologist which prompt him to apply mathematics to his

6. Carr, H. A., The Search for Certainty.

science. The former says, 'I suspect that many of us are somewhat inclined to use mathematical operations,, in the fond hope that our experiments will thereby become suffused with some of the dignity and respectability of that science. (and) as a means of compensating for the well-known inferiority-complex of our science.'⁷ The latter writes, 'Unfortunately psychologists. imagine that their discipline can attain full scientific maturity merely by measuring, experimenting or quantifying.'⁸ If this is the attitude of contemporary psychology towards the prevalent method of treatment of psychological facts, then the situation is desperate, for mere accumulation of facts without an orienting concept is not scientific, and will not be helpful for intelligent research. We must have a fundamental or basic category for our science, in the light of which the investigator can orient himself in the vast field bristling with facts. It is at this critical juncture that the youngest discipline in mathematics, namely Topological Geometry, comes to our aid. It does not claim to solve the problem for us, but only points to the direction in which we should proceed in order to find the solution.

If metrical methods are inapplicable to psychological facts, then we should employ non-metrical methods of handling our data. *Analysis Situs* is non-metrical. It is qualitative, not quantitative. Professor Kurt Lewin has made a systematic application of *Analysis Situs* to the study of the behaviour of the organism in the environment in his book, 'Principles of Topological Psychology'. Now Topology is itself an infant science; it is being applied to psychology which is also considered to be an infant science, and Professor Lewin's attempt is the first of its kind. So we can only consider whether this new branch of our science, in its triple infancy, shows signs of a more promising future than the other branches.

The Gestalt school in general, (and Professor Lewin in particular) has familiarised us with the 'field' concept in psychology, and also with the re-formed definitions of 'force', which have been forced on the mathematical physicist as the result of the latter's abandonment of the aether hypothesis and of the space-time dualism. The new concepts operate quite successfully in physics. But could they be made to operate with equal success in psychology? We shall mention two objections.

Consider the behaviour of a thing X in its structured field, for example the behaviour of a magnetic needle in a structured electromagnetic field, whose structure S_1 it is proposed to determine by the

introduction of the needle. Now the introduction of the needle which has a field of its own S_n produces a modification in S_1 and the resultant ($S_1 \times S_n$) is S_2 . For all practical purposes the physicist considers S_2 to be identical with S_1 since the quantitative difference between the two is negligible as compared with S_1 . Physical measurements are invariably subject to this indeterminacy, which is merely the result of a generalised form of Heisenberg's principle of Indeterminacy. This indeterminacy is negligible in physics, since only the quantitative aspects of phenomena are considered. In psychology on the other hand, the inter-action between S_n and S_1 may be so revolutionary qualitatively as to destroy the structure of S_1 almost completely. Hence the 'field' concept is workable in psychology only within very rigorous limits, and it is very doubtful whether it would be workable at all where qualitative considerations count most.

The concepts of *force*, *stress*, *tension* and *direction* depend on measurement. Our object is to get away from the metrical to the non-metrical.

Is *Analysis Situs* more helpful to us? When we consider the early origin of the Topological concept in the manipulation of knots, we seem to receive considerable encouragement. A loop is made in a rope, the two ends of which are fixed. In how many ways can the loop be manipulated? Can the knot be untied? What general principles of manipulation can be formulated? Now psychological problems dealing with the behaviour of the organism appear to bear considerable resemblance to these problems of the 'knot'. Heredity and environment being fixed, in how many different ways can the behaviour-pattern of the individual be changed? Can heredity be annihilated? What are the psychological laws controlling behaviour?

