THE

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

VOLUME CLIV. JULY—DECEMBER 1938.

LONDON:
THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW COMPANY LIMITED
19–19a CURSITOR STREET, E.C.4
1938



CONTENTS OF VOL. CLIV.

JULY 1938

	PAGE
Germany and England. By H. Powys Greenwood	1
Czechoslovakia's Henlein Problem. By Dr. Gerhard Schacher	9
Polish Foreign Policy. By Kazimierz Smogorzewski	16
John Bull and Brother Jonathan. By Professor W. T. Morgan	26
Economic Consequences of the "Anschluss." By Arnold Lair	36
Slavery in Muhammadan Countries. By Sir George Maxwell, K.B.E., C.M.G.	44
Television. By Janet Leeper	52
Bismarck's Political Technique. By Dr. Veit Valentin	60
Palestine: A Rational View. By A. N. Awab Zada	69
China and Communism. By Dr. Franz Michael	75
Sea Birds. By G. B. Gooch	83
Recent Scandinavian Literature. By Dr. Walter A. Berendsohn	91
Foreign Affairs. By George Glasgow	101
Literary Supplement:	
Reviews of Books	113
Shorter Reviews and Notices	125

AUGUST 1938

The Grouping of the Powers. By G. P. Gooch, D.Litt., F.B.A.	129
Japan's War of Conquest. By A. Morgan Young	139
British Policy and Czechoslovakia. By S. Grant Duff	147
"Freedom Day." By the Right Hon. Lord Olivier, K.C.M.G., C.B.	154
"Great is Diana!" By Henry W. Nevinson	163
State and Nation in the Spanish War. By Dr. Heinz Paechter	169
The Irish Agreement and the Irish Elections. By Hugh A. Law	176
Dr. Johnson and Spiritual Diaries. By H. Arthur Baker	183
Hitler's Cards. By Germanicus	190
Agriculture under Fascism. By Basil Davidson	197
The Contemporary Russian Theatre, 1917-1937. By Huntly Carter	205
Glimpses of the Eighteenth Century. By Janet Whitney	212
Fascism in South America. By Norman A. Ingrey	218
[illegible] y George Glasgow	229
[illegible]nt:	
[illegible]f Books	241
[illegible]eviews and Notices	254

SEPTEMBER 1938

The European Situation and Collective Security. By the Right Hon. Viscount Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E.	257
The Session. By Geoffrey L. Mander, M.P.	268
The Entente—and After. By Sisley Huddleston	277
Family Allowances. By B. Seebohm Rowntree	287
President Roosevelt Faces the Storm. By S. K. Ratcliffe	295
Our Public Schools. By Principal John Murray	305
Switzerland Fights Against a New "Anschluss." By H. A. Friedman	312
The Free Churches and the New Authoritarianism. By the Rev. Gwilym O. Griffith	319
[illegible]b Wasserma[illegible]n. By Dr. Fritz Gross	327
[illegible]nditions in Yugoslavia. By William Teeling	334
[illegible]n Relations, 1898-1899. By Dr. H. G. Dittmar	342
[illegible]dern Paris. By O. F. Abbott	350
[illegible] By George Glasgow	357
[illegible]ent:	
[illegible]f Books	369
[illegible]iews and Notices	381

INDEX.

OCTOBER 1938

PAGE

The Crisis. By Sir Arthur Willert, K.B.E. 385
Prague in Peril. By Mary N. Hawes 393
An International Economic Policy. By the Right Hon. Lord Marley, D.S.C., D.L. 400
The South African Danger. By Sir John Harris 410
The Jews of Vienna. By Erasmus 417
Egypt: a New Era. By Major E. W. Polson Newman 425
Time and the Dictators. By Economist 433
Poland as a Link. By Dr. George Adamkiewicz 441
The "Thurloe Papers." By Dr. Hubert Hall 448
The Rising Generation in France. By Dr. Alexander Rossmann 455
The Totalitarian State and the Churches. By Gertrude Farion 463
Wild Life on a Palestine Farm. By Paula Arnold 470
Baroque in Bavaria. By C. von Rolshausen 478
Foreign Affairs. By George Glasgow 485
Literary Supplement:
Reviews of Books 497
Shorter Reviews and Notices 511

NOVEMBER 1938

Munich—Before and After. By J. A. Spender 513
Germany after Munich. By H. Powys Greenwood 523
Twenty Years of Czechoslovakia. By George Glasgow 532
The Anglo-French Alliance. By the Right Hon. Lord Davies 544
Property and Liberty. By Ramsay Muir 552
Religion and Reason. By the Rev. Dr. J. Scott Lidgett, C.H. 560
Czech-Polish Understanding. By Professor W. J. Rose 570
The Nazis and the Vatican. By Prince Hubertus Loewenstein 576
Geneva Reconsidered. By Robert Sencourt 582
The Origins of Fascism: Vincenzo Gioberti. By the Rev. E. L. Allen, Ph.D. 591
A Famous School Book. By A. W. Holland 599
Nîmes. By Mary F. Raphael 608
"Time and the Hour" in Literature. By H. M. Wilson 617
Literary Supplement:
Reviews of Books 625
Shorter Reviews and Notices 638

DECEMBER 1938

Twenty Years After: A Survey. By the Right Hon. Viscount Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L. 641
The New Deal in Europe. By the Right Hon. Sir Charles Hobhouse ... 651
The Outlook in Europe: A German View. By Baron von Rheinbaben ... 659
The Czechs and the Crisis. By S. Grant Duff 669
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. By C. A. Macartney 677
The Canadian Political Scene. By Dr. Frank Darvall 684
The Press in Nazi Germany. By Ernst Albert 693
Mussolini and the Jews. By Israel Cohen 700
Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Human Pity. By F. McEachran 707
Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. By Lieut.-Commander A. S. Elwell-Sutton ... 716
Non-Violence in Israel. By Julian Franklyn 724
Yellow Butterflies. By Herbert Mace 727
Foreign Affairs. By George Glasgow ... ...
Literary Supplement:
Reviews of Books ... ...
Shorter Reviews and Notices ... ...

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JULY 1938.

GERMANY AND ENGLAND.

ON the Saturday night before the Austrian plebiscite I was sitting in one of a row of smart red charabancs waiting to unload their cargo of journalists in the hall where Hitler was to make his final speech. Austrian S.A. men in their white shirts and black trousers—very few had uniforms then—lined the street, and were singing lustily to keep themselves warm in the cold wind. The refrain of what seemed to be their favourite song ran as follows:

> For to-day Germany is ours,
> To-morrow 'tis the world entire.

As propaganda for foreign journalists this seemed hardly up to standard; but then Dr. Goebbels was in Berlin. There are, I suppose, few more burning questions in foreign policy to-day than whether that refrain, which I had not heard before, represents the real spirit and purpose of Nazi Germany. The idea of the Germans as an insatiable people aspiring to rule the world or at any rate to mould the world on its totalitarian model is probably the main fear behind British rearmament, just as similar fears inspired our pre-war policy and played a considerable part in bringing about the Great War. Now, as then, the average German would hotly deny that such fears had any substantial basis; but now, as then, speeches or publications from by no means uninfluential quarters give other nations serious food for thought.

Every nation has its diehards and its jingoes, to whose utterances it is perhaps unfair to pay excessive attention. We have most of us had our periods of wanting to paint the map red or blue or green or whatever colour the mapmakers have chosen to represent our nationality. But seldom have ambitious dreams been published so frankly to the world as those of the Pan-Germans before the war or those of the Nazis to-day. How seriously should they be taken?

A modern psychologist might say that exaggerated imperialistic imaginings are likely to be the natural compensation for frustration in concrete imperialistic achievement. For

after all, whatever Germans may have dreamt, other people got away with the swag. There can be few examples in history of a people as energetic, intelligent and virile as the Germans having not merely failed to establish their rule over other peoples but having to watch considerable numbers of their own race living under alien rule. For such is the hard fact which every German has to face, and no one who has not thoroughly realised it with all its implications can claim to understand Germany or is likely to be able to deal justly and intelligently with the German people.

The reason for this state of affairs is fairly evident ; it is the failure of the German people to achieve unity. It would lead too far afield to enter here upon the deep-seated historical causes of that failure, upon the reasons, for example, which enabled a Duke of Bavaria to stand up to a German kingship at the height of its power better than the Duke of Aquitaine to a French kingship in the depths of its degradation, upon the effects of the religious wars, upon the rôle of France under Richelieu and his successors ; upon Germany's bitter experiences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the chief battleground of Europe. But it is difficult to deny that no great nation of Western civilisation has received as hard a lesson as Germany of the vital necessity of unity and of political and military strength based upon that unity.

The fundamental basis of the Nazi movement is the yearning for unity. That yearning has proved a stronger force than political or class divisions or historical traditions ; it threw the Austrians into Hitler's arms ; under perfectly free conditions it brought a 90 per cent. majority in the Saar ; and now it is giving Henlein a similar majority in Bohemia. And it derives its strength above all from the great movement of nationalism which rose out of the French Revolution—a movement which still seems to be the most powerful influence in world affairs.

Here we can distinguish a certain difference between the dreams and aspirations of the Nazis and those of extreme German nationalists before the war. The old Pan-German League or *Alldeutscher Bund* was far more occupied with schemes for imperial and colonial expansion than with its ostensible object of uniting the German people. One pamphlet recommended by the chairman of the League in 1895 described, in the form of an imaginary history, the creation of a

Pan-German Empire including a large part of Russia, and after the defeat of England and the United States most of Africa and South America were to be incorporated. As in other similar publications the policy recommended was to defeat each opponent separately, and the idea that, warned by such charming frankness, the potential opponents might take it into their heads to forestall the plan by uniting apparently never occurred to the authors.

There is no real parallel to this sort of thing in Nazi literature, in spite of common assumptions to the contrary. Here the stress is invariably laid on the need for uniting those of German blood, and this is generally combined with the statement that National Socialism rejects the old imperialistic idea of conquering and subjugating other peoples. It is true that " German blood " and the " German race " are elastic terms, and it is often suggested that they cover such peoples as the Scandinavians, the Dutch, the Flemings, and of course the Swiss and Alsatians, as well as the genuine German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere. But neither in the Nazi writings themselves nor in the works of such propagandists of this view as Mr. Wickham Steed have I discovered any evidence that it is seriously held in the new Germany.

The most authoritative exposition of the aims of National Socialism is of course Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, which has hitherto proved a remarkably accurate guide to the development of the Third Reich. Few national leaders can ever have explained their innermost thoughts with such frankness, and if one thing is certain it is that Hitler when he wrote that book was troubled by no inhibitions as regards the possible effect on foreign opinion. The two principal aims of German foreign policy laid down in *Mein Kampf* are firstly the need to unite the German people and secondly the need to secure the subsistence of the German people by giving them the necessary living room. " The National Socialist movement," writes Hitler, " must endeavour . . . to remove the disproportion between our population figure and our available territory." As examples of successful because durable political acts on these lines he enumerates the colonisation of the *Ostmark* (Austria) by the Bavarians, the conquest and settlement of the area east of the Elbe, and the organisation of Prussia by the Hohenzollerns as a point of crystallisation for the new Reich. He

expresses contempt for the German historians who instead of stressing the permanent nature of these solid achievements "praise all sorts of fantastic deeds of heroism, innumerable battles and wars instead of finally recognising how unimportant most of these events have been for the real development of the nation." These are at any rate the words of a realist and not of a man likely to lead his people into precisely those fantastic adventures which he thus severely stigmatises.

German foreign policy, according to Hitler, should not be led astray by dreams of world dominion or vast colonial expansion, nor should it try to support the German people by the peaceful conquests of trade. It should secure the necessary land for the German people by the sword if need be, and it should secure that land in Eastern and Central Europe, when the German position can be permanently consolidated and maintained. In order to secure the necessary backing for this policy allies are necessary, and the two nations whose friendship Germany should endeavour to secure are Italy and Great Britain. Italy can be won if Germany is prepared to abandon the South Tyrolese for good and all, and that is a sacrifice which must be made for the good of the German people as a whole. As for Great Britain—and here is one of the few points where Hitler's remarkably acute analysis of foreign political factors goes astray—she must by tradition be opposed to French hegemony in Europe, and once Germany renounces serious colonial and trading ambitions there is no cause of quarrel between the two peoples. Thus fortified, Germany can proceed to the inevitable reckoning with France without which no effective German policy in Europe is possible.

The passages dealing with this "final reckoning" with France are deserving of the closest study for obvious reasons. It is generally assumed that they stand in complete contradiction to the Führer's recent assurances that Germany has no direct cause of quarrel with France, and that Hitler is therefore at present merely trying to throw dust in French eyes. In fact, however, there is no such contradiction. For the whole context shows that the France with which Hitler regards a "final reckoning" as necessary is a France determined to thwart and weaken Germany. "The perpetual aim of the French," he writes, "is to prevent the consolidation of Germany into a united power, the maintenance of a system of

small German States . . . without unified leadership, and at the same time to occupy the left bank of the Rhine; all in order to create and secure their hegemony over Europe." This passage and others like it were written just after the Ruhr occupation, when any German patriot might be expected to give expression to such sentiments.

Hitler's essential thought is surely quite clear. Germany's quarrel with France is not due to ambitions to be satisfied at French expense. There is no mention of the Briey basin, of colonies, or even of Alsace-Lorraine in *Mein Kampf*. On the evidence of his own book Hitler may well be perfectly sincere in declaring that enough blood has been shed during the past thousand years over the Franco-German frontier question. But it is obviously an implied condition of the continually reiterated offer of peace to France that she should cease to oppose German policy in Central and Eastern Europe.

We have seen that this policy as laid down in *Mein Kampf* consists in the unification of the German people and the conquest of the necessary land to support them. In one of his most startling passages Hitler visualises an expansion of the German people to 250 millions and their settlement on land in Europe. Fortunately in spite of drastic and comparatively successful measures the German birth-rate has only risen sufficiently to avert the threatened rapid decline, so that Europe looks like being spared this problem at least.

Is Nazi foreign policy still aiming at the conquest of land for peasant settlement, and if so, where? There are one or two points worth noting in this connection. Firstly, Hitler's economic ideas at the time when *Mein Kampf* was written were still comparatively unformed. Secondly, practical experience has demonstrated the difficulty of finding enough suitable settlers even for schemes within the German boundaries. And thirdly Soviet Russia, which Hitler expected to break up, has become a powerful nation constituting in the eyes of Germans a serious threat to their security. Here again it is possible to distinguish the underlying idea. Hitler advocates the conquest of land as opposed to trade expansion or grandiose imperialistic adventures. The subsistence of the German people should not be dependent on the vagaries of world trade or even on the unstable forces of world politics; it should be secured at home. That of course is the principal

object of the Four-Year Plan. But since this subsistence cannot be secured within the present German boundaries and the conquest of land is impracticable, at any rate at present, Germany should aim at the next best thing—an economic system whose principal factors are within the sphere of German economic influence and as far as possible political influence as well. Thus Hitler's thought leads logically to the present primary aim of German foreign policy—a *Mitteleuropa* under German leadership.

Recently a new term has become increasingly common in German economic and political publications. This term is *Lebensraum*. A vaguely defined area comprising Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Yugoslavia and extending into the Balkans is regarded as the German "living-room," where every attempt should be made to establish economic predominance and intruders are looked on askance. Here it is hoped that German trade can be made independent of such incalculable factors as Wall Street slumps, tariffs or export drives by other nations, or even blockades. Since the acquisition of Austria this tendency has of course received a powerful fillip. Undoubtedly this area is the natural hinterland for German trade. It can supply a good many, though by no means all, the raw materials and foodstuffs Germany needs—iron ore and tropical products are conspicuously lacking—and since the 1931 crisis Germany, aided by an intelligent manipulation of clearing systems and similar devices has been gaining an increasing share of its total trade. At the present time *Grossdeutschland* takes just under half the exports of Bulgaria and Hungary, over a third from Turkey and Yugoslavia, over a quarter from Greece and Roumania, and one-fifth from Czechoslovakia and Poland. But when the Rhine-Main-Danube canal is completed much better things are hoped for.

It is in this light that the present critical situation in Czechoslovakia should be viewed. Of the other Danubian countries Hungary is fairly definitely associated with Germany, while the remainder, even the partners in the Little Entente, Roumania and Yugoslavia, are pursuing a vacillating, opportunist policy with the idea of coming down on the German side as Poland has done if it seems advisable. But the Czechs traditionally regard themselves as a barrier against Germanism and German influence. Nobody who has talked

recently to influential Germans can doubt that they are determined to break that barrier, and once it is down German influence is likely to become paramount throughout Central and Eastern Europe. This does not, in my view, mean that Germany proposes to create a vast Nazi empire stretching from the North to the Black Seas. Even in the event of a successful war Hitler is unlikely to endanger the homogeneity of his racial State by incorporating other races. The idea is rather that of Moeller van den Brück's famous book *The Third Reich* (from which the title of the Nazi Reich was taken) that Germany should be the leader and protector of the rising nationalities in Eastern Europe. It does mean, however, that Russian and French influence would be excluded and that Germany would be paramount in her *Lebensraum*.

The immediate object of British policy seems to be to arrange a peaceful settlement of the Czechoslovak minority problem and to further a Czech-German understanding. That is only possible if the Czechs abandon the Russian alliance for a policy of neutrality, allow the Sudeten Germans considerable influence over their whole policy, and cease to act as a barrier against Germany. Nothing short of this will satisfy either the Sudeten Germans or Berlin. Sooner or later if the barrier remains the Germans will fight.

If this analysis of German foreign policy is correct, two conclusions suggest themselves. The first is that a war between Germany and the British Empire or between Germany and the Western Powers is not necessarily inevitable. There is no real evidence that Germany is aiming at world dominion or at breaking up the British Empire. I was particularly interested to note in Germany recently that the appetite did not seem to be growing with eating; on the contrary it was impressed upon me that Germany was coming to the end of her demands on Europe, and that once the Czechoslovak problem was solved she would be prepared to negotiate an understanding with Great Britain conceding armament limitation as against colonial concessions. Undoubtedly Hitler would prefer to gain his ends without war, and among the people at large war is just as unpopular as and probably even less generally canvassed than in England. The second conclusion is that only a general war can prevent Germany becoming paramount in Central and Eastern Europe, and the most powerful nation in Europe.

I have purposely refrained hitherto from entering upon moral questions, which are apt to confuse the picture. For, after all, the moral issues are by no means clear, in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere. It is at least arguable that the natural demand of the German peoples for a secure subsistence, equality and protection for minorities is in the circumstances inevitably tantamount to a demand for hegemony. As *The Times* put it once in a leading article, it is as easy to divert the Gulf Stream as to deny the gravitational pull of a nation of over seventy millions. However that may be, I do not wish to minimise the dangers inherent in such an increase of German power, not merely to the British Empire but to the whole conception of life for which that Empire stands. Many voices are raised advising us to fight to prevent that increase, to pursue what is described as our traditional policy of preventing any Power becoming paramount in Europe.

But in making such a fateful decision three factors seem worth considering. The first is that with the growth of extra-European Powers the importance of Europe, and thus of European hegemony, is greatly lessened. The second is that in pursuing their aims the Germans, like other ambitious peoples before them, may provoke oppositions and meet obstacles stronger than can at present be foreseen—incidentally an extremely likely result of an attempt to conquer land at the expense, say, of Soviet Russia. The third and most important is that the peoples of the Western democracies, intervening against Germany in a Central European quarrel, might well, if Germany remained on the defensive in the West, refuse to fight the war to a finish—particularly with the ruthless methods of bomb and blockade which would be called for.

I cannot help feeling that "protective war," war because your potential enemy may become stronger, is a counsel of fear. And there is no worse counsellor. Is not the best way to defend the British Empire to develop it, to populate it, and to make its free institutions at least as efficient and strong as those of its possible rivals? Then if another great struggle should prove to be unavoidable we should face it with confidence and in the knowledge that the free peoples of the Commonwealth would throw their full weight into a cause understood and supported by all.

H. Powys Greenwood.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S HENLEIN PROBLEM.

THE events of May 20th to 22nd have shown clearly that the military resistance which Czechoslovakia resolved to offer to a German attack was able automatically to lead to collective co-operation on the part of the democratic Great Powers. The whole significance of Czechoslovakia as a centre of military resistance against an expansion of Germany towards the east and south-east was suddenly clear, even to those who had hitherto been in doubt as to the great value of the strategic situation of this country for the maintenance of European peace. The rightness of the opinion of Colonel Moravec, of the Czech general staff: "Without Czechoslovakia, France would be thrown back on to the periphery of Europe," was confirmed; and British foreign policy, in these last days when the fate of Europe seemed to hang by a hair, has drawn conclusions from this.

This great strategic significance of Czechoslovakia and its value as a factor of military resistance will have to be kept continually in view if one wishes to form a correct judgment in the Sudeten German question. Every solution of this question that weakens the military significance of Czechoslovakia for the maintenance of European peace must automatically decrease the interest of the democratic Western Powers in Prague. Herr Henlein, in his Carlsbad speech of April 24th, confessed openly to the National Socialist faith. Herein lies the real problem, and not in questions of nationality and language; least of all in the minority problem, the solution of which has not once been seriously grappled with by many other states, Poland and Italy in particular. What is going on in Czechoslovakia to-day seems to be merely an arrangement between Czechs and Germans. In reality it is a clearing-up of the question as to whether this state shall fall into the hands of National Socialism, or whether the principles of Western democracy and culture, with their policy based on the system of collective security, shall rule.

A confession of National Socialism signifies nothing more nor less than recognition of the principle that there exists only one single "leader of all Germans," and that leader Adolf Hitler. It is further identified with the claim to unite all Germans under one Führer in a great German Reich, as

National Socialism itself expresses in its confession of faith: "*Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Führer*," one realm, one people, one leader. Czechoslovakia's Henlein problem is a European problem in the proper sense of the word because it is a question of whether the military and political key position in Europe shall be given over at first partly and later completely to National Socialism. This key position is the land of Bohemia, almost completely surrounded by mountains, and by natural and artificial fortifications. At the foot of these mountains and within the Czechoslovak girdle of fortifications live Germans who have adopted the National Socialist ideology, not totally, but in a strong majority. This ideology obliges them through the medium of Konrad Henlein, the deputy of the "leader of all Germans," to make political union with Nazi Germany. The real Henlein problem of Czechoslovakia also touches the question of whether this ring of fortifications, so important for European peace, and with it the region surrounded by it, should remain in the hands of Czech democracy or be delivered over to National Socialism. From the angle of European peace—and only from this angle is Czechoslovakia so important for the west and particularly for England—the Henlein problem is therefore of eminent strategic and military importance. If National Socialism once occupies this Bohemian citadel, the way lies open not only to expansion in a south-east direction to the Black Sea, but also to a push towards the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, an advance to Poland and the Baltic, and finally the way to Russia.

How much it contributes to the complicatedness of the whole picture when one refers to the military-political and international significance of the Henlein problem in Czechoslovakia from the point of view of purely internal political considerations, is clearly to be seen when one examines more closely one or two catchwords. What, for example, is the practical significance of the claim of the Henlein Party to make a "second Switzerland" out of Czechoslovakia? The self-administration of the Swiss cantons arose historically in such a way that small sovereign states, of their own free will, formed "an eternal union," and a part of their sovereign rights, for instance foreign policy, military organisation, and so on, they delegated to the "Confédération Suisse," an institution specially created by them. This development is thus characterised on the one hand by the free will of the

cantons, and on the other by the efforts to form an independent state structure. Not only are both these factors wanting in Czechoslovakia, but also there is here a quite contrary development in the shape of the Henlein Party. Factious sections of a unit state, formed on democratic principles and developing organically, are demanding, with the support and military threats of a neighbouring, anti-democratic Great Power, for this state to hand over to them the greatest part of its sovereign rights. Under the completely false analogy of the Swiss canton constitution, which arose on a quite different basis and has developed also quite differently, the Henlein Party claims that the Czechoslovak state should support the National Socialist efforts for the "totality of all Germans," by giving up, under pressure and force, an ever-increasing proportion of its rights in favour of such a Sudetendeutsch "canton." In Switzerland the canton idea was the cause of the union. In Czechoslovakia it would serve the desire for emancipation, i.e. the desire of a party ideology propagated and continuously fostered by Berlin.

Here, then, is no will for the concord that was shown in Switzerland by sacrificing the canton to the former's independence, but the will for a separation that must lead to a weakening of the Republic. The rights of the minority are proclaimed by the Henlein Party only for itself. They do not recognise this right where democrats, socialists, Catholics, Czechs and Jews are concerned, who live in the Sudeten frontier district in hundreds of thousands.

As the municipal elections have shown, the Henlein Party is very far from totalitarianism in the Sudetenland, even the votes given to other German parties, especially the German socialists and communists, being at least 12 per cent. Besides these clearly anti-Henlein German votes, there were so many votes for the several Czech parties in these districts that the non-Henlein section may be estimated at between 25 per cent. and 33 per cent. In any case, the share of the anti-Henlein "sub-minorities" in the Sudetenland is far bigger than 22 per cent., this being the percentage of the German minority in all Czechoslovakia. This may be taken as a proof that Henlein does not want to recognise, from the point of view of totalitarianism, the rights of his own sub-minorities which are of a much stronger percentage than the German minority in all Czechoslovakia.

Ideologically, the National Socialist Henlein Party cannot recognise these rights of the minorities when they are made to apply against the Sudeten Nazis ; for by doing so they would set themselves against the totalitarian claims of National Socialism. Theoretically, therefore, for everyone who considers at length a perhaps feasible canton system in Czechoslovakia, it is seen that the aim of this is not in strengthening Czechoslovakia but in weakening her. It is desired to weaken the influence of the Prague Government in all those districts in which are the fortifications that ensure the maintenance of the independence of the Republic. Almost all these districts are inhabited in the majority by Germans who have recognised the National Socialist totalitarian programme.

How would the carrying through of this plan be in practice ? In everyday life, the democratic Prague Government would no longer be able administratively to carry through the constitutional rights of a citizen, even if the Henlein Party recognised this on paper. The clerks necessary for keeping internal order, in the administration of justice, the police, and so on, would be subject to the local self-administration. The self-administrative authorities, however, could and would practically exclusively act on the principle of National Socialism, take the clerks gradually from their own ranks, and thus force the Prague Government to send military expeditions in each separate case where police and justice should refuse to ensure the Czechoslovak constitution its rights. Not much imagination is necessary to consider that this would lead to a process of gradual loosening, and—last but not least—to cause the neighbouring Great Power to find pretexts for protests and interventions and endless propaganda campaigns. As, with such a strengthening of the forces striving away from Czechoslovakia, Prague could hardly maintain a condition of constant military readiness in the frontier districts, it would very soon be shown that the influence of Berlin in everyday life in the Sudetenland would be much stronger than that of Prague. Is it necessary to describe further what this would mean militarily and strategically for the ring of fortifications which would be occupied then by Germans on both sides, who would have a certain legal claim to the carrying through of National Socialist totalitarian principles ?

It may be objected that legal determinations might be constructed which would guarantee the rights of democratic and non-German, etc., minorities in the frontier districts, in spite of their self-administration. Freedom of the Press and of meetings could be legally protected, and one could determine, in numerous paragraphs, that the self-administrative authorities should suffer no terror, no boycott, no abuse of the State flag, and no propaganda against the maintenance of the independence of the Republic. But what do such safety measures signify when the Prague Government, apart from the army, have no possibility of carrying them out against the self-administrative authorities ? An old proverb says that the greatest justice can turn into the greatest injustice. The apparent justice which may, at first sight, lie in the free self-government of the National Socialist Sudeten Germans in the fortified frontier district would not only be injustice to the minorities living there whom it would no longer be practically possible to protect, but also a still greater injustice against the Czech people and the Czechoslovak state, whose frontier guard against National Socialist expansion would be delivered over to the aggressor step by step, although it is believed that the sovereignty of the Prague Government could be formally ensured. It would be in a higher sense an injustice to European democracy, which would thus lose its last bastion that was tested practically by the events of May 1938. Even without a plebiscite, but as in the Saar and in Danzig, justice would become injustice ; for it is the oft-tested method of National Socialism suddenly to succeed to power by seemingly democratic means, speculating upon others' democratic sense for justice, and then to use this power for setting aside democracy.

I am fully conscious of the fact that, with these considerations of the practical issues, I stand opposed to the many who wish to see in this way a simple and speedy liquidation of the Henlein problem in Czechoslovakia, so important for European peace. Unfortunately I cannot share the view of those who would like to solve this difficult problem, that is strategically most important for the destiny of Europe, by comparing it with Home Rule for Ireland or the British agreement with the Boers. Behind Ireland lies the Atlantic Ocean, while behind the fortified mountains of Bohemia lies National Socialist, south-east-pushing Germany. And the Boers did not fight for a world perspective which obliged them, as do National Socialism and the eight points of Herr Henlein's

Carlsbad speech, to carry on this struggle to the final attainment of their goal, namely, the gathering of all Germans in one Reich under one Führer—Adolf Hitler. It is exceedingly dangerous to simplify the very complicated circumstances of the Sudeten German question, and to quote such unsuitable examples as Switzerland, Ireland or the Transvaal. The Heinlein problem of Czechoslovakia is not one of mere local limitation. It is rather a cutting from the great problem that the constant and unhindered growth of National Socialism has given to the European cultural world.

As far as the question of a fair recognition of economic, political and cultural interests of the Germans in Czechoslovakia is concerned, which for decades have been represented by the German democratic parties, a far-reaching agreement has become necessary—and not only from to-day. Just those who recognised this necessity have in this connection constantly pointed out the world political error that lay in making to National Socialism forced concessions that had always been denied the democratic Weimar Republic. One must be clear to-day that concessions to the Henlein Party are concessions to National Socialism. And it will have to be strictly examined, whether any, and if so which, concessions to National Socialism have hitherto proved beneficial to European peace. This is valid not only for the question of local self-administration, whether one now calls it autonomy or not; but it is valid also in the same degree for the participation of National Socialist Ministers in the Prague Government. Such a participation of the Henlein Party in the Government of this country, the master of which, on account of its geographical and strategical position, would almost automatically become master of Europe, would not be a very comprehensible participation of Germans in the Prague Government, but a participation of National Socialism in the power of a state the conquest of which is now the chief aim of National Socialism.

If one has been able to observe, during the last few months, with what methods and to what extent the Sudetendeutsch Nazi Party have "*gleichgeschaltet*," by means of terror, innumerable non-political unions and cultural organisations, without having legal or administrative organs appointed for this purpose, one can form a picture of the development that would ensue after the introduction of self-administration to

the district. Solely military measures enabled the Prague Government to ensure its frontiers. The duration of such measures is naturally limited by economic and political considerations. The already severe problem of militarily blocking the National Socialist expansion would be almost insoluble if Sudeten German administrative authorities, influenced by Berlin, were to further the National Socialist advance southeast by all the means in their power. That this could never be avoided by a cantonal constitution in the frontier region is a thing that is self-evident to anyone knowing the circumstances.

One of the leading theoreticians on pan-Germanism has so explained the German *Drang nach Osten* that it is a question of nothing else than a perfectly natural struggle at the place of weakest resistance. After the occupation of Austria the opinion prevailed in Berlin that the success of Vienna would be repeated in Prague. The effort to pursue the same methods failed clearly on account of the watchfulness and capability of the resistance of Czechoslovakia, and because of the Western European initiative in setting up collective security again. It would be a fatal error to suppose that this attempt will not be repeated.

The significance of the Henlein problem for internal politics thus lies above all in this, that the National Socialists wish to effect a definite solution to this question under pressure. If this is successful, there is the decided prospect of a second attack on Czechoslovakia, on the strategically most important line on the map of this Continent, and with it the preparation for a European conflagration that National Socialism so urgently needs for the maintenance of its régime.

GERHARD SCHACHER.

Prague.

POLISH FOREIGN POLICY.

IT is Poland's destiny to be situated between Germany and Russia and to have to live independently of those two powerful neighbours. That fact determines her relations to her other neighbours. It has its influence on the ties that exist or may exist between Poland and the Great Powers that are neighbours of Germany and Russia. The Germans had been brought up on history as it was taught in the Bismarckian school and they thought of a really independent Poland as a calamity. Most of the leaders of the Weimar Republic thought of the new Poland as an accident and spoke of her as a " temporary " state. One of the main objectives of the policy launched at Rapallo in 1922, was to make that " temporary " period as brief as possible. That tactic undoubtedly worried Poland, but it did not affect her firm resolve to stand her ground. In another direction it actually was a help to Poland. It stimulated her business men to take advantage of her outlet to the sea, hastening the construction of the port at Gdynia and promoting new industries. As the ancient bonds between German and Polish lands were severed, Poland's economic and political independence was more and more emphasised.

Hitler's régime was received with marked reserve in Poland. The Poles could not guess how he would set about giving effect to the first point in his platform, which called for the " re-entry of all Germans into the bosom of a Greater Germany." On February 15th, 1933, Marshal Pilsudski, our great leader, warned the government of the Third Reich through Colonel Beck, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, that " Poland's attitude towards Germany and German problems would always be the same as Germany's attitude towards Poland," and he added that, " practically speaking, the situation in that regard depended much more on the attitude of Berlin than on the attitude of Warsaw." Hitler, therefore, had to make up his mind either to continue the irritations that were leading to unpredictable results, or to put a halt to them and try to create a healthier atmosphere in German-Polish relations. He chose the latter course.

Poland has always desired not merely peace with Germany but, if possible, a friendly neighbourliness based on mutual respect and confidence. No Chancellor of the Weimar

Republic had the courage to set out along that road. Could the Poles sit speechless and deaf when Hitler proposed that we should work together for an improvement in the German-Polish situation? We might, at the most, have returned an evasive answer just to gain time and to see whether the National-Socialist régime was destined to an early collapse. But we were the first to understand, since we knew our Germany, that that régime was going to endure. We therefore accepted Hitler's suggestion and on January 26th, 1934, signed a ten-year non-aggression treaty with the Third Reich.

What are the terms of that historic document, closing a whole epoch of German-Polish relations? The two governments note that " the moment has come to begin a new phase in diplomatic relations between Poland and Germany." That " new phase " is to lie, at bottom, in a settlement by direct communication " of any sort of question that has a bearing on their mutual relations." In the quest for such solutions, or in any eventual case of dispute, the two governments " in no circumstances will resort to arms," since their purpose is to " strengthen the good relations that should obtain among neighbours." It is obvious that no territorial questions are to come up under this procedure, since, " in accordance with international law " such questions " must be considered as belonging strictly to domestic affairs." Finally, the international agreements that may have been undertaken " by either of the parties " are " to be held as not incompatible " with the text of the German-Polish treaty. This important proviso leaves Poland's alliances intact.

The great idea of Hitler is to build a Third Reich, nationally unified, embracing all territories bordering on Germany where compact masses of German population are to be found. He certainly loses no opportunity to protest against the treaties of 1919 as " contrary to nature," but he no less recognises in principle the territorial transformations of which the treaties are an expression, and which, indeed, are the only part of the settlement that will endure—at least till the next seismic convulsion. What he claims is that fair play was violated in 1919 in that the principle of self-determination was not applied in certain cases where it would have worked to the advantage of Germany. Poland has a strong case against that theory of racial nationalism. In none of Poland's provinces or districts is the proportion of German inhabitants more than

about 10 per cent. There are 724,000 Germans living in Poland. There are 1,400,000 Poles living in Germany. On that basis, both countries have interest in letting sleeping dogs lie.

Imperial Russia certainly never did anything to deserve the sympathy of the Poles. The Polish nation joyously welcomed the fall of the Tsarist régime and the establishment of a democratic government in Russia. But it was overthrown by the Communists on November 7th, 1917. Hoping that a similar revolution was in the offing in Germany, the Bolshevist leaders called for immediate peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples. However, on the collapse of the Central Powers and quite inconsistently with principles which she had herself proclaimed, Soviet Russia did not hesitate to throw her troops westward upon Warsaw. That was the occasion for the outbreak of the Polish-Soviet war. It ended in 1920 with a decisive defeat for the Reds. The victory was due to a leader of genius, Marshal Pilsudski.

To restore reasonably courteous relations between Poland and the Soviet Union was a long and difficult process. From the ethnic standpoint the territories which are strictly Russian are separated from those which are strictly Polish by a mixed and, on the whole, not very prosperous region, which is sparsely settled with a White-Ruthenian population in the north and by Ukrainians in the south. However, here and there in that zone one finds (to say nothing of a general civilising influence on the part of Poland) districts with strong Polish minorities or even majorities. A frontier running on the line of the Riga treaty (March 18th, 1921) through this mixed territory was, therefore, a compromise that gave Poland security without affecting her character as a national state in which Poles were indisputably the prevailing element. Had the Polish delegation at Riga so chosen, it could have drawn the new frontier much farther to the east, for at that time the Soviet representatives were only mildly interested in territorial questions. All the frontiers which they were then establishing with their neighbours were, in their eyes, temporary expedients. The world was soon to go Bolshevist—peace was just a truce. War with the " capitalist " world was to go on, though there might be changes in the character of the " front."

In 1931 Soviet diplomacy was checkmated by Japanese

policy in the Far East, while in Germany proper the ascendancy of National-Socialism threw cold water on the pro-German orientation of the Kremlin. At this juncture Polish diplomacy played its hand in a clever way. Reviving a negotiation that had been hanging fire since 1926, the Warsaw government signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union on July 25th, 1932. That agreement provided that " any act of aggression affecting the territorial integrity and inviolability or the political independence of either country " would be considered contrary to the pact, and each party pledged itself " not to participate in any accord or agreement that was overtly hostile to the other in respect of aggression."* Furthermore, on July 3rd, 1933, Poland, the Soviet Union and some other countries signed in London a collective agreement that gave a very comprehensive definition of the term aggression.

So a wholly new atmosphere came to prevail in the relations between Moscow and Warsaw. But the Soviet government would not rest content with that very notable achievement. Looking feverishly about in Europe for diplomatic successes that were eluding his grasp in Asia, Litvinov suggested to Warsaw through the French government a mutual assistance pact of a definitely anti-German cast. One of the motives underlying this suggestion must undoubtedly have been a desire to prevent the normalisation of German-Polish relations. This suggested " Eastern Pact " was a favourite theme also with the people who can think of Poland only as an instrument of the policy of some Great Power. Had we accepted the " Eastern Pact," the Franco-Polish Alliance would have come to an end, to be replaced with a Franco-Russian Alliance, and the Polish army would simply be lining the road to salute the passage of the new " steam-roller." That is not the Polish view. Poland does not intend to be anybody's plaything. Much less does she want or need the support of one great neighbour against another. Both east and west what she wants is co-operation and goodwill.

France and Poland have common interests, and an alliance between them is in the nature of things. On February 19th, 1921, the two Powers agreed therein " to confer on all questions of foreign policy affecting the two states." On

* The pact of 1932 had been made to cover three years. In May 1934, a protocol was signed in Moscow that extended the non-aggression pact to December 31st, 1945.

December 1st, 1925, within the framework of the Locarno treaties, they signed a new agreement stipulating that in case of unprovoked aggression " each would come immediately to the other's aid." The Poles love France, and they realise that a powerful, prosperous and independent France is necessary to Europe and to the world. All that Poland asks of France is that she shall take accurate account of the position of Poland in Europe and especially in East Central Europe. Poland's policy since 1932 is aimed at putting her alliance with France on a sounder footing.

Poland has not been satisfied with the way the alliance has worked. While France could always be sure that in case of a German attack Poland would support France with all her strength, Poland had grave apprehensions about what would happen in the reverse situation. While the utility of the alliance was never questioned in Poland, one could collect a whole library of articles, books, and pronouncements by more or less prominent Frenchmen calling for the abandonment of the alliance on the ground that the " Corridor " might some day drag France into war with Germany. The very term " alliance " as applied to the relationship with Poland disappeared from official language. Everything seemed to indicate that France regarded the alliance as binding on Poland but optional for herself.

This gradual lapsing of the Franco-Polish alliance was sorrowfully contemplated in Poland. Poland could see the soundness of the view often expressed in Paris that a weak and cramped Poland was a danger to France, and the Warsaw government did everything it possibly could to normalise relations with Germany and the Soviet Union on the basis of complete equality. It was considered strange that that frank and open policy should then cause dissatisfaction and criticism in France. We cannot say that the present diplomatic situation in Europe is altogether favourable, but what Poland has done may certainly be taken as consolidating peace and increasing confidence. She has relieved France of serious causes for worry. And she is still the ally of France. That does not justify her in resting the whole weight of her security upon France.

Poland is bound to Rumania by a treaty of alliance signed on March 3rd, 1921, made more definite on March 26th, 1926, and renewed on January 15th, 1931. The two countries

undertake " mutually to respect their territorial integrity and political independence as at present constituted, and to maintain them against any aggression." That alliance makes Poland the only country that has pledged itself to uphold Rumania's possession of Bessarabia, as the agreements involved in the Little Entente do not extend to the Soviet-Rumanian frontier. In negotiating its non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, Poland took it for granted that Rumania would sign a similar pact at the same time as Poland. It is matter of common knowledge that the reason this was not done was because of pressure exerted at Bucharest by France. During the years 1934 and 1935 the friendly Polish-Rumanian relations were troubled by the support given by Mr. Titulescu to the idea of an " Eastern Pact." We are sorry to say that only the dismissal of this distinguished statesman rendered the strengthening of the Polish-Rumanian alliance possible. During June and July 1937 the President of the Polish Republic, Mr. Ignace Moscicki, exchanged state visits with King Carol of Rumania. These visits formed the climax in the efforts consistently made since the beginning of the year to draw the two countries closer together. The diplomatic missions of the two states in Warsaw and Bucharest respectively were raised to the status of Embassies.

Not only people who are unfriendly to Czechoslovakia but also those who are friendly consider her present position grave. All who are interested in the attitude of the Powers to this difficult situation are asking themselves what will Poland do. The first thing to be said is that Poland has no alliance with Czechoslovakia. This fact is the result of the complex of relations existing in Central Europe since the Great War. During the war the Czechs prayed for a Tsarist victory in the hope that Russia would be the dominant power in the East, with Czechoslovakia as her outpost in the heart of Europe. Poland was to be independent but small. Eastern Galicia would be a Russian province and, if so, Czechoslovakia could be Russia's neighbour. The Czechs took Poland so lightly that in January 1919, while her very slender military forces were engaged in the East, they occupied the Duchy of Teschen, although in November 1918 an ethnographical frontier had been agreed upon. The decision of the Supreme Council to arrange a plebiscite was not carried out, because the Czechs were in doubt as to the result. Further the gravest

hour of the Bolshevist invasion—July 1920—was exploited to get a settlement leaving a Polish minority of 120,000 on the Czech side. Moreover, the Czech government showed itself unfriendly to the Polish cause during this war even to the point of not allowing ammunition trains to pass through their country from France to Poland's support. All this made it difficult to create an atmosphere favourable to closer co-operation.

Meantime the Little Entente had been formed by the three Succession States to watch over the future of the Danube area. Poland would not join this because the purpose was expressly anti-Hungarian. In any case the sphere of Poland's vital interest is the Baltic area. In spite of this, having an eye to the future, Poland proposed to Prague in June 1923 an extension of this Entente into a Quadruple Alliance as a mutual guarantee of all existing frontiers. This proposition was rejected by Prague in a manner which wounded Polish *amour-propre*. Undeterred by this rebuff a second offer was made in April 1926 which, however, did not succeed. Further attempts were not considered necessary, the more so as good relations with Czechoslovakia were not so important for Poland as those with her two larger neighbours. The Czech government felt in much the same way toward Poland, witness the words of Dr. Beneš who, in May 1927, told Czech journalists that Poland was certain to have trouble with Germany over Pomerania, with the U.S.S.R. over the Ukrainians, and with Lithuania over Vilna. One other factor which hindered cordial relations between the two countries has been the consistent effort of the Czech authorities to assimilate as fast as possible the Polish minority in the Teschen district. The treatment of the Poles has never been in keeping either with the letter or the spirit of the Czechoslovak Constitution.

All that has been said, however, is not enough to justify Poland's being a party to any kind of plotting against the Czechoslovak Republic. The relations between the two Powers are not abnormal, although some points of difference have not been composed. An example of this is the existence in Prague of the head office of "Komintern" for Central Europe, to which fact the Polish Foreign Office has recently taken objection.

In the last weeks a new situation has arisen in Europe in which one of the Great Powers is threatening the existence of a smaller neighbour. Should the Western Powers decide to act

in this emergency, in particular France, an ally of Czechoslovakia, the course of Polish policy will be quite clear. If, however, the Western Powers do not decide on action, Poland must determine her policy in keeping with her own vital interests alone. This would involve concern for her Polish minority in the Teschen area.

Like Poland, Hungary stands at the cross-roads of Europe. Polish and Hungarian history are, therefore, one long tale of fights against invasions. During several centuries Poland and Hungary were good neighbours and very often allies, forming the most exposed defence of European civilisation against the onslaughts of the East. To-day they have no common frontier, but the old feelings of friendship are still strong. In November 1928 Walko, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Warsaw; in May 1929 Zaleski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, was cordially received in Budapest. In April 1936 Koscialkowski, Polish Prime Minister, left for Budapest, to return the visit of Gömbös, Hungarian Prime Minister, who came to Warsaw in October 1934. In February 1938 Admiral Horthy, Regent of Hungary, visited Warsaw. Professor Moscicki, President of the Polish Republic, will pay a state visit to Budapest in September.

Maintenance of the independence of the Baltic states is a constant principle in Poland's foreign policy. Her relations are cordial and friendly with Finland, Esthonia and Latvia. But Lithuania, clinging to her unjustifiable claim to Vilna, where only a small Lithuanian minority is to be found, refused to resume diplomatic relations with Poland and to recognise the international character of the Polish-Lithuanian frontier. Basic in the Vilna settlement of March 15th, 1923, were: 1, a plebiscite of the inhabitants affected; 2, a decision of the League of Nations Council; 3, a request from Lithuania to the Great Powers to draw a frontier between Poland and Lithuania. The settlement was, therefore, binding upon both parties.

Throughout the fifteen years every effort was made by Poland to establish normal relations with Lithuania. Hardly a year passed without some more or less official approach. All these attempts were thwarted until the general opinion prevailed in Poland that outside interests encouraged Lithuania in its intransigence. While in normal times the lack of direct communication with Lithuania constituted a great

inconvenience to everybody on both sides of the frontier, in the unsettled conditions of the last few months the existing situation was a source of grave danger not only to Poland and Lithuania but also to the remaining Baltic states. For this reason the Polish government, having exhausted all means of normal approach which have been tried and found unsuccessful over a period of fifteen years, issued an ultimatum on March 17th, 1938, requesting the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. There were no humiliating conditions and no demands for the settlement of outstanding problems. Once having found means for direct intercourse with Lithuania, Poland is as anxious to preserve Lithuania's independence as that country herself. A general hope prevails in Warsaw that after the bitterness is removed, they will continue to live side by side in accordance with the age-long traditions of mutual interests, respect and friendship.

The new British evaluation of Poland's position and capabilities is one of the most important changes in post-war Europe. Poland's energy and patriotism, moderation and cleverness in both domestic and foreign matters have impressed the British. The visit to Warsaw of Mr. Eden, Lord Privy Seal, in April 1935, was a manifestation of their increased appreciation. It was the first official visit of a British statesman to Poland. It was explained that Poland opposed the " Eastern Pact " because it could be regarded as an attempt by France to free herself of her obligations toward Poland and pass them on to the Soviet Union. If the guarantee of Poland had been shared by Great Britain, it would have been a different story. But, as everyone knows, London will not commit itself beyond the Rhine, and is quite right in refusing to assume obligations along the Vistula. Why, then, should Poland be asked to guarantee the *status quo* along the Danube ?

In November 1936 Colonel Beck came to London. It was the first official visit of a Polish Foreign Minister made at the invitation of the British Government. A Polish-British closer understanding on the main questions of European politics was reached. During the visit, Mr. Baldwin delivered a striking tribute to Poland. " Poland has always enjoyed the sympathy and regard of my countrymen. . . . Under the leadership of that great soldier, Pilsudski, she won her place among the ranks of the Great Powers of Europe."

Poland's foreign policy is neither pro-French nor pro-German nor pro-Russian. It is Polish alone. The sooner this simple fact is realised, the less misunderstandings and disappointments there will be. Poland conducts a permanent policy, conforming to her interest and to the interest of peace. Her policy is based on three factors : her own defensive power, good relations with her neighbours, and purely defensive alliances. Our purpose was never to nullify our alliances, but to diminish the probability of invoking them. Peace with all the world but full independence at home ! The Polish people are full of hope. They expect to succeed. They want to see their rôle in Europe enlarged. Poland is not a " bridge head," not a " buffer state," not a " satellite," but an important state of 34 million inhabitants, loyal to her friendships and alliances and grateful for services rendered. But she is just as firmly resolved that affairs that concern her shall not be discussed and disposed of without consultation.

KAZIMIERZ SMOGORZEWSKI.

JOHN BULL AND BROTHER JONATHAN.

IN an English play some years ago, a young under-secretary of state, on being asked what he considered the most important things in life, replied: "Love—and Anglo-American relations." Nothing is perhaps more fundamentally important to-day than the co-operation of John Bull and Brother Jonathan. Most Americans, however, get their idea of the English from the stage Englishmen or Wodehouse. Many of the English believe that eastern United States is inhabited by white men, and the western half, starting at Buffalo, is still infested with bloodthirsty Indians or gangsters. English lecturers, who still abound in our land despite the depression, visit a few of our larger cities, and return home to speak authoritatively of America, without having caught even a glimpse of the hinterland. They read the *New York Times* and *Boston American*, or possibly the *New York Journal* and *Boston Transcript*, and consider them typical American newspapers.

Important organisations are working most intelligently towards a better feeling between the two countries. The English Speaking Union has done much to increase our appreciation of each other's problems. The Pilgrim Trust also does good work most austerely. American Rhodes Scholars have done a great work in improving Anglo-American relations. The Commonwealth Fund has helped moderate Anglo-American intellectual jealousies by sending brilliant British students to leading American universities. The American University Union does valuable work among American college students in Britain.

Americans must not assume that their country will be favourably interpreted by British literary lions, even by those whom they have wined and dined. Britishers are more prone to be brutally frank even among themselves than Americans are. After making liberal allowance for the hostility engendered by the American Revolution, the strictures of Dr. Samuel Johnson are far from charitable:

> Sir, they are a race of convicts, and ought to be thankful of anything we allow them short of hanging . . . I am willing to love all mankind except an American . . . To a man of mere animal life you can urge no argument against going to America. But the man of any intellectual enjoyment will not easily go and immerse himself and his posterity for ages in barbarism.

Charles Dickens' caustic reflections in *Martin Chuzzlewit* still rankle. Kipling in his all-too-brief biography certainly exaggerates the cultural differences between Canada and the United States:

> And always the marvel—to which Canada seemed insensible—was that on one side of an imaginary line should be safety, law, honor and obedience, and on the other frank, brutal decivilization.

In recent years the *National Review* described America as a place "where every citizen carries a 'gun' as we do a watch or pocket handkerchief."

Englishmen believe that all Americans are British in ancestry, when in fact the United States is racially most heterogeneous; until the war it was an asylum for the oppressed, adventurous, poverty-stricken and criminal classes from all over the world. Relatively, British blood is declining in America, because of the greater fecundity of Eastern European stocks, which flocked to the modern economic Mecca. During the world war we began to understand each other better. The United States was on the way to become world-minded, but her failure to join the League occasioned bitter disappointment. The two nations co-operated at the Washington Conference (1922). By 1923 America had become convinced that she was wise in staying out of the League. In that year and the next France's efforts to broaden the basis of collective security came to naught, largely because of British aloofness. The Locarno pacts of 1925 likewise owed little to British statesmen, and the Briand-Kellogg pact three years later was watered down by Anglo-American reservations. Moves towards disarmament made little progress because of Britain's opposition. The Marquis of Londonderry insisted upon retaining bombing from the air as a weapon against Indian tribesmen. From that time forward Americans found it increasingly difficult to understand British diplomacy. Since 1932 they have been completely bewildered. We shall now explain how British policy appeared to a large part of the American public.

After the League branded Japan the aggressor in Manchukuo, Henry L. Stimson, American Secretary of State, asked Britain to join in refusing to recognise territory seized in contravention of the Kellogg pact. She refused. This led some journalists to believe that Britain and Japan had a

JOHN BULL AND BROTHER JONATHAN.

IN an English play some years ago, a young under-secretary of state, on being asked what he considered the most important things in life, replied: "Love—and Anglo-American relations." Nothing is perhaps more fundamentally important to-day than the co-operation of John Bull and Brother Jonathan. Most Americans, however, get their idea of the English from the stage Englishmen or Wodehouse. Many of the English believe that eastern United States is inhabited by white men, and the western half, starting at Buffalo, is still infested with bloodthirsty Indians or gangsters. English lecturers, who still abound in our land despite the depression, visit a few of our larger cities, and return home to speak authoritatively of America, without having caught even a glimpse of the hinterland. They read the *New York Times* and *Boston American*, or possibly the *New York Journal* and *Boston Transcript*, and consider them typical American newspapers.

Important organisations are working most intelligently towards a better feeling between the two countries. The English Speaking Union has done much to increase our appreciation of each other's problems. The Pilgrim Trust also does good work most austerely. American Rhodes Scholars have done a great work in improving Anglo-American relations. The Commonwealth Fund has helped moderate Anglo-American intellectual jealousies by sending brilliant British students to leading American universities. The American University Union does valuable work among American college students in Britain.

Americans must not assume that their country will be favourably interpreted by British literary lions, even by those whom they have wined and dined. Britishers are more prone to be brutally frank even among themselves than Americans are. After making liberal allowance for the hostility engendered by the American Revolution, the strictures of Dr. Samuel Johnson are far from charitable:

> Sir, they are a race of convicts, and ought to be thankful of anything we allow them short of hanging . . . I am willing to love all mankind except an American . . . To a man of mere animal life you can urge no argument against going to America. But the man of any intellectual enjoyment will not easily go and immerse himself and his posterity for ages in barbarism.

Charles Dickens' caustic reflections in *Martin Chuzzlewit* still rankle. Kipling in his all-too-brief biography certainly exaggerates the cultural differences between Canada and the United States:

> And always the marvel—to which Canada seemed insensible—was that on one side of an imaginary line should be safety, law, honor and obedience, and on the other frank, brutal decivilization.

In recent years the *National Review* described America as a place "where every citizen carries a 'gun' as we do a watch or pocket handkerchief."

Englishmen believe that all Americans are British in ancestry, when in fact the United States is racially most heterogeneous; until the war it was an asylum for the oppressed, adventurous, poverty-stricken and criminal classes from all over the world. Relatively, British blood is declining in America, because of the greater fecundity of Eastern European stocks, which flocked to the modern economic Mecca. During the world war we began to understand each other better. The United States was on the way to become world-minded, but her failure to join the League occasioned bitter disappointment. The two nations co-operated at the Washington Conference (1922). By 1923 America had become convinced that she was wise in staying out of the League. In that year and the next France's efforts to broaden the basis of collective security came to naught, largely because of British aloofness. The Locarno pacts of 1925 likewise owed little to British statesmen, and the Briand-Kellogg pact three years later was watered down by Anglo-American reservations. Moves towards disarmament made little progress because of Britain's opposition. The Marquis of Londonderry insisted upon retaining bombing from the air as a weapon against Indian tribesmen. From that time forward Americans found it increasingly difficult to understand British diplomacy. Since 1932 they have been completely bewildered. We shall now explain how British policy appeared to a large part of the American public.

After the League branded Japan the aggressor in Manchukuo, Henry L. Stimson, American Secretary of State, asked Britain to join in refusing to recognise territory seized in contravention of the Kellogg pact. She refused. This led some journalists to believe that Britain and Japan had a

Gentleman's Agreement as to China. Lord Lytton noted two years later that " the failure of our Government to back up Mr. Stimson is perhaps the most regrettable of all its shortcomings." Failing to strengthen her position by an Eastern Locarno, France joined England and Italy two years afterwards in the Stresa pact, definitely directed against Germany. Within a few weeks, however, Britain shocked the diplomatic world by making a naval agreement with Hitler. Since the Stresa pact was expressly restricted to Europe, Mussolini assumed that he would have the same freedom of action in Africa that Japan had enjoyed in Asia. He was naturally surprised when Britain objected to his Ethiopian war, particularly after she sent a fleet into the Mediterranean and asked the League to apply economic sanctions against him. We believe that she moved her warships and appealed to Geneva to impress the League of Nations Union that economic sanctions would not work. That body had in June announced the result of the peace ballot, which was overwhelmingly in favour of collective security through the League. It is obvious that the war scare was utilised to secure a political mandate for speedy rearmament. The Government won decisively at the polls as the champion of collective security, yet within a few weeks it sold the League and Ethiopia in the Hoare-Laval proposals.

Nothing in recent history has lowered British prestige in America so much, or so rapidly. Despite the rebuff to Stimson, Sir Samuel Hoare's statement as Foreign Secretary on September 11th, 1935, that the League would serve as the keystone of British policy, caused American statesmen to take a new interest in collective security. Hoare was dropped, temporarily, from the Cabinet, but Britain refused to intensify economic sanctions, Mr. Baldwin complaining meanwhile that they were unworkable because of America's attitude. Roosevelt, nevertheless, wished to carry oil sanctions much farther than Britain was willing to go. Certainly this was neither the first nor the last time that British statesmen have tried to drag Uncle Sam into a controversy to which he was not a party.

As early as 1921, Balfour's pronouncement that Britain would modify her demands upon her debtors only as she gained relief from her own debts placed Uncle Sam in a most embarrassing position. The United States emerged from the war as the great creditor nation, and presently was being

referred to in some British periodicals as Uncle Shylock. In 1931 when Austria and Germany again faced bankruptcy, Hoover suggested a year's *moratorium* on war debts. Congress ratified it, specifically declaring against any cancellation or reduction. The European Powers who met later at Lausanne scaled down German reparations from thirty-two billion marks to three—contingent upon similar reductions by America. Inasmuch as the United States was not represented at the conference, this hardly seems like cricket. The British Ambassador's claim that Hoover had sanctioned it will not hold water. Even if our President had not categorically denied such an understanding, England was perfectly aware that the President could not bind Congress—above all a Congress that had put itself on record on that very point. That autumn, moreover, Britain nullified Hoover's *moratorium* by going off the gold standard and abandoning free trade.

The attempt to throw responsibility upon Uncle Sam also appears clearly in the World Economic Conference of 1933. No nation showed any inclination to make sacrifices for the sake of economic appeasement, and Russia disrupted it by announcing that she was in the market for two hundred million pounds worth of goods, which would go to those willing to grant long-term credit. Roosevelt torpedoed the conference much to the relief of all present, although there is no denying that his way of doing it left much to be desired. The next year Baldwin stated that all of Europe's diplomatic troubles " arose from the refusal of the American Congress to support President Wilson in his efforts to guarantee security to France." Even as Baldwin was abandoning Ethiopia to her fate, he stated at the Lord Mayor's banquet (1935) that England looked forward " to a further period of friendly co-operation with the Government of President Roosevelt."

When Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland, France called on Britain to fulfil her obligations under the Locarno agreement. She sidestepped responsibility on the plea that it was far better to try to conciliate Germany. England's subsequent behaviour has caused some to surmise that the Anglo-German naval agreement may have contained secret provisions. The casual way in which Hitler treated even the most urgent communications from England lends colour to this theory. The reaction of the British Press revealed a strong pro-German sentiment in high quarters, as well as in Fleet Street.

Thoughtful Americans have never understood Britain's non-intervention policy in Spain. That she should herself violate international law by depriving the legal government of Spain of the right to purchase war materials, while winking at open violations of non-intervention by Russia, Germany and Italy, has caused Brother Jonathan to question her *bona fides*. Americans have long since concluded that British policy has been just as hypocritical as in Ethiopia—" one of connivance and encouragement of Fascism." They also maintain that the Fascist psychology of the Government alone explains its failure to stop Mussolini and Hitler. British Diehards, they say, fear that if the dictators fail, Communism would triumph all over Europe. Americans do not so much resent British policy as the hypocrisy of pretending to stand for collective security while secretly aiding Fascism.

Some journalists insist that Britain looks upon Japan as the outpost against Communism in the Far East. She manifested slight interest in Japan's activity until the announcement of a Fascist *Triple Entente*. But once England began to fear the trend of the war, she sought to interest Uncle Sam, and Eden stated that he was in daily consultation with Washington. British experts were obviously quite as blind as the Japanese to the recent growth of Chinese nationalism and were, perhaps, even more surprised when the war turned towards Shanghai, where Britain had nearly two hundred million pounds invested. In October 1937, however, Roosevelt allowed his indignation full sway in his Chicago speech. Immediately Chamberlain attempted to capitalise it.

> Three days ago the attention of the world was arrested by the clarion call from the other side of the Atlantic . . . he has voiced the convictions of this country as well as of his own, and in his call for a concerted effort in the cause of peace, this Government will be wholeheartedly with him.

Americans recall that when he said that, he was working to secure an understanding with Hitler, whose promises have the same value as those of a Tammany politician at election time. Sir Frederick Whyte commented upon Roosevelt's speech in the pro-German *Observer* as probably marking

> the point at which the United States definitely began to turn away from the isolation which has been its policy since . . . 1920. But it would be a profound mistake to believe . . . that it implies any readiness to identify American policy with British or French policy or any kind of commitment or entanglement in the policies of Europe in the Far East.

Lord Lothian also warned his countrymen against expecting " American policy [to] underwrite the British Empire." The Premier said at the Guildhall, a month later :

> We are convinced that a closer understanding and a more complete community of purpose between our two nations may do much to assist the cause for which the President pleaded, and also which is nearest to our own hearts.

He also said that an Anglo-American trade agreement might bring " benefit to the world far transcending the immediate advantages to the trade of our respective countries." Eden welcomed Roosevelt's statement, but insisted that Britain would go just as far in the Far East as the United States, but no farther. John Bull clearly wanted to lead the opposition to Japan from the rear. Norman Davis's resolution censuring Japan was quickly chloroformed at the Nine-Power Brussels Conference, which speedily adjourned without accomplishing anything.

Britain's neutrality during Hitler's ruthless absorption of Austria has likewise convinced America that she has no vital interest in preserving the rights of smaller nations. In view of Halifax's visit to Hitler, the Fuehrer's *ultimata* assume a new meaning, which leads some critics to conclude that Chamberlain's Government was an accomplice both before and after the fact. The Cabinet received considerable help from Fleet Street in condoning this crime. The attitude of the Archbishop of Canterbury on the rape of Austria stunned the American public :

> The union of Germany and Austria was inevitable. I think that it is plain that the union does receive the support of the great majority of the Austrian people. Certainly if this union sooner or later had to take place, it is something for which to be thankful that it took place without any bloodshed whatever. . . . Remember also that the Roman hierarchy in Austria . . . completely and fully accepted the union.

To many the British recognition of Austria as a part of the Reich smacks of unseemly haste.

Enthusiastic Anglophils find it difficult to explain British

passivity to the threat against Czechoslovak independence except on the ground that Halifax had consented to its liquidation along with Austria. The same disregard for the rights of weaker peoples is found in Chamberlain's eagerness for a treaty with Mussolini, leaving the Spanish Loyalists to be massacred by German and Italian aeroplanes and machine guns. This treaty greatly strengthened the suspicion of the American public. Americans now fear that Czechoslovakia is doomed, that France must make terms with Italy, and eventually be forced into a new Locarno which will give Hitler a free hand in Eastern Europe. In defending his policy, Chamberlain said :

> The peace of Europe must depend on the attitude of four major Powers—Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves. If we can bring these four nations . . . into a settling of their difficulties, we shall have saved the peace of Europe for a generation.

The provisions of the new Anglo-French military alliance suggest only another step toward a pact between the two dictators and the two democracies, although the Austrian *coup* has probably slowed down the completion of the London-Berlin axis.

Britain must understand this atmosphere of a deep distrust as she begins a serious discussion of an Anglo-American commercial treaty. Such an arrangement, if founded upon broad, liberal principles, will contribute much to economic appeasement. It is most unfortunate that as the American Government is intent on a liberal commercial policy, Britain, under a Premier whose traditions are for Imperial Preference, is erecting barriers to trade with countries outside the Empire. To anyone familiar with the history of American tariffs, Cordell Hull is a miracle man. But while he has negotiated seventeen multilateral agreements—none of them with totalitarian states—Britain has made twenty-three bilateral agreements, or exclusive " deals." Most Americans who favour a general liberalisation of our commercial policy doubt whether Anglo-American diplomats will accomplish any constructive work. In Washington they must contend against exceptionally powerful economic influences, while Britain already has vested interests that will make a bitter fight.

American opinion has steadily grown more hostile to Britain since it became clear that her non-intervention

policy in Spain was a sham. This growing distrust is shown in several recent magazine articles in this country. Cartoons of a trenchant kind have also appeared, dealing especially with Britain's betrayal of the League, Eden's dismissal, and the twisting of the lion's tail in turn by Hitler and Mussolini. One represents the caretaker of the League Palace saying to the charwoman : " Mr. Eden and us were the only ones who took any interest." A more recent one, reprinted from the *Glasgow Evening Times*, represents Chamberlain on the phone, saying to Halifax, " That's him . . . inviting me to Berchtesgaden. Do you think I should go ? " Another from the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* represents the dictators putting the lion through his paces, and has the caption, " Making the British lion purr." *Current History* refers most flippantly to Eden as the Cabinet member who scattered the perfume, while his Machiavellian colleagues worked out their deep and dark intrigues. We have, however, lost our faith in Eden, who, at a time when Mussolini conceded that there were 40,000 Italian troops in Spain, asserted

> There has been, so far as I am aware, no proved case and indeed no definite charge of the arrival of volunteers—national units, call them what you like—in large numbers in Spain.

Our experts feel that he should have resigned at the time of the Hoare-Laval episode.

In recent months British periodicals have shown a great interest in American politics. The *Political Quarterly* devoted one issue to American problems and relations with Britain, and the most recent issue contains an article by Professor W. Y. Elliott of Harvard on " A Joint Policy for Britain and U.S.A.," in which he urges their financial control of much indispensable war material. The *National Review* has failed to sneer at America in the last few issues. The *Spectator* emphasised the failure of British papers to furnish their readers sufficient information on American affairs to act as a basis for intellectual conclusions—a point developed in several letters to the editor. One such letter urged Britain to accept America's outstretched hand before it is withdrawn. The *New Statesman and Nation*, itself severely critical of British diplomacy, likewise attempted to explain America's position in world affairs. After describing the unpopularity of Chamberlain and the popularity of Eden as shown by

American cinema audiences who were being shown newsreels, a correspondent of this journal warned the British public :

> The simplest escape from the complexity of the international and psychological problem is to advocate isolation ; and a large number of influential politicians and publicists, ranging from Senator Borah on the Right to Charles Beard on the Left, are simple isolationists. Why pull England's chestnuts out of the fire ? Quincy Howe's book, *England expects every American will do his Duty*, epitomises the attitude at its crudest.

Following his recent visit to America, Wickham Steed wrote : " One of the worst effects of the ' Eden crisis ' has now been to deprive us of the remnant of confidence and good will which we possessed abroad." He urged his Government to stand up for democracy and " be ready to fight for it, for it is the only faith to hold the British Commonwealth together, or to gain for us the support of the United States."

The Berlin correspondent of the *New York Times* likewise wrote, " Chamberlain has removed for the time being the danger of a common front of the three well-armed democracies." All this may have been in Hoover's mind upon his return from a swing round Europe. While conceding that Communism was a dying faith, and Fascism was the real menace to liberty to-day, nevertheless he urged his own countrymen above all to avoid any alliances with other democratic nations in a war against the Fascist Powers. Yet his attitude is typically American—definitely anti-Fascist and isolationist. Mr. Hull was accused of having made an Anglo-American naval *entente*, which he went to great lengths to deny, as did the American naval authorities.

Despite abundant evidence of distrust, there is also a large fund of public sentiment favourable to Britain. Many American statesmen, scholars and journalists are in despair because of Britain's refusal to chart a straight course. Walter Lippmann recently wrote :

> When the European democracies take their stand, American popular opinion will passionately take their side, so passionately that in the end it will not permit them to be defeated. . . . If they do stand and set one of the aggressors back on his heels, they will let loose in this country a popular enthusiasm, now dammed up, which will have very great practical consequences. . . . The chances are . . . at least very great indeed that in another war we would eventually intervene again.

The *Round Table* concludes that " the possibility of limited co-operation with the United States on the high seas for the defence of free institutions is greater to-day than it has been since 1920." This was suggested in March by Hull's speech, which almost promises England and France support in certain circumstances. There is little likelihood, however, that Uncle Sam will sympathise with Chamberlain's benevolent attitude towards dictators, or that he will listen to the dulcet tones of British diplomats so long as Britain finds hundreds of millions of pounds for rearmament, and not one farthing for repayment of debts. Chamberlain must do something to inspire America's confidence before Anglo-American co-operation can proceed. To-day he stands in America as the proponent of power politics, for which he was labouring two years before he became Premier. Finally, John Bull must show somewhat more interest in an Anglo-American commercial treaty before Washington will consider any further diplomatic steps in conjunction with him, although it is crystal clear that a combination of the military, naval, and above all financial power of France, Britain and the United States would prove irresistible.

W. T. MORGAN.

Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE "ANSCHLUSS."

PLACING an important emphasis on its self-sufficiency in production and markets, the present German system naturally benefits from the inclusion of Austria. The broader the area and the greater the population of a state, the more natural resources it may be expected to discover and exploit. Greater Germany further enjoys one of the largest domestic markets in the world. The buying power of that market is being singularly controlled by artificial measures and canalised by exchange regulations, yet the very refusal to grant foreign currency for purchasing goods abroad makes the Germans buy at home and thus hold themselves up by their own bootstraps. Whether they can continue to support their own industrial weight indefinitely is a question which we are not yet in a position to answer, yet it is obvious that their power for resistance has been enormously increased by the union with Austria. Both lands may expect to profit in the immediate future from the events of March 13th.

At first sight it appears that two states with similar instead of complementary economies have been joined, thus in part aggravating instead of solving their particular problem in the international division of labour. Both face the task of supporting dense populations on soil too poor or land too narrow for the raising of adequate food. Supplies have thus to be imported, and in order to raise the means to pay for foreign food, manufacturing has been developed, based on the principle that cheap raw materials may be brought in from abroad, transformed and then exported at dearer prices as finished products. This principle, which functioned well before the war, is now threatened because most of the regions which were formerly tributary to the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg systems have during the past twenty years become independent. The mandatory powers have to some extent captured the comparatively unimportant trade of the former German colonies, while tariff walls and local factories have halted the normal flow of Austrian products through all the Danubian countries. In their efforts to meet the new situation Germany and Austria have taken different routes. Germany has developed autarchy, which aims at freedom from outside raw materials and thus in a way reflects the

attempt of the agrarian and formerly tributary states to cut loose from her manufactured goods. Austria, under the influence of a group of brilliant economists, has clung tenaciously to the theory of liberalism, even if many Austrian customs duties denied it and many bilateral and regional trade agreements jeopardised its free expansion. About 41 per cent. of the German workers continue to be employed in industry, while the crippled and halting Austrian factories still are important enough to hold about 37 per cent. of the Austrian workers. In the development of world commercial relations, however, the absorption of Austria may be interpreted as just one more defeat for liberalism in commerce, a creed which, like democracy, has fared ill with the present generation.

It is the irony of history that Austria, having built up her once vast industries to serve the Danube basin, is chiefly valuable in the German scheme of self-sufficiency as a source of raw materials. Austria brings iron, magnesite, lead, graphite, copper, salt and timber to the Reich, while the only important German raw material for which she may hope in exchange is coal. Coal, after all, is the most vital of raw materials. The Greater German household may thus flourish at least temporarily under the stimulus of reunion, enthusiasm and sound economic exchange. For the German and Austrian peoples within the high walls of the Schacht *Devisenverordnung* the *Anschluss* spells freer trade. For Europe and the world it means the abstention of nearly 75 million persons from the normal commercial amenities. If continued too long this abstention may cause all Europe, including Greater Germany itself, to suffer the same effects of trade anæmia which were produced when Soviet Russia was excluded from the economic society of nations. For the good of all it may be hoped that in the long run negotiations will succeed in breaching the Schacht wall. For the present, what is going on between the Rhine and the Danube has an immediate interest. The British Government guarantee covers Austrian Government Bonds to the value of £14 million, of which £11 million are held by British investors. The service charges on these loans have not had to be transferred in full to England, since British and Irish tourists spend large sums in Austria, and paid for 456,000 nights' lodgings in the country during the 1935-6 tourist season. Economically, Great Britain could afford to

ignore the commerce between Greater Germany and the Balkans, yet politically this commerce will become more and more important as it reflects the *Drang nach Osten*. The effect of the financial and economic well-being of Greater Germany upon armament programmes the world over is clear so long as no accords exist between Berlin and other capitals. It is vital to ascertain how the *Anschluss* affects German industry, including that of Austria, and how the new *Grossdeutschland* dominates the Danube.

The Four Year Plan calls for such progress in exploiting the comparatively poor German ores that by the end of the programme 50 per cent. of the national requirements in iron may be met at home. There need be little fear that this pressing need for steel will now continue, for Austria brings as her dowry, to use the very word employed by sentimental Austrian economists in discussing the *Anschluss*, a mountain literally made of iron. The total Austrian iron ore reserves, centring round the famous Eisenberg, amount to 220 million tons and largely offset the ore lost in Alsace in 1918.

Austrian iron ore production may be trebled easily. One of the problems weighing upon the Four Year Plan quite as heavily as the lack of steel has been the lack of men to work the mines and to man the iron and steel plants. Cheap field labour might be imported from Italy, yet where was the Reich to find skilled hands for metallurgical processes? The answer, again, was Austria. The loudly heralded Hermann-Göring Works may now produce with the certainty that manpower is not lacking. Austrian unemployed were unofficially placed at 590,000 at the end of January 1938.

The solution of the German steel problem in a way which simultaneously relieves the burden of Austrian unemployed is typical of the dovetailing and mutual aid which solve German and Austrian needs once the two peoples get together. For those who take the larger view the spectacle affords a lesson in co-operation which need not be confined to the union of states which boast the same racial elements. There is no racial reason why Austria and Germany should complete each other's resources in energy, and yet the geographical situation of the former permits the creation of waterworks and power stations which will forward the electrification of all southern and central Germany, while the geological history of the latter has revealed coal reserves amounting to 280,000

million tons of which Austria may now take her full share without upsetting quota and exchange requirements. The water-power resources of the Austrian Alps promise a yearly production of 25,000 million kilowatt hours, of which 90 per cent. still remain undeveloped. Thus, even in highly civilised and technical modern states, it is possible that natural wealth in the present day should only be developed to approximately one-tenth of its potentialities. The observation might give rise to far-reaching conclusions, yet here it is only necessary to state that one of the drawbacks in the exploitation of this vast and freely available wealth has been the difficulty in obtaining capital.

German credit markets are more liquid than those of Austria. The chances for finding the sums needed for turning Vorarlberg streams into power have improved since the Reich thrust aside the frontier. Early in April, shortly after the first survey of the *Anschluss* had been made, the Reich announced the floating of a new internal loan totalling 1,000 million marks. Five days later the Finance Minister was authorised to utilise his position to guarantee loans encouraging Austrian industry up to the amount of 150 million RM. There is no probability that the larger reservoir of capital will dry up. During 1935 the Reich placed loans totalling 1,640 million, while in the next year the sum rose to 2,120 million, and in 1937 to 2,970 million RM. It is stated that during the first four months of the present year sums equivalent to 74 per cent. of those raised during 1937 have already been subscribed. No difficulties have as yet been met in placing these loans, and in the absence of other forms of guaranteed placements, the government bonds answer a popular need. Ease in financing has not been felt in Austria since the pre-depression times when foreign bankers competed for the privilege of lending money for Danubian developments which all too soon crashed in the failure of the Creditanstalt. Even to-day, seven years later, loose money is not to be found in Austria. Germany will float loans here as well as in every other province of *Grossdeutschland*, yet the liquid resources of Vienna and its hinterland cannot be compared with those of Berlin. Working-class savings are lower *per capita*, although bank accounts have increased since the deep depression of 1932 until they again approximate the level of 1930. These savings banks, like the commercial banks and insurance

houses, will contribute to any loan for which their resources may be drafted, yet they cannot sustain the financial burden to the same extent as similar institutions in Germany .

Where Austria helps Germany on the financial battle front is in the larger resources of the Nationalbank which is being liquidated. Through the wizardry of Dr. Schacht, the Reichsbank was carrying on at the time of the *Anschluss* with announced gold holdings of only 76 million RM. Austrian gold holdings might be evaluated at nearly twice this sum, being converted at the figure of 143 million RM. It is true that Austria brought foreign debts which aggravate the heavy foreign payments which are owed by the Reich, and which stand under no moratorium, so that they constitute, unless their status is changed, a pressing obligation. The Greater German economy will have been so improved by the end of the inevitable period of assimilation and adjustment —which observers limit to a mere year or two—that the new foreign payments may be taken in its stride.

It is not in such sensational developments as the Zistersdorf oilfields or synthetic petrol and buna rubber that German economy must seek its soundest improvement. Although English and American engineers have indeed succeeded in tapping oil resources in the backyards of the Viennese suburb, the increased production of 1937, totalling about 33,000 metric tons, only served to meet approximately one-fourth of the Austrian need for oil during that year, and cannot promise to effect the provisioning of Greater Germany for years to come, if ever. Buna rubber and synthetic petrol are fascinating experiments which will take annually between 20 and 30 million tons of German coal to produce *ersatz* articles at a higher cost than the natural products could be purchased for if foreign exchange were available. Obviously, the happier method would be to produce such normal commercial prosperity for the Reich that this question of foreign exchange might be met through national exports. For this a background of intense domestic activity must be built up to bolster the expansion of mining, transforming, and manufacturing activities. Articles for export must be created out of the superfluous resources of the land. It has been already indicated that Austrian timber and cellulose products, enormously helpful in maintaining the Italo-Austrian balance of payments in the days before the *Anschluss*, may no longer

be counted upon for supplying exchange : the embargo placed upon wood and cellulose exports indicates that Greater Germany needs to husband her forestry resources. She can afford to do so if the amount of foreign raw materials, especially foodstuffs, which require large amounts of foreign exchange, may be cut down through the development of domestic production, or if, as is to be preferred, the whole economy of the country experiences such an upward impulsion from the *Anschluss* as to make possible the production and exportation of products for which foreign furnishers have a need.

The difficulties against which Austria struggled for twenty years as an isolated state may give some measure of the progress which Austrian industries may now be expected to make through the sudden expansion of their market to include the Reich. The buying power of the bond-holding class was wiped out through the post-war inflation. That of the property-holding class in the urban centres was similarly destroyed by municipal laws which forbade increase in rents adequately to offset the inflation. The fortunes of the industrialists, having been built on the basis of a large dependent empire, could not withstand the loss of this empire and the disintegration of its market through the mushroom growth of competing local factories in every formerly component part of the once well-balanced Danube region. Shut off from the peoples to whom they had been prepared to sell, and lacking even the usual support of a domestic market, Austrian industrialists looked toward Germany. For a while, in spite of the Peace Treaties and the Geneva Protocol, negotiations appeared to promise that a way might be opened toward a preliminary customs union, yet the draft agreements drawn up by Curtius and Schober were rejected at the Tribunal of the Hague, and Austria was penalised by the withdrawal of foreign credits at a moment when the loss precipitated a banking crisis. Governments changed both in Germany and Austria. The Vienna Socialists were driven from power, and the Dollfuss-Fey-Starhemberg triumvirate devised new forms of taxation and carried on the state under a constantly increasing burden of debt and a constantly growing hostility from the National Socialist government which had come into power in Berlin. The foreign debt was in part converted and in part reduced through the devaluation of the pound and the gold bloc currencies, yet the hostility of Germany was irreducible.

Both sides suffered. In 1929 Germany exported to Austria goods worth 441 million RM., while in 1937 the paper value of her exports had fallen to 122 million RM. and the real value was even lower. Only Great Britain and Holland took goods from Germany in 1937 which were valued at totals approximating the value of the Austrian purchases in 1929. The normal place of Austria at the very head of the list of German customers is thus indicated. Germany should also head the list of Austrian customers, but while Germany was in fact Austria's largest customer and furnisher in 1937, the amount of trade was artificially restricted. Austria did not sell as much in Germany as the Germans sold in Austria, yet Germany owed Austria money because of tourist trade, transport services, and other invisible items in the balance of payments. To facilitate the liquidation of an Austrian credit of 60 million schillings, Germany cut down Austrian imports by 40 per cent., permitting agrarian products to enter nearly as before, yet holding out most industrial goods. At the same time the exchange rate of the Reichsmark was held so high in Vienna that importers of German machinery, instead of buying direct from Germany, bought from Swiss dealers who enjoyed a better rate of German exchange and could thus undersell in Austria the original German producer. A more complicated and lamentable state of trade between two neighbouring and related peoples could hardly be imagined. It was time that something improved their relations.

The *Anschluss* is normalising trade which has not flowed properly heretofore. Customs duties have been successively abolished. A common currency was decreed, first at about the legal rate of one mark to two schillings, but later at the rate of one to one and a half. A brake was still kept in the form of import permits. The revised schilling rate also acted as a brake upon Austrian goods toward Germany, since it made them more costly than competing local products. It has also placed Austrian goods at a slight disadvantage in competing for markets in the Danube, yet this is largely offset by the better bargaining position of *Grossdeutschland* as a whole from Vienna to the Black Sea.

In the first years of the depression, Bulgaria liquidated trade debts with British and American oil companies by shipments of tobacco and attar of roses. Later only Germany was prepared to continue such barter arrangements in the

Balkans. Since 1934 Germany has adopted the rôle of the friend in need to more than one Danubian state which found no other outlet for its grains and tobaccos, fats and ores and oils. In 1936 Bulgaria took 61 per cent. of its imports from the Reich and only 5·7 per cent. from Austria. Greece showed a similar preference. It is an interesting aspect of the *Anschluss* that through its new position in Greater Germany Austrian industry may hope to come back into contact with its natural geographical markets from which it had been outmanœuvred when the Reichsbank clearing accords put German industry in a position to take the customers' wares while offering its own.

So long as no other country can offer a better bargain to the Balkan lands the way from Vienna to the Black Sea must lie open to the Germans. In 1936 Bulgaria took two-thirds of her imports from the regions which now comprise Greater Germany, while Italy, allied to Germany and bound to Austria by the Pact of Rome, took from them only one-third. Similarly, distant Greece took one-fourth of her imports from Germany and Austria, while the Swiss, although neighbours, took no more. Roumania took over 55 per cent., Hungary over 42 per cent., and Yugoslavia 37 per cent. These proportions may rise in 1938, since in every case the German far outweighs the Austrian contribution in the earlier statistics, and from now on Austrian salesmen may also use the persuasion of the clearing accords. Till offers come from lands with free exchange the Balkan states can do no better. Even Czechoslovakia takes over a fifth of her imports from Greater Germany, and appears to be more than ever dependent upon the encircling neighbour.

The union of the German folk in Austria and Germany would have been pushed through by the two peoples in any event, regardless of the purse, since it sprang from sentiment and did not even hesitate before the use of force. What may be the eventual economic consequences, when political motives may prompt other powers to intervene again in the Danubian basin, still remains on the lap of the gods, yet it would appear that the immediate future promises an inordinate display of activity, a great expansion of trade in the Balkan regions, and a stimulating exchange of raw materials, industrial energy, capital and workers between the two united peoples.

ARNOLD LAIR.

SLAVERY IN MUHAMMADAN COUNTRIES.

IT is often said that the Koran expressly sanctions slavery. This is not so: the Koran merely recognises the existence of the system. The Prophet Muhammad saw the system as an integral part of the life of the pagan people of Arabia, and it was as such that he accepted it in teaching the Muhammadan religion. For many centuries before the birth of the Prophet, the practice of employing negro slaves had been prevalent, not only in Arabia but in Europe. Immediate prohibition of slavery would not only have entirely disorganised the social and economic system of Arabia but, as experience in many other countries has subsequently proved, might well have caused real hardship to the slaves themselves. In Arabia at the present day it is often better to be a negro slave than a poor free Arab or an unemployable freed slave. Furthermore, if in the succeeding centuries of the proselytising wars of Islam slavery had been prohibited, the fate of the war captives could only have been death. The wisdom of the Prophet was shown in permitting slavery to continue, in commanding the kind treatment of the slaves, and in making provision for their liberation in many ways. The following translations of a few verses in the Koran and of some short extracts from the traditional sayings of the Prophet show how he devoted himself to his task. The passages from the Koran are taken from the translation of Maulvi Muhammad Ali.

> Righteousness is not . . . but is of him,
> Who out of love for God, gives away wealth
> To the kin, and the orphans,
> And the needy and the way-farers,
> And those who, being war captives and slaves,
> Are under the yoke. (Chapter 2, verse 177.)

> God causeth some of you to excel others
> In worldly possessions, yet they who are caused to excel
> Do not give their wealth unto the slaves
> Whom their right hand possesses
> That they may become equal sharers therein.
> Do they then deny the beneficence of God?
>
> (Chapter 16, verse 71.)

> And what will make ye comprehend
> What the up-hill road is, or the climb of a cliff?

> It is the setting free of a slave,
> Or the giving of food in a day of hunger,
> Or to an orphan having relationship
> Or to the poor man lying in the dust.
>
> (Chapter 90, verses 12-16.)

The best-known compilation of the traditional sayings of Muhammad is that of El-Bokhari, who was born in A.D. 810 and died in 870. It has been translated into French by O. Houdas and W. Marcais, whose work in four volumes was published at the Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, in 1906. The following extracts out of a great number are taken from chapter 49, which is entitled *Of Liberation.*

> Abu Horaira said that the Prophet had said to him: "the man, whoever he is who frees a Muhammadan: God, for each limb of the slave, will deliver from hell-fire a limb of that man."—Abu Zarr said that he asked the Prophet: "of which slave is the liberation the most meritorious?" and the Prophet replied: "he that has cost the most, and he whom the master prizes the most."—Hakim-bin-Hizam, before his conversion to Islam, freed one hundred slaves. After his conversion he asked the Prophet whether this earlier pious act would be in his favour: "by your conversion," replied the Prophet, "you have retained the benefit of the good that you did before it."

The other side of the picture is that, under Muhammadan law, slaves have no legal rights: they are mere chattels, the property of their owner, who (as in our own colonies before 1834) can dispose of them as he likes by sale, gift, dowry or will. The separation of families was denounced by the Prophet in the following words: "whoever is the cause of separation between mother and child, or husband and wife, God will separate him from his friends on the day of resurrection." As a general rule, though exceptions are often made by private arrangements, slaves can not give away anything, can not enter into contracts, and can not make wills: anything that they earn belongs to their masters. They can not appear as witnesses in any court: they have no legal redress against their masters for ill treatment, but may claim to be sold to another master. A slave may only have two wives instead of the four permitted to a free man: on the other hand, the principle is repeatedly laid down that the punishment for a slave is only half of that for a free man, solely for the reason that he is a slave.

Concerning the treatment of slaves, another traditional saying may be quoted. One day El Ma'rour saw Abu Zarr and one of his slaves clothed alike: in reply to a question, Abu Zarr said:

> " the Prophet has said to me that your slaves are your brothers: they are the servants whom God has placed in your hands: let him who has a brother in his possession feed him with the food which he himself eats and clothe him as he clothes himself: let him not impose upon him any task beyond his power, or if he does so let him come to his help.

This is perhaps one of the most far-reaching sayings affecting slaves. It does not merely forbid ill treatment: it expressly commands equal treatment. Its effect is seen in the kindly treatment of slaves in the households of wealthy Muhammadans; and in the fact that in a great number of cases the slaves are content to remain with their masters. In a middle-class house of a town in Arabia, a slave is generally treated as one of the family, eating the same food, wearing similar clothes, and for better or for worse sharing the family's fortunes. Amongst the Bedouins of the desert life is so hard and its standard so low that a slave fares little if at all worse than a free man. The slaves who form the bodyguard of a chief are invariably chosen for their devotion to him, and are so well fed, clothed and equipped that their position is better than that of an ordinary free man of their class.

W. G. Palgrave, in *A Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia* (1865), said that the negro slaves he met in the wealthy houses in Northern Arabia were " contented indeed, and happy, fat and shining." In 1888, C. M. Doughty, in *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, said that " the condition of a slave in Arabia is always tolerable and often happy "; and he mentioned their prospect of liberation by a generous and God-fearing master. Mr. Eldon Rutter, speaking at the Royal Geographical Society in March 1933 said:

> Slavery in Arabia is, in its physical aspect, a slight thing. Regarded in a material aspect only, the lot of a slave in Arabia is quite as happy as that of thousands of human beings in the most advanced countries of the world. . . . There is no doubt that slavery of the easy-going Muhammadan type makes contented slaves.

Let me add that in every Muhammadan family every slave has the complete assurance of being fed, clothed and housed

from the time when he or she is past work until death: an " old age pension," than which many people in other countries would ask for nothing better. Mr. Bertram Thomas, in *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, wrote: " Local slavery is of two kinds, domestic and industrial. Slavery in Arabia is, generally speaking, domestic—a comparatively innocuous kind."

Let us now turn to the legislation in Muhammadan countries on the subject of slavery. In many of them slavery has been prohibited by law and completely abolished in fact. It was prohibited many years ago in Turkey by the Ottoman law. The same Ottoman law holds good to this day in Iraq, Transjordania and Palestine. Persia, Egypt and Afghanistan have also prohibited slavery. A very long list could be made of the Muhammadan countries which, under European influence, have by law prohibited slavery. It will suffice to mention the Sudan, French Morocco, French Tunisia, Italian Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland, the Emirates in Nigeria, Zanzibar, the Federated and Unfederated States in Malaya, and the Sultanates in the Netherlands East Indies. All this legislation would have been impossible if it had been repugnant to the Muhammadan faith.

Slavery still has a legal status in Saudi-Arabia and in the Yemen, and in parts, but parts only, of the Aden Protectorate and of the Sultanates and Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. In Saudi-Arabia an epoch-making change was made by the Regulations of October 2nd, 1936. The first Article, under penalty of imprisonment without the option of a fine, prohibits absolutely the importation of slaves by sea from any country; the importation of slaves by land routes, unless the importer proves by a Government document that the slave is recognised as such in the country from which he comes; the enslavement of any free person; and the purchase or possession of any slave imported in contravention of this Article. In respect of the slaves born in the country, the Regulations are briefly summarised by the Slavery Committee in its 1937 report as follows:

> 47. In Saudi-Arabia, the Regulations of October 1936, of which a translation has been supplied to the Committee, confer upon every slave the following rights against his owner or possessor:
>
> *Article* 2. The slave shall have the following rights against his owner or possessor: (1) the right to be fed, clothed, and housed; (2) the right to be well treated and to be employed with kindness

and consideration and without harshness; (3) the right to free medical attention; (4) in general, all the rights enjoyed by the members of a man's household or dependants, as laid down in the provisions of the Islamic faith.

Any slave who is ill treated can have his case investigated and can obtain relief (Article 3). Any person who has been enslaved since the year A.H. 1344 in a manner contrary to Islamic law can obtain relief (Article 4). The prohibition of the separation of husband and wife and of mother and children is contained in Articles 5 and 6. Any slave can demand from his master a written agreement enabling him to purchase his freedom, and in the case of dispute the competent authorities shall decide on the amount to be paid and the dates for the payments (Article 7). Articles 9 to 11 provide for the registration of slaves; Article 12 provides for official licences to approved agents or brokers. The appointment of an "Inspector of Slave Affairs" (with a travelling assistant if necessary) is provided for in Article 13. Half-yearly reports are required by Article 14. This regulation constitutes an important step forward in the path of progress.

48. The Committee recalls that in its report of 1935, it pointed out the Muhummadan religion encourages in every way the liberation of slaves.

The principle of State protection of slaves introduced by these regulations will create an entirely new public opinion throughout the country regarding slavery, and the result may well be that the whole system will fall into general disfavour. In the towns many masters will think seriously of liberating their slaves, either as a gesture and a meritorious act, or under the provisions relating to gradual redemption, rather than keep them under a system of registration and inspection; and any slaves who are discontented with their lot will be encouraged to purchase their freedom. Amongst the Bedouins the reaction may well be slower, but perhaps none the less sure.

In the Yemen there is no local legislation concerning slavery. The Government has however undertaken, in notes exchanged with the British Government in connection with the treaty of February 11th, 1934, to prohibit the importation of slaves from Africa. There has always been a regular route along which the slaves raided in Ethiopia have been taken across the Red Sea to the Yemen coast and thence taken overland to Saudi-Arabia or distributed in the Yemen: the supply has now ceased, and as shown above the importation into Saudi-Arabia is now prohibited. Possibly in course of time the

example set by the Saudi-Arabian Government may have an effect upon the Yemen Government; and there is little doubt that a powerful incentive to reform may be a lively perception of the fate of Ethiopia.

In the Aden Protectorate and the Persian Gulf most of the sultans and sheikhs have bound themselves by treaty with the British Government to prohibit the importation of slaves. Concerning the slaves born in the Aden Protectorate, the Slavery Committee reported in 1936, on information supplied by the British Government:

> "As a general rule, the slaves are well treated. They do not rank as the lowest class of the community. Sometimes they rise to the highest positions such as Governors of Districts. The majority are soldiers. Others are domestic servants and cultivators.

In respect of the Persian Gulf area, the committee wrote in the same report and on the same information:

> Concerning the conditions of "household" and "industrial" slavery in this area, it is claimed that, partly because it is easy for a slave to escape to some British agency, partly as the result of the frequent visits of British sloops, and partly as the result of the right of manumission, the slaves in general are well treated. Broadly speaking, no one need remain a slave on the Arab coast against his will.

In the very small British Crown Colony of Aden (which is quite distinct from the Protectorate) there is no slavery; and severe punishments for offences are provided by the Penal Code.

After this brief account of the present position in Arabia, let us turn to the Muhammadan law on the liberation of slaves. The act of liberation (*Itq*) is highly meritorious (*Kurba*), and gives a claim to a reward in the future life. All that is necessary is for the master to tell the slave that he is free. It is now usual for the master to make a document which is sealed in the court. Not only do masters do this from religious impulses and from natural feelings of goodwill, but any person may perform a meritorious act by buying a slave for the sole purpose of liberation. It was a common occurrence some years ago for pilgrims to the Holy Places to do this as a part of their pilgrimage, but the pilgrims are poorer than they were. The consequences, however, were often less happy than the benefactor had contemplated: some slave, from a temporary pique, might desire freedom and then find it impossible to get work; and it often happened that, from motives of

economy, some old slave was bought, and soon reduced to becoming a beggar in the streets.

If a master says to his slave " you shall be free when I die," or any words to that effect, the statement is known as *Tadbir*, and the slave at once becomes a *Mudabbar*, and has many privileges. A master frequently inserts a *Tadbir* provision in his will. The system of liberation known as *Mukatabat* is is the most important of all. Verse 23 in Chapter 24 of the Koran declares :

> And unto such of your slaves of either sex,
> As desire a document allowing them
> To redeem themselves on paying a certain sum,
> Write one, if ye know good in them,
> And give them of the riches of God,
> Which he hath given you.

Sale, in his famous translation of the Koran, says that this means by making a gift or abating a part of the ransom, and adds that some commentators understand it to mean that some part of the public alms should be given to these slaves. Under the system, the master gives the slave a document, known as *Kitabat*, agreeing to set him or her free after the payment of a specified sum of money payable from time to time. Thereafter, the slave becomes a *Mukatib*, and has so many privileges that his or her condition is little different from that of a free person. This is the system to which reference is made in Article 7 (mentioned above) of the Saudi-Arabian Regulations : it is implemented most powerfully in that Article, first by giving the slave an absolute right to obtain a document, and secondly by the provision that in case of dispute competent authorities shall decide on the amount to be paid and the dates for the payments.

Concerning the public alms, the Koran declares in Verse 60 of Chapter 8 :

> Alms are only for the poor and needy,
> And for the officials appointed over them,
> And for the ransoming of captives,
> And those in debt . . .
> An Ordinance from God.

In a footnote to this verse, Maulvi Muhammad Ali states that "alms" mean the obligatory, and not the voluntary, alms connected with the Muhammadan religion ; and that the payment of the salaries of the officers connected with the fund shows the

institution was meant for raising a public fund, whose management would be entirely in the hands of a public body.

There are many wealthy religious funds connected with the Muhammadan religion : they exist not only throughout Arabia, but also in the great autonomous Muhammadan countries which have abolished slavery—in British India—in the great Muhammadan Indian Native States—and in the Muhammadan colonies of the European Powers. The *Mukatabat* system of redemption by payments from time to time needs only to be supplemented, in accordance with the teachings of this verse of the Koran, by some organised system of contributions from such funds. With the example before them of the unfortunate results in other countries of hasty liberation of slaves who could not earn a livelihood, the authorities would be careful to institute inquiries before making any contribution. Moreover, for psychological reasons, they would probably find it desirable, in the majority of cases, to make a part contribution only.

Nothing can be clearer than that the liberation of slaves is in accordance with the teachings of the Muhammadan religion. Although abolished elsewhere, it has continued to survive in Arabia, partly for economic reasons connected with the extreme poverty of the country, partly on account of the curious isolation of the country, partly because of the intense conservatism of the Arabs, and partly perhaps as the result of their resentment against the opinions expressed in European countries. A great change in public opinion throughout Arabia may result from the legislation recently enacted by the Saudi-Arabian Government. There is also another factor. From all the countries of the world Muhammadans, influential and wealthy, humble and poor, make the pilgrimage, and cannot fail to feel some dismay and even shame that in the Holy Cities—of all places—slavery, so long forgotten in their own lands, is still openly practised and tolerated : the leading Arabs are well aware of this feeling among their foreign co-religionists ; and, with the encouragement of the new law, may set themselves to the task of supplementing it by organised action, and by guiding the local public towards the eventual abolition of the whole system of slavery.

GEORGE MAXWELL,
Vice-Chairman of the Slavery Committee,
League of Nations.

TELEVISION.

> At the foot of every bed . . . was a television box. Television was left on, a running tap, from morning till night. . . . Hither and thither across their square of illumined glass the little figures noiselessly darted, like fish in an aquarium—the silent but agitated inhabitants of another world.

SO, with the prescience of the creator, wrote Aldous Huxley in his satirical novel of the future, *Brave New World*, published in 1933. Five years later, this television box is in being, and the Tennis Championship Match, envisaged by the novelist as being played in " silent and diminished reproduction on the screen of the television box," became a reality last summer. Other sporting events, such as the finish of the Boat Race, Rugby football from Twickenham, the Cup Final from Wembley, polo from Hurlingham, the Derby, and a Test Match from Lord's have been or are to be seen on the television screen this summer, and although certainly diminished—the standard screen measures but twelve inches by ten—they are by no means silent, but are accompanied by sounds more faithfully reproduced than even the best broadcast programmes.

Radio began in a tentative way, with home-made crystal sets, an aerial tied to a convenient chimney, and experimental programmes sent out by a private company from a room in a corner of their electrical works. In contrast to this, television springs forth from the B.B.C. its fountain head, armed with a Government guarantee, while sixteen different manufacturers are already making receiving sets, as there is no equivalent to the home-made crystal set in television. The vision transmitter, which sends out pictures from Alexandra Palace, is immensely complicated compared to the sound transmitter, a fearful and wonderful apparatus, and the receiver requires no fewer than twenty-one valves. If pictures are transmitted in colour the difficulties are increased threefold, for three cameras with colour filters have to be used, and in order to reproduce colour on the screen, pigments of green, blue and red have to be in actual existence, as colours cannot be produced electrically as yet, though much research work on this subject is going on. Television pictures are therefore at present in monochrome, and even then the apparatus for their transmission is sufficiently complex. We can trace this

difference between broadcasting and television back to something as fundamental as the difference in structure between the ear and the eye.

The ear receives broad impressions blended in one stream from all the sounds offered to it at a given moment. The microphone picks this up, and it is reproduced again for the listener as a single impression. The eye, being a far more intricate sense organ, demands a more complex apparatus both for picking up and for reproducing a picture. The eye can look at a whole scene and yet pick out some detail and concentrate upon it, to the exclusion of others, which the ear cannot do. It records a thousand details, simultaneously, and with varying emphasis. Anyone who has made experiments will have noticed how highly developed the eye is in comparison to the ear, for quite a large distortion in sound reproduction will pass almost unnoticed, whereas quite a small visual distortion is at once perceived by the eye.

The ear is, moreover, governed by the eye, when the attention is divided between them. It is curious to notice how little this fact is appreciated at Alexandra Palace. In a concert last winter, a sonata for violin and piano was televised with pictures first of the violinist then of the pianist, from various angles, and finally of the pianist's hands in a solo passage, thereby largely spoiling the effect of the music. The sight of the players should add to and not detract from the enjoyment of the music. A quartet playing together can be a beautiful and rhythmic sight, but singers are not seen in the concert-room at a distance of only two feet, or down to the waist only, with the light of excellent photography playing upon their features. Few musicians can stand such scrutiny unscathed, and it ought to be possible to arrange some compromise between camera and microphone, whereby the music does not suffer from being televised, or the artists from being seen at times to such disadvantage.

It might be argued that music of this kind—pure music—is not suitable for television, but the fact remains that music sent out on the ultra-short television wave-length is of the greatest attraction to musicians, owing to the marvellous fidelity of the sound reproduction. Faithful reproduction is one of the properties of the ultra-short waves (6·7 metres for vision and 7·2 metres for sound) used in sending out television, for owing to the wide band of frequencies necessary for visual

transmission the use of long or medium waves is ruled out, and the wide frequency band is just what gives faithful reproduction. These ultra-short waves have only one disadvantage: their range is limited to about thirty miles from the transmitting station though occasionally pictures have been seen, in favourable conditions, as much as sixty miles away. It will therefore be necessary to relay programmes, and this can be done by means of the special coaxial cable which has been laid by the Post Office from London to Manchester (for the purpose of multi-telephone conversations, and ultimately for television) and which is soon to be extended to Leeds and Newcastle. The installation of the necessary amplifying equipment has still to be carried out, before the cable can be used for relaying television programmes.

In comparison with other countries, television in England is well advanced. There is no regular television service as yet in any other country, although Italy, Germany and Russia are contemplating or actually constructing transmitters, and America is making preparations for its adoption at the auspicious moment. In New York there is a purely experimental service from the top of the Empire State Building, but it is only seen by a hundred experts or so of the Radio Corporation of America. If we are to judge by broadcasting experience, the Americans will favour the system of sponsored programmes. This means that, however skilfully disguised, advertising will pay for the service. The quality of sponsored broadcast programmes in the United States does not, according to those who have experience of both, compare unfavourably with our own programmes under the monopoly system of the B.B.C. The Americans have two great competitive systems which provide a network of stations throughout the States, and are in competition with one another. It seems probable that television will follow along the same lines, and the laying of the coaxial cable, linking together the chief cities, seems to point to such a development.

We have therefore in this country the interesting situation that the Government, through the B.B.C., are pioneers in developing a new technical service, which requires a large outlay of capital, and which only a very small section of the public (owing to the thirty-mile reception limit and to the high cost of sets) is in a position to criticise or enjoy. Such a situation has never arisen before, and we should feel proud

as citizens to think that our Government has helped to establish the only regular television service in the world, and that Parliament has not quailed before an allotment of a further £295,000 (i.e. nearly 8 per cent. of licence revenue) for television expansion, following on the heavy cost of erecting the transmitter and starting the service. For television and broadcasting act in effect as huge subsidising concerns to drama and music, and by so doing enrich our national life. " Ill fares the race which fails to salute the arts with the reverence and delight which are their due," said Mr. Winston Churchill at the Royal Academy Banquet on April 30th; and as it has not been the practice of British Governments in the past to foster the musical and dramatic arts, we should welcome all the more gladly this just spending of licence revenue.

For imagine what promise television holds out for the future! Chamber music more beautifully reproduced than anything sent out from Broadcasting House. Actors visualised as well as heard, their voices so clear and true that they seem to be in the room. Music faded in and out as required, with all the resources of broadcasting, to blend with the pictures. Scenes changing from open-air to indoors, as each camera is brought into play, and fading from one scene to the next with that subtle " mixing " process, which is one of the graces of television, and which makes the equivalent cinema " fade-out " seem crude in comparison. Trick magical effects, achieved by means of small models (such as was used in the *Rime of the Ancient Mariner* for the Ghost Ship) or interpolations of film (as of the Indian scenes in *Clive of India*) used in the studio to give local colour to a play. But as yet television does not know where to borrow or what to create; it is in an artistically experimental stage.

A visit to the studios while a play is in progress is instructive. On the left are the actors, in brilliant light, while before them men in white overalls mounted on silent cameras like machine-guns, from which trail long grey hose pipes, are wheeled to and fro. On the right, in the same room, is a television set with the finished result already " on the air." The producer sits above, like the Captain on the bridge of his ship, behind a glass panel in the wall, connected with the camera men by means of head-telephones, and flanked by his expert assistants who " mix " the pictures. Each month brings improvements of some kind, either in production or

camera-work, but the technical difficulties are great, only two studios are available, and the staff are hard put to it to get sufficient material together to fill up two hours a day. The result is that instead of working up gradually to balanced productions, too much has to be prepared in too great a hurry, and the actual programmes sent out are often terribly disappointing. It is only fair, however, to judge the future possibilities of television from its best productions.

Those who have not seen television may wonder what it is like. Imagine a tall wireless set of the radio-gramophone type, in which a small oblong window is lighted from within with a fluorescent light. On this screen figures appear, much as they did in the early days of the cinema, with a good deal of flicker. As the figures get near the right or left edges of the screen, they become distorted. They can, however, be seen walking away into the distance quite clearly, and without loss of focus. Nine to ten figures can be seen clearly simultaneously, if they are not too near the camera, but in close-up two are safe and three are dangerous, unless they are well in the middle. Big crowds are all right in outside events but are never attempted in the studio.

A good television-play—and there are one or two every week—is like a fireside version of a film, with these important differences, that the sound is brilliantly faithful, that the vision is rather uncertain, and that the play, the acting and the production show the intelligent discrimination of a good Sunday Play Society's performance. In fact these interesting plays would never be seen in any cinema. The superficial likeness to a film only seems to emphasise how different it really is. Such moving productions as Tchekov's one-act play *On the Road* or T. B. Morris' *The Beautiful One* (a study of Ikhnaton, the sun-worshipper) would never have been made into films, because the public demand would not have justified the necessary outlay of capital. On the other hand, like the Sunday Play Societies, television can call on the best talent for its productions, which receive at most two performances, so that interesting well-acted plays, with the minimum of scenery and stage effects, are the rule rather than the exception at Alexandra Palace.

Variety, cabaret, dancing, music, news films and cartoons are all used to fill up the programmes. (Mickey Mouse cartoons are charming on the little screen.) Famous people come to

discourse on whatever pleases them, while the "Zoo Man" brings convenient animals with him. Important State or sporting events, like the Coronation or the Derby, must remain the chief attraction, as public interest is so enormous in seeing something real which is actually taking place. The Cup Final at Wembley was followed with the greatest interest, and it was thrilling to see the finish of the Oxford and Cambridge Boat Race, and to feel that we were looking at the Thames through our little electric window, at the unedited reality. But apart from these outside events, which cannot be made to order, it is the plays which have the greatest entertainment value, and which make the broadcast plays seem uninteresting in comparison.

A perfect example of a television play was Lady Gregory's *Workhouse Ward*, acted by Mr. Fred O'Donovan and Mr. Harry Hutchinson. The intimate quality of this play is brought out by having it in your own room. You are looking through a peephole, eavesdropping as it were on the two old men quarrelling amicably together in the Workhouse Ward, and the fine shades of expression which pass over their features are far clearer than they ever could be on the stage. Moreover, the play is static, for both the protagonists are in bed: it might have been written specially for television.

To turn from this miniature to a mighty play of another order, great success attended the performance of *Othello*, in a version which lasted just over an hour. We know what the film magnates have done to Shakespeare; television, whatever its other failings, is not likely to err on the side of overproduction. This version, although a great deal had to be left out, gave us the essence of the play. How is it that a Shakespeare play on a tiny screen can come through so much better than when it is done with all the vast expense and paraphernalia of the films? The answer, in this case, was that the acting was so good. Mr. Baliol Holloway gave us a noble Othello, Mr. D. A. Clarke-Smith an oily and sleek Iago full of twisted inverted passions, and in the clash of these commanding personalities, and the developments of their relations to one another and to Desdemona, beautifully and simply played by Miss Celia Johnson, the unseen audience was spellbound. These actors might possibly have been allowed to give their distinguished performances in a film, but we would not have heard their natural voices speaking that wonderful

music of Shakespeare's spontaneously ; for surely a play can be *felt* by the actors far more deeply when it develops as the author intended, rather than by the film producer's method of " shooting " the scenes out of sequence. In Shakespeare's day it was the acting which carried the play, not the scenery or the dresses, and the same is true in television to-day.

Scenes from *Macbeth* were not nearly so successful, probably because the attempt was made to recreate a stage version without sufficient adaptation, so that the actors seemed to be cramped and hemmed in by the limitations of the screen. The same is true of ballet. Unless it is planned for the screen, or skilfully adapted, it will fail to make its effect. The Pepler Masques, planned for television, of which *The Eve of St. Agnes* was a good example, whatever other faults they may have, never give one this sense of physical limitation. The actors are placed within the frame of the screen, and within that space they build up little pictures in mime, illustrating the poem, which is read by an unseen reader.

A more striking but less successful example of this sort of technique was used in a performance of the second act of *Tristan and Isolde*, when expert singers were employed to sing with the orchestra, while the story was mimed by actors on the screen. Although moments of real beauty were attained, especially in the open-air scenes, when four or five figures were seen at a distance in silhouette, the performance as a whole was a failure, and for the following reasons. We do not want to see close-ups of Tristan and Isolde, however presentable, while pages and pages of glorious music describe their emotions. The hero and heroine are merely symbols for the heroic emotions they portray, and true Wagnerites shut their eyes in the opera house sometimes, so as to enjoy the best passages to the full. With the screen to look at, our eyes are chained, for we are curious as to what is going to happen next. On this particular occasion, all sorts of things undreamed of by Wagner did happen—visions of hunting scenes, of the ship in full sail coming to Cornwall, of realistic waves breaking on the shore, in the worst possible film manner. It did not fulfil the music so much as distract the attention, for brother eye, as we have seen, rules brother ear, and realistic treatment for heroic themes is absolutely wrong. We might imagine a completely new treatment of Wagner's story, as was done so successfully in the German film of the *Nibelungenlied*.

We might have, for instance, a ballet about Isolde, in which the exquisite beauty of Isolde's death dance might give something of the feeling of the *Liebestod*, but it would not be Wagner's opera. Television opera should create *pictures* not *scenes* for the television screen, unlimited by stage conventions, but they must be one with the music, and in harmony with the composer's original intention. This is a medium which holds out great possibilities for the future, both for new creative work and for imaginative treatment of old favourites ; but just as the cinema and broadcasting have had to invent their own methods of presentation, so will television have to find out what can and cannot be shown on the screen.

JANET LEEPER.

BISMARCK'S POLITICAL TECHNIQUE.

RECENT additions to our knowledge of Bismarck's personality and work facilitate a general survey of his political technique. He came from the country and in many respects he remained the country gentleman to the end. His language kept the strength and vigour of the country people's speech; he never made a good bureaucrat and hated the paper-and-ink atmosphere of offices and the dull stiffness of the *Geheimräte*. He brought to his political work all the lore which had served him as hunter and fisherman; most especially did his experience in these crafts teach him the wisdom of biding his time and of waiting patiently for the right moment. How consciously Bismarck himself identified the chase and the political game is shown in his own words: in 1877, he said to his faithful aide-de-camp, Tiedemann, "I am like a sportsman who has been after hares and wildfowl the whole day long. In the evening, he wouldn't budge for another partridge, but let a boar make its appearance, and he is fresh again in a moment." And in his last years he could write: "Politics was the biggest trout in my pond. It has devoured all other passions, as the fattest trout eats up its fellows." Typical of the country gentleman, too, was his attitude as a landowner. He was a keen man of business, proud of his increasing successes and not least of his ability to make landowning pay.

Bismarck was a typical son of the new period of high capitalism in Germany. He was acquisitive, liked presents and hoarded them so that the family seat at Schönhausen became a perfect museum of rubbish. In passing a wood at Versailles he would not appreciate the beauty, but give his expert opinion as to its value as timber. In the administration of his very considerable fortune he was shrewd and rather mean. The banker Bleichröder was the financial adviser upon whose advice he most frequently acted in financial matters, and this very profitable association with a Jewish man of business was made the occasion for many attacks. Nothing illegal was ever proved against Bismarck, but despite the refutation of various slanderous accusations, in 1876 a number of the ultra-conservatives, amongst them many an old friend, broke with him both personally and politically.

For the very reason that he was no bureaucrat, Bismarck proved a very difficult subordinate. A report dating from his schooldays praises his pleasant manners but deplores his lack of the respect due towards superiors and "one terrible outburst of extreme arrogance." Thun, Prokesch and Schleinitz had very unhappy and unfortunate experiences with him. It is, therefore, rather unexpected to find that he was on the whole a pleasant superior—very courteous, unruffled, never in the least pedantic, a *grand seigneur* who could be fascinating when he found it worth his while. A suspicion of intrigue or of underhand work brought the dangerous and inexorable elements of his character into play. Criticism angered him and real or suspected competition was intolerable. The case of the unfortunate Arnim, his treatment of Bötticher, and the struggles with Manteuffel, Hohenlohe and Caprivi all demonstrate the tyrannical disposition of the older Bismarck.

From his official papers it would be impossible to guess that Bismarck was a highly emotional man. The contrast with Metternich is obvious. He makes no appeal to God; there are no references to Destiny or Nemesis; there is an entire absence of any realisation of spiritual values. He had a masterly manner of discussing business, expressing his solid arguments in studiously quiet phrases which held no hint of drama but were, nevertheless, emphatic and tense. It is interesting to note that his similes were drawn not from philosophy or science but from history, particularly Roman history. He did not care for the Greeks. In Germany politics are rarely divorced from philosophy, but Bismarck's technique was free from any form of political or philosophical doctrine. The three chief forms of political thought in the Germany of his day—nationalism, liberalism and socialism—were all used by him at different times in his career, but he was able to do this without identifying himself with any one of them.

Bismarck was a good Prussian, and, as was well observed by Lord Bloomfield, British Minister in Berlin during the period of the Crimean War, it is as a Prussian nationalist that he is to be understood. Sir Alexander Malet, British Minister at Frankfurt, compared his political position to that of the Jacobites in Hanoverian England. During the period 1848-66, when the idea of German Nationalism was so important a

force in politics, he displayed no interest in it, and he was equally unsympathetic towards both *Kleindeutsche* and *Grossdeutsche*. "Have you been bitten by the German dog?" he asked of a colleague in the Erfurt Parliament. He was an unfriendly critic of H. v. Gagern, the hero of 1848, nor could he ever feel any interest in Bennigsen and his disciples of the *Nationalverein*. "Are you a German at all?" was the question which the incensed King William I put to him in 1866. Even later, after the great triumph of 1866, Bismarck could not hide his contempt for the South Germans. He called Baden the elephant trunk which should not be planted on the North German body, and compared the Bavarians to the Calabrians. No one felt the tragedy of 1866 less than he.* As a good Prussian, Austrians, Bohemians and Baltic Germans meant nothing to him, and he was a complete stranger to all Nordic ideas, or to the suggestion of any community of interest between Germans and Scandinavians. His treatment of Denmark was that of an enemy and nothing more.

In his young days Bismarck was something of a rebel. He was solitary, he steeped himself in the works of Heine and of Byron and was fired with republican and radical ideas. He was a gifted writer and a great reader. He was deeply attached to his wife—this attachment is one of the most attractive traits in his character—and for her sake he made his peace with the orthodox Protestant Church of Prussia. It was a sort of "Gentleman's Agreement," involving curious reservations. In his heart of hearts he remained a liberal, not in the sense of attachment to a party but in the wider sense of intellectual independence, of inner freedom, of the natural right to settle the affairs of his body and soul according to his own judgment. In the bitter period after his dismissal, when he was living in voluntary exile on his estates, the scepticism of his young days came over him again, and in a terrible inner conflict he doubted God and eternity for the last time. Something in him remained wild and unruly to the end. He never shared the prejudices of the period against the love affairs, debts and religious shortcomings of men of genius or talent. It was as a liberal—in both the good and the bad senses of the term—that Bismarck fought the Roman Catholic Church, and in this struggle his allies were such liberal leaders as

* Cf. documents quoted in my book *Bismarcks Reichsgründung im Urteil englischer Diplomaten*, published in January 1938, by Elsevier, Amsterdam.

Falk; their convictions were his, his mistakes were theirs. After his defeat he naturally dropped his liberal followers. In all his antagonism and opposition to radicals and democrats there is a suspicion of the bad conscience of the renegade. The young Bismarck had not been free from the traditional social and sentimental anti-semitism of a North German aristocrat. At Erfurt, when he was appointed to a parliamentary secretaryship under the presidency of Simson, he exclaimed: "My dear old father would turn three times in his grave if he heard of my working as the clerk of a Jewish scholar." Thirty years later he appointed Simson, the most distinguished German lawyer of his time, President of the new Imperial High Court at Leipzig. Anti-semitism as a political weapon was, in his eyes, as dangerous as disgusting. The leader of the new-fashioned German anti-semitism of the 'eighties was the Court preacher Stöcker, a cleric whose political activities he regarded as highly objectionable, but whose remarkable eloquence wrung from him the phrase: "The fellow has a mouth like a sword."

The same unconventional attitude which Bismarck showed towards liberals and Jews was apparent in his relations with socialism. He frequently received Lassalle and was eager to learn from him the state of the working men's movement. At that date the principle of universal suffrage was no less shocking to liberals than to conservatives: Bismarck adopted the idea as his fellow-dictator, Napoleon III, had adopted it before him, from the revolutionary parties. He learned from socialism of the needs, the despair and the distress of the working classes, and his great system of assistance to women and children, of insurance for the sick and disabled, will always remain a monument to his wisdom. The reverse side of this great achievement was the almost incomprehensible incapacity of the older Bismarck to find a way towards reconciliation with the masses. The repressive laws against socialism should surely have been a temporary measure only, but the obstinate old fighter overshot his mark, and he spoke of abolishing universal suffrage and even of the abrogation of the Imperial constitution. These vague plans reveal the real Bismarck most characteristically: his socialism had gone the way of his nationalism and his liberalism, and for the same reason. He did not believe in any of these political creeds. In spite of its many triumphs, Bismarck's home policy may be

said, on the whole, to have ended in disturbance and disappointment.

Bismarck once said: "Foreign affairs are the most important thing for me. In my opinion, they stand before any other task." Here is the watchword of his career. He emerged as an ultra-conservative deputy, and when he was appointed a Minister to the Frankfurt Diet, the professional diplomats looked upon him as an outsider, at best as an amateur. Yet this very greenhorn was to inaugurate a new technique for the handling of foreign affairs—the technique of perfect elasticity.

Metternich applied his famous "system," Napoleon III worked for the "*idées Napoliennes*": Bismarck did not obey the command of any doctrine in foreign policy. His technique is shown particularly clearly in his dealings with France. He made a working business friendship with the French Emperor, cheated him, and finally destroyed him. Neither the Schleswig-Holstein affair nor the war of 1866 could have been settled without that French friendship, which, in the long run, had its price in land and blood. The Prussian Junkers of the old school disliked these flirtations with France. After the Luxembourg affair co-operation was no longer possible, and the second period of Bismarck's relations with France was one of tension. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, which made reconciliation out of the question, somewhat diminished the elasticity of his technique as it applied to France.

Ever since his Frankfurt days, Bismarck had shown himself to be a deadly enemy to Austria; he provoked her, ill-treated her, repulsed her; after defeating her, he gave her a new chance, wooing and flattering her ambition so that her wounded pride was healed. Then, but without committing himself definitely for all cases and all eventualities, he concluded his famous alliance in 1879.

Almost the same game was played with Russia. After the Crimean War a personal connection existed between Prussia and the Russian Court and the Russian Imperial family, and Bismarck developed a very cautious friendship with Gortschakoff. He was perfectly well informed of the rising forces of Slav nationalism, and viewed with growing distrust the irresistible *rapprochement* of Russia and France. He handled the delicate relations with Germany's great eastern neighbour in a masterly fashion, indefatigable in discovering new forms of co-operation but without any sentimental prejudice as to

the home policy of Tsarism, and entirely without any practical interest in the destiny of the Germans in the Baltic provinces. He had sacrificed the Poles in cold blood to the Prussian interest and the Russian friendship, yet in 1866 he did not scruple to incite Czechs and Serbs against their Habsburg rulers, and he would have planted the colours of Polish liberty on the walls of his Prussian fortress had its existence been endangered. The help which he gave to Hungarian and Italian revolutionaries was neither more nor less disinterested. He knew Italy and the Italians fairly well, and expected neither gratitude nor constancy from them. The Triple Alliance—his most popular stroke of foreign policy—was never overrated by its maker.

The only country with which the system did not work well was England. In the first period of his foreign policy, Bismarck had many a clash with British diplomats and Foreign Secretaries.* As long as Bismarck enjoyed the assistance of the French Emperor he could afford to neglect, ignore and even hurt English feelings and interests, but when reconciliation with France had become impossible the necessity of friendly relations with England became more and more evident. As early as 1875 he had commenced his attempts at a *rapprochement*, and they were renewed time after time but without result except, perhaps, the meagre fact of England's partnership in the so-called Mediterranean *Entente* of 1887. His main object was to separate neighbours: before 1870 he had managed to paralyse the *entente cordiale* by playing off France against England and England against France. For many years he was lucky enough to prevent the Franco-Russian alliance by inciting both countries against each other, especially over the Eastern Question. One of his greatest chances came with the strained relations between Austria and Russia after the Crimean War. He worked hard to prevent a definite reconciliation, and when, after the Franco-German War, an alliance between the three Emperors had been brought about, he always contrived to remain the closest friend of each partner. The same technique answered in the treatment of Italy, who was separated from her neighbours, Austria and France. By such shrewd management he ended as he began—master of the game.

* See V. Valentin, *Bismarck and England in the earlier period of his Career*, Trans. Royal Historical Society, London, 1937-8, pp. 13-30.

Bismarck's earlier experiences with the problems of the German Confederation, which offered him a marvellous opportunity for a trial of his technique, show many analogies with his later European policy. The separation of Bavaria and Austria, Hanover and Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg, Electoral and Grand-ducal Hesse are cases in point. What I have mildly called his "elasticity" was developed in the forcing-house atmosphere of the old German Diet. At Frankfurt he became the first expert in German Federal Law; he learned to handle it and if necessary to elude it. His experience of Federal Law was responsible for his deep distrust of International Law, as well as of lawyers of all descriptions and of courts of arbitration. Yet though the breaker of many an obsolete law, he was very anxious to make agreements which were politically sound and valid. It was not his fault that the famous Article V of the Peace Treaty of Prague was not executed; only the military prejudices of the old King William prevented a vote being taken in Northern Schleswig, and it was thus that the battle-fields of the Danish War remained Prussian.

Bismarck, the great Prussian, lived in constant and increasing tension with the military group. No statesman gave the Prussian army greater opportunities for triumph, yet, absurdly enough, he was not popular with military men. Despite considerable doubt on his own part, he had lent his authority to the three years' military service scheme of the old King, yet the army was not to be satisfied. The climax came with the preliminary peace of Nikolsburg. King William and the leading military authorities were convinced that he had spoiled all chance of a triumphant peace. Wrangel, Moltke, Blumenthal, Waldersee—all the well-known generals of the day—criticised him strongly and on the whole unfairly. Their resentment found expression in all sorts of petty annoyances; for instance, he could not even obtain the two sentinels to form the guard of honour before his house to which, as a General, he was entitled. Perhaps the fact that in his later years he always appeared in military uniform has encouraged the idea that he was completely identified with the military party. This was not so, and his wearing of uniform was probably no more than a personal convenience, to save unnecessary changing, and even a possible help to smoother dealings with the old Emperor.

Politically, Bismarck went his own way and that, after three wars, of which he had planned, desired and carried through the two first against the wishes of nearly all influential opinion, was the way of a peace-maker. The origins of his third war are much more complicated. Certainly, after the challenging speech of Gramont on July 6th, 1870, he gave France the choice only between war and humiliation. The war-maker of the first period became the peace-maker of the second, but it is absurd to call him a pacifist, as some queer people in Germany have done. He preserved what I have called the marvellous elasticity of his foreign policy, but he disagreed thoroughly with the idea of a preventive war fostered by the "demi-gods" of the General Staff, and he knew how to frustrate their schemes in 1875 as well as in 1887. The 'eighties were certainly not the great statesman's most brilliant period—that is to be found in the years preceding the Franco-German War—but they show a grand old man, a patriot who had done an enormous work for his country and who was anxious to bequeath it as it stood. He was far too wise to ignore the weak points of his work: he knew the rising powers of the new generation, and he was determined that this empire of his creation should not be exposed to fresh international struggles and crises. The economic transformation, the increase in numbers and in power of the working classes, were problems of such importance that the attention and powers of the younger generation were fully claimed by them. The old statesman warned his people: he disliked boasting and bragging, and a vast experience had taught him to be deeply distrustful of high-flown sentiment, cheap eloquence, and any kind of political crusade. The question of colonies and of the navy remained for him matters of secondary importance, for which it was not worth endangering Germany's hazardous position in Central Europe.

The technique of Bismarck's last period in office is more powerful and less supple than that of his earlier days. In essentials it remained the same, and no British Ambassador saw these essentials more clearly than Lord Napier, who, as early as in 1863, had spoken of his extraordinary mixture of rough frankness and subtle caution. He would bully a visitor by an unlimited revelation of bold plans, which would later be carried out in exactly the fashion in which he had outlined them, and, at the same time, he would mislead his

Bismarck's earlier experiences with the problems of the German Confederation, which offered him a marvellous opportunity for a trial of his technique, show many analogies with his later European policy. The separation of Bavaria and Austria, Hanover and Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg, Electoral and Grand-ducal Hesse are cases in point. What I have mildly called his "elasticity" was developed in the forcing-house atmosphere of the old German Diet. At Frankfurt he became the first expert in German Federal Law; he learned to handle it and if necessary to elude it. His experience of Federal Law was responsible for his deep distrust of International Law, as well as of lawyers of all descriptions and of courts of arbitration. Yet though the breaker of many an obsolete law, he was very anxious to make agreements which were politically sound and valid. It was not his fault that the famous Article V of the Peace Treaty of Prague was not executed; only the military prejudices of the old King William prevented a vote being taken in Northern Schleswig, and it was thus that the battle-fields of the Danish War remained Prussian.

Bismarck, the great Prussian, lived in constant and increasing tension with the military group. No statesman gave the Prussian army greater opportunities for triumph, yet, absurdly enough, he was not popular with military men. Despite considerable doubt on his own part, he had lent his authority to the three years' military service scheme of the old King, yet the army was not to be satisfied. The climax came with the preliminary peace of Nikolsburg. King William and the leading military authorities were convinced that he had spoiled all chance of a triumphant peace. Wrangel, Moltke, Blumenthal, Waldersee—all the well-known generals of the day—criticised him strongly and on the whole unfairly. Their resentment found expression in all sorts of petty annoyances; for instance, he could not even obtain the two sentinels to form the guard of honour before his house to which, as a General, he was entitled. Perhaps the fact that in his later years he always appeared in military uniform has encouraged the idea that he was completely identified with the military party. This was not so, and his wearing of uniform was probably no more than a personal convenience, to save unnecessary changing, and even a possible help to smoother dealings with the old Emperor.

Politically, Bismarck went his own way and that, after three wars, of which he had planned, desired and carried through the two first against the wishes of nearly all influential opinion, was the way of a peace-maker. The origins of his third war are much more complicated. Certainly, after the challenging speech of Gramont on July 6th, 1870, he gave France the choice only between war and humiliation. The war-maker of the first period became the peace-maker of the second, but it is absurd to call him a pacifist, as some queer people in Germany have done. He preserved what I have called the marvellous elasticity of his foreign policy, but he disagreed thoroughly with the idea of a preventive war fostered by the "demi-gods" of the General Staff, and he knew how to frustrate their schemes in 1875 as well as in 1887. The 'eighties were certainly not the great statesman's most brilliant period—that is to be found in the years preceding the Franco-German War—but they show a grand old man, a patriot who had done an enormous work for his country and who was anxious to bequeath it as it stood. He was far too wise to ignore the weak points of his work: he knew the rising powers of the new generation, and he was determined that this empire of his creation should not be exposed to fresh international struggles and crises. The economic transformation, the increase in numbers and in power of the working classes, were problems of such importance that the attention and powers of the younger generation were fully claimed by them. The old statesman warned his people: he disliked boasting and bragging, and a vast experience had taught him to be deeply distrustful of high-flown sentiment, cheap eloquence, and any kind of political crusade. The question of colonies and of the navy remained for him matters of secondary importance, for which it was not worth endangering Germany's hazardous position in Central Europe.

The technique of Bismarck's last period in office is more powerful and less supple than that of his earlier days. In essentials it remained the same, and no British Ambassador saw these essentials more clearly than Lord Napier, who, as early as in 1863, had spoken of his extraordinary mixture of rough frankness and subtle caution. He would bully a visitor by an unlimited revelation of bold plans, which would later be carried out in exactly the fashion in which he had outlined them, and, at the same time, he would mislead his

questioner with the most extravagant fancies. It was for his opponent to exercise an adequate discrimination.

The old man was dismissed. He took a terrible revenge. He created the Bismarck legend. The master of the technique of an elastic policy now dogmatised himself. Profound hatred for the young Emperor and his circle, sorrow for his life-work, wounded self-respect and the insatiable ambition of a great fighter—all the demonic elements of a nature conceived on a gigantic scale came to life again, and there were not wanting busybodies among his entourage who added fuel to the fire. He who had lived singularly free from doctrine and dogma now put forward the Bismarck doctrine of German foreign policy: friendship with Russia but not with France; the Triple Alliance as the keystone of Germany's political existence; and distrust of England. At its best, this was but a poor simplification of certain characteristics of his work: it was not the real Bismarck. It became, however, immensely popular. A statue of iron and marble—decorated, I regret to say, with German silver—was erected; all the champions of imperialism, of a defiant naval and colonial policy, of German world supremacy, even the prophets of Pan-Germanism claimed the old giant as a figurehead and as protector of their causes. It is the duty of scholarship to discover, behind the monument, the historical reality.

VEIT VALENTIN.

PALESTINE: A RATIONAL VIEW.

THE labours of another Royal Commission, which has recently gone out to Palestine, would not have been needed if a more rational view were taken of the situation there by the contesting parties. In the contesting parties the British Government has to be included, because even although the British are "a presiding power" there, the activities of a mandatory Power are not free from the supervision of the League of Nations; thus, in order to justify the satisfactory discharge of their trust, the British had time and again to furnish an account of their doings in the Holy Land. The three parties concerned, then, namely the British, the Jews and the Arabs, have all had their say; everyone has had his cause propounded; they have challenged or stalemated each other for the last three years at least, with such a plethora of booklets, Blue Books and pamphlets, that the general lines of arguments are too familiar to the average student of international affairs to demand recapitulation here.

But the one very significant point which has escaped the attention of many is that, although we do not like to own it, the Palestinian question has all along been discussed on sentimental lines. It is so because Palestine being a Holy Land to the followers of three great religions of the world, their emotional feeling embedded as it is in age-long historical and religious associations, has prevented an objective handling of a situation which, after all, judging from a purely territorial point of view, is a minor problem compared to others that practical politicians have solved with relative ease and despatch. It is owing to this sentimentality, which is still warping and letting the heart continue to rule the head, that no solution of the Palestinian problem is any nearer. Dispel this emotional feeling, even as an experiment, grapple with the question in the abstract, and you have the solution. It is, indeed, to draw off the veil from the eyes of my own coreligionists—the Moslems—that I would endeavour to reveal the true nature of the menace which is dogging their footsteps, so that before it is too late they might detach themselves from emotional thinking, lest it close over them like a dark and bitter sea of disappointment.

The time has come to deal with things as they are. We are

living in an extraordinary age. Cherished dreams have been shattered, ideals have been cast to the limbo of the forgettable past, what civilisation is none can tell, culture is only measured through sword-rattling, the vice and sin of yesterday belong to the hour that is dead. In a world like this, when the affairs of the nations are only assessed according to the gain of this and the loss of the other—because the pious sense of international morality has been shifted by force from its pivot—how and why can a world problem such as obtains in Palestine to-day continue to be bandied about ?

Let us examine the situation quite dispassionately. What are the naked truths ? First there are the British, good Christians who would like nothing better than to hold Jerusalem in their hands. They should be welcome to it, especially as they have undertaken to allow free worship to the followers of the three religions in their respective shrines. But there is more. The long-headed British statesmen want a corridor there to the sea at Haifa for the oil wells of Kirkuk situated some twelve hundred miles away in Iraq. Appreciating the fact that now the life-sap of the British navy is oil, none can disregard the British inclination to retain that on which not only the cohesion of their Empire depends, but the actual protection of English homes and hearths, which would be jeopardised if the Royal Navy were not provided with the needful oil.

Incidentally, too, they have taken on a mandate over Palestine, regarding which, speaking in general terms, it might be added that they have vindicated their trust completely ; but as to labour this point is outside the scope of this review, nothing further useful can be said here. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that they are very much there, and that they have shown no desire to leave in any undue hurry ; their interests, therefore, would have to be acknowledged in any Palestinian settlement, whether we like it or not.

As to the Jews, there is no denying that the prosperity which they have brought to the land, and the capital which they have attracted to the several enterprises in the country, cannot but be a boon to Palestine. What is, however, forgotten by them is that those who come into the country arrive from the New into the Old World. The contrast is so patent that the appellation given above is true to a fault. The incoming Jew, however, I have heard it said frequently in Palestine, is

so extremely arrogant, aggressive and ill-mannered that his neighbours take offence at his attitude. Manners count much more with the Arabs than they should in this self-assertive age.

Also the Arab, who had always allowed the crop to grow on the land as Allah had made it, is jealous of the fruitful results that have accrued from the field which he himself had sold to the Jews. He sees smiling fields with swaying crops, where he was able to grow only some half-starved barley. But he more thoroughly dislikes those modern habits of behaviour which the Jew has imported from his European environment—little knowing that those non-Arab ways of the Jew are as much part of himself as his own skin, for he has lived for generations thuswise in Poland or Central European countries, where practices considered " shocking " in Arabia are the order of the day and as commonplace.

The only method by which a person can shape a people's way of life to his own is either by force of arms, or by design. The one is not sufficiently at the disposal of the Arab ; the other he does not or cannot practise, since that is begotten of friendship, which he does not at present cherish in his heart for the Jew. The only other method left for him is to " turn his head away " and let the other live his own life ; and at worst consider him a necessary evil to put up with, till he makes friends with him. The major part of the subject, of course, appertains to the Arabs. To my way of thinking it is they who are to engage themselves in a little honest heart-searching. It is they that have to face facts as they are.

In the first instance, I have heard it said a thousand times that the root of all evil is the Balfour Declaration ; and as its corollary I have been told, with more than a whisper in Palestine, that a Home for Jews as embodied in the Declaration was a part of the war-time bargain between the British Government and the American Jews as the price of help to the Allies. That help was chiefly responsible for turning the scales against the Germans, that this was known to the defeated party ; and as soon as they came to power, as a revenge they are now putting the Jews out of Germany ; and much else in the same strain which I refuse completely to believe : as I reject the report in circulation that the British wish to " dump " the Jews in Palestine because it is said that the Jews when distracted turn their minds to world-revolution. However

unfounded such reports might be, yet the fact of their being in circulation should be noted.

The potent fact remains that there is a Balfour Declaration ; and the British mean to stand firm by it. That should be enough for any sensible person. We will have to accept it, and make the best of it. Quite unnecessary effort was frittered away in endeavouring to force the British Empire to change its policy. Why that policy is so, need no longer waste our time. Several changes in the British Government since that Declaration was first pronounced have failed to alter that policy by a single hair's breadth ; so what is the good of battering one's head against a brick wall ?

There was a hope in the heart of the Palestinian Arabs that they could make this an Arab—an all-Arabian—issue even an all-Islamic question. Conferences were held in Geneva and Jerusalem towards that end. Delegations were sent to far-off Arab and Moslem countries. " Awake, Arabia is in danger—Awake, Islam is in danger," were the battle cries raised. Many important Palestinian personages went to kings of Arabia with lamentations in their hearts ; Sultans and the Sheikhs of the desert sent fiery protests to the powers that be, but all passion disappeared in thin air when confronted with realities.

A deaf ear was turned to all the solicitudes of the Effendi class in Arab Palestine. Terrorism started ; killing and looting has assumed such giant proportions that it would take even the Arab leaders several years to stop. I have seen old and young, both Arabs and Jews, the victims of mob savagery ; I have seen the pages of the Koran torn and flung about ; I have noticed blank-range firing at motor-cars and motor-lorries ; and I have seen a photograph of a child with a knife wound in its throat. What a peace in The Land of Peace !

The Arabs should realise that the call that they had raised —a Pan-Arab call—was a futile one from its very inception ; it could not be responded to, because there is no such thing as the Arab Confederacy of Nations in the modern temper of the world. As in the West, so in the East, economic nationalism holds sway everywhere ; old standards of religious and linguistic affinities are fast disappearing. The Arabs, even in their long and glorious history, could not be welded together, except when the Caliph, as the Leader of the Faithful, was strong enough to bind them together. Sultan Abdul Hamid,

even with the help of such a remarkable Pan-Islamist as Syed Jamaluddin Afghani, could not do it. The unfurling of the banner of the Prophet and the proclaiming of a Holy War from Constantinople could not effect it ; the Arab Revolt during the War itself disproved the unity which the Palestinian Arab now seeks. Rather than point to any real disintegration of Islamic solidity as such, these factors serve to show how not to test the true Islamic solidarity which is at all times unshakable, if you know what it is.

Furthermore, it cannot be hidden from the eyes of acute observers that there have been factions amongst the Palestinian Arabs themselves, for there were at one time as many as eight parties in Jerusalem who claimed to speak in the name of Palestine. Nor can it be forgotten that the mediation of Emir Abdullah only helped to add to his unpopularity. His plan was discounted by alleging that its acceptance merely meant the extension of the Emir's Transjordanian kingdom up to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Similarly the efforts of General Nuri Pasha were viewed by some to be nothing less than Iraqian designs on Palestine ; likewise a recent Egyptian report to place Palestine of the Arabs into some sort of Cairo tutelage was yet another hair-raiser. So that the citation of these examples of Arab disunity, to which many more instances can be added, goes well to prove that the Palestinian problem is no other than what it is ; and its ramifications are not so many as some would have us believe.

It is, therefore, doing a considerable disservice to the Palestinian cause to make people believe that the question can be solved by giving it a general Arab sanction, let alone an all-Islamic one, in the face of the fact that the reactions of those even independent Arab kingdoms towards the problem have been less than lukewarm, no Arab legions of the desert kings having been sent to help their brethren in Palestine ; and that at best or at worst all that has been done is for Beduins to descend upon a country in a disordered state ; with the net result that they have come across the highly efficient British forces, and have had the worst of the battle so far, in addition to alienating the sympathies of even the few pro-Arab Englishmen.

Stark destitution stares into the faces of the Arabs who owned lands in Palestine ; there is no peace in the country ; life is not secure ; there is terrorism everywhere ; gentry

have been rendered homeless, and yet no help comes. But what help? And why? It does not come because wiser heads have realised that the struggle is to no purpose. There is no particular valour in falling upon a naked sword, nor is there any real defeat in owning the superiority of others. The most victorious General in history was one who knew his line of retreat, for retreat is not necessarily a defeat, it is an essential canon of all successful warfare.

So it must be with the Arabs of Palestine. They should come to terms with the Jews and the British. This disorder cannot last eternally. It had better end before the Arabs suffer any more. The longer it goes on the greater will be the loss of the Arabs for they will be left behind in consequence in the future prosperity of their country, which the world's affairs will actually force upon Palestine. Is it not the oft-repeated saying of the Oriental sages, that the wisest amongst us is he who wants a great deal more than most, but accepts the half of his original demand as a tangible something?

What then is the remedy? Unquestionably the acceptance of the Partition scheme—in some modified form if you like—but partition nevertheless. And this for the very elementary reason that since two people do not desire to live together, and neither can put the other out, they must necessarily live apart. For this reason many important Moslem notables have agreed with me to help in calling a peace conference between the contesting parties in some European centre at the earliest possible moment to arrive at some working arrangement. Some have even confided to me that if a fair and friendly settlement could be arrived at, the heart-burning regarding the Partition that there is in both camps might not distress them much further if they resolved to live together on terms suitable to each. A conference can only decide it, provided that there is less cold calculation on one side and sentimentalism can give place to practical values on the other. So ends this review, an appeal in reality for peace. May Allah make it so, and that soon.

A. N. Awab Zada.

CHINA AND COMMUNISM.

IT is Japan's claim to protect Asia from communism and it is this task which, in her internal and external propaganda, is made the chief reason for the China "incident." Japan pretends to fight not only the communist influence there but also the Russian influence backing the Chinese Government. A Sino-Japanese anti-communist alliance has long figured in Japanese proposals for settling the conflicts between the two countries and has appeared again in newer peace proposals. If we wish to know whether this Japanese claim has some truth in it, we have to study separately the background and development of communism in China and to-day's relations of the Chinese Government with Russia, for a mingling of these two problems, though they are related, makes an understanding of China's internal and external problems only more difficult.

To begin with the former, communism in China dates from the time when the drive of the new revolutionary movement started in Canton under Russian advisers and marched victoriously northward, welcomed on the way by the common people, the farmers especially, who hoped that a better time had come. This movement was based on an alliance of the Kuomintang, the party founded by Sun Yat-sen which to-day controls China, and the communist party. It was not only the quality of its Russian-trained officers, but also the revolutionary *élan* of this alliance and its ideas, which brought the victory over the militarists of the old type, who exploited the country for their own benefit. This combination did not last, but it has become of great historical importance for China that half-way through this march Chiang Kai-shek, the leading general of the expedition, separated himself and the Kuomintang from the communists. Henceforth under his leadership the unification of the country was brought about without the help of and even in opposition to the communists.

This failure of communism in China is as understandable as its original success. Communism working on the agrarian problem had brought for the first time a people's movement out of the revolution, which till then had been mainly an affair of the intellectuals and a personal fight between powerful generals and politicians. The strength of communism in China was always its advocacy of agrarian reforms. Long

before modern communism existed, China had her agrarian revolutions. When too much land is accumulated in the hands of a small number of rich lessors and the lot of the small farmer under the burden of lease and taxation becomes intolerable, we find that a revolution leads to new division of the land. In many parts of China to-day we have a similar situation, and communism finds sympathy by supporting the cause of the suppressed small farmers. Where it could get a foothold, new division of the land was its greatest achievement; but this was, strictly speaking, no communism. On the other hand, any real communist organisation is practically impossible in China because of her social and economic structure. With her slight industrial development she is still an agrarian state in which the small—often too small—holdings and the system of most intensive cultivation are a greater obstacle to machines and collectivism than any adverse theory could be. Still more important is the Chinese family system, with its economic and personal relations between all the members of the clan, on which rests, through old tradition, the whole social structure of the country and which is the greatest possible obstacle to any idea of general equality.

All this becomes clearer if we consider the chief occasion when Chinese communism succeeded in getting a foothold in one district. For several mainly dogmatic reasons, the official party leadership had not been in favour of a communistic agrarian movement; but, on his own initiative, one of the leaders, Mau Dse-tung, eventually obtained permission to organise peasant groups in Kiangsi. After the split between the communists and Chiang Kai-shek, Mau with his peasant groups and deserting soldiers withdrew into the mountainous districts of southern Kiangsi and western Fukien. The communist party was still more or less opposed to this policy and Mau was expelled, and only later did the party follow the practical development. But while the official party began to lose its influence, Mau succeeded in organising and upholding a " Chinese Soviet Republic " from 1929 to 1934 in these districts. Besides his farmer policy, this was due mainly to the favourable *terrain* and the high fighting value of his communist troops; but the system of this so-called " Communist State " was rather primitive. If one reads the propaganda literature, one finds that, besides the important point

of redistribution of the land and organisation of co-operative stores, the main emphasis was laid on orders that the soldiers must behave well towards the local peasantry; for example, polite behaviour especially towards old people, food must be paid for, damage must be repaired, doors taken down to be used as beds must be put back, and similar rules to be appreciated only when compared with the behaviour formerly experienced. However, despite the " Soviets," there was no real state organisation, which moreover was scarcely possible under the primitive conditions. The communists lived as soldiers on the people, not so very differently from the armies of the war lords in other parts of the country. What made a difference, however, was chiefly the cruelty with which hundreds of thousands of their fellow countrymen were murdered and houses destroyed. Ruins, empty villages and many newly-erected buildings in the old towns in this part of China tell to-day in their own language of the time of communism.

The task of suppressing this communist uprising at a time when the whole Chinese state was under reconstruction was certainly not easy. It was made even more difficult by the external situation with the constant danger of a foreign attack, which made it impossible for the Chinese Government to throw all its power into this struggle. It can at least be said that Japan, profiting from the situation, did not make easier the fight of the Central Chinese Government against the communists. Nevertheless, since 1930 the National Government under Chiang Kai-shek tried again and again to defeat the communists in their mountain strongholds. In 1934 other tactics were adopted. According to a plan made by German military advisers and based on a method which had been used in old China for fighting bandits, the communists were blockaded in their territory by means of a chain of blockhouses, which can still be seen on the tops of hills and mountains and by rivers and important roads, surviving witnesses of past fights. The communists were now forced to give up; they broke through the blockade to the west and marched through the provinces of Hunan, Kweichou, Yunnan, Szechuen, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi, followed by the Government troops. This great march over more than 2,500 miles of partly desert country, in itself an extraordinary military achievement, has become famous in China and has

been compared with great historical parallels, although the full history has not yet been told. Its political importance was that it gave the Government troops a chance to bring under central control many regions formerly practically independent. The communists were pressed to the north-west to the Shensi province and might have been finally suppressed in those poor regions or forced to withdraw to Russian controlled territory, had not two important political events changed the situation. These were the attack instigated and led by Japan on the Chinese Inner Mongolian province of Suiyuan and, partly provoked by this attack, the Sian *coup*, with the imprisonment of Chiang Kai-shek.

The communist armies, chased through a great part of China, tired by years of fighting and in a precarious situation, were willing to come to an understanding with the Central Government. They wanted to give up their Soviet state, independence and communist principles and co-operate in the national reconstruction. The Japanese attack gave them the slogan that at the time of Japanese aggression " Chinese should not shoot Chinese " but resist together, a slogan which had already become more and more popular amongst them, when after continuous defeat communist principles were no longer attractive. This slogan was now taken up by the north-western army under Marshal Chang Hsue-liang, which refused to fight against the communists.

Whatever the real motives of the Sian *coup* of Chang Hsue-liang may have been, the most important result was an understanding between the Central Government and the communists. Although this understanding may have been forced upon it, it was doubtless a great success for the National Government. The communists paid for the cessation of the fighting the high price of renunciation of their programme, dissolution of the Chinese " Soviet Government," incorporation of their army into the Central army, and recognition of the Three Peoples Principles of Sun Yat-sen as foundation of the Chinese state. This settlement, forced upon Chiang Kai-shek or rather his friends by breach of trust, may, although favourable to him, not really have changed for long his policy to destroy every communist political influence, if the outbreak of the present undeclared war had not made the understanding a political necessity. It became public and the communists reaffirmed it in a proclamation in which,

besides renouncing their organisations and principles and recognising the Three Peoples Principles, they expressed their sincere hope that the Government on its side would now consider the necessary social reforms. Consequently the communist army has been reorganised as 8th Route Army and has taken over its sector of the front; it is, however, still a separate unit. The whole understanding is not what in Europe has been called a "people's front" but a capitulation of the communists in order to fight with the Government against the Japanese aggression. As such the end of the civil war has been accepted throughout China with rejoicing as a sign of natural unity in the moment of external danger. Although " Soviet China " and Soviet principles have been denounced, the communist party still exists, and it can easily be seen that it is dependent only on whether the National Government will in future be strong enough to prevent communism from gaining new influence.

Apart from England, the Soviet Union is perhaps the Power most interested in the outcome of the Sino-Japanese war, but not because of her interests in China, which in Europe are often wrongly interpreted. For the development of communism in China has been from the beginning a continuous disappointment for the Russian Government, and economically Russia and China are in no way dependent on each other. The ordinary trade between the two countries is of little importance, and Russian railway or financial interests in China no longer exist. Russian influence in Outer Mongolia, which is legally Chinese territory, and Chinese Turkestan is in no way endangered by China. The Sino-Japanese conflict may become, however, a prelude to a Russo-Japanese war, and in both these countries it is often interpreted as such. The Japanese advance in North China and Inner Mongolia would become of great strategical importance in case of an attack against Soviet Russia. Russia therefore is very anxious that her enemy should find in China as much resistance as possible and become so weakened that any adventure against Russia is for the near future out of the question. That Russia herself does not want to take any active part in the present war is clear. Any strengthening of Chinese resistance, however, will be welcomed by her, and the most important assistance which the Russian Government has given to the Chinese Government is in persuading the

Chinese communists to give up their stand against the Government. The new Sino-Russian non-aggression pact, concluded last year, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, is, for China, equivalent to a guarantee against Russian interference in her home policy.

There is also indirect military assistance, till now mainly aeroplanes and pilots for the Chinese air fleet. This help has not yet equalled that given by other countries, for instance Germany. It seems moreover that the Chinese Government has, for reasons of external and internal policy, a certain dislike to too much assistance from the Russian side, indeed it is said that a Russian offer of a great number of technical experts for all branches has been declined. As to war material, Russia is apparently willing to do even more in future than in the past, which is specially important with regard to the possible danger that the way of import through Hongkong may be closed sooner or later. Russia has, however, fulfilled the non-aggression pact and the war material has been delivered, not to the 8th (former communist) Route Army but to the National Government alone, which is careful in its distribution. It can therefore be seen that for Russia the strengthening of the Chinese Government in its resistance against Japan is more important than doubtful successes of communists in China. The Chinese Government, though willingly accepting Russian help, especially as regards material, is careful not to let this assistance weaken its internal position.

It is of the greatest interest to see how the Government tries to avoid the military co-operation of the former communists leading to communist propaganda in the Press or public meetings or to a military danger. The stationing of National Government troops between the former communist army and the road to Russia may be regarded as a preventive measure. Together with internal fighting, the persecution of the communist party by the Government ceased, but its activities are hampered by all means. The method, for instance, of giving a (false) air alarm at the beginning of a meeting, which, of course, quickly dispersed, is certainly a proof of ingenuity. Moreover, more active measures are employed. Chiang Kai-shek seems to realise that only a reorganisation and rejuvenation of the Kuomintang can make this party morally strong enough to keep the leadership. As

the secret of local communist success and general sympathy for the communist struggle lies more in their agrarian reform plans than in any dogmatic programme, there is no reason why the Government itself should not undertake such reforms, thereby taking the wind out of the communist sails. At the recent general party congress at Hankow Chiang Kai-shek showed his keen interest by being present and presiding over almost every meeting. He did not withhold his severe criticism of many party policies and activities and proposed to organise youth movements, of which he himself was appointed the leader. If we think of Chiang's ideas in connection with the former " New Life Movement," we know what line this reorganisation may take. And it can be hoped that under the double pressure of Japanese aggression and communist competition the often repudiated party corruption may give way to real constructive work of which we can see already a beginning in several provinces. So, after all, the communist influence may have done some good in keeping the social conscience awake. Besides, it has, as a matter of practical policy, in the regions where it ruled, brought about reforms which the Government would have had more difficulty in carrying out, but could accept when the communist left. It seems moreover not quite impossible that new Government reforms in the same line may win over the leaders of the 8th Route Army, the former communist group, which led the agrarian and military revolt. As we have seen this is not the first time that they have been in opposition to official communist party principles. First indications of such a possible development of their co-operation with the Kuomintang can, as a matter of fact, already be noticed.

We can do no more than try to outline possible developments after the war, if the Chinese Government survives and when the nation, newly united for the common resistance, has to start a no less difficult task of rebuilding all that has been destroyed. Chiang Kai-shek, as well as the Kwangsi leaders, who play to-day such an important part in the National Government, have shown, through their policy, that they are strong opponents of any communist influence. The stronger the Government, the less the communist danger. If however Japan succeeds in smashing the National Government and its organisation, no force will stop the communist development. Then old-type communist bands may bring

chaos over the country which has already suffered so much. For Japan, if she wins, will never have enough troops to uphold order in so vast a country with its people united in their animosity against her. What Japan has done till now is to give the communists a chance, which heretofore they did not have. If her Chinese adventure reaches its goal the result will be the opposite of the Japanese claim. Reconstruction and newly attained order will be destroyed without anything being put in its place and the door will be open to communism. There is, however, still unity, leadership and order in China, and the outcome of the war cannot yet be foreseen.

FRANZ MICHAEL.

Taiho, Kiangsi.

SEA BIRDS.

BIRDS may be considered from a number of different angles. Some people look upon them as egg-laying machines, others as an agreeable but vague part of the general background of life in the country or by the sea. You may look upon them as allies and as enemies of man. Or you can study their structure, their flight, their evolution and so on. But for the moment I would like you to think of birds simply as fellow inhabitants, sharers if you like of the world we live in. I would like you to look upon them as living creatures with joys and sorrows, difficulties and triumphs, a life and finally a death that is all their own. The first birds came into existence many millions of years ago. They were strange cold-blooded reptilian animals, that ran, jumped and hopped their way into the air in the process of becoming the warm-blooded, delightful creatures that we know as birds to-day. That being so, what, it may be asked, can have induced so many of them to give up a sheltered life on land, in exchange for the rigours of the sea? What can have induced them to expose themselves to appalling gales, to the full force of sun, wind, rain, snow and hail? I have seen marine duck in a rough sea diving into and through every single wave that curled threateningly above their heads. It was a wonderful sight. A moment before each wave broke in a treacherous swirl of foam, the black duck plunged into a green wall of water. It made one realise that while the storm lasted, there would be no rest and no sleep for those birds. Not only that, in leaving the land birds had to go without fresh water and to drink sea water, quite a formidable proposition.

Why, then, did so many birds leave the land for the open sea? The answer, as you know, is food. The sea is teeming with fish. No other bird food is quite so abundant, and an assured food supply is worth a struggle. There are many ways in which birds catch fish, but for pure pageantry I commend you to the gannet. This great white bird, with a wing-spread of over six feet, often sails over the sea in flocks on our coast in the winter. Spotting fish below, numbers of these enormous birds shoot downwards with half-closed wings at prodigious speeds and, as they hit the waves, a great column of water rises high into the air. In keeping with their size they have very large dagger-shaped bills; yet they disappear beneath

the surface at converging angles, and I often wonder why they do not impale one another. Many sea birds meet and defeat fish on their own terms, swimming under water in direct pursuit. They are handicapped only by the necessity of coming up for air. Some of them literally fly under water, for they use their wings to drive themselves along. Others use their feet only. Of course, when a bird propels itself under water with its wings, it is not using them in quite the same way as in flying through the air. Under water the wings must prevent the bird floating up to the surface; while in the air they must prevent it dropping down on to the sea. Penguins, of course, are the supreme performers in what we may call under-water flight. But then, they have developed their wings into paddles and in so doing they have lost the power of flight.

There is one other way sea birds have of fishing—if you can call this disgraceful method fishing. The skuas, the pirates of the sea, great brown birds the size of a herring gull, live by robbing other birds of the fish they have legitimately caught. A wretched gull is chased until it drops the fish it is carrying in its beak, or it is heckled until it disgorges what it has already swallowed. The skua then catches the fish before it falls into the water and the poor gull has to go and catch and eat his dinner once again.

Perhaps at this point I had better make it clear that there is no real hard-and-fast division between sea birds and the birds of inland waters. Even the gulls, which you might regard as true sea birds, differ greatly in this respect. Some, such as the kittiwake, will swim right across the Atlantic to America. Others rarely venture far from land, while the black-headed gull often nests far inland on lakes and marshes. The most typical sea birds, however, fall into two main classes. There is the " penguin " type, which spends its time swimming on the water and after fish beneath the surface. And there is the " gull " type, which flies over the sea and swoops down upon the fish that are near the surface. The puffin, the razor-bill, the guillemot, the cormorant and various divers and grebes are of the penguin type, while the gull type is represented by the terns, the gannet, the piratical skuas, the petrels and the shearwaters. In both types you have birds that come ashore only in the breeding season. To some this must be a tremendous effort, for they have developed their sea-legs to such an extent that they can scarcely stand on land.

They shuffle along on their breast. Some too are so shy of coming ashore that they enter and leave their nesting burrows only on dark nights, as for example, the Manx shearwater and the storm petrel.

There is one more point I would like to make before coming to the most exciting time of the year. In going to sea, birds have left behind, not only the warmth and the shelter of sunny places, but the very landmarks—a mountain here, a valley there—that make life on land so pleasant. Just how much importance birds attach to these things in finding their way about, we do not know. But it is clear that at sea, in mid-Atlantic perhaps, a bird has nothing to guide it home except that still mysterious, unexplainable faculty we call the homing instinct. And this instinct, as we should expect, is very highly developed in sea birds. I should like to give just one example.

Last summer a Manx shearwater was taken from its nesting burrow on an island off the Pembrokeshire coast. The shearwater, by the way, is about the size of a pigeon, delicately made, black above and white below. A numbered identification ring of aluminium was then placed on each leg, and the bird was taken by aeroplane to Venice. Here it was set free on one of the lagoons, hundreds of miles beyond the normal range of its kind, where even a storm-beaten wanderer had never been seen before. A week passed, ten days passed. Every night between twelve and three, the bird's burrow was visited to see whether it had returned. We were privileged to see the bird's mate sitting, patiently waiting on her solitary egg, wondering perhaps what had happened to the partner who used to share her burdens. We saw that egg hatch and took the tiny fluffy chick in our hands, and then at last, after a fortnight, the absent one returned—all the way from Venice alone, the first of its kind as far as is known ever to visit that part of the world. How I wish someone could have understood those two birds talking! This and similar experiments conducted by the Skokholm Bird Observatory, have confirmed the almost unbelievable ability of sea birds to find their way home. Sometimes science sweeps away mystery and offers us instead a simple explanation. But, so far, in this case, the more one experiments the deeper grows one's reverence for the wonder of life.

That brings me to the spring, when the minds of a myriad birds contain but a single thought. That thought is home—

not the old home of last year but a new one, for which they will need new furniture and for which they have put on new clothes. The puffin goes one better than most birds and puts on a magnificent false nose, which it sheds at the end of the season. This nose is really a work of art—at least, I am sure the puffin thinks it so. It is bright blue with a brilliant red tip—and just to cheer things up a bit, there are bands of yellow on the red. Still, however, the puffin is not satisfied, so it grows false eyebrows which it also sheds in due course. These are steel-blue triangular plates, one above and one below the eye. And the eye itself is ringed with crimson. But, despite its fantastic appearance, the puffin is a bird of grave demeanour. One laughs at it, but it stares back in high dudgeon, as much as to say " Nonsense ! My tailor assures me that I am in the very height of fashion."

In the spring, when thousands of puffins collect on islands and on cliffs to breed, one is compelled to laugh, too, not only at their absurd appearance but at a ridiculous habit they have of dancing, as R. M. Lockley puts it, " a slow jig, one foot after another, a melancholy sort of one-step." When several puffins begin this plodding one-step, " the rest of the vast meeting gaze quizzically upon them. You will soon notice that they enjoy the joke as well, for one after another the whole colony of puffins, some deep in their holes, will begin a deep, throaty, aldermanic chuckle, ' Ah . . . ha . . . ha! ' " " It rolls around from one colony to another, in and out of holes, and is often taken up by puffins resting on the sea, so that you never hear the end of what must have been an amazingly satisfying piece of puffin-humour."

It seems amusing and in keeping with the puffin, that scientifically he is not even allowed the name that should be his by right. The Manx shearwater has got it. This is how it happened. Many years ago a naturalist, pulling a young bird from its burrow and thinking that he had found a young puffin, gave it the Latinised scientific name of *Puffinus puffinus puffinus*. Now, it was found later that he had discovered a young shearwater, and not a puffin at all. Yet, such is the priority law of nomenclature, to this day the shearwater is called *Puffinus puffinus puffinus*, while the poor puffin has to be content with *Fratercula arctica*!

I cannot describe to you, or even mention by name all the sea birds that flock home in the spring from far out in the

Atlantic, from the Mediterranean, from the shores of Africa and even from the seas around the Cape. Nor can I tell you of the many joyous home-comings all around the shore, or of the way in which one bird will repeatedly offer his mate a fish, as though anxious to prove his ability to provide for a home, while another bird as often brings his mate nesting material—a broad hint no doubt to hurry up and choose the furniture for their new home. Each bird is a study in itself. All I can do is to choose one and give you in broad outline a picture of what happens in the spring. I will take the guillemot, a bird you might at a distance mistake for a small penguin. It has the same elongated body, which it holds erect, the same long snaky neck. White underneath and slate-grey above, it stands about eighteen inches high. It lays a single, large, pear-shaped egg on a ledge of rock on a perpendicular cliff, choosing where possible those ledges that slope seawards, because the rain can run off these without harming the chick or the egg. No nest is made, the egg being placed on the bare rock. It used to be thought that the shape of the egg would cause it to revolve on its own axis, instead of rolling over the edge, if by chance it was moved by the bird or the wind. No doubt a pear-shaped egg is better in such positions. But many of the nesting ledges are too narrow to allow an egg to revolve at all, and every year innumerable eggs crash to destruction. Still, the shape may help a bit in some cases. The birds pack so tightly on the cliffs, that each individual has often only just room to brood the single egg while it stands, wedged in between its neighbours. The ledges indeed are so overcrowded that it is a wonder that any eggs survive at all.

Early in the year guillemots begin to collect on the cliffs. They collect there to claim the few square inches of rock that will presently mean so much to them. They spend weeks flying up and down between the cliffs and the sea, for laying does not begin until towards the end of May. There is ample time then for every bird to get on good terms with its neighbours. Too much bickering on narrow ledges in such a congested community would spell disaster for the colony. The scene at a guillemot colony is animated indeed. The air is full of ascending and descending birds, while strings and groups of guillemots float upon the water, preening their feathers, washing themselves or engaging one another in conversation. Yet many nesting ledges are packed with birds, and one wonders

what would happen if they all wanted to sit about on the cliffs at once. As it is, a bird that alights on a crowded ledge is usually greeted with pecks. This, presumably, is because to reach its mate and the few inches of rock it calls its own, it must often trespass on the territory of others. But these are only fleeting incidents. On the ledges many rows of white-breasted birds sit upright in the sun, basking in the pleasant warmth and at peace with all the world. Here and there a sentimental couple sit with necks entwined.

As the year advances, the colony spends more and more of its time on the cliffs. The call of the sea weakens, and at last the time comes when you may expect to find the ledges crowded every day, and to hear from afar the strange cries of this sea bird—cries that at times one can only describe as deep, chattering, angry growls, though often the birds' notes are querulous and shrill. All this is a preliminary to egg laying, and when that begins, each bird of a pair takes its turn at incubation. The sexes in the guillemot are exactly alike, so one rarely knows at which bird one is looking. This is unfortunate, because they have many delightful little ways—in courtship for example—whose significance is sometimes lost owing to the fact that the two birds are alike. That, however applies to many birds.

When the egg is laid, both birds, as I have said, help to incubate. Nor is that all. Those unhappy guillemots that have sent their only egg spinning to destruction, have now but one idea. That idea is to steal someone else's egg. A proud father, then, has not only to keep an egg warm. He has also to ward off robbers who may well materialise from two or three directions at one and the same moment. I need hardly say that these lawless methods merely aggravate the trouble they are intended to overcome. For, of course, many more eggs crash to destruction during these raids than would otherwise be the case.

Now, when the surviving eggs hatch, the unhappy childless —or perhaps I should say the unhappy chickless—guillemots, redouble their efforts. If they cannot always steal or borrow a baby, they frequently manage to snatch the fish the rightful parents are bringing home. This they will hold in their bills for quite a long time. It seems to comfort them. Perhaps it helps them to forget that they have no fluffy youngster of their own. And then, of course, there is always a chance that

before long a raid will be successful. Then they will have the immense satisfaction of depositing that fish into the open mouth of a hungry chick. Sometimes one of these unfortunates manages to steal two young guillemots—twice as many, that is, as it could possibly obtain by fair means. You will see, therefore, that great temptations are put in the way of these bereaved guillemots. One cannot help sympathising with the birds that are trying to rear their own rightful chick. From the very moment the egg is laid, they may have to fight for its ownership. And now they can only with difficulty get a fish through the barrage of hostile guillemots to give it to their own little Tom, Dick or Harry. Tom, Dick and Harry by the way, who are fed not only by their lawful parents, but by any bird that can get at them, do not have too bad a time, even though they are sometimes treated as if they were little footballs in a Rugger scrum. The greatest danger is that they may be pushed off their precarious rocky ledges, while their innumerable, adoring aunts and uncles battle for the privilege of rearing them.

The guillemot, given half a chance, is a really delightful parent. I will quote a few lines from the book of a well-known ornithologist. He describes the arrival of a parent with food, and then goes on, " The chick is asleep under his mother's wing, and both parents seem averse to waking him. The one with the fish seems quite embarrassed. He approaches, stands still, looks at his partner as if for advice, shuffles about, turns this way and that, and several times, bending his head, gives a choked and muffled *jodel*, for his mouth is almost too full to speak. Still the chick sleeps on, and still the parents seem to doubt the advisability of waking him. At length, however, they admit it to be necessary. The father shuffles up into his usual position, the mother rises by slow and reluctant stages, as though apologetically, and finally stirs the chick several times with her bill till at last he rouses. Then, in a moment he bucks up, and, seizing the large fish, swallows it in a whole-hearted gulp."

When the young guillemot is about half grown, the call of the sea becomes irresistible. Though its wings are as yet little more than rudimentary, it suddenly leaves its rocky ledge and plunges, often from a dizzy height, into the sea below. Beating its puny wings, it just manages as a rule to plane down obliquely to the water. But sometimes, when there are rocks

below the nesting ledge, it fails at first to reach the sea. It drops with a sickening thud upon the rocks. At this stage, however, the guillemot chick, no doubt thanks to the communal feeding, resembles the fat boy in *Pickwick*. It is, moreover, covered with a thick protective padding of down and feathers. Hitting the rocks then in its fall, it actually bounces off unhurt on its hectic scramble to the sea. Once it reaches the sea it dives beneath the waves, to reappear on the surface a little way out from the foot of the cliffs. On coming up it at once begins to drink, holding its head up to let the water run down its throat. It calls shrilly. Soon its parents arrive and with much fussing and excitement conduct it out to sea.

But what, you may ask, happens if the weather is rough, and great waves smash against the cliff face? Still the baby guillemot jumps, quite deliberately, and often when both its parents are absent. Immediately it becomes the plaything of a succession of angry waves that leap up towards the ledges, as though they wished to draw down every little chick into a watery grave. Then, falling back, in their impotence they rage and foam around the rocks at the foot of the cliff. The young guillemot at one moment is tossed up and, at the next, it is sucked down in the wake of a wave that glistens and crashes and roars out to sea as though it were itself some awful living monster of the deep. But you must not think of the chick as a mere cork tossing about in this turmoil of water. All the time it is swimming, struggling actively to get away from the rocks. Though it seems that on a dozen occasions it must be killed, at last it is beyond the reach of that mighty mass of foaming water that pounds upon the shore beneath the guillemot ledges. At last it can rest and drink and wash—for it soon forgets its battle with the waves. Thus every sea bird has in its infancy to conquer the sea again for itself. Leaving the comparative safety of the land, it launches out into the ocean on a life of high adventure, as its ancestors did millions of years ago.

G. B. Gooch.

RECENT SCANDINAVIAN LITERATURE.

IF we disregard the *Edda* and the Iceland Sagas, as well as the theological and scientific writers, there are only three names in older Scandinavian poetry that have gained a place in the literature of the world: Ludwig Holberg, with his satires and comedies (the latter did not, however, meet with any success in England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), Esaias Tegnér with his *Frithjof Saga*, and Hans Christian Andersen, with his fairy tales and stories. But in the last third of the nineteenth century the North succeeded in finding an audience with its mixed choir of song, which voiced many new, strong, manifold melodies.

We can give an exact initial date. In the winter of 1878 five Berlin theatres played Ibsen's *Pillars of Society* simultaneously. This began the triumphant progress of his dramas over all the stages of the world. He, the miner of his own hidden world, of the depths of humanity, beat at the crumbling walls of human society with his heavy hammer, attacked the decrepit middle-class morals, and threw the fire-brand of doubt into the souls of men. Side by side with this dark and reserved personality stood Björnson, full of light and ingenuousness, the educator and master-builder of his Norwegian people, whose powerful personality filled the intellectual horizon of his country for many decades, and, as a speaker and writer, carried its influence far beyond its boundaries. Quite recently the newspapers tell us that a huge inscription in honour of his struggles for the liberty of the small nations has been hewn in a rock in Czechoslovakia. These two were followed, in the next generation, by the Swede Strindberg, a tragic soul, staggering through life on the brink of madness, because he heaped the full load of man's misery on himself. Nevertheless, beyond his own broken, human, all too human existence, he flowered into literature, burning lava cooled and shaped into sixty dramas and numerous works of prose. These three, Ibsen, Björnson, Strindberg, born in 1828, 1832 and 1849 respectively, are well known in England in many translations. Ibsen has long been a favourite on the stage as well, whilst Strindberg's plays did not find their way to the stage in England until recently.

Four other figures in Scandinavian literature, men and

women still alive, are to be treated here, four that tower above the common herd and have achieved world-wide fame. Two are approaching the limits of human life—the Norwegian Knut Hamsun, born in 1859, and the Swede Selma Lagerlöf, born in 1858; two are somewhat younger, the Dane Johannes V. Jensen (1873), and the Norwegian Sigrid Undset (1882).

Selma Lagerlöf is without doubt by far the most popular of these four, a teller of homely legends and stories, to which old and young children all the world over love to listen. Some people of cultivated literary taste have raised objections to her; her philosophy is too simple for them, her outlook too limited. The Swedish writer, they say, does not even touch the social problems of our day; where she stops questioning, we begin. In the psychology of her works there are no traces of her own nerves and senses; it would seem as though the psychological writers of the nineteenth century (to name but a few, Dostojevski, Balzac, Ibsen, Strindberg, Hamsun) do not exist for her. All these objections must be granted. But let us open any one of her books and begin to read, anywhere, right in the middle. We are soon enveloped by her atmosphere, as though we were sitting in the soft light of a cosy room. A kind hand takes hold of us and leads us on, a wise and understanding eye is fixed on us, we are guided to our destination and walk towards it fearlessly expectant. We never stand in the dark, at a loss, confronted with insoluble riddles. The people with whom we become acquainted soon stand before us clearly and firmly, characterised by their actions rather than by their words. Action is everything, it advances rapidly. In every short story, in each chapter of the longer novels surprising events occur, a climax is reached that grips the reader and reveals the fundamental truth to him. The art of story-telling, unprecedentedly sure and poignant, bears us along.

Selma Lagerlöf's first work, *Gösta Berling*, published in 1891 when she was thirty-three years old, does not yet show her style in its perfected simplicity. Emotions, suppressed for many years, break forth in this novel, and Carlyle's ponderous pathos has influenced her style. Later she writes more calmly, more steadily, more simply. The *Legend of the Manor House* (1899) shows her style in its maturity, as do *Legends of Christ* (1904) and *Nils Holgerson's Wonderful*

Journey With The Wild Geese (1906-7), the most charming child's book.

More than any other author Selma Lagerlöf is in touch with the old art of story-telling in a circle of listeners, the oral traditions that we find in all corners of the earth. Her grandmother had told stories to the lame little girl from her earliest days; and when grandmother died a world of rich and vivid colouring was buried in her coffin. A continual longing for these same excitements and tensions remained during the rest of her life, a longing which she tried to satisfy by all possible means. She has not only taken her raw material from these very stories actually told to her, but her very art of telling them bears the stamp of homely truth. Legends and sagas, not fairy tales, are nearest to her heart, stories in which supernatural powers and forces intervene in the realities of everyday life, be they ghosts, as in *Herr Arne's Treasure* (1909), or *The Wagoner of Death* (1912), or the powers of Providence either direct or through the medium of their influence on the human heart. The miraculous in our life on earth is her true theme.

But the literary labours of this Swedish woman stand on a somewhat different plane from that of mere folk tales. She is the prophet of a faith brought forth by her motherly heart. She has wholly assimilated this part of the Christian doctrine, the faith in a just and kindly Providence, working on earth through the active mercy and loving-kindness of mankind. The deep calm of her style is the fruit of her success in subordinating the miraculous in the sagas and legends to the all-embracing idea of humanity. In *Jerusalem* (1902) this fusion is complete.

Into the framework of this story the author, like a weaver of carpets, has stretched the web that bears the whole bright fullness of life shown by her tales. The creative force of her imagination and her deep knowledge of the human soul grow equally against the homely background. St. Peter on the brink of the abyss of Hell watches the Angel who seeks his mother, raises her and lets her fall again when she, hardening her heart against the souls clinging to her for support, drives them away. (*Legends of Christ.*) This is one instance of her imagination, one out of many. Again and again, filled with the deepest love, has she followed the erring and straying human souls. The musicians Liljecrona (*Liljecrona's Home*,

1911) and Gunnar Hede (*Legend of the Manor House*), the schoolmaster's daughter Gertrud (*Jerusalem*), as well as the *Emperor of Portugallia* (1914) are examples.

Selma Lagerlöf lays little emphasis on her own personality, almost disappearing behind her work, which is, for her, part of her service to society. That is why she so often stands out in public life ready to help. Of all her public speeches the best known is the one on *Home and State*, which she delivered at Stockholm at the World Congress for Women's Rights in 1911. Here she formulated the axiom that the women must take part in the life of the nation, that they may help the men to change the state into a home for the whole people. Here again we see her faculty for making difficult and complicated things simple and impressive. She possesses the Honorary degree of Doctor, she was awarded the Nobel Prize, she is the first woman member of the Academy. Sweden has heaped all honours on her who has made her country famous the world over.

We penetrate straight into the core of Knut Hamsun's works if we bear in mind his close relationship with nature, emphasised by his deep religion. On being questioned he once answered (1913) : " You ask whether I am a friend of nature ? Of course I have a certain sentiment for nature. And I should like everyone to have that, if only because it is the first religion and will be the last. Everything else is but a livelihood for theologians." We can count on the fingers of one hand the occasions in his writings where he speaks of his religious experiences ; not their number, but their weight is decisive. The axis of his work leads from *Pan* (1874) to *Blessed Earth* (1917), from the man who, with all his mental and moral faculties, beyond the pale of his fellow-men, experiences nature in the woods, to the other man, who serves life in faith and fear, working on the barren land, merging his labour in the rhythm of the seasons. This close bond with nature explains Hamsun's conception of life—an expression occurring again and again in the titles of his works : *The Voice of Life*, *The Game of Life*, *In the Grip of Life*, *But Life Does Live*, and holding a dominating position in all of them ; it is the forces of nature in the life of man that he means. He loves and praises all that is borne and driven by them, he despises and condemns all that has lost touch with them. His entire criticism of urban civilisation receives weight and

dignity against this mighty background, however strongly it may be influenced by Rousseau and Strindberg.

Early in the nineties Hamsun demanded, in aggressive appeals to his hearers, a new psychological literature that was to grant the individual soul its due attention.

> " We might thus learn something about the secret movements that stir in the remotest corners of the heart, about the unfathomable world of feeling, about the delicate life of the imagination seen under a magnifying glass, about the way our thoughts trail off into the blue distance, about the pathless journey of the brain and the heart, about the elusive actions of our nerves, the whispering of our blood, the begging of our bones, the whole unconscious life of the soul."

We can divide Hamsun's works into two parts. On the one hand are the books in which the programme given above is carried into effect. This begins actually with his earliest work, *Bjoerger* (1878) and embraces *Hunger* (1890), *Mysteries* (1892), *Pan* (1894), *Victoria* (1898), *Munken Vendt* (1902), *The Wild Choir* (1904), *Under the Stars of Autumn* (1906), *Muted Strings* (1909), and *The Last Joy* (1912). In all these works the individual outbursts of the soul outweigh the objective description. We cast our glances deep into the strange intricacies of the inner life, whose tangled wealth is shown with no questions as to good and evil.

The other books of Hamsun's do not lack these pictures of the soul, they even contain, most of them, some figure that typifies this idea. But the broad description of surroundings, treated critically, either in the pathos of attack, in sharp irony or gentle humour, predominates. Here we would include *From the Intellectual Life of Modern America* (1889), *Lars Oftedal* (1889), *Editor Lynge* (1908), *Rosa* (1909), *Children of Their Time* (1913), *The Town of Segelfoss* (1915). Here different aspects of social psychology are added, a thousand observations of the dependence of man on his community with his fellow-men, on the part they play in each other's eyes, their vanities, their desire to be something—which occasionally manifests itself in boastfulness—their envy, their mass-dullness and mass-stupidity, their subjection to money, the fruitlessness of their progress. Similar verdicts on civilisation are to be found, in rare instances, in the other type of his works as well.

In *Blessed Earth* another strain is marked more strongly. Hamsun creates symbolic figures. Markgraf Isak (*Blessed Earth*, 1917), is the symbol of the peasant and landowner in the wilds; Oliver (*Women at the Well*, 1920) is the typical busybody, never achieving anything, in a small town; the suicide (*The Last Chapter*, 1923) is the symbol of the intellectual town dweller, incapable of life, *Augustus with the Golden Teeth* symbol of the tramp and his way of life. (*Tramps*, 1927, *Augustus*, 1930, *But Life Does Live*, 1933.) They all grow to a superhuman height. Isak and Augustus are perhaps the stuff of which those are made who take a lasting place in the literature of the world.

Hamsun's special world has gained a world-wide reputation through his incomparable art of portraiture, which endows all unique happenings with an equally unique expression, so that we are snatched out of our usual way of thought and hurled into an alien life. He aspired to this most original mastery of diction from his early days with never-tiring perseverance. His fragmentary work, *Hunger*, was hailed at its publication in 1888 in all Scandinavia as a literary event of decisive importance. He quickly won a large public in the German-speaking countries, in the beginning of the century in the Slavonic countries as well; not until he had received the Nobel Prize in 1920 for *Blessed Earth* did he become even more widely known.

On his sixtieth birthday Johannes V. Jensen received, among many others, a public greeting from Hamsun in the newspaper *Politiken*. Hamsun described Jensen as a man, "visionary by means of all his five senses," a linguistic bull's eye of Hamsun's. It characterises incomparably his receptivity towards the whole reality of life on this side of eternity, to which he had bound himself with all the senses and powers of his soul—including those that are visionary. The *Stories from Himmerland*, which made his name well-known as early as 1898, are full of the sense of reality; they are stories of his Jutland home, the country from which the Cimbric tribes set forth for Italy long ago. Jensen incorporates the whole landscape, so real and lifelike to him, by a thousand traits in his stories, and interwoven with them the figures of men, strange, gnarled men, dominated and torn by passions, delicate people, touching us in the most unfathomable way, and their fates, some of them very simple, but most of them

tragic. All this is related with an almost cold realism, in a language that is plastic and that grasps the fullness of life from its proximity to it. In the year Jensen was born, 1873, his Jute compatriot J. P. Jacobsen, a scientist, too, as Jensen was at first, published the translation of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. Jensen's youth was filled with the controversy concerning the theory of evolution, and he himself became a passionate disciple of the great English scientist. Darwinism, the evolutionary school of thought, is to him the beginning of a new epoch. He became a stubborn fighter for this doctrine in Scandinavia. He himself blocked the path to metaphysics for his vivid imagination. His realism grew to be a programmatic demand of new ways and means in poetic art. The renunciation of the Beyond means for him the creative concentration of all forces on the Here and Now.

From the beginning Jensen was in close touch with the Press, and he has been a keen contributor to *Politiken* to the present day. Journalism is derived from everyday life, and reacts on it in its turn. He values the Press as a mighty reservoir, collecting the vast mass of life day by day, hastily shaped in part, generally not shaped at all, raw material, but nevertheless bubbling, sparkling life. He sees one of the noblest tasks of his art in giving shape to life, unique life, in moulding it and preserving it, just as it faces us in the stories, statues and pictures of past centuries. The constant practice of his journalistic work enhanced his realism. Under the influence of Darwin's teaching he created a new literary form for the flood of raw material which he called Myth. He breaks the old shape of the myth, as Hans Christian Andersen before him had broken that of the fairy tale, by giving it new content. His myths mingle a part of life with the passing of time to a symbolic happening, giving it a definite and lasting outline.

The best known example of such a great myth is the novel of pre-historic days, *The Glacier* (1908). The white race originated from adaptation to the climate of the glacial period; whilst the common herd fled southwards, two single individuals, Dreng and Moa—later they become a united couple—take up the struggle which makes them masters of the animal world, fire, and life itself. The author's powerful imagination has been brought to bear on this natural Genesis of the human mind. Jensen is a proof of the marvellous links which

evolutionary thought gives to human existence. In six novels, which form *The Long Journey*, he has described the cultural history of mankind up to the discovery of America. A number of shorter sketches, most of them the fruits of observation abroad and at home, or of studies, are grouped round the central work. With an imagination that never flags he builds a thousand bridges through time and space, from the near to the far, from the living present to the greyest and most distant past. He has devoted himself to novels and short stories, to lyric and dramatic work as well. To-day he is still one of the best brains and most fertile writers in Scandinavia. Again and again surprises are produced in his workshop. Quite recently he has attempted a new translation of *Hamlet*. Jensen conceives Hamlet as a virile rebel against his corrupt surroundings, and expounds his theory in the most original manner. This achievement of his is as hotly disputed as many of his earlier works. Again he plunges into the heat of the fray, which rages round the questions of *Weltanschauung* to-day, a fearless champion of his convictions.

In the centre of Sigrid Undset's literary productions up to the present day stands *Kristin Lavransdatter* (1920-2), for which she was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1928. In Norway this work is acknowledged to be the most powerful and most vivid piece of native historical literature. Norway, allied with Iceland, has risen to great heights in history, which came to an end towards the close of the thirteenth century. Sigrid Undset has placed the story of her heroes in the fourteenth century. The decay of nationalism and the union with Sweden form the background. The Roman Catholic Church still has undisputed sway over the souls of men, gives meaning to their lives, and guides their struggle for light. Erlend Nikolasson and Kristin Lavransdatter belong to two different worlds. A descendant of the Vikings, loving danger and adventure and fame, but lacking the strength and steadfastness of the old heroes, Erlend instigates a rebellion, but in a moment of recklessness allows an important document to fall into the enemies' hands. Kristin is, at the first glance, merely the mistress of a manor farm with strong feelings on the upkeep of the family inheritance; but inwardly she is divided against herself, gripped by a strong and melancholy passion for her light-hearted husband, and yet full of longing for redemption from the burden of earthly life. He is finally

killed in a scuffle in his own farmyard, and she dies in a nunnery, while laying one of the victims of the Black Death to rest in consecrated ground. The stress of this work does not lie in the outward action, though it rises to impressive scenes from time to time, but in reflections, memories, dreams, glimpses of the soul. To show us a portrait of the struggling soul of Kristin Lavransdatter is the task Sigrid Undset has set herself.

How did she come to write such a novel? Her father was a well-known antiquarian, who died in 1893 and left his family in straitened circumstances. Her mother came from a group of liberal-minded people in Copenhagen of which Georg Brandes was the centre. Sigrid attended the commercial school in Copenhagen and then, for a long time, led the drab life of a typist. She has described this humdrum life in numerous novels and sketches (*Novels and Stories of the Present*, five volumes) and has spoken fearlessly of the disappointments of love. Attempts at abandonment to the passions of life are followed by disappointment, abhorrence, repentance and often by a bitter end. Very gradually happier moments appear in the course of these stories, more favourable hopes for struggling souls. This is the path that Kristin Lavransdatter follows, and it ends in the peace of the Church. Sigrid Undset herself joined the Roman Catholic Church in 1925; since then she has not only published works in which conversion is the main theme (*Gymnadenia*, 1919, *The Burning Bush*, 1930), but has translated Chesterton and delivered propagandist lectures.

Apparently not only outward circumstances led her to follow the course she adopted. She married the painter Anders Svarstad, and has been living, divorced from him, for a long time in Lillehammer, where she divides her time between the care of her farm and her children on the one hand and her literary labours on the other. In the first pages of her first story, *Martha Oulie*, we find a passionate appeal for the auricular confession of the Roman Catholic Church. It is clear that the leaning towards this creed is deep in the structure of her being. She did not first turn to the Middle Ages and then find Catholicism there. Her own leanings enabled her to penetrate the life of Catholic Medievalism. In *Kristin Lavransdatter* and her battling for the peace of her soul there is much of the author's own struggle. We can hardly

imagine a greater contrast than Selma Lagerlöf, whose work radiates peace at last, and Sigrid Undset. The Norwegian does not lead us into the social difficulties of her time any more than the Swede—all political questions are outside her interest. But she does show us the rousing reality of modern people, more especially the experience of the senses and psychology of women, that has not often found a way into literature so broad and honest and true to life.

Seen from the German point of view these four Scandinavian masters are distinguished by the strength, the originality and the unity of their personalities. Compared with Germany, the Scandinavian countries are thinly populated. Solitude in nature is still to be found to an overwhelming degree, so that individualities of a strong and rich originality grow there as natural products. The history of their development has gone its own way. Christianity did not achieve a dominating position until very late, heathenism left a stronger living heritage. The political unity of the different countries was reached comparatively early, and even economic development has been growing steadily. In the newly blossoming Scandinavian literature the Germans found many characters in unfamiliar surroundings who, during the last centuries, had been shaped by a different fate from those at home, and bore many traits longed for as an escape from the narrow oppressiveness of German life, set aloft as an aim, cherished as a dream. These are merely a few of the reasons why Scandinavian literature was able to exercise so great an influence on German life for the last fifty years. Its influence has waned since 1928, when the new German literature, impassioned and deepened, turned decisively to mankind in the bulk. Literature has followed other ways in England. The United States has, on the whole, been more kindly receptive to Scandinavian literature, on account of the strong Scandinavian strain in the population. Lately the interest in England has been growing, and it is to be hoped that in the next few years many a Scandinavian book, untranslated as yet, may appear in the English Press.

WALTER A. BERENDSOHN.
Author of works on Selma Lagerlöf (English translation 1931) and Knut Hamsun.

695'15

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE SUDETENLAND.

SINCE Austria was united to Germany three months ago a crescendo of anxiety and speculation has been trained upon the Sudetendeutschen, the Germans of pre-war Austria who live in Bohemia and Moravia. "Sudetengebirge" is the collective name given to the mountain range which includes the Riesengebirge and the Adlergebirge and which forms the eastern frontier of Czechoslovakia. Together with the Erzegebirge and the Böhmerwald they separate Bohemia from Silesia, Saxony and Bavaria and they thus follow the line which constituted the pre-war frontier between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The words Sudetenland and Sudetendeutschen were coined by Dr. Freissler, who on October 29th, 1918, set up a provisional government claiming to represent the Germans of Austria, Silesia, North Moravia, and Eastern Bohemia. The Sudeten Germans number something between 3,000,000 and 3,500,000. They are subject to the Czechoslovak Government. Herr Hitler has advertised his ambition to "protect" all the Auslandsdeutschen, or German outlanders living just over the German frontiers. The 6,500,000 Germans of Austria were the biggest congregation of such outlanders. The 3,250,000 (say) Germans of Sudeten Czechoslovakia are the next biggest. There are over 3,500,000 more in other countries neighbouring upon Germany (about 1,000,000 in Poland, 750,000 in Roumania, 500,000 each in Hungary and Jugoslavia, 300,000 in Danzig, 200,000 each in Latvia and Italy, 60,000 in Memel, 35,000 in Denmark, 30,000 in Lithuania and 20,000 in Estonia).

For three months the question on all lips has been: What is to happen to the Sudeten Germans? Are they to be the next batch to be reclaimed by Herr Hitler? Is there to be a general European war about it? Questions no less crude have shaken the very foundations of confidence. The names of Herr Hitler, Herr Konrad Henlein (leader of the Sudeten Germans) and Dr. Hodža (Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia) have been bandied about in every home in Europe, and even further afield. France and Russia are allied to Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia "will fight," as the Germans well

m56.N42
m62-156

know. Czechoslovakia, in the view of many English students of affairs, is the only remaining bulwark against a German Mitteleuropa and all that is therein implied.

Mr. Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, has staked his political life on reaching " an understanding " with Germany, as in April last he reached an understanding with Italy. But his professional opponents and the imposing array of British democrats who regard the dictators as the great menace to " liberty," have found it difficult to sympathise with a policy of pacifism on Great Britain's part. The British lion, by jingo, has become the slogan in this country, not of the old-type Conservative, but of the new-type Socialist. Ideologies have hardened and blood is up. The issue is apt to be diagnosed as the straight fight between the good and the free on the one side—Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and, oddly, Russia—and the bad and the oppressive on the other—Germany, Italy, Franco Spain, Japan. Such emotions are produced only by sincerity and depth of feeling. Since the beginning of time, probably, wars have been fed by holy passions. In our time we still remember the Germany of 1914-18 commonly featured in the British press as the " anti-Christ." If war is to be the inevitable, periodic product of idealist enthusiasts, is it then to be accepted as an act of God, like earthquakes and thunderstorms ? Or is it merely an habitual folly, from which mankind has never yet been able to escape ? Is patriotism for ever to devastate mankind ? Will commonsense never triumph over it ? It is idle to deny, or to argue down, the sentiment of patriotism. It is obvious that at the present time the countries most influenced by patriotism are Germany, Italy and Japan. It is not obvious how sectional patriotism is reconciled to national patriotism in Spain. But the European Left-wing ideologues and patriots have contrived (with some show of reason) to identify the Spanish Nationalists with the totalitarian camp of ideologues and patriots.

Every government, not in Europe only, but in the world, is engaged in piling up armaments on a scale never before dreamt of in the history of the world, with the only object of conducting, sooner or later, a world war utterly without purpose. There was no purpose and no sense in the last war. There will be no purpose and no sense in the next. Yet it will take place, sooner or later. The chief present hope

of postponing it so that it shall take place later rather than sooner derives from the consideration that the devastation produced by the last war is still so far from being repaired that every government in the world is bankrupt, and that the present diplomatic confusion is so great that nothing so clear as the two sides in the next war is yet recognisable. German patriots argue that they are presented with an Anglo-French-Czechoslovak-Russian encirclement. British, French and Czechoslovak patriots answer with all the heat at their command that they at any rate have no aggressive designs, and that their alliances and war preparations are dictated solely by German militarism and arrogance. It is all very crude. It has all happened before, including even the next war. The anti-German defensive combination accepts the case for " making a stand " against Germany on the argument that if Germany is given an ell she will take a mile. And the really baffling part of the matter is that that argument is probably sound. But the equally baffling fact proved in blood and in the experience of our time, is that the postulated " stand " against Germany can do no more good now than it did in 1914-18. In November 1918, by a world-wide " defensive " combination against Germany, Germany was beaten in the field and broken to the very backbone at home. Twenty years later she is the strongest military country on earth, trained and mobilised to the last man for war. What then ? Is Herr Hitler to be allowed to redraw all the European frontiers, to reclaim all the Auslandsdeutschen, to control Central Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, to recapture the pre-war German colonies, to achieve a position in Europe where he can dictate not only to the people of Germany, but to those of every other country ? Or are we to have another war with Germany, and if experience prove a true guide, still another twenty years later, and so on ? A war with Germany every twenty years ? Even if the Germans were a nation so hopelessly patriotic as themselves to accept the notion of a war every twenty years (which is possible), even knowing that, as Mr. Chamberlain has said and as every sensible person always realised, " there are no winners in war," is it good enough that the rest of the world should accept it ? Is there no other way out ?

If one denies the contention that war by its inevitability, as suggested by the cumulative experience of mankind, is an

" act of God," then there must be another way out. If there is another way out, it can be found. It can be found by looking for it. And lo! it is very obvious. The historic lesson taught by the experience of our time is that Germany is strong. Stripped of the details, the purpose and the effect of the last war was to keep Germany down. The effect did not last. Therefore, it seems reasonable to deduce, you cannot keep Germany down. You can have another war, you can even win it again, but you won't keep Germany down. What then? Obviously you must accept Germany as a strong power. You must make a deal. You must satisfy her craving for the fruits of power, just as in the past Britain's craving for the fruits of power has been satisfied. Germany must wield a probably predominant influence by one means or another in Central Europe. She must have colonies. Either that result will be produced by war (whereby, there being no " winners " in war, Germany might gain the fruits but would be unable to enjoy them) or by peace. Mr. Chamberlain's argument, to quote one of many such philosophers, is that it is better to reach the end by peace than by war. Peace implies a deal with Germany. If such a deal could be made, disarmament might become an attainable object of diplomacy. That is pacifism. It excites the indignation of the " patriotic " people. But it is really the truly patriotic thing, if patriotism be the love of one's country, rather than a desire to prove how much more ferocious we are than anybody else. On the simple ground, there is nothing more unpatriotic, in the true sense, than war, because nothing damages any country more than war.

Whatever be the outcome of the present unrest, whether it lead to another war or whether by luck or good sense we escape, the fact remains, on the cold ground of history that the Hitler-Henlein-Hodža drama holds the stage, with the other interested parties exerting their influence behind the scenes. In that drama has been concentrated for three months the general question whether it is to be general war or peace. Speaking on March 4th in a joint session of parliament, Dr. Hodža declared that Czechoslovakia's relations with Germany needed explanation, and stated that views had been exchanged between Prague and Berlin with the object of discouraging mutual aggressiveness in the press of the two countries. But he confessed to a feeling of uneasiness. Referring to Herr Hitler's speech on February 20th, in which the Führer had

referred to " the ten million Germans living in two of the States adjoining our frontiers," Dr. Hodža declared: " It is an historic fact that more than three million Germans have their homes in Czechoslovakia. Surely the Peace Conference could not do otherwise than confirm a situation which had been in existence many centuries. It is but natural that Czechoslovakia emphasises—I say this fully conscious of the importance of the statement—that her frontiers are absolutely inviolable." Then, referring to Herr Hitler's observation that the protection of Germans in other countries fell within the sphere of interest of the Reich, Dr. Hodža denied that such protection need have any application to the Germans of Czechoslovakia, " because Czechoslovakia guarantees equal rights to all her citizens without distinction of nationality, and looks after their interests with their own co-operation." He added: " We would serve the situation in Central Europe badly, and especially the relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany, if we did not state very clearly that Czechoslovakia and her people will never in any circumstances allow interference in her internal affairs. Ambiguous statements are particularly dangerous in this part of Europe. . . . The Czechoslovak Government, therefore, do not wish to leave anyone in doubt that the people of this country would defend with all their might all the attributes of her independence if they should be involved."

President Beneš made a statement on the following day (March 5th), in which he said that " our treatment of the minorities and the relationship between the Government and the German parties here constitute an internal issue which can never be the subject of direct official negotiation or discussion with a foreign Power." He then explained his own view of the problem by denying the feasibility of federal autonomy and by claiming that the democratic system, in which no differentiation was made between the German and the Czechoslovakian parties, was the effective safeguard of Sudeten German interests. Switzerland, he said, had taken five centuries to evolve, whereas Czechoslovakia had a history of only twenty years behind her. The Germans of Czechoslovakia, moreover, were split into six " islands " along the frontier, covering a distance of 1,300 miles.

Only six days later, on March 11th, Herr Hitler's troops crossed the frontier into Austria. The whole face of Central Europe was thereby transfigured. In the military sense the

German high command now controlled all the means of communication—by river, rail and road—to South-eastern Europe. In the economic sense Czechoslovakia was isolated and surrounded. In addition to her trade outlet through Hamburg, her outlets by rail and river to the south and the south-east could also now be blocked. She could be strangled by tariffs and tolls and cut off from her raw materials. The frontiers of Saxony, Bavaria, Austria, Hungary, now directly or indirectly controlled by Germany, ran three-quarters of the way round the 1,500 miles of Czechoslovakia's total frontiers. The proclamation of the *Anschluss* on March 13th set the seal upon that new situation. It was only a month earlier that Herr Hitler had told the Reichstag of the " ten million Germans " over the border. Two-thirds of them were no longer over the border. What of the remaining third, the Sudetendeutschen ? How electrifying to high diplomacy became the resultant speculation was shown by the fact that on March 15th—only two days after the *Anschluss*—the Russian Government assured the Czechoslovak Government that it would carry out the obligation of the Czechoslovak-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact of May 16th, 1935, by coming to the help of Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression, provided France for her part gave the like assistance. The condition therein imposed had been made an integral part of the text of the Pact. The upheaval in general European diplomacy that immediately followed was recorded in this section of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for May last (pp. 614-24).

What of the effect in Czechoslovakia herself ? On March 11th, while the German troops were on the way to Vienna, Field-Marshal Göring had given a general assurance to the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin that it would be " the earnest endeavour " of the German Government to improve German-Czechoslovak relations. On the following day, March 12th, he informed the same Minister that the German troops then in Austria had received the strictest orders to keep at least fifteen kilometres from the Czechoslovak frontier. Yet it was obvious that Czechoslovakia had now become an inevitable political battleground between the Sudetendeutschen and the Czechs. During the five years of Nazi control of the Reich the Sudetendeutsche Partei (S.d.P.) had developed from strength to strength in Czechoslovakia under the leadership of Herr Henlein. It had developed by a process of evolution.

On February 18th, 1937, an agreement was signed by the Czechoslovak Government and the " Activist " section of the Sudetendeutschen (who collaborated with the Government) by which five out of seven Activist demands were conceded. Herr Henlein on February 28th, 1937, refused to recognise that agreement on the ground that it was inadequate. He instead demanded autonomy for the Sudetendeutschen and gave notice that he would demand an election. None the less the relations between the Sudetendeutschen and the Czechoslovaks developed normally until the German-Austrian *Anschluss* of March 13th, 1938. Hot on the heels of that event—on March 16th—Herr Henlein openly welcomed the incorporation of Austria in Great Germany and urged the Germans of Czechoslovakia " to join the great political front " of the German race. On the same day the German Agrarian party announced its decision to secede from what was called the Committee of the Activist parties, in other words they seceded from co-operation with the Czechoslovak Government. On March 22nd, Dr. Spina, the German Agrarian representative, resigned from the Cabinet and the German Agrarian Party joined the S.d.P. Two days later, on March 24th, the German Clericals seceded from the Activist Group and joined the S.d.P. On March 26th the German Social Democrats announced the resignation of their representative, Dr. Czech, from the Government, but they did not join the S.d.P. Herr Henlein took the occasion to formulate his policy. On March 25th he demanded new elections, and announced that the Social Democrats would never be allowed to join the German race group. But he declared that the Sudeten Germans would respect the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia.

It was at this point that Dr. Hodža made his first post-*Anschluss* contribution to the controversy. On March 28th he broadcast an announcement that " a new period of minority policy had to begin." He stipulated that " neither Germans, Hungarians, Russians, nor Poles, and, of course, no Czechs or Slovaks, must be denationalised." He declared that in spite of the Activist secession, the Government would go on trying to reach an understanding with them. Though he protested the Government's resistance to " moral, economic or political " pressure from any quarter, he announced that the Government intended to embody all the existing laws and decrees about the minorities in one single instrument, to be

called a Minorities Statute. In the Chamber on the following day the German, Magyar and Polish minorities and the Slovak Clericals in turn demanded autonomy, though they all protested their loyalty to the State. On April 1st Dr. Hodža received a deputation of the S.d.P. to discuss the matter. The inspired Berlin press meanwhile was talking of "self-determination" and "partition."

The next contribution to the discussion was made by President Beneš, who on April 16th addressed the Chamber on the occasion of the Easter Peace Celebration. "We believe," he said, "in ultimate agreement between our State and Germany (which belief, he said, was in harmony with recent statements made by Germany's responsible statesmen). "The calm which we have preserved during the recent happenings around us was appreciated and admired, and has undoubtedly contributed towards the maintenance of international peace. . . . We refuse to join any ideological front and we firmly refuse to be classified as members of such fronts, no matter by whom. . . . We must not close our eyes to the fact that we are passing through the biggest political, social, economic, and cultural revolutionary process in the history of Europe. . . ."

Herr Henlein addressed a meeting of his party at Carlsbad on April 23rd when he specified his precise demands "in order to pave the way for peaceful development." They were: (1) Full equality of status for Czechs and Germans. (2) A guarantee for this equality by the recognition of the Sudeten Germans as a legal body incorporate. (3) Determination and legal recognition of the German areas within the State. (4) Full self-government for the German areas. (5) Legal protection for every citizen living outside the area of his own nationality. (6) Removal of injustices inflicted since 1918 and reparation for the damages thereby caused. (7) Recognition of the principle: within the German area German officials. (8) Full liberty to profess German nationality and German political philosophy.

The sting of the demands was concealed in No. 3. If a regional delimitation were conceded to the Sudetendeutschen, it would be a mere formality at any later date to rename the sovereignty of the region delimited. Moreover, Herr Henlein for the first time raised the question of the Czechoslovak-Russian Pact. It had always been a somewhat obvious score for the Sudetendeutschen to argue that an impossible

strain was placed upon their loyalty to the Czechoslovak Government when that Government maintained an alliance with Russia of which the logical implication was to commit the Germans of Czechoslovakia to march against the Germans of the Reich in the hypothesis prescribed by the Pact. The answer that the Pact could be brought into operation only by a German aggression against Czechoslovakia could not be regarded by men of the world as an adequate answer, for the reason among others that no agreement has ever been found possible about what precisely constitutes "aggression." If, for example, the Reich troops were to enter the Sudeten territory at the request of Herr Henlein (as they entered Austria on March 11th at the request of Dr. von Seyss-Inquart), it could be argued with juridical reason that Herr Henlein was not competent to extend such an invitation; but juridical reason in such a case would be a wasted exercise. What Herr Henlein said was: "I feel convinced that the Czech man in the street loves peace and is disposed to become reconciled to the fact. I do not believe in hatred and perpetual quarrels. On the other hand, it is also plain to me that the average Czech citizen must be freed from the influence of the Chauvinistic Czech Press. After twenty years' oppression we cannot be expected to join in the celebration of the anniversary of the foundation of the Republic. To-day we feel less free than ever before, and we know that our whole future is at stake. If the Czech citizens are earnestly striving for a better understanding with Germany, then it becomes inevitable to carry out (1) a wholesale revision of the Czech myth of their own history; (2) a correction of that unfortunate opinion that it was the particular task of the Czech people to form a bulwark against the so-called German *Drang nach Osten*; and (3) a revision of Czechoslovak foreign policy, which had led the country into the ranks of the enemies of the German people. For twenty years the Czechs have failed to fulfil the justified expectations of the different nations in the Republic, for they have not kept the promises given in Paris or their international duties under the Treaty of St. Germain or the duties set out in their own constitutional charter."

Instead of the "promised second Switzerland," he said, a State had been created where to-day "all non-Czech peoples have every reason to feel unfree, deprived of their natural rights, and oppressed." By the end of April the British and

French Governments were urging the Czechoslovak Government, while there was yet time, to give satisfaction to the Germans, Magyars and Poles, and at the same time were urging the German Government in Berlin to exercise restraint and patience. Herr Henlein himself arrived in London on May 12th. He stayed for two days, during which time he conversed with Mr. Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Minister in London, Sir Robert Vansittart, Mr. Winston Churchill, Sir Archibald Sinclair and many Members of Parliament. The substance of what he said to them was understood to be something like this: "While full equality with the Czechoslovak State is the actual demand so far made, the demand itself is contingent on Czechoslovakia's giving up her alliances with Russia and France. Though those alliances be 'defensive' and can operate only in the event of German 'aggression,' the very hypothesis of a potential alignment of Czechoslovak Germans against Germans of the Reich is impossible. That is why at Carlsbad I postulated a complete revision of Czech foreign policy, which up to to-day has led the State into the ranks of the enemies of the German people."

The general nervousness about Central Europe was due at least in part to the fear that in the highly charged atmosphere accidents might happen with incalculable results. The history of May 21st, when two Sudeten German farmers were shot dead by a Czechoslovak policeman, gave both an illustration and a warning of the danger. Two days earlier Herr Henlein had left Czechoslovakia for Germany, where he secretly met Herr Hitler. There was evidence that the German Government was disposed to force the pace in the Czechoslovak-Sudeten issue. The *Berliner Tageblatt*, for example, on May 19th, wrote: "If the Czechoslovak Government," it said, "is not in a position, or does not wish, to solve the problem, there remains no other way than a plebiscite. For self-determination is a matter which must no longer be merely talked about, but must become a reality if Europe is to have a genuine peace." During that day reports of troop movements on both sides of the German-Czechoslovak frontier gained persistent currency. On the following day, May 20th, Dr. Hodža said: "We shall defend ourselves if the need arises, but at the same time we shall satisfy all claims dictated on the one hand by the Constitution and, on the other, by the needs of the times. Our people ought to be in a state of permanent

readiness for the struggles which await us. We shall hold our ground in all circumstances. . . ." During that day assurances were given by the German Government both to the British and to the Czechoslovak Governments that any troop movements that were afoot were of a routine nature and had nothing to do with the political situation. The German Minister of Defence, however, early the next morning took the step of calling up one annual contingent of the reserve and other special branches, giving as the reason the necessity for training the men in the use of new weapons. It was said that about 100,000 men, including Sudeten Germans, in that way reported for duty.

On May 21st the tension and anxiety in general diplomatic quarters increased almost hourly. Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, had an hour's conversation with Herr von Ribbentrop, at which he is understood not only to have sought further reassurance about the reported movement of German troops in Bavaria, Saxony and Austria, but to have taken the opportunity of again urging patience and restraint upon the German Government. The Czechoslovak explanation was that the two Germans crossed the frontier at Cheb (Eger) on motor bicycles and refused to stop when challenged. It also became known on May 21st that the Czechoslovak Government had called up one class of reservists, it being explained in Prague that the purpose was to safeguard the peace during the municipal elections due to take place on the following day (May 22nd), partly in answer to the request of the Sudeten Germans for additional measures of security.

In a report which he gave to the House of Commons on May 23rd Mr. Chamberlain added these details: "On May 19th rumours began to gain currency of German troop movements in the direction of the Czechoslovak frontier. The German Government informed his Majesty's Ambassador on the following day that there was no foundation for these rumours, and they gave a similar assurance to the Czechoslovak Government. On May 21st His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin received further assurances from the German Government that stories of German troop movements were completely unfounded. The Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Minister in Prague on May 21st that a formal invitation had been sent to Herr Henlein to negotiate on the Nationality Statute, which had

been approved on the 19th by the Czechoslovak Government. But on that same day—May 21st—it was announced in the Sudeten Press that the Political Committee of the Sudeten German Party had decided to inform the Prime Minister that the party were not in a position to discuss the Nationality Statute so long as peace and order in the Sudeten districts and above all the constitutional rights of freedom of opinion, of the Press and of assembly were not guaranteed. In face of this situation, the principal concern of his Majesty's Government has been to use all their influence, wherever it could be effective, on the side of restraint in word and deed —while keeping open the way to peaceful negotiation of a satisfactory settlement. With that object they have represented to the Czechoslovak Government the need of taking every precaution for avoidance of incidents and of making every possible effort to reach a comprehensive and lasting settlement by negotiation with the representatives of the Sudeten Party. His Majesty's Government have represented to the German Government the urgent importance of reaching a settlement if European peace is to be preserved—and have expressed their earnest desire that the German Government would co-operate with them in facilitating agreement. His Majesty's Government have at the same time informed the German Government of the advice tendered in Prague and of the assurances received from the Czechoslovak Government. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he welcomed the efforts being made by his Majesty's Government and that the German Government fully shared their desire to see negotiations succeed."

In Germany by contrast violent attacks were made on Czechoslovakia for her alleged oppressive treatment of the Sudeten Germans, attacks which themselves added greatly to the general nervousness, for the obvious reason that just as on March 11th the German troops had marched into Austria "to save the people from oppression," so now a preliminary emphasis on a Czechoslovak oppression of the Sudeten Germans might be intended as the forerunner of a German march into the Sudetenland. But the storm blew over, without breaking.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

June 12th, 1938.

No. 442. *July 1938.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

FULL REVIEWS 113
GLADSTONE; THE COMING OF THE STORM; THE "DRANG NACH DEM SÜDOSTEN"; DOMINION SOVEREIGNTY; MADEMOISELLE DE SCUDÉRY; JOHN TIPTOFT.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: GERMANY'S CLAIM TO COLONIES; AN ELIZABETHAN PURITAN; PUCCINI AMONG FRIENDS; WAR AT SEA UNDER QUEEN ANNE, 1702-1708; THE NONESUCH LIBRARY; WAGES AND INCOME IN THE UNITED KINGDOM SINCE 1860; THE CROSS IN THE STAR OF DAVID 125

GLADSTONE.*

Great men have in common with great books that successive generations extract new meaning from them. This is certainly true of Gladstone, who, if we may judge from the books written about him and the tributes paid to him, is more alive now than any Victorian statesman. In recent years there has been one remarkable study of him by a German writer, i.e. Rudolf Craemer's *Gladstone als Christlicher Staatsmann*, which, in respect of his religious opinions and the religious movement in England during his life, is fuller and more elaborate than any similar book by English writers. There now comes another book by a German writer, Dr. Erich Eyck, covering the whole of his life, and gathering up the new material which has accumulated in the thirty-five years since the official life was written. This has deservedly been translated into English, and in the English version by Mr. Bernard Miall is an extremely readable chapter on English history as well as a vivid and sympathetic portrait of its subject.

More and more, as we look back, Gladstone presents himself as *the* representative man of the Victorian age. The changes in his opinions correspond to its developing phases and reflect the course of events which, beginning with the Reform Bill of

* By Erich Eyck, Ph.D. Translated by Bernard Miall. George Allen & Unwin. 15s.

1832, turned aristocratic England into Liberal and democratic England, abolished class and sectarian privilege, and threw open her ports to the trade of all the world. Dr. Eyck keeps touch with this background, and rightly lays stress on the method of intensive study and thought which led Gladstone step by step on the road of progressive politics. We see the student and the politician, the secular leader and the Christian statesman, keeping step one with the other, sometimes with heart-searchings and clashes between them which leave the impression that the two were never completely reconciled. There is not much that any new biographer can add to the story of the early period, but in the later Dr. Eyck has the advantage of the biographies of statesmen who were on the scene during the last part of Gladstone's life, as well as numerous autobiographies, including Viscount Gladstone's *Memories*, and, most important of all, the *Letters of Queen Victoria*.

Of these, with the aid of Mr. Philip Guedalla, he has made good use, and it cannot be said that the story enhances the fame of the Queen. To balance the scales fairly Gladstone's own tribute to her " unfailing dutifulness " and " great sincerity " needs to be borne in mind. Also that her prejudices and weaknesses were constantly being played upon by Opposition leaders, who ought to have known better than to involve her in their party politics. By any measurement Queen Victoria remains a great figure, but it is difficult to read with patience of the perpetual mortifications that she inflicted on the greatest of her Prime Ministers, or of the final parting at which she neither offered him her hand nor said a word of thanks for any of his public services.

Specially interesting in this book by a German writer is the implied contrast between Bismarck and Gladstone. The two men were born to misunderstand one another. To Gladstone foreign policy was crusading on behalf of the Ten Commandments ; to Bismarck it was cut and thrust by experts striving to overreach one another. Gladstone perpetually echoed St. Augustine's question " take away justice and what are the kingdoms of the earth but great bands of robbers ? " Bismarck could not imagine that anyone could honestly and seriously propose to apply these high moralities to mundane politics. Gladstone he judged to be both hypocrite and blunderer, who was always troubling the professionals in the great game by

unseasonable irruptions into their territory. When Herbert Bismarck came to London in 1885 he reported to his father that it was not worth while talking to Mr. Gladstone since he " knew nothing whatever about foreign affairs." Dr. Eyck quotes Bismarck *père* as having told Jules Ferry that " apart from England herself, all the rest of the Powers must wish more than anything to keep Mr. Gladstone in office," and he is surprised that Ferry " laughed heartily at this observation." Ferry no doubt interpreted it rightly. This was Bismarck's irony, but there were times when he was grimly in earnest about supporting foreign statesmen whom he supposed to be unconsciously playing his game ; for example, Thiers, whose continuance in office as Prime Minister in 1873 he thought essential to his purpose of keeping the Russian and Austrian Emperors in a state of alarm about French Republicanism. The unfortunate German Ambassador in Paris, Count von Arnim, was ruined for failing to understand this point of view.

This is a generally accurate book, but the bibliography would have been better for more careful proof-reading.

J. A. SPENDER.

THE COMING OF THE STORM.*

More than the first volume, which included studies of five statesmen no longer in power at the opening of the war, the present volume resembles *The Ring and the Book*. The five statesmen of the present volume—Grey, Poincaré, Bethmann Hollweg, Sazonoff, Berchtold—were all in high office when the war broke out and in the years immediately preceding. The book deals with the questions and events immediately leading to the World War from five different points of view. Dr. Gooch possesses, to a degree which may almost be called unique, three qualifications for this purpose : knowledge, imagination, objectivity. Taking each statesman in turn—British, French, German, Russian, Austrian—he presents a narrative or sketch which is the result of reading and checking some thousands of documents ; of putting himself into the shoes of the man he is describing ; and of looking at him scientifically from the outside. It is a deeply interesting study in what may be called historical psychology. The

* G. P. Gooch : *Before the War*, vol. II, *The Coming of the Storm*. Longmans. 10s.

working of the minds of the five statesmen is revealed. There is, of course, none of the factitious glitter of the modern novel-biography—no imaginary conversations (though there are some real conversations), monologues, *rêveries*. Nothing is advanced as a fact for which there is not documentary evidence, and strict economy is exercised in criticism and commentary. This rigorous scientific method, which is consistently followed throughout the book, has in itself a great charm for the reader because it produces a work of great simplicity and clearness, all extraneous matter having been sifted away and only the essence preserved.

The study of Count Berchtold may be taken as an illustration. The legend that he was a mere trifler is dispelled. " Behind the façade of nonchalance were the heart and brain of an Austrian patriot. In the five thousand closely printed pages which record his activities from his appointment in February 1912 to the outbreak of war in 1914, we watch an experienced statesman grappling with difficulties which he had done nothing to create." Berchtold was not responsible for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, for the German ultimatum to Russia in 1909, for the Italian invasion of Tripoli which almost ended the Triple Alliance, nor for the Balkan League which destroyed the balance of power in the Balkans. He came to the conclusion, as the result of prolonged experience and reflection, that nothing could prevent the break-up of the Dual Monarchy at the hands of the Servian Government and governing class, through their working upon the five million Southern Slavs in Austria and Hungary, except the military defeat and diminution of Servia. This diminution was not to be for the profit of Austria but of Bulgaria and Greece. He hoped to localise the war against Servia. That Russia would probably take a hand he was well aware, and that a general war might follow. This risk was worth taking (in his view) for the alternative was the certain break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy. He never changed his mind and apparently felt no regrets. " That the war was lost and the Habsburg Empire disappeared never altered his conviction that no other course was open in 1914."

The study of Bethmann Hollweg is equally understanding. The Kaiser, disillusioned with the brilliant Bülow, " was less anxious for another trained diplomatist than for a trustworthy official with whom he could work." When Bethmann became

Chancellor in 1909, German relations with England were bad. He assumed office with the deliberate purpose of improving their relations. With great perseverance he continued to work for this, through the affair of Agadir, the Haldane visit, the Baghdad Railway and negotiations concerning Portuguese colonies. He was really defeated by Tirpitz and the " navalists," but he found the British Secretary of State somewhat reserved. Nevertheless he had succeeded in improving Anglo-German relations by July 1914, through long and very patiently conducted negotiations in which Grey acted sympathetically. The war-crisis of July Bethmann did not manage so well, and he was ever afterwards conscious of having made mistakes. "Like Grey, he was a great gentleman and a sincere lover of peace; but he was an amateur in diplomacy and he was never master in his own house."

Dr. Gooch's long study of Grey (it covers 133 pages) is a highly useful contribution not only for its detailed diplomatic narrative and exposition, but for its criticism and judgment amounting in the end to defence and approval not without qualification or reserve. Poincaré (62 pages) is not so difficult to describe and assess. The analysis of the difficult personality of Sazonoff will be helpful to all students. He was probably the least dynamic of the lot. " Sazonoff, like the Foreign Ministers in other capitals, was convinced that he had no alternative. All of them wanted peace, but they desired other things still more. . . . It is true that while Austria fought under the banner of self-preservation, Russia, whom nobody threatened, marched out to battle in the name of prestige. But in the accepted scale of national values prestige, honour and security are motive forces of equal weight."

R. B. MOWAT.

THE "DRANG NACH DEM SÜDOSTEN."

Miss Wiskemann* has contributed an excellent volume to the Chatham House series of studies on the results of the Versailles territorial changes. She gives a full account of the relationship between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans, as developed through a long history and as now culminating in the most urgent and most unpleasant of all the contemporary

* *Czechs and Germans.* By Elizabeth Wiskemann. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

disturbances in Europe. She writes with an obvious concern to establish only the facts, and that is a magnificent thing to do in circumstances of such emotional explosiveness as now obtain. It need hardly be said that a book sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs gives us in all their abundance, yet clearly set out and assessed, the relevant facts, tendencies and feelings which together constitute the problem of Central Europe. It is by no means a new problem. The blood shed in the last war—and in the next ?—abidingly proves how essentially insoluble that problem is. Miss Wiskemann herself concludes (p. 283) that " in the circumstances of Europe to-day the problem of the Historic Provinces cannot be satisfactorily solved." She concedes that " a wise government can greatly reduce friction, but, whatever the government, friction there will be, so long as a socialistic nationalism is regarded as an absolute standard of good. Some common political principles which different races can respect is the cement which is needed to repair the Czech-German structure " ; and she wistfully surmises that " the humanism of Thomas Masaryk might gradually have created the necessary cohesion, and the Historic Provinces, by reconciling German with Slav, might have pointed the way towards the genuine solution of the problem of Central Europe."

As for other solutions, Miss Wiskemann regards " the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a federation of its component nationalists " as impossible, because of the hostile ideologies that have developed and have thereby differentiated the Czechoslovak from the Swiss condition. She recalls the Beneš memorandum (p. 92) of May 20th, 1919, in which the present President promised " to make of the Czechoslovak Republic a sort of Switzerland." In her diagnosis the condition of Central Europe is so far gone that " there is no very clear distinction to be made between the cession of the mainly German territories of Czechoslovakia to Germany and the complete domination of Central Europe —Czech-speaking territory included—by the Germans."

Of course Herr Gerhard Schacher is right in his facts.* Of course the last war was started from Serajevo, and the next, if it starts, may be started from another Danubian source. Of

* *Germany Pushes South-East.* By Dr. Gerhard Schacher. Hurst & Blackett. 7s. 6d. net.

course the military strength of Germany and her diplomatic ambition to establish a vast, impregnable *Mitteleuropa* is in one sense what Dr. Schacher calls a menace to the peace of the world. We all know this. We know it *ad nauseam.* Dr. Schacher, a graduate of German universities, correspondent of several English newspapers, specialist in the economic and financial aspect of diplomatic affairs, adds his specialist knowledge of Central Europe to swell the tide of what was already obvious. Dr. Schacher writes :

> The German thrust south-east is and remains the greatest danger to European peace and international economic co-operation. It has achieved this position in international politics because in it National Socialism's exaggeration of its own political, economic, military, and intellectual forces have been able to find clearest expression. The liquidation of the false investments systematically made in Germany (not only in the sphere of economics) will yet cause the whole world, and Germany in particular, considerable difficulty. This is not the place to decide whether it can be achieved by any other method than by the abolition of the régime now in force. But at all events it is in the interests of the world that these problems are not " solved " at the cost of world peace. Recognition of the fact that European peace is indivisible and of the necessity for a final and lasting termination of the period of Germany's exaggeration of its own armament capacity, which seriously endangers this peace, is indispensable, if the German push south-east is not to plunge the world into fresh confusion, whose outcome no one could foresee.

What is not obvious is the precise purpose of the reiterated warning about the German " danger." This type of literature was commonplace during the last war. As a result of the last war and a world-wide combination against Germany, Germany was " beaten " in the field. But as Mr. Chamberlain has said, after the pristine, but not latter-day manner of Sir Norman Angell and of all men who value common sense, " there are no winners in war." What do we want ? Another war ? And then, after a further twenty years, still another war ? Must reason for ever dictate, and experience for ever confirm, the absurdity of attempting to deny the fact that Germany is strong ? It is nothing to do with the prevalent ideologies. There was no National Socialist dictatorship in 1914. It is proved beyond the possibility of a doubt that to defeat Germany in the field is not to keep Germany down. The obvious alternative is to accept Germany as a strong power.

G. G.

DOMINION SOVEREIGNTY.*

Professor A. Berriedale Keith has surveyed afresh the constitutions of the Dominions, their international status and the character of imperial relations. His new work, which largely supersedes his earlier *Sovereignty of the British Dominions* and *The Constitutional Law of the British Dominions*, has been prompted by the view that a period of constitutional stability has now been reached. The author shows with little difficulty that " in a large sense the Dominions are really and unquestionably States of international law." In theory they may well be restricted in the sovereign rights of declaring war and claiming neutrality in a conflict in which Great Britain is engaged. The former envisages a remote contingency while with regard to the more immediate question of neutrality, Professor Keith points out that no Dominion has asserted a right to remain neutral. Moreover, in respect of South Africa and Eire neutrality cannot be maintained in view of the Simonstown base agreement and the Irish undertaking relating to harbour facilities. The degree of participation, of course, apart from agreement remains essentially a matter for the Dominions themselves.

If the Dominions assert themselves as sovereign international States, they also gladly retain the advantages of a lower status which Commonwealth membership provides. Even the Irish Free State has been willing to acknowledge the domestic character of imperial economic agreements so as to avoid the application of the most-favoured-nation clause, although quite illogically it has refused to accept an *ad hoc* imperial tribunal for determining Commonwealth disputes as agreed upon at the Imperial Conference of 1930. For a number of purposes the Empire remains recognised as a single entity under a common Crown. But in dealing with internal and effective bonds of union, Professor Keith refrains from overstating what is frequently overstressed, namely the unifying power of the Monarchy. " The Empire has more cohesion than mere subjection to a single King, whose powers are exercised on the authority of the several Governments with no bond between them." Professor Keith argues with cogency that the Crown is indivisible in law and that the

* (1) *The Dominions as Sovereign States.* By A. Berriedale Keith. Macmillan. 25s. net. (2) *The Law of the Indian Constitution.* By M. Ramaswamy. Longmans. 21s. net.

oft-quoted parallel of Hanover is inapplicable since in the United Kingdom and the Electorate "the lines of succession were different, and that point is vital." The abdication, however, has lent colour to the theory of divisibility, although, the author contends, it was not constitutionally established by the action of the Union. Common allegiance represented in the advantages of British citizenship is of course a real cohesive factor, but in the main the Crown represents simply a link of sentiment of varying strength in each Dominion. Apart from ties of blood, language, law and religion and a common democratic ideal, co-operation and consultation to the mutual advantage of all, as for example in the conduct of foreign policy and in defence, must be the foundations upon which the new Commonwealth of equal States will grow in unity and strength.

While the Statute of Westminster vested in the Dominion legislatures in general unlimited powers, amendment of the British North America Acts was expressly excluded and must be enacted by the Imperial Parliament itself. Professor Keith is most cautious in considering " the vital question " as to the grounds upon which Parliament would act. The leading Canadian authority, Professor W. P. M. Kennedy, has recently given his view that the British Government constitutionally cannot refuse to introduce legislation at the Dominion Ministry's request until provincial consent is obtained. No definite view is offered by Professor Keith, although he stresses the precedent of 1907 when the assent of all the Provinces was given. Indeed to dispense with their consent when provincial interests are affected is to nullify the very safeguard provided in the Statute of Westminster.

Although the constitutional position of Dominion governors has been assimilated to that of the King in the United Kingdom, the mode of exercising the prerogative powers in various contingencies remains a matter of controversy. While it is clear that " under normal circumstances," as Professor Keith remarks, the Governor must act upon the advice of his Ministry, his duty is less certain in special situations, for example when asked to assent to an act which he considers illegal. The better opinion is that the Governor should accept the legal opinion of his Attorney-General and allow the issue subsequently to be challenged in the Courts. Professor Keith, however, supports the action taken by Sir Philip Game in

1932, when he dismissed the Lang ministry with its parliamentary majority on the ground of its illegal actions, thereby ousting the remedial jurisdiction of the Courts. In such cases the Governor inevitably becomes discredited and the subject of partisan attacks. Mr. Justice Evatt, of the High Court of Australia, has argued very forcefully in favour of statutory formulation of principles to govern the exercise of the Governor's powers. Otherwise the latter may well become a mere political nominee of the party in office.

India is outside the scope of this work, but Professor Keith has written an appreciative Foreword to *The Law of the Indian Constitution* by Mr. M. Ramaswamy. In an exhaustive analysis of the new Act, the author pleads for a liberal interpretation and quotes extensively from judgments relating to analogous provisions in the Dominion and American constitutions. Mr. Ramaswamy clearly dislikes many aspects of the Constitution, including the safeguards and indirect election to the central legislative assembly, although his work is essentially a legal textbook. He has included a general historical survey from 1600 to 1917. It is not inappropriate here to recommend among the numerous concise Indian histories that sound and valuable book, *A Short History of India** by Mr. W. H. Moreland and Sir Atul Chatterjee.

MADEMOISELLE DE SCUDÉRY.

Madeleine de Scudéry, novelist and best seller, *précieuse*, and salon lady, appears in Miss McDougall's book† as one of the most interesting personalities of le Grand Siècle. Yet I doubt whether anyone now alive has had the patience to wade through either of her interminable romances, *Le Grand Cyrus* or *Clélie*. And we need no longer feel it incumbent upon us to do so; for in this book we shall find all we want to know about them. That Miss McDougall has read in them deeply if not all through them, and that she is fully conversant with the vast literature that has been written about the romances and their authoress, there is no question. For she has drawn in this, the first exhaustive study of Mlle de Scudéry and her works that has appeared in England, a lifelike portrait of the greatest of *les Précieuses*.

* Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

† *Madeleine de Scudéry, Her Romantic Life and Death.* Methuen. 12s. 6d.

The heroine is set in a background not only of her own Salon in le Marais, but of those stirring events and social conditions with which she was intimately associated. The Blue Room of Madame de Rambouillet, for instance, the foundation of the French Academy, the Fronde, the rise and fall of Fouquet. Indeed, we have here a picture of the great century through ninety-three years of which Madeleine de Scudéry lived. It is a history which should be read in conjunction with Miss McDougall's earlier book on Versailles and the Tuileries, *Two Royal Domains of France*.

Despite the ridicule heaped upon Madeleine and her friends by Molière and Boileau, we find her in these pages no mere dry-as-dust pedant. She had her human, even her modern, side, as may be seen from the following quotation given by Miss McDougall: "If ever I have a daughter she shall dance from the cradle, the first word taught her shall be a gallant one: she shall know the name of love before she knows her own; and, in consequence, she will likely conform more to a vestal than to a coquette." No mean psychologist was the author of *La Carte de Tendre*. Madeleine, though one of the first French feminists and remaining a spinster until the end of her long life, seems herself to have dallied with love. Why exactly she never married her faithful gallant, Paul Pellisson, no one, not even Miss McDougall, has been able adequately to explain.

To the history of French literature this book is an important contribution, for it shows the French novel at a significant crisis of its development. After producing two romances of thirty volumes each, the first containing no less than 13,095 octavo pages, Madeleine began to realise that the time had passed when Europe would eagerly await a fresh instalment of *Le Grand Cyrus* or of *Clélie*. *Almahide*, in 1660, ran to no more than eight volumes, *Célinte* in the following year to only one. In *Célinte* another new departure was made: the scene and the time, instead of the court of some oriental or ancient Italian potentate as in *Le Grand Cyrus* and in *Clélie*, was the contemporary court of Louis XIV. But alas! these concessions to changing literary taste brought Madeleine no success. Triumph in this modern field was to be left for her rival, Mme de la Fayette, whose masterpiece, *La Princesse de Clèves*, was soon to appear. While *Le Grand Cyrus* in three years had run through five editions and been translated into

several languages, not more than one edition of *Almahide* was called for, and we gather that *Célinte*, published anonymously, received no more enthusiastic welcome. Madeleine's works, however, will always remain invaluable sources for the history of her day because of their excellent portraits of her famous contemporaries, long hidden under oriental disguise, but identified eighty years ago by Victor Cousin's chance discovery of a key.

English readers will find two of the most interesting chapters of this book those which deal with Madeleine's readers and critics on this side of the Channel, with Dorothy Osborne, Mrs. Pepys, Dryden and Charlotte Lennox, her parodist, in *The Female Don Quixote.*

WINIFRED STEPHENS WHALE.

JOHN TIPTOFT.*

The sub-title of this book inevitably suggests the familiar Italian proverb that appears on its first page. But Tiptoft, though later denounced as a ruthless judge, was no fiend, nor did his sojourn in Italy corrupt his native character. His friendships there were with scholars, his money was spent in acquiring books and in patronage. But, while thus a pioneer of English humanism, Tiptoft was also a statesman, holding several high offices, diplomatic, administrative, and judicial. His varied career forms the subject of this scholarly work, based on research in Italy and England, and supplemented by valuable notes and beautiful illustrations. The distressful period of the Wars of the Roses here comes to life. Sir John escaped the earlier years of war by betaking himself to the Holy Land and Italy: at Padua he was one of five English pupils ("men barbarous by nature," according to an Italian description) of the famous Guarino da Verona. He visited Florence, and in Rome, as envoy from Henry VI to Pius II, pronounced an oration before the Pope which greatly impressed all hearers.

Tiptoft had been created Earl of Worcester in 1449 through the influence of Warwick, and, on his return to England in 1461, he took a leading part among the Yorkists. He was made Lord High Constable, with the newly-granted power to try

* *John Tiptoft: an Italianate Englishman, 1427-1470.* By R. J. Mitchell. Longmans. 1938. 16s.

cases of treason without jury or right of appeal: this innovation was, naturally, hated by the people, who, moreover, suspected the Constable of introducing foreign methods—the "lawe padoue" (i.e. of Padua). But the death sentences pronounced on the Earl of Oxford and other Lancastrians, and on the Earl of Desmond, were strictly legal, and, though Tiptoft's rule in Ireland may have been harsh, he could not be considered brutal save for two painful instances—the wholesale execution, with mutilation, of some mutineer sailors, and the slaughter of Desmond's young sons. These probably earned him the sinister title of "bocher [butcher] of Englande," though, as our author points out, it was first applied to him by a Tudor chronicler.

When finally, Edward being in exile, Tiptoft was captured by Lancastrian troops, and condemned to execution, he protested that all he had done had been in the interests of the State; he seems, indeed, never to have sought place or personal profit. At his death, says Fuller, the axe "cut off more learning than was left in the heads of all the surviving nobility." As Constable, Tiptoft had to preside over the Court of Chivalry, and compiled some *Ordinances for Justes* (jousts). His *Declamacion of Noblesse*, translated from the Latin, and printed by his friend Caxton in 1481, is given in Appendix I.

E. G. S.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The latest Chatham House publication on the colonial question is an Information Paper specifically devoted to *Germany's Claim to Colonies.** After its summary of German colonial policy before the War and the creation of the Mandates the Paper outlines, largely from facts and extracts from speeches, the gathering momentum of the German claim with its changing emphasis from purely economic grounds to those of prestige and national honour. The argument, widely accepted, that colonial restoration of itself cannot solve the economic problem is recapitulated in the Paper, which also sets out the more recent proposals, including the Van Zeeland Report, for general economic amelioration. In tracing the movements of British public opinion, the Paper, while emphasising the wide divergence of

* The Royal Institute of International Affairs, St. James's Square, London, S.W.1. 2s. net.

views, points to the "large body of opinion which, in principle, is in favour—for one reason or another—of making some concession to Germany." As to its nature there is no agreement and meanwhile the Government refuses to be committed. The Paper quite properly recognises "the fairly general agreement" that the allegations of German colonial maladministration have not been established.

* * * * *

Mr. Louis Thorn Golding has done well to search the records for new light on his Elizabethan ancestor, a distinguished Puritan scholar, and to publish the results in this handsome volume.* It is regrettable that no portrait or letters of its subject survive. Born at Belchamp St. Paul's, near Clare, in 1536, Arthur Golding was a considerable landowner in what the American publisher quaintly calls the "East Anglican country-side," and brother-in-law to John de Vere, Earl of Oxford. Educated at Jesus College, Cambridge, a member of the Inner Temple and of the Society of Antiquaries, his claim to remembrance is as the author of a great number of translations from the Latin and French, notably from Ovid and Calvin! He introduces the *Metamorphoses*, indeed, with grave moralisings. The chief interest of his version lies in the use of it apparently made by Shakespeare, though the poet is known to have read Ovid in the original also. Golding's translations have won praise from contemporary and more recent critics, and he was chosen by Sir Philip Sidney to complete that of De Mornay's *Truth of Christianity* left unfinished by himself. Golding also compiled a moral *Discourse* on the earthquake of 1580, and an account of a notorious murder a few years earlier; this is printed at length in the book. A specimen also given of his original verse is not inspiring, and it must be confessed that the prolonged litigation on certain estates, which reduced him temporarily to the Fleet Prison for debt, makes rather dull reading. He was still in debt at his death in 1606. A slight inaccuracy in describing two Orders of Friars (p. 24, cf. Appendix p. 229) should be corrected in a future edition.

* * * * *

There have been several biographies of Puccini, but this book, *Puccini Among Friends*,† by Vincent Seligman, has the great advantage of having been written largely by himself, and in some part by his friends. The true "inwardness" of incidents in his career is here presented by understanding and affectionate people, and in some hundreds of letters written by him in Italian, and now translated, to his very great English friend, Mrs. Seligman, from the time of their first acquaintance in 1904 until his death in 1924. There are interesting introductory chapters describing his methods of working, his "uncanny" and "unerring instinct for the theatre," which led him to

* *An Elizabethan Puritan.* By Richard R. Smith. 1937. $3.50.

† Macmillan. 16s.

struggle with his librettists for the proper presentation of the story before he could compose—indeed the dependence of the composer on his authors was desperate at times. And after all that had been surmounted, the choice of singers and the manner of production were also a very great anxiety. For these reasons he wrote far fewer operas than Verdi: only five great successes: *Manon Lescaut*, *Tosca*, *La Bohème*, *Madama Butterfly* and *Turandot*. His co-operation with the great conductor Toscanini, who still delights us, the singing in his operas of Melba, Ternina, Destinn, Jeritza and especially of Caruso, whose "authentic sob in the voice every Italian tenor has since striven in vain to copy," are here described. But Puccini himself preferred the "level performance" rather than a couple of star performers with the rest of the company distinctly second class. He won the reputation of keeping himself up to date, and "the influence of contemporary music is apparent, in a greater or lesser degree, in every opera that he wrote." There are several photographs of Puccini, one of Tosti, of D'Annunzio, and an amusing sketch of Caruso by himself.

* * * * *

Commander J. H. Owen has written a valuable account of naval operations during the first seven years of the War of the Spanish Succession in his *War at Sea under Queen Anne, 1702-1708*.* It is a detailed painstaking work derived from a study of contemporary records, including officers' journals, and will be appreciated by the student both of naval history and of this period. The war was not significant for any great decisive naval battle, although after Malaga in 1704 the French, like the Germans after Jutland, avoided a major engagement while harassing the merchantmen. The author deals at length with the system of convoys and patrols. These years, of course, were notable for numerous amphibious operations and for the foundation of a lasting British supremacy in the Mediterranean made possible by the capture of Gibraltar and finally Minorca in 1708. The reader will be interested in Commander Owen's views upon points which remain in controversy. For example in dealing with the Toulon Expedition he lends no support to Mr. Churchill's suggestion that the Duke of Savoy "deliberately spoiled the expedition" but accepts the ordinary view that it was thwarted by Prince Eugene's reluctance. Again in his account, which might well have been expanded, of the capture of Port Mahon he does not share Mr. Churchill's criticism of Admiral Leake's co-operation with Stanhope. In discussing the attempted invasion of Scotland by the Pretender with a French army in 1708, Commander Owen disputes vigorously the view, accepted among others by Professor Trevelyan, that Admiral Byng failed to corner all the French privateers under Corbin owing largely to the foul bottoms of all but two of the British ships. Such condition in regard

* Cambridge University Press. 21s. net.

to many vessels is, in the author's opinion, contrary to the evidence and asserted by Byng and Sunderland either for political reasons or to shift the blame. In this book, Commander Owen also discusses the direction and methods of naval command, conditions of service, the character and quality of the ships and the principal Commanders of the period.

• • • • •

Two recent additions have been made to the elegant volumes of The Nonesuch Library which aims to provide "by clever editing and appropriate critical apparatus a true conspectus" in a single volume of various great English writers. In *Milton*,* Mr. E. H. Visiak has collected all Milton's poetry and a substantial selection of his prose which excludes all the Latin works. The book contains English verse translations of the Latin Elegies and Sylvae by Mr. W. Skeat; while the Latin epigrams and the Italian Sonnets are rendered in English by Mr. A. Vesselo and George MacDonald respectively. Professor Enory Holloway has undertaken with skill and great care in *Walt Whitman*† the difficult and somewhat invidious, though no less important, task of publishing a representative collection of the great American's work. He has been able to include, with a few minor exceptions, the whole of Whitman's published verse, and also a large selection of his prose and correspondence, aiming thereby "to represent fully and fairly the many-sidedness of his nature and achievement." Both volumes contain brief annotations, mainly to clarify textual obscurities.

• • • • •

In *Wages and Income in the United Kingdom since 1860*,‡ Professor A. L. Bowley has revised and brought together as a most convenient coherent whole the conclusions of his innumerable investigations made during the past forty years. He has included wage and price index-numbers up to the end of 1936, but has not attempted an estimate of National Income since 1924 except only as to some important constituents in subsequent years. It is a volume for which the student of economic and social history during the last eighty years will be wholly grateful.

• • • • •

We would draw the attention of readers to *The Cross in the Star of David*, a small pamphlet giving particulars of the Jewish Christian Union, and the International Association for Jewish Christian Settlement in Palestine, an enterprise founded by Mr. Abram Poljak for distressed Jewish Christians. The pamphlet can be obtained from Diocesan House, 33 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1. There is also a Jewish Christian Liturgy drawn up by the Rev. P. P. Levertoff, D.D., and authorised by the Lord Bishop of London, for use in church.

* The Nonesuch Press. 10s. 6d. net. † The Nonesuch Press. 12s. 6d. net.
‡ Cambridge University Press. 8s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

AUGUST 1938.

THE GROUPING OF THE POWERS.

AT the beginning of the World War there were eight Great Powers. At the end there were seven, for Austria-Hungary had disappeared. Five were in Europe, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia; two outside, the United States and Japan. Four were satisfied with their share of the earth's surface, the four biggest. Three were not. The classification did not follow the simple dividing line of victory and defeat. Russia was beaten and lost territory, yet she was contented with her lot. Italy and Japan were on the winning side and gained territory, yet they complained that they had less than their deserts. If all the seven Great Powers were satisfied, there would be little fear of war. If all were dissatisfied, the outlook would be even darker than it is. The existence of even a single large State armed to the teeth and passionately convinced that it has not had a fair deal is a standing menace to peace, and now there are three. While each of them pursued an independent course it was formidable enough. Since they became working partners the danger is enormously increased, all the more because the four satisfied Powers can boast of no such intimate association. What Hitler calls the world triangle hangs like a sword of Damocles over our heads. Here indeed is the fundamental cause of the renewal of the armament race, of mounting deficits, of the terror which grips our hearts, of the utter uncertainty as to what may happen next week, next month or next year. In emphasising the sharp line of division between the satisfied and dissatisfied countries it is scarcely necessary to say that there is no flavour of praise or blame. That the biggest empires are content is as natural as that the smaller empires are not. While reserving our full right to censure specific endeavours of certain governments to redress the balance in their favour, we have no justification for severing nations into good or bad. Some were late starters, others had the luck of the deal. Bismarck was not the first or last statesman who created empires and made history with blood and iron.

Let us deal first with the two non-European Powers. Japan

is still in the stage of deliberate empire-building from which we only emerged with the conquest of the Sudan in 1898 and the Boer republics in 1902. So long as the mood of aggressive Imperialism prevails in Tokio any friend is welcome who will help her towards her goal. For nineteen years we were her ally, and unless we had kept the ring she could not have attacked and would not have defeated Russia. But our decision not to renew the alliance when it ran out in 1921, however wise it may have seemed at the time, was bitterly resented and was the prelude to a reorientation of Japanese policy. For a decade she lay low, biding her time. Then in 1931 she struck at China, braving the displeasure of the British Empire and the United States. With the triumph of Hitler she saw her chance of substituting her enemy in the World War for the ally who had thrown her over when she had played her part. There were points of contact with the new Germany. Both were dissatisfied with their share of the earth's surface, both were old enemies of Russia, both were the sworn foes of communism, both abhorred the League of Nations and all its works. The Anti-Communist pact of November 1936 pledged the governments to combat communism, but, as they were doing so already, it was difficult to believe that no other object was in view. Russia was not mentioned in the document, but everybody knew that antagonism to Russia was the *raison d'être* of the *rapprochement*. Whether there were secret articles of a political or military character we do not know. What is clear is that Japan is now working with Germany, as she had once worked with us. For we, as the greatest of the satiated Powers, stand for the *status quo*, whereas the friendship of Berlin and Tokio is cemented by common resentments and discontents. If and when Japan, after digesting a further morsel of Northern China, decides once again to attack Russia in order to drive her back to Lake Baikal, the reconciliation with Germany will prove of immense and possibly decisive significance. On the other hand Italy's subsequent adherence to the anti-communist pact was an ideological demonstration rather than a serious addition to the anxieties of Moscow.

Can we say that the United States are likely to redress the balance thus tilted in Germany's favour by her *rapprochement* with Japan? Everyone knows that we dare not answer in the affirmative. American sentiment was outraged and American commercial interests were damaged by the rape of

Manchuria, but not even Mr. Stimson ventured to propose an economic boycott of the aggressor. Americans looked with horror on the rape of Abyssinia, but there was no thought of taking action. America abhors the Nazi régime, its cult of violence, its contempt for law, its savage persecution of the Jews, its insane attack on the Churches, its detestable system of arbitrary arrest, concentration camps, torture, confiscation and espionage. Yet there is no feeling that it is America's business to interfere. Intervention in the World War was followed by a crop of bitter disappointments which have sunk deep into the national consciousness. Instead of paying their debts the nations of Europe are spending astronomical sums on rearmament. Instead of the world becoming safe for democracy it seems to have become safe for the aggressor. Instead of Europe settling down after the fiercest struggle in history it is girding itself for a new trial of strength. Millions of Americans regret that they sent their troops across the Atlantic, and millions more swear that they will not be caught again. Never was isolationism more firmly entrenched, not only because of wholesale unemployment and mounting deficits at home, but because the tragic futility of war is stamped across the face of Europe. Of the seven Great Powers America is the most politically and psychologically detached.

The return of Russia into the European game, after a decade of voluntary quarantine, ranks among the most significant events of the post-war world. Confronted by the resumption of Japanese aggression on the one hand and by the victory of Hitler, the hammer of the communists, on the other, Moscow sensed the perils of isolation, entered the League of Nations, revived the old partnership with France, and found a new ally in Czechoslovakia. That the Bolshevists would like their system to spread over the world is no secret, and the range of their propaganda is only limited by prudential considerations. But the attribution by the Nazis of aggressive intentions to Moscow is pure nonsense. The first reason is that the third largest empire in the world covets no territory and has its hands full in developing its immense estate. Secondly, it knows that an attack either on Japan or Germany would almost automatically bring in the other on its flank. That Russia will vigorously defend herself if attacked is beyond all doubt. That she will fulfil her obligations to France or Czechoslovakia in case of need is highly probable.

That she will herself start the avalanche is out of the question. Her internal system is a ruthless tyranny, and her savage Georgian dictator seems as incapable as Robespierre of satisfying his thirst for human blood. But we who are fortunate enough to live at the other end of Europe can regard her with somewhat greater detachment than her neighbours. She is no more democratic than Germany or Italy. But in a world highly charged with explosive possibilities, and at a time when the principles of Western civilisation are trampled underfoot by Hitler and Mussolini, we may be glad that Russia stands for peace, and that her Marxist ideology, however repulsive to the Western democracies, at any rate keeps her from joining the Rome-Berlin axis.

The coming of Hitler to power in 1933 is beyond question the most important event in European history since the end of the war. Germany was bound in time to recover her strength and her self-confidence, as France had quickly revived after Sedan, and it was madness on the part of France to trample on her prostrate foe. The process of recovery had gone far under the Weimar régime, but the Nazis quickened the pace. To-day Germany is no longer isolated and is rapidly becoming the strongest Power in Europe. Hitler's chief claim to the support of his countrymen is that he has ended the dictation of France and broken the fetters of Versailles. He has restored conscription, created a formidable air force, begun the building of a fleet to dominate the Baltic, refortified the Rhineland, disarmed the hostility of Poland by a ten-year pact of peace, accepted a 2 : 5 ratio in a naval agreement with Great Britain, ravished Austria, and helped to form the Rome-Berlin axis. After the war our eyes turned hopefully to Geneva ; to-day they turn anxiously to Berlin. For twenty years Bismarck bestrode Europe like a colossus, and all the world waited on his smiles or frowns. To-day a far smaller man sits in the Wilhelmstrasse, but the fate of every one of us is in his hands. If war is to be our portion, it is he who will hurl the thunderbolt.

What use will he make of Germany's recovery of her armed strength ? Dictators live by prestige, for they have no roots in the past and they know their time is short. Thus there is always a danger that megalomania or internal discontent may drive them to a desperate gamble, as Napoleon III gambled in 1870 and lost. Yet there is no reason to suppose that war is

a fixed point in the programme of the man who sits brooding over the map. Like other people he would greatly prefer to reach his goal by peaceful means. If he were beaten he and his system would disappear in the twinkling of an eye. He is aware that it is easier to start a conflagration than to limit its range. Litvinoff's maxim, " Peace is indivisible," though incorrect in relation to the Far East and Abyssinia, would almost certainly prove true of a conflict originating in the heart of Europe.

Unless a sudden emergency, such as the Serajevo murders, forces his hand, we may assume that Hitler and his advisers will carefully weigh the pros and cons of a policy of unlimited liability. After the march into the Rhineland he announced that the era of surprises was over. Yet the greatest surprise—the rape of Austria—was still to come, and there may well be others ahead. Believing as he does in the gospel of race, he is to be classed, not with the Imperialists who are eager to conquer alien races, but with the Pan-Germans who dream of gathering in the sheep outside the fold. But though it is intrinsically a more defensible principle, it may prove equally dangerous in practice. The majority have already been incorporated, for Austria has been absorbed. The Germans in Transylvania and Memel are far away. Danzig could hardly be reunited without a Polish war. South Tyrol is left to the tender mercies of Mussolini as the price of the Rome-Berlin partnership. But if the dictators drift apart, the Tyrolese will quickly find themselves subjects of the Reich, for Hitler has shown us what his promises are worth. Alsace cannot be reunited except after a smashing victory over the Western Powers. But what of the German districts of Czechoslovakia ? In the evening of his life Foch foretold that the next world war would start in the Corridor. Since the German-Polish pact of 1934, which has still over five years to run, that seems improbable. To-day our gaze is fixed not on Danzig but on Prague.

Czechoslovakia is a member of the Little Entente, but her partners are not pledged to defend her against a German attack. She possesses defensive alliances with France and Russia, but both are a long way off. The German fortifications in the Rhineland are rapidly becoming as impregnable as the Maginot line. Russian troops would have to force their way through Poland or Roumania, for the Polish-Roumanian

alliance was concluded to prevent Germany and Russia from flying at each other's throats. French and Russian airmen could render immediate but hardly decisive aid. The Czechoslovak army is reputed to be excellent in quality, but it is relatively small. Before the disappearance of Austria the frontier marched with Germany for 550 miles; to-day it is 800. Moreover the frontier districts are largely inhabited by German malcontents, whose grievances ought to have been remedied by the Prague Government years ago. The Czechs, like the French, made the costly mistake of thinking that Germany, once thoroughly beaten, could be kept in subjection by her conquerors.

Nobody imagines that Hitler has only just woken up to the grievances of the Germans beyond the borders of Bavaria, Saxony and Silesia, but he knows how to wait as well as how to strike. The seizure of Austria was obviously a less risky enterprise than a challenge to Prague, for the former was small, weak and without allies. But after its spectacular success the prospect as seen from Berlin has immeasurably improved. Germany thereby added seven millions to her population, enlarged her supply of iron and timber, became the neighbour of Italy, Hungary and Jugoslavia, increased her power to exercise political and economic pressure in South-Eastern Europe, and enormously enhanced her prestige. Her central position is a weakness when she is weak and a source of strength when she is strong. The rapidly growing power of Germany and the boldness of the Führer's lightning strokes are contrasted with the apparent lack of virility of the Western Powers. The passivity of Great Britain and France, despite their vital strategic interests in the Mediterranean, while Franco marches to victory with Italian and German support, has produced an impression throughout Europe almost amounting to stupefaction. What has happened to the British lion, people ask, that it has ceased to roar when its tail is twisted again and again? No wonder that the little States ask themselves whether it would not be wise to make terms with Berlin before it is too late. The Henlein of 1938 is a different man from the Henlein of 1935. When he emerged in the elections of 1935 he professed himself a democrat: to-day he is a Nazi. His conversion is the price of Hitler's support.

Prague is at last prepared to make substantial concessions

to the German and other minorities. Will they solve the problem, either temporarily or permanently, which brought Europe to the brink of war in the second half of May? The answer depends far more on Hitler than on Henlein, for the former has to bear in mind not merely the local grievances but considerations of far wider scope. The offer of Prague may well satisfy the unspoken feelings of many of Henlein's supporters, who have no wish to see their homeland devastated by war and who have no hatred of their Czech neighbours. Moreover no territorial cuts in districts with a German majority would meet the case of the hundreds of thousands of Germans scattered round the fringes of the State, and the transfer of any territory at all would carry with it large numbers of Czechs. The present frontier has existed for centuries, and the fortified mountain barrier is the only possible defence for the little State. Even to-day a bona fide equality of status and opportunity within the existing frontiers would satisfy a large section, perhaps the larger section, of the German population.

The problem has two faces, internal and external, and the latter is the most intractable. So long as Prague and Moscow are allies even the complete removal of domestic injustices and inequalities, we are assured from Berlin, would not suffice. As Hitler sees it, the alliance of France, Russia and Czechoslovakia is a perpetual threat to the security of Germany and a challenge to European civilisation. The Sudeten Germans are reminded that they may one day be compelled by treaty obligations to fight on the side of Russian communists against their German brothers in the Reich. It is apparently useless to point out that the alliances of France and Czechoslovakia, both predominantly bourgeois countries, were not made till 1935, and that there was no thought of such a combination till Hitler came to the helm. When countries are alarmed by the emergence of a new peril they instinctively seek allies. France, Russia and Czechoslovakia, being fully satiated Powers, have no urge to rob their neighbours, quite apart from the absurdity of wantonly challenging such a formidable Power as Germany. The alliance is as purely defensive in fact as it is in form. It is premature to decide whether it was wise to make it, for the drama is still running its course. But once made it cannot be torn up at the behest of the man whose potential enmity called it into being.

Compromise on internal problems in Czechoslovakia is desirable and essential. Surrender of the control of foreign affairs is incompatible with the conception of an independent State. To yield to a virtual ultimatum on such a point would be to enter the German orbit and become a trembling satellite of Berlin.

Assuming that Hitler contents himself this summer with an improvement of the status of the Sudeten, what of the future? A vital element in his calculations must be his relations with Italy. For seventeen years after the war the three Western Powers who had combined to defeat Germany formed a *bloc* which was destroyed by Mussolini's aggression in 1935. Finding himself alone and angrily resenting the imposition of sanctions, he looked round for a new friend. Where could he find an outstretched hand save in Berlin? The Rome-Berlin axis was the offspring of the Abyssinian adventure, and when the war was over the partnership remained. The dictators proceeded to pool their policy. Franco's rebellion provided a welcome opportunity of co-operation. Mussolini visited Berlin in September 1937, and Hitler responded by a visit to Rome in May 1938. A Central European *bloc* had been created which challenged the hegemony of Great Britain, France and Russia. The pattern of pre-war Europe re-emerged. Germany, Austria and Italy were in one camp, Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia and Russia in the other. The vertical and horizontal lines cross in Prague.

At the opening of the present year Mr. Chamberlain was so alarmed by the strength and hostility of the Hitler-Mussolini combination that he decided to liquidate the Anglo-Italian quarrel by a conditional promise to recognise the conquest of Abyssinia. Convinced that nothing could be done for the moment at Berlin, he believed the tension could be diminished by blunting the Rome end of the axis. Whether the Anglo-Italian treaty was on balance a wise step it is too early to decide. The recognition of the rape of Abyssinia is a moral humiliation for the Power which led the campaign of sanctions, all the more since we have never recognised the fruits of aggression in Manchuria. Do not let us grovel still further before the aggressor by supplying him with financial aid.

The seizure of Austria was the shock of Mussolini's life. After the foul murder of Dollfuss by the Nazis in 1934 he had proclaimed that he would stand by her to the end. Yet when she vanished he made no sign. No Italian could welcome the

Germans on the Brenner. In the twinkling of an eye the Rome-Berlin axis was transformed into the Berlin-Rome axis. To use Bismarck's familiar simile, Germany was henceforth the rider, Italy the horse. Hitler's fraternal embrace was becoming too tight to be comfortable. In that hour he realised the advantages of a *rapprochement* with Great Britain, or, to put it more crudely, of having one foot in each camp. This was the practice of Italy before the war, when the weakest member of the Triple Alliance had secret treaties with France and Russia. The countryman of Machiavelli is up to all the tricks of the trade. Would he have sided with Germany in a European war unless the Anglo-Italian treaty had been signed? It is by no means improbable. Does any one expect that he would do so now? Is it not almost certain that he would repeat the tactics of 1914 and wait to see which way the cat jumped? If so, Mr. Chamberlain may claim that he has something to show for surrender in Abyssinia and humiliation in Spain.

The Anglo-Italian *rapprochement* can never be watertight while France and Italy, as Mussolini remarked, are on different sides of the Spanish barricade. The Duce is resolved that Franco shall win, while France needs a Government at Madrid on whose benevolent neutrality she can rely in the event of war. For her communications with Africa are as vital to her as the maintenance of Belgian independence is to us. Yet she has felt unable to take a strong line against Italian aggression in Spain lest it should lead to a general conflagration. If another struggle is inevitable she wishes to face Germany on her eastern frontier with her undivided strength. Her armaments are large and steadily increasing, but Germany has now nearly double her population. France knows that she is too weak to ensure her own safety, and for that reason she looks to us. But we also look to her. Our frontier, as Lord Baldwin declared, is on the Rhine. Never have Anglo-French relations been so intimate as since the civilised Weimar statesmen were displaced by the Nazis. We are tied to France by the doctrine of the Balance of Power, which has been the master-key to our policy for four centuries, and by our common attachment to free institutions. While the two great democracies stand together, with the United States in the background, there is no fear of totalitarian autocracy suffocating Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic.

Foreign visitors constantly inquire why the British Government seems so unwilling to stand up to the truculent dictators. The answer, no doubt, is twofold. Firstly, our armaments are not yet up to a major emergency. Secondly, public opinion is too deeply divided for the Government to take uninsurable risks. Then what is its policy here and now? To defend France, Belgium, Portugal and Egypt (for twenty years) in accordance with our treaty obligations in case of attack. To prepare for the worst by piling up our means of defence. To seek opportunities of settlement with potential foes. To inform possible aggressors that a conflagration once started, for instance in Czechoslovakia, is almost certain to bring us in. Unfortunately, devotion to the League of Nations can hardly be reckoned among the characteristics of the Chamberlain Ministry since the resignation of Mr. Eden.

Germany is dissatisfied and she has some good reasons for dissatisfaction. But we cannot satisfy her at other people's expense. Then what of our own ample possessions? Shall we restore our share of her colonial empire, or at any rate some portion of it? Not, we rightly reply, as an isolated transaction but only, if at all, in return for some solid contribution to the stabilisation of peace. So long as Hitler demands the unconditional return of the German colonies there is nothing to be done. No party in Parliament would look at an arrangement which presented a potential foe with submarine and air bases in the heart of Africa.

The misuse of their victory by the Allies is a heart-breaking story of lost opportunities. It was a tragic mistake to impose the Treaty of Versailles on a proud nation, to refuse oral discussion, to keep Germany out of the League, to demand impossible reparations, to invade the Ruhr. The Locarno policy came too late to undo the mischief and it was not followed up. Briand disappeared, and Barthou was as blind as Poincaré. We are reaping what we have sown. Mr. Lansbury's plan of a round-table conference would lead nowhere; for economic concessions do not carry us very far, and countries are not in the habit of surrendering their property however politely the request is made. At the moment no master-stroke of conciliation seems possible.

G. P. Gooch.

JAPAN'S WAR OF CONQUEST.

MORE than a year having passed since the war in China began, and the end not being yet in sight, the business mind seeks an *ad interim* reckoning. This is a very imperfect proceeding, however, for there is no common standard to which the factors can be reduced. One of the most frequent of the comparisons made is that between the respective armies, and it is pointed out that China has far greater potentialities as a recruiting ground than Japan. There is not only a greater population, but a less complicated economy in China, which allows a larger proportion of the manhood to be withdrawn. On the other hand, if it is a matter of a mere counting of heads, China has, perhaps, seven times the population of Japan, but has lost ten times as many men. That the Chinese, hitherto reckoned an unwarlike race, have stood up against superior weapons with a fortitude which has few parallels in history does not help very much in an arithmetical comparison.

Wars, however, are not brought to an end so much by a competition in butchery as by the war-weariness of the civil population. To a certain extent invasion provokes a spirit of heroic resistance, but in the Great War the Germans, who had studied the subject most thoroughly, had very little faith in the strategic uses of adversity, and followed no principle so energetically as that of endeavouring to do all the fighting on the enemy's territory; and though they lost in the end, their principle was a sound one. The Japanese have the great advantage of doing all their fighting on the enemy's soil; and though the civil population in Japan has fared hardly, it has suffered none of the great tribulations which it has heaped so unsparingly on the heads of the Chinese. To pay higher prices and higher taxes is annoying, but a nation of newspaper readers, with a press willingly and completely subservient, can be induced to suffer much. Japan is completely free from the sufferings of China, which are on such a scale that it is difficult to assess them. There are wide areas of China as yet untrodden by the invader, yet not many centres of population that are now out of reach of the terrors of the bombing plane. The vast number of soldiers killed is probably exceeded by that of the civilians blown to pieces in the cities, massacred in the villages, and lying dead from

privation in flight ; and as for the lives lost in the floods which are the result of the invasion, whether through neglect or the deliberate breach of the river banks, they are past computation. It is difficult to see how famine on an enormous scale can be avoided over a very large part of China. From all this Japan is entirely free.

It is not necessary in such a survey to say anything of the gratuitous horrors of war. An invasion is always sufficiently terrible, and how the Chinese population has been treated in only certain small areas and during a very short period of time may be read (with the documents) in Mr. H. J. Timperley's *What War Means* (Gollancz). War may be more scientific than of old, but it is certainly not less barbarous.

Sympathy with China in a war which is destitute of justification for the attacker, and admiration for the unity and fortitude shown by a previously disunited and unwarlike nation, have rather blinded us to the facts. People are rather ready to declare that " Japan has already lost," that " she can never control a great population that hates her," and so on. But the facts are these : Japan, it is true, miscalculated badly in her estimate of China's resistance. Not that a juster estimate would have deterred her : the Japanese view was that China must be conquered before she became too strong ; and, however great the task, it must be undertaken. The miscalculation, however, was one of degree rather than a fundamental error. Yet it involved a fundamental change in strategy. Had there been a complete collapse in the north, and no northward expedition to recover for China the beaten provinces, the campaign would, it is pretty certain, have followed the pattern of that of 1931, with the setting up of a puppet government under the Japanese ægis, and an ambiguous relationship regarding other countries. As it was, the Chinese government has not ceased for a moment to try and recover its territory. But Japan still has the initiative and seems likely to retain it.

Whether what is called " international law " really operates effectively once force is let loose may be doubted ; but a distinguished authority on international law, in the service of the Japanese Government, laid down the dictum at the time of the Manchurian business that " recognition " was not of the nature of a privilege granted, but simply an acknowledgement of fact ; that a region could not, except for a very short

time, be regarded as being without a government ; and that if the central government refrained from taking energetic steps to try and recover territory that had passed under another authority, the region in dispute passed from its sway. Supposing for the sake of argument that this is sound doctrine, it constitutes the great difference between the Sino-Japanese campaigns of 1931-2 and of 1937-8. At Peking there was an initial withdrawal in face of a powerful threat, just as there had been in Manchuria ; but there has been an unceasing endeavour to recover the lost ground—unsuccessful, indeed, but quite sufficient to render farcical any claims put forward by a substitute government.

Japan has certainly not lost any time in trying to establish a substitute government for that which it has rendered ineffective over a large part of North China, less, perhaps, from any belief in the potency of what lawyers regard as " international law " on the subject than from a very lively conviction that possession is nine points of the law, international or other. The selection of her own creatures from among former Chinese officials as heads of all sorts of bureaux was one of the easiest and least important of the proceedings. Everything was worked out on a carefully arranged plan, and few details were overlooked. The officials of the " independent " governments have no power whatever, but may in some cases act as mouthpieces of the Japanese whom they serve. On the pretext of the necessity for there being new laws to direct commerce and industry, those laws are promulgated, and all Chinese commercial and industrial ventures are taken under Japanese charge and direction, with some show of trying to make it look like a voluntary arrangement. A purely imaginary Japanese capital is injected, in order to justify a very effective Japanese control. All public services are, of course, taken under Japanese direction. One of the most important innovations is the interference with the Customs, to which the Japanese have succeeded in obtaining a provisional acquiescence. Leaving some show of existing authority, the Japanese have allowed the Customs service to resume its work on new conditions. It is very difficult to see what else could have been done short of taking sides actively with China against the invader. Japan even offered the bait of a new tariff, devised by herself. In need of all the money that could be raised, the Chinese Government had

increased the tariff to somewhat rigorous heights, such as would, if continued in the present circumstances, have almost precluded import, and a reduction is, no doubt, very welcome. The Japanese have lowered the rates, and have got a large number of Japanese assistants into the service. From the foreign trader's point of view, the relief is small, but very welcome. Besides, it was the only alternative to a continued monopoly enjoyed by Japanese duty-free goods. With a large Japanese personnel, all taught from childhood that their one aim in life must be to promote their country's interests, it is impossible that the Customs should now be managed with any substantial show of impartiality, but from the trader's point of view there is a great difference between doing a little trade and doing none at all. At the same time, the seriousness of this arrangement must be recognised. In however large a degree Japan's success falls short of her desires, a defeat such as would make her withdraw unconditionally seems at the present moment the most unlikely thing in the world, so the restoration of the Customs service to its former status is virtually impossible. The best that can be hoped for is that its funds will be deposited in the Bank of China again instead of in the Yokohama Specie Bank. At present, such trade as has been restored to foreign interests is only assisting in the accumulation of a fund which Japan will claim. Pretexts for such a claim will be extremely numerous ; and no more than will suffice for the service of the foreign loans will ever be disgorged.

To this extent numerous countries whose whole sympathies are with China are actually serving Japan. Indeed, all of the foreign public services in China come under the same criticism. Whether it be the police service, the water supply, transportation, the supply of electricity, or the ordinary amenities of trade, these, where carried on by foreigners in areas under Japanese military control, are serving the Japanese cause ; and, unpleasant though it be to contemplate it, there is no visible remedy, though there are conceivable ways of making things worse. Most of the interferences with the previous routines have been entirely contrary to the principles on which international residence and trade have been carried on for the greater part of a century, but the Japanese exercise *force majeure* under the guise of military necessity. To the philosophic view, it is an object-lesson in the undesirability of the numerous encroachments on China's sovereignty which we

have encouraged in the past ; but while we philosophise China is in danger of bleeding to death. It has been remarked how much slower is the Japanese progress from Nanking to Hankow than it was from Shanghai to Nanking. This is not due entirely to military reasons. Japan would be very glad to reach a conclusion, for the war is costly ; but extra speed costs a great deal of money ; and time lost in penetrating the Yangtse valley has its compensations. That " time is on China's side " is a platitude which we sometimes repeat to soothe our own consciences. It is far from being altogether true. The longer the Japanese have to dig in their heels in the north before a general settlement is reached, the firmer will be their hold, whatever the outcome of the present struggle—unless we are so optimistic as to expect that China will win an absolute victory.

Prince Konoye, the Japanese Premier, taking note of the anniversary of the outbreak of war, reiterated the frequent declaration that Japan was paying due respect to all foreign interests in China. He admitted regretfully that in England, where these interests are largest, the declaration only evoked scepticism. It is possible that Prince Konoye spoke sincerely, and according to his official information ; and the military men in Shanghai and other places, if they ever consider the matter at all, find it the easiest thing in the world to persuade themselves that actions which interfere with foreign interests possess some military advantage for Japan. Scepticism penetrates into other quarters also. Denials of massacre, of wanton cruelty, and of reckless bombing and shooting, are so much at variance with facts of which the evidence accumulates, that they can only be accounted for as due to the demoralising influence of war. No doubt the Japanese point of view is that " We are bearing the heat and burden, and whatever benefit to ourselves can be reaped is our legitimate harvest." An obedient press, feeding a docile nation with the propaganda that its self-respect demands, easily persuades the Japanese public that its cause is a righteous one and that all criticism is malicious.

With the completion of a year of warfare there were also renewed declarations that no peace could be made with General Chiang Kai-shek's Government. Undue importance appears to be attributed to these, for it would be perfectly easy to discover a reason for treating with the Kuomintang

Government if it became advantageous to do so. The declaration, is, indeed, a somewhat stale device. It was freely used over a hundred years ago, when nations disclaimed hostile feelings for the French people and concentrated on Napoleon, and it is, of course, merely a propaganda trick to try and detach the nation from its leader. But the Japanese utter it with great solemnity, and have been doing so ever since China protested against the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. It would be less easy for the Chinese to select an individual enemy, and to say that they are fighting Japanese militarism and not the Japanese people would be so obvious as to be absurd. Changes in the Government of a country at war are by no means always a sign that things are not going well, though they indicate a desire to make them go better. The Japanese Cabinet becomes more military with every change. There is a civilian Premier, it is true, but he obediently says whatever he is required to say by his military colleagues. And not only are the Defence Ministers both (as the rules require) service men, but there is an admiral for Home Minister, a general for Foreign Minister, and a general for Minister of Education. General Araki, who holds the Education portfolio, is fond of heroics, but what more he can do in an educational system so full of the gods, of Cæsarism, and glorification of war that some years ago it was complained in the House of Peers that the school books were full of nothing but bloodshed, it is not easy to see; but his authority on other matters will be powerful at Cabinet Councils. It is more difficult to understand how he finds himself in the same Cabinet with Mr. Ikeda, for many years the principal brain in Mitsui's, for six years ago General Araki, as Minister for War, used to inveigh almost like a good Communist against the big firm, which he swore he would never allow to get into Manchuria. But general officers in Japan have a habit of rather suddenly losing the heats of youth and becoming wise. Perhaps General Araki has reached the age when he sees that capitalism has its place in the world. Six years ago he said that the only danger in which Japan stood was that of dangerous thought, and that so long as that was absent, Japan could meet the world successfully though her soldiers were armed only with bamboo spears. Since then there have certainly been some demonstrations that however high the spirit of man, it cannot avail against mechanism.

Rather less than the due emphasis has been put on the fact that Japan has entered on a second year of war with a declaration that she still does not regard herself as being at war but only as delivering the Chinese people from an oppressive government. It would be difficult to deny that the Nanking Government was oppressive. A government making a great effort to achieve modern military defence cannot be other than oppressive; but as for deliverance, Soochow and Nanking, as well as many other places, have had experiences which seemed to bear no relation whatever to this aim. Still, the theory of deliverance has some support. One of Japan's star propagandists is a Chinese woman with a platform talent, who tells of the dreadful experiences she had in Hankow and how much she was relieved to get to a part of China that was under Japanese occupation. The reason for not declaring war, however, has nothing to do with deliverance. The United States laws provide for the automatic cutting off of supplies from a country that declares war, and though that usage which goes by the name of "international law" would make it easier than at present for Japan to blockade the China coast, Japan finds the munitions that she buys from the United States far more deadly to China than the trickle which gets through to China from the same source is deadly to Japan. Japan has, in fact, while not admitting that she is at war, succeeded in stopping large consignments of arms bound for China, and has cried out so much about those which she has not succeeded in stopping, that she has created a general impression that China is getting help and that Japan is getting none. Actually, of course, Japan's imports are far more important than China's, hence her refusal to declare war. It is an unsatisfactory position, but it is hardly probable that the nations will ever find and adopt a procedure which, in time of war, will give general satisfaction or even operate, on the whole, justly.

Those who, in Europe, are looking forward, somewhat fearfully, to the dangers of war in their own countries, have reason for apprehension when they observe the work of the air arm in Spain and China. The destruction and slaughter in both countries has been horrible, and the aeroplane seems now to be the chief weapon of terror in war. The one thing in which it has failed conspicuously is that instead of inducing submission it provokes a spirit of desperate resistance. The

Chinese have been at a terrible disadvantage as regards the air arm, but have been well served by a number of Russian airmen who have fought for them. Nor is this the only service that Russia has rendered, for Japan has fought all the time with a wary eye on the Soviet, and a big force on the Manchurian border. So long as Manchuria was under the Chinese, the Russians did not trouble to defend their border; but since the advent of Manchukuo, the whole line has been fortified and well manned, as Japan is regarded as a very dangerous enemy. There are always "incidents" on the border any of which would serve as an excuse for beginning a fight; but though it is conceivable that Mr. Stalin would not be altogether averse from diverting attention from internal troubles by means of a war in the Far East, there is considerable doubt as to how Germany would react. Besides, the Chinese Government itself would regard a Russian offer of help with apprehension, for when the Kuomintang decided to purge itself of Communism, it was somewhat drastic in its methods, and in case of accepting Russian help would expect to have to pay for it by the adoption of a policy more agreeable to Moscow. Where "ideologies" come in, the situation becomes all the more complicated.

As a moral force, able to prohibit war, the League of Nations has disappointed those who had the highest hopes of it, and civilisation is threatened as a consequence. It was certainly not expected that the most striking demonstration of the League's failure would be in the Far East. But the League has escaped one great danger: it might easily have formed two hostile parties, keeping a precarious peace until another Great War came. The secession one by one of members which were unwilling to accept the general verdict and calculated that they could defy it with safety has left a membership which can use its influence for peace and reconstruction, without threatening the rest of the world. It is not what was hoped in 1919, but what was hoped for was too much like force to be really acceptable. Perhaps when Japan and China have come to an end of their struggle, the League may be able to direct reconstruction on lines that look for something beyond the highest safe dividend.

A. MORGAN YOUNG,
Former Editor, *Japan Chronicle*.

BRITISH POLICY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

"The immediate object of British policy," wrote Mr. Powys Greenwood in last month's issue of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, "seems to be to arrange a peaceful settlement of the Czechoslovak minority problem and to further Czech-German understanding. That is only possible if the Czechs abandon the Russian alliance for a policy of neutrality, allow the Sudeten Germans considerable influence over their policy and cease to act as a barrier against Germany. Nothing short of this will satisfy either the Sudeten Germans or Berlin. Sooner or later if the barrier remains, the Germans will fight."

NOBODY would dispute the general truth of Mr. Greenwood's first sentence, though his euphemistic use of the term "Czech-German understanding" to mean "that which will satisfy Berlin and the Sudeten Germans" without mentioning the Czechs is more questionable. Nobody would dispute the truth of any of Mr. Greenwood's sentences if the word "German" were substituted for the word "British" in the first sentence, since the policy which Mr. Greenwood outlines is in fact nothing more nor less than the policy of Germany. Why should this also be ours? If we are indifferent or even favourable to Germany securing a commanding influence over Czechoslovakia, it would seem unnecessary to forsake a carefully preserved British neutrality in Central Europe. Germany is five times as strong as Czechoslovakia, and it would appear gratuitous to add our strength to the present disproportion in order to force acceptance of an "understanding" on the Czechs. Yet there is reason to believe that Mr. Greenwood is right, and the policy of the British Government since the Czech-German issue was raised in an acute form in March of this year has been to support Germany at the expense of Czechoslovakia. This has been the effect, if not the motive, of British policy.

It must be remembered that Mr. Chamberlain was involved in Central European affairs against his will. In January of this year, two months before the event, the French warned the British Government that the independence of Austria was seriously threatened. They requested that common action should be taken by England and France to show Germany that the two countries were interested. Mr. Eden was known

to be in favour, but action was impossible without the previous consent of the Cabinet. The matter was laid before Mr. Chamberlain; shortly afterwards Mr. Eden resigned. His resignation was the defeat not only of a certain attitude towards Italy, but of a general policy in Central Europe and the Mediterranean.

The story of the invasion of Austria on March 11th is too well known to be told again. When the news of German pressure on Dr. Schuschnigg reached London, Mr. Chamberlain was lunching with Lord Halifax and Herr Ribbentrop. On the assurance of the latter that a "peaceful understanding" was expected, the British Government urged Dr. Schuschnigg to take no drastic action for self-defence. The French who were far from reassured by statements passed between Herr Ribbentrop and Mr. Chamberlain, demanded an answer to their earlier request for joint action. At 7 p.m. Schuschnigg resigned with the words:

> The Federal President authorises me to inform the Austrian people that we yield to force. . . . We have given our armed forces, in case the German invasion is carried out, orders to withdraw without serious resistance—without resistance—and to await the decisions of the hours which are to come.

The German invasion was carried out, and at 9 p.m. the common Anglo-French action was at last taken in support of Austrian independence. It took the form of simultaneous protests in Berlin that this independence no longer existed.

The whole question of our policy in Central Europe was again raised. In his speech of February 20th, Herr Hitler mentioned two countries whose internal conditions were, in the long run, "intolerable for a world power with national pride." The first was Austria and the second Czechoslovakia. The French again pressed for combined action; but the situation of Czechoslovakia differed in one important respect from that of Austria. French intervention did not depend on previous agreement with us. Regardless of the attitude which we might adopt, the French were committed to the military defence of Czechoslovakia (by the Franco-Czech Guarantee Treaty of 1924 incorporated in the Treaty of Locarno, 1925). We on the other hand were committed to the defence of France (also under Locarno—both these parts of the Locarno Treaty were confirmed after Germany tore up the Rhineland

Pact in 1936) should Germany attack France. Legally, of course, we were not committed should France attack Germany, even if her motive for doing so was to come to the protection of Czechoslovakia after a German attack on that country. This legal protection was obviously slight and it was almost certain, should Germany attack Czechoslovakia, that we should be involved. This situation was confirmed by Mr. Chamberlain in his speech to the House of Commons on March 24th, 1938.

> Where peace and war are concerned, legal obligations are not alone involved, and, if war broke out, it would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations . . . it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries besides those which were parties to the original dispute, would almost immediately become involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven, devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty, and determined to uphold them.

In other words, whether we liked it or not, we were through our alliance with France and the French alliance with Czechoslovakia, involved in the Czech-German conflict. Our being involved, however, in no way committed us or predetermined us to a certain policy. Our aim, since we were involved, was to use our influence in an already existent conflict in such a way that it would result in an "understanding."

In determining the policy which we would pursue, the first question was obviously: had we, or had we not, any important interests ourselves or was peace, as Mr. Eden I believe once said, our greatest interest? In his speech of March 24th Mr. Chamberlain denied that we had any vital interests in Central Europe and appeared to confirm in relation to this particular area, that our main interest was peace. In other words, so long as peace itself was secured, we were more or less indifferent as to the actual terms. On this assumption, we would bring pressure to bear on the side most likely to surrender, we would support the side who would fight rather than accept any other but his own definition of an "understanding."

If Mr. Chamberlain agreed with Mr. Powys Greenwood that the Germans would fight if they obtained anything short of satisfaction of their claims, his conviction that war was not

inevitable would predispose him to conclude that the Czechs would not fight and that therefore pressure could be brought to bear on them to surrender even their independence. A policy intended to bring about a swift German solution of the Czech-German problem would be carried out in four main ways :

1. It would put pressure on the Czechoslovak Government to give in to the full demands of the Sudeten German Party (the Henlein Nazis) thus assuring to the latter a commanding influence over Czechoslovak policy.

2. It would recognise the interest of the German Government in Czechoslovakia and in the Sudeten German Nazi party as justified in spite of the recognised principle of international law which forbids foreign intervention in the internal affairs of another country.

3. It would put pressure on the French to relinquish their alliance with Czechoslovakia. Since the Czech-Soviet Pact is dependent for its operation on the Franco-Czech and Franco-Soviet pacts, this would have the automatic effect of isolating Czechoslovakia simultaneously from France and from Russia. Our pressure on the French would not take a direct form, but would arise from our categorical refusal to commit ourselves to the defence of France should she be involved in war with Germany through her alliance with Czechoslovakia. In return we would probably tighten up our military understanding with France in Western Europe.

4. It would intimate to the German Government that while in war time we would probably come in on the French side against Germany, in peace we would support German claims in Czechoslovakia—but only in so far as these were peacefully pursued.

Do the facts support that this has been Mr. Chamberlain's policy ?

1. On May 7th the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister received the French and English Ministers and a *communiqué* was issued which stated that both Ministers had advised Dr. Krofta to go " to the utmost limit of possibility " in reaching an agreement with the Sudeten German Minority. On May 16th, replying to questions in the House of Commons, Mr. Butler declared that no particular measures or concessions had been suggested. He refused to answer requests from all parts of the House that the British Government would give no support to

concessions which either threatened the military defence of Czechoslovakia or accorded to the Sudeten German Minority a decisive influence over Czechoslovak foreign policy. It is not known exactly what concessions the Czechoslovak Government was asked to make, and it is doubtful whether they took a precise form. The suggestion that an impartial commission should be appointed was refused by the German Government. The Czechs accepted the appointment of British observers. It was recommended that the Czechs should comply with the German request for the demobilisation of the reserves called up during the week-end of May 22nd in response to German troop movements on the Czechoslovak frontier.

2. We have expressly recognised the interest of Germany in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia by informing the German Government on each occasion of our action in Prague and the reply of the Czechoslovak Government.

3. In March, as we have seen, the earlier request of the French Government that we should define our Central European policy was repeated. On March 24th Mr. Chamberlain made what was expected to be and has since been called a " statement of policy." It was, however, no more than a statement of fact—that we would probably be involved on the side of the French if war broke out. The question to which the French demanded an answer was, however, not whether it would be possible to count on our neutrality, but whether it would be possible to count upon our assistance. Mr. Chamberlain replied in the negative :

> This position (that of being called upon automatically in the event of a conflict) is not one which His Majesty's Government could see their way to accept in relation to an area where their vital interests are not concerned in the same degree as they are in the case of France and Belgium ; it is certainly not the position which results from the Covenant. For these reasons His Majesty's Government feel themselves unable to give the prior guarantee suggested.

At the end of April, the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister paid a visit to this country. It was made plain to them (to the French Government) that we could not go beyond Mr. Chamberlain's statement of probability of March 24th. It was intimated to the French that our policy was one of " neutralising " Czechoslovakia and the French were asked to

associate themselves with us in putting pressure on Prague. M. Daladier renewed his assurance that the French would come to the immediate assistance of Czechoslovakia, but nevertheless agreed to add their pressure to ours in forcing an "understanding" on the Czechs. Did the French accept our and the German definition of the term "understanding"?

The *Temps* published an article by M. Bartélemy which tried to prove that France was not really committed to the defence of Czechoslovakia since this agreement, like the Rhineland Pact, had been torn up by the German action in 1936. Both in Paris and in Prague the French Government officially denied that this article expressed anything more than the opinion of M. Bartélemy, and reaffirmed their loyalty. Obviously, however, the British refusal to give a guarantee to France strengthened the hand of the French defeatists and encouraged those who favoured pressure on Prague.

4. Our negotiations with Germany over Czechoslovakia are more obscure. The events of May 21st-22nd would suggest that the Germans had not in fact understood our policy, the essence of which was to avoid a conflict, and not to support the German claims *per se*, or in the event of a conflict.

By sending troops to the Czechoslovak frontier, the Germans inevitably forfeited our support. The German troop movements were countered by the calling up of the Czech reserves and a threat on the part of the French to mobilise. In other words, our entire policy, whose only aim was the exclusion of this possibility, was shown to have failed. The Germans still resorted to methods of violence and, what showed even greater miscalculation on our part, the Czechs had shown themselves also ready to fight, so that the danger of war was no less in May than it had been in March.

The whole history of the crisis of May 21st-22nd has not yet been published and certain important questions remain unanswered. What, for instance, did the Germans really intend by their troop movements? If they intended to attack, what was the relative weight of the various factors which stopped them? From all accounts, the most important factor was the Czech mobilisation. This took place on the Friday night, and it was on Saturday that our intimation to the Germans that we would not "remain inactive" took place. In other words, by the time we interfered we knew that the Czechs were prepared to fight even without our support and

that either they counted on the French and the Russians, or they were prepared to fight alone.

This fact should change our whole policy, because, if the Czechs are prepared to fight for their independence in all circumstances, even without the certainty of French or Russian aid, our policy is bound to fail. The more we put pressure on the Czechs, the more we try to isolate them, the more certain is the probability of war, since it encourages the Germans to think that an isolated war in Czechoslovakia is possible, and a war in which Germany is five times as strong as her opponent holds no terrors for the German army. In fact, isolated war is absolutely impossible. Not only are the Czechs bound to fight for their independence because to them the loss of it takes all value from peace, but France's position as a first-class Power is at stake.

In 1866 France lost the leadership of Europe because she allowed Austria to be defeated by Prussia at Königgrätz (to-day the most strongly fortified point in the Czech defences). In 1870 she was defeated again. In 1918 she was morally defeated because she won against Germany and Austria-Hungary only with the help of a world-wide coalition. Her entire post-war policy has been concentrated on building up in Eastern Europe the vital counterweight which France needs to balance Germany. Czechoslovakia is the key-point in this system. If she goes France is again at the mercy of Germany as she was after the battle of Königgrätz. For France and for the Czechs the issues in Central Europe concern their most vital security.

For Germany much less is at stake. Czechoslovakia is only one of her ambitions and up to 1936 played a minor part in German foreign policy. If Germany realised that an attack on Czechoslovakia means another world war and a strong coalition against Germany, it is doubtful that she would at present force the issue. There are other points in the Nazi programme which can be achieved more easily and at less risk. Surely therefore, a real policy of peace would be one which was directed to a clear intimation to Germany that we can guarantee to the Sudeten Germans no more than is their right as citizens of a democratic country and that the German attempt to use them against Czechoslovak independence will lead inevitably to a new world war in which our place will be by the side of our allies.

S. GRANT DUFF.

"FREEDOM DAY."

"But this people's Heart is waxen gross and their ears are dull of hearing. . . . Wherefore God shall send them strong delusion; that they should believe a lie; lest at any time they should hear with their ears and understand with their heart and be converted and I should heal them."

THE first day of August, 1838, known in the British West Indies as "Freedom Day," was the date on which the freeing of slaves was intended to be completed by the termination of the Apprenticeship System instituted by the British Emancipation Act.* Projects have been afoot during the last four years for organising popular demonstrations and Thanksgivings in celebration of the centenary of Emancipation throughout the West Indian and other Colonies or territories whose inhabitants might be presumed to desire to express their emotions at the enjoyment of freedom. These projects have been falling rather flat; and it seems probable that the two or three years' period ending to-day will be principally remembered in Colonial history as having been signalised by petitions from wage-earners in Mauritius for redress of industrial grievances and in the West Indies and British Guiana by "labour disturbances," strikes for higher wages, food riots, tumultuous assemblings, prosecutions of labour "agitators" for sedition and the discouragement of such manifestations of discontent by appointments of Special constables, the massing of armed Police forces, local Militia forces, companies of the British Army, and of Marines from the British Navy, and the patrolling of coasts by Imperial ships of War. Writers in the British Press and Members of Parliament have expressed very vigorously a general impression produced on the British public, by the accounts received here of these events, that the economic and political regimen introduced in the Colonies in substitution for the system of slavery and for political control by local plantocracies has not been altogether successful in its operation.

Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in opening the proceedings of the Oxford University Summer

* An Act for the Abolition of Slavery Throughout the British Colonies; *For Promoting the Industry of the Manumitted Slaves*; and for Compensating the Persons hitherto entitled to the services of such Slaves. (August 28th, 1833.)

School on Colonial Administration at Lady Margaret Hall on June 28th last, is reported to have spoken as follows:

> Colonial policy must have thought, plan and design and it must be constantly inspired by some great purpose. What was the main purpose of the British Empire? He thought it was the gradual spread of freedom among all His Majesty's subjects in whatever part of the Empire they lived. They in this country had a passion for liberty; they gained it by many struggles on the part of their forefathers. They cherished it to-day, and they would fight and die for its maintenance again.
>
> The spread of freedom throughout the countries oversea is going on all the time, by a slow, evolutionary process.
>
> In some countries overseas the process was already completed. . . . The Dominions were completely free, and they were to-day in practice equipped with all the constitutional rights and powers of a full sovereign nation.
>
> But even among the most backward nations of Africa their main effort should always be to stand a little more securely on their own feet. In spite of the great variety of conditions they could detect that process going on. They could say with confidence that the trend was towards the ultimate establishment of the various colonial communities as self-supporting and self-reliant members of a great commonwealth of free peoples and nations.
>
> He thought they were conscious that the eyes of the whole world were fixed on British colonial administration to-day. They had got to be more vigilant than they had ever been before, and see to it that the standard of their government of their fellow subjects throughout the British Empire was on a level and very high.

The promoters of slave emancipation firmly believed in two things: (1) Politically and economically they believed in the principles of individual liberty and capitalist enterprise. (2) Most effectually for their purpose, the most active of them believed that the freed slaves were children of God, members of Christ and inheritors of the Kingdom of Heaven. The only relic of these convictions remaining discernibly active in present-day Colonial Policy is that the capitalist system of industry (which does not effect what the slaves understood by freedom or what their descendants and representatives understand by it, either in industrial or political matters) is essential and indispensable for the maintenance of civilised human society and that its preservation from dissolution in the Colonies as in totalitarian Europe must be the paramount

aim of all intelligent statesmanship. This is the common conviction sincerely and firmly held by the British National Government of which Mr. Malcolm MacDonald is an accepted member, by their supporters in Parliament who form an overwhelming majority of that body, and presumably by the electors who have returned and support them.

Mr. MacDonald spoke brave words. Precisely similar sentiments were being prodigally uttered by statesmen a hundred years ago on the same topic. The report from which I have quoted was tantalisingly brief, and I have been unable to obtain any report of the subsequent discussions. Some students must surely have longed to ascertain from Mr. MacDonald precisely what he meant by the word " freedom " and what was the form of the very high standard he hoped our Colonial administration would duly attain.

I have before me a reprint, compiled by a West Indian journal, of letters and special articles which have appeared in the British Press on the subject of features considered to be unsatisfactory in West Indian communities which have recently attracted attention and of some of the comments that have been made about these conditions in the Foreign and Colonial Press. The impressions of the contributors of these commentaries do not appear to support the convictions of Mr. MacDonald of the progress of freedom, of constitutional rights and capacity for self-support among Colonial populations. They must be content with the explanation that these developments are proceeding by a " slow evolutionary process." This " gradualness " of the process does not seem to them quite inevitably so gradual.

The comments made in this country, ranging from the sentiments of Sir Leonard Lyle to those of Mr. Lloyd George, are very illuminating as to the degree of acquaintance with the facts of our Colonial Empire prevailing throughout this country. To criticise the manifold ignorance they display would be too immense a task for this article. It almost induces me to suppose it possible that some needed light may be thrown on Colonial problems by the labours of the proposed Royal Commission. I feel, however, impelled to correct one misapprehension expressed very vehemently by friends of my own on behalf of the Independent Labour Party, that poverty in the West Indies is chiefly due to the ruthless exploitation of wage labourers by callous employers and planters

who make vast profits at their expense. I have never myself known any West Indian sugar planter who made great profits out of the ruthless exploitation of labour or who did not admit that the highest wages he could afford to pay consistently with remaining in business were deplorably low. That is part of the West Indian employers' case against the British consumer, and has been so for the last fifty years or more. The greatest mistake that Mr. Ormsby-Gore (the best-informed and most progressive Colonial Secretary that the Colonies have had during my recollection) made in connection with the recent trouble in Trinidad was to allow Sir Murchison Fletcher to retire and Mr. H. Nankivell to be removed from the service of Trinidad because the Commissioners he had sent out reported that they had made " indiscreet " utterances. Not all West Indian planters and employers think such utterances " indiscreet," any more than do the classes that suffer from the low wages. Such utterances chiefly appear indiscreet to the British shareholders of Colonial companies. West Indian employers know them to be true ; and impressed that fact upon Mr. Semple and myself when we were studying West Indian conditions in 1929-30 in all of the principal sugar-producing Colonies, as part of the case for fair treatment of all Colonial producers at the hands of British consumers.

British public opinion appears to have been specially shocked by the reports of bad housing among West Indian wage-earners. Comparatively little emphasis has been laid on the low rates of wages. As to housing, there is nothing to be said that was not expressed more than forty years ago in Mr. Bernard Shaw's early play, *Widowers' Houses* ; and the Duke of Montrose spoke very pertinently in the House of Lords when he remarked that there were bad housing conditions in Scotland. The causes in both cases are the same. There is more bad housing proportionately to the numbers and needs of the workers in Great Britain than there is in the West Indies. The low wages are the result of British economic policy ; and the paramount colonial policy of Great Britain is now, as it has been since 1885 (when Africa was " partitioned "), and as it was during the whole of the earlier Colonial period up to the middle of the nineteenth century, addressed to the fostering of the property-owning, refining, mercantile and consuming interests of Great Britain.

The emancipation of slaves by the British statutes of 1833

and 1838 was an act of national moral compunction repudiating one particular iniquitous element in the national laws of property, which then sanctioned the principle that one man could own another and had a vested interest in his value. It was an act of reparation to the corporate body of Africans and the descendants of Africans, who had been inhumanly deprived of their liberty by capture or kidnapping, and deported from their native lands to work for British owners in British Colonies. Because the British National State had created and practised the laws which made kidnapped Africans property it was concordant with the principles of British Property Law that the owners of such slaves should be compensated when their property was taken away from them by an Act of Parliament, whatever might be the reasons for which that Act was passed. The Government of the day applied those principles and paid the bill out of the proceeds of general taxation. Colonial communities do not believe that the purposes of Colonial policy as expressed by Mr. MacDonald can be attained or that progress can be made towards their establishment by the strict administration of the exploiting Economic Policy.

On behalf of the populations representing the former slaves and their congeners still resident in Africa and the other countries from which slaves were transplanted, the conviction is held vicariously that the maintenance of capitalist policy is necessary for the uplift and civilisation of those representatives of backward human peoples: that at the worst it is educational for them to have to work for the white man, and that, most justly and fairly regarded, the function of the white man in Empire is to act as trustee for the interests, material and spiritual alike, of these still childish or adolescent representatives of humanity.

Mr. MacDonald declared:

> We could say with confidence that the trend was towards the ultimate establishment of the various colonial communities as self-supporting and self-reliant members of a great commonwealth of free peoples and nations.

Blessed word!—" ultimate "! Political critics in several West Indian Colonies have for some time past been inquiring at what stage it may be expected that ultimacy may be considered to have been attained? Has it, for instance, been

reached in Barbados, which is to all intents and purposes self-governing; and in political matters appears to be quite successfully governed although its economic position under Imperial economic policy is disastrous? Had it been attained in the United Kingdom, from which Eire has recently separated, following the example of other Dominions, and where economic principles, as illustrated by the necessity for rehousing campaigns, the existence of nearly two million unemployed workers, and the apparently insoluble problem of what are called the special areas, are apparently not yet deemed more relevant to the question of ultimacy in the political sphere than parallel distresses are considered to be in the more important British West Indian Colonies?

The West India Royal Commission of 1896-7 (Sir Henry Norman, Sir Edward Grey and Sir David Barbour) did not base their plea for the countervailing of Continental sugar bounties on grounds of international law or on argument that the lowering of the price of sugar by those bounties was not advantageous to British consumers. They admitted that those consumers profited by the bounties. They appealed on grounds of equity and human morality, pointing out that the obligations of reparation to the descendants of Africans who had been enslaved had not been completely liquidated by Emancipation; but that having planted these populations corporately in the West Indies, torn from their native homes, the British nation had a corporate responsibility for seeing that they were ensured conditions of decent maintenance and human civilisation. That appeal prevailed with the British Government of the day; and the foreign bounties were countervailed, at a certain cost to the pockets of British consumers. A similar appeal made by the West Indian Sugar Commission of 1929-30 further prevailed on a more recent British Government to assist in the mere preservation of the Colonial sugar industry at some further cost to consumers and taxpayers. The opposition to a fully effectual policy in this crisis was stronger; and partly prevailed; and the representatives of the interests which, on the grounds of manufacturing, commercial or domestic economy, opposed further equitable concession, have stood in the way of effectual political methods of safeguarding the livelihood of Colonial workers and may still maintain their resistance. That opposition has since then in some degree been reinforced by

the national adoption of a beet-sugar-producing policy. It is, however, a fallacy to suppose, as some good friends of Colonial producers have recently represented in letters to the Press, that the competition of beet-sugar subsidised by the British State has, at any rate as yet, done any injury to Colonial interests. Colonial producers only feel that they have as good a claim to the like assistance; and that it would pay British consumers better to grant it, because cane-sugar, even paying adequate wages, can be produced a good deal more cheaply than can beet-sugar.

So remarkable, however has been the expression of sentiment in all sections of the Press in this country and in Parliament, elicited by recent reports on conditions in Mauritius, Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica, accompanied by reports of disturbances in other West Indian Islands and in British Guiana, that it appears possible to believe that another effectual wave of sentiment, inspired by human feelings of justice and equity, is making itself felt by the British Government. Parliamentary supporters of that Government have declared so emphatically that "something must be done," that the Government, either not knowing what must be done or being unwilling or unable to do it, has decided to appoint a Royal Commission to supply them with or support them in some policy or decision. It is to be hoped that such a Commission will not discover that it has been sent out on a fool's errand. Unless that is to be the result there must be considerable changes in the principles and spirit of Imperial Colonial policy and administration as well as in those of domestic industrial and economic administration.

Much in the stimulus which created the decision to free the slaves was demonstrably quite irrational. The present crisis has revived some of the protestations that were prevalent a hundred years ago, that slavery was a better system for Africans than nominal freedom. Lord Strickland, a former Governor of the Leeward Islands, explained not long ago in the House of Lords that many people, for example in Antigua, had reason so to consider to-day. That is not a sound judgment. Notwithstanding much that is unsatisfactory in Colonial societies founded on slavery and now exploited under Imperial Capitalism, no one well acquainted with the records of a hundred years ago and conversant by contact with West Indian populations to-day would subscribe to it. The immediate

response on the part of the freed slave population to the spirit of Emancipation manifested itself in a spirit of energetic progress. The response of a further act of compunction and compensation on the part of the British nation towards the West Indian wage-earners and of an act of justice of granting them a possibility of conditions of life appropriate to their present standard of civilisation would, I have little doubt, produce a similar reaction of progress.

The late Lord Milner, a man of powerful intellect and impressively persuasive personality, did more than any other man within living memory, except perhaps Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, to establish the superstition that the best education for Africans to fit them for freedom, self-respect and self-government, is to compel or induce them to work for wages for white employers. The Imperial policy of maintaining the capitalist system of private ownership of the means of production, combined with the doctrine of "vocational" education for wage workers, is the school in which for about fifty years now the whole Colonial service has been trained. Associated with this is the principle that individuals of "backward races" are to be excluded from the political franchise, not yet being fit for democratic political power, to which they are "ultimately" to attain. This fact will not be disputed by anyone who has taken any interest in the policies followed in regard to political institutions in the West Indies, in Kenya and Rhodesia.

The wage-working population of all these Colonies do not accept the theory that the capitalist system is a system quite different from slavery. They do not accept the theory that the relation of tenants at will to private landlords is a beneficent system quite distinct from slavery and conducing to freedom. Now that the wage-workers in Jamaica by ill-organised strikes have succeeded in obtaining a promise of an increase of 25 per cent. in their wages (which neither their employers can pay without increase of prices, nor public employers pay without increase of taxes, which even now they cannot collect), many tenants of land in small holdings are threatening a no-rent movement, to mature on Freedom Day (August 1st); and the Government, to meet this situation, is meditating a great scheme of land settlement to convert unemployed wage-workers as "squatting tenants" into small freeholders at the cost of public funds, thus creating

a situation very similar to that which was created in Ireland by the Land Purchase Legislation.

West Indian tenants have not the same basis for agitation as Irish tenants had, namely that the land of the West Indies was stolen from the West Indian people—the Spaniard had killed out the original natives before the British had introduced African slaves—who are not (as British tourists and journalists commonly call them) "natives" but denizens, like the Englishmen, Americans, Jews and Scotsmen that manage most of the land and capital. But they share the universal African philosophy that land should be public property, administered for the maintenance and livelihood of the people and not for private profit; and this philosophy is quite as profoundly rooted as the philosophy that they should receive living wages. From the point of view of predominant English constitutional law and economic practice these notions, like the notion of freedom, are pure sentimentality; but they have a very strong practical basis.

One of the reasons for ill-success in British and Colonial administration is that most British Governors and imported civil servants as now trained and indoctrinated in the Colonial Service, take a very long time to recognise that the West Indian population, white, brown or black, have pretty clearly developed and firmly rooted ideas and character of their own, and that these ideas are different from those of established Colonial policy. One of the causes contributing to present difficulties in Jamaica may have lain in the fact that the late Governor failed to secure the confidence of the three most important and representative indigenous associations in Jamaica, the Jamaica Imperial Association, the Jamaican Agricultural Society and the Jamaican Banana Producers' Co-operative Association. Those populations hold and know that in the last hundred years British policy has not been continuously addressed to their interests and they believe that Britain still owes them substantial reparation.

OLIVIER.

"GREAT IS DIANA!"

"FELLOW craftsmen," cried Demetrius the silversmith, "how long shall we suffer it? For two years now we have had this vagabond Jew among us—the man who calls himself Paul. You all know him by sight—short as a dwarf, bald, bow-legged, with a long Jewish nose, eyebrows meeting at the base of it, a sure sign of an evil nature. He is an object hideous enough to frighten the crows, though they may well hope to peck at him dying on a cross. You have all seen him meandering about the byways, or even walking down the open road to the harbour. Some of you may have been exposed to the misfortune of hearing him jabber in the School of Tyrannus, who admits any fool to chatter nonsense on payment of three obols. And he constantly frequents the Jewish synagogue, though the Jews hate him as much as we all hate the Jews.

"His real name is Saul, for he was called after a primitive Jewish king who was killed in his own country by neighbouring barbarians. But now he has had the impudence to take to himself the name of Paulus as though he were sprung from the famous Roman family, and he claims Roman citizenship, just because he happened to be born in the wretched little port of Tarsus, far away in Cilicia. Else we should have given him up long ago to be scourged and then thrown as a tasty meal for the lions and tigers in the theatre over there.

"But I cannot doubt, fellow craftsmen, that you know him well, at least by sight. For even from the artistic eye a loathsome being cannot be hid. You remember the Athenian who, as he was passing beside the ravine into which the corpses of executed criminals were thrown to rot, pulled his eyes open with his fingers, saying, 'Take your fill, then, of this disgusting sight since you insist upon it!' For horror fascinates all mankind, even us artists, and some of us rejoice in carving monsters, Medusæ, Chimæras, and the Eumenides with serpents in their hair.

"You will say, 'Yes, we know the fellow well enough, but why have you brought us here this afternoon to remind us of so contemptible an abortion?' Craftsmen of Ephesus, I will tell you why. It is because this Jewish outcast goes running from place to place and from city to city, and to and fro among the islands, telling the common people that there are

no gods made with hands, and that our temples might just as well stand empty.

"Nay, he has wandered even as far as Athens herself, the very throne of wisdom, and has there told the wisest philosophers gathered upon the holy rock of Ares, beneath which the sister Avengers of crime have long slept at peace—even there he has told the wisest of mankind to their faces that they are too superstitious in worshipping the gods and goddesses whose statues are assembled in the sacred temples just above them; and he has called upon them rather to worship the Unknown God in whose honour a simple column stands inscribed, but no statue set upon it. And, what is more, in that city, where the wisest of men come together to discuss the nature of man and the universe under shady trees and beside a running stream, he had the audacity to tell them that he himself worshipped that Unknown God, which he called a Sacred Spirit, dwelling inside every man, like an invisible king.

"That kind of talk may have pleased the Stoics, who pride themselves on spiritual speculation and draw up their skirts lest they touch anything common and unclean; but their disdainful approval was speedily withdrawn. For, besides prating about an invisible spirit, he went on to tell the common people, both Greek and barbarian, that the end of the world was at hand, and they ought to be perpetually worshipping a tiresome young Jew of Palestine, a man of uncertain birth, though his mother is said to be lurking still among us in this very city as a Jewish refugee. He was crucified a few years ago, together with other malefactors, for calling himself the King of the Jews in place of Herod, who reigned by the appointment of Cæsar Augustus. I ask you, fellow artists, could any art, whether Greek or barbarian, be employed to produce as a divine figure the similitude of a criminal bound and nailed to a shameful cross, the rightful penalty for a seditious upstart who stirred up rebellion against Rome? What sane man or woman would buy of us so degrading an image, whether of silver, ivory, or gold? No wonder you laugh!"

Turning to his left, he stretched out his arm towards a great temple, gleaming in the afternoon sunlight, about two miles from the city walls. The inner shrine was surrounded by tall Ionic columns of dazzling white marble, and the roof

was tiled with white marble slabs, so thin as to let a dim light penetrate into the interior. On the pediment could be discerned the upright figure of the Greek Artemis, with bow and arrows in her hands, while round her fawned the figures of deer, leopards, and other wild beasts whom she delighted to shelter and to slay.

Then he cried aloud again, saying, "Fellow artists, there stands the temple of our goddess, the greatest temple in all the world, as ours is the richest city, second only to Rome. Our temple is glorious on the outside, as you all can see—so glorious that multitudes come from all parts of the world just to behold it. But few may penetrate to the recess within, where stands the statue of the holy goddess herself. Her sacred priests tell us she is black, being made of ebony; and many ages ago Zeus himself, the father of gods and of all mankind, sent her down to earth in an eastern land far beyond that great river, the Euphrates, whence she was borne through the air till she came to rest upon that sacred hill. She is the mysterious Virgin-Mother who with her many breasts nourishes all the living creatures and trees of the earth, causing the fertilising waters to flow in life-giving streams, as flows our river Cayster, issuing there into our harbour, where all the ships of the world find refuge and anchorage."

He pointed to the crowding masts of ships lying in the port at the end of the straight canal. Across the narrow sea to the west, which is the pathway of ships, could be seen the hills of wealthy Samos, rising from the purple level of the Ægean, and at the sight of their city's evident prosperity, the assembly of craftsmen raised the ritual cry, "Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!"

But the loud voice of Demetrius overbore the shouting as he continued: "I speak to all men of this famous city, but especially to my fellow artists, the workers in silver and other precious metals. For what is to become of us if this atheist Jew is allowed to ramble over our country, uttering his blasphemies against the ancient gods and our revered Virgin-Mother, who came down from heaven? It is by our own skill and hard toil that we artists make our livelihood, and keep our wives and children clothed and fed. We labour hard at casting and carving in silver and gold the shrines into which we insert the very models of our divine goddess, with holy face, mystic robes, and fertilising breasts, all finished in

exact resemblance. Every citizen desires to possess one of our images according to his wealth, and to set it above his bed or in his cultivated garden, that he may ensure fertility both in his home and upon his land, for the land alone furnishes all the food needed to sustain our lives. Strangers also come from very far away to buy our beautiful shrines, and I have heard that even in Athens our models of the goddess are to be seen. To her alone we craftsmen owe our prosperity and our fame. But how shall we set about making shrines or images of an invisible spirit? Or what Ephesian, what Greek or barbarian will ever purchase the similitude of a wretched Jew, an atheist and malefactor, dying in torment, nailed to a cross, which was the deserved penalty for his sedition and unbelief?"

On hearing this, the silversmiths and all other metal workers began to rush through the streets, shouting "Great is Artemis of the Ephesians." And crowds of people ran with them into the vast theatre, not rightly knowing the cause of all the disturbance; but some cried one thing and some another, so that wild bewilderment spread through all the streets and squares. But when Paul himself was struggling to crush into the theatre with the crowd, he was held back by his friends, for they feared he would be torn in pieces as by wild beasts in an arena, so violent was the rage against him, as against all Jews. Even when a harmless Jew named Alexander, whom from his name they supposed to be a Greek, was put forward by the Jews to speak on behalf of their race, they howled him down on discovering that he was only another Jew, and the tumult grew worse.

For the multitude, not knowing what to say, nor the reason why they had come together, took up the cry of the silversmiths, and shouted, "Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!" And so they continued to shout, jostling with each other, and swarming over the wide arena and up the marble seats that rose like wedges to the back wall of the building. Some simply shouted with the vain repetition of savages, but others questioned and argued, as though indeed the goddess of the Moon herself had suddenly struck them mad. Some cried out against the Jew Alexander, but all the metalworkers called for the Jew of Tarsus who had falsely taken to himself the patrician name of Paulus. For they desired to rend him to pieces and offer his head and limbs in sacrifice to the Virgin-Mother who

descended from heaven. Thus the tumult continued with growing confusion for the space of two hours, and above all other outcries and shoutings rose with religious monotony the cry, "Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!"

But when at last the tumult became troublesome and even dangerous to life, the official Recorder of the city entered the theatre with a guard and stood in the centre of the stage above the stone of Dionysus. And when the crowds saw the public officer, they became quiet and allowed him to speak in silence. Then he told them that no one could question the worship due to their great goddess who had descended from heaven, but that the man Paulus and his friends among the Jews had not robbed temples or blasphemed the goddess; and if they had done any wrong to the artisans or their trade, the common law was always open to citizens. And as to the childish uproar, it must cease at once. For if it continued, it might attract the attention of the Roman Government, so that they had better go home quietly at once.

Then the crowds began to disperse, in fear of what the Government might do. But Demetrius went away with his fellow craftsmen, laughing in triumph. For, "now," he said to them, "we have settled with that filthy Jew who babbled about the end of the world and the worship of an invisible spirit and a crucified seditionmonger. We need trouble ourselves no more about him, though the pitiful animal has for the moment escaped the fate of being torn to pieces by our official wild beasts, as was his lawful due."

So Demetrius went back to his workshop and put some finishing touches to his carved model of the Ephesian Artemis. "I only wish," he murmured to himself, "I might cut away those numerous breasts hanging out from her chest. They are according to religious tradition, but unnatural. She can never be so beautiful as a Greek statue. Nothing like so beautiful as the alluring Paphian, or the solemn Demeter of Cnydos. But never mind! As she came down straight from God, we must make the best we can of her.