'In this branch of mathematics (*analysis situs*) shape and size are unimportant. *Analysis situs*, is interested only in those properties of figures. which are not changed when the figures are subjected to continuous motion in a fluid medium. Thus it is easy to conceive of a fluid motion carrying a circle into an ellipse, and thence into a square, even though the areas enclosed by these figures differ greatly. From the stand-point of *Analysis Situs*, then, there is no essential difference between these figures—the differences in their size and shape are unimportant.'⁹ Topology permits us to stretch, twist, pull, puff or otherwise do anything with the geometrical figure so long as we do not tear it up or do not link up what is unlinked or unlink what is already linked. For the Topologist a point and the earth are alike. And what is most appealing to us is that 'mathematical relationships may be determined

7. Kantor, J. R., Concerning Physical Analogies in Psychology.

8. Kurt Lewin: A Dynamic Theory of Personality, 1935.

9. Ency. Britt. 14th edn.

without measurement.' Eliminating measurement and quantity, which are stumbling blocks in psychological experimentation, the new discipline introduces such concepts as *point sets*, *limit points*, *proximity*, *boundary*, *path*, *homeomorphism* etc., which are welcome to the psychologist. Topology is qualitative mathematics for whose advent the psychologist has been eagerly looking forward.

Professor Lewin in applying analysis situs to the study of behaviour derives, in the first instance, a very important equation :

$$B = F (PE)$$

where B, P and E stand for behaviour, person and environment respectively. This is not a mere symbolic representation of the old formula that behaviour is determined by the organism acting in an environment. To understand this equation we should first understand Professor Lewin's definition of causation and his new concept of 'LIFE-SPACE'. Like Spinoza Professor Lewin discards both mechanical and teleological concepts of causation. For the Professor only the present counts, past antecedents and future purposes do not have meaning. Like Spinoza the Professor too employs geometrical and logical concepts in the analysis of events. The law of causation is merely the expression of the relationship of logical ground and consequence. Besides this rigorous logical and mathematical definition of causation, Professor Lewin stresses the need for introducing spatial concepts in psychology. Temporal concepts have had their day and have played out their parts. Spatial concepts have been neglected so far. We must now give them the consideration that is due to them. For this purpose the expression 'Life—Space' has been introduced. Space in this connection should be understood in the purely mathematical sense. For contemporary mathematics space is n-dimensional, non-metrical and curves round on itself. For mathematics it matters little what this space represents. It may be smell, colour, drive or interest. Physical interpretations are ruled out.

When we analyse the concept of Life-Space, we find that it is merely a cross section in the concrete behavioral stream. It may be compared to the microtomic sections of organisms made for zoological purposes. The successive aspects of life-space are like the successive sections made on the microtome. Each slide gives us a clear and accurate picture of one small proportion of the organism. But to understand the organism as a whole we have to reconstruct the whole by synthesising the sections. Each 'Life Space' study is perfect in itself. But for a knowledge of the organism as a whole we shall have to synthesise these partial studies. Such synthesis will lead us to the drives or propensities which move the organism. In other words Gestaltic psycho-dynamic studies will find their culmination in Hormic Psychology.

The Diamagnetic Susceptibility of Formic Acid-Water Mixtures

By

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(Annamalai University)

1. INTRODUCTION.

The study of the magnetic susceptibility of binary mixtures of organic and inorganic liquids has engaged the attention of many workers in recent years.¹ The general conclusion appears to be that when the molecules of two liquids mix with each other without the production of any chemical reaction, the additive law holds good. When the molecules combine with each other resulting in the formation of new compounds, departures from the additive law are noted. These cases do not include solutions of salts in water. Investigations by the authors² have shown that when some salts are dissolved in water, departures from the additive law may be observed. In these cases, the percentage changes appear to be independent of concentration and have been attributed to (1) interaction between the ions and water molecules (2) depolymerisation of water (3) release of constraints within the molecules due to their breakage into ions and (4) change of valency of any of the ions when the salt is dissolved. While the first two causes do not produce more than 1 % change from the additive law, the other two causes give rise to much larger changes. Hoare and Brindley³ have recently determined the susceptibilities of salts composed of ions with inert gas configurations and found that for the halides of lithium and caesium, the additive law breaks down. Flordal and Frivold⁴ obtained large changes of susceptibility when some alkaline earth halides were dissolved in water. Similar results were also noted by Subramaniam⁵ who discussed the magnetic effects accompanying ionic deformations in the solid salts studied. Varadachari⁶ had previously drawn attention to such effects in his study of sulphuric acid-water mixtures. He investigated also acetic acid-water mixtures and obtained no departure from the additive law in this case.

1. For references see *Ind. Jour. Phys.*, 8, 483, 1934.
2. *Phil. Mag.*, 24, 1025, 1937.
3. *Proc. Roy. Soc.*, 147, 88, 1934 ; 152, 342, 1935.
4. *Ann. der Phys.*, 23, 425, 1935.
5. *Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc.*, 4, 404, 1936.
6. *Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc.*, 2, 161, 1935.

Formic acid is well known to be highly polar. During the recent investigations of aqueous solutions of formates and acetates, the authors found a strict adherence to the law of additivity. On making similar investigations with formic acid, however, definite departures were found. Since this result is at variance with that of Kido,⁷ we have thought it advisable to record our conclusion.

2. EXPERIMENT.

The formic acid used was the purest (100 %) available from Kahlbaum. It had a density of 1.220 grams per c.c. at 26°C. The water used was obtained by repeated distillation in an all-glass apparatus. The densities of the aqueous solutions prepared were determined by the hydrostatic method. A glass piece was suspended from one arm of a sensitive balance by a fine gold wire and weighed in air, in pure water and in the solution. The concentrations were found from the known concentration-density data given in International Critical Tables.⁸

Measurements of susceptibility were made with a Curie balance.⁹ The position of the test bulb at which the magnetomotive force on it was maximum was carefully determined by studying the deflections obtained with the bulb at different places along the horizontal line of symmetry between the pole pieces. At the place where this force was maximum, investigations were also made in a vertical direction and in this manner the volume wherein the force was uniform was definitely fixed. The size of the bulb used was in every case arranged to be less than the volume thus obtained.

The magnetomotive force on a bulb of mass m_g containing a liquid of mass m_l is given by

$$m_g \chi_g H \frac{dH}{dx} + m_l \chi_l H \frac{dH}{dx}$$

where χ_g and χ_l are the specific susceptibilities of the glass and liquid respectively. The force on the bulb alone $m_g \chi_g H \frac{dH}{dx}$ was determined separately. The force (in this case the deflection which is proportional directly to the force) on the liquid $m_l \chi_l H \frac{dH}{dx}$ becomes known. In the same manner if water is studied, the force on a mass m_w becomes

$m_w \chi_w H \frac{dH}{dx}$. If d_l and d_w are the deflections obtained for the liquid

and water respectively, then χ_l is determined from the equation,

$$\frac{m_l \chi_l}{m_w \chi_w} = \frac{d_l}{d_w}.$$

The susceptibility of water at 26°C was assumed to be 0.720.*

The containers were thin spherical bulbs blown from glass tubing having a very low diamagnetic susceptibility. The deflections obtained with the bulbs were about 2 mms. while for the mixtures, they were nearly 15 cms. The retorsion method was employed, the specimen being brought to the identical position in presence of the magnetic field. The weights of the bulbs with and without the liquids were determined with a Sartorius balance correct to the tenth of a milligram. A careful estimate of the various errors involved in these observations indicates a probable error of 1/2 per cent in the susceptibility values.

3. RESULTS.

The specific diamagnetic susceptibility of pure formic acid was found to be 0.4464. This value compares favourably with 0.432 given in the International Critical Tables¹⁰ and 0.434 given by Kido.⁷

The values of the diamagnetic susceptibility obtained at different concentrations are given in the following table. The concentrations of the mixture are given as the number of grams of formic acid in 100 grams of the mixture.

TABLE I.