"Now for her shrine! I'm thinking of designing a new sort of shrine to put her in. The temple columns are Ionic, but I rather incline to make them Doric, like the Parthenon of the Virgin Goddess in Athens, for she is ancient and primitive. Perhaps the columns ought to be wooden, and I wish I dared carve the robes in straight and parallel folds,

like the archaic Athene's. But that would raise an uproar among her worshippers, such as we saw to-day, especially if I painted the robes red and blue, though the goddess is black.

"But I am sick of carving those curly Ionic capitals, year after year. How if I advanced to the Corinthian style, with a lot of pretty ornaments and leafy decorations? That would attract feminine purchasers; and if sticklers for tradition objected, let them do their worst. People must be taught that even religion changes in the course of years. The columns shall be Corinthian." The door of the studio turned upon its marble sockets, and a servant entered, bowing. "May it please you, sir," he said, "there is a man standing without, demanding to speak with you."

"Tell him I am occupied," said Demetrius. "What does he want?"

"He speaks Greek with a kind of accent," said the servant. "He calls himself Paul of Tarsus, and he desires to redeem you in the name of Christ."

"Paul of Tarsus!" exclaimed Demetrius. "Desires to redeem *me*! Tell him to begone quickly or it will be the worse for him. Insolent blasphemer! If he does not go, set the dogs at him!"

HENRY W. NEVINSON.

STATE AND NATION IN THE SPANISH WAR.

FOR the first time in her history Spain is going to have a State in the modern acceptation of the word. The traditional centrifugal forces—regions, classes, castes—are merging into a nation which is congruent with its State. The instruments of power—army, police, administration—are transformed from an oppressive "superstructure" into national organs.

Unlike other peoples, Spain has no national legend of the State. The hero of her saga is a *guerillero*; the creators of her epics are poor gentlemen; The Cid, Don Quixote, Cervantes, Velasquez, Calderon, Ibanez belonged to the gentry, the only class which, unbroken by the central power, organised the life of the country. National pride, therefore, is not incorporated in the State, and the natural social organisation is the region or the municipality. Under Philip II each region had its own law. The ruling Castilian nobility never allowed the upper classes of the regions to be melted into one; the Catalan Cambo could not become Premier; even fifty years ago the Mayor of Barcelona addressed Queen Isabella as "Countess of Barcelona." Each party and each region had its gunmen, sometimes superficially draped with police uniforms, and the Governments did not refuse the help of such bands. Each part of society took to arms whenever they saw a chance. Neither of the ten Constitutions established rules of social relations which were acknowledged throughout the country. The lower the classes, the weaker were their links with State and nation. Where custom and common consent had not consecrated a system of lawful collaboration, the State was considered as a device of its "owners" to hamper individual and regional development. Regionalism was the belief of the masters and anarchism that of the employees. Nobody considered legal action as a means of reform; "freedom" meant "upsetting the whole system." As a consequence of the failure of the State to organise its subjects into a nation, "the Spanish used to live outside the Constitution" (Madariaga).

When the superstructure of the State disappeared, the nation emerged. It fought under priests and popular heroes against Napoleon after the king had eloped, but the revolutionary

Cortes could not reconcile the requirements of national defence with the aspirations of the nation. Their phantom Constitution did not create an army. Nor was the revolution of 1873 successful in creating a federal republic out of a conglomerate of " free cities " : there was no national tradition to supply the elements of a democratic power. The State was thought a useless parasite, and so small was its *rôle* in national life that its periodic breakdowns did little harm. Even in July 1936, the supply of the great towns, the public utilities and in many places even public order continued ; the " liberated nation " could even wage war against 80 per cent. of the State machine.

Leaving aside the Church, which was dispossessed of power in the last century, the State was an instrument of different clans of *caciques*, freemasonries and military arms. At the Disarmament Conference Madariaga stated that the Spanish army was an instrument not of war but of home politics. The Monarchy broke down as soon as officers (like Queipo de Llano) launched pamphlets from an airplane over Madrid and General Sanjurjo refused to lend the power of the Madrid police to the king. Moreover, artillery and naval officers would no longer obey an infantry general. As a matter of fact Primo de Rivera was the only officer who had the idea of securing popular support for his dictatorship. But in spite of his public works and labour reforms he failed to do so, just as the country had not responded to the patriarchal schemes of Jovellanos in the eighteenth century. For what was wanting was self-government and the participation of the middle classes. To break the monopolistic power of the Castilian army and police, the Republic of 1931 was obliged to create a special body of *Guardias d'Assalto* and *Mozos* (in Catalonia) who were not in a perpetual state of vendetta with the peasants. These were the first nucleus of a more democratic power, and in 1936 most of them favoured the Government. This division of power shows that the State was a stranger to the nation.

The political representation of the people was not less independent of the life of Spanish society. By the famous " Pact of the Prado " Canovas and Sagasta had agreed that they should in turn distribute all political posts down to the village boss (*cacique*) among their respective crews. This agreement gave them a strong hold over their supporters—

whether they were " in " or " out "—and not even the Liberal leader remarked that it rendered democracy impossible. Likewise the Republicans had distributed as early as 1930 the seats in the Government of 1931, irrespective of the result of the elections, and even the revolutionary Catalonians appointed in 1936 local governments with fixed proportions of seats, regardless of the political situation in each individual borough. This *cacique* system, which made different gangs the representatives of the State in the borough and gave them power to exploit the people they were supposed to govern, is another cause of the undying hatred between the State and the nation. In no other language can the word " politician " be pronounced more disdainfully. No wonder that as soon as caciquism disappears, the underlying anarchy of the Spanish society emerges, and, according as the middle or the lower classes prevail in each town, separatism or anarchism will be the natural consequence. The Republicans either were not willing or not able or had not time enough to put a more democratic and efficient system of collaboration in the place of caciquism. They could abolish neither the prerogatives of the army, nor the predominance of the Castilians, nor the power of the *caciques* from whom they held their power. They finally admitted that Barcelona had more inhabitants than the capital (which the royal statisticians had not done), but they would not grant her a Catalonian university. They reconciled neither the regions nor the workers nor the peasants, because their legislation on agricultural, social and political reform—well meant as it was—could not be applied unless the interested categories exercised a certain pressure on the executive organs. Any economic problem, such as the question of the Catalonian vineyard leases, could bring about a constitutional crisis. The Basques refused to pay their taxes ; during the two years of the Lerroux-Gil Robles administration the state of alarm was suspended only because martial law had become necessary. Any of the thousand strikes which occurred year in year out was likely to degenerate into bloodshed. The Anarchists numbered one million, which means that the Republic had failed to make Spain into a nation. Socialists and C.E.D.A. accused each other of preparing rebellion and armed themselves to " prevent " it.

There were, however, new tendencies in the attitude towards the State among the Socialists, the Catholics and the

Intelligentsia. The trade unions had always believed in the power of a strong State which could enforce legal labour relations and abolish violence and local arbitrariness. Their leader Caballero was Labour Secretary in the military cabinet of Primo, and Besteiro's corporativist doctrine is not so far from what Suñer professes in his radio speeches in Salamanca. Prieto and the intelligentsia such as Dr. Negrin who embraced socialism want social and economic planning through integration of the workers into the State. In that attempt they were backed by the Catholic Labour and Peasants' movement in the Basque provinces, which equally tried to employ the State machine rather than to destroy it. Large Labour masses were approaching the State when the insurrection cut short this evolution towards democracy.

The new current of democratic ideology among the Intelligentsia was described by Azaña on July 14th, 1935: "The Republic is not an enumeration of principles but the instrument of reforms . . . it is not a legal apparatus of egoistic interests but of democratic emancipation. . . . After all our experience . . . direct, immediate and working democracy shall be efficient in the public power and shall, through the common consent to a legal structure, identify the national power with the representation of the unity of the State." With such a new acceptation of the notion of the State he contrived to convince even Anarchists that they had better collaborate. Indeed, it was noted as early as in March 1936 that the old Anarchist leaders began to feel uneasy at the new gradualist evolution among syndicalist members. But after July 18th they had a fresh chance.

On the other hand, the Right split into the intransigent monarchists (Goicoechea), Fascists (Primo de Rivera and Suñer) and Calvo Sotelo, and a "loyal opposition" headed by Gil Robles, who had broken with Fascism and "attempted to conciliate fascism and democracy, corporatism and parliamentarism, authority and liberty" (Maurin). The mutual insults exchanged between the Generals and Gil Robles show that genuine Conservatives had conceived of a new republican evolution of the State, and that the alleged impossibility to "wait and see" is a legend. Gil Robles had realised that the *coup d'état* which he had been asked to undertake in 1935, when he was Minister of War, would fail unless it was backed by mass support and a new conception of social and political

relations. Left advocates suggest that the shooting early in 1936 was provoked in order to elude the dissociation of the ancient Right from the idea of a national coalition government as advocated by Prieto. But I think it is generally admitted that on July 18th, 1936, the time was not yet ripe for this new State. The Government were about to restrict the oppressive machine of the ancient State, and the nation had not yet arrived at building up a national democratic power. Right advocates charged the Government with "not governing."

The rebellion of 80 per cent. of the State machine made things still worse. On the one side, there was no longer any State at all; the regions took back their liberty and built armies of their own; the party militias, which had been illegal up to that date, found themselves possessed of all political power. Sometimes they came back from the front to tell the Government what they thought good policy; each party and trade union built up an administration of its own; the ministers could not pass a village without the special permit of the local authority. On the other side, there was a State machine with but poor mass support except in Navarre and Old Castile; Queipo de Llano could not govern Andalusia without martial law (decree of August 28th, 1937); executions in the conquered towns numbered thousands. The problem, therefore, was easy to state: the insurgents must secure the consent of the people, and the republicans must secure a government. Both problems were tackled in such efficient manner that after a year of war an able observer could say: Once, the Government said "reforms" and the Generals "authority"; now the Government say "reforms and order," whereas the insurgents say "order but reforms too." As a matter of fact the war has brought nearer the respective points of view.

General Franco, who had set out to restore the "Spain which blossomed in the sixteenth century," had to admit that military dictatorship and a coercive economic system must be compensated by corporative schemes. After dissolving the fascist Phalanges he borrowed their syndicalist programme and appointed Suñer Minister of Propaganda in order to reconcile the people. As yet Suñer has not contrived to create his corporations, and the bulk of the population are still indifferent towards the State; but the nationalist authorities are aware that they cannot govern Spain unless

Intelligentsia. The trade unions had always believed in the power of a strong State which could enforce legal labour relations and abolish violence and local arbitrariness. Their leader Caballero was Labour Secretary in the military cabinet of Primo, and Besteiro's corporativist doctrine is not so far from what Suñer professes in his radio speeches in Salamanca. Prieto and the intelligentsia such as Dr. Negrin who embraced socialism want social and economic planning through integration of the workers into the State. In that attempt they were backed by the Catholic Labour and Peasants' movement in the Basque provinces, which equally tried to employ the State machine rather than to destroy it. Large Labour masses were approaching the State when the insurrection cut short this evolution towards democracy.

The new current of democratic ideology among the Intelligentsia was described by Azaña on July 14th, 1935: "The Republic is not an enumeration of principles but the instrument of reforms . . . it is not a legal apparatus of egoistic interests but of democratic emancipation. . . . After all our experience . . . direct, immediate and working democracy shall be efficient in the public power and shall, through the common consent to a legal structure, identify the national power with the representation of the unity of the State." With such a new acceptation of the notion of the State he contrived to convince even Anarchists that they had better collaborate. Indeed, it was noted as early as in March 1936 that the old Anarchist leaders began to feel uneasy at the new gradualist evolution among syndicalist members. But after July 18th they had a fresh chance.

On the other hand, the Right split into the intransigent monarchists (Goicoechea), Fascists (Primo de Rivera and Suñer) and Calvo Sotelo, and a "loyal opposition" headed by Gil Robles, who had broken with Fascism and "attempted to conciliate fascism and democracy, corporatism and parliamentarism, authority and liberty" (Maurin). The mutual insults exchanged between the Generals and Gil Robles show that genuine Conservatives had conceived of a new republican evolution of the State, and that the alleged impossibility to "wait and see" is a legend. Gil Robles had realised that the *coup d'état* which he had been asked to undertake in 1935, when he was Minister of War, would fail unless it was backed by mass support and a new conception of social and political

relations. Left advocates suggest that the shooting early in 1936 was provoked in order to elude the dissociation of the ancient Right from the idea of a national coalition government as advocated by Prieto. But I think it is generally admitted that on July 18th, 1936, the time was not yet ripe for this new State. The Government were about to restrict the oppressive machine of the ancient State, and the nation had not yet arrived at building up a national democratic power. Right advocates charged the Government with "not governing."

The rebellion of 80 per cent. of the State machine made things still worse. On the one side, there was no longer any State at all; the regions took back their liberty and built armies of their own; the party militias, which had been illegal up to that date, found themselves possessed of all political power. Sometimes they came back from the front to tell the Government what they thought good policy; each party and trade union built up an administration of its own; the ministers could not pass a village without the special permit of the local authority. On the other side, there was a State machine with but poor mass support except in Navarre and Old Castile; Queipo de Llano could not govern Andalusia without martial law (decree of August 28th, 1937); executions in the conquered towns numbered thousands. The problem, therefore, was easy to state: the insurgents must secure the consent of the people, and the republicans must secure a government. Both problems were tackled in such efficient manner that after a year of war an able observer could say: Once, the Government said "reforms" and the Generals "authority"; now the Government say "reforms and order," whereas the insurgents say "order but reforms too." As a matter of fact the war has brought nearer the respective points of view.

General Franco, who had set out to restore the "Spain which blossomed in the sixteenth century," had to admit that military dictatorship and a coercive economic system must be compensated by corporative schemes. After dissolving the fascist Phalanges he borrowed their syndicalist programme and appointed Suñer Minister of Propaganda in order to reconcile the people. As yet Suñer has not contrived to create his corporations, and the bulk of the population are still indifferent towards the State; but the nationalist authorities are aware that they cannot govern Spain unless

they transform their State. In any case, their social organisation will be neither the *ancien régime* nor the *dictatura gaya* of Primo de Rivera, nor an imitation of the Salazar régime in Portugal; it will be a State much in line with their present allies, though more artificial and *cæteris non paribus*.

On the side of the Government the requirements of war brought about a considerable change in the state of mind. At first the trade unions had to establish authority, which they did more or less successfully. But under the slogan " first win the war, afterwards revolution," the Government took control of the " collectivised " industries, militarised the militias, restored authority to the police—which they had kept in the rearguard—and step by step did away with the " little governments " of the first months. Their control of the Treasury and of the Russian shipments of arms secured them independence and considerable liberty of action. I hear from an engineer that in the midst of a real scarcity of arms Prieto did not suffer new armament factories to be built unless under State administration; the Catalonian anarchists continually complained of being left without arms. There is not space to describe the whole story of the Government's struggle against the revolution. In their attempt they were largely supported by the German and Italian intervention on the opposite side; the aeroplanes finally gave the death-blow to the traditional indifference of the Spanish people towards their State; the nation rallied behind their Government as soon as the catchwords of " national defence " and of " democracy " had merged. The desperate state of the republican army and the difficulties of food supply have further increased this national feeling which is identified with the Government.

It is generally forgotten that in the beginning of the war there were not two but three parties, the third being hidden behind the Government lines. This latter was the only revolutionary one, and it was defeated in the beginning of May 1937 in the battle of Barcelona. As the Generals had to do away with the monarchists, Phalangists, *caciques*, capitalists and liberals on their side, the Government had to subdue the revolutionaries. The word " revolution " is still honoured on this side, but what it means is reflected in a speech of the Communist minister Hernandez. " The real revolutionaries are that party who create a powerful army and increase production. . . . End economic chaos and do away once for all

with these attempts at socialism in the hands of unions and committees " (May 28th, 1937). As a matter of fact, the republican State has taken in hand so many businesses that it is already said that there is too much State interference. For the sake of order Catalonia has even practically renounced her home rule, and the new army has all the characteristics of a real army.

There is now on both sides the same problem. The Governments cannot continue to decree on dictatorial lines. As Suñer emphasises the necessity of corporatism, Azaña does not appear to be very satisfied with a skeleton parliament which assembles twice a year to approve wholesale of the Government's policy. He does not like the mock democracy of a *cacique* apparatus. If elections cannot be held, the Catalans, the trade unions and the Republicans think that democratic control should be established by consultative organs of the great organisations (which is possible because each class has its trade unions now). This solution would bring about a new kind of State which would be linked to the traditional institutions of the nation. But only demobilisation could show whether the actual all-embracing State can be transformed into a progressive democratic authority of the nation. The war made one part of Spain into a republic, but it threatens to hamper the pursuance of this development.

In the rebel camp there is poorer information to be had on the state of mind. Publicly exhibited enthusiasm is certainly not smaller than on the " red " side. But if Franco contrives to quiet the passions of war and to reconcile the " conquered " population, that will largely depend on his cleverness in getting rid of the Italians and Germans, or on his liberty to make a gesture of conciliation which would suit one who professes to strive for " national unity." Unless serious changes take place in the rebels' staff, troubles will arise on every possible occasion and the army will have to fight indefinitely against a population which had been ripe for collaboration and whose main ambition has always been independence.

HEINZ PAECHTER.

THE IRISH AGREEMENT AND THE IRISH ELECTIONS.

MR. DE VALERA is a lucky man. To be the only holder of an independent command to escape the firing squad in 1916 might be considered luck enough for most people, even if each volley that slew one of his fellow insurgents had not simultaneously sounded the passing bell of constitutional nationalism and the tocsin of revolution. Within a fortnight Sinn Féin, from a group of little-known doctrinaires, became a great political force; and Mr. de Valera's own election for East Clare in the place of Major William Redmond, killed while leading an attack by part of that new Irish Division he and his brother had helped to raise, was a portent of what was soon to be. But who could then have foreseen that the British Government would thereafter pile blunder upon blunder: would that autumn repudiate their own proposals for a settlement and so leave the Irish Party exposed to the charge of having agreed for nothing to a partition, however temporary and, compared with that now in existence, innocuous; would summon a National Convention, without making sure that it should not be wrecked, like the Act of 1914, by the Ulster veto; above all, would commit the incredible folly of trying to extend military conscription to Ireland just at the very moment when everyone knew that any attempt to put it into operation would meet with organised and violent resistance from one end of the country to the other?

Yet, after all, to profit by the errors of other people is not difficult. Think how Hitler's rise to such power as no Hohenzollern ever enjoyed was made possible by the supineness of German Liberals, the senility of Hindenburg and the short-sightedness of the Western Powers. What renders Eamon de Valera's career in some respects more remarkable than Adolf Hitler's is that, whether by good luck or good guidance, he has been able to turn to account not only other men's mistakes but his own. In 1922 Ireland was sick of bombs and rifle shots, of broken bridges and roads, and of the bands of men quartering themselves upon peaceful farm-houses. For the first time in history a Government responsible only to the Irish people occupied Dublin Castle. Yet when the Irregulars seized the Four Courts and started out to burn houses and

destroy public and private property all over the country, Mr. de Valera's sympathy with the trouble-makers was known to everyone. Even when the electorate had in 1923 made it plain that it desired the Treaty to stand, Mr. de Valera refused to accept the verdict; and on the plea that the oath required of its members was such as no honest Nationalist could take, continued for five more years to keep his followers from entering the Dáil. In 1927 he discovered that the policy of abstention could be no longer maintained and that the oath itself was a mere "empty formula." So sudden and complete a rightabout would have ruined most politicians. It served only to strengthen his position. In 1932 his party achieved office mainly by promises to reduce taxation, to put an end to unemployment and to keep the land annuities in the pockets of the farmers—so, at least, the farmers believed. New industries, once Mr. Cosgrave's obstructive Tariff Commission was swept away, were to absorb all surplus labour and attract back to us thousands of emigrants from overseas. John Bull, it was said, would never dare to retaliate whatever we might do, having too great need of our cattle and eggs and butter; but should he for a while quarrel with his own stomach, well, were there not alternative markets for Irish agricultural products? In the event, of course, every one of these promises proved false. During the past six years, taxation was not reduced, but increased by some four and a half million pounds. Costs of living went up and unemployment, taking town and country together, did not go down. Britain retaliated so effectively that we were obliged to give her a monopoly of coal imports in return for a somewhat larger quota of Free State cattle. The alternative markets were quickly shown to be a figment of Fianna Fáil's imagination.

Nevertheless, with this record behind him, Mr. de Valera has been again returned to office, and now for the first time at the head of a majority independent of all other parties in the Dáil. Rejoiced to find the stupid quarrel composed, no one has greatly cared to enquire how it began, or whether more willingness to negotiate at the start might not have saved us much intermediate loss. Had it been much worse, provided only it enabled our chief trade to flow once more in its natural channel, I think we should still have welcomed the agreement and have thought the better of Mr. de Valera for

signing it. Certainly ten million pounds is not too much to pay for getting rid of annuity payments by mutual consent; and though the Opposition have made some play with the future cost to the Irish taxpayer of the coastal forts—well, sovereign rights and dignities have to be paid for, like other things in this world. Above all there was a pretty widespread feeling that no excuse should be left—such as Mr. de Valera's defeat or an inconclusive result might have afforded him—for any failure to stand by the new Treaty as well in spirit as in letter. Few politicians out of office can resist the temptation of embarrassing their opponents, and, admirable as are many of his qualities, nothing in Mr. de Valera's career inclines one to think him one of the few. I have dealt at some length with that career, because, as always in Ireland, the personal factor is dominant, and because it all goes to prove the extraordinary ascendancy which this man has acquired among his fellow countrymen.

The most striking feature of the election is that it shows clearly what I have always believed: that in the constituencies Labour was always more dependent upon Fianna Fáil than Fianna Fáil upon Labour. Outside the large towns most Labour candidates owed their seats to the later preferences of Fianna Fáil voters. Once the two parties quarrelled, the seats so obtained were irretrievably lost. Study of "first preference" figures—far the most reliable test of the real strength of various groups at any given moment—does not suggest any considerable swing-over from any party to another. It is worth remarking, perhaps, that the increase in Fianna Fáil votes is considerably greater than the total decline in those of Fine Gael, Labour and Independent added together. The decline is perhaps sufficiently accounted for by the fact that the conclusion of the agreement left the Opposition, for the moment at any rate, without any clear alternative policy to put before the electorate; while the increase must be largely due to further addition to the register of young voters. To these the sober expositions of hard economic facts upon which Mr. Cosgrave has always relied are less attractive than the emotional lure of Mr. de Valera's personality.

One eminently satisfactory result of this election is that it removes any plausible excuse for abolishing (as Mr. de Valera had threatened) our system of Proportional Representation based upon the single alternative vote. That system,

naturally enough, finds little favour with party wire-pullers who constantly assert that it is uncertain in its working, illusory as a safeguard to minorities and, by favouring the multiplication of small groups, unduly weakens the power of the executive. The first may be conceded; for every electoral arrangement as yet devised plays strange tricks with us. The other and more important objections seem quite unfounded. Notwithstanding that under the last Electoral Act the size of many constituencies was reduced, it has once more been proved that a really substantial minority in an electoral area has at least a sporting chance of returning one or more men of its choice, and, that, broadly speaking, there is a close correspondence between first preference votes cast and seats won. Here are the figures, as published in one of the Dublin newspapers, in respect of the 131 seats contested.

	1st Preference Votes	Seats won	Votes per seat
Fianna Fáil	667,732	72	9,274
Fine Gael	428,615	43	9,967
Labour	128,945	9	14,327
Independents	60,693	7	8,670

Far the heaviest loss of first preferences (both relatively and positively) was suffered by the Independents. That they should nevertheless have lost only two seats as compared with Labour's five is a curious instance of the freakish results of which even P.R. is sometimes capable. But under British electoral arrangements both must have been almost completely obliterated. Now to me at least, it appears that in a country such as this, where political passion runs high and where the powers of the Second Chamber have been so severely restricted, to deprive permanent and substantial minorities of all hope of direct representation would be, not merely unfair, but exceedingly dangerous. It could only be justified by clear and repeated proof that the existence of P.R. was incompatible with the legitimate rights of the majority and with the primary duties of government. Now in actual practice, since Mr. de Valera and his followers entered the Dáil in 1927, no party until now has had an independent majority in the Dáil, for the simple reason that no party has had an independent majority in the constituencies. From that moment until his defeat in 1932 Mr. Cosgrave was

obliged to rely upon Independent and Farmer groups precisely as Mr. de Valera had subsequently to rely upon that of Labour. But I have yet to be convinced that the country was a penny the worse because the leaders of the two largest parties had always to be careful to consider the wishes of others than their pledged supporters. Certainly it did not prevent either of them from carrying into effect, whether for good or evil, their major objects of policy. Under Mr. Cosgrave the Constitution of 1922 was repeatedly amended, appeals to the Privy Council were virtually abolished, long-standing abuses of local government reformed (sometimes by suspension of the offending body and the appointment of paid Commissioners), the selection of candidates for the Civil Service was transferred to an independent commission, the basis of election to the Senate radically altered, and military courts were set up to deal with crimes which, by reason of the intimidation of witnesses and jurymen, the civil courts were unable to punish. Under Mr. de Valera a system of high and nearly universal protection was introduced, an economic war with Great Britain was carried on for nearly six years, the Governor-Generalship and the Oath were abolished, the Senate was dissolved for a time and then restored in another form, and a brand new Constitution, embodying with much else Mr. de Valera's favourite plan of " external association " with the Commonwealth was triumphantly established.

As for the alleged multiplication of small groups, the fact is that the number of these has steadily decreased. There were altogether seven distinct groups or parties in the Dáil of 1927, six in that of 1932, five in that of 1933, four in that of 1937; there are four in that just elected. Three of these represent organised and permanent bodies of political opinion, roughly corresponding to similar bodies in Great Britain. The *raison d'être* of the Independent group is less obvious; but for my part I should be sorry to see it made impossible for men whose views do not in every respect tally with those of any of the other three to enter the Dáil. To have two General Elections within less than twelve months, as happened in 1927 and has now happened again, is no doubt expensive and tiresome; but is truly a very small inconvenience when compared with that artificial exaggeration of the voting strength of a majority which leaves great masses of Liberals up and down Great Britain without due representation.

In conclusion let me add a few words about the future. Apart from the menace of European war, which even we are not too remote to feel, the omens are, I think, as favourable as at any time during the past quarter of a century. What our actual financial position is we shall perhaps see more clearly when the long-promised Report of the Banking Commission is published. Meantime cattle prices have leapt up in response to the settlement with Great Britain, and farmers large and small at last see the prospect of reasonable profits, though losses sustained during recent years will not be made good for some time yet. Greater industrial activity in Great Britain has meant employment for thousands of Irish boys and girls—our latest census returns, by the way, show that we have now a large feminine surplus—and, in consequence, more postal orders coming in to help the old folk at home. Since 1923 housing both in town and country has very notably improved. In my own county, for example, the single or two-roomed cabin has almost entirely disappeared and given place to comparatively roomy two-storied houses with large and easily opened windows. Moreover, though higher taxation, higher rates and the increased cost of foodstuffs and clothing attendant upon high duties and restricted imports are facts not to be denied, the general standard of comfort does not appear to be sensibly affected among the poorer sections of the community. Others, though hard hit by many lean years, have still, it would seem, capital to invest; for the Agreement Loan of £10,000,000 was quickly over-subscribed. The unanimous choice of Dr. Hyde as President of Eire and, in a small way, the issue of new postage stamps to celebrate the centenary of Father Matthew, the great Temperance advocate, go to show that we sometimes have regard to cultural interests transcending the party politics of the moment. Best of all, public order is being maintained without recourse to any extraordinary powers such as have been deemed necessary in the past or as are now used as a matter of course in so many European states; though a recent discovery of hidden arms in Belfast suggests that trouble may still be looked for in that quarter.

There remains the problem of partition, with which I dealt at some length in my last article.* For the present, the less anyone says of this the better, unless he can devise

some new means of overcoming the obstacles to reunion. There is plenty of good will on both sides of the Border, but very little constructive thought; so that irresponsible mischief-makers have it all their own way. When a prominent speaker boasts that he and his associates have beaten the British out of Lough Swilly and will presently beat them out of Londonderry; or when a member of the Dáil talks of advancing into the Six Counties behind a cloud of poison gas, the utterances naturally provoke the worst possible reaction in the threatened areas, where the stern rebuke administered by Mr. de Valera in the second instance is unreported or dismissed as merely politic.

No one in Eire itself takes talk like this as having any real significance; but others cannot be expected to realise how little such people express the mind of Southern Ireland. Thirty years ago, or more, G. K. Chesterton wrote that " men whose next-door neighbours know them for pantaloons cast gigantic shadows across a world." How much truer is this to-day, when newspapers of a species then hardly known leave statesmanlike utterances unnoticed but seize eagerly upon anything, however silly, that looks like making a good headline.

Of the permanent effects of the new Anglo-Irish compact it is too soon to speak. But at least it appears to remove any doubt that, should the need arise, the two countries will stand together in the common defence. Mr. de Valera has declared that Eire must never be allowed to become the base of a foreign attack upon Great Britain; and, with all his faults, I believe him to be a man of his word. Moreover, as things now stand, I cannot imagine any section of Irishmen—unless it be the small and diminishing faction of doctrinaire Republicans—welcoming to Irish shores the forces of Nazi Germany. We have seen the trampling out of liberty in Austria and the persecution of Austrian Christians as well as of Jews, among whom (so I hear on good authority) those classed as " Non-Aryan Christians " are most of all to be pitied, since Jews regard them as perverts and Nazis as Jews. I sometimes think we have not much sense, God help us! But we have more sense than that.

HUGH A. LAW.

DR. JOHNSON AND SPIRITUAL DIARIES.

IF Samuel Johnson had not laughed heartily one day in the company of Boswell, a certain Dr. John Rutty would in all likelihood have remained buried in respectable oblivion. As it is he has a two-fold claim to immortality. His name is to be found in the *Dictionary of National Biography* and is remembered by all Boswellians. Whether Johnson should have laughed in the circumstances is a question of interest. The opportuneness of laughter is one of the more vexing of social questions. Many a nerve has been jarred and even friendships have been jeopardised, as Boswell's pages bear witness, by an untimely laugh. Chesterfield's now rather threadbare dictum that " a gentleman is often seen but very seldom heard to laugh," was anathema to Johnson and we are all the happier for it. He at any rate did not think with Chesterfield that the heart of fools is in the house of mirth. But who was the victim of his laughter on this occasion?

John Rutty was in most respects one of the most ordinary of mortal men. He ate, he drank, he worked, he prayed and departed this life leaving scarcely a ripple on the surface of the waters of humanity. And yet those who seek refreshment in the bypaths and less frequented pastures of literature may find solace, and perhaps instruction, in the curious pages of Rutty's *Spiritual Diary and Soliloquies*. Here is one of the several strange human documents to be found on the dustier shelves of the eighteenth century. " Johnson laughed heartily at this good quietist's self-condemning minutes " says Boswell: but he adds with good sense that this meticulous register of Rutty's mind " though frequently laughable enough was not more so than the history of many men would be if recorded with equal fairness."

Now Rutty was a Quaker. Johnson, unlike Charles Lamb, had no tenderness for Quakers as a body. One of his most cruel outbursts of spleen was directed against a poor unoffending girl who had dared forsake the tepid atmosphere of eighteenth-century Anglicanism for the purer airs of Quakerism. " Madam, she is an odious wench," was his heartless verdict. So Johnson's laugh calls for some discount at the outset. Easy it is to join with Johnson and Boswell in ridicule of a man who, like Rutty, chronicles not only his spiritual wrestlings and discomforts, but his eating and his drinking, his

uprising and his lying down, his smallest physical disturbances from an eructation to a stomach-ache.

Other eighteenth-century diarists, notably Parson Woodforde, favour us with similar embarrassing intimacies. Some of them almost persuade us to agree with Sir Andrew Agueche that life " consists of eating and drinking." But here was a humble and undistinguished Quaker physician who lashed himself in spirit with an almost Franciscan severity and daily submitted himself to rigorous self-examination. Admittedly the bounds between morbid self-analysis and " uncommon tenderness of conscience " such as Rutty exhibits are not always easy to mark and define. Rutty, however, shows us once again how little we know of one another's lives and inmost thoughts. To the outside world :

> He was esteemed a skilful and successful physician and was well beloved in this City (Dublin), being an exemplary and useful member both of civil and religious society. His temper pleasing and well guarded . . . He was accounted temperate in eating and drinking. He generally used to rise early in the morning to his studies . . . He declined ostentation and adopted a lowly way of living. He was charitable to the poor, many of whom almost daily resorted to him for his advice and help. . . .

And yet for twenty years (1753-73) Rutty accused himself of sins real and imaginary, of faults of mind, temper and conduct which most weak mortals would deem venial and inconsiderable. True, Rutty once records ambiguously that his " chastity was attacked " and prayed to be preserved from whoredom and the spirit of it, but he deals mainly with the small emotions and not the grand passions which both disfigure and ennoble humanity.

Rousseau's comment on " the dark and dirty labyrinth " of his own *Confessions* that " It is easier to admit that which is criminal than that which is ridiculous and makes a man feel ashamed," is no doubt historically true. De la Rochefoucauld puts it more neatly when he says " *on fait souvent vanité des passions les plus criminelles.*" While the crimes and deeper passions of an Alcibiades or a Napoleon become part of the web and woof of history, their little vanities and petty weaknesses pass into contempt or nothingness in the records of time. No doubt Rutty felt easier in mind when he had registered that an overdose of whisky resulted in a dull cross

day: that he had "licked spittle" a little too much for his self-respect : that he had suffered " An hypochondriac obnubilation from wind and indigestion " : or that " the old Adam is not put off, but his native fierceness and impatience repullulate." Johnson, we may note, was not the only one who wrote Johnsonese.

If Rutty records such entries as " eat more like a swine," " ate too much and was too cross," " a little incubus on too much spinach," he sins in good company. Even Gibbon, a century later than Pepys, thought fit to enter in his *Journal*, " I felt the usual consequences of debauch and was unfit for any application all day " (after two bottles with Farmer Higgins !) or again " drank a vast deal too much wine to-day . . . I quarrelled with my good friend Harrison (the Lord knows for what)." When Rutty suffers from " a sudden eruption of ferocity," our thoughts fly to Johnson who knew more of the art of the bull-ring and " tossing and goring " in talk than Rutty ever dreamt of.

But there was another and more important side to Rutty's daily life. Doctoring the sick poor is at any time a test of character, and doctoring the Dublin poor in the eighteenth century was a searching trial of patience and goodwill, even for a Quaker. Our sympathy for a long-suffering profession is evoked by cries from the heart, such as " Eleven patients and not one fee," " a rencounter with a clamorous woman," " great impertinence from a patient "—Reviewing one's own life steadily and as a whole requires uncommon integrity and firmness of mind. Among Rutty's periodic stocktakings (July 1755) is one which illustrates how widely men differ in their estimates of their own weaknesses and imperfections. " On a review of my spiritual registry the result is, that out of four, three capital snares are in a great measure destroyed, viz. drinking, smoking and studying, but anger unsanctified remains. Lord, weaken it and introduce patience and meekness."

Rutty did not in modern fashion spend time over endless paragraphs of dubious psycho-analysis. He ruthlessly condemned himself in a line or two. Perhaps he was too busy to deal in Freudian complexes : for apart from his daily rounds as a doctor he spent forty years on a Latin treatise on drugs (some critics claim that it is " still useful for reference ") ; he was an eager student of meteorology, wrote on the *Weather*

and Seasons in Dublin for Forty Years and compiled a *National History of the County of Dublin.*

Such was the man who raised a laugh from Johnson, who himself was guilty, if guilt there be, of similar errors of introspection and the same self-exposure of his weaknesses to the ridicule and ribaldry of an unsympathetic world. In fact, if Johnson's own *Prayers and Meditations*, brief and sporadic as they are, had not been preserved for us by the questionable zeal of Dr. Strahan, we should have been unable to assess that laugh of Johnson's at its true value and, despite our Boswell, much of Johnson's inner life would be unknown to us.

There are strange similarities between the journals of the Quaker Doctor of Medicine and the Dictator of Learning—but there is one fundamental difference between them. Rutty, we feel, wrote with an eye to the moral edification of others, while Johnson's *Prayers and Meditations* were wholly introspective and gave no oblique glance at the outside world. They are, as has been well said, the expression of his " tremulous piety." " They are the voice of his solitude and written only for himself." There was a touch of cruelty, undesigned perhaps, in Strahan's exposure of Johnson's soul to the mock of the vulgar and the malicious. Men, as we all know, are conscious of nothing so much in this world as one another's infirmities. Criticism of others is the very life-blood of self-satisfaction. Carping at the minor follies of the great is a pastime in itself. But Johnson of all men might well have remembered that bigger critics have lesser critics upon their backs to bite them. Even as Johnson laughed incautiously and unkindly at Rutty, so did Horace Walpole with his customary spite gibe at Johnson's spiritual and physical torments. There is venom and malice in Walpole's outburst in his letter to Lady Ossory, August 29th, 1785, and his essentially mundane soul can find no excuse for " the pious editors " of the Prayers.

> See what it is to have friends too honest ! How could men be such idiots as to execute such a trust ? One laughs at every page and then the tears come into one's eyes when one learns what the poor being suffered who even suspected his own madness! one seems to be reading the diary of an old almswoman : and, in fact, his religion was not a step higher in its kind. Johnson had all the bigotry of a monk, and all the folly and ignorance too.

Then comes Walpole's usual spice of wordly wisdom in his final comments. " Methinks the specimen and Rousseau's *Confessions* should be lessons against keeping journals, which poor Johnson thought such an excellent nostrum for a good life. . . . How foolish might we all appear, if we registered every delirium." Horace Walpole was right.

Spiritual Diaries are often a sad reminder that it is but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous. No doubt the world would be poorer in literary values without its Pepys, its Casanova, its Rousseau, and its Benvenuto Cellini. All of them and their kind leave us a rich heritage over and above the confessional matter of their Diaries and Autobiographies. But poor Samuel Johnson did more than register " every delirium "—though he chronicled—much as Rutty did—his daily aches and pains, his digestive processes, his " mental vellications and revulsions " as he so characteristically called them. If Rutty accused himself of sloth and lying abed, Johnson with better reason chided himself for the same vice! " My thoughts have been clouded with sensuality : and except that from the beginning of this year I have in some measure forborne excess of strong drink, my appetites have predominated over my reason " (1764). When Johnson writes, " I have lived totally useless, more sensual in thought and more addicted to wine and meat . . . I fasted all day "—if the hand is the hand of Johnson, the voice is that of Rutty with his self-accusation of " guzzling " and his " dogged " eating and drinking too much.

On Good Friday, 1773, Johnson made an entry which might have come bodily from Rutty—" fretful and impatient ; I was relieved in the morning by drinking tea and eating the soft part of a penny loaf." Like Rutty, he even chronicles a flatulence. But whereas Rutty accused himself of " inordinate study " (surely a venial sin in a physician) Johnson was harassed by his constitutional sloth, his " idleness and folly " ; his broken vows to work and study ; his omissions in Bible reading (at the age of 65 he avows he had never read the Apocrypha). In the end like Rutty poor Johnson finds little good in himself, whatever the world might think : " other good of myself I know not where to find except a little charity."

Spiritual Diaries of all kinds provoke certain obvious comments. They are in themselves evidence of a certain

egotism, for no man can tell the full story of his own life without the help of others. The Diarist sees only part of himself, often the worst part and too often the morbid and the hypochondriac element creeps in. Whether it is fair or desirable to seek to penetrate the arcana of men's minds may be open to doubt. All that is hidden is not gold. Few at any rate grow in moral stature under the process. But when men themselves reveal or purport to reveal the innermost workings of their hearts and souls, and voluntarily submit themselves to the scrutiny of mankind, they must suffer or benefit accordingly in the judgment of posterity. Some, like Pepys and Rousseau, gain eternal literary fame at the expense of their moral reputations, and they must pay the price. Both of them would probably pay that price willingly if the option was theirs to-day. With them and their tribe posterity must regard the bargain as a good one, for, in the literary sense, it has much to gain and nothing to lose. The sinner who has avowed his own iniquity (even by "confession and avoidance") comes up for sentence only.

In some respects the sinners are obviously easier to estimate than the Saints. But the Saints, big or little, whether a St. Augustine or a St. Francis, a Quaker Woolman or a Quaker Rutty, offer a more baffling problem. St. Augustine, for instance, despite the almost universal and century-long approval of orthodoxy, provides one of the greatest conundrums of all. His life and his *Confessions* offer as much material for the psychologist as the theologian. Shocking as it may appear to the divines, many laymen will continue to feel a little uneasy as to the spiritual adjustments of St. Augustine's life. There is always in the background the memory of that cruel but not untrue apophthegm of de la Rochefoucauld—"*Quand les vices nous quittent, nous nous flattons de la créance que c'est nous qui les quittons.*" His *Confessions* are one long diatribe against his dead-self. The fires of Hell burned more fiercely than ever after Augustine. One who spared himself not at all was little likely to spare others. When St. Augustine draws an edifying contrast between the spiritual reformation of his later life and the time when "the muddy concupiscence of the flesh and the bubblings of youth" beclouded and overcast his heart—there comes to mind that memorable parting between Henry V and Falstaff. "I know thee not, old man . . . Presume not that I am the thing I was : For God doth know, so shall the world perceive, That I have turned away from my former self. . . ."

However edifying in itself, the spectacle of the repentant soul struggling for freedom from the sense of guilt and shunning the errors of youth, sometimes leaves us with a craving for the milk of human kindness. Looking at St. Augustine's picture of himself we have an uneasy feeling that the brush is laid on too heavily and that nothing delights the heart of a Saint so much as reflection upon his past misdoings. The greater the sinner, the greater Saint. Are we to believe, as he tells us, that at the age of seventeen "he polluted the brook of friendship with the sewage of lust," and led a life of unspeakable vice and debauchery? We may not know, with exactitude, what were the moral standards of Northern Africa in the fifth century, but the great Father of the Church seems to have remained faithful to one concubine for a number of years—though he behaved rather badly to her in the end.

But the real and final test of all Spiritual Diaries and Confessions is not in the light of their minor inconsistencies and aberrations, but whether they are sincere and honest outpourings of the human spirit. Even the *Confessions* of one who was so odious in the sight of Johnson as Rousseau survives the test of sincerity, save perhaps for a few pages where the egotism nauseates and repels, as it does in wholly different measure and quality in the case of St. Augustine. With the memory of these and other examples in our minds we may part from Rutty and Johnson with the verdict of their fellowmen in our ears, as they sank to their graves. Just as Hannah More noted "the mild radiance of the setting sun," as Johnson's end approached, so did Wesley note in his Journal (April 6th, 1775) "that venerable man, Dr. Rutty, just tottering over the grave, but still clear in his understanding, full of faith and love, and patiently waiting till his change should come." Good men, both of them, though of unequal stature. But one thing is clear: Johnson had no right to laugh at Rutty!

H. Arthur Baker.

HITLER'S CARDS.

FOREIGN politics have often much in common with a game of cards. Ludendorff—the politician-general of the World War—was given the name of " the hazard player," a name that has stuck to him in the minds of many Germans in spite of all efforts at posthumous glorification. Men sit down to all sorts of card games. There are some where to win is all a matter of luck. There are others where something can be made of a bad hand if the player has more cunning or more daring than his antagonists. Hitler is playing such a game—a game of poker. He has not much of a hand, but he knows that in poker and in politics one can bluff. And one can only see how shamelessly he bluffs if one has a look at the cards in his hand. Only someone with an intimate knowledge of Germany, its people and its history, one who has trustworthy friends in the various groups and strata of society, can catch a glimpse of what he holds in his hand. This is the reason for the failure of so many of the correspondents to English papers. They are men of more than ordinary ability in their profession. They know and report far more of what is happening in Government circles than most Germans suspect or find out. But of the real feeling of the various grades of society in Germany they can know and find out very little. The most severe restraint and distrust of others has become second nature to the opponents of Hitler in Germany. They know how often a word spoken in anger has led to arrest and imprisonment. The most innocuous passer-by may be a spy. So they are silent when a stranger is in their midst. Only when they feel themselves safe, in the close circle of friends and relations, do they talk. Only those who have many old and faithful friends can learn the true state of affairs under the Third Reich.

Hitler's party comrades and followers are his first card. The " old fighters," " professional Nazis," as they are called by others, are those belonging to the not very large groups of shrewd fellows—cranks and mercenaries—who would find no place in a peaceful Germany. Unsuccessful in any profession, at variance with themselves and the world, they became street politicians. Professional hecklers, they were the first to introduce violent means of breaking up meetings. They are, though in many cases dissatisfied, Hitler's most faithful

adherents. Still, their number scarcely exceeds 200,000 and they are not to be confused with the millions of party members. The " March Company " (*Maerzlinge*) as they are called, were the first to come into line with reality after the " revolution " of March 1933 and beg humbly for admittance into the party. They are not even yet completely accepted by the old party members. One can still find in the offices of the party and of its various organisations a poster which exposes in bad verse, but with noble indignation, this " turn-over." Many of those who have voluntarily joined the Nazis since 1933 are really keen and determined opponents of the system. It is for these that the term " beefsteak " has been coined, brown outside (the Nazi colour) and red inside (socialists). There are said to be whole companies of the S.A. composed chiefly of opponents of National-Socialism. One should not overrate these statements in the hope that Hitler will be overthrown from within. The safeguards against this are enormous, and any attempt would only result in a massacre.

The officials, who have been forced, willy-nilly, into the party, form a strong body. They came in with wry faces. Being party members means that their free evenings must be spent at stupid meetings, not to mention the considerable sums of money they must sacrifice in the form of contributions to party funds. " I pay my subscription as a tax for political freedom, which I used to have free before nineteen thirty-three," one of them remarked morosely. He was wrong. No German living under National-Socialism is allowed anything like the liberty he enjoyed before 1933. What the officials have gained by their acquiescence can be seen from the following occurrence which took place in North Germany a few weeks ago. An elderly man had gathered his children and grandchildren together to celebrate his seventy-fifth birthday. As so often happens now in Germany, when there is no one but the members of the family present, they told the latest political jokes. The following day the old man was summoned to appear before the Secret Police and told to his face what had happened. Only their regard for his age prevented them from arresting him, and they let him off with a warning. He called his family together, told them what had occurred, and asked who had betrayed him. It was his fourteen-year-old grandson who, as a member of the Hitler Youth, had sworn to report any disloyal act. His father, who was an official, was greatly

incensed, let himself be carried away by his anger and gave the boy a thrashing. The next day he was arrested, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him and he was dismissed from his position. His own son had betrayed him.

All party members are by no means enthusiastic National-Socialists. Many are sick to death of the stupid propaganda which goes on from dawn to dark in an attempt to stop the German people from thinking. But the hundreds of thousands who got small jobs through the party are its staunch supporters because it is in their interest to be so. The coming of the Third Reich has placed them in well-paid positions and fine jobs and they know whom they have to thank. This is Hitler's best card.

That sociological puzzle, the middle classes, are Hitler's second card. Decimated by the World War, their property swept away by the inflation of 1923, they seized on the promises of the National-Socialists as a drowning man clutches a straw. They were promised everything and got very little. Were not the small shop-keepers and artisans led to believe that Hitler would do away with the large factories and stores? The Third Reich was to be a new heaven and a new earth for the middle classes. But they had a rude awakening. The large stores are still there and the four-year plan has embittered the life of many a small tradesman. Taxes are higher than ever and exacted with brutal ruthlessness. Many thousands of independent artisans have been forced into the factories. Germany is rearming, and this is not the time for sentimentality. Large sections of the middle class have been disillusioned about Hitler. But he may still have many adherents among the petty bourgeoisie—small factory owners who are making money through rearmament, officials whose sons have perhaps become officers, engineers and architects who have got work again. Uncritical, without political acumen, they are taken in by the propaganda of the Nazis. Although they think themselves educated, they do not realise that they are living behind walls and that day after day their newspapers present them with a deceptive picture of the world. The middle class, though not very large numerically, is very divided. It is not a safe card.

The "Land Folk," as all people living on the land are called in the Nationalist-Socialist phraseology, are the third card. They are not a homogeneous group and their interests are very diverse. There are the large landed proprietors, noble and commoner, chiefly east of the Elbe, who regard National-Socialism with misgiving. The man who talks of Blood and Soil and sets up the peasant as the main source of national strength, can be no true friend of the feudal lord. The mills of the land settlement scheme grind slowly and cheap agricultural labour is to be imported again from Italy. But if, some day, the Nazis were up to their necks in hot water, then perhaps an agrarian revolution might break out, even in Germany, encouraged by many of the National-Socialist theoreticians. The old German Nationalists and Steel-helmets among the landowners have every reason to be mistrustful.

Then the peasant-farmers—it was they who prepared the way for Hitler. Before 1933, they were not in a very prosperous state. They felt the competition of other countries, able to produce in more favourable circumstances frozen meat and butter, wheat and feeding-stuffs more cheaply than they could and consequently able to find an easier market. Then the level of prices was against them—industrial products commanded a high price, agricultural products a low one. The condition of the peasant was not good before 1933. Hitler promised to mend all this. His first care would be the peasant and the four-year plan was for his advantage. The four-year plan is over and the peasant is not so pleased with it. It was fine to own your own farm, which could not be sold over your head under the Erbhof Law. But then the peasant discovered: if you cannot sell your land, you cannot use it as a security for a loan. The peasant can no longer get credit. Of course prices are better. Germany wants to be self-supporting as far as the production of food is concerned. But there is not only a Reich Food Ministry, but also a Reich Peasants' Guild and a Reich Peasantry Commission. They all have large offices where officials sit who write and tell the peasant what he must and must not do. He hates this bombardment of forms and papers. So it happens that in certain parts of the country—as for example Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein—there has been a change of heart. One sign is the refusal of the people to take part in the harvest thanksgiving festival.

Then there are the agricultural labourers. The frightful conditions under which they lived and worked was one of the reasons for the flight from the land, so plainly marked in

Germany. The town is for the labourer the place where contracts have value and where he is treated, to some degree, like a human being. Pledges were made to the workers on the land, too, but their conditions have not changed. Now that cheap agricultural labourers are to be brought from Italy and Hungary they realise that there is no intention of fundamentally improving their standard of living. Indifference, if not actual hatred, is all that Hitler can expect from the man working on the land. No, the land is not a safe or good card for the " leader and peace-maker " to gamble on.

It was the Industrialists, Hitler's fourth card, who helped him to power. They supplied him with the means for the most extensive propaganda ever seen in Germany. They thought to use him as a buffer against the workers, but they must often reflect that they have only driven out the devil with Beelzebub. It is true, there is an armaments race in Germany, and there are armament profiteers just as there were war profiteers from 1914 to 1918. But there is Goering's four-year plan, and affairs in general are not so pleasant as they seemed in the beginning. Anyone making a profit must also make " voluntary " contributions to the Reich loans. He must pay larger sums of money into the *Winterhilfe*, and the demands made on the industrial concerns by *Kraft durch Freude* are extremely heavy. Resistance is useless. The industrialist must appear generous and pay his workers' travel holidays. Not every factory is engaged in the manufacture of armaments. But they are all compelled to make possible the export of German goods at dumping prices. Many would be able to do good business if there were not a shortage of raw material and foreign currency, as a result of the intensive rearmament campaign. Textile factories are forced to work short hours or close down from time to time, although there is a great need of textiles. There is almost a mania for the chemical manufacture of substitutes for every tried and tested material which has been in existence for years. There have been a few successes and a long series of failures.

The quality of German raw material has degenerated during the carrying out of the four-year plan. This is not apparent in the export goods which are always made of the best material. But for the home market every kind of inferior material has to be used. To keep the workers in good

humour the employer is often heavily encroached on financially. For example, just before last Christmas Goering announced that in future the workers would be paid for the Christmas, Easter and Whitsun holidays. This cost Goering nothing, but it cost the industrialists millions of marks and is a very heavy burden on the back of the small manufacturer. With the exception of the armament profiteers, the employers of labour are not a very safe card in Hitler's hand.

What about Hitler's fifth card, the German worker ? Before 1933 the German Workers' Movement was the strongest in the world. It was strong in numbers but not in leadership. The working class has never really taken up the fight against Hitler ; otherwise we would have a different Germany to-day. Up to May 1933 the German labour leaders believed that they would be able to carry on their work under him. They are now paying the price. Has the working class gone over ? Not at all. Hitler has failed in his many attempts to win them. He has shrunk from carrying out his promises. Again and again he has told them that they must not think of a rise in wages. But at the same time, because of the alignment of foreign trade with other countries and because of the measures taken for carrying through the four-year plan, the price of food has risen. The attempts on the part of statisticians to deny this state of affairs, only too apparent in every working-class household, merely create bitterness among the masses. The quality of many food stuffs has deteriorated because of measures which seem to point to a return to war conditions. Butter is rationed—200 grammes per person per week. Eggs, cheap fats, as well as pork, on which the worker sets great store, are to be had only in insufficient quantities, when at all.

In many of the factories engaged on the manufacture of armaments the workers are continually forced to do overtime. Anyone watching the workers in a German industrial town return home could not fail to notice what overwork and under-nourishment have done since 1933. The housing shortage has never been tackled by the Nazis. At the same time one enormous public building after another is going up and a great state road is being planned for Berlin. Hundreds of millions of marks are being spent in this way. It has been announced that during the year 1938 20,000 new houses will be built ; but in view of the real housing shortage it is like a

drop of water in the desert. The workers realise that they are being derided. They have not forgotten Goebbel's slogan "Guns before butter." Dourly they wait for their hour to strike. We are not speaking of those who in spite of prison and concentration camp continue their work against Hitler, but of the millions who have learned in disgust and shame to hide their thoughts but who have become fanatical adversaries of this system of deception and meanness.

The workers are not to be deceived by hypocritical speeches and the dishonest demands which *Kraft durch Freude* makes on their behalf. They feel that a foreign policy which talks of peace and acts to its detriment must lead to war. The workers hate war. At the front they suffered what the soldiers of other countries were forced to suffer, with this in addition, that at home their wives and children went hungry. They hate war, but to many it appears the only way out. "We want weapons, we'll know against whom to use them," they have often said to me. This is the weakest card in Hitler's hand. Nowadays a war is not fought with soldiers alone. Every tank, every aeroplane needs a certain number of workers. The German worker is waiting.

Here are the five cards which Hitler holds in his hand. They are by no means good ones. But he has taken up another. Has he become stronger through the annexation of Austria? It may have gratified his pride and love of power to enter Vienna as a conqueror, but the day after the people ask themselves: what have we really gained? The "Purging" is in full swing, aimed equally at Jews, Socialists and Catholics. But no matter how many are imprisoned, it will not help him. Of the seven million Austrians, four and a half to five million are his bitter opponents. Another bad card.

GERMANICUS.

AGRICULTURE UNDER FASCISM.

WITH 1926 as a pivot, fascist land policy has two well-noted phases. In the early years social considerations dictated a quick solution for the double-faced labour problem represented in the south and islands by interrupted emigration, and in the centre and north, acutely in Emilia, by the highly explosive syndicalist labourers. Nineteen twenty had seen 189 agrarian strikes with more than a million workers involved: by 1922 it is claimed that over one-third of the fascists were *rurali*, the majority being either peasants with shares in or land of their own whose interests had been menaced by the syndicalists and who had formerly been in the Catholic popular party, or else followers of Mussolini and Rossoni (now Minister of Agriculture) who had changed sides.

In the three years following the march on Rome the peasant organisations were destroyed as ruthlessly as was necessary to enable the fascists to place others in their stead. The alienated day-labourer lost all voice in his affairs and could no longer take independent action, while in the south the would-be emigrants were left to get along as best they could until a beginning was made in 1924 with the formation of a permanent committee for "internal migration" which had the powers, later widely amplified, of reorganising and encouraging permanent or temporary transfer of unemployed labourers to the north. Enrolment in the army, public works and industry could not, however, absorb increasing unemployment. Italian agricultural wages after the war had risen to a level, topped in 1922, which has not since been surpassed. But livestock of all kinds had been swallowed up during the hostilities and stocks, particularly of labour beasts, were heavily depleted. A natural tendency to turn over ploughland to pasture, not only to make up stocks of cattle, but also because the cost of growing grain relative to that of raising beasts was much higher, was an important factor in accentuating unemployment. In this lay the genesis of the "battle for grain," proclaimed in 1925, which provided means to force unwilling proprietors to employ more labour.

This main movement apart, the years 1922-6 saw several developments of plans made by parliamentary Italy. In 1923 money was laid out for much-needed research institutes, notably for the foundation of the excellent National Institute

of Agrarian Economics, and in 1924 ten new research stations were founded. Signor Serpieri introduced his first laws on land reclamation in 1924, destined to be outshone by the impressive outlay of 1929; and 1924 also saw the first fascist law, abortive and followed by others, on the troublesome *usi civici*, a problem of local rights which had been under debate and legislation since the beginning of the century. A modest but useful programme undertaken in 1925 was the formation of some thirty-five poultry breeding stations. Hand in hand went a stifling of the peasant co-operatives. These *affittanze collettive* had been an interesting phenomenon of pre-war labour conditions; writing in 1913, Signor Serpieri records that in Reggio Emilia alone in the ten years after 1902 there had been formed eighty-three of these co-operatives, partly to satisfy land-hunger, partly as organs of social resistance in the class struggle. It may be said that until 1918 brought the men home from the trenches to find that the promises of land made to them by politicians were to be broken, the co-operative movement in northern Italy was heading reasonably towards a marked measure of land reform. The war accentuated the struggle, and fascism found its opportunity in support of land-owners and part-sharing peasants. The peasant leagues were smashed, and 1926 brought in the corporations to discipline production and the producer. To-day exists a high state of compulsory organisation, workers being broadly ranged under a confederation of agricultural syndicates and employers and tenants under a confederation of agriculturalists.

Foreign observers of the "battle for grain" which for eight years was fought ostensibly to release Italy from the "slavery" of imports, have found its merits debatable. The battle has now taken another lease of conflict in line with the self-sufficiency drive: on the general position of agriculture its effects remain highly important. Ghino Valenti, a classic Italian agriculturalist, respected by both fascists and dissenters, wrote in 1914 that healthy equilibrium would be established in Italian agriculture when the wheat area of 4,700,000 hectares then being sown, and producing 50 million quintals, was reduced to 3½ million hectares yielding with improved technique 70 million quintals, the land thus freed being given over to stock-raising. This, he thought, would provide the Italians with their needs and enable them to export "the special products of Italy's soil and climate." In 1920, perhaps in

view of the greater population, Valenti enlarged the area he thought should be under wheat to about 4 million hectares; and Signor Serpieri recorded himself in agreement. In 1936, eleven years after the initiation of the "battle," an area of 5,137,000 hectares produced only 61 million quintals, admittedly a bad harvest, but proving that to give Italy her average annual needs (calculated by Serpieri at some 85 million quintals) it must be possible to reap in a good year up to 100 million quintals. Nineteen thirty-seven is claimed to have produced on an area not less than that of 1936 80 millions, fêted as a bumper harvest; and yet in November last a decree made it binding on all bakers to use a standard ten per cent. of maize with their bread, and officially inspired publications spoke openly of the leguminous materials also used. A tentative estimate would put the proportion of wheat flour used in commercially baked bread to-day at seventy per cent., perhaps rather less. And in no year has Italy been able to dispense with imported wheat. This is enough to show that the "battle" is nothing like won, nor can be won without a large extension of area under plough.

By dint of coercion backed up with propaganda for improved technique (fertilisers, selected seed, sowing in rows, machinery, competitions) annual production has indeed been increased. In the years 1910-14 an average area of 4,760,260 hectares yielded an average annual harvest of 48,700,000 quintals or 10·2 quintals per hectare. For the years 1932-6 these figures had increased to 5,027,000 hectares producing 71,625,000 quintals, or 14·3 quintals per hectare. By high tariff protection the internal price of wheat has been maintained far above the general world level, something the working man knows all about. Estimates of the public money spent on promoting the "battle" vary from 125 millions of lire to 225 millions.

It is when one compares the effects of this policy on the different provinces of Italy that its true nature becomes clear. In 1930 the authoritative Professor Mortara (quoted by Salvemini) wrote: "As to the cultivated area, we note that from 1923 to 1929 it diminished by 61,000 hectares in the north and by 65,000 hectares in central Italy, while it increased by 160,000 in the south and by 155,000 in the islands." But whereas in the good grain lands of the north the campaign for improved technique in official figures raised average

production per hectare from 15 to 25 quintals, in the south and islands the increase was only from 8·9 to 10 quintals. It does not need these figures to state that the impoverished and arid soil of southern Italy is not suitable for wheat: the quantity produced there before the "battle," except for parts of Sicily, was mainly to be accounted for by the need of the peasant to grow his own daily bread. Nor can it be claimed that the increased wheat area helps toward "fixing the peasant on the land," as fascists declare their ambition since Mussolini's famous speech of 1927, for the increase has been in the south and islands and there the labourers, at sowing and reaping, are hired by the job in the nearest market-place. They do not live on the land or necessarily only by the land, and between times they have nothing to attract them out of the towns. The wheat increase militates, too, against the settlement of smallholders, for wheat is simplest grown on unrestricted plains.

Upon the numbers of Italian livestock the "battle" has had a disastrous effect, particularly on sheep stocks, which none of the various livestock commissions and high intentions embarked upon by Government has been able to avert. Writers for thirty years have been lamenting Italy's poverty in livestock, and things had commenced a little to improve before the initiation of the "battle." Since then they have been rapidly worsening. From the early years of the century there has been a slight increase in the *per capita* consumption of meat, but it still bulks very small in the daily ration—in 1929 a fascist writer calculated it at 5½ per cent. An illuminating example of the conditions which now obtain can be seen in Puglia. Until some years ago some half-million sheep had winter pasture on the hills around Foggia moving for the summer since grass will not grow in Puglia after the middle of June, to the heights of the western Abruzzi. To-day those sheep have disappeared and wheat is being grown around Foggia while the lonely pastures in the Abruzzi, fit for no other employment, lie unused. "The battle for grain is a policy only of to-day," a small landowner in the south of Italy remarked to me, "it has neither justification in the past nor any future. Its only excuse is political."

The second phase of fascist land policy was entered upon in 1926 with the publication of the Charter of Labour and the first law on corporations. Henceforward the policy loses sight

of the social and concentrates on the political aspect. The crisis and the march of history bent early intentions into a frame far more arbitrary than that foreseen in previous years: the "battle for grain" lost its early significance and together with the present push for self-sufficiency and the tightening control of workers' organisations, became a clear dependent on political needs. Signor Serpieri is the doyen of fascist agriculturalists and he has put it clearly enough: "The fascist conception does not sever economics from politics, economic wellbeing from the power of the nation. . . ."

These years have seen modest work well done in several fields. Deforestation has been for centuries the bane of Italy and fifty years of parliamentary legislation made little impression. After a useless law in 1923 the Government took a decisive step in 1926 by forming a forest police equipped to deal sternly with peasants who objected to afforestation because it robbed them of goat-grazing. This has been effectual and contemporary with tree-planting. Official figures state that from the founding of the kingdom to 1922 there had been reafforested 50,920 hectares, and since 1922 58,486 hectares. The production of fruit and vegetables has much increased over pre-war figures. The crisis heavily checked this trade, and despite the admirable work in marketing and selection instigated by the Institute of Export, founded in 1927, sanctions went far towards its destruction. The research stations founded in 1924 and 1925 have turned out a body of excellent material.

The emphasis on immediate political needs extends beyond the "battle for grain" to that other *magnum opus*, the *bonifica integrale*, best translated as land reclamation. The parliaments of united Italy which carried on the good work of drainage and irrigation in process since the Middle Ages did not always spend their money to the best advantage; still they put under cultivation large tracts of once useless land. Reclamation has been in the forefront of the fascist land policy and a vast amount of good work has been executed, albeit at a vast cost. Apart from fine performances such as the improvement of the *Campagna romana* and the settling of the Pontine Marshes, land has been reclaimed in most provinces of Italy, with or without the active co-operation of local landowners. The Mussolini Act of 1928 provided for 4·3 thousand million lire being spent by the Government and a further 2·7

thousand million lire by landowners (under threat of expropriation), in the next fourteen years. Enthusiasm flew to fever-heat. Forecasts predicted colossal results. The whole of Italy would smile with bumper crops in ten years' time. Alas, the fourteen years which were at first declared all the time necessary for reclaiming the whole of Italy, soon lengthened into many decades. It became clear that far larger sums than those ear-marked would be needed. Until 1935, however, a very large sum of money from public and private sources was spent on reclamation; by then it was admitted that this was a work of long and laborious expenditure.

The problem is gigantic and has been faced with courage and determination; and were it not for the fact that this "battle" has only commenced and cannot be ended without many years of persevering expense, unreserved praise would be due to its authors. Criticism is inevitable precisely because of this fact. Agriculture has incurred very large debts. In the 1930-1 budget it was stated that mortgages on rural property amounted to more than five milliards of lire. In February 1935, Signor Curato after much experience wrote that at present private reclamation (compulsory work done by individual or associated landowners, not directly by the State) "is feared and shunned by capital and good initiative," and that to put reclamation on its soundest footing it was necessary "to base it on the economic convenience of private reclamation and not on the financial and coercive intervention of the State, intervention which . . . can obtain results only by way of exception." This attitude is met with in Italy to-day among those who see in the penniless condition of landowners who have been obliged to embark on reclamation, the doom of that very work itself, since they have been forced to spend and mortgage on immediate work which, however, must, to be successful, call for steady expenditure over many years—the essential characteristic of land reclamation. Certain effects are already emphatically noticeable. In 1933 it was calculated that the amount of agrarian debt relieved or in course of relief by means evolved after the crisis of 1929, was more than three milliards of lire. In the south and islands, for instance, reclamation has scarcely touched the *latifondi*, great absentee estates; theirs is a case for irrigation before settlement, so that many years must pass and great sums be spent before much change can appear. As it is, heavy

taxation has defeated the good intentions of the more conscientious proprietors. One such told me his experience: he had determined to transform arid upland pastures from sheep to olive culture, and after successful experiment set out to plant 10,000 olives. But when he had put down the first 1,600 he found himself through taxation without the money to continue, and the project fell through. If this is the state of things to-day, how will the land and its workers fare in twenty years' time?

The policy of to-day is explicit in the campaign for agricultural autarky which doctrinally declares that "the farm has become entirely state-controlled" and that "individual interests suffer wherever they conflict with national requirements for autarky." In a symposium published this winter it was pointed out that autarky must not be confused with economic autonomy, which Italy could never realise, but that the campaign is intended to prepare for that autonomy in moments of crisis; more esoteric writers are ready to admit that agricultural self-sufficiency is impossible for Italy except during brief periods of crisis. This latest "battle" is dominated by the need to increase average grain production by some ten million quintals per year, which means a large extension of land under plough even supposing, which is doubtful, that yields can be markedly improved during the next few years; and by the simultaneous need to spend big sums on enlarging and improving forage rotation crops and to allow of a livestock increase, for meat, fats, milk and wool, of another two and a half million heads (about ten per cent.), mostly in sheep and beef. There must also be an enormous increase, on a large-scale production basis, of pigs and laying fowls. Competing for money and land with these primary needs are many others, cotton, maize, canapa, flax, timber, etc., and none of these may borrow land now under cultivation of another crop. And yet only one-fourteenth of Italy is scheduled as unproductive, and most of that is irreclaimable. Only the inconsiderable rice area may be diminished. All this intensification is to be accompanied by a wide enlargement, because they are "ideal fascist forms," of part-sharing systems of tenancy like *mezzadria*, which above all demand that the peasant grow his own nutritive needs and are therefore incompatible with much intensification of production. Aeon-old experience in Tuscany has shown that the best of these

systems, *mezzadria*, works smoothest when the peasant grows a little of everything ; if he is now to be governed with a rigid measuring rod of national production his economy will certainly suffer. The basic problem is how simultaneously to increase the wheat harvest and the weight of livestock : these are in the end mutually exclusive, and it will be recognised from what has been said that no solution can be found until decades of careful tending and well-measured expense have improved the soil of southern Italy.

The fascists declare themselves ready to be judged on their land policy by the results of land reclamation and the " battle for grain " ; if one cannot find these results consonant with good farming or good economics, still the criticism should take notice of the unquestionably good work done in quieter fields. It is unfortunate that such high figures for reclamation should have been aimed at in the early years. " Mistaken people have said that agriculture needs credit," wrote Valenti in 1914, " while they ought to have said that it needs capital, which is a very different thing." No longer is there any private capital available. The " battle for grain " has done a great deal of harm and good only so far as yields have been increased on the restricted wheat lands of the north. Although the régime has recognised that a basic problem its land policy is called on to solve is how to absorb the day-labourer into the ranks of the peasantry possessing land or tenancy, the land-hunger of the *bracciante* remains unfed—except that his voice is no more heard in the land. His wages have been diminishing for years ; otherwise he is in much the same condition as he always was. If he is a better fascist to-day it is because his hopes are centred on Abyssinia.

A policy of to-day which leaves the morrow to fate is implicit in the hurried reclamation expenditure and admitted in the " battle for grain " ; it has received emphatic support in the self-sufficiency campaign. Tightening corporative organisation and stricter disciplining of production for political ends leaves an Italian agricultural economy, isolated within itself, to develop not according to the canons of good farming which will make the best of home and foreign markets, but to struggle impoverished for products better and more cheaply grown elsewhere. Italian agriculture, in short, is conscripted for the crisis of to-day.

BASIL DAVIDSON.

THE CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN THEATRE, 1917-1937.

HAS the Russian theatre changed as the bolshevists and friends of Russia claim ? Is it changing ? Will it continue to change ? And if so, to a desirable end, say democracy and peace ? These questions continue to be widely put outside Russia. The purpose of this article is to answer them in the affirmative from the point of view of the writer who has been " on the spot " many times since 1917. First-hand inquiry has shown him that the Russian theatre has changed from the bottom, not the top, that the natural expression which springs from the folk (now called the people) is the medium by which it is being recreated and restored wholly to its rightful owners, the people, that the policy of the Government, and the people's real dramatic and æsthetic power and energy have given it a true democratic form and function. In short, that the change has been from an aristocratic theatre for the privileged few to a democratic theatre for the entire community of 170,000,000.

There are three principal changes, from the Left Bloc (to use the fashionable Russian political term) to the Right Bloc, to the Stalin United Russia Bloc.

The Left Bloc. The contemporary Russian theatre was the direct and inevitable outcome of the October Revolution. The Revolution itself was a mighty social drama causing the creative stream to flow in two immense dramatic currents of economic and social unfolding, processes of a vast task to be performed by chiefs and people. In the theatrical sense there came two stages, the economic and the mass. One was the national economic stage for the production of a new existence ; the other was the stage of the people's theatre for the reflection of the ideas (or ideology) and actualities of the new existence. Upon the one has been played realistically ever since the epic of the new life, the building of a national economy and the remoulding of an entire community with this labour. This herculean task of productivity, similar to that which had taken capitalist countries two hundred years to perform, and the preparation of an illiterate and backward population to perform it unacquisitively, could it be achieved within two or three decades and by the achievement introduce a higher civilisation and culture ? In this problem was the source of the

mightiest dramatic motive and action the world has ever known. The chiefs, on their part, felt and recognised its dramatic importance. They have done everything on the biggest dramatic scale, from the first ideas, policies, decrees of the People's Revolutionary Government, 1917, to the latest, those of the United People's Government, 1937. And the people, in its theatre, have expressed in epitomised form this rich dramatic experience.

The story of the first period of the mass, or democratic, theatre is the story of the famous October theatre. The first and, as yet, only volume of *The History of the Soviet Theatre*, published in Russian in 1933, shows in detail how the sweep of the action and intensity of the high dramatic quality of the events of militant communism were transferred to the October theatre largely by the unorganised and untrained masses. It presents a sensational and spectacular picture of revolution and war laying the foundation of the democratic theatre. It shows that the great central idea of the moment was the " proletarianisation " of the theatre by the working masses themselves, and the production of working-class authors capable of epitomising the national epic.

The actualities of the idea appeared in Government, people's and proletarian action. Government decrees nationalised, organised, sovietised and democratised the theatre and its workers and transferred some of the power of the old personnel to soviet councils and local committees. The workers and peasants came together in congresses—the first the world has ever known in 1918—to discuss the vital problems of the theatre in relation to their new ownership of it. Proletarian groups formed to consider how best to cast the work of the theatre in the collectivist mould. For five years the Left Bloc continued to produce its own unique Left specialities. Then suddenly came a new development.

The Right Bloc. The year 1922 saw the second big change. Along with the Government's New Economic Policy, which had the effect of helping the fission rather than the fusion of the individualist and collectivist parties, there went the re-emergence of the Right Bloc formed by the old pre-war academic theatre specialists and evolutionists who accepted the revolution without seeking to understand and interpret its working-class ideas. The N.E.P. and the internal situation created by it, seen in particular in the rebirth of the small

capitalist, favoured the aristocratic isolation of the Right Bloc and the retention of its enormous load of late nineteenth-century influences, dramaturgical, æsthetic, technical and other, many derived from Western European sources and covering a wide field of thought and action—mysticism, metaphysics, philosophy, religion, æsthetic cults and systems, the Free theatre literary and moral campaign, and so on ; all tending to impinge upon and mould Russian theatrical activities, while setting up the utmost confusion between the concepts of the theatre and the drama.

The Right Bloc theatre consisted of six sections, each under a sectional specialist and all under A. B. Lunacharski, the Commissar of Education. In addition there were groups formed by studios, disciples and other followers. Thus, there were the old imperial theatres under Lunacharski, who sought to Marxianise them : the Meyerhold theatre under Meyerhold, bolshevising upon the grave of his old system of theatrical synthesis ; the Moscow Art theatre under A. Stanislavski and Nemerovich-Danchenko, deeply in love with their old tradition of acting ; the Kamerny theatre under A. Tairov, metaphysicking his pre-revolution theatre with an overdose of rhythmic synthesis ; and the Jewish theatre under A. Granovski, busy with an elaborate system of dramaturgical " tailoring," which also occupied the attention of the others. Most of the plays staged by them during the 1922-8 period have the look of being made from a common recipe for contemporary entertainment from classics and recent Western European and American " masterpieces."

A great deal could be written about this very remarkable situation of a body of highly intellectual men neglecting or refusing (as some say) to subdue their old and, in some respects, worn-out theatrical systems to the creation of a new system capable of conferring theatrical power on millions of citizens. Perhaps the future writer of Russian theatrical history will decide that it was due to the policy and power of Lunacharski, the People's Commissar of Education, who from 1917 to 1929 was the dominant figure of the Right Bloc if not the theatrical dictator. Perhaps the historian will decide also that Lunacharski was not the right man for the post of supervisor of the building of a democratic theatre that is the inevitable product of revolutionary conditions and not evolutionary ones. Lunacharski, like his fellow builders,

was an evolutionist, traditionalist, and conservative. He was an academic scholar of the Tsarist age, a brilliant and prolific writer. In 1926 at an exhibition of his literary work there were books alone with 120 titles. He wrote philosophical and æsthetic and literary essays, poetry, political and national-economic pamphlets, tragedies, dramatic plays, farces, opera text books, and a variety of other works. He lived in a world of literature. It is not clear whether he had any contact with the world of human beings, the true field of dramatic inspiration. Academic study, literary erudition and evolutionary science do not make real men of the theatre.

Lunacharski conceived of the contemporary Russian theatre and sought to use it as an instrument of cultural education. His policy was one of *laisser faire*, and his attitude towards his fellow academic traditionalists was tolerant and touched with concession and compromise. He tolerated their lack of socialistic ideology and outlook, even defended it by arguing that their technique was "truly revolutionary." Of his policy it was said in 1920 that

> he realised fully that it is necessary in art for any new movement or general tendency to develop its strength in free combat and contrast with the forms and "philosophies" of art that it is striving to supplant. The Commissariat for Education, having taken over the nationalised theatres, brought them within the reach of all classes of the community. It gave over into the hands of the theatrical workers themselves the task of choosing the plays, ballets and operas to be performed. It gave them complete control over the method of production as well as repertory. And then it left the various movements to develop or to die without interference or constraint.

There is no need to stop to examine the confusion in the mind of the originator of this policy. The material point is that it left the old theatrical specialists and reformers much freedom to do as they liked. They could enter into combat with the Left theatrical forces with a highly developed technical tradition against which their opponents without a technical tradition would be powerless. Their position was strengthened not only by Lunacharski's concessions, compromises and tolerance, but by the fact that they were to a large extent masters of their own theatres. For a long time they chose their own plays and used their own methods in the traditional field

of æsthetic technique. In a word, Lunacharski's policy made the position of the specialists impregnable.

For proof, there are comparatively few plays vital for the new regime staged by them. Lunacharski expressed his revolutionary mood in several plays including *Oliver Cromwell*, *The Bear's Wedding*, *Poison* with a happy ending, *The Liberation of Don Quixote*, *The Incendiaries*, a futurist *Carmen* that aroused fierce proletarian criticism on account of its formalism, and gave M. Herriot the cold shivers, according to his book *La Russie Nouvelle*. Meyerhold produced a number of plays by present-day Russian authors, Mikhail Bulgakov, Ilya Selvinski, A. Bezymenski, Maiakovski, and others. But he was always transgressing, shifting the real soviet socialist interest from the play to something else that annoyed even his proletarian friends. He specialised on the representation of decadence, and improvised ideologies, altering those of other periods of history into a semblance of the contemporary one. Stanislavski moved warily in the socialist field. He staged *The Day of the Turbins*, a compromise; *Lyubov Yarovaya*, the new woman; *Grain*, Five Years' Plan politics; *Armoured Train*, and two or three others. It was not till 1933 that Tairov was received by the Left as a convert to the new theatrical order. He staged *Optimistic Tragedy*, a study of the new woman at the time of the Civil War. But two subsequent productions, a strange mixture of Bernard Shaw, Pushkin and Shakespeare, and a study in historical falsification, seriously affected his acquired Soviet reputation. Granovski, who was concerned with Jewish nationalism, decorating it with Western European æsthetic systems, expressionist neo-constructivist, and the rest, is no longer in Russia. The work of the Jewish theatre is being carried on by Mikhoels, a great Jewish actor.

With the Stalin theatrical Bloc in 1928 came the third big theatrical change. It came in a year that is famous for the introduction of many remarkable features of progress and of recent Russian history. It introduced great creative, constructive plans, greater enterprises, still greater revolutions, agrarian, industrial, cultural and constitutional, and it encouraged very great expectations. It gave birth to an immense dramatic pageant extending from 1928 to 1937. It saw the eclipse of the Right Bloc which continuously tended to become more Westernised, to get further and further away

from the collective work and to centre attention on itself and its individualistic emotions. And it saw the Left Bloc once more occupy the centre of that stage whose actors and auditors at the beginning were the workers, peasants and Red army. Once more the entire people came into the limelight, this time joined by the many nationalities within the Soviet Union whose theatrical rise was due partly to the national policy of the Government and the cultural autonomy conferred upon them by the October Revolution, and partly to the action of Stalin by whose efforts they were brought within the Constitution and bound up with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The anti-R.E.P. movement also played a strong part in restoring the cult of the democratic theatre, with its highly dynamic character in harmony with that of a vast country in a state of continuous change and unfolding. It was a sign of the renewal of extreme communism and criticism directed against the rise and irregularities of the small bourgeoisie and small capitalists and the establishment of theatrical structures, systems and theories contrary to new national principles, a sign of the reassertion of soviet socialism under Stalin.

The theatrical consequences of Government policy, in particular of cultural policy, compose the most remarkable chapter in theatrical history. They present a picture of the extraordinary unification and universality, features comprising the factors and aspects of the intense dramatic struggle for a national United Russia, and the great universal mass movement in the theatre reflecting this epic struggle. On the Government side the principal factors are the Government policies shown in chronological order, beginning with the Five Years' Plan and the collective effort, industrial and agrarian, in building national economy and soviet socialism. Then come the universal cultural mass amateur effort, the annual Theatre Festival, the cultural unification and enthusiastic recognition of nationalities within the Union, the renewed battle with the old intellectuals in order to bring about the essential fusion of Left and Right Blocs. Finally came the establishment by the Government of an All-Union Committee of Arts to organise and correlate the work of the amateur masses and minorities and to establish it firmly and soundly on a folk (now called people's) basis in the belief that the people best expresses itself, is expressed and enlightened, through the folk elements within and without it; that a great

deal of the world's finest dramatic and art inspiration has come from the people and is embodied in the world's masterpieces, as in the pure Russian classics; that this Russian inheritance should be restored to the Russian people through music, the drama, opera, dance and other natural forms of expression; and that the expression potential in the people should be developed and increased, in particular, in theatrical ways as a powerful unifying and peace-making factor.

The theatrical situations and consequences produced by these policies are without parallel. They are seen in the barrier-destroying Olympiads beginning in 1928 which brought the masses together in peaceful rivalry and friendship; in the systematised epitomisation of the gigantic industrial events for dramatic representation within the amateur and professional theatres (many plays on the subject of the reconstruction of the Soviet Union under the Five Years' Plan were written and staged); in the birth and growth of collective farm and other peasant theatres with plays reflecting the changes wrought by the agrarian revolution; in the annual Theatre Festivals starting in 1933 with the purpose of displaying yearly the riches of the Russian theatre to an increasing body of foreign visitors, and intentionally or unintentionally revealing the slow process of introducing the soviet-socialist spirit in the Right Bloc theatre; in the final stages of the battle with the Right Bloc, the violent attack on its individualistic, non-mass, non-socialist tendencies, the admission by its directors of their sins, and the recognition by them of the soviet purposefulness of the theatre. The final consequence of this vast theatrical fusion was the Theatre of People's Art, founded in Moscow in 1936. The first performance was a brilliant success demonstrating that the mass builders of the New Russia are a source of new cultural creative power. Implicit in this performance and in the ideas of the Arts committee was the future creative path of the changing theatre. The future development of the theatre is rooted in the lives of the common people. In the spread of this development beyond Russia lies the possibility of the building up of international friendship and understanding through the theatre and between peoples of all countries on a basis of permanent democracy and peace. The changing Russian theatre embodies the idea that cultural creation and peace do not grapple with one another, they go hand in hand.

HUNTLY CARTER.

GLIMPSES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

IF the ages of mankind could be arranged in order not of discovery or achievement but of happiness, the Eighteenth Century in England might take a high place. The industrial revolution was not yet, the enclosure of the commons had not proceeded far. Village life was social and joyous, the family was at its zenith. And the fortunate middle-class had developed a type of life so agreeable in its daily passage that the habit of journal keeping became almost universal. It was, to all but the poet, the best of all ways of delaying the lovely moment and of re-savouring it a thousand times.

Even food can thus carry a reminiscent pleasure down almost two centuries, like the light of a star whose past is our immediate present. Parson Woodforde of Weston, near Norwich, tickles nostrils and palate often in his savoury pages, written only for his private pleasure. Dinner at Mr. Priest's, " a Couple of Boiled Chickens, a Pig's face, broad beans, Leg of Mutton rosted, Blancmange and Currant Tarts mixed with Raspberries. After Coffee and Tea we set off for Weston as we went " (i.e. in a horse and cart) " and thank God got safe and well home before 8 o'clock." Dinner was at three or four o'clock in the day, breakfast about eight, and nothing between except perhaps a snack called a nooning. At nine o'clock the supper-tray rattled through the hall. No labour-saving devices can provide the comforts of a well-trained and adequate domestic staff.

The pleasures of home were great, but so were the pleasures of travel. Curiosity and leisure combined to make travelling a national habit. Come with Parson Woodforde on a fine September day, when a visit to London is drawing to a close. " Walked into Lombard Street and changed two of Gurneys' bank-notes of 10 Pd each for cash. Then went to the Black Bull in Bishopsgate St and took 2 Places in the Norwich Expedition and one outside for Monday Afternoon." The outside seat was for the servant, the two inside for self and niece Nancy, the coach's interior accommodating four. On Monday then, " went to the Black Bull in Bishopsgate Street and there we eat some cold rost Beef drank some Bottle Cyder and stayed still 4 o'clock. We got into the Norwich Expedition Coach at 4 o'clock and went off for Norwich. Nancy and self

had the whole coach to ourselves. We did not stop anywhere on the road only had some Rum and Water and bread and Cheese at New-market for which I paid eight pence." They spent the night at Thetford, on the border of Norfolk, and on Tuesday, " we breakfasted about 7 o'clock at the White Hart at Thetford, kept by one Clarke, a very tolerable Inn, paid there about two shillings ten pence. We got to Norwich I thank God safe and well about 11 o'clock this Morning to the King's Head where we stayed about an Hour and then got into a Post Chaise and sat of for Weston Parsonage where we arrived about 2 o'clock safe and hearty, blessed be God for it."

Seldom, however, did one have the coach to oneself. The close association with one's fellows over a long, slow journey was one of the stimulants of travel. Fellow-passengers and the adventures of mutual acquaintance figure largely in all journals of people who went by public conveyance instead of in their own carriages or by privately hired post-chaise. Another of the advantages of not being too well-off. When Parson Woodforde went to Bath for a holiday, taking, of course, his niece, he had more than the purchase of places to record. " The coach carries only 4 inside Passengers. We had a very fat Woman with a Dog and many band boxes, which mush incommoded us, and also a poor sickly good kind of a Man that went with us." But a couple of schoolboys cheered up his good-natured heart, " two young Gentlemen by name Joliffe that got up on the top of the coach, being going Home from School for the Vacation. I remembered their Father at Sydenham School. We dined at the Pelican Inn, Sydenham. The young Gentlemen dined with us, I franked them." And good-humour prevailed. " The fat lady that came with us supped with us."

An American Quaker called William Savery took leisurely travel, with religious motive, through Eighteenth-Century England, and the sunny scents of a June day blow back upon us from his clear and candid page. " Breakfasted at R.Ch^ms. after taking a Refreshing walk in the fields among the hay makers and mowers. then took the 12 o'clock Stage to London. Two very lusty women, the most incessant Talkers I have met with for a long time ; myself and a young Jew and two others —women—were glad when they were put down at Shoreditch."

Or in a wintry February, enter with him the stuffy and

intimate interior of the Ipswich Expedition coach. We begin with an American's view of the city of London—surrounded as it was in those days by the separate villages of Hampstead, Kensington, Whitechapel, Shoreditch, and others.

> Rose before 6, it was Dark the streets yet in Possession of the Watchmen. as we went along the Streets began to thicken with people, the Day was dawning—there soon appeared to be as many stirring and Coaches and Carriages Running in Bishopsgate Street as in Philadelphia at Noon Day. This London baffles all my power of Description. At 7 precisely went to the Coach after having breakfasted. It was now Light our Company Consisted of a young vain and assuming parson of a Regiment, a Decent young woman of Ipswich, Sir Thos T—— of the same place—an old man and quite, (quiet)—and a Decent man name unknown; there were also two or three outside. We pasd through White Chapell, Shoreditch etc and Divers Villages and Breakfasted at one 12 miles from London. The young Chaplain kept singing Catches, talking very lightly to the young woman who was much more serious than himself, and whistling to the Disturbance of our quite much. his Reg^{t} was at Ipswich where he said the Soldiers had Committed their souls to his keeping, that he preached to them every Sunday and prayed for their Salvation—and Supposed he was of use to the Creation, but he Could not Conceive what use the Young woman was of, he thought it was no matter to the world or anybody whether she Livd or died. She made him some good replies to his Impertinence. I also threw in a Little.

The Mail coaches could perform such a journey as that from London to Norwich in one day, but they travelled at the reckless and uncomfortable speed of eight miles an hour. Who could see the scenery or read a book in comfort, rattling along at that pace? Even the stops to change horses were so well-organised, efficiency was brought to such a painful pitch—ostlers waiting, harness ready—that it took barely a minute. People who were short of cash or who were in a deuce of a hurry could travel by the Mail, but reasonable people took the Expedition. Time was too valuable to be frittered away being bounced about like that.

The slow journeys of the eighteenth century did not mean sluggish minds, but quite the reverse. John Wesley attributed his good health into advanced old age, and his serenity of temper under a variety of trials, to the fact that he had spent on an average ten hours a day in solitude, first on horseback and later alone in a chaise. He was thus enabled to accomplish

a prodigious amount of reading and writing, as well as to cultivate the art of peace. Early rising, constant travel, change of air, and frequent solitude are his recipe for long life. Sleep, under this régime, took care of itself. That is, one went to sleep at once, slept soundly, and woke refreshed.

The quiet pace of a horse-carriage, especially up-hill, sometimes came in handy for other purposes than the tranquil enjoyment of the landscape or the reading of books. The beautiful Mrs. George Norton, Meredith's original for *Diana of the Crossways*, benefited by it to escape from a marital beating-up by her savage husband; escaped somehow out of the door of the high moving chaise and ran to safety with her brothers and sisters in another carriage of the party. She had but thrown the mouthpiece of George's hookah out of the window, after repeated protests that his heavy smoking in the closed carriage made her sick. But her brothers, indignant and protesting, saw the marks of his fingers on her throat.

When Wesley first began his journeys in the forties, there were few turnpikes in England, and no stage-coaches that went further north than York. The excessively tedious journeys of that period, over bad roads, involving many nights on the way (the "flying coaches," for instance, left London three times a week, and took four days to go from London to York, a distance of about 200 miles), were the heyday of the highwaymen. By the middle of the eighteenth century, these gentlemen were comparatively scarce. Jane Austen never mentions them, and Wesley never saw one. But foreigners believed that England was full of them, and Englishmen believed that they swarmed on the continent.

Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, brother-in-law of Elizabeth Fry, tells a story illustrating this obsession. An Englishman who could speak no Italian was visiting in Rome. One night, after dining with some friends, he walked back to his hotel alone, comfortably wined, and wary of the dark foreign streets. Turning a corner sharply, he collided with a man. With muttered apologies or imprecations, mutually incomprehensible, the two disengaged themselves and walked on, blacker shadows in the darkness; when the Englishman, bethinking himself of robber's tricks, felt for his watch. It was gone. He immediately rushed back after the rascal and grappled with him in the dark, shouting "Montre! Montre!" The robber trembled, and reluctantly yielded the watch. The Englishman

put it in his pocket and triumphantly proceeded on his way. On reaching his quarters, the victor told his friends of his exploit, with a modest consciousness that a few more Englishmen of decision and presence of mind in Italy would soon teach "foreigners" that banditry did not pay. But his sister's comment was damping, as sisterly comments so often are. "It's very odd, because your watch is hanging in your room now. I saw it there not long after you went out." And indeed it was.

Yet even in England to the English the solitary horseman in the dusk was alarming. And Ireland and Scotland took advantage of their wilder scenery and less travelled and tended roads to cultivate highwaymen well into the nineteenth century. Aplomb was more useful than pistols in dealing with them, after all. The true experience of a Quaker lady in Ireland is instructive. One wild and stormy night the Dublin mail carried but two inside passengers, one of them a respectable merchant and the other a Quaker lady in the dignified dress of her sect. A little conversation passed, as was natural, chiefly some grumbling at the weather and expression of apprehension on the part of the merchant. The intimacy of their situation there, shut in by the darkness and rain, invited confidence, and as the miles jolted by, he eased himself of his secret. "I am carrying home with me four hundred pounds, in paper, and I would not meet a highwayman to-night for much. But 'tis just the weather they find best for their ill trade!" Sure enough, there was presently a commotion on the dark and lonely road. Shouting and a shot. The coach was drawn to a jarring stand. The merchant hastily thrust his wads of notes into his top-boot. The door was wrenched open, in blew the rain, and a masked horseman presented a dripping musket. "Quick now! Your money or your life!" The merchant in a fluster emptied his watch, seals and small change into the highwayman's outstretched hand.

"That's all I have, I swear! That's all! That's all! Who'd take money with them in a coach by night? That's all I have, for my board and lodging in Dublin, so help me——"

"Friend," broke in the Quaker lady primly, as she contributed a couple of gold pieces, "It is not meet to swear falsely. My duty compels me to say that I saw thee but now put a bundle of bank-notes into thy top-boot!"

The bandit collected the four hundred, thanked the lady, banged up the door and rode away. The coach proceeded, but the atmosphere inside was strained. The merchant did not allow himself to suffer from repression. The lady bore his vituperation with Christian meekness; indeed, for the most part, in silence. The city reached at last, the merchant went to his inn, and tossed in exasperation and distress till toward the dawn. From his first heavy sleep, early in the morning, he was awakened by a messenger who came to his bedside with a packet. "Friend," he read, by the flickering candle, "I am sorry to have incommoded thee last night, and beg thee to receive at my hands the sum of four hundred pounds in reimbursement of thy loss. I would not have betrayed thee, but I needed to distract the bandit's attention from myself. I was sitting upon bank-notes to the value of three thousand pounds which I was bringing to my husband's bank."

But by the end of the century a girl of sixteen could travel safely across England unattended. When Catherine Morland was turned out of Northanger Abbey, the journey home "in itself had no terrors for her." And sure enough, "she met with nothing to distress or frighten her. Her youth, civil manner, and liberal pay procured her all the attention that a traveller like herself could require; and stopping only to change horses, she travelled on for about eleven hours without accident or alarm."

Pass, century of the comfortably-off. Perhaps there is more in that casual "liberal pay" than would be pleasant for democracy to inquire into. But when was leisure ever made a better use of, and *ennui* more banished from the generality of men?

JANET WHITNEY.

FASCISM IN SOUTH AMERICA.

IS fascism making any progress in South America? Are totalitarian methods of government being favoured to the prejudice of constitutional democracy in the ten States that make up this southern continent? And if so, to what extent is this due to foreign influence? These to-day are some of the questions frequently asked of resident newspaper correspondents. The following is a summary of the situation by the writer in the course of his journalistic observations. Fascism, open or implied, has found roots of varying strength in nearly all ten republics. The Brazilian "Green Shirts," probably a million strong, are of the open variety, though for the time being they have been driven underground; so are those of the Province of Buenos Aires in Argentina; and those of the Chilian Nazi movement headed by Señor Jorge Gonzalez von Marees, a member of the Chamber of Deputies.

But there are other fascist movements besides those glorying in the name. Paraguay and Bolivia have offered parallel evidence of strong fascist leanings in their post-war governments. The army leaders of both countries, who invariably have the last word in government, are fascist-minded. Colombia, perhaps, is practically free from fascist influence, though much sympathy exists there, as in neighbouring Ecuador, for the cause of Indo-Americanism, a kind of continental socialism which, if ever established, would hardly differ from fascism in practice.

The Benavides Government in Peru is militarist and dictatorial, but, as so frequently happens in South America, is able to combine much of its illegality with many forms of democracy. The "Aprista" movement, so much feared there, advertises itself as Indo-American and National Socialist. It would probably turn out to be one hundred per cent. totalitarian. Neither would it require very much manipulation to convert Uruguayan *Terrismo*—named after the outgoing President—or Ecuadorean "Military Socialism" into full-fledged fascism.

Before proceeding it is necessary to differentiate between fascist totalitarianism and military dictatorship of the historical Latin American type. Southern politics, of course, have produced a typical class of dictator, who is not so

common as he used to be, but still exists. For him fascism is a heaven-sent opportunity. It is another vehicle—a particularly good one—in which to ride to power. The student of South American political affairs must bear this point in mind when he reads reports of "fascist" revolutions, especially those fomented in barracks.

Another important point to remember is the paradoxical one that the Latin tendency to dictatorship has received a fillip from democracy itself. This is because the influential radical school of thought on this continent has, in the majority of States, carried democracy to an exaggerated extreme of socialism. The South Americans themselves boast that they have the most advanced social legislation in the world. But in this achievement they have mechanised and centralised government to such an extent that now many of them are asking if the change will not operate against the democratic system which they favour. Why? Because, as a labour leader told the writer, with the big industries and institutions in fiscal leading strings and the workers syndicated, it is comparatively easy for any strong-willed soldier or politician to secure effective control of national machinery within a few days. The genuine fascists appreciate this. All this regimentation of industry and centralisation of government assists their advance to power. There is hardly a single Southern State which has not an official Board, with effective interventionist powers, for all industries and departments of activities. The individual is not free from blame because it is his lifelong aspiration to become an "*empleado publico*" and secure the coveted pension. Industries rush into federation and workers into syndicates because it is the only way to attract fiscal notice—which means subsidies and favours. This tendency may be checked as the average individual, who undoubtedly prefers freedom to dictatorial regimentation, appreciates the increasing temptation it offers to fascist autocracy.

On the other hand, fascism as a creed and philosophy has made considerable progress among many South Americans. This is especially true of young men and new political parties of the "Nationalist" type. Many active fascists are to be found in the ranks of the *Juventud*—youthful conservatives and liberals, and a few socialists. It is significant, also, that the banner of Christianity is being associated with this youthful inclination. These young men adduce the old plea—

or excuse—that youth has nothing to hope for from the "*politiqueria*" of the older parties. They favour fascist, especially Italian, methods of education and organisation of production.

Judging by the declaration of the leaders of these Christian youth movements which favour fascism, there will be no mere aping of governmental forms in Europe. Fascism here is more likely to develop a continental character—that is, if youth has any vital say in the matter—and to follow an Indo-American programme of the kind advocated by Señor Haya de la Torre, the Peruvian "Aprista" leader, who is described by his political foes as a communist. There are many anti-imperialist items in this programme which would probably work up as much *furore* here as Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini have done with their separate nationalistic programmes on the European continent. These fervent young South American fascists-to-be, if ever they get anywhere, will doubtless cause much anxiety in Anglo-American capitalist circles when they crusade against "foreign exploitation." But they are undoubtedly in earnest in declaring their determination to educate and raise the status of the masses in their countries.

The foregoing fundamental facts must be understood in their true relation to the South American fascist movement. Before proceeding to an examination of foreign influence it should also be borne in mind that a semi-feudal existence is led by most rural communities. Farmland is composed chiefly of large estates owned by comparatively few powerful families whose workers—"*inquilinos*"—are paid in money and kind. There is nothing approaching a middle class. That buffer stratum of society has only recently begun to appear in the urban areas. Until a few years back the capitalist society in South America was numerically very weak and composed exclusively of landowners. To-day it is reinforced by the industrialist—the post-war product of nationalism and high tariffs. This propertied class has a traditional fear of communism. The fear dates back to the days of Spanish colonial dominion when landed wealth was first divided irrationally. It becomes accentuated as the quasi-communistic experiments progress further north—in Mexico. Small wonder then that the fascists appear on the scene to exploit this fear. "There is only one enemy," they shout,

"and why not name it? It is communism." Advocates of democracy or the "middle-way" of tolerance can make little progress against this.

Unconsciously and, therefore, unprotestingly, many conservatives and liberals are drifting into the fascist camp, while some Left-inclined liberals and many socialists find themselves in the communist camp. It is almost tragic to witness this increasing division of feeling despite the publicity secured for the Roosevelt pan-American appeals on behalf of democracy and the British advocacy of tolerance. Not that a majority of South Americans are going to political extremities, but it is true that influential sections are. The fascists have made the greater progress—numerically. The fascists also have the advantage of conducting their propaganda in the open, to a certain extent, whereas communism is banned in many States and operates underground. Statesmen appreciate the perils of both fascism and communism and isolated attempts have been made to curb the propagation of the two doctrines. The more it is tried to conjure away these perils by legislation, however, the more the continent seems to get involved in the bitter ideological strife that the two creeds promote.

That the greater part of the fascist propaganda is imported and distributed by totalitarian sympathisers there can be no possible doubt. South American government departments, especially those related to education, labour, production and social welfare, get their fair share of literature and other forms of advice. This, in both volume and the nature of the material, goes far beyond the ordinary literature exchange facilities common between governments. Many proselytes are reported by fascist agents among permanent officials; indeed, several of these, especially in Argentina, have published their sympathies with fascist ideas of education and industrial organisation. The Youth movements previously referred to have also proved efficient vehicles for the propagation of fascist schemes.

There is a constant barrage of public opinion from Rome and Berlin. British diplomatic and commercial interests are thoroughly aroused about it. The B.B.C. is now transmitting Spanish and Portuguese programmes to counteract this. There is no intention of broadcasting propaganda, but it is hoped that "straight news" from a British angle will

assist in dispelling the unfortunate effects of deliberate fascist distortion of international events. Indirectly, the United States has not escaped, for democracy, pan-Americanism and anything savouring of liberalism has been slanged in this fascist broadcasting of propaganda on South American beams. Political broadcasting from Europe has become so specialised, it is alleged by Americans, that it can easily kill the wave-lengths allotted to non-political programmes from elsewhere, even from the United States.

Foreign fascist agents also operate commercial information agencies giving away "news" and photographs to editors in the different countries. They are more successful than they would be in other parts of the world. This is due to the social and political contacts established through successful South Americans of Italian or German blood. There is evidence available that these blood ties have been exploited for the furtherance of international fascist policies. British people, to less extent, have similar ties, though there is no evidence that they take advantage of them in this way. North American residents are nearly all of this generation. Like their fellow-countrymen at home they base their hopes exclusively on geography and economics to "win out" in this market.

Apart from all this, the totalitarian governments, of course, are financially at the back of every commercial and cultural effort of their citizens, who number several millions in South America. They grant subsidies to their schools and newspapers. They entertain and instruct them in their own language over the ether. Lire and mark bounties bolster their trade. But there is no evidence that they are incited to stimulate fascism in their adopted countries. Yet, as they are continually preached at on the virtues of totalitarian government and reminded to sing the praises of their Führer and the Duce's methods of administration, it is difficult for them not to spread the "good news."

The effect of all this propaganda is to be seen principally in the international outlook of South American States. The Italians especially have been successful in softening and transforming the South American attitude towards Italy's acquisition of the Ethiopian Empire and towards the Franco cause in Spain. The Italians and Germans together have inspired some doubts regarding the efficacy of the League of Nations, and the Germans alone have latterly secured some editorial

sympathy for their colonial claims. It is impossible to deny Italian diplomacy its success. It has been persistent and, to some extent, patient. It has had astute representatives in the principal capitals, especially Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Santiago, who have worked zealously for Il Duce. How well these ambassadors have succeeded can be gauged by a rapid retrospect. Not much more than a year ago there were a number of newspapers whose news captions and editorial articles suggested an intense dislike of Italian aggression. Signor Mussolini was frequently booed on the cinema screen and there was barely a good word anywhere for fascism. Sanctions had failed but the Geneva organisation was still respected, and General Franco's men in Spain were Insurgents even in some of the pro-Church newspapers. The popular attitude towards Italian fascism was very much like what it is now against Japanese policy in China.

The change to be noted to-day is more than that ordinarily produced by the healing hand of time. Italian diplomacy and propaganda, working hand in hand, have persuaded many South Americans that they themselves were also the victims of sanctions. They have also played on official fears of communism to encourage a much more tolerant attitude towards fascism. Many of the important daily newspapers soon conceded their recognition of the Ethiopian Empire, even if this was withheld by the Governments, the majority of whom, of course, were tied to their League obligations. They have not hesitated, however, to issue several veiled warnings that the Geneva organisation must get down to "realities," one of which to them undoubtedly is the existence of the Italian Empire, if it wishes to retain South American interest. It is futile to deny that the League cause has been on the wane, temporarily it may be, in this southern hemisphere. Italian fascism concentrated all its propaganda machinery in exploiting the local disillusionment occasioned by the failure of sanctions. On the other hand it directly recognised the international influence of the Geneva organisation by constantly falling back on one or other of the South American members to suggest or sponsor a line of action required in its behalf.

Italian diplomacy and propaganda have also contributed to a changed attitude towards the Franco régime. Results were produced long before the military situation improved in favour

of the Insurgent General. The transforming task was somewhat easier, perhaps, because the sympathies of many South American rulers were with the rebels from the beginning. This was not necessarily because the rebels were Right-wing but because they represented a revolt from the evil effects of Soviet propaganda which had also been evident in South American countries. Nominal ties are maintained with the Republican Government, but it is doubtful whether these would be continued if the principal Southern Governments were free of the refugees in their Embassies in Spain. It is commonly believed here that the Spanish Government is deliberately retarding the solution of this problem to avoid the legal transfer of affections to Burgos. General Franco has confidential agents in nearly every South American country and these have government contacts. It is affirmed that the Benavides Government in Peru openly received a Franco mission. Practically the whole continental Press has gone over, in varying degrees, to the Spanish Nationalist cause.

If the foregoing were the main aims of fascist propaganda, the Italians and Germans, especially the former, should be highly pleased with the results. Branded as aggressors at the international bar, the Italians felt their position acutely. But they now feel almost reinstated in the good opinion of their South American friends. They have built up their trade again, re-established cultural contacts and registered success with various Missions. The Aviation Mission which exhibited Italian aeroplanes was well received and did good business. Incidentally, some of its members had their first contact with a free Press. They expressed surprise when Left-wing newspapers protested against their reception because " Fascist uniforms are stained with the innocent blood of Ethiopian and Spanish civilians." They wanted revenge for those calumnies!

But, if the fascists seem confident that many South American rulers to-day are broadly sympathetic to their internal and external policies, they would be making a serious mistake to assume that the cause of democracy and constitutionalism is discredited here. For there are powerful factors operating against the eventual establishment of fascist or totalitarian theories of government. The main deterrent is the average South American's ideal of spiritual freedom.

Somehow or other he manages to conserve his liberty of thought and expression through all the changing conditions of government. Liberty of the Press frequently exists and is exercised, for example, under the tightest form of military rule—a South American paradox that is not always appreciated in Great Britain and even in the United States. Foreign-directed fascism could possibly destroy this freedom with the sword, but alien participation in government is out of all reckoning. A South American revolutionary, whichever shirted movement he represented, could not successfully override local notions of liberty.

Fascism would probably also fail in South America for economic reasons. The present status of this continent forbids the application of autarchic principles. These countries live and have their being as producers of raw materials. If they wish to retain their modern, civilised living standards —with motor cars, screen entertainment, wireless and newspapers—they must continue to sell their raw products to the principal consumers, who are mainly those of democratic faith and government. National industry has made fair progress, but for at least a generation to come South Americans will be absolutely dependent on foreign trade. Fascist self-sufficiency ideas, if attempted in practice, would spell their doom. It is logical to assume, therefore, that their plans of government will approximate to those of the countries with whom trade relations are prosperous.

Recently, too, the fascist cause has suffered a serious reverse by the South American feeling that later on, if not to-day, there may be an attempt to create a minorities issue here. There was a continental wave of indignation when the German official journal, *Politische und Diplomatische Korresponden*, objected to the treatment accorded the German Nazis in Brazil. The most significant aspect of this episode was the general confession that hitherto southern statesmanship has underestimated the perils of their " invisible frontiers." It is possible that the fluttering in the diplomatic dovecotes on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts may lead to a " common front " against the danger. The lessons of Spain and Austria, especially, have been effective. The few who still say " It can't happen here " say so less enthusiastically. South Americans—even those governed by undisguised dictatorship—are continually exhorted to look to their invisible and

spiritual frontiers. Prominent writers have emphasised that the invaders' plans in Austria were complete long before the actual event occurred ; that the boring was silent and within ; and that, at the given signal, military and civil functionaries appeared overnight, as if by magic, each in his allotted strategic place, ready for the triumph. There is no suggestion of a possible local parallel, but, undoubtedly, there has been simultaneous speculation regarding the ultimate aim of all the publicity and effort directed towards South America, the insistence on the " nazification " of the many and numerous German colonies on this continent and the money spent on those sympathetic to the cause.

Recent European events are also responsible for a significant change of outlook in certain governing circles. Professional diplomats—the permanent officials of the Chanceries who guide ultimate policy—are shaking their heads dubiously over the Austrian coup of Herr Hitler. These, with the official and mercantile community generally, are the class who hitherto have not been completely averse to fascist concepts of internal administration, as they feel that ordinary democratic processes are not sufficient to discipline Latin American masses at a time when here, as everywhere, the speed of national development is being considerably accelerated. Secretly or openly, many have approved the introduction of authoritarian principles at home, say, for education, labour regulation and economic production, " to get things done quickly " and not wait for the tedious methods of democracy in educating the masses to the vote, and then for the lengthy parliamentary analysis of every legislative project. This reasoning is supported by the typical impetuosity of the Latin temperament.

This influential school of thought was of the opinion that many fascist pointers could be borrowed for the purposes of internal administration without incurring any suspicious association with the external policies of fascism. The creed itself was never mentioned by name, except in the case, prematurely it now appears, of Brazil's recent constitutional change. It was a question of introducing German schemes for this and Italian methods for that department and regulating or disciplining the " material and spiritual resources " of the nation. There was an honest belief that greater success could be obtained by these methods, but also an honest

fear that fascist nomenclature would arouse majority opposition. This class—or school, or whatever it may be called—is now " back pedalling," because it is afraid of borrowing ideas for internal objects from a source whose external policy runs counter to the very principles on which South American security has been founded. Years ago it was fashionable here to dwell exclusively on the domestic fruits of fascism—the " law and order " for whose maintenance parts of South America suffer many changes of government. Even in the latter days of Ethiopia, Spain and China, there were many who held that a dividing line could still be applied to the internal and external policies of fascism, though several began to take up a map for the first time and measure the distances across the South Atlantic in terms of modern military transport.

Imperialist wars and episodes in other parts of the world, therefore, have banished the enthusiasm of this influential class for every aspect of fascism. So far their thoughts have only been bared in private. The fate of Ethiopia, Spain and China does not actually cause them any great anxiety ; but they are genuinely worried by the flouting of international law and the triumph of force. It is a disagreeable reflection for them when all the nations of the New World have planned their security and development on the basis of this same law. So, in the same spirit that the United States is building a bigger navy to prepare for the perils this illegality foreshadows, these southern nations are taking stock of their defence resources. An all-American pooling of guns has even been mooted.

This brings one to consider South America's many links with the United States which must not be overlooked in considering this vital aspect of the fascist problem. The " good neighbour " has succeeded the " big stick " and " dollar " policies, and he would be a poor observer who denied that it has been a success. But the Monroe Doctrine still lives, despite its new pan-American multilateral form, and Washington is looked to for insurance coverage in the event of possible aggression. It is no secret that many of the Latin States lined themselves up with the Geneva collective system at the end of the Great War for purposes of international prestige and to remind Uncle Sam that they could obtain protection elsewhere on the basis of equality and without the support of the

Monroe Doctrine whose unilateral genesis was held to be humiliating for them. But this European protective system has let them down badly, and, with recent historical lessons before them, South Americans are realising that the Monroe Doctrine, in any form whatsoever, is a very desirable thing to have.

Fortunately at this time Washington is not disposed to take any mean advantage. It is sincere in its "good neighbourliness" and President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, between them, have built up a huge fund of friendship and good faith, which, however, as they have been careful to insist on to their Latin colleagues, depends on mutual respect for and practice of democracy.

Added to this vital factor is the favourable combination of Geography, Wall Street (whose money is bound to flow southwards again) and Hollywood. Southerners would also be almost entirely dependent on the United States if a new war deprived them of European trade. Therefore, so long as North America makes a success of its present form of government, it is reasonable to assume that South America will be safe—for democracy.

NORMAN A. INGREY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IS IT PEACE?

DURING the early part of July there descended upon Europe a sense of something like calm, a sort of numbed hope that the war was not after all inevitable. It may be that the nervous strain inflicted upon Europe by the German annexation of Austria in the middle of March had exhausted the general capacity for alarm. Or it may have been the spurious unnatural calm that precedes a further storm.

But there were certain facts which at least in part explained the respite from anxiety. It became known that the new German administration in Vienna was meeting with difficulties, although no outside person could know how serious they were. It was rumoured that Herr Hitler had been forced towards the end of June to pay a secret visit to Vienna and to stay there several days. If one thought about it, there could be no occasion for surprise that so drastic a thing as that which took place between March 11th and 13th should lead to trouble. Austria was an old historic independent country. Her Chancellor, Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, staked his political life—perhaps something more—on defending Austrian independence against the designs of Herr Hitler. He lost. But it would be inconsonant with every prompting of common sense to believe that the thousands of politicians, diplomatists, civil servants, the fighting services and the rest would readily or without deep resentment accept the imposed fact of sudden expulsion from their posts and sudden deprivation of all their traditional habits, their pride of country, their daily routine and their exercise of the responsible duties that flowed from sovereign independence. A subtle interest attaches to the fact that on June 27th, that is after Herr Hitler's rumoured visit to Vienna, the Official News Agency made a statement about the Nazi organisation in Austria, denying the allegation that most of the important posts had been given to Germans of the Reich. Had Herr Hitler been forced to deal so drastically with the situation he discovered in Vienna? Moreover, the temptation to sharp practice that was offered to the invading hordes of Nordic overlords could not be other than a fruitful source of mischief. Even German discipline,

even German pride of racial purity, is not extra-human, and human things comprise the baser as well as the more exalted emotions.

When the highest authority in the State propounds as a patriotic and sacrosanct duty that all Jews be maltreated, what was to happen when the baser Nordics were faced with opportunities for looting Jewish assets? We all remember how an uncurbed nationalist fever can cover a multitude of atrocities. During the last war it was not only a matter of venial unconcern, it was in itself regarded as a fine thing, that British newspapers, for instance, should write the most blatant and poisonous of lies about everything German. No lie, no calumny could be too gross for the then prevailing taste. The present phase of exuberant nationalism in Germany is a sort of patriotic war fever. Injustice, stupidity, dishonesty, corruption tend to be acceptable to the prevailingly warped German mentality when practised at the expense of Jews or of any other class of hypothetical " enemies " to Herr Hitler's gospel. And such things tend to rebound upon their authors. The case of Austria was something new in the German experiment. The Austrian Germans were historically distinct from the Germans of the Reich. Apart from their political traditions they had a culture, a music, a literature, a temperament, a gift for lighthearted geniality, that was all their own. To ride roughshod over such a heritage of human accomplishment was to invite a reaction of incalculable momentum. Moreover, the Sudeten Germans of Bohemia and Moravia, themselves before 1914 belonging to German Austria, not to the German Reich, were given an object-lesson in what might happen to themselves if their " protectors " were to rescue them from the Czechs. They knew what to expect from Prague. If they were handed over to Berlin they would certainly lose their individuality as the Austrian Germans of Vienna had lost theirs. They would lose their jobs. Herr Henlein, now the important leader of a party and of a cause within Czechoslovakia, would become an insignificant unit in the millions of the Reich. Dr. Hodža, meanwhile, was offering him at any rate something that would enhance his importance within the Czechoslovak State.

It was at least arguable that German preoccupation with the emergency in Vienna—even if the emergency should prove not to be of any great seriousness—combined with a

spell of sober thinking on the part of the Sudeten Germans, played a contributory part to the undoubtedly better general feeling that developed towards the end of June. The feeling was helped in the first week of July by an unaccustomed achievement on the part of the Non-Intervention Committee. That Committee was able to announce that an agreement had been reached between the five Great Powers—Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia—in no less contentious a matter than that of the evacuation from Spain of the non-Spanish troops. As if to make the general feeling still better an agreement was reached by the British and German Governments about Germany's liability for the service of the pre-*Anschluss* Austrian debts. Nor did that achievement exhaust the sum of good tidings. It was in June that incontrovertible evidence made its appearance that Japan was trapped in a hopeless enterprise. China's resistance now promised to prevent the tremendous dislocation that would have followed a Japanese triumph.

A confluence of good tidings seemed to be conspiring to encourage the belief that the peace of Europe might be saved. It happened that the well-informed people (who are nearly always the most gloomy) were now suggesting that the middle of August would be the critical period. Germany, they argued, would wait until she had gathered in her harvest before starting the next world war. It may be that their argument was partly suggested by the remarkable fact that since 1914 the month of August has in fact regularly been the period of maximum diplomatic disturbance. And the last world war began in August. In the prospective instance of 1938, the German spokesmen, despite their preoccupation in Austria, were doing their best to encourage the well-informed pessimists to take the gloomiest view. Dr. Goebbels, for instance, whose duty it is to " tell the world," on June 21st celebrated the summer solstice by a speech in the Olympic Stadium, whence he announced for the enlightenment of all whom it might concern that " we will not look on much longer while three and a half million Germans are maltreated. We saw in Austria that one race cannot be separated into two countries, and we shall soon see it somewhere else."

Could the gift of tongues formulate a clearer intimation that Germany was about to annex the Sudetenland? But despite Dr. Goebbels, despite the learned pessimists, despite

the lack of any constructive pacifist impulse on the part of any government in Europe, the good news momentarily outweighed the bad, and the peoples of Europe decided to throw off their forebodings and to indulge a sense of security and peace. The London and New York Stock Exchanges staged a sort of boom. In New York at any rate there was a genuine outburst of buying. In London the normal circumstance that prices must be put up on this side in sympathy with what happens in New York was further helped by the action of jobbers who as an original measure of their own put up prices against the hordes of bears who began running to cover. Independently, however, of its intrinsic value the upward movement in Throgmorton Street and Wall Street did symbolise a better political feeling.

It is one of the increasing causes of surprise to the plain people that the resources of government are so poor when the matter in hand is the preservation of peace. Governments the world over are deadly in their efficiency when they conduct a war. Their courage is boundless. Their energy is inexhaustible. They exhale noble sentiment. They appeal with confidence and with overwhelming success to the spirit of self-sacrifice which is ready to yield up life itself in the cause. But if peace, not war, be the object, what government in Europe would make any real sacrifice to achieve it? Would any British Government even contemplate the surrender of a single colony rather than face a devastating war? Any man who talks of peace, and who is prepared to pay the price of peace, is dubbed a "defeatist." That word itself has no meaning, but it is intended, and is understood, to convey a stigma of cowardice. Any fool, on the other hand, who clamours for war receives the wildest approbation of his fellows. At a recent "panel debate" held at the English Speaking Union before a large audience five men debated British foreign policy. One of them, who happened to be in a minority of one, argued that if you do not have war, you must have peace, and if you want peace you must pay the price; that in the case of Britain and Germany, where Britain owns about one quarter of the globe, and Germany has no colonies at all, the obvious thing was for Britain to surrender colonies to Germany. The chairman later referred to that argument, obviously without feeling any suspicion that his description might be challenged, as "defeatism."

At the present moment the governments of Europe are not only arming against each other. They believe war with each other to be inevitable. They are prepared to face any sacrifice in money, liberty and human life to make their country "strong." With the single exception of Mr. Chamberlain, Prime Minister of Great Britain, no responsible head of any government in Europe has argued the case for peace, or claimed that the price to be paid for peace is preferable to the price that would inevitably be paid for war. Yet even Mr. Chamberlain has never suggested that the British Government should offer any colonial satisfaction to Germany as part of the price for peace. There are five men in Europe to-day who wield great, perhaps decisive, power, in the issue of peace or war that may be joined at any moment. They are Mr. Chamberlain, M. Daladier, Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini and Dr. Hodža. Around them are the millions of people who will pay the price if they fail to realise their professed desire to keep the peace. Each of the five in fact professes his desire for peace. Yet each of them devotes his main energy to preparing for war. Not one of them has dared openly to make a suggestion whereby the potential cause of war may be removed. Mr. Chamberlain, it is true, in his speech of March 24th last, made this tentative remark: "His Majesty's Government do not differ from those who feel that the increase of armaments alone is no sure guarantee for peace. They earnestly hope that it may yet be possible to arrive at a reasonable balance of armaments by agreement rather than by force and unlimited competition." Yet it is arguable that disarmament is a symptom of good international relations rather than an objective end of diplomacy. Mr. Chamberlain did not suggest a means to an agreement with Germany. And not one of the other four—not M. Daladier, nor Herr Hitler, nor Signor Mussolini nor Dr. Hodža took the slightest public notice of Mr. Chamberlain's hint about disarmament.

It would seem reasonable to expect that the five men who wield power, if they wanted peace, could ensure peace. They could severally declare, simply and without reserve, that they want peace and publicly state their terms. Yet at the present moment, when the possibility of war is the subject of general and urgent concern, the governments unanimously refuse to disclose their peace terms. One remembers the famous

journey of Mr. George Lansbury to Berlin, undertaken a year ago with the only object of asking Herr Hitler to state simply and openly whether he wanted peace. Herr Hitler could have said "yes." He did not. Instead he authorised a careful and cautious statement for publication, thus: "Germany will be very willing to attend a conference and take part in a unified effort to establish economic co-operation and mutual understanding between the nations of the world, if President Roosevelt or the head of another great country will take the lead in calling such a conference"; and four days later even that statement was modified by an explanation issued from the propaganda department of the German Government to the effect that Herr Hitler, in offering to take part in the conference aforesaid, had only done so on certain conditions, which had been verbally added. The chief condition was, that Germany could not be drawn into international co-operation unless "the prospects of success were present."

We were therefore presented at the beginning of July this year with the spectacle of a unanimous refusal on the part of governments to call each other's bluff and to plead openly for peace, and on the other hand of a unanimous movement on the part of public opinion in the several countries to forget the threatened war and to assume that it was to be peace. There was this to be said for the well-informed people, that the consistent and cumulative testimony of the foreign diplomatic representatives in Berlin—whose testimony could not be ignored—was to the effect that the entire technical organisation in Germany was now concentrated on an intensive preparation for the complete destruction of Czechoslovakia, to be carried out whenever Herr Hitler should give the word. Information from that source in the second week of July established the fact that Germany was now producing aeroplanes at the rate of 400 a month. In their varying degrees the other European Great Powers were doing the same sort of thing. They were all hurrying to get ready for a war they none of them wanted nor could justify.

Spain and Europe.

The new phase of general European feeling about Spain dates from the signature of the Anglo-Italian Agreement on April 16th last. At the beginning of May it looked probable

that a Franco-Italian Agreement would follow upon its heels. But whereas Great Britain had attempted and had in fact succeeded in keeping clear of the main Spanish complications, France was a little too near the scene, and was in fact one of the four non-Spanish Powers which had been drawn into direct or indirect participation in the conflict. The effect of that circumstance became soon apparent. The Franco-Italian negotiations, conducted in Rome by M. Blondel, French Chargé d'Affaires, and Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, were in due course brought to a standstill. Signor Mussolini, with his accustomed realism, made public confession of the difficulty. Speaking at Genoa on May 14th he declared: "In one extremely vital matter we stand on opposite sides of the barricade. Their desire is for the victory of Barcelona; we on the other hand want Franco to win." During May, therefore, Spain was still as decisive a stumbling-block to European pacification as it had been at any time during the two years of war.

In the third week of May, M. Corbin, the French Ambassador, in an attempt to ease the way to a *détente* over Spain, made an important offer to Lord Plymouth, Chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee. What he offered was to accept, on behalf of the French Government, a system of control over the French frontier for a period of thirty or even forty days immediately after the counting of the foreign troops in Spain had begun. (The counting of the foreign effectives engaged on the two sides was the first step that would be taken if the British proposal, now many months old, for a scheme of evacuation were accepted.) M. Corbin's offer constituted a real gesture of conciliation to the Italians. He made the condition that the existing scheme of sea control be strengthened, and that the counting commission when it reached Spain should not waste time. Italy's complaint had been that Red reinforcements had lately poured into Spain over the French frontier in defiance of the Roman conversations and with the effect of prolonging the war. France denied that charge; but at the same time took an initiative to reassure Rome.

Indeed it was clear that France, too, had profound cause for anxiety. It happened that the main French war industries had of late years been transferred to the south of France, to within a hundred miles of the Spanish frontier. *Nam sua res agitur* . . . Moreover, in the prevailing phase of diplomatic

unrest, France had now three frontiers to watch : the German, the Italian and the Spanish. No country had a greater interest than France in a Spanish settlement. Emboldened by what M. Corbin said to him, Lord Plymouth called a meeting of the Chairman's sub-committee for May 26th. In advance of that meeting he informed Dr. von Dirksen, the new German Ambassador, Signor Crolla, the Italian Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires acting in the absence of Count Grandi, and Mr. Kagan, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, of the substance of M. Corbin's offer (May 20th). The British Government decided to endorse the French offer and to present it to the committee as an Anglo-French proposal. The new hope was found to be justified to the extent that when the sub-committee met on May 26th the atmosphere, so far at any rate as Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy were concerned, appeared to be so much improved that two further meetings were arranged for the following week to appoint the members of the actual commission which was to go out and count the volunteers. The scheme was that a commission of six men should go out and should then divide into two teams of three men. One team should go to each of the belligerent sides in Spain, one man being detailed to act as liaison with the third man of the other team. It is true that the prospect of the commission's practical usefulness was a little obscure. It did not make much sense to imagine two men wandering about in the fighting lines counting the number of Italians, Germans, Russians or Frenchmen engaged in the fighting. Besides, the troops could easily be assigned Spanish names for the occasion. And were the commissioners to embark upon an investigation of pedigrees, what time the subjects of the investigation were engaged in battle ? Obviously the commissioners could not be expected to attempt anything beyond applying to the respective authorities at Burgos and at Barcelona and asking to see their pay-lists or other documentary evidence about the troops at their disposal. And even such a proceeding would be wholly conditioned by the good faith of Burgos and Barcelona. Pay-lists could be extemporised *ad hoc*. What it amounted to was this, that the commissioners would merely have to ask the respective authorities to provide them with the figures they wanted.

The meeting of the sub-committee held on May 26th, though it provided evidence of the willingness on the part of

four Powers to reach some sort of an understanding, did not yield any evidence that Russia yet had weakened in her determination to defeat every proposal for conciliation. Mr. Kagan's attitude was the more formidable because the recent reinforcement of the Spanish Republicans and the recently increased stubbornness of the Republican defence made it impossible to hope that there could be any early settlement of the war in the military sense.

It happened at that very time that General Franco's tactic was extended to include the bombing from the air of what are called " open towns." During the last week of May and the first week of June the coast towns of Republican Spain were constantly bombed by Nationalist aeroplanes. The feeling thereby aroused was such that Mr. Butler, Under-Secretary of State, announced in the House of Commons on June 3rd that the British Government proposed to invite " certain foreign Governments in no way identified with either of the contending parties in Spain " (which formula excluded Russia, Italy, Germany and France) to provide the members of a commission whose duty it would be to visit the scene of " open towns " that had been bombed, to make a report of what they found, including an estimate of how far the bombardment could be justified by the existence of " military objectives," and to publish their findings in the hope that world opinion, thus informed, would bring pressure to bear upon those who sanctioned such methods of warfare. Sir Robert Hodgson, British Agent in Burgos, was at the same time instructed to protest to the Nationalist Government against the bombing of " defenceless civilians." The Nationalist argument was that the constant stream of war material from France and Russia to the Republican ports had made those ports a legitimate war objective. The old, old question was raised of " humanising " war. Can war be humanised, except by stopping it ? Does it even make sense to talk of conducting war in a humane manner ? Is it more human to kill the women and children along with their menfolk or to ensure that the women and children shall go on living without their menfolk ? As much nonsense is talked about humanising war as about any other human perversity. Moreover, on the strictly technical plane it was arguable, and there were those who argued, that the objective of war is to break the enemy. When Germany was defeated in 1918 her women starved.

Is it better for a woman to starve to death and to see her children starve to death or for women and children to be killed instantaneously? There were those also who argued that "military" objectives could not be differentiated from "non-military" objectives, partly because areas protected as non-military could, and certainly would, be abused in that sense, and partly because the differentiation between civilians and combatants so far as the horrors of war are concerned is largely a matter of imagination, and in practice it is always the imagination of the male civilian (for instance of governments) that tends to be excited in this matter. Those who sympathised with General Franco's cause protested that the entry of sea-borne supplies to the Republican ports anyhow excluded those ports from the category of "open towns," even if the sacrosanctity of open towns be accepted in principle. None the less the British Government launched its humanising proposal. The prospect thereby took shape that two commissions might be going out to Spain at the same time. The counting commission was brought nearer as a probability by the fact that when the sub-committee met on June 2nd, the Russian representative, for the first time since the war started in Spain, showed a disposition to agree to the proposed British scheme for the evacuation of foreign troops.

But the Nationalist bombing of Republican ports was prosecuted with such vigour that something like an emergency developed within the British Cabinet. British ships and other ships flying the British flag were among the casualties. The Government was in this dilemma, that on one hand it is the duty of British Governments to protect British life and property abroad and, on the other hand, it is an even more solemn duty not to plunge the country into war. In this case three categories of ships were concerned: the normal British trading ships, the additional British ships engaged for the high profits commensurate with the risks, and the bogus British ships owned and manned by non-British interests, but flying the British flag. The baffling nature of the dilemma was made clear when Mr. Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons on June 14th, as the following passages from his speech will show: ". . . Faced with a situation which has arisen out of the development of military aircraft and is without precedent in previous experience, His Majesty's Government have given earnest consideration to the question

of what action, if any, they could take which would be likely to give protection to British shipping without reversing their declared policy of non-intervention. . . . The present attacks are made by aircraft while the shipping is in port, and consequently protection could only be afforded by stationing anti-aircraft guns on land, or warships in or near the port. Since it is impossible to tell whether any aeroplane is intending to attack a British ship until the attack is delivered, and since to wait until the attack had been delivered would be to deprive the defence of any useful effect, it follows that fire would have to be opened on all approaching aircraft. Action of this kind would obviously constitute participation in the defence of the port and would amount to direct intervention in the civil war. . . . Two proposals have been made which, if found practicable, may go some way in the desired direction. The first is for the provision of safety zones for shipping in certain harbours, and although this proposal presents considerable difficulties, it is being actively investigated. The second proposal was received by His Majesty's Government from the Burgos authorities, and is to the effect that a port in Spanish Government territory should be selected outside the zone of military operations for the use of British merchant ships, which could enter and leave it unhindered. The Burgos authorities desire to make it a condition that the port should not be used for the purpose of supplying the Spanish Government with munitions or certain other commodities, and they therefore propose the appointment of international commissioners who would be in a position to guarantee that no such commodities were carried in ships using the port. The selection of such a port or ports would mean that British ships entering it under these conditions would be free from the risk of bombardment. There are certain obvious difficulties about this suggestion. It depends for one thing upon an agreed understanding of what the commodities in question should be, while its effectiveness would clearly be impaired unless ports in both portions of the territory held by the Spanish Government were allotted for the purpose indicated. Apart from these specific proposals for safety zones and the establishment of a neutral port or ports, the result of the further and detailed examination made by His Majesty's Government has been to show that effective protection cannot be guaranteed to ships trading with ports in the war zone

while they are in territorial waters unless this country is prepared to take an active part in the hostilities. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government they would not be justified in recommending such a course, which might well result in the spread of the conflict far beyond its present limits. They must therefore repeat the warning they have already given to British shipping on November 28th and 29th last, that while they will continue to afford protection as hitherto to ships on the high seas, ships entering ports which are liable at any time to be the object of military operations, and attack must do so at their own risk."

It became known in the second half of June that Norway and Sweden had agreed to be represented on the commission proposed by the British Government on June 3rd; but that the United States, the only other country invited, had intimated its unwillingness as yet to decide whether to accept or not. That intimation being interpreted as a polite refusal, the fact had to be accepted that the commission would be constituted as an Anglo-Norwegian-Swedish enterprise. The crowning achievement of the Non-Intervention Committee was reached on July 5th, when a plenary meeting, representative of twenty-six nations, held in the Locarno Room of the British Foreign Office, recorded unanimous and complete agreement on the British plan for the evacuation of foreign troops from Spain. It then remained for the plan to be submitted for acceptance to the two parties in Spain. There still remained certain obstacles to be negotiated in the future, even if the plan were put into operation by the consent of Burgos and Barcelona. But for the first time since the Spanish war started two summers ago the five non-Spanish Great Powers —Russia, Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain—were agreed on a plan for localising the conflict. The full scheme was expected to cost some £2,000,000 to carry through. The British share of the cost was expected to amount to half a million sterling.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

July 12th, 1938.

No. 443. *August 1938.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

FULL REVIEWS 241
EUROPE SINCE THE WAR; CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HERETIC; THE CRUMBLING OF EMPIRE; ARMIES AND POLITICS; THE NEW GERMANY; THE JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO CIVILISATION; THE MEDIÆVAL UNIVERSITIES.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: ARMS AND THE COVENANT; OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ISLES; ENGLISH WITNESSES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION; OUIDA; WILD FLOWERS IN BRITAIN 254

EUROPE SINCE THE WAR.*

No British scholar knows more about post-war Europe than Professor Seton-Watson, whose latest book should be diligently studied at home and abroad. There is solid learning in every chapter, but it is lightly borne and there is not a dull page from beginning to end. Like the rest of us, he detests the theory and practice of totalitarianism; yet he recognises the strength of its appeal to millions who have inherited a tradition and lived through experiences differing widely from our own. What he describes as his extreme outspokenness is due to his conviction that the fate of the British Commonwealth, and with it the fate of free institutions throughout the world, is in the balance. How we have reached this predicament, what mistakes in policy have been made by the victors in the world war, what can be done to avert another catastrophe—these are among the themes of a dramatic narrative.

A careful study of the principles of pre-war British statesmanship is followed by a brief sketch of our policy during the struggle and a detailed analysis of the peace settlement. To call the Treaty of Versailles a Carthaginian peace seems to our author grotesquely inaccurate, for Carthage disappeared

* *Europe and the Dictators.* By R. W. Seton-Watson. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

for ever after her defeat. Yet, though he gives its makers rather higher marks than some other examiners, he complains that five mistakes were made—the refusal of oral discussion, linking up of the Covenant with the treaties, the charge of exclusive war-guilt, the thesis of Germany's unfitness to possess colonies, and the severity of the economic clauses. It will be noted that the redistribution of frontiers in Europe is not on the list, for the author believes the ethnic principle to have been on the whole loyally carried out.

If costly mistakes were made in the Treaty of Versailles, it was not the fault of England alone. But we were solely responsible for a blunder to which Professor Seton-Watson attaches great importance. When America backed out of the Treaty of Guarantee signed on the same day as the Treaty of Versailles, we had a technical pretext for following suit. "By not upholding our pledge at all costs, we created in France that sense of grievance and insecurity which has never left her since that day, and indeed robbed ourselves of that restraining influence over Paris which we might have asserted to good purpose." In her craving for security France looked elsewhere for allies, without finding any who could take the place of England and America. Our excuse, such as it is, must be sought in our geographical situation, which for centuries has given us a detached outlook and dictated an opportunist course exasperating to our Continental friends.

Three massive chapters, together claiming half the volume, survey our relations with Russia, Italy and Germany in the post-war years. As a democrat the author abhors the ruthless autocracies which hold half Europe in their grip, and he is free from the temptation to whitewash the Bolshevists which afflicts many critics of Hitler and Mussolini. But he realises that the peace of the world is not threatened by Russia, and he defends the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact of 1935 as the obvious rejoinder to Hitler's ambitions and threats. "If, in face of a rearmed Germany and a highly doubtful Italy, Russia could be completely isolated from Europe, France would obviously be in a position of extreme danger. In a word, the main aim of the pact is to preserve that very balance of power in Europe which Hitler professes to favour. . . . Much as we may detest the methods of Moscow, nothing can obscure the fact that at present more

than ever the interests of the two countries run parallel, and that it is not in the general interest of Europe that Russia should be isolated."

The chapter on Italy is written with something more nearly approaching passion than any other except that on the Abyssinian war which forms its natural continuation. "In dealing with Italy and above all with Mussolini we must dismiss from our minds every spark of sentiment, every historical analogy from the long-vanished era of the Risorgimento, and must study attentively Machiavelli, and the despots and *condottieri* of the Italian Renaissance. Secondly we must realise that the Duce has long had a poor opinion of British statesmanship, an opinion confirmed by the ease with which he has deceived a long series of distinguished Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors. He is now convinced that the British nation is emasculated by pacifist doctrine and excessive comfort, and threatened by a catastrophic decline in man-power. He believes that the British Empire is disintegrating, and deliberately aspires to take its place, at any rate in the Mediterranean, in Africa and in the Middle East." With Russia under Stalin, adds the author, our interests need not collide. With Germany under Hitler a compromise is difficult but by no means impossible. With Italy under Mussolini there can be nothing better than armed neutrality and perpetual vigilance, for it is useless to hug illusions as to his friendship or to trust his word. These stinging sentences were written before the Anglo-Italian Pact, but we can hardly imagine the author desiring to cancel them in consequence of that much criticised experiment. Those who have faith in the Duce's promises should study the section of the Abyssinian chapter entitled Broken Pledges, which sets forth nine instances of perfidy.

The chapter on Germany is the longest in the book, for it describes not only the policy but the ideology of the ruling clique. And it is precisely the ideology of Hitler, Rosenberg, Streicher and other sinister figures which fills him with alarm. "They are widening the gulf between Germany and Western Europe, and consciously, deliberately, trying to train up a nation which knows next to nothing of Western institutions, or, in so far as it knows them, contemptuously rejects them. This cultural cleavage among the nations which totalitarian autocracy has brought about is perhaps the gravest of the

many dangers which confront unhappy Europe." A huge note of interrogation hangs over the coming weeks, months and years. "It is probable that Hitler will continue at intervals that policy of bluff which has proved so successful on four occasions until at last a point will be reached when it will no longer be possible for the other Powers to yield. Then his bluff would be called, and war might be upon us suddenly and irrevocably. The best hope of conquering this danger is for this country to make it quite clear that there are certain things which it will not tolerate, and in particular an attempt to alter the map of Europe by force. It is doubtless more in keeping with the traditional British policy to avoid commitments made in advance; but present circumstances are altogether exceptional, and render essential a greater clarity of aim and a courageous lead to the nation." The difficulty of following this advice is that public opinion is deeply divided as to where we ought to make a firm stand.

Where all is good it is difficult to single out any chapter for special praise. But certainly no part of the book is more helpful than that which discusses the problem of small states and national minorities. Professor Seton-Watson moves with sure tread through the intricacies of Central and East European controversy, for the geography of the contested zones is as familiar to him as the historical background. Particularly interesting at the present moment is the section on the German-Czech frontier. In his opinion the Germans of Czechoslovakia have the fewest grievances of all the minorities in Europe. The volume concludes with a balanced discussion of the war in Spain, a careful survey of the tendencies and problems of British policy to-day, and an epilogue on the sudden disappearance of Austria, followed by "the disgusting farce of a totalitarian plebiscite." G. P. G.

CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HERETIC.*

The heresies of one generation are the accepted truths of the next. Although it may not be quite accurate to say that Mr. Hobson's theory of over-saving and under-consumption is now generally accepted by economists yet many would

* By J. A. Hobson. Allen & Unwin. 5s.

undoubtedly agree that it is an important factor in emphasising and prolonging a trade depression. Mr. Hobson has shown in many books which stand to his credit that oversaving is a rational explanation of bad trade which results from the excessive inequality of distribution. Quite early in his life the author was convinced of what he calls the fundamental "immorality" of a business system in which all markets were morally damaged by differences in bargaining power, and the settlement of market prices, alike for goods and services, by the play of selfish interests. Through the whole of his life he has maintained this thesis, and whatever modifications of his economic theory may have been made in the course of many years of writing and controversy, it is true to say that this belief in the social and political injustice of such a system has tinged and permeated all his work. Whether we are dealing with economics or politics, sociology or human welfare, there is the same trend of thought. His own personal experience has convinced him that in the main his view is a sound one and his hope is that we shall gradually substitute human for purely money valuations of costs and utilities. The translation is from the quantitative into the qualitative in this economy. We have as a matter of fact almost entirely dropped the idea of *laissez-faire* and even the most orthodox are now convinced that there must be extended social and political reforms. Few men are better fitted to indicate the sort of lines upon which we must travel in the future. His life both at school and the university, as a student and as a lecturer, while it has brought disillusionment, especially as to the wisdom of civilised man, has also enabled him "to see life steadily and see it whole." His wide range of interests and his clarity of thought have given him some claim to leadership in movements for the bettering of the condition of the working classes. He speaks and writes with restraint and wisdom illustrated in his concluding sentence "an effective operative democracy requires close attention to the inequalities in men in order that special abilities may be utilised for the common welfare."

The writer confesses that as a young man he not only accepted Mr. Hobson's heresies but drew inspiration from his humanistic attitude. Mr. Hobson also influenced and was influenced by men like Edward Carpenter, William Archer, H. W. Nevinson, Ramsay MacDonald, Graham Wallas and

many others, and his latest but we hope not his last book will be read with interest by all his many friends who have not finally despaired of human progress and still regard him as a faithful exponent of present-day movements.

P. A.

THE CRUMBLING OF EMPIRE.*

The title given to this important book does not do justice to the scope and richness of its contents. For though Dr. Bonn is chiefly concerned with showing the facts and forces which in his judgment prove that "the age of empire-breaking is following the age of empire-making," his work actually contains the fullest and closest study of recent international relations, political, economic and cultural, that has yet appeared. The past history of many countries supplies light upon the methods and motives of the different forms of colonial expansion which were the early stages of modern Imperialism. How far were the conscious motives, territorial aggrandisement, commercial gains, power politics, population pressure? Such vital problems are here set forth with amazing industry and exactitude. The reader is fed to plenitude with statistics showing the relative dependence of each country upon outside resources for foods and raw materials, and the comparatively small part played by colonies in this essential commerce. While particular groups of industrial exporters or investors may reap great temporary gains from a spirited imperialism which costs their country dear in expenses of acquisition and defence, the net advantages of such colonies or empire are usually quite small as compared with the commercial advantages of free relations with foreign countries. Unfortunately such relations have lost much of their former freedom, in the new age of economic restrictions, making towards isolation in all more self-sufficing countries and towards commercial conflicts among countries dependent upon external supplies for subsistence and for the armaments which are the most alarming feature of the post-war legacy of national hostility and fear.

Though Dr. Bonn, as an expert economist, does full justice to the part played by commerce and finance in nationalism and imperialism, he recognises that the so-called

* *The Crumbling of Empire.* By M. J. Bonn. Allen & Unwin. 15s. net.

"Have-not" peoples, who demand colonies and territorial expansion as an economic necessity, are actually motived more deeply by considerations of prestige and power. The new "Holy Roman Empire" is not likely to prove a profitable undertaking. German expansion is not seriously concerned with African or other colonies, old or new, but with continental dominion. Japan cannot regard China as a place for the settlement of her excessive population. "The Japanese themselves see it in the light of an anti-colonial movement, designed to break the domination of the West over the East" (p. 346).

The main issue is "Conquest or Federation." A close and interesting study of recent developments in the British Empire favours federation as the true line of advance. The growing equality of the federal relation is discussed not only in the relations of the Dominions to the mother country and to each other, but in the democracy asserting itself in India and the coloured colonies. "Colonial co-operation for the purpose of liquidating the white man's burden, honourably and profitably to all concerned, is an aim well worth striving for" (p. 423). Pacific international co-operation, however, still remains in the balance. Fascist and Communist alike believe in force. But force, however temporarily successful, inhibits a just settlement and willing co-operation. It is possible that popular discontent with arbitrary rule and the poverty and insecurity it brings, may prove fatal to the continuance of dictatorship. But though empires may eventually "crumble" and collapse, we cannot assume that they may not last long enough to produce some catastrophic conflict. In his concluding chapter Dr. Bonn seems to leave this vital question open, notwithstanding the title he has given to his book.

J. A. Hobson.

ARMIES AND POLITICS.

In his book *A History of Militarism,** Dr. Vagts attempts the rather grim but interesting essay of rewriting the main course of military history, not as a succession of battles in the times of war, but as a political and social factor in the times of peace. He served throughout the last war, first as private

* *A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession.* By Alfred Vagts. Allen & Unwin. 18s. net.

and then as officer, in the German army. He was connected as a student of history with certain leading German universities until the advent of Herr Hitler persuaded him to leave Germany. He writes the history of militarism from the Middle Ages up to the present day. The book is profusely illustrated, and although written in a somewhat gaunt style is full of matter that throws light on the processes by which " militarism " has come so largely to dominate civilised life as we know it to-day.

We are given a good definition of what constitutes militarism. " Every war," writes Dr. Vagts, " is fought, every army is maintained in a military way and in a militaristic way. The distinction is fundamental and fateful. The military way is marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with the least expenditure of blood and treasure. It is limited in scope, confined to one function, and scientific in its essential qualities. Militarism, on the other hand, presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions and thought associated with armies and wars, and yet transcending true military purposes. Indeed, militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and defeat the purposes of the military way. Its influence is unlimited in scope. It may permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and arts. Rejecting the scientific character of the military way, militarism displays the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief."

It is indeed a most depressing book, tracing as it does through the centuries the sinister spread of what may truly be called the cancer of politics. The growth of militarism from its heroic days to its present all-pervading omnipotence as exemplified in the totalitarian states is revealed with all the horrible fascination of a true human tragedy and with a scholarly documentation that gives it a sound historical value. The life of a soldier, the position he occupies in national affairs, is one of the grotesque features of political civilisation. In origin and in theory, armies are a means of national self-defence ; in effect they are the means of national insecurity and adversity, impartially distributed among friend and foe. War and its paradoxes are an essentially religious study. Why so hideous an apparent perversity should be an equally apparent inevitability, established by the cumulative

experience of the human kind, is one of the difficult questions. Those who are interested in the philosophical speculation thereby excited—and we are all necessarily interested—will find in Dr. Vagts' book the very context of their study.

G. G.

THE NEW GERMANY.*

In *Germany Speaks*, twenty-one German leaders and administrators have contributed articles upon various phases of Nazi activity and policy during the last five years and upon her future attitude and aspirations. It is presented as an authoritative work, intended to promote in England a better understanding and appreciation of the new Germany. Anglo-German friendship is one of the great needs of the time and any book which can contribute to that end must be welcomed. There is no reason to think that this volume temperately expressed though not uncritical is not prompted by the sincerest intentions. In reading these four hundred pages the public cannot fail to be impressed by the magnitude and efficiency of the Nazi effort in material development and in recasting and energising the Reich, albeit under the ruthless pressure of a dictatorial regime. Indeed, it is particularly the Nazi method, pursued both in internal and foreign policy, which has roused in democratic states the existing antagonism ; and unfortunately there is little in this volume to allay such feeling.

Dr. Franz Gürtner, the Reich Minister of Justice, in an article on the administration of justice, remarks that " the National Socialist State is a constitutional State in the best sense of the term " since " law and justice are at the root of every activity carried on in the new Germany." The judges who enjoy an " independent and irremovable status " are given wide powers of punishing acts which are strictly outside the criminal code, but which demand punishment " in pursuance of the general tenor of the law and in accordance with healthy national sentiment." Dr. Gürtner is wrong in treating the conferment of such judicial authority as the adoption of an English common law principle since in England the judge is bound by a rigid system of precedent which has no equivalent in Germany. Such wide general powers, however, are not inconsistent with the rule of law if the subject's liberty is

* Thornton Butterworth. 10s. 6d. net.

determined ultimately by an impartial judicial act. But, unhappily, no *Habeas Corpus* Act exists in the Reich and legal judgments may be rendered futile, as in the case of Dr. Niemöller, by the arbitrary acts of the secret police, whose activities, along with their corollary of concentration camps, are ignored by Dr. Gürtner and throughout the volume.

German propaganda is discussed specifically by Dr. G. Kurt Johannsen, who declares that it is "only directed towards the German people." It is justified as an educational work of enlightenment and national solidity and more particularly as a necessary antidote against the infusion and reception of anti-Nazi ideas, although it is axiomatic in this book that the people are unitedly and fervently behind the regime. For example, Dr. Hans Blunck argues that lack of a strong press opposition is due not to suppression "but because the conviction of opposition is also lacking." It is admitted, of course, that no attack on the Nazi regime is allowed. Dr. Dietrich, the Reich Chief of Press, describes press freedom as "a phantom" which has never existed anywhere, and advances the well-known argument that democratic journals are shackled to the selfish views of their owners while the fascist editor enjoys a greater freedom and responsibility "within the obvious limitations set by the vital interests of the nation." Apart from the press, propaganda admittedly impregnates every phase of governmental activity, particularly among the young. Even so, the impressionable reader may well gain a false sense of Nazi tolerance. For example, in his valuable account of social policy, Dr. Ley denies that "charity work carried on for the benefit of necessitous Jews is in any way inferior to that carried on for the rest of the population." While the well-known argument for racial purity is urged by Dr. Walter Gross, the known facts of Jewish persecution are not unnaturally concealed. It is also noticeable that the religious issue, with which the Englishman is particularly concerned, is entirely ignored.

Herr Fritz Reinhardt discusses the reduction of unemployment from six million in 1933 to the existing total of one million persons, only half of whom are unemployable. In this, public works have played an important part, as appears from Dr. Todt's account of the great road-building schemes which have aroused international admiration. But no mention is made of the huge absorption of labour in the armaments

industries. In his chapter on the economic position Dr. Schacht attributes the Four Year Plan and autarkist policy to foreign currency and trade restrictions. He also treats the colonial problem as "essentially economic," an attitude which is stressed with well-known arguments by General von Epp, who also urges a "legal and moral" claim based on the injustice and illegality of the Peace Treaty provisions. Without accepting the logic of his argument, it is fair to acknowledge that the charge of colonial misgovernment is now generally regarded as unsubstantiated. That the colonial claim is primarily one of national honour and prestige is recognised by Baron von Rheinbaben, who writes on Anglo-German relations. Apart from the issue of colonies there is no actual divergence between the two countries and he urges that lasting friendship may be built upon mutual respect for each other's dignity, strength and efficiency, a joint determination to promote understanding and the recognition of mutual vital interests. In short, Great Britain should recognise Germany's need for economic expansion and influence in Central and South-east Europe and for colonies, and acknowledge her claim to protect, without interference, the culture and rights of German minorities. Such broadly are the terms, the writer infers, for the peaceful collaboration and appeasement in Europe which Germany ardently desires.

THE JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO CIVILISATION.*

It is a common habit of modern thought to regard our western civilisation as a peculiarly Christian superstructure towering impressively upon the foundations of past periods and of extinct peoples, but we are forever forgetting (or failing to observe) that much of the best of what we have and know is not a mere legacy, but the free gift of a yet living people—the Jews. Most of us are vaguely aware that Jews carried learning through the Dark Ages, and so made the Renaissance a practical possibility; but few of us know how objective a part they played, and only the specialist could recite the name and fame of the protagonists; hence Dr. Cecil Roth's* new book is a boon to the general student of European culture,

* *The Jewish Contribution to Civilisation.* Macmillan. 7s. 6d.

inasmuch as it forms a very complete survey, and is a useful guide to further studies. It is astonishing to find how largely Jews have figured in the various branches of advance : that they were a power behind the Reformation, that they popularised printing, that they even introduced the handkerchief into general use, and further, that without maps made by Jews, mathematical instruments invented and constructed by them, without their encouragement and capital, Christopher Columbus, himself most probably the son of Jewish parents converted to Christianity, could never have embarked on that epoch-making maritime adventure that culminated in the discovery of the New World.

Shakespeare, Dante and Milton, we learn, were not without Jewish influences, and the important part the Jews have played in the development of art, music, mathematics, medicine and astronomy, not to mention philosophy, can barely be evaluated. In the sphere of economic, industrial and commercial activities, we expect to find Jews largely represented, for either better or worse, and it is perhaps surprising that many altruistic reforms have emanated from Jewish capitalists. Dr. Roth disposes in one mordant paragraph of that anti-Semitic writer on economics, Sombart ; and in the section on finance makes it clear that the financier—particularly the Jewish financier—is more closely associated with the preservation of peace than the ferment of war. A great deal of the beneficial political reform of the last century has Jewish conscientious striving behind it ; while in social uplift Jews have been both practical and active ; indeed the " working man " to-day has no one but the Jews to thank for the decent clothes on his back, and the useful furniture in his neat home.

In this age of " racial " myth, when the mediæval mania of Jew-baiting has once more reared an ugly head, full of poison fangs, in Europe, it is reasonable to evaluate the " Jewish contribution in terms of Jews, and not of Judaism alone—by taking, that is, into account those contributions made by persons of traceable Jewish ancestry, whatever their religious affiliations or sympathies " ; hence we find, in days far more recent than the " legendary " period of the first three Popes, that Jews have taken an active part in the establishment of Christianity in Europe—to witness, the figures of such personages as St. Isidor of Seville, the brothers Ratisbonne who

founded the Order of Notre Dame de Sion in 1842, the Venerable Francis Mary Paul Libermann, Antoine Frederic Ozanam, and last but by no means least, " General " Booth, of rabbinical appearance, and Salvation Army fame.

This book, to the making of which there has gone superb scholarship, vast knowledge and painstaking research, is encyclopædic in content, brilliant in the manner of presentation, dignified and restrained. The illustrations are not the hackneyed plates that appear in the average book on Jewish historic subjects, and the volume should form a valuable addition to any library, either private or public, for it does not fall within the narrow category of pro-Jewish propaganda—though it must provide a wholesome prophylactic for healthy minds.

JULIAN FRANKLYN.

THE MEDIÆVAL UNIVERSITIES.*

In the short compass of 375 pages Mr. Schachner describes the rise, growth and many-sided development of the mediæval universities. There is a bibliography of four pages which attests the width of his reading, and it is pleasant to know that he " has leaned heavily " upon Rashdall's *magnum opus*. He does not characterise Denifle's book which has revolutionised many of our conceptions. Width of reading is not enough, for we require depth of insight, and here the author does not fail us. He might have technically described the European universities as taking their beginnings from the cathedral schools, and he might easily have lost his way in cathedral statutes. Such research would not have been misspent. The author has given us just enough of it, and has pursued the main road without any undue strayings into attractive by-paths. The particular origins of such great universities as Paris and Bologna are carefully traced, with emphasis on the main features in their history. At the same time Mr. Schachner never forgets that a university is a home of learning, and such scholars as Abélard, Wyclif and Roger Bacon are duly set against the background of their generation. The author specially brings out the inner meaning of the prolonged conflict between Realism and Nominalism. It has

* *The Mediæval Universities.* By N. Schachner. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.

often seemed to us that some even of the great Schoolmen were scientists who were unaware of the fact. Had there been laboratories in their time, they would have surely turned the attention they bestowed upon the analysis of words to the no less urgent analysis of chemical composition.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

A collection of Mr. Winston Churchill's parliamentary speeches on foreign policy and national defence during the past six years has been compiled by his son in *Arms and the Covenant*.* Some forty speeches are bound together by the constant reiteration, repeated with growing urgency, of arguments for British rearmament. In 1932-3 Mr. Churchill was pleading for a policy of detachment by a Britain strongly armed, leaving France and her allies as a sufficient counterpoise to any German ambitions. British intervention was to be limited to securing the removal of Germany's just grievances. With the rapid growth, however, of German strength and her menaces of aggression, Britain must not only rearm with the utmost speed, attaining in particular parity in the air with Germany, but unite with France and all other threatened States under the ægis of the League as a collective body of overwhelming strength. Mr. Churchill stresses not the failure of collective action, but its necessity as an effective deterrent to German aggression. This selection covers not only the broad issues of policy but also the more technical questions arising in the method of rearmament, such as Mr. Churchill's insistent appeal for a Ministry of Supply. Apart from their propaganda value, these speeches will be read for their prescience, dialectical skill and literary composition.

* * * * *

Very little is known of Scottish, Welsh and Irish history by the English public apart from those events which have impinged upon and directly influenced the course of English history. This is, no doubt, due largely to the limited scope of history teaching in the schools and to the lack of a sound elementary textbook which embraces the whole field. The latter, at least, has now been remedied by Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw in his *Outlines of the History of the British Isles*.† He treats side by side and views synoptically the historical development of the four territorial divisions of these Islands, pointing out the peculiarities of each and their inter-connexions, mutual relationships and influences, leading towards convergence and unification, at least in the United

* Harrap. 18s. net. † Harrap. 12s. 6d.

Kingdom. This historical sketch is packed with facts lucidly and attractively presented and with a minimum of necessary comment. Incidentally at a time when some writers are endeavouring to rehabilitate the policy and work of Charles II it is interesting to note that Professor Hearnshaw brands that monarch as "both a bad man and a bad king" whose "evil rule" was "offset in some measure" by patronage of science and the arts and encouragement of trade and colonisation. The author has included lists of books which should encourage the reader to further reading and knowledge.

* * * * *

In his latest book, *English Witnesses of the French Revolution*,* Mr. J. M. Thompson has published a valuable and interesting selection of impressions left by contemporary Englishmen who either enjoyed a first-hand knowledge of the events recorded or were in a particularly favourable position to acquire accurate information. For the most part these extracts are valuable as factual and objective accounts, although they do at times indicate the critical mind of the author. For example, the quotations from Tom Paine point to his change from exultation and praise to disgust at revolutionary excess. In a prologue covering 1785-9 Mr. Thompson has included reports of the deep-seated discontents and oppression in the country and forecasts of revolution by men such as Arthur Young and the British diplomats, Lord Dorset and Daniel Hailes. The passing traveller might take a more superficial, happier view, as Mrs. Thrale did in 1785. "The French are really a contented race of mortals; precluded almost from possibility of adventure." Mr. Thompson concludes his symposium with the end of The Terror; and among the fifty witnesses and observers included in some 150 short passages are, apart from the above, figures such as Francis Burdett, William Cobbett, Lord Gower, W. A. Miles, John Moore, Edward Rigby, Samuel Rogers, Mrs. Swinburne, Wordsworth, and other prominent names. The collection is not, and is not intended to be, exhaustive in any way.

* * * * *

The story of Ouida's life† reads like a novel. To spring from the quiet upbringing of an English country town into sudden notoriety, won by an excessively romantic imagination and frankness which amounted to a scandal, points to an "outsize" character not to be judged by our Island standards. The photograph of her at the beginning of this book is of a very clever, interesting face. Miss Yvonne ffrench, her biographer, claims for her throughout "noble standards" and "intelligent political and social insight." "Ouida's books are almost all aimed at weaknesses in the social structure." . . . "The pill was so successfully gilded that it was never seen to be a pill at all." Her colossal success brought in due time great wealth, which

* Basil Blackwell. 10s. 6d. net. † *Ouida*. Cobden-Sanderson. 8s. 6d.

was spent on living in extravagant style in her Italian home, with her mother and her numerous dogs around her. The many incidents due to her violent, impulsive character and unrestrained actions are told with kindly humour. The inaccuracies of spelling and grammar and more than all the exaggerations and lack of observation in Ouida's society novels were such that when she took up a serious cause like that of the Italian peasants in her book *A Village Commune* the same kind of criticism was expressed. In a letter replying to such charges in an article in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW in 1881 Ouida gives her views on the effects of conscription on home life in Italy. Her passionate love of liberty burns through her writings. "In theory she was almost the ideal Liberal." In later life there were many essays from her pen on social and political subjects, including a strong attack on *The Crispi Dictatorship* in this REVIEW in 1895.

Her other great passion was a love of animals, and especially dogs, which led her to many efforts in support of the Italian branch of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. The pity of it was that as money failed and extravagance continued, there was an increase of eccentricity and a gradual decline to misery, redeemed to some extent by the great kindness of her many friends, but not by gratitude on her part. She saw herself always in a heroic light and her pride was too great. Though, according to Miss ffrench, her books are still read, the "dawning of Edwardianism and the new fashion for realism" put an end to a vogue which nevertheless set succeeding novelists free and has opened the way to much modern writing.

* * * * *

Mr. R. Gathorne Hardy has written a most instructive book on *Wild Flowers in Britain** which will encourage in the amateur a practical botanical interest without dwelling too deeply upon scientific detail. In his choice of flowers Mr. Gathorne Hardy is guided by his own predilections, but the ground covered is sufficiently wide for a small book of this character. Separate chapters are devoted to wild flowers peculiar to river and water meadows, woods, downs, moors, mountains and the seaside; a particularly helpful classification for roving amateurs. The chapters on grass and orchids are of a more specialist character and describe plants which are less generally known. The volume is well illustrated, including a large number of admirable photographs.

* Batsford. 8s. 6d. net.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.
SEPTEMBER 1938.

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY.*

IT is a good thing now and then to stand back for a moment from the controversies of the hour, to view the international situation as a whole and to relate present-day problems to the permanent principles that we hold. Liberal foreign policy has always been based on certain clear and definite ideas. National liberty is a good thing; for any people that has risen above the primitive, foreign domination is wrong and to be resisted. All States are equal juridically; if justice is to be done, it is as necessary that there should be an equal status for strong and weak nations in international law, as for rich people and poor in domestic law. One State should not interfere in the internal affairs of another—should not try to determine the form of its government or the structure of its society. All should encourage mutual intercourse and trade; recognising that to advance the welfare of mankind as a whole is both the duty and the interest of every section of it, and realising that each nation prospers best in a prosperous world. If disputes arise, they should be settled by negotiation or arbitration, and not by war. A treaty once signed is sacred; unless nations can trust each other's word, peaceful intercourse becomes impossible, as commerce would be impossible if contracts were not binding. These have been for a hundred years, as all would agree, the guiding ideas of a Liberal foreign policy. Since the Great War another has been added. The foundation of the League of Nations was acclaimed by Liberals everywhere. To promote collective action through the League, in order to uphold law and peace and to prevent aggression, became a new, and a foremost, article in the Liberal creed.

In what way are these principles to be applied in the present state of affairs? Are they sufficient, or must further new ideas be evolved to meet the new conditions? In particular, how far can the rule still be observed that Governments should not concern themselves with the internal régimes of

* Address to the Liberal Summer School, Oxford, July 30th, 1938.

their neighbours? Certainly there have been many departures from that rule in the post-War world. The Russian Revolution established in power a party with a universalistic creed. Marxism is a dynamic and pervasive force. The resources of the Russian people were drawn upon, under the auspices of the Russian State, to inculcate it everywhere. In order to forestall or to counteract this propaganda counter-movements arose; the support given by Britain and France to the White Russian armies of Koltchak and Denikin was the first example. Subsequently Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Spain claimed a justification, and found an excuse, in the widespread fostering of Communism by Soviet Russia.

All this has worked infinite mischief. The present confusion and peril in Europe may be traced in no small degree to the breaches of the old rule that Governments should not interfere in their neighbours' domestic affairs—whether by armed force or by subventions or other help to kindred political parties. The question now arises—and is of the first and most urgent importance—whether such intervention should be continued; whether indeed it should be carried further, nations holding the same political principles drawing together to help each other, and setting themselves to thwart and weaken those of opposite views. Or, on the other hand, should we seek to return to the old principle of Liberal policy, that international relations should not be determined by internal régimes.

In this matter a severe strain is being put upon British Liberalism. Vehemently opposed to the root ideas of Nazism and Fascism, holding in detestation their violent manifestations that are so frequent and so dangerous, are we to view with equanimity, or even to assist, the growth of their internal strength and external influence? Are we to urge Czecho-Slovakia to submit to German pressure; are we to raise no finger to prevent German economic domination in Danubia and the Balkans; are we even ourselves to restore colonies to Germany, and so equip her with additional strategic bases and fresh sources of supply? Is this to be the consequence of conducting foreign affairs regardless of the character or purpose of internal régimes? If so, would it not be a truer Liberalism for the Liberal countries to draw together in face of a common danger; to recognise that the militarism of Germany, Italy and Japan is likely, if not certain, to eventuate in a war in

which we shall all be involved; and to seek to restrict, so far as we can, the economic strength and political influence of those who must be regarded as potential enemies?

A dilemma such as this is not new in history. Much the same problem arose at the time of the French Revolution. Burke lashed the British people into a fury of anger and terror against the excesses of France; the conservative Powers of Europe combined against her; the consequence was the spirit of the Marseillaise, the rise of Napoleon, the combinations of Pitt and twenty years of war. Charles James Fox consistently urged the contrary view; "the principles of Mr. Pitt" and "the principles of Mr. Fox" divided the nation. Again, when Napoleon III had seized power in France, a similar situation threatened to arise. Richard Cobden, profoundly opposed though he was to all that the Emperor stood for, took the lead in striving for an accommodation between the two countries. The Trade Treaty which he negotiated, and the peace which he helped to preserve, stand as monuments in history of the Liberal method in dealing with anti-Liberal rulers. So once more when the Government of Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith and Grey entered into an entente with Russia, to whose Tsarist system they were fundamentally opposed.

Look back over the course of events since 1918 and note how many were the mistakes—now so obvious—that were made by the Allies in the handling of Germany. The impossible reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles; the occupation of the Ruhr; the demilitarisation of the Rhineland—as integral a part of Germany as Kent and Sussex are of England; the forfeiture of all the German colonies—ignoring President Wilson's requirement, in his Fourteen Points, of an impartial investigation into the colonial problem; —we see now clearly enough that all these were mistakes. To compel German disarmament was no doubt right; but only because it was accompanied by the promise that the others would follow with a voluntary disarmament. When that promise had remained unfulfilled for many years, and when the failure of the Disarmament Conference made it clear that it was unlikely to be fulfilled at all, how could it have been expected that unilateral disarmament—which we have all declared is inconceivable for ourselves—could be maintained for Germany? An Austria was created that was an impossible

unit economically. When she tried to save herself from ruin by a Customs Union with Germany, the Allies vetoed it.

The mistakes have indeed been many and grave. The chief responsibility rests with France, whose feelings of intense resentment and deep suspicion are easily understood. But Britain acquiesced in the policies of Poincaré, Tardieu and Barthou, and the League of Nations acquiesced as well. Our share and their share in the responsibility cannot be gainsaid. Are we quite sure that we are not in danger of making just the same kind of mistakes to-day?

If we were to view the economic situation in Europe impartially, without bias against Germany on account of the militarism and violent intolerance of her régime, we should be obliged to recognise that one of her chief natural sources of supply of foodstuffs and raw materials, and a natural outlet for her manufactures, was to be found in the countries of the Valley of the Danube and the Balkan Peninsula. If then we declare that we and our allies ought to try to thwart the development of that trade for the reason that economic expansion would involve political domination, we should in fact, whatever the reason, be adopting, as the Nazis say, a policy of encirclement. Germany has often suffered from attacks of national claustrophobia, and that is a dangerous condition. Would it not be better in the long run to revert to the Liberal rule that questions of trade should be treated, so far as possible, independently of politics? After all, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Rumania and the rest have their own passionate love of independence; Germany would not find it so easy to convert commercial intercourse, however active, into political domination.

Preventive war is always wrong. Military attack, on the plea of forestalling attack that is feared from the other side, is indefensible. I submit that a preventive economic war is as wrong and as indefensible. By all means let the western Powers promote their own trade in south-eastern Europe, as elsewhere; but let them not regard it as a peril to themselves, to be obviated by any means in their power, if Germany does the same.

Consider again the question of Czechoslovakia. We sympathised whole-heartedly in the Czech movement for national freedom. We saw in Masaryk one of the same illustrious line as the leaders in the Greek War of Independence and in the

Italian *risorgimento*. "Peoples should be free from alien domination." British Liberals have striven to obey the rule in Ireland and in India. But why should our sympathy with the Czechs, when the issue lay between them and the Austrians, lead us to abandon the principle when the issue lies between minorities in Czechoslovakia and the Czechs? True that here other elements enter—the geographical intermingling of the races and the strategic defensibility of the State. The fact remains that a minority problem exists. We are told that the Czechs are "very ready to meet the reasonable and legitimate claims of the Sudeten German minority and of the other minorities." And there is no doubt that the government of Czechoslovakia, which is genuinely democratic and progressive, has not been guilty of the oppressive measures which most other States with racial minorities have not scrupled to adopt. Nevertheless the conclusion cannot be avoided that, if action is now to be taken to meet claims that are reasonable and legitimate, it follows that during the last twenty years reasonable and legitimate claims had been rejected.

In relation to the colonial issue, it is no doubt true that in its early days German colonial administration was disgraced by great cruelties. That, however, was afterwards reformed. The same was the case with Belgian administration in the Congo, where abuses were many and grave in the beginning, but were eliminated later. Whether sufficient guarantees for the protection of native interests can now be secured is a matter for discussion. Which territories should be brought under consideration is another. How far, and in what way, the mandatory principle should be applied is a further important point. There is no reason to assume that a simple and unqualified restoration of the pre-War German colonies is the only plan that is open. I do not support here any specific proposal. But I would urge that we should merely be continuing our series of unhappy mistakes if we were to rule out arbitrarily from the outset any question of German participation in colonial development, leaving her for all time as the only Great Power in the world to be so excluded.

There, then, is the issue. It is plain and clear-cut. Are we to say that any accommodation on points such as these are "concessions to the dictators," "surrenders to violence," "a submission to blackmail"? Are we to accept the doctrine of an "inevitable war," gather to ourselves what allies we can,

and take up, in the political, the strategic and the economic spheres, our battle positions? Or are we to reject absolutely the doctrine that war is ever inevitable, and take what measures we can to remove the present causes that might make a war imminent? Shall we not recognise that the dictatorships are facts; that we have to live in the same world with them; and that the only wise course for Liberals is still to be loyal—in spite of powerful temptations—to the old rule that international relations ought not to be determined by internal régimes?

Another great issue arises in these days—the position of the League of Nations and the future of Collective Security. The Peace Movement has always urged that Law should be substituted for war. We have been accustomed to take our stand on the broad principle that, just as private individuals are not allowed to be judges in their own cause, but must submit their case to a court of law whose award will be enforced by the police, so also should nations be required, when they differ, to accept a third-party judgment. The outcome has been the admirable system that has been established of international arbitration, culminating in the august Judicial Tribunal at The Hague. It has been backed by the Council of the League of Nations and the articles of the Covenant that penalise recourse to arms. But we have been liable to forget that a Judicature and an Executive are not the only organs of a State. There is also a Legislature. Laws are not only interpreted and enforced; they may also be amended. We govern with the consent of the governed, because any who may be aggrieved by the provisions of the existing laws have a process open to them by which they may secure, if they can establish their case, that the laws shall be changed. But where is that process to be found in international affairs? What procedure is there—generally accepted and normally functioning—by which treaties can be modified? The Covenant includes its Article 19; but that Article has never been used, and there was no indication that it ever would be.

The chief questions now at issue are not matters of legal interpretation. The law under the Peace Treaties is clear. The demands that are made are for changes in the law itself. The conclusion is that States are successful on the whole in maintaining peace and order among individuals, while the

League is not successful in maintaining peace and order among the States themselves, because States have effective legislative organs, as well as Judicatures and Executives, and the League has not. The result has been that the League appears in the eyes of the dissatisfied Powers as being merely the guardian of the *status quo*. Its function is simply to defend the Peace Treaties. The map of 1919 is to be clamped down on Europe and on the world for all time.

The leaders of the peace movement, insisting on the importance of resistance to aggression, have laid chief stress on the sanctity of law and the necessity of "police action" to enforce it. They declare indeed their readiness to listen to grievances, and to seek remedies if they be substantiated; but this has usually been only by the way and in a parenthesis. "Peaceful change"—yes; but with the emphasis always on the peace and rarely on the change. Lord Halifax made a declaration of importance when he said in a recent speech in the House of Lords (on July 27th, 1938): "The one guiding principle is that there should be accepted and, if possible, elaborated some sure system for the reasonable discussion and remedy of grievances without resort to the stupid and disastrous arbitrament of war."

It would be futile for Liberals to close their eyes to obvious facts with regard to the present composition of the League of Nations and the views now being expressed by many of its members. Of the seven Great Powers in the world three are in the League—Britain, France and Russia; and four are outside—the United States, Germany, Italy and Japan. Among those that have always been staunch and active members of the League are to be counted the seven "Oslo Powers"—Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg. The Foreign Ministers of these countries met recently in conference at Copenhagen, and on July 25th made a notable declaration. It stated:

> The Oslo Powers are ready actively to co-operate in all international efforts at reconciliation in an impartial and independent spirit in regard to the various groups of powers. They agree to try every possibility of putting an end, through international agreement, to the present armament race, and, in particular, to help forward any attempt to solve the problems raised by air bombing. They are convinced that their countries must continue their participation in the work of the League of Nations, but they

> have ascertained that their Governments are resolved to declare that—in present circumstances, and after the developments of last year—they consider the sanctions system as having no obligatory character, not only for special groups of states, but for all members of the League. They are convinced that it is in the League of Nations' interest that this right to free judgment in the matter of sanctions should be expressly stated.

Further, Herr Munch, the Danish Foreign Minister, in the name of all the rest, added that "all seven States were definitely determined never to take part in any conflict between the Great Powers." Let it be remembered that Switzerland also has declared her permanent and unqualified neutrality, and that Hungary declined to take part in the imposition of sanctions against Italy. Let it be remembered also that no fewer than nine of the States of Southern and Central America have lately withdrawn, or given notice of withdrawal, from membership in the League—Brazil, Chili, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras.

Viewing this situation as a whole a campaign, such as that of Mr. Winston Churchill, intended to draw all the smaller nations into a defensive military alliance with ourselves and France under the ægis of the League, seems to be misconceived. There is no indication that the smaller nations would lend themselves to it. Whatever the causes that have brought about the existing position may be, the facts as they stand to-day are plain for all to see. If the catastrophe were to come, the conflict seems likely to be between Germany, Italy and Japan on the one side, and France, Russia, the British Empire and the Little Entente on the other, with almost all the rest of the world standing neutral. Such a struggle, not unevenly matched, terrific and probably prolonged, would bear little resemblance to the original conception of Collective Security—the nations of the world acting together, with overwhelming power, to arrest one among their number who had turned criminal.

The present British Government cannot escape a large share of responsibility for this tragic situation. It was joint author, with the then Government of France, of the Hoare-Laval Agreement, which was launched without consultation with the League, and which struck a crippling blow at its effectiveness at the very crisis of its fortunes. Our present

Government has shown a pathetic feebleness in handling the Spanish situation, only once relieved, for a moment, at the time of the Nyon Conference. In the economic sphere, which has of course the closest association with the political, the Government of Great Britain, during the last seven years, has been one of the principal agents in perpetuating the widespread restrictions that hamper and diminish international trade. The fervour with which it condemns the economic nationalism of other countries is only equalled by the persistence with which it maintains our own. A few bilateral trade agreements have indeed been made, of very limited scope. But on the other hand this Government has helped to block the efforts of various countries from time to time to arrive at regional agreements for the liberation of local trade from tariff restrictions, on the ground that some British interest might be indirectly affected. Its complete neglect of the carefully framed proposals of the Van Zeeland Report for the revival of the world's commerce is inexcusable. The general outcome has been that this country has lost one-third in value of the export trade that we possessed before the great depression, and one-half of our entrepôt trade, and that, in spite of the great activity of the armament industries, we have to-day 1,800,000 unemployed; while many other countries are undergoing a continuous economic strain that is a constant source of national and international unrest.

What then is the policy that, in present conditions, Liberals may seek to promote? We are bound to recognise that, in view of the philosophies now dominant in Germany, Italy and Japan, any efforts, however honest and however far-reaching, to remove grievances and to safeguard peace, may fail. At any moment, on some plea of national honour or vital interest, the dictatorships may plunge Europe and the world into the cataclysm of war. It is essential therefore that the democratic and peace-loving Powers should look to their own armaments. Liberal thinkers and statesmen, in this country and in all countries, at this time and at all times, have consistently denounced the waste of the resources of civilisation in competitive armaments, and have urged agreement for arms limitation. But I do not know of any one among them who has ever advocated one-sided disarmament without such agreement. Obviously if the peaceful democracies, Britain, France and the United States, were to denude themselves of defences

to-day, while the military dictatorships continued to swell their formidable forces on land and sea and in the air, the result could only be to surrender the affairs of all mankind to the control of the militarists. Liberty would collapse and Power be enthroned. Until mutual limitation is in sight, the armament effort, with all its dangers and all its waste, must needs continue. Meantime the economic sphere remains open for a serious and persistent effort towards the liberation of international trade from the restrictions which have contributed, and are still contributing to bring disaster upon the world.

There is truth undoubtedly in the argument, powerfully urged by Lord Lothian, that the root cause of the troubles of Europe lies in the anarchy due to the existence of twenty-five independent States, each possessing unlimited sovereignty; he rightly insists that the ultimate cure can only be found in a voluntary surrender of some part of that sovereignty by the creation of a European Federation. Yet it is difficult to escape the conclusion that all the factors which have prevented the full success of a League of Nations would militate even more strongly against the still closer union and more intimate co-operation that would be involved by the Federal plan. We cannot hope to find there an early solution for our pressing problems.

The creation of the League of Nations is to be counted, I firmly believe, as by far the greatest effort for the welfare of mankind that the modern history of the world can show. It is essential still to make use of every opportunity that offers for employing the activities of the League within the domain in which they can now be effective. It has scope for great usefulness in dealing with any differences that may arise between the States that are still members. In the social, economic and philanthropic spheres the League has a record of fine achievement, and all that work may be maintained and developed. For the rest, we must seek to solve one by one the urgent problems of to-day—in Czechoslovakia, in the Mediterranean, in the Far East and elsewhere—by such diplomatic or other machinery as may be available. If we can succeed in that, and if the dangerous period in which we now find ourselves can be passed through, then we may set to work gradually to rebuild the League, though with a more restricted programme; to draw back to it the members that

have fallen away, and perhaps even ultimately to secure a large measure of co-operation from the United States. But to attempt to force the pace now might well destroy the League altogether.

One factor, yet more fundamental, remains. Certain it is that the troubles of our times spring at bottom from the intellectual confusion of the age. In the great matters of philosophy, of religion, of politics, we do not know where we stand. Out of the confusion crude notions were born, and spread widely. Materialism—which found some sanction in the scientific opinions that were prevalent sixty or seventy years ago, but which few scientists would endorse to-day—influences, through the teaching of Karl Marx, the fundamental ideas of large sections of mankind. Pseudo-philosophies, full of primitive fallacies, receive a ready welcome from Nazis and Fascists in search of a moral justification for immoral action. In the last resort politics and economics must be based upon religion and ethics. Only when the age finds a foundation of belief in positive religion and a well-grounded ethics will it be able to create for itself a stable and lofty civilisation.

SAMUEL.

THE SESSION.

THE Session of Parliament which has just concluded has been dominated in every way by the personality of the Prime Minister. The Government, "*c'est moi.*" His mental vigour, courage of leadership and determination to accept the responsibilities of the chief political figure in the State, though in marked contrast to the genial and easy-going ways of his predecessor, would be admirable if it were not that they are devoted to purposes wholly wrong-headed and based on narrow and antiquated ideas. In any race it is not enough to be the fastest horse on the course; it is also necessary to be going in the direction of the winning post, and in my opinion the Prime Minister is heading for a state of affairs disastrous to the British Empire and the peace of the world.

The Prime Minister has taken all important matters into his own hands and particularly in the realm of Foreign Affairs he is master and no one else counts. At last the criticism has been answered that the British Government has failed to take the lead in the international realm, but has it been a lead in the right direction? Mr. Chamberlain's single-mindedness and devoted adherence to the principles in which he believes is based on a view of foreign policy which must in the end bring about war. It is not only the Opposition who feel this, but some of the best-informed observers on the Government side of the House.

The cleavage of opinion first showed itself in February with Mr. Eden's resignation of the Foreign Secretaryship. His position had become impossible. His conception of foreign policy differed fundamentally from that of his Chief and the direction of his office was virtually taken out of his hands. He was brushed aside with brusque ruthlessness. Great states like France and Czechoslovakia have felt this heavy Chamberlain touch too. These debates of February 21st and 22nd brought into the open the naked truth that, while the Prime Minister regards the League of Nations conception as an ideal that will certainly be reached some day a very long way off in the history of the world, he looks upon it now with something like contempt and derision, and it occupies no place whatever in his working plan. What he really wants is a four-power pact between Great Britain, France, Germany

and Italy. This view is admittedly shared by a large number of his Conservative supporters in the House.

But there is also substantial and influential support in the House for the Eden view that the collective system of the League is the only practical plan for preserving the peace of the world now, in the year 1938. The late Foreign Secretary has shown great restraint since he resigned office and has given the Prime Minister's policy every chance. But he must be careful not to allow the Old School Tie to choke him. He well knows his responsibility to the country and to the world and we must leave him to judge the best course of action.

Mr. Chamberlain is working purely on the lines of bi-lateral arrangements and pre-war balance of power ideas, without any fixed principles of policy. Unfortunately, his experience of public affairs has been confined to internal administration, where he has to his credit splendid contributions in the realm of Health, Local Government and Social Services. Where he understands, a sane intuition guides him wisely. But, though he does not realise it, he does not understand foreign affairs, and his limited outlook is a European danger. He has made himself the prisoner of Signor Mussolini in the matter of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, where his personal prestige is now at stake. A Franco victory is essential to any hope of its coming into force, though a Franco victory would be in effect a major military defeat for Great Britain and France.

The Prime Minister works very hard. He attends the House regularly, leads it and intervenes whenever necessary. The absence of the Foreign Secretary from the House of Commons is, in the circumstances, of minor importance, as Mr. Chamberlain is himself, in fact, Foreign Secretary and also answers all questions of importance. Mr. Butler is shaping well as Under-Secretary. He seems to have absorbed some of the imperturbability of the East where he was born, and answers large numbers of searching interrogatories without turning a hair or committing an indiscretion. He is very much an understudy, but a good one.

The other outstanding figure on the Government side is Mr. Churchill. He may have entertained hopes on the formation of the new Government that he might in due course be included in it, but, in view of the development of Mr. Chamberlain's ideas on foreign policy, it is quite clear that

he could not join an Administration founded upon such a basis. In the House and the country Mr. Churchill has focussed the opinions of that large body—clearly a majority as the last Election showed—which believes in making the League of Nations machinery work, and the antagonism between those who take this view and the Chamberlainites grows ever more pronounced. The Sandys case is clearly a symptom of this antagonism. If Mr. Churchill's balance and judgment equalled his brilliant intellectual gifts and powers of oratory he would be irresistible.

Some of the most important debates of the Session have been devoted to Defence and grave anxiety has existed as to the adequacy of our Air programme. It became clear that the promise of Lord Baldwin, that we should have a standard equal to the nearest Air Power, had not been kept, and that the gap between the British and German Air Forces was steadily increasing, to the benefit of the latter. Finally, a debate took place in which Lord Winterton endeavoured to stem the tide, but so patently failed to do so that internal forces caused the frequently discussed resignation of Lord Swinton and his replacement by Sir Kingsley Wood. Lord Swinton was doubtless a most capable administrator and a hard worker. Unquestionably he did great things for the Air Force, but it was not enough. His manner of dealing with human beings was hardly conciliatory, and he had the great disadvantage of being in the House of Lords. Sir Kingsley Wood has all the human qualities of accessibility and amiability that his predecessor lacked, but whether he can produce what is required in the circumstances remains to be seen.

Among other Ministers who must be mentioned is the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who has mastered the complicated details of a courageous Budget with an easy intellectual grace. Like all Chancellors he is necessarily somewhat withdrawn from Parliamentary work unconnected with finance, but no one doubts that he will maintain the high standard of former occupants of the office. He holds in importance the second position in the Government. Will he ever hold the first? That is the question that is doubtless frequently in his thoughts. It is a natural and proper ambition, but one unlikely to be fulfilled in this case. No man can possess all the gifts and there are certain qualities omitted from his make-up

which would seem likely to prove fatal to further progress. I have heard some Conservatives threaten barricades on the strength of the bare idea!

The senior Secretaryship of State, the Home Office, rests in the competent hands of Sir Samuel Hoare, who brings a real humanity and understanding to the many problems that affect his Department. In particular, reference should be made to the question of refugees where the Government has taken up a reasonable and generous attitude in keeping with our national traditions. Obviously an unlimited influx of aliens, however deserving, cannot be permitted, if only because of the reactions that would be likely to arise in this country. Consistently with this, the utmost sympathy is shown. Cases are considered on their merits and few really deserving persons have been refused admission up to the present.

With regard to the Home Secretary, the question again may be asked, is he likely to succeed to the first position? It is possible. The lamentable Hoare-Laval episode will not cause much trouble in the minds of Government supporters who can swallow Mr. Chamberlain's present foreign policy. But Sir Samuel lacks certain human qualities and is never likely to be an outstandingly popular figure in the minds of the people as a whole. His competent and hard-working Under-Secretary, Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd, is now devoting his whole time to A.R.P., and Lord Winterton, who, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, has no job of his own, is assisting at the Home Office, a position which he has expressed the hope will not prove to be blind-alley employment.

Mr. Malcolm MacDonald has undoubtedly been one of the successes of the Government. Simple, modest, sincere, clear-minded, sympathetic and patient, he dealt admirably with the Irish difficulty and may be trusted to bring to bear all these qualities on the solution of the problems of Palestine and the West Indies.

The Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, has been mentioned by many as a possible successor to the premiership, a suggestion which when first mooted no doubt surprised him as much as anyone else. His stock is not quite so high as it was. Negotiations with the trade unions have not gone easily, and the driving force that is required in defence matters is obviously not present on a

sufficient scale. On the other hand, he possesses the best qualities of the average Englishman—kindly, high-minded, unselfish, upright in all his dealings, scrupulously fair and truthful, and always good-tempered. His personality has some of the geniality of the Baldwin type and, while not claiming to possess the highest intellectual gifts, he is certainly a possible candidate. But at present any potential successor would be received without enthusiasm. The brightly shining star of Mr. Eden, when it appears in the Prime Ministerial sky, will be a wholly different matter.

The Secretary of State for War, having had a dashingly successful career in every office he has occupied, including the present one, has taken a nasty toss. His future remains at the moment obscure and depends upon the Report of the Select Committee on the Sandys case, and subsequent reactions.

Mr. Walter Elliot has been transferred to a position at the Ministry of Health which, as a doctor and for personal reasons, he should admirably fill. There are plenty of opportunities here for his active and progressive mind.

A word of praise must be given to Mr. Ernest Brown, who, at the Ministry of Labour, has devoted with unceasing enthusiasm his great knowledge and drive to the problems affecting employment. While it is possible to criticise very searchingly the policy that is being pursued in many respects, the goodwill and competence of the Minister are beyond dispute. He is unique; it is not possible to compare him with any standard type of Cabinet Minister, but he possesses qualities which properly include him within their ranks.

Mr. Morrison has been labouring actively in the difficult and controversial field of agricultural policy, and continues to display the competence which is thought by many to mark him out at some future time for the highest honours, but that day is not yet. Mr. Colville will make an excellent Secretary of State for Scotland. He has a winning manner, industry and ability, and should achieve a real success in his tenure of office. Mr. Oliver Stanley has borne a very heavy burden this Session, having had to deal at the same time with important Bills so different and so highly technical as the Films and Coal Measures. This he was able to do successfully in spite of a period of ill-health. It is an onerous task to have to devote the whole morning to intricate details in committee on the

subject of Films and the whole of the afternoon and evening to similar problems about Coal. Mr. Kenneth Lindsay represents the Board of Education in the House of Commons owing to the presence of the President in another place, and this heavy responsibility he has carried with distinction.

Private Members have been active during the Session in making use of the facilities that are available to them for bringing to bear their influence on both legislation and policy. Some useful Private Member's measures, such as the Architects' Registration Act and Miss Ellen Wilkinson's Hire Purchase Act, have found their way to the Statute Book, and many others have been introduced and printed for the purposes of propaganda. Mr. Foot's Bill amending the Official Secrets Act was singularly apposite in view of subsequent events. Useful discussions have taken place on various occasions on the 11 o'clock adjournment, and in particular the adjournment motion "on a definite matter of urgent public importance" in June, raised by the Leader of the Opposition, undoubtedly had powerful influence in limiting, at any rate to some extent, the bombing of British ships engaged in lawful trading to Spain. The spectacle of the Conservative Party tolerating attacks on the British flag has been astonishing. They have not enjoyed it. "It is not very nice," as the Prime Minister said.

Much valuable work is done at question time by private Members who specialise in different subjects and continuously bring to bear their expert knowledge on the policy being pursued by different departments of State. Tribute must be paid in this respect to the little group, all too small, who have kept up an effective barrage on the subject of Foreign Affairs, consisting of Mr. Vyvyan Adams, Miss Rathbone, Mr. Noel Baker, Mr. Arthur Henderson, the Duchess of Atholl and Commander Fletcher.

The women Members play a distinctive and useful part and are a real addition to the proper functioning of representative government. Some of them are distinctly decorative as well. Three are endowed with varying shades of reddish hair—Miss Ellen Wilkinson, Lady Davidson and Dr. Summerskill; attractive Mrs. Tate plays an active part on many questions, and Miss Horsbrugh brings useful Parliamentary ability from north of the Tweed. Miss Ward is a courageous and not too easily satisfied questioner. She stands up well for

her constituents. Miss Lloyd George is a great deal more than her father's daughter; she has a personality and distinction of her own which would have carried her far in any case. Miss Cazalet, in addition to being the best tennis player in the House, is an admirable Parliamentarian and was the first woman to become a Parliamentary Private Secretary. Lady Astor is courageous, and irrepressible on the subjects in which she is interested, if not always discreet!

With regard to the Opposition parties, Mr. Attlee carries out his duties with distinction and clarity of mind, if without inspiration, and the best members of his Front Bench team are Mr. Herbert Morrison, Mr. Alexander and Mr. Dalton. Sir Stafford Cripps, now reseated on the Front Bench, is far and away the best speaker they have and is all too seldom used. Sir Archibald Sinclair continues to be a tower of strength to the Liberal Party; he is a first-rate Parliamentary leader and has been well supported by his small band of active followers. The father of the House looks in now and again, particularly on Foreign Affairs debates, and the lash of Mr. Lloyd George's tongue has lost none of its devastating force. Any attempt at co-operation between those in all parties and no party who desire an active peace policy based on the League has been severely stamped upon by the Labour Executive, who take the view that no other organisation beyond their own is necessary for the achievement of this object. Even to many of their own members this seems a lamentable attitude—times are far too serious to put the interests of a Party before the achievement which that Party desires.

During the latter part of the Session, a great deal of the time has been taken up with discussion of the Sandys case, and it is unnecessary to refer to it in detail, the more so as the final judgment of the House of Commons has been postponed until the autumn when the Report of the Select Committee will be presented. Mr. Sandys has incurred unpopularity in his own Party, but in view of the threat that was used to him, it is difficult to see what other attitude he could have taken up. A less courageous man would have crumpled. He has rendered a great service to the House and the State by standing firm against an attempt by the Executive to overawe Members and make improper use of the machinery of the Official Secrets Act. Such an incident is never likely

to occur again, and it is remarkable how Mr. Hore-Belisha came to make such a first-class error of judgment in the handling of the affair.

One aspect of the work of the Committee of Privileges is worthy of note. It seems odd that the question at issue should have been referred to a body of which some of those who might well be thought to be responsible for the breach were members, and it is worth consideration for the future whether, in a similar case, a special Committee should not be set up to deal with a breach of privilege in which Ministers are concerned. In the present instance the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General for public, and Mr. Churchill for personal, reasons might well have been omitted, but the important point is that the Committee unanimously rose superior to these considerations and found judicially that a breach of privilege had been committed. They did not say by whom, but it seems pretty obvious that the Prime Minister and Attorney-General had, at any rate, some responsibility for it as members of the Government.

What are likely to be the developments? There are various possibilities. It is conceivable, though most unlikely, that Mr. Chamberlain will carry through his policy of direct negotiations with the Dictator Powers to a successful conclusion. If he does, it will mean either that they abandon the whole basis of their foreign policy, which is to use power as an instrument of national policy, or that we submit to their dictation over a wide area of the world and abandon our policy of general appeasement and the determination to stand firm for definite principles and obligations. It is far more likely, and events are tending in this direction, that Mr. Chamberlain's policy will fail and that he will be obliged to move some way at any rate towards the policy advocated by Mr. Eden. So long, however, as Mr. Chamberlain dominates the Cabinet and the Parliamentary scene as he does at the present time, with all his antiquated ideas and dangerous obsessions, national unity is an impossibility. Nothing is more important in the difficult days that lie ahead than that all parties should act together in support of a foreign and defence policy which will appeal both to their idealism and to their practical commonsense. The Prime Minister's whole attitude is hostile to such an accommodation, nor does he genuinely seem to desire it, and as a result our defence arrangements

are being severely hampered and many steps that could be taken if there were common agreement are impossible.

If a situation of real menace developed, as was threatened on several occasions this year after the invasion of Austria and the threatened invasion of Czechoslovakia on May 21st, the demand for unity might become too strong, and reconstruction be essential. In the week after the Austrian *coup* it was difficult to find anyone who thought the present National Government could continue. Certainly war would produce a change of administration. In that case my own feeling is that perhaps the best way out would be a Government headed by Lord Baldwin with Mr. Eden as Foreign Secretary, containing Mr. Churchill and some members of the present Cabinet, and representatives of the Liberal and Labour parties. Mr. Chamberlain could only be in such a Government in a position such as Lord President of the Council where he had no important or dominating control of policy.

If by luck war can be staved off, an election in the autumn of 1939 seems likely to return in some form with a decreased majority the present National Government, in spite of its gross blunders of action and outlook and the steadily mounting unemployment. But in view of the present mentality of some Opposition leaders, what stable, dependable, impressive alternative is there? What a democratic tragedy!

GEOFFREY MANDER.

THE ENTENTE—AND AFTER.

IT would be difficult to exaggerate the cordiality of the reception given by the French people to their Royal visitors. The official arrangements were perhaps excessive; they seemed designed to exclude the populace from participation in the ceremonies; but the warmth of the popular welcome overcame all obstacles, and it is impossible to doubt the genuineness of the enthusiasm manifested for the British Sovereigns and for Great Britain. The deportment of Their Majesties—the dignity of the King, the grace of the Queen—counted for much in the public demonstrations. Theirs was a personal triumph. Nevertheless the diplomatic significance of the occasion is considerable. It may be that no new engagements are taken—that Great Britain merely reaffirms fidelity to the position she adopted when Germany, tearing up the Locarno Pact, reoccupied the Rhineland, in defiance of the Versailles Treaty, in March 1936. It was, however, intended in 1936 to give only temporary reassurances to France; it was hoped, after negotiations, to frame a new pact to which Germany and Italy should again be parties. But the provisional, as the French say, may have a long life. The militarisation of the Rhineland, which was the direct consequence of the Anglo-Italian feud and the ill-fated "sanctions" experiment, entirely changed the European situation. It is, in my view, by far the most important event since the war. Out of it flow, logically, the absorption of Austria in a Greater Germany, and the present menace to Czechoslovakia. In trying, and failing, to stop Italy in Africa, we overlooked the capital fact that we were giving a free run to Germany in Europe. Wise statesmanship would have foreseen the remilitarisation of the Rhineland; at any rate, it would immediately afterwards have cut its losses, and have come to an accord with Germany and Italy. Instead, the breach was allowed to widen. Europe gradually but steadily ranged itself into two hostile camps. Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini exchanged visits, and month by month, in an atmosphere of sulky obstinacy, consolidated the Berlin-Rome axis. It became increasingly "inevitable" that France and England should create a rival London-Paris axis. As soon as the ruinous Front Populaire administration in France was broken, MM. Daladier and Bonnet were invited to England. The subsequent

are being severely hampered and many steps that could be taken if there were common agreement are impossible.

If a situation of real menace developed, as was threatened on several occasions this year after the invasion of Austria and the threatened invasion of Czechoslovakia on May 21st, the demand for unity might become too strong, and reconstruction be essential. In the week after the Austrian *coup* it was difficult to find anyone who thought the present National Government could continue. Certainly war would produce a change of administration. In that case my own feeling is that perhaps the best way out would be a Government headed by Lord Baldwin with Mr. Eden as Foreign Secretary, containing Mr. Churchill and some members of the present Cabinet, and representatives of the Liberal and Labour parties. Mr. Chamberlain could only be in such a Government in a position such as Lord President of the Council where he had no important or dominating control of policy.

If by luck war can be staved off, an election in the autumn of 1939 seems likely to return in some form with a decreased majority the present National Government, in spite of its gross blunders of action and outlook and the steadily mounting unemployment. But in view of the present mentality of some Opposition leaders, what stable, dependable, impressive alternative is there? What a democratic tragedy!

GEOFFREY MANDER.

THE ENTENTE—AND AFTER.

IT would be difficult to exaggerate the cordiality of the reception given by the French people to their Royal visitors. The official arrangements were perhaps excessive; they seemed designed to exclude the populace from participation in the ceremonies; but the warmth of the popular welcome overcame all obstacles, and it is impossible to doubt the genuineness of the enthusiasm manifested for the British Sovereigns and for Great Britain. The deportment of Their Majesties—the dignity of the King, the grace of the Queen—counted for much in the public demonstrations. Theirs was a personal triumph. Nevertheless the diplomatic significance of the occasion is considerable. It may be that no new engagements are taken—that Great Britain merely reaffirms fidelity to the position she adopted when Germany, tearing up the Locarno Pact, reoccupied the Rhineland, in defiance of the Versailles Treaty, in March 1936. It was, however, intended in 1936 to give only temporary reassurances to France; it was hoped, after negotiations, to frame a new pact to which Germany and Italy should again be parties. But the provisional, as the French say, may have a long life. The militarisation of the Rhineland, which was the direct consequence of the Anglo-Italian feud and the ill-fated "sanctions" experiment, entirely changed the European situation. It is, in my view, by far the most important event since the war. Out of it flow, logically, the absorption of Austria in a Greater Germany, and the present menace to Czechoslovakia. In trying, and failing, to stop Italy in Africa, we overlooked the capital fact that we were giving a free run to Germany in Europe. Wise statesmanship would have foreseen the remilitarisation of the Rhineland; at any rate, it would immediately afterwards have cut its losses, and have come to an accord with Germany and Italy. Instead, the breach was allowed to widen. Europe gradually but steadily ranged itself into two hostile camps. Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini exchanged visits, and month by month, in an atmosphere of sulky obstinacy, consolidated the Berlin-Rome axis. It became increasingly "inevitable" that France and England should create a rival London-Paris axis. As soon as the ruinous Front Populaire administration in France was broken, MM. Daladier and Bonnet were invited to England. The subsequent

sojourn of Their Majesties in France, and the promise of President Lebrun to come to England, have signed and sealed a new *Entente Cordiale.*

In the circumstances, we may well rejoice in the renewed friendship of the two countries. It is doubtless true that their solidarity has been a decisive factor in the maintenance of peace in the past few months. Had they still been at loggerheads, as they have been so frequently and so unhappily since 1919, it is highly probable that irreparable steps would ere this have been taken. No trained political observer living on the Continent entertains illusions. It would not have been surprising had war already begun; it is, rather, surprising that war has hitherto been averted. Knowing the dangers, as they are recorded in the reports of the chancelleries, I am often shocked and amazed at the reckless challenge of many diplomatic writers, the shrill irresponsibility of many Parliamentary speakers. In an image used, if my memory serves me, by Mr. Neville Chamberlain, an avalanche is perilously poised, and an unlucky shout may start it on its catastrophic career. In France and in England there are now moderate Governments which, for the first time since 1935, appear to be in harmony and to have a reasonable programme. Whether Germany and Italy are equally reasonable, I will not venture to say; the evidence is conflicting and confusing. One must hope for the best; and France and England must pursue, in the teeth of any opposition, internal as well as external, their peace plan. There is, indeed, internal opposition. Of England it is not my business to speak; but of France it may be said that M. Bonnet has not always been well seconded either by his entourage or by his colleagues. There are groups which will not be placated, which envenom the disputes, precisely as though they wanted war. Passions were aroused which have become the vested interests of politicians. The unity of France and England should have a steadying effect in both countries. Together they are not only stronger in a military sense—which is a dangerous sense—they are also politically stronger against the forces of belligerency in their midst, and they may find the courage to work openly for appeasement.

Unless the new *Entente* operates as an instrument of peace, and not as a weapon of war, the applause of the crowds will have been meaningless and even pathetic. For I think it is clear to whoever is acquainted with the temper of the French,

that they are not, despite certain loud shouters, willing to fight Germany or Italy. They desire to come to terms with their great neighbours. The politicians, imprisoned by demagogic formulas of the Front Populaire, still lag behind public sentiment. Take the case of Italy. Quite gratuitously, the French Ambassador to Rome was withdrawn nearly two years ago by the Blum Government, and after waiting patiently for a whole year Signor Mussolini withdrew his Ambassador from Paris. The British, at the height of their quarrel with Italy, took care not to make such a mistake. Now when M. Daladier and M. Bonnet succeeded M. Blum, it was anticipated that their first act would be the appointment of an Ambassador to Rome. Every newspaper said so; names were mentioned; there was a general sigh of relief. Unfortunately, negotiations which sought to effect a settlement on every outstanding Franco-Italian problem—and they are many—were begun. Now it is obvious that ordinary diplomatic representation in fairly normal circumstances cannot be made contingent on a preliminary settlement of particular problems. On the contrary, diplomatic representation is necessary for the discussion of these problems. Why these debates were introduced, and by whom, remains undisclosed. But M. Bonnet thus failed to strike the iron when it was hot, with the result that normal diplomatic relationship between France and Italy seemed farther off than ever. The question of the reopened Pyrenees frontier further exacerbated Franco-Italian relations. The French deeply deplore this fiasco. There have been loud and repeated protests; political circles were astonished and the public bitterly disappointed. The deterioration of Europe would not have proceeded so far and so fast had there been a French as well as a British Ambassador in Rome. The policy of absence is always wrong. Sooner or later an Ambassador must be appointed—and it will not be an all-round agreement which will render possible the appointment; it will be the appointment which will render an all-round agreement possible.

The instinct of the people favours a new *Entente*, partly because it is hoped that British influence will help to restore Franco-Italian friendship unnecessarily lost under supposed British leadership. To be sure the Anglo-Italian accord must await the settlement of the Spanish problem before it is put officially into force; but as, in fact, most of it is already

operative, and the rest is a mere formality, this nominal delay deceives nobody in France. If England and Italy are in substantial agreement, as we may assume them to be, then the present difficulties between Italy and France will assuredly be smoothed out eventually. It should be remembered that, in the past few years, the whole Quai d'Orsay system of diplomacy has been utterly dislocated. France has lost Belgium, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and can scarcely regard Czechoslovakia as an effective ally in the future. Between the unfortunate gap of the Chautemps and the Blum Ministries this year, Austria was swallowed up in Germany, and thus Germany at long last won the war. There has been a general contracting out of the League of Nations so far as "collective security" is concerned, and an emphatic and wholesale reversion to neutrality. Germany is marching from success to success in Central Europe, and unquestionably, whatever was the declared official "non-intervention" attitude of France in Spain, the notorious sympathies of the Front Populaire, expressed in action, for the Barcelona Government, made the task of Germany and Italy in obtaining a grip, political, economic and military, on Nationalist Spain extremely easy—with the result that France must reckon in future with an antagonistic Spain and with menaced Mediterranean communications. In short, these have been lamentable years for French diplomacy; and it is to be trusted that the purpose of the *Entente* will be, so far as is possible, to redress the balance. It is well known that M. Daladier has always been favourable to a Franco-German understanding, and that he does not share the "ideological" prejudices of other French politicians whose calculations have been proved singularly unsound. The opportunity, therefore, of Anglo-French efforts to restore European stability, at the legitimate cost of an immediate revision of the remaining blunders of the treaties, is too good, let us hope, to be lost.

To regard the *Entente* as exclusive would be incredibly foolish, and proper emphasis was laid on the desire of both France and England to extend it to include countries whose "ideology" is different from ours, in the discourses of the King and of the President. Even the man in the street is acutely aware that like causes in diplomacy produce like effects; and anything which tends to deepen the European division takes us back with a run to 1914. It is certainly

necessary that France should keep as closely as possible by the side of England. The alternative would be—if we set aside Russia, which is at best a doubtful, and at worst a disruptive quantity—isolation in a Europe now in rapid process of change. But France cannot, as a great nation, abandon her own conceptions and permit herself to receive orders from England; and already there are complaints in various quarters of the price that France may be called upon to pay for the *Entente*. If I understand a recent article of M. Léon Blum, the Socialist leader while professing his allegiance to the *Entente* is opposed to political bargaining. It will be remembered that M. Blum, when back in power, reopened, in March, the Pyrenees frontier; and that M. Daladier and M. Bonnet afterwards closed the frontier in accordance with international agreements. On the principle that the best defence is attack, it is natural enough that M. Blum, instead of accepting blame, should consider the action of his successor, in strictly enforcing French neutrality, as a surrender to Signor Mussolini, who broke off negotiations with France because of the French facilities to the Spanish Government. In the light of these facts, M. Blum suggests that a "deal" has been effected by which Paris leads London in the defence of Czechoslovakia, on condition that Paris follows London in its Spanish policy. He hints at "a sort of compensation." There is, he says, no formal contract nor even an implicit engagement, but a logical and psychological *liaison* is created by the events themselves. "Among the explanations of the French closing of the Pyrenees frontier," he continues, "one of the most plausible was as follows: If satisfaction had not been given to the urgent representations of the British Cabinet regarding the Pyrenees frontier, the British Government would not have decided to range itself with us in the Czechoslovakian crisis of May." Thereupon he argues that Spain must not be sacrificed to save Czechoslovakia; nor must Czechoslovakia be sacrificed to save Spain. The mission of Lord Runciman in Czechoslovakia does not, incidentally, seem to bear out M. Blum's insinuation that London is only following a Paris lead—the contrary would seem to be the case; but the immediate point I would make is that it will not always be easy to translate the sentiment that inspires the *Entente* in terms of practical politics without arousing the suspicions and provoking the

criticisms of partisans both in France and England. For we are far from uniformity in thinking.

At the other end of the scale, a Nationalist writer, Henri de Kérillis, is equally troubled by the difficulty of constructing a common policy. He remarks that Germany is endeavouring to create divergences of interests between Paris and London. Proposals of a Four-Power conference to consider the Czechoslovak problem, with the prospect of a non-aggression pact, and an agreement to limit the construction of aeroplanes, are engagingly described as " traps " into which the innocent British Government may fall. If France, Germany, Italy, and England are even loosely linked, Russia will be cut off from Western Europe. " Now in the event of war," he argues, " Russia alone can send tanks and aeroplanes to Prague, and serve as the base of an Eastern anti-German formation." Therefore he will not hear of the neutralisation of Czechoslovakia, or the abandonment of the alliance with Russia, and he does not believe it possible to control the manufacture of aeroplanes. His fear is lest the British should be tempted by German offers—these or others—that would, if accepted, be detrimental to France.

On the other hand, M. P. E. Flandin, the former Prime Minister, has been bitterly attacked by the Left for his view that the principal task of Anglo-French diplomacy should be a reconciliation with Germany and with Italy. His policy is interpreted as a virtual invitation to Germany to go ahead in Central Europe, provided she leaves Western Europe in peace. The Four-Power Pact, in whatever form it is revived, is taken to mean the complete surrender of Czechoslovakia. Needless to say M. Flandin has not advocated such a cynical doctrine as the condonation of violence at a given geographical line; but it is becoming increasingly hard even to begin negotiations, much less to reach arrangements, in present-day Europe, full of suspicions, hatreds, fears, ideological antagonisms; for there are always those who launch the reproach that any solution contemplated is partial and is a mere trick. Wladimir d'Ormesson has adopted, it seems to me, a more reasonable attitude. The dilemma of a Western accord and an Eastern renunciation is, he states, largely fictitious. Leave Germany a free hand in the East? Why not? A free hand to export goods, engineers, workers—to extend her influence as she pleases and as she can. We have no right to

forbid the extension of German influence, or for that matter of Italian influence. France has no monopoly and aims at no hegemony.

> The only thing which France must oppose is recourse to violence in the settlement of the questions which present themselves—and which will continue to present themselves—in Europe. No sensible Frenchman dreams of denying to the Reich the right of developing its commercial, political and cultural interests. But no sensible Frenchman can admit that such expansion may be carried out by conquest, by fire and by sword. No Frenchman can accord *carte blanche* to make war. And as on this point France and England are in agreement, it is difficult to see the object of these controversies.

It is by no means to be assumed that France, any more than England, would be prepared, in all circumstances, to take up arms on behalf of Czechoslovakia. M. Daladier has expressed himself plainly and firmly on at least two occasions, though he has gone out of his way to thank Germany for her co-operation in the preservation of peace. Czechoslovakia would, however, be wrong to suppose that it may therefore concede anything short of the maximum to the Sudeten Germans and yet reckon on French military aid. It must not jingle the keys of European war. For France to lend any effective assistance to Czechoslovakia she would have to attack Germany with some prospect of speedy success. But hundreds of miles of well-protected territory lie between France and Czechoslovakia, whose neighbours are Poland, Rumania and Hungary, none of whom can be expected to be particularly friendly. Russia is nearer than France, but troops and aeroplanes, assuming them to be available, would not be allowed to traverse Polish or Rumanian territory. The less we hear of these threats of force, either in defence of Czechoslovakia or against Czechoslovakia, the better will be the chances of an honest reparation of the admittedly botched work of 1919. A sensational page of *Gringoire*, a weekly journal of the Right with a large circulation, showed that French opinion would be deeply divided on the rights and wrongs, and, above all, on the intrinsic importance, of the Czechoslovak problem. After all, there are more than three million Germans—to say nothing of millions of men and women of other nationalities—artificially placed under the

rule of Prague; and if it is not worth a European war to obtain autonomy for them, neither is it worth a European war to maintain them under the rule of Prague. The powers which fashioned the Czechoslovak state of odds and ends in 1919 are entitled to insist to-day on a fair solution. That is, as I take it, the prevalent French view; it is the Government view. The Czechoslovak question is not, in the last resort, an internal question; it is international. Czechoslovakia cannot at the same time expect to be defended and decline the counsels of its prospective defenders. Yet as France is peculiarly related to Czechoslovakia by treaty, it was considered desirable for France to stand aside and give, as it were, a mandate to Great Britain to intercede in the name of the Great Powers.

That is why the mission of Lord Runciman is of such overwhelming importance to the peace of Europe. The announcement that he would use his good offices in the search for an acceptable arrangement was heard with genuine approval in France—except in those circles of the Front Populaire which are impenitent, and which apparently would prefer European conflict in a bad cause, rather than European appeasement through justice. It is, of course, highly unfortunate that the League of Nations, in the years when it flourished, failed to consider the promised revision of the treaties under Article 19; for that revision was inevitable sooner or later, and it would have strengthened the League immeasurably if it had at least tried to fulfil one of its principal functions. It turned away from its task; and I have myself often heard in Geneva anti-revisionist utterances—some of them from Czechoslovakian spokesmen. Revision has accordingly been taken out of the hands of the League; the League has lost the credit, but revision is none the less necessary. There are naturally regrets in France at the want of foresight shown by French and Central European statesmen ever since the war, but on the whole I think France is reconciled in advance to any judgment which honourably preserves peace. Whatever happens, the system of European alliances on which France counted has been shattered by so-called "collective security," which in its turn was shattered on the rock of realities. The Liberal antecedents of Lord Runciman, his ability, his independence, his fairness of mind, commend him to the French, who would like to think they can now

safely leave to negotiation a problem which was regarded with acute apprehension.

There is, of course, no unanimity in France any more than there is in England. There is the widest diversity of opinion. The more one goes to the Left the less one finds a desire to come to terms. The curious paradox of our time is that the Left, which preached conciliation vainly for years, is now ideologically intransigent; and the Right, which was nationalistically stiff-necked, is now much more ready for a pacific compromise. The Communists, for example, who exercised a vital influence in the Front Populaire, are very unfriendly to the British Government, despite the *Entente*; they now attack M. Bonnet and Mr. Chamberlain for "intervening" in Czechoslovakia, and for not intervening in Spain. M. Jean Montigny, a Radical Deputy, has called the attention of M. Daladier to the accusations of M. Gabriel Péri, the Communist spokesman in foreign affairs, condemning the present policy of Anglo-French co-operation as "serving Fascism." The French Government is urged by the Communists, still nominally in the Government majority, to take such action as would possibly precipitate war. Bellicosity takes many and unexpected forms. Men who would like to be regarded as pacifists apparently, remarks *Le Temps*, reason as follows:

> Our neighbours mean to attack us one day or another. Therefore, why should we hesitate to do everything in our power to defend our ideologies before they are finally jeopardised by the offensive of the totalitarian states? Since we cannot avoid war, let us prove that we do not fear it.

But this logic, points out the journal, rests on the hypothesis that war is really inevitable—that nothing we can do will satisfy the potential enemy—and that the sooner we force a "show-down" (a euphemism for what may be universal war) the better. That is not the reasoning of M. Daladier. He proclaims the falsity of the horrible doctrine that war is "inevitable." He turns his back on anything that resembles or may lead to "preventive war." He would explore every avenue of escape from catastrophe. That is surely a return to the old Liberalism, which has been under a cloud in recent years; and it does not seem to matter that the policy is practised by a Conservative Government in England and a

Radical Government in France, provided they are now determined to follow, without deviation, the middle of the road. It is only in the middle of the road that there can possibly be an Anglo-French *Entente*. The two countries cannot long march together if either of them has doctrinal or selfish designs. They must stand on a basis of moderation and mediation. A militant *Entente*—whether militant for ideas or interests—would not last. It would be dissolved in bickerings and recriminations. The common denominator must be a profound and equal resolve to achieve peace. There would be no reason to welcome the *Entente* for its own sake; still less reason if it were regarded as a sheer necessity, to which Great Britain is, after years of refusal, finally driven because there is no other *point d'appui* on a hostile continent but France. Were the new *Entente* a confession of despair, an indication that the negotiations for a more general pact to replace the Locarno Treaty have hopelessly broken down, then, despite the regal trappings and the popular enthusiasm, we should be registering the gravest of diplomatic defeats. No, the new *Entente* must be the starting-point of a diplomatic victory which will consist neither in refusing to the discontented nations of Europe their just demands, nor in weakly conceding under menaces their unjust claims, but in discovering how it is possible to establish fairer conditions of international existence in the European framework. The Anglo-French Entente is capable of many interpretations; but, if it is to exist at all, and is not another stage in the drift to disaster, it must be inspired by the common desire for general European co-operation; it must be enlarged by the methods of reason, goodwill, and justice.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

FAMILY ALLOWANCES.

IT is not surprising that the growing determination to raise the health standard of the people of Great Britain has brought the question of family allowances to the fore. Broadly speaking, the reason why the health of the working classes is much poorer than it should be is that many of them are unable to afford the requisites of a healthy life. Too often they are inadequately fed, and forced to live in unwholesome, sunless and overcrowded dwellings. We shall never have a really healthy population until we solve the poverty problem—a problem which has baffled humanity throughout the ages. But do not let us despair! We are making great advance in overcoming poverty. We talk of the "good old times," but they were only good for a small minority of the population; the others lived under conditions incalculably worse than any but the very poorest live under to-day, and the proportion of the "very poorest" is rapidly declining. In an industrial country the sole income of the vast majority of the people is derived from wages and salaries; comparatively few enjoy unearned incomes. Real wages, i.e. wages considered in terms of their purchasing power, have increased greatly in the last twenty-five years. Since 1914 money wages have doubled, whereas the cost of living has only risen by one half. But though conditions are much better than they were, they fall far short of what they should be, and we must not slacken in our effort to banish poverty from our midst. It is not a Utopian dream that we could, within a very few years, make it possible for almost every wage earner to provide his family with the requisites of physical health. I say "almost," for my statement does not apply to those obliged to pay abnormally high sums for rent, or for transport between home and work.

This may appear to be an extravagant statement. Let us, therefore, consider what the accomplishment of this task would involve. The first question we must answer is, what sum is necessary to maintain a family of given size in a state of physical efficiency. I have recently made a careful investigation into this question. I started by ascertaining what amount of nutriment, in terms of protein, fat, carbohydrate, vitamins and mineral salts physiologists to-day regard as necessary for physical efficiency. The next step I took was to translate

this amount of nutriment into a dietary for a man, wife and three children. Obviously, the choice before me in selecting a dietary was infinite. I adopted one which was as economical as possible, having due regard to national custom. No one can accuse me of having adopted an extravagant dietary, though I have been criticised for having been too parsimonious. I then ascertained the retail price of the foodstuffs in my dietary by inquiry at a number of shops frequented by workers in three different towns. With regard to other expenditure, I arrived at an estimate of what is necessary by asking a large number of people who were forced to buy as economically as possible what they actually had to pay, and what they got for their money. There remains the question of rent, which is the most difficult to assess, because rents of working-class houses vary so widely not only from town to town but within each town. After corresponding with a large number of people who had expert knowledge, either through their connection with housing associations, or through their knowledge of rents charged for municipal houses, I adopted finally a figure of 9s. 6d. a week to cover rent and rates as being as near to a norm as I could get. I have since made a detailed study of economic conditions in York, a city with a population of 93,000, and found that one-third of the workers were paying more than 9s. 6d. for rent and rates, and two-thirds 9s. 6d. or less. It may safely be assumed that only a small proportion of the lowest-paid workers, who are those we are here considering, are paying more than 9s. 6d. I am well aware that adequate accommodation at this figure frequently cannot be obtained in big cities, although it can often be obtained in small towns at a somewhat lower figure. However, adopting this figure (with a mental reservation that it should be higher in highly rented towns) I arrive at a total of 56s. a week as the lowest defensible minimum wage for a man, wife and three dependent children.* This sum allows only 4s. 5d. a week for purposes which are not absolutely essential to physical efficiency. When it is remembered that out of this meagre margin all expenditure must be met for such items as recreation of all kinds, for newspapers, beer, tobacco, for holidays, for all transport except that of the wage earner to and from his work, I think it will be agreed that my

* The figure in 1936 published in my book *The Human Needs of Labour* was 53s., but the cost of living has risen since then.

figure is not excessive. I have made a separate estimate for country workers, and arrive at 44s. in place of 56s. My estimate for the country has been criticised as being too low in comparison with that I made for towns. It is possible that this criticism may be justified. But, at any rate, my figures provide a measuring rod to enable us to assess the cost of providing the requisites of physical efficiency.

It may be asked why I assume a family with three dependent children. My answer is that the purpose for which I made my inquiry was to afford guidance in the fixation of minimum wages. I think it will be agreed that all adult male workers should receive a wage high enough to enable them to maintain in physical health a family of five. For the survival of every race every couple in it must have on an average two descendants who grow up to replace them. To allow for people who have none or less than two, and to allow for children dying before they grow up, a large proportion of parents must have not two but three or four children. If in seeking to justify a minimum wage one assumed a family of less than three dependent children, one would thus be seeking to justify families smaller than are necessary for the continuation of the race. Can industry afford to pay such minimum wages to adult males? I think there is little doubt that, *given a reasonable time* to bring up to those levels any wages which are to-day below them, almost all industries would be able to pay them. There are to-day 45 trade boards regulating men's wages, and these have been set up in industries where labour was not well organised, and where, at any rate in the past, wages were exceptionally low. Out of these trade boards, ten have established minimum wages of 56s. a week or higher, thirteen between 52s. and 56s., eleven between 48s. and 52s. and eleven below 48s., the lowest being 39s. 1d. The last group consists of a number of small and miscellaneous trades, such as Aerated Waters (Orkney and Shetland Islands), Cotton Waste Reclamation, General Waste Materials Reclamation, Sack and Bag, Jute, Flax and Hemp.

I have sat on a trade board for twenty-five years, and have seen real wages steadily rising to a degree which I am sure many of the employers would have regarded as utterly impossible twenty-five years ago. My experience has taught me that if a trade board were established in every industry where wages are low, and given a time limit of, say five years,

within which to bring them up to a level which would enable a family of five to live in physical efficiency, those regulating the wages of the vast majority of the workers would succeed in doing this without seriously dislocating the industries concerned. Of course there would be a lot of grumbling, but in the end the job would get done. There would doubtless be certain industries which are worth preserving which would find that, with the best will in the world, they could not pay the minimum wages. I think that this is more likely to occur in the country than in the towns. In these cases assistance in one form or another should be given. There is nothing new in such a policy; a great number of industries are now being assisted in many different ways. It may be urged that to give artificial help to industries is unsatisfactory; I would answer that it is much more unsatisfactory to know that millions of our fellow-citizens are inevitably under-nourished.

So far I have been dealing with the wages necessary for a family with three dependent children, and those who have not examined the matter closely may come to the hasty conclusion that since the average size of family is considerably less than five, if wages adequate for five persons are paid, all will be well. But any who come to that conclusion would be making a grave mistake. Investigations which I have recently made point to the fact that approximately forty-two per cent. of the children of Britain belong, for a period of a year or more, to families where there are more than three dependent children. A third of them belong to such families for five years or more. A quarter of them belong, for a year or more, to families with five or more dependent children, and ten per cent. to families with six dependent children or more. These are very serious figures, for they show that to raise the wages to a level which would just provide the means of physical efficiency for a family with three dependent children would leave a large part of the poverty problem unsolved. What are we going to do about it?

In the calculation of the cost of living which I have made, the additional cost per child is about 5s. Even if the minimum wage were increased from 56s. to 61s., there would in the families living on the minimum wage still be twenty-four per cent. of the children underfed, and with a 66s. minimum there would still be ten per cent. in that condition. It is useless to deny that it will be a long time before we can hope to get the

real wages of all unskilled workers up to a figure high enough to maintain a family of five children in full physical efficiency, and yet if we do not provide such families with adequate incomes, we are merely playing with the problem. As just stated, even if we could accomplish that end, there would still be ten per cent. of the children in families living on that income under-nourished.

I see only one way in which the problem can be solved, and that is by a scheme of family allowances whereby grants are made for every dependent child over three in a family. I fix the figure at three because I am confident that it would be possible, within a reasonably short period, and possibly with a little help from the State in the case of a small minority of industries, to raise minimum wages to a figure adequate to maintain that number of children in a state of physical efficiency, and that an unduly long period must elapse before it would be possible, without a serious dislocation of industry (from which the workers would chiefly suffer), to raise statutory minimum wages to a point which would provide for a larger number of dependent children. What would it cost to provide family allowances on this basis? There are no official statistics which enable us to answer that question, but estimates have been made by social investigators which indicate that the cost of providing an allowance of 5s. per dependent child over three in a family would be something under ten millions a year even if they were paid in the case of all families, irrespective of their incomes, which would not be the case. I have myself made detailed inquiry into this subject, and place the probable cost at somewhere between seven and ten millions annually. Even to-day, when every penny added to the national expenditure must be carefully scrutinised before it is agreed to, so small a sum to attain so important an end can surely be justified. It is equivalent to about 3½d. a week per adult male worker between the ages of 21 and 65, or, of course, much less than this if the cost were distributed over employees of both sexes and all ages. This cannot be regarded as a crushing burden. If we were considering the question of paying allowances for all children, it would be a very different matter, and we should be driven to the conclusion that the adoption of such a scheme would have to be postponed for an indefinite period, in view of the present level of taxation and of the charges

already borne by industry for social purposes. In 1931 it was estimated that to pay 5s. a week for all children would cost £120,000,000 a year. The figure may be somewhat less to-day, but still remains at a prohibitive level.

If we are to get anything effective done quickly it must, I feel sure, be on the lines of fixing statutory minimum wages based on the cost of maintaining a family of man, wife and three dependent children in a state of physical efficiency, and allowances for all dependent children in excess of three per family. These two proposals cannot be separated. Obviously industry, possibly with some help from the State in a few cases, will have to provide any additions to wages which may be necessary to bring them up to the statutory limits. In many cases this will not be an easy thing to do, and I suggest that it would be unreasonable to superimpose on employers any charge in connection with the granting of family allowances. My own proposal would be that this cost should fall upon the Exchequer, but this is a matter which might well be decided later.

I suggest that there is an overwhelming case for setting up a statutory committee to inquire into the whole problem of the means that should be adopted to make it possible for all wage earners to maintain their families in a state of physical efficiency. The inquiry would thus include the question of fixing statutory minimum wages, as well as the whole question of family allowances. If there should be agreement on the desirability of adopting some system of family allowances, an enormous number of questions upon which widely different views are held would, of course, still await decision. I may mention just a few of these, though without making any attempt to cover the whole ground. The first will be whether family allowances should be paid on account of all dependent children, or only on account of those in excess of a given number in each family. If the latter, in excess of what number and what allowances should be paid? I have already stated that in my opinion the answers to these two questions are clear. Even those who advocate an allowance for every child will agree that the colossal expenditure involved could not be contemplated at present in view of the heavy expenditure being incurred for armaments, which unfortunately is likely to continue for some time. Therefore, even if they hold strongly that allowances should be paid for each child, they

might be willing to accept half a loaf as being much better than no bread, especially as it would not stand in the way of, but would rather facilitate, the adoption of their policy, if at a later date such a course seemed desirable and the country could afford it. The question of the amount of allowance to be paid per child could be fairly easily answered, for there is a good deal of information available to guide us in this matter. Then comes the question of who should find the money. There are four possibilities: the State alone, employers alone, the workers alone, or some combination of these three. In passing I may say that the third alternative is a theoretical one; I think no one would regard it as practical. Then there is the question of the income limit up to which families should be eligible for allowance. This is a difficult question, and cannot be answered without considering the relative importance of the various reasons which make the scheme of family allowances desirable. If the sole object of these is to make it possible for the children of every worker to be provided with the bare needs of physical efficiency, then the question can be answered comparatively easily. But there are many other reasons which can be brought forward in favour of a scheme of family allowances, perhaps the most important of these being the fact that the growing determination of the people to enjoy a higher standard of comfort than in the past is undoubtedly an important factor in the reduction of the birth-rate, the seriousness of which is only just beginning to be appreciated. Except in the case of the rich, the standard of living is inevitably lowered as the size of family increases, and to avoid this lowering of standard, families are restricted. There would thus appear to be a case for setting the income limit of those eligible for allowances pretty high, though in the case of those who are better off a contributory scheme might be advisable, even if this policy were not imposed on those with lower income. Then there is a whole series of questions which would have to be decided as to the way in which allowances should be made, for instance whether they should always be paid in cash, or whether in certain circumstances they should be paid in kind. The advantage of the latter course would be that it would be easier to ensure that the children actually benefit. I think, however, this argument may be over-emphasised. It is not the duty of the State to spoon-feed the people, but it is the State's duty to facilitate

the creation of conditions whereby it is possible for all wage earners to provide the needs of physical efficiency for their children. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of any scheme which would at the same time be practicable and comprehensive other than one which involved payment to the family being made in cash. It would probably be a mistake to do away with the present schemes for school meals and providing milk at half price or free, but the bearing upon them of a scheme of family allowances would have to be considered. I only mention a few of the questions which would have to be settled before a statutory scheme of family allowances could be introduced; but although there are a good many to be settled, the problem on the whole is not a complex one, and it should be possible for a committee to report within a few months of its appointment. I know of no step in social reform which would accomplish more in relation to its cost than the adoption of a scheme of family allowances. But to be really effective in attacking the problem of poverty, it must be associated with the fixing of adequate minimum wages by Statute.

B. Seebohm Rowntree.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FACES THE STORM.

It is not unusual for an American President to be judged mainly upon the basis of the last two years of his term of office. In January next, when Mr. Franklin Roosevelt enters upon this decisive stage, his position will have been affected by the results of the autumn congressional elections, by which may be gauged the likelihood, or otherwise, of further progress in New Deal legislation. The Democrats are certain to suffer losses on November 8th. Experienced political observers calculate that the Republicans may win as many as eighty seats in the House of Representatives. This is quite possible, although it will be something less than probable if the signs of economic recovery, much advertised in the world's press at the time of writing, should prove—surprisingly—to be genuine. The loss of eighty seats, or even sixty, would of course be serious as evidence of a swing in public opinion, but it would leave the Democrats with an adequate majority in the House, while in the Senate they cannot by this year's election be deprived of their dominant position. The first point to note, however, is this. The balance of parties in Congress is no longer to be estimated by reference to the old party alignments. For there is to-day one issue in American national politics, and one alone—the President himself.

During the two years since the last presidential election—a stage of lamentable confusion throughout the United States—there has not been in any quarter an effort to bring the discussion of public matters back to principles, or even to policies—unless we are to make a partial exception in the case of the new LaFollette party. The conflict turns always upon the personality and actions of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and latterly it has been intensified by speculation upon one specific point. If in the near future the country does not hear from the White House a positive word to put an end to the uncertainty, all other questions may well be subordinated to that of a third presidential term.

The Democrats are without an alternative leader, and there is no other member of the party with a full national standing who can be identified with the aims of the New Deal. Will the party then wish or try to renominate Mr. Roosevelt in 1940? And if so, would he consent to run? A large number of his

supporters give their answers now in the affirmative. After November, whatever the results of the polling, the total will doubtless be greatly increased. And in the meantime opinions are being dogmatically expressed on both sides. The Republicans seem to be convinced that the President is thinking only of going on. Mr. Heywood Broun, one of the most widely read of daily columnists, well to the Left in his political views, holds it to be inconceivable that Mr. Roosevelt should not be a candidate to succeed himself. "There is no one else," he says, "who can maintain the gains which progressive government has made in the last few years." The second statement here is incontestable, and yet we may be fairly certain that the next Democratic candidate will not be selected for the reason suggested, unless—and this is the core of the matter—he is the man designated by Mr. Roosevelt. But in what manner is the President to achieve the miracle of succeeding himself? It will hardly be denied in America that opinion against a third term is not much less powerful than in the past, and the popular sentiment has latterly been reinforced by incessant and carefully organised alarms as to the growing peril of dictatorship. Those alarms are directed to a single purpose—the destruction of the President's prestige. As such they will be discounted by his regular supporters, but they are not to be underrated in view of the unbroken rule by which the Chief Executive has been limited to a maximum of eight years. Moreover, we have to bear in mind that among perhaps one-third of the nation Mr. Roosevelt is excessively unpopular, and that a large percentage of these people entertain towards him a feeling of black hatred. Any serious attempt to defy the White House tradition would break up the Democratic party. That perhaps would be no bad thing in itself, but all other predictable results would be calamitous. We should witness a campaign of unlimited bitterness, and the President who emerged would find himself in an intolerable situation. American citizens, however, should not allow themselves to anticipate these developments. There is no American citizen at present in view who could imagine himself as victor over Franklin Roosevelt; but all the same, a third term for this President is as nearly impossible as anything in our world can be.

. . . . .

At the beginning of 1937, when Congress assembled in the

glow of the second presidential triumph, Mr. Roosevelt appeared to be admirably placed for the launching of a revised New Deal. The Supreme Court had formally demolished the first, but to-day it would be agreed that that structure could not possibly have stood. There were as yet no misgivings in relation to business recovery, and the President, backed by a majority surpassing all records, seemed destined for a season of fair weather. This expectation was completely falsified. Mr. Roosevelt was plunged at once into a series of searching experiences, a few of which were thoroughly disagreeable. He laid before Congress and the country two major measures, and on both he was signally defeated. They were the proposals for a remodelling of the U.S. Supreme Court, and an elaborate plan for the reorganisation of the Federal Government departments. The first of these filled the year 1937 with a conflict of indescribable acerbity. Upon the issue the conflict itself was unavoidable; its virulence was a staggering disclosure of the half-hidden depths in the American political character. Certainly Mr. Roosevelt's tactics were peculiar. He did not prepare the country for his Court plan. He had, indeed, kept it entirely secret, and there can be no doubt that he was taken aback by the force of the resistance he provoked, particularly on the part of individuals and groups upon whose support he had hitherto been able to count. As a matter of fact the proposals, and the President's defence of them, provided the American public with material for a more educative debate on the Constitution than they had known since the time of Theodore Roosevelt; but the success of the attack was almost a foregone conclusion. For Mr. Roosevelt himself the most significant element in the destroying force was a compact body of Southern Senators, already outspoken in their antagonism to the New Deal. The President could not be in any doubt as to the strength and tenacity of the foes within his own household. Then came the fight which ended in his second serious reverse. It was no less acrimonious than the storm over the Court, and perhaps even more revealing.

There cannot be any difference of opinion as to the pressing need of reconstruction in the Washington departments. Every President since Taft has acknowledged this, and throughout the past decade the urgency of a full overhauling has been a commonplace. Under the two Presidents who followed Woodrow Wilson a policy of administrative reform was not to be

looked for. Mr. Hoover was a departmentalist in grain, but the grim economic conditions of his presidency made it impossible for him to attack the problem. Mr. Roosevelt inherited an administrative jungle—an assemblage of old-established departments, modern executive commissions, and ill-defined personal offices to which the improvised bureaux of the New Deal inevitably made huge and miscellaneous additions. The complexity and overlapping are indescribable, the costs have become stupendous. Nothing could be plainer than that a Government Reorganisation Bill ought not to be further delayed. Mr. Roosevelt himself could not but remember at intervals that a keynote of his first campaign five years earlier had been the outworn cry of Anti-Waste. When his scheme was announced the Press was not particularly interested. The public was indifferent—and no wonder, for the subject is enormous and terrifying in detail. The chances for a wrecking campaign were anything but bright. Indeed, at the beginning of this year's session of Congress the anti-Roosevelt forces had no more than a desperate hope of success. Yet they managed to destroy the Bill, and their methods may be cited in illustration of present-day political expedients.

The President's enemies had been stimulated by the battle over the Supreme Court. They realised afresh that in any controversy touching the balance of powers in the Federal Government it is easy to arouse deep-seated American suspicions. They were not unaware of a drop in the President's popularity, noticeable with the return of the Depression and with the diminished flow of federal funds for unemployment relief. Victory over an Administration measure is, of course, far beyond the reach of a small Republican opposition. A large defection from the other side is a prerequisite, and the dissident Democrats in this case were headed by a compact body of Southern Senators—extreme Tories, not yet divested of the Democratic label. These men and their allies, including two or three press magnates each controlling a powerful chain of newspapers, set out to exploit all the resources of what in America are known as pressure politics. They had command of unlimited funds. They formed an *ad hoc* association for the defence of constitutional principles. They engaged a publicity officer who, as it happened, carried the handicap of a dubious record in wartime propaganda. They raised the multitudinous cry that Mr. Roosevelt was resolved to make himself dictator,

and that the Bill they were attacking had been drafted for this single flagitious purpose. Their activities could not be kept private. It chanced that a Committee of the Senate was opportunely employed in an exposure of the pressure organisations in Washington and their ways. This committee turned its attention to the rich deposits furnished here by one of the quickest and most affluent of groups. They found from the books of the publicity director that his office had in a short time circulated some 800,000 items of propaganda, while telegrams from alleged constituents demanding votes against the Bill had descended upon members of Congress to the number of 300,000.

The fate of the Government Reorganisation Bill was an almost complete surprise, the general assumption having been that its passage was assured. The effect upon the President's standing was serious. His reverse in the Supreme Court affair had been bad enough, but the results were materially softened by two immediate developments. First came a series of judgments, on important questions of the hour, which led the public to infer that the Court in its existing form was not a reactionary body intent upon frustrating a reform Administration. And next came a realisation that the Supreme Court had certainly not been weakened by the President's latest appointments to the Bench. No similar palliations, however, accompanied the smashing of the Reorganisation Bill. After that event Mr. Roosevelt had for a short time the appearance of a Chief Executive whose power had been gravely impaired and whose authority as legislative leader (to use Woodrow Wilson's phrase) might not be recoverable. But among the unusual gifts of the President none is more valuable than his resilience. Mr. Roosevelt, of course (remember the cruel disability he bears), cannot always be master of the situation, which is one of continuing hardship, and merciless Washington correspondents take care to broadcast every momentary breach in his marvellous good-temper. Yet he is never cast down for long, and in the crisis of last spring his leadership regained the note of vigour and resourcefulness which, five years before, had changed the mental climate of the land.

In the middle of April Mr. Roosevelt sent to Congress a message dealing with the gathering depression and the imperative need for a new effort towards recovery. He reworded this statement in a fireside radio talk, perhaps the most successful of

his recent utterances. The substance of this twofold pronouncement was the essentially unchanging Rooseveltian doctrine of Spending and Lending, and there was no mistaking the nature of the public response. In August 1937 the President had partially yielded to the pressure of criticism, especially from the business world, in respect of emergency public works and unemployment relief. He put a check upon the federal grants, in an endeavour to throw the burden back upon the States and local authorities, and he ordered large cuts in the Works Progress Administration and conservation camps (W.P.A. and C.C.C.). How much weight there was in the widespread belief that these drastic strokes were mainly responsible for the depression itself, which became glaringly manifest twelve months ago, no one can say. But the messages of April admitted of no doubt. Mr. Roosevelt cannot have believed in the possibility of reducing federal expenditures on public works and relief. Perturbed like everybody else by the sweep of the policy and the mighty expansion of the public debt, he was none the less driven by inexorable forces. His opponents may hammer in the sense of the Chinese proverb, "He who rides on a tiger can never dismount," but they know that this Administration has no choice in the matter, and that any other would have to continue the policy. The millions of American citizens who are without jobs cannot be left to starve, and the business community is the first to make demands for the restoration of the people's purchasing power. Hence the President's sharp return to his proper policy, with overwhelming popular approval, and the drafting of the latest Spending and Lending Bill which, after many manœuvres on the part of an Opposition patently unable to produce any alternative, passed both Houses in June. The provisions of this Act have staggered the world; but the American public, as we may all see, has passed beyond the stage at which figures of government spending can still be expected to create a sensation.

. . . . . .

In the sphere of positive New Deal legislation the present year has produced one measure of first-rate importance, the Hours and Wages Act. The President was determined upon this reform from the date upon which the regulating codes of the short-lived N.R.A. were swept away by the Supreme Court. It was carried after many months of bargaining and

displays of prejudice, crookedness, and callousness which one could not contemplate without disgust. Social reformers seem in large part to have treated the Bill as nothing better than a meagre beginning, which leaves the United States a long way behind all the advanced countries. But no one claiming acquaintance with American industry and commerce, or knowing the obstinate differences between the States, can fail to see that the Act registers a very important advance. Needless to say, the hardest resistance came from representatives of the South, ready to employ any weapons against the approach to a national minimum standard—and also, it must in fairness be conceded, knowing altogether the peculiar racial and economic obstacles inherent in their communities. The gains formally embodied in the law include the living-wage principle and the ending by federal authority of the surviving evil of child labour, these provisions being so drafted as to avoid, it is believed, the danger of invalidation by the Supreme Court. The basic scales laid down are low enough, to be sure, particularly when judged by the still prevalent notion that America is a land of high wages. For the first year the common rate is to be 25 cents (1s.) per hour, with a minimum of forty-four hours, that is, $11 (44s.) a week. For the second year 30 cents and a minimum of forty-two hours—$12.60 a week. After this, rates are to be fixed by wages boards (roughly as in New Zealand) upon a maximum of 40 cents and forty-four hours. The differentials, unavoidable in a country of continental extent and a wide range of family condition, to be determined by the boards. Differences between North and South are less than they were in the quite recent past, and the theory is that, despite the extreme difficulty of Negro labour, they must in time disappear.

No theory concerning American conditions of work and pay is at present more difficult to accept than that, but we have evidence in plenty as to the support of the Act both in principle and in method. The American public has swung round to the policy of minimum national standards, and presumably to their embodiment in federal laws. But the work of establishing such standards, no matter how low the uniform scales, must be formidable beyond definition or description. The difficulties will be colossal, the evasions without beginning or end, the task of enforcement something to which no imagination can be equal. Nevertheless, the Act

is a plain necessity. A New Deal without its inclusion in the statute book would be a mockery.

The election campaign will be well advanced by the time these lines are in print. It is exceptional as regards one feature—the deep and wide division that has been made in the Democratic ranks by the later New Deal, and the consequent activity of the President within his own party on behalf of the candidates who are declared supporters of his policy. Direct intervention of this kind is most unusual, but in the present instance it was fully to be expected. We may find the deciding circumstance in the assault upon the Reorganisation Bill and the temper exhibited by many of the Senators and Congressmen who in that business made common cause with the President's foes. One deduction only was possible. Mr. Roosevelt was given proof enough that a large number of conservative Democrats had definitely changed sides. He was obliged to treat them accordingly. Therefore he is making use of every legitimate means for the purpose of preventing their return to Congress, and he is quite open about it. He is aware that this action will tend to increase the trouble in his party, but those who agree with him will naturally ask, What else is a President in that situation to do?

The mid-term pollings are still a long way from the presidential election. But meanwhile we have one diversion of an interesting and not unfamiliar kind coming from the distinctive State of Wisconsin. Robert and Philip LaFollette (one being Senator and the other Governor) have renounced their support of the President and launched a National Progressive Party, with designs upon the Presidency in 1940. This pair of brothers, each with a record of fine public service, carry on the work of their eminent father, the late R. M. LaFollette, who stood during the last generation as the champion in the North-West of radical individualist progressivism. The elder LaFollette was an able public man, devoted to his causes and personally unbeatable; architect-in-chief of the Wisconsin experiments in State organisation, taxation, and labour policy. In the presidential election of 1924 he came to grief as head of the only attempt at a third party which in recent times has come within sight of actuality. The younger LaFollettes, striking out in similar fashion, were content with a minimum of preparation and publicity, and are without the aid of any conspicuous politicians outside their own State.

Their breakaway from the President is on the ground (not at all difficult to defend) that his New Deal is half-hearted and is a great and proved disappointment, together with the highly disputable plea that it is essentially un-American. But their movement has the look of mere evangelism, while their tactics indicate that the sons have failed to read the plain lesson of their father's later career. The new Progressive could only make headway at the expense of the President—that is, by reducing the strength of the one leader who, under existing conditions, is able to shape a national policy and push it forward. There are two other important points to be urged against the LaFollette enterprise. The vast and varied American nation will not accept a political lead from Wisconsin, and the platform of the new party is surely negligible. Its doctrine is the old American individualism, and it has no perceptible relation to the new Labour movement, which under John L. Lewis has opened a fresh and portentous chapter in the history of organised Labour in North America.

Whatever destiny is reserved for Franklin Roosevelt, this one thing is clear. His term of office is epoch-marking: it divides the older America from the new and the unpredictable. At the close of his sixth year the President occupies a position of challenge and peril to which there has been no parallel in the experience of any predecessor. Within this lustrum the greatest and richest of industrial countries has passed from the blackest night through an interval of stormy and bewildering recovery, into a second depression which in some respects would seem to be more menacing than the Hoover crisis of 1929-31 which shook the world. Meanwhile American industry and labour have been building reserves, in organisation and preparation, behind which deep-seated forces of suspicion and enmity threaten an outbreak of violence which, if not forestalled at once by wise action, may plunge the Republic into a civil conflict exhibiting a range and passion hitherto unknown in North America. The lists are set. The might of Industrial Feudalism—as developed in Chicago and Detroit, in Pennsylvania, Ohio and California—is mobilised for a trial of strength with the gathering, though far from unified, masses of organised Labour.

This grave danger to the internal peace of the United States takes shape at a time when the Roosevelt effort towards recovery and reconstruction is nearing its crucial test: for we

cannot doubt that if, under the strain of another great depression, the second New Deal should break down, or its measures be overthrown by the Supreme Court, the result would be a national condition of extreme insecurity. Moreover, these threatenings become increasingly ominous just as events in Europe and the Far East are combining to prove the illusory character of America's theoretic neutrality. It is becoming impossible to believe that, unless immobilised by economic collapse at home, the Washington Government can much longer refrain from stepping out to exercise a decisive influence in the settlement and direction of the world—that is, of course, if such settlement can now be the fortune of our generation.

The central irony of Franklin Roosevelt is this: that the world's most powerful elected ruler, governed by instincts and convictions which in normal times would have made him a progressive Conservative, and an active internationalist, should have been forced by implacable circumstances, and by a political system remote from present-day realities, to remain outside the orbit of world affairs, and in the view of some millions of his fellow-countrymen, to appear as an enemy of that American system which, commanding his own entire allegiance, can have nothing to fear from any policies that he could initiate or support. The one serious defect in his leadership has been the failure to make this essential fact plain to the American business world. And yet, when we remember the attitude and temper of American business, in its dominant character, towards any statesman bearing the Democratic party name, we cannot greatly wonder that this should be so.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS.*

I WAS asked some months ago to speak for the defence in a public debate in a Devon town on the theme that "*The Public Schools have lost the confidence of the nation.*" I refused, not that I thought the Public Schools could not be defended, or was unwilling to defend them: on the contrary; but because I anticipated a very small gathering and a dreary evening. I was pressed, and I agreed to go. The gathering was large and anything but dreary. The sounding of alarms is a feature of English life. The English enjoy these speculative alarms; for there is usually a happy ending—and happiness until the next alarm is sounded. From needless alarm to happy ending is Romance.

Alarmism has certain recurrent forms, and misgiving about the Public Schools is one of them. Many people would confess, if they were questioned, to vague dissatisfaction or doubt about them. Most of them would do so in the sure hope of reassurance. The scepticism of the English, for the most part, goes no deeper; their disbelief is a disguised wish to have their beliefs, so to speak, massaged. Some critics say the Public Schools are not what they were: the Old Boys' criticism, sometimes. The retort to this is easy: "they never were." The answer, too, is easy: "and a good thing too." The Public Schools, in fact, are improving, both in themselves and in repute. But so are all forms of Education in England. It would be odd if the Public Schools alone were out of the fashion.

But let me get to grips with the Public Schools. They start with a paradox: whisking boys out of their homes, and handing them over, body and soul, night and day, in joy and woe, to strangers, mostly men, and to the company and the tender mercies of their own kind—boys. What other boys are, or can be, every mother knows. It is a wrench for the affections, a cold plunge for the victims, or some of them, a grave reflection on the homes. But let us face the facts. The family is the root and key of everything. But what is this key like, and more and more like nowadays? An only son, or an only son tyrannised by an elder sister, a doting mother, a doubting father. It is a favouring and fostering atmosphere to a degree, but lonely, and there is not enough young company.

* An address given at the Sherborne School Commemoration, June 18th, 1938.

To resume, there is a presumption, and more now than ever, in favour of sending boys away for a time. But not all boys. Some would thrive better by staying at home and going to school as day-boys. I suppose there is no Public School that has no boys who by idiosyncrasies of nature and intelligence would not be happier at home. Not that unhappiness is decisive: the school may be doing for a boy what his home could not do, what is better done thus in adolescence than left undone for life.

A cynic said once that no woman can bring up one son, but that any woman can bring up five; he said, too, that the capability of fathers is just the inverse, they can be good with one but are floored with five. My faith, therefore, is pinned to the mothers. But there is everywhere a residue that would have its best chance at home. Who are of this residue is not easy to tell beforehand. But whoever they are, the day schools are ready to receive them, far more numerous and far better than they were. They improve rapidly, and they are busy absorbing and embodying, so far as is possible, in their different circumstances, the peculiar features, the peculiarly English features, of the Public Schools. For these English ideas and methods and spirit begin to permeate the world. Even Scotland takes note of them. The Germans are aware of them: the new Adolf Hitler schools borrow in large measure from England. And it is not only Germany. The English, seeking for reassurances, desiring soul-massage, may sometimes feel dubious about their Public Schools. But the outside world is inquisitive and envious. For generations England has had an unrivalled system—if system it can be called—of manly and citizenly education in the Public Schools. Real scholars, scientists, artists, these schools turn out when Nature sends them the materials. Men and citizens they must infallibly turn out. All this the English have scarcely begun to theorise or expound. In any other country an army of expositors would have been busy on it. There is an old rhyme:

> I count him wise and right well taught
> Who can bear a horn and blow it not.

The English blow not this horn: perhaps from modesty, or a little from lack of skill. They are a little helpless in self-expression or self-appreciation. It is an appealing helplessness, this of the English: that is why so many other sorts of people

come to their rescue. So I, a Scotsman, blow the English horn.

But let me get closer to the Public Schools. They are, first and last, schools; Education is their business. And what is that? To cut it short, I say that it is to awaken, practise, and enrich a certain human faculty—imagination. There is a mystery about imagination: one moment a boy doesn't see, and the next he does see what a thing means, or is worth, or what it will do, or what was its cause, or how it can be done, or can be done better. Seeing, then doing—seeing, then remembering, is the clue. Imagination is the key of initiative. The unimaginative mind seldom sees for itself what to do, or how, or meanings, or causes, or results, or the first steps to things, or by what handle to lay hold of them. All boys have imagination. Some have it in several forms. With some boys the trouble is to find where they keep it, hid away—to start them in the use of it. Imagination has many forms. A very few boys have the mathematical imagination: they just see mathematics: other boys have to try to learn them and remember them, at any rate they think so. I think, for my part, that the mathematical imagination matures at very diverse ages and often late, e.g. about 40. The world is teeming with fine old mathematicians who don't know it, and never will. A few boys have the scientific imagination: they have presentiments about causes and effects, a sort of prophetic sense of how a thing will work. Some boys have the musical imagination, some the artistic, some the literary. Some boys' imagination is in their fingers: they can make things and unmake too: they have a sense of material, of texture, of what can be done with wood, or metal, or leather, or even mud. Some boys' imagination is in hands and feet, in muscle and nerve: they have a sense of force, momentum, movement, pace, distance—the most exact intuitions of what the body can be made to do, and to do beautifully. They are artists in bodily movement, in limbs of precision.

The business of a school is to cast about in the nature of a boy for the roots of imagination. One root will do for a start. One root found and developed will lead on to more: the more can be discovered and trained, the better. First discover them, and then train them. The first point is not too well done in Public Schools. The reason is they are so busy, so deadly busy with the second. There is only the staff to do both things.

The staffs are seldom underworked in Public Schools: they are, too, at a disadvantage in comparison with the staffs of day schools; they can never get away from it, they are never out of sight and sound of the school community, of its activities, of their own responsibilities. They are actors who spend their time between the stage and the green-room; they never leave the theatre, or if they do it is only to study their part in the next piece, to prepare for next term.

Teachers in Public Schools need sabbatical leaves, if they are to keep watch freshly for imagination in their pupils. They must be fresh enough for their own imaginations to work freshly. They ought to go up frequently into an exceedingly high place alone, and think about their pupils, and their methods, and how to plan a middle way between the grind of the old-fashioned dictation method in teaching and the great Dalton picnic. All good Governing Bodies should have sabbatical schemes, even if it adds to the expense. All good parents should be willing to help with the expense. I cannot but think that with perfect Governors and perfect parents, as we have here, it could be done. The chief trouble is that school life is such a drive, such a hunt. Prefects hunt boys, masters and house-masters hunt both, the H.M. hunts the masters, the Governors hunt the H.M., and the Board of Education hunts indiscriminately every so many years. And all the time examiners are on the hunt. Boys must pass examinations before they can get here. They must pass more before they can ever get away again, or get on to a university. Everyone is against examinations, in sentiment, and wishes them different.

I am afraid that countries have the examinations they deserve. If the teaching system is poor, the examination system will be worse. If teaching is improving, the examinations may perhaps be improving, but most certainly much slower. There is an awkward time-lag about examinations. There is the same about examiners. Who are the examiners? They are usually rather senior, retired, very nice, but not up-to-date, and not at all well paid. And they are never given enough time to mark the papers. What they have to do so fast against time is apt to be faulty and mechanical. And they never see their victims. They are external. That is supposed to make them impartial, and perhaps it does, but it is not really defensible. Take the School Certificate. It is fair to

say that the general idea of such certificates came to us from Germany. The external plan we invented for ourselves. We owe externalism to the University of London, which for long decades examined in everything and taught nobody. The candidate paid his fee, he wrote his papers, the examiner, unseen and unknown, examined, and the candidate took his pass or his plough. If it was a plough, the insertion of fresh coins would always restart the mechanism, and perhaps with better luck. Nothing, believe me, was ever more impartial, or more paradoxical, than London University. The truth is that teaching and examining are parts of the same effort, and should be closely linked. Were this Germany, the old Germany at any rate, Sherborne would run its own Certificate, working within broad lines laid down by some national authority, and accepting an external examiner from this authority to co-operate with the school, and keep the standard level. Were this Germany, Sherborne would have a place on a long list of "approved schools" permitted to conduct their own examinations with the help of an external examiner. An external examiner is a good thing, and an external examination a bad: I mean, for a good school. Bad schools cannot be trusted: for them the whole examination must be external. Freedom is a jewel in a school. By this I do not mean that the H.M., the masters, and the boys should do what they please in respect of work, but that the school, within limits and under some broad form of authority, should freely shape and freely work the programme of its own teaching and its own examining.

There is much root and branch criticism nowadays of examinations. It helps to carry the newspapers through the silly season. I believe in examinations, because I believe in original sin. Who that knows boys, who that has been one, doubts that boys on the whole need lines marked out for them within which to work and goals towards which to strive? To get work done by boys, and done to a standard, requires a set programme, examinations, and prizes. It may be different with girls: the divine spontaneities of womankind may suffice: I do not know. It is not necessary, of course, to believe in any and every examination. If examinations are on the mend, it is only because they very badly need amendment. Good examinations will hurt only those boys whose qualities are too fugitive and fragile altogether for Public School life.

After all, examinations are nothing but doing the best you can on the spur of the moment with the means available: and human life is like that. Examinations are liker life, perhaps, than teaching and study are. They are certainly liker the life for which Public Schools are meant to prepare boys.

The Public Schools work powerfully on the social imagination of boys. In those impressive scenes, as yours is here, amidst those buildings enriched by the effects and associations of antiquity, the long tradition of ordered ways and famous names tells on every inmate. The boy is but one in this company of the living and the dead: among them he may find his hero and exemplar, and he will always find his match, and more. The school humbles the perceptive boy, but stimulates and steadies him too. Inside the framework of rules and customs he finds safety and happiness: outside it, neither. The scheme of equilibrium requires in a boy a two-edged sense, a sense of self and a sense of other, a sense of rights and of duties, of social pattern and of cohesion. The indeterminate, the wistful, the passive, and the negative are here at a discount. In this thronging life at close quarters the cues are unmistakable—to be active, prompt, direct and controlled: to be friendly and courteous, to keep smiling, to keep one's own counsel, to keep one's heart elsewhere than on one's sleeve. Premature and even harsh some of these cues may seem for tender years. But Public School education, even on the social side, is not without hardness and hardship. This is a life keyed up, in the likeness indeed of an examination—of the good examination. It is to live as if all life were a long emergency in which nothing less than a clear mind, a ready will, conviction and courage, that is, nothing but the best, were the daily and hourly needs. This sort of life, in a word, is a clearing of the issues, and a call for alertness and decision. Delays and evasions are not of this keen mood, nor are secrecies, or childishness, or freakishness, or will-o'-the-wisps of fancy, or . . . plenty other things. The odd weak sides of selfishness and self-assertion have no part in this mood.

One of the most leading cues of Public School life is the cue to belong. The root lies deep: what is bred in the bone must come out. All men at first belong: they are their mother's long before they become their own. Some never quite become

their own: the mothers hold on hard, the mothers and many more. The lesson of belonging, of being a member, of sharing, is all-important. Here in this school is the play-life of patriotism and citizenship. The instinct of attachment works with spontaneous force, though not always without crudity and narrowness. But the lesson of belonging reaches forward always to moral and religious matters of vital import. If these implications are not accepted and worked out, if their force is not made to tell heavily in the life of the school, great risks arise. Public Schools have their own besetting temptations: and the chief perhaps is egoism. The more intimate, the more disciplined, the more forceful an organisation is, the more it needs the religious influences, lest it conceive itself as an end in itself, lest belonging to it should pervert principle, or blind hearts and minds. For belonging can seem to hallow selfishness.

What is the alternative to the religious tradition of the Public Schools? Sectionalism, class-interest, selfishness unreconciled and unsubordinated—in a word, the extravagances of organised egoism. The extravagant nationalism that pervades and distracts Europe may be traced in part at least to the prevalence of secularist education. "To be as one is to be as God" is good totalitarian doctrine. Here in this English school, on lines of old tradition, a boy is helped to feel himself a member of a greater life that existed before him and will exist after him; he is made to feel greatness and goodness in his school and in people, and made to feel, too, that the hand of God is in it all, that neither his school nor himself is an end, or a sufficiency, but only servant, and disciple, and means. He is made to feel, in short, that there is challenge and scrutiny of his school and himself coming from another quarter altogether, from God, and that this challenge cannot be put aside. That is what all the keying-up in school life tends towards. That is what belonging comes to in the end. That is what all the wealth of opportunities, of influences, of happy intercourse, offered here really means. "To whom much is given, of him much will be required." The boy of spirit and perception will see the point, if not at first, then presently, and he will rise to it. Most boys will see it. Some will not. For them it will seem no great matter. And they themselves will be no great matter.

JOHN MURRAY.

SWITZERLAND FIGHTS AGAINST A NEW "ANSCHLUSS."

THE situation created by the *Anschluss* of Austria has brought with it a number of new and rather dangerous problems, not only for Czechoslovakia but also for Switzerland. How serious they are is seen from a recent declaration of Herr Baumann, President of the Confederation, in which he announced that the Swiss nation will defend its freedom and independence as long as the Swiss people have breath. There are many good reasons for anxiety in Switzerland. The problem that has suddenly arisen is not only a problem for Switzerland but also for Europe and especially for France. We shall see later why.

The new period in the history of Europe began for Switzerland in a peculiar way. On March 14th, when the Reichswehr had entered Austrian territory, the diplomatic representative of Germany in Berne called on the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to assure the Swiss Government, in the name of Herr Hitler, that the Fuehrer had no evil intentions in regard to Switzerland and that he would respect the integrity of the country. This was an astonishing declaration for the Swiss nation, which had taken for granted that its independence was a permanent element in Europe's structure and needed no special acknowledgment. Herr Hitler's assurance, however, proved that he was well aware of the fear that he might also try to annex the nearly 3 million German-speaking Swiss. If this apprehension has become possible, it dates not only from the entry of German troops into Austria but from the very beginning of the Nazi régime in Germany. On the same day on which the German envoy made his declaration in Berne all the important bookshops in Vienna exposed maps which showed not only the actual frontiers of Germany, but also the territories outside Germany which, according to the National-Socialist theories, belong to the Fatherland. Among them was also the territory of Switzerland inhabited by a German-speaking population. But this was no surprise. It was characteristic that these maps were suddenly seen in Vienna just at the moment when Austria was occupied. Years ago the German press had already claimed that these nearly 3 million Swiss were actually without "Fatherland" and would only get one when they were incorporated into the

Greater Germany. Optimists might have been induced to think that all this campaign had been checked by Herr Hitler's *démarche* in Berne. But only a few days after the occupation of Austria, several important German newspapers began to reopen the same campaign in spite of Herr Hitler's declaration. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* published an article which said: "No branch of the German race has the right or the possibility of withdrawing from the common destiny of all the Germans." It is remarkable that this declaration was printed in the country where no newspaper and particularly not so important a one as the *Frankfurter Zeitung* would publish anything that was not approved by Dr. Goebbels. But this was not a special case. Another powerful paper, the *Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung*, wrote after Herr Hitler's assurance: "Austria has had the experience of what can be called *Verschweizern* [Swissising], meaning the tragedy of a people which has been made to believe that they were a nation while in reality they were only part of a community of the same language." At the same time, a special edition of the *Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung* inundated Switzerland. It contained many illustrations of the so-called enthusiasm with which the German troops had been welcomed in Austria, and this review was sold at a price far below the real rate of exchange and even below the price of Swiss reviews. A few weeks later the German press reproached the Swiss press for not having truly informed their readers about the meeting of Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini. They were accused of not having published enough details of the receptions given in Rome. Finally, the Swiss Government was forced to lodge a protest in Berlin against the use of a school book containing a map which marked the German-speaking regions of Switzerland as future German territory. All these things show that in spite of the spontaneous declaration of the German envoy in Berne nothing has really changed. There is no reason for the Swiss people to feel assured of the goodwill of Germany. The new steps taken by the Federal Government show already that it is fully aware of the new danger.

First of all the change in the situation is of military character. So long as Austria existed, the eastern frontier of Switzerland could be neglected. Only one division of the Swiss army had its quarters on this side. There had been no reason for keeping a greater force in this region, for her

SWITZERLAND FIGHTS AGAINST A NEW "ANSCHLUSS."

THE situation created by the *Anschluss* of Austria has brought with it a number of new and rather dangerous problems, not only for Czechoslovakia but also for Switzerland. How serious they are is seen from a recent declaration of Herr Baumann, President of the Confederation, in which he announced that the Swiss nation will defend its freedom and independence as long as the Swiss people have breath. There are many good reasons for anxiety in Switzerland. The problem that has suddenly arisen is not only a problem for Switzerland but also for Europe and especially for France. We shall see later why.

The new period in the history of Europe began for Switzerland in a peculiar way. On March 14th, when the Reichswehr had entered Austrian territory, the diplomatic representative of Germany in Berne called on the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to assure the Swiss Government, in the name of Herr Hitler, that the Fuehrer had no evil intentions in regard to Switzerland and that he would respect the integrity of the country. This was an astonishing declaration for the Swiss nation, which had taken for granted that its independence was a permanent element in Europe's structure and needed no special acknowledgment. Herr Hitler's assurance, however, proved that he was well aware of the fear that he might also try to annex the nearly 3 million German-speaking Swiss. If this apprehension has become possible, it dates not only from the entry of German troops into Austria but from the very beginning of the Nazi régime in Germany. On the same day on which the German envoy made his declaration in Berne all the important bookshops in Vienna exposed maps which showed not only the actual frontiers of Germany, but also the territories outside Germany which, according to the National-Socialist theories, belong to the Fatherland. Among them was also the territory of Switzerland inhabited by a German-speaking population. But this was no surprise. It was characteristic that these maps were suddenly seen in Vienna just at the moment when Austria was occupied. Years ago the German press had already claimed that these nearly 3 million Swiss were actually without "Fatherland" and would only get one when they were incorporated into the

Greater Germany. Optimists might have been induced to think that all this campaign had been checked by Herr Hitler's *démarche* in Berne. But only a few days after the occupation of Austria, several important German newspapers began to reopen the same campaign in spite of Herr Hitler's declaration. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* published an article which said: "No branch of the German race has the right or the possibility of withdrawing from the common destiny of all the Germans." It is remarkable that this declaration was printed in the country where no newspaper and particularly not so important a one as the *Frankfurter Zeitung* would publish anything that was not approved by Dr. Goebbels. But this was not a special case. Another powerful paper, the *Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung*, wrote after Herr Hitler's assurance: "Austria has had the experience of what can be called *Verschweizern* [Swissising], meaning the tragedy of a people which has been made to believe that they were a nation while in reality they were only part of a community of the same language." At the same time, a special edition of the *Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung* inundated Switzerland. It contained many illustrations of the so-called enthusiasm with which the German troops had been welcomed in Austria, and this review was sold at a price far below the real rate of exchange and even below the price of Swiss reviews. A few weeks later the German press reproached the Swiss press for not having truly informed their readers about the meeting of Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini. They were accused of not having published enough details of the receptions given in Rome. Finally, the Swiss Government was forced to lodge a protest in Berlin against the use of a school book containing a map which marked the German-speaking regions of Switzerland as future German territory. All these things show that in spite of the spontaneous declaration of the German envoy in Berne nothing has really changed. There is no reason for the Swiss people to feel assured of the goodwill of Germany. The new steps taken by the Federal Government show already that it is fully aware of the new danger.

First of all the change in the situation is of military character. So long as Austria existed, the eastern frontier of Switzerland could be neglected. Only one division of the Swiss army had its quarters on this side. There had been no reason for keeping a greater force in this region, for her

relations with Austria had been always very friendly. And what could be feared from little Austria which only wished to be left in peace? The situation is now quite different, especially on the northern, southern and eastern frontiers. Since the beginning of Germany's rearmament, three divisions had been placed in the north on the border of the Rhine, while only two divisions were in the proximity of the French frontier. Quite recently a special frontier corps was created and was exclusively placed in the new system of defence established near the German border. A sort of Maginot line in miniature has been constructed in this region to stop a possible German invasion and to permit the mobilisation of the other units. Sixteen months ago the Federal Government issued a loan of 240 million Swiss francs in order to reorganise the army and fully modernise its equipment. For the first time the Swiss general staff decided to order great quantities of tanks and aeroplanes. All these measures had been taken while Austria still existed; Germany's enormous rearmament compelled the Swiss to make a serious sacrifice.

The German-Swiss frontier has now increased by several hundreds of miles. It begins at Basle, runs along the border of the Rhine and continues for more than 200 miles in the east on the former Austrian frontier. The whole north and more than half the east of Switzerland is now surrounded by Germany. It is a situation akin to that of Czechoslovakia, perhaps worse. In the north the Rhine border is not easy to defend, for the Rhine is very narrow and the country behind it is flat and without strategical possibilities. To the east the valley of the Rhine reappears, together with the valley of the Inn. Both lead into the interior of Switzerland. The valley of the Rhine arrives at the Alps of Glarus and the city of Chur, the capital of the canton, and the valley of the Inn opens the way to the Alps of the Engadine. These two valleys are now of great strategical importance since the enlarged Germany with her enormous army has replaced little Austria from whom Switzerland had nothing to fear. At the same time Germany has become the direct neighbour of the important canton of St. Gall and its capital of the same name with 500,000 inhabitants. On the other side of the Rhine is situated the little principality of Liechtenstein, united with Switzerland by monetary and customs' agreements. German newspapers pretend already that there is a "minority" demanding

the *Anschluss*, although the little Liechtenstein people immediately declared that it did not want to loosen its union with Switzerland. All this requires a reorganisation of the Swiss army. The one division that is there now is obviously insufficient for the defence of this border. It is out of the question to reduce the number of the divisions placed on the northern frontier where already the greater part of the army is stationed. In the south, on the Italian border, the same precaution is necessary because the Italian propaganda in the Ticino district has recently increased and requires alertness and readiness for all emergencies.* This is especially so since the establishment of the Berlin-Rome axis. Only on the French side has Switzerland nothing to fear. France alone of the three neighbours of Switzerland demands nothing and keeps aloof from Swiss internal affairs. No Frenchman would dream of demanding the incorporation of Geneva and the Swiss districts where French is spoken into France! It is therefore possible, and even probable, that the necessary reinforcements will be taken from the western frontier. The Government has already decided to prolong the period of military service and now demands new credit for an increase in armaments.

So much for the military aspect of the problem. There is also the economic factor to consider. The maintenance of good relations with Austria and of her independence has always been of great importance for Switzerland because an independent Austria was a guarantee of free access to Central and Eastern Europe. After the Franco-German War of 1870, Swiss and French capital collaborated in constructing the Arlberg railway line which was built to link the Austrian provinces of Arlberg and Tyrol; and this permitted communication with Eastern Europe without having to cross German territory. At the end of the Great War, Switzerland's interest in the independence of Austria increased still further. Switzerland participated in the international loans granted to Austria, and Swiss capital was invested in Austrian industries. After 1933, when Herr Hitler came into power, the maintenance of this

* The following appeared in the *Sunday Dispatch* of August 7th: "Strategically important zones in the Swiss holiday district of Grisons, a canton bordering Italy, have been closed to tourists. Concealed fortresses are being constructed on three important passes near the Swiss-Italian frontier. The routes are the Maloja Pass, the Bernina Pass and the Julien Pass. Close approach to the roads is forbidden, and the districts are patrolled by sentries."

gateway to the east of Europe became of vital importance to Switzerland. This communication has now been cut off. It is now impossible to reach Prague, Budapest, Warsaw and Belgrade from Zürich without crossing Germany. At the same time, the junction of Germany and Italy at the Brenner pass has brought with it a new problem. Hitherto a great part of the traffic between Germany and Italy has been effected via Switzerland and the St. Gothard pass, although the route via the Brenner is a little shorter. The very modern equipment of the Swiss line compensated for the difference of length. The Swiss fear that Germany will now, after the establishment of a direct frontier with Italy, choose the Brenner way, partly for reasons of prestige and partly to save the expense in Swiss francs, seeing that Germany is very short of foreign exchange. This would cause considerable financial loss to Switzerland. The country is already in fear of what will become of the international loans granted to Austria and the Swiss loans which had been granted to Austrian cities. Swiss citizens established in Austria are now forced to deliver their holdings of foreign exchange to the German authorities, and it will become impossible for many of them to leave Austria and find a new means of existence in Switzerland because they are unable to dispose of their capital. It is also probable that Austria now incorporated into Germany will cease to buy the same quantities of Swiss merchandise as before; they will be replaced by German goods.

There is yet another side to the problem. The *Anschluss* has deprived the Swiss newspapers of a large public in Austria. Most of the papers are now forbidden by the German authorities. The Swiss publishers of books are in the same situation. In normal times and before the Nazi régime in Germany the literary relations between Switzerland and Germany had been very close. Swiss books had been published by German publishers and books published in German by Swiss firms had been sold not only in Switzerland but also in Germany. Now in Germany only those books and those authors are tolerated who are approved by Dr. Goebbels. That means that Swiss writers and publishers in the German language are confined to selling in the small Swiss market, and naturally 2·5 million German-speaking Swiss offer very reduced possibilities as compared with the 76 millions of Greater Germany. The link between Swiss and German civilisation is broken and it is not

without danger for the former. For nearly all the German-speaking Swiss talk a great variety of dialects that differ from literary German and cannot easily be understood by the majority of Germans. Only books and newspapers are printed in literary German, while the debates in the municipal assemblies and even in the courts are very often held in dialect.

All this is a matter of grave concern not only to Switzerland but also to France. This new military threat to Switzerland is also alarming France. The new Swiss demand for acknowledgment of complete neutrality has been granted by France, in accordance with Great Britain and the Council of the League of Nations, but there is some anxiety in France as to whether Switzerland will really defend her integrity and fight against a German invasion. It is known that Germany during the war had considered the possibility of attacking France by invading Switzerland. The French Maginot line ends five kilometres before Basle and the Swiss frontier, according to the old treaty of 1816 that forbade France to establish fortresses in this region. France respected this treaty when she constructed her new system of defence, but there is a rather dangerous hole near the Swiss frontier at Basle which may tempt the German invader to violate Swiss territory and to push as far as Lyons or Creusot, the seat of the Schneider armament works. France is also highly interested in the maintenance of the Swiss economic system. Switzerland is the best buyer of French goods on the Continent, and no less than 10 per cent. of the total of French exports are sent to little Switzerland. The new situation might affect the economic position of Switzerland, which is already forced to buy large quantities of German goods in order to get possession of the millions of frozen marks, the only means by which they can be repaid on their large credits granted to Germany before the Nazi régime. A weakening of Swiss economy and an increase in German exportations to Switzerland would equally affect French economy and exports.

At present, however, the German-speaking population of Switzerland is rather favourable to France. The present Swiss envoy in Paris, Herr Stucki, who is of German-Swiss origin, delivered a remarkable address on the occasion of presenting his credentials to Monsieur Lebrun, President of the French Republic. Herr Stucki said: "It seems to me, and I attach particular importance to this fact, that in these days when

democratic institutions are daily attacked, the noblest and highest task is to give to the French Republic a picture of Swiss democracy. I will use all my force and my profound conviction in order to solidify more than ever the relations of friendship which exist between our democracies and to develop their mutual appreciation." It is significant that a Swiss diplomat whose mother tongue is German expressed himself in such vigorous words. Hitherto the German propaganda in Switzerland has had no success. If it is true that the French " Popular Front " and the social experiments of Monsieur Léon Blum have been watched in Switzerland with distrust, it is also a fact that no sympathy has been given to the propaganda of the German press which tried to frighten the Swiss people with the ghost of bolshevism invading Switzerland from France. Also all efforts of Germany to create in Switzerland a feeling of anti-Semitism have been in vain. Swiss tribunals have severely condemned the authors of such propaganda, all the more as they accused respectable Swiss personalities of " being paid by Jews," of " having placed Switzerland in the position of a vassal of France and of being under the rule of international Jewry." Germany, which does not refrain from insulting Switzerland and the Swiss people, finds it compatible with this attitude to pretend that an ever so slight critical remark in the Swiss press is intolerable to German dignity. There are signs that Herr Hitler might try to force upon Switzerland one of his pet ideas, a so-called press truce, which in reality would be nothing less than the end of the liberty of the Swiss press. Austria also had concluded a press truce with Germany!

R. A. FRIEDMAN.

N.B.—Since the above was written, the Italian and German Governments have given fresh assurances that they will respect Swiss neutrality. The German Government affirms in a diplomatic note its satisfaction that Switzerland has, according to the decision of the League of Nations, reobtained her former neutrality as regards sanctions. But the *Deutsche Diplomatische Korrespondenz* comments: " If the principle of neutrality is to be effective it must be sustained by an absolute objectivity in the relations between the two countries; and that means great reserve in formulating the ideas which may result from the differences between the two régimes."

THE FREE CHURCHES AND THE NEW AUTHORITARIANISM.

RECENTLY at an eclectic clerical gathering an Anglican Professor of Divinity posed the writer of this article with an inquiry about the full and precise implication of the term " Free Churches." He confessed to a general appreciation of its significance; as for example that in this instance the noun qualifies the adjective no less than the adjective the noun: and this cleared the ground. For a church, whatever else it may be, is a group of people gathered into a community, acknowledging a common allegiance, a common bond; therefore the " freedom " of the Free Churches cannot be of the sort that would leave every Free Churchman a law unto himself. The Free Churches are not lodges in which religious anarchists meet to encourage one another in the defiance of all religious rule and authority.

But in what sense, then, did our Churches claim to be " Free "? If the answer was to be put into a single sentence one had to run the risk not only of paradox but also of seeming arrogance, and reply: They call themselves " Free " because they regard themselves as bound to the Word of God, and because they understand this central allegiance to liberate them from anything like an absolute submission to any other authority, ecclesiastical or civil.

Let us see, first, how this answer works out in the region of faith. As to his Christian faith, a Free Churchman in common with all Christians, begins with something *given*. If he is asked, What is this given thing? he may reasonably answer: It is something objective; it is not a supposition which we add to our faith but the presupposition with which we begin. It is in history and behind history; properly understood, it creates history and is its very theme and *continuum*. It is the Word of God. And this Word of God is historically before us, supremely, in the Gospel, encountering us in Jesus Christ.

So far all Churchmen, all men of Christian faith, stand together. But, for the Free Churchman, the Word of God is the one objective authority, accessible and sufficient for faith and life. And here he breaks away from those Churchmen for whom the Church itself certifies the Word, defining its doctrine and fixing the faith of all true believers. For if the

argument runs, Is it not the Church who gave us the Word, the Church who gave us the canon of Holy Scripture, the Church who through her Councils and Creeds defined its doctrine, and the Church who, through her Orders, Sacraments and ministry, conveys the supernatural grace of the Word to the faithful? the answer of Free Churchmen is: It is the Word that certifies the Church, not the Church the Word. The Church gave us the Scriptures, but the Word gave us the Church. The Church, the Scriptures, the Creeds, the Sacraments, the ministry, all bear witness to the Word; they cannot fix and frame it within final and binding definitions. That which is "given," then, is the living, eternal Word of God encountered supremely in the Gospel and in the Person of Jesus Christ. This, for us, is authoritative in the region of faith, and creates the faith that receives it.

Moreover our final allegiance is obviously not to any particular and systematised *theory* of the Word—not even to our own! Our Protestant fathers believed the Word was reproduced infallibly and *verbatim* in the Scriptures; we endorse the general claim of Christian scholarship to go behind that theory and examine it in the light of all the facts that modern knowledge can command, and form our conclusions accordingly.

Here, then, we have one aspect of our Free Church witness. Over against those who claim that Holy Church has defined the Word and fixed those definitions for all time, and who therefore deny the existence of any Christian right to inquire behind these formulations, or, at least, any Christian liberty to reach conclusions at variance with them—over against this authoritarian attitude the Free Churchman says: We value the guidance of these definitions; they are sacred and precious; but we do not acknowledge their absolute authority. We hold ourselves free to seek behind and beyond them to the eternal Word of God to which—to Whom—Church and Scriptures and Creeds alike bear witness.

Now this position may be right or wrong, but no one will deny that its underlying principle is one of incalculable importance. Nor can the Free Churchman be convicted of a wholly unreasonable prejudice if he suggests that those countries where authoritarian Christianity has been dominant are apt to be the countries where materialism and scepticism are most widespread and where social and political liberties are most easily undermined. Churches which claim

for themselves a final authority in dogmatic definition, and thus attack the mind by methods of concussion, can hardly fail to represent Christianity as fundamentally magisterial and dictatorial and as consecrating the despotic principle. The act of Christian faith may then be all too easily equated, in the eyes of the world, with the collapse of the intellect before the assault of dogma, and the alternative that offers itself is the repudiation of faith altogether. So that if ever again in our own country Christianity were to be nationalised into one comprehensive, syndicated institution which should claim authority to stand magisterially and prescriptively between the Word of God and the people, then it is likely that by millions of Englishmen the livery of unbelief would be accepted as a nobler habit for the soul than the uniform of so regimented a faith.

One recognises, of course, the blots and stains on the other side of the picture. Over three hundred sects in Christendom! What a witness to confusion! What an affront to the Faith! Yet we ought not to be misled out of all reason by these figures. So far as the Free Churches are concerned, the fact is that these sectarian divisions classify themselves under a very few heads. There may be a variety of Baptist sects in Europe and America, but they are all Baptists, and known to be such; the same is true of the various Presbyterian Churches, and, until recent years, of the many different Methodist bodies, now happily united: and between Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Congregationalists there is an impressive unity in all matters of vital faith—a unity which is making for visible union. And the point is that this unity which already exists, and which is developing toward organic union, has not been dictated by any external ecclesiastical authority; it has been conceived in liberty and wrought by the grace of the Spirit and the Word of God. It is to this liberty, then, that the Free Churches bear witness; liberty in the region of intellect and conscience—liberty of faith; not the licence to choose truth *or* error, for man is obligated to choose the truth; but liberty to seek and cultivate an examined faith in the light of the living Word of God; liberty, therefore, to accept as helps and guides, and not as warders and taskmasters, the doctrine and counsel that come to us by tradition and by institutional certification.

But also, for Free Churchmen, the Word of God is the charter of freedom in the region of politics and the State no less than in the region of faith. And here, manifestly, the Free Church witness is pertinent to the new situation in Europe.

When Cavour on his deathbed greeted Fra Giacomo with the words, " Friar, a free Church in a free State! ", he spoke in the voice of nineteenth-century Liberalism. The Christian Church and the secular State were to exist side by side, each minding its own proper business; and even when the State established the Church by law it was still recognised that their spheres were distinct, and therefore the partnership was amicable. But in Europe to-day the new Totalitarian ideologies have created a new situation. To-day the State is entering the domain of the Church; it is invading the realm of metaphysics, of conscience, of faith; it is itself a sort of Church, with a creed of its own, a morality of its own, a spiritual goal of its own; it puts itself forward as a transcendent entity, a religious (or anti-religious) mystery, sitting in the place of authority and power and demanding of its subjects a complete obedience in mind and will and soul.

For the average Englishman, it is true, these reflections have a relevancy that is comfortably remote. As Professor Karl Barth has suggested recently at St. Andrew's, Great Britain is still, in common with the Scandinavian countries, living in the old Europe of bygone days, and the happy anachronism is accepted with more or less of complacency.

> . . . it must always seem natural to a Briton to regard our Continental troubles, commotions, struggles and revolutions as regrettable but transitory exceptions to the rule with which you are familiar, whereas the plain fact is that over the whole Continent it is precisely this rule itself—that unity of Church and State which means the Old Europe . . . —which has been shaken and in part shattered.

And however secure our insulation may be, it ought not to narcotise a proper concern for the nature of our own witness in the present world-situation. Moreover, it may be that Canon Guy Rogers was not unconscionably wide of the mark when he suggested recently at Oxford that it might need only another major crisis to transform our own National Government into something more or less pontifical and totalitarian —in the name, of course, of the Defence of the Realm.

It is here, indeed, that the situation for all our Churches, National and Free, is crucial—here in the fact that the morality of every national or imperial State is grounded upon its own interests and preservation. Self-preservation is the sovereign law of the State, and any course—arson, poisoning, the destruction of unarmed civilian communities—is " moral " and justifiable if the defence of the realm demands it. Here we reach the ultimates of State-morality; and now that modern science has placed at the disposal of the State such forces of destruction as can menace whole populations with terror, torture, madness and death, the challenge to the Christian conscience is inescapable. No one believes that Christianity can be nationalised like coal or gas or electricity, and subordinated to the service of Governments as a public utility; there is however a very general belief that religion properly functions (and justifies itself) as the preservative of society and usually as the upholder of the existing order and the State itself. And as to this, modern Free Churchmen cannot be lightly accused of inculcating a disparaging conception of the dignity of earthly government or of forgetting that the Powers that be are ordained of God. As the Rev. Thomas Edmunds has recently pointed out in his excellent little book, " Christian Freedom and Community," as far back as 1895 so doughty a Free Churchman as Dr. Clifford contributed to the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW an article on " Religion and State " in which he quoted with approval Lotze's dictum that the State is " a union of living persons . . . feeling itself to be more than the sum of those living persons," and holding itself " obliged to maintain a definite form of spiritual culture." Dr. Clifford indeed went further and animadverted upon the blindness of men in times past " to the divinity of the State " as a " sovereign educator " and " guide to life," and to the function " of civic activity in establishing the rule of God."

But to-day the blind ruthlessness of modern warfare and the neo-paganism of modern States are slowly forcing the Christian conscience over the line of " world-affirmation " and back upon the ultimate line of " world-negation " maintained by Apostolic Christianity. It is coming to be felt that the first Christian concern is not for the preservation of the State nor yet of " civilisation," but for the confession of the eternal Faith in a temporal and transient world; and that,

by a divine paradox, the Churches can best serve—and save—"civilisation" by denying its ultimacy as a moral ideal. In short, their allegiance is not to any of the kingdoms of this world but to a Kingdom not of this world, and to the eternal Word of God.

This is not to identify the Free Church position with an extreme and absolute Pacifism. The pacifist who endeavours after a seamless ideological ethic and a pedantic moralism is countered by the New Testament itself, which includes both the Sermon on the Mount and the thirteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. To affirm the Last Things is not to declare that they must be the Next Things, nor to repudiate all ethical relations with interim conditions. To affirm eternity and deny the finality of this present world, to affirm the law of love and deny the primacy of force—this is not to deny also the reality, within its own sphere, of the temporal State, nor to repudiate its sanctions. For here, indeed, the New Testament commits us to that fundamental paradox from which there is really no escape—although to recognise is to be accused of "confused thinking" or worse—namely, the paradoxical relation between the temporal and the eternal, between flesh and spirit, between force and love. To live in society at all is to agree to some measure of compromise, and to attempt to apply the Christian rule to a sub-Christian civilisation is to acknowledge the necessity. "For love's sake," as Brunner puts it, "the possession of force by the State is necessary, although in itself the use of force is opposed to love." And this cannot be dismissed as "casuistry," since the Christian, in common with every rational citizen, must deal not only with principles but with actual cases.

For this reason most Free Churchmen, no less than others, have supported the League of Nations. They have believed that war can be built out of our international life only as it has been built out of the internal affairs of individual countries—by some system of union, by a common law, a common currency of conscience and a central authority capable of enforcing its sanctions. The League, in other words, represented an approach to the Christian ideal of community, an ideal in which war on the one hand and neutrality on the other were ruled out as an offence against international morality. But what is to be done if the Great Powers, betraying the

League with a kiss, lead us back to an era of balance-of-power diplomacy, calculated neutralities and "non-intervention"? For then war itself is by way of being tacitly reinstated, and from being outlawed as a crime against the community of nations returns to its status as a legitimate instrument of national or imperial policy. There must be a limit somewhere to Christian compromise, a limit beyond which it becomes indecent. Compromise that obtains an advance toward a recognised ideal is one thing, compromise that make terms with apostasy another.

But it is precisely here that the new mind and temper in European politics meets the Churches with a demand, tacit or explicit, that their witness must conform to the policy of the national State. The Church, ceasing to be seer or prophet, is put into uniform as Chaplain-General.

What is being envisaged, then, is a fight for what Professor Barth has termed "the most inward being" of the Churches—of Christianity itself. And more: it is a fight for the soul, the spiritual liberty, of the human race. For if in these last years in Germany the Confessional Churches have found their long-neglected meeting-houses crowded with earnest worshippers, has it not been, in part at least, because the confession which these Churches are now witnessing is no mere sectarian affair but is a conflict waged no less for the struggling spirit of Man than for the freedom of the Word of God? For the struggle in Germany is dramatising a conflict which is age-long and world-wide, and which, being a conflict of principle, is inexorable and beyond compromise. In the light—or darkness—of this menace of the modern State, what may be the position of our National and State-established Churches in Europe is a question which must be left to answer itself; but it is clear that in these last decades the witness of the Free Churches has assumed, not indeed a new significance, but a new intensity of significance.

And for Free Churchmen the application is plain. If our freedom stands in the Word of God we must seek to the Word as it encounters us in history and life and supremely in the Gospel, knowing that this same living Word "gives to every man and every era such answers to their questions as they deserve." For indeed it is not a Recall to Religion that deeply meets the situation. Religion is an ambiguous word and its calls and recalls are various. They may summon us with an appeal that

means little more than that of the Old School Tie (spiritualised), or an appeal to preserve the *status quo* from those commotions which threaten the traditional order, or even an appeal to submit to some new and plausible tyranny in the name of God and King and Country. There is no lack of "religion" in our new and militant Cæsarisms. It is not religion that convicts the conscience of man and imposes a crisis upon the world, but Christ; nor even "Christianity," externalised and systematised and capable of "concordats" and arrangements, but Christ. In Him the living Word encounters us, and it is He Who encounters us in the Word. In our bondage to that Word is our freedom; and we are coming to see that the freedom of God, the freedom of the Word, and the freedom of Man stand together.

GWILYM O. GRIFFITH.

JACOB WASSERMANN.

THROUGH the towns and villages of the Bavarian province of Franconia a young man is harried, with burning eyes. He is sixteen years old and hungry. He loves his home, that which is called the "heart of Germany." He cannot leave it, and yet he knows that it can never be a home for him, that he will never have a home, he, Ahasuerus, the wandering Jew. He has nothing of his own, not even a parental home, for his father, married a second time, has no use for him. No one has any use for him, himself, Jacob Wassermann, least of all. No one wants his work. He is in a land rich and blossoming, needing industry and skill, and yet he is shut out of it. Restless and fugitive shalt thou be on earth, O Jew!

Then at last a hint of release comes from Vienna, from a faraway and unknown uncle. But after a few months this dream too is shattered. It has been more like a nightmare. The relations have even less use for the youngster from Furth than he for them. For at this time he loves but one person, his mother, but one place, her grave in the Jewish cemetery at Nuremberg. Jacob Wassermann wanders on and on blindly through a land that does not want him, does not need him. Munich, Nuremberg, Wurzburg, Zurich mark but the halts on the road of this fevered journey, of these hurrying, futile attempts of a hemmed-in, hunted creature to find rest, work, peace.

At twenty he set foot in Munich. Here he was to spend four endless years, hard on the starvation level of proletarian existence as manual worker and casual labourer. All day long he vegetates. Only the nights are his own, and these he gives up to his visions. It is out of this period—as a complacent and empty century lies down to die—that his first work arises, *The Jews of Zirndorf*. It is the history of a people's character, a waif's story of home. In the prologue two characters emerge, play their part and vanish—the messianic figure of the Sabbatai Zevi, a dark and gloomy shadow, and the suffering Agathon, a morbid self-portrait. The book contains all the problems of a man of forty.

An author's life, begun like a dark musical theme; the key in which the chords are struck has a new name, but the content is old. It is called *My Life as German and Jew*. The

landscape is German, but the heart which burns itself out within it is Jewish. It is under this sign that the German poet and Jewish sceptic, Jacob Wassermann, begins his work. The books which follow handle problems of a narrower world. The poet goes to Vienna. Austria is to become his second home, his grave. The short stories and novels, covering a whole decade, are to-day, both in their literary and personal worth, faded, even unimportant. They are all—*The Housekeeper*, *The Story of Young Renate Fuchs*, *Moloch*, *The Unkissed Lips*, *Alexander in Babylon*, and *The Sisters*—but stones that make up the great building of his *Caspar Hauser*. Like all his writings, this is also very much an autobiography, a self-revelation. Young Jacob Wassermann is the young Caspar Hauser. He is the man without home, without past and without future. He is that Middle German mystic's candle that burns at both ends. In a world of the most awful confusion, of inextricable, tumultuous muddle, that utter fool Caspar is the one stable point in the vision's flight. With a poet's magic eyes he is seen set back in the past, a grandiose vision of the confusion which will soon threaten the poet himself. That confusion was to be in his married life; but not much can or should be said of that "marital hell," besides the little that the author himself put into his last work, the vast, complex *Joseph Kerkhoven's Third Existence*.

This first marriage of Wassermann's, entered into at the turn of the century and not broken off till the end of the War, was "the thorn in the flesh" of which Kierkegaard spoke so shudderingly. As time went on the marriage was blessed with children, but the partners were as restless and as unhappy as poor Caspar Hauser, its product. Later there came another novel—quite apart from the unimportant propagandist pot-boilers, as he himself shamefacedly called them—born of the labyrinths of that "marital hell," *The Goose Man*. Both man and poet had meanwhile grown richer and riper, and so he could let this work end, in contrast to the tragic conclusion of *Caspar Hauser*, with a peaceful, resigned Daniel Nothafft. This musician's novel has a permanent place as one of the finest monuments of the German language. Everything that can be called music and landscape in Germany is there in marvellous movement, and echoes long after in the memory. It is into its development that the poet's first great experience falls, his finding a home. The poet, the

age-long wanderer, Agathon, Alexander, Erwin, the forty-year-old, finds a home. Altaussee, the Austrian village at the foot of the Dachstein, at the edge of the little lake, that pearl in the magic shell of the Salzkammergut, becomes the poet's deepest intellectual and spiritual home. He will never leave it again; he will follow Columbus's trail to America and travel Stanley's path in Africa, but he will always come back to his Altaussee. In his dreams the lake's small jagged waves roll, blown by the southernly *Föhn*, the bare and mighty Loser towers, the noble, sheer-faced Trisselwand glitters, and the colossal whiteness of the Dachstein glacier shines immortal and unforgettable. Here by the lake, on its grassy shores, only a stone's throw from the country houses of Schnitzler and Hofmannsthal, his closest friends (as far as the creative mind's loneliness knows such a relationship at all), the poet settles down. Even so, restless like the waves of the lake, accusations and lawsuits of the marital conflict strike unceasingly even as far as this paradise: but the poet learns to bear them. For the second and greatest experience of his life has come to him: to his side another comrade comes, his second wife.

The poet was not broken by the War—a reproach that neither he nor any other can be spared who came out of that bath of steel with unscathed head and a whole skin. He did not indeed, like many of his colleagues, waste his powers unconditionally. But it would have been no great pity if his connections with those "glorious" years, published under the title *German Personalities and Events*, had never been collected. Throughout this period, as the old times fell to pieces and the new era waited to appear, between the break-up of the first marriage and the painful public announcement of the second, the poet published a novel a year. But only at the beginning and at the end of these ten years was there a work of any enduring importance—*Christian Wahnschaffe* (1918), and *The Maurizius Case* (1928). What lies between, *Worlds' Ends*, with its four sequels *Wedlock*, *Pilgrim*, *Revolt*, and *Amulett* are but pot-boilers, written to satisfy the ever-growing material needs. The poet was rich and famous, yet from his lips came this moving confession: "a person who has once struggled for his bread bears scars on his mind which, even when he is free of care, secretly begin to bloom."

In *Christian Wahnschaffe* the basic harmonies of the Parsival theme are struck again. Agathon, Alexander, Caspar, Daniel, all those tired-hearted brothers, passive heroes whose life is suffering, get a new brother, a millionaire's offspring who, in a great city's slums, passes away and then appears again, resurrected. Ten years later there comes his younger brother, Etzel, who brings to an end the son's struggle with his tyrannical father and wins it. These two great epics are the two pillars in Jacob Wassermann's life and work. What came before was youth, what came afterwards was age, ripeness, withering, decay. But we have not yet got as far as that.

Suddenly one's eyes are opened: one sees. There comes a day when one knows that poetical language does not suffice for the reckoning with life. As Wassermann himself put it: "In the course of his life every writer consumes such a colossal amount of words that gradually the words lose their appearance and their importance." This long-due and ever-postponed reckoning with the world bears the name *My Life as German and Jew*. There is a sentence in this book, a terrible, despairing sentence, but in its meaning the purport of the whole work is contained: "It is fruitless for them to live and to die; they say: he is a Jew." And that century-old pessimism, which stigmatises the life of this nation living among the nations, finds no way out. Even though the poet always looks at himself and his companions in fate as "victims of superstition," though he always tries to argue to himself and the rest that all this talk about "Jews" and "Germans" has neither sense nor purpose. Even though he once cried out "This being Jewish does not apply to me any longer," yet behind the words and the arguments there is still traceable the tired, sceptical smile of the Don Quixote, who runs at the windmill's sails with his pen. The book aroused a great deal of comment. Where other authors—Döblin, Hofmannsthal, Liebermann, Schnitzler, Zweig and so on—remained silent, partly because they had nothing to say, partly because they did not wish to say anything, he wanted to pull away the curtain which separated them from the nation's life. But the curtain was stronger than he.

As if to get away from these all too oppressive and insoluble problems, the poet once more wrote for the market. He produced the two biographies of Christopher Columbus and Henry Stanley, that thus with the two early works, *Alexander* and *Caspar Hauser*, he might complete a symphony in biography, in four movements. Then came the fear, the most awful feeling the writer ever felt, the fear of dying before fulfilment, that awful feeling which comes to the best in the zenith of life. He had said of his dead colleague, in that wonderful *In Memoriam Hofmannsthal the Friend*: "He lived his last ten years in a continual state of fear." Yet this was also a revelation of himself. It was in a race with death that he produced his last two works, *Etzel Andergast* and *Joseph Kerkhoven's Third Existence*."

These two books, together with their powerful prelude, *The Maurizius Case*, form a trilogy. In them the three faculties of our life are lived and given form in monstrous visions. Maurizius, the juridical, Andergast, the medical, and Kerkhoven, the theological vein of our existence. Justice, marriage, and the seeking after God, those are the three ultimate poetical experiences of Wassermann's age.

Of these three books Maurizius was the most sensational, Andergast the most exciting, and Kerkhoven the most human. But there is something more to be said about Kerkhoven, not because it is the sixty-year-old's last work, but because it crowns his life. Wassermann, from the heights of his work, his fame and his wisdom, recounts his own life. Not *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, but truth—without fantasy. The poet flees to Dr. Kerkhoven's sanatorium. His picture of the doctor's world, the section entitled *Alexander and Bettina*, stands out like a rock. In it is contained the story of his marriage. To find a comparison in literature one can but name Goethe's *Wahlverwandtschaften*. Yet besides this log of his own life, seen, it seems, almost with August Strindberg's eyes and written with his pen, dipped in gall and blood, there are many other and perhaps more important things contained in *Kerkhoven*. The central point in the book is the creative work. Three times a manuscript is the focus of events. On the first occasion it is the material of a writer called Mordahn (in reality the well-known German journalist Maximilian Harden) who dies there in Kerkhoven's home, after he has himself destroyed that material, which would have been a fearful weapon in his hands. On the second occasion it is Alexander Herzog's manuscript, under which name Wassermann had sketched his own life for Kerkhoven. The third time it is

Doctor Kerkhoven's own life work, which is lost for ever through a tragic mistake of Herzog's.

This threefold chasing after paper, after the product of thought and experience, is not accidental, but a profound confession summarised in the sentence: "Each of us is each moment just as likely to do good as evil. We never know whether what we have done was good or bad." This *Ignorabimus* is the poet's final word. In ultimate symbology Kerkhoven's long foreseen and predestined death is a way to God, to a God before whom, in the end, even the atheist Alexander bows. Thus this last book of Wassermann's is theological in its final purpose. It closes with the birth of a new man. Over him bend the people of the past, of resignation, of decline, among whom the poet also counts himself. He died, and others will follow him. But we shall not forget him.

No, we shall not forget him, because we cannot forget him. We are reminded of the beautiful remark of his friend Hugo von Hofmannsthal, when someone in the company asked who was "a good man": and Hofmannsthal, without hesitating, firmly and emphatically replied: "Jacob, he is a good man." We know this much better since his life story, written by Martha Karlweiss, the companion of his last years, was published. Even if we were to subtract all that loving prepossession sees or wishes to see in rosy colours, nevertheless we feel throughout the pages of this mighty work of self-revelation, the struggle of a giant personality with his evil spirit. That tireless frenzy for work that would not let him look up. Only now and then he took momentary rests, these were closely bound up with all the peaks and chasms of hope and despair. That ceaseless craze that dragged him down to a mere money maker, working for pay, deep in debt; a serf to his calling, chasms that swallowed all that was once safe and harmonious. Stronger and ever stronger grew the wave of anti-semitism, which the author sought to withstand, deeply conscious of how hopeless it was to try to dam the floods of the underworld.

Certainly Jacob Wassermann's last works were not accidental amidst the intellectual victims who finally acknowledge that all was in vain against the up-swung spade, rifle butt or bayonet. Not for a moment had Wassermann, prepared for and consecrated to death, that detached, courageous attitude to life of a Goethe: "The traces of your earthly days cannot

vanish in æons." No, our author knew it and knew it ever more clearly that after him the tide of mud would break in and overwhelm and submerge every work, every confession, every spirit. Consciously and full of smiling resignation Wassermann did not sheath his pen. He had no thought of flight, not for a moment would he flee into the "Darkness." For that the glitter of the glacier from the distant roof was too clear, too powerful. Everything around him was dead. Hofmannsthal, his Apollo, Schnitzler, his Socrates, were dead. Whatever was alive was withering or passing over to the Swastika. *My Life as German and Jew* ended in an impasse. There was no retreat. For behind him stood his work—mighty, gigantic. Before him stood a wall, erected by hatred, stupidity, lies, hopelessness. There was no resignation—Jacob Wassermann could not break his pen and play the private man. He could not be silent nor act the hypocrite. Nor could he flee or fight. He had to die, and death made it easy for him. He was not long dying. After a few days' illness his body surrendered to the inevitable. Four peasants carried him to the little cemetery of Altaussee. The snow crackled under their shoes. He died on the morning of the New Year (1934). He had no wish to live through the year that made Hitler master of Germany. They left him in the earth that he loved more than anything else; they closed the grave with snow and earth. Above his grave rises Mt. Loser. Soon it will thaw, spring, summer, autumn, the world rolls on, but no more for him. We men are transient and our work is quickly forgotten; mountain, forest and sea remain.

FRITZ GROSS.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA.

THERE are few countries in Europe which know more about the British Empire than Yugoslavia. Yet we know very little of the constructive work done in that country since the Great War; its democratic tendencies and its problems of nationalities. Many of the best workers in Australia, New Zealand and Canada have come from different parts of that kingdom; and the only complaint of the Dominion Governments has always been that these people will not settle; they prefer to return to Yugoslavia and to practise there what they have learnt from us. From the moment I reached the Dalmatian Coast I found myself constantly in the company of men and women who had lived in our Dominions or had spent years in the United States, many as exiles under the pre-war Austrian régime, and others who had been refugees and guests of France and England throughout the Great War.

These people of Dalmatia are mostly Croats, and are cultured people with a tremendous admiration for what they call Democracy. I would be more inclined to say they are keen individualists longing for a greater independence than they have got, but rather intolerant of the other nationalities in their kingdom, without whom in the long run they can do nothing worth while. The Dalmatians, once under Venice, later under Vienna, and to-day under Belgrade, watch every development of the Irish situation. They feel that their position is similar. But their leader, Dr. Maček, pointed out to me in Zagreb how wrong is this comparison. The Irish are three million people in an Empire of five hundred millions; the Croats of Croatia and Dalmatia and the Slovenes form over 40 per cent. of the whole Yugoslav population of thirteen millions. The Irish are certainly not the superiors in education or culture of the British; but the Croats are in many ways more cultured than the Serbs.

This fact greatly worried an old friend of mine in Split. He pointed out how the Croats had lived for centuries semi-independently under the rule of the Hapsburgs. After the Great War they had joined with Serbia, and now they found themselves not only in a slight minority in the new kingdom, but under the strict rule of the Serbs, who were fighters, not cultured rulers like the Hapsburgs. He and his friends would

point out to me that no Croats and no Slovenes are allowed to hold high positions in the Army, nor in the Navy; this latter point being particularly galling to a race of sailors from the Dalmatian Coast. He said, the Serbs, due to long years of suppression under the Turks, were still a distrustful race, knowing only one form of rule, the rule under which they themselves had lived for generations; and they are determined to be the dominant partner in this federation of small nationalities.

The Serbian's answer to this admits quite frankly that Belgrade has often been too greedy, has got the best Government posts for its supporters, has made fortunes for its citizens, and has done much to give the Croats and the Slovenes grievances; but now they would alter all that. They argue, could they have been expected to allow Croat officers, just after the war, who had fought against them, and who had been trained in the traditions of the Austrian Army, to remain officers in what now was the Army of the Serbian King? It may be true that, due to conscription, nearly half the Army is to-day Croat and possibly discontented; but surely that is all the more reason to have Serbian generals. And moreover, how would it be possible for young cadets of the post-war years to have yet reached any higher rank in the Army or the Navy than they in many cases hold? The Serbians argued that the Croats might be culturally superior, but they could not see that that made it excusable for them to sulk and to refuse to take further part in the country's government, and they were proving themselves to be in many ways less virile than the Serbs. These Serbs asked me to leave Dalmatia and penetrate first to Sarajevo, there to see a city of Moslems, Jews, Serbs, Croats and Bosnians and to try and realise the complicated problem of how to rule and please everyone; and later to visit Nish and Southern Serbia, there to see how virile and active is the stock that intends to dominate this gateway to the Balkans, and if possible to incorporate it one day with Bulgaria, making a powerful kingdom from the Adriatic to the Black Sea.

In Sarajevo I found the dominant population Moslem. These people explained to me that they admired Turkey but distrusted the modernism of Kemal Ataturk. They told me of their oppression in recent years in Yugoslavia and said that they had finally given in and joined the Government for two

reasons : they felt they could stand oppression no longer and must have peace, and they felt the nation was in danger and whatever happened Yugoslavia must not be allowed to break up. They compared their alliance with the present Government to a Moslem marriage—it did not prevent them marrying other people as well, and they could put away their wife when they needed her no more. They seemed to find the Croats more difficult to work with than the Serbians.

Next in importance to the Moslems in Sarajevo were the Serbians, and they showed me some of the practical work they are doing for the country as a whole. I went with them to peasants' farms which though poor were neatly kept, and the top rooms were usually let in the summer to tourists from the towns. On the road we passed Army conscripts at work on their own farm ; for the Army teaches farming in its military training in order to supply itself with food and keep independent of profiteers in time of war. I also noticed several half-idle factories near the city. These were started with Government support in 1928, but the slump had hit them badly, and it had been impossible to persuade the young peasants to leave the land and work in factories as long as they could make a living at home. In spite of that there are some 600,000 industrial workers in Yugoslavia, and considering the poverty of the country it is amazing how much they have done for themselves with the aid of the Government.

In Sarajevo you will find perhaps the cleanest unemployment hostel for men in Europe ; here I watched over sixty unemployed men and ten women enrolling night after night for free board and lodging. Through their insurance tickets they can stay there for twelve weeks, and those who are passing through to some of the other fifteen towns that have doss-houses can stay for three nights, and longer if no one else wants their beds. I found every type in the queue, from fair-haired Moslems, wearing fezes, to fathers travelling through with their nine- or ten-year-old sons, all lining up for a shower bath. This the keeper turns on, and after they have all washed he leads them to bedrooms for four to six people, where they stay peacefully till six o'clock next morning. As I came away I could not help but think of the great centres I have visited in Vienna, in Berlin, in Rome and in Philadelphia, with numbers of police and armed guards and other signs of authority. Here in the rough and so-called war-like Balkans, there was only a

rather mild-looking keeper with his keys to look after sixty down-and-out mountaineers. There was never any trouble, they did what he told them, and he often turned one out and was then backed up by fifty-nine out of the sixty men.

Next morning I went out to see something that again is typical of Yugoslavia and that I think cannot be found in any part of the British Isles that I have visited ; I went out to see a sanatorium built entirely for those of the 600,000 industrial workers who may be needing a rest or may be slight cases of tuberculosis. Over 200 people can be housed in this really beautiful building where there is now going to be built another wing especially for railway workers. I was told that there were already ten such buildings scattered throughout the mountainous districts of Yugoslavia. Contributions to keep these sanatoria going are compulsory, equally from employers and employees ; the State pays nothing.

Around the buildings are some 400 acres of farmland which produce nearly all the requirements for the patients, especially the milk for the tuberculosis cases. The land was taken from the peasants, but it was properly paid for ; the gardens have been beautifully laid out and young trees planted ; the idea started ten years ago, and the last wing was only completed in 1936. There are doctors in charge and Roman Catholic nuns act as nurses.

The peasants of Serbia work on different lines from the industrial workers. They have special co-operative health centres meant for groups of small villages. Before a district is allowed to have one of these co-operatives 200 heads of families must apply for the centre. They must be willing to pay from 5 to 20 dinars a month, and in addition, every time they visit a doctor they must pay him 6 dinars ; and if he comes to them, he charges 10 dinars ; roughly speaking, a dinar is worth a penny. The people pay for their own medicines and women and children can have free examination once a week. There are already 120 centres, and each centre may include about twenty villages, where previously there had never been such a thing as a doctor. These centres also provide a midwife. The whole thing is run on voluntary lines, and the idea is one of peasant self-help, which is founded on grants given by the Rockefeller Foundation and arose out of the original American Serbian Relief Organisation after the Great War.

The work these co-operatives do is a little different in the different parts of Serbia. In the south I found the most necessary work is to teach the poorer people how to look after their large families, mainly in villages where life is still extremely primitive. One of the first things they have to teach the people is to wash, and for that purpose they show them how to use the shells of old pumpkins. They teach them to provide lavatories and other methods of sanitation, and have built in each of these centres a model type of farmhouse, or else a modern building on school lines. Here they are teaching them a certain amount of national history, and that is why the Croats refuse to join them ; although the Croats themselves have got organisations run on very similar lines. In the Serbian scheme the whole question of village life is included, as well as veterinary work and such agricultural questions as the most suitable kinds of food. At first the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture objected to this because they considered it a trespass on their own work. But afterwards they gave way. It is a proof of how important an advance is this Serbian work that people are being sent from all over the world to copy the Serbian ideas, including I believe from certain parts of India.

The north of Yugoslavia differs slightly as the peasants are wealthier. There I found the problem is not one of large families, but how to look after the small ones and to make them increase. The people are so keen to keep their properties in one family and intact, that there has been a considerable amount of inter-marriage amongst relatives. And in one town I visited, in the last four years the birth-rate has gone down from 21,000 to 9,000 ; all this in a district of 75,000 people. In the south you find it extremely difficult to get to the co-operatives, since they are in outlying districts where the roads are not very good. But in the north they have got them in the suburbs of big towns ; and in one place I found a suburb of 800 families where previously there had been no doctor. Six hundred families belonged to the peasant co-operatives, although 300 families out of this number were already insured workers in the Government insurance. This shows that the co-operatives can be useful for working men as well as for the peasants. I asked why people belonged to both, and the working men gave me this interesting answer. In the co-operatives they pay for each medical visit, but not

in the State insurance ; as a result in the State insurance they are always rushing to a doctor, whilst in the co-ops they think twice before paying such a visit and value it more. Again in the co-ops, if they do not like their doctor they get rid of him ; whereas in the State insurance they must take what they can get. The State insurance only gives certain medicines and the patients feel that they are the cheapest obtainable. Whereas in the peasant co-ops they get the best, though all admit they must pay for it, but argue it is still much cheaper than if there was no co-op ; and they feel very strongly that the peasant organisation is far more personal.

At heart the Yugoslav is neither capitalist nor communist, and his struggle to keep independent of both systems is noticeable in his reaction to life in a highly organised factory near Osijek in Croatia. Here I was shown a model town where 2,200 workers live, controlled by the owner who learnt his ideas in America. The worker must first work for fourteen days for nothing, to be tried out, and the salesmen, who go up and down the country selling the boots turned out at the factory at the rate of seven million pairs a year, spend six weeks each year here. They are kept on full wages in the factory learning the latest things about the boots and also taking a course in all forms of pedicure. Only five days are work days, but a fixed amount of work must be done, and to complete it many have to work a sixth day. There is no pension scheme, but half the worker's share in monthly profits is held for him against illness. The workers have their " own " restaurant, dance band, and even monthly journal, with articles in it from what the managers consider the best literary efforts of the past month throughout the world. All employees have to rent houses from the company and to use the company's shops and stores.