No.	Density.	Concen- tration. C	χ_1 Observed.	χ_2 Calculated.	$\chi_2 - \chi_1$	$\frac{\chi_2 - \chi_1}{C} \times 100$
1.	1.063	29.0	0.6292	0.6408	0.0112	0.039
2.	1.080	36.0	0.6105	0.6217	0.0112	0.031
3.	1.108	49.0	0.5701	0.5863	0.0162	0.033
4.	1.112	51.0	0.5705	0.5808	0.0103	0.020
5.	1.127	57.5	0.5434	0.5630	0.0196	0.034
6.	1.126	57.5	0.5414	0.5630	0.0216	0.037
7.	1.152	69.5	0.5055	0.5303	0.0248	0.036
8.	1.155	71.0	0.5058	0.5261	0.0203	0.029
9.	1.171	79.0	0.4834	0.5043	0.0209	0.026

* All susceptibility values in this paper are given in 10^{-6} units and are diamagnetic unless otherwise mentioned.


10. Int. Crit. Tables, 6, 356.

7. Sc. Rep. Tohoku Imp. Univ., 21, 385, 1932.

8. It. Crit. Tables, 3, 122.

9. For details, see Varadachari, Annamalai University Journal, 4, 73, 1935.

In figure 1 is shown the graph between concentration and diamagnetic susceptibility. It will be seen that there is much deviation between the observed values and those calculated on the basis of the additivity



law. The departures from additivity are examined by drawing the difference graph at various concentrations. The maximum departure is found to be 5 % and occurs at a concentration of nearly 70 %. At this concentration, formic acid and water exist nearly in equimolecular proportions. This suggests the formation of the monohydrate $\text{HCOOH} \cdot \text{H}_2\text{O}$ and the consequent departure from the law of additivity.

4. DISCUSSION.

An examination of figure 1 suggests the probable formation of the monohydrate of formic acid. There is indeed some evidence for the existence of such a compound. Colles¹¹ has recorded that when a mixture of formic acid and water having the composition $4\text{HCOOH} \cdot 3\text{H}_2\text{O}$ is rapidly cooled, crystals having 76.7 and 77.2 per cent of formic acid are deposited. The hydrate formed in this manner at -54°C seems to be also produced at higher temperatures from a mixture of the

11. Chem. Soc. Trans., 89, 1251, 1906.

composition $2\text{HCOOH} \cdot \text{H}_2\text{O}$. It is however open to doubt whether at the temperature of our investigations (26°C) the monohydrate exists in such a stable manner as to affect the magnetic susceptibility by 5%.

There is however another method of accounting for the observed deviation. It was pointed out by the authors in a recent paper that the molecular susceptibility of formic acid is 20.5 while the susceptibility of the formate ion is 17.3. If we assume with Kido¹² that the hydrogen attached to the formate ion does not contribute anything to the molar susceptibility of the acid, then it is difficult to account for the higher value of the acid.

Investigations¹³ on the electrical moments of the fatty acid molecules show definitely that these exist mainly as double molecules even in dilute benzene solutions. It would appear that the doublets of the carboxyl groups cancel one another giving practically zero moment to the molecule as a whole. Smyth and Rogers¹⁴ studied solutions of acetic acid in ether and have concluded that in solution, single and double molecules of acetic acid are in equilibrium. It is likely that such a condition may also exist in aqueous solutions of formic acid. When the double molecules break into single ones, the susceptibility will tend to approach that of the formate ion and hence shows a decrease in value. In table I it will be found that the change of susceptibility for 100 grams of the acid (given in the last column) remains nearly constant showing a tendency to decrease at higher concentrations. This is exactly what would happen if a change of susceptibility occurs when some of the double molecules of formic acid break into single molecules when the acid is added to water. When the concentration of formic acid is increased it is natural to expect that the percentage of molecules suffering disruption would be smaller. This is exactly what is suggested when one observes the last column in table I.

This argument would indicate that if in formic acid all the molecules were to exist as single molecules, the susceptibility would be the same as for the formate ion. But since the molecules exist in pairs, we have for formic acid a value larger than that for the formate ion. Such a conclusion should be true for acetic acid also.