The reaction of the Yugoslav to all this is interesting. The small shoemaker is bitter ; the taxpayer points out that the company pays less tax than would the thousands of shoemakers put out of work, and these become a charge on the community ; the average citizen gets his shoes cheaper and is unwilling to press the Government to control prices. But there is little doubt the Yugoslav as a rule dislikes such capitalistic ventures, as do the supporters of the small trades in this country. Incidentally, where I have seen similar factories working in Australia the Yugoslav immigrants have been the

leaders in resentment. The Government, however, which has behind it the interests of about 300 Serbian wealthy families in Belgrade, will not step in since it is very anxious to encourage foreign capital, especially in the development of the mineral possibilities of Southern Yugoslavia, which are very considerable. Here the German capitalists would seem to have left the British well behind, and the propaganda of their country was to be found almost everywhere I went.

In the north-west it was most noticeable where in the olden times, down to Trieste, it was Empire territory; and Frederick William of Prussia said of this territory, "to lose this for Germany would be like 'cutting off your nose to spite your face.'" Here the inhabitants all spoke German as well as their native tongue, but were intensely interested to hear of the strengthening of the British Navy. The people spoke with feeling of the Slovene minorities in Italy, with some disrespect of the Serbians in Belgrade, and with a certain reverence of their former Hapsburg rulers, but with fear of Germany. Further south in Nish there was no German spoken, but most people could talk French. Even so there was a great sympathy for Germany over the colonial grievances and a memory that she saved Nish from being pillaged by the Bulgarians. I found, however, little actual sympathy for the German régime, especially amongst the Army, for Nish is an Army centre.

The Army seemed rather socialist and distinctly republican and wanted to be friendly with France and England, but felt both countries were on the downward grade and that Yugoslavia must *faute de mieux* make friends with Germany and Italy. This was much encouraged by a number of young men who have been given scholarships by the Germans to be used in German universities and have returned as very real propagandists. They are opposed, especially in Sarajevo, by the wealthy Jewish families of Spanish origin who have been settled there some 400 years and are about 8,000 strong. They do what they can to help German Jews pass through to Palestine and are hampered at every point by the Fascist organisations which show signs of being supported by outside funds, especially in Zagreb, though their leader is above suspicion. The Government, since it needs the financial assistance of the Jews, is somewhat curbing the Fascist enthusiasms.

In Zagreb I found a large demand for Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, which is sold in Croatian, and the whole of Croatia seemed

disgruntled. In a long talk with Dr. Maček, the Croat leader, I gathered his Party felt it was useless, if not dangerous, to take an active part in politics in Belgrade until the Constitution was altered, and he felt if the Prince Regent holds firm to his determination to hand over to the boy King Peter the same Constitution he received from King Alexander as a sacred trust, then there is a grave risk that there will be little left for King Peter to hold together, for it will be too late; Croatia even talks of breaking away. The Croats are undoubtedly bitter. By developing their own co-operative movements and by a barter trade with Dalmatia, they manage to keep semi-independent of Belgrade, but the result is a great weakening of the nation and any incident such as the recent question of the Concordat is made full use of politically, since as a whole the Croats are anti-clerical.

One comes away from Yugoslavia, especially after watching the wonderful health work done by the Slavonic Sokols, and by the different co-operatives, and after examining the wonderful mineral and industrial possibilities of this country, in despair at the shortsightedness of politicians and at the lack of statesmen. The people as a whole are steadier than in most of Southern Europe and without agitators would work easily together; but they are independent mountaineers, most of them, and they will not develop as long as they are harshly ruled. Whether they could make any better show of a free democracy to-day than they did before King Alexander abolished the previous Constitution, it is difficult to say; but they have the makings of a great nation, as Germany and Italy fully realise, and as Great Britain may, before it is too late. Many of their best intellects would like to model the five different little countries that make up Yugoslavia on the lines of Great Britain and the Dominions.

It must be remembered that there are as many millions in Croatia as in Australia and as many Slovenes as there are New Zealanders; Serbs as there are (non-French-) Canadians and Bosnians and Moslems and Montenegrins as there are Ulstermen and Free Staters. Altogether they form thirteen millions of people with political differences, in the heart of the Balkans, but with an historic past, a possibly great future and a very real hatred of war and distrust of dictatorship.

WILLIAM TEELING.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1898-9.

THE last two years of the nineteenth century bore the seed of the diplomatic development which led to the catastrophe of 1914. Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, had not sufficient confidence in any of his younger colleagues to entrust to them the all-important Foreign Office. The policy with which he identified himself throughout his tenure of office was " against binding alliances with any country. It was not one of ' isolation,' because he continually intervened actively in European affairs, and was indeed prolific in initiating agreements for mutual advantage with all neighbours."* Balfour played an important part, not only as the Leader of the House but also as the Prime Minister's deputy during the frequent periods when he was kept away from office by ill-health. The " second head of the British Government," however, was Joseph Chamberlain, who had chosen the Colonial Office in 1895, and, in Mr. Garvin's words, soon became recognised everywhere as the dynamic man of the new Imperialistic era. At that period of colonial expansion all over the world, he could hardly be excluded from an important share in Great Britain's foreign policy.

Events gave to Anglo-German relations a cardinal importance. The German Ambassador was Count Hatzfeldt, whom Bismarck called the best horse in his stable. He was on intimate terms with Salisbury, who had already known him during his second Ministry. The increasing obstacles to good relations between Downing Street and the Wilhelmstrasse, added to the English climate, did much to undermine his health. He, like Salisbury, was for long periods unable to give full attention to his duties during the closing years of the century. Thus the Attaché, later Councillor, of the German Embassy, Freiherr von Eckardstein, became an outstanding person. Though his diplomatic rank was not a high one at first, and he even left the diplomatic service for more than a year in 1898-9, he pushed himself into the limelight by never quarrelling with the all-important man of the German Foreign Office, Holstein, and made himself indispensable through his position in London society, due in part to his marriage to John Blundell Maple's daughter. He regularly visited the pro-German Rothschilds, and called the

* Lady Gwendolen Cecil to the author.

Duke of Devonshire and Joseph Chamberlain his friends. Prince Hohenlohe, the octogenarian Chancellor, was too old to pay much attention to foreign affairs. He wanted to remain at peace with the Kaiser, who called him " uncle," and left the country's affairs mainly to Bülow, the Foreign Secretary, and Holstein, the " mystery man " of the Wilhelmstrasse. The latter's correspondence with German Ambassadors and envoys abroad was larger than theirs with the Secretary of State, and the suspicion is well founded that he had his share in Bismarck's dismissal, the repudiation of the Russian treaty, and Hohenlohe's appointment as Chancellor. We can well understand the Kaiser's bitter feelings when he heard again and again from foreign diplomats whom he advised to have a talk with the Secretary of State : " *J'en parlerai avec mon ami* Holstein."

The outstanding question during the first months of 1898 was the Far East. Germany had made the murder of some missionaries in 1897 a pretext for leasing the harbour of Kiaochau from the Chinese Government, thus establishing herself at the Gulf of Pechili, much to the annoyance of both Russia and Great Britain. Russia, however, had acquiesced, as it gave her an excellent reason for occupying Port Arthur and Talienwan. Salisbury did not want any dismemberment of China, and declined a Chinese offer in February 1898 of the first refusal of Wei-hai-Wei, which was still in Japanese hands. He was seriously attacked for not preventing either occupation. His policy, however, was justified, for he was fully aware of the impending danger of an Anglo-French conflict on the Upper Nile. He was determined not to give an acre of the Sudan to France nor to allow a single French soldier near it. To achieve that object without a break with France he was prepared to go a long way. Instead of protesting against Russia's Far Eastern policy he offered her a deal embracing all the disputed Asiatic questions between the two countries. That offer was declined. And instead of listening to Chamberlain's demands in the colonial negotiations with France he gave in to many of that country's wishes in West Africa. Chamberlain thought this policy weak, and argued that England could take a stronger line if she had an ally. He disliked any concession to France in West Africa, and considered the Russian diplomatic, or rather undiplomatic, methods in the Far East as a humiliation for England.

On February 3rd, 1898, he formulated his protests in a letter to Balfour, and proposed to ask the American and the German Governments " to stand in with us in our Chinese policy," in other words to become England's allies against Russia's advance in the Far East.

Balfour, who felt uncomfortable over the prospect of facing Parliament without being able to show any positive results from Salisbury's foreign policy, fell in with Chamberlain's suggestions and approached the United States unofficially on March 8th, and Germany in the same manner on March 24th. Washington was not in a position to consider anything except the impending war with Spain. The attitude of the German Government was different. Holstein was a firm believer in the inevitability of war between Great Britain and Russia. His only doubt was the precise time when it would break out. He gambled on that doubt in the hope that he would receive the offer of an alliance from both countries. He could not conceive of England going to war against Russia without wanting the help of a land Power, and Germany was the first military Power in the world. Nor could he conceive of Russia going to war against England without the help of the whole Continent. Thus, he thought, Germany was in a position where she could put up her price. The first talk between Balfour and Hatzfeldt, which took place on March 24th, ended non-committally. But that conversation was followed by a series of talks between Chamberlain and Hatzfeldt or Eckardstein. The Colonial Secretary asked for a German alliance against Russia. Germany was offered a big sphere of interest in North China, the middle and south being reserved as British spheres of interest, and was given the further promise that she would be favourably considered in any colonial claim she might make. The reason Holstein gave for refusing that offer was not that he was averse from a war in Russia. He argued that a treaty with England was not valid unless ratified by Parliament, that the Commons would probably refuse ratification, and he thus would not only not have obtained England's help in war, but would also have lost Russia's friendship. He further stipulated as a condition of negotiating a treaty that England should first show her willingness to give Germany a fair share in colonial expansion in order to predispose German public opinion towards friendship with England.

Chamberlain believed in the possibility of ratifying any treaty in Parliament which had the effect of strengthening his Far Eastern policy. He had to accept Germany's demand for special consideration in colonial questions provided that she pledged herself to conclude the alliance. The negotiations could have been left at that (as Germany did not put forward any immediate claims) if it had not been for the initiative of Eckardstein. He had assured Chamberlain that the Kaiser was eager to conclude an agreement with England based on a mutual guarantee of each other's possessions. The Colonial Secretary received the Prime Minister's authority to negotiate on those lines. To his great disappointment he found that the German Ambassador and the German Foreign Office appeared to be of a different opinion from that of the Kaiser and Eckardstein.

Chamberlain for a long time did not see the real reason for Germany's delaying tactics. He did not, or could not, understand that Germany was trying to get as much as possible out of his offers, while remaining firmly resolved not to fight against Russia. Even the Kaiser was not prepared to conclude any agreement which was too pointedly directed against St. Petersburg. He informed the Tzar, after consultation with the German Foreign Office, of the British overtures, and asked what Russia could offer should he refuse them. The Tzar answered by informing his cousin of Salisbury's overtures in the first months of 1898, and put forward a claim on Germany's gratitude for having made possible the occupation of Kiaochau. That answer was a disappointment. The German reaction towards the proposed agreement with Great Britain therefore became more favourable, particularly because the Kaiser, in a talk with the British Ambassador, was privately informed that Chamberlain wanted only a defensive agreement of which the object would be to guarantee each other's possessions and to protect them in case either country was attacked by two Powers at once. For Germany that amounted to a British guarantee of her conquest of Alsace and Lorraine and to a British alliance in case Russia and France should attack her at the same time. For England it also meant protection against the combined attack of Russia and France, plus a guarantee of her Indian and Egyptian possessions.

Meanwhile Chamberlain had been busy dispelling German fears that Parliament would not ratify any treaty with

Germany. On May 13th he spoke in strong terms against Russia and argued the case for an alliance between England and those Powers whose interests were the same as her own. In Parliament, on June 10th, he made it clear that the only Power with whom England might be associated in an attack on Russia was Germany. As the Government received a majority of 254 to 128 he had ample evidence to prove that Parliament would follow him, provided that the offer of an alliance or understanding was made by the Reich and was directed against Russia. A German offer of an alliance would certainly have been ratified by Parliament if it had contained only the guarantee that either Power would help the other in case of a combined attack by two Powers. Germany, however, did not want to offer an alliance. She was prepared to accept a British offer on her own conditions, which naturally included many colonial concessions which England was very reluctant to make. For that same reason Chamberlain as well as the other British Ministers refused to take the initiative. They knew that then they would be at Germany's mercy. Thus, though both countries were willing to accept an offer, neither was willing to make it.

There was a development in another direction. Germany had repeatedly asked Chamberlain to do something in the colonial field which might appease German public opinion. When Bülow, in June 1898, heard of the Marquis de Soveral's efforts to obtain a loan from England in exchange for Delagoa Bay, he protested in strong terms and demanded that no alteration of the existing frontiers in South Africa should be contemplated unless Germany were given her share in it. Inasmuch as an Anglo-French conflict was impending on the Nile, and the position of British subjects in the Boer Republics became more and more precarious, Salisbury acquiesced in admitting Germany to the Anglo-Portuguese negotiations. As they were kept secret they did little to assuage German public opinion, but they appeased the German Government, which was perhaps more important. Germany received an imaginary share of African territory—it remained imaginary because Portugal's finances righted themselves without the help of either Great Britain or Germany. England, however, relinquished her right of first refusal in the matter of Delagoa Bay, thus enabling any country to trade with the Boer Republics without touching British territory. On the other

hand, Germany promised that she would remain neutral in any conflict between England and the Boers. That was a very valuable concession from the land of the Kruger telegram. The Kaiser went even further as he considered himself from now on an ally of England's in all questions concerning Africa.

The Kaiser's attitude became of vital importance for England during the Fashoda crisis. Though many responsible persons in Russia as well as in France and Germany were at that time trying to form a continental alliance against England they were bound to fail, among other reasons because of his belief in the reality of the Portuguese agreement. To his mind he was bound to come to England's assistance in case she should be attacked by two Powers during the Fashoda crisis. " His Majesty continued," wrote Sir Frank Lascelles on December 21st, " that if war should break out, which he considered almost certain, he would maintain a strict neutrality as long as the struggle was confined to England and France, but that if any other Power came to the assistance of the latter, he would act in accordance with the agreement he made with me at Friedrichshof in August."*

Thus, on New Year's Day, 1899, England and Germany could practically be considered as allies. The field seemed to be open for further and more direct negotiations. Fashoda, to all appearance, had had a very good effect. In reality that was not the case. During the first months of 1899 it became clear that France would not go to war against England. Hanotaux had left office, the Dreyfus case had shaken the moral foundations of the country, and Delcassé was concerned more with revenge against Germany than hatred against England. He sent Paul Cambon to the Court of St. James's. Salisbury saw the achievement of his ambitions. Great Britain remained sole master on the Nile, and France gave up all her plans of a French bridge across Africa.

If Lord Salisbury had tolerated, and even half-heartedly authorised, the efforts for an Anglo-German alliance before Fashoda, he did not see any further necessity after Fashoda. He became anxious to show his good feelings towards France, and did not mind showing Germany that he intensely disliked

* *British Documents*, Vol. I, No. 124. It had been at Friedrichshof in August that Lascelles told the Kaiser of Chamberlain's willingness to prepare an agreement with Germany based on mutual defence in case of a combined attack by two Powers.

her diplomatic methods. The German Government was not aware of the change. Bülow thought he had an easy task when demanding from Great Britain the partition of the Samoa Islands which hitherto had been administered as a *condominium* by Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. Although civil war broke out on the islands, Germany still found it difficult to persuade Salisbury even to send an International Commission to investigate the possibility of dividing the islands between the Powers concerned. Negotiations between Hatzfeldt and Salisbury would have become impossible had it not been for parallel negotiations which Eckardstein at the same time conducted with Chamberlain behind Salisbury's back. Eckardstein told the Colonial Secretary that once agreement over Samoa was reached there would be no further obstacles to a complete alliance. The task still remained very difficult, as it was Chamberlain's duty as Colonial Secretary to adopt as reluctant an attitude as possible when Great Britain was invited to give up rights. Agreement was not reached before November 1899. Its conclusion had at last been hastened by events which concerned England very deeply and which made German friendship again desirable, at least for Chamberlain and the majority of his colleagues.

That event was the outbreak of the Boer War. When, in the second half of 1899, it became more and more evident that hostilities would start before the century was over, Chamberlain became anxious for a visible gesture from Germany that she would not do anything in favour of her old protégés, the Boers. But neither the Kaiser nor any of his Ministers would hear of a friendly gesture towards England so long as the Samoa problem had not been solved. The German Government declined the British offer that Germany should safeguard British interests in the Boer Republics when diplomatic relations between London and Pretoria ceased. The differences between Berlin and London had prevented the Kaiser's accepting an invitation to England which he had sought in 1898, and Samoa was the cause of some outspoken correspondence between him and Queen Victoria. When, in November 1899, thanks in particular to Chamberlain's efforts, agreement over Samoa was reached, the Kaiser considered it appropriate to pay the promised visit to his grandmother. Its importance was symbolised by the fact that Bülow was to

accompany him. During that visit he and Bülow had long conversations with Queen Victoria, Balfour and Chamberlain. Salisbury was prevented from being present as his wife died on the day of the Emperor's arrival. The visit was very unpopular in Germany and throughout the Continent. The Kaiser and his ministers became all the more popular in the eyes of the subjects of the Queen. The question of an agreement with Germany was discussed, and Chamberlain and Bülow came to an understanding that they should prepare public opinion in their respective countries for the conclusion of a close agreement.

Chamberlain fulfilled his part of the bargain in a speech at Leicester on November 30th. He stressed the necessity of an alliance between the two countries. "The natural alliance is between ourselves and the great German Empire." Bülow, on the other hand, had not the courage to defy public opinion. In his Reichstag speech of December 11th he poured cold water on the results of the Kaiser's visit, and in particular on Chamberlain, by demanding in terms clearly formulated against England a considerable increase of the German navy. That speech disillusioned Chamberlain, and left him most distrustful of German diplomatic methods. During the black December of 1899, when things were bad in South Africa, he gave all his sympathies to the Prime Minister. It was a long time before he began again to think of an understanding with Germany.

The explanation of Germany's attitude was that she prospered too much at that time. The years 1898-9 had brought her a substantial increase in her colonial possessions; she was on good terms with Russia, whose ruler gave proof of his peaceful intentions by advocating international disarmament; and she had received offers of alliance from England. The German statesmen speculated on the inevitability of war between Great Britain and Russia, and were firmly convinced that political conditions were bound to develop in their favour, in other words that Great Britain as well as Russia would have to repeat her offers of friendship on better terms for Germany. They did not see the writing on the wall and failed to appreciate the significance of the Anglo-French Agreement of March 1899.

H. G. DITTMAR.

A MAKER OF MODERN PARIS.

NAPOLEON III and Baron Haussmann usually get all the credit for making Paris a modern city, but the work of slum clearance, street paving, lighting and tree planting, as well as the organisation of public services, was really started twenty years before their time by a sagacious nobleman who deserves to be better known. The Comte de Rambuteau, son of the Marquis of that name, belonged to an old Burgundian family whose sons had mostly distinguished themselves in the army. Circumstances enabled this member of the family to achieve fame in civil administration and he left a record which has never been surpassed. There was nothing in his early education to prepare him for such a career, but in 1808 he married a daughter of Comte Louis de Narbonne, the War Minister, who obtained for his son-in-law a position at Court.

Every three months M. de Rambuteau had to be on duty at the Tuileries Palace and one of his functions was to attend Napoleon I twice a week at Councils of State. The young chamberlain took a keen interest in the proceedings, and, as a mere looker-on, learned how to treat public affairs with method and precision. His intelligence and discretion soon gained him the favour of the Emperor, so much so that a year or two later when the Swiss province of Valais became a French department, the Comte de Rambuteau was appointed Prefect of the Simplon. His first public office was no sinecure as the annexed population bitterly resented French domination and started to conspire against the invaders. The Prefect received orders from his Government to arrest the twelve principal conspirators and place them in a fortress; but he first tried persuasion. Calling them together in a general meeting, he explained that it was a case of *force majeure* and in their interest to submit. He promised to leave them their liberty if they would give their word of honour to refrain from hostile acts. They gave their word and kept it.

Rambuteau, who had always been a great lover of trees, was much impressed by the beautiful forests of larches and silver pines on the rocky slopes of the Alps, and felt sure that they would flourish equally well on the granite foot-hills of his native province. He caused a thousand acres of waste land in Burgundy to be planted with these graceful trees and, by way

of exchange, introduced into Valais the celebrated vine-stock of Mâcon. Vines cultivated to this day at Prieuré-de-Sion give a fine and delicate white wine much appreciated by connoisseurs.

In his official capacity the noble Count carried out his duties with so much patience and moderation and exerted himself so consistently for the public good that he won the universal regard of the Swiss population. When in 1814 the army of Italy was defeated and retreated in disorder through Valais, the Prefect had to arrange for the feeding of 12,000 soldiers, many of whom were sick and wounded. A few days later it was realised that Valais was lost to France, so the Prefect himself and about eight hundred French citizens had to withdraw into Savoy. It took four days to reach Chambéry on foot, and the mountain roads and passes were hidden under six feet of snow. But the ex-Prefect was held in such esteem that the Swiss inhabitants provided voluntary guides, food and lodging, without which most of these refugees must have perished miserably.

Rambuteau's next post as Prefect of the Loire was equally difficult because of the troublous times that followed the downfall of Napoleon. Although an imperialist, he displayed so much wisdom and judgment in the management of his department that he won the recognition and gratitude of the monarchial government. At the Second Restoration, however, he withdrew into private life and built himself the splendid château that bears his name, surrounded by a great park of the trees he loved.

As a public official he was too valuable to be allowed to remain long in retirement, so in 1819 he was appointed to the General Council of Saône-et-Loire and special correspondent with regard to agricultural matters in that region. By 1827 he was sitting in the Chamber of Deputies as representative for Mâcon, but he said little and voted with the opposition. When the revolution of 1830 occurred, Rambuteau was one of the liberals who rallied to Louis-Philippe and sat on commissions with de Broglie, de Barante, Benjamin Constant, Guizot, Rémusat and others. A couple of years later he was appointed Prefect of the Seine Department with the title of Councillor of State.

It needed a man of special tact and strength of character to face the first elected Municipal Council of Paris, composed of

men of all shades of opinion with the radical Arago at their head. De Rambuteau proved equal to the task, aided by his easy polished manners and imperturbable amiability. He managed to keep aloof from party politics and to concentrate all his energies on the public welfare. By his diplomatic and conciliatory attitude he succeeded in overcoming all opposition and in carrying through the most enterprising schemes. Paris had not yet recovered from the effects of the recent revolution and the city was in a deplorable state. All municipal enterprises had been abandoned during the street fighting and the damage to roads and buildings had been only superficially repaired. The new Prefect threw himself with zeal into a formidable task. But he was a born organiser, resourceful, and full of ideas about town planning, sanitation and public works. Moreover, he had sound notions of finance and labour problems, so that his projects were not only planned with the least expenditure of public funds, but with a view to absorbing seasonal unemployed labour.

The first task de Rambuteau undertook on appointment was to inspect the city hospitals, where he was shocked to find much overcrowding and lack of hygiene. His first efforts therefore were directed towards aiding the sick and needy. Extra wings were built to the Beaujon and Necker hospitals, larger windows and better ventilation were installed at the Hotel-Dieu and a fine new building was erected in North Paris, now known as Lariboisière. His intervention did not stop at improving the hospital buildings, as he likewise took a keen interest in the domestic economy and management. One day, noticing the unpalatable liquid being served to the patients as soup, he caused samples to be taken of all the food served at city hospitals and their methods of cooking investigated. The best samples came from the establishment of the Dutch company, whose system was copied, and in due course model bakeries and butchers' shops were installed. He also insisted that separate rooms be set aside for operations and that all dissecting work by students be done in special premises isolated for that purpose. In those days all nursing was done by nuns, who were in the habit of retiring to their respective convents at nine o'clock every evening, leaving the wards uncared for. The Prefect pointed out that city hospitals were maintained in the interest of the sick and not that of any conventual system, so from that time a certain

number of sisters-of-mercy had to be on duty during the night.

Destitute children were de Rambuteau's next concern and much was done to alleviate their lot. Accommodation was provided for thousands of additional waifs and strays, who besides being properly housed and fed were taught to earn a living. He likewise instituted playgrounds, an unheard-of luxury in those days. When he took office there were only fifty schools in all Paris, but this number was trebled during the next decade.

Perhaps the greatest of all his humanitarian work was carried out on behalf of the insane, who were still treated with the utmost barbarity a hundred years ago. The Salpétrière asylum was rebuilt and equipped with adequate heating and ventilation. Suitable occupations were organised to relieve the tedium of the unfortunate inmates, some of whom showed unusual skill in the arts and crafts. The percentage of recoveries was raised enormously by the more humane treatment. La Roquette and Mazas prisons were built to relieve the congestion of the older gaols and, for the first time in such establishments, were equipped with a heating system and water taps. Simultaneously with these philanthropic schemes and little by little as funds allowed, a hundred miles of sewers were reconstructed and several new reservoirs doubled the city's water supply. At least twelve hundred streets were paved and equipped with side-walks. Gas-lighting was in its infancy when de Rambuteau took control. Two rival companies were operating in Paris without profit and charging exorbitant rates. He persuaded them to combine and lay down about ninety miles of piping, as well as to lower their prices in order to attract clients. After a long struggle with the Town Council, a contract was made with the gas company for lighting the city streets.

In his official capacity, the noble Count had a number of ceremonial duties to perform and on one occasion narrowly escaped being killed. While Louis-Philippe was reviewing his troops on July 18th, 1839, an anarchist named Fieschi threw a bomb at the sovereign which caused terrible slaughter, although the King was unhurt. Seventeen people were killed outright, including a marshal, a general and two colonels. De Rambuteau was riding just behind the King at the time, and one of the victims fell dead across his horse.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding all his other duties and

obligations, the Prefect was constantly occupied with schemes for beautifying Paris. Important monuments like the Arc de Triomphe, planned in the great days of the Empire, and the Madeleine church, started under Louis XV, were completed; and the main boulevards leading to the Place de la Bastille were levelled, paved and planted with trees. A couple of million francs were spent on improving the Place de la Concorde and decorating it with monuments, fountains and an obelisk. When the latter was erected, it is estimated that nine hundred thousand spectators assembled to witness the operation. He did not always get his way about trees, and perhaps it was fortunate that the King vetoed the scheme to plant a big avenue of limes across the east side of the Place de la Concorde.

In spite of a good deal of opposition, some old buildings were demolished to permit of linking up the quay Montebello with the quay des Augustins, thus completing the line of the Seine embankments. The bridges of Saints-Pères and the Archevéché were completed and trees planted along the quaysides. For the first time in history public benches were placed in the streets and squares so that Parisians, who could not afford to pay for chairs in the parks, could sit and rest in the open air. Until this time the people with chairs for hire had successfully opposed free seats of any kind.

The list of municipal activities during de Rambuteau's administration is still a long one. The Palais de Justice was enlarged and restored, the Sainte-Chapelle disencumbered. Notre-Dame cathedral and several other churches were restored and improved. At the renovation of Saint-Eustache some ancient and valuable paintings came to light. The Town Hall was cleared of surrounding erections and finished in a style that completely harmonised with the original structure. The balance sheet for the City of Paris for 1839 shows the following items:

Enlargement and isolation of the Hotel de Ville	Frs. 200,000
School-house—St. Philippe du Roule	30,000
Barrier between Sainte Marie and Longchamp ...	51,300
Hotel-Dieu, rue de la Boucherie building ...	80,000
Beaujon hospital	100,000
New hospital in North Paris, "Lariboisière" ...	100,000
Consolidation of quarries under Paris	110,000
Quai de Louviers island	100,000
Quai St. Bernard	45,000

Quai de la Tournelle	Frs. 75,000
Quai des Ormes	50,000
Quai des Saints-Pères	50,000
Paving public squares	110,000
Planting trees, public benches, etc.	30,000
Paving inner south boulevards	100,000
Granite borders, benches, platforms	100,000
Encouragement to owners for pavements ...	150,000
Pavements in front of public buildings	50,000
Water system of the Ourcq	400,000
Artesian wells at Grenelle	20,000

It is obvious that all these schemes could not have been carried out without some hindrance to traffic, and at that time the Parisians, who are inveterate although good-natured grumblers, used the word "Rambuteau" as a synonym for an obstruction or impediment of any kind. In fact, during the fifteen years he was in office, de Rambuteau was constantly opposed, criticised and ridiculed; but to-day only the memory survives of his great services to the city. He displayed extraordinary foresight and economy in money matters and carried out every improvement possible with the limited means at his disposal. In a speech to the Chamber in February 1870, Adolphe Thiers paid a great tribute to this remarkable man:

> M. de Rambuteau accomplished some extraordinary things that were both excellent and wise. He took office after a revolution when the entire administration had to be changed and he was able to introduce notable improvements. With a budget of only fifty millions he solved many traffic problems and improved the city. The street which bears his name was cut through a noisome slum, giving access to the central markets and facilitating means of communication with the Bourse and boulevards. The new populous suburb of Batignolles was linked to the city by the streets named Amsterdam and Havre. . . .
>
> With a budget of only fifty millions, M. de Rambuteau did something more, which I appreciate tremendously, but which no one takes account of to-day when a thousand millions is considered a normal debt for a single city. The City of Paris debt had been liquidated, or nearly so, when he resigned. It is true that he was about to negotiate a loan for sixty millions, as there was much useful work yet to be done, but it was because the old debt was practically wiped out that he proposed to raise more funds. I recall these souvenirs as a proof of what can be done with patience, time and a moderate outlay.

The Comtesse de Rambuteau was a kind and charitable lady, whose name is associated with many good works. She rendered invaluable assistance to her husband and entertained graciously all sorts of tiresome people who were hostile to his schemes. Her children were all daughters, but a grandson later carried on the title and estates and became a well-known writer. When the revolution of 1848 started, de Rambuteau armed his staff and held the Town Hall for thirty-six hours against all comers, retiring only when the news reached him that the King had abdicated and fled. As the mob invaded the building a voice in the crowd shouted: "Don't harm our Prefect, he has been like a father to the workers." De Rambuteau was able to walk away unmolested, but the building was pillaged. The insurgents removed his portrait from the wall, paraded it round the building for all to see, then placed it carefully face downwards on his bed with an inscription in chalk on the back:

Dors, Papa Rambuteau	(Sleep, Papa Rambuteau)
Tu as bien merité de faire dodo.	(You deserve to go to bye-bye.)

The picture was afterwards found unharmed amid the wreckage; only to be destroyed, alas, in the later disorders of the Commune.

At the start of the Second Empire, the noble Count consented to have his name placed on the list of candidates for the new Senate, but when the Decree was published for confiscating the property of his former King, he was greatly shocked, withdrew his name and abstained from further office. In his ripe old age, de Rambuteau lost his sight, but retained to the last an excellent memory and was always keenly interested in the schemes for improving Paris that were carried out by his successors. Napoleon III had not been in power a month before the new Prefect, anxious to emulate de Rambuteau's record, submitted for approval further plans for slum clearance and street improvement. The cutting through of the rue de Rivoli to the Town Hall—something de Rambuteau had advocated for many years—was now carried out. A few years later, to prevent a recurrence of barricades and street riots, Baron Haussmann effected some drastic improvements, but at scandalous expense.

O. F. Abbott.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

The War, as Before?

THE really interesting thing in the continuing diplomatic tension is that there seems to be hardly any widespread, or effective appreciation of the crude analogy that lies so closely behind it. Men are already lost in manœuvring for position, in piling up armaments, in preparing arguments for propaganda. In one generation human memory and human sensitiveness have been so deadened that the obvious and gross stupidity of what is taking place escapes recognition. What men say now about Germany they said before the last war. The argument they make now for resisting German aggression by war they made the last time. They repeat what was proved in their own experience to have been a fallacy. The same men who experienced the last great war in the full exercise of adult intelligence now forget what their intelligence then taught them, even though the lesson was written in blood. In 1914 the cry of the informed, influential people in Great Britain was that German militarism must either be "crushed" or civilisation must perish. The cry really was so simple. It was encouraged by indignation over the fate of Belgium and of Servia.

At Christmas 1916 when suggestions were made by the few still extant people of common sense, including for example Lord Lansdowne, that the war should be called off as a "draw" or as a mistake, and that what could still be rescued of civilisation should be thankfully rescued, and the life and property still untouched should be spared, the influential people above alluded to were filled with sincere, if paradoxical and even nonsensical, alarm. To leave the job half-finished, they said, was a form of mental flabbiness that amounted to a crime. To listen to "defeatists" was to betray the dead who had already given their lives for the cause. No, they said, it must be *la victoire intégrale*. The world must be made "safe for democracy"; at no matter what a cost in blood and human misery the "anti-Christ" presented in the form of German militarism must be so crushed that it could never again raise its head; the world must be made fit for the heroes to live in (if any heroes survived the process of making it such). This time, they went on, it must be a war to end war.

There were those who in the period of 1914 to 1918 saw through the poverty of such an argument, who had the sense to protest, with Milton : " for what can war but endless war still breed ? " But the impressive thing is not that the people who were right were then proved right. The truly amazing thing is that the people who were wrong were then proved wrong and they now again raise their clamant folly and demand that we do it all again. The same men make the same old arguments in the same old way. If, they say, we do not resist Germany now by force of arms, she will gradually submerge the whole of European civilisation, liberty will pass from the face of the earth, Britons will be slaves. They said it in 1914 ; they said it in 1916 ; they say it in 1938. But what happened in the meantime ? On November 11th, 1918, Germany was beaten and crushed. Everything they postulated was fulfilled. And not one single result that had been promised was fulfilled. The price had been paid. The reward was not only inadequate. It was totally non-existent. The men who argued the case for *la victoire intégrale* were proved to be wrong up to 100 per cent. That is not surprising. Any man of average common sense, if he uses his common sense, knows easily that you cannot achieve anything useful or decent whatsoever by the means of war, even when you believe (as all belligerents always believe) that your enemy is the aggressor. What is surprising is that the decisively influential people who were proved wrong cannot themselves see the point. " Invention is exhausted ; reason is fatigued ; experience has given judgment ; but obstinacy is not yet conquered," cried Burke. It may be that human folly is due more to obstinacy than to any other perversity. If that be so, then perhaps it is not after all surprising that the men who once defeated Germany for a certain purpose, and who then found that their purpose was unattainable by the means they prescribed and used, should be again suggesting the same means for achieving the same unattainable object.

The fact that Germany was " crushed " in 1918, yet in 1938 is strong again, proves that, although another war with Germany will achieve many things, such as the renewed devastation of the earth, it will not keep Germany down. In 1918, except for the devastation, we were back in the same position we started from in 1914. History has proved that statement. In 1938 we are still in the position we started

from in 1914. If there is now to be another war with Germany, lasting, say, four years, whether we " win " it or " lose " it, we shall still be in the position we started from in 1938 and 1914, except for the further toll of devastation. That at any rate is all very clear. It is doubly clear because reason establishes it and the proved test of experience has driven it home. What is not clear is whether European civilisation is irrevocably bent upon its own destruction. It is commonly expected that this year or next—probably next—we shall have another war with Germany. The really puzzling philosophical question is not whether human folly results from " the fall of man," but whether, after all, human folly and the fall of man itself are not a prescribed means of human chastisement and purification, for some ultimate purpose not revealed to man on earth ? How else can one explain the apparently fatal insistence of mankind, despite reason, despite its clear interests, despite its experience, upon plunging itself endlessly into wars that otherwise make no sense ?

The present concern of high diplomacy, then, is that we should fight all over again the war we fought a quarter of a century ago. Though it make no impression upon those who again see the anti-Christ in German form, there yet is to be derived some curious cold-blooded interest in trying to recall some of the more blatant thrusts of the historic irony. The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28th, 1919. In the preamble to that treaty five Great Powers (namely the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) and the remaining twenty-two of the so-called " Allied and Associated Powers " (namely Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Czechoslovakia and Uruguay) put on record a glib hope that has ever since mocked its authors. That famous single sentence of the 1919 preamble cries out as loud as any of the world's agonies. " Bearing in mind (it read) that on the request of the Imperial German Government an armistice was granted on November 11th, 1918, to Germany by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in order that a Treaty of Peace might be concluded with her, and the Allied and Associated Powers being equally desirous that the war in which they were

successively involved directly or indirectly and which originated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 28th, 1914, against Serbia, the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on August 1st, 1914, and against France on August 3rd, 1914, and in the invasion of Belgium, should be replaced by a firm, just and durable Peace."

The peace, whether spelt with the exalted capital P of 1919 or with the small shamed letter now more appropriate to it, was neither firm, nor just, nor durable. Peace cannot be made out of victory in war. Fire and water are as reconcilable as war and peace. Not till war has been banished from the habits of man will the world know peace in its politics. So long as war is retained not only as an instrument of national policy but as a cultivated ideal of patriotic duty, so long will peace be denied to the nations. The uniforms, bands, medals, all the ballyhoo of the attendant heroics : these are the abiding breeding ground of war. The Foreign Offices, War Offices, Admiralties, Air Ministries are the standing guarantee that another war one day will be fought, and then another. When human intelligence has developed to the point where war is recognised as a stupidity, then the means of war, the armies, the navies, and the air forces, will automatically vanish. Until then—not in our time, O Lord ?—the disjointed impulse of a generation smarting under the wounds of war to set up a League of Armed Nations to prevent war by the common sanction of collective war belongs to the category of frivolous tragedy. Is it not yet obvious why the Covenant of that particular League of Nations which began to function on January 16th, 1920, has proved so preposterous a failure ? The aims of that Covenant were expressed in a preamble thus : " The High Contracting Parties, In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations." There followed a long and elaborate prescription for the way in which the Covenant was to be put into practice. There was contained

in that prescription one single sentence which made nonsense of the whole. It was the first paragraph of Article 8, reading thus : " The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

Until the last year or two, when the League of Nations has had to face the inevitable climax of its own failure, the month of September has been the time when Geneva has staged an annual ritualistic celebration. The ritual was misleading. There is no real cause for regret that such an experiment has failed. The experiment itself was wrong. When a Covenant prescribes that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point " consistent with national safety," it gives itself away. The Covenant was written by men who in their hearts did not believe in it. They left open a back door to the very jungle it was their professed object to close. In their half-hearted bid for peace they did not, perhaps in the existing stage of human development they could not, abolish war, or prescribe its abolition. They by implication admitted the need of war as a means of " national safety." The implication was the very madness of men who are afraid. It is not only nonsensical to talk of war as a means of national safety. The hypothetical object of the League of Nations to establish peace on earth could be achieved only by the complete uncompromising issue with war in its entire principle, no matter in what cause war might be fought. National sovereignty combined with the means to make war is in itself the very negation of the principles professed in the preamble to the League of Nations. In short the League of Nations was a muddle. Either war is a human method, or it is not. If it is, no League of Nations can save us from it. The alternative is peace, the whole peace and nothing but the peace. That means no armies, no navies, no air forces. Full pacifism, in the sense of an absolute refusal to make war in any circumstances whatsoever, is the only guarantee of peace. That principle implies non-resistance. It may be unpractical. It may be that the world is incapable of it. In that case, the world is as yet incapable of fashioning a League of Nations.

Those who have worked hardest for the present moribund League of Nations have been inspired by the hope, perhaps even by the belief, that the ideal of peace could be achieved

by a process of evolution. If, they argued, a League of Nations could amicably settle such questions as Upper Silesia, the issue between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands, the frontier controversy between Albania and Jugoslavia, and could prevent a war between Greece and Bulgaria over certain unpleasant frontier incidents, why should it not grow in strength until one day it could impose peace on the Great Powers? Experience has proved, what ordinary intelligence might have suggested, that such hopes were illusory. Sovereign, armed Great Powers are in themselves the negation of any hope of establishing international law. At the present time there is no international law whatsoever of the slightest practical validity. There is no possibility of the gradual insinuation of an empirical international law. So long as the machinery of war is maintained, and the fatal reservation of " national interest " or " national safety " is accepted in all the so-called " pacifist " enterprises, so long those enterprises will be doomed to failure. There is no compromise in this supreme issue. The system must be either peace or war, as the instrument of diplomacy. It is even arguable that palliatives such as a half-hearted League of Nations, a Red Cross organisation, a " humane " convention for the conduct of war, defeat their object by enabling war to be reconciled to man's conscience. We have even heard the muddled slogan of a League of Nations' war advocated as a sort of police war. Muddle could hardly engender a greater mischief. The true reformer keeps his eye steadily on the only real objective, which is to abolish the nations' right to make war. It may be, it looks as if it is, a hopeless venture; but anything short of it is worse than useless, for it in effect entrenches war as the ultimate political sanction.

The Analogy.

What was the object and what the effect of the last war? On October 19th, 1916, there appeared the first number of a weekly review called *The New Europe*, whose board was representative of the Allied countries in general. On the first page an editorial statement of policy declared that the Review's " highest ambition will be to provide a rallying ground for all those who see in European reconstruction, on a basis of nationality, the rights of minorities, and the hard facts of geography and economics, the sole guarantee against

an early repetition of the horrors of the present war. It will be our endeavour to unmask the great designs of German war policy, to provide the historical, racial and strategic background of problems too long neglected in our comfortable island, and to emphasise the need of a comfortably thought-out counter-plan, as an essential condition to allied victory. After our armies have won the war, our statesmen will have to win the peace, and their task will, indeed, be difficult, unless public opinion is alert, organised and eager to support them in a clearly defined and enlightened policy. Our attitude, then, will be constructive rather than destructive; our methods will be frankly critical and vigilant, reading the meaning of history out of the brutal logic of facts. An ' integral ' victory such as alone can secure to Europe permanent peace and the reduction of armaments, the fulfilment of the solemn pledges assumed by our statesmen towards our smaller allies, the vindication of national rights and public law, the emancipation of the subject races of central and south-eastern Europe from German and Magyar control—such must be our answer to the Pangerman project of ' Central Europe ' and ' Berlin-Bagdad '."

Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, of honoured memory, a political philosopher whose thought scaled the heights, whose opinion certainly did not err in attaching any base motive to contemporary political thought on the Allies' side, contributed the first signed article to *The New Europe*. He wrote on " Pangermanism and the Eastern Question." He stated that " Pangermanism means, in its original sense, the unification of Germans in a Greater Germany (*Grossdeutschland*)." He also stated that: " To-day there cannot be the slightest doubt that the present war, alike in its origin and in its development, is purely Pangerman. Germany was from the first fully aware that she must defend Austria-Hungary in her own interest. There is a decisive document proving this assertion, namely, the Memorial submitted to the German Reichstag on August 3rd, 1914, in which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg expounded the true Pangerman theory concerning Austria, and treated the anti-Austrian manœuvres of Serbia as a distinct menace to German interests "; and he ended with this warning: " It is interesting to observe how both the Pangermans and the official politicians and publicists have two irons in the fire, but it must suffice for the moment to

have shown that the war is the logical continuation of Pangerman policy, and that Berlin is already prepared to put only the first half of the Pangerman scheme into practice. The first decisive step in this policy, its first political achievement, out of which the final aim will follow almost logically, is the absorption of Austria, the preservation of Turkey and Constantinople, and the consequent weakening of Russia and the Slavs. If Berlin succeeds in creating 'Central Europe' the aim of the war is attained, even if, at the worst, some time should elapse before the completion of the Constantinople-Bagdad and Constantinople-Cairo routes." Though Germany was defeated in the field in 1918 she succeeded in 1938 in creating her "Central Europe." Could history more effectively prove the futility of war? Can any man ever again talk about *la victoire intégrale* as an object of human endeavour? Yet men are now talking in precisely that way again. Pangermanism is again the cry. What Masaryk wrote in 1916 could be reproduced to-day verbatim with as much relevance to the next war as to the last. The fact that the last war was won against Germany has made no difference whatsoever to the cause for which one million Englishmen and ten million Europeans were killed. Are another million Englishmen to be killed equally without purpose?

To examine the cold history of the "firm, just and durable" peace handed to Europe by the victorious politicians over the dead bodies of ten million Europeans twenty years ago is almost to despair of human reason. Even as the signatures of the politicians were being written on the parchment, another war was being fought in Russia. Russia had been one of the holy combination against Germany. Broken by the war before the other allies, she made her separate peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk (1917). At the very moment when the Treaty of Versailles was being signed to replace war with a "firm, just and durable" peace, Allied forces were fighting in Russia on one side in a civil war against the other. Italy in 1919 annexed Fiume by war. In 1923 Italy sent a fleet to occupy Corfu. The Poles were at war with the Ukrainians in 1919. They were as a result fighting with the Russian army in 1920. In 1920 also Polish troops annexed Vilna, then the capital of Lithuania. Greece was at war with Turkey in 1921. French troops marched into Germany in January 1923. And so on. The immediate sequel of the firm peace was war in

many parts of Europe and the Near East. The war, by an immediate demonstration, bred endless war. More lately we have had Japan and China at war in the Far East, Italy at war with Abyssinia, a civil war in Spain. The last great war started a general habit of war not yet exhausted. And the air is now full of aeroplanes practising for the grand climax in which we are to have the last great war all over again.

The changed map of Central Europe is proved to be no better safeguard against war than was the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. Indeed, the only real change brought about by the last war was that there are more sovereign States in Europe than there were in 1914, more units, that is, which have the power to make war. There are only five Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) instead of six (Austria-Hungary having disappeared); but the total number of sovereign independent states was raised from twenty to twenty-seven. The number is reduced to twenty-six by Germany's incorporation of Austria last March. No fewer than six wholly new states with their separate military organisations were created: Czechoslovakia, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Albania. Lithuania has been on a permanent war footing towards Poland ever since she was formed into a State. Czechoslovakia, herself the embodiment of the principle of emancipated national minorities, is a potential source of general war on the very issue of national minorities claiming emancipation. The old-Austro-Hungarian Empire having collapsed for the very reason that it contained too large an element of discontented national minorities—Czech, Slovak, Serb, Croat, Slovene, Rumanian—a brand new Czechoslovakia was constituted with quite as large an element of discontented national minorities, mainly German and Magyar, even if one accepts the composite idea of "Czechoslovaks" as politically sound. In politics it is apparently much easier to be foolish than to be wise.

A Solution.

It will be asked: if it be true that the last war was wholly deplorable, in its origin, in its course, in its results; if the next war is bound to be equally deplorable; if the League of Nations is deplorable; if nothing short of pacifism can be of any avail, and pacifism *ex hypothesi* is itself a hopeless or

unattainable ideal: what then? It follows from the available evidence that the only practical present object of sensible people is to prevent the next war, *at any cost*. The real enemy is the misplaced sentiment of what is called national honour. If war be regarded simply as a disaster, like an earthquake, it cannot be used as a means of vindicating national honour. One of the difficulties is that the habit of war is embraced within the scope of the ridiculous public school notions about esprit de corps. "Play up, you cads!" is the sort of exhortation that drives men to misdirected self-sacrifice. Dispassionately, if war be regarded as a low as well as stupid enterprise, and not as a fit occasion for the exercise of the public school spirit aforesaid, the problem becomes practically soluble. The next war with Germany can be avoided. All one need do is to consider how to avoid it without any other consideration. Would it really matter if, for example, Tanganyika were strategically German and not British, if thereby the war could be avoided, or even postponed? The imperialist, of the type for example of Mr. L. S. Amery, frankly distrusts such an argument as lacking in realism. His answer would be that the only effect of buying off Germany by a gift of colonies would be to put Germany in a gratuitously stronger position when the war comes—as come it will, according to his perfectly sincere belief. In other words, the next war is being in effect fought in advance by a British refusal, on strategic grounds, to make any concession to Germany.

The great difficulty encountered by those who argue pacifism is that pacifism is wholly foreign to the cumulative traditions of human history. The risks of peace are never taken. The risks of war are taken almost light-heartedly. It is, of course, obviously true that peace involves a risk. The conventional patriots may be right when they argue that the giving away of colonies to Germany would be interpreted in Germany as a mark of weakness, and would precipitate rather than postpone the war. But that only means that the political traditions of the world are so bad that no one even believes in the possibility of goodwill or common sense. Goodwill and common sense are never tried as a political instrument. Until they are tried there can be no escape from the monstrous sway of war over mankind. Somebody must take the chance before that sway can be broken. Who knows but that the risk of peace might prove less formidable than we all now suppose?

In the present case the situation is perfectly simple. The distribution of colonies may fairly be taken as symbolic of the general conditions which are again driving Britain and Germany into war.

Before the last war, Germany had amassed colonial possessions in Africa and in the South Pacific six times as big as Germany herself. That looks rather big as an achievement. It looks not quite so big when we remember that the territory now administered by Great Britain, or by Governments of the British Empire, including the mandated territories, is a hundred and fifty times the size of Great Britain, or that the French colonial empire is twenty times as big as France. The possession of colonies is the result of cold-blooded competition between nations. Colonies are often the spoils of war. Germany lost her colonies when she lost the war. She lost German East Africa, German South-West Africa, the Cameroons, and Togoland, in Africa, and in the South Pacific she lost German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands, the Caroline, Marianne and Marshall Islands, Samoa and the port of Kiao-chow on the Chinese mainland. Included in the South Pacific Islands was the small island of Nauru (nine square miles) from which valuable deposits of phosphates were and still are obtained. Altogether Germany lost 1,140,000 square miles of territory. Of that total no fewer than 826,000 square miles or more than two-thirds of the whole were added to the British Empire. Great Britain, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, it is true, hold those new territories, not as "swag," but as what the League of Nations Covenant calls a "sacred trust" of civilisation. But in practice all that that means is that the resident officials have to spend an hour or two every year writing a report to the League of Nations. For all practical purposes the new mandated territories have been added to the Empire. The crude present fact is that we beat Germany in the field and took her colonies for ourselves. We can hardly pretend that it was done in the interests of the natives. We just annexed Germany's colonies, and left her with none at all, though we ourselves had a quarter of the globe. To give Germany so deep a sense of injury is a stupid thing. It makes real peace between the two countries impossible. When Mr. Chamberlain last November sent Lord Halifax to Berlin he already knew, and Lord Halifax on his return confirmed it, that one

of the things Germany wanted was colonies. Herr Hitler has often said so.

What the British Government could do would be to surrender its own mandates back to the League, and make the suggestion that Germany should be appointed the new mandatory. As Germany is no longer a member of the League of Nations, and has made it clear that she has no intention of again becoming a member of the League of Nations, a formidable barrier seems at once to be raised. But the possibility of failure is not a decisive argument against making the attempt, and if the result were indeed to be a failure, then the British Government could at any rate claim to have done its best. Suppose, then, for the sake of argument, that the British Government did make an offer of the kind here suggested. What precisely would be involved? The British Government exercises a mandate over the greater part (363,000 square miles out of a total of 384,000 square miles) of German East Africa, now renamed the Tanganyika Territory; over a small part (34,200 square miles out of 166,000 square miles) of the Cameroons; and a still smaller part (14,000 square miles out of a total 34,000) of Togoland. In the Pacific, the small island of Nauru is jointly administered by Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Great Britain, therefore, could herself directly surrender only the mandates over parts of Tanganyika, the Cameroons and Togoland. No one can pretend that such a step would be either easy or pleasant. The strategic value of Tanganyika is such that all the majestic instincts of British imperialism would rise in revolt. But there has to be a choice of one evil or the other. Which is the greater? An attempt made now in a generous spirit to win German friendship by a surrender of the African territories taken from Germany, and added in effect to the British Empire, might generate a new spirit in international relationships. If it succeeded in that object, all other problems might be readily soluble. It is true, and provable by the consistent experience of men and nations, that problems are never soluble except by goodwill. There is at any rate an obvious possibility worth trying, of saving Europe from a war now threatened.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

August 12th, 1938.

No. 444. *September 1938.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

FULL REVIEWS 369

SYMBOLISM AND BELIEF; THE AGONY OF SPAIN; TARIFF LEVELS AND THE ECONOMIC UNITY OF EUROPE; THE SECOND TORY PARTY; BEYOND TRAGEDY; CHARITY SCHOOLS; THE MIDDLE WAY; THE NEWTONIAN MYSTERY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: MUSSOLINI IN THE MAKING; PROFESSOR WERNER WEISBACH; THE WORLD CRISIS; WILD BIRDS IN BRITAIN; HOBSON'S CONDUIT; THE YACHTSMAN'S WEEK-END BOOK; A HISTORY OF CRICKET 381

SYMBOLISM AND BELIEF.*

The use of Symbolism is universal and indispensable. Men can only describe their subjective experiences in terms of their objective perceptions. By this means only can the contents, whether of thought, volition or affection be communicated and made intelligible. Yet the habitual use of figures drawn from sense experience to make spiritual experience, in the widest sense of the word, intelligible raises important and very difficult problems. In what relations do these symbols stand to what is represented by them? In some cases a measure of resemblance is assumed, but in others any resemblance is out of the question. Hence the passage from the impressions created by symbols to rational concepts and the explanation of the reason why such impressions are useful and the best available present serious subjects of investigation. What claim have accepted symbols on Belief; and, what is still more important, in what relation do they stand to Reality? The question is of the highest consequence in regard to religious beliefs, for the Idea of God is set forth, not merely by symbols drawn from the material world, but, above all, by the attribution of human qualities, especially all such moral qualities as justice, goodness and love, to the Deity. Yet it is clear that even the highest and best qualities of finite beings

* *Symbolism and Belief.* By Edwyn Bevan. George Allen & Unwin. 15s. net.

must needs be inadequate to describe the reality of a Being deemed infinite. To what extent, then, are such finite qualities trustworthy as a relevant, though inadequate, representation of the Supreme Reality? What rational meaning can be attached to statements, not only that God is "the most high" but still more to those which essay to represent His eternal perfection in terms that have acquired their significance through the experience of finite, mortal, and imperfect men?

In view of the many-sided importance and the great difficulty of the subject Dr. Edwyn Bevan has done well to select it as the theme of his Gifford Lectures, and to present his views to a larger public in the volume dealt with in the present review. It need only be said at the outset that Dr. Bevan has treated his subject with a fullness, a wealth of scholarship, and a lucidity which make his contribution not only timely but of permanent importance. The Lectures deal, in the first stage, with the Symbols of Height, Time, Light, Spirit and Wrath as applied to God. In his exposition, while not transgressing the limits imposed upon a Gifford Lecturer, he sets forth the Christian view, in relation to those of other faiths, and discusses the issues that are raised. In the later stage the author passes on to deal with such wider questions as the distinction of Literal and Symbolical, Pragmatism and Analogy, Mansel and Pragmatism, Rationalism and Mysticism, ending up by stating his conclusions on the Justification of Belief. In regard to all these topics he has much to say that merits careful attention and that is valuable both for the information he gives and for the considerations that he advances.

The necessary limits of this notice prevent any detailed account of the survey as a whole, but the following comments appear to the reviewer to be important.

1. In regard to the psychological question, Why men attribute Height to all kinds of excellence, and why they use "looking up" as indicative of reverence, may not the starting-point be found, not so much in the effect of mountains, etc., on observers, as in the fact that the infant on his mother's knee *looks up* to her, and that in the earlier years of its life the child *looks up* to its parents and others for protection, guidance, and commands?

2. In dealing with the problem of Time, as it is concerned with God as the Eternal, Dr. Bevan discusses the well-worn

question of the bearing of Free Will upon Fore Knowledge. Without entering upon the profounder aspects of this problem it may, perhaps, be suggested that the appointed Movement of the Time-process is so powerful and ordered that the secular tide (to use indispensable symbols) goes forward to its appointed end, despite the ripples and even adverse currents occasioned by Free Will, and that God has provided such reactions to these, whatever they may be, as eventually countervail the temporary obstructions that they occasion. While God is apprehended as eternal and changeless He cannot be entirely excluded from the Time-process over which He is supreme and which He Himself has constituted. Such entire exclusion would conceive the evolving universe as being so self-contained and self-sufficient as to justify the externalism of Deism as against the belief of Christian Theism.

3. In the judgment of the present reviewer, Dr. Bevan's account of Maurice's conflict with Mansel is seriously deficient (pp. 333-4). The main concern of Maurice was not with Mansel's fundamentalism and with his treatment of a crude view of eternal punishment as regulative of Christian belief, but with the whole conception of the doctrine of the Bible as merely regulative of belief, while the Truth in regard to God was entirely beyond the reach of human apprehension. For Maurice, the Revelation contained in the Old and New Testaments, and especially the Incarnation of the Son of God, furnished *the Truth* in regard to God—His Character, Will and Love—so that while this Revelation was, of necessity, inadequate, it was trustworthy as a guide to rational belief, and not merely regulative of human conduct. The highest qualities—spiritual and moral—of men, were, as the Incarnation showed, the projection of God-given Truth into the apprehension of men, so that it might be concluded "If ye . . . how much more He." By means of the Incarnation Maurice transcended what appear to Dr. Bevan (see pp. 79-80) to be "incompatible alternatives," namely the Transcendent "Otherness" of God and His Immanence. With these brief comments the reviewer must end and in doing so bespeaks for this book the careful study of those whose minds are exercised in regard to the profound problems with which it deals.

J. S. L.

THE AGONY OF SPAIN.*

Mr. Sencourt has written a very eloquent and moving book on the country which he knows and loves. Impartial he is not, for political and religious convictions and his personal friendships tie him closely to the side of the insurgents. Indeed he would scorn impartiality in a conflict, as he conceives it, between right and wrong, The struggle, he tells us, is for the soul of Spain. He is obsessed by the Communist peril, as equally ardent champions of the Left see nothing but the dark shadow of Fascism. Clearly this is not the sort of work which historians will try to write in fifty years. Only Professor Allison Peers and Dr. Borkenau seem to have been able to keep their heads in this fierce duel of ideologies. The beginning of wisdom in the Spanish problem is to recognise its exceptional complexity. There are many good and bad people in both camps, as there were in our own civil war three centuries ago and in the American conflict last century, though it was not realised at the time by the combatants or their backers. There are plenty of Spaniards on Franco's side who are not Fascists and plenty more on the Government side who are not Communists, such as the Catholic Basques and the Catalans who are fighting bravely for the retention of their historic rights. Our author never leaves his readers in doubt where he stands. He disapproves of Señor Madariaga, and Mr. Eden, and the Front Populaire in France, and above all of President Azaña, the "truculent, fanatical, sensual, ill-tempered and vindictive."

Though he makes no attempt to stand above the battle, he is well worth reading, and his book should be studied by those who are inclined to watch the performances of the Spanish Government with favour. For though his pages throb with passionate emotion, he can tell us a good deal both of the past and present of Spain. He is at his best when he is describing the unique characteristics of the country of the Inquisition and the bull-fight. He quotes the saying of Ford, the incomparable traveller, that a spark, a trifle, sets the impressionable masses in action, and recalls Wellington's bitter aphorism that only in Spain two and two do not make four. They have remained unchanged, he tells us, "a people of blood and gunpowder with unbroken traditions of

* *Spain's Ordeal.* By Robert Sencourt. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

nobleness, uproar and singularity." King Alfonso, of whom he speaks indulgently, had to learn his lesson: "that no one can calculate what his volcanic people would do, that people whose impromptu actions are guided by passions which are as fierce as the sun in Africa and as capricious and instantaneous as the hurricane." We are reminded of "the oriental excess" in the Spanish character. "There are parts of Spain to-day so Moorish in population and character that one feels one is already in Africa."

With such a heritage, what could be expected of the successive Governments? Surely just what we have seen for the last century—misrule and corruption, rebellion and civil war, squalor and ignorance. Yet unless we assume that nothing can be made of such turbulent human material, we surely have the right to blame the governing classes and factors—the Crown, the Church, the nobility, the great landowners, the army, the upper bourgeoisie—for the lamentable spectacle of the twentieth century. "The Spain of 1931 was too much like the France of 1789." The Communists and other Labour extremists of whom we hear so much cannot be held responsible for this backwardness, for they only came on the stage a few years ago. They found the soil prepared for their activities by the neglect and selfishness of those who had gone before. Oppression and poverty bred revolutionary violence, clericalism gave birth to anti-clericalism, the sins of the fathers were visited on the children to the third and fourth generation. The educational revival which followed the loss of the Spanish colonies came too late and was too limited in range to civilise and humanise the masses. The two greatest needs of the country, education and agrarian reform, were scandalously neglected. King Alfonso did his best, but he lacked judgment. Primo tried his hand, but the Dictator was soon hissed off the stage. Parliamentary democracy was a failure in a land where the spirit of compromise seems almost unknown. What reason is there to suppose that Franco, with his policy of centralisation, would do any better? Spain was ruled by soldiers during the reign of Isabella who have left anything but a fragrant memory. General Metaxas, who seized power two years ago in Greece, has an easier task, but his failure is already notorious. Mr. Sencourt believes that Calvo Sotelo could have done more for his country than any other man, but he was murdered in July 1936. It is a tragic

story, and indeed the deepest impression one carries away from this fine book is one of sadness.

The story of the fighting down to the spring of 1938 is told with great spirit, and the chapter on the defence of the Alcazar at Toledo is superb. It is interesting to learn the author's views on such controverted episodes as the mass executions at Badajoz and the destruction of Guernica. "By the end of October [1937] Franco had not ended the war, but he had won the war," declares Mr. Sencourt, who looks forward to his "spectacular victory." He may be right. The end must come some day. The friends of Spain in all the British parties can only hope, however little they can expect, that in the hour of victory a spirit of moderation, alien though it be to the fiery national temperament, may bring at any rate temporary relief to a country ravaged not only by the customary horrors of war but by the added barbarities of the massacre of prisoners and the bombardment of swarming cities.

G. P. G.

TARIFF LEVELS AND THE ECONOMIC UNITY OF EUROPE.*

The main purpose of this book by a famous research student of Heidelberg University is to give a detailed account of European post-war tariffs and their influence upon inter-European commerce. Its elaborate and well-classified statistics bring out certain important conclusions which should be digested by all concerned with the present critical situation in industry and politics. The general movement up to 1913 had been favourable to the economic integration of Europe. Tariffs had been low, flows of money easy, and migration of labour free throughout the world. The early post-war years exhibited a disposition to escape from the economic chaos left by the war and to get back into a constructive phase with a lowering of tariffs and other obstructions. This reconstructive process was broken in 1929 by the crisis of American finance and the general collapse of world prices, first in agricultural and afterwards in other goods, and the period of terrified protectionism which followed has continued in spite of political conferences in 1932 and 1933

* By H. Liepmann. Allen & Unwin. 21s. net.

designed to aim at the reduction of tariffs and a return to an integrated Europe. But while the economists and statesmen who met in conferences approved the utility of a movement towards free trade, the actual pressure of agrarian, industrial, financial, nationalist military forces precluded its possibility.

Mr. Liepmann gives a full explanation of the tangled story up to 1931, and in a final chapter adds a shorter account of the happenings up to 1936. Though primarily concerned with the tariff aspects of the situation, he discusses briefly but effectively the parts played by population and migration, militarism and imperialism, as contributory causes to the dangers of the disintegration of Europe, and its accompanying impoverishment. It is an elaborate practical defence of the free-trade policy towards which the world was sensibly moving before the war, and an equally elaborate refutation of the reasoning of the advocates of protection. Agrarian protectionism in most industrial countries, taken in conjunction with the feverish endeavours of agrarian countries to become industrially self-sufficing, is perhaps the most glaring form of this economic madness. Unfortunately the cure seems to lie outside the region of immediate rational appeal. It is possible to get most politicians in every country to recognise the follies and perils of the course they pursue, but not to induce them to incur the immediate political troubles that confront drastic reform.

J. A. H.

THE SECOND TORY PARTY.*

Mr. Keith Feiling has now followed up his celebrated *History of the Tory Party, 1640-1714*, with a new work which examines the emergence of the second Tory party in the eighteenth century, its supremacy under Pitt and until its eventual disappearance with the passage of the Great Reform Bill of 1832. In his study of eighteenth-century politics from the Tory viewpoint, Mr. Keith Feiling has exercised a degree of research and painstaking analysis which the subject has long required. It is certainly a work which the student will find indispensable. It is not light reading and will appeal less to the reader who looks for sweeping generalisations and

* *The Second Tory Party, 1714-1832.* By Keith G. Feiling. Macmillan. 15s. net.

sensational colour in historical writing. This closely packed narrative, however, is both illuminated and enlivened by an epigrammatic sense and a wealth of knowledge of the personal characteristics and private habits of the politicians and statesmen who fill the pages of the book.

"In parliamentary democracy, even more perhaps in parliamentary aristocracy, conflict and principle must find its expression in Men." Thus while this work narrates the course of political faction and intrigue, of politicians struggling for office, emoluments and power, there is none the less the essential background of principles, at first delaying and then promoting and consolidating the rise of party. There is, for example, in the fifty years of Tory wilderness, the conflict of loyalties and the gradual reconciliation to the Hanoverian dynasty; as evidenced for instance in the Tory supporters of Frederick, Prince of Wales, in opposition to the Government. Incidentally of this extraordinary person Mr. Feiling expresses the view that in character he was "weak, mischievous, false though hardly bad enough to explain the hatred showered on him by his family"; a verdict differing very widely from Sir George Young's recent opinion of the Prince as a real potential Patriot King.

Mr. Feiling is careful not to confuse the rise of the new party with the Tories who propped up and supported George III's period of personal rule. The King himself did not accept Party as such. With the Grenville ministry of 1763 which was to arrest Wilkes and to tax America, "at length we have reached a comparatively solid ground of party, under leaders able to form connections of some permanence, independent of royal patronage." Events in England and America were leading to a new dividing line in political principle. Fundamental issues of freedom, representation and taxation were at stake and the new radicalism was to split the Whigs and drive moderates to the right. With the restaging of principle emerged the conservative revival. After the collapse of George III's personal rule, Pitt entered into power as leader of the new party, at first with a progressive and liberal policy. With the impact of the French Revolution and the subsequent war, reform turned to reaction and the party to one of national resistance with supporters in every class. Mr. Feiling deals at length with the succeeding generation of Tory rule, to Catholic Emancipation when "the Tory party was destroyed," and the final collapse with the passing of the Reform Bill, the inevitable outcome of failure, after the peace was won, to readapt itself and understand the changes and needs of the time.

BEYOND TRAGEDY.*

This volume consists of a collection of Reinhold Niebuhr's sermons turned into essay form. They show Niebuhr at his best; and it is a remarkably good best, displaying a rare combination of very different excellences. While Niebuhr is thoroughly up-to-date in his thinking, valuing intelligence generally and making full use of his own, he is at the same time a "man of faith," and a man, moreover, whose faith is deeply grounded in the Bible. He is no "Fundamentalist," nor, for that matter, a "Barthian," but he treats the texts of his sermons with more fidelity and directness than many who profess a far greater reverence for Scripture than his own. Nor is it merely the social challenge of the Bible that he takes more seriously than most—he brings out with even greater realism the truth behind such ancient doctrines as that of original sin. In this respect he is very reminiscent of a great Christian Socialist of an earlier day, F. D. Maurice, who complained that

> While we are most anxious to plead the Fall as an excuse for our folly and sinfulness, while we give it a prominence in our discourses which the Apostles never gave it—for they were sent to preach the Gospel of the kingdom of God—we are very indignant when we are told that Protestant England may have the same low and dark conceptions of the character of God which there were among Egyptians or Assyrians.

This complaint, in fact, forms a fairly accurate summary of the greater part of Dr. Niebuhr's new book.

It is as a prophet of social realism and social righteousness that Niebuhr has become most widely known. In at least one of these sermons he shows himself to be something else as well—a worker of no mean significance in the field of the philosophy of religion. The use which he has often made in earlier works of the category of "myth" has frequently brought severe criticism upon his head from those who are very

* *Essays on the Christian Interpretation of History.* By Reinhold Niebuhr. Nisbet. 8s. 6d.

rightly concerned to insist upon the objective reality and truth of the fundamental Christian verities. (Dr. W. A. Visser t'Hooft, for example, has criticised him on this score.) Here, in the opening study entitled "Deceivers, yet True," he explains exactly what he means when he describes Biblical thought as "mythological," and makes out a very convincing case for his position. Nevertheless this term was perhaps an unfortunate choice.

ARTHUR N. PRIOR.

CHARITY SCHOOLS.*

The name Charity School has a distasteful sound, it suggests Bumbles and Brocklehursts, condescending patronage and enforced servility. This perhaps accounts for the fact that, while other philanthropic efforts of the eighteenth century, such as prison reform, are fully appreciated to-day, no previous study has been made of this important branch—"the most striking of the many social experiments of the age," whereby "thousands of schools were set up and hundreds of thousands of children, for whom no other means of education existed, were instructed." Miss M. G. Jones has now filled the gap with her comprehensive and detailed description of the origin and development of such schools throughout the United Kingdom. Some idea of the immense amount of research involved may be gathered from the Bibliography: the records kept by the S.P.C.K. in particular have yielded valuable material. The first half of the book deals with England (London and provincial towns, rural areas and their problems); the second, with Scotland, Ireland and Wales. The term "puritan" is explained as denoting an austere piety common to devout Churchpeople and Noncomformists of the day; both fostered the Charity Schools, which were based on religion, and largely supported by the middle-class laity. Funds were often supplemented by special annual sermons, when the fashionable world attended to see the children, in their distinctive dress, and hear them sing, as Blake describes. It is estimated that there were over 7,000 in the London Charity Schools in 1799. An appalling picture is drawn of their previous

* *The Charity School Movement.* A Study of eighteenth-century Puritanism in Action. By M. G. Jones. Cambridge University Press. 1938. 21s.

neglected condition. The names of Hannah More and Mrs. Trimmer, of Robert Nelson and Joseph Lancaster, are inseparably connected with this movement, as is that of Robert Raikes with the allied growth of Sunday Schools. The promoters were anxious that the education provided should not unfit the children for their lowly station—an objection frequently urged; it was, therefore, extremely limited. Various forms of handwork were taught. Miss Jones describes the difficulties of establishing schools in the remote parts of the Highlands, where, as in Wales, some had to be "circulating" or "itinerant," and in Ireland, where the "hedge schools," taught by proscribed "Popish" schoolmasters, held their own successfully against the endowed "Charter" schools. The unsatisfactory conditions that prevailed in these last, and in too many Charity Schools, are not minimised. We can only indicate some topics dealt with in this well-arranged and authoritative work; they include the supervision of schools by managers or trustees; the selection of teachers (many, alas, ill-equipped and ill-paid), and their duties; the split between Church and Dissent, Jacobins and Whigs; a comparison of Charity Schools with the grammar schools of two centuries earlier.

E. G. S.

THE MIDDLE WAY.*

Mr. Macmillan expresses here the most advanced conservatism of his party. For he perceives that no standstill policy is practicable for believers in liberty and pacific reform. His central theme is the need for public action in the preservation of an economic liberty and opportunity no longer to be found in the modern play of industrialism. Here he discusses in detail both the failure of our current economic system to afford an adequate standard of living for a large section of the workers, and the kind and amount of socialism required to make good this deficiency. He sets out in close detail the recent evidence of waste in our current methods of production and distribution, the development of trusts and other capitalist combinations for limitation of output and control of prices, and the piecemeal growth of public enterprise and social services. He urges the need of a National Economic Council

* By Harold Macmillan, M.P. Macmillan. 5s. net.

" which should survey the whole field of economic activity and, in consultation with the responsible representatives of the Government, formulate a comprehensive scheme for general guidance. The Central Bank, the National Investment Board, the Foreign Trade organisation and the Industrial Advisory Council would conduct their operations in accordance with their policy and seek to enlist the co-operation of industries or enterprises to assist in carrying it into effect " (p. 290). Though the scope for State action as indicated is a wide one, Mr. Macmillan has a clear conception of its limits. It is confined to economic activities which are directly related to the primary needs of consumers, and it carries the minimum of compulsion with the maximum of voluntary co-operation. The great merit of this work is its clear apprehension of the meaning of freedom for individuals who are members of a society the modern growth of which threatens to reduce them to " robots."

J. A. H.

THE NEWTONIAN MYSTERY.*

The career of Sir Isaac Newton is one of the most wonderful in the long annals of science, and the late Mr. Sullivan has done justice to it. Dr. Charles Singer writes a short graceful memoir of him, and we read it with the liveliest interest. Mr. Sullivan realises to the full the colossal brain that Newton possessed, for we doubt whether if all the brains of scientific men were gathered into one, they would form a tithe of that of the greatest man of science our race ever produced. No one can enter the chapel of Trinity College, Cambridge, without being struck by the remarkable statue of him, and if you stand at the altar of that Chapel and gaze to the west door the only figure observable is that of Newton standing in lonely pre-eminence. The author writes with extreme lucidity, and leaves us in no doubt of the marvellous accomplishments due to Newton. He is intrigued by the character of the man as well as by the achievements of the scientist. In his eyes Newton was a great chemist as well as a great mathematician. In fact, he might have been great in any department of science had he cared to exert his unique genius. The amazing matter is that, except for brief intervals, he did not care in the least

* *Isaac Newton, 1642-1727.* By J. W. N. Sullivan. Macmillan. 8s. 6d.

to exert his genius. For two years as a very young man he worked incredibly and then turned dormant in the use of his powers. He became Master of the Mint, and discharged his work admirably there, but surely it seems as if a pistol was discharging the duties of a sixteen-inch gun. He also wrote theology, interpreted the books of Daniel and Revelation, and his interpretations even for his own day are sufficiently poor. The problem of problems is why a great man should have allowed his superb brain to lie fallow for forty years. He was as indifferent to his reputation as Cavendish himself. No doubt he was bored by the controversies of the age, and particularly bored by the controversies that his own discoveries excited. It is a lamentable fact that the controversies of scientists are at least as bitter as those of the theologians. The truth is that the expert in any department does not like, say, after fifty to hear of discoveries which will upset some of his own preconceived ideas. Newton experienced much opposition from this source, and it may well be that this opposition forced him to work at the coins he turned out as Master of the Mint. We lay down this book with admiration for it, and yet with the feeling that even Mr. Sullivan has not solved this problem.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

*Mussolini in the Making** provides the first authoritative account of the life and opinions of the Italian Dictator before the World War. The author has spent years over his task, hunting up old newspapers and books, consulting witnesses, and gradually reconstructing the extraordinary human being who now holds his country in the hollow of his hand. It is not an agreeable picture, for Mussolini was as brutal and autocratic when he was a revolutionary socialist as he is to-day when he declares himself the implacable foe of his old associates and his old beliefs. The student of his struggles and adventures, his controversies by tongue and pen, will be struck by the note of unbridled violence which runs through and poisons everything. Among the most valuable features of a book of enduring biographical value are the vivid portrait of his father, the village blacksmith; the exact measurement of his intellectual debt to Pareto, Nietzsche and Sorel; and his

* By Gaudens Megaro. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

actual experiences during the early years in Switzerland. We learned from Emil Ludwig's *Conversations with Mussolini* that he has read widely if discursively. From the present volume we discover how relatively little he was indebted to any teacher, and how completely his ideology was and is the expression of his own volcanic individuality. The striking photographs, beginning with the repulsive-looking boy of 14, help to explain the sensational rise of the ablest Italian man of action since Cavour.

* * * * *

The autobiography of the well-known historian of art, Professor Werner Weisbach, who will lecture in London during the coming winter, gives a vivid account of artistic, literary and academic circles in Germany and elsewhere in the generation before the World War. He excels in portraits of celebrities. None of his readers will forget his picture of Bode, the famous Director of Museums, whose reputation never recovered from his mistaking a Lucas bust for a Leonardo and paying £15,000 for it. He took himself much too seriously, and his rough and autocratic ways were almost unbearable. The author had the good fortune to study at Berlin when Treitschke, Ernst Curtius, the historian of Greece, and Hermann Grimm, the biographer of Michelangelo, were at the height of their fame. An even greater privilege was to hear the incomparable Jakob Burckhardt at Basle. As the son of a rich father he was able to travel widely, and we have some interesting snapshots of artists in England, particularly Herkomer, whom he admired, and Alma-Tadema, whose work seemed to him too imitative and conventional to be great. The surviving friends of Felix Moscheles and his wife will read with pleasure the pages on their hospitable house in Chelsea. Among German painters he ranked his friend Leistikow high. We naturally hear about Stefan George, though he was never a disciple of that exacting poet. Like everybody else he was impressed by the brilliance of Rathenau, but he was not attracted by his personality. The author, like many other German scholars, has had to leave his fatherland and has found a home in Switzerland. His title, *It is all Gone** breathes the sadness of exile, but there is no flavour of bitterness in the book. Luckily, not even a ruthless Dictator can rob his victims of their happy memories or prevent them and their friends from looking forward to better days for their country if not for themselves.

* * * * *

The World Crisis† contains a series of contributions on world problems by thirteen prominent Professors of the Graduate Institute of International Affairs. The articles range over historical and political, legal and economic questions, and are none the less interesting because

* *Und alles ist zerstoben.* Herbert Reichner Verlag, Wien, Leipzig, Zürich.
† Longmans. 10s. 6d. net.

they cover in the main well-worn ground. While objectively written, they represent in many respects a liberal and democratic viewpoint which will command a wide measure of assent. It is not possible here to mention all the contributions, but among those of more immediate practical interest is an article by Dr. Hans Kelsen upon the separation of the League Covenant and the International Labour Office constitution from the Peace Treaties. He considers and treats it as "a purely technical problem" which in no way affects the competence and legal powers of the League or the I.L.O. or the rights and obligations of any parties to the Treaties. In an article on Civil War and International Law, Dr. Hans Wehberg holds that the Spanish nationalists, having once established a territorial *de facto* government, became entitled to recognition as belligerents with the consequent rights. The main burden of an illuminating article is that belligerency should be recognised automatically upon the occurrence of certain precise circumstances; and the lesson of the Spanish conflict is the need for an international body which in future cases could decide the moment of such contingency. Here is met the requirement for a new measure of international comity and solidarity, the lack of which, as these articles so continually stress, is at the root of international chaos.

* * * * *

In *Wild Birds in Britain** Mr. Seton Gordon describes the birds he has seen in a lifetime of watching. He is naturally familiar with many northern breeding species such as the dotterel, ptarmigan, greenshank, rock-dove, goosander and so on, which enhances the interest of the book for those who live in the South. There are many pleasant sidelights on the author and his wife on their bird excursions. One can almost see them, high on the Cairngorms, when they made the interesting discovery that dotterel chicks are able to leave the nest and run actively before their eyes are open. There is, too, a description of a pair of turnstones picking up and throwing small stones over their shoulders in a pretty little ceremony, when they "change-over" on the eggs, one bird walking towards the nest and throwing stones, and one away. Some one hundred photographs by well-known photographers, including seventeen taken by Mr. and Mrs. Seton Gordon, illustrate the book. One, wrongly labelled Brown Owl, should obviously read Barn Owl.

* * * * *

All interested in the history of local water supply and particularly Cambridge men will enjoy and appreciate *Hobson's Conduit*† by Mr. W. D. Bushell, who is one of the trustees of Hobson's Conduit Trust. For some 250 years from 1610 the principal supply of drinking water to the University town was brought from the Nine Wells between Trumpington and Great Shelford by a remarkable conduit commonly

* Batsford. 8s. 6d. net.
† Cambridge University Press. 6s. net.

named after the famous Cambridge and London carrier, Thomas Hobson. Remains of the system are still to be seen in the open channels on either side of Trumpington Street which formerly conveyed the water to the conduit head in Market Hill. It is not clear what part Hobson played in its construction, though he was a principal benefactor. In the course of this fascinating and erudite little work Mr. Bushell has something to say of the tradition surrounding Hobson, who incidentally in his method of hiring out horses to undergraduates in strict rotation gave expression to " Hobson's choice."

* * * * *

*The Yachtsman's Week-end Book** will appeal to all who in their leisure pursue the sport of sailing as a much-needed and serviceable volume. Within less than six hundred pages Mr. John Irving and Mr. Douglas Service have compressed in a concise and attractive manner, with numerous illustrations, a quantity of practical information and instruction upon most matters germane to yachts and yachting. There are also notes on kindred topics, such as fishing and sea and shore birds. For a leisure moment also it will prove an entertaining companion with its brief anthology of nautical literature and chanties. There is a useful glossary of sea terms, but for a volume which is largely a reference book the indices are too scanty.

* * * * *

A revised edition has been published of Mr. H. S. Altham's well-known work, *A History of Cricket*,† which Sir Pelham Warner in his Introduction declares to be " the greatest book ever written " on the game. Six new chapters have been added dealing with the post-war period to 1937, the bulk of which has been contributed by Mr. E. W. Swanton. The first edition, however, is not entirely superseded, since in this new volume the account of the years 1900-14 has been severely compressed and the valuable bibliography omitted.

* Seeley Service & Co. Ltd. 8s. 6d. net.
† Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d. net.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.
OCTOBER 1938.

THE CRISIS.

British politicians know nothing of the Continent. They do not know much more of continental conditions than we do of those of Peru or Siam. To our way of thinking they are rather naïve in their candid self-seeking and again in the easy way in which they give their confidence. They believe with difficulty that others have bad motives. They are very calm, very easy-going, very optimistic.

THESE words were written at the very end of the last century by the then Foreign Minister of Germany, Count von Bülow, afterwards better known as Prince von Bülow and Chancellor of Imperial Germany. They were the result of a visit paid to England in attendance upon William II and of conversations with British politicians, especially with Joseph Chamberlain, then at the height of his great authority at the Colonial Office. The Boer War had just broken out and Berlin had been at pains to advertise its sympathy with President Kruger. The pre-war period of Anglo-German tension had, in fact, begun. Joseph Chamberlain, nevertheless, spoke to the German visitors about the possibility of an Anglo-German alliance in which the United States might join. He then made a once famous speech at Leicester in the same sense. Count von Bülow bespattered the speech with ridicule in his well-drilled Press and dealt with it in the Reichstag with an icy lack of sympathy. For his Imperial Master and his colleagues he penned the confidential comment upon British statesmanship quoted above. " The dangerous Englishmen," he added, " are people like Chirol and Saunders, who know from their own observation the depth and bitterness of the German antipathy against England." He was referring to Valentine Chirol, then the Foreign Editor of *The Times* and previously its Berlin correspondent, and to George Saunders, Chirol's successor at Berlin. The compliment was merited. Both men knew the rulers of William II's Germany through and through and laboured for years to persuade their countrymen of the menace to peace that lurked behind the impulses and ambitions of Berlin.

Herr Hitler has made Germany again the dynamic force of Europe. His diplomacy is as ambitious as that of his predecessors. It is more grandiose in scale, more ruthless in method and has so far been more fruitful in results. In circumstances of far greater urgency and danger the Prime Minister, like his illustrious father forty years ago, hopes to reach international appeasement through an understanding with Germany. This is written during the fateful week-end following his visit to Herr Hitler in Bavaria. The clean-cut courage of his initiative has won great and deserved applause. There is growing confidence that the immediate danger of war may have been conjured away. But equal confidence regarding the negotiations which it is hoped will soon be held has yet to be engendered. Many, including not a few of those who can claim to be the Chirols and Saunders of to-day, fear that agreement may be possible only at the price of concessions to Germany of a nature to lay up later trouble. Whatever happens, the reason for these fears will remain worth examining.

Since the National Government came into office in 1931 the headlines of international history have nearly all had to do with the retreat of the law-abiding, peaceful Powers before the relentless illegalities of Japan, Germany and Italy. The Japanese rape of Manchuria, Germany's bland assumption of the right to rearm after the failure of the Disarmament Conference, Germany's reoccupation of the Demilitarised Zone—both major infractions of the Treaty of Versailles—the Italians in Abyssinia, the Germans and Italians in Spain, the Japanese invasion of China proper—what a crescendo of discomfiture and frustration does this list imply. It has meant the paralysis of the political authority of the League of Nations, the collapse of the ideals for which we like to think we stand, failure to protect weak nations who trusted us, the destruction of our hopes for a tranquil world. It has meant an armaments race madder than anything that was conceivable a few years ago, taxation on a war level while we are still at peace, the semi-strangulation of international trade with which our own prosperity is inevitably bound up, recurrent war-scares; and last but not least it has meant that the democracies, under the leadership of France and ourselves (and of the United States in the Far East), have lost the initiative in international affairs where and when that initiative is most needed.

Lest this should seem too pessimistic an accounting, let us glance at the three main theatres of diplomacy—Europe and the near-by parts of Asia and Africa, the Western Hemisphere and the Far East. Only in the Western Hemisphere does decency obtain. In the other two portions of the globe power-politics, which we fought the war to destroy and created the League of Nations to replace, is again in the ascendant. The gesture of power-politics is to do something illegal or ruthlessly selfish, probably both, and then to turn round to the world and say: "Well, if you don't like what I have done, come and stop me (or turn me out)."

The collapse of law and order in the older parts of the world can thus be ascribed to the fact that the aggressors have organised their strength and, on occasions, have employed it, while the peace-loving Powers have, with one or two minor exceptions, done neither the one nor the other. Japan holds Manchuria and has invaded China farther south because the United States and Great Britain have been unready to lead an armed crusade to protect the integrity of China; Germany has driven a coach and four through the Treaty of Versailles because the other Powers confined their efforts to prevent her to Notes and Resolutions; Signor Mussolini bluffed us out of effective sanctions against his Abyssinian campaign by threatening us with a war which we thought we were unready to wage; Germany and Italy have flouted our non-intervention policy in Spain because we and the French have failed to take the only possible measure to make non-intervention effective, namely the use of our enormous naval superiority for the prevention of the arrival of foreign fighters and war material in Spain. Inversely, international society in the Western Hemisphere remains upon a civilised basis because the overwhelming strength of the United States enables the decent elements to have their way in essential matters.

Germany has so far raked in the principal gains from the gaming table of power-politics. She has been ensuing the domination of Central and South Eastern Europe, which is her first aim, while Japan uses her strength in the doubtful struggle in China and Italy is expensively occupied in Abyssinia and Spain. There have, moreover, been for some time past potent reasons for believing that Japanese activities in the East, Germany's activities in continental Europe

and German and Italian activities in the Iberian peninsula are part of a world-embracing plan of aggression. Germany, Japan and Italy are never tired of proclaiming the community of their interests and ambitions. All three want changes. All three despise democracy. All three fear, or profess to fear, Communism, and, thanks partly to the Franco-Russian alliance, are inclined to couple it and democracy together as variants of the same ideological bugbear. Ideological sympathy is, however, only a minor ingredient in the cement which binds the new Triplice. A common determination to remove grievances, to gratify ambitions, to consolidate offensive and defensive dispositions is the real amalgam.

Germany directs the combination. Once again she finds herself, from her own point of view, pitted against France and Russia with Great Britain in the background. Once again, therefore, as before the war, fear of encirclement is mingled with expansionist ambition as the incentive of her policy. That policy is the natural one for a group of military-minded autocrats thinking in terms of potential warfare to adopt. It is to encircle the encirclers and thus to weaken them as an army is outflanked in the field. On the west of the vast front which she has created Germany is working to establish a Fascist client in power in Madrid with the help of Italy. Success in that direction would mean that France would be encircled in her turn by three Fascist countries and her communications with her African Empire would be gravely endangered in case of war. Nor, as has often been said, would German guns over against Gibraltar and German air and submarine bases in the Mediterranean and jutting out into the Atlantic be precisely healthy for our Imperial communications and food supplies. In the East, Japan's membership of the new Triplice is meant to cramp Russia, if ever she has to resist some manifestation of German policy in Europe. It is also intended to hamper us. The closer the ties between Germany and Japan, the weaker we ought logically to be in another war as compared with what we were in 1914. Then Japan was our ally. She guarded our Far Eastern interests and enabled us to concentrate nearer home. Now the situation might be very different.

History will have much to say as to the responsibility of British diplomacy for the formation of this Triplice and for its successes. It will find that the inability of the European

democracies to organise their strength to protect themselves and their ideals of peace and decency was to no small extent due to British shortcomings. It is at least arguable that the grim confrontation of these days would have been avoided had the Disarmament Conference succeeded in reducing the armaments of Great Britain, France and the other victors, and in allowing Germany to achieve equality by increasing hers. But France and her friends in Europe saw that peace really rested, not upon the Pact of Locarno, the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and so on, but upon the preponderance of their organised armaments over those of the countries which desired a change in the *status quo*. They, therefore, perhaps with more logic than foresight, refused to diminish this preponderance or to consider other alterations in the *status quo* which might strengthen Germany and the other discontented countries unless Great Britain would undertake unreservedly to do her share in protecting the peace of Europe. This the National Government refused to do. They refused to extend our automatic commitments beyond the Rhine. The French argued in vain that if Germany once more went in for expansionism her first aggression would this time be in Eastern and not in Western Europe and that the best, indeed the only, way to prevent that aggression would be to let her know definitely that, if she made it, she would have to reckon with the armed forces of Great Britain as well as with those of France and her continental friends. The Conference faded painfully away; Herr Hitler took by power-politics the equality which it had failed to give him; and that which President Roosevelt has called "the present reign of terror and international lawlessness" engulfed us by what at first sight looks like an inevitable progression. But, when one scrutinises it, one wonders whether the progression might not have been arrested had the National Government been more alert, less careless of fundamental issues, less timidly reluctant to support the principles they professed by something more than words.

Whether China could have been saved by a stronger and more resourceful diplomatist than Sir John Simon is a more open question than many of his critics admit. But our behaviour over Abyssinia and Spain is likely to figure as almost flawless examples of how not to conduct diplomacy. Having by a lack of alertness, at which all Europe gaped in

amazement, failed to warn Signor Mussolini, until it was too late for him to draw back, that we should oppose his venture, we rushed to the other extreme. Mr. Eden was allowed to invoke sanctions without any apparent effort to discover if the force would be available to carry them out, should Signor Mussolini show his teeth. Hence, when Signor Mussolini did show his teeth, our front collapsed, no effective sanctions were imposed and Mr. Eden suffered as bad a rebuff as has ever befallen a British Foreign Minister. As for Spain, it was pretty obvious to anyone less ignorant of Europe than Prince von Bülow's English politicians that when the dictators began to back Franco they were doing so not to make Spain safe from communism but to bring her into their system. Yet the National Government, for reasons which there is no room here to examine, have gone out of their way to help General Franco and his allies. Their non-intervention policy has really been intervention against the Republican Government. It first prevented that Government from exercising the recognised right of a Government to buy arms abroad for the quelling of an insurrection. It then failed to prevent Germany and Italy sending their *protégé* all the men and material they wished. It is true that Russia and other countries redressed the balance to some extent. But that hardly improves our record. Rather the reverse. It is a humiliating thought that, when all is said and done, the Republicans in Spain and the Chinese are, by their resistance to the dictatorial front, fighting the battles of the Western democracies, and that it is not we who are helping them, but the Russians.

Germany's attack upon the integrity of Czechoslovakia has been the latest offensive of the dictatorial Triplice and the most important. The weakening of Czechoslovakia would mean another great step forward for Germany in campaign for the dominance of Central Europe. It has been conducted with the now familiar tactics of armed demonstrations, interference in the affairs of a weaker country and so on. It is not yet known whether M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain are prepared to try to liquidate the resultant crisis by concessions to the German demands such as are now so much in the air. Prague, too, must have its word. It is to be presumed, moreover, that concessions would be counterbalanced by conditions devised to protect the independence of Czechoslovakia and the peace of mind of Europe from further

assaults. But no amount of local safeguards are likely to prevent the German jingoes from regarding compromise as another triumph for power-politics and from demanding more such adventures. The democracies must show that they have made their last retreat if there is to be any real appeasement as the result of a compromise settlement. We must accept the lesson of our discomfitures in recent years. That lesson is that, in this world of brute force, the only way in which the democracies can recapture and retain the initiative is for them to be prepared to co-operate to defend, by force if necessary, the things they believe in just as the dictators are working together to obtain the things they want.

If what M. Blum has called his " noble audacity " enables the Prime Minister to resolve the present crisis, he will have the opportunity not only of succeeding where his father failed but also of definitely rescuing our diplomacy from the low estate into which it had fallen when he and Lord Halifax took it over. He will have the opportunity of putting Great Britain in the leadership of a constructive effort to organise the protection of peace upon an international basis. Collective security has become unfashionable since the police provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations were discredited by the Abyssinian fiasco. But, when one comes down to it, those provisions failed, not through any inherent fault of their own, but because we ourselves led the stampede from the responsibilities they implied, and thus accorded the lawless nations a monopoly of the use of organised force. Hence the present situation in which we are so disquietingly and expensively compelled to recognise that war is possible, that we shall be involved in it and that therefore we must ruin ourselves by tremendous armaments. At the same time, we admit that our victory in it would not in all probability prevent another war from smashing our civilisation to bits.

In these circumstances it would seem to be the part of wisdom for us to admit that the Czech crisis has shown that peace and war are indivisible in Europe. That would mean a decision to do our share in the armed resistance to aggression not only on the Rhine but in any part of the Continent. Opponents of collective security used to make much of the military unpreparedness of the democracies, and especially of ourselves, to assume such a responsibility. The rearmament of Great Britain and France, to say nothing of

Russia and the Little Entente, now answers that objection, especially with Japan so heavily committed in China. Less, therefore, is likely to be heard of our unpreparedness if, as the result of Germany's attempt upon Czechoslovakia, the question of international organisation for the protection of peace again comes up. Those who are still afraid of such a project are more likely to argue that public opinion here and in the Dominions would never tolerate such an abrogation of national sovereignty as would be involved in an undertaking by Great Britain to go automatically to the protection of peace wherever it might be threatened in Europe.

But constructive international relationship has for a long time entailed abridgements of national sovereignty for the common good, and so far one of the characteristics of public opinion both here and in the Dominions has been an intelligent acceptance of necessary changes of that nature. A salient example of this arose out of the only successful piece of disarmament work, now smashed by Japanese nationalism, that there has been since the war, namely the Washington Treaty for the limitation of navies. The key to the treaty was naval parity between the United States and ourselves. To the applause of the Empire, Mr. Balfour was made an Earl for his share in the arrangement, on the recommendation of Mr. Lloyd George. That was in 1922. Yet at the Peace Conference in 1919 Mr. Lloyd George had told the Americans that no Government would live a week which accepted the assault upon British tradition and British independence implied by the surrender of the two-power standard to America or any other country.

ARTHUR WILLERT.

PRAGUE IN PERIL.

FOR days, for months, almost for years Czechoslovakia has lived under the strain of expecting an attack while hoping it would not come. Long ago the essential question of peace or war in Central Europe ceased to turn on whether the Sudetens received greater minority rights and became, instead, a question of whether Hitler's expansionist designs were to be pampered or opposed. The welfare of the Sudeten regions became of only secondary importance except as a convenient excuse for German propaganda. Those who most fervently championed the German minority cause indulged in a policy most likely to lead to complete devastation of the region—either transforming it into a battlefield or into an economic " no man's land."

The sufferings of the Sudeten Germans was not the first line Germany took for a propaganda attack on her neighbour. Two years ago the German Press was charging Czechoslovakia with growing communist activities. Czechoslovakia was dotted with Soviet aerodromes, so she claimed; while the German Military Attaché at Prague refused the Government offer to let him visit—without notice—any place suspected of concealing such an aerodrome. Even in the autumn of 1936 Czechoslovakia was already under a menacing cloud. Two years passed. The bogy of communism took second place to the charge of maltreatment of Germans. With the new venom of German Press attacks, with the constant threat of invasion that followed the *Anschluss*, Czechoslovakia has lived in a state bordering on mental torture.

Yet such torture had miraculously little effect. The Czechs remained outwardly calm, determined to fight if it came to that, but hoping human intellect could find a way against force. Their constant " refrain " last summer was : " With us it is not a matter of prestige. We are willing to make concessions compatible with our democratic State. However, we are convinced that Hitler is not seeking justice for our German minority, but German expansion and domination in Central and South-eastern Europe. Therefore, our Government can do nothing to influence the situation. We can only hope the Western Powers will realise our cause is theirs, and that England will take a stand against German aggression, which in itself would deter Hitler from an invasion." True!

Was it not Hitler's own belief, as expressed in *Mein Kampf*, that in the struggle for territory in Europe England was the only possible ally, and Germany must win her?

The months which followed May 21st were an undeniable strain. The Czechs like to act. Imagine, therefore, the effect of living in danger of an invasion from week to week, wondering if it would come on July 21st, August 15th, September 7th, thinking of the eight long weeks of German manœuvres and the dangerous days of the Nuremberg Congress. In these months they acted only once when the moment absolutely demanded it. Then on May 21st they mobilised so rapidly that the world was left breathless. In six hours they were ready—only two hours to spare, so it is said in Czechoslovakia. They met Hitler on his own ground rather than retreat before the threat to peace. The pine forests of frontier regions bristled with German and Czech arms, but there was no invasion. The words "Hitler is coming" died on the lips of the Henleinists.

After May 21st, throughout the summer, the Czechs, though necessarily passive, were as determined as ever to defend their country—including the historic frontiers of Bohemia. Unfortunate in their geographical position they have nevertheless been blessed in their mountainous borders. Driving along a section of the frontier last August, looking across a mountain stream into Germany, the very peacefulness of the scene, the absence of any sign of fortifications, spelled preparedness at a time when otherwise there would have been a great bustle to provide defence precautions. Conscious of the advantage of mountain barriers in defence and of this preparedness, the Czechs faced the constant threat of attack with a certain bravado. But as days lengthened into weeks, as weeks lengthened into months and the situation was aggravated by its very prolongation, they grew more and more restless. Outwardly they maintained the necessary calm, inwardly they were longing for a decision—one way or the other—instead of nerve-racking uncertainty. Many had hoped for quick action on the Nationalities Statute, but not so Henlein or Hitler. The Czechs were convinced that, practically speaking, only England could settle the essential question of whether Germany would attack or not. Consequently long-drawn-out negotiations on the Nationalities Statute and the Carlsbad demands seemed useless—like diagnosing a disease and

treating it, while someone stands by intent on knifing both doctor and patient.

It was, therefore, with mixed feelings that the Czechs received the Runciman Mission. They realised that their Government could do nothing but accept the plan and welcome the Mission, but they disliked the probability of long uncertainty and complicated negotiations over a question which had become merely secondary. On the other hand they believed there was less danger of a German attack with Lord Runciman at Prague, and they hoped that he would bear witness to the actual situation, to the good faith of their Government, to the intransigent attitude of the Henleinists, and to the importance of Czechoslovakia as a first line of defence against an expansionist drive which will ultimately destroy world peace.

Other sentiments, other events also increased the restlessness of the Czechs. They were conscious of a keen injustice—that their country, which formerly was characterised as exemplary in its treatment of minorities, should suddenly be singled out for international pressure on that point. "If Czechoslovakia, why not other countries which treat their minorities far worse than we do" they asked themselves. The answer was obvious: "Because Hitler threatened war in this particular case." But still the feeling rankled, as they were sure it was territory and not greater minority rights for the Sudeten Germans that he sought.

These thoughts piqued the Czechs as one German Press campaign eclipsed another in animosity, as one German plane after another violated the frontier (seventy-eight such violations took place from May 1st to August 11th). Many people began to feel the Government should take a firmer stand. Hodza, some thought, was too willing to grant concessions. A Slovak and former deputy in the Budapest Parliament, he has lived Danubian politics since his youth and has set high store by compromise and his many political friendships. But the creation and existence of independent Czechoslovakia has been the very life of President Benes—from the time during the war, when as a young man he followed Masaryk abroad, through his years as Foreign Minister and now as worthy successor to his former teacher. It is to him the people have looked for guidance—anxious to show themselves united behind the Government but jealously watchful over their independence and democracy.

Henlein's policy contributed to the restlessness of the Czechs. Whether intentionally or not he clouded the issue; certainly he delayed the negotiations. Henlein, in London, acclaiming democracy, bears no resemblance to the man playing the rôle of Fuehrer in Asch. At home he had little reason to work for any settlement that involves a compromise. Still less did his master Hitler desire such a settlement. Nazis, it seems, look upon a compromise as something dishonest since they assume the righteousness of their own aims. Did not Hitler himself say in *Mein Kampf*: "Political parties are always ready to compromise; world theories never are. Political parties bargain with their opponents; world-theories proclaim that they themselves are infallible." Consequently, the Nazis apparently feel fully justified in breaking an agreement as soon as their fuller aims may be achieved. To those who regard a compromise as sacred and a form of justice itself, this other attitude is incomprehensible. Henlein felt none of the interest Prague had in reaching a settlement. In fact, it seemed, the longer he prolonged the danger the more he was likely to receive, and the greater the opportunity for Hitler to decide whether to risk an attack.

What were the aims of the former bank clerk and gymnastic teacher who rose to be Fuehrer of the Sudeten Germans and henchman of Hitler? Had the answer to that question been clear-cut from the first, Henlein's movement might have fallen under the Government ban which dissolved the earlier Nazi party in 1933. But the Carlsbad speech of April 24th gave perhaps the first really lucid answer. The demands spelled "disruption of Czechoslovakia" from within or from without. Among other points he demanded territorial autonomy, recognition of the Germans as a legal corporative entity, liberty for Germans to profess Nazism and the German *Weltanschauung* (world-outlook). But he also insisted that, if the Czechs sought friendly relations with the German people, they must revise "the erroneous Czech historical myth," and the idea that they were a Slav bulwark against the German *Drang nach Osten*; they must even revise their foreign policy. Such were some of the demands and principles which a leader of a minority intended to force on a majority, for it must be remembered that there is a majority in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, what Hitler was offering to the Czechs through Henlein was peace at the price of the Pact

with Soviet Russia. But to the Czechs the "friendship" of the man who had agreed to recognise Austrian sovereignty seemed a dubious asset.

Although in April Henlein demanded recognition of Nazism, he had reared his movement under the pretence of democratic principles. He himself never ran for Parliament. Why? "Because," as a member of the Sudeten German Party informed me, "he is the Fuehrer. He does not concern himself with details—that is the work of his subordinates. He deals with decisions!" Yet most of his "decisions," curiously, follow a visit to Berchtesgaden. The Henleinist democratic professions amounted only to a smoke-screen—possibly to guard against a Government ban, possibly to win sympathy in London, possibly to turn against democracy itself. Henleinists demanded freedom for their movement, called on the principle of self-determination, cried for a proportional ratio of offices—all on the basis of democracy. What does this mean except a demand that democracy live by its principles, in order that the Nazi doctrine may develop to the point where it can suppress both democracy and the very freedom and principles it demanded under the democratic régime? Said a member of the Sudeten German Party in Reichenberg: "There is no other party in the State that lays such stress on democracy. On the basis of democracy we claim rights for the race as such, just as much as for an individual. There could not be a dictator in a democratic State. A dictator is not chosen by the people, but a Fuehrer is of the people and is their representative." But in that case what happens to those very principles of freedom so loudly demanded by Henleinists and so completely denied under the acclaimed Fuehrer of them all—Hitler?

Such contradictions have terribly confused the main issues. Even to the rabid Henleinist the attainment of greater minority rights became secondary to the ideological and nationalistic aim. This change was a counterpart to Hitler's own exploitation of the Sudeten situation for the expansionist aims which he himself proclaimed. But whatever the appeal of Nazi ideology, it only partially explains the strength of the Henleinist movement. Any visitor in the Sudeten region last summer could sense the extraordinary massing of different appeals and divergent aims in the Sudeten German Party. To all of these the movement held out some hope, however

illusory. The nationalist dream of a greater Germany, the Nazi *Weltanschauung*, the blind trust in and enthusiasm for Hitler, the fervent hope for work and a return of prosperity, the fear of persecution by Henleinists or punishment if Hitler should come: from one end of the scale to the other these hopes and fears were represented not only in the region itself, but in the very heart of the Henleinist party.

Pride of race is no new thing among the Sudeten Germans, who, after all, cherish the memory of days when they dominated economically, culturally and politically. This natural pride has been magnified into excessive nationalism by economic suffering and Henleinist propaganda. The Czechs were blamed for every imaginable misfortune. The export market had failed; Prague was guilty. Textile factories, closed years ago when no one thought to accuse the Czechs, became one of the show-pieces of Henleinists pointing out the malevolence of their "oppressors." If Germans failed to pass the Government service examinations, Prague was to blame; the questions were too hard.

Fundamentally, behind practically every charge and every petty accusation has been some form of economic suffering, some feeling of national affront. Across the frontier, in Germany, the Sudeten Germans knew people had work, while in their own region they looked at deserted textile and glass factories, many of them closed even before the great depression. Export trade suffered painfully from the rising industries of new States and the tariff barriers erected everywhere. But across the border industries appeared thriving, highways were being constructed. With a card and blessing from the Sudeten German Party one could get work building some of the strategic roads of Germany—for what purpose? Thousands of Henleinists found employment on the other side. "Frontier-walking," as it has long been called, came to have a political significance. None but a Henleinist could get work. So the appeal of employment, the fear that if Hitler should come a Henleinist card was the only safeguard, sent many hustling to join the ranks of the Sudeten German Party before the enrolment closed on May 31st.

The German Social Democrats, I found, were ostracised. As one of them said: "I am a German. I do not even speak Czech, but now Germans are not considered Germans if they are not Henleinists. I am considered only German-speaking."

Their position (that of about 13 per cent. of the German vote) has been more precarious than that of the Czech minorities in German regions. They told stories of Henleinist employers or foremen who refused to hire German Social Democrats, of tenants turned out by their landlords, of political candidates terrorised into withdrawing from last spring's elections, of children tormented in their German schools, where they say 90 per cent. of the teachers are Henleinists. Yet a Sudeten German Party member complained to me against a school system that would not permit them to teach German history as the Nazis see it! But Henleinists denied such terror, maintained their F.S. (a kind of Sudeten Storm Squadron) was unarmed, and disclaimed any boycott of the German Social Democrats or Czechs, although the police found boycott leaflets at their headquarters. All the time the economic situation of the region was growing worse. The watering-places, formerly so popular, were empty last summer. Within a few weeks 170 enterprises moved from the region.

"Peace and Work" a German Social Democrat gave as the only solution to the Sudeten problem. But Peace came first. If Hitler was not threatening war the nationalities problem could be settled over-night—on this Czechs, Slovaks and even non-Henleinist Germans agreed. After Peace, then should come Work. The Government, they believed, could arrange measures for the rationing of State offices, for more public works, for export facilities, for loans to reconstruct the distressed areas—measures which would be meaningless in the face of war. For even economic security is second to human security.

As this is written, in the first week of September, the man in the street in Prague expects a German attack. If, by some miracle, a compromise is reached, it will mean a living agony for Czechs and Sudeten Germans alike, unless at the same time Hitler is convinced by foreign Powers, particularly England, that the odds are against him. If however war comes it will "solve" the Sudeten problem in the most ghastly manner—by annihilation of the population between two opposing forces. For the Czechs will defend themselves, true to the words of Masaryk: "Defensive war is ethically permissible and necessary. Humanity opposes violence and bars aggression."

MARY N. HAWES.

AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY.

IT is now almost universally realised that the machinery provided by the Peace Treaties for the settlement of international disputes has become non-effective. The League of Nations has been mainly concerned with political problems, and as an instrument for change, or for collective security, is not functioning. Recent examples can be seen in the failure to take any action over the Japanese aggression in Manchuria, the failure of sanctions in connection with Italian aggression in Abyssinia, and various failures to check German aggression or threats of aggression in Europe. Almost all recent political adjustments in the world have been made by force. The most important single reason for this state of affairs can be seen in the fact that the economic needs of the nations are interfered with by the obstacles of frontiers, many of which are obsolete. The machinery for alterations in frontiers lacks flexibility, and the League of Nations has broken down under an impossible strain.

The confining of national groups within obsolete political boundaries is the cause of the adoption of the economic policy of national self-sufficiency. In essence this is an attempt to produce at home essential raw materials or manufactured goods, which in the past have been imported and which to-day could usually be imported at a lower cost than the cost of production of home supplies or substitutes. The economic result of such a policy, in the case of individual nations, is a general poverty and reduction of the standard of life of the people, or at the best a check on the rise in the standard of life which would have been possible with normal conditions of international trade. A similar development is seen in the greater empires, such as the British Commonwealth, the United States of America, and the U.S.S.R. In each case, either by imperial preference, high tariffs, or strict control of foreign trade, there is a diminution of freedom of trade with the rest of the world. As these imperial groups frequently contain within their boundaries a monopoly of certain essential raw materials, such as rubber and oil, there has been developed amongst the nations a fear of the effects of these monopolies, either as regards the price which is charged or of the withholding of supplies in periods of political tension or of war. Hence economic imperialism has

caused a further growth of economic nationalism, and a widespread preparation for war, to remove this cause of fear. The preparation for war, causing as it does a demand for particular raw materials, such as nickel and iron, again increases economic nationalism, and adds to internal poverty, willingly borne by the peoples because it is an insurance against defeat in a war.

In order to attempt economic appeasement it is essential to examine the real position of the various nations. Many studies have been made by various organisations, in particular the Raw Materials Committee of the League of Nations, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Foreign Policy Association of New York, as well as by a number of individual writers, including Dr. Brooks Emeny, Sir Thomas Holland, and others. In most cases, however, these studies are based on political groupings, and do not take account of the strategic and geographical links which are the preoccupation of those responsible for the economic security of the nation in time of war.

Accordingly a table has been prepared showing the economic position in war time of four principal Powers: Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The basis of the table is an examination of the availability of certain selected needs of each country during a war. For this purpose the vulnerability of trade routes is estimated, both from submarines and from air attack. The economic needs selected are merely representative. The final column of Table I (twelve metals) is a general indication of the metal position, based on Table II. The metals selected are again only representative, and the totals are not weighted.

As regards the availability of supplies, Column 2 indicates an estimate of the percentage of available exports from the country named which may be expected to reach the country concerned. This percentage is calculated on the losses by submarine attack in the last war, together with an estimate of possible losses by air attack, and the limitation of despatch of available surpluses due to needs of the country of origin.

Great Britain may expect to receive safely some 50 per cent. of French supplies, but only about 15 per cent. of supplies from the Americas; the Mediterranean is assumed to be closed to all shipping, which must proceed via South Africa and be subjected to danger of submarine attack from Spanish

TABLE I

ESTIMATED AVAILABLE SUPPLY OF ESSENTIAL NEEDS—INCLUDING RAW MATERIALS—IN WAR.

	Per cent. of available exports estimated to arrive	Per cent. of Total Requirements Available									
		Power Machinery Chemicals	Food	Iron Steel Iron-ore	Coal	Oil	Aluminium and Bauxite	Rubber	Cotton	Wool	12 Metals
GREAT BRITAIN ...		100	50	70	100	substitute 5	—	—	—	25	
From France ...	50	—	—	10	—	—	50	—	—	—	
From America ...	15	—	25	5	—	50	—	—	25	—	
Via S. Africa ...	5	—	5	—	—	—	5	30	10	20	
Total		100	80	85	100	55	55	30	35	45	53
GERMANY		100	80	30	100	substitute 50	2	substitute 20	substitute 16	15 sub. 15	
From S.E. Europe ...	100	—	20	—	—	50	90	—	—	50	
From Scandinavia ...	100	—	—	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total		100	100	65	100	100	92	20	16	80	53
U.S.A. AND CANADA ...		100	100	100	100	100	60	substitute 20	100	60	
From S. America ...	90	—	—	—	—	—	40	10	—	40	
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	30	100	100	96
U.S.S.R.		almost 100	100	100	100	100	50	substitute 15	90	85+	60+

TABLE II

ESTIMATED AVAILABLE SUPPLY OF TWELVE IMPORTANT METALS IN WAR.

	Per cent. of available exports estimated to arrive	Per cent. of total requirements available													÷12
		Copper	Lead	Sulphur	Zinc	Manganese	Nickel	Chromite	Tungsten	Antimony	Tin	Mercury	Asbestos	Total	
GREAT BRITAIN ...		—	5	25	—	—	—	—	2	—	10	—	—		
From France ...	50	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
From America	15	95	50	100	30	—	90	—	20	15	15	20	80		
Via S. Africa ...	5	5	8	—	5	13	—	—	30	15	12	—	—		
Total ...		100	63	100	35	13	90	—	52	30	37	20	80	620	53
GERMANY		15	30	20	70	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
From S.E. Europe	100	50	60	80	40	10	20	100	10	25	—	100	—		
From Scandinavia	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Total ...		65	90	100	100	10	20	100	10	25	—	100	—	620	53
U.S.A. AND CANADA		100	95	100	100	10	5	60	35	10	—	40	100		
From S. America	90	—	10	—	—	50	100 —	30	20	90	90	20	—		
Total ...		100	100	100	100	60	100	90	55	100	90	60	100	1,155	96
U.S.S.R.		70	30	90	60	100	60	100	—	—	—	90	100	700	60

ports. Germany is assumed to have effective control of south-east Europe, and Scandinavian supplies will be continued to the same extent as during the 1914 war. Canada is grouped with the United States, which has practically the whole of South American exports at its disposal. The U.S.S.R. is a solid and largely impregnable land block.

From an examination of the foregoing tables it can be seen that, with the exception of the United States of America, all nations are vulnerable in war. In particular Great Britain is vulnerable as regards its food supply (unless large-scale storage is undertaken); Germany is deficient in certain essential metals; rubber is the only important deficiency for the United States.

An interesting feature is the change in the relative advantages of land and sea empires. In the past the sea was a cheap and safe means of intercommunication; land distances were difficult to bridge, owing to the expense and limitations of railway communications (e.g. the vulnerability of Siberia). To-day modern transport has redressed the balance, and submarines and aircraft have destroyed the safety of sea communication. The land blocks (Germany, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) are safer than the British Empire.

Nevertheless the deficiencies in raw materials of all the great nations make it of vital interest for all to seek a peaceful solution to the raw material problem. Unless nations possessing political control of essential materials (as the British Empire) are prepared to take steps to secure international availability in all circumstances of these raw materials, the danger of war becomes increasingly serious. In this connection the policy of Germany is of great interest. It is based on her economic needs; prestige and the argument of economic injustice are used to secure popular support for a policy of aggression. Territorial expansion in south-east Europe and economic hegemony in that area is in order to secure additional supplies of food (the memory of shortage in the 1914 war is still bitter in Germany), as well as certain metals, oil, wool and other material. It is significant that recently an attempt to develop British trade in south-east Europe has been resented in Germany; to quote *The Times* (May 27th, 1938): "England, with a world-wide empire at her disposal, is regarded as thrusting herself in the way of German development in Central Europe, the area in which nature, history,

and the energies of her people, it is held, have destined Germany to play a leading part."

The interest of Germany in colonial demands has the same object, as has also the extension of spheres of influence, of which Spain is an example. Here not only is there a source of metals (iron, copper, mercury, etc.), but an important strategic base is involved, together with a potential market for German industrial exports in barter exchange for raw materials. The colonial policy moreover is intended to secure for Germany an extension of her currency control, so as to diminish the handicap of scarcity of foreign exchange. Furthermore the strategic advantages of colonial extension (as in the demands for German South-west Africa) are important factors in preparation for a successful war for raw materials and markets. The dilemma is obvious: raw materials are necessary for rearmament to wage a successful war; rearmament is essential to wage a successful war to obtain necessary raw materials. A vicious circle which is liable to snap at any instant.

It must be realised that within the past few years a great change has developed within the British Empire, of which the Statute of Westminster was an important symptom. This change is the result of the rise of Dominion nationalism, based upon the differing economic interests of the Dominions, and their geographical proximity to new and growing markets. Accordingly complete unity in a common Empire policy is no longer possible, and even a Commonwealth internal economic policy is increasingly difficult. The signs of difference are becoming clearer. The link between Canada and the United States needs no emphasis. Australian trade with Japan is growing, particularly in iron ore and wool. New Zealand, realising her strategic isolation, is developing a form of economic nationalism, of which her new iron and steel industry is an example. Our differences with India over cotton imports are now openly recognised. South Africa's dependence on gold for her prosperity makes the gold policy of the United States of predominating importance. We must therefore recognise the isolation of Great Britain, and as a result her increased vulnerability. The conclusion of the Anglo-American trade treaty is to-day of greater importance than the maintenance of imperial preference, and we may therefore expect a retreat from Ottawa in the coming discussions.

An economic analysis which merely aggregates the raw materials of the British Empire is accordingly misleading. Britain in her own interest requires a New Economic Policy. The inevitable lesson must be drawn that raw materials should be made available for the entire world if Great Britain, isolated in war, is to escape the risk of a catastrophic defeat. Such an international policy must be the economic satisfaction of all Powers, by means of an increase in world trade and of making raw materials and markets accessible to all nations.

The reopening of international channels for world trade has recently occupied considerable attention. Gratitude is due to Mr. Cordell Hull for his initiation of the policy of economic appeasement, by negotiation with many countries of bilateral treaties. This was particularly difficult for the United States, where a long period of tariff policy culminated in the Smoot-Hawley tariff law of 1930—the highest tariff in the whole history of the United States. However, the Reciprocity Tariff Act of 1934 has resulted in trade agreements with seventeen countries; the most important of these was with Canada. The task of America should now be to conclude an agreement with one of the industrialised countries of Europe, which would have widespread effects, not only in political solidarity, but in forcing other industrialised countries to re-enter the economic comity of nations. Hence the importance of the negotiations now taking place between Great Britain and the United States. Such an agreement would be of far-reaching consequence, for it would tend to force participation in world economic reconstruction by the totalitarian powers, and so lay the foundation of economic world appeasement.

Other examples in the direction of freer world trade are seen in the attempted Oslo pact of the Scandinavian Powers for limitation of trade restrictions; and in the important enquiry by M. Van Zeeland, whose suggestions deserve a closer examination than the Government has apparently given to them. The Van Zeeland Report among other suggestions proposed to generalise the open-door system of trade which exists in the Congo basin. There is much to be said for an extension of the mandate system, involving not only the obligation to give no trade preference, but also an annual report to some internationally appointed authority. In all probability the recent troubles in Jamaica and Trinidad

would have been prevented had certain abuses been brought to the light of day by report, and had trade been open to all instead of limited (as in the case of sugar) to an artificially saturated and controlled market.

Furthermore the policy of Imperial preference initiated at Ottawa has come in for much criticism, and is due for revision, particularly if the Anglo-American Trade Agreement is to be really effective. The limitation of trade by other countries with the United Kingdom, owing to Ottawa policy, has been the subject of complaint by many countries. Sir George Schuster, in a series of somewhat controversial articles in *The Times* (June 3rd and 4th, 1938), drew particular attention to the complaints of Argentina in this connection. It is hoped therefore that British policy will advance on parallel lines with the United States in the direction of economic appeasement in the world. Not only will an agreement be of great mutual advantage to both countries, but, as these two countries together buy 28 per cent. of the world's exports, any increase in their prosperity and purchasing power will cause an important improvement in international trade, and therefore in international prosperity.

The nations of the world are aware of the necessity for dealing with maldistribution of raw materials, and indeed Sir Samuel Hoare, as Foreign Minister, speaking at the Sixteenth Assembly of the League in September 1935, warmly supported an investigation. As a result the Raw Materials Committee of the League was appointed and issued a report in September 1937. Among other interesting facts they showed that " the total present production of all commercially important raw materials in all colonial territories is no more than about 3 per cent. of world production." Hence the mere return of colonies to Germany would be inadequate as a source of raw materials. It is of course true that such a return would be of great importance for prestige, and it would be untrue to say that colonies have only an economic importance. Indeed it has recently been stated that colonies were in origin a survival of feudal militarism, and only latterly became, in Lenin's words, the monopoly stage of capitalism. However, there will be general agreement that to-day the economic aspect of colonial expansion is of great importance, though we now know that still larger economic adjustments are essential. It is often said that there is no need for action,

because raw materials can be freely purchased in the open market, and indeed that all who control sources of raw materials are searching for new purchasers. Unfortunately there are a number of obstacles to free purchase by certain nations. There are quota and tariff preferences; there is the pull of economic relationship with the mother country; there is the fact of inclusion within a currency group (of particular importance to countries such as Germany which have difficulties with foreign exchange); and there is the final power to prohibit sale and export (especially in war), examples of which are the recent prohibition by Australia of exports of iron ore to Japan, and by the U.S.A. of sales of helium to Germany.

It is important to note that all the wars now raging in the world have a definite economic origin. Japan is fighting in China to control the iron ore, coal, and other materials there, as well as to secure exclusive entry to the vast Chinese market. Italy's claims in Abyssinia were reinforced by constant reference to the vast mineral resources alleged to exist there. Germany's gradual absorption of south-east Europe is for trade reasons, and to control mineral and food supplies in that area; and her interest in Spain is openly proclaimed to be to secure the vast iron, copper, mercury and other resources of Spain and Morocco, as well as the strategical advantages of bases for submarines in case of war with Great Britain.

The result of a genuine measure of injustice, enhanced by immense propaganda, can be seen in the widespread support by the German people of their Government's policy of force and aggression. The people do not realise to what extent their low standard of living is caused by the policy of economic self-sufficiency, but are taught that it is the dog-in-the-manger attitude of the wicked and grasping democratic empires, which have in the past seized by force all that is of economic importance in the world; that they then attacked Germany and took from her even her modest colonial possessions; and that they are now engaged in preventing the emergence of Germany as a modern industrial great Power, and in starving the German people. The League of Nations, they are taught, is but an alliance of the "Have" Powers to hold on to their possessions.

The effect on the people of the democracies is not less

marked. It is probable that much of the disunity in the democracies can be traced to an uneasy feeling that collective security is mainly the security of monopoly control of raw materials and the right to exploit native peoples for private or national profit. "Making the world safe for democracy" is making it safe for capitalist groups, and people are not prepared to fight for such an end. The wide differences of opinion between supporters of collective security, believers in rearmament for national defence and opponents of any military preparation whatever, can be traced to a growing understanding of this factor.

The solution can only be the establishment of economic justice in the world. It is difficult to make readjustments in the face of aggressive demands and threats. Possibly the main value of rearmament is to follow Sir Arthur Salter's suggestion, that concessions can only safely be made when the conceder is strong enough to be under no compulsion to act, but is pursuing a policy based on considerations of justice alone. The Government has admitted that "alarm is caused by fear of monopoly and of the withholding of essential raw materials" (Hoare, September 1935), but since then there has been no real action. The League of Nations should be used from its economic rather than its political side. The Economic Section should be developed, and perhaps reconstructed, so as to become an international economic organisation similar to the International Labour Organisation, which has been so successful in its own sphere. Nations not members of the League could join. The United States of America is an important member of the I.L.O., and would undoubtedly participate in a new economic organisation. Other non-members, such as Germany and Italy, would realise its advantages. Above all there would thus be removed that suspicion of injustice which has been so disastrous to democratic unity in the past. Such an organisation could proceed with the redistribution of essential raw materials on a basis of legitimate industrial needs of all nations. Prices could be controlled, and by making available supplies to all countries, the very basis of war preparation could be made unnecessary. On such foundations could be erected a fairer international economic structure. There would be built up a better understanding amongst all peoples, and it would at last be possible to complete the edifice of a just and lasting peace.

MARLEY.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DANGER.

GREAT BRITAIN will be called upon very soon now to make an historic decision which will probably determine the political future of the greater part of the African Continent—and incidentally that of Great Britain herself in the Continent. Lord Bledisloe's Royal Commission will present Parliament with a Report which is certain to call for major decisions affecting the whole Zambezi region. General Hertzog will again be pressing for the transfer of the High Commission territories. These Dominion and Colonial territories are under the direct control of Whitehall. The Rhodesias, Nyassaland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland cover an area four times the size of Germany, and are occupied by 5½ million white and native people, and the acid test of British statecraft will be found in the handling of the three High Commission (Protectorate) Territories.

A journey of 3,000 miles through these native areas from Cape Town to the Zambezi just now is full of absorbing interest. The most startling general features are, first, the admitted growth of discontent and distrust, both within and without the Union, among the larger part of the 10 million native people south of the Equator. Secondly, the resolute and even passionate opposition to any proposals for incorporating the three Protectorates into the Union of South Africa. The request for the transfer of the administration of the "Protectorates" as set forth by General Hertzog is supported by the argument that the Act of Union provided for the transfer, and secondly that economically and racially the three territories belong to the Union. It is disputed by the natives and by eminent Counsel that Article 151 of the Act of Union does provide for the transfer of any specific territories and it is highly significant that it has never been argued that the inhabitants of the Protectorates desire to join the Union!

It is of first importance to note that the structure of the South Africa Act has been materially changed, in so far as it affects the natives, by the Statute of Westminster. For instance, the "veto" safeguard provided in the Act has completely disappeared, and the appeal to the Privy Council no longer obtains. Thus, as the Selborne Committee has pointed out, "the native inhabitants of the Protectorates can no

longer regard the Schedule of the South Africa Act, 1909, as their safeguard." The seriousness of this statement by Lord Selborne will be increased if, as there is good reason to fear, General Hertzog proposes to limit himself to a declaration shortly to be issued that, if and when transfer should take place, the Union Government will only undertake to adhere to those parts of the Schedule which have survived the Statute of Westminster! It has been agreed between London and Pretoria that in the first place no transfer of Administration will be made until the inhabitants have been "consulted"; secondly, in the words of the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava, "with the full acquiescence of the population of the territories concerned."

There is one further stipulation which, owing to a variety of circumstances, has now become the dominant factor. This is to be found in a declaration made by General Hertzog in Parliament. The Prime Minister explained that he had told a Deputation of white people that he thought the time was approaching to raise the question of Bechuanaland and Swaziland: "But, with regard to both I immediately told them that our position has always been . . . that we are not prepared to incorporate in the Union any territory unless the inhabitants of the territory are prepared to come in, and that was the position we were going to take up in regard to Bechuanaland."* This declaration was reaffirmed in the *Aide Memoire* issued under the joint authority of General Hertzog and Mr. Thomas. Thus the will of the inhabitants quite properly becomes the deciding local factor by which the House of Commons will doubtless be guided when considering the destinies of the Protectorates and their people.

It is thus of first importance to know what the inhabitants are thinking. Bechuanaland is over 500 miles from Swaziland, whilst Basutoland is isolated from either. It was therefore surprising to find that the views of the natives were almost identical, and that they were at the same time quite different in material respects from those entertained in Whitehall and Pretoria; for example, Lord Stanley said in Parliament that when General Hertzog had prepared his memorandum of suggested conditions for transfer, this would be translated into the native languages of the Protectorates and circulated amongst the inhabitants. No doubt every Member of Parliament,

* March 25th, 1925.

and indeed most people who thought about the matter, considered this a useful and reasonable procedure. When this matter was considered in the kraals our astonishment was profound indeed, for it was quite clear that neither Swazis, Basutos, nor Bechuanas will take the slightest notice of it whatsoever. It is indeed doubtful whether any of them will take the trouble to read a line of it! The universal cry of the kraals of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland still rings in my ears, " Conditions!—they are of no interest to us, we won't go into the Union! " But this was not the only surprise. The natives are extraordinarily well informed; their chiefs can quote accurately and at length from old treaties, despatches and speeches made in London and South Africa. Their insight into policies lurking behind phrases is almost uncanny. To this is doubtless due their clarity of vision and sound reasonings.

What is the order of the objections to joining the Union? The first is that, having sought and obtained British " protection," the natives are not prepared to surrender their right to British citizenship. To ask whether the transfer would not be a British Dominion, brings the immediate retort that the questioner cannot have read the speeches in the South African Parliament; cannot have observed the reluctance to hoist the British flag, and has never heard of the attempt to smother the British National Anthem! None of these have escaped the notice of the natives.

The second main objection is also one of status—and this extends far beyond the bounds of the Protectorates. The movement to deny any form of civic association between White and Black is no longer a matter of inference, it is now boldly proclaimed and defended. This indeed raises the greatest of all issues for Great Britain, because if generally adopted it must inevitably destroy the British Empire as constituted to-day.

It would be idle to think that this is only a political or even an economic issue, it is much more, for it is now being reasserted as a fundamental religious doctrine. There is now no hesitation in declaring that the Almighty long ago proclaimed that, because of their colour and colour alone, the African races were a separate biological creation, destined for all time to be servants to the white races. The fact that this doctrine has been given greater emphasis coincident with

General Hertzog's request for further native territories, has accentuated the alarm which is deepening throughout the Protectorates—and incidentally in Indian and Malayan circles in South Africa.

But the question of status and British citizenship thrusts into the limelight a new factor. In all three territories there is now a substantial body of white settlers and traders (about 10,000 in Swaziland). It had been thought that, for a variety of reasons, these settlers were in favour of incorporation, but there is now reason to think they are at least divided: the purely British element, because like the natives they now fear that they would lose British citizenship, especially as it has become known that General Hertzog intends introducing a " Nationality " Bill, with the object of separating still further the British and South African nationalities. Many of the Dutch settlers, who are on both sides of the border, are also hesitating and for a curious reason. One of the " pin pricks " inflicted on the Protectorate natives is a quota system for the sale of their cattle in the Union. For example, Tchekedi Khama and his Bechuanas are only allowed to send for sale in the Union 200 head of fat stock per week, each of which must turn scale at 1,100 lb., that is 10,000 beast a year. This has given rise to widespread smuggling which is largely in the hands of the Dutch farmers—it is estimated that more than 30,000 cattle per annum are introduced by a lucrative smuggling trade which would presumably cease if the incorporation took place!

The third main native reason against incorporation, namely treatment, was no surprise. But the fact that it was put second or third by most natives showed how much clearer is the perception of the Basutos, Bechuanas and Swazis than, say, that of the well-informed Editors of Fleet Street or the officially informed " higher powers " in Whitehall. The native argument is quite sound, namely that treatment rests on status. True, only the Swazis have had actual experience of any form of Union control in their own land when the Transvaal, by permission, administered Swaziland for three years, with consequences only too well known.

But the one million inhabitants of the Protectorates know what Union Government must mean. First, there is the whole series of racial laws in the Union—with more to follow! Next, there are constant racial speeches, there was one made in the

South African Parliament which is now being reproduced and circulated amongst the natives :

> Four things are essential to a native. The first is that when his time or the month is over, then you must pay him every penny you owe him. The second is to give him enough food. The third that you must give him a tot when he needs it. The fourth is the most necessary, and that is a good hiding when he deserves it. Let honourable members opposite go back to the republican days when the natives were given 25 without them being counted, and do they want to tell me that the natives were ever better off than in those days? The natives were happy when they were kept in their place.

Then there is a constant flow of propaganda. There are in the Union about 100,000 Basutos and a lesser number of Swazis and Bechuanas. These " boys " spend much of their energy writing letters, and the " treatment " they receive forms the basis of lurid correspondence concluded in most cases with earnest warnings against voluntary incorporation. In a large number of instances Chiefs who have entered the Union to verify these allegations have been subjected to such gross indignities that they have gone back to their people to urge them on no account to risk coming under the same rule.

Within the Protectorates the natives fear that British statesmen are about to forswear Britain's solemn and specific engagement set forth in speeches, despatches and treaties. Within the Union poverty, suspicion and discontent grow apace. Further north, between the Limpopo and the Equator, there is no question that discontent is growing, and there the native fear is that the control of Native affairs is about to pass completely from the Colonial and Dominions Offices. It would be folly to ignore a situation fraught with such grave consequences to British honour and security. Lord Bledisloe's Royal Commission is certain to provide Parliament with material which will cause a good deal of searching of heart, and it will surprise nobody if the able members of that Commission do not draw pointed attention to the danger of allowing the present drift to continue.

The " Protectorate " question, which in fact governs the whole situation, confronts the British Government with this dilemma : either there must be a breach of honour with the inhabitants greater than any in British history, or, alternatively, General Hertzog must be informed that transfer can

only take place under certain definite conditions. The initial and most important condition was first stated by General Hertzog and later reaffirmed by him, namely, that the native willingness to come into the Union is essential. The second is that the whole schedule to the Act of Union must be accepted, and that where vital elements of the schedule have disappeared, something must be provided to replace the objects which these sections were designed to secure.

The third element must obviously be that of status, and this should be a twofold undertaking : first, that the inhabitants be guaranteed an undiluted British citizenship, and secondly the provision laid down by Mr. Winston Churchill at the Premiers' Conference of 1923 :

> I think there is only one ideal that the British Empire can set before itself in this regard, and that is that there should be no barrier of race, colour or creed which should prevent any man by merit from reaching any station if he is fitted for it.

A final condition ought to be an agreed one under which provision should be made for carrying on the actual administration as it is to-day, subject of course to the machinery envisaged in the schedule. It is not a question of trusting or mistrusting the Union Government, it is the difficulty of securing that element which all parties are agreed must be the initial factor, namely the goodwill of the inhabitants, a condition which, apart from equity, is mere common sense.

Even with agreement on those four main conditions the task of securing the " full agreement " of the inhabitants is going to be a long and difficult business, for unhappily suspicion and discontent are so much more difficult to eradicate than to create. The one thing which stands out clear beyond all question is that there can be no compulsory transfer of people and territory whilst the present tension and ill-will exists. But side by side with this there is a condition in the Thomas-Hertzog correspondence, partly stated and partly implied, namely that each Government will do its part in creating the " atmosphere " appropriate to transfer. But, unhappily, almost every blunder that could be committed, wittingly or unwittingly, has been perpetrated, whilst several legislative and administrative actions have been taken which together have put back the work of appeasement. The worst type of blunder was the well-meant offer by

South African Parliament which is now being reproduced and circulated amongst the natives :

> Four things are essential to a native. The first is that when his time or the month is over, then you must pay him every penny you owe him. The second is to give him enough food. The third that you must give him a tot when he needs it. The fourth is the most necessary, and that is a good hiding when he deserves it. Let honourable members opposite go back to the republican days when the natives were given 25 without them being counted, and do they want to tell me that the natives were ever better off than in those days? The natives were happy when they were kept in their place.

Then there is a constant flow of propaganda. There are in the Union about 100,000 Basutos and a lesser number of Swazis and Bechuanas. These " boys " spend much of their energy writing letters, and the " treatment " they receive forms the basis of lurid correspondence concluded in most cases with earnest warnings against voluntary incorporation. In a large number of instances Chiefs who have entered the Union to verify these allegations have been subjected to such gross indignities that they have gone back to their people to urge them on no account to risk coming under the same rule.

Within the Protectorates the natives fear that British statesmen are about to forswear Britain's solemn and specific engagement set forth in speeches, despatches and treaties. Within the Union poverty, suspicion and discontent grow apace. Further north, between the Limpopo and the Equator, there is no question that discontent is growing, and there the native fear is that the control of Native affairs is about to pass completely from the Colonial and Dominions Offices. It would be folly to ignore a situation fraught with such grave consequences to British honour and security. Lord Bledisloe's Royal Commission is certain to provide Parliament with material which will cause a good deal of searching of heart, and it will surprise nobody if the able members of that Commission do not draw pointed attention to the danger of allowing the present drift to continue.

The " Protectorate " question, which in fact governs the whole situation, confronts the British Government with this dilemma : either there must be a breach of honour with the inhabitants greater than any in British history, or, alternatively, General Hertzog must be informed that transfer can

only take place under certain definite conditions. The initial and most important condition was first stated by General Hertzog and later reaffirmed by him, namely, that the native willingness to come into the Union is essential. The second is that the whole schedule to the Act of Union must be accepted, and that where vital elements of the schedule have disappeared, something must be provided to replace the objects which these sections were designed to secure.

The third element must obviously be that of status, and this should be a twofold undertaking : first, that the inhabitants be guaranteed an undiluted British citizenship, and secondly the provision laid down by Mr. Winston Churchill at the Premiers' Conference of 1923 :

> I think there is only one ideal that the British Empire can set before itself in this regard, and that is that there should be no barrier of race, colour or creed which should prevent any man by merit from reaching any station if he is fitted for it.

A final condition ought to be an agreed one under which provision should be made for carrying on the actual administration as it is to-day, subject of course to the machinery envisaged in the schedule. It is not a question of trusting or mistrusting the Union Government, it is the difficulty of securing that element which all parties are agreed must be the initial factor, namely the goodwill of the inhabitants, a condition which, apart from equity, is mere common sense.

Even with agreement on those four main conditions the task of securing the " full agreement " of the inhabitants is going to be a long and difficult business, for unhappily suspicion and discontent are so much more difficult to eradicate than to create. The one thing which stands out clear beyond all question is that there can be no compulsory transfer of people and territory whilst the present tension and ill-will exists. But side by side with this there is a condition in the Thomas-Hertzog correspondence, partly stated and partly implied, namely that each Government will do its part in creating the " atmosphere " appropriate to transfer. But, unhappily, almost every blunder that could be committed, wittingly or unwittingly, has been perpetrated, whilst several legislative and administrative actions have been taken which together have put back the work of appeasement. The worst type of blunder was the well-meant offer by

the Union Government of £35,000 for public works in the Protectorates—any native office boy could have told his White Superior that hardly anything would so quickly rouse the suspicions of the native tribes as this offer. It is not the least of the complaints which the natives make to-day that this was an attempt to " buy off " their opposition to transfer!

Since the *Aide Memoire* was published legislation has been passed in the Union Parliament which again has been of a purely racial character. This also has added fuel to the fire of opposition. During the same period discussions have taken place between the Dominions Office and the South African Government and debates have taken place in both Parliaments ; the native Chiefs and " Pitsos " complain that not one word upon the question of transfer has even been said to them officially.

Happily there is at hand machinery competent to bring about a right atmosphere. If given time and freedom to work it will do everything that is humanly possible. Each " Protectorate " possesses Resident Commissioners and Commissioners, all of whom enjoy the confidence of the native people, all of them know native aspirations and know just how far the white man can safely go. At the same time, the Union Government has in its Native Affairs Department a body of officials equally competent, equally trusted to do the right, and equally anxious to give their native charges a " square deal." To these men might be committed the task of bringing about the right atmosphere. But, if they are to do so they must not be hampered either by " time limits " or by the continual passing of racial legislation.

JOHN HARRIS.

THE JEWS OF VIENNA.

HUNDREDS of thousands of Austrians, mainly Jews, half-Jews or Christians of Jewish origin, are at present victims of an indescribably ruthless treatment, daily exposed to brutalities and humiliations which only a fiendish imagination can devise. No one can fully estimate the enormity of this tragedy who has not realised how inseparably the Viennese of Jewish blood were connected with the life of the city, and how much of its prosperity, grandeur and charm was due to them. Jews have lived and worked in Austria since time immemorial. Jewish traders are first mentioned in a customs regulation of A.D. 904 and in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Dukes of Austria, the Kings of Hungary and other rulers in Central and Eastern Europe entrusted the administration of their revenues to Jews. In the Middle Ages many Emperors, Popes, Kings, Princes and Bishops appreciated their services as financial organisers. They even preferred them as physicians, and tried to protect them against the fury of enemies thirsting for their blood and wealth. Yet this favour only enhanced the popular hatred and frequently their high protectors had to yield to the demand for their spoliation and extermination. The history of most countries records endless humiliations and exactions, often culminating in terrible butcheries and expulsions. The chief motive of the persecutions was everywhere the desire of people, owing money to Jewish lenders or having to compete with Jewish traders, to get rid of their creditors or competitors by killing them and to plunder their houses.

In Austria the Jews at first enjoyed good times, but later, when a class of Christian traders developed, they suffered cruelly. In 1421 several hundreds were burnt in Vienna by order of Duke Albrecht V. Yet after each expulsion or extermination the Government soon recognised that the interests of the Prince and the country had been severely damaged by these measures and that the Jews were a necessity for the Treasury and for economic life. Therefore, again and again we find that a Government which had driven them out soon invited them to return and to resume their business. Under Leopold I Austria rose to the rank of a world power through the victories of Prince Eugene over the Turks and the French. That was the most glorious epoch of Austria,

and its splendour survives in the fine Baroque architecture of Vienna. Yet the marvellous achievements of generals, statesmen and artists were only made possible through the efforts of two Jews who procured the gigantic amounts of money and goods needed by the Government. Samuel Oppenheimer and Samson Wertheimer were the greatest financiers and State contractors of their time; their credit and organising talent enabling Austria to unfurl her flag victoriously in the Balkans and the Netherlands, in Italy and Spain. They stood high in favour with the Emperor and Prince Eugene, and the Jews of Vienna were considered the richest in Europe. Yet their wealth soon vanished, for Governments and Princes were bad debtors. Endless wars and magnificent courts ruined at last both the public finances and those who had lent the money.

During the whole epoch of rising absolutism the position of the Jews oscillated between opposite poles. The old prejudices had still powerful supporters, and the Jews were on the whole subject to the most burdensome and humiliating restrictions. These disabilities were partly repealed by the Emperor Joseph II (1782), and their complete abolition was effected by the revolution of 1848. Yet during the whole period the Imperial Ministers again and again emphasised the fact that the Jews were indispensable for the industrial and financial development of Austria, and they tried incessantly to alleviate the restrictions in the interest of the State. Thus a small class of privileged Jews was allowed to live and carry on business in Vienna. In later times a larger number of unprivileged Jews gathered there; this was only tolerated *de facto*. In the latter half of the eighteenth century the spirit of the age of enlightenment made headway in Austria too. Leading statesmen, a great part of the aristocracy, the bureaucracy and the intellectuals embraced the new creed of toleration and humanity and advocated the emancipation of the Jews. Klopstock, otherwise a forerunner of Teutomania, enthusiastically praised Joseph II for his edict of 1782. The best known pioneer of "Enlightenment" in Austria was Sonnenfels, the son of a rabbi. He was baptised, became a University Professor and writer, rose to a high position in the Government, and was ennobled. Other officials of Jewish birth were also raised to the rank of nobility at that time, e.g. Hönig von Hönigstein, the organiser of the Austrian tobacco monopoly. The greatest service of Sonnenfels was his share in the abolition

of torture in judicial procedure. His statue stands to-day in front of the Town Hall of Vienna, with broken instruments of torture under his feet, and another monument is in the University. Will the Nazi régime tolerate them?

The expectation of enlightened statesmen that a cautious admission of Jews to economic and social equality would be beneficial was fully confirmed. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the number was still very small in Vienna, but they included an élite of patricians who had a very large share in developing the economic and financial resources of Austria. The greatest banking firm was that of Arnstein and Eskeles, who received the rank of baron from the Emperor Francis, though he was no friend of Jewish emancipation. At the time of the Congress of Vienna Fanny von Arnstein was famous for her beauty and spirit. Her salon was the meeting-place of all the great statesmen, aristocrats and men of letters, and she was generally acknowledged as the queen of society. Madame de Staël had complained that there was no intellectual life in the higher circles of Vienna. Now high society began to evince an interest in the progress of literature, taste and thought, and many Jews and Jewesses took a leading part in this development. The former rigid separation of Jews and Christians was virtually abandoned. The Jews were eager to be baptised, and many showed the greatest fervour in practising Christianity and cultivating German civilisation. It seemed certain to most observers that the Jews would soon have ceased to exist as a separate group with their own creed and traditions. This process of rapid assimilation was continued through the greater part of the nineteenth century. In its course countless Jews adopted the Christian religion and intermarried with Christians. The contribution of Jews to the development of banking, industries, law, science, literature and art was so enormous that the history of Austrian civilisation would lose a very great part of its lustre and many distinctive features if their share were left out.

What were the causes of this success? How can it be explained that a small minority won such an outstanding position despite the prejudices working against it? Antisemites, of course, like to ascribe it to their alleged unscrupulousness, while others believe in their innate acuteness. Obviously both explanations are superficial and misleading. Small religious or racial minorities living outside their own

territory have often startled the world by their economic success, and have sometimes aroused similar prejudices as the Jews. Particular factors had a decisive influence. In the first place the Jews were not bound by certain traditions hampering economic progress. They were not admitted to trade guilds in former times and, therefore, escaped their reactionary spirit. Neither could nor would they become peasants, who in those times were serfs and were most unprogressive. In most countries the Jews were for many centuries restricted to money-lending and certain trades spurned by Christians, and their frequent expulsions gave them a good training in international connections. Therefore, when the epoch of capitalism began they were equipped with traditions specially favourable to the new requirements. For this reason sometimes rulers of backward countries invited them to settle within their dominions. In Austria several further circumstances favoured Jewish activities. The Catholic Austrians were never very enterprising, or shrewd business men. The traditions of the Church did not foster an adventurous spirit, and capitalism was looked on with suspicion and aversion. Aristocrats regarded business as beneath their rank. There was no rich urban patriciate versed in big commercial transactions. For the middle classes the ideal was to become a State official with a secure though small salary and sufficient leisure to enjoy life in a modest way. The Jews, moreover, played a prominent part as middlemen between the different nations of the polyglot Empire. They did not find it beneath their dignity to learn languages or to trade with people of other nationalities. They were also to a large extent the commercial and financial mediators between Austria and foreign countries, between East and West.

The Rothschilds, who had come from western Germany, built the first railways and founded the first great banks in Austria. They became the State bankers as formerly the Oppenheimers and Wertheimers, who also had come from the Rhine. The extensive and highly organised banking system of Vienna which before the last war formed the financial centre of central and eastern Europe, and the flourishing export trade which made Austrian products famous in the markets of the world, were mainly the work of Jewish bankers and merchants. Before their emancipation the Jews of Vienna were a small privileged class of capitalists. As soon as the old

disabilities were removed the number rose rapidly through immigration from Bohemia, Hungary, Galicia, Russia, etc. This large influx of Jews, of whom many were not assimilated to the standards of western civilisation, later on aroused feelings of aversion and was successfully utilised by the anti-semites to represent all Jews as an alien and repulsive race. Yet even this immigration was on the whole advantageous to Austria's economic life. These Jews were most industrious, enterprising, and frugal. They began as pedlars or small shopkeepers and many rose to wealth and a respected position. A long list of leading industrialists, great merchants and distinguished intellectuals, could be drawn up from that class of Eastern Jews, whose services to the community were conspicuous. In this way the Jews of Vienna became for some time a rather wealthy class, though their share in the total wealth of the country was never so large as their enemies believed. Moreover, this wealth was not concentrated in a few hands. The bulk of it was in small and middle-sized fortunes. Large capital was in most cases quickly split up, as Jewish families used to have many children. Moreover, among the descendants of successful business men the striving to enter a more intellectual walk of life was exceedingly strong, and fortunes inherited by intellectuals were rarely preserved intact.

The legal and medical professions were especially attractive, and soon Jews and former Jews comprised the majority of lawyers and doctors in Vienna. The civil service and the army also admitted them, though they had usually to be baptised. Francis Joseph appreciated their services, and most of the high officials and aristocrats of his reign had little prejudice against them. In this epoch an astounding number of Jews and half-Jews rose to the highest positions as Ministers, Generals, high Judges and Professors. No names are more famous in the development of Austrian law than those of Unger, Glaser, Klein and Grünhut. All four were Professors of law at the University of Vienna and later on became members of the Austrian House of Lords. Three of them also were Ministers of Justice. Another Minister of Jewish descent was Steinbach, who was a fervent adherent of social reform and a most successful Minister of Finance. He was the pioneer of social legislation; he introduced a stable currency based on gold, and tried in 1891 to overcome the national strife

threatening the foundations of the Empire by a Bill proposing universal suffrage. In many respects he recalls Disraeli. One of the most conspicuous Foreign Ministers, Count Aehrenthal, came from a family which originally had been Jewish. After the world war Jews contributed decisively towards building up a new Austria. Professor Kelsen drew up the democratic constitution, and when Dollfuss abolished it his principal adviser in framing the new authoritarian constitution was another official of Jewish origin, Dr. Hecht, though Dollfuss was an anti-semite. Previously Chancellor Seipel, himself a priest, had inaugurated a policy of economic and financial reconstruction designed to form the basis for Austria's independence. This policy was largely conducted by officials and advisers of Jewish blood, such as Schwarzwald, Kienböck, Schüller, Grünberger, Kunwald. At the same time the socialist administration of Vienna carried out grand schemes of social welfare work which aroused the admiration of the world. The merit was chiefly due to Professor Tandler and Alderman Breitner, both of them Jews.

The achievements of Austrians of Jewish extraction in medicine and almost every branch of science are overwhelming. The University of Vienna was a hotbed of anti-semitism, and well paid and influential chairs were seldom given to Jewish scholars in recent times. Yet in the courts of the University, where the busts of its great scientists are placed, we find many memorials erected in honour of professors who would be called " non-aryan " to-day. The number becomes still greater when we run through the annals of the University or muster the names of Professors who were teaching in German Universities. The number of Austrian scholars of Jewish blood was always so great that a large part went to German and other Universities abroad. A list comprising only the best-known names would be far too long to be inserted here. The development of broadcasting has only been made possible through the invention of the amplifying valve, by an Austrian Jewish physicist, Robert von Lieben. A few years ago a Ministry, though professing anti-semitism, felt obliged to issue a post stamp with his portrait, in order to remind the world that this invention was due to an Austrian. In front of the Vienna Polytechnic we find a monument devoted to the inventor of the benzine automobile, Siegfried Marcus, a Jewish mechanic of Vienna.

Better known to the general public are the names of Austrian poets and writers. In every history of modern literature the highest rank is conceded to authors of Jewish origin. One need only name Hofmannsthal, Schnitzler, Karl Kraus, Franz Werfel, Stefan Zweig, Jakob Wassermann. One of the greatest composers was Gustav Mahler, the director of the Vienna Opera. Musical and theatrical life of Vienna can hardly be conceived without the rôle played by Jews as authors, actors, producers, critics. Adolf von Sonnenthal was considered the greatest actor of his time. At present Elisabeth Bergner is perhaps the Viennese Jewish actress best known in England. The whole world, moreover, knows Max Reinhardt as a producer of extraordinary ingenuity. The lighter sort of Viennese theatrical art, especially the operetta, also owed much to Jewish composers and performers. No Viennese song has ever enjoyed such popularity and has become such a classical document of the old Viennese spirit as the *Fiakerlied* composed by Pick, a judge of Jewish descent and a great favourite in aristocratic society. A special chapter would have to be devoted to the rôle of Jews in Viennese journalism. The modern Austrian press have been mainly created by Jewish writers and editors.

The Jews of Vienna have endowed their beloved city with charitable and other institutions which contributed largely to her welfare and fame. No public collection has ever been made without the Jewish contributions surpassing by far those of the rest of the population, though the Jews certainly were much less wealthy than the non-Jews as a whole. Great hospitals have been founded and munificently endowed by Jewish Viennese, and countless skilled Jewish doctors have devoted their services without payment to such institutions as the Polyclinic, where everybody could find help. The wonderful system of popular lectures and academies making serious scientific studies accessible to everybody was mainly built up by Jewish efforts, particularly by Professor Ludo Hartmann, a half-Jew, and Professor Emil Reich. One of the most beautiful parks of Vienna was given to the city by Francisca von Wertheimstein, a Jewish lady of great distinction whose salon was the centre of literary life.

It is not our task to describe the rise of anti-semitism in Vienna and to trace its motives ; yet our brief survey reveals one of the most potent factors in that movement. Besides

economic competition the very contributions to the civilisation and welfare of the city made by Jews, and their outstanding position in cultural life, went far to arouse envy and hatred, particularly among " aryan " students and the lower ranks of officials. The enormous majority of the Viennese population, however, always lived in friendly relations with the Jews, even many of them who belonged to the Christian Social party which professed to be anti-Jewish. We have already shown that the most prominent leaders of that party, Seipel, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, made ample use of the services of advisers descended from Jewish families.

The most crushing blow for the Jews of Vienna was the Great War. It ended with the destruction of the big market which had been the basis for the functions of the banks and export trade. The governments of the new States immediately did everything to rupture the close relations between Vienna and the former provinces. Thousands of firms had to remove their head offices to the new States or to close down. All the great banks collapsed after a long and desperate struggle, and their assets were ultimately taken over by a bank under State control. Most Jewish employees were dismissed or sent off with meagre pensions. The growth of Austrian semi-fascism as introduced by Dollfuss meant to most Jews increasing exclusion from public and private employment, though exceptions were made for baptised Jews who had special qualifications needed by the new régime. When the independence of Austria drew near its end the Jews of Vienna had lost by far the greatest part of their former wealth and influence. More than a third were so poor that they could only live on relief afforded by the Jewish community. The constant narrowing of their conditions of existence forced thousands to emigrate every year. Yet that state of things must now appear as a lost paradise. At present every Jew or half-Jew, whether baptised or not, is exposed to the most ruthless spoliations and humiliations, to imprisonment and expulsion. Scholars and students are not allowed to consult libraries, no Jew is admitted to a public bath or park, and when recently a family of five committed suicide the Nazis put up a poster before the house: " Imitation recommended! " An English journalist who inquired at the Jewish cemeteries was informed that up to now 7,000 had followed that advice.

ERASMUS.

EGYPT: A NEW ERA.

THE last two years have seen the opening of a new era for Egypt, brought about by important events within her frontiers and dramatic changes in the north-east corner of Africa to which she belongs. These two sets of events, taking place more or less at the same time, have changed the face of Egypt's internal and external policy. The purpose of this article is to review the political and economic changes that have taken place, and to consider their significance with regard to the future interests and modern opportunities of a country which enjoyed civilisation thousands of years before the Christian era.

The death of King Fuad in April 1936 marked the end of a transition period in the history of Egypt—a period of semi-independence based on the Declaration of 1922 and limited by the " four reserved points." During this time the situation was most unsatisfactory for the Egyptians, for the British Government, and for Anglo-Egyptian relations. Force of circumstances, however, made this unavoidable. But no sooner had the Council of Regency been set up to tide over the time until the young King Farouk attained his majority, than force of circumstances again stepped in to bring about the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance in August 1936. With this Egypt obtained the complete independence which has been the object of all her Governments since she was released from the yoke of the Turkish Sultans. She is also obtaining release from the " capitulations," which have long since become " time-expired " in every sense of the term. Egypt is to be relieved of the indignity of having British troops quartered in her principal cities as soon as accommodation is provided in the Canal zone. She also enjoys greater participation in the administration and defence of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Egypt is now a member of the League of Nations. But this enhancement of her position in the world carries with it important responsibilities, the diligent discharge of which is essential to Egyptian as well as to British interests. She has to carry out definite defensive measures, construct roads and railways, and build barracks, involving considerable expenditure. Egypt is now responsible for the protection of foreigners within her frontiers. But perhaps the greatest responsibility of all is the necessity of working out her own destiny in Africa

and setting her house in order without the guidance of British advisers. Egypt is now "finished with dual-controlled machines; she is now flying solo."