Experiments of Varadachari¹⁵ show that when acetic acid is heated from 28° to about 60°C , there is no change of susceptibility. It might be possible that the change actually taking place in this range of tem-

12. Sc. Rep. Tohoku Imp. Univ., 22, 835, 1933.

13. Smyth, Dielectric Constant and molecular structure, 94, 1931.

14. Jour. Am. Chem. Soc., 52, 1824, 1930.

15. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 2, 166, 1935.

perature is too small to be measured. For the difference between the susceptibilities of acetic acid and of the acetate ion is only 7%. In the limited range of temperature in Varadachari's experiments, the number of double molecules breaking up into single molecules may be so few that the change of susceptibility may be less than $\frac{1}{2}\%$, the limit of accuracy in these investigations.

Formic acid and acetic acid behave differently from other liquids from the point of view of optical scattering. Ramakrishna Rao¹⁶ found that in all the organic substances studied by him, the optical anisotropy in the liquid state was less than in the state of vapour. The significant exceptions were formic and acetic acids. Here the anisotropy in the liquid state was found to be greater than in the state of vapour. Experiments on the variation of the anisotropy conducted by Rao¹⁷ showed definitely that such an effect was due to association. The anisotropy in the case of acetic acid showed a small decrease in the range 30° to 60°C but at higher temperatures the decrease was much greater. More recent experiments of Krishnan, Sundara Rama Rao¹⁸ and Jogarao¹⁹ have in general verified the above observations. Krishnan²⁰ infers the presence of molecular clusters in formic and acetic acids of dimensions not small compared with the wavelength of light. It is obvious that in magnetic considerations we are not concerned with such large clusters even if they are present within the liquids. Experiments are being instituted to study the susceptibility of formic acid and acetic acid at much higher temperatures and of solutions of fatty acids in organic solvents like benzene and ether.

It is well known that aqueous solutions of formic acid and formates are very weak electrolytes. Experiments with aqueous solutions of formates of sodium, barium and calcium show that no change of magnetic susceptibility takes place when these salts are dissolved. In the case of formic acid, the decrease in susceptibility on dissolving it in water molecules of the acid. This would suggest that in the double molecule, there should be something more than mere association in the sense that only electrostatic forces keep the two acid molecules together. There has been explained as being due to the break-up of some of the double should be a large release of constraints when the double molecule is

formed resulting in an increase in the diamagnetic susceptibility. Or some more fundamental process should occur. More experimental work is needed to settle these questions and investigations on these lines will be taken up shortly.

5. SUMMARY

The magnetic susceptibility of aqueous solutions of formic acid has been studied at different concentrations. The results suggest the formation of a monohydrate of formic acid at a concentration of nearly 70% of the acid. An alternative explanation for the decrease of susceptibility is also presented. The formic acid contains ordinarily double molecules and on dissolving in water, some of these may break up into single molecules. This phenomenon may account for the decrease of susceptibility observed when the acid is dissolved in water. This explanation gains interest from the fact that the formic acid has a molar susceptibility of 20.5 while the ionic susceptibility of the formate (which should be the same as that of the molecule) is 17.3. The higher value of the acid is to be attributed to the existence of double molecules. More detailed experiments are being instituted.

16. Ind. Jour. Phys., 2, 61, 1927.

17. Ind. Jour. Phys., 3, 1, 1928.

18. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 3, 369, 1936.

19. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 3, 377, 1936.

20. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 3, 126, 1936.

The Infinitesimal Flow on the Projective Plane

By

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INTRODUCTION

Let G_r be a continuous r -parameter group of point transformations which carries a manifold S_n into itself. With every linear operator ξ^i of the group may be associated an infinitesimal displacement of the points of S_n given by

$$x'^i = x^i + \xi^i \delta t$$

which may be supposed to take place in the short time interval δt . If S_n carries a metric, every such infinitesimal transformation of G_r determines a velocity field $\mathbf{V}$ in S_n , which is characteristic of the group G_r from which it is derived. In this paper, the velocity field due to the infinitesimal transformations of the projective group is studied by the methods of Euclidean vector analysis.