Except in so far as she is bound by the terms of the Treaty, Egypt has now a perfectly free hand. Her internal affairs are no longer the concern of the British Government, although the British Ambassador in Cairo is always ready to help with advice if asked to do so. This has brought about a great change in the whole Egyptian outlook, and the coming of a young and popular king at this propitious moment for modern Egypt has provided an exhilarating tonic. It is no exaggeration to say that the King is adored by his subjects, and that his name is glorified by the simple cultivators of the soil the whole way from Alexandria to Wadi Halfa. Wherever he goes he is hailed by multitudes, who regard his happy manner and smiling young face as an excellent omen for a country at last blessed with complete independence. Farouk's attitude to his people differs widely from that of any of his predecessors. He mixes freely with the people, and finds out what they are thinking about; while they in turn regard him as one of themselves and as the bringer of an entirely new era in the history of Egypt. This simple, friendly and sympathetic way of sharing the life of even his humblest subjects has endeared him to the masses, who have never before experienced such a thing. Fully aware of his immense popularity, Farouk is determined to turn it to the best use. He knows that his influence with the people is great, and realises the value of this at a time when his country has just gained her complete independence, and is about to take an important part in co-operation with others for the development of North-East Africa.

Farouk has also come at a stage in the development of the internal combustion engine when civil aviation and motor transport are bringing about far-reaching changes in Egypt and neighbouring countries. He has the advantage of being in the saddle before important economic events take place farther south as a result of Italy's development of Ethiopia. Farouk's opportunities are to be found chiefly in his youth, popularity and diligence at a time when great changes are developing. In Egypt to-day there is a strong desire for internal progress on national lines, stimulated by a wish to show the world, and most especially Great Britain, what Egyptians can do without outside assistance. The Egyptians

are a proud people, both nationally and individually, and they attach great importance to the trust placed in them by Great Britain in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Hence they are now making every endeavour to carry out its terms to the best of their ability. Indeed a recent visit to Egypt created the impression that the Egyptians have learned as much in one year of complete independence as they would have done in five years of the previous régime. As this would not have been possible ten years ago, much credit is due to the services of those who have acted as British advisers. In purely Anglo-Egyptian affairs it is hard to-day to find any feeling against Great Britain. The old game of bickering with Britain is dead, and has been replaced by a much healthier occupation—that of trying to make Egypt as self-reliant as possible, and to improve social conditions as well as local industries, communications and trade.

The Egyptians also want to increase and extend their country's prestige and influence throughout North-East Africa, and to co-operate with other countries for mutual benefit. Most important to Egypt is the decision of Great Britain and Italy to pursue policies of political and economic co-operation in Africa; for recent progress in civil aviation and motor transport has increased Egypt's geographical significance as a transit country between north and south as well as between east and west. When all these developments are taking place, it is essential that Egypt should be united; and here the influence of King Farouk can do a great deal. Although the Egyptians cannot be expected altogether to abandon what is second nature to them, their affection for the King transcends party politics and has rather put all this unsavoury business in the shade. Reduced to a few words, the King can control the party political game: he can lead Egypt, united in loyalty to himself and at one in a desire to profit from progress and co-operation with others.

Hitherto politics has overshadowed almost everything else in Egypt to the detriment of constructive progress. Now there are definite signs of economics, commerce and material progress throwing politics into the shade. This is partly due to the change of outlook arising from complete independence, and partly owing to the influence in Africa of a progressive Italy. Yet the movement to throw off foreign control over public utility services is nothing new. Although the Egyptian

State Railways have until quite recently been virtually under British control, it is now eight years since the Egyptians began to form a mercantile marine of their own. The Alexandria Navigation Company, established in 1930 with a capital of £E.20,000 and a Government subsidy, was followed in 1934 by the Misr Sea Navigation Company and in 1937 by the Pharaonic Mail Company. This not only gives Egypt a footing among the maritime nations of the world, but enables the Egyptian flag to be flown in many places where it would never otherwise be seen. In these days of newspaper and wireless propaganda of doubtful reputation the time-honoured and honest method of flying the national flag at sea is apt to be overshadowed. The Egyptians, however, realise its value to a nation trying to build up its position in the modern world, especially to one holding an almost unique position as far as world shipping is concerned. Nor are the Egyptians behindhand in the matter of civil aviation. The Misr Airworks Company has been operating since 1932 with a capital of £E.40,000 and a Government subsidy; and services are maintained in Egypt itself and also with Palestine, Syria and Iraq. Although at present most of the pilots are British, this is only a temporary measure until a sufficient number of good and reliable Egyptian pilots are available. That the air appeals to young Egyptians is obvious to any visitor to the Almaza aerodrome at Heliopolis, where there is every facility for training under favourable conditions. As, apart from the cultivation of cotton, Egypt's future seems to be based largely on her position as a transit country, it is significant that the Egyptians are now paying more and more attention to transport questions. They do not want their country to become just a "landing ground" or a mere stretch of territory providing space for the Suez Canal. They want to participate in the forward movement of African and Mediterranean transport, whether it be by sea, by land or by air.

According to the terms of the Treaty the Egyptians are under the obligation to build certain roads for strategical purposes, and there is little doubt that the benefit of this development will be felt in many directions quite apart from the primary object for which the roads are intended. Hitherto road communications in Egypt have been deplorable, and it is only recently that a good road has been constructed from Cairo to Alexandria. Now the Egyptians have seen what

roads can do for a difficult country such as Ethiopia, and this has directed their thoughts to road possibilities in their own country. Also, a proud people do not like to see themselves outdone in a much less civilised part of their own continent. The possibilities in Egyptian road-building are immense, and the demands of modern motor transport may give rise to great opportunities of financial benefit from improved land communications with the south. In any case the improvement of communication will give a new stimulus to Egyptian industries, which have been gradually pushing forward since the time of the Great War.

When Egypt became a base for operations in Palestine and Salonika, the presence of allied forces on Egyptian soil created a demand for a large assortment of commodities. Naturally the Egyptians put forward every effort to benefit from a situation calling for local industries to supplement the meagre supply of foreign manufactured articles. At the end of hostilities it was fortunate that there were some industries to absorb an ever-increasing population, all of which could not possibly be employed in the cultivation of cotton. As soon as it was realised that industries in Egypt would not only help to absorb those who could not find work on the land, but would also be a step towards economic independence, action was taken to create what is now the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Cairo. Since its beginning in 1920 the activities of this Ministry have been extended to cover a great variety of subjects, and industrial and technical education has progressed so as to meet the demand of industrial development. In 1936-7 there were 17,409 students receiving this form of education. The whole object of the Ministry is to encourage Egyptian industries, development and trade by all reasonable means, and to co-operate with other Ministries with this end in view. The degree of success already achieved is considerable, and the eyes of this Ministry are looking well to the future.

The year 1930 was the turning-point in industrial development; for it was then that Egypt acquired her full liberty in the formulation of a tariff policy. Without some measure of protection Egyptian industries did not stand a chance of fulfilling the objects for which they were intended. This change gave a new impetus to production and more confidence to local enterprises. This is manifest in the number of industrial

joint-stock companies now affiliated to the Bank Misr. These are engaged in work such as cotton-ginning, cotton-spinning and weaving, silk weaving, linen printing, fisheries, transport, shipping, aviation, tourism and insurance. The total paid-up capital of these companies is now £E.2,327,000. The Bank Misr itself started business in 1920 with a modest capital of £E.80,000, which has since been increased to £E.1,000,000, with a reserve fund of £E.690,362 and deposits amounting to £E.3,913,926. The capital of the joint-stock companies as well as that of the bank itself is held entirely by Egyptians, who also form the whole staff in both cases.

The increase of industries in recent years is reflected in the rapid growth of the towns. In 1917 Cairo had a population of 800,000, and there were only six towns in the whole country with between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. In 1927 there were nine towns in this category, and the population of Cairo had risen to 1,065,000. To-day, although the figures of the 1937 census are not yet available, Cairo is known to have reached the one and a half million figure. In a country which has always been regarded as essentially agricultural, these figures are most significant as pointers to the future.

The industries connected with cotton are ginning, pressing, spinning and weaving, the two former processes being carried out by local factories equipped with up-to-date machinery. The entire cotton crop, which in 1936-7 amounted to 881,893,854 lb., is exported with the exception of about 5 per cent., which is retained for spinning and weaving in Egypt. The aggregate output of yarn is about 36 million lb. per annum, which is consumed locally with the exception of a small export of about 1½ million lb. Although Egypt's output of cotton piece goods now amounts to 83 million yards per annum, this only meets about 30 per cent. of the home demand. As the remaining 70 per cent. has to be imported from abroad, the opportunities of expanding this industry are more than obvious. Next in order of importance come the silk, woollen and linen industries. The output of woven silk amounts to about 15 million metres per annum, and is of superior quality and fineness. The woollen industry is still in its infancy, with an annual output of about 500,000 lb. of yarn, and Egypt still has to import woollen yarn for the "tarboush" industry and for the manufacture of rugs and blankets. But a joint-stock company has recently been

formed for the making of woollen cloth for suitings. For the manufacture of linen there is so far only one large factory equipped with up-to-date machinery, which produces about 661,000 lb. of yarn annually for weaving locally. The production of cotton seed in 1936-7 amounted to 732,776 tons, of which 75,746 tons were used as seed for the following cotton crop, 329,967 tons were exported, and 309,639 tons were pressed locally. The oil extracted therefrom amounted to 55,018 tons, leaving 268,695 tons of oil cake. The cotton-seed oil is partly consumed by the soap industry, which has now reached an annual output of about 45,000 tons, valued at £E.1,000,000, and meets 90 per cent. of the home demand. The production of sugar in Egypt is more than sufficient for local needs, and gives about 66,500 tons of molasses per annum for the local distillation of alcohol as well as for export purposes. It is also interesting to note that flour milling, the oldest industry of Egypt, is now being completely modernised. The 1936-7 wheat crop, amounting to 1,234,950 tons, was ground in the country; and Egypt is now almost self-supporting in cereals, especially in wheat and maize.

It is unnecessary to deal with the remaining industries such as tobacco (Egyptian cigarettes), hides and skins, matches, glass, cements, minerals, and fisheries. What has been described is sufficient to show that Egypt is no longer content to export large quantities of cotton, and to import practically everything else, including piece goods manufactured abroad from Egyptian cotton. She has now set her hand to the establishment of industries to meet as far as possible her various needs, and thereby to reduce her imports. Although this policy, together with the tariffs introduced to protect her industries, must affect older producing countries, Egypt cannot be blamed for looking after her own interests as long as her tariffs are fair and reasonable.

Another development in recent years has been a determined attempt to make the agricultural wealth of the country not quite so dependent on the success of the cotton crop. Raw cotton, together with cotton seed, cotton-seed oil and cotton-seed cake, make up 80 per cent. of Egypt's exports. Steps have been taken to cultivate for export products such as oranges and mandarines, and to control the export of rice, onions and eggs in order to ensure a high standard of quality. Similar efforts are being made in other directions, the result

of which is a gradually increasing safeguard against the calamity of a bad cotton crop.

While this agricultural policy is calculated to introduce more stability to the economic position of Egypt, industrial development is stimulating progress in many different directions. With the growth of the urban population there is a greater demand for education, social services, labour legislation, and all that goes to further the welfare of a more civilised people. That important progress has been made in these questions during the last decade is unquestionable, but there is still a great deal to be done. Public health and the standard of living are still deplorable throughout the greater part of Egypt. The Egyptian Government, now free to carry out their own plans, are facing this task with enthusiasm, and seem determined to make Egypt worthy of her new position in the world. They also realise the increasing importance of their country in the future of North-East Africa, and foresee the influence of increased industry and better internal communications on the general standard of Egyptian life. The man who works in a factory will no longer be content to live in a filthy hovel, especially when he comes in closer contact with European ways of living and has more money to spend.

Although many of the movements which I have endeavoured to describe have been gradually developing for some years, they have received a strong encouragement from the outcome of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, from the accession of a young and popular monarch, and from the remarkable transport developments of recent years. Egypt, though free to work out her own destiny, is now much closer to Europe than ever before ; she has great opportunities for progress on modern lines ; and her geographical position in the world is more valuable to her to-day than it has ever been. She however has one disadvantage. Her ancient monuments and her winter climate are inclined to overshadow her modern endeavours. Egypt sends many students and others to Britain to study our country and conditions of life. We send many tourists to Egypt to see the treasures of Tutankhamen and the ancient monuments of the Pharaohs. Why do we not send more of our students of suitable type to see what is being done in modern Egypt, and to profit from a closer knowledge of the aims and aspirations of the Egyptian people ?

E. W. Polson Newman.

TIME AND THE DICTATORS.

In a world dumbfounded by the continued success of aggressors, some comfort has been derived by many people from two arguments. It is said, first, that the mounting ambitions of the dictators are mutually incompatible and must sooner or later bring them into collision. Secondly, it is believed that the wanton expenditure on wars of conquest and preparation for future aggrandisement must cripple the economic systems of the dictatorships and evoke internal opposition. From this it is argued that time works on the side of the democratic countries, whose economic systems are in any case thought to be both more powerful and more stable. Therefore, the argument goes on, the democratic countries should refrain from taking any action which would precipitate armed conflict. An attempt will be made in this article to show that the real sacrifice imposed on the population of the totalitarian states by rearmament and economic self-sufficiency is very much less than is commonly supposed ; that there are cogent reasons for believing that the economic difficulties they have experienced are beginning to diminish and—if Nature does not come to the rescue of the democracies in the shape of severe crop failures—are likely to diminish further ; that, therefore, unless the co-ordination of national and international economic policies of the democratic countries achieves signal success, the democracies are likely to lose rather than gain ground, even in the economic sphere.

The economic argument is based on the thesis that the production of armaments, the maintenance of great standing armies and military expeditions abroad is sterile. It follows, the argument goes on, that the real cost of rearmament consists in the curtailment of other, economically valuable production—and thus consumption. The consequences of this preference for guns rather than butter are aggravated by the determination of the dictatorships to render themselves economically independent of foreign supplies. Considering the enormous effort which these countries have made militarily, and the waste resulting from their insistence on producing substitutes at a fantastic cost of labour instead of concentrating on the production of commodities which they are especially fitted for, the fall in the standard of living must become increasingly intolerable. This argument is formally

unassailable. Unfortunately it is based on certain assumptions which render its application impossible without vital quantitative qualification. The most important of these are that the economic system is at all times working at full capacity; that it is not expanding; that there is free competition, especially in foreign trade; that no redistribution of the national income takes place concomitantly; that the financial relations with foreign countries do not change; in one sentence that the economic system is very much like the ideal model constructed to facilitate the teaching of the elements of economics, and "all other things remain equal." However useful as a first approach in the technique of economic analysis these assumptions do not in the least hold true in practice.

A considerable—and increasing—part of productive resources, both labour and capital, are devoted in modern communities to the service not of immediate consumption but either to the purpose of preparing for a future expansion in the capacity to produce, or to produce goods whose services are consumed over a longer period of time (like houses)—i.e. capital goods. In a depression, no matter how it started, it is this part of production that is mainly discontinued. Both the German and the Italian economic systems were very far from working at full capacity when rearmament was decided upon. Therefore it is fallacious to say that the *whole* cost of rearmament has been borne by the population of these countries being deprived of part of their former real income. The actual figures show that an impressive reserve of productive power was available in Italy and even more so in Germany, even if we concede that in 1931-2 obsolescence of their capital equipment was probably not being made good, that there was a drain on stocks of goods previously accumulated, and that the average standard of life had dropped to intolerable levels. The re-employment of this reserve of productive power could go far in making good any losses in real income entailed by the increase in costs due to economic nationalism, and support a rearmament programme far in excess of anything contemplated in the democratic countries. In Germany employment rose from an average of 12½ millions in 1932 to over 19 millions in 1937—i.e. more than 50 per cent. In Italy the expansion was only slightly less. Some indication of the importance of this accession in productive power is given by the reflection

that employment in England in the same period rose less than 25 per cent. Our national income increased by well over £1,200 million, or more than 35 per cent. At least part of the increase was allowed in Germany to raise the standard of life, in comparison to the bottom of the depression (though in distinction from England it still is well below 1928), the output of consumption goods increasing by over 33 per cent. This revision of the popular thesis is unquestionably the most decisive. There are, however, several other, though individually less important, factors, whose cumulative influence must not be disregarded. Average productivity of a country can be increased by fuller utilisation of existing resources. It can also be increased by accumulation of capital and by invention. The former could not have played an important role in Germany as rearmament was bound to reduce the margin available for an expansion of capital equipment for civilian purposes. Invention, however, must have gone some way to offset the loss of productivity due to military reasons.

The control of all trade and financial transactions with foreign countries was an additional expedient in the dictatorships, especially in Germany, to shift the burden from the shoulders of their own populations and, incidentally, to secure a socially tolerable internal distribution of the sacrifices—absolute and relative—which had to be exacted. In 1931 and 1932 huge export surpluses were achieved by Germany in a desperate effort to pay fully the service and repay part of the capital of the foreign debt previously contracted. In 1934 there was a considerable import surplus, and since the inauguration of Dr. Schacht's new plan, the export surplus reappeared at a heavily reduced level. The fall of the export surplus which reflects the progressive default on the foreign debt freed considerable productive resources for rearmament. Part of the burden was thus shifted on to the foreign creditors and Jews who desired to export their capital. The central control of foreign trade, moreover, enabled the Government to use the full weight of German consumption power in her trade negotiations. In the period of acute congestion of the commodity markets, especially in 1933 and 1934, this enabled Germany not only to obtain exceptionally favourable prices, but through clever working of the clearing agreements also involuntary commercial credits. She then forced the distracted creditor to accept at favourable prices such German

produce as she could most easily spare. Thus apart from exceptional cases when even in conditions of free competition state intervention in the shape of bounties or tariffs secures advantages to a country by changing the terms of trade, apart from the favourable effect of the decline of the price of raw materials relative to manufactured products which also benefited this country, Germany almost succeeded in transforming her foreign trade relations into monopoly buying and selling.

Under a free individualist system the increase in employment and national income consequent on rearmament would have spontaneously resulted in an increase in consumption and in imports. The totalitarian countries could not afford to permit either, as they were unable to pay for any but the most vital imports because their productive resources were needed for rearmament work and could not be spared—even if there had been a demand for their produce, and during 1936-7 at least there was an urgent demand—to increase their exports. The exchange control thus changed from an emergency measure to safeguard the currency into the most important single instrument of control of the whole economic system. These regulations entail an enormous waste because of the inevitable red tape; no doubt there are also many loopholes and abuses. But the control enabled the economic system to work almost continuously at full capacity irrespective of the state of trade elsewhere. The output of the re-employed factors therefore provides a very substantial off-setting reserve.

To achieve rearmament it was necessary to limit an increase of consumption, for otherwise labour and capital would have been absorbed not only by the output of consumption goods but also by the extension of these industries. A collective saving was thus enforced on the community. On the one hand, wages were fixed. On the other, an increase of dividends above a certain level was also forbidden. Profits above that level had to be surrendered to the Government against its obligations. Taxation was increased: the German tax revenue seems to have doubled during the period, quite apart from the unofficial but very effectively enforced contributions for charity, to finance both exports and the four-year plan which entailed uneconomic investment. In Italy, taxes also increased and a capital levy was decreed. Control was extended on the capital market. Security issues, establishment

of new companies and the extension of plant was made contingent upon Government permission. The strain on the balance of trade which nevertheless ensued made a rationing of the available commodities inevitable and the import of luxuries was completely prohibited. This meant discrimination against the more prosperous who otherwise could have afforded to satisfy their demands. All these measures were not part of a consciously planned scheme. They were forced on the Fascist states step by step by the trend of events. They resulted nevertheless in a more equalitarian distribution not so much of the national income as of current consumption. The upper classes were not deprived of their capital, but were forced to abstain from certain kinds of consumption and to invest their savings in Government securities and state-planned enterprises the eventual value and earning power of which is problematical.

In consequence the material satisfaction of the population has been supplemented (apart from any elation at external political successes) by the feeling of national military security (however irrational the fear of French or Russian aggression may have been) and individual economic security as a member of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, of the " community " which in effect has " abolished unemployment." At the same time the relative fall in the material satisfaction of needs as compared with, say, 1928 was much less and better distributed than commonly supposed. Therefore it seems vain to hope for an internal revulsion of feelings on account of *economic* grievances alone. It is futile to point out that these results and much more could have been achieved with less risk of an eventual catastrophe had the democratic individualist systems not been destroyed.

An analysis of the prospects is even more disturbing. In the last six years England has experienced a phenomenal prosperity. Since 1935-6 a fraction of the increase of the national income has been devoted to armaments. The bulk has gone to swell consumption demand and stimulated the production of capital goods. This period of cumulative expansion seems now ended, and in the absence of very powerful external stimuli or Government intervention it is difficult to discern any strong internal factor which would re-create expansion. In America and France the continued rift between the Government and the propertied classes renders the further outlook unfavourable.

The totalitarian states on the contrary have cogent reasons to look forward with some confidence to the economic future, provided unprecedented crop failure does not suddenly increase their import requirements. The successful aggressions in Spain and Austria not only provide very useful sources of raw materials and foreign exchange, but also increase the economic and financial bargaining power of Germany and, to a much less degree, of Italy. They are now able to throw some of the burden of their rearmament on to the unfortunate Spanish population, which has to supply raw materials and foodstuffs in exchange for the (fortunately not always first-class) arms which the dictators provide for their destruction and subjugation. It is undoubtedly true that Franco, if he wins, could get economic help from Paris and London at much less political cost than from his erstwhile friends and protectors. The problem is whether he will be at liberty to choose. The extent of economic concessions which he has already been forced to make is unknown, but must be very substantial. From an economic point of view it is certainly fallacious to assume that methods of reconstruction and rearmament which were applied in Germany cannot at equal and better advantage for the dictators be applied in Spain. Franco seems to have learned the game of foreign exchange control which virtually expropriates foreign productive assets but leaves that illusion of ownership which seems so precious to many " realists." If the country is poorer, savings can be enforced more ruthlessly on the subjugated population in the shape of convict labour at low cost. It is being tried out in the northern provinces under foreign leadership and will presumably be extended to Catalonia, if the opportunity presents itself. It may be more advantageous to Franco to approach England. He will not by economic reasons alone be forced to do so.

Germany has recently acquired the solid gold reserve of Austria and the foreign assets of such Austrian nationals as were not lucky or far-sighted enough to get away in time. The loot will certainly reach £40 millions. It may amount to as much as £70 millions. For a country like Germany, whose export surplus does not amount to more—the mark taken at its fictitious par—this is no mean achievement. No doubt much of the tourist traffic and entrepôt trade of Vienna which was an important source of foreign exchange has been

destroyed. But the confiscation of Jewish, Habsburg and other capital assets will go some way to relieve the rest of the population from the consequences. The new decree which allows a sequestration even of internal assets under the guise of " participation in the Hermann Goering Werke " shows the ruthless determination of the German Government to go to the bitter end.

The economic power of Greater Germany in Central Europe has become overwhelming. Most of the countries in the Danube basin and the Balkans send over 40 per cent. of their total exports to Germany and are Germany's heavy commercial creditors (the Hungarians alone with some 60 million pengoes). This enables her to enforce even greater supplies and to change in her favour the terms at which she exchanges her produce for raw materials and foodstuffs. Clearing agreements secure her favourable markets overseas. If world demand for commodities should again shrink as a result of renewed depression in the democratic countries this power would be all but unlimited. Her own population would thus further be relieved. This development is fostered by the armaments race which begins to grip even smaller countries. Thus Germany is able to get rid of relatively obsolete arms on favourable terms.

Nor must it be forgotten that in the first years of rearmament vast resources were absorbed by the establishment of armaments factories and other military buildings. If no further extension becomes necessary as a result of similar expansion in England and France (and present output capacity in Germany is certainly very much greater) capital and labour will be freed to work for an increase of the standard of life (or a further increase of actual armaments output). The hopes based on an early economic breakdown of Germany and even of Italy seem rather spurious on closer investigation. The likelihood of an imminent split—resulting from the clash of interest between Italy and Germany or subtly induced by Great Britain—may or may not be very great. It is certain that no complacency is justified on account of their reputed relative economic weakness.

The potential strength of the democracies certainly is far superior and their basic position is much more stable. Their accumulated reserves permit them to draw freely upon the productive capacity of the entire outside world. The stringent

regulations of production and consumption, the sacrifice of their material progress is superfluous even if they decide to match the military efforts of the totalitarian countries. They are able to maintain economic liberty (though not irresponsible libertinism and sectional egotism). But it would be a mistake to suppose that that liberty of action of the individual in itself ensures superiority of the community. On the contrary, it renders the task of those who are responsible for the management of economic and financial policies far more complicated. It also increases the responsibilities of the individual. If our potential strength is wasted by unemployment, if the weaker countries are thrown politically and thus economically at the mercy of the dictators then the outlook is bleak indeed.

There is no necessity for the authoritarian countries to steal a march on us continuously. But only a far-seeing internal social, economic and monetary policy, an international co-operation weakening the hold of Germany on the smaller members of a community of pacific nations by the provision, even at a sacrifice, of financial assistance and profitable markets, will ensure the re-establishment and maintenance of such superiority of force against any combination of aggressors as will stifle any further threats to peace.

ECONOMIST.

POLAND AS A LINK.

INTEREST in and practical knowledge of maritime problems have been expanding in Poland ever since she regained a free access to the sea. This has been emphasised recently in two noteworthy speeches made by prominent Polish statesmen who are playing a leading part in this development. The Minister of Industry and Commerce, M. Roman, speaking before the Financial Committee of the Senate on February 17th, 1937, said: "For many years we have taken up a strong position as a seafaring nation and are achieving, thanks to the combined efforts of the Government and the whole community, conspicuous success in our endeavours to divert the flow of our external trade to the open sea." And the Vice-Premier and Minister of Finance, M. Kwiatkowski, speaking in July 1937, at Gdynia, the city of his creation, expressed very much the same thought in the following words: "Millions of people hitherto bent on pursuits on land and unconscious of the opportunities lying open to them on the sea are now being systematically trained to exert their faculties in fields of maritime enterprise."

Undoubtedly considerations of expediency have been largely responsible for this policy, it having been recognised that economic independence is greatly furthered by the possession of direct maritime connections with the principal markets of the world. Besides, a glance at the map will show that Poland's geographical situation between Soviet Russia and Germany, both of which countries have subjected their external trade to a rigorous control and far-going restrictions, must necessarily have the effect of enhancing the importance of her trade routes leading to the Baltic in the north and the Black Sea and Mediterranean in the south. Thus, by a natural sequence of events the policy of the Partitioning Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, which had resulted in diverting the trade of Eastern Europe from its old channels, from the Baltic to the North Sea and from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, is being gradually rectified by a restoration of the shortest and quickest trade route, which of all overland routes is also the least encumbered by intervening frontiers, leading from north to south through Polish territory to the Danubian States—Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania—and further to the Near East.

Poland's maritime policy aiming at concentrating her external trade in the ports of her customs territory has already had the effect that the major part of her exports to, and imports from, foreign countries is transported by sea through Gdynia and Danzig. A large variety of raw materials, mass production and other goods, such as coal, coke, iron and steel, agricultural and dairy products, meats, fertilisers and so forth, are exported over the maritime border, whilst on the other hand valuable raw stuffs, colonial goods as well as semi- and wholly manufactured articles, are imported by the same way in increasing quantities, in conjunction with the general improvement of business conditions in Poland. Direct trunk-lines leading from Upper Silesia to Gdynia and from the interior of Poland to Danzig and Gdynia facilitate the interchange of commodities with overseas countries. The participation of Gdynia and Danzig in this turnover is at present 46 per cent. and 31 per cent. respectively as regards weight, and 47 per cent. and 19 per cent. respectively as regards value. The lower figure representing the value of trade through Danzig is influenced by the preponderance of imports of high-priced goods through Gdynia. The general turnover of the port of Gdynia in 1937 amounted to 9 million tons, of which 1·7 million tons represent imports and 7·3 million tons exports, the latter figure including 6 million tons of coal. As regards the total volume of goods handled, Gdynia to-day occupies the first place amongst Baltic ports.

In conjunction with this development the technical, transhipment and warehousing equipment of the port of Gdynia has been systematically improved and extended. The total costs of these investments hitherto amount to 230 million *zlotys* or £47 million. They include forty long- and short-time storage warehouses, two large refrigerating plants for perishable agricultural and dairy products, sixty-seven electrically driven cranes and special plant, such as wagon tip, endless belt conveyors and floating cranes, a new elevator with a capacity to handle 10,000 tons of grain, and so forth. Processing plants for oil-seeds and rice, smoked and canned fish factories have been erected within the precincts of the port. A number of large importing firms have been established here. A new canal, now under construction, which will connect the inner harbour with a point further north on the bay of Puck, will afford to industries to be established in its vicinity the possibility of loading and unloading goods direct into or from sea-going vessels. By the establishment of institutions destined to facilitate international trade, such as fruit auctions, a court of arbitration and appeal for raw skins and hides, and a cotton exchange (to be opened during the current year), Gdynia is becoming an important centre of distribution for a number of staple articles of world trade imported in large quantities into the markets of Eastern and Central Europe.

The number of in and outgoing vessels in the port of Gdynia has risen from six (with a total tonnage of 10,890 n.r.t.) in 1923 to 11,525 (with a tonnage of 11,293,561 n.r.t.) in 1937. Gdynia is connected by more than fifty direct shipping lines with all the principal ports of the world. Steamers of the Blue Funnel Line call at this port at regular intervals. There are regular sailings to a number of ports in the United Kingdom as well as to all parts of the British Empire. Four separate lines with weekly sailings connect Gdynia with London, Bristol, Hull and Leith-Grangemouth. The boats are all equipped with up-to-date refrigerating appliances, etc., so that agricultural, dairy and meat products can be shipped for quick delivery to the London district and the industrial areas of England and Scotland, whence industrial products and colonial goods are conveyed as return cargoes to Gdynia. It is a noteworthy fact that the number of lines connecting Gdynia with distant overseas ports is increasing year by year, whilst at the same time efforts are being made to multiply the lines and intensify the frequency of sailings on all routes leading from Gdynia to the principal centres of distribution in North-Western Europe, especially the ports of the United Kingdom, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Copenhagen, Gothenburg and Oslo.

A similar line of policy is being pursued with regard to the North East of Europe with the object of developing the regular interchange of merchandise between Poland and the ports of the Eastern Baltic, such as Riga, Helsingfors and Tallinn, which are playing a more and more important part as centres of local distribution. Thus the natural functions of the port of Gdynia as a juncture of international trade routes is being systematically developed, and at the same time the possibilities of Poland's direct co-operation with other maritime countries in handling a growing flow of sea-borne traffic is being gradually extended. As a matter of fact Gdynia is

playing an increasingly active part as a port of turnover and distribution for goods transported by sea to and from the Occident and also as a port of transit for goods, transported by land or with transhipment in Danubian and Black Sea ports, from the Scandinavian and Baltic States to Central and South Eastern Europe and vice versa. This is also a convenient overland communication with the Danubian States for the northern and western continental ports and also for England and can compete successfully with the maritime route around Europe. Already at present certain quantities of merchandise, comprising hides and skins, wool, rubber, metals, chemicals, etc., are being imported into the Danubian States from England via Gdynia.

Goods traffic between the Polish ports and their nearer and more distant hinterland is greatly facilitated by associated freight tariffs, enabling the goods to be transported, at especially low transit rates, to their respective destination, viz. Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria and Soviet Russia. Besides, there are special combined tariffs with rates reduced 50 to 60 per cent. for goods transported to their destination with transhipment in the Danubian port of Bratislava, belonging to Czechoslovakia. These rates are applicable to all transports conveyed on a combined river and railroad freight system through the above-mentioned port to or from Austria, Hungary, Jugoslavia and Bulgaria. Furthermore, traffic between the Polish ports and the ports of the Near East and Western Mediterranean via Rumanian ports is based on a special Polish-Rumanian-Levantine and Western Mediterranean direct tariff which also enables goods to be conveyed on a direct bill of lading via Port Said to and from the ports of the Persian Gulf, British India, the Dutch East Indies, China, East Africa and Australia, and also via Constantinople or the Piræus to and from the ports of Turkey or Greece respectively. The duration of transport from Gdynia to Vienna or Prague is approximately one and a half days, and to Constantza two days. Thus by way of Gdynia a consignment of goods can be shipped in about four and a half days from London to the Black Sea.

The question of overland communication between the Baltic and the Black Sea is not, however, entirely one of railways. Access to the Baltic, at the mouth of the Vistula, essential in

itself to Poland, acquires its full political significance only when completed by a system of waterways linking Danzig and Gdynia with the Rumanian Black Sea ports, that is to say, by a restoration of the former Levantine trade route whose natural course follows the Vistula, the San, the Upper Dniester, the Prut and the mouth of the Danube. An important step towards achieving this end would be the construction of a canal connecting the above-mentioned rivers. This waterway is planned to have a total length of 1,900 km., of which 1,000 would flow through Poland and 900 through Rumania.

The estimates for 1937-8 provide funds for the execution of the most urgent hydraulic works constituting the first stage of a comprehensive scheme of construction and improvement of Polish waterways in general. This work will comprise, in the first instance, the regulation of the upper and middle course of the Vistula which at present is navigable without seasonal interruptions only from Warsaw downwards. The upper course of the river will be made navigable as far as the town of Sandomir, which forms the centre of the new industrial district now being called into existence under the auspices of the Polish Government. Regulation works for improving the navigability of the middle course from Sandomir to Warsaw are to commence immediately. A further introduction into this scheme of communication will be the construction of a canal joining the mining district of Upper Silesia with Cracow. The river-ports of Warsaw, Cracow and Plock will be enlarged and modernised. Early in the current year work was to commence on the construction of a canal, 32 km. in length, which will join the River Warta with Lake Goplo and thence through the Bydgoszcz canal with the Vistula, thus opening up a new direct connection by water between the industrial districts of Poznán and Lódz and the port of Danzig. In conjunction with the regulation of the Vistula, which will naturally result in a very considerable increase of inland water traffic, plans have also been elaborated for the construction of a canal, 215 km. long, which will connect Bydgoszcz with Gdynia, thus enabling barges and steamers to convey bulk cargoes destined for the latter port direct, instead of having to use the longer and often precarious route via Danzig and the sea, as is the case at present. Furthermore, the contemporary reconstruction of Polish trade routes will necessitate the materialisation of the

post-war project of a bridge over the Danube between Rumania and Bulgaria, allowing for direct goods transport without the necessity of unloading, crossing the Danube and reloading. The location of this new bridge is to be at Giurgiu-Rustchuk, but for financial reasons this scheme is not as yet practicable.

There exist at Gdynia very favourable opportunities for the development of industry and commerce. Port industries are connected with export, import and re-export after some manufacturing. The characteristic feature of all these types of industry is the possibility of profiting by lower transportation charges on raw materials employed in the manufacture of the finished product and even of avoiding railway transport altogether in the case of re-export industries. Prominent examples of such industries are the manufacture of meat, fruit and vegetable conserves, the production of timber provided by the hinterland, chemical, paper, celluloid and artificial silk factories, cotton, woollen and jute mills, tanning plants, rubber goods factories and so forth. Apart from this there is in the port of Gdynia ample scope for subsidiary industries, such as packing plants—cardboard and tin containers, barrels, sacks—and the like. Industrial establishments operating within the free zone of the port are exempt from customs duties, monopoly dues and indirect taxation.

The prospects of the shipbuilding industry are especially propitious in view of the projected enlargement of the Polish mercantile fleet consisting at present of sixty-eight vessels with a total tonnage of 96,288 b.r.t., which can only handle 10 per cent. of Poland's overseas trade. The construction of an up-to-date shipyard, docks, etc., at Gdynia, has therefore become imperative and the technical and financial aid of a noted firm of British shipbuilders, Messrs. Samuel White & Co. of Cowes, has been secured for this purpose. It is evident that this work will necessitate not only the importation of various articles needed in this branch of industry and hitherto not produced in Poland, but also the acquisition of the services of specialists thoroughly acquainted with this particular craft from abroad.

In connection with these developments preparations are also being made for the reorganisation of the present form of administration of the port of Gdynia. Instead of being administered direct by the State, as is the case at present, the

port is to be "commercialised," that is to say, it will assume the form of an autonomous corporate body under State control with a Director, Advisory and Administrative Board of of its own.

A word must still be said concerning the development of Poland's defensive forces at sea. The Polish navy which is still very small will be considerably extended in due course. Two of her most up-to-date battleships have been built in England; one of these, a destroyer, which has been delivered only quite recently, is the most powerful unit amongst existing fleets in the Baltic. Thus Poland has already become a constructive factor within the framework of post-war intermaritime connections. At the same time she is being instrumental in linking together by new land, water and air routes a vast expanse of territory lying between the Baltic and the seas of South Europe; these routes follow from north to south the belt of new States in Eastern and Central Europe which have been created or reconstructed after the War. The consequences of these developments can be summarised as follows: they entail the establishment of an effective balance of maritime interests in the Baltic, conducive to a greater measure of co-operation between the States concerned, new facilities for trade with the respective countries, affording greater opportunities for providing them with the technical equipment needed for their further development and, last but not least, the opening-up of a new highway to the Near and Far East.

GEORGE ADAMKIEWICZ.

THE "THURLOE PAPERS."

A New Theory of Their Concealment.

THE early history of this country has presented many difficult problems to its students, though these may now appear to be of merely academic interest. The later history includes a few problems that are still with us, and among these the memory of treaties made and broken may rankle when a wound is still unhealed. Other cases have been open to discussion in the light of international research, regardless of venomous dog Latin or the feline amenities of diplomatic French; and so we have argued with ever-increasing earnestness and learning as to whether the German Chancellor and British Ambassador conversed in English or German at their fateful interview in August 1914; or whether Pitt really prophesied a reaction after the defeat of the "Third Coalition" in 1805; or by what means intelligence of the secret treaty of Tilsit could have reached England in 1807. There are some problems, however, that might seem to invite the solution which has not been obtained because it has not been attempted, and one such instance forms the subject of the present article.

The discovery of the "Thurloe Papers" in Lincoln's Inn, some time in the reign of William III, is an historical fact that may be known to "every schoolboy." In any case, the "man in the street" has been reminded by a commemorative tablet that a certain house backing on to Chancery Lane is famous as the former residence of one John Thurloe who, like John Milton, served the Commonwealth with pen instead of sword; but, unlike Milton, with a subtle mind. Students of national history, biography or topography can obtain much information for Thurloe's career as Secretary to Cromwell's Council of State, or for the administration and establishment of Lincoln's Inn, and for its position in the topography of London. They may be able to distinguish the eponymous origin of Thurloe Square, but they may not find it easy to discover the sequence of the tenancies of John Thurloe's chambers, or the intimate features of his relations with the governing body and fellow members of his Inn. These matters, however, would appear to have been of great importance in connection with his

position at the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, when his precious papers might have perished in the bonfires of triumphant royalists.

Some sixty years ago, when Thurloe's later "chamber" was pulled down, it might not have seemed to matter how his "Papers" came to us, even if their personal associations had been more evident. In these days, however, many local antiquaries and archivists will be interested to learn that the official records of a scholarly Inn of Court can supply some instructive particulars. From these we could infer that Thurloe had not merely lived and died in the Inn, but that he was in touch with contemporary students, barristers and benchers, some of whom favoured the Parliament and Commonwealth, while others were either neutral or in favour of the Restoration. Naturally we should not find any mention of Thurloe's "Papers," but we should have valuable material for an explanation of their prolonged concealment and eventual discovery. Finally we have a tradition of the looting of the "Papers" by a clerical holiday guest of the last tenant associated with Thurloe's coterie. The loot, having lost its political savour, seems to have been distributed among collectors of both high and low degree; for the State Papers had not yet been centralised in Whitehall, and the record office visualised by Francis Bacon was not realised for another century and a half.

Reference has been made by the present writer in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1938 (citing a recent correspondence in *The Times* and an early article in *The Times Literary Supplement*) to neglected materials for interpreting such mysteries, among others, as the disappearance of the "Thurloe Papers." It is not perhaps surprising to find that the Lincoln's Inn mystery may be responsible for a local ghost story; but even Morland's tale of Cromwell plotting in Thurloe's chamber, with drawn weapon and eye upon a sleeping clerk, has only provoked a languid interest. It is indeed surprising that the facts connected with Thurloe's tenancy have not been carefully investigated, but the truth is that the successful concealment of his papers, like their chance discovery, has remained an enigma to this day.

It seems desirable to attempt here a brief description of the stage on which the *enigmatis personæ* played their

parts, for like that of the contemporary city its aspect has greatly changed. In those days there were several " courts " containing " rows " of ramshackle chambers closely packed round the hall and chapel with a main approach through the great Gateway from Chancery Lane, then unpaved. We have to do with only two of these courts and their respective " rows," all of which have disappeared except such as are represented by the " Old Buildings " extending from south-east to south-west of the " Old Hall." Indeed, their identification has proved to be difficult, since chambers were sometimes built or enlarged by private enterprise, a fact with which we may have to reckon here. The " chamber " itself was usually self-contained, by means of a lavish use of " wainscote " at the cost of privacy, a device that must have increased the difficulty of concealment from fellow tenants.

In Gatehouse Court, Thurloe's original " chamber " (now 24 Old Buildings) was distinguished, as we have seen, presumably because the actual house in which the famous papers were found had already disappeared. From Gatehouse Court Thurloe moved into another chamber, in Dial Court, and here he died suddenly in 1668 and was buried beneath the chapel, whose preacher he had recommended to reluctant benchers in the days of his greatness. A few hours before his death he walked with an old friend in that same cloistered crypt, after dinner in the hall, and with a gentle exultation assured him that he " knew the worst of death, and it was nothing for him to die." As we read the touching narrative of his last hours preserved by Sir Charles Firth, we are reminded of the grave but gentle features, in a well-known portrait, of one whose vigilant and astute policy had enabled the Protector " to carry the secrets of all the princes of Europe at his girdle." Thurloe had saved his beloved papers, with their compromising revelations, for a more sympathetic hearing after the Revolution.

If the official lists of Thurloe's tenants or assignees between 1646 and 1695 are scrutinised, the result is illuminating. We might expect to find his chambers associated with the names of other tenants, since a tenancy for life could be disposed of by permission of the council. The Gatehouse chamber passed through several hands before it came into his occupation, and the Dial Court chamber

through those of still more occupants from first to last. It must be obvious therefore that the concealment and discovery of the " Thurloe Papers " might have been influenced by the personality of one or other of them. When Charles I raised his standard at Nottingham in 1642, some absentee fellows of Lincoln's Inn were suspended, and eventually the tenant and sub-tenants who preceded Thurloe in his Gatehouse chamber were denounced as royalists and their leases forfeited. In 1646 Thurloe was installed in their place and in 1659 he nominated his own successors, who remained in possession for nearly thirty years. It may fairly be assumed that Thurloe, the master-mind of the Commonwealth intelligence department, would not have assigned his lease to anyone likely to be inquisitive as to mysterious happenings in the past or disclosures in the future.

Thurloe's new chamber in Dial Court had also been forfeited by a royalist in 1646 and occupied subsequently by a fellow who had been a neighbour in Gatehouse Court and who, as acting under-treasurer of the Inn, would be of further service. But Thurloe's most valuable supporter was Isaac Ewer, who became a bencher, while future guardians of the enclave were found in their respective sons, a younger John Thurloe and Isaac Ewer. It is perhaps impossible to ascertain whether the papers, or any of them, were concealed in the Gatehouse chamber between 1646 and 1659, but Thurloe knew that danger was already at hand, and he doubtless decided to vacate this chamber for another that offered more facilities for the concealment of papers from Whitehall as well as of those in chambers. What happened after November 1659 has remained obscure, but something can be learnt from a consideration of the persons who must have been in the secret or else prepared to ask no questions. For although Thurloe survived the ordeal of examination and confinement, following the Restoration, he was practically committed to his chamber for another year to see if any use could be made of his official experience. There the reaction seems to have halted; but at any moment a warrant for recovery of State papers might be issued and his old friends compromised in the guise of former enemies of the king.

We must not forget that Thurloe had been closely

associated with men who had distinguished themselves on the side of Parliament. Among these Isaac Ewer, colonel of foot, and Matthew Thomlinson, colonel of horse, had played their parts in a regicide tragedy, though to the hapless king a change from the ministrations of the grim ex-serving man, Isaac, to those of the deferential law student, Matthew, must have seemed like the transition from an Old to a New Dispensation. Yet Ewer was a brave man who drew his death-warrant with the lot for service in Ireland, where he died in 1650, leaving Thurloe, the son of a neighbouring parson and his " very brother," his executor and trustee for his children. Thomlinson, with the mascot of a " golden tooth-pick," presented on the scaffold with words of royal gratitude, was able to weather the storm which threatened Thurloe equally; but though a law student he was not a member of Lincoln's Inn. His namesake and fellow Yorkshireman, who is mentioned below as the latest tenant of Thurloe's garret chamber, may or may not have been a relative. But Isaac Ewer and his son Isaac, who were so intimately associated with Thurloe's post-Restoration chamber, are linked in the official registers with a stock of which the regicide soldier may have been a cadet. His biographers forgot *The Gentlemanly Profession of Serving Men* published in 1598.

These intriguing associations seem to suggest that Thurloe needed allies for the protection of his " Papers," and that they were found in both camps; but a glance at the family connections of a Thurloe, Ewer, Thomlinson or Twysden might account for their tacit exception from the penalties of treason or lukewarmness imposed in 1661. Though Secretary Nicholas may have received unfavourable reports of these and other members of Lincoln's Inn, they could be useful also to a restored monarchy, and they had given hostages to Fortune—a favoured goddess in all times.

After Thurloe's sudden death in 1668, followed by that of his son in 1682, the watchful guardians of his chamber seem to have found a powerful ally in John Green with his son John. In 1695, however, a breach was made in the defence. In the previous year, on the motion of ex-treasurer Green, old Isaac Ewer in Dial Row was allowed to exchange chambers with his son in Chapel Row (also in

Dial Court). Next year he was dead and Thomas Thomlinson had applied for and obtained a lease of " the little garret chamber " now vacant, and after a dispute with the Inn as to a suspicious increase in its dimensions and rent " since Ewer's time," he disposed of his lease in favour of one Thomas Chetle who may have been a descendant of the Jacobean dramatist.

On this showing the date of the discovery of the Thurloe papers by a prying visitor during Thomlinson's actual tenancy must be put between 1695 and 1697. Their subsequent vicissitudes, however distressing to a modern archivist, are perhaps negligible here in view of the notorious neglect of public and private records in the eighteenth century.

Apart from these genealogical gropings and archæological adjustments, which were needed for a description of the Thurloe papers, we must not forget that those very papers may help us to elucidate some obscure social and economic aspects of the period. It has been suggested that the copious transactions for compounding royalists' estates must have afforded many opportunities for political double-dealing, and among the lawyers suspect of this mean traffic were some in Lincoln's Inn, notably Benjamin Harrington. Now in 1661, when Thurloe (questioned in Whitehall) asserted that the evidence of a certain " Black Book " would hang half the professed royalists, an order was entered in the " Black Book " of Lincoln's Inn fully compensating Harrington for the loss of his " chamber." It is possible that Thurloe was alluding to the traffic in royalist estates as well as to Secret Service correspondence, for his friend Colonel Philip Jones had been ironically praised for " making hay while the sun shone," and he knew himself that the hazardous financial position during the latter days of the Commonwealth would not permit of a strict investigation of ways and means for carrying on the business of the State. After all, what the bench and bar of Lincoln's Inn lost through the ill-fame of a Benjamin Harrington was fully recovered through the good repute of a Philip Jones. The Inn, too, has on record in that same " Black Book " that when Mr. Secretary Thurloe, bencher and confidential adviser of the Inn, was found in 1657 to be in arrears of his " Commons," he was told officially that

he must pay or lose his " chamber." In view of a tendency to regard the City of London as responsible for the venality of Commonwealth finance, it is gratifying to note a trivial but typical exception.

It would seem, however, that these papers are still best known to us as the seven large volumes edited by Birch in 1742 and described, a century later (by an unbalanced critic) as the " dreary old Thurloe rubbish and continents of Spy Letters, Intercepted Letters and Letters of Intelligence where, scattered at huge intervals, the History of England for those years still lies entombed." This qualified appreciation of a " hideous old pamphletical imbroglio " of " facts and figments " was possibly inspired by the publication of two volumes of Protectorate dispatches by Robert Vaughan in 1838, since which date our interest in the vicissitudes of the Thurloe Papers has been once more arrested. But if we still have to be content with an incomplete and inadequate eighteenth-century edition of these salvaged papers, we must remember that the Clarke and Nicholas papers awaited publication till our own time, and that other papers still await description in the secure precincts of the ancient Courts of Justice.

HUBERT HALL.

THE RISING GENERATION IN FRANCE.

IN examining the life of a foreign nation, it is the young people of whom it is hardest to form a clear picture. In France we can really get into touch with youth. Latin in its gaiety, it holds together instinctively, and is more reserved than German young people—reserved as in England, where silence is imposed by tradition. The observer, therefore, has to listen through his eyes. French youth inclines to the Scout Movement in consequence of the political affinity of the Western democracies; interest is taken in the German Youth Movement, especially in Socialist circles, which frequently consider the pre-Hitler state exemplary as regards social culture. The French boy's mentality is more German than English; this is revealed in his manner, as well as in his games. Boys and young men are the subject of special reference in this article, for it is the man who is in the ascendant again.

The spiritual atmosphere of France was formerly determined by the woman. But February 6th, 1934, the date of the clashes in the Place de la Concorde, marked the beginning of changes more far-reaching than those of the post-war period. During a visit to Paris nine months after the riots, I remarked to a French friend that France had suddenly become masculine. He agreed, and affirmed that the atmosphere was tending towards civil war. Frenchmen assured me continuously that their country, however it might yield to the normal round of life, was becoming the land of the male. The women and girls of the small bourgeois class still suggest, by their manners and their devotion to kid gloves, the *salon* of the nineteenth century. The girls certainly face facts, but attach themselves, as elsewhere, to groups tending to Fascism; Colonel de La Rocque's *Parti Social Français* enjoys their special favour. They do not realise that they would be unable to maintain the position they have held hitherto were France to turn Fascist. Besides the P.S.F. types there are the girls who are willing to accept changes and who flock in increasing numbers to the trade unions. They usually make a plucky and, in part, a distinctly revolutionary impression, but do not seem to have found their balance as yet. They are more masculine than their P.S.F. comrades, but equally problematical; seeming a little strange in their new surroundings,

they may possibly develop great individuality in time. They have thus been carrying on woman's conservative vocation : the preservation of French individualism amidst the wave of collectivism that is sweeping over France.

Socialism, whatever aspect it may assume, is the remarkable feature of contemporary French history, which finds expression in the fervour of the younger generation. It is of no consequence whose opinion is correct—those who assert the political sympathies of youth, or those who maintain that young people are sick of all politics, are conscious only of the uncertainty that has deprived even money of its value, and are without faith and governed only by anxiety for the morrow. Is not this negative estimation the voice of the fear felt by the barren war decades in the face of generations yet untouched ? The war generation in France sees a youth inspired by fresh ideals only in the generations which succeed the decades immediately following the war. The French war generation is descended from pre-war France ; the generation of the day after to-morrow is the child of the 6th and the 12th of February, 1934—the latter being the date of the anti-Fascist counter-demonstration against the former.

In watching the streets the observer is struck by the change in the style of dress. English fashions are worn—indeed, sports clothes are favoured for everyday wear, as in Germany and the Central European countries. They are worn with the Latin sense of form : a new convention has arisen out of the old one, not so strong as the latter, but strong enough to produce some strange results, for example, hiking clothes handled as football costume. People are leaving for hiking in ordinary walking clothes, the real hiking clothes are carried in a needlessly weighty rucksack ; ramblers pass the day at a Youth Hostel (it is considered unnecessary to stay overnight) and change into hiking clothes there. Another oddity is the almost complete disappearance of the celebrated French beard. As for the lads and boys, the former dress more in the German or Central European style. Yet they are less sensual than young Germans, who have matured too early in consequence of the events of recent years. In particular, the onlooker is struck by the prevalence of bare legs. A new " sense of the body " is developing, as in the classical period of the Youth Movement ; this is also borne out by those athletic clubs in which nothing is worn save

shorts. Amongst the younger boys the familiar black school pinafore which concealed their natural charm is disappearing. One section is dressed in boyishly manly style, another with feminine daintiness : the latter are led along by their mothers till they are fifteen, taken to school and fetched home, and probably their satchels are carried by their adult companion. Some of these pampered laddies write letters of protest to the editors of popular daily papers.

Literature has always served as a criterion for the young people of France. Nevertheless one has the impression that the spirit of the rising generation is growing less literary. The age upon which France has entered may be styled romantic by reason of its socialistic tendencies. A certain naturalism is becoming obvious which is not inherent, as a rule, in the French nature. Is Romanticism in France better qualified for action than in Germany ? Or will this French Neo-Romanticism be termed once again un-French ?

The framework of French youth is supported, as in every young generation, by indefinable fellowship groups. These can only be grasped when they are reduced to terms of organisation. Those young people shouldering responsibility, whom a Paris newspaper called recently " Youth in Uniform " —the Red Falcons (*Faucons Rouges*) and various types of Scout organisations—are of interest. The Red Falcons (a co-educational body), the Socialist Party's Youth, was founded some years ago, before Hitler assumed power, on a German model, under German influence and with German assistance. They draw upon the experiences of the German Youth Movement as upon those of the Scout Movement, and are concerned for care of youth, together with training in party politics. They are doing valuable work as regards hygiene and physical education. It is to be feared, however, that their spiritual training is mainly anti-religious, as neutrality in religion serves, as we all know, to attack it. All the same, it is probably true that the ranks of the Red Falcons will develop into the flower of the youth of their Party.

It is as an Order, if this term may be allowed, that the Scouts are coming forward. In many cases their own personal future will no longer resemble the life they led under their parents' roof. The education they have received may, however, produce the spiritual leaders of the oncoming

masses, for the purpose and the reality of a new era are always determined by its forerunners. Comparing the *Scouts de France* (a Catholic group, founded in 1920), the *Eclaireurs de France* (non-denominational), and the *Eclaireurs Unionistes de France* (whose attitude is Protestant), the last-named, though numerically the weakest, are the most interesting.

The ex-Servicemen demanded the revival of the Scout Movement founded in 1911 in the ranks of the Young Men's Christian Association (U.C.J.G.), which was checked in 1914; and they also demanded for it the same freedom of action which had already enabled the *Eclaireurs de France*—whose group was likewise founded in 1911—to achieve successful work. This request, which met with opposition, was fulfilled through revolution, so to speak—a story that reminds us of the rebellions that arose in the German Bible Unions (*Bibelkränzchen*) and that led, in that country, to separation and to the rise of a Protestant Youth Movement. This may be one of the reasons why the foreign observer discovers a spirit amongst the *Eclaireurs Unionistes* which seems akin to that of the German Youth Movement. The non-denominational *Eclaireurs de France* reveal more of the political and social inheritance of the French Revolution and of the French intellectualism which, though unlike the Scout spirit, has nevertheless been successfully brought into line with it. The Catholic *Scouts de France*, the strongest body of Scouts in France, whose friend, Mgr. Bruno de Solages, attempted to draw up the first Scout philosophy, bear the closest resemblance to the English in their contact with the parishes. A comparison between them and the Catholic Youth Movement of Germany shows the difference between self-governing youth and youth that is led by others: German Catholic Youth, fulfilling the vow made on the Hohe Meissner (1913), took up its connection with the Church "out of personal responsibility," and thus is not in a state of dependence.

All Scout Movements often recall German youth rather than Scouts of the country of their origin. In their discussions, as in their various activities (vocal and dramatic clubs and so forth) they stand midway between England and Germany. They are all interested in camping and, in a lesser but increasing degree, in hiking (this was described to me as a "Teutonic instinct" as late as 1924). All this is not new to France, but it was unknown hitherto as a mass movement.

These masses are drawn from the working class and small middle class and their young people. Propaganda for outdoor life is carried on as part of the movement for leisure planning, the necessary adjunct of the forty-hour week. Camping, hiking and the like are made a matter of politics, an affair of "Socialist culture."

The work done by the Youth Hostels is significant. Youth Hostels have been set up in France since 1929 by the *Ligue Française pour les Auberges de la Jeunesse* (A.F.J.), which was founded by Marc Sangnier, under German influence. The *Ligue* receives State subsidies. Side by side with this there is also the *Centre Laique des Auberges de Jeunesse* (C.L.A.J.). The list of the organisations attached to the *Ligue* shows that the differences of the two organisations must be more deeply rooted than in religion alone. There is the cross in the Hostels of the *Ligue*; but there are clearly political groups behind the C.L.A.J. The latter are also on friendly terms with the *Amis de la Nature*. Members of the C.L.A.J. address everyone as "Comrade" as a matter of course, and take it for granted that all who attend their meetings are members of the Popular Front or sympathisers with it.

A large number of meetings are held, well supported by the former Under Secretary for the Planning of Leisure (*Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat pour Sports, Loisirs, Education physique*), M. Léo Lagrange. The C.L.A.J. also receives a State subsidy, and its Hostels (which, even more than those of the *Ligue*, are planned as resident headquarters, pointing to a not over-developed taste for hiking) are springing up like mushrooms; in numbers they have far surpassed those of the *Ligue*. The C.L.A.J. leads us to conjecture that its aims are political rather than social. It is obvious that it is working, not only for a rational and healthy use of the considerable amount of free time left by a forty-hour week, nor for physical education, but for the development of a mental and spiritual attitude—namely, collectivism. Not without success has an attack been launched against that strongest fortress of French individualism, namely, the virtual impossibility of getting French people to join in community singing. The texts of the songs, largely determined by events in Spain, the significance of the *Internationale*—these things give a clear picture of the political complexion of the C.L.A.J.

The use of the term " non-denominational " in the sense of " based on the State " recalls the use of the word " national " in the Germany of the Weimar Constitution to indicate nominal political neutrality. To the Socialistic non-denominationalists their slogan means an attack on all religion. In a country in which the Catholic Church is supreme this attitude is explicable though inexcusable. For Catholicism, if not fighting for its own ends, is slow to rise to the demands of the times, and in France has even failed to keep abreast of various developments which had been undisputed by the Church in such a Catholic country as former Austria. In France the Church is looked upon by many as the patron of totalitarian authority. This might land her in a mill which could grind to powder both the totalitarian State and her own authority, different as the claims of the latter may be. The Socialists will have to recall the original meaning of non-denominationalism if religion is really to be kept a private matter. At present those who are not non-denominationalists are regarded as Fascists—an opinion which rouses astonishment when applied to the Scout organisations. The latter's weak point is that they scarcely touch the working classes. Their leaders are drawn from those middle-class sections of society that are particularly awkward in making contacts with the workers. Since most of the boys are drawn from the small middle classes, they belong to circles which, in other countries, are the breeding ground of Fascism. But what does that prove as to their mental and spiritual attitude? It certainly will depend on the wisdom of the leaders whether French Scouts are saved from a development similar to that of the German youth.

Scout discipline transforms these young Frenchmen into comparatively quiet people, and scarcely knows the meaning of noisy uproar save when it is called for by those leaders who are nearest to the older generation; we might almost talk of " disciplined noise." This discipline makes the Scouts appear Fascist to those in the opposite camp; for the latter encourage the love of glamour, which fosters the collective spirit as effectively as singing. " They look so old," was a Scout's remark concerning a crowd of noisy students, most of whom were a little younger than himself.

Let us complete our picture of French youth by considering the physical types that are to be met. Amongst the

Scouts, especially amongst the younger members, a surprising increase of the blonde type can be noted, and has already been confirmed by the Scouts themselves. Far be it from us to suggest any racial turn of thought—nevertheless, this fact reminds us of a French author's remark that the Germanic type is only good for producing officers. If the sarcasm of this quotation is forgotten, yet the increase of the blonde " Germanic " type indicates not only the soldierly element but rather an actual racial transformation, which has also been observed in certain forms in other countries. A physical racial transformation must also have spiritual consequences. The increase of the blonde type is not limited to Scout circles. It can also be noticed in such bodies as the C.L.A.J., where it reveals itself when groups join together for common activities. The change of type corresponds to the change in dress referred to above: the latter serves the former.

Not only may this increase of the blonde type be observed, but also a strange growth of that phenomenon known as Blüher's " *typus inversus*." For Hans Blüher, in his two books *The Wandervogel as an Erotic Phenomenon* and *The Erotic Factor in Male Society*, by no means considers the " *typus inversus* " to be synonymous with mere homosexuality. It is true that it may lead to gross sensual excesses. Primarily, however, it indicates a certain attitude of mind and spirit, which the Youth Movement found formulated in Stefan George's poems. Here, too, close observation points to the expression of a spiritual interpretation and the attitude determined by it. As I watch the throng in the streets in France, and in particular the young people of the generation that is passing and therefore concentrating upon itself, I do not believe that the increase in the " *typus inversus* " is confined to this group or that, so that a broad general development here becomes visible which is not paving the way in one special direction such as the rise of nationalism. But the spiritual (including the political) development of the country depends on the wisdom of the anti-Fascists. In contrast to Germany, where, in the years before 1933, a certain development of the " *typus inversus* " could be observed even in the working class, this state of affairs is not found in the France of to-day. It is precisely such organisations as the *Faucons Rouges* and the C.L.A.J. that, by fostering the principles of co-education in their ranks, retard the development even of

the spiritual "*typus inversus*." Any expression of sex life is to be based entirely on nature and free from hypocrisy. This tendency, backed up by the impelling power of the young Communists, is seen to be in the ascendant. Whether such a development can be carried on uninterruptedly in a time of conflict against Fascism, and whether the principle of co-education will not suffer another check, only time will show.

To reach a conclusion from these observations is difficult. The development of a youth culture, in the German sense, is delayed by convention. The various factors of the Scout Movement will work out slowly because it has, first and foremost, to make its stand against the crowded Red Falcons and the C.L.A.J. These are too much of a mass to create the subtleties of a really fine culture; they can only develop the collective basis—they cannot organise. Self-restraint, discipline, are demanded by present conditions from both groups of "Youth in Uniform," whose creative will could be steered, above and beyond uniforms, to fellowship with the full sense of conscious responsibility belonging to the Western world. The danger lies in forgetting this greatest of traditions. Yet France is destined in a very special measure, as a Great Power and also from the standpoint of Christian tradition, to play such a part in modern Europe. The Red Falcons, with their strong leaning towards Scout tendencies, will be driven from their present undeveloped, rudimentary position into that of sociological intermediaries. What will emerge from the France succeeding the clashes on the Place de la Concorde is the sense of responsibility amongst anti-Fascists. That young generation may be playing with fire. Independence, in fellowship, has built up the West, anti-Fascism will have to set the independence free—otherwise it is not only an inverted Fascism, but much more—its own negation, leading into, not out of, conflicts and crises. This decisive factor in the spirit of the times likewise means discipline.

ALEXANDER ROSSMANN.

THE TOTALITARIAN STATE AND THE CHURCHES.

A CONFLICT between State and Church is only conceivable in a civilisation that has been definitely influenced by the spirit of Christianity. The pre-Christian era, with its State religions in Greece and Rome or its Jewish theocracy, knew nothing of it, nor do the heathen civilisations of our own day, such as the Japanese with its Shinto-cult, realise that such a possibility exists. The identity between the community of the State and the community of worship was so strongly felt that pagan Romans could not understand why their Christian fellows should refuse to perform their duty as citizens and worship Cæsar, and Christians meet the same lack of comprehension in modern Japan with its violent nationalism.

It is only since the proclaiming of the Gospel that a conflict between State and Church became inevitable. At the root of this antagonism lies the fact that the Kingdom of God proclaimed by the Church is a kingdom of love, while the State represents power in this world. Judged by the standard of absolute love, the State with its prerogative of the sword stands condemned as sinful. That in case of need it should have recourse to coercion, proves its essentially immoral nature. There is not even the hope of overcoming the tension between the State and the gospel of love by a gradual permeation of the former with Christian elements under this dispensation. Orthodox and Reformed thinkers are equally emphatic in rejecting such a possibility. "A Christian State is a sheer impossibility; a Christian State is as impossible as a Christian police force, a Christian prison or a Christian system of penal legislation,"* writes Professor Emil Brunner. His words are borne out by Professor N. A. Berdiaeff: "There exists a complete difference, contrast and incompatibility between the Gospel and the world. The Christian State, Christian economics, Christian family, Christian science, Christian traditions never existed and never will exist, for in the Kingdom of God and in the perfect divine life there exists neither State nor economics, nor family, nor science, nor traditions, subject to the law. . . ."†

* *Der Staat als Problem der Kirche*, p. 4.

† Quoted from *An Orthodox Approach to Nationalism*, by A. I. Nikitin, *The Student World*, Second Quarter, 1933, p. 137.

Though it may be argued that, owing to the fallen state of mankind, a powerful authority must exist to act as a dam against the inrush of anarchy, the fundamental incompatibility of the use of force with the gospel of love entrusted to the Church cannot be denied. The antinomy between love and power is insoluble in this world. Though the tension between the two may at times only be latent, it tends to break out into open conflict on the slightest provocation. The issue, it is true, has often been confused. As soon as the Christian Faith was established by Constantine as the official religion, the original tension between Church and State, between the realm of love and that of power, resolved itself into a tension between two powers, engaged in a desperate struggle for political supremacy. The history of the Christian West has witnessed all conceivable stages of this struggle from the papocæsarism of powerful popes to the cæsaropapism of the Byzantine era. It is, however, well to bear in mind that all previous conflicts between Church and State arose and were settled within the confines of Christianity itself. In the past no State would have thought of doubting the claims of the Church to spiritual superiority.

To-day, the position has entirely changed. Though it may not be generally realised, the present age is definitely post-Christian. In some countries the State has emancipated itself altogether, and is endeavouring to lay hands on what has hitherto been the sole prerogative of the Church—the spiritual guidance of the people. The totalitarian State of the present day is neither more nor less than a rival Church; that the Churches are aware of the danger by which they are threatened is proved by the fierceness of their struggle for existence. The situation has been aggravated by the fact that political and metaphysical issues are confused. If the Church, in order to safeguard its character as a Church, demands freedom of witness and opposes all measures that would deprive it of this fundamental right, the State denounces its actions as political opposition and brands its members as disloyal subjects. Anyone acquainted with the modern Church controversy will realise that the argument is being developed on two entirely different planes, the spiritual and the political. It is the separation of these two motives, the political and the spiritual, that constitutes the significance of the Church conflict. Faced by the totalitarian State with its demands of

wholesale allegiance, the Churches are being forced to rethink their position with regard to the State and, purged of all desire for political power, to take their stand on what is their essential nature.

The essential characteristic of the Church is to be at the same time "in the world" and yet not "of the world." Its loyalties are divided. While its primary duty is to God, there are secondary duties which cannot be neglected. "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things which are God's," is a very emphatic commandment, by which the claims of Cæsar are, within limits, justified. The exact extent, however, of the loyalty due to Cæsar is not defined. It varies according to the diverse historical situations, and may comprise anything from a peaceful pursuit of work in an ordered State to martyrdom for the sake of the Kingdom of God. By a strange paradox the allegiance of the Church to its Master can only find full expression by action within the world, involving the risk of a conflict with a power which, though in some mysterious way ordained by God, is frequently opposed to His will: the State.

Since the one Church, professed in the Creed, is divided into a number of different Churches with different traditions and spiritual heritages, it is impossible to speak of the position of *the* Church in relation to the State. Instead, a variety of positions exists, each based on a different theological conception of the universe. On one point, however, all the Churches agree—that they have a definite responsibility towards the State as the divine order in a sinful world.

The attitude of the Church towards the State depends in a large measure on the metaphysical position assigned to it. That a powerful institution to preserve law and order in a community should be necessary, and at the same time be in itself a denial of the principle of love, presents a great and genuine theological difficulty, which has been met in different ways within the various Churches. The Christian tradition includes two fundamentally opposed conceptions of the State, the Thomist view, now generally accepted by the Roman Catholic Church, which is based on Aristotle, and the view of the Reformers, which goes back to certain Fathers of the early Church. The existence of these two conflicting theories as well as of a number of intermediate positions testifies to the complexity of the problem.

The Roman Catholic view is founded on the premise that the State is the divinely appointed form in which man was destined to live with his fellows from the beginning. As such, it partakes of the essential goodness of all nature. Though it has suffered perversion after the fall, it still retains its character of " final organ of co-ordination in social life ; it imposes order—if need be by the use of force—in virtue of its unique Divine authority, and it demands the obedience of the citizens in this its legitimate office."* This position, however, does not give expression to a complete justification of the State in its various historical forms. By the fall, the whole of nature and with it the State, as the perfect natural society, was corrupted and has since stood in need of purification. This it cannot achieve in its own strength, it must be guided by a higher order, belonging to supernature : the Church. It is only when the State " accomplishes its service in the spirit of obedience, recognising the direct authority of the Church in spiritual things, and its indirect authority in things temporal,"† that it can fulfil its true purpose. In practice, this view has either resulted in a theocratical or an ascetic solution of the relations between the spiritual and the temporal power. In times of outward strength and inner decay, in fact, when the Church was least the Church, it wielded both the spiritual and the temporal sword. At other times, when faced by a powerful State, the Church was content with the spiritual guidance of its members.

The Catholic view of the State tallies in all essentials with that held by modern Anglican theologians. Though it has been the custom within the Anglican community to avoid official pronouncements on theoretical points, and to decide practically in relation to concrete historical situations, both the Archbishop of York and V. A. Demant have in recent years expressed themselves in favour of the traditional Catholic doctrine, which conceives the State as naturally good. Most emphatically they reject the view which regards the State in itself as sinful and solely as a provision against the evil tendencies within man. In their opinion force cannot be regarded as its *differentia specifica*. This position suffers from the essential weakness that it tends to underestimate the demonic properties of force as well as the expansive

* Nils Ehrenström : *Christian Faith and the Modern State*, p. 50.
† *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

tendencies of the State itself. In recent years, Orthodox theologians have devoted much attention to the problem of force or might, and the developments of modern history seem to corroborate their argument. Force, it appears, however legitimate in its origin, tends to acquire a momentum of its own, which results in its abuse. The State is only too frequently tempted to use the sword, entrusted to it by God for the upholding of justice and the protection of innocence, to further its own ends and finally to emancipate itself entirely and constitute itself as the supreme Reality.

This is a possibility of which the Orthodox Church with its long experience of domination by the State is extremely aware. Consequently, Orthodox theologians, while acknowledging that the State is a part of the " universal divine cosmos " and hence capable of transfiguration and glorification (*theosis*) at the end of time, lay " a strong emphasis upon the tragic dualism in the nature of the State, in that the State, as an institution of power, is indeed a Divine instrument for the restraint of the evil and chaotic elements in this sinful world, but is at the same time an instrument of the demonic forces of evil."*

In their eagerness to restore the purity of the gospel, the Reformers rejected the Catholic doctrine of the graduated hierarchy of Nature and Supernature with its consequences with regard to the temporal and spiritual realms, and substituted for it the fundamental contrast between faith in God and faith in Self as two completely different attitudes. His own overwhelming experience of the grace of God led Luther to brand all nature as sinful, denying it that original natural perfection which, according to the Catholic theory, had belonged to it before the fall, and was since only perverted, not wholly lost. This new attitude could not fail to influence the Reformed conception of the State. The State was no longer conceived as the " analogy," in the order of Nature, of the Church, by submission to whose spiritual authority it might win back some of its original perfection. Instead, the temporal and spiritual spheres were strictly kept apart.

In order to meet the demands of the new situation, the doctrine of the orders was developed which has exercised such influence on Lutheran as well as Calvinist theology. A distinction was made between the orders of creation, preservation

* Nils Ehrenström : *Christian Faith and the Modern State*, p. 68.

and redemption, between God the Creator, who made the world and "all that therein is," God the Preserver, who, since the fall, has been working in nature and history, and God the Redeemer, whose sphere of action is the Church. According to this doctrine, the Church belongs to the order of redemption which is under the law of grace. Opinions are divided as to which order the State belongs to, the order of creation, as the family does, or the order of preservation; whether it is to be conceived as one of the original forms of social life or as a protection against evil. "The theological position of the State is neither within the order of creation nor that of redemption, but within the order of preservation. The State is one of the means by which God preserves the world, which through sin fell from the order of creation, for the coming judgement and the Kingdom of God."* This is a very emphatic pronouncement. On the other hand one reads, "State, Nation, Family, Culture are not objects of faith but forms in which Christian obedience and love are tested . . .: the laws of the order of grace (i.e. the order of redemption) are not applicable to the order of creation. Luther: the sword is not a foxtail."†

The distinction made between the order of creation and that of preservation may appear to the superficial observer to be irrelevant. It has, however, acquired extreme significance in the present day. "The decisive point in our inquiry into the political ethic is that in this distinction the interest is concentrated upon an emphasis upon the divine activity of the Creator in the historically given orders of human life, above all in the nation and the State."‡ There has always been a strong tendency within the Lutheran theology to conceive the nation and the State as orders originating in the Divine will and hence ranking almost equal with the gospel itself. Since both were considered as different manifestations of the providence of God, the State was in a position to present its claims to the allegiance of its nationals with the certainty of divine sanction. The close connection between "Throne and Altar" in the history of Prussia is a well-known instance of the political consequences of this doctrine.

* *Kirche und Staat*, by Emil Brunner, p. 12. Published in *Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart*. Geneva, 1935.

† *Der Totalitätsanspruch des heutigen Staates and das christliche Freiheitsverständnis*, by Gerhard May, p. 115. Published in *Totaler Staat und christliche Freiheit*, Geneva, 1937.

‡ Nils Ehrenström: *Christian Faith and the Modern State*, p. 112.

The State is one of the forms in which God's will meets man on earth. There is more than a grain of truth in this statement. The Divine call cannot be abstracted from the historical situation, in the shaping of which the State plays such a prominent part. "God's word does not come to us in abstract form divorced from the concrete realities of our experience; He speaks to us in, and through, the historical situation in which we find ourselves and through its demands. This truth pushed to an extreme, however, results in the conclusion that there is no distinctly Christian ethic at all."* This is exactly what has happened in Germany in recent years. Faced by the demands of an all-powerful State, some theologians have seen the fulfilment of their duty to God in perfect obedience to the temporal power instituted by Him. They acknowledge nationality (*Volkstum*), race, "blood and soil" as realities given by God, and advocate strong support of the State which protects them, not merely as expedient but as a definite Christian duty. They would even justify State control of personal matters in case of need. Though the necessity of freedom of practice and witness for the Churches may be stressed, this position is only too apt to result in a complete merging of the Church into the State, and a dissolution of the tension between the two.

In view of this sinister development, a number of leading theologians in Germany as well as in other countries have laid especial emphasis on the doctrine of the essential sinfulness of the State. "In the State we human beings see our own sin magnified a thousand times."† Their interpretation of the gospel leads them to reject all totalitarian claims of the State as diabolical. "Acknowledging the totalitarian claims of the State would be the same thing as falling from God and betraying the gospel."‡ Insisting as they do upon the essential tension between Church and State, these theologians call upon the Churches to defend the Christian Faith, even at the cost of martyrdom, against what is more than heresy.

GERTRUDE FARION.

* *The Function of the Church in Society*. J. H. Oldham, p. 41.

† E. Brunner: *The Divine Imperative*, p. 445.

‡ Peter Barth: *Der Totalitätsanspruch des heutigen Staates und das christliche Freiheitsverständnis*, p. 22. Printed in *Totaler Staat und christliche Freiheit*. Geneva, 1937.

WILD LIFE ON A PALESTINE FARM.

WHERE the Zerka or Crocodile river tries to reach the sea, it is prevented by a low ledge of rock running parallel to the coast. Thus all the land between the southernmost ridges of the Carmel and this ledge used to be a swamp, uninhabitable and uninhabited except by a few half-nomads (negroid Beduin) who pitched their black tents on hummocks rising out of the poisonous plain. Their buffaloes wallowed happily in the mire, their children—all of them with bellies swollen by malaria—did likewise. To the south of the swamp rose sand-dunes, billow on billow, for miles on end. To-day the sand has been turned into orange and grapefruit plantations, for below some inches of it there is good red earth, the ideal soil for citrus. And the swamp has been drained, the surplus water of the river used for irrigation canals, and where wild boar and buffaloes disported themselves, and giant turtle bred, there is now corn and barley and wheat, yielding undreamed harvests.

The Jewish settlement founded near by in 1923 lies two miles inland, due east of the ancient port of Caesarea Marittima which at the time of Christ was a huge city, covering the whole area between the coast and the hills, up to the swamp made by the Zerka. The farmers still dig up fragments of stone work, potsherds, mosaic and green glass, coins and the like, and I have unearthed two Greek marble tablets from Græco-Jewish graves, and a fine fragment of a pillar, in my own garden. Near the shore, in the ledge of rocks mentioned above, are tomb chambers and ancient quarries, making quite a system of caves, and where the spur of Carmel dips sheer into the once swampy plain, there are more. A Roman aqueduct from this point to Caesarea is still more or less preserved. The farmers tell me that there were absolutely no birds when they first came—vultures and hawks excepted, of course—and that is perfectly comprehensible: except for a few ancient and extremely picturesque sycamores on a hill to the west, lying and standing there like huge pachyderms, and a deserted fig grove by the river, there was not a single tree in the valley then.

It is lucky trees grow so fast here, for now the place is a very pretty village, embedded in orange groves and fringed with eucalyptus woods that look quite imposing in these

Mediterranean surroundings. The main street boasts an avenue of palms (*Washingtonia*), there are plenty of other trees, some high and graceful, like jacarandas and grenvilleas, some with huge circumference, making shade enough for the whole village to dance in (which, alas, it does not do)—these are a species of mulberry. Cypress also abounds, some few poplars point slim fingers at the sky, the cottages are trellised with bougainvillea, wistaria, plumbago and bignonia, the gardens are full of bright flowers and shrubs. And there is a great variety and number of birds and other wild animals to be observed, attractive and otherwise.

The least spectacular among these are the mammals. Except for the jackals and the rats and mice, they do not obtrude themselves. Against the two latter constant warfare has to be waged, of course, and the former sing their discordant hymns night after night on the outskirts of the village. They feed on the carcases of the camels, cattle and sheep that the poor Beduin lose in great number in times of drought, and occasionally they grab a chicken that *would* spend the night in the open. Jackal pups are sometimes picked up by the cowherds and kept in farmyards. They look adorable, just like young Alsatians, but they must be chained up while quite tiny still—a cruel practice!—for they will kill a duck twice their own size in the twinkling of an eye. They form the subject of countless stories and adages with the Arabs. A modern one has made me smile somewhat sourly, in view of recent developments. It says: "The Jews are like the jackals. They howl aloud when they go to steal grapes." The reference, of course, is to Zionist propaganda for buying land.

Foxes are comparatively rare, and I have never seen one myself, though furs have been offered me. The English residents in Palestine hunt, but—jackals. There is a regular meet farther south, in the Ramleh vale. I have heard a hyena once, and seen a tamed one—in a school garden, of all places!—but they have become rare with the advance of civilisation. The Arabs regard them with quite unwarranted superstitious fear. They believe that this stupid but very strong beast is capable of charming a man, "eating his sense," so that he will follow it blindly to its lair, where it falls upon him and devours him. On the southernmost spur of Carmel, which is sparsely wooded with carob, but densely covered

with brush, I have twice seen a large wildcat. The authorities say it must be the ancestor of the tame tabby (*Felis maniculata*), but I don't feel sure. It was not fawn-coloured, as *Felis maniculata* ought to be, but distinctly grey, lighter on the belly, darker and clouded on back and sides. There I have also met Rikki-tikki (*Herpestes ichneumon*), slinking into his den in the rocks. He is not beloved of the farmers, for he is not content with his traditional part of snake-killer, but devours chickens pretty often. Otters are plentiful, and I once found a beauty dead on the beach near the mouth of the Zerka river, thrown against the rocks in a storm. They tell me that there is a brindled weasel (*Vormela peregusna*), but I have never seen one, dead or alive, so it can't be so frequent as the books make out. Badgers abound; in fact there is a family living in our orange grove (a mile from the house), where I often find their claw-marks round the trees. They eat the grubs, I am thankful to say. Hedgehogs are frequent, and grow very large. They are rather tame. Porcupines are said to live in the woods, and I have seen quills, but have never met one. There are many species and numbers of bats, both fruit-eating and insectivorous.

Now these are all the wild mammals I have come into contact with. But the birds! I don't know how many species the naturalists can count, but I have myself, without special knowledge, without much leisure to watch, and without either camera or field glasses, been able to make out more than forty. Not all of these breed here, and some stay only for a short time. But even of those who live farther north, many species and numerous individuals stay here for months on end, enlivening garden and fields with their merry ways. These migratory birds are for the most part those that breed in Russia and spend the winter in Africa—they take their way across the Caucasus and the Syrian desert; some do not go farther south than Palestine at all, some spend several weeks before moving on.

Without exception the most beautiful spectacle it has been my good fortune to behold is the flight of the storks under certain conditions. When the sun is not very high yet and his rays strike the thousands upon thousands of birds from below, the white of their plumage takes on a creamy, almost yellow tinge. They all fly in one direction, except the small scouting parties that circle ahead when they are looking for a suitable

place to break the journey. And the impression made by the marvellously graceful black and yellow flights filling the sky with their geometrically exact pattern of dark wings and light bodies is like nothing earthly. They pass on their way north at the beginning of April, while the south-going flights in autumn take their way across the Mediterranean. This western route is the shorter one, and it is only the prevailing western wind which brings them inland in spring. In the year 1936 I waited for them in vain. There were only a few flights of some insignificant hundreds, nothing like other years. The terrible desert winds of that spring, unheard of for generations in such violence, had caught the great masses in the Sinai Peninsula and Transjordan, and millions of dead birds, storks chiefly, but also flycatchers, willow warblers and wagtails, littered the desert, killed by thirst.

Wild ducks also pass through, a small kind breeding in marshy country near here, where the settlers sometimes go shooting and bring down plenty of moorhens and ducks. They are the only game for the pot which is really plentiful at any time of the year, except perhaps the charming little African wood pigeons. These come here to breed in the high eucalyptus trees and acacias. When they arrive and still fly in coveys, at the end of winter, a good many are brought down, though they are shy. Since a new road has been built for the district, we get even more of them, poor things, because they have not yet learnt to associate danger with a car, and so they can be picked off the telegraph wires with perfect ease from an automobile. Not great sport exactly! By the time they separate into pairs and breed they are rarely seen. They are very small, russet and slate-blue in colour. Other wild birds for the table are the sand partridge from the rocky slopes of Mount Carmel and the peewit. On the rocky little islands off the coast, which a good swimmer can easily reach, you find quite palatable gulls' eggs in hundreds. It seems the Arabs will not eat them for some mysterious reason, or there would be none left, for the village of Tantura (ancient Dor) lies quite close, and the Arab boys swim like fish.

In spring a bittern, with the most silky cream-and-black plumage, suddenly reared its long neck from our patch of purple medic, frightening into fits a boy who thought it a snake. The lovely thing only lived for a few days, it must have dropped from a flight with some internal injury. They

are not rare in the swamps of the Jordan valley, but it was the only one I ever saw here in the coastal plain.

On the sands by the beach one of the prettiest sights in early summer is the shore sandpiper with a single chick, running after its mother on incredibly thin and long legs, scarcely visible from a distance, so that it seems a puff of down floating before a strong wind. When pursued, the mother flies off, deserting the chick, and trusting to its protective colour to save it, for the little morsel will remain motionless and is indeed hard to find. I have held one in my hand just once—it is spotted black and tan, absolutely round, its pert little black beak only protruding.

Another lovely thing to watch are the kingfishers. There are two species of the blue-and-green kind, one much like the British, the other smaller. I have seen both here by the irrigation canals and the River Zerka. A third kind, the pied or Egyptian kingfisher, is a fascinating fisherman to watch, for it does not sit still like the others and then dart at its prey, but it hovers high above the shallows of river or sea, like a kestrel over the plain, and drops perpendicularly like a stone to catch its fish, often diving for it. It is almost as large as a wild pigeon, black, with white stripes on the wings. It will fish in this strenuous way for hours at a stretch, resting only to swallow its prey.

The most gorgeous bird, however, is not the blue kingfisher, but the bee-eater (*Merops apiaster*). This greedy bird, greatly disliked by the farmers, who mostly keep bees hereabouts, looks as if it came straight from the jeweller's shop, gleaming with enamel and precious stones. No feather is ever out of place, it shimmers from beak to tail, and its colours are brown, white, emerald, turquoise and crimson. It is loveliest when seen in flight from below, with its short, pointed wings spread so that it forms a rhomboid, its colours showing most flamboyantly on the under side. It is not shy, and often sits on the telegraph wires in my garden, to rest on its way from the beehives, all set up at the edge of the eucalyptus wood half a mile farther on.

An interesting visitor to my garden, too, is the Jericho sunbird or honeysucker, a species found only in Palestine. It comes to the morning glories, the bignonias and zinnias, slits the flowers, drinks the nectar and eats the little insects at the bottom of the cup, especially of the morning glories. The

books, most of them older than our village, say he is rare and to be found in the Jordan valley only. But I can testify that by now he is quite frequent here by the coast, and I watch him every day. In fact he is just sitting on a wire before my window as I write, singing beautifully. The male is uniformly blue-green, shimmering like a glorified starling, with two crimson feathers on the neck which only stand up when he is wooing. They form a brilliant tuft then, but when laid back vanish completely. It was some time before I found out that the perfectly insignificant brown bird that but for its crooked bill might be taken for a tiny sparrow, was his wife! She has two steel-blue feathers where he has the crimson ones.

In winter the garden is full of wagtails, coming up to the steps for crumbs, for all the world like red-breasts or sparrows, not like the shy birds they are in Europe. There are thrushes and blackbirds too, for about two months, and they are as bold as brass. I could every day have put my hand on them had I chosen.

Crested larks mince along by the hundred, indefatigably singing their sweet but monotonous song, and getting so stout and portly in the good fat winter months that they can scarcely raise themselves from the ground. Robins and redtails are scarce, but there are titmice in the casuarina trees, and their song, like a melodious saw going through wood, reminds you strangely of the European spring, while the autumn *khamseens* are parching the land.

Three birds only nest in my garden : the bulbul, the thistlefinch and the Palestine warbler (*Prinia gracilis*). The bulbul of Palestine is a distinct species, found nowhere else. It is like a blackbird in shape and size, but grey, with coal-black head, tail and wings, and a bright lemon-coloured patch behind. The eyes are ringed white. The female is uniformly grey. They fly in pairs all the year round, and mates are quite inseparable. The song is not good enough to explain the popular name of the bird (the Turkish nightingale), but it reminds one of the blackbird's first essays in spring. The bulbul is charming to look at and entertaining to watch at its hymeneal by-play especially, but it is a fiend at destroying my strawberries, tomatoes and plums. I should be very willing to give them a fair share of all the good things in the garden, but the little wasters will peck at everything, never finishing one single fruit, and ruining all.

The thistlefinches are most gregarious, and flights of a hundred and more are frequent. In my garden I always have a dozen or so, and they sing very sweetly. Perhaps because singing birds who sing in this country are comparatively rare in my region, their song seems longer and more melodious to me than it did in Europe. I have sunflowers for them the best part of the year, and they are also strongly attracted by the sprinklers. It is pretty to see them hovering above the whirring wheel and fearfully taking a drop or two from the mouthpiece of the pipe when it revolves slowly after the water has been cut off.

The warbler, a tiny dun thing like a wren, with a light breast and belly and a tail longer than his whole body, is a pure joy. He slips in and out busily through the vegetable rows and the shrubs and flowers, climbing the thinnest stalks and running down them head first. He rarely flies, and never crosses open spaces except by slipping along the ground. He is never still, restlessly hunting after all those noxious insects that abound here. The warblers place their nests in the most unlikely places, thus some *will* build in the tall peas and the sweet peas, and when these wither before the young are fledged, as happens sometimes, the cats get at them. I left a most unsightly brown hedge of sweet peas standing by my main path for weeks, so that they should be able to rear their babies. But neighbour's Tom got three of the four. Another family was brought up safely in a geranium plant not a foot from the path, and so was a third, " born and bred in a briar bush "—a cluster of polyanthus roses, to be exact. The nest is a beautiful structure, always slung between two stalks and never higher than two feet from the ground. It is five inches deep, with a tiny aperture on one side near the top ; the outside is woven of grass, but the cup is made of wool, feathers and camel's hair, and feels like felt, being all pasted together with the bird's saliva. One nest was within the radius of a sprinkler, and on this the mother sat all day—usually they leave the eggs to the sun during the hot hours, especially with the second brood, which comes in July or August.

There are several swallows, the European house swallow passing through only, an African kind with russet throat breeding here. These latter are very numerous in our plain. Swifts also abound. The hoopoe sometimes comes into the farmyards to feed with the pigeons. It seems to be getting

rarer lately, perhaps because so many swamps have been drained. A very charming black-and-white chat, with continually wagging tail, hops about on stone walls and rocks, perhaps the Arabian chat (*Œnanthe Finschii*). In winter the finches stay for some months, most of them being females. (In Austria, where they are numerous, feeding on the beech nuts of the large forests, the males are gradually giving up the winter flight to the south. Lately the fact has been duly noted by naturalists. I myself remember perfectly that twenty years ago there was no finch to be seen in the Vienna public gardens in winter, and now their russet waistcoats are very much in evidence there.)

As may be expected in a country still consisting largely of waste land and grazing grounds, the birds of prey are numerous, both as regards species and individuals. The Egyptian vulture, a fine black-and-white bird, nests in the rocks of the Carmel spur close by, and can be watched feeding its young. There are buzzards, falcons and kestrels galore, and in early spring, when the chickens are hatched in the farms, they will hover hopefully above the village for weeks. A beautiful white-breasted owl (*Strix alba*) devours the young pigeons, and we shot two this year when they came out of the dovecote, after the deed, alas! There are several other owls, one a little darling that sits on our shed roof, hooting melodiously, long before sunset. I suppose it is *Athene Saharæ*, though the imposing name does not fit it. The huge brown fish-owl (*Ketupa Ceylonensis*) is also found here; like the sun-bird, it belongs to the tropical fauna zoo, geographically—but then Palestine is a borderland in this as in other relations, and its fauna contains elements from the Mediterranean, Saharo-Indian, Tropical, Irano-Turanian, Euro-Siberian and even Holarctic regions.

PAULA ARNOLD.

BAROQUE IN BAVARIA.

BAROQUE is a typically continental style of art, which is practically unknown in England. It developed slowly out of the Renaissance, softening the severe classical lines into arches and curves and fancifully shaped windows, and breaking up the long hall by the insertion of a cupola as the central source of light. Baroque means movement, imagination, light, and colour. The Baroque building, especially the Baroque church, is an indivisible entity, formed by the elements of architecture, painting, and plastic art; each of these arts would be imperfect in itself, lacking the essential union—together they result in a glorious symphony, of which the overpowering effect makes us forget the individual components.

Art and handicraft rival each other in their endeavour to produce the great masterpiece: the iron-wrought gate, the darkly-polished carved wooden stalls, the marble tombstone, all are as much a part of the Baroque church as the light-coloured stuccoes, the garlands and multi-coloured ornaments, the visionary paintings of the ceiling, and the golden statues of the saints against the white background. Overflowing imagination and vitality are the creative powers in Baroque art, which reached its culminating point towards the beginning of the eighteenth century. Its acknowledged centres have always been Rome and Vienna; Bavaria has been subject to the influence of both. The early period of Bavarian Baroque is marked by the works of Italian masters like Barelli and Lurago, whereas the architects of High-Baroque—Joh. Mich. Fischer and the Asams—tend more towards the Viennese School.

Yet Bavarian Baroque differs entirely from both schools in so far as it does not represent an artistic period, more or less born in and limited to a certain capital, characterised and influenced by the whims of the dominant class. Bavarian Baroque sprang from the heart of the Bavarian people and is deeply rooted in their culture. Many elements joined to make the Baroque of all styles very congenial to the people between the Alps and the Danube, the Inn and the Lech, with its bizarre and picturesque outlines, its coloured vividness, and its exuberant *joie de vivre*. The Bavarians have always been gay and lively, deeply religious, yet loving earthly beauty,

taking delight in the elements of form, light, and sound. Resulting from these qualities and expressing them, innumerable small country chapels and village churches are scattered all over Bavaria—perfect models of Baroque art and in their beauty often more impressive than the towns' gorgeous Baroque architecture.

The Bavarian hates rigidness, austerity, and restriction, and certainly nothing could be less restrained, less subject to any laws than Baroque, which in its most sublime conception means dissolution of almost all horizontals and verticals. How free the distribution of lights, how glorious the abundance and confusion of colours, how turbulent the eternal struggle between light and shadow in the cupola of the Baroque church! Yet all excess is avoided, the architects' will being guided—even if only subconsciously—by the strong formative power of Catholicism, in whose ancient civilisation alone the source of Baroque's quickly pulsating life can be found.

Churches and chapels owe their existence chiefly to the country-folk's contributions, but castles and residential buildings to the Court and the landed aristocracy. The Wittelsbachs, always famous for their love of art, had done their best to encourage architects and artists. After the Thirty Years' War in Prince-Elector Ferdinand Maria's time their treasure-chests were empty and exhausted. His son, Max Emanuel, spent most of his reign in exile in Brussels and France; his grandson, Karl Albert, later Emperor Karl VII, had not much time left for Bavarian interests. Yet they all contrived to leave some outstanding building, characteristic of their reigns and tendencies. The aristocracy, politically less tied up than their princes, rivalled them in the display of pomp and splendour in their country-seats and palaces in town. The Baroque castle is the expression and essence of a domineering personality and a nearly unlimited individuality, impressive in its heavy splendour. The nature of Baroque cannot be summed up in a few names, it is not crystallised in three or four characteristic buildings: only one who has seen its variety throughout the country can possibly form an opinion on this very Bavarian period of art. Only one who is not merely dazzled by the lavish display of colour and decoration on the outside, but sees in it the creative result of a powerful age, has indeed entered into the spirit of Baroque.

Two churches stand at the beginning of a long row of Baroque buildings and have been decisive for the later development of this art: the Theatinerkirche in Munich (1663) and the Dom in Passau (1668). The big green cupola of the Theatinerkirche and its two boldly shaped towers above the yellowish front—Zuccali's masterpieces—are one of Munich's most attractive features. The severe tradition of the Renaissance has been broken; Agostino Barelli, the architect, introduces a dramatic and southerly note into the highly complex, many-curved façade. Entering, we are overpowered by the effect of the massive pillars, the majestic marble statues, and the impressive splendour of the high altar. They still lack the grace and verve of High-Baroque, and the grey walls want more vividness and warmth. But the large nave is like the deep, rich drone of an organ as it is flooded by broad bars of light, which do not yet reach to the chapels and side-altars, but leave them hidden in mystical dusk. The garlanded pillars stand solidly and the pleats of the drapery fall heavily around the high altar; already the softly-curved galleries, which are to play so important a part in late Baroque's interior architecture, appear on either side.

More impressive and larger still is the Dom in Passau, standing in the very heart of this old episcopal town on the Bavarian frontier. Here, at the junction of the Inn and the Danube, in the easternmost part of Bavaria, rose a strong centre of civilisation and of commerce, and there Passau's bishops erected this glorious and eloquent testimonial of their far-reaching power and influence. Ruthlessly the vigorous vitality of master Carlo Lurago replaced the unearthly, spiritual features of the old gothic cathedral, with his highly dramatic, intensely powerful creation. Enormous arches stretch from pillar to pillar, the walls are lined with splendid monuments to Passau's bishops. The lordly carved features under the mitre and the marble plates inscribed with gold tell us of how the Baroque bishop not only looked after his diocese's spiritual needs, but also controlled very successfully its affairs and interests. In this Dom we find for the first time the whole ceiling divided into panels and painted in dark, deep colours. Silver and black marble shine faintly in the darkness of the side-altars, and the fantastic shapes of the stucco on the pillars and galleries complete the impression of

monumental grandeur. When the full, sweeping sound of the biggest church organ in the world floods and fills the cathedral, and the bishop in his gold-embroidered, flowing vestments stands in the light of innumerable candles at the altar, while sweet, intoxicating puffs of incense slowly float through the nave, Baroque in all its glory and splendour is revealed to our spellbound eyes.

The bishop's palace near the Dom contains a beautiful staircase with dancing *putti*, carrying picturesque lanterns —a fine example of Baroque residential building in town. The houses of the canons and of some of the rich citizens with their lavishly decorated and fancifully curved fronts, the fine stone steps and balustrades leading to the Inn Embankments, intensify our impression of this old city on the Danube as one of the most flourishing centres of Baroque art and culture.

The big Cistercian church and monastery of Waldsassen, Oberpfalz, is of the same period (1681) and has to be considered, though it does not, strictly speaking, belong to Bavaria. It is one of the largest Baroque buildings; and the abundance of cupolas and niches is equally astonishing and delightful. Unique and perfect in its way is the library, where the massively carved cupboards in highly-polished and shining wood contrast effectively with the rich stucco ornaments and the splendid paintings on walls and ceiling. Many artists were needed to complete so complicated and multiform a masterpiece; one of the most important in Waldsassen was Georg Dientzenhofer, offspring of a famous family of master builders, characteristic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These native, simple families handed down their craft's tradition from father to son, from uncle to nephew, as a precious gift. Their works were full of originality, undaunted vigour, and most effective in their genial conception. One of the Dientzenhofer family's masterpieces is the pilgrim's sanctuary in Kappel (1685). Its white silhouette stands out gaily against the dark green background of the surrounding woods, a marvel of ingenious creation. Completely disregarding all tradition, its short, bulb-like towers spring out from each corner of the three niches and three small imitation towers come out on top of the roofs, a delightful, playful construction exactly suited to the rural, sunny landscape. Hundreds of small villages in Bavaria hide some jewel of this kind: not strange, dazzling visions of an unknown world

amidst the simple peasant-life, but the expression of a great and luminous experience arising out of the tremendous vitality of the race.

Another world-famous family of artists are the Asams, whose genius already pointed to the coming Rococo, disregarding all the laws of gravitation in their fanciful, graceful constructions. Unknown to many a visitor in Munich " their " church—the Asamkirche (1733)—hides behind the busy traffic of the Sendlingerstrasse. The unpretentious building reveals a most exquisite interior, in which architecture and decoration complement each other in delightful harmony. Soft curves, unexpected, playful lines on the twisted pillars, and the lavishly decorated walls catch the eye ; yellow light pours on to the crucifix on the high altar and plays round the merry, mischievous angels, who peep out of every corner. The golden gloriole above the tabernacle and the richly draped, silver side altars are plunged in streams of light. The paintings on the ceiling make us forget the smallness of the room, for it seems to open and to widen to a glorious vision of sky, clouds, and sun, real in its unreality. Lighter, more graceful than the beginning of Baroque, this overflowing, jubilant burst of colour and light makes us forget by its naturalness all the difficulties of construction and material.

Art seems to find fulfilment in the small sanctuary on the rocks of the Danube, in Weltenburg (1719), another of the Asams' churches. Indescribable is the effect of this most Baroque of all Baroque buildings, this jubilant abundance of unearthly glory. Floods of light fall from the cupola on to the soft shades of pink, blue, green, and yellow in the stucco ornaments, on pillars and arches, producing a unique and splendid orgy of colour.

Another masterpiece of the Asams is their church in the monastery of Rohr (1717), famous for its incredibly dramatic Ascension scene. Then there is the new building of the cathedral in Freysing (1714), the hall-church of Maria Victoria in Ingolstadt (1732)—C. D. Asam has surpassed himself in the endless vistas he portrays on its ceiling—the church in Osterhofen near Passau (1740), where plastic art and painting are inextricably combined, Aldersbach (1720) and Straubing (1738)—all of them magnificent masterpieces, whose beauty cannot be told, but has to be seen and experienced. Most of them mark the transition from Baroque

into Rococo, that subtle, delicate period of art in the later eighteenth century.

The same is to be said of the churches of Joh. Mich. Fischer —for example, Berg am Laim near Munich (1745)—and of Dominikus Zimmermanns's much praised, everlasting " Wies." Marvellously set into the quietness of the woods the Wies reaches a zenith in decorative possibilities, a ravishing vision of gold and colours. " Heaven on Earth "—here the eternal longing of a pious people's faith has been realised! No wonder that the simple villager, after the first marvelling awe has passed, finds himself more at home in this glory and splendour than the disillusioned sceptical townsman, who cannot realise the holy earnestness and deep religiousness behind all this startling magnificence.

Even though the Baroque architects concentrated more on ecclesiastical buildings, we get some very fine representatives of profane art in the two residential castles of the Wittelsbachs near Munich, Nymphenburg and Schleissheim. Their lines are clearer, less fanciful than those of contemporary churches, destined to impress chiefly by the rhythm of their structure, the long, low front, flanked by two wings, and the " cavaliers," houses. Magnificent are the hall and staircase in Schleissheim, which seem to evoke splendid festivals, rustling silk dresses, and glittering jewels in the light of flambeaux, held by bewigged footmen. Schleissheim (1719 by Effner) and Nymphenburg (1702 by Barelli, Viscardi, and Effner) are surrounded by large parks ; trees, lawns, and water are included in the scheme of the Baroque architect and are part of his grandiose *mise-en-scène*. Fanciful flower-beds alternate with stately alleys, sparkling cascades, and fountains. *Putti* and fauns, gods and nymphs have their niches in the hedges and lead a happy life of their own amidst roses and sunshine. Delightful is the dreaming beauty of the Amalienburg—already high Rococo, it is true—the Pagodenburg and Badenburg in Nymphenburg's park, ingenious creations of an artistic imagination.

Heavy sumptuousness characterises the Baroque rooms in the Munich *Residenz* : the so-called papal suite of Ferdinand Maria and the imperial suite of Karl VII. The same may be said of the huge Baroque halls in the country-houses of the Bavarian aristocracy. Hohenaschau near the Chiemsee or Arnstorf in Lower Bavaria show the lavish pomp of this

self-conscious style, softened and cheered by light stucco decorations and gay allegorical scenes. More uniformity is displayed by the palaces in town, small, yet dignified in their greater intimacy. The Theatiner- and Prannerstrasse in Munich are full of lovely examples of most individual taste; in Augsburg and Passau we find their curved, lively façades bringing unexpected vivacity and elegance to quiet back-streets.

It is evident that the Baroque atmosphere, so congenial to and so expressive of Bavarian character, has produced masterpieces in every branch of art and that Baroque culture is not limited to palaces and churches, though they may represent its most outstanding and impressive achievements. Each small piece of art or handicraft, the delicately shaped goldsmith-work and the bizarre wrought-iron gates, the broadly curved, heavy furniture and the artistic china figures, the gaily-coloured Gobelins and the popular, beautifully worked Christmas cribs—all have sprung from the same spirit, all are testimonials to the honest striving and seeking for a lively, original and free expression of the beauties of this world. And if we have, by looking at them and enjoying Baroque art, been convinced of the loveliness on earth, its message has been fulfilled.

C. VON ROLSHAUSEN.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS VICTIM.

THERE are nearly a hundred million Germans in Central Europe. They outnumber by more than two to one any other race in Central Europe. Twice within living memory the question has been raised, whether the German race is to be "allowed" to "dominate" Central Europe. For weeks and months past the average man and woman in every European country, and to a smaller degree in America, have been constrained to consider no less primitive a possibility than that the Great War, ended twenty years ago, should be fought all over again, for the same object as before. The details of the so-called German-Czechoslovak crisis, which has dislocated the everyday life of all the European peoples throughout the present year, are themselves not easily to be appreciated unless one keeps fairly in mind the broad and simple fact that underlies them.

In this case the elementary and obvious thing is the true thing. The essential reason why the Great War was begun in 1914 was that Germany was strong and was getting stronger. The territorial bloc constituted by Germany and Austria-Hungary was by far the biggest single factor of Central Europe. Germany had begun to develop her colonial power. Great Britain and France were the two biggest colonial Powers. Germany, the newcomer, threatened their colonial ascendency. In political matters, especially in their international aspect, the ruling motive is wholly material and wholly sordid. To the victor the spoils. Great Britain and France had most of the spoils. Germany's strength was in effect a challenge. It was Germany's object to wrest as many of the spoils from Great Britain and France as she could. Hence the Great War. By a combination of circumstances, Great Britain and France were helped by Italy, Russia, Japan and the United States. They defeated Germany. The purpose of the peace thereupon imposed on Germany was to break Germany's power. Her colonies were all taken from her, the roots of her national growth were shattered at their source. East Prussia was cut off from the main body of the country. Austria-Hungary was eliminated from the map. The Germans of Austria were for the most part isolated as a small independent

country. More than three millions of them were included within the new State which was called Czechoslovakia. Probably in the whole course of diplomatic history there has been nothing more remarkable than the constitution of Czechoslovakia at the end of the last Great War. The Czechs themselves, few as they are in number, are a virile, accomplished people. Building from the very foundations, amid the ruins of Central Europe, they made a State which majestically triumphed over the economic and financial difficulties which crippled their less gifted neighbours.

But the tragedy of the Czechs was not of their making. They had been given their national sovereignty, their independence, their liberation from a minority status within an alien Empire to the status of responsible government on their own behalf. But they were given it by two Great Powers, France and Great Britain, who acted from the "realist" motive of making of Czechoslovakia a buffer against Germany. To look at the post-war map of Europe, to see the long stretch of Czechoslovak territory, one end of it thrust into the very side of Germany, its 1,500 miles of frontier for the most part (along 1,200 miles of it) flanked by people of German race, is to appreciate at a glance why Great Power diplomacy at Versailles bent itself upon the formation of such a State. It was a bulwark against what is called the German *Drang nach dem Südosten*. It was a thorn in Germany's side. It is the conventional practice to clothe diplomatic crudity in a garb of high-sounding moral principle. In the last war the recruiting sergeants were enabled to marshal the rich young manhood of England for slaughter because the ruling politicians at Westminster, the lords of the press in Fleet Street, the priests of the churches in their pulpits, talked of German atrocities against "little Belgium," "little Serbia," and the like. The constitution of Czechoslovakia after the war was in the like spirit represented to be the moral vindication of a great principle, namely the emancipation of a small people from the exploitation of a Great Power, the "self-determination" of a nation's fate. That principle was lauded and honoured throughout France and Great Britain, the while 3½ million Germans (who were not consulted) were consigned to an alien rule in Prague. The Czechs are a fine race. Their treatment of their minorities has been something far more enlightened than the treatment of any minority by any other

government in the world at any time. On the moral ground it is one of the world's most appalling crimes of diplomatic jockeying that so admirable a small nation as the Czechs should have been sacrificed by two Great Powers for their own purpose. Little Belgium? Little Serbia? What of Little Czechoslovakia? Life to-day throughout that country is something like a nightmare. Within their border are more than three million Germans determined no longer to be subject to Czechoslovak rule (no matter how enlightened that rule may be) and supported by 76 million fellow Germans just over the border.

The real issue is between Germany on the one side and France and Great Britain on the other. Czechoslovakia is the vanguard of a Franco-British anti-German enterprise. Germany shall not dominate Central Europe. Such is the cry. Czechoslovakia shall first be destroyed in the attempt to thwart German power. And why? So that Great Britain shall keep the colonies she took from Germany in 1919. Such is "power-politics." As always before in the history of civilisation, the small Powers are crushed beneath the heel of the great Powers. Germany, in 1914, had no more compunction about crushing little Belgium than Great Britain and France (unless at the last moment they change their policy) have in 1938 about crushing little Czechoslovakia. The real problem is that the standard of life in its public aspect has never risen above the bedrock of raw smash-and-grab. They who argue that if Germany be given an inch she will take an ell are right. There is not much more than a pin to choose between the real motives of any of the Great Powers. The present danger of war derives from the crude fact that Great Britain and France are the main possessors of the world's spoils. Germany, and by other means Italy, are the disgruntled losers, determined to grab what and when they can. The British Government could at once allay the present bogy of war by an offer of colonies to Germany, and by a recognition of Italy's latest colonial acquisition. According to the cumulative experience of history and by all the accepted canons of international behaviour, such an offer would probably be construed by German opinion as an admission of weakness, and might therefore defeat its own object.

What is the way out? Obviously the British Government,

instead of parading a Runciman mission in Bohemia, should offer Tanganyika to Germany and take the risk of the consequences. In the alternative a greater risk is taken. In the last analysis the problem is one of elementary philosophy, concerning the original motives of human conduct. The world is such in its physical property that it offers to all mankind an abundance of what is necessary to all mankind. Instead mankind fights over the abundance and destroys it. The Sermon on the Mount is the only practical principle of *Realpolitik*. The politician laughs at it and bends himself to his destructive work. Czechoslovakia is one of the many victims.

The Runciman Mission.

How beautifully the raw facts can be garbed in pacific sentiment and how completely the politicians are able to deceive themselves was illustrated in the origins of Lord Runciman's mission to Prague as "investigator and mediator." Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons on July 26th, made this statement: "Hitherto we have ourselves abstained from making suggestions as to the particular method of trying to solve this Czechoslovak question, although of course in this country we have had a certain amount of experience which has brought up the difficulties of trying to provide for local government without endangering the stability of the State. We have, perhaps, in that respect had as much experience as any country in the world. But, while we have felt that an agreement voluntarily come to between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech Government would be the best solution, nevertheless as time has gone on it has begun to appear doubtful whether, without some assistance from outside, such a voluntary agreement could take place. In those circumstances His Majesty's Government have been considering whether there was any other way in which they could lend their help to bring the negotiators together, and in response to a request from the Government of Czechoslovakia we have agreed to propose that a person with the necessary experience and qualities should investigate this subject on the spot and endeavour, if need be, to suggest means for bringing the negotiations to success. We have already demonstrated the possibility of a complete agreement between a democratic

and a totalitarian State, and I do not myself see why that experience should not be repeated."

On the following day, July 27th, Lord Halifax, after declaring that the Sudeten Germans had received the idea of the Runciman mission favourably, added to the honeyed words thus: "His [Lord Runciman's] function as I see it will be to inform public opinion not only in this country but in many other countries, but, more important, to act as mediator and bring the two sides together, to explain perhaps where there is misapprehension and conceivably to make new suggestions and the like. We cannot but feel that a public man of British race, and steeped in British experience and thought, may have it in his power for that reason to make a contribution of quite particular value. The British people at home and in the Dominions have repeatedly found themselves confronted with the problem of reconciling the unity of the State with the position of men of different race included within the body politic. The British Commonwealth itself is an outstanding example of the attainment of single unity through great diversity. It may be, and no doubt is, that the particular problem that faces the Czechoslovakian Government is not strictly analogous to those with which the British Government have had to deal, but it is of the same order of difficulty and requires the same kind of genius for its solution. Since we are pressing the Czechoslovak Government to be generous and conciliatory we confidently count on Germany to give similar advice where she may with a view to avoiding a deadlock, the consequences of which might be incalculable. I feel bound to say plainly that the public opinion of this country would quickly declare itself against any action, whether by obstructing reasonable compromises or by rendering impossible their fair consideration, which would imperil a settlement and jeopardise the cause of European peace."

Lord Runciman duly arrived in Prague on August 3rd. He at once announced in a general press interview that he had received assurances of welcome both from the Sudeten Germans and from the Czechoslovak Government, and that he would be the friend of all and the enemy of none. The spectacle of a distinguished British statesman in his private capacity embarking upon a mission of conciliation between Germans and Czechs with the vague general purpose of

persuading the Czechs on the one hand to concede enough to satisfy the Germans, and the Germans thereupon to remain contented and loyal members of the Czechoslovak State, had in it the elements of the supreme British gift for political compromise, peace, *savoir faire*, and the delicately ironical technique wherein the issue was featured as an isolated problem of accommodation between the two local parties, the while no mention was made of Britain's possession of all the spoils, which was the true issue at stake. In some degree, both Germans and Czechs were impartially lulled about the true issue. There was no doubt about Lord Runciman's impartiality. The Germans, for example, concentrated their emotion in attacking the Czechs. On the very day of Lord Runciman's arrival in Prague the *Deutsche Diplomatische-politische Korrespondenz* expressed the conviction that his lordship's business would be " to expose the Czech subterfuges and to establish the facts and conditions in their true character with a view to drawing the appropriate conclusions." Lord Runciman made business-like contact with both sides to " the dispute," received memoranda, mobilised all the social and personal means, which are of impressive dimensions, of British good fellowship and tact, and the mission was well away. Of course there were " incidents." On August 5th, for example, a Slovak municipal official chose the " Masaryk " railway station in Prague, of all hallowed places, to slap the face of a Sudeten German deputy. Such incidents, committed by both sides impartially, and the resultant magnification of them in the song-sheets of the press, are a normal feature of political excitement. Nor was the technique of such incidents always clear-cut. On one occasion (August 8th) a Sudeten German was killed in a brawl with German Social Democrats.

It would be merely tiresome to recapitulate the precise history of Lord Runciman's contacts with Sudeten Germans and Czechs during the month of August. The essential fact is that in that period the gap that separated the demands of the one from the offers of the other was quickly narrowed, so that by the time the Nuremberg Congress opened on September 5th the issue had been thus crystallised: were the Sudeten Germans to be satisfied with an offer of what they themselves had so far demanded, or were they to be driven by the politicians of the Reich to press for total separation from Czechoslovakia even at the risk of a general European war?

That issue is made clear if one recalls the main landmarks in the process of narrowing the gap. After the annexation of Austria by Germany in March the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia under Herr Konrad Henlein lost no time in working up their own agitation against the Prague Government. On April 23rd, addressing a party meeting at Carlsbad, Herr Henlein formulated eight demands, thus: " (1) Full equality of status for Czechs and Germans. (2) A guarantee for this by recognition of the Sudeten Germans as a legal body incorporate. (3) Determination and legal recognition of the German areas within the State. (4) Full self-government for the German areas. (5) Legal protection for every citizen living outside the area of his own nationality. (6) Removal of injustices inflicted since 1918 and reparation for them. (7) Recognition of the principle: within the German area, German officials. (8) Full liberty to profess German nationality and political philosophy." He added: " We solemnly and openly declare that our policy is inspired by the principles and idea of National-Socialism. If Czech statesmen want to reach a permanent understanding with us Germans and with the German Reich they will have to fulfil our demand for a complete revision of Czech foreign policy, which up to to-day has led the State into the ranks of the enemies of the German people."

Herr Hitler's first general declaration about the Germans " over the border " had been made, before the *Anschluss*, on February 20th. He then promised the protection of the Reich " to those fellow Germans who live beyond our frontiers and are unable to ensure for themselves the right to a general freedom, personal, political, and ideological." The *Anschluss* with Austria was effected on March 13th. A fortnight later Dr. Hodža, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, first made known his intention to correlate all the laws and decrees about the minorities in a single Statute in the hope that the Sudeten Germans would thereby be satisfied. There followed months of tension before that Statute was actually drafted. It was drafted by the beginning of June, but was tentatively presented as a basis of negotiation with the minorities. During the course of those negotiations the Sudeten German Party elaborated the Carlsbad programme and submitted the resultant memorandum to the Czech Government on June 7th. The text of that memorandum was published by the

Sudeten German Party on July 19th, thus : " (1) Recognition of equality among the various nations and national groups to be guaranteed by the Constitution. (2) Guarantee of the following democratic principles : (*a*) every national group to have the right to manage its own affairs ; (*b*) and to have an equal share in the conduct of State business ; (*c*) protection against anti-nationalists ; (*d*) unrestricted rights to such groups to foster common national interests. (3) A National Regional Statute involving territorial reorganisation of the State in Czech, German, Slovak and other areas. (4) Application of these reforms to legislation and administration. The Czech and German populations to have the right to determine their own national and territorial requirements consistently with the interests of the State. National self-administration to apply in particular to the police, education, pre-military training, local finance, etc. (5) Division of legislative powers between the National Assembly and the Diets of each nationality. In the Assembly each national group to have its own section to represent it as a body corporate. The representatives in the national sections of Parliament to form the Diet of each nationality. The National Assembly or the President of the Republic to have the right to veto decisions by the Diet, but not for a second time. (6) The executive power to be exercised by the President and the Government. In addition to the Cabinet Ministers, heads of the respective Administrations to be members of the Government, independently of the confidence of Parliament. The heads of the local Cabinets to be members of the Supreme Council for National Defence. (7) Reorganisation of the Administration, involving the suppression of the Ministries of Education, Social Welfare, Health and Unification of Laws, whose responsibilities would be transferred to the local Governments. National sections to be established in all other Ministries, except those of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence. (8) Appointment to public services in national areas to be reserved for members of the nationality. (9) The Courts of second instance and the Supreme Court to have national sections. (10) All languages used to have equal official status, with special regulations for Prague. (11) All public and State-controlled enterprises to have national sections. (12) In the Budget, provision to be made for each nationality in accordance with an agreement between the national sections in

Parliament. (13) The reorganisation to be carried out by Constitutional measures as far as possible. (14) Reparation to be made to the Germans in land reform, university laws, minority schools, and laws *re* the Legionaries."

How far the Czechoslovak Government finally decided to meet that programme was revealed by the offer officially summarised by that Government on September 8th, thus : " The most recent proposal of the Government is based on the following principles : (1) Recognition of the principle of proportionality, according to the national quota of the population, for public services. (2) The Government take the standpoint that public officials should be employed on principle in the area of their nationality. Shortcomings in the past are to be remedied in all grades of public officials. (3) The Government will once more introduce the principle employed at one time of division of the police between the local and the State administrations. [This was assumed to mean that the local police would be under the control of the local administrations and the gendarmerie would remain under Prague.] (4) The regulation of the language law is in preparation, according to its suitability and practical application, on the basis of equality of the languages. (5) The Government are carrying through plans for extensively helping industries in the German districts which have been hit particularly hard by the crisis. In particular, they plan a loan of 700,000,000 Czech crowns (£4,970,000). (6) The most important point is that the application of national equality should be carried out on the basis of national self-administration, in which the division of the country into *Gaue* can be brought into effect. In this way the German nationality will receive entire self-administration in the territory with a preponderantly German population. (7) At the central departments special sections are to be established for the affairs which concern the various nationalities with officials of the respective nationalities in control. (8) The rights of the nationalities are to be regulated by special laws, and representatives of each nationality will have the right to complain about any infringement of such rights. (9) The points which do not need a law for carrying them out are to be put into force forthwith. So far as new laws are concerned, the Government will draft them with the co-operation of the Sudeten German Party. Bills will then be submitted to Parliament so that they may take

effect as quickly as possible, in order that they may be incorporated in the Nationalities Statute, which will be valid not only for Germans but for all other nationalities of the State."

The actual opening of the German National-Socialist Rally at Nuremberg had taken place two days earlier. It was followed by a week of increasingly nervous tension in all the European capitals. It had been preceded on September 2nd by an interview between Herr Henlein and Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Though Herr Henlein returned to Prague the same day he made no disclosure, even to his own party colleagues, of what had taken place. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin, a member of Lord Runciman's mission, was not able to see him till September 4th. On September 5th the Sudeten German party met at Eger to hear from Herr Henlein a report of what had happened at Berchtesgaden. The party then announced formally that " the dispute can be settled only by a comprehensive and rapid realisation of the Carlsbad demands." The Czech Government took swift action. It was later in the day of September 5th that, President Beneš in the Chair, the Inner Cabinet " agreed on definite proposals." On that day Lord Halifax received from Mr. Newton, British Minister in Prague, a report of Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin's interview with Herr Henlein. Lord Halifax the same day passed on the information to M. Corbin, the French Ambassador. It was announced by the French Government on September 5th that " on account of the international situation and because of the important reinforcement of effectives and material made by Germany on our north-eastern frontier," reservists had been called to the Colours to keep the French forts on that frontier at full strength. It was on September 6th that President Beneš handed to the Sudeten Germans the text of the new Czech offer. The text itself was not published, but it conceded the substance, point by point, of what Herr Henlein had demanded at Carlsbad. Subject to Czechoslovak sovereignty Prague now did offer to the Germans full self-government within frontiers delimited to include a maximum of Germans. Thus the German claim for fewer cantons with larger powers was in effect granted. That evening Herr Henlein arrived in Nuremberg; London was the centre of continuous consultations; Paris announced further measures of mobilisation. What was called, in honour of Austria's "homecoming," the "Parteitag of Great Germany"

was duly opened on September 6th. The flags of the Austrian Nazis were carried into the hall. Herr Hess, the Führer's deputy, made the opening speech. Herr Hitler made a proclamation, read according to custom by the Gauleiter of Bavaria. No reference was made to Czechoslovakia. Herr Hitler's main protestation was that Germany " for years to come " was relieved of anxiety on account of food supplies, and that the idea of a blockade of Germany was now completely ineffective as a weapon of war.

September 7th was a black day. The Sudeten Germans were about to start discussing with the Czechs the new offer to meet the Carlsbad programme. Before the discussion could start news came from Moravska-Ostrava (Mährisch Ostrau), a North Moravian industrial town, mainly Czech, but containing 20,000 Germans, that a body of Germans, including Sudeten deputies, had been thrashed with riding whips by mounted Czech police. The news was, of course, exaggerated. It was the almost inevitable type of incident. One of the Sudeten deputies, for instance, had a Czech official by the throat when the police took their whips to him. In Prague, the Sudetens informed Lord Runciman that they could not negotiate with the Czech Government because it was " not sufficiently master of the situation." On September 8th and 9th the tension increased. Mr. Chamberlain returned to Downing Street on September 8th, interviewed Lord Halifax and other Ministers, and announced a full meeting of the Cabinet for September 12th. In Berlin, under such headlines as " Democracy with Riding Whips," the press launched a new outburst to the effect that the latest Czech offer could not be accepted. Ominously it was hinted that a " cry for help " from the Sudetenland, reminiscent of the classic Austrian precedent, could not be ignored by Berlin. In Prague the Sudetens, still refusing to resume negotiations, discovered fresh fuel for their emotion in alleged maltreatment of imprisoned Germans and Czech inability to control their officials. The end of that week brought a real climax. Herr Hitler, on Friday, September 9th, addressed the Nazi leaders at Nuremberg on the theme " no capitulation." Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador, saw Herr von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, in Nuremberg. On Saturday, September 10th, Mr. Attlee, Leader of the Opposition, saw the Prime Minister. One thin ray of hope came from Prague.

Dr. Hodža informed Herr Kundt, the Sudeten chief negotiator, and his colleague, Herr Rosche, that the Chief Constable at Moravska-Ostrava had been dismissed. The negotiations, it was hoped, might be resumed in earnest during the week-end. To that extent the tension was relieved.

Herr Hitler made his speech on September 12th. He made no announcement which involved immediate war. He did announce that "if those tortured and terrorised comrades cannot obtain their rights or help, then they will get both from us"; and that "what the Germans demand is the free exercise of their right of self-determination." The explosion was postponed. With Germany cut off from colonies and cooped up without possibility of expansion in Central Europe even into territory inhabited by Germans, ultimate explosion seems inevitable. Feeling in Britain as well as in France is dangerously embittered against Germany. The British Government, while again refusing to give a precise commitment, has conveyed a warning to Germany in the sense of Mr. Chamberlain's speech of March 24th, that Britain cannot be disinterested in war that might result from German action in Central Europe. Of the three Western European Powers, Britain and France are in possession of most of the spoils in colonies and raw materials. It is in their power to avoid another war by offering a fair share to Germany. If they persist in refusing colonies to Germany and in blocking German expansion in Europe by the vicarious means of Czechoslovak integrity they make war certain. In a nutshell, the threatened *casus belli* is not Czechoslovakia, but Tanganyika. It was a blunder in 1919 to add the German colonies to an already too big British Empire. The sanction is none but the sword. Peace is the only object worth pursuing. War is a crime. It cannot in any circumstances be justified. The present rulers of Britain have this responsibility, that they can avert a threatened war by disgorging colonies they do not really need and cannot really defend. It is even a small price to pay. Will they instead burden their conscience by accepting the holocaust of war for Britain rather than exercise, not generosity, but only common sense and a sense of fairness?

GEORGE GLASGOW.

September 12th, 1938.

No. 445. *October 1938.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

FULL REVIEWS 497

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION; PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT; MARLBOROUGH IN DECLINE; BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY SURVEYED IN STATE PAPERS; BISMARCK AND LORD ODO RUSSELL; DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: WILLIAM COWPER, HUMANITARIAN; SIR EVELYN RUGGLES-BRISE; VICTORIA AND ALBERT; VALLENTINE'S JEWISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA ... 511

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION.*

Students of the Phenomenology of Religion are greatly indebted to Dr. J. E. Turner for his excellent translation of Dr. Van der Leeuw's very important book, entitled *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*. The author is Professor of the History of Religions in the University of Grönigen, and the publication of his work in English has been made possible by the generous financial help of the Sir Halley Stewart Trust.

The Translator, in his Introductory Note, speaks of the "wide range of comprehensiveness" and the "marked originality" of Professor Van der Leeuw's contribution to his great subject. This description is well merited and in no way excessive. The book furnishes a careful, unbiased, and lucid account of every type of religion, whether primitive, advanced, or, in modern times, commanding. The author has availed himself of all the results of research in every part of the vast and many-sided subject. Yet he has done so with sure command and from an independent point of view. The programme of the book is immense and no important feature is overlooked,

* *Religion in Essence and Manifestation.* By G. Van der Leeuw. Allen & Unwin. 25s. net.

as the list of Contents shows. Professor Van der Leeuw explains his attitude and the limitation of his work in the following words :

" I myself regard Christianity, then, as the central form of historical religions ; and, in general, the ' comparison ' of religions among themselves is possible only by thus begininng from one's own attitude to life. For religions are not wares that one can spread out on a table. Surveying the realm of historic religions, therefore, from the point of view of Christianity, I consider that we perceive that the Gospel appears as the fulfilment of religion in general. But whether this ' appearance ' has its roots in any ultimate ' reality ' is again an issue which theology must decide " (p. 646). In short, the book is concerned with the Phenomenology of Religion ; not with its criticism, or with its proof. In carrying out this very important, yet limited, design, the author has neglected no manifestation of religion, however lowly and however it may have been superseded by the historic religions which, at present, hold the field.

From this comprehensive standpoint the book eventually classifies the forms that religion has taken under the heads of Religions of Remoteness and of Flight, the Religion of Struggle, the Religion of Repose, the Religion of Unrest, the Religion of Infinity and of Asceticism, the Religion of Nothingness and of Compassion, the Religion of Will and of Obedience, the Religion of Majesty and of Humility, and the Religion of Love. While giving sympathetic regard to Professor Rudolf Otto's starting-point from " the Sense of the Numinous," Professor Van der Leeuw finds the ground and deduces the growth of religions from the apprehension and desire of Power—of Power as confronting men, as sought and received by men, as imparted to men, places, objects and sacred rites. Power is the ground upon which the subsequent developments of form, ethical content, and world-outlook have been built up in different religious systems, and by religious Founders or Reformers. The working out of this thesis is elaborated with width of survey and minute detail.

It is clearly impossible, within the limits of this review, to call attention to the particular features that are described. It must suffice to make the following brief comment. It may truly be said that all the forms and factors of religion still survive, if only in instinctive attitudes and sentiments. The great world-religions have embodied and developed certain selected elements of the immense range of suggestions, sentiments and concepts that have come to them by inheritance of the immemorial past. The Religion of the Old Testament took its rise from this pre-existent ground, absorbing and purifying its products, transcending and superseding them when they were seen to be incompatible with the loftiness of its eventual spiritual and ethical Monotheism. This prophetic inheritance was handed over to the Christian religion, which in its catholicity has in such wise fulfilled all that it received that as our author has said, " the Gospel appears as the fulfilment of religion in general."

This book will take a commanding place as a critical survey of all that has been accomplished and brought to light. It will be an invaluable textbook for those who are entering upon this fascinating and important field of study.

J. S. L.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.*

Emil Ludwig, like other biographers, is at his best when he finds himself in full sympathy with his subject. He has studied Franklin Roosevelt at close quarters, in the White House and at his home on the Hudson ; and the more he knows of him the more he likes him. He is particularly attracted by two qualities—his open, friendly, wholesome character, and his devotion to the working class. A rich man, who has had everything needed for his enjoyment and his activities, has become the friend and champion of the poor, spending himself in their service and earning the bitter hostility of Wall Street in the process. Not that he is the enemy of the rich, any more than his cousin Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, who also fought against the Money Power. His mission is to mediate between rich and poor, and instead of being the greatest enemy of the capitalist system he may perhaps be its truest friend. For uncontrolled capitalism is doomed in America as everywhere else. Its only chance of survival lies in its acceptance of a considerable measure of State control. Roosevelt's policy is

* *Roosevelt.* By Emil Ludwig. Hamish Hamilton. 10s. 6d.

neither socialism nor individualism, but controlled capitalism. Socialists declare that this is impossible, like the squaring of the circle. Our children will discover how far it is practicable.

Emil Ludwig excels in the art of bringing his subjects to life. On closing this book we feel that we are in closer touch with a remarkable and attractive personality than ever before. The author loves photographs. He contrasts the handsome, healthy, happy face with what he calls the distrustful look and pinched features of Hoover, whose early struggles have left their mark. The courage and good humour of the President are emphasised, and the triumph of will over his physical affliction is praised as it deserves.

The general outlines of the President's career are familiar to us all, and the author does not linger long over his work as Governor of New York State or Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Nor are his pages overloaded with detail when the Democratic leader is swept by a tide of popular emotion into the White House in 1933. The main task is to portray the man himself—in his office, in his family life, on board ship (for he loves the sea), in contact or conflict with the leading actors on the American stage. Dr. Ludwig loves parallels and contrasts. Theodore Roosevelt is depicted as a noisy egotist, consumed by a convulsive eagerness for life, yet never entirely at peace with himself. Al Smith emerges as a tragic figure. "This man in his middle sixties stirred in me feelings of profoundest sympathy. Political ambition had finally transformed a valiant, fascinating and amazingly productive friend of man into an embittered misanthrope." That the friendship of the unsuccessful and the successful candidate for the Presidency is at an end is a sorrow for both.

Soon after landing his hero in the White House, the biographer interrupts his narrative to summarise the achievements and methods of Roosevelt and Hitler. Here in a democracy a born leader can get things done without shooting his rivals, imprisoning his critics, outlawing every party but his own, muzzling the press, degrading broadcasting and education into instruments of crude propaganda, attacking the Churches, and substituting uncontrolled violence for the reign of law. That Roosevelt has made mistakes may be freely admitted by his admirers, and some American readers of the chapter on the Presidency are likely to complain that the sky is painted a little too blue. The time for a final judgment

is still far off. In the event of the outbreak of war before 1940 he would doubtless enjoy a third term. But the outlines are already clear enough, and a man in the middle fifties is not likely to change very much. Here is our author's forecast. "Those rights which he was the first to ensure to the overwhelming majority of his fellow-citizens can never again be taken from them; and yet the day will come when his wealthy opponents will raise to his memory a statue with the inscription: The Last Champion of Capitalism. But towards the end of this century, somewhere on a remote farm in New Mexico, grandfather will be telling his grandson how, when he was a boy, there was a certain President in Washington: he was born rich, and he fought against the rich; he was paralysed and he led the battle sword in hand; he came out of banking circles and was the first to break the pride of the captains of finance; for he was a genuine friend of the people, like Lincoln."

G. P. G.
69515

MARLBOROUGH IN DECLINE.*

The concluding volume of Mr. Winston Churchill's monumental biography of the Duke of Marlborough will not disappoint those who have appreciated and enjoyed the three earlier volumes. The bulk of the book deals with six vital years in British and European history from the autumn of 1708, when Marlborough initiated in vain peace proposals to Louis XIV, up to the death of Queen Anne. The succeeding eight years, of Marlborough's honoured retirement until his death in 1722, are summarily sketched. A number of documents hitherto unpublished are included in a volume which is a model of factual presentation and critical analysis, although on some matters the author's deductions and opinions may not receive universal assent. Apart from its qualities as a piece of historical writing, it certainly deserves praise as a literary achievement. Few can fail to admire Mr. Churchill's spacious narrative and pungent style. He possesses in full degree the rare capacity for imparting the dramatic intensity of his story without damage to historical balance or veracity.

* *Marlborough: His Life and Times.* Vol. IV. By The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, P.C., C.H., M.P. Harrap. 25s. net.

JL
M·56, M62.
M62·151,

The account of Marlborough's life during these six years is set amid a detailed narrative of political history, with Harley and St. John as the main villains of the Peace. Indeed, in many respects they are the central figures in the narrative, undermining Marlborough's authority and stultifying his efforts for a victorious peace to be imposed by a united Grand Alliance. To this decline in power Mr. Churchill ascribes the loss of the peace in 1709 when negotiations broke down upon the famous Articles IV and XXXVII which required Louis XIV to assist the allies in expelling his grandson from Spain. He points out that Marlborough was opposed to insistence upon this provision, but was quite unable to enforce his views. Although the indispensable agent of the British Government, the Duke had no real control over the negotiations; and resignation in protest only would have hardened the French demands. The author condemns as entirely baseless the recurring charges during these years that he was prolonging deliberately the war for his own profit.

Mr. Churchill ascribes particular importance to the incident in January 1710 when the Queen desired Marlborough's assent to the appointment to the vacant colonelcy of the Oxford Regiment of Mrs. Masham's brother, Colonel Hill, who was not qualified for the position. Upon the Duke's resolute refusal Anne eventually gave way and the former proposed to follow this up with a demand for the removal of Abigail and the consequent cessation of the insidious Tory influence. This move, however, was opposed by Godolphin and the Whigs and Marlborough desisted. They refused "the chance, which never recurred, of bringing everything to a head." The Whigs had a decisive case, and "the pressure which the whole Ministry could have brought upon Anne to choose forthwith between her responsible Ministers and her backstairs advisers would almost certainly have been irresistible. Abigail could have been chased from the Court, and Harley exposed before Whig majorities in both Houses."

Marlborough is put forward during these years as a model of political consistency. While distrustful of Harley, the Duke yet was willing to co-operate and to be conciliated when, as in the spring of 1711, the former sincerely desired, for the time at least, the active prosecution of the war. But he refused to be a party, actively or passively, to the secret peace negotiations; and there followed dismissal and the famous

peculation charge. "Where public money was concerned," says Mr. Churchill, "his record is impeccable." The general modern view that there was nothing irregular in Marlborough's receipt of 2½ per cent. of the pay of troops in the Low Countries for secret service purposes is confirmed by hitherto unpublished evidence. Mr. Churchill has printed letters presented to the Peace Congress at Utrecht by States of the Grand Alliance which affirm that they voluntarily granted the money and that it was spent to their satisfaction.

In Marlborough's long-established secret intelligence service Mr. Churchill finds a possible clue to his continual contacts and relations with the Pretender. He is convinced that they were not merely a form of insurance against a possible Stuart restoration. He points with "regret and repugnance" to the "wearisome tale of the frauds and injuries which Marlborough perpetrated upon the House of Stuart"; his "fundamental integrity" is clear. From his warning to James II in 1687 to George I's accession "he never swerved from his fidelity to the Protestant Succession." Mr. Churchill suggests a possible "theory which fits all the facts of twenty years. These contacts with the Jacobite Court were to him a window of indispensable intelligence. . . . Is it certain that the Paris spy whose deadly information has been mentioned so frequently, and who clearly moved in the innermost circle of Court politics and fashion at Versailles, was a Frenchman, and not an English Jacobite of rank, busying himself in this ceaseless reporting of military and political facts?" This theory may well explain the action of Marlborough in obtaining, during his exile in 1712, a pardon from the Pretender while working for and enjoying the closest confidence of the Hanover Court. It is remarkable, argues Mr. Churchill, that when in 1713 Harley sent to the Elector documentary evidence of his Stuart intrigues the revelations "made not the slightest impression."

It must be sufficient here to mention with appreciation Mr. Churchill's narrative of the military campaigns, in particular the terrible battle of Malplaquet and his brilliant exploits in forcing the "Ne Plus Ultra" Lines and in capturing Bouchain while the French relieving army impotently watched. Mr. Churchill analyses and describes these operations with great care, lucidity and dramatic effect.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY SURVEYED IN STATE PAPERS.*

In the last twenty or thirty years the British public has become enormously interested in foreign affairs. Before the World War the preponderance of interest was in domestic affairs; since the War the balance has shifted to the foreign scene and to the British Government's adjustment of its policy towards foreign conditions. The completion of the great edition, in eleven volumes, of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, has given the public an unrivalled means of knowing the inmost workings of the British Government and Foreign Office in the years 1898-1914. These volumes were edited by Drs. Gooch and Temperley with the assistance of Professor Lillian Penson. Dr. Temperley and Miss Penson have now added two complementary volumes. One contains lists of the titles of British Blue Books, from 1814 to 1914, dealing with foreign affairs; there are also introductions explaining the policy of successive Foreign Secretaries with regard to this vital matter of "Blue Book publicity." The second volume contains a series of dispatches, many of them hitherto unprinted, taken mainly from the Foreign Office archives, and covering the years from 1792 to 1802. The editors state that if this volume is successful with the public, they will consider the editing of a selection from the eleven volumes of *British Documents on the Origins of the War*. It is greatly to be hoped that they will see their way to publishing such a selection. To ensure this the public response to the *Century of British Blue Books* and to the *Foundations of British Policy* should be immediate and widespread. All students of modern history, all College and Public Libraries, should have these books at their disposal.

No other Government except that of the United States has taken its public so fully and so rapidly, as important events occurred, into its confidence. Blue Books (or Parliamentary Papers) are issued by authority of the Government, sometimes willingly, sometimes under pressure; and they are always, in effect, a defence as well as an explanation of the Government's policy. Their value is in the fact that they consist of original,

* (1) *A Century of British Blue Books, 1814-1914*, lists edited with historical introductions by Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson. Cambridge University Press, 1938. (2) *Foundations of British Foreign Policy, from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902)*. Cambridge University Press, 1938.

contemporary documents; but as they deal with current affairs and necessarily involve the susceptibilities of foreign Governments, they are not all published *in extenso*, and indeed, not all the important documents on the question at issue can, as a rule, be included in any particular Blue Book. Dr. Temperley and his colleague have given an invaluable aid to the study of Blue Books by supplying along with the titles the dates of publication, and by indicating, from their knowledge of the originals, any significant omissions made in the published collections.

There was not much publicity about eighteenth-century diplomacy, but after the Napoleonic War Castlereagh did occasionally take the public into his confidence. Dr. Temperley calls him a "bridge." Canning really began the policy of publicity. The long, though not continuous ascendancy of Palmerston was "the golden age of Blue Books." Curiously, as democracy increased in Great Britain, the importance of Blue Books tended to diminish. Party discipline grew stronger and the Government seemed more able to resist a demand in Parliament for Papers. Grey was fairly prolific in Papers—except on the most important subjects. There was no Blue Book on the development of the Dual and Triple Entente nor on the Anglo-German naval tension. There are some things too delicate and dangerous to be made public in Parliamentary Papers. In spite of these limitations the British Blue Book policy has been and still is an important element in public enlightenment and in strengthening the hands of government.

The other volume, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy*, shows by simple selection of dispatches, all dealing with major or at any rate important questions, the continuity of British aims and methods. The editors write: "The famous State Paper written by Sir Eyre Crowe on 1 January 1907 reproduces what are virtually Canning's ideas on foreign policy eighty years before." Crowe's paper is not reproduced in this volume. It is in *British Documents on the Origins of the War* and will doubtless appear in the projected volume of selections from this series. The present volume of selections ends in the year 1902.

The modernity or current applicability of many, indeed of most, of the selected documents is remarkable. Pitt's Memorandum on the Deliverance and Security of Europe, dated January 19th, 1805, could have been read with profit by any Secretary of State or Minister of Foreign Affairs in the years 1919-38. Castlereagh's State Paper of May 5th, 1820, on

Non-Intervention, contains an exposition of policy which, whether they have read it or not, is still the rule of British Foreign Secretaries. The collection is very rich in selections from the private papers of statesmen—Aberdeen, Clarendon, Gladstone, Russell. There are a considerable number of extremely interesting reports sent by the Austrian ambassador in London to his government, containing his account of conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. These have been taken from the Vienna Archives and are translated into English. There are, in addition, extracts from debates on foreign affairs in Hansard, for instance, from Palmerston's celebrated speech in the House of Commons, July 23rd, 1863, on the Schleswig-Holstein Question when he declared that if any assault were made on Danish independence, "it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend."

This volume not only offers a complete conspectus of British foreign policy over a period of more than a century, and from the original documents, but it also elucidates a number of obscure points, for instance, Lord Salisbury's attitude to the guarantee of Belgian neutrality in 1887. The dispatches themselves, and the editors' introductions and comments, throw great light on the personality of successive Foreign Secretaries and on those Prime Ministers who took an important part in the direction of foreign policy. To the writer the volume has provided a fascinating study and he believes that it can be read not only with profit but with genuine pleasure by any intelligent and interested citizen. R. B. MOWAT.

BISMARCK AND LORD ODO RUSSELL.*

Lord Odo Russell was one of the most successful of nineteenth-century British Ambassadors. It is curious that no study of his Berlin period has been undertaken before, for it marks the summit of his career. Dr. Winifred Taffs deserves the warm gratitude of all scholars for this fine book, which is the result of zealous and profound scholarship continued through many years. As all the private correspondence was destroyed, the work is chiefly based on Foreign Office archives. Various members of the Russell family gave valuable help. Three departments of historical research will draw profit from

* *Ambassador to Bismarck, Lord Odo Russell, First Baron Ampthill.* Winifred Taffs, M.A., Ph.D. Frederick Muller.

this book: the history of British diplomacy, German history during the later period of Bismarck, and the history of international policy, 1871-84.

In the early period of his career, Bismarck had many a clash with British diplomatists, and personal misunderstandings got mixed up with political disagreements. British diplomatists in Berlin up to the end of the Franco-German War did not get on very well with him, with the exception of Lord Napier who appreciated his work and personality more than the Foreign Office liked. Lord Odo had made a strong impression on Bismarck that famous November night of 1870 when he uttered his threat: "with or without allies"—in this exceeding his instructions, but saving peace by his bold attitude. The Chancellor treated him as an equal when he was sent to Berlin as Ambassador, and there was an unusual quality of intimacy about their relations, to the benefit of both countries. On his early death, Bismarck, though always sparing of acknowledgment, remarked that England might give him a successor but could never expect to replace him. There was indeed a unique combination of qualities in Lord Odo—a fine sense of what was due to his own dignity, and a fine sense of what was due to others, the power to penetrate deeply into the minds of his fellow-men, a wide charity, sincere tact, a charming wit, and a mastery of languages. His despatches are full of requests for better conditions for those who worked under him. The fact that he was a warm friend of the Crown Princess Victoria and that he, himself a son of a Roman Catholic mother, was always *persona grata* with the Pope, never disturbed his excellent relations with the Chancellor. How skilful he was at mending the blunders of his chief, Lord Granville, is shown by a secret letter of January 13th, 1883. He had made a communication concerning Egypt to the German Foreign Office. Immediately he received the order to postpone the delivery. What was he to do? He could not recall it, but he begged the Foreign Secretary to consider the circular in question as private and confidential until it had been finally sent and received by all the Powers concerned.

In the early seventies Lord Odo witnessed Bismarck's first political defeat, in the Kulturkampf. We learn from his reports how distrustful he was from the beginning, owing to his deep knowledge of Roman affairs. Dr. Taffs supplies interesting details from the Berlin archives which show how

deeply alarmed were distinguished Englishmen at the obstinate fight between Church and State. Earl Russell, Lord Odo's venerable uncle, wrote a letter to his nephew expressing his opinion on the struggle and giving Bismarck his advice, finishing with the suggestion of an Anglo-German *rapprochement*. Bismarck's secret answer, published now for the first time, stresses the fact that the danger of international conflicts would be greatly lessened by the co-operation of the two nations and their statesmen in preserving the peace of Europe. Lord Odo again showed his independence of mind during the unpleasant Arnim affair. Dr. Taffs compares the official reports of the Ambassador with Bismarck's account in his memoirs, and states that the latter was wrong in referring to Lord Odo's authority when describing Count Arnim as an untrustworthy and bad character. The Ambassador was courageous enough to invite Count Arnim to dinner during this crisis.

When Lord Odo came to Berlin he had to deal with a new German Empire founded in the teeth of British advice and British sympathies. France's defeat was accepted by Great Britain because her international and European influence had not been essentially endangered. Any further humiliation and spoliation of France would have been a challenge to Great Britain as an attack on the Balance of Power. From Lord Odo's report of December 1873, we learn that Bismarck greatly preferred to fight out the conflict at once and declare war if France really intended revenge. This was a sort of prelude to the war scare of 1875 of which the author gives a very fair account with many new details. The well-known declarations of Radowitz to the French Ambassador could not be doubted in London because they only repeated the utterances of Bismarck himself. It was during the war scare that Lord Odo had a most interesting conversation with Moltke, who suggested that Austria might become a source of embarrassment to Germany because her position would be made very awkward through the growing desire of her German subjects to shake off the rule of the Magyar and the Slav and become subjects of the German Empire. Bismarck, on the other hand, emphasised Germany's perfect contentment—she did not intend to annex the Netherlands nor did she desire colonies or any fleet. In this way he disarmed British distrust for some time, and hoped to separate the

Western Powers, as he had done with such success before the Franco-German War. It was different with the Balkans and Turkey. The immediate result of the Berlin Congress was the increasing influence of Germany in Roumania where the famous Strousberg built the railways, and in Turkey where military missions prepared an economic co-operation. It was a scheme of the same speculator, Strousberg, to build a line from Constantinople to Bagdad. Bleichröder, Bismarck's banker, was said to be concerned, but the Chancellor denied any interest in the matter, all of which did not prevent Drigalski Pasha being granted the concession. He was a favourite of the German Emperor and an aide-de-camp of the Sultan.

When Bismarck encouraged Great Britain to act in Egypt, he was obviously offering her a compensation which meant tension with France and Russia. But it was a step to lead to that Anglo-German *rapprochement* which was the darling wish of his last period. Dr. Taffs' information from English sources may be completed by German material, particularly by von Bülow's letter of January 4th, 1876, to Munster, which expresses the first known suggestions concerning the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the first hints of a desire for Anglo-German co-operation (*Grosse Politik*, II, page 29 ff). Bismarck's offers of February 1877, adequately referred to in German monographs, thus find fresh corroboration. They were repeated in May 1877, in the course of an interview between Bismarck and Lord Odo in Bismarck's house just before the departure of the Ambassador for England—an episode which German sources had not before revealed. Gladstone's new Cabinet and colonial competition introduced a new unfriendly period. Lord Odo's disappointment at German colonial activities was manifest, and not to be dispelled in view of the previous reiterated denials of the Chancellor. Unfortunately death prevented him from smoothing over the situation.

VEIT VALENTIN.

DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND.*

We warmly welcome the third volume Dr. W. K. Jordan has given us on the rise and growth of toleration in our country. In his new volume he discusses the period from 1640

* Allen & Unwin. 21s.

to 1660, and there can be little doubt that more experiments in the direction of toleration were tried in those twenty years than during almost any other period in our history. In an age which has become so notably intolerant as our own, it is a relief to see how gradually we came to see that, to quote Montaigne, it was putting a high price on our opinions to burn a man who did not hold them. This book falls into four sections. The first deals with the period of Puritan (Presbyterian) dominance and the question of religious toleration, 1640-8; the second with the period of sectarian (Independent) dominance and the question of religious toleration, 1648-60; the third with Puritan (Presbyterian) thought and its relation to the development of religious toleration, 1640-60; and the fourth with moderate sectarian thought and its relation to the development of religious toleration, 1640-60. What we like best about these books is the care with which the views of minor men are placed before us, and the equal care with which these men are related to their stage in the generation of thought to which they belong. On such a matter as the treatment of the Jews by Cromwell this is conspicuously clear, for their treatment is regarded as a matter of toleration by administration. Naturally, then, the Quakers, the Roman Catholics, the Anglicans, and the Socinians—not to speak of Protestant Incendiaries—come in for a due share of the author's attention, and the whole question of the treatment of the Jews is considerably clarified. That is, Dr. Jordan never sees a problem in isolation but in strict connection with kindred problems, and the result is that we feel indebted to one who surveys questions from the hill and not from the plain. The backgrounds to his four sections constitute ample proof of the largeness of mind the author possesses, and in the good sense of the word we envy him this largeness. So he considers the attack on the Anglican establishment, the conservatism of the Commonwealth, the metamorphosis of Puritan thought during the revolutionary period, and independency, 1640-60, in its relation to the development of religious toleration. With our envy we combine admiration, tempering both by the hearty hope that Dr. Jordan will continue his strenuous and illuminating work of love. We eagerly await his next volume not for the light his present one sheds on its own subject, but also for the side-lights it affords on many aspects of our national history.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

In his *William Cowper, Humanitarian*,* Professor Lodwick C. Hartley does not attempt to compete with Lord David Cecil's exquisite biography; he emphasises an aspect of the poet which has been somewhat neglected, and shows that his keen and practical interest in the varied humanitarian movements of his day has not had sufficient recognition. Cowper's provincial seclusion from the world and its concerns was (except during the periods of his mental derangement) less complete than has been often depicted: he kept in touch with many leading persons. His opinions on such topics as the poor and the Poor Law (the administration of which he attacked), education, prison reform (he expresses warm admiration for John Howard), war, liberty, foreign missions, care for animals, were vigorously expressed in his poems and letters alike, as the quotations in this book show; they make interesting comparison with others from, e.g. Pope, Thomson and Rousseau. The ballads he composed, by request, to be sung to existing tunes, in aid of the anti-slavery cause, and passages like the nobly indignant lines from *The Task* (quoted on p. 78), exerted a widespread influence and won for their author from Clarkson the title of "a great coadjutor." Dr. Hartley gives an instructive account of the philanthropic efforts of the eighteenth century, some based on rationalism, some on religion; Cowper, he says, while anxious to improve their lot, does not sentimentalise about either the "noble savage," the poor (who, unfortunately, are not all "neat" and "industrious," as he would have them), criminals, or children; he thinks his attacks on the universities and public schools probably exaggerated. Cowper's zeal for liberty led him at the outset to sympathise with the French Revolution, but, like a greater poet, he shrank later from its excesses. While condemning the "nabobs" in general, he stood by Warren Hastings, perhaps in loyalty to their schoolboy friendship.

* * * * *

Mr. Shane Leslie has attempted a difficult and not altogether satisfactory method of biography in his recent memoir of the late *Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise*.† Towards the end of his life Sir Evelyn dictated an autobiography and in this short volume Mr. Leslie has linked it up, by way of commentary, with extracts from a diary of anecdotes and memories kept by Lady Ruggles-Brise during her husband's last two years, private correspondence and some material from the files of the Prison Commission. The importance of the measures of prison and penal reform, including the creation of the Borstal system, during Sir Evelyn's lengthy tenure of the chairmanship of the Prison Commission are universally recognised; and these pages are valuable

* The University of North Carolina Press. 11s. 6d.
† John Murray. 9s. net.

particularly for his own account of his outlook and part in accomplishing the great changes. This volume provides a basis for a full and adequate biography and also material necessary for a complete history of the treatment of delinquency and of prison administration during the last half-century.

* * * * *

The greater part of the material of Mr. Hector Bolitho's new book, *Victoria and Albert*,* has already appeared in his books *Albert the Good* and *Victoria the Widow and her Son*. It is not, however, a mere fusion of these works for both books have been entirely re-written and a considerable amount of new material added. During the last five years Mr. Bolitho has had access to documents hitherto unpublished, which he considers have given him greater understanding of both Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. The most important of these discoveries are letters from the Prince Consort to his tutor, Florschütz, and correspondence between Queen Victoria and the Empress Augusta. One interesting memorandum written by Prince Christian in 1889 on the "Vienna incident" also appears for the first time. It gives the whole story and shows Prince Christian's work of reconciling the Kaiser to the Prince of Wales before the former's visit to England. In this new book Mr. Bolitho has excluded the numerous footnotes and authorities for quotations given in the earlier books, but confines such information to the new material in the text.

* * * * *

Vallentine's Jewish Encyclopædia† is an ambitious undertaking edited by Mr. Albert M. Hyamson and Dr. A. M. Silbermann. Their aim has been to compile a digest of "the sum of human knowledge regarding Judaism, Jewry, Jews and Jewish affairs"; and without doubt an immense amount of reliable information, including biographical notes of living Jews, has been compressed within the seven hundred two-column pages of this book. The need for concision is clear and fundamental, although some of the biographies, at least, deserve more attention; for example Einstein's life and work is allotted a bare two-thirds of a column. On the other hand topical questions receive, quite naturally, comparatively greater space, as for example Palestine. Incidentally on the latter, as on most questions, the reader cannot fail to appreciate the detached and temperate tone of the articles. Among the contributors are a number of distinguished Jewish names. The volume contains maps, plans and many excellent illustrations. It may well be felt, however, that the letterpress has been unduly sacrificed for their inclusion.

* R. Cobden-Sanderson Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.
† Shapiro, Vallentine & Co. 15s. net.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.
NOVEMBER 1938.

MUNICH—BEFORE AND AFTER.

THE Prime Minister deserves all the tributes that have been paid to him for the splendid initiative which brought the world back to safety and sanity at the eleventh hour in the recent crisis. I do not think many people share the confidence of his critics that they could have done better than he did. At the same time it is a portentous fact that we should have been brought to the edge of this terrible precipice in seeking a settlement of the Czechoslovakian minority problem. That belongs to the order of events which could not be repeated without total disaster. "Never again" must be the word for us all.

Let us try meanwhile to keep some sense of proportion in looking back on what has happened. There is a temptation to bandy epithets which are either inappropriate or greatly exaggerated. Whether Czechoslovakia was sacrificed to the convenience of France and Britain or, as a large part of Europe believes, saved by their intervention from the fate of Austria, will only be known for certain when the secrets of more hearts are revealed. But in any case, words like "surrender" and "betrayal" cannot fairly be applied to the British part in those transactions. We were of course, as signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, concerned to see that any alteration in its terms was carried out in an orderly way, and we shared with other nations the obligations of the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. But we had not, like France and Russia, given Czechoslovakia any specific pledge to guard her interests; we were not like those two in a special relation with the Little Entente, of which Czechoslovakia was a member. Our interests were rather European than local—to see that the local dispute did not develop into a European war in which by virtue of our pledge to support France we should inevitably be involved.

It was in these circumstances that Lord Runciman went out at the request of the British Government to play the part of *amicus curiae*, if that were still possible. It was late in the day. Czechoslovakia had failed to solve the problem of the

Sudeten Germans in the years since the peace; grossly as their grievances had been exaggerated, she had left enough of them to afford a handle to her German enemy, who had the overwhelming advantage over her friends of proximity and an immense apparatus of force within striking distance. It is impossible to read Lord Runciman's report without coming to the conclusion that the chance of any moderate settlement under which the Sudeten Germans would have lived as loyal citizens within the boundaries of Czechoslovakia had passed before he had time to study the problem. A correspondent who visited Czechoslovakia in August wrote to me on his return that the Sudeten Germans genuinely believed that they were going to be massacred by the Czechs. I replied that the fear was fantastic, and that it must have been put into their heads by German propagandists. To which my correspondent rejoined that this might be true, but that the alarm was genuine and must be regarded as the essential fact in the situation with which Lord Runciman had to deal.

It is here precisely that we get the crux of an unsolved minority problem. It may be settled by compromise early in the day, but if that fails and it becomes material for agitation and propaganda, it rapidly passes beyond the point at which a stubborn dissentient bloc can be induced to live in amity with a majority of different race and religion. That was our experience in Ireland, it is our experience to-day in Palestine, and after much tribulation we have been driven to the conclusion that there is no remedy, when this point is reached, but that of partition in some form. Lord Runciman no doubt had his own Irish experience in mind when he reported that some cession of territory was necessary and had better be carried out promptly.

Those who object may fairly be asked to say what alternative they think there was in the circumstances as he found them. Was it possible that Britain, France, and Russia, operating from a distance, should make themselves responsible for clamping this reluctant minority on to the Czech State and defending that State against the opposition of Germany? Could that have been permanent, and would it have been wise, even if we had had the force available to keep the watch that would have been necessary to prevent another Austrian *coup* from the German side? Was there any compromise which would not have been a continuing source of mischief?

Disagreeable as may be the necessity for Czechoslovakia, it seems to me highly probable that if an impartial international Commission had been called upon to deal with the situation in the form in which it was presented to Lord Runciman, its conclusion would have been substantially the same as his. What was amiss was not so much the settlement proposed, which may very well be judged hereafter to have made the best of a bad job, as the manner in which it was reached—pressure and counter-pressure to an accompaniment of roaring speeches and marching troops. The present German régime has always been preternaturally obtuse to the impression it makes on foreign countries, but if it is concerned to inquire why at the end of this affair practically the whole world was convinced that, if there had been a war Germany would have been to blame, it has only to refresh its memory about the proceedings at Nuremberg and the speeches of Herr Hitler and Field-Marshal Goering during the feverish days of the Party Congress.

I do not think we need trouble ourselves too much about the appearances in this affair. The judgment of history will be on the substance, not on the appearance, and to those who come after, the appearance of having sought a solution by threats may well, in the light of the facts, be as discrediting as the appearance of having yielded to threats. But it was extremely desirable that Herr Hitler's passionate assertion that the question concerned him and him alone should not pass unchallenged, and here, it seems to me, there was real gain in the final Munich terms as compared with the Godesberg terms. It was at last admitted that other Powers were concerned as well as Germany. An International Commission was charged with seeing that the transfer was carried out in an orderly way. Various mitigations were introduced into the original German demands, but, most important of all, the settlement bears the signatures of Four Powers instead of being imposed by one. The late Lord Grey would have been well content if he could have obtained a similar recognition of the rights of other Powers after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908.

II

So much for the local question. If nothing more can be said for it than that in the end the best was made of a bad job, I

believe that history will judge that those who saved the world from being plunged into war about it were public benefactors. But it remains to ask, why was it such a bad job, and why are there so many bad jobs lying dangerously about to trouble the peace? The "postscript" signed jointly by himself and Herr Hitler which the Prime Minister brought back from Munich gives promise of a new start, and the answer to this question is of great importance as a preliminary to that.

I should say briefly that the question of Czechoslovakia has brought to its climax the whole order of events which may be summarised as the failure of the League of Nations. This was not the failure to enforce sanctions but the failure to lay the foundations on which alone sanctions could have been enforced without risk of great and dangerous wars. For this two conditions were essential. (1) Disarmament which would have redressed the heavy adverse balance against the defeated nations, and (2) Treaty Revision to the extent of removing their principal grievances under the post-war Treaties. With the United States standing out, the problem of establishing collective security was from the beginning much more difficult than was contemplated in 1919, but if these two conditions had been fulfilled, a sufficiently powerful European League might still have been set up. Without their fulfilment and the consequent failure to bring Germany into the League, the original idea was changed out of recognition. The "collective security" of the original model was security for all against war and security for each against aggression, the means to be employed being the supposed peaceful one of economic sanctions imposed on an offender by an (*ex hypothesi*) overwhelming majority, which an aggressor would have been powerless to resist. In the actual circumstances the League commanded only a majority, and by no means always an overwhelming one, and the measure it proposed was not security at all as that word is generally understood, but the punishment or restraint of a powerful aggressor at the cost or risk of a great war.

It seems to me important that the right emphasis should be laid on these facts, for otherwise the failure of the imperfect League may lead us to despair of the possibility of realising the perfect League. There is no need to despair. The League as originally planned is still the right ideal for peacemakers in all countries, and with patience what is essential in it may

still be realised. But the important point for the moment is to face the fact that the conditions essential to the success of the League, as constituted in 1919, were never realised, and, if we can, to discover why.

The short answer to this question is, I believe, that the two principal members of the League, Britain and France, held radically different views about its objects and functions. We regarded it benevolently, if rather vaguely, as the road to appeasement and international order; the French regarded it as the guarantor of the *status quo* established by the post-war Treaties. Disarmament was essential to the British idea; the maintenance of all armaments against Germany to the French. Between the two, successive disarmament Conferences broke down on one pretext or another; treaty revision slipped out of sight, and the opportunity of conciliating Germany, while she was still a democratic Power, was lost. There was a moment, the moment of Locarno, when the French seemed to be converted to the British point of view, but the refusal to disarm persisted and once more the opportunity went by.

The circumstances can be explained without recrimination. French fears were natural, and to the French mind British hopes seemed Utopian. France had again and again been invaded from across the Rhine, and Frenchmen could not afford to take the risk of a German change of heart. In spite of all disclaimers they were convinced that Germany was rearming, and until they had positive proof that she had abandoned the thought of a *revanche* they would not join in any general disarmament. In 1919 they had withdrawn their claim to the Rhine frontier in deference to our wishes and accepted in return the pledge of a tripartite guarantee which had immediately been repudiated by the United States. The least, they protested, that they could do in the circumstances was to remain armed. How right we were, is even to-day the conclusion drawn by immense numbers of Frenchmen; and how wrong you British were to delude yourselves with the dream of a reconciled Germany.

Our answer was that, apart from anything that we might wish or hope, the idea of keeping Germany subdued and disarmed was in itself a dream which could not be realised for any length of time. It was Bismarck's policy to France after 1870, the policy which came to its catastrophe in 1914. But these differences of opinion were fatal to any coherent

or consistent policy. We were not prepared to make war on Germany to prevent her from rearming or reoccupying the Rhineland—which would have been the logical corollary of French policy—and after their experience in the Ruhr, the French were unable or unwilling to act alone. In the upshot we alone continued to disarm, irrespective of what others might do, with results that Mr. Baldwin revealed to an astonished public in 1936. After that came the rush into rearmament, accompanied by alarming doubts whether we should be ready in time. So far we had neither succeeded in appeasing Germany, nor armed sufficiently to be safe against her rearmament.

This confusion between the ideal and the real came to its climax in the attempt to apply sanctions to Italy. The British Government considered it supremely important to vindicate the League, but immense numbers in France thought it folly to commit the French army and navy to rescuing Abyssinia, while Herr Hitler, now known to be formidably armed, stood waiting for his opportunity on the Eastern front. A firm common front was extremely unlikely in these circumstances, and the Hoare-Laval settlement was the patch-up which the Quai d'Orsay considered essential to extricate them from what they thought to be an extremely dangerous situation. Once more France and Britain slipped into the hole between the old diplomacy and the new League policy. The Hoare-Laval settlement, a typical effort in the old diplomacy, was rejected as a betrayal of the League, and the League failed to save anything out of the wreck of Abyssinia. Long before the question of Czechoslovakia was reached the League was out of action. The signatories of the Treaty of Versailles were now left with the burden of defending against a rearmed and hostile Germany territorial arrangements, many of them admitted to be harsh and unfair, imposed on her when she was helpless and disarmed.

III

Can we now get out of this unhappy situation and lay the foundation of peaceful adjustment in the future? The paper —let us hope, this time, not a scrap of paper—to which Herr Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain have put their signature—takes us to the heart of the matter. It raises, in its simplest terms,

the question which, throughout my lifetime, has overshadowed all others—can Europe live at peace with Germany? It was the question of 1870, the question of 1914, and is now the question of 1938. It presents itself first of all as a question between France and Germany, but their hereditary quarrel has for generations been the vortex into which all their neighbours have been sucked, and it must be ended if Europe is to have peace.

If this is impossible then—let us face the fact—there is no hope of permanent peace. Disclaim it as she may, France will, indeed must, still seek the encirclement of Germany; Germany will still seek to break loose from encirclement, and as she grows stronger will draw others to her side. All other questions—Spain, China, the minority problems of Central and South-east Europe, the Colonial question, will be considered in their relation to this central issue. The League of Nations, if it survives, will more and more become an anti-German bloc, and probably be asked to leave Geneva lest Swiss neutrality should be compromised. The prospect of keeping Germany within bounds will then largely depend on Russia, whose policy and intentions, with all the mystery attaching to them, will more than ever be the subject of anxiety to the Western Powers. We shall be back in the old power-politics with the danger greatly increased by the new armaments.

An uneasy peace may be kept on these terms but it will be enormously costly in armaments, and largely fatal to economic progress. Not only will the contribution which a peaceful Germany might make to the happiness and prosperity of the world be lost, but her economic expansion and increase of population will be regarded as a menace by her neighbours. To satisfy her demands for Colonies would be to put weapons into her hands.

Since that is the inevitable sequel on the hypothesis of a hostile Germany, it seems mere common sense to try the hypothesis of a friendly one and exhaust its possibilities. Here I can imagine a cynic breaking in and asking whether I am so innocent as to trust Germany in the teeth of the evidence supplied by Herr Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and her behaviour in recent times. I would trust nothing except a settlement which she has an interest in observing, or at least not seeking to change by force. Here, I think, there is a new factor which

should help. The alternative to peace is no longer the business-like kind of war contemplated by Bismarck and the soldiers of his generation—it is the fearful and indiscriminate destruction from which all the nations shrank aghast in the few days in which they had to look it in the face. In Germany, no less than in France, Britain and Italy, the peoples are at this moment on the side of peace, as never before in living memory. Whatever their dreams and ambitions, statesmen cannot afford to ignore this new fact.

But if we are to go forward with any prospect of success, we and the French must this time keep step. We must not give Germany a pretext for saying that we are pursuing a double policy, professing friendship but continuing hostility behind the scenes, "reinsuring"—in Bismarck's phrase,—our open obligations with secret treaties. If we are to sweep away suspicions and animosities, we need at last to make a reality of the openness and candour which we had hoped would be a leading feature of the new order created by the Covenant of the League. Next, we must go to meet the difficult problems instead of waiting, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, until they have gone past the point at which they can be settled without wrath and threats. The ingrained diplomatic habit of looking to the morrow and letting the next day look after itself will not serve in these times. We must go at least half-way to meet our modern devils.

It is conceivable that if France and Britain had acted together in the last twenty years, they could have prevented the rearming of Germany and kept her within the boundaries of the post-war treaties for another short period. But this would have been only to postpone the problem, while aggravating its conditions. Europe has somehow to digest the fact that Germany with her immense population and resources is beyond doubt the greatest Power in Europe and can in no way be prevented from playing a predominant part over the great central region. Is that impossible? Let us remember that other nations have for generations had to digest the fact, undoubtedly disagreeable to them, that Great Britain is by far the strongest world-power. Neither we nor Germany can expect to live in peace or be free from trouble if our neighbours have cause to think that we are abusing our position. Strong as we are, the coalitions against us would, in that case, be stronger.

IV

I can only touch the fringe of the questions which now open up. I do not think it wise to complain that a new beginning must be made by the Four Powers, Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Practical statesmanship has to reckon with suspicions and prejudices which make it impossible at the moment to bring Russia in or to use the machinery of the League of Nations. But to bring Russia in and get back to a new League—or rather, let us say, the League as originally planned—must be one of the principal thoughts of the Western Powers. The co-operation of Russia will be essential, for standing out or going her own way she will make disarmament on any large scale extremely difficult, and fear of a combination between her and France will still be one of the chief motives of German policy.

In the meantime the pacifism, which urged unilateral disarmament—disarmament in faith that others would follow where we led—has, I am afraid, received its death-blow. Great countries with crowded centres of population cannot negotiate with others on even terms if they are all the time conscious of their vulnerability from the air. This is an open invitation to the diplomatic blackmail which has followed in recent years from the development of air-power. To be assured that the outbreak of war will not immediately expose us to massacre and confusion is the minimum necessary. The cost and the collective absurdity of being compelled to order the life of peace in this way should in all countries help to the education which will presently abolish war or cause it to fall into desuetude.

To offer sympathy to Czechoslovakia may seem at the moment like the shedding of crocodile's tears. It is in a sense true that the peace has been secured at her cost, and if for that reason alone she deserves all possible public and private assistance. But we are not at the end of Treaty revision; we have in front of us the Colonial question, which concerns not us alone, but all the Colonial and Mandatory Powers, and if every proposal to return territory to Germany is to be denounced as an intolerable sacrifice by those who are in possession, there can be no peaceful settlement. To invoke all the sentiments which have gathered about ancient States and nations for the benefit of twenty-year-old treaty

creations, and to denounce their reconsideration as though it were a violation of time-honoured loyalties and unities will greatly increase the difficulty of this problem. The excesses of national sovereignty make trouble enough in the old States; we must keep them within bounds in dealing with the new.

Through all these questions runs another question: Can the different "ideologies" be induced to work together for peace? If we were to take seriously their propagandist literature the answer would have to be no. The Bolshevist dream of international revolution, the Nazi idea of the Greater Reich, the Italian of restoring the Roman Empire, all threaten international trouble. But if a peaceful atmosphere can be restored, these crusading battle-cries are likely to sink into the distance. The probable causes of war between nations are not ideological; there is no necessary connection between their foreign policies and the different forms of their governments; nothing could be less probable than that they would succeed in converting one another by violence. A large field is open to common efforts for world peace while each goes its own way in its internal affairs. But no offence must be taken if, while seeking this common ground with the Fascist Powers, the free and democratic Powers continue energetically to defend their own doctrines against attack or infiltration from without. It is on the battleground of debate and argument, and not on the physical stricken field that this war will eventually be lost or won, and here we must all be free to defend what we think to be the right.

J. A. SPENDER.

GERMANY AFTER MUNICH.

ON the Monday after Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Berchtesgaden I was dining in Berlin with some leading German journalists and Foreign Office officials. It was quite a convivial party. While the Wilhelmstrasse did not wholly share the optimism and immense sense of relief of the German people after Berchtesgaden, and had some knowledge of the difficulties which were to come to the surface at Godesberg, we were all comparatively hopeful. The toast of Anglo-German understanding was proposed and we were all about to drink it, when one of the party said there was another toast he wanted to drink first—to the well-being of the new Czechoslovakia.

I do not think it would be fair to dismiss this as cant or hypocrisy. The previous conversation had turned on the question what the policy of the new Czechoslovakia was likely to be. Strange though it may seem, the Germans had quite genuine misgivings on the point. They feared that even after the lopping of Sudeten territory the Czechs might, fortified by the proposed guarantee, attempt to reconstitute the old barrier against German predominance and continue to pursue an anti-German policy. And they were quite determined that this should not be done. But provided that the Czechs were ready to make terms with them they were prepared, they said, to offer good terms. In particular, the new Czechoslovakia could obtain, they maintained, a thoroughly favourable commercial treaty, and the proposer of the toast in question insisted that the people who would profit most by the whole transaction would be the Czech Agrarians, in fact the Czech and Slovak farmers generally.

Here, I think, lies the key to Hitler's intransigence at Godesberg, as well as to much that has happened since. The Nazis were determined to press matters to a point where any attempt to hold the Bohemian bastion or to maintain French Eastern policy would be patently ridiculous, and with that objective Hitler was undoubtedly prepared to face a world war which, it was calculated, would peter out as soon as the Western Powers saw they could not do anything effective. Here, too, is the explanation of the bitter attacks on M. Beneš, a man whose whole career was bound up with the policy of resistance to Germany and reliance on the Western Powers

and Russia, and of the change of tone in the German Press now that he is gone.

From the German point of view the real achievement of Munich is not the annexation of territory or the liberation of the Sudeten Germans, good propaganda points though these may be. In both the February and July numbers of this REVIEW I maintained that apart from Austria the primary object of German foreign policy to-day was not territorial revision. I do not believe, for example, that Henlein's Carlsbad points or the negotiations with Lord Runciman were pure eyewash, as many people have naturally assumed. If at almost any time President Beneš or the Czech leaders had made it clear that they were ready to denounce the French and Russian alliances and enter the orbit of German policy, they might well have been able to avoid cessions of territory altogether. For two years at least the German Foreign Office has been putting this forward, together with some sort of autonomy for the Sudeten Germans, as the German terms for an understanding with Czechoslovakia. If the terms were raised at the last minute the reason was probably not so much to secure the aggrandisement of the Reich as to make doubly sure of the smashing of the Paris-Prague-Moscow line.

Perhaps I may quote here a passage from my book, *The German Revolution*, written some five years ago :

> It may indeed reasonably be argued that the chief difficulty of the situation lies in the fact that the natural demand of the Germanic races for equality, territorial adjustment, and security for minorities is inevitably tantamount to a demand for the hegemony of the Central and Eastern Europe. At present France and her Slav allies are predominant. Their demand for the chimera of absolute security involves the maintenance of this predominance. The situation is somewhat complicated by the emergence of Italy as a new competitor in the South-East. But in any case the real issue at stake is the leadership of Europe east of the Rhine and the future of French Eastern policy.

Rightly or wrongly, practically every German is convinced that the object of French foreign policy since Richelieu has consistently been to keep the German people divided and hemmed in or " encircled." The context shows that Hitler in *Mein Kampf* bases his declaration that a final settlement (*Auseinandersetzung*) with France is essential upon this conviction. Provided, however, that France finally ceases to

oppose Germany in Central and Eastern Europe there is no warrant either in *Mein Kampf*, or as far as I know in other authoritative Nazi literature, for the assumption that the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine or the offer of future peace with France is not genuine.

The fact should be clearly faced that any attempt to reconstitute a barrier to replace Czechoslovakia, say in Jugoslavia, or Roumania, or Hungary, will bring uncompromising German hostility. This was put to me in very precise terms by a leading German diplomatist. Germany, he said, wished to establish a Monroe Doctrine in Central and Eastern Europe. She would regard any alliances or other arrangements between outside Powers and States in this area, which might conceivably be directed against Germany, as a definitely unfriendly act. This German Monroe Doctrine is a phrase of which we are likely to hear more.

But the German aims in point of fact go a good deal further than anything the United States has yet claimed in regard to South America. The Monroe Doctrine has never been held to cover commercial policy. The economic relations between the Argentine and Great Britain are probably a good deal closer than between the Argentine and the United States. Under cover of the " good neighbour policy " of President Roosevelt, Mexico is frankly expropriating American business interests with impunity. But the recent suggestions for a drive to extend British trade with the Danubian countries and the purchases of Roumanian wheat aroused a storm of protest in Germany, and any Balkan movement to emulate the policy of President Cardenas would certainly be labelled as Bolshevism and treated accordingly.

The German objective is clear, logical and comprehensible. Partly by choice and partly under the pressure of circumstances since the world crisis, Nazi Germany has built up a system of more or less planned and wholly controlled economy. That system has enabled her to solve the problem of unemployment—there is a serious shortage of labour to-day—to rearm on a wholly unprecedented scale, and to launch a vast programme of public works. As is well known, the nigger in the woodpile is not so much finance as foreign trade. The problem has been to secure by the export of German goods the raw materials necessary to keep the colossal German economic machine going at full blast.

The famous Four-Year Plan, now virtually completed, cannot, nor was it ever intended to make Germany wholly self-sufficient. All it can do is to some extent to relieve the strain. A considerable volume of foreign trade will remain essential for Germany whatever efforts she may make at home.

There are two reasons, however, why the Nazis find it difficult and undesirable to rely on normal world trade. In the first place the system of controlled economy, which the more radical and socialistic elements now paramount in the Party are quite determined to retain, is comparatively unsuited to such normal trade, and lays Germany open to continual complaints of "dumping." And secondly, world trade is subject to wide fluctuations wholly outside German control, while the Nazis pride themselves on having worked out a system which will prevent for all time the employment and living of Germans being dependent (as so catastrophically in 1931) on such incalculable factors as Wall Street booms and slumps. Now if it is possible for Germany to secure the bulk of her raw materials and imported foodstuffs from countries under her political and economic hegemony, whose trade she can organise on lines similar to her own, she can snap her fingers at the crises of Western capitalism, and incidentally at blockades as well.

Broadly speaking, that is what Germany is doing in Central and Eastern Europe to-day. I have not the space to go into the details of her methods, which have in any case been widely discussed in recent months. In essence they consist in taking advantage of the difficulty experienced by the countries in question in disposing of their products on the world markets to compel them to sell to Germany in exchange for German manufactures. The Germans claim that there is nothing illegitimate in this, that in fact it is merely logical and natural. However that may be, there is no doubt that Danubia is likely to become almost entirely dependent on the German economic system. Germany is in fact doing what a very eminent historian suggested she might do in a lecture to which I listened a year or two ago. He compared Danubia after Versailles to the famous croquet party in *Alice Through the Looking Glass*, with hedgehogs for balls and flamingoes for mallets. By the time those attempting to organise Danubian trade had got their mallets stiff and ready, the balls had unrolled themselves and wandered away. So now Germany is coming along and seeing to it by her customary methods that flamingoes and hedgehogs do as they are told.

The Treaty of Versailles failed to organise Central and Eastern Europe on lines suited to modern commercial and industrial trends, which have been consistently towards larger units. It left as it were an economic vacuum, just as, a hundred years before, the Congress of Vienna left political vacuums in Germany and Italy. That vacuum is now being filled, as the previous vacuums were filled, by what may perhaps be described as the atmospheric pressure of world evolution.

Here, however, there is a clear contradiction between political and economic tendencies, which did not exist in the nineteenth century. For the main political trend in the world to-day is plainly racial or ethnographic nationalism, and the post-war troubles of Danubia were due to the victory of the political principle over the economic. Now through the instrumentality of Germany the economic principle seems destined to triumph over the political.

But does that mean that Nazi Germany proposes to crush the powerful and growing nationalisms of the Slavonic and other races east of the Rhine? Is she going to proclaim self-determination for Germans with one voice and to deny it to other peoples with another? It may be so, though to do this would be to deny the very principles upon which the racial Nazi State is based. Rather does it seem likely that she is aiming at a synthesis of the conflicting principles and proposes to use that very force of racial nationalism as an instrument of her aims.

There is warrant for this in the writings of the two original protagonists of the Mitteleuropa idea. Neither Friedrich Naumann, its real inventor, nor Moeller van den Brück, whose dreams extended further east, envisaged securing the homogeneity of a vast Reich by conquest. The Germans should be not the conquerors but the leaders of the young peoples of the East and South, and Mitteleuropa should be based on consent. "German Nationalism," wrote Moeller van den Brück, "understands the nations out of their inner purposes. It understands them out of their conflicting ideals and attributes to each its own mission."

It may seem a far cry from these words of a thinker and

idealist to the strident tones of National Socialism. But none the less there is a good deal of evidence that to-day leadership rather than conquest is the aim. While one can scarcely take at its face value the *Frankfurter Zeitung* when it claims that Germany is " striving for no political hegemony in the South-East," the velvet glove is as much in evidence as the iron hand. Nations which, like Hungary and Poland, have readily fallen into the German orbit get a good deal out of it, and the other day I had the unusual experience of hearing a leading German arguing heatedly in favour of a great and ancient people like the Poles (as opposed to the upstart Czechs) having a corridor to the sea.

I could not help wondering, however, how long such views would outlast a change in Polish policy. The Nazis have realised, in fact, that the grievances of Versailles are an excellent method of keeping the beneficiaries in line. The outstanding example is, of course, Italy. It is not always understood that Hitler clearly laid down in *Mein Kampf* the need for renouncing South Tyrol as the price of Italy's friendship. He was not responsible for its loss, he wrote. But the co-operation of Italy was a vital necessity for the welfare of eighty million Germans, and who would dare to blame him for abandoning two hundred thousand odd South Tyrolers for this great aim ? But though Hitler did not expressly say so, if Italy ever turns against Germany the armies of liberation would soon be on the Brenner. The same applies, of course, as the Führer quite plainly implied at Nuremberg, to Alsace-Lorraine, and the idea was most clearly and explicitly put to me by a leading German official in reply to a question whether a plebiscite in Memel would not be advisable. Memel, he said, was the port of Lithuania and could not prosper without Lithuania. Above all, as long as Memel and its German minority were within Lithuania there was a very cogent reason for Lithuania to co-operate with Germany, and Germany could incidentally quite well see that the minority was well treated.

Skilfully handled, in fact, the German minorities scattered throughout Central and Eastern Europe are an excellent instrument of German policy. They can always cause trouble when needed, and in ordinary times they are efficient auxiliary channels of propaganda. The type of propaganda envisaged can be seen from the examples of Hungary and Roumania,

where a type of National Socialism suited to local conditions and the race in question is being evolved in the Hungarian National Socialist movement and the Roumanian Iron Guard. Both these movements are primarily directed against " Bolshevism," and would in case of need serve the additional purpose of keeping Russia out of the Balkans—always a primary aim of German policy. Incidentally, it is not without interest that the whole technique was invented by the Comintern.

There is no doubt that the ablest among the German leaders feel that it is scarcely necessary for them to do more than sit still for Central and Eastern Europe to fall into their lap on the lines indicated. And since Munich it seems to me quite certain that their calculations will prove correct.

I do not wish to suggest that I am in any way criticising Mr. Chamberlain or the policy of Munich. On the contrary, as those who have followed my articles in this REVIEW and elsewhere will know, I feel that in the circumstances no other policy was conceivable. But what we have to do now is to face facts calmly and without flinching.

Nazi Germany is likely rapidly to become politically and economically paramount in a vast area east of the Rhine, an area which while by no means wholly self-sufficient (as the Bulletin of International Affairs pointed out in a recent well-documented number) is economically comparable with Soviet Russia or the United States or the British Empire, but which unlike the British Empire is geographically concentrated. That area will be efficiently organised on lines which, whatever we may feel or say about them, have been shown to work well, and have enabled Germany completely to outdistance the democracies in rearmament, despite their incomparably greater resources.

It may be, of course, that the methods of National Socialism will provoke resistance and disturbances from the lively and growing nationalisms of the other races concerned. She may bog herself in the East as others have done before her, and find her hands as full as ours are with the British Empire. The more ruthless her behaviour, the more likely this is to be so and the weaker she will be. But we cannot count on this. The most elementary prudence demands that we should act as though she were going to be very largely successful. What, therefore, should we do ?

Before endeavouring to answer that question, let us look at Germany's possible future policies. She may, of course, remain satisfied with the Mitteleuropa I have outlined, and since it to some extent coincides with the objectives of *Mein Kampf* this possibility should not be dismissed. Again, she may lead Danubia on a crusade against Soviet Russia, for which there is stronger warrant in *Mein Kampf*—a policy which may result in weakening or strengthening her according to circumstances we cannot possibly foresee. Finally, she may turn on the West. For this there is no real warrant in *Mein Kampf* and little in Nazi literature. It is emphatically, and I am convinced honestly repudiated by all the leading Germans I know. But, heady with success, the Nazis may after all turn to the intoxicating dreams of the Pan-Germans which, as President Masaryk pointed out in his book, *The New Europe*, represented a grandiose " attempt to organise Europe and the human race," but under the sole dominion of the chosen German people.

We do not and cannot know the answer to these questions as yet. But if we want them answered in such a way that we can avoid the appalling tragedy of another war between the British and German peoples, then we must try, sincerely, patiently and steadfastly to be friends with the German people and to understand them. We must frankly face the question of colonies : is Czechoslovakia alone to pay the price of peace ? And, however difficult it may be, however deeply we may feel about certain aspects of one of the great upheavals of history we must try to put our feelings in such a way that they will do good instead of evil. The words of Goethe quoted by Joseph Chamberlain about Krüger are just as applicable to a great nation : " If you wish a man to be what you want him to be you must express your belief that he is so."

Whether it is possible to come to an understanding with Germany or not, it is quite certain that the attitude taken up by most of Mr. Chamberlain's opponents is the surest way to make war inevitable. " With growing astonishment," writes an old friend to me from Germany, " we see that reputedly important British politicians are attempting to represent Chamberlain's work not as that of a great and idealistic spirit, but as action born of Britain's weakness. You know from our discussions that among the vast majority of the German

people there is a genuine longing for peace and the sincere wish to reach a permanent understanding with England. The applause which Chamberlain received everywhere in Germany *is based on the assumption of a reciprocal feeling and a similar attitude, an attitude not based on a feeling of weakness and unpreparedness, but upon the idealistic will to maintain peace and thus European civilisation, and upon the wish better to understand National Socialist Germany*" (my italics).

But how can such an attitude develop, he asks, when there is such a violent campaign as that of the Churchills and Duff-Coopers impugning Germany's honesty and throwing in unmeasured words suspicion on Hitler's honesty ? He quotes Opposition speakers at length—every word of theirs is carefully studied in Germany and has its effect. It is not, he says, the fact of the British rearmament campaign which troubles Germans, but the reasons given for it. " Our belief and optimism was based on the conviction of the ascendancy and bravery of Chamberlain. If not this, but the knowledge of British weakness, was the real motive of Chamberlain's action, as is stated on your side, then gradually every hope of understanding and ending the arms race will die in us."

Yet what are we to do ? We must be strong. But can we not rearm without perpetually pointing to Germany as the enemy ? After all, we are not meeting an immediate menace. If the British people are to survive we must be strong not merely in ships and guns and tanks and aeroplanes, a madness which, if Mr. Chamberlain succeeds, may yet be limited, but strong above all in the spirit of our people. Strong with a spirit which does not only arise in times of crisis—as so impressively the other day—but with one which faces sacrifices in quiet times, which builds for the future and tackles the humdrum yet noble task of rearing sons and daughters who believe in freedom, which will transcend sloth on the one hand and profit-making on the other in its work for the common wealth. For these are the things that endure—even through humiliation or defeat.

H. Powys Greenwood.

TWENTY YEARS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THOSE who have known Czechoslovakia at first hand, who have come into contact with the men who built it from the foundations, and with the people who became its body politic, recognise in the recent events a drama of almost Sophoclean force. The Czechs themselves are a race of fine quality, hard working, shrewd, sound, accomplished. They have performed a prodigy of statecraft, destined, however, after only twenty years, to crumble about their ears. It is no fault of theirs. Their very qualities in some degree have, it is true, contributed to their tragedy. But the main fault was in their stars. It is not for the Czechs to hang their heads. Their courage and dignity in defeat is the proof that such a race could not be responsible for what has taken place. They are the victims of circumstances not wholly or even mainly of their making.

Consider the circumstances in their crude simplicity. The old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy broke up because—as no British, French or Czech historian will deny—its texture was rotten from the very folly of government imposed by virtue of what we call " power politics " over discontented national minorities. The reconstruction was the work of perfectly sincere, non-German, non-Magyar, political forces which derived their opportunity from the victory in war over the German and Magyar forces. One of the motives of the new State-builders was to emancipate the subject races of Austria-Hungary and thus to remove a condition of grievance in Danubian Europe such as (according to the argument) had been a contributory cause of the war itself. But they had another motive. They wanted to cripple Germany, to block the famous *Drang nach dem Südosten*, to deprive " German militarism " of its power. On paper it looked natural enough to take the old Austrian frontier of the Sudetengebirge, the Erzegebirge and the Böhmerwald as the new Czech frontier. It was, after all, the content of the old Austria-Hungary that was being reformed ; and besides, the mountains aforesaid constituted a natural as well as an old-established frontier. So much excuse—for it is now seen to need an excuse—there was for Anglo-French diplomacy at Versailles. Would it have been fair to expect people to be wise in the atmosphere of the 1919 peace conference ? Did anyone at that time even suspect

that there was any ground for criticism on the particular territorial reshaping of Danubian Europe, as distinct from the economic provisions, and the general spirit, of the treaties ? The very notion of " Sudeten Germans " had never then been heard of except as one of many contemporary essays in political enterprise. The words Sudetenland and Sudetendeutschen were coined by one Dr. Freissler who on October 29th, 1918, set up a provisional government claiming to represent the Germans of Austria, Silesia, North Moravia and Eastern Bohemia. It is true that the Magyars were loud in their grievance, and that the Poles, despite their own acquisition of sovereignty over vast alien minorities, resented the inclusion of Teschen in Czechoslovakia. But the Sudeten Germans, though they were no more consulted about their inclusion in Czechoslovakia than were the other non-Czech peoples, were not at that time conscious of any political affinity with the German Reich. Their race-consciousness is a Hitler inspiration. But that fact is beside the point. It is the business of those who make " peace treaties " to make treaties which will ensure the peace, and which are in themselves reasonable. The crude fact cannot be denied that the victorious Allied politicians of 1919, proclaiming the doctrine of the " self-determination of nations " as their motive, abolished the German-Magyar dominance over Czechs and Slovaks, and thereupon constituted a " Czechoslovakia " containing large German and Magyar minorities under " Czechoslovak " dominance. In a literal sense they turned the tables. Now the interesting question is this. If the *principle* of nationality were the operative principle, if " self-determination " were a serious consideration, if the hypothesis of dominance by one nation over another were the true argument, how could they expect to undo an evil by merely turning it upside down, by substituting a Czechoslovak dominance over Germans and Magyars for a German-Magyar dominance over Czechs and Slovaks ? Put in that way it certainly looks crude. History has proved the crudity to be a fair symbol of the fact.

But what of Thomas Masaryk and Edward Beneš ? They were the men who would have to stand or fall by what was done at Versailles, so far as it affected the Czech people. It has to be confessed that so large-hearted, so well-informed, so clear-minded a philosopher as Thomas Masaryk, whose

philosophy, like all philosophy, was the product of personal suffering, was himself blinded by the passions of that deplorable epoch of human history. He it was who in 1918 invented the name Czechoslovakia; and he wholly endorsed, indeed was largely responsible for, the decision about the frontiers that were to enclose the new State. He was a man of gigantic strength, broad-minded, tolerant, gifted in the art of government. He no doubt felt confident that he could weld the elements that were to constitute Czechoslovakia into a harmonious whole. Perhaps if he had been twenty years younger, and had therefore spanned the crisis itself, he would have done so, despite the overwhelming odds. It is doubtful. Few things in history are more tragic than the life work of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk. From 1916 till the end of 1920 he was associated with Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson's *The New Europe*. He was an impregnable rock. Opposition broke upon him as the waves break upon the eternal barriers. Two things are fixed in one's own mind as one looks back upon the story of what he did. He duly founded the new State, built it from a foundation of what had been chaos, worked a miracle of statecraft.

At the beginning of June 1928, nearly ten years later, during luncheon at Lany Castle, the President's country seat some twenty miles outside Prague, he said things which one can never forget. He was then seventy-eight years old. The country in that short space of time had reached a condition of hard-working stable prosperity, all the more remarkable by contrast with the condition of nervous disorder in every surrounding country. "Of course," he said on that occasion, "you must remember that the Republic is a new State. In England, by contrast you have an old State with old traditions, with machinery that runs. Everything here is new. We have the machinery now, but all the time we have to mend it. We have to create our traditions. That was the task when I came. What it means is that we have to be more careful than an old State. We have to weigh more consequences. When we came here after the war, Bohemia and Moravia, being the richest countries in the whole of Austria, had been impoverished, exploited by the army. There was no bread when I came. The first work was to provide wheat from America, from Rumania, from other sources. Next, the war had upset the whole administration, including the postal service. The post was in such a state in 1918 and 1919 that we had to be careful in the sending of money-letters. Money was not safe in the post and was often lost. At the railway stations there were no time-tables. If goods were sent by rail—for instance, eatables or clothing—they were in danger, for the people had been bereft of everything they possessed. Our new State began with a minus. Year by year I watched, got figures from my Ministers, and saw by-and-by how the post office, the railways, etc., could be reorganised. So now our machinery runs in good order. That was the work of the new State. In addition, we had to create an army: not a big army, but an army. It has been created. It is in working order. And so on. One of the biggest things we have done has been done in Slovakia and in Ruthenia. There were no schools in those provinces. There are now some 3,000 in Slovakia and nearly 1,000 in Ruthenia. It costs money, and has been a big financial operation. We also had to stabilise our money. We have succeeded, as you know. Our budget balances. We have already paid our debts. We have made Economic Treaties with Germany, with Austria, with other countries. The Little Entente is our idea. We have two German Ministers in our Cabinet. All this has been accomplished in a short time. In the old Austrian days there was a continuous national fight. Now there is some progress, some hope. On the whole it is a good bit of work. I may say I am not satisfied. I am an old man, but I hope before dying I shall be satisfied."

Before dying? Before he died he had to relinquish the Presidency of the country he had created. The second thing that will never be forgotten was something he said when, in 1927, he was re-elected to the Presidency for a further period of seven years. On that occasion he delivered a Presidential Message to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly and Senate, in which the following passage occurred, now almost heart-breaking in the posthumous meaning added to it: "And now, after the world war, close consideration is given to the great changes in society which have come into existence everywhere, and which again are regarded by some as a definite, by others as only a partial decay, while others welcome them as signs of regeneration and resurrection. I myself regard the fall of three great Empires and the foundation of new States as a sign of progress and regeneration. Even in a bedouin's

wretched tent you will find simple philosophers of history and politics, reflecting on the consequences of the Great War to Europe and other parts of the world. 'Your Europeans,' they often say, 'are falling, and Asia and Africa are about to occupy your place.' And so while on my journey, in my capacity as President of a new State, I was constantly led to the question as to what keeps nations healthy, what guarantees the stability and permanence of their States and themselves, what, in fact, constitutes the true welfare of nations, what ensures a constant progress and settled existence for them. Every statesman, every politician and every political party, and in fact everybody to whom the destinies of his own nation, and thus also of other nations, are not indifferent, must discover for himself what is 'the one thing necessary' for nations and States (as Komensky formulated it), what is not needed, what harms them and leads them to destruction. During the agitated period of the Thirty Years' War, Komensky continually reverted to the problem of the decay of States and nations. He left us a small treatise on the happiness of nations, and in the decline of his life—by chance at the same age as myself—he defined the 'one thing necessary' for the life of society and State. He attached the greatest importance to religion and morality for nation and State and mentioned seven kinds of obstacles and confusions detrimental to the welfare of the people: a multitude of rulers, a multitude of laws, many interpreters of statutes who bewilder the public courts, a multitude of external ceremonies which obscure the true basis of affairs, contempt for laws and the infringement of them, which is called taking into account things as they are, the mutual jealousy of rulers, and, finally, open wars and bestial savagery. Translated into the terminology of to-day, this is a justifiable criticism of many aspects of present conditions. . . . Democracy must assert itself not only within, but also without. In foreign politics also argument must suppress violence and deceit. The world, as Palacky was well aware, is becoming centralised. No State, no nation can live without agreement and co-operation with its neighbours and other States. Smaller States, we ourselves in our geographical situation, cannot safely continue without the sympathy of neighbours and other States—our *raison d'être* must be acknowledged and respected by the world. Our policy must be a world policy."

He resigned the Presidency in 1935, but continued to give his advice in the management of the State he had created. The date September 14th, 1937, when he died in Lany Castle, will for ever be remembered. As though symbolically, his passing ushered in the critical phase of German-Czechoslovak relations. Can it be believed that little more than a year ago Herr Henlein's organ *Die Zeit* in its obituary tribute wrote these words: "Masaryk always commanded respect. He could fight without hate. When his life's work was crowned in 1918 he did not hesitate to establish good relations between Czechs and Germans. In his heart there was no hatred of the Germans." What was felt by the German Social Democrats was less remarkable, but the words then written by Herr Jäksch have now been invested with a deeper meaning. "The German elements," he wrote, "that remain faithful to the ideas of humanity have lost a great friend in Masaryk." What indeed may fairly be called the Masaryk phase of Czechoslovakia's short history presents one of history's most striking contrasts with the rapid decline and fall that set in after his passing. He had laid a foundation of German-Czech collaboration in Bohemia and, despite Dr. Tuka, of Magyar-German-Slovak collaboration in Slovakia. Eight years after the foundation of the State, Dr. Spina, a Bohemian-German, and Dr. Mayr Harting, a former Austrian-German, both of them deputies in the Czechoslovak parliament, were given portfolios in the Government itself. Dr. Spina, who before the war had been a professor of the Czech language at Prague University, was an enthusiast for collaboration with the Czechs. Dr. Mayr Harting, less of an enthusiast in that cause, none the less continued himself to collaborate. I saw him in Prague on June 2nd, 1928, when he said to me: "Collaboration is the only way to peace in the State, but it is a hard way and difficult. It is a beginning, but we want more."

The interesting thing, as one looks back on the twenty years' history of Czechoslovakia, as constituted at Versailles, is to assess the causes that led to the total failure of the enterprise of German-Czech collaboration in Bohemia, so promisingly launched under the Masaryk régime twelve years ago. As long ago as 1927 separate administrative districts were set up in Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. Dr. Hodža himself was a Slovak. But we know that the decisive district was Bohemia. When in the early autumn of 1938 the German

Reich absorbed the Sudetenland, it followed as a natural result that Poland would absorb the Teschen district and Hungary the southern part of Slovakia. The point is so clear that it hardly needs to be elaborated. It was Berlin that decided the fate of Czechoslovakia. How came it that Berlin had so great a power? The answer, simple as it is, contains in it the epitome of Czechoslovakia's tragedy. A State which out of chaos evolved order in so unpromising a field as Danubian Europe, which made diplomatic or commercial treaties with every country in Europe, which balanced its budget and increased the surplus, which stabilised its currency, paid off its foreign loans and replaced them by loans at a cheaper rate, which was even launched in a surrounding hotbed of nationalist vendettas on the crowning enterprise of harmonising Czechs with Germans in the West and Magyars with Slovaks in the East: why did such a State flounder before the advance of the Germans?

The answer is all too simple. Dr. Edward Beneš was in continuous office, first as Foreign Minister, then as Prime Minister, then as President in succession to Dr. Masaryk. Upon him fell the routine responsibility for consolidating in diplomatic practice the great principles enunciated by Masaryk. On the face of it it looks as if Beneš failed. The entire collapse of the Masaryk structure took place in little more than a year following Masaryk's death. Was it the fault of Dr. Beneš? He was the only practising politician in Europe who held continuous office since the days of Versailles. He was the only actual link with Versailles left in Europe. His knowledge of facts, persons, policies, tendencies in every country in Europe was profound. In his early days he was accused of subservience to France. Those of us who have known him throughout those twenty years knew what his answer always was to the taunt that he was ready to sell his principles for French diplomatic and military support. He admitted it. He hated it. He had a greatly developed taste—and who has not?—for independence. But he was a realist. At the beginning of his life's work, now shattered, he formed the deliberate opinion that to quarrel with France was to jeopardise the whole work of Central European pacification and consolidation on which, under Masaryk, he was embarked. He used to say that in one sense Czechoslovakia was the child of France and Britain. He was taunted, not only

with servility, but with interference in Anglo-French affairs; and the two charges were mutually destructive. He was the representative of a small Power, and he was realist enough to know that small Powers can prosper only by the leave of the Great Powers: unless, indeed, the League of Nations were to become a success. Hence his unremitting work at Geneva. He was the author of the famous Geneva Protocol of 1924. It was defeated by the opposition of the British Government in 1924. Four years later, when Mr. Kellogg made the substantially same proposal it was enthusiastically adopted. In the one case the proposal came from a great, and in the other from a small, Power.

It is necessary to accept the simple facts in all their crudity. Czechoslovakia was made by Great Power intrigue and was destroyed by Great Power intrigue. In that intrigue a central part was played by Germany. One of the cardinal facts in the history of our time is a strong Germany. If one is to see the wood despite the trees one must concentrate on the bare outlines. It was Napoleon who made possible Bismarck's unification of Germany. The unified Germany was one of the greatest facts in history. The only essential reason why Britain and France fought the last great war was fear of Germany, or jealousy of Germany's ebullient strength. Helped by the entire world they defeated Germany. In victory they did two characteristic things: (1) they took away all Germany's colonies; (2) they constituted Czechoslovakia. The single motive was to dam German expansion. Czechoslovakia was an instrument of Anglo-French "power-politics" directed against Germany. When the issue was joined in September of this year between a resurgent strong Germany and the Anglo-French combination, Czechoslovakia was bound to get the worst of both worlds. In international, as in all human affairs the small man is at the mercy of the big man. If Britain and France decided to "fight," then Czechoslovakia would be the initial battleground. If Britain and France decided not to fight, then Czechoslovakia had no alternative but to concede the German claims. They were in essence German, not Sudeten German, claims. Herr Henlein has consistently based his own policy upon winning a greater degree of power within the Czechoslovak State. Until he was forced to do so this year by Herr Hitler, he never claimed or wanted incorporation in the Reich. These men who play the

political game are thinking in the first instance of their own part in the game. Incorporation in the Reich means for Herr Henlein his abdication from the position of Sudeten leader and the possibility of a leading rôle in Czechoslovak government in order to become a cypher in the German Reich. But the point is that the fate of Czechoslovakia this autumn was wholly decided by the Great Powers. Even Masaryk could not have saved Czechoslovakia. To what extent was Dr. Beneš to blame? Could he and Dr. Hodža by a quicker offer of autonomy to the Sudetenland have defeated the German Reich in its object of incorporating the Sudetenland? If one reviews the critical events of the present year in their true light as a matter of Great Power rivalry, one begins to wonder if President Beneš and Dr. Hodža, no matter what steps they had taken, and no matter how promptly, could have had the slightest effect in preventing what has taken place. Indeed, there is little satisfaction to be obtained from the actual history of those events, the successive Czechoslovak offers to the Sudeten Germans, the progressive expansion of Sudeten German claims, the open intervention of the Reich, the British attempt to save the threatened clash by means of the Runciman mission (which in the nature of things had no chance of success) and the final Anglo-French device of saving the peace by a virtual surrender to Herr Hitler's demands. One knows that the only reality was the conflict between Germany on the one side and France and Britain on the other.

What however is interesting is the simple story of the famous week, the last week of September, when Mr. Neville Chamberlain's personal resource staved off at the eleventh hour a danger that by then seemed inescapable. It is delicate ground. Did Mr. Chamberlain "surrender"? Of course he did. Why not? On any ground, the greatest menace to every interest involved was the possibility of war. No one wanted it. There were four men, Herr Hitler, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, M. Daladier, and Signor Mussolini, all of them quaking in their shoes, none of them wanting war. It was obvious that this was Herr Hitler's normal method of conducting high diplomacy, his calculation being that the mere threat of war, backed by his superiority in military strength, would be enough to win for him what he wanted. He happened to want something which could not reasonably be denied, and which in principle was already conceded. The real danger was that

Herr Hitler had overplayed his hand and might be hoist with his own petard. The precise story of how the four of them escaped from a war they all dreaded will remain for many a day one of the memorable passages of history. Let the main events of that final choice be here summarised. The concentrated drama of Herr Hitler's speech at Nuremberg on September 12th was followed, after days that seemed years of anxiety, by the still greater drama of the British Prime Minister's flight to Berchtesgaden on September 15th. Behind the scenes the old conflict in British policy was enacted. On September 11th it became known that, though the British Government had taken thorough measures to convince the German Government that a war resulting from German "aggression" would almost certainly involve Britain in it against Germany, yet Britain persisted in refusing a precise and open "commitment." British lives could not be automatically placed at the mercy of whatever Herr Hitler might decide. The British Government insisted on its own right to decide so grave a thing if and when an emergency had arisen and its nature was known. Herr Hitler spoke on September 12th to what was in effect a world audience. On the main issue he was restrained and moderate. He did announce in reference to the Sudeten Germans, that "if those tortured and terrorised comrades cannot obtain their rights and help, then they will get both from us," and that "what the Germans demand is the free exercise of their right of self-determination." No sooner had Herr Hitler finished speaking than the Sudeten Germans staged sundry exhibitions of disorder, continuing throughout the night of September 12th-13th. Prague declared prompt martial law in the districts affected. Herr Henlein on September 13th delivered a six-hour "ultimatum" to Prague demanding the abrogation of martial law, the withdrawal of State and special police, and the confinement of troops to barracks; the vague "penalty" being that if his demands were not conceded he could not be responsible for the consequences. Prague refused the demands.

On September 14th Mr. Chamberlain sent a direct message to Herr Hitler: "I propose to come over at once to see you with a view to trying to find a peaceful solution. I propose to come across by air and am ready to start to-morrow." The Führer at once answered that he would gladly see Mr. Chamberlain. Signor Mussolini at that moment announced that

a plebiscite for the German and other minorities in Czechoslovakia was, in his view, the just and only hope of avoiding war; and that, far from being weakened, the Czechs, relieved of alien elements, would be strengthened. Mr. Chamberlain, accompanied by Sir Horace Wilson, his personal adviser, and Mr. William Strang, head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, left Heston Airport on September 15th for Berchtesgaden. He talked for two hours and a half with Herr Hitler. In itself that magnificent venture lifted many of the clouds of war. An unforgettable week began on September 18th with a Franco-British agreement "as to the policy to be adopted with a view to promoting a peaceful solution of the Czechoslovak question." The details of the offer were not at that time officially made known. In their main substance they were that the Sudeten districts more than 50 per cent. German should be incorporated in the Reich; and that, pending the delimitation of the new frontier, Herr Hitler should demobilise his army and refrain from military measures against Czechoslovakia. The French and British Governments further agreed that they would participate in an international guarantee of the sovereign integrity of the new Czech State, resulting from the partition. They did not offer a specific commitment to defend the existing Czechoslovakia against any aggression that might be committed during the period of delimiting the new frontier. During the prolonged hesitation of Prague on September 19th and 20th the British and French Governments addressed urgent appeals for a definite acceptance of their plan, so that Mr. Chamberlain could meet Herr Hitler a second time with Czechoslovak approval behind him. On September 21st the Czechoslovak Government, in a spirit of disillusion, announced that "under the strongest pressure from Great Britain and France" it had decided to accept the plan for ceding the Sudeten districts to Germany. Early on September 22nd Dr. Hodža sent in his Cabinet's resignation to President Beneš. After a day's negotiation a new Government was formed by General Sirovy, who himself took the portfolios both of Prime Minister and Minister for War. He was a Czech legionary in the last war, and now symbolised Czech resistance to German aggression. Dr. Krofta was retained as Foreign Minister. The new Government remained loyal to the Anglo-French plan.

Mr. Chamberlain left Heston for Godesberg on the morning

of September 22nd. Herr Hitler presented a memorandum of Germany's final attitude on the Sudeten issue, claiming that German troops should by October 1st occupy the Sudeten districts within the new frontier proposed by France and Britain. Mr. Chamberlain, on September 24th, sent the Hitler proposals to the Czechoslovak Government. At 10-20 on the evening of September 23rd (that is before the final Hitler-Chamberlain meeting) President Beneš broadcast a proclamation ordering full mobilisation.

It was on September 25th that the third, last, and in the end successful attempt was begun to escape from the urgently threatened war. The Anglo-French proposals had not suggested a date for the transfer to Germany of the ceded territory. Herr Hitler in form "proposed" a date, and in effect intimated his determination to seize the territory on that date. Such, on the surface, was the whole issue that created a world-wide panic. On September 26th Herr Hitler made a speech in the Berlin Sport Palace that was listened to by the whole world. On a sustained tone of vibrant emotion he declared that his patience was at an end; that his ultimatum was unchangeable; that it contained nothing more than President Beneš had promised; that President Beneš now had peace or war in his hands. On September 27th Mr. Chamberlain broadcast a statement that registered the blackest phase of the panic. "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is." Parliament met on September 28th. It was at the very end of Mr. Chamberlain's speech that Herr Hitler's answer was received to a letter sent to Berlin that morning as a final attempt at peace. Herr Hitler agreed to Signor Mussolini's plea and postponed mobilisation for twenty-four hours. He accepted Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion and invited him, together with M. Daladier and Signor Mussolini, to a conference at Munich on the following day. From that moment events moved swiftly to the miracle. In the early hours of September 30th a four-Power agreement was signed in Munich whereby the method and stages of Germany's taking over the Sudetenland were fully detailed. Before Mr. Chamberlain left Munich he met Herr Hitler again, with the historic result that Britain and Germany signed a pledge of peace "never to go to war with one another again."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE.

THE revival of the Entente between France and Great Britain, in the form of a new Anglo-French Agreement, is probably only another milestone on the road to Armageddon. Considered merely as one of the many events during the past two years which have demonstrated more and more the anarchical tendencies and moral deterioration of Europe, it has little significance. It simply emphasises the fact that we are once more back on the old trail which led to the tragic events of 1914. On the other hand, it is within the bounds of possibility that the new Agreement may eventually produce unexpected and far-reaching results. It may contain the seeds of an international policing system which, in course of time, will restore the vanished authority of the League. If it is to be regarded as the first step towards the consolidation of the resources of those nations in Europe who are prepared to resist aggression and uphold the rule of law, then indeed it may become a new landmark on the highway of human progress and achievement. In its present form, however, the Agreement is only the continuation of a pre-war policy inaugurated by Lansdowne and Delcassé in 1904. The new alliance does little more than dot the i's and cross the t's of the original scheme.

The details vouchsafed to us are extremely scanty. There has been no explanatory statement from the Government, and the only information is gleaned from Press reports. From these sources we learn that the new Agreement includes the following: (*a*) the immediate purchase of armaments and raw materials, together with a certain amount of pooling of financial resources; (*b*) Great Britain will concentrate her energies on the building of heavy bombers, while France will be responsible for turning out pursuit planes; (*c*) there are to be more interchanges of British and French officers, so as to spread knowledge of each other's methods, while special facilities are to be afforded to British military pilots at French military aerodromes; (*d*) co-operation is to be secured by placing the joint air forces under the command of a British officer, whilst the armies are to be placed under a French general. According to the *New York Times*: "The principle of a unified command, which took three and a half years to be accepted in the last world war, will be brought into instant

operation in the next. A French general will command the combined armies of the two countries, a British admiral will direct the allied navies, and a British air force officer will have charge of the combined air forces from the moment an attack on either country is launched."

Up till now these are the only particulars which have leaked out. No White Paper has been issued which would give Parliament and the country authoritative information as to the steps which have been taken to unify and co-ordinate the economic and military resources of France and Great Britain for the common defence and protection of both countries. But enough has been disclosed to demonstrate that, once the political difficulties have been overcome, there is no insuperable obstacle, from a technical standpoint, in pooling the economic and military resources of two sovereign States for a common purpose. This arrangement disposes of one of the stock arguments advanced against the creation of an International Police Force, namely, the impossibility of solving the technical difficulties, which are inherent in any scheme of this kind. Here is a pact, freely entered into by both sides, which represents a drastic pooling of sovereignty. Clearly, if national armies, navies and air forces can be merged and unified in peace time to meet an emergency, there is no valid reason why these arrangements should not be developed into a permanent system, in order to deter the aggressor from the crime of war, and to ensure the solidarity of all those nations who are prepared to pledge themselves in support of Equity and Justice.

I repeat that in principle and in its present form there is nothing to distinguish the Anglo-French Agreement from the old pre-war military alliances. Its appearance at this juncture is due to two causes. First, the abandonment of the League and the system of collective security, without the slightest attempt to develop and organise it, and secondly, the growing menace of German rearmament. Everyone realises that after Manchukuo, Abyssinia, Spain, China, and Austria, Article XVI has, at least temporarily, become a dead letter. The Prime Minister, speaking a few months ago in the House of Commons, said that "we would not tear up a single article of it [the Covenant], not even Article XVI, in the hope that some day it might be reconstituted in such a form that we might rely upon being able to use those powers for the function for

which they were originally intended." It is the same old story: always jam to-morrow, but never jam to-day. The League is to be reconstituted: but when—after the next war or before it? We are back in 1914 with a vengeance. Our rulers, wallowing in their preconceived notions of national sovereignty, and their pre-war mentality, have by their crass stupidity and obstinacy during the past twenty years missed priceless opportunities of establishing law and order in Europe on a firm and durable basis. Now they have brought us to the verge of a still greater catastrophe, when our sons and daughters will probably be compelled to pass through the fiery furnace of another Armageddon.

But perhaps the Anglo-French Agreement may prove to be the starting point in the process of rehabilitation. Obviously standing by itself, without being implemented and developed, it cannot prevent another war any more than its predecessor, the Entente Cordiale, was able to prevent the last. But before the crisis comes and the dogs of war are unleashed, it may lay the foundations of victory. From the outset it will ensure the close co-operation of the chief partners on the side of democracy, freedom and the *status quo* in the threatened conflict for the mastery of Europe. That is the most that can be said for it. But the next war will be very different from the last. It will be mutual destruction on the grand scale and, in the words of Mr. Winston Churchill, it may pulverise what is left of civilisation. Consequently, in a material sense, it is the greatest disaster which can befall us, and must, therefore, be prevented by every possible means.

One of these means, I suggest, is the provision of an appropriate procedure for effecting peaceful changes in the relationships of nations by means of an Equity Tribunal or Commission which will be entrusted with the task of finding a just and impartial settlement, when the resources of negotiation and conciliation have been exhausted. There was a time, not so very long ago, when the relationships between Great Britain and France were strained almost to breaking point. No one can foresee the future, but it is possible that "some day" new sources of friction may arise which, unless they are resolved by peaceful means, may ultimately embroil us with our neighbour across the Channel. Consequently, why should not both nations take advantage of the present opportunity to provide a just and equitable procedure for dealing with all

political disputes, which may defy settlement through the usual channels of diplomacy? Once such a Tribunal has been created in conjunction with the new defensive Agreement, another step will have been taken to establish the rule of law in Europe.

France and Great Britain, the pioneers of this system, could then, with confidence, invite other countries to join them in promoting a new plan in which every European State would be invited to participate. At the outset, Italy and Germany in their present moods, and under their existing totalitarian régimes, would be unlikely to co-operate. But if there was a disposition on the part of the smaller Powers to join in this development; if the impartiality and disinterestedness of the Equity Tribunal commanded the confidence of the majority of European States, then it is conceivable that even Germany and Italy might eventually throw in their lot with the members of the new confederation. After all, totalitarian government is not an everlasting phenomenon, and no one knows what changes there may be when the dictators vanish from the scene.

What are the distinguishing features which would differentiate the new system of law and order from the old worn-out practice of military alliances? First, the creation of an effective arbitral body would be the hall-mark of the new system, because, in its absence, it is impossible to establish unmistakably the identity of the aggressor. It is clear that any nation which ignores this tribunal and takes the law into its own hands by attacking its neighbour, declares itself to be the aggressor by its own act. Secondly, membership of the new confederation will be open to any and every member of the European community who is willing to submit all disputes to such a tribunal, and to contribute its appropriate share to a common defensive force. These are the conclusive tests and conditions which differentiate the new system—the rule of law—from the old régime, the balance of power. It will be aimed not at any one country or group, but only against the aggressor, whoever he may be.

If we are to win the support of the peoples of Germany and Italy, we must convince them of two things. First, that a remodelled League, that is to say, the new system, will give them a fair deal, that it is not an alliance directed against them. Secondly, that the League is a virile organisation

whose strength and solidarity is a power to be reckoned with, which neither they nor anyone else can afford to ignore. Is this rehabilitation possible in existing circumstances? Can we be satisfied merely with the new Anglo-French Agreement in its present form reproducing, more or less, the same conditions as existed in 1914? Is there no escape from the present impasse? I believe there is, and it is to be found in the extension of this Agreement, supplemented by the establishment of an Equity Tribunal, to what are described as the "Small Powers of Europe." The latter consist of twenty-two small States, as distinct from the four Great Powers, France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain. All these twenty-two States are members of the League, and all, with the exception of Hungary and Albania, joined in imposing sanctions upon Italy. During the last two years, however, their loyalty to the League has been sorely strained by the behaviour of the Great Powers, especially France and Great Britain. At the moment, therefore, and until a feeling of confidence has been restored in the good faith and sincerity of their more powerful colleagues, the smaller States may hesitate to take the plunge. But even if they all refused, which is unlikely, Europe would be no worse off than it is at present. I think, however, it is a fair assumption that a certain number, it is impossible to say how many, would be prepared to join at the outset, whilst the others would gradually follow as the benefits of the new system became apparent.

It is easy to underrate the combined resources of the twenty-two small Powers and to strike them off the map as if they were of no account. That is because few people take the trouble to investigate the subject. Under the Barème formula, however, we find that these resources are computed for the purpose of assessing their individual contributions towards the annual maintenance of the League. As a result the total contribution of the twenty-two States is assessed at 301 units, whilst the four Great Powers, France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain, are rated at 337. Consequently, the potential resources of the former are roughly equal to those of the four Great Powers. Therefore, if the smaller Powers could be induced, by the example of Great Britain and France, to throw their combined weight into the scales in support of the rule of law, then the future peace of Europe,

if not assured, would, at any rate, rest upon a much broader and more powerful basis than it does at present.

Let us assume that the principle of equality of sacrifice has been agreed to, and that the military contributions to a joint force are to be assessed under the Barème formula. It follows that the total contributions of the Small Powers, plus those of France and Great Britain, will be represented by 489 units. Further, let us assume that the dimensions of the joint defensive force will depend upon the armament programmes of those States who refuse to submit themselves to the rule of law. At the moment, Germany and Italy are not members of the League, and their potential resources are assessed at 139 units. To these must now be added those of Austria, rated at 10 units; a total of 149 units.

It is clear, therefore, that the extension of the Anglo-French Agreement, so as to include the small States, would give the new combination at the outset a considerable preponderance of resources, if not of actual military strength, in comparison with any aggressive axis or outside alliance which might threaten to disturb the peace of Europe. But, says the critic, I want to know what military strength the small States can contribute now, not what their potential resources may be. It is common knowledge that during the last few years, the small Powers have been drawn into the armament race; between 1932-7 they increased their expenditure upon military equipment by approximately 43·9 per cent.

Let us take air power as one of the tests of their military resources. After leaving out of account such countries as Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary, where no figures are available, and also, for obvious reasons, omitting Spain, there are fifteen small States which in the aggregate possess at the lowest calculation 4,000, and at the highest some 6,000, military planes. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if all the small States were prepared now to pool their air weapons and to place them exclusively at the disposal of the League, this joint force would consist of approximately 5,000 front-line aeroplanes. The combined air forces of Great Britain and France are estimated at 4,780 front-line planes. Consequently, if the small States could be induced to become partners in the Anglo-French Agreement, Europe would be equipped with an Air Police Force of some 10,000 planes, which could be organised and controlled as a single unit, and

would only be employed to go to the assistance of any of the co-operating countries which might become the victim of aggression. Moreover, the existence of an Equity Tribunal presupposes, if it does not guarantee, that this preponderance of force would only be applied to uphold the rule of law, and to compel the submission of all disputes to the adjudication of an impartial tribunal. It follows that moral force, the superiority of reason over brute force, which is the basis of the new system, will be reinforced by the joint resources of all those nations who are prepared to co-operate in establishing law and order in Europe.

Can anyone doubt the effectiveness of such a plan? Can anyone suggest an alternative which is more likely to banish the spectre of war? All past experience proves that rearmament programmes, the inevitable result of competitive national armaments, sooner or later end in hostilities, and that military alliances are temporary expedients which only postpone the evil day. Therefore, the problem which confronts us is, how to establish not merely a new alliance, but a new system, backed by a superiority of moral and physical force. The solution, I suggest, is the inclusion of all States who are willing to participate, in the Anglo-French Agreement, supplemented by an Equity Tribunal. Not only would this new combination be endowed with the superiority I have described, but it would also command the moral support of the United States, and the beneficent neutrality, if not the armed assistance, of Russia.

In a recent speech Mr. Churchill has emphasised the necessity of securing the support of the small States on the side of law and order. This is what he said: "Britain and France are now united. Together they are an enormous force, which few countries would dare to challenge. I should like to see these two countries go to all the small States that are menaced, and say to them bluntly, 'We are not going to help you if you are not going to help yourselves. What are you going to contribute? Are you prepared to take special service in defence of the Covenant? If you are willing to do so and prove it by actions as well as words, then we will join together in active military association with you.'" I doubt, however, whether the majority of the small States would be willing at this stage to join any military alliance, even though it is purely defensive in character. But it is a different

proposition to invite their participation in a new European system, as a preliminary step to a United States of Europe, in which they will be able, not only to maintain their individuality and national character, but to be also assured of their security.

The Anglo-French Alliance may be only the stepping-stone to a new war. On the other hand, it may become the stepping-stone to a new peace. Almost two centuries have elapsed since Rousseau wrote: "But if those obstacles are such as I have described at the present moment—a moment when all the Powers are entirely free to form separate leagues and offensive alliances—judge what they would become if there were a general league, fully armed and ready at any moment to forestall those who should conceive the design of destroying or resisting it. That in itself is enough to show that such a Federation, so far from ending in mere vain discussions to be set at defiance with impunity, would on the contrary give birth to an effective power." Even in these days of turmoil and strife let the nations of Europe highly resolve that the Anglo-French Agreement shall be the advance guard of a League fully armed, which will become the guardian of equity and justice, no less than the powerful protector of every nation in "this venerable home of philosophy, this brilliant sanctuary of art and science."

DAVIES.

Note.—In these days events move with alarming rapidity. The above article was written some months ago, and since then the Czechoslovak crisis has intervened. What was a practical policy three months ago may appear somewhat visionary to-day when so many of the Small Powers are hastening to make their peace with Hitler.

Great Britain and France have now forfeited the respect and confidence of the Small Powers. But the Czechoslovak *débâcle* only illustrates the soundness of the policy advocated in this article, because it proves that the two great democracies standing alone can never hope to assert the rule of law, or to deter aggression in Europe. Now it may be too late to revive the policy of collective security. Manifestly, however, it alone offers the only chance—slender though it may be—of averting the catastrophe of war.

D.

PROPERTY AND LIBERTY.

ONE of the supreme problems of modern democracy is the problem of limiting and regulating the power wielded by great wealth, and by the organised interests which control it. In America, President Roosevelt has been struggling against this power; in France, M. Blum fought an unsuccessful battle with it. The problem exists also in Britain, but is not yet being seriously tackled. Various schools of reformers are sharply divided as to the way in which it should be dealt with.

The relations between property and liberty have long been a subject of debate. Time was when the sanctity of property was regarded as an essential element in a system of liberty: when Locke founded the case for representative government upon the necessity of consulting every man (through his representative) before any part of his property could be taken from him by taxation; or when Burke glorified the great estates of the landowning magnates, and the independent power of giant corporations such as the Bank of England or the East India Company, as the chief bulwarks against monarchical tyranny. We have abandoned that view. But most Conservatives are still prepared to spring to the defence of the great industrial corporations which form a new and dominating factor in our social life, and which are now the backbone of Conservative strength.

Those who recognise the danger of this formidable power are divided. Socialists find the root of every social ill in the institution of private property, or at any rate in the ownership by private persons of "the means of production and exchange." They believe that this leads to the creation of vast aggregations of wealth and power in private hands, and to the exercise of an illicit domination, by the wielders of this power, over the whole life of the community. Their remedy is to transfer the ownership of all "the means of production and exchange" to the State, which will presumably wield it, not in the interest of private persons, but in the interest of the community. Liberals, on the other hand, while recognising the danger of excessive aggregations of wealth and power, believe in private property as an essential element in a system of liberty. In their view, the ownership of some property is a vital condition of personal freedom; it heightens a

man's self-respect, buttresses his independence, and saves him from being completely at the mercy of his employers, whether public or private. The aim of their policy, in this sphere, must therefore be to bring about the widest possible diffusion of ownership; they accept Bacon's aphorism that "property is like muck, good only if it be spread." Fearing the vast increase of the power of the State and its rulers over the individual which would result from the concentration of all capital in its hands, they advocate, not "public" but "popular" ownership of the means of production.

It has, however, become necessary to think out afresh the whole question of the relations between property and liberty, in the light of the extraordinary change in the nature of property which has come about during the last century, and especially during the last generation. The cause of this change has been the growth of the joint-stock company with limited liability, and the enormous increase in the scale of industrial production which the joint-stock system has made possible.

Property used to consist almost wholly of definite, tangible *things*: of land, crops and livestock; of houses, workshops, factories, tools, machines, ships, carts and carriages. The owners of these things controlled, and were responsible for, the way in which they were used. Property still consists, ultimately, of things. But most of the things which are needed by modern industry and transport are so huge and so costly that they cannot be individually owned. They are therefore owned in "joint stock"; and the property of a sharer in a joint stock is represented by a document which can be bought or sold, and which entitles him to a share of the wealth earned by the use of the joint-stock company's property. Thus the greater part of the property owned by individuals has now become incorporeal or disembodied; and those who control this disembodied property now control the greater part of the nation's activities.

But by whom is this control actually wielded? In theory the shareholders of a joint-stock company are still held to be responsible for the use made of their property; and the shareholders (for example) of the L.M.S. Railway are annually summoned to a meeting, at which they are supposed to elect the Directors, and to criticise, approve or disapprove of their report on the year's working. But this responsibility has ceased to be more than a legal fiction. If all the shareholders

of the L.M.S. Railway were to attend an annual meeting, there is no building in the country that could hold them, not even the Wembley Stadium; and if they did assemble—perhaps on Salisbury Plain—it would be impossible to transact business with a mob of some hundreds of thousands. The consequence is that the Directors, in effect, elect themselves, or fill up vacancies in their number; and that they wield a practically irresponsible control over the Company's work, over its army of workers, and over the vast mass of capital which it employs.

In short, *the ownership of property has been divorced from responsibility*; and this is true not only of vast concerns like the L.M.S., but even of small companies. The divorce is accentuated by the practice, common among investors, of distributing their risks: a man who has £10,000 invested in many concerns, perhaps scattered over the earth, can neither feel nor exercise any responsibility for the use made of his property. It is still further accentuated by the growth of Trust Companies. When a man invests £100 in a Trust Company, he draws his interest from many different concerns, about which he may know nothing, and whose meetings he is not even entitled to attend. The incorporeal character of property, and the divorce of ownership from responsibility, could not be carried farther.

It is futile to deplore, or to denounce, these developments. They are the inevitable consequences of the joint-stock system, which alone has made possible the gigantic achievements of modern industry. It is impossible to reverse the process. We must be content to study and understand it, and to realise its momentous social consequences, instead of merely taking it for granted, as we too commonly do. The change in the character of property, and in the way in which it is controlled, opens up new problems, and dictates a fresh approach to the question of the relations of property and liberty. There are, in particular, two consequences of the change which especially demand our attention.

In the first place, the new form of property lends itself readily to the building up of gigantic aggregations, either by the direct amalgamation of separate concerns, or by the device of "holding companies" which exercise control over a group of concerns by owning a majority of their voting shares (which may form a relatively small proportion of the

total capital), or by other financial devices. The upgrowth of these giants has been a marked feature of our economic development, especially since the war; and it has been greatly encouraged by the exclusion of foreign competition by means of tariffs. These huge concerns often bring about an improvement in efficiency and economy, and it is for this reason that the process which has created them is glorified by the name of "rationalisation." But these advantages are frequently nullified by gross over-capitalisation; and, in any case, a concern may easily become so unwieldy in size that efficient central direction is impossible, and the elaboration of organisation, and the multiplication of red tape may counterbalance the efficiency and economy that are aimed at.

For the most part, the giants are built up, not by practical industrialists but by financiers, and are therefore dominated by financial rather than industrial aims. The main motives of the organisers are usually, first, the hope of making large flotation profits; and, secondly, the desire to build up a gigantic fabric of power. Each of these huge concerns is usually dominated by a single powerful and masterful personality; his colleagues on the Board are apt to follow him with docility, especially as most of them probably hold directorships in a multitude of different concerns.

The controllers of these gigantic organisations instinctively aim at monopoly, or at such an approximation to it as will enable them to dominate their rivals, and to control the market. Even if they cannot succeed in incorporating all the concerns in a particular industry into one gigantic combination (and this has not yet been attained in any British industry, not even in chemicals or soap) they can often achieve the substance of monopoly by organising price-rings or agreements.

Monopoly is in some instances defensible and even necessary, as in the case of the Post Office, or the supply of electricity or water: it would be wasteful to have more than one postal service, and intolerable to have more than one organisation laying pipes in the street. But these are cases of essential public services of a uniform and standardised character. Where these conditions exist, it is best that the monopoly should be under public control. But in all other cases, which are concerned with the supply of the infinitely varied and changing needs of the public, monopoly is vicious

and indefensible. A monopoly, even an imperfect monopoly, has the consumer at its mercy : it is tempted to use its power to crush out legitimate competition ; it strives to establish a stranglehold over the distributors ; and it is often tempted to buy up and suppress useful new devices in order to avoid the cost and trouble of making changes. The controllers of a monopoly, whether private or public, are always tempted to conceal their own inefficiency at the expense of the public, especially when they are protected against foreign competition. On all grounds, it should be a prime object of public policy to be constantly on guard against tendencies to monopoly. Yet no attempt has been made to check or to regulate the very rapid development of monopolistic tendencies in British industry. They have rather, in recent years, been stimulated and encouraged by Government action.

A part of the reason for this may perhaps be found in the second aspect of the transformation that has been taking place : it is creating a new ruling class in Britain, as formidable and as much in need of control as the old feudal class of independent barons. It is not wealth as such that now threatens British liberty. It is the power of those who wield an almost irresponsible control over the accumulated wealth of millions. The new ruling class may be described as the Director-class.

It is recruited in part among men who have shown ability, especially in finance : the chief controllers of these giant concerns are nearly all very able men. But many of their colleagues can scarcely be described as master-minds. Some of them hold their places because they were directors of concerns that have been absorbed ; some because they are the sons of their fathers ; some because they own great wealth ; some because they were supposed to have useful influence, economic or political. In this category must be included many politicians, or ex-politicians : the *Directory of Directors* includes a large proportion of the members of the Houses of Lords and Commons, especially on the Conservative side, and it is sometimes said that the chance of obtaining directorships is one of the attractions of membership of Parliament. Although members of the Cabinet cannot be directors while they hold office, they can generally look forward to being provided for in this way when they retire. The new ruling class thus wields a great indirect influence over

the regular organs of government ; and this reinforces the immense direct power which they wield over the nation's economic policy, and over the lives of the millions whom they employ.

There is thus enthroned at the heart of our nominal democracy a formidable power which is, in the main, irresponsible and uncontrolled ; this offers a real danger to liberty. If democracy is ever to be real, this power must somehow be regulated and controlled. But how ?

The Socialist solution is that the State must take over both ownership and control. This would mean that the imperfect monopolies which now exist in some industries would be replaced by complete monopolies, enforced by law, in all industries. Most of the evils that spring from monopoly, and especially those that arise from over-bigness of scale and the absence of competition, would be present in public monopolies as much as in private ; indeed, they might be worse, since all competition would be forbidden by law. The Socialist plan would mean, secondly, that the great but as yet imperfectly organised power wielded by the small class of Directors would be replaced by an overwhelming plenitude of power wielded by the small number of men who always act in the name of the State, and who would have control of practically all the capital of the country. How crushing and irresistible this power can be is to-day being exemplified in Russia. The notion that Parliament could guard against abuses must be dismissed : Parliament cannot adequately perform its existing duties of criticism and control ; if to these duties were added the supervision of the whole economic system, the machinery of democracy would break down completely. For these reasons the Socialist solution of our problem must be discarded.

But if the State cannot undertake the direct control and conduct of the whole industrial machine, it has an inalienable duty to regulate the working of the machine in such a way as to ensure justice and liberty for all its citizens. The State has itself, by its legislation, and especially by its Company Law, created the conditions from which our problem has arisen : it has, notably, given to the investors in companies (whose ownership, as we have seen, is divorced from responsibility) the great privilege of limited liability, without any corresponding limitation of profits. When need arises—and, surely,

the need has arisen—it can revise and strengthen its system of regulation.

It can, to begin with, lay down stricter provisions regarding the qualifications of Directors, requiring, for example, that a majority of the Directors in any concern shall be men who give most of their time to its service, and limiting by law the number of directorships that any man may hold. It can, again, impose strict obligations upon auditors, regarding the fullness, accuracy and fairness of the balance-sheets or prospectuses which they endorse; and auditors might well be enrolled in a professional organisation, charged with the duty of "disbarring" those guilty of professional misconduct.

It can (and this is more important) draw a clear distinction between small companies, which commonly initiate new enterprises, and, in doing so, often take great risks in the hope of later winning substantial profits; and, on the other hand, large and well-established concerns: the criterion of their being well-established should be the volume of their total capital, including that of their subsidiaries. Companies controlling more than a defined amount of capital might be required to register in a special category as Public Corporations. They might be required to publish much fuller accounts than are exacted from ordinary companies, and it might be provided that complaints of unfair competition made against them could be referred by the Board of Trade to a special tribunal. They might be prohibited from distributing free bonus shares among their shareholders, who have done nothing to earn them; and encouraged to allot new capital set aside out of profits among their workers by brain and hand. The amount of the dividends they might pay might be limited, by a provision that beyond a certain figure profits should be shared with their employees. The effect of these provisions would be to weaken the motives for striving after a monopoly position and for plundering the consumer; and also to diminish fantastic rises in the market value of shares, and the speculation which this occasions.

Finally, something can be, and ought to be, done to check the abuse of price-fixing rings and agreements. In their place, these arrangements have a real value; they prevent ruinous competition, especially on a falling market; but they are obviously open to grave abuses. They should be regularised, and their decisions should be made public. It might be provided

that any price-fixing agreement not publicly reached by an authorised and recognised body should be open to prosecution as a conspiracy in restraint of trade.

This is a very brief and desiccated summary of the way in which the State might use its inalienable power of regulation to restrict within reasonable limits a development that is full of danger to our social order, without forbidding or preventing the expansion in the scale of industrial organisation that is probably necessary. But even if all this were done, we should still be far from having brought on to a sound basis the relations between liberty and property. I have not, in this article, attempted to consider how the new form of property can be utilised to bring about a healthier distribution of wealth among the people. That is a distinct theme, for which another article is required.

RAMSAY MUIR.

RELIGION AND REASON.

THE age-long controversy concerning the relations of Reason and Religion is at present being raised again from different quarters, both within and outside the Christian Church, and in new forms, both religious and psychological. In his Gifford Lectures on *Symbolism and Belief*, Dr. Edwyn Bevan recalls attention to Dean Mansel's once famous contention that religious beliefs are *regulative* for conduct, but that the Divine Reality beyond them is inaccessible to human thought. Mansel advanced this extreme position because he had become entangled in the abstract philosophy of the Absolute and Infinite. Dr. Bevan gives qualified support to Dean Mansel's position, somewhat modifying it by explaining that what the Dean really meant was that " If we *could* know the life of God we should see in it something which human love really resembled, so that to call it love would be the best way of saying what it is in human language " (p. 332). The Dean of St. Paul's, Dr. W. R. Matthews, in reviewing Canon Quick's new book, *Doctrines of the Creeds*, remarks that

> At the present time there are two types of systematic theology, which are in conflict with one another and are based upon widely divergent principles. The Roman Catholic dogmatic theologians, and some Anglo-Catholics, begin with the Scholastic philosophy and its distinction between faith and reason; the prevailing School of Protestant theology abjures all alliance with philosophy and, at least in Karl Barth's presentation, deserves our author's title " Protestant Irrationalism."

In praising Canon Quick for seeking a truly Anglican *via media* between, or if possible a synthesis of, the two extremes, Dr. Matthews adds that Canon Quick " does not accept the sharp distinction between reason and revelation which scholasticism would suggest, nor does he admit that we have no knowledge of God except through Jesus Christ, as some Protestants would hold " (*Spectator*, July 22nd, 1938). While seriously questioning the statement that those who abjure all alliance with philosophy are the " prevailing " school of Protestant thought, it appears to the present writer that the general situation thus presented demands fresh and careful consideration.

1. Though the philosophical assumptions of materialism and agnosticism remain unchanged, yet some notable

modifications are to be observed. The old materialism simply dismissed religion as irrational from beginning to end. It criticised religious beliefs one by one as improbable, contradictory, or absurd. At present there is a tendency to seek to account for religion; to explain its origins and factors in order to explain it away. The services of psychology are involved to trace the way in which subjective consciousness is projected upon the objective and unconscious universe. The old agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, in its attempt to mediate between Religion and Reason, fell into a hopeless contradiction, for it *affirmed the existence* of the Unknown and Unknowable. The less metaphysical, and therefore less positive, agnosticism of the present day appears to be content to assert that the Whence, Why, and Whither of the Universe are not known, rather than to contend that they must needs be unknowable. It suffices for it to dispute or to deny the existence of conscious personality as the explanation of the cosmos. Perhaps, if it be true that these modifications are real, they may be treated as marking an advance of reason in rationalist thought. Religion is a fact that cannot rationally be ignored.

2. The new breach, on the religious side, between Religion and Reason, owes its rise, in the main, to Professor Rudolf Otto, and its development to Professor Karl Barth. The sense of " The Numinous," if it be held to *overbear* human consciousness by the apprehension of the " *tremendum Mysterium*," is, of necessity, non-rational, if not irrational. It is assumed, without sufficient ground, that no element of reason is involved in this primary apprehension. If this were really the case, the eventual rise of a reasoned, if not rational, religion out of the sense of the Numinous would be inexplicable. Other factors may indeed have been subsequently introduced from without, yet how is it that these factors have been absorbed by a sense that is absolutely discontinuous with them?

It has remained for Professor Karl Barth to glory in the absence of reason from true religion, and to treat reason as incompatible with evangelical belief. The Righteousness of God is, for him, revealed to the conscience of men in total separation, not only from human thought, but even from human morality (*The Word of God and the Word of Man*, Eng. translation, pp. 18-23). Barth italicises the statement

that "at the moment when religion becomes conscious of religion, when it becomes a psychological and historically conceivable manifestation in the world, it falls away from its inner character, from its truth to idols. Its truth is its other-worldliness, its refusal of the idea of sacredness, its non-historicity" (p. 68). It, therefore, must come by "a crisis that denies all human thought" (p. 80). It is the revelation "of a new order absolutely beyond human thought." The Will of God "is not a corrected continuation of our own. It approaches ours as a Wholly Other" (p. 24). The contradictions contained in these statements are obvious. How, for example, can the grace or righteousness of God be recognised as "*truth*" and as "*a new order*" without the activity of reason in the accepting faith? The very recognition that it is discontinuous with all other human thought and experience is a judgment of reason. The whole of Barth's characteristic position is simply the exaltation of a mood into a method. This mere exaltation of the mood overwhelms the perception of its incoherence and contradictions.

3. The position, thus taken up, is wholly incompatible with typical and continuous Christian thought; with the truly Catholic conception of the Christian faith as accepted by all branches of the Church. The early Christian thinkers, whether they were apologists or systematic theologians, were conspicuously rational in their exposition and establishment of the Christian Faith. This was above all the case with the Alexandrian Fathers. For them all, God, the Eternal Son as the Logos, the Incarnation, and the incarnate Christ, formed a coherent and inseparable Whole, which threw as much light upon the nature of the universe as it did upon the Nature of God Himself. They proceeded to the spiritual and rational interpretation of the universe and its history upon the assumption, fortified by their philosophy, that the universe is organically related to Christ, and, therefore, is interpretable in terms of the Truth and Values revealed in Him.

The Scholastic period exhibits a change, which received its classic formulation in the great work of St. Thomas Aquinas. Faith and reason became clearly distinguished from one another, and their respective provinces marked out as Revealed and Natural Religion. Yet faith and reason, following their characteristic ways, were united in arriving at the truths of Natural Religion. Even in the case of Revealed

Religion, while its truths were conveyed by revelation, and were above the sphere and competence of reason, yet, when revealed, these truths became so far amenable to human reason that it was competent to articulate them and to deduce their consequences. So truly was this the case that this ancillary service of Reason was treated not merely as legitimate, but as essential. Thus Religion and Reason were not merely held to be in alliance; they were, indeed, "deeply interfused." The explanation of the need of Revelation lay above all in this, that God being the Supreme Personality, the truth concerning Him must needs be conveyed by Himself; and this, above all, because His purpose for mankind and His redemptive grace in accomplishing it were conveyed through His transcendent Activity and Deed. Yet after they had been so communicated, they could be recognised, not only by faith but by reason, as being in keeping with the glory of His spiritual perfection, and in particular with His love.

In view of all this it becomes intelligible why the Roman Church showed a distrust of John Henry Newman, with his ambiguous and changeable attitude towards reason. This distrust was intensified by his emphasis on certain factors of religious faith, which he treated as subjective, and therefore as lacking in the universality of the appeal that reason, by its very nature, is impelled to make.

4. It is only necessary, at present, to call brief attention to the fact that the recent advances in the psychology of religion have emphasised important factors in religious faith that are, at least primarily, distinct from reason, being concerned with the will, the affections, and the aspirations which are active in religious belief. To call these factors non-rational, however, because they can be distinguished from reason, is to prejudice the case, as will shortly be seen, by separating factors which, while distinctive, are united in the total act and attitude of Personality. The contributions of psychology, in calling attention to the volitional and affective elements of religion, have been reinforced from the side of philosophy by Kant's criticism of what he called the Pure Reason, and by his transference of all that establishes the certitude of faith to the realm of the Practical Reason, with its predominant ethical concern.

In view of the situation thus briefly described, it is important to examine the subject afresh, and the following

suggestions are offered in the hope that they may be of some service in this endeavour.

(1) It is essential to start with a clear conception of what is meant by the terms Religion and Reason. Religion stands for something more than and different from the acceptance of a body of doctrines and practices. It is above all an attitude, and an attitude to a Being, or beings, deemed to be beyond and higher than, to use symbolic language, the religious individual or community. Religious faith is, therefore, the act and venture of the whole personality, involving the co-operation of mind, heart, and will. Religious belief postulates the real existence of its object, and assumes that this object is in actual relations with, and at least in partial control of, the believer. It also presumes that its object is adequate to satisfy the demands and needs of the worshipper, whether these be trivial and material, or whether they have become so profound, with the development of personality and the enlarged range of experience, as to be truly spiritual. Now reality, relationship, adequacy, each and all require a judgment of the reason, however imperfect and almost instinctive it may be. Even if Schleiermacher's definition of religion as "the sense of dependence" be accepted, yet it is inconceivable that this sense should exist without some glimmer of a concept of the object upon Whom, or which, dependence is felt. An element of reason is, therefore, involved in the attitude taken up, even if this be only "the sense of the Numinous," since it is the act of the personality as a whole, is occasioned by the whole of its conditions and circumstances, and involves the affirmations of reality and relationship. To expel reason from religion is, therefore, to maim the personality that believes.

On the other hand, reason is a differentiated, a specialised, activity of the personality, in which an attempt is made to become purely intellectual and disinterested. If reason is to be "pure," its activity must be so entirely disentangled from emotions, desires, and intentions that it becomes concentrated upon the apprehension, pursuit and definition of what is objectively *there*. When thus set free and isolated, reason seeks to articulate Reality as a coherent Whole; its coherence, however, involving its consonance with the reasoning mind of the inquirer. Otherwise Reality, if existent, would be altogether unintelligible. To use symbolic words again, it may

be said that religion is primarily concerned with the Above and the Inward in association, while reason fixes its attention upon the Around. Hence it would appear that religion is prior to reason, at the outset, that its factors are more complex, that its aims are more far-reaching and its satisfaction more intimate. Yet reason enters into religion, as an essential ingredient, and faith is not absent from reason, if only faith in its own competence and in the universe as being amenable to the effort to interpret it.

(2) In so far as reason itself is concerned, the human inquirer has, to begin with, to make a choice between two alternatives. Human consciousness is twofold. There is the inner world of personal life and there is the outside world perceived through the senses. Roughly speaking, there is the spiritual and there is the material. Which is to be made the starting-point? In terms of which should the problem be approached, if the Truth of Reality is to be discovered and explained? Since the rise of the physical sciences in modern times, a widespread tendency has arisen to choose the external universe, assumed to be material, as the starting-point, and as containing within its facts, forces, and laws the clue to the interpretation of Reality, if indeed it can be interpreted by man. Those who make this choice arrogate to themselves exclusively the title of Rationalists. This preference can easily be explained. The pioneers of the physical sciences concentrated their attention upon the material universe, and built up an instrument of inductive philosophy—comprising observation, experiment and inference—with wholehearted concentration and astonishing success. In making the twofold endeavour to discover the secrets of nature and to build up a systematic instrument of inductive research they found themselves confronted, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by a rival system that came down from antiquity, authoritative in its claims, highly articulated in its content, derived by deduction from abstract metaphysical premises, and vitiated by its inherited neglect alike of nature and of the methods of practical research. The dogmatism of this system not only countenanced but supported a great mass of primitive superstitions, which were clearly at variance with nature, and often actively mischievous. This system enjoyed the approval of current religion, and indeed was held to be an integral part of it. In these circumstances it was hardly

remarkable that the new science claimed the exclusive possession of reason and assumed that faith and religion must needs be, not only irrational, but the deadly foes of reason; not only in its endeavours, but in its very essence. Yet to choose the other alternative, and to hold that since personality is the culminating factor of evolution, since the employment of personal faculties is the only way to discover the secrets of the universe, and since all scientific progress shows the universe to be so amenable to their employment as to reward them, therefore the secret of world-explanation—its Whence, Why and Whither—is to be discovered within and through personal, spiritual consciousness is, to say the least of it, as rational a choice as that of naturalism. It is the contention of Theists that it is more rational; indeed, that it is so rational as to be able to embrace, within its ample scope, the whole apparatus and results of natural science. What is given to faith supplies the impulse and inspiration of reason. Theism has a Wholeness all its own. Knowledge is the fruit of Faith, Reason is a handmaid of Religion. This is the claim of faith, and it is substantiated by all the aids that can be supplied by reason.

(3) Important consequences follow from this choice, made not blindly, but by the aid of reason.

To begin with, the contents of religious experience are entitled to higher regard and more careful appreciation by reason. The intimations, aspirations, hopes and fears which spring from religion, and are sifted by rational faith, cannot reasonably be dismissed on the mere ground that they are human and religious. If personality counts in the rational interpretation of Reality, still more if it be the most valid means of interpretation, then to dismiss spiritual experience as merely subjective is irrational. Why should the categories of the understanding alone have cosmic significance, to the exclusion of the contents of spiritual experience and the dictates of moral consciousness? Above all, why should Love be overlooked, seeing that it is the outstanding fact of human life, and that it rises to ever greater heights of spiritual purity and transforming achievements? It is not merely religion, but reason, that presses this inquiry and seeks to substantiate this claim.

In the next place, when the significance of Personality has been recognised, reason itself comes forward with religion to

give more reverent heed to the claim that the Divine Personality, God, the source and ground of all finite personalities, is real and living, has spoken and acted in human history for ends worthy of His Godhead, and in ways that are congruous alike with His transcendence and His immanence in the spirits of men. The self-imposed limitation of agnosticism corresponds with religion in its characteristic utterance, "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" (Job xi, 7). Religion joins with reason in this confession. They are united in acknowledging that God, in the fullness of His eternal and infinite perfection, is beyond the adequate apprehension of man. Yet if He be personal, "the Father of our spirits," what can be more reasonable than to expect that He "has not left Himself without a witness," that He has given more than a merely regulative revelation of Himself, and that this Self-revelation has been consummated in the life, work and teaching of the supreme personality of human history, Jesus Christ? This acknowledgment assumes such kinship between God and man as to make this revelation possible and probable. This assumption is as much the conclusion of reason as of religion, once the rational choice of Personality as the key to the nature of Reality has been made.

(4) Perhaps the most crucial question for reason is that of the Personality and purposiveness of God. Belief in both is indispensable to the Christian Religion. It is impossible within the limits of this article to discuss the subject. Only two remarks can be made in order to affirm that at these vital points for religion, reason is as active as elsewhere. Both reason and religion are at one in recognising that personality, as it exists, or indeed is only coming to exist, in finite creatures, must needs give an utterly inadequate idea of what the Personality of God must be. Yet for religious reason it is unthinkable that the world of spiritual life as found in human society is explicable without a spiritual ground, that reason springs out of the non-rational, and that the whole drama of conscious life is being played out, and, indeed, furnished with its setting and instruments, in and by means of a universe that is careless and unaware of what is taking place. So, also, in regard to the purposiveness of God. The universe as it exists to-day is the unfinished result of an ordered evolution, which has advanced by stages, is active at every stage, and

throughout which there is intimate interaction and reciprocity of every part, whether animate or inanimate, whether conscious or unconscious. This evolution has culminated in Man, and man has come into his manhood through his purposiveness. The triumphs of civilisation have been due to the ever-increasing activity of a purposiveness, which has created and organised the Sciences and Arts, and has applied them to the individual and collective activities through which its ends may be attained. Ordered evolution has issued in the ever-growing power, range and persistence of human purposiveness. Religion invokes reason to join in insisting that the cause must be adequate to and consonant with the result—in short, that it must be a Sufficient Reason, linking cosmic evolution and human purposiveness in a consistent movement towards the fulfilment of its aims.

(5) Irrationalism in religion, whether Barthian or other, is incompatible with the nature of faith, with practically the whole course of Christian thought and with the intellectual procedure by which alone can religion itself in the end be satisfied. The Faith of religion is the act and attitude of the whole personality, and as such carries with it every activity and affection of the believer. Were reason left behind the personal act would be incomplete, and a subsequent inner disruption would take place. This is still more evidently the case when such faith is not merely a momentary act but a steadfast attitude. That, similarly, account must be taken of the volitional and emotional elements of faith goes without saying. Yet, while these may be distinguished in thought, neither intellect, emotion, nor will is isolated in the activity of the entire personality. They are interpenetrative. If reason could be so detached from the so-called non-rational factors and ingredients of religion as to survey them from outside, the very fact that these reach out beyond themselves towards Another would supply to reason strong evidence that such Another is actually existent. For just as the eye can only be explained in relation to the light, so, it may well be argued, can the life of the spirit only be explained as due to the reality of the object of which it is in quest, which develops it by satisfying and stimulating it, as is the case with the senses and their objects.

(6) Finally, to contend that reason is inherent in true religion is in accordance with the uniform teaching both o

the Old Testament and the New. Both the Prophets of the Old and the Apostles of the New Testament support their appeal to the conscience and heart of their hearers by invoking the confirmation of wisdom and knowledge. The Truth they proclaim and the salvation they offer, while revealed from above, as they insist, are shown to be coherent with the universal ways of God with mankind and with His world. Hence St. Paul, in giving an account of his Gospel to the Areopagus, sets it in relation both to the order of nature and to the philosophy of men. They are set forth by him as constituting a coherent whole. The findings of human thought are summoned in support of the Divine revelation of the Gospel as being accordant with it. Any other position involves, not only discontinuity of process, but an ultimate Dualism, which ends in Manichæism. Thus religion and reason go hand in hand, alike in the venture of faith, in the reverent apprehension of its object, and in so casting aside the superstitions of crude anthropomorphism, as to contemplate God as the Divine Other, Who because He is not "the Altogether Other" is the "rewarder of them that seek after Him."

J. Scott Lidgett.

CZECH-POLISH UNDERSTANDING.

The Teschen Question.

ONE of the most unhappy cases of tension in post-war Europe has been that between two neighbour Slav states, Poland and Czechoslovakia. For this reason, the prospects of removing this tension, by the returning of the Polish parts of the Duchy of Teschen to their motherland, are welcomed warmly by all friends of peace.

A number of reasons contributed to these strained relations, each of them worthy of special study: the difference in the attitude of the two peoples during the nineteenth century, on the one hand to Tsarist Russia, on the other to the Hapsburg régime in Vienna; the manifest unfriendliness of the Prague government in 1919 and 1920 toward the new Poland, during her life-and-death struggle with the Bolsheviks; the unwillingness of Poland to join the Little Entente, which she regarded as a Danubian Basin affair. But more than all these taken together, the seizing by Czech troops of the town and district of Teschen on January 23rd, 1919, after an agreement had been reached by the two parties on the spot on November 5th, 1918. Without pressure or interference from outside, a line had been accepted that would have done the minimum of injustice to the inhabitants; giving in effect the county of Frydek to the Czechs, and the other three counties to Poland. The result of the Czech invasion was the coming of an Inter-Allied Commission, and a year and a half of unrest on the spot, and of anxiety for the Peacemakers in Paris. The dramatic outburst of Mr. Lloyd George, "Where's Teschen? Who ever heard of Teschen?" brought the issue to the attention of the newspapers; but few people knew anything about the matter, and as a result few cared.

But the thing could not end there. Those of us who have known the facts never doubted for a moment that an adjustment would some day be necessary. Now, after eighteen years, under pressure of an ultimatum sent by Poland as the culmination to long negotiations, the Prague Government yielded on September 30th to the demand for an occupation at once by Polish troops of the admittedly Polish parts of the Duchy, beginning with the part of the town of Teschen, lying west of the Olza river. This start was made on October 2nd, amid the unbounded rejoicing of the inhabitants, and further

steps came in due course. In a short speech the Polish Foreign Minister referred to "our adversary of yesterday," and foreshadowed a new era in the relations of the two neighbour states and peoples. This turn of events is a relief to all, if only in view of the surging tide of German expansion, threatening all Slav peoples.

In appearance this whole incident, to the average and so uninformed man in Western Europe, has been unfortunate. It has looked as though, at a time of special danger for a smaller state, another neighbour—also bigger—has come along to rob the victim when he was down. Such is the appearance, but the reality is something quite different. What has now happened in the Teschen area was bound to come some day or other; and we can only regret that things have come to such a pass in European affairs—not through the fault of the smaller Powers, that conference and negotiations are of little value. The brief survey of the salient facts in the Teschen dispute should help to explain what has happened in these days.

The agreement made on November 5th, 1918, was denounced by the Czech Government a month later, and a campaign set on foot for the gaining of the "historical frontiers" for the new republic. This would have meant the giving up by the Poles of the whole Duchy as far as Bielsko (Bielitz). As noted already, only one of the four counties, namely the Western one around Frydek, has ever had a Czech population. The Poles naturally refused to budge, and on January 23rd the Czechs began a formal attack on the Polish lines. Having no kind of equality of forces, the Poles had to withdraw and to leave over half of the area in dispute in Czech hands. They did, however, make a stand after three days of fighting, on the Upper Vistula around the town of Skoczow.

An Inter-allied Commission took charge, and a long period of unrest and discussion followed. The Poles were at a disadvantage throughout, owing to the far graver peril of the Bolshevik invasion, which engaged the attention both of the people and the Government. Small wonder then, that under French pressure and with the promise of "compensation" in Prussian Silesia, they agreed to withdraw their demand for a plebiscite and accepted a settlement at the hands of the Council of Ambassadors on July 28th, 1920. This settlement cut the town of Teschen in two on the line of the Olza River,

giving the German part to Poland and the Polish part to the Czechs. The latter also got the rich hard-coal mines of Karwina and the big foundry at Tryniets. Finally, they remained masters of the trunk railway of this part of Europe, running southward from Bogumin (Oderberg) through purely Polish territory to the Jablonkow Pass, and on to Slovakia The new line left on the Czech side a Polish population of at least 120,000 souls.

Looking for a moment at the main grounds on which the Czechs based their operations, we find three :

i. The claim for historical frontiers—Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia,
ii. The need for the natural resources of coal and iron to be found in this area, to balance the economic structure of the new republic, and
iii. The need for the trunk railway just mentioned, connecting Prague with Slovakia.

Only the third of these claims could really bear examination. There was at the time no other good railway connection with Slovakia, and the latter was gravely threatened by an invasion from Hungary. Even so, however, there is no doubt that the Poles would have allowed the use of the railway as a temporary measure, for the protection of Slovakia. Further, the time soon came when the other lines through Moravia were in working order. Finally, if the local needs demand consideration, then the parallel line running south from Ostrava to Frydek and Bila, through purely Czech territory, could be put through the pass of the Western Carpathians without great cost, to join the trunk line in Slovakia at Čadca. (It is on record that Paderewski offered to pay for the building of this short line in order to save a national frontier for his people.)

The " need " for coal and iron, or any other raw materials, could be used as a pretext for both reasonable and unreasonable frontier claims in any part of the world. Certainly the economic position of Czechoslovakia was stronger for having these resources. However, to get with them a solid population belonging to a neighbour state, and so bound to be discontented, was to weaken and not strengthen the body politic. Even if the treatment of the Polish minority in this area had been in the last twenty years in keeping with the very liberal Czechoslovak Constitution—and it has been very far indeed from this ideal, the sense of injustice would remain in the hearts of peasants, miners and foundrymen. With this kind of thing every wise Government in the world will reckon.

The claim to " historical frontiers," more readily conceded to the Czechs where they were held in common with the German Reich, because they also represented a strategic frontier for defence, falls to the ground entirely in the Teschen area. All the way around Bohemia and the length of the Grandfather mountains, the frontier follows the watershed. Here it leaves the watershed entirely. The whole Duchy of Teschen lies outside of the Moravian Gate. It belongs geographically to the plain of the Upper Oder river. The fact is, of course, that not a single national claim to historic frontiers as such was admitted in Paris after the war—neither those of Poland, Lithuania nor Hungary. This makes the concession to the Czechs the more unusual, for the special reason just mentioned.

Writing in *The New Europe* of September 30th, 1920, by the courtesy of the editor, Professor Seton-Watson, to protest against the frontier drawn in this fashion, I said as follows :

> The *exposé* made by Dr. Benesh to his Government reveals many interesting facts, surmised already by those of us who have been in close touch with the whole Teschen dispute. He admits that the American line, as he calls it, was very near being decided on over a year ago ; and that it would have been far less advantageous to the Czechs than the one now attained. I am ready to believe it. The Americans, who investigated the matter on its merits as a boundary dispute between two peoples, found that an ethnical frontier was not at all hard to draw. It exists : one of language, defined some ten years ago by both a Pole, Nitsch, and by a Czech, Niederle ; one of nationality, which goes with the language ; and one of religion—most remarkable of all. It lies almost identically on the boundary of the two counties of Frydek and Teschen (Cieszyn) ; and to anyone who has lived any time in the country, it is obviously the only just division. . . . The Polish population now assigned to the Czechs is Protestant and has always gravitated toward Teschen ; whereas half a mile away further west there is scarcely a Pole—all are Catholics and they gravitate toward Frydek.

This " American line " is the one now occupied by the Poles, who have shown commendable moderation in not going

further. It is notable that their press kept calling for the " return " of the whole Duchy ; which would have meant the county of Frydek as well, and have given the Ostravitsa river as a new boundary. Such action would have meant including the same kind of Czech minority in Poland, as was the Polish group hitherto included in Czechoslovakia. It would have been both unnecessary and undesirable ; and could only have led to trouble in the future. Official action has been wiser than the shouting of the masses.

To me personally, who had spent the whole war period as a civilian prisoner in their midst, the blow dealt to the Polish Protestants in this region—a group of close on 100,000 peasant people, with an unbroken Church tradition since Reformation days, was the worst feature of the whole transaction. They were cut right in two, and their spiritual and social life almost ruined by the disruption. Nine parishes were separated from their mother country ; a very serious thing in a part of Europe that is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. The large parish of Teschen, partly urban and partly rural (which is served by one of the " Churches of Grace " begged early in the eighteenth century from the Emperor as a special favour by the King of Sweden), was cut in two. Nine thousand of its members were left on the Czech side, a small part of them Germans, but mostly Polish peasants. From visits made every few years to the homes of these people, I know what they have suffered from the new order ; and the rejoicing among them at their reunion will be of a very special kind. For one thing, the contribution this solid body of Protestants can make to the cause of their Church in the whole of Poland will be greatly enhanced.

It should be added that the history of this Protestant community in pre-war days was not a happy one. Related directly to the Supreme Council for Evangelical Churches in Vienna, they were always faced with the reproach used for political purposes by the Germans throughout Central Europe : " If you are Protestant, you must be German! " Ensnared by this, and by the promise of the loaves and fishes that political and economic controls can always offer, one section of these people formed a " German friendly " group, led by the since notorious Joseph Kożdon. Calling themselves " Silesianists," they curried favour with the existing order, and earned the name of " renegades " from all men and women of principle.

During the post-war unrest, they threw their influence against Poland, counting on a safer future in the much larger German minority of Czechoslovakia than as a part of the far smaller and extremely scattered German minority in Poland. Kożdon rose in time to be Mayor of the part of Teschen given to the Czechs : a curious business, since he had hated the Czechs of old for their sound hostility to the Austrian régime. It was on this account that, as the English papers reported, the Governor of Polish Silesia, Dr. Grażynski, refused to accept from his hands on the Sunday of occupation, the keys of the city. " We respect honest Czechs and Germans," he said in effect ; " but not political trimmers like you! " This incident is notable ; seeing that the presence of people of this kind in most mixed population areas of Central Europe, has made all settlements harder to achieve.

With the removing of this, the chief bone of contention, between Czechoslovakia and Poland, there is no reason left for strained relations between them. The fortunate thing is that, in spite of this tension, cultural, economic and personal contacts and collaboration have made real progress. To enter on this is, however, outside our present theme. There remains only one point to be touched on, the bearing of what has happened on the balance of power in Central Europe. It is a good deal more significant than the outsider might suppose.

The reason is the fact of the trunk railway already referred to. The fifty miles or so of this line, now in the possession of the Poles, are a sector of the famous Berlin-Belgrad-Bagdad railway of war-time fame ; a means of communication of capital importance for whatever may come in south-east Europe. Viewed coldly the situation is this: the Czechs could not hold it against the Germans, if they attempted to take it ; while the Poles must! For this fifty miles of line to get into German hands means the threatening of all Polish industry in Silesia, and the turning of the Polish flank in the struggle for position in this part of the continent. If the Germans want only the " liberation " of their minority, then all is well. If, on the other hand, they are out to control the Danubian lands, then the possession of this railway has a bearing on the whole process.

WILLIAM J. ROSE.

THE NAZIS AND THE VATICAN.

THAT the final settlement of accounts with Christianity was but a question of time was evident to all those who fully realised the character of the Totalitarian State. They saw clearly that Concordats and agreements might create an external truce but could never bring a real solution of the problem. Thus no special prophetic gift was needed to predict that the true opposition to modern State absolutism would come from the religious camp—remarkable though the fact may seem at a time when so many believed Christianity to have lost its democratic features. This has been substantiated by the happenings of the past five years. Christianity in Germany, no matter whether Catholic or Protestant, has produced so many witnesses of faith unafraid of prison or death that our era can compare with the first centuries of the Christian Church. In July 1938 the official organ of the Vatican, the *Osservatore Romano*, published a document entitled *The Religious Situation in Germany* which by its simple enumeration of facts is one of the most pathetic records of history. It is arranged in seven chapters, entitled respectively: "Anti-religious Propaganda," "Against the Cross," "Restrictions upon Divine Service," "Hindrance of Religious Teaching," "Educational Propaganda," "Against Catholic Associations," "Against Charitable Institutions and the Administration of the Sacrament of Matrimony."

Chapter I recalls the methods by which the ideas of Alfred Rosenberg, the apostle of Neo-Paganism, have been spread among the people in every possible way: by educational courses, public meetings, periodicals and the entire daily press; how suspicion was systematically cast upon the clergy's patriotism, and demonstrations against priests and princes of the Church were arranged, whereas church processions were prohibited and those taking part in them punished. Public opinion in general was whipped up against the clergy, above all by means of sensational law-suits for money-smuggling and "immorality." As early as in December 1935 I had learned from a friend who wore the swastika from purely outward motives that the Ministry of Propaganda was preparing trials for "immorality." I already knew that whole libraries of falsified evidence and falsified photographs were piled up for use in due course as a death-blow to

the Church. It was possible for me at this juncture to inform the Vatican by the agency of Cardinal Hinsley of these facts; I also published what I knew in the American daily press. In March 1936 the American Jesuit review *America* published an interview with me in which numerous further details of the coming trials were disclosed. The first of these law-suits took place on May 27th, 1936. The document of the *Osservatore Romano* calls special attention to the propaganda made for "public renunciation of faith," above all amongst educationists and other State and Party officials. Within the Archdiocese of Freiburg in Breisgau the number of "public apostasies" rose from 2,798 in 1936 to 3,374 in 1937. These cases of apostasy are frequently due to intimidation and threats.

The second chapter describes the war waged against the Cross in the name of Rosenberg's ideology. Many examples are given of the removal, destruction, mutilation, and profanation of crucifixes. The third chapter treats of the restrictions imposed upon religious freedom in general. Churches are closed on the pretext of Party demonstrations; employees of the State and Party are prevented from taking part in Divine Service and in the Corpus Christi procession; pilgrimages are declared to upset the traffic; children of State and Party officials are forbidden to minister at Holy Mass. Notwithstanding the guarantees of Article 34 of the Concordat, the Catholic People's Association (*Katholischer Volksverein*), which in Baden alone numbered 450 branches with 30,000 members, was dissolved in 1934; its property was confiscated; the Catholic professional associations are persecuted, the Catholic sports associations disbanded. Even Catholic charity is subjected to the terror. Its institutions are not allowed to co-operate with the general ones; children's homes and orphanages are evacuated by force and Catholic associations are not even allowed to give shelter to the unemployed, to nurse old people or attend to prisoners and lunatics.

Chapter IV is dedicated to the obstacles put in the way of the free teaching of the Word of God; though freedom of preaching is stipulated by Articles 4 and 32 of the Concordat, it is in practice narrowly limited by police measures. Numerous clergymen are being arrested on account of their preaching; the announcements of sermons in the Cathedral of

Münster have been removed by order of the police. The reproduction of Papal encyclicals was frequently made impossible, even for the organ of the diocese. A special decree was issued to prohibit the distribution of religious pamphlets. In Baden twenty-two Catholic newspapers have disappeared and the Censor has suppressed a number of Catholic books. (The Catholic population of Baden amounts to hardly 7 per cent. of the total number of German Catholics.) As regards Catholic teaching in the schools the guarantees of the Concordat are practically non-existent. In the Archdiocese of Freiburg alone, thirty-two Catholic professors have been dismissed; the work *Wahrheiten des Katechismus* ("Truths of the Catechism") has been confiscated; since July 24th, 1927, the *Handbook of the Bible*, for many years a standard work, has been banned; biblical teaching is prohibited in all the schools. State officials can no longer send their children to Catholic schools. What makes the document particularly important is the fact that it is written by the Archbishop of Freiburg himself, who in the first years of the régime was among the few who believed it possible to get on with compliance and compromise. What he now has to say about the situation in Baden can be applied to the whole of Germany, and the *Osservatore* has recognised this.

The more unpopular this régime grows, the more hopeless its political situation becomes, the more unrelentingly will it seek to indemnify itself at the expense of Christianity. The recent persecutions of German and Austrian Jews which surpass all the preceding ones in savagery can be regarded as a barometer, for during the past five years Jew-baiting has always been the forerunner of blows directed against the Christian Churches. We have reason to assume that the régime will exercise pressure with a view to creating a schism within the Catholic Church in Germany and Austria. In Berlin and in the circles around Herr Bürckel the hope is nourished that even princes of the Church can be persuaded into apostasy and made agreeable to the formation of a "National Church" supervised by National Socialism. Rumours of this kind were heard even before Cardinal Innitzer, after the Austrian coup, had signed his declaration of loyalty to the new masters of the country with a "Heil Hitler" written in his own hand. Though the Cardinal had till that day sharply rejected National Socialism in public as

well as privately (I can myself recall numerous conversations with him on this subject), he has in the meantime gone so far as to try to introduce the Nazi racial laws into the matrimonial order of the Church. Needless to say this attitude is condemned by the Vatican and by the militant German bishops.

But that is far from being the whole story. As early as the summer of 1933 the Nazis tried to gain influence over the Chapter of the Cathedral in the Archdiocese of Salzburg, and it was said that they wanted to turn Salzburg into "the German Rome." To-day they might perhaps succeed where they then failed unless the Church keeps a sharp look-out; the consequences for those Catholics who have remained faithful, as well as for Christendom as a whole, would be immeasurable. All the means of pressure and terror of the State would be put at the disposal of such a "National Church" and brought into effect against conscientious bishops, priests and laymen. It is seen what immense dangers await the Church from all sides in the Totalitarian State—that state which denies the freedom and dignity of the individual. But to realise this does not exhaust the problem: it is, moreover, indispensable to take a clear stand regarding the Democracies, to play an active and not merely a defensive part in international as well as in national life. By its very nature the Church belongs to the camp of the Democracies, because their form of Government is the one most closely related to her qualities of freedom and social ethics. In his Encyclicals, *Non abbiamo bisogno*, *Quadragesimo Anno* and *Mit brennender Sorge*, the reigning Pope has declared Fascism and National Socialism in their political as well as social and moral aspects to be incompatible with the teachings of the Church. Moreover, the Encyclical *Arcanum* issued by Leo XIII and the Encyclical *Casti Connubii* of Pius XI make the laws of sterilisation, which play such a decisive part in National Socialism, unacceptable to every Catholic.

In spite of all this and of the campaign of destruction of the totalitarian state against Christianity, a deplorable division of public opinion exists to-day—a division which perhaps does more harm than all the persecutions. We need in this connection hardly refer to the Spanish "Civil" War, that revolt organised by the Fascist Powers against a legal Government—the classic example of a rebellion of the kind which the teaching of the Church has at all times condemned.

It is, however, not even necessary to go very far back in history for the verdict: it will suffice to look up the Encyclicals *Immortale Dei* and *Au Milieu* by Pope Leo XIII, the *Gravissimo* of Pius X, and the present Pope's *Divini Illius*. Notwithstanding these facts, and although Spain, were she to become the prey of the totalitarian states (to say nothing of the Islamic Moors) would mean a grave danger to England and France, Catholic papers in England and America try to present facts in such a light that it must seem almost a heresy for a Catholic to side with the Constitutional, Republican Government. Yet Austria ought to be a terrible example! Her powers of resistance would have remained intact if Austrian democracy after 1933 had received the support of the clergy. Instead of this a pseudo-Christian state was supported, about which the eminent Catholic statesman and scholar, Don Sturzo, says in his book *Church and State*: "The Austria of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg pretends to be a Catholic state based on the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*; in reality it is a dictatorial state under Catholic and Fascist domination. Her Government represents but a minority whose power resides in martial law and whose social measures, called into being by Papal Encyclicals, are no realities. . . . The masses of the workers have not forgotten the cruel suppression of February 1934."

We have seen whither this policy has led the country and into what attitude—pro-Hitler, pro all that his name stands for—it has finally been converted. There are still people, of course, who dream of a "South German solution," a "Catholic" state consisting of Austria and South Germany under one of the Habsburgs, provided Germany is defeated in a war, or National Socialism is overthrown. Such ideas are said to be popular, amongst others, in foreign financial circles. They are bound to be popular with all those who are incapable of learning the lesson of history. From the point of view of true Catholicism such a thing cannot be envisaged, least of all by German Catholics, who must refuse to see their Church misused as a bulwark of reaction and for the disruption of their Fatherland. For them there is but one alternative if they realise their Christian, European, and German-democratic duties: in home policy Christian freedom and social justice within the frame of a peaceful Greater Germany; co-operation with all positive forces, whether Catholic or not; in

foreign politics, a policy of friendship without competitive ambitions, and of international justice—be the individual problem called Abyssinia, Spain, or anything else.

The burning question of "Church and State" can only be solved when totalitarian claims to power have ceased to infringe the right of every human being to his own God and his own conscience; when all the members of the Church recognise that political freedom and social progress are essential elements of the teaching of Christ. It is often contended that the Church only turns against the totalitarian state in so far as her privileges are being prejudiced. If this were true then the term "Catholic" would indeed have lost its intrinsic meaning, for the cause of the persecuted, whether Catholic, Jew, Protestant, Freethinker, or heathen, German or non-German, European or non-European, must be the personal concern of every Catholic. This means that even were the unimaginable to occur and the totalitarian state, for strategic reasons, to leave the Catholic population in peace, still no Catholic could compromise with it so long as a single person, no matter what his way of thinking, is kept under terror or other nations are being threatened.

According to the doctrines of the Church and the modern conception of the nature of the State, Church and State are two perfect and independent communities; but the existence of either is only possible if they respect man—for whose sake they were created. The present crisis has one good point; namely in increasing recognition of the oneness of human destiny. Since in Germany all the loyal followers of the Cross have had to suffer persecution, Catholics and Protestants have ranged themselves on a single front. Cardinal Faulhaber, Bishop Count Gahlen and the others have come to be the same heroic examples for the Protestants as Pastor Niemöller is for the Catholics. Once a similar recognition has been achieved in all the nations now suppressed, as well as in those which still enjoy their liberty, and also throughout the Catholic and the various Protestant Churches, we shall not be far from a solution of the problem "Church and State." In that day it will possibly be called "Church and Humanity," and the ordeal through which we are passing to-day will appear to those who come after us as the last which mankind has had to suffer.

PRINCE HUBERTUS LOEWENSTEIN.

GENEVA RECONSIDERED.

FOR two full years the believers in the League of Nations have been looking their greatest disappointment in the face : and in that time many have begun not only to see clearly, but almost to accept as fundamental, facts which before 1936 were hidden from their eyes. These facts have been recently dealt with in two American books, as frank as they are fair, dealing with international policy as a whole : they are, *Looking Behind the Censorships*, by Mr. Eugene F. Young, and *World Policies of the Great Powers*, by Dr. Frank H. Simonds and Professor Brooks Emeny. These books, being in agreement with regard to Italy and to Abyssinia, throw a new light upon Geneva. They point out that in spite of Italy's defiance of the League and in spite of the way she waged the war, she had a case, and that if the League failed, this was not merely because of the brutal and Machiavellian resources of Mussolini but because of certain defects in the working, and in the very structure of the League itself.

In the first place, it aimed at too much. War is a tragic and onerous burden weighing on the shoulders of peoples, and they cannot be expected, least of all in democratic countries, to engage in it except in defence of what they have been convinced are vital necessities. It was a mistake to expect Paraguay to go to war to defend the frontiers of Transylvania against the Hungarians, or to expect Siam to keep the Bulgarians from the tobacco lands of Macedonia. The interest was too remote for the principle of peace to overweigh the scales against the state of peace. It was for this reason that from the beginning the United States refused to ratify Wilson's engagement, and they were right. There was no Court working out valid principles of law, and when there neither is agreement in the law, nor means of enforcing it, what looks like a Court becomes a debating society. Furthermore, it may act not on principles of right as against wrong, but from motives of self-interest. When, for example, the question of an Austro-German customs union was brought before the League, the judges declared the union illegal by a vote of eight to seven. The eight states which declared it illegal were all linked in interest with Germany, the other seven were not.

But this was not the only difficulty. The position established when the League began was what might be called the

Victory of Versailles. It left Russia and the United States entirely self-supporting within their vast territories, one of eight million the other of three million square miles, as against, say, the hundred and eighty-one thousand of Germany. Even vaster than Russia's territories were the twelve million square miles of the British Empire. These huge extensions of territory were supported by the resources of wealth, of coal, of iron, of food and power, of cotton and wool, of machinery, rubber and chemicals, of iron ore, petroleum and metals. Of all these the United States had the full supply for her needs within her own territories, with the exception of wool and rubber. Russia's imports were confined—but for small amounts of machinery, minerals and wool—to rubber, nickel, tungsten, antimony, tin and lead. Great Britain, in addition to her vast supplies of power, coal, iron, machinery, chemicals and nitrates, was well able to supply her other deficiencies either from the Empire or her foreign investments : while Italy had to import iron, copper, cotton, rubber and minerals. At first she was also in desperate straits for her wheat supply—and at the same time her population was increasing. In the years before the war this increase in population had meant that emigrants sent home remittances, and so had balanced her economic system ; but in the years following the victory, she found her quota of emigrants to America reduced from 250,000 to 35,000, and they were almost excluded both from South American States and British colonies. This forced on the country a rigid and controlled economy. With this, she was almost though not quite able to maintain her birth rate, and her population continued to increase at the rate of 400,000 a year. But neither in the League of Nations, nor elsewhere, was any provision made for her increasing power : on the contrary, the rising numbers of her people were resented. Ignoring the fact that her birth rate was already tending to decrease, her neighbours on the West told themselves that it ought to decrease far more. They also ignored the fact that this would mean for the Italian people a revolution of both their emotional lives, and their moral principles. For both were inseparably associated with the vital impulse of their patriotism. The question involved was too wide and too fundamental to enter public debate anywhere, not to mention Geneva. Yet it involved the health not only of Italy, but also of the League of Nations.

In Germany the issue centred not so much on the actual life of the people as on the rights of the nation, and the very existence of her economic system. To demand reparations from a starving nation was itself an anomaly : to keep the largest and most progressive nation in Europe out of the League for a term of years was another : to use the machinery of the League to apply very questionable decisions, all to the detriment of Germany in territorial cases in Eupen-Malmédy, in Upper Silesia, and in the Hultschin area, were still others. They were aggravated by the circumstance that Germany in 1919 had forfeited areas essential to the economic system of the last fifty-eight years. But all these pointed to the fact that, in spite of all the idealisms of Geneva, it was, in its actual working out, an organism to perpetuate the victory of Versailles. It was true that at Wilson's instance it contained a clause to permit possible revisions ; but when it came to the point, the clause was seen to be controlled by two great Powers, France and Great Britain : and even so, those two Powers were frequently in disagreement. It became almost impossible to obtain a revision of the League : lacking the sense of general human justice in the vindication of powerful people long oppressed, lacking also the power to apply judgments with the force of law, it became merely a peculiar plan of the concert of Europe. The situation could not be summed up more clearly than it was by Count Grandi when he wrote in 1934 :

> We are faced at Geneva with the following reality : that the Powers—large and small—carry their difficulties and their conflicts to the League of Nations. These conflicts do not shrink at Geneva : they expand. The Great Powers, in conflict with one another, seek for allies among the lesser Powers and form hostile groups which complicate and aggravate the situation ; the small States court the support of the Great Powers, who in order to maintain their diplomatic combinations at once take sides. Thus all disputes brought to Geneva finish sooner or later, either directly or indirectly, as conflicts between the Great Powers. During my stay in Geneva, I never saw a dispute of any importance settled otherwise than by agreement between the Great Powers. They alone are responsible for the situations that arise. A few States that remain outside of fixed diplomatic combinations and are therefore able to maintain an independent attitude have from time to time exercised a conciliatory influence at Geneva. But this only happens in the case of secondary disputes, and moreover these lesser Powers, not having at their disposal the forces that might become necessary to back their action, are themselves compelled to have recourse to the Great Powers. The whole of the Geneva procedure is, in fact, a system of *detours*, all of which lead to one or other of these two issues : agreement or disagreement between Great Britain, Italy, France and Germany—the latter now formally absent, but not yet entirely detached from the League.*

Such then was the real state of affairs at Geneva, when the Italians, in their need of expansion, finally arrived by combination with other Powers at being allowed a pretty free hand in Abyssinia. Their case was strengthened by two facts, not then generally known in England : first, that Abyssinia, after twelve years in the League, was still a slave State ; secondly, that it had evaded every clause of its trading agreement with Italy. Italy was guaranteed the privileges of the most favoured nation ; but in point of fact she was the least favoured. The words of Messrs. Macartney and Cremona, in their authoritative book on Italy's foreign policy, are strong : " It was intolerable for Italy to be treated by blacks as a third-rate nation."

The deplorable results of all this are too familiar. If the Abyssinians made mistakes, they have paid for them heavily indeed. And for a long time Italy forfeited the friendship of the world in order to gain territories which it appears only foreign capital can fully develop. But even this was not so serious as the situation which developed when Hitler, remembering the policy of Bismarck in the early 'eighties, opened his arms to Italy, and in return for diplomatic support, first armed the Rhineland so as to be free for aggression in the East, then to prevent a plebiscite invaded Austria, now reduces Czechoslovakia to subservience, and sends a shiver of apprehension through the Balkans, as though the muddy waters of the Danube had overflowed their low banks on to the wide plains of Hungary and Roumania, of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, with waters poisoned at their source.

The country most threatened by this bumptious Frankenstein is obviously its too trusting companion, Italy. Italy ? No. The Italian people were anything but trustful or enthusiastic over national socialism. The axis does not mean a union of German with Italian hearts : it was the fire into which

* *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XII, p. 558.

Mussolini jumped from the frying-pan of his vendetta with Eden. But he has far too good a memory to forget that the words of *Deutschland über Alles* claim the Etschthal as German soil. It was, furthermore, as the southern port of German trade that Trieste rose with Genoa, Barcelona and Marseilles. It was as the vassal of German Emperors that Italy remained, through the centuries of her most magnificent achievement, divided politically into what Dante called harlotry, and instead of bringing her rich freight to port was driven like a ship rudderless in the storm.

In such circumstances, Italy naturally seeks rapid release from the Spanish embroilment. That there was a real danger of Russia controlling Spain has been proved, and that such a Spain could have cut off Italy at any moment from her sea-borne trade is also true, but the Spanish war has lasted far longer than Mussolini desires. The money he has spent on it has brought no return : and he needs for Abyssinia every *lira* he can get. Yet he cannot obtain a loan till he, and with him the far more dangerous Germans, are out of a Spain that matters to British trade routes only a little less than it matters to Italian ones.

Yet if we look at this curious state of affairs : that Italy almost came to war with an England who was her friend from the beginning ; that Germany keeps Europe—from our Western Island to the Black Sea—apprehensive every hour, we see that it is not merely the differences between our parliamentary system, and the combination of industry with government in one complex and inter-relating organism. There is a greater difference than that. It is that Geneva was linked up with a treaty which put ethnic urges before economic realities. It might be said that the Congress of Vienna had not understood the momentum of nationality : the Treaty of Versailles showed its consciousness more behindhand in thinking in terms of nationality, rather than those of economic life. They so undermined the peace they proclaimed ; very powerful nations were very poor, and could not be asked to acquiesce in a system, which, far from giving them a better distribution, took from them even the little they had. Mussolini may have given a knock-out blow to Geneva, but sooner or later Geneva must have been shown up as supporting a system which guaranteed the richer nations an addition to their riches, while the poorer nations could not make their claims heard.

That does not mean that Geneva should never have existed ; still less does it mean that Geneva promises nothing for the future. It means that if its force is to be as great as its best ideals were noble, peace must be seen in its true meaning. For peace is not the mere absence of war, though that is much. Peace is the life of peoples fulfilled in rich harmonies of inter-relation. It is not silence, but the concord of many instruments in an orchestra. It is the fullness of life which results from general freedom and justice.

To obtain peace, therefore, we may have to pay a higher price than so far we have had in view. We may have first to see that the League of Nations and its collective security were a benefit more agreeable to us than to hungrier nations. "Like the Americans," say Dr. Simonds and Dr. Emeny, "the British were willing to obey the law ; also, like the Americans, they were content with their own territorial possessions. *Having by past aggression attained present satiety*, they were now able, with complete sincerity, to renounce all purpose to disturb the *status quo*." The expression puts it gently ; but it is a call to moral responsibilities we seldom envisage. Englishmen, and sometimes Americans, are quick to detect and slow to forgive a moral failing in a foreign ruler. Their indignation is founded on the highest principles : it is supported by incontrovertible evidence. The only thing they leave out of account is the possibility that, in their wealth and ease, they had to take thought for a situation which tempted the foreign ruler to provide something more for his hungry people. Dr. Simonds and Professor Brooks Emeny put this very forcibly :

> The economic policies of the well-fed nations have brought slow starvation and a cloud of impending disaster to those nations less fortunately situated. Thus, in a period of nominal peace, Italy has been subjected in reality to the experiences hitherto the lot only of cities blockaded and besieged in war. In a very real sense, therefore, the Ethiopian and Spanish enterprises represented not so much the departure of an invading host as the sortie of a beleaguered garrison. . . . Mussolini the conqueror is in reality Mussolini the captive.

If this applies to Italy, it applies also to Germany. The two countries, although so often lumped together, are in reality vastly different. They are different in history, different in temperament, not least are they different in government.

Urbane, astute, and slightly cynical, the Italian people were as a whole undisciplined and anything but military. (Whether recent years have changed them is open to debate. Marshal Badoglio gave his troops in Abyssinia the highest praise. Franco praised them for their advance on Santander ; but it is understood that he would not be heartbroken to see them leave Spain.) Mussolini has retained the monarchy, the Church, the capitalists, the Universities, the aristocracy, and until very recently the Jews. The genius and tradition of Italy which he cultivates proclaims with famous eloquence the ideals of freedom.

In Germany—in Vienna—it is, alas, a very different story. But disquieting as it is, can London—or New York—or Geneva—repudiate every responsibility ? Our American authors sum up the case in these words :

> After the war, the high tariff movement led by France and the United States, well-fed nations, greatly restricted Germany's sale of the products of her labour, thereby reducing her to part-time work. Germany asked for work relief in the form of lowered tariffs, but American and British loans provided direct relief instead, so that Germany did not go hungry. Then when the first chill blast of the Great Depression stopped foreign loans and froze foreign credits, and the new series of trade barriers, led by the American Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930, combined to reduce Germany's work and relief at the same time, the German people forsook the blessings of democracy for Nazi dictatorship.

These words are not in a pro-fascist book : they are written by American writers in a book supported by documents, charts and figures as thorough as any that have yet been made available to the public.

Many Britishers, some Americans, will lay the blame on France. But even in favour of France there is something they should remember. It is that France was in real danger of revenge. We know now that even Stresemann was looking for his opportunities : we know now that long before Hitler came to throw off the mask, Germany had been secretly rearming. What France asked was security. She might, it is true, have realised that England could never afford to see her crushed : but she asked for a sign. Both England and America refused it. And so while the French asked for security, the Germans asked for parity, and the British for disarmament, to find they could only agree each to threaten the other, till twenty

years after the armistice we come back to a situation nerve-racking in its tensity and menace. As the ghoul has come nearer and stares us in the face, Geneva has done nothing. Yet its Article VIII insisted that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments.

Mr. Young's book, with a shrewdness that no one can ignore, analyses from his coign of vantage as Cable Editor of the *New York Times* the interests and intrigues, many of them personal, which accompanied this plan of the sated Powers to maintain the *status quo*. But he sees certain principles of British policy : security of communications, the use of the balance of power against any continental rival, the fostering of buffer States against this rival, and, finally, co-operation with America to stabilise and police the world. These objects, he asserts, were hidden as propaganda for peace and disarmament, which sometimes made much of Geneva, and sometimes not.

As he develops, generally with great acumen, the analysis of the diplomatic games of the Powers, he never once finds a trace of any great constructive statesmanship, any sense of the good of Europe as a whole : any analysis of Britain's position in relation to her European neighbours on one side, and on the other to her own Empire, which claims both political independence and yet defence at the cost of the taxpayers and men of Great Britain. There is no inkling of the real historic significance of the Great War : that in it Europe abdicated her supremacy. Divided against herself, she could no longer stand on the proud eminence which made her both the leader and the beneficiary of the whole world. His record is one of policies which, although intelligible, are so much connected with varying interests, and even personal interests, that at times they look very like intrigues. There has been some idealism, no doubt, but on the whole each country has been fighting for itself alone. The sense of the unity of the world has not developed : on the other hand, the sense of the unity of Europe has almost disappeared. The leadership of the world has been forfeited : direction has been lost. Asia has stepped into conflict which Europe is unable to restrain, because she is divided against herself. England is warned to abandon her responsibilities and think only of herself ; but the unity of the Empire is dependent on Great Britain's relation to Europe. If a Great Power were to threaten the

centre of the Empire, no dominion, no colony could help feeling the result. The independence and security of each would be at the mercy of the Power which was supreme in Europe. Each, therefore, needs to support Great Britain in a constructive policy, which will enable her to give reality to the ideals and principles of the League.

We see now that what really happened at Geneva was that a system of Power politics was being pursued all the time. Economic combinations and personal combinations, not without support of armaments, produced such cynicism that at the end Germany and Italy followed the example of France in armament, and of Great Britain in thinking first of national profit. But this system has not only brought us to the verge of war: it has led to increasing economic strain. The only remedy for these is a policy which foregoes immediate profit or selfish security for the sake of that general welfare which will maintain Europe in her position of leadership. The Great Powers need to come together: and the only means of doing so is for the British Empire to face the responsibilities of its wealth and come forward with generous and far-reaching proposals to put Europe as a whole, and especially the Great Powers, in a juster relation to the economic system of the world, and especially to the developing territories of which so many are still within our sphere of influence. We need to forego quick profits for a policy nobler and wiser.

Recent events have shown up, like gallows on the skyline, some of the most dangerous elements in the contrivances of Geneva: on October 5th in the House of Commons, Sir John Simon pointed out that, by Article XIX, existing frontiers, no matter how false to ethnic principles, and economic needs, could not be changed unless all the governments in the League were *unanimous* in demanding the change. Why such an absurdity? If we want an answer to that, let us turn to the eloquent and tragic episodes of disillusionment in the newly published memoirs of one of the most distinguished contributors to THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW: to *In My Time*, by Mr. Sisley Huddleston. Its honesty, justice and acumen make it one of the most salutary documents of our time.

ROBERT SENCOURT.

THE ORIGINS OF FASCISM.

VINCENZO GIOBERTI.

IT is April in that year of revolutions 1848, and the streets of Genoa are beflagged to welcome home an exile. Fifteen years before, Vincenzo Gioberti left his country a republican; he returns as one of the firmest supporters of the monarchy. All Italy is astir. Charles Albert has put himself at the head of the movement for a united Italy, and he needs such men as Gioberti. A few months will see the exile installed as Prime Minister, a philosopher turned statesman, a priest planning war; yet a few months more, and he will quit his country again, till out of the wreck of the *Risorgimento* in its earlier phase new men arise to carry on his work.

Who is this man with the spare frame and the thoughtful eyes of one who has long looked upon the ultimate mysteries of human life? Vincenzo Gioberti was born at Turin on April 5th, 1801, and was educated by a devout mother for the priesthood. In his student days he came under the two influences which were then most powerful in the intellectual circles of Northern Italy—a but half-understood German Idealism and Republicanism. A brilliant student, his ordination was followed by rapid promotion, so that he soon found himself Court chaplain. But in the King's service he retained his republican opinions, and associated himself with Mazzini and Young Italy. His first political *credo* was published in the periodical which served this new movement; it was an appeal for the renewal of Christianity and the achievement of national unity as the two urgent tasks of the hour, tasks, moreover, which were not to be thought of as in any sense opposed. "Let us make religion social," he cries, "make its voice to the peoples one of unity, independence, liberty, equality, humanity and love; its voice to tyrants one of anathema and condemnation, a threat of terror and divine vengeance by the hand of the people; let its voice to the individual citizen be a summons to patriotism, hatred of tyranny, public spirit, the passion to live in freedom, and admiration of and desire for death in the service of one's country."

Gioberti had already resigned his post at court, and for such daring opinions he was banished in 1833 to seek a place of refuge in Paris. Once there, he began to shake off the influence

of Mazzini, now himself an exile also. He was repelled by the doctrinaire fanaticism which could foment sporadic revolts which were foredoomed to failure, and so fling away the very lives which Italy would one day most need.

In 1838 he published from Brussels his first philosophical work, the *Teorica del Sovrannaturale*, in which a view first appears of fundamental importance for all his thought; he derives the origin of language in particular and of civilisation in general from divine revelation. From this it is but a step to the conception of Catholicism, the one revealed religion in his eyes, as the sole bond of unity for the European peoples and for Italy among them.

Five years, however, were to pass before Gioberti's thought had fully matured. It did so in a book which is still at work among us. The *Primato morale e civile degli Italiani* is the fountain-head of that cult of Italy as "the supernatural nation"—the expression is Gioberti's—which is active in Fascism to-day. In it Gioberti stands revealed as the high priest of a Catholic nationalism, offering up to the mother of civilisation all that romantic devotion which was characteristic of the early *Risorgimento*. From the divided, exploited Italy of the present, the book appeals to the heroic Italy of the Cæsars and the Popes; surely one so great cannot perish, surely she is destined once again to be mistress of the world! The ancient world, so runs the argument, was the work of two peoples, the Greeks and the Jews. Rome has fallen heir to both of these, she is the unity of religion and civilisation. The two streams converged on Rome, to flow on henceforth in one mighty river, whose waters are for the healing of the nations. Europe is more properly Christendom, the union of Christian peoples under the Vicar of Christ in Rome. "The interests of religion and the hopes of world-civilisation alike are rooted in Italian nationality. Italy is the elect people, the typical people, the creative people, the Israel of the modern era."

The book is divided into two parts, showing how Italy is superior in action and thought respectively. Geographically, Italy is marked out for leadership. Does she not lie in the centre of that sea around which the ancient civilisation grew up? Do not all roads lead still to Rome? Racially, too, Italy is superior to her rivals. In the veins of her people to-day the blood, not merely of many nations, but of the best and most vigorous of their sons, flows commingled. Some were drafted

from the Rhine to serve under the Roman eagle, some swarmed over the Alpine passes in quest of plunder and new homes; all alike have gone to make the Italian of to-day. One cannot resist the temptation to quote here the very different inference which Houston Stewart Chamberlain draws from the same facts. The population of Italy "goes back to the countless thousands of liberated slaves from Africa and Asia, to the jumble of various Italic peoples, to the military colonies settled among them from all countries in the world, in short, to the Chaos of Peoples which the Empire so ingeniously manufactured."

But most important of all in Gioberti's eyes is the historical rôle of Italy as the mother of European civilisation. Roman roads were highways of law and order, and our modern languages are but so many degenerate forms of the old Roman speech. It was Catholic Rome which softened the manners of the barbarians, and at the Renaissance the descendants of those barbarians crossed the Alps to learn what Italy had to teach. It was an Italian who discovered the New World, as it was Italians who discovered that other world within the personality of the individual. The land of Dante, Michelangelo, and Galileo "deserves to be saluted as the universal fatherland and as the nation charged with the redemption of the whole human family."

Great as Italy is in herself, she is greater still because, in the Catholic Church, she has been appointed guardian of a heavenly treasure. It was the revolt against the Vicar of Christ at the Reformation which rent Europe in twain and brought about an inner decay of human society. To be sure, for that result Church and State are alike to blame; the one clung to temporal power even after the peoples had attained to that full nationhood for which it was her task to train them, and the other shook off a legitimate authority with the yoke which had come to prove galling. But the nineteenth century, ardent as its nationalism is, yet longs for a restoration of the lost world-unity; where then will it turn if not to the Roman and Catholic tradition?

It is not difficult to see what this would mean for Europe. But what does it imply for Italy? Gioberti answers: A federation of Italian States, with the Pope as its head. The head of the Church Catholic is to become the champion of Italian unity, the Pope is to return to politics as a national

leader! For such a step the people are ready. So at least Gioberti thinks. Hence all that remains is to win the princes for such a policy. Above all, Piedmont must enlist on its side. "As the Pope is Italy's word, Piedmont is her sword." Let Charles Albert march behind the cross of St. Peter!—such was the political fantasy of the erstwhile republican in his Brussels exile.

Before we pass on to the attempt to translate these theories into action, we complete the analysis of the *Primato* with a passage even more prophetic than any we have yet cited. Looking into the future, Gioberti sees Italy "united, strong, powerful, at peace and harmony within herself, winning the respect and admiration of the peoples." To such an Italy empire will fall as well as peace.

> I picture to myself the joy and elation of the sea, when an Italian fleet sails again the waters of the Mediterranean, and those moving plains, so long under alien rule, will return at last under the empire of the strong and generous race which once possessed them and gave to them its own name. I see in the future a regenerated Italy draw to herself the eyes of Europe and the whole world; I see the other nations, astonished at first but afterwards receptive and reverent, receive of their own accord from her the principles of truth, the form of the good, the example and the norm of noble actions and lofty sentiments.

Surely there is an echo of these words in Mussolini's proud utterance in 1921: "It is destiny that Rome again take her place as the city which will be the directress of the civilisation of all Western Europe. Let us commit the flame of this passion to the coming generations; let us make out of Italy one of the nations without which it is impossible to conceive the future history of humanity."

As long as Gregory XVI was on the throne of St. Peter, who could think that the Church would identify herself with a democratic and national policy? But the accession of Pius IX raised the hopes of many, and Gioberti wrote enthusiastically to a friend: "Heaven has given us more than we hoped for. . . . Pius is our Cæsar and our Emperor." Alas! Pius was no bold crusader for liberal principles; even had he been such, he was surrounded by cautious and reactionary Cardinals. Gioberti saw that no easy solution of the Italian problem was now possible; there must be massive toil to rebuild the nation from within. The *Risorgimento* would succeed only as it

became a spiritual revolution—that was the thought which followed on the "great refusal" of Pius. Italy needs a generation of writers who will look upon themselves as prophets called to a holy mission in the service of their country, accepting Mazzini's slogan of "God and the People" while discarding his revolutionary fanaticism. It was in this light that he regarded his own work; as Catholic and as Italian, he must serve the fusion of religious and national ideals.

The period from the publication of *Il Primato* to the rising of 1848 has been called that of "Gioberti's Italian hegemony." Few, no doubt, shared his hope of leadership emanating from the Vatican; but who did not respond to his appeal for love and devotion to that Italy which is mother of art and science, the God-willed redeemer of a divided world? The shame of Italy could not long endure, now that a man had risen with such a faith in her destiny. "The Italians," says Massari, "had at last found a cry which they could raise as one man to express their hopes, their desires, and their faith. That cry was *Viva Gioberti!*" Hence, when the exile returned in 1848, it was with the welcome of King and people alike. He was offered a place in the Cabinet, but declined; it seemed to him to think in terms of Piedmont and her interests, while he wanted Piedmont to suffer and sacrifice for the Italy that was to be. The fortunes of war went against the little kingdom; an armistice was concluded with Austria; the Government resigned, and Gioberti was called upon to form a Cabinet. In his declaration of February 1849 the priest-premier declared himself against the particularism which has been the bane of his country to the present day. "The divorce of provincial and State interests from those of the common fatherland is in our eyes unnatural and fatal. The primary characteristic of our administration will be that of being national."

The new Prime Minister of Piedmont was soon on his way to Rome. Three audiences, however, served to convince him that the only leadership under which Italy could ever be united was that of the House of Savoy. He was compelled, therefore, to face the political and military situation afresh. Was the armistice with Austria to be followed up by negotiations for a treaty, or to be broken by the resumption of hostilities? The King was for the more cautious policy and the Minister for the bolder. A rising of the Florentines compelled

a decision. Gioberti was for war; the King hesitated, and when confronted with his resignation, accepted it. His brief political career was at an end. He went into voluntary exile, while Charles Albert accepted too late the policy which he had at first declined. In the disasters which followed at Novara and Rome, there were not wanting those who said that the *fons et origo* of all was that Piedmont had proved unworthy of her ablest son.

Into the few years left to the exile and the modifications of his thought which took place in them, we need not enter here. For the Gioberti who stirs the heart of Fascist Italy is the Gioberti of *Il Primato* and the baffled heroisms of 1848. Suffice it to say that even in exile his thoughts were only of his country, and that in pamphlet after pamphlet he urged the cause of the very monarchy which had rejected him. Doubtful though he was of Cavour in some respects, he saw clearly that only in him and in Victor Emmanuel could a will to national unity be found strong enough to cope with the problem as the first failure of 1848 had left it. He despaired of the Pope and put his trust now in Piedmont; yet not in her arms alone. "Ideas and arms may for the time be balanced one against the other, but not for long; arms do not overcome ideas, but ideas arms." So he was true to the end to his faith as a Catholic, as to his loyalty as an Italian. It was on October 25th, 1852, shortly after a visit from Cavour, that he passed away in poverty in a hired lodging in a Paris street. Piedmont went on to victory, but he was not there to see it.

What would have become of the *Risorgimento* had Pius responded to Gioberti's appeal? Interesting as the question is, it is too remote from the possibilities to call for discussion here. Catholicism did not make common cause with Italian nationalism, but stood aloof from it. When, therefore, in our own day nationalism flamed up again, it retaliated by taking over some of the functions of religion. Superficially, no doubt, Fascism and Catholicism are on the best of terms, the one providing the moral and religious background for the political purposes of the other. Gentile sees in Catholicism the only possible expression of the Italian genius in religion, and in the discipline of the Church—at least, as far as the masses are concerned—an essential component of the régime. But

how far is such a *modus vivendi* in accordance with the realities?

Has not Catholicism shut its eyes to the fact that, in the last resort, Fascism is Catholicism modified by the substitution—surely an all-important one!—of the State for God? The slogan "Everything within the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State," makes illegitimately for a political organisation that totalitarian claim which is legitimate when the Church makes it for God. Unity, Authority, Duty—the triad is an excellent one in itself. But in whose name is it required, God's or the State's? That Fascism is a secularised Catholicism is plain for all to see. Indeed, such a relation is inevitable, for have not both a common ancestor in Imperial Rome? The political system of the Cæsars rises again, after so many centuries, against the spiritual dominion of the Popes.

If the Duce is a political counterpart of the Pope, the College of Cardinals reappears in the Fascist Grand Council. Nor is Mussolini wanting in the attribute of infallibility. For the Fascist Militia also has its Ten Commandments, and the last of these runs: "Mussolini is always right." The Party, a select body into which only those enter who have assimilated a political theory and from which none is excluded on grounds of class—is not this the political equivalent of a priesthood protected by celibacy from hardening into a hereditary caste? The oath of the Young Fascist: "I swear to execute without discussion the orders of the Duce, and to serve with all my strength, and if necessary with my blood, the cause of the Fascist Revolution," calls to mind the vow of obedience and unquestioning fidelity required of entrants to the Society of Jesus. One would think that all possibility of doubt on this score had been removed by the Duce's own clear statement: "The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value."

Palmieri, in his *Philosophy of Fascism*, an apologia for American readers, does not hesitate to admit what has taken place. The disintegration of the modern world, the breakdown of moral authorities, and the clamant self-assertion of materialistic individualism have reached a point at which they must perforce be bridled. That would, of course, be a task ordinarily for religion; but religion to-day is itself too

gravely imperilled by this mood to be able to check it. But we cannot let chaos loose, the moral government of society must somehow be carried on. Since the idea of God can no longer avail for this, we must set up the State and ask for it what we once asked for God :

> Gone is forever [*sic*] the time when it was possible to find a way to the heart of man through his devotion to higher things than his personal affairs ; gone is the time when it was possible to appeal to the mystic side of his nature through a religious commandment ; gone, finally, is the time when it was possible to illuminate the reasoning powers of his mind with the light of ideals whose existence and whose reason of being cannot be proved through the powers of reason.
>
> All that remains is an appeal to force, to compulsion ; intellectual as well as physical, an appeal to what lies outside of man, to what he fears and with what he must of necessity abide. Such a forceful appeal is made at present by Fascism which, compelling the elder or educating the younger, is slowly but surely bringing the Italian people to the comprehension of the worth, the beauty, and the significance of the National Ideal.

E. L. ALLEN.

A FAMOUS SCHOOL BOOK.

IN 1871, in the German town of Kassel, a society was founded to preserve the memory and perpetuate the ideas of Johann Amos Comenius, and this Moravian educationist and bishop became the recipient of an honour which, as Bacon said of another kind of distinction, "happeneth rarely." Well and truly did he deserve it, though in one particular respect credit belongs to another. A number of writers have made or repeated the statement that Comenius was the first to introduce illustrations into the text-books that were prepared for the use of the young ; but this appears to be incorrect, for the Italian scholar, Tommaso Campanella, and probably one or two others, had already done something of this kind. The distinction of popularising the new idea, however, belongs rather to Comenius than to Campanella, for it was the Moravian's little book *Orbis Sensualium Pictus* that set an example that has been so widely followed. From it are directly descended the thousands of illustrated text-books that fill the shelves and load the desks of our schools and display their infinite variety whenever and wherever teachers and education authorities meet in conference.

Born probably at Nivnitz in Moravia, in 1592, Comenius embraced the religious faith that had been taught by John Huss and became a pastor in the church founded by the reformer, but his main interests were in education rather than in theology. He gained practical experience of teaching when he conducted a school in his native land and he widened his knowledge by reading, travel and correspondence. The Thirty Years' War cost him dear. His wife and children were murdered, his home was plundered, and in 1632 he himself was driven into exile. He found a refuge in Poland, where for some years he was in charge of a school, and in 1641 we hear of him in England where he had friends and where he was actively engaged in furthering a project for the foundation of a college of universal knowledge (*Pansophia*) that was to be built in Chelsea ; a drawing of the proposed edifice can be seen in the British Museum. Comenius also spent some time in Sweden ; here he was more fortunate than Descartes, for in the year (1650) that the Frenchman died in Stockholm the Moravian left the country, where he had survived the rigours of seven or eight winters, to enjoy a further twenty-one years

of life. His long and fruitful career ended at Amsterdam in 1671.

Here, however, we are only concerned with one event in a full life, this being the preparation and publication of the illustrated text-book for the young that has just been mentioned. This *Orbis Pictus* enjoyed a remarkable popularity, not only in Germany, its birthland, but throughout almost the whole of Europe and the United States. An American authority, Ellwood P. Cubberley, in his *History of Education* (1920), puts the period of its influence at a hundred and fifteen years, during which time it was "without a competitor in Europe." It then served in a secondary or auxiliary capacity for a further eighty-five years, making an active life of two hundred years in all. As remarkable as its length of life was the number of countries into which the *Orbis Pictus* was introduced. It was in truth an international text-book. We have seen that it crossed the Atlantic and one authority says, somewhat rashly perhaps, that it was translated into all the languages of Europe. It was certainly translated into a good many, and our libraries hold copies that were prepared for the use of English, French, German, Italian, Russian, Polish, Dutch and Czech students.

A recent writer, Gladys Scott Thomson, in her *Life in a Noble Household, 1641-1700*, throws an interesting sidelight on the use of the little volume in England in the seventeenth century. In 1658 William Russell, fifth earl of Bedford, who was later to receive a dukedom for his services in the glorious revolution of 1688, was employing as tutor to his younger children, five or six in number, a Cambridge graduate, the Rev. John Thornton. Thornton was evidently familiar with the ideas of Comenius and had introduced his pupils to the master's earlier and unillustrated text-books, so it is not surprising that, as soon as an English edition of the *Orbis* was available, he ordered several copies for the use of his young charges. So much use was made by them of these books, or so badly were they treated, that the tutor found it necessary to order replacement copies more than once.

We may imagine the boys and girls, for Thornton had three girls under his care, of this illustrious family poring over their slender volumes, slowly learning the Latin words for the corresponding English ones, and from time to time aiding the memory by glances at the illustrations where the various

objects named were pictured. At a later date it is possible that the book was used in a more august schoolroom, for the copy of the first English edition now in the British Museum came from the library of George III. In any case what was happening to future lords and ladies in the Bedford household at Woburn or in London, and possibly in the succeeding century to princes and princesses in the royal household at Windsor or elsewhere, was certainly happening to many humbler folk, and we are told that this book, explained by mothers in the home and by ushers in the school, "gave to many a boy and girl his or her first general notion of the outside world."

The decision to prepare a book of this kind came to Comenius some time between 1631 and 1657, that is, during his years of exile. In 1631 he had published his *Janua Linguarum Reserta* (*The Gate of Languages Unlocked*), a book containing some eight thousand Latin words arranged in simple sentences with vernacular equivalents in parallel columns; the idea was probably suggested by a work issued in 1616 by a member of the Irish College at Salamanca. The sentences gave information on a variety of subjects. The *Orbis* was a shorter and simpler form of the *Janua* with the added attraction of illustrations. The material was arranged in 150 chapters, each dealing with a particular subject and, as in the *Janua*, the information was given in Latin and German in parallel columns. Each subject was provided with an illustration directly related to the text; this was prepared for the pupil by numbering every object thereon, each number corresponding to one inserted in the text where the object in question was mentioned. The first edition was printed at Nuremberg in 1657 by Michael Elsner and a second was called for in 1658. The illustrations were from wooden blocks cut by Michael Endtor. The name and work of Comenius were by then widely known and the book was a best seller from the first.

German boys and girls did not long enjoy a monopoly of the book and, as we have seen, the young Russells were in possession of an English edition as early as 1658. This was prepared by a London schoolmaster named Charles Hoole, who left the Latin sentences as they were in the original, but translated them into English instead of into German. The illustrations were the same in both books, so evidently Hoole

obtained wood blocks from the Nuremberg printer. It would be interesting to know what he paid for them, but it is hardly likely that anything in the nature of royalties reached the pocket of Comenius. With the eye of a good bookmaker Hoole, or someone associated with him, arranged that each subject, with one or two exceptions, should begin at the top of a page and should occupy exactly two pages, illustration on the left and letterpress facing it on the right, but this example was not followed in some of the later editions. The book made 309 pages, in addition to which there was some prefatory matter and an index.

On the title page of Hoole's first edition the *Orbis*, or *Visible World*, the name it bore in England, is described as "a picture and nomenclature of all the chief things that are in the world and of man's employments therein." It was "a work newly written by the author in Latin and High Dutch (being one of the last essays and the most suitable to children's capacities of any that he hath hitherto made) and translated into English by C. Hoole, teacher of a private grammar school in Lothbury, London." Comenius had provided a motto taken from Aristotle that justified his title: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.* Two prefaces were provided: the original one of Comenius duly translated, and one by Hoole, who addressed his remarks to "all judicious and industrious schoolmasters." The date of this preface is January 25th, 1658, and the book was printed for J. Kirton, at the King's Arms, St. Paul's Churchyard, London.

Hoole was not indifferent to the possibilities of advertisement. Quite in the modern style he printed at the beginning of the book a short eulogy from the pen of an "eminent schoolmaster in London," Hezekiah Woodward, who says: "And if we had books wherein are the pictures of all creatures, birds, beasts, fish, fowles, they would stand us in great stead. For pictures are the most intelligible books that children can look upon. They come closest to nature; nay, saith Scaliger, art exceeds her." Then comes a personal advertisement telling the public that Mr. Hoole will take pupils into his house at New Buildings in the Tokenhouse Garden in Lothbury, London. He says that in the work of instruction "he will be diligent himself and will maintain an able usher in his house to attend to their teaching, and his wife and her servants ready to see to their wholesome diet and cleanly ordering upon

a rate reasonable to so great a charge and pains as are thereunto required."