THE COMPONENTS OF THE FLOW VECTOR

2. The projective group G_8 in the Cartesian plane, has the eight independent infinitesimal operators

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x}, \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, x \frac{\partial}{\partial x}, y \frac{\partial}{\partial x}, x \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, y \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, x^2 \frac{\partial}{\partial x} + xy \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, xy \frac{\partial}{\partial x} + y^2 \frac{\partial}{\partial y}$$

on which every other infinitesimal operator of G_8 is linearly dependent. Hence χ being any infinitesimal operator of the group we may write,

$$\chi = [a_0 + a_1x + a_2y + x(\lambda x + \mu y)] \frac{\partial}{\partial x} + [b_0 + b_1x + b_2y + y(\lambda x + \mu y)] \frac{\partial}{\partial y}$$

where $a_0, a_1, a_2, b_0, b_1, b_2, \lambda, \mu$ are all constants. Thus the velocity field $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{I}v_1 + \mathbf{J}v_2$, due to a general infinitesimal transformation of the group corresponding to the operator χ is given by

$$\left. \begin{aligned} v_1 &= a_0 + a_1x + a_2y + x(\lambda x + \mu y) \\ v_2 &= b_0 + b_1x + b_2y + y(\lambda x + \mu y) \end{aligned} \right\} \quad \dots (2.1)$$

From (2.1) we have,

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \text{Div } \mathbf{V} &= \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial x} + \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial y} = 3\lambda x + 3\mu y + a_1 + b_2 \\ \text{Curl } \mathbf{V} &= \left(\frac{\partial v_2}{\partial x} - \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial y} \right) \mathbf{N} = (\lambda y - \mu x + b_1 - a_2) \mathbf{N} \end{aligned} \right\} \quad \dots (2.2)$$

where $\mathbf{N}$ is a unit vector normal to the plane.

From (2.2) we see that,

the locus of points at which $\text{Div } \mathbf{V}$ is constant is a system of parallel lines, and the locus of points at which $\text{Curl } \mathbf{V}$ is constant is another system of parallel lines perpendicular to the former.

Thus there is a unique point in the plane at which the divergence and curl take given values and in particular a point O where they both vanish. Taking the lines L, L' , along which the divergence and curl respectively vanish, for axes of co-ordinates, the expression for v_1, v_2 may be written in simpler form,

$$\left. \begin{aligned} v_1 &= a_0 + a_1x + a_2y + \mu xy \\ v_2 &= b_0 + a_2x - a_1y + \mu y^2 \end{aligned} \right\} \quad \dots (2.3)$$

The eight velocities of which the field vector $\mathbf{V}$ is composed may be grouped as follows. Firstly a velocity $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{I}a_0 + \mathbf{J}b_0$ due to a pure translation; secondly a velocity $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{I}(a_1x + a_2y) + \mathbf{J}(a_2x - a_1y)$ due to a homogeneous strain of zero divergence and zero rotation, the axes of strain being the lines L, L' turned about O through an angle θ given by $\tan 2\theta = a_2/a_1$; thirdly a radial flow, in which each point P has a velocity along OP of magnitude μry , whose divergence and curl are equal to $3\mu y$ and $-\mu xN$ respectively. It should be noticed that this radial flow is peculiar to the projective group, in the sense that it does not belong to the Euclidean or affine sub-groups of the projective group.

3. Every projective transformation on a plane leaves three points A, B, C invariant. From (2.3) it is evident that

the locus of points at which the vector $\mathbf{V}$ is parallel to a fixed line $y = \lambda x$ is a conic C_λ passing through A, B, C , having one asymptote parallel to $y = \lambda x$ and the other parallel to the line L along the points of which $\text{Div } \mathbf{V}$ vanishes.

In particular when $\lambda = 0$, C_λ is a parabola whose axis is parallel to the line L . When the fixed direction is parallel to the y -axis, i.e., to the line L' , C_λ is a rectangular hyperbola whose asymptotes are parallel to the axes, i.e., to the lines L and L' .

Again, since the expressions for $\text{Div } \mathbf{V}$ is linear in x and y , it follows that the divergence of the vector at the centroid of any number of points $P_1 P_2 \dots P_n$ is the mean of the divergences of the vectors at these points. A similar result is true of the curl of the field. Using homogeneous co-ordinates referred to the triangle ABC formed by the fixed points, the equations of an infinitesimal transformation may be written,

$$x' = \rho(1 + \epsilon_1)x, \quad y' = \rho(1 + \epsilon_2)y, \quad z' = \rho(1 + \epsilon_3)z,$$

where the ϵ 's are infinitesimals. If the identical relation between the homogeneous co-ordinates be $ax + \beta y + \gamma z = 1$, assuming the displacement to have taken place in a time δt , the expressions for the divergence and curl of the vector at $P(x, y, z)$ may be written,

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \text{Div } \mathbf{V} &= \alpha(k_2 + k_3 - 2k_1)x + \beta(k_3 + k_1 - 2k_2)y \\ &\quad + \gamma(k_1 + k_2 - 2k_3)z \\ \text{Curl } \mathbf{V} &= [\alpha(k_2 - k_3)\cot A. \ x + \beta(k_3 - k_1)\cot B. \ y \\ &\quad + \gamma(k_1 - k_2)\cot C. \ z] \mathbf{N} \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (3.1)$$

where $k_r = \lim_{\delta t \rightarrow 0} \epsilon_r / \delta t$ ($r = 1, 2, 3$) and $\mathbf{N}$ is the unit vector normal to the plane. Also the direction of the vector at the point $P(x_1, y_1, z_1)$ is along the line

$$(k_2 - k_3) \frac{x}{x_1} + (k_3 - k_1) \frac{y}{y_1} + (k_1 - k_2) \frac{z}{z_1} = 0. \quad \dots (3.2)$$

From (3.2) it follows that the lines of flow (the W -curves of the projective group) are given by

$$x^{k_2 - k_3} y^{k_3 - k_1} z^{k_1 - k_2} = \text{constant.}^*$$

From (3.1) it follows that $\dots (3.3)$

$\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = 0$ at the centroid of the triangle ABC and $\text{curl } \mathbf{V} = 0$ at the orthocentre of ABC .

Further, since the lines L, L' are at right angles, we see that the locus of points O at which the divergence and curl of the vector vanish for various infinitesimal transformations which keep the same three points A, B, C invariant, is the circle on PG as diameter where P, G are respectively the orthocentre and centroid of the triangle ABC .

From (3.2) we see that the locus of points at which the direction of the vector $\mathbf{V}$ passes through a fixed point P is a conic passing through A, B, C and P . Dually, it is found that the envelope of the directions of the vectors at points of a fixed line l is a conic touching l and the sides of the triangle ABC . If the point O at which the divergence and curl

vanish coincides with one of the three fixed points say A , it may be inferred from (3.1) or directly verified that the triangle ABC is right angled at A . In this case if C_λ be the conic which is the locus of points at which the vector $\mathbf{V}$ is parallel to a fixed direction λ and C_μ be similarly defined it is found that the angle of intersection of the conics C_λ and C_μ at A is equal to the angle between the direction λ and μ . Also the lines of flow are all conics having double contact at B and C and having as tangents the sides AB, AC of the triangle ABC .**

At all points on the line at infinity except those on L and L' the magnitude of the field vector, its divergence and curl are all infinite, the direction of the vector being, however, definite. The behaviour at the points at infinity on L and L' is somewhat peculiar. Since all the conics C_λ pass through the point at infinity on L and also all the lines of constant divergence are all parallel to L , the direction of the vector and its divergence are both indeterminate at this point. The curl of the field has an infinite value. Similarly, since all the lines $\text{Curl } \mathbf{V} = \text{const.}$ are parallel to L' , the curl of the vector field at the point at infinity on L' is indeterminate. The direction of the vector at this point is parallel to L' and its divergence is infinite.

EXTENSION TO n -DIMENSIONAL SPACE

4. Many of these results may be extended to a Euclidean space S_n of n dimensions. In S_n , the projective group G_r , where $r = n(n+2)$ has the $n(n+2)$ independent infinitesimal operators,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x^i}, \quad x^i \frac{\partial}{\partial x^j}, \quad x^i x^j \frac{\partial}{\partial x^i}, \quad (i, j = 1, 2, \dots, n)$$

the tensor summation convention being followed. Hence, if χ be any infinitesimal operator of the group, since it is linearly dependent on the above $n(n+2)$ operators, we may write,

$$\chi = (a^i + l^i x^j + p_{ij} x^i x^j) \frac{\partial}{\partial x^i}$$

where the a 's, b 's and the p 's are constants. Hence the components v^i of the velocity field $\mathbf{V}$ due to the infinitesimal displacement corresponding to the operator χ are given by

$$v^i = a^i + l^i x^j + p_{ij} x^i x^j \quad \dots (4.1)$$

The fundamental tensor g_{ij} being chosen so that $g_{ij} = \delta_{ij}$, where the Kronecker deltas δ_{ij} are given by equations,

$$\delta_{ij} = 0 \text{ if } i \neq j \text{ and } \delta_{ij} = 1 \text{ if } i = j.$$

** This is a consequence of $\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = 0$ at A so that $k_2 + k_3 = 2k_1$. The curves (3.3) now become $x^2 y^{-1} z^{-1} = \text{const.}$

we have from (4.1),

$$\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = \frac{\partial v^i}{\partial x^i} = l_i^i + (n+1)p_i x^i$$

Hence the locus of points at which $\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = 0$ is the prime
 $p_i x^i + l_i^i / (n+1) = 0$.

The components of the Stoke's tensor† of $\mathbf{V}$ in S_n which corresponds to the curl of the field in S_2 or S_3 , are given by

$$[ij] \equiv \frac{\partial v^i}{\partial x^j} - \frac{\partial v^j}{\partial x^i} = b_i^j - b_j^i + p_i x^j - p_j x^i \quad (i \neq j; i, j = 1, 2, \dots, n)$$

From the above equations we deduce

$$p_i[jk] + p_j[kl] + p_k[lj] = \lambda_{ijk} \quad \dots (4.3)$$

where the λ 's are constants. In virtue of the identities (4.3), only $(n-1)$ of the components of the Stoke's tensor of $\mathbf{V}$ are independent, such sets being of the form $[k1], [k2], \dots, [k(k-1)], [k(k+1)], \dots, [kn]$; also, since each component of this tensor is linear in the co-ordinates x^i , it follows that the locus of points at which the components of the Stoke's tensor $\mathbf{V}$ are given constants satisfying (4.3) is a line L whose direction is given by

$$\frac{dx^1}{p_1} = \frac{dx^2}{p_2} = \dots = \frac{dx^n}{p_n} \quad \dots (4.4)$$

From (4.2) and (4.4) it is evident that the line L is orthogonal to the prime at the points of which $\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = 0$.

The projective transformation in S_n leaves $n+1$ points invariant. Taking these as the vertices of the simplex S of reference, the expression for the divergence of the vector $\mathbf{V}$ may be written in the form,

$$\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = \sum_{r=1}^{n+1} k_r - (n+1) \sum_{r=1}^{n+1} \alpha_r k_r x_r \quad \dots (4.5)$$

where $\sum_{r=1}^{n+1} \alpha_r x_r = 1$ is the identical relation satisfied by the homogeneous co-ordinates of every point of S_n and the k 's are constants depending on the infinitesimal transformation. From (4.5), it is evident that the divergence of the vector v vanishes identically at the centroid of the simplex S which is given by the equations,

$$\alpha_1 x_1 = \alpha_2 x_2 = \dots = \alpha_{n+1} x_{n+1} = 1/(n+1)$$

† Eisenhart: *Riemannian Geometry*, Page 27.

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