The plan of arranging the information in Latin and vernacular sentences in parallel columns adopted by Comenius, first in the *Janua* and then in the *Orbis*, was not seriously altered by those who translated and edited the smaller book, but from time to time some of the illustrations were replaced by others, and a certain amount of new matter was added. After 1729, at least in England, the book lost a good deal of its popularity, but some forty years later a certain William Jones, having heard "a learned gentleman" say that the *Orbis Pictus* "had fallen totally into disuse, though no other comparable to it had been substituted in its place," set about the work of preparing a new edition, the twelfth, which, bearing Hoole's name, appeared in 1777. Many of the illustrations in this edition are different from those in the first and some new chapters have been added, notably one on botany and another on the deluge. The editor also tells us that he has made mention of Harvey's recent discovery of the circulation of the blood. But even so, owing to the use of smaller type and the saving of space by beginning a new chapter on the same page as the old one ended, this book is slighter than its predecessor of 1658; its 153 chapters make only 179 pages, exclusive of the prefatory and index matter.

Of the numerous editions in languages foreign to England, one published at Nuremberg in 1746 was in two volumes; the first was practically the original work, but the second was entirely new, containing 150 chapters on subjects omitted by Comenius. In 1808 an edition issued at St. Petersburg contained only eighty chapters and its illustrations differed almost entirely from those in the original. The languages used were Latin, German and Russian. Primarily the *Orbis* taught Latin, but it could be, and was, easily adapted to teach any other language as well and in one or two of the editions four are employed. The pupil could acquire, at one and the same time, a considerable amount of useful information and an acquaintance, let us say, with Latin, German and Italian, or Latin, French and Dutch. The British Museum possesses a stout volume in which Latin, French, German and Italian are employed, but the bulk of the information given has diminished from sentences to words. Editions of the *Orbis* were prepared for those who wished to study Greek.

In England the work of Hoole and his successors was continued towards the end of the eighteenth century by a certain James Greenwood, who, however, treated Comenius with less respect than his editorial predecessors. In his own words, he prepared an illustrated text-book "based on the method of Comenius but criticising it." This was "adorned," to quote again from the Preface, with twenty-six pictures, a much smaller number than heretofore, but this economy did not prevent it from reaching a twenty-third edition in 1797 and so carrying the ideas of Comenius into the nineteenth century.

To return to Hoole's first edition, which is really an English translation of the first Nuremberg one. It opens with a dialogue between master and boy:

M. Come boy, learn to be wise.
B. What doth this mean, to be wise?
M. To understand rightly, to do rightly, and to speak out rightly all that are necessary.
B. Who will teach these things to me?
M. I, by God's help.
B. How?
M. I will guide thee through all. I will show thee all. I will name thee all.
B. Sir, here I am, lead me in the name of God.
M. Before all things thou oughtest to learn the plain sounds of which man's speech consisteth, which living creatures know how to make and thy tongue knoweth how to imitate and thy hand can picture out. Afterwards we will go into the world and we will view all things.

Evidently something went wrong when the book was being printed, for the illustration to this "Invitation," as it is called, is one that has no bearing on the subject, while a few pages further on is one showing master and boy in conversation in the open air. The two have evidently been transposed in error. The correct illustration is repeated at the end of the volume where the master gives his valedictory address. "There, thou hast seen in short all things that can be showed and hast learned the chief words of the English and Latin tongues. Go now and read other good books intelligently and thou shalt become learned, wise and godly. Remember these things; fear God and call upon Him that He may bestow upon thee the spirit of wisdom. Farewell." In the twelfth edition the illustration to "The Invitation" shows the master

seated before a filled bookcase with the boy standing in front of him. The dialogue is followed by a "lively and vocal alphabet," the adjectives being justified by giving against each letter a representation of an animal or bird that makes its sound. The crow croweth gives the sound of *a*; the lamb's bleat gives *b*, and the grasshopper's chirp gives *c*. The sound of *q* is attributed to the cuckoo and of *x* to the frog.

The lessons proper, 150 in number, begin and end with religion. That on God is at the beginning and the last two are on God's Providence and the Last Judgment. They are arranged to some extent in groups according to subject. One group consists of chapters on the products of the earth, both vegetable and mineral, and another of chapters on living creatures, which are divided into the following classes: tame fowl, singing birds that haunt the trees and woods, ravenous birds, waterfowl, flying vermin, four-footed beasts and those about the house, herd cattle, labouring beasts, wild cattle, wild beasts, serpents and creeping things, crawling vermin, creatures that live as well by water as by land, river and pond fish, sea and shell fish (Hoole's spellings have been modernised). The illustrations are often unexpected and sometimes incongruous, at least to the modern mind. For example, the one on singing birds shows an owl in a cage, two other birds in adjacent cages and several others perched on a tree. Other chapters or lessons describe and illustrate the shops of the barber and the bookseller, and the crafts of the weaver, potter, carpenter, blacksmith, printer, bookbinder, tailor, shoemaker and cordwainer. The work of obtaining food is under such headings as fishing, fowling and hunting, and of preparing it as butchery, cooking, and baking. Vintage and brewing describe the making of wine and beer and there is a lesson on bees and honey. The dressing of gardens is a pleasing reminder that time was found for one of the most humanising of occupations.

The sciences taught include geometry and astronomy, which take the form of chapters on the heavens, planets and eclipses. The schoolmaster is seen at work in the school and the study is described and illustrated. The virtues inculcated include diligence, temperance, fortitude, humanity, liberality and prudence, and there are chapters on religion and on its manifestations as Christianity, Judaism, Mahomedanism and Gentilism, the last-named describing briefly the mythologies of Greece and Rome. The lessons on the city and the

inward parts of a city suggest a beginning of the modern study of civics. The chapter on the earth describes its physical features as high mountains, deep valleys, hills rising, hollow caves, plain fields, and shady woods. The one on Europe names its twenty-eight countries, all called kingdoms, and marks each of them on a map. Switzerland, although by then an independent State, does not appear. The lesson on man shows Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden with the serpent twined round the tree of life; other adult beings, presumably their children, are walking about. Other chapters in this group deal with what we should now call physiology, and there is one on the seven ages of man.

The social historian might do worse than consult this book for information about the daily lives of the people of the seventeenth century. He would learn that the potherbs and vegetables then in use included the lettuce, colewort, onion, garlick, parsnip, turnip, radish, horse radish, parsley, cucumber and pompion, an old spelling of pumpkin. He would get some ideas about travel by land and water, on foot and by coach; about the musical instruments of the day; about weights and measures and about sports and pastimes. Recreations include the stage play, tennis and dice. Under the heading of sleights we are told about tumbling and rope-dancing as well as juggling. The fencing school is described and the sports of boys include whipping a top, walking on stilts, and a ball game resembling cricket or rounders. The house as pictured by Comenius is a pleasant place, inhabited clearly by a man of substance. Its furnishings include a bath, stoves in the bed rooms, clocks, called dialls, and mirrors. Its rooms include not only the kitchen, the buttery and the bedchambers, but also the gallery and the dining-room.

Two chapters at least are on subjects that would not find a place in the modern schoolbook. One describes deformed and monstrous persons and the other the tormenting of malefactors. The torments mentioned and illustrated bear witness to the extraordinary inhumanity that existed side by side with a considerable amount of culture, a contrast very vividly pictured for a somewhat earlier age by Lytton Strachey in *Elizabeth and Essex*. Not only are the whip, the pillory and the galleys mentioned as normal forms of punishment, but breaking on the wheel, burning at the stake and cutting out the tongue are enumerated.

Mere enumeration soon becomes tedious, and perhaps a better idea of the book will be obtained by a slightly fuller reference to two chapters taken almost at random from the first edition. The one headed Fire has on its illustration thirteen numbered items, each referring to an article similarly numbered that is mentioned in the text. On a table we can see a flint, a steel, a tinder-box, a lighted match and a candle, these being numbered one to five. Six, seven and nine are the parts of the fire that is burning on the hearth, stick, flame and smoke, while through the window we can see a larger and more uncontrolled fire called a blaze; this bears the number eight. Ten is the chimney and the remaining three, firebrand, coal and ashes, take us back to the fire on the hearth.

The other chapter selected is on a feast, which is thus described in Hoole's translation.

> "When a feast is made ready the table is covered with a carpet (*tapetibus*) and a tablecloth by the waiters who besides lay the trenchers, spoons, knives with little forks, table napkins, bread with a salt-cellar. Messes are brought in platters, a pie on a plate. The guests being brought in by the host wash their hands out of a laver or ewer, over a hand basin or bowl, and wipe them with a hand towel; then they sit at the table on chairs. The carver breaketh up the good cheer and divideth it. Sauces are set amongst roast meat in saucers. The butler filleth strong wine out of a cruse or wine pot or flagon into cups or glasses which stand on a cupboard and he reacheth them to the master of the feast who drinketh to his guests."

As in other chapters the articles mentioned are numbered to direct the attention of the pupil to their present representation in the illustration.

Such, in bare outline, are a few of the pictures of the little book from which, for nearly two hundred years, boys and girls all over Europe and in the American colonies obtained such knowledge as they had of the world around them and of languages other than their own, the lesson being reinforced by the presence of informative illustrations. To-day it looks old-fashioned, and so it is, both in appearance and in content. The matter suggests the unhurrying and unscientific age from which it came; an age to which some would like to return, for it knew nothing of the modern examination system.

A. W. HOLLAND.

NÎMES.

NÎMES is, to all appearances, a modern city. One stands in the Place, waiting for a pause in the traffic of rapid cars, vans and motors. One glances down the elegant tree-lined boulevards, reminiscent of Haussmann. And one exclaims: "Roman Nemausus? Incredible!" True that, not far away is the exquisite little Græco-Roman jewel, the Maison Carrée. True, here and there one catches glimpses of the fine arena between the densely patterned foliage of the plane-trees. And true indeed that now and then in the streets one comes upon some ancient Roman gateway. Yet to-day, in the midst of the continual bustle of busy people and petrol-propelled vehicles, one feels that either the antiquities are out of the picture, or that latter-day Nîmes fails to reach a standard of stateliness in keeping with their hoary dignity. The snorting of taxi-hooters, the screech and pulsating of motor-bicycles, the clamour of vociferous humanity and the gay music of the smart café's orchestra at the corner of the Esplanade; tend to disturb the earnestness of the sight-seer and to introduce a more cheerful modern note into the formal strain of past times.

The Esplanade is Nîmes' finest square. In spite of first impressions, one finds the city is far from being altogether given up to frolic. A wise strain of the practical and commercial steadies its balance. Its industries of grape-pressing and silk-weaving are far-famed. It is the birthplace of Jean Nicot, to whom France owes as much as we in Britain owe to Sir Walter Raleigh. For Nicot in 1564 introduced to his country the plant which owes its botanical name to him. Another of Nîmes' illustrious sons and one who has benefited mankind, or at any rate literary mankind, is Alphonse Daudet, who was born here in 1840. Throughout Provence, nay more, wherever French literature reaches, his is a name with which to conjure. Who that has revelled in the *Lettres de mon Moulin* and chuckled over "Tartarin's" doings, both in the Alps and in Tarascon, who that has followed the fortunes of "Jack" and enjoyed "Numa Roumestan," and above all, who that has discovered between the lines of *Le Petit Chose* much of the youthful Daudet himself, is not grateful to his birthplace for the gift of this great writer? His statue by Falguière in the Place de la Couronne bears witness to his

city's appreciation. Force of adverse conditions compelled him to leave Nîmes at the early age of fifteen and to seek his living elsewhere. When he reached Paris in his seventeenth year, however, his pen began to trace for him the road to fame. In later life after he had gained success, he was frequently to be found at his mill in the valley of the Rhône, where his friendship with Frédéric Mistral, a great and kindred spirit, was a recurring pleasure. Daudet's nature, genial, artistic, delicate and generous, was one of the best that France—land of many fine natures—can show, and his love of his country was only second perhaps to his love of his countrymen and countrywomen, her sons and daughters. Through all his works runs a pæan of praise to his native corner—Provence. Another well-known name, whose bearer first saw light at Nîmes, is that of Guizot, the great statesman and historian.

But to return to the city itself. In the vast arena are held at stated times the bull-fights, or *mises-à-mort*, that Provence has borrowed from Spain. These *mises-à-mort*, as practised in France, are an anæmic version of the original Spanish sport, about which widely divergent opinions are held. There is no doubt, however, that in Nîmes the sport attracts a multitude of spectators and adds greatly to the financial gains of the city. As to the arena, it is one of many such impressive memorials with which the Romans embellished the lands where, if only temporarily, they ruled as masters. It is somewhat smaller than the one at Arles, but it is in far better preservation, although its past history shows as many changes as befell the Arles arena. At times it has also become a fortress, at others it has developed into a small town within a town. During this stage, two of its arcades were converted into a church, of which portions have been retained to tell their own tale. The view over Nîmes and the surrounding country is delightful when one has climbed to the topmost gallery and on to the paved way roofing it.

We read that probably the arena was built chiefly for gladiatorial contests. Careful scrutiny, we are told, has, in fact, revealed that the wall of the podium, separating the actual arena from the spectators' seats, is too low to have safely allowed of fights in which wild beasts took part. Many critics compare the amphitheatre with the giant of its kind—the Coliseum in Rome. It is a comparison hard to draw when one

remembers that Rome's amazing arena held 90,000 persons, while that of Nîmes was only constructed to seat 22,000. The stupendous bulk of the Coliseum overpowers one. The spell that its ruined immensity casts is a spell of bewilderment, of intimidation, striking one with awe. Whereas the arena of Verona, of which the seating capacity was only for 20,000 spectators, that of Arles with its 30,000 seats and that of Nîmes at once attract one. The exterior of the Nîmes amphitheatre has preserved to this day its admirable cornice, and the holes are still to be seen into which the masts supporting the awning or " vela " were fixed. Many traces of sculpture were discovered lying amongst the rubble within the elliptic ring. The outside of the pile, as well, shows relics of similar decorative art. Some fragments of stone, bearing interesting inscriptions, are kept in the museum, which is housed in Nîmes' most fascinating old building, the little Maison Carrée.

A short distance from the amphitheatre along streets shaded with plane-trees and flanked with handsome shops, one comes upon this exquisite temple. The first sight of it gives one a thrill of deep pleasure, so charming are its proportions, so graceful its lines and so altogether satisfying its symmetrical daintiness. Its features are, of course, known to nearly everyone, just as a great painting by Carpaccio, Botticelli, Raphael, Rembrandt or Gainsborough is known to us, or in the same way that we are familiar with Michael Angelo's stone marvels. But previous familiarity with its lineaments in no way lessens the joy felt on beholding it for the first time in reality. It was constructed by Greek genius under Roman sway. One reads that none of its vertical or horizontal lines are really vertical or horizontal, but show subtle curves of their own, which convey an impression of greater height and more slender outlines than it actually possesses. Yet the sight of the perfect whole banishes the importance of these facts. The beauty, in truth, is so complete that, to the lay eye, analysis becomes superfluous and one is left merely marvelling and gratefully accepting.

Sir Theodore Cook tells us that the Greeks knew it was those deliberate inaccuracies which give life and beauty. This is, he adds—" an essential principle which, known to Greece and known to the builders of the Maison Carrée, is one of the chief reasons why this little temple is the greatest treasure of classical architecture north of the Alps." Another and earlier

critic, Arthur Young, who visited Nîmes while travelling through France during the Revolution, wrote—" it would be impossible to single out any special part for excellence of beauty, for it is altogether perfect in symmetry and grace." And yet another modern writer declares it to be—" the finest classical temple extant." The design of the Madeleine in Paris has been copied from the Maison Carrée, but just misses the artistic grace and harmonious contours to be found in its smaller prototype. Looking at the heavier bulk of the Madeleine, one is tempted to quote Browning—" Oh, the little more and how much it is! "

The Maison Carrée was built in the first years of the Christian era and inscriptions that have since been discovered prove that it was dedicated to Caius and Lucius, the two sons of Agrippa. These lads died early without having performed any great deeds to carry down their fame to posterity. But because their names are connected with the Maison Carrée, they will never be forgotten. Many are the uses—and in some cases, I am afraid, also the abuses—to which the little temple has been put during its long and remarkable career. It has been a Pagan temple and a granary. It just escaped becoming a private vault to the Uzès family, its sale for that purpose to the Duchesse having at the last moment been refused. The utilitarian trend of life, however, converted it into stables. Finally, last scene of all that ended its strange eventful history, it was held by the Augustine friars, who used it as a church or chapel. After the Revolution it attained peace under the Government of the Restoration, and now it abides as a museum in which a unique collection of antique relics is stored.

This brief mention of it would be incomplete if attention were not drawn to one or two of the sculptured busts to be found within its walls. The gentle, pensive head of Julia Domna looks out at us so serenely, that it seems hard to believe she was the mother of the cruel Caracalla, whose bust is also housed there. Near by is a third head, that of Caracalla's cousin, Julia Mamaea. But the most outstanding of all the sculptures in the Lapidary Museum is the Venus of Nîmes, a charming figure, inferior certainly to the Venus of Arles, but nevertheless built on fine, if somewhat generous lines. There is swing and life in the folds of the long drapery which she grasps with her left hand. It is the only one,

by-the-by, which the cruel passage of the centuries has spared to her. Many interesting inscriptions of the Roman epoch are kept in the Musée Lapidaire. They were discovered near and removed from the Pont du Gard, a few miles away. A word must also be said in appreciation of the excellently wrought mosaic pavements to be found in the temple. The workmanship in its delicate precision is admirable and can hold its own with that of many of Italy's ancient pavements.

A graceful flight of steps leads down from the Maison Carrée to the street below. We read that this was originally the place of the old Roman Forum and traces of its foundations may still be seen. Now the square is set round with modern houses, but as the architect has had the good taste to place them at a respectful distance from the precious relic they surround, the sense of spaciousness is not disturbed. Further to the left of the town stands the cathedral of St. Castor. Though the interior has been much restored, luckily no disturbing signs of renovation are to be seen from without. It is said to have been built on the site of an ancient Roman temple, as indeed was often the case with many of the antique churches of France and Italy. Its exterior is decorated with an interesting frieze of the twelfth century, carved very simply and in excellent preservation. The subjects are chosen from the Old Testament and are easily recognisable. Unlike the Maison Carrée, the cathedral, unfortunately, lacks the space due to it. Modern shops and houses have encroached somewhat unceremoniously on its position and this detracts from its dignity. So that the only satisfactory view that can be gained of it is from the small Place facing the west porch.

In Nîmes there are besides two other churches worthy of notice, Saint Baudile and Saint Perpetué. The twin spires of the former stand up in the landscape when viewed from afar, like the masts of a ship. These churches, however, cannot be placed in the same rank of interest as the cathedral of Saint Castor. Not very far from Saint Baudile we may find Nîmes' most venerable remnant of Roman mural architecture, the Porte d'Auguste, built by Augustus in 16 B.C. It has four arches, two large central ones and two side ones, over which there are small niches. At one time the gateway formed part of the ramparts of the town. Later it was buried under a big fortress and it was not until centuries afterwards that it was again revealed. Like the stones of Les Baux, of which the

wonderful remains are known to all who have sought and visited the historical traces in Provence, how many stirring tales of warfare, gallantry and siege could these old arches tell! They must have seen the passage of armed hosts. Those ancient walls must surely have echoed to the song of roving troubadours and witnessed gay cavalcades of bold knights and the captivating ladies they courted. Far later, and nearer to our own times, a down-trodden populace, from which the revolution was bred, must have passed, riotous with despair, beneath those curving vaults.

Among the outstanding works that Rome has bequeathed to us at Nîmes, the Fountain of Nemausus is one which offers an insistent appeal. It takes us captive at once on account of the grace of its lines and its delightful setting, both natural and artificial. The dusky wooded slopes of Mont Cavalier form a happy green background to the beautiful gardens where the spring is to be found and which one reaches through a fine, wrought-iron gate. The Fountain and its surroundings seem in many ways related to those near Tivoli. Their broad terraces and wide flights of steps winding up the shady inclined paths of the mount are admirably planned. Involuntarily they call to mind the canvases of Poussin and renew for us the gay times of eighteenth-century France. The pellucid green of those waters! The white of those charming putti and of those graceful urns and marble balustrades! They seem so rightly present in every mental picture of elegant, careless, pre-revolutionary France. Standing there, surrounded by all that white and green, unconsciously one peoples those sunny terraces and foliaged walks with the *belles dames et gentils galants de France*, whose fatal downfall was so imminent.

Though the gardens of Nîmes certainly cover a far smaller area and do not possess the grand park Versailles owns, there is yet here and there a hint pleasantly recalling M. Lenôtre's noble planning that still delights us in the Park of Versailles. The square central basin of the Fountain, now embellished with graceful groups of cherubs and garlanded urns, occupies the original site of the Nymphæum, or the old Roman bath where, in those past times, the fine ladies made merry. Below, now half covered by the glaucous waters of the spring, still stand some of the white pillars of the ancient colonnade. No doubt passage-ways led from there to the disrobing-rooms

and other apartments. Gazing into those clear emerald depths, watching the wavy reflections of the marble columns, one played with the fancy that, now and then, laughing voices were to be heard. Almost one saw the sparkle of splashed water, and even, here and there, one caught the gleam of shapely limbs beneath the glassy surface. *Ebeu fugaces . . .!*

At the far end of the probable passage which must have connected it with the Nymphæum, is to be found the ruined Temple of Diana. It was formerly sacred to that goddess and to an earlier divinity of Gallic origin, Nemausus, the water-god. The spring which afterwards fed the baths and fountain was originally dedicated to this divinity. Inscriptions bearing upon Diana's Temple and the Fountain of Nemausus are still extant and carefully preserved in Nîmes. The Temple of Diana, though only a ruin, still shows a beautiful portico with pillars and a colonnade. Inside, it houses one tall column. This and others similar are believed to have supported the *vela*, under which the Roman ladies bathed. Antiquarians are much interested in the vaulted roof of the temple, that is, they declare, one of the first examples of barrel-vaulting, afterwards so widely adopted in ecclesiastical architecture.

Leaving the wonderful relics of Diana's Temple, one may climb the sloping path of Mont Cavalier. Odorous flowering shrubs and the dense foliage of ilex trees shade the way and at the outset one passes the circular basin of the real spring of Nemausus. Ten minutes' walk takes one to the Tour Magne, which, we are told, is the oldest building in Nîmes. It is a hollow octagon about a hundred feet high and was erected as a tribute in honour of Augustus. It commands a wide outlook over the surrounding country. At its foot, beyond the gardens, stretch miles of marshy land between Nîmes and Aigues-Mortes. It is 360 feet above sea-level, and probably therefore when first constructed in 27 B.C., it was built for the purpose of a watch-tower. From its dominating height the approach of sea-faring enemies could be detected. Later when the town was besieged, the monument was used as a point of defence. Its summit is reached by a narrow circular staircase winding up the hollow tower. The interior is gloomy and awesome. On one side the staircase lacks any handrail or balustrade, so that one peers down into dim nothingness. To those subject to giddiness the climb, though anything but an arduous one, is not to be recommended. When the top is

gained, however, the far-reaching view over bland and smiling country basking in the warm hush of the spring day is reward enough.

There is a strange scarcity of tales or legends connected with the tower. Almost the only one available is banal, but is here given for what it is worth. The astrologer, Nostradamus, a name that often figures in the sixteenth century annals of Provence, declared that the discovery of a golden cock would make a rich man of some lucky farmer. This talk, by the way, of hidden treasure in the form of golden birds and beasts is often to be met with in the folk-lore of mediæval Provence. A farmer named Trucat is said to have heard of the prophecy and, like all superstitious people, he felt that he was destined to be the fortunate finder. He was also firmly convinced that the treasure-trove would reveal itself within the Tour Magne. After surmounting the obstacles placed in his path by a careful and grudging sovereign, Henri IV, who insisted that a share of any find should be claimed by the crown, Trucat was allowed to commence operations and began excavating in the interior of the monument. Needless to say, his efforts proved quite unavailing. Like Mark Twain's snakes in Iceland, the golden cock of the Tour Magne has still to be discovered.

In connection with the Tower, Sir Theodore Cook says that it gave rise to a most elaborate pun dealing with the romantic adventures of a Provençal courtier named Gal. The pun, which follows, was probably composed by Marc Monnier :

> " Gal, amant de la reine, alla, tour magnanime,
> Galamment de l'Arène à la Tour Magne à Nîmes."

" This is supposed to refer to the athletic lover's feat of carrying his sweetheart on his back from the amphitheatre to the tower."

While at Nîmes, a visit to the local picture-gallery may well be included. The antique mosaics in the great hall attract one at once. They are splendid specimens of early Roman work, far less coarsely executed than many to be seen elsewhere. They were discovered near the market-place in Nîmes over fifty years ago. The gallery can boast many good pictures, both French and foreign, though certainly those of France surpass the rest. There are several paintings by Poussin ; of these his two landscapes are greatly to be

preferred to his biblical canvas. Sigalon has a delightful portrait of Madame Diaz, besides some other pictures. There is as well a large canvas by Besnard, of which the colour and the brush-work are arresting. Among the foreign artists' exhibits, the Nîmes gallery is lucky to be able to include good work by Titian, Rubens, Vandyck, Nicholas Berghem and Wouwerman. A portrait by Carl Vanloo of an elderly woman, who was, we are told, the artist's mother, is delightful. There is another portrait, too, of an old lady, full of dignity and refinement—this one by a woman artist whose maiden-name was Gérard. She died in 1905 at the age of 100. In the gallery is also housed a valuable collection of engravings, so that the Nîmes picture gallery adds one more attraction to its city's charms.

MARY F. RAPHAEL.

"TIME AND THE HOUR" IN LITERATURE.

> Come what come may,
> Time and the hour runs through the roughest day.
> *Macbeth.*

WHEN the world was young, day had only the two natural divisions: the time when the sun was going up to the zenith, and when he was declining from it. Odysseus, recounting his raid on the Cicones after he sailed from Troy (*Odyssey IX*), tells how "as long as the sacred day waxed, and the sun climbed," the raiders held their own, "but when he turned back to the time of the loosing of oxen," the fight went against them. And when "night sped down from heaven," "immortal night," in Homer's world, men had no fear of it.

Lucretius makes the same point, rightly or wrongly (*De Rerum Natura*, V, 973), that men in early times did not fear the night. If he is correct, it is an interesting speculation as to just when, in the development of man's moral consciousness, this fear crept in. For as literature advances (or recedes) from the simple grandeur of the age when "immortal night" was common speech, we find two aspects of night emphasised in poetry. On one side is the peaceful, beneficent time of rest; Virgil's "*suadentque cadentia sidera somnos*" ("the sinking stars persuade to sleep") and his picture a little further on (*Aeneid IV*, 523), of all nature at rest: "the woods and the savage seas were stilled, when the stars wheel in mid-course, when all the farmland is silent, beasts and brightly coloured birds, both those which far and wide possess the watery pools, and the bushes of the rough open country; laid asleep beneath the soundless night"; but Dido in her misery cannot rest, "nor ever melts into sleep nor takes the night into her eyes or heart." Virgil had in mind, no doubt, Apollonius Rhodius' haunting picture of Medea's wakefulness, at the hour when "the mother whose children are dead is asleep, when only the helmsman wakes, watching the sky and the stars in Orion"; and both passages are echoed in Shelley's *Remorse*:

> The cloud shadows of midnight possess their own repose;
> For the weary winds are silent, or the moon is in the deep;
> Some respite to its turbulence unresting ocean knows;
> Whatever moves or toils or grieves hath its appointed sleep.

Virgil can portray night, however, no less vividly in a far different guise: the terror that walks in darkness, when "black night has stolen the colour from the world," in (*Aeneid VI*), the descent of Aeneas to the dead. This is night's other aspect, the uncanny hours when strange powers are abroad, Hamlet's "very witching time of night When churchyards yawn and hell itself breathes forth Contagion to this world." The awe, if not the sense of evil, is already present in the Book of Genesis, when a deep sleep and "a horror of great darkness" falls upon Abraham, in the dusk when God speaks to him beside the rows of divided animals; it is the atmosphere of Faunus' oracle in Virgil (*Aeneid VII*) where the priestess, sleeping her ritual sleep within the shrine on the skins of sacrificed sheep, sees phantoms flitting and hears the Gods at talk, and speaks with the deep places of the world beneath. The Irish legends can parallel it, as can the tales of some modern countrysides where superstition has lingered long; Cuchulain, passing through the magicians' trials to earn a champion's name, watches alone through a night of despondency, and to his watching "nine grey shapes came out of the marsh by the light of a cold moon."

The effect of night and dark powers sweeping forward the action links two of the world's supreme epic dramas, the *Sixth Aeneid* and Dante's *Inferno*, whose kinship is obvious and acknowledged, with Shakespeare's *Macbeth*.

> Ere the bat hath flown
> His cloistered flight, ere to black Hecate's summons
> The shard-borne beetle with his drowsy hums
> Hath rung night's yawning peal, there shall be done
> A deed of dreadful note . . .
> . . . Light thickens, and the crow
> Makes wing to the rooky wood.
> Good things of day begin to droop and drowse.
>
> (*Act III, sc. ii*)

Almost the same imagery is repeated in Gray's *Elegy in a Country Churchyard*, but with what a difference!

> Now fades the glimmering landscape on the sight,
> And all the air a solemn stillness holds,
> Save where the beetle wheels his droning flight,
> And drowsy tinklings lull the distant folds.

Macbeth's fevered imagination seizes upon night in its grimmest aspect, leagued with the powers of darkness, as a necessary setting to the second murder even as it had been to that first which had swept for ever out of reach, for him, night's gentler meaning ("Macbeth shall sleep no more"). Night to him henceforth can only be an ominous blackness, paralleled by that sudden opening of a door into the dark in St. John's account of the Last Supper, when the commonplace departure of one of the diners, affording a glimpse of the black square of the doorway, as he goes, is recollected afterwards in its appalling significance: "He then having received the sop went immediately out; and it was night."

The division of the night into "watches" is of an antiquity going back to Homer's time or earlier. "Let us be going," says Odysseus to Diomede, cutting short the latter's embarrassing praises of him; "for truly the night is waning, and near is the dawn, and the stars have gone onward, and the night has advanced more than two watches, but the third watch is still left" (*Iliad X*). The "dead" of night, midnight and the hours just after, is the time when Richard in Shakespeare's *Richard III* wakes screaming from the nightmare visitation of his victims' ghosts, and mutters as consciousness of time and place returns, "The lights burn blue. It is now dead midnight." Traces survive in literature and folklore of a belief that the last watch of the night, like the last phase of the waning moon, was the most uncanny. Such an idea may help to account for the disciples' panic when Christ came walking over the Lake of Galilee towards their boat, "in the fourth watch of the night," and they took Him for a spirit and shrieked aloud. R. L. Stevenson shows us the small hours in their healthiest and kindliest aspect, in a celebrated passage from his *Travels with a Donkey in the Cevennes*:

> There is one stirring hour unknown to those who dwell in houses, when a wakeful influence goes abroad over the sleeping hemisphere, and all the out-door world are on their feet. It is then that the cock crows, not this time to announce the dawn, but like a cheerful watchman speeding the course of night. Cattle awake on the meadows, sheep break their fast on dewy hillsides, and change to a new lair among the ferns; and houseless men, who have lain down with the fowls, open their dim eyes and behold the beauty of the night.

According to Dante, the cold clear twilight before dawn is the time when dreams are true; "the hour when the swallow begins her sad lays nigh unto the morn . . . when our mind,

more of a wanderer from the flesh and less prisoned by thoughts, is almost prophetic in its visions." Dante dreams (*Purgatorio IX*) of what was even then happening, and when he awoke " the sun was already more than two hours high, and mine eyes were turned to the sea."

Sunrise in poetry has never, perhaps, been painted with more brilliant economy of expression than in two lines of Lucretius (V, 461, 2),

> Aurea cum primum gemmantis rore per herbas
> matutina rubent radiati lumina solis ;

" when first the golden morning light of the beaming sun burns red through the dew-spangled grass." Anyone who has awakened out of doors or walked through summer fields at sunrise knows well that gold of the first level rays and the tiny red sparkles they strike from the drops of dew. The passage goes on, " the pools and never-failing streams give out a mist, as at times the very earth seems to smoke." Such imagery taken in its context, illustrating the birth of the world according to Lucretius' atomic theory, calls to mind the Biblical story of creation when " there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground."

The colour and the mist inspire the *Odyssey's* recurrent daybreak line : " When the Dawn shone forth, mist-born, the rosy-fingered." The mist flees before the dawn at Dante's first sunrise in Purgatory : " Daybreak was vanquishing the breath of morn, which fled before her, so that from afar I recognised the trembling of the sea " (*Purgatorio I*). The sense of air and space which breathes through those first two cantos, dew-washed morning and mists fleeing over the water before the sun, are eloquent of the deliverance from a long harrowing experience, from the horror of great darkness (" Hell is murky," " *Oscura, profunda era, a nebulosa* "), yet of a deliverance not to serene sunset in the evening of life, as some have imagined for Shakespeare after the period of the great tragedies, but to a new daybreak of strenuous vigour ; the man still young, all his faculties quickened to go forward and upward through range upon range of still more tremendous experience, passing up from the earthly hill of Purgatory to regions where the very roots of Time are laid bare. Rossetti, whose Christian names (Dante Gabriel) must have been a perpetual suggestion to him of such regions and such themes, attains for a moment

by sheer imaginative simplicity, in *The Blessed Damozel*, the heights where Dante continually dwells :

> From the fixt lull of heaven, she saw
> Time, like a pulse, shake fierce
> Through all the worlds ;

but Dante's vision by grace of Beatrice penetrates still further, gazing in the swiftest heaven (*Paradiso XXVII*) to the sphere where " the nature of the universe which stills the centre and moves all the rest around, hence begins as from its starting-point, and in this same vessel Time hath its roots, and in the rest its leaves."

Two great descriptions come to mind of the dawn of day upon those who have travelled through the night. One, austere and forceful as only Greek literature and the Old Testament can be, is in the Second Book of Samuel (ch. ii, v. 32, Revised Version) : " And Joab and his men went all night, and the day brake upon them at Hebron." The other is at the end of Malory's *Morte D'Arthur* : " And as soon as Sir Bedivere had lost the sight of the barge, he wept and wailed, and so took the forest, and so he went all that night, and in the morning he was ware between two holts hoar of a chapel and an hermitage."

Of " mornings after " in literature, perhaps one of the most amusing comes at the end of Plato's *Symposium*. The banquet and its immortal discussion have ended in rollicking uproar, and a number of the guests, including the narrator Aristodemus, spend what remains of the night more or less under the table. Towards daybreak Aristodemus opens a sleepy eye, when the cocks are crowing, and sees Socrates still " in," passing an enormous bowl of wine round with two others while he forces them to admit that the same man may be a writer of both comedy and tragedy. In the end he argues them both to sleep ; whereupon he tucks them up on the couches, and goes off to the Lyceum for a bath.

The long period of sunlight in the early morning, before people are about, is a peculiarity of summer-time in towns in the northern countries. This was the hour when the sight of London so deeply moved Wordsworth, as he stood on Westminster Bridge :

> The City now doth like a garment wear
> The beauty of the morning . . .

Ne'er saw I, never felt, a calm so deep!
The river glideth at his own sweet will;
Dear God! the very houses seem asleep,
And all that mighty heart is lying still!

At such hours the day has not yet made up its mind what weather it is going to bestow upon the world, and the unwary were evidently lured by its deceptive brightness, in Shakespeare's time as now, into setting out for the day without their "rainwear":

Why didst thou promise such a beauteous day,
And make me travel forth without my cloak,
To let base clouds o'ertake me in my way?
(*Sonnet XXXIV.*)

From time immemorial, "perpetual day" (probably in contrast with the satanic aspect of night) has been pictured as one of the joys of a future life. For Christian writers the idea was no doubt stimulated by the seer of Revelation's vision, "There shall be no night there." Such religious poetry as the Dark Ages produced is pathetically shot through with this heaven of eternal sunlight—a theme which has suffered many things at the hands of mediocre hymn-writers since, but which must have been appealing enough in the squalid age of St. Peter Damian and of Bede. "*Nox et tempus desunt ei, diem fert continuum,*" writes the former, "Night and Time are found no longer, heaven brings forth perpetual day," and from Bede is the "Wistful beauty" of the line which Helen Waddell translates:

Nor any night
To snatch the splendour of the gracious light,
(*Nox ubi nulla rapit splendorem lucis amoenae*)

Mention of actual hours of the day brings home not a few of the great scenes of literature to our own humdrum, clock-ridden lives. Even Shakespeare's climax of ethereal beauty woven under the spell of night, love kindling into flame between Juliet at her window and Romeo in the moonlit garden, is linked to daily life by the fixing of "the hour of nine" for their communication next day. There must after all be a to-morrow, must be a morning following such a night; nine, of all the hours of daylight, having perhaps for most of us the least romantic associations. And that precise and feverish watching of the clock connected with all appointments

and "dates" when one is in love, is evident in Juliet's first words when we next see her: "The clock struck nine when I did send the nurse." So Cyrano de Bergerac in Rostand's play keeps restlessly crying "*Quelle heure*, Ragueneau?", as he sits writing his letter in the "Rôtisserie des Poètes" while the minutes tick by off the last hour before his meeting with Roxane; writing to her in a letter the things he knows he will not dare to say.

The earliest account of Christ's crucifixion (St. Mark's) gives the exact time: nine o'clock in the morning ("the third hour," Jewish reckoning being from sunrise, 6 a.m.). Three accounts give the time of the terrible darkening of the sky which followed, from twelve o'clock to three, and at three His last cry and His death. St. John, writing his gospel perhaps fifty years after the events, recalls the exact time on the day he and Andrew first met Christ and went to spend the evening with Him: it was four o'clock in the afternoon (ch. i, v. 39). Twice again in this gospel a precise hour is put on record across that gap of half a century; "about the sixth hour" (mid-day) when Christ sat down on the well-side in Samaria and the woman came to draw water (ch. iv) and one o'clock in the afternoon when the nobleman's son, according to the servants' report, recovered from his fever, and the father remembered that that was the exact time when Christ said he was well. In the Acts of the Apostles, ch. xix, where St. Paul is recorded as "reasoning daily" in the school or lecture-room of Tyrannus at Ephesus, there is an old traditional reading which says that he had the use of the room from "eleven o'clock till four."

The afternoon, on the whole, receives little definite notice in poetry. Tennyson sums it up in the *Lotus Eaters* as a time of lethargy: "In the afternoon they came unto a land In which it seemed always afternoon." Shakespeare mentions an afternoon hour in the groom's remark, *2nd Henry IV*, Act V, sc. 2, "it will be two o'clock ere they come from the coronation"; one of those realistic comments put into the mouth of characters who toil at the "trivial round," which sketch behind so-called historic events that background of ordinary commonplace happenings measured by the clock, which make up after all the bulk of life.

Though the daye be never so long,
At last the bells ringeth to evensong.

The *Odyssey's* recurring line for nightfall, " The sun sank and all the ways were darkened," and the Psalmist's " Man goeth forth to his work and to his labour, until the evening," both from the poetry of Mediterranean lands where twilight is short, are exemplified to this day in the villages where the country folk go home from the olive groves and vineyards at sunset, to exist over candles and wretched little lamps in their comfortless houses till daybreak. Dante has a sharply realistic phrase for evening, drawn very likely from the experience of many a nightfall on the road in his journeys of exile: " when the fly gives place to the gnat." The French express twilight in a delightful idiom, "*entre le chien et le loup*," " between the dog and the wolf," which takes one straight back into lands of fairy-tale infested by wild beasts.

As midnight comes round again, one recalls Gibbon's description of " the hour of his final deliverance," how he wrote the last words of the monumental history which had been conceived twenty-three years before. " It was on the day, or rather night, of the 27th of June, 1787, between the hours of eleven and twelve, that I wrote the last lines of the last page in a summer-house in my garden. After laying down my pen I took several turns in a berceau, or covered walk of acacias, which commands a prospect of the country, the lake, and the mountains. . . . A sober melancholy was spread over my mind by the idea that I had taken an everlasting leave of an old and agreeable companion, and that, whatsoever might be the future date of my history, the life of the historian must be short and precarious."

" Turn off the water-clock." It brings the page of print to life, that little direction which has come down the centuries at the end of some of Demosthenes' legal speeches, conjuring up the court scene in Athens where a kind of water-clock marked the time-limit for the speeches of advocates. An even more light-hearted method of dealing with Time is that of the sundial near Venice, which Hazlitt saw and quotes in his *Sketches and Essays*. Round it ran the inscription: " *Horas non numero nisi serenas*," " I count only the hours which are sunny."

H. M. WILSON.

No. 446. *November 1938.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

FULL REVIEWS 625

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT; UNDERSTANDING MODERN JAPAN; SLUMP AND RECOVERY, 1929-37; THE RELIGIOUS STRUGGLE IN GERMANY; THE GENIUS OF THE GERMAN LYRIC; CHINESE WOMEN, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY; CROMWELL'S UNDERSTUDY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: ITALY'S FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY, 1914-1937; EDUCATION IN NAZI GERMANY; THE COLONIAL EMPIRE AND ITS CIVIL SERVICE; LETTERS FROM BENJAMIN DISRAELI; A TOUR IN NORTHUMBRIA; SHADOWS ON THE HILLS; THE ANGLER'S ENGLAND 638

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.*

Professor Harold J. Laski's latest volume is an important commentary upon the principal aspects of parliamentary government in this country. It is certainly a work which ought to be read and digested by all serious students of the Constitution. It is true, of course, that the author is not a detached observer and that he writes as an ardent socialist, and no doubt some of his factual hypotheses may appear to many readers either distorted or untrue. But much of his argument has a non-party character and even that presented from a socialist angle frequently has an interest and validity which goes further to the very roots of representative self-government.

This work is at once a commentary on the working of the Constitution under existing conditions with the Labour Party in opposition and a foreboding for the future when a socialist government seeks to overthrow the capitalist system. Professor Laski argues that ever since the struggles of the seventeenth century our parliamentary system has operated upon the assumption of the private ownership of the means

* *Parliamentary Government in England.* By Harold J. Laski. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

of production and that this basis of society has never been questioned by any party in power until after the Great War. Absence of any fundamental economic and social cleavage has permitted the existence of party tolerance and compromise which is essential to the success of parliamentary government. So far the " function " of the party system " has been the settlement of what may be termed quantitative differences ; now it is called to settle differences that are qualitative in character." Between conservative and socialist economic thought " there is, in fact, a doctrinal abyss now unbridgable in terms of the old continuity of policy." From the very nature of the issue the capitalist cannot remain idle in face of a Labour majority. Either of two events will follow. Under pressure of conservative elements in the Constitution, such as the Crown, the House of Lords and the Civil Service and threatened by economic sabotage a Labour Government may suspend, as Professor Laski fears, at first temporarily and then indefinitely its programme of socialisation. But if it insists, anti-socialists will resist to the utmost, using every constitutional manœuvre and resorting ultimately to conflict. It is needless here to comment on the contingency of civil war since it infers unpredictable constitutional consequences. But there is involved the question of the Crown's so-called " reserve powers " in critical circumstances. In particular, has the King still the constitutional right to compel a dissolution against the advice of his Ministers, or alternatively to dismiss them ? Professor Laski has very little difficulty in showing that political neutrality is the foundation of the British Crown and that such initiative must ultimately subject it to party attack and possibly to ruin. " A ' Patriot King,' whatever the character of his opinions, is incompatible with parliamentary democracy in its British form." Moreover it is significant, as the author points out, that Edward VIII preferred to abdicate rather than oppose actively his Ministers' advice. So long, however, as authorities such as Professor Berriedale Keith insist upon the Crown's personal powers and there exists the possibility of personal influence upon the King, particularly from the Right, there must remain in the Labour Party some fear of a possible royal intervention when it is in power. In this connection there is much to commend the view of Mr. Justice Evatt in his *King and the Dominion Governors* that the personal

prerogative should receive statutory formulation ; and according to democratic principles.

While Professor Laski fears that the issue of socialism is likely to provoke extra-constitutional resistance against a Labour Government he agrees that normally at least our Cabinet system of government enables the will of the electorate to be carried out and is preferable to the American, French or former German democratic models. He quite rightly sees in party the great cohesive and directive factor in government, and is strongly opposed to proportional representation. " Once we grant the need for legislation on a body of coherent principle, the fragmentization of opinion may easily prove a major disaster." Moreover the Cabinet, being a party committee and, subject to the impact of public opinion, in control of the House of Commons " knows that it can get what it wants. The result is to make responsibility direct and policy coherent." Professor Laski does not regard a Member of Parliament's duties as merely automatic. He points, for example, to the ventilation of grievances and opinion and the extraction of information. However, he would enlarge their functions by setting up committees to advise Departments and to scrutinise delegated legislation and by extending the use of the Select Committee for inquiries and the examination of Private Members' Bills. " The real function of the House is to watch the process of administration as the safeguard of the private citizen." Professor Laski, however, vigorously denies the existence of a bureaucratic " despotism " in the Civil Service, although it is noticeable that he favours many safeguards which critics urge. His main complaint is in the alleged class consciousness of the upper grades of the Service and their inability to appreciate the working-class view.

Apart from the House of Lords, for which, of course, Professor Laski has little or no constitutional use, much of his sharpest criticism is directed against the judiciary, with its alleged " ignorance of, and hostility to, modern social reform." The need is for greater elasticity in statutory interpretation and for a " far profounder understanding by the judges that the historic philosophy of the Common Law is in considerable part unsuited by its inherent individualism to the necessary implications of a collectivist age." The author likens the High Court to the United States' Supreme

Court as a deliberate and reactionary brake upon social change. Such a charge and comparison is quite untenable. Unlike the Supreme Court, the English judiciary is bound strictly by precedent and is obliged to observe rules and decisions which may have ceased to be in touch with modern conditions, and also be disliked by the judges themselves. There is, for example, the notorious doctrine of common employment and it is noticeable that, where lack of precedent has permitted, its application has been restricted or abrogated as in the case of statutory duties. It is far better that settled rules of the Common Law should be amended, where necessary, by legislation than that the judiciary should exercise an arbitrary discretion governed by the individual views of its personnel. Professor Laski himself condemns the latter practice which exists to a certain degree in the Supreme Court of the United States.

A. G. DE M.

UNDERSTANDING MODERN JAPAN.*

Mr. Morgan Young is a distinguished member of Far Eastern circles, having been for ten years editor of one of Japan's best-known English newspapers, *The Japan Chronicle*. He has had peculiar opportunities to take a long view of all that has happened in that country during some very momentous years. Now that Japan is dominated by her military, however, criticism, or indeed the reporting of unwelcome news, rouses the wrath of her rulers, and Mr. Young has most arbitrarily been forbidden to reoccupy his editorial chair. This is the second record of Modern Japan which Mr. Young has given us. The first concerned Japan from 1912 to 1926. The present volume takes up the story from 1926 to 1938.

Books on Japan are very varied in type; so it is curious that, somehow, between them all, Western readers have failed to gain any balanced conception of Japan. Last century Lord Redesdale in his *Tales of Old Japan* showed us a feudal people, samurai loyal to the death, quick upon the sword. Yet, even while we read, as Mr. Morgan Young points out, we wondered what was the matter with us that, at heart, we could not wholly admire those "heroes," the Forty-Seven Ronins who so persistently hounded down their lord's slayer,

* *Imperial Japan, 1926-1938.* By A. Morgan Young. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.

and then committed *hara-kiri*. Next came Lafcadio Hearn, who delighted us with Japan's nature-loving artistry and charm. Yet, even so, the Western sensed a curious ghoulishness, an uneasy fear of the unseen, which Christianity has long exorcised in us. Not so long ago most of us were reading Arthur Waley's admirable translation of *The Tales of Genji*, and were confounded to find ourselves in a Japan of the eleventh century as sophisticatedly amorous and cynical as English society in Charles II's day. Is the genius of Japan really too elusive for Western comprehension? Or can it be, alas, that we understand it only too well?—even though we know that behind the modern gunmen-descendants of the old vengeful Ronins must be an inarticulate kindly peasantry, and beneath the herded university students and teachers the yearning of unspoken thought. We tell ourselves that in this twentieth century Japan's growing and reputable list of scientists makes it impossible that her ideology should be founded on any Sun-Goddess myth. Yet we are forced to believe missionaries when they tell us how they have been held in court for hours on end, because they would not teach that the Emperor of Japan is the Highest Authority in the universe. Japan's rulers may give a theoretical assent to the Buddhist hypothesis of "the impermanence of all things"; but the outside world cannot help seeing that, within the last forty years, Japan has reft from her neighbour, China, the Liuchiu Islands, Formosa, the suzerainty of Korea, the three Manchurian provinces of China with their wealth of coal, iron, and the soya bean; that she is now engaged in absorbing—if she can—Jehol, Inner Mongolia, and all North China; admittedly has her eyes on the coal and iron of Shansi and Shantung provinces; and, at the moment, is pressing on Central and Southern China, to destroy—again, if she can—the one government that has raised China up from her chaos to hope and unity.

Mr. Morgan Young gives us the inside history of all this, and vivid lights on the personalities concerned. It is a most disturbing and pitiful picture, but it gives a point and a meaning to what we see of Japan abroad; for the fabric is of one piece. Japan's devastation of China is identical with her destruction of progressive and constructive thought at home. Nor is the sword clean. Corruption, jealousy, treachery are rife amongst these soldier-rulers; and stupidity almost

past belief. Hamaguchi's policy of conservation of the great funds which Japan accumulated during the European War has been thrown to the wind. The more intransigent military would like science omitted from university courses as leading to " dangerous thoughts." The mildest objector to military domination is at once dubbed a " Communist " and is thereafter totally deprived of justice. It is small wonder that no man of parts is willing to become Premier, since assassination on the score of indignant patriotism surely awaits him if military demands on the Budget are not met *instanter* and *in toto*.

Nobody can predict how it will all end. For Japan's sake as well as China's, one cannot help hoping that she may find herself bogged in China, and be forced to re-think. Meanwhile, Mr. Morgan Young's book should be read by any who are interested in world affairs : and which of us to-day can afford to be otherwise ? He writes logically, interestingly and with personal knowledge—and with a restraint which cannot have been easy to maintain.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

SLUMP AND RECOVERY, 1929-37.*

This book based upon economic chapters contributed by Mr. Hodson to the annual *Survey of International Affairs* is an indispensable work of reference for students of international and national economy during a most critical period of shifting experimental industry, commerce and finance. It is inevitable that finance should assert its prominence, both as a measure of economic facts and forces and as a prime causal factor. For the chief features of this economic period, the struggle of many countries after economic isolation, the depression of 1931-3, the subsequent American crisis, the restriction of production in several industries and countries, the eccentric treatment of gold, the attempts at international policies, the armaments boom of 1936-7, find their most intelligible explanation in financial movements.

We have here a full and detailed account of these and other factors in both their national and international setting, with important incidental light upon the relations between economics and politics, internal and external.

* By H. V. Hodson. Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

The chief lesson that emerges is the chaotic state of economic thinking among the statesmen, economists and business men involved in the proceedings. The struggles after higher price levels, the oscillation of inflationary and deflationary " cures " for economic diseases, the costly public aids to depressed or excessively productive industries, the futile Conferences with their excellent assertions of principle and complete failure of policy—these revelations of unreason in the practical affairs of life are most disconcerting. It is not, however, Mr. Hodson's business to dwell upon the follies but to place them upon record for future analysts to study.

Protective duties are seen to play a most important part in the limitation and direction of international trade. It is natural that much space should be devoted to our own protective and restrictive policy, begun in war-time for purposes of national security and developed later for different ends. The growing sentiment of Imperialism contributed to damage our trade with many of our former customers, in particular Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Finland, Poland, Chile and Argentina. How far such disadvantages are offset by improved and enlarged trade with Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa is a question that still awaits an answer. The new position of the United States, suddenly converted from a debtor to a creditor nation by war and early post-war loans and investments, receives due attention in these chapters, for the American banking crisis reacted with mighty effect upon the trade and finance of the entire world.

Mr. Hodson, while admitting the influence of armaments expansion on trade revival in 1936-7, thinks there is a tendency to exaggerate its size. That it contributed to higher prices, not only of goods directly involved in armaments but of many other articles, is, of course, indisputable, but the effect differed widely in different countries, according to the measure in which they were debtors or creditors, producers of foods and raw materials or of manufactured goods for internal consumption or for export.

The writer distinguishes five phases in the period under study. The first was the depression which began in 1929 and was aggravated by the financial crisis of 1931. The next phase was one of " international defaults, of standstills, of exchange control," with various attempts to find solutions

along international lines which failed for lack of confidence. Then followed a phase of national efforts towards recovery which showed some measure of success in spite of the continuance of low prices. Fourthly came the phase of rising prices with promise of a boom when the collapse of the gold bloc coincided with commercial expansion and high governmental spending. Finally, we reach the pricking of the price boom early in 1937. " Associated with the curve of economics was a curve of political change, neither exactly parallel with it nor wholly representing cause or effect of the economic ups and downs, but linked to the economic curve by many important ties."

J. A. H.

THE RELIGIOUS STRUGGLE IN GERMANY.*

For breadth of vision, complete mastery of the subject, and moderation in tone the Dean of Chichester's book, *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany*, stands unrivalled. With great skill Dr. Duncan-Jones traces the stages of a struggle which has compelled the attention of the Christian world for the last five years. That this struggle was inevitable, given the nature of the two antagonists, the Christian Church and the National Socialist State, is the main argument of the book. It is a struggle between two conceptions of life, each of which demands a complete surrender of the individual, the totalitarian claims of the State in Germany being by no means less emphatic or less comprehensive than those of Christianity itself. More than that, it is a struggle between two Churches. For the National Socialist *Weltanschauung* is not merely a philosophy of life, it actually forms a religion, with its own dogmas and symbols, and its own sacraments, centring round the personality of Adolf Hitler. In clear terms the author states the issue. " What is the dogma before which the clear-sighted Christians of Germany have refused to bow ? It is the assertion that the rise of Adolf Hitler, his success in restoring German self-confidence, and his recovery of German military might, with its promise of reversing the defeat of 1918—that

* *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany.* By the Dean of Chichester. Victor Gollancz. 8s. 6d.

these things are a miracle of God, a Divine Act, more significant than the appearance on the earth of Jesus Christ."

At the outset, it is true, this issue was obscured. The successes of National Socialism in the political field were certainly appreciated by Christians of all confessions, and the promised moral regeneration of the German nation was eagerly welcomed. Only when it became apparent that National Socialism would not confine its activities to politics and morals, that it demanded man's soul as well as his body, and that the creed it endeavoured to force upon men was decidedly anti-Christian, did the Protestant Churches begin an organised resistance against the encroachments of the State.

The author gives a very clear and intelligible account of the details of the conflict without ever losing sight of the main issue. For the most part he lets the facts speak for themselves. He traces the development of the Confessional Movement from its very beginnings to the establishment of the Confessional Church with its great synods, and takes pains to show the different methods employed by the State to effect a co-ordination of the Church, and the various forms of pressure applied. It is a sad story of human suffering inflicted by human ignorance of man's deepest needs. At the same time it is a story of heroism and sacrifice which testifies to the reality of the Church.

In the four chapters devoted to the struggle of the Roman Catholic Church, Dr. Duncan-Jones shows that though the form of attack may vary—smuggling and immorality trials taking the place of financial and legal pressure—the National Socialist State is equally desirous of breaking the Roman Catholic Church, to which the Concordat of July 20th, 1933, affords as slight protection as the Church Constitution of July 14th, 1933, to the Protestant Churches. The growing danger to the Roman Church is reflected in the gradual change of outlook of the Pope, who has been persuaded that the German form of Fascism constitutes as great a menace to Christianity as Bolshevism.

The Dean of Chichester leaves no doubt that the struggle for religious freedom in Germany is still continuing and that it will continue in spite of perils and persecutions. " When the choice was offered—as it is clearly offered—Hitler or Christ, there can be but one answer."

GERTRUDE FARION.

THE GENIUS OF THE GERMAN LYRIC.*

What is the most criticised feature of the Nazi régime in Germany to-day? Probably the coercion of the individual, the fact that honesty of thought is being suffocated there. . . . It is, therefore, delightfully refreshing to come to Mr. Closs's book. From the inviolable retreat of Bristol University he is able to speak in perfect freedom. He extols nothing unduly and withholds nothing from us—he never, for instance, denies all knowledge of the name of Heine, nor does he appear to smile in inane ignorance at the mention of Thomas Mann or Stefan Zweig. Race is for him no all-determining factor of the lyricist's genius. Rather he sees the lyric as part of a great tradition, and traces out its long development, chequered and uneven as has been the development of the national life of the German people. And for this very reason, because amidst the unrest and upheavals of the past there has never existed a great literary society or literary *coterie*—as, for example in France in the seventeenth century—the lyric has become an essential characteristic of Germany's literature. It reflects the fleeting emotion of a moment—a moment caught and rescued for ever from the passing of time. In all ages the lyric has reached the highest form of German literary excellence, and from out the pages of this book some of those sweet old folk-songs seem to come floating over the air, to fill one with nostalgia for the German forests, and the German Rhine.

And so Mr. Closs opens little fairy doors, and shows us a dream-world: old court-yards the haunt of the Minnesingers and Meistersingers; the prim gardens of classicism; the "gushing fountains and whispering trees of the Romantic poets"; the "kaleidoscopic colouring," the verdant pastoral borders of the Impressionists. But the garden wall is, and remains, the end of the cosmos. Perhaps Mr. Closs is mistaken in not conjuring up a sufficient background of history. Poetry, even lyric poetry, is not severable from the time when it is written. The Muses walk hand in hand. History and literature are, must be, to a certain extent co-existent and interdependent. It is a pity, for instance, to discuss the Romantic movement with only a passing allusion to Revolutionary

* An Historic Survey of its Formal and Metaphysical Values. By A. Closs. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 18s.

Europe, and to cite modern poetry without a reference to the demands of Nazi Germany. But Mr. Closs is so occupied in cultivating his garden that he fails to look over the garden walls!

Yet this book is and will remain an outstanding achievement because of the real intimate understanding and sympathy which it shows for the German character. Mr. Closs argues that the Germans love nothing better than to follow an enthusiasm. They evolve a slogan, and it becomes their self-imposed duty to carry out that slogan to the letter. Even in literature they develop the mentality of the poster-artist! But patiently the author bears with them through all their literary phases by turns—*Wanderlust*, *Waldeinsamkeit*, *Waldweben*, *Weltschmerz*, *Kultur*, *Weltanschauung*—up to the curiously mystical catch-phrase of the moderns: "*Mensch, werde wesentlich.*" These manifold voices echoing through Germany's lyric poetry have always acted upon it as an immense stimulus. To-day in Germany there is no stimulus lacking, and Mr. Closs tells us that there is a literary movement afoot, worthy and deserving to enter into the very vast heritage to which it has become heir.

E. R. Hodsoll.

CHINESE WOMEN, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY.*

This is a book of uncommon charm. It unites in a personal manner the most diverse qualities such as a light and readable style, profound knowledge of the subject and, what seem to a non-Chinese, excellent translations of Chinese poems with attractive drawings made either from rubbings or from original modern designs. One criticism which may be offered is that Mrs. Ayscough, like many strangers who adopt a sympathetic and understanding attitude towards a foreign country, paints her picture in altogether too rosy a light. By this she not only omits doing full justice to the complexities of a great culture, but hampers some of the effect of her book, as, artistically speaking, it lacks contrasts.

In the first part ancient and modern China are compared, and the social position of the Chinese women of old, which was defined by the Yin principle—the principle of earth, darkness and the moon—is explained. An interesting reference

* By Florence Ayscough. Cape. 12s. 6d.

is given to the eight terms of maternal relationship, such as legal mother and divorced mother. Yang and Yin are complementary, and so are men and women although their activities are distinct. To-day concubinage is no longer legally admitted, and modern women, now that they have entered professional life and may be self-supporting, are apt to be intolerant of double standards. Perhaps the most remarkable women of our age in China are the "3 sisters," the ladies of the Soong family, Mrs. H. H. Kung, Mrs. Sun Yat-sen and Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek. All three are Christians, a fact which seems of great importance to the understanding of modern womanhood in China.

In the second part, Mrs. Ayscough studies Chinese women, both of the present and the past, such as educationalists, artists and writers. A deeper sociological analysis is not attempted, and therefore it is difficult to realise what meaning the fact had for the general condition of Chinese women in the fourteenth century that a painter, like Lady Kuan, could hold high positions at court.

The third part gives a comprehensive summary of the Lieh Nü Chuan as summarised in the Kuei Fan in 1591. Particularly interesting, both sociologically and psychologically, is the story of a lady of the Shih clan. She passes a useless life in the harem of the Emperor T'ai Tsung (627-50) and writes a poem expressing her thoughts which she slips into the sleeve of a coat; there it is eventually found and the maiden is married to the foot-soldier who detected it. Ten widows are chosen by the Chinese author as worthy of immortal fame because they have, under trying conditions, protected their chastity. The "Ways" also illustrate the joint family system of old China, where the sons and their wives shared the paternal home and a common purse. In the short space available for this review it is impossible to do justice to all the aspects of cultural life evoked by Mrs. Ayscough's book. It is a valuable introduction to Chinese civilisation for the layman, and makes delightful reading for the student.

HELEN ROSENAU.

CROMWELL'S UNDERSTUDY.*

Dr. William Harbutt Dawson is best known for his valuable works on modern Germany, but he is also a specialist on the

* *Cromwell's Understudy: The Life and Times of General John Lambert.* By William Harbutt Dawson. Hodge & Co. 15s.

Cromwellian period. A full-length biography of Lambert was urgently required, and this substantial volume is the realisation of a plan conceived nearly sixty years ago. It is a dramatic story, sympathetically told, and based on a mass of fresh material. There is no suggestion of greatness about him, and he was not a very striking personality; but he was a fine character, patriotic, honourably ambitious, cultured and averse to extremes. If there is nothing of the overpowering genius of Cromwell, there is also nothing of the ruthlessness of the greatest man of action in our history. Dr. Dawson admires the Protector a good deal less than Gardiner. He speaks of his mobile conscience, and he explains why Lambert did not get on very well with him.

> They differed in that Cromwell, in his honest impatience to hasten the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth, was prepared to carry restriction and prohibition into every department of social life, where Lambert, with a stronger faith in humanity and a larger and more generous conception of personal liberty, distrusted the assumption that men and women should or could be made moral by legal compulsion. He consistently refused, in fact, to mix religion and politics.

Cromwell was first a Puritan, whereas Lambert was, above all, a liberal Parliamentarian.

After helping him both to win his victories and to rule the country, General Lambert withdrew from the Government in 1657, a year before Cromwell's death. He had approved and indeed proposed the Protectorate, but he declined to encourage the still higher ambitions of his chief. He regained influence on the death of the Protector, and the obvious incompetence of Richard Cromwell turned many eyes towards the man who was well liked by the army and had no violent enemies. But the royalist tide had begun to flow when the country was ruled by the Major-Generals, and when Oliver was gone it swelled into an irresistible flood. Clarendon and other Royalists used to discuss the question whether Lambert, whose moderation was generally recognised and who had no share in the execution of the King, might perhaps promote the restoration of the dynasty. The chance was seized by Monck, and Lambert's career closed at the early age of 41, when Charles II returned to Whitehall. He was condemned to death for his active part in what Royalists described as the great rebellion, but passed the remaining twenty-four years

of his life as a prisoner, first in the Channel Islands and then on an island in Plymouth Sound. "The more he is studied and understood," writes his biographer, "the more attractive as a man and the more important as a historical figure he will be found. He was called by Cromwell and the soldiers Honest John Lambert, and such a name is not bestowed without reason." Dr. Dawson makes out a very strong case for his favourable verdict. G. P. G.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914-1937,* by Maxwell Macartney and Paul Cremona, is the first full, authoritative and fairly impartial survey of the subject. The authors, who have spent many years in Rome as correspondents of leading English and American journals, detest dictatorships like the rest of us, but they keep their feelings under control. Introductory chapters on the war and the peace treaties are followed by studies of different aspects of Italian policy—Fiume, Albania, France, Germany, England, the Near East, the League of Nations, Disarmament, Abyssinia, etc. The authors find a good deal to criticise not only in Italian but in British policy. They remind us that the Corfu affair earned for Signor Mussolini "that name of a dangerous international firebrand which has clung to him ever since." They write with justifiable resentment of "the deliberately fomented anti-British campaign of lies and coarse insults which for months dishonoured the Italian Press." But they also censure the deplorable errors of the British Government at the opening of the Abyssinian war, when Sir Samuel Hoare blew a loud blast on the League trumpet at Geneva and then ran away as soon as Mussolini showed his teeth. "Great Britain raised among her partisans of the League hopes such as could not be realised, and her mistake was that of not having seen in advance the consequences of an action doomed to failure because of the manner in which it was conducted. Thus the failure of the League likewise became a British diplomatic defeat of the first order." The closing chapter on Italy's future aims is not cheerful reading. Writing before Mr. Chamberlain's Anglo-Italian treaty was concluded, our authors declare that the recognition of Abyssinia would not end the trouble. The real source of anxiety is the Mediterranean. Is there room for more than one Great Power there? The Fascists are convinced that there is not. "When Italians call the Mediterranean *mare nostro*, these are no empty words. . . Italy, re-born as a nation under Fascism, is seeking to wrest from Great Britain her undisputed sway over the Mediterranean which began with the capture of Gibraltar."

* Oxford University Press, 12s. 6d.

Education in Nazi Germany, by Two English Investigators (The Kulturkampf Association, 19 Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, London, W.C.2), provides a carefully documented account of a very important subject. All autocracies try to capture the child, and the Nazis are as thorough as the Bolshevists. "The mind of the German youth," writes Sir Norman Angell in a Foreword, "is now being so formed as to subserve the ends of evil, to undermine all hopes of peace and disarmament, and to menace the security of free communities like those of the British Commonwealth." In these seventy pages the reader will find a wealth of material, derived from many official sources, relating to the general aims of education, Hitler's theory of race, the textbooks, the universities, the teachers, and such outside influences as athletics and religion. The whole story is summarised in a quotation from Dr. Ley, head of the Labour Front: "The Party claims the totality of the soul of the German People. It cannot and will not suffer that another party or point of view should dominate in Germany." Such spiritual tyranny can be imposed for a time by terror and brute force, but some day it will be shaken off by a great and highly cultured people, perhaps at the cost of a world war. That the mind of the country which produced Lessing and Kant and Humboldt and Goethe is being dragooned by anti-semitic fanatics is enough to make the angels weep.

* * * * *

*The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service** is a valuable and informative book by Mr. Charles J. Jeffries, who is an Assistant-Secretary to the Colonial Office. Since the Report of the Warren Fisher Committee in 1930 there has been great reorganisation in colonial administration towards unification and the creation of definite professional services, and in the Colonial Legal Service and the Colonial Medical Service. The author is careful to point out that this development is "complementary and not in opposition to the development of local services manned as far as may be possible from local resources." In this volume Mr. Jeffries is only concerned with the services recruited from Whitehall, and provides a lucid and straightforward description with an historical background. It is a book which should appeal particularly to the student of colonial administrative methods and to the potential recruit to any of the main branches of the Service.

* * * * *

The Marchioness of Londonderry has published an interesting collection of *Letters from Benjamin Disraeli to Frances Anne Marchioness of Londonderry, 1837-1861*.† Extracts from some of the more important letters in this correspondence have already appeared in Monypenny

* Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d. net.
† Macmillan. 7s. 6d. net.

and Buckle's *Life*, and Lady Londonderry has now taken the opportunity of publishing these along with fifty further letters, all linked together by a short commentary and historical narrative. The letters are largely concerned with social gossip, but in some measure they also express Disraeli's outlook upon the passing political scene. Lady Londonderry has also something to say of the life and character of Frances Anne, whose patronage and friendship Disraeli so solicitously courted and received for more than twenty years and whom he once described as "half ruffian—half great lady."

* * * * *

*A Tour in Northumbria** has been issued under the auspices of the North-Eastern Trading Estates Ltd., whose efforts, without any view to profit, in attracting to the Special Area in the North-East new industries are well known. The main purpose of this most attractive and informative book is to explain the charm and amenities of Northumberland and County Durham as a residential area for the industrialist and business man from the South. The author, Mr. Douglas Goldring, is himself a Londoner and in these vivid pages describes with enthusiasm his first impressions of the scenery, people and historic and romantic associations of this corner of England. It is too frequently forgotten, as he points out, that the coal mining and industrial areas in Northumberland amount in extent to only a tenth of the county and the remainder consists of sparsely populated agricultural land and "wild and deserted hills and moorlands, of an extraordinary beauty and grandeur." This short volume with its delightful illustrations forms an attractive introduction to this too little known countryside and coast, apart from its more special aim in showing the enjoyment of living in an area where the pleasures of town, sea and countryside are equally at your doorstep.

It is not inappropriate here to welcome a cheap edition of *Shadows on the Hills*.† Miss Nancy Price's reminiscences among the Cumberland Fells are written with a delicacy, depth of insight and a descriptive power which mark out the particular charm and merit of her book.

* * * * *

A new addition to the English Scene series edited by Mr. Eric Parker is a delightful volume by Mr. Patrick Chalmers on *The Angler's England*.‡ It is more than an appreciation of the English countryside from the fisherman's angle. The author approaches angling from most varied viewpoints, including literary, artistic and social aspects, in a narrative lightly written and enlivened with anecdotes and the author's own deep knowledge and experiences of fishing.

* Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. net. † Allen & Unwin. 5s. net.
‡ Seeley Service & Co. 8s. 6d. net.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.
DECEMBER 1938.

TWENTY YEARS AFTER: A SURVEY.*

ONE of the chief aims of this Institute is to bring philosophy into relation with affairs, to help in applying Thought to Life. It is now just twenty years since the end of the Great War, and we may well take this moment to survey, with a philosophic eye, the trends of the period; to consider, however briefly, the tendencies in thought and action; and to look where we now stand so as to take direction for the future.

The period has been dominated by international politics. This followed naturally from the convulsion of the Great War. The home affairs of most countries, and certainly of our own, have been over-shadowed by foreign affairs; the minds of the new generation have been moulded, in a degree unprecedented in the modern age, by world conditions; the stress and strain in Europe and Asia has impressed itself deeply on the domestic politics, the economics, the literature, the art, the religion of the time.

The two decades, we may see, differ notably from one another. The first ten years were a time, in the main, of reconstruction and development, often of prosperity. The League of Nations included six out of the seven Great Powers. It was active and successful. Thanks largely to its efforts, there was no war between nations anywhere—with the exception of the short campaign in Asia Minor of Turkey against Greece, which was really a remanet of the Great War. History can record the only decade in the annals of the modern world when the Temple of Janus might have been closed. It was a time, no doubt, of some disillusionment after the high hopes cherished at the end of the War. There was already apparent among the younger people a tinge of bitterness, sinking sometimes into cynicism. But on the whole, people felt that things were not too bad.

Very different was the second decade. There came the Great Depression; the trade of the world was suddenly halved; thirty millions of work-people found themselves

* Presidential Address to the British Institute of Philosophy, October 11th, 1938.

unemployed. A World Economic Conference met in London to find remedies, and dispersed without results. A World Disarmament Conference met in Geneva, sat for three years, and ended in equal failure. The spirit of nationalism and militarism captured Germany ; an armament race developed in all the principal countries, and rushed along with ever-increasing speed. Taxation was enormously increased ; trade restrictions were multiplied ; the economic recovery which had begun was first retarded and then brought to a standstill. There came the Japanese invasion of China, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the civil war in Spain, the march of the German armies into Austria. The system of Collective Security proved to be ineffective. (It is not within my province here to try to assess causes or to allocate blame.) The League shrank till it included only three of the seven Great Powers ; it found itself powerless to function in any of the major issues. The dangers of the time reached their terrible climax in the grave crisis through which we have just been passing.

There were factors, it is true, on the credit side. The Balkan States, in former years the most dangerous centres of disturbance, reconciled their quarrels and presented an unusual picture of harmony and peace. Russia seemed for a time to be stabilising both her internal régime and her external relations. India, after a long period of constant unrest, was tranquillised to a large degree by the enactment of a new constitution ; in its scale, its boldness and its elaboration perhaps the most remarkable statute ever passed by any legislature. The whole continent of America, from the Arctic regions to Cape Horn, has achieved a peace within itself that may well be the envy of Europe and Asia.

But these favourable factors were few ; they could not out-balance the heavy items on the debit side—the economic coils in which the peoples have been struggling desperately, the ever-growing perils of war, the steady drift, as it seemed, towards the abyss.

Dictators may rule, or peoples may rule, but both are themselves ruled by ideas. Very clearly we may see in these times how ideas govern deeds, how Action follows Belief. Communist doctrine directs the policy of one-tenth of mankind in the Soviet Union. Fascists and Nazis are moved by definite codes of principle—race, nationality, personal leadership, subordination of the individual to the State, approval

of violence. The democratic peoples have their principles also. Underlying all these various codes of action are the teachings of philosophers of various schools. Marx, Engels and Lenin ; Hegel, Nietzsche, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Spengler, Sorel, and Croce ; Mill and the other protagonists of liberty—these, with many more, are the brains that guide the men of action—Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, or Roosevelt and the Governments of the democracies. Which of these conflicting ideas are right ? We see in these times a clear duty for thinkers everywhere to examine these several doctrines, to reach conclusions as to each, and to try to give guidance to the troubled world.

The social philosopher must approach this duty in a spirit of impartiality ; but not that of the Mayor who at his inauguration said, " I can assure the aldermen, councillors and citizens of this borough that during my year of office I will act always with the strictest impartiality, between Right on the one hand and Wrong on the other." Nor will the inquirer be deterred by too much diffidence when judging the works of such writers as Houston Stewart Chamberlain or Oswald Spengler. Their works are voluminous and of vast range, but do not impress by profundity. They remind me of the definition of a plane surface in geometry—length and breadth without depth. Nietzsche, who felt much scorn for writers of that type—as well as of most other types—said that " great learning and great shallowness go together very well under one hat."

Nearly two hundred millions of people in Russia, and parties and groups in most other lands, are influenced by the teachings of Karl Marx. Yet hardly any philosopher or scientist of to-day would endorse Marx's materialism. Hardly any historian would accept his doctrine that it is the economic factor which almost alone determines the course of human affairs ; or would agree that the events of the past, or the state of mankind in the present, give any confirmation of his theory of an automatic evolution of nations from capitalism, through revolution to communism. Hardly any economist accepts Marx's Theory of Value, which is the foundation of his argument. Hardly any statesman who had laboured through the volumes of *Capital*, would say that here was a sound analysis of modern society, or indeed that the book had any close relation with real affairs.

When we turn to the philosophies of Fascism and National-Socialism, we are struck, there also, with the insistence on Destiny, Necessity, Inevitability, the power of " Events " in themselves. All this is empty assertion ; on a par with the unsupported dogmas of the medieval scholastics. I have no doubt that, if Mr. Neville Chamberlain's missions to Germany had failed, and Europe had been plunged this autumn into a general war, historians of this school would be saying in the future, as they said about the catastrophe of 1914, that " events were too strong for human efforts and marched inexorably to their pre-destined end." Since things turned out otherwise, we shall hear nothing in this case of Destiny and Inevitability.

This school exalts intuition and personal temperament above reason and the teachings of experience. Thereby it deprives ethics of any rational foundation. It becomes free to regard patriotism as a supreme and unconditioned virtue, for no reason except that it chooses to do so ; not recognising that there is such a thing as a criminal patriotism as well as a righteous patriotism. The conception of justice is relegated to a dim background. At best the leaders of this school would say, with a character in one of Meredith's stories, " I commit no injustice except with sufficient reason." Signor Mussolini reiterates as a maxim for the people of Italy, " *Credere, ubbedire, combattere* " ; but if we ask *why* men should take it to be their chief purpose in life to believe, to obey and to fight, there is no answer.

"In Germany," it has been said, " everything that is not prohibited is compulsory." The individual human soul and intellect is made subordinate. No one is allowed to say " I " ; everyone must say " We." Possibly the ants and the bees think in the same way. The totalitarian States are moving along a road which at the far end would bring them to an insect civilisation. The people are not allowed to know facts that are vital to them ; blindfolded by the censorships they are led helpless into the future. If the thinkers of the world know that all this is wrong, have they not the duty to rise up and say so ?

Nor are the fundamentals of the democratic creed without need of review. Liberty is seen nowadays not to be a single and simple thing, as used to be thought, but to be complex. It is indeed fourfold. There is national liberty, and there is

constitutional liberty, and personal liberty and economic liberty. The four inter-act ; their claims sometimes conflict ; at times one of them may have to be sacrificed in some degree for the sake of another. This inter-relation has not yet been studied. Economics, again, used to be regarded as the science of wealth ; but now, as Mr. J. A. Hobson says, " 'Welfare Economics' have come to be recognised as superseding the older valuations, implying that wealth of an economic order must be translated into human benefits." Simple *laissez-faire* individualism has gone by the board, but the system that is to take its place—which must also be of more complex character—is not yet agreed. In international affairs the new problems that arise from the advent of dictatorships have not been realised and examined. The old principle, that internal régimes should not determine international relationships, in these times often puts the lovers of liberty to a hard test. The policy of preventive war—to seize some favourable opportunity in order to strike, before he grows too strong, at a neighbour who, you feel sure, is bound to become your open enemy—this policy, though unconfessed, evidently has its adherents. Yet all history shows that to engage in preventive war is nothing but wickedness. It would be futile also as a safeguard of peace ; on the contrary it would give us a continuous see-saw of one war after another. The cause of Peace, Liberty and Justice is so commanding, so vital to the well-being of mankind, that it is not surprising, perhaps, that some of its devoted champions are eager to spring to arms for its sake, would hasten to draw the sword even before the necessity was certain. Peace, it seems, may have her Jingoes as well as war.

On all sides, then, there is room and there is need for the philosophic thinker to give guidance, by pen and by voice, in the realm of public affairs—the scene of the main problems and the centre of the chief activities of these twenty years.

The troubles of the world, together with the lack of agreed standards in religion and in philosophy, have created an atmosphere of uncertainty and scepticism. As may be expected in such a period, art is at a low level. No one would say that the twentieth century is anywhere a period of great art. In England the art of poetry has rarely been at so low an ebb. It is passing through a fashion of pretentious and

sophisticated obscurity, which robs it of all interest and deprives it of all influence. In painting and sculpture, some of the younger generation of artists, from whom the great men of to-morrow should be drawn, swim with a current which carries them down from level to level till it reaches bottom in Sur-realism ; the whole movement appearing to most older men to be intellectually stupid and morally decadent. On the other hand, architecture and industrial design reach in some countries and in some instances a standard in which the age may well take pride. That the importance of the amenities is becoming recognised is shown also by the growing movement in Great Britain against the spoiling of the countryside, a movement which is reaching the scale of a national revolt. We are beginning to rebel against what Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis calls " selling our birthright for a mess of cottages."

On the credit side, again, stands the continued expansion and improvement of national education. Tens of thousands of devoted workers, in the teaching profession or in voluntary organisations, are busy continuously in maintaining the activities and raising the standards of our educational system in all its grades and branches. In spite of admitted defects, the results on the whole are admirable. It is partly because we have a more educated people ; and partly because of well-directed social legislation and voluntary movements of various kinds, that the national vice, as it used to be of drunkenness has been reduced to small proportions ; that crime has greatly diminished, so that during these twenty years, we have been able to close half our prisons ; and that the standards of health have greatly risen, and the death-rate has fallen during the present century by one-third. It is a consequence of educational progress that publishers find a market for millions of copies of cheap reprints of the best books, old and new, in letters and in all branches of knowledge. While, it is true, little good can be said of some sections of the press, the best of our newspapers are at least as good as they have been at any time, and far more widely read, while the average, I would contend, is certainly higher than it has ever been.

Science continues her triumphant march. In every direction she has been consolidating her gains and conquering fresh domains. There was not long ago a tendency in some quarters to say that, because scientific discovery had been

put to destructive and terrible uses—poison gas, bombing aeroplanes, submarines and so forth—civilisation might have fared better with no science at all. But this is plainly a hasty and superficial judgment. Lord Rayleigh, in his Presidential Address to the British Association last summer, gave a considered and convincing reply. One might as well say that, because coal gas is used for suicides, and the radio for broadcasting jazz music, it would be better to prohibit both.

But in one province of science, the fundamentals of Physics, in which indeed philosophy is specially interested, there has been disappointment. There we seem for the time being to have come to a standstill. Contrary to earlier hopes, Relativity Theory has not succeeded in furnishing an explanation of gravitation that will command general agreement ; nor an acceptable substitute for the hypothesis of a physical ether. Professor Einstein, in a recent book, *The Evolution of Physics*, written in collaboration with Dr. Infeld, has felt constrained to say : " Our only way out seems to be to take for granted the fact that space has the physical property of transmitting electromagnetic waves, and not to bother too much about the meaning of this statement." But no one could regard this as the last word, or believe that physics can be content permanently with such a position.

The mathematical physicists have adopted in recent years a standpoint which seems to many philosophers quite untenable. Because their own observations of electrons or molecules can only be based upon the resultants of movements in the aggregate, since the single electron or molecule is far out of reach, they hasten to the conclusion that the individual unit is governed by what are called " statistical laws," and not by a combination of definite physical causes. Because the physicist cannot determine with certainty both the position and the velocity of an electron at any instant—since his means of observation do not allow him to do so, and from their nature can never allow him to do so—this school deduce from this that the electron itself shares the uncertainty of the physicist. Since he cannot " determine " what is its position-cum-velocity, in the sense that he cannot discover what it is, we are to suppose that Nature cannot " determine " it either, in the sense that she cannot cause or decide it.

They have devised, also, a strange amalgamation of physical facts with mental concepts. They speak of curvature

or stresses of space-time, although space and time and their combination clearly are human ideas, while "curving" or "stress" postulates a physical subject. We even hear it suggested that the universe consists ultimately of nothing but "waves of probability," although it is hard to see how the notion of probability can take the form of a wave, or any other form. One might as well say that the number Four was heavier than the number Two. I would commend to your attention, if you have not already read it, a searching examination of the propositions of this school by Professor Susan Stebbing, in her recent book, *Philosophy and the Physicists*. It is indeed more than a searching criticism; one might describe it as an indignant and vehement onslaught. But it is not unjustified, and it should help to clear the air. Meanwhile, as philosophy, in this province, must needs seek its premises in the conclusions of science, we must wait, with what patience we may, until the physicists have made a fresh start on other lines; for these, we may strongly suspect, will lead to no profitable end.

Government, Art, Science—we have yet to touch upon the other chief human interest, Religion. These twenty years have been a time of searching of hearts. The moral shock of the Great War and of all the troubles that have followed, together with an ever-spreading knowledge among the people of the discoveries of science, have stirred the Churches and shaken the creeds. The human Soul, dimly perceiving, has ever been groping in the universe, seeking the Spirit that animates the Whole. Can the Soul touch Deity through its own qualities; or through the teachings of the Founders of religions and the Prophets, or the experiences of mystics; or in the panorama of Nature? Always there is a haunting doubt; always a distrust of the range of its own powers. But of one thing there is no doubt. We have a certainty that what we perceive and what we know is not all that there is. Something Else there must surely be. The striving to reach and to understand that Something Else can never cease.

The stimulus of our times has invigorated religion; but with a difference. We may see almost all the creeds becoming year by year less historical and dogmatic, and more actual, spiritual, ethical. Inherited custom counts for less; individual thought and aspiration counts for more. The influence

of the ancient theologies is on the wane. Among different nations there are different tendencies for their replacement. In the civilisations of North-Western Europe and of America, of India also, it is not materialism which is taking their place; nor yet a crude, irrational nationalism as in Central Europe; but rather a moulding of the old creeds to accord with what we now know about the processes of the universe and about our own natures, while preserving their precious value as a channel of inspiration and a force for righteousness.

Meanwhile, as always happens in times of confusion, there is a plentiful crop of weeds in the fields that are left uncultivated. Human credulity seems to have no limits; its fertility is inexhaustible. We see all around us a rank growth of superstition, of new religions based on the emptiest beliefs, sometimes on obvious delusions; even the ancient nonsense of astrology is sprouting again. Almost any absurdity will be accepted under the influence of emotionalism by some people somewhere. Such were the symptoms of social confusion which history records as prevalent in the Dark Ages. Happily our Society has not reached that stage of dissolution; these symptoms are as yet sparse, and seen in their right proportion, are of little importance.

At this time two movements are clearly desirable in the sphere of religion. The first would carry on the tendency, long proceeding within each of the ancient creeds, which aims at cutting away those dogmas and doctrines, inherited from a distant past of scantier knowledge, which are in plain contradiction with established facts. When the religions are ready to rank truth above tradition, and seek to satisfy the intellect as well as the emotions, they will soon take their place again in the van of human progress. And secondly, in the relations between the various faiths, there is need of a movement to promote mutual goodwill and co-operation. If instead of antagonism and recrimination, each more intent on emphasising differences than resemblances, each drawing only on its own resources of spiritual strength and example, and rigidly excluding the others—if there were between them friendship and neighbourliness and a common pursuit of great aims that are held in common, this age might well witness a religious renascence, which would help to rescue it from the moral quagmire in which it flounders, and set its feet on firmer ground. There is in this country a movement for World

Fellowship in Religion. It has held Congresses in the last three years in London, Oxford and Cambridge, with spokesmen drawn from all the great Faiths. But its supporters are numbered in hundreds, while it is hundreds of thousands that are needed.

The field for the social philosopher, then, is wide; it calls out for the plough and the sowing. There is a growing readiness to answer the call. Philosophy, in England and elsewhere, is far less obsessed by epistemology than it was a generation ago. One may find healthy signs also that a ruthless obscurity of style is seen to be an offence. Bacon dedicated his first book on philosophy to King James I, who, on reading it, remarked, " it resembles the peace of God in that it passeth all understanding." Such has been the stigma that many philosophic writings have justly earned—though not Bacon's later books of course, nor a number of English works in every period. There are happy indications that the philosophy of our own time is emerging from the fashion of esoteric pedantry, and is ready to treat the great problems of life and thought in a plain way for the plain man. Then the philosopher, too, will take his place again in the forefront of the march, leading the leaders in the varied spheres of thought and action.

There is always in the British people a healthy practical spirit which seeks to arrive at positive results, and is not discouraged by obstacles. We confess to many faults, but Defeatism is not among them. We seldom find here—to quote George Meredith again—" the juvenile ' shrug philosophy.' As thus: ' What creatures we are, but life is so.' " We struggle on in spite of the difficulties that crowd around us. So, in international affairs, we shall still seek to establish the policy of " peaceful change," and to restore that collective discussion and guidance which is a condition of the sane ordering of the world. In national affairs we shall still stand fast for our own ideals of freedom and justice. If we can succeed in the political sphere, then the strong moral forces innate in the people will bring other things of value after—in religion, art and letters, in social conditions also, in all the elements that make a worthy civilisation; so that these two troubled post-War decades may be followed by a third that is better.

SAMUEL.

THE NEW DEAL IN EUROPE.

IN March this year Herr Hitler led Germany to the occupation of the Sovereign State of Austria and thereafter incorporated it into the German Reich. He did this at a time when Europe was internationally peaceful, though more than one country was in domestic confusion, and France, as at the time of the Rhineland *coup*, was changing from one incompetent Government to another. Previously to this absorption of Germany's former rival Hitler had declared that he had no hostility to Austria and no designs against her territorial integrity, while simultaneously conducting a subterranean and costly campaign against the Austrian Government. In July he mobilised part, and early in August the whole, of his armed forces amounting to a million and a half men for " autumn manœuvres " on the borders of Czechoslovakia, and made plain to everyone, except the British Government, that another adjacent territory was about to be absorbed. On July 26th Lord Runciman, permitted at the request of Prague, or encouraged, or asked to go there by the Foreign Office, to mediate between the Berlin and Prague Governments, embarked on a mission which had no element of success therein. His task, which can only have been undertaken from the sternest sense of duty, was welcomed by the British people from whom the gravity of the situation had been most unwisely withheld, and also by the Czechs who believed not only in the unswerving integrity of an English negotiator, but in the moral and material resources of Great Britain. This procedure seems to have been acceptable to such Germans as were allowed to know anything about their country's foreign policy. How great was the general ignorance of this is best illustrated by the following occurrence. A high financial authority in Berlin rang London on the phone to inquire the price and order the purchase of a very large block of shares. When told the day's price was one-half of the offer, the German asked the reason for this sudden and great slump, to which England inquired, Do you know nothing of " the crisis " ? " What crisis ? " replied the German. Such genuine ignorance seems impossible to us and yet is accepted as perfectly natural in Germany. It is little wonder that we do not understand each other. Into the details of Lord Runciman's mission it is now profitless to enter. It was not his fault that

he entered in triumph and left " with none so poor to do him reverence." Herr Hitler had tolerated a mission which might delay, but he took care it should not interfere with, his plans. When the delay threatened the plans, he grew impatient and menacing. Thereupon Mr. Chamberlain, who has assumed direction and control of foreign policy, in a series of personal visits and discussion with the Führer received and accepted, with a few trivial emendations, the German ultimatum.

The exact part played by England and France respectively in this acceptance will not, perhaps cannot, be revealed at present. The relief, humiliation, and shame must be equally apportioned. Time and events may justify or condemn the acceptance, but until we know all the details which led up to the Munich agreement we can only judge of what was done there by the results which followed at once, and by those which are developing from day to day. To supporters of the Prime Minister he is notable as one who discarded pride or precedent, who at an advanced age flew, for the first time, to undertake negotiations personally, and so by his personal exertions saved his country from a devastating and possibly a fatal war. His claim to have brought back peace and honour is repeated, though without enthusiasm and without any conviction. To his opponents and critics he is the weakest of all those who have held the responsible office of Prime Minister, and his physical courage is more than offset by his personal assumption of control when ignorant alike of foreign languages, of foreign mentality, and of the intricacies of foreign politics. Criticism has extended to the exclusion of Russia from the Munich Conference, and considers that the refusal to admit the Czechs was but a repetition of the grievous fault committed when Germans were shut out from Versailles.

Until, therefore, the secrets of the four Governments present at the Conference are disclosed, until the relative preparations and strength of England and Germany in the air and on the sea at the moment are known, whether the collapse of the Democratic Governments before the threat of warfare was due in the main to a knowledge of their own weakness, or alternatively due to their misplaced belief in Germany's power, until the ability and willingness of France to redeem the public commitments she abandoned at Munich, until the readiness of Russia to march to the aid of the Czechs or her capacity to do so, is revealed by subsequent and authentic publication,

only a few facts stand clearly out from the mists of ignorance and rumour. In the first place it must, with deep grief, be admitted that the political credit of England has never been so low in the eyes of other countries as it is at the present moment. A hundred and fifty years ago Oliver Goldsmith could write without fear of contradiction :

> " Pride in their port, defiance in their eye,
> I see the lords of human kind pass by."

Can any Englishman say that to-day of his fellows ? We have to confess ourselves objects of regret and of derision to neighbouring nations. Whatever, wisely or foolishly, was done at Munich has been ratified and approved by Parliament. We have formally endorsed the action and decision of our Prime Minister and his Cabinet. Whatever humiliation and shame there may be in his conduct is shared to the full by the nation. We indeed could not nullify his decision, but we could have repudiated it. We did not do so.

In the second place, the apparent docility with which England and France yielded to the rough virility of Herr Hitler (for it was by no means certain that Italy would stand by Germany) has reacted unfavourably on their economic standing in the world markets, and correspondingly raised that of Germany. The great diplomatic triumphs at Munich and Vienna have not only increased her resources in men, minerals and other raw materials and rendered her independent of the outside world in many of her requirements, but they have restricted in serious measure the markets open to us. It is not merely a question as to the actual areas in which we shall find new competition, and experience new discrimination, but contacts will have been established with new spheres of influence in which Germany will reign supreme and to which her rivals will have ever-increasing difficulty in penetrating. Dr. Funk's commercial mission was the logical concomitant of Herr Hitler's armies, for trade has always followed the flag.

Thirdly, Germany has gained with these additional territories a new strong line of natural defences with corresponding opportunities for offence, a system of fortifications on which some eighty million pounds has been spent, together with a considerable population industrious and virile in habit of mind and body. Resting momentarily on these, she can

organise in perfect security for that further advance which will place her in impregnable control of the economic fortunes of Eastern Europe.

Fourthly, we have given to the present Czech Government, as some compensation for our regrettable conduct towards its predecessor, a credit of ten million pounds. At such a sum do we assess what the late President Kruger called " moral and intellectual damage," for it does not cover the material loss which the Czechs could not unreasonably have put at ten times that amount. Since the insignificant remnant of the Czech State must inevitably fall into the commercial orbit of Germany, the bulk of this money will sooner or later pass through the State-controlled industry of Germany and increase the amount of foreign exchange available to her for the purchase not of butter but of guns. Her new conquests indeed will have been accomplished with a minimum of cost and a maximum of celerity and gain.

These of course are not all, but they are the chief factual certainties resulting from the Munich Conference. I hesitate to call it the Munich " agreement." I hope it was assent to the unavoidable, and not agreement to the desirable, but I cannot expect in my time to be enlightened as to this. I can note however that the appetite and opportunity for plunder still continue. Demands for " restoration " or appropriation flow in from Poland and from Hungary. Slovakia claims autonomy tempered by federation. On the horizon hovers the possibility of a Polish-Slav development of opposition to Teuton Nazi hegemony which cannot be ignored and which travels like a thief in the night. The Baltic States lie midway between the German and Russian Empires. In the name of self-defence either of the latter might swallow the former previous to a struggle *inter se*. It is worth noting here how closely the present policy of Herr Hitler corresponds in principle and in detail with that of Ludendorf and of the General Staff as expressed in the treaties of Brest Litovsk and Bucharest twenty years ago. Those were nullified by the subsequent success of the Allies, but remain true indicators of the German aims and methods. They transferred Russian Poland and the Baltic States to German sovereignty and Roumania to German domination. To-day Hitler has written : " When we talk of new lands in Europe we think first of Russia and her border States," while Ludendorf has left us the legacy of : " We must

hold out the strong protecting hand not only over German citizens but over all Germans."

The wonder grows that with all these problems clamouring for occurrence and settlement, unless his underlying motive was a fatal military weakness which he concealed from us but could not conceal from Herr Hitler, no apprehension of the consequences of surrender seems to have crossed the mind of Mr. Chamberlain. He was indeed aware that the peace he returned with was likely to be very short-lived—it may be little more than a truce as many people think—but no hint was given that he knew that the new Europe, barely twenty years old, had gone up into the air. Rearmament we are told must be continued, intensified and above all hastened ; but that the map of Europe, as he and his friends had made it and kept it, would have to be redrawn did not suggest itself to that part of the British people who decide the fate of Ministries, but do not often consider their judgments beforehand. Nor would it be prudent yet to begin that drawing. The process of alteration in the east of Europe is no more completed than in Northern Europe and will not be completed until Germany is satisfied that in no way will her ambitions for mastery in those regions be endangered. Nor can it be drawn afresh in the West until some decision in Spain is reached. Since compromise is foreign to the Spanish character, a partition of authority and territory seems ruled out, and war to the point of extermination the only alternative. Will the Spain of Franco, if it be the conqueror, prove strong enough to resist the claims, financial and military, of its Fascist friends ? If it does so yield and admit them to a dominating position, which is certain also to be menacing to the democracies, will the democracy of England be prepared to wake from its lethargy, and will that of France for once subordinate internal quarrels to the external danger ? Or if, as one hopes, Constitutionalist Spain triumphs over the extreme Left as well as over Franco, will all the democratic States recover their political balance, and will their respective Governments have the courage to tell them that discipline of mind and body is as essential to a democratic as to an authoritarian State ?

We are standing at the fork of roads which branch on the one hand to the realms of hope and progress and on the other to those of reaction and despair. England as a nation thought twenty years ago that she stood at the gates of peace and

reconciliation, and though she had paid a great price to arrive at her goal, she believed that goal was won. Step by step, and year by year, we have retreated into the wilderness of strife, till we are back to the position of 1914. But the powers of evil are stronger. Our defences seem to be relatively in a weaker condition, our courage is lower, and so our danger is greater. We have smaller financial credit, a smaller trade, less goodwill behind us. Is this no one's fault? Just sheer bad luck? Or is it not due to the absence of effective opposition, to the want of able criticism of the Government's policy and in particular of their administrative handling of the Foreign and Defence Offices? Is it not also, primarily, due to the electorate which has been hypnotised by the slogan of a "National" Government, and by fear of "Socialism" into rejecting all but supporters of that Government? If then our grievous and continuous errors are due to our own shortcomings, at least we have the remedies in our own hands and can begin to apply them at once. We can elect either at the dissolution of Parliament or at by-elections, as and when these occur, representatives with the ability and determination to inquire into the colossal expenditure on armaments which we have had, or are about, to incur and which seems quite unequal to safeguarding our honour or our safety. It is our money they are scattering, it is our country they are neglecting to defend.

Every day I am more horrified at the statements made to me as to the utter chaos which obtains in the auxiliary services controlled by the Home Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. If defence is too complex for any three men to achieve, why not subdivide control still further and still lower down, and why is there not more co-operation at the top? Why send War Office "observers" to Czechoslovakia who can speak neither Czech nor German? Why send naval reservists to east coast ports literally in hundreds without duties to perform, or why send Home Office instructors to teach citizens what and how to do things in an air raid without masks or the other appliances which would be required for protection? Why form anti-aircraft units which have not, and are not likely to have in the near future, protective weapons? If democratic government is to survive the present crisis it must take its obligations and its dangers far more seriously than it does. It must not refuse to believe in the

fact of war and all that war entails because it delights in peace. It must be taught, and it must accept the teaching, that the ideals involved in government by reasoning are not the ideals of those who practise government by force. Democracy in England seems to think that a majority implies a policy, and has yet to learn that the policy of the present leaders in Europe is that of a forceful minority imposing its will and its decisions upon a docile majority. Democracy must, if only in the interest of self-preservation, understand that continental traditions permit their statesmen to pledge themselves in the most definite language to peace, and straightway to plan and conduct war. The methods of Cavour, Bismarck, Mussolini and Hitler are separated by time but not by principle. We in England are attached to democratic principles by tradition, we have accepted the main principle of majority rule, and have for two centuries gained great wealth as a nation, and widespread dominions. We find it difficult to believe that other nations, though friendly to us personally, can at the same time envy our wealth, covet our possessions and laugh at our system of government.

That they are in earnest as to their right to the future is shown by what happened at Godesburg and was confirmed at Munich. There is little doubt that Herr Hitler meant to risk a war. There is even less doubt that Mr. Chamberlain feared the risks of that war. He may have forgotten the Navy, he may have questioned the steadfastness or been influenced by the unlooked-for and unexpected reticences of his allies. He may, like Alphonso of Spain, have visualised the blood that would at once have flowed had he stood fast, and had no thought of that which was certain to be shed when he was gone. Whatever his fears or his reasons he has changed the face of Europe, he has displaced and disheartened the forces of democracy, and has incidentally destroyed the liberties of the Czechs and their happiness. Great is his responsibility. History may explain his necessities and condone his actions. Whatever may be its verdict on Mr. Chamberlain it will most certainly and most justly condemn us, for whom and to whom he is responsible, if we do not take warning by these untoward happenings and so prevent any recurrence of his action. Lord Baldwin has told us that he gave false assurances to, and withheld unpleasant truths from, the country before the election of 1935 lest adversity should fall on his party. From his

reticence and from his deception has followed the greatest political disaster this country has ever experienced. From the deluge which threatens our fortunes, spiritual as well as material, let us hope we may escape not unscathed but yet afloat and intent wholeheartedly to restore our dignity, repair our fortunes, and redeem our honour.

There are signs that the English people are awakening from their dreams. The young are beginning to realise that their generation will not escape political disaster by refusing to fight for king or country, or economic disaster by taking shelter in state employment. The old men are recollecting the pride of place and the security which England afforded to her children. If we can arouse the middle-aged from their too vivid recollection of the horrors of the past—into recognition of the duty which they owe to the future—we may yet avert from that future the worse evils which Science has devised in these last years. If they but saw the truth, it is *their* hopes, commendable if you like, which permitted universal disarmament. It is *their* folly which refused justice to Germany by neglecting revision of Versailles. It is *their* fears which allow Hitler to ride rough-shod over Europe. It is *their* generation which will pay in pocket and in person for their credulity, for their blindness, and for their timidity. They may perhaps ruin their own fortunes here in Europe, but I believe they will, by so doing, cut themselves adrift from Britain oversea. The world must change, dynasties and dictators must come and go, and systems of government arise and fall. But one or two attributes seem obligatory in every age for success. Courage and a fixed unshakable belief in one's own star are vital factors. They have recently been dimmed here. Let us trust that an old spirit relit may guide us along the road of foresight to rejuvenation.

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

THE OUTLOOK IN EUROPE: A GERMAN VIEW.

TWO months have elapsed since the Munich Agreement was signed, and much has happened in the meanwhile. We are not all quite sure as to what the decision of the four leading statesmen on September 30th meant for the future. The international discussion regarding the altered situation continues unabated. So far as I can see, however, some of the commentators have allowed their imagination to run away with them. For example, a prominent Englishman recently asserted that Germany's expansion will hardly stop even at the Bosphorus. Another wrote that the little English army which would be lost in a Continental war might easily regard the defence of Constantinople on the Chatalja Line as within their might. In these dull autumn weeks, which tend to make one sober, I really think we should stick to realities and seek agreement at the outset on some main points.

I shall start with the Munich Agreement. This is still regarded in Germany as an act of justice, not as a triumph over an opponent. The Czechoslovakia of 1919 was an artificial creation which was a great injustice to Germany. That other Great Powers which made the unfair decision possible at the time have now recognised the injustice of their former solution, or, at least, seen its danger to peace, is considered in Germany as nothing more or less than making good the error of 1919. It is true that the German people believe that their right to form a union with Austria and to liberate the oppressed Germans would never have been realised if they had not had sufficient might behind their claim, but this by no means alters their view that a wrong was righted. Considered all round, the ethnographic principle has proved to be the most important for lasting satisfaction in Europe. It has turned out to be of more import than the League of Nations, alliances, pacts, guarantees, and fortifications. If the Great Powers responsible for Europe's fate in the future continue to agree on this point, the most likely cause of any further wars would doubtless be avoided. That is the lesson

N.B.—The Editors share to the full the general detestation of Nazi methods. They believe, however, that readers may be interested to learn how the European situation appears to a German champion of the present régime.

taught by history between 1919 and 1938—and, in fact, by European history for some centuries past. And although it must be stated with regret that too little confidence is given to some declarations as to Germany's future policy, it cannot be denied that National Socialism is built up on the basis of the right of union of people of the same blood, the same culture and the same language. It would be sapping its own strength if it were to abandon this principle, follow the example of Cæsar and Napoleon, and try to extend its rule to foreign peoples. Towards the close of his life Sir Austen Chamberlain once said that in his opinion the ethnographical frontiers have been so well defined by the Peace Treaties of 1919 that human forethought and ability could hardly have done more in view of the great mixtures of peoples on some borders. Not only Germany, but also some other States have always emphatically contradicted this view. The year 1938 has proved them right, new frontiers having had to be drawn owing to the *Anschluss*, the liberation of the Sudetenland, the restoration of Teschen to Poland, and of the border land to Hungary, thus creating the basis for lasting peace. The unjust frontiers, born of hatred and oppression in 1919, were the true reason for the failure of the League of Nations, of the Disarmament Conference, and of economic collaboration. Several difficult frontiers have been redrawn, and the questions settled once and for all. Germany has no further territorial demands to make in Europe, and a big step in the right direction has been taken to assure lasting peace on our Continent.

This is also proved by arbitration carried out at Vienna. A " new era " is to be introduced in Central Europe. But it is not the League of Nations, not a group of international commissions, nor yet a world conference, which led to this " new era." On the contrary, it was the confidence of the countries concerned that a decision reached by Germany and Italy, as the countries mainly interested in that part of Europe, would give a maximum of worldly justice. The decision waived two claims—that of Hungary for the restoration of her " historic " frontiers, and the desire on the part of Poland to have a common frontier with Hungary for reasons of expediency. If one of these two claims had been allowed, we should have returned to the atmosphere of the Paris treaty-makers in 1919. This time the principle of self-determination, so often quoted, so many times wrongly practised, was carried out as

far as possible. And although one may admit that some economic and transport problems remain to be solved, the fact remains that the example of Czechoslovakia of recent days shows that clear and energetic statesmanship can master even the worst difficulties. Judging from what one hears from its own public opinion it cannot be regarded as a one-sided German view when one states that the smaller Czechoslovak-Ukrainian State has been freed of foreign component parts, and left to work with honour and energy on the unavoidable difficulties resulting from the changes, and bravely to accept the facts.

The fundamental change in the trend of affairs in the east and south-east of Europe is mirrored also in the altered attitude of French foreign policy. Following her " collective victory " of 1918-19, France demanded a policy of " collective security," with the object of maintaining by force the status of 1919, with the alliances and phraseology of the League. Towards Germany it was the shadow of Richelieu which dictated her attitude—weakening and oppressing the defeated land, intended by Nature and Providence to be the stronger in Europe. A cordon, composed of France's friends and allies, was drawn round Germany, and France, which is really weaker, prevented the restoration of Germany as long as she could with the help of all these other States and of an artificial system. That is all a matter of the past. The League of Nations, the Little Entente, and " collective security " are now no longer realities. The natural course has returned in the ups and downs of history. In the struggle between progress and stagnation, the former has proved victorious. Germany did not allow herself to be bound by the chains of Versailles indefinitely. And to-day she has almost 80 million citizens, as against 40 millions in France. History has so willed it that these two Powers now seek friendship with each other —not at international conferences, but as a result of facts and living progress. Those who do not like the methods employed by Germany should remember that the victors of 1918 forced their methods upon Germany. Those who say that Germany broke her word should first consider how the Treaty of Versailles came into being, and should remember the broken promise of the victors, who simply dictated the peace terms without listening to the other contracting party, and on absolutely different lines to the Fourteen Points. No

German now likes to look back on these old disputes, and it is better to look into the future. Richelieu's shadow has vanished from French politics to-day.

At the recent Congress of the Radical Socialist Party in Marseilles, Senator Berthod wrote the following important words in his report on the foreign political situation :

> The hour has come to ask in regard to each of our obligations which vital interest of the country they meet, and, which is more important, with what means we could fulfil them in case of need.

If one places this sentence side by side with the traditional speeches of the French Ministers, such as Herriot's famous answer at Geneva to the question of French foreign politics—"*Le pacte, rien que le pacte, tout le pacte*"—one will see fully what phases the foreign policy of France has passed through. These phases are, it is true, to be placed to Germany's account, but we believe that they were necessary for the creation of a healthy political basis in Europe. In our opinion, the French method of having a say everywhere, and of switching on the mechanism of the League or her alliances at intervals, without herself being threatened, and thus carrying on a policy of useless but dangerous prestige—"*la France prolongée*"—was one of the main causes of the unrest in the past two decades. If France, whom no one threatens, and which is everywhere acknowledged as a Great Power, being supported by her Colonial Empire, and firmly linked by friendship with England, wishes to start a calm and constant policy of European collaboration with Germany and Italy, there will hardly be any other country which will be better pleased than Germany. The fact that the military position between France and Germany has changed during the last few years (and months) by the creation of a big German air force, and the erection of the defence line in the west, will not fundamentally make any difference to this genuine satisfaction. The disarmament discussions broke down largely on account of the French veto at the time. In fact it was literally France who compelled Germany to arm. Since then both lands have done all they could to become strong, and especially to defend their own borders in all circumstances. An attack by land may be regarded as hopeless on either side to-day. There is simply no "battlefield." The fight for the Rhine, which lasted over ten centuries, has not only been ended by the will of the people,

but by concrete and steel walls. On the other hand, the destructive possibilities of the air force have grown to such an extent that the idea of a war is more terrible than ever. It may thus be said from the military point of view that the possibilities of 1914 have gone for ever.

It would appear as though the political trend were inclined to take the new facts into consideration. There is talk of the Anglo-German declaration of September 30th at Munich being followed by a similar declaration between France and Germany, as intimated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop, in his speech of November 7th. As a German I can only say my satisfaction would be great if these hopes were realised. Germany has accepted the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and has no aims in Europe which are against the national interests of France. Thus is it explained in the changed atmosphere that mutual visits between British and French statesmen are no longer obviously undertaken in connection with plans directed against Germany, but largely to discuss the bringing about of friendly relations with Germany. The century-old mistrust is slowly giving way to positive international collaboration between Germany and her friend Italy, on the one hand, and England and her friend on the other. This could also be done without a Four-Power Pact, which some people do not like. Progress is being made gradually, according to time and circumstance. This method is just the opposite to the badly prepared World Conferences and the unhappy methods of Geneva. It is the only method from which Germany expects good results. It proved its worth at the so-called Easter Agreement between England and Italy last spring. And once again I cannot say how glad we Germans were to learn that this agreement is at last to come into effect, and how very much we wish for a similar agreement between France and Italy.

"Spain for the Spanish!" How often have Germans uttered this phrase. Germany still wishes Franco complete success. The possibility of the bolshevising of Spain was such a danger for Europe that she was determined to oppose it with suitable means. But this danger is now passed. Franco can and will attain his goal, and no further danger to the peace of Europe is to be expected from Spain. But for more than two years the Spanish question has given the inciters to war and the sowers of unrest the opportunity of carrying on

their evil work in many lands, and trying to make trouble between the peoples. The final goal was a lasting gulf between Germany and Italy on one side, and England and France on the other. We both, Germans and Britons, have now these three stages—the Spanish War, the *Anschluss* and the liberation of the Sudetenland—behind us. The firm leadership of a great statesman in England is ending these crises with the Anglo-Italian Pact, and with the fact that he proposed on September 30th the signing of a declaration to which the Führer appended his name with joy—England and Germany never wish to wage war against each other again, but to confer. The question as to how Anglo-German relations are to progress in practice is still an open one. A clever political writer in London who is much prejudiced against Germany recently accused the Prime Minister in the House of Commons of having created the impression abroad of breaking a tradition which had existed for 250 years by signing a pact with Germany; he had made an agreement with the stronger party, instead of backing the weaker against the stronger. This remark seems to me to contain—perhaps unintentionally—the truth in a nutshell. A German would conclude that such a policy as was followed by Sir Edward (later Lord) Grey towards Germany might meet the tradition referred to in the House, but necessarily bore in it the germ of war. If England really worked again on such principles, the only right course of action for the stronger State would be a preventive war before England could collect her Allies for "collective security." Considered from this point of view, it must have been a great mistake for Germany not to have exploited the Russian abortive revolution in 1905, and the years of internal weakness which followed, and with the aid of the mailed fist at least to have weakened France to such an extent that she would certainly not have been prepared for a fight in 1914.

This example clearly shows the following points. Firstly, pre-war Germany was not out for conquests and a European war, and secondly, if England were to return to the policy proposed by the Member of Parliament quoted above, and supported by others, the European continent would slide back to a state of tension, and it would be impossible to see when lasting peace and collaboration would be restored. On the other hand, the policy of the present Premier, that of collaboration not only with "democracies," but also with

Germany and Italy, seems to us Germans to be a big step forward. This policy has met with complete understanding in Germany, and it alone can maintain the peace. In my opinion the relations between the two Great Powers, England and Germany, should in future be such that each has understanding for the special tasks and aims of the other, that neither interferes in the vital spheres of the other, and that both avoid injuring the interests of the other. So far as I can see, all the conditions for such an attitude on Germany's part are at hand. It has been increasingly shown, however, that even when official goodwill is present in a "democracy," this is not enough, since the Opposition should voluntarily accept certain limits in criticising other countries. When parliamentary freedom is to be utilised for inciting to war, and for abusing other lands, not only will, in the words of Bismarck, "windows be broken," but the *rapprochement* of two Powers who have particularly great responsibility for future peace, and for the happiness of mankind, will be seriously interfered with. I am, of course, prepared to admit that corresponding necessities are to be found in the authoritatively led but self-disciplined German Press. In order that we may understand each other better, I only wanted to point out how important this side of the question also is for our mutual relations and for the future. What will probably occupy the attention of both English and Germans in the near future is the German demand for the return of the colonies, and the English wish for an understanding regarding future armaments. The Führer said to Mr. Chamberlain at Godesberg: "There will be no mobilisation on account of colonies!", and he repeated it the other day in Munich. At Weimar Hitler briefly stated that a disarmament of the mind, the cessation of incitement to war, would have to precede any new attempt to begin a new international discussion on disarmament. It appears to me that there are enough points here to direct the work of peace between our great nations.

In Germany we have noted with satisfaction that discussion has gradually become more healthy on another topic—Germany and the south-east. Under the motto "Germany advances Eastwards," public opinion in many countries had been made to believe in Germany's world-wide ideas of conquest. Now Mr. Chamberlain and his Ministers, as well as leading papers in England and France, have expressed the

opinion that Germany, from her geographical position, and in view of her special economic methods, is only doing something natural in south-east Europe. We ourselves go further and say that what we are doing in south-east Europe is not only done in the service of Germany, but to a much greater degree to the advantage of the lands concerned. Space does not permit of giving details here. But in Rumania the wheat after harvest is stored in living-rooms because there are not enough barns and silos. Other lands in the vicinity have also a surplus and cannot sell these products. The truth is that, apart from Germany, there is no other big buyer for the cereals and raw materials of the lands in south-east Europe. The population there would have the lowest imaginable standard of living if Germany did not purchase a large part of the production regularly. What Germany supplies in exchange is largely the mechanical and industrial equipment which benefits these countries most of all. And no doubt Mr. Chamberlain is right when he says that there is still room enough for trade and all kinds of undertakings with other countries than Germany, in addition to the trade with Germany by barter. It is equally correct to say that these other European countries, including England, can only benefit if the south-east countries have a greater purchasing power and prosperity as a result of the new agreements with Germany.

What about the east? News that hunger prevails comes from the wide plains of Russia, where tyranny rules over the people. We hear of new arrests and of the ruthless execution of military and civil leaders in Moscow. Stalin himself has used the hardest words to condemn the bad management in many fields, and Litvinov announced during the critical days of September that Soviet Russia would remain true to her Czechoslovakian ally—but only after France had rendered military aid in conformity with her treaty. That is the vast State which was to crush Germany like a steam-roller once upon a time, which was then praised to the skies by millions of Communists everywhere, who said Stalin's realm was great and mighty. Of this State a "Conservative" politician in England said in the spring of 1937 that it was happily becoming more "democratic," and inclined to join the front of "peace-loving countries" against Germany. We Germans, together with the Italians and Japanese, have a very different

opinion of this "democratic" State. We hope that in future Bolshevism will have no more to say in Europe, and do not believe that Soviet Russia in its present state is capable of any decisive action outside its borders. Its representatives still sit at Geneva, although this does not worry us, and the formal pact between Russia and France, directed against us, still exists. It does not take a prophet to say that friendly relations with France would, in the long run, be difficult to imagine without this pact losing its substance. Friendship still exists between Germany and Poland, in the interests of both lands. During the tension between Warsaw and Kovno some months ago, a serious conflict between the two seemed unavoidable. Germany was glad when this was settled by Lithuania's surrender. On the other hand the tension between Lithuania and Germany has abated. Germany merely aims at the strict autonomy of the Memelland, as internationally guaranteed. Once this is assured, Lithuania may be certain of Germany's friendship. In Danzig, too, the fate of this Free City is in National Socialist hands, and the German character of the town is assured. Altogether the east, extending to the vast plains of Soviet Russia, offers no ground for particular speculation. Only time will clear the future.

What is the rôle of economic considerations, apart from south-east Europe, in the outlook of New Europe? I will limit myself to the German view. I think the example of the Munich Agreement shows that also in the economic realm the time of big international conferences is in part past, and has in part not yet come. One remembers the much-boasted World Economic Conference in London in 1933 and its failure. This method attains nothing. Germany at least has helped herself as well as she could. Her special agreements with different countries were the result of the need of the moment, and of goodwill between neighbours and friends. They have proved excellent, but many are temporary measures. When Lord Stanley recently said the methods of the old economy must to some extent be changed so as better to compete with the authoritarian States, he showed the trend of matters. Fostering exports is the watchword in England, and must, of course, be all the more so in Germany.

But who speaks of the mistake of Reparations in former days, and who buys the surplus of the world's industrial

products? Who, again, refers to the solidarity in fostering the purchasing power of the coloured peoples? And who feels responsible for the fact that the U.S.A., formerly a debtor land, now owns half the world's gold without using it? Everything is upside down. I am sure that, after the most urgent political questions have been cleared up, Europe will prepare the way for a brighter future of commerce and trade, the lead being taken by a few responsible governments.

Now let us look across the Atlantic. What have the United States to do with my article on Europe? To reply briefly, I may state that we have been much astonished at the attitude taken towards Germany, hovering between hate and absurdity. At the same time we know of the close relations between England and France on the one hand, and the U.S.A. on the other. We also know of the hopes placed in America "in case of need." We also see that America resists with loud protests the commerce long carried on between Germany and South America. Not even grotesque lies regarding Germany's alleged intentions to imitate the Conquistadores are lacking. All this is a sign that public opinion is being poisoned. Healthy, hundred-per-cent. Americans should ask themselves what is the object of this agitation. One cannot be surprised if Germany takes little notice of the sermons preached at her, especially as America played her full part in responsibility for the injustice meted out to the Reich.

In broad outlines this appears to me to be the most important contribution a German can make at present on the outlook in Europe. It shows the great changes of our time, the new possibilities, some justified hopes, but also the dark side and the dangers. But whatever the future may bring, every politician should draw two conclusions. Firstly, that it would, to paraphrase a famous French saying, be worse than a crime—it would be a foolish act—if the Powers in Europe who are dependent upon collaboration were to fight each other, or were only to sink into camps of contrast, merely because the one or the other has built his house to suit himself, and intends to continue managing it on the same lines. Secondly, that those who incite to war, no matter whether that party be in a Government or an Opposition, would be largely responsible if Europe were not to find peace.

BARON VON RHEINBABEN,
Formerly Secretary of State.

THE CZECHS AND THE CRISIS.

THE calm and the dignity with which the Czechoslovak people have received their fate at the hands of those indifferent to their fortunes, has been the admiration of the whole of Europe. Yet this admiration is not untinged by a certain lack of comprehension on the part of their friends, that the Czechs so quietly and passively accepted the destruction not only of their country but, it would seem, of everything for which it stood. M. Ernest Denis, the French historian of Bohemia, wrote that it was at once the merit and the happiness of Bohemia that its own cause was always bound up with the cause of humanity in general. If this be true, it would seem that the cause of humanity has gone down undefended, betrayed on the one hand, and accepted as past saving on the other by those whom, in the first place, it most nearly concerned.

There is no place in the present world for an Englishman or a Frenchman who would throw a stone at the Czechoslovak Government for refusing to fight, but in the calmer and more detached atmosphere of history, will no historian demand with perplexity why it was that the Czech nation surrendered without resistance? It was of the Greeks that Byron wrote

> Hereditary Bondsmen, know ye not,
> Who would be free himself must strike the blow.

If the historian or poet of future days is to level his judgment with a just aim, he must take into account not only the decisions of the Czech leaders but the thoughts and feelings of the masses of the Czech nation.

To understand the decisions of the Czech leaders, both political and military, it is only necessary to remember that whereas Nazi threats reached a pitch of violence, brutality and intemperance never before equalled in history, Anglo-French influence was used not to steady that intemperance, but rather to secure capitulation before it. Pressure to this end was first used in May 1938 and was the occasion for an Anglo-French *démarche*. From that time onwards this pressure steadily increased and by September it would appear that this was the settled policy of the two western democracies. The Anglo-French intimation, in the small hours of the night of September 20th, was not the

reversal but the culmination of this policy. Britain and France, faced by what they considered to be a German threat to make war, retreated from their moral, and in the case of France legal, obligation to defend the rights of a sovereign state against the threat of foreign invasion. It would be a grave mistake to see in this Anglo-French retreat in September 1938 a mere loss of heart or lack of courage, though to many, including most of the Czechs themselves, there was no other explanation. The official German press was, however, more correct in its judgment when it realised and openly stated that the Munich Agreement was merely a formal recognition of the complete reversal not only of French post-war policy but of the traditional policy of Great Britain—the policy of the balance of power in Europe which was so important in the years leading up to the Great War.

It was perhaps because they realised this, that President Beneš and the Czech leaders, as opposed to the Czech people, bowed before Anglo-French pressure. If England and France no longer intended to preserve the democratic heritage they won in four years' battle, if England were no longer interested in the balance of power, nor France in the system of Continental alliances painfully pursued in the years succeeding the war, it was obvious that, however the Czechoslovak nation might strive to defend that heritage or maintain that balance, it would be powerless to do so against the combined forces of Central Europe. Czechoslovakia stood, as it were, for a cause in which Europe and humanity at large were no longer interested. President Beneš may well have considered that the sacrifice of life, necessarily immense in a Czech-German war, would have been absolutely in vain. It would only have added to the sum of human suffering without stemming the tide of human retrogression.

It was just this deep resignation on the part of the Czech leaders, this apparent conviction that the forces of progress were doomed and the sparks of liberty, courage and honour so low in the west that they could not be kindled, which distressed people so profoundly in other countries and may have done wrong to the Czechs themselves. It is certain that 90 per cent., if not 99 per cent. of the Czech nation, was filled two months ago with such conviction that they would have fought, even against the whole world, had the Western Powers left even the shadow of hope. Leaders

they could have found who would have fought not merely in self-defence, nor even for the original frontiers of the Czechoslovak state, but for the ideals of liberty and democracy which are again becoming revolutionary cries in Europe. If such a war had broken out, how long would the dictatorships have survived? Which dictatorship could have issued victoriously from it? It was no mere coincidence that in the last weeks of the crisis the Nazi Press used the word "Hussite" as a term of abuse to conjure up fear among the Nazis. The Czech Hussite armies of the fifteenth century not only defeated the German yeomanry but were welcomed by the German serfs and joined by the peasants who envied the Czech peasantry its freedom. The same danger of internal dissolution faced the armies of Nazi Germany.

There is no doubt that the Czechs would have fought to a man had they not had the order to retire. Witnesses of the mobilisation will never forget that night of September 23rd. At 8.29 p.m. everything was as usual—the lights, the traffic, the noise of the trams, the crowds of people who wander on a summer evening up and down the Wenceslas Square—and then suddenly at 8.30 the warning from the loud speakers erected on every big corner of the town—*General Mobilisation. Every reservist under* 40 *years of age to be at his post within six hours.* Before the order could be repeated the streets were completely transformed. Without stopping to say good-bye, without returning to their homes for their personal belongings, men and boys headed for the stations. I have spoken with people who went up to the front with the troop trains. There was no wild exhilaration, but equally no dejection or despair, only a steady determination, softened by the comradeship and jokes of soldiers in war time. Not Czechs alone, but Sudeten Germans as well, went to the front as citizens to fight for their homes, and to fight for liberty against the Nazis.

If this was the spirit in which they went up to the front, how was it, one may well ask, that they retreated with such submissiveness? What was the spirit which inspired that retreat? We have the military explanation of the command to retreat, broadcast on the Prague radio on September 30th, by General Krejči, Commander-in-Chief of the Czechoslovak Army.

> Soldiers! The Czechoslovak Government, under pressure of world events, was obliged to accept the transfer of various territories of

our State. We soldiers, who were the pride of the nation until now, must remain so in the future. Western Europe has asked this sacrifice from us categorically in order to prevent world war.

In our oath we have promised the President of the Republic unconditional obedience. Destiny obliges us to fulfil this promise in the most painful circumstances. Our Chief Commander, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and all the representatives of our State, anxiously aware of the enormous responsibility, could not have permitted useless losses which would have diminished the strength of our State. They have always had our confidence, and will have it in the future, because we are convinced that they have done everything that was humanly possible.

The true soldier must endure failure, for even in it there is a manifestation of true heroism. Our Army has not been vanquished. The Republic will need a strong Army. We are confident our nation will come happily out of the present difficulties. We soldiers will deserve it. Our Government will always find us ready for all sacrifices.

The President, the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief ordered the retreat, but the way in which this order was received has been witnessed by officers of the British Army acting as "Observers" superintending the execution of the Munich Agreement. One, Captain Coulson, has published his experiences. (*Daily Telegraph*, October 28th.)

It was not at all certain that the Czech troops would obey the orders of their own Higher Command to withdraw from the frontier. I realised this danger as soon as I met our Czech A.D.C., even before leaving Prague. As I bowed, making some polite remark, he clapped his hand to his hip and declared that he would shoot as many Germans as he could and then shoot himself rather than give up a yard of his country. We met with variations of this attitude among nearly all the Czech officers, up to the most senior.

In some places the officers could not bring themselves to give the command. In Southern Moravia two Czech officers committed suicide. Others tried to explain to their men the circumstances which made retreat necessary, and the spirit in which the retreat must be carried out.

A day or two later the withdrawal of the Czechs and the advance of the Germans began. But there were no signs of insubordination among the troops. The discipline of the Czechs was indeed splendid. It was of a kind I have never seen before. The relations between officers and men were easy and informal, yet the authority of the former was absolute. "Ours is a democratic army," a General said to me. "Had it not been we would have had mutinies and revolts. The officers are in the closest personal touch with the men."

The Czechs retreated, but they retreated before the full terms of their capitulation had been made known to them. Only when it was too late for the Czechs to think of resistance did the Four Powers, in conference in Berlin, choose to decide the final extent of the sacrifice to be demanded of them. The Fifth Zone of the Berlin Commission exacted from the Czechs terms harder, more bitter and more humiliating than those demanded by Herr Hitler at Godesberg. It was from Godesberg that the British sent their warning to the Czechs to mobilise. It was of Godesberg that Mr. Chamberlain said it "would profoundly shock public opinion in neutral countries." It was rather than accept Godesberg that the Czechs chose to mobilise. By a trick, Godesberg and more than Godesberg was forced upon the Czechs in the name of Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany.

"If they had known how much they would have to give up, many Czechs told us," continues Captain Coulson, "they would have fought.

"The country was ruined anyway. The chief of the Corps Staff, a tall, thin, rather intellectual-looking man, took me by the arm and led me over to a large map of the country. 'How can we exist?' he asked me again and again, as though I had it in my power to alter the frontier. I noticed that there were tears in his eyes. 'What is there left for us to do?' he went on asking.

"Suddenly he turned full towards me. 'Do you know what the worst of all this is?' he demanded harshly, and at once answered his own question. 'It is not the economic or strategic consequences to us, but the moral effect. We can believe no more in right or justice or truth or honesty. There is only brute force.'"

This is the real core of the tragedy. Here, in the Army, was the voice of the whole people, the voice which finally echoed with answering despair, the deep resignation of the Czech leaders which led to the first capitulation. In the first days of the calamity it was despair and bewilderment which was written on all their faces.

Many a Czech who looks into his mirror will see that his face has changed in these last few days, but no mirror will reflect the

changes which have taken place in our souls and in our hearts, where, never to the day of our death, will we find again that which has been mercilessly and brutally torn out.

Time will pass in vain, it will be powerless to heal that wound and there is no word which can relieve the great pain which is common to us all. The whole world around us has suddenly changed its aspect. Our children will live a different life from that for which we prepared them : and we will often read in their eyes the question " why ? " We will be unable to give an answer. There is only one thing which we can bequeath to them and which they must believe. " We have lived in honour and we die without stain." But they must struggle better than we have known how to do, they must believe and love less intensely than we have believed and loved. They must learn from our terrible experiences still more to model themselves upon those truths and those ideals towards which we guided them with such good faith, and with so clear a conscience. (M. Klima in the *Ceske Slovo*.)

Not every Czech has reacted, like M. Klima, to the tragedy of his nation. The first feeling of a united nation was that they had been betrayed but that their future troubles would be shared in common. Yet national solidarity soon deteriorated. In part it was deliberately broken up by the necessary federalisation of the Republic and the disingenuous exploitation by Nazi Germany of the Slovak fascists against the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia. Partly it crumbled from within and was displaced by mutual recrimination, and above all by a violent onslaught by fascist elements on the policy of Masaryk and Beneš. A certain demoralisation set in and the defencelessness of the abandoned Czech democrats before the dictation of Nazi Germany helped the turn-coats, time-servers and fascists to power. Thus a Commission of Inquiry, inspired very largely by M. Osusky, Czechoslovak Minister in Paris, was set up under Senator Matousek to inquire into the " causes of the national catastrophe," and find scapegoats among the Czech leaders for the action of the British and French Governments. Its avowed aim was to put through a purge in all departments of State and above all in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Press department, and bring Czech foreign and domestic policy into line.

It would be doing an injustice to the Czechs to judge them by certain elements in a Government forced upon them by national defeat, but disillusionment and the natural

resentment against Britain and France were powerful allies on the side of the new régime.

> We have struggled for the good of humanity. It has been proved to us that it does not pay. Very well, then! Let us concern ourselves with our own good, being loyal to ourselves and only to ourselves.

The first idol to be smashed was that of France. " All that we know is that France is no longer the France of 1914-18. She has become a second-class power, protected henceforward by a sort of British Protectorate, and she is threatened at one and the same time by Germany, Italy and Spain. *Adieu la France.*"

> " Let us try to reach," continued the same writer, " —we have no other alternative—an understanding with Germany. Let us become, like Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Germany's biggest producer, her best client, and let us refuse every manœuvre which seeks to embroil us in an anti-German front."

The Nazification of Czechoslovakia was awaited on every side. The expulsion of refugees, the persecution of Jews, the dissolution of the Communist Party, the transformation of the Social Democrats, were all interpreted as signs of the disappearance of the last democracy in Central Europe. Certain sections of the Agrarian Party tried to organise a totalitarian party on a semi-Nazi model. Reputable diplomats turned informer against their former chiefs and colleagues.

Czech voices were raised which demanded a complete subservience to Nazi-Germany and the abandonment of all the western traditions of the Czechoslovak Republic. The " Central European orientation " has always had a certain following in Prague and especially among the Czech Agrarians whom the crisis has enormously strengthened. But the " western orientation " has strong roots. " It would not be to our honour," wrote the paper of the Czech Legionaries, in the week succeeding the capitulation, " in this hour of difficulty to speak of a re-orientation of the Czech nation or of the Czechoslovak Republic. In celebrating the first anniversary of the death of Masaryk, we reaffirmed our conviction that our political orientation was given us by the secular evolution of our history and by the highest qualities of our culture. It is to them that we must remain faithful and never more so than now, in these most tragic days. . . . We are not at the

end but at the beginning of the European crisis. Nothing has yet proved that *finasserie* and utter selfishness will be triumphant. . . . Let us be careful of those who advise us to tread new paths.

So a good cause does not die so easily, nor does a people which has been patiently taught by its leaders so easily forget or so completely despair. The despair of the Czech leaders which led them to capitulate, of the Czech Army which enabled it to withdraw without fighting, gradually gave way to a certain dogged optimism. The innate sense of ridicule of the Czechs protects them from the mock heroics of fascism and it is based on a deep democratic conviction that the cause will ultimately vanquish in other ways, over this apparent defeat.

> We must not recriminate but learn, remember and take a new stand, above all no supplications, no jeremiads and no denunciations. The day will come when Europe will hear of us again. For the moment let us take example from the Germans and from that which they have been able to accomplish in the twenty years which followed their terrible humiliation of 1918.

Thus in a certain perplexity and bewilderment the Czech nation faces the future. The foundations of Czech democracy are profoundly shaken and the outward aspect of political freedom may disappear. But the Czechs are a nation of peasants and a peasant is usually noted for his slow tenacity or his inability to remove ideas fixed pretty steadily in his head. For the moment Czech attention is absorbed by tasks of a practical kind necessary for the reconstruction of the state. If Czechoslovakia can once more become an economic whole, if its present frontiers are slightly modified and surely guaranteed (as guaranteed they are by two countries which cannot morally afford again to betray a confidence), then, on a very modest and restricted scale, the Czechoslovak Republic can again become independent and again keep alight in the heart of Europe, the sparks of individual freedom and of human dignity. That the great majority of the Czechs are determined to do so if they can, cannot be doubted, but will it be possible? If it be true that the cause of Bohemia has always been bound up with the cause of humanity, then the struggle is not yet over. If the cause of humanity ultimately triumphs over the dark forces and tyrannies which oppress it to-day, the Bohemia of the Czechs will not be lost.

S. GRANT DUFF.

HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THE award by the German and Italian "arbitrators" on Hungary's claims for revision of her frontier with Czechoslovakia has been accepted by both parties, according to previous arrangement, as binding, and the countries concerned will, presumably, proceed to the demobilisation of their armies, their Press and their public opinion. There is certain to be grumbling on both sides; but it is unlikely that either will, for the time at least, indulge in any active campaign to alter the new frontier line.

For this there is, of course, good reason: Germany and Italy have given it to be understood that their decision is not to be questioned. They have established as between their respective *protégés* their own version of that collective security the more general application of which through the League of Nations they have successfully destroyed. But just as the League proved itself powerless in 1938 to enforce its will, so a time may arrive when Germany will be unable or unwilling to insist that the frontier which she has now ordained must remain sacrosanct. It is therefore relevant to ask whether, outside compulsion apart, the present "peace settlement" is likely to achieve that objective which its predecessor, the Treaty of Trianon, failed so conspicuously to attain. Is it, in fact, of a nature to establish a settled peace?

Relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia have been fundamentally hostile since the war: that is, since the creation of the latter state. Nor is this unnatural. It is true that upon a superficial view the elements of an understanding would always have seemed to be present. Czechoslovakia's behaviour towards her Magyar minorities contrasted favourably with the far more barbarous attitude of Yugoslavia and Roumania, nor was she guilty in other respects of acts of violence or extreme discourtesy towards Hungary. Thus Dr. Beneš's pronouncements on the revision question, if no more compromising at bottom than those of his partners in the Little Entente, were infinitely more conciliatory in tone than the frothy outbursts of M. Titulescu. And yet it was not incorrigible perversity alone that impelled Hungary to concentrate her most insistent and venomous propaganda precisely against the mildest-mannered of all her neighbours. For the point really at stake between the two was the possibility

or otherwise of frontier revision and this, in relation to Czechoslovakia, opened issues of far more vital importance to both parties than emerged at any rate between Hungary and Yugoslavia. The losses which Hungary had incurred to Yugoslavia were (since she had accepted, and written off, the secession of Croatia-Slavonia) comparatively trivial, whether measured in terms of territory, of economic wealth, of total population, or of Magyar minorities. Conversely, the disputed area never loomed particularly large in Yugoslav eyes, the average Serb politician being far more deeply preoccupied with the Croat and the Macedonian questions. The Roumanian problem is much more serious in every respect; yet even there Hungary was unable to deny the predominantly Roumanian character of most of Transylvania, or the reality and strength of Roumanian nationalism, while Roumania could—it is true that she has shown no signs of doing so—satisfy most of the more clamant Hungarian demands without seriously endangering her national, economic or strategic position.

In the case of Slovakia the roots of the conflict went much deeper. Many considerations brought Hungary's losses in the north home to her with quite particular emphasis. The frontier itself ran only a score or two miles north of Budapest, and excursionists to Esztergom on Sunday afternoons looked out from the hill on which the Cathedral stands over wide leagues of land once familiar, now become foreign. These stretches, and others adjacent to the frontier, were overwhelmingly Magyar in population, and the loss of them was bitterly resented as a piece of arbitrary injustice. Further, Hungary had been forced into expensive measures of reconstruction by the loss of the Slovak factories, forests, mines and water-power, which had occupied an important and integral place in her planned economy. The north of Hungary, unlike the east or the south, was bound to the body of the country by nearly a thousand years of unbroken tradition, which the Turkish occupation of Central Hungary had not touched. During that period, indeed, Pozsony (the Bratislava of to-day) had been the capital of Hungary; the city in which her Parliament met and her kings received the Holy Crown; while Rákóczi lies buried in Kassa.

But above all Hungarian public opinion was entirely unconvinced that, even on grounds of national self-determination, the separation of North Hungary ought ever to have taken place. It admitted the national differentiation from the Magyars of the Roumanians and Serbs, and even to some extent their hostile feelings, but maintained with real conviction that the Slovaks and Ruthenes, who had undeniably offered much less resistance to "Magyarisation," had never desired to leave Hungary. It regarded them, not perhaps in the phrase which has now become fashionable in Budapest as "brother peoples," but as faithful servants, whose political aberrations did not represent the true feelings of the people, but were due exclusively to outside influences: to "Pan-Slav agitators" or to Czech intrigants. It was never able to convince itself that the Declaration of Turčanský Svätý Martin, whereby the Slovak nationalist leaders signified their adherence to the Czechoslovak State, was a real expression of the wish of the people; much less the agreement, concluded by President Masaryk with a group of emigrants in the U.S.A., on the strength of which the Ruthenes were attributed to Czechoslovakia. It firmly believed and loudly maintained that these were fraudulent instruments, obtained under false pretences, which the Czech negotiators at the Peace Conference had buttressed up by false statements and disingenuous promises—a belief which lent a peculiar bitterness to the feelings, never in history particularly friendly, with which not the Slovaks but the Czechs were regarded; which animosity awoke a natural response, since no man likes to be perpetually called a liar and a thief.

Thus if in form Hungary cloaked part of her demands under the guise of a request for a plebiscite, in effect she was maintaining actively her claim to the restoration of the historic frontier along the whole of its northern course. And there was enough truth in her contentions to make them most unwelcome to Czechoslovakia. The possibility of Slovak and Ruthene secession was at least for many years not wholly to be excluded. The whole of the centralist and forceful policy into which the Czechs were driven from December 1918 onward: the refusal of autonomy, the political trials, the introduction of Czech officials, the colonisation with Czech peasants—all these were tacit admissions that the Slovaks and Ruthenes could not, if left to their own devices, be trusted to remain within the Czechoslovak State. Thus Czechoslovakia had to face as a real danger the possibility of losing, not a mere frontier strip,

but a territory comprising almost half the total area of her State, and one without which it seemed doubtful whether the other half—the Historic Lands—could survive at all as an independent Czech State. Even frontier concessions were difficult to make, quite apart from the dangerous precedent which they might have set. Czechoslovakia had herself claimed at the Peace Conference that the Magyar territories which in the eyes of the world constituted the most justifiable portion of Hungary's claims, and that pressed most strongly by Hungary herself, were vital to the economic viability and strategic security of the Slovak areas. The more she came to see the weakness in her own internal position, the more necessary did she find these extraneous aids to solidarity ; and not in territory alone, but in the alliances and systems of security, local and general, which she sought to erect round her.

All Czechoslovakia's elaborate defensive system has crumbled and vanished to-day : the allies are impotent or uninterested, the fortifications, strategic lines and frontiers are in enemy hands. The new frontier confines not only Hungary but also Czechoslovakia to her ethnic limits (to allow, for argument's sake, that these include the Ruthene areas). On her own premises it would appear that, having lost so much which she had repeatedly declared to be vital to her, she was doomed now to early decease ; in which case the Vienna Agreement only marks a stage in her disintegration. There are circles in Hungary which take this view ; and the relative degree of philosophy with which the extreme nationalists of Budapest have taken the rejection of their wider demands springs from a conviction that this deprivation is, after all, only temporary. They believe that economic stress, if nothing else, would drive the Slovaks and Ruthenes sooner or later to return to the Hungarian fold ; and now that the Czech compulsion has been removed, that hour is not likely to be long delayed.

These calculations, however, are probably mistaken. It is true that if the Treaty of Trianon sacrificed ethnical requirements too readily to military and economic claims, the Vienna line is perhaps too austere in its majestic disregard of these factors. The new frontier of Ruthenia places that province in so difficult a position as regards its communications and economic outlets that it is genuinely hard to see how it is to

go on living as a part of Czechoslovakia ; particularly as its overwhelming desire to do so is yet to be proved. Here the new frontier does not, in spite of the self-satisfied pronouncements of the German Press, seem likely to withstand many shocks.

As regards the main issue, however, the position is different. Czechoslovakia is no longer a buttress of French, Russian or League of Nations policy ; no longer enjoys any importance other than that naturally attaching to her as the national home of an independent people. She had laid so much stress on the wider rôle, had adapted herself so radically to the playing thereof, that the present transformation may seem, in some respects, almost equivalent to destruction. The reduced, national Czechoslovakia is, by contrast with the old, almost a new State.

But it is new not only in its limitations, and in its form, which seems likely to be in the future that of a wide federation, but in one item on the credit side also : in the unmistakable will of the Slovaks as well as the Czechs to belong to that federation. Even in their relations with the Slovaks, the Czechs have recently had to swallow bitter pills. The alacrity with which the Slovaks, once their liberty of action was restored to them, threw off the Czech control, the ungrateful precipitancy with which they ejected Czech officials who had worked for them hard and conscientiously, cannot have been pleasant to contemplate. Yet the fact remains that the Slovaks, if they have repudiated most emphatically the theory that they were Czechoslovaks, have denied with equal vigour that they were " Slovak-speaking Hungarians." They have shown a very clear preference for existence within a federated Czecho-Slovak State.

There seems reason to believe that the more sensible among the Hungarians, including both the Magyar parties in the former Slovakia (who have had the best opportunity to observe the development of feeling around them) and the younger generation in Hungary itself, recognise this cardinal fact. It was probably rudely forced upon the Hungarian delegates to Komárom, who went thither (or said that they did) believing that the Slovak delegates would prove less intransigent than the Czechs in the matter of territorial concessions. The awakening must have been painful for the Hungarians, as it was for the Czechs, but it has cleared the air to an astonishing

degree. The recognition by all parties of this cardinal central fact of Slovak nationality, prepared to seek its home within a Czecho-Slovak State, is, after all, the essential requisite for a permanent understanding between Hungary and her northern neighbour.

A second requisite was the restoration to Hungary of the predominantly Magyar territories in the south. It is true that in Slovakia, and still more in Ruthenia, it is impossible to draw a frontier satisfactory at once to ethnic and to economic claims. A perfectly reasonable case could be put forward for nearly all the derogations of the ethnic principle made in Czechoslovakia's favour in 1919. They were in many respects beneficent to the local populations; but it should have been recognised that they formed no basis for peaceful relations between the two States. The sacrifices imposed upon Hungary were too painful and too one-sided, so that they kept her in a state of eternal resentment, and Czechoslovakia in a condition of perpetual and nervous defence. Given sufficient political obstacles, be it remarked, the most careful economic provisions will break down, a truth admirably proved precisely by the example of the Hungarian-Slovak frontier. Necessary to both countries as were the commercial exchanges across it, it was practically closed in 1930 by Czechoslovakia in pursuance of her agrarian policy, which in its turn was forced on her by predominantly political considerations—not least among them the desire to safeguard the Czech colonists settled along the Slovak frontier. Thus this elaborately economic frontier proved fundamentally anti-economic. By contrast, the boundary of the Burgenland, between Austria and Hungary, was drawn on strictly ethnic principles, without consideration of other factors or favour to either party. Special arrangements were laid down in order to mitigate the hardships which it occasioned, and these, loyally carried out, have worked to the general satisfaction.

Political appeasement is therefore the first necessity; and the new frontier is certainly better calculated than the old to bring it about. Neither side has got all that it wanted. The Slovaks deplore the loss of certain towns which perhaps they might reasonably have expected to retain, on the population figures. On the other hand Hungary not only fails to recover the Slovaks, but also the Ruthenes, of whose devotion to herself she was convinced, and who would have brought with

them the much-desired gift of the common frontier with Poland. She is left without Pozsony, the old Coronation city, and without the ancient episcopal see of Nyitra. It is quite certain that neither country is content with the award, and this is precisely as it should be; for if one had been wholly pleased, this must have meant that the other had received less than justice. The Danube basin consists exclusively of conflicting and mutually incompatible claims, and the only sage method of dealing with them is on the principle enunciated long ago by Count Taaffe (who governed Austria for twenty years, not unsuccessfully, on the strength of it): of "keeping all parties in a state of equal and nicely regulated discontent."

But the discontent is at least equal now, and reasonably regulated, and there seems therefore no reason why a new era, happier in many ways than its predecessors, should not open. Much, of course, depends on the wisdom of the two States and especially, perhaps, of Hungary. Czechoslovakia's sacrifice has been the more apparent, but Hungary's is in some respects the greater; for by engaging in advance loyally to accept the arbitrators' decision she has, in effect, abandoned her old claims on the Slovaks. The fact that, looked at from the point of view of national self-determination, those claims lost something of their substance each year did not make the spiritual renunciation of them much easier. Hungary should, however, be able now to see that a Czecho-Slovak State possessing internal stability and a will to independent existence has its solid advantages for her, as well as its drawbacks. If she realises this, and if the Slovaks in their turn accept with philosophy the shattering of their own imperialistic dreams (smaller in scale but not different in quality from the Hungarian) and the somewhat niggardly assessment of their national claims, then there is no essential reason now why Czechoslovakia and Hungary should not become friends.

A little time must perhaps pass while fresh wounds are still smarting, but given goodwill on the part of both governments, which are in a position powerfully to affect the public opinion of their respective countries, the healing process should not be of long duration. If the old hostility gives place to a new era of friendship and mutual support, then the grievous humiliations through which Hungary passed in 1919 and Czechoslovakia in 1938 will not have been all in vain.

C. A. MACARTNEY.

THE CANADIAN POLITICAL SCENE.

RECENT months, and even more recent weeks, have seen a certain consolidation of American and Canadian opinion with regard to world affairs. The isolationist sentiment which has been so pronounced in the U.S. and Canada since the Hoare-Laval Plan, and the feeling which underlies it, that events abroad are of no concern to remote and secure North America, are clearly diminishing. President Roosevelt's speech of August 18th, when he assured Canada that the American people would not " stand idly by if the domination of Canadian soil was threatened by any other Empire," is a striking result of this diminution, and is likely to accentuate it still further.

In itself Mr. Roosevelt's promise to Canada of American support is not of great significance. Everyone has known for years that the U.S. would defend Canada in case of necessity, since it would be an immediate threat to American security if any foreign State obtained a foothold anywhere in North America. If Canada has been, and according to Mr. Roosevelt's comment on his Kingston speech still is, regarded as outside the Monroe Doctrine area, that is only a surface concession to Canadian nationalist, and British Commonwealth, sentiment. The same fundamental considerations which have led the U.S. to make the Monroe Doctrine the basis of its policy elsewhere in the western hemisphere impel it to resist attack on Canada. It required no speech from an American statesman to make that clear.

Mr. Roosevelt was, however, not addressing his remarks to Canadians who feared, or foreigners who planned, an attack on the Dominion, if there be any such. He was trying rather to do two quite different things. He wished firstly to encourage the peoples of North America, Canadian and American, to realise more fully the fact that North America is not, and cannot be, isolated in any complete sense. As he said at Kingston : " We in the Americas are no longer a far-away continent to which the eddies of controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm. Instead, we in the Americas have become a consideration to every propaganda office and to every General Staff beyond the seas. The vast amount of our resources, the vigour of our commerce and the strength of our men have made us vital factors in world

peace, whether we choose it or not." In so saying he was only continuing the attempts to educate the people of North America in the realities of the contemporary world situation, and in the fallacies and dangers inherent in those extreme isolationist ideas which have been current in the past, and which have so hampered American and Canadian statesmen in their efforts to defend their own interests and defend peace, which he, his Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, and other American and Canadian Ministers, have been constantly making during the last twelve months. The Kingston speech was in the tradition of last autumn's Chicago speech (though wisely omitting such controversial words as " quarantine " which are as yet a little too bold for the majority of the North American public), and of many of Mr. Hull's speeches, notably that of August 16th. It is intended to create a public opinion in North America which will be less prone to hamstring the efforts of American and Canadian diplomats to play their part in tackling the world crisis.

The speech had, however, another, and equally important object. It was intended as a warning to the totalitarian States, and especially to Germany, and as an encouragement to those States which are honestly trying to prevent war, and notably Britain. It is clearly the desire of Mr. Roosevelt, as it was last summer of Mr. Mackenzie King when he referred in Paris to the certainty that, if Britain were threatened, Canadian opinion would not be indifferent, to dispel the dangerous notion that North American desire to keep a free hand, and if possible to stay out of war, means that aggressors can count upon lack of American and Canadian opposition to their aggression. No American or Canadian statesman can promise military support to any extra-American victim of aggression. None can disregard the deep-seated determination of the North American public to avoid all commitments abroad which would diminish the free choice of the American Congress and Canadian Parliament to fight or not to fight when the emergency actually arises. But Mr. Roosevelt, like Mr. Mackenzie King, is increasingly eager to prevent this natural and proper North American desire for a free hand from depriving the U.S. and Canada of their normal influence in world affairs.

Mr. King has recently distinguished five schools of thought in Canada, so far as world affairs are concerned. These are :

1. The 100 per cent. isolationists, especially strong in Quebec.
2. The North Americans, who believe in the most complete accord between Canada and the U.S.A., and hence in a Canadian foreign policy at any moment as isolationist as is American foreign policy.
3. The advocates of a League of Nations policy for Canada, who would fight for the League, but not for the Empire as such, except in accordance with the Covenant of the League.
4. The 100 per cent. imperialists, especially strong in Victoria, B.C., and in Ontario.
5. The "middle way" school of thought, which refuses to surrender the decision as to peace or war either to London or to Geneva, which will judge the wisdom and extent of Canadian intervention in any struggle when the issue arises concretely, but which, not being by any means indifferent to aggression, or without strong loyalty to the League and the Empire, would probably support another part of the Commonwealth, and possibly support another friendly member of the League, if such State were to be the victim of unprovoked aggression.

Canadian foreign policy tends to conform to the wishes of this fifth school of thought, which is in some measure the common denominator, if not of all the remaining four schools, at least of all but the out and out isolationists. It has to do so, whatever might be the private views of the government in office, if the unity of Canada is not to be endangered.

Mr. Roosevelt's speech should help Mr. King by diminishing the extreme isolationist sentiment of North Americans, and by depriving the so-called "North American" school of Canadian publicists of their argument that support of London or Geneva carries with it risk of Canada getting out of step with the U.S.A. For while Canada can do little without the U.S.A., or in advance of it, it should be encouraged to pull its full weight in world affairs in response to such an American lead. If the President of the U.S.A., representing a great State outside the League, free from imperial connections, and far more self sufficient than Canada, dares to say that North America cannot be indifferent to aggression overseas, it becomes much safer for a Canadian statesman to say the same thing.

It is, however, admittedly difficult for any Canadian Government to pursue a very positive foreign or defence policy. The divisions amongst Canadian opinion, which are inevitable in a country 50 per cent. British, 25 per cent. French, and 25 per cent. foreign in origin, divided into five distinct and loosely linked sections (The Maritime Provinces, Quebec, Ontario, The Prairie Provinces, and British Columbia) all of which, except Quebec, are in some respects closer to the American region south of them than to the Canadian section east or west, make the path of the Canadian politician difficult even in domestic affairs. It is essential, if the Government is to avoid a fatal clash either with the imperialists or with the isolationists, that it should provide defences strong enough, and should pursue a foreign policy British enough in character, to enable Canada to play its part with other members of the Commonwealth if and when an emergency should arise, and yet should avoid anything at all resembling an imperial defence or foreign policy. Such armaments as are provided, and Canada has been modestly re-arming, must be such as would be of use to Canada, for purposes of local defence, even if it were not a member of the Commonwealth or League, and unlikely to be engaged in a collective war. It is safe to allow British purchases of aeroplanes and other arms in Canada, and even the development of a large scale war industry in the Dominion, but the Canadian Government must not become a formal party to such British purchases or industrial development. It is safe to allow pilots and aircraftmen to be trained in Canada for the purposes of the British R.A.F., but it is, in Mr. Mackenzie King's view, unsafe politically, and improper technically, to allow British Flying Schools to be established for this purpose, as Britain is said to have requested, and as the Canadian Conservative Party says it would have allowed. All military establishments on Canadian soil must, in his view, be wholly under Canadian control. It is safe to develop a Canadian air force and militia, and a modest fleet of coastal vessels, but not to create anything which looks like an expeditionary force. It is safe to do nothing and say nothing which would embarrass the British Government in its conduct of foreign policy. It is unsafe to offer Britain advice, since this would deprive Canada, at least morally, of the free hand she cherishes.

Some Conservative politicians, notably Mr. Meighan, the former leader, and Mr. R. J. Manion, the newly elected leader who has just taken Mr. R. B. Bennett's place, have criticised Mr. King on the score of his lack of adequate support to Britain, especially in the matter of the proposed Flying

Schools. It is doubtful, however, whether a Conservative Government in Canada would feel free if in office to pursue a much more imperialist policy. Mr. Manion's election, due as it was largely to French-Canadian votes, since he is a Roman Catholic, and was in his early days in politics a Liberal, and has a French-Canadian wife, must be regarded in some measure as an attempt by the Dominion Conservative Party to make greater inroads into traditionally Liberal French-Canada. It is natural that the Dominion Conservative Party should have this intention, since the Duplessis Government, formed out of the former Quebec Conservative Party and some dissident Liberal elements, has overthrown the hitherto irresistible Liberal machine in Quebec headed by the long-time Premier Taschereau, and since recently Quebec province has been one of the very few regions of Canada in which the Dominion Liberal Party has been losing by-elections. If the sixty-five votes of Quebec could cease to be almost the preserve of the Dominion Liberal Party the whole complexion of Canadian federal politics would be altered. But if Mr. Manion and the Federal Conservative Party want to woo French-Canada successfully they cannot afford to be very pro-British in attitude, and will have to walk almost as warily in defence and foreign policy matters as the Liberals have done. And in any case it is the primary duty of any Canadian government to avoid imposing undue strains on the national unity of the Dominion, which involves pursuing an ultra-cautious international policy.

Domestic politics, even in North America, tend to get somewhat overshadowed by international developments in these difficult days. Canada is, however, far from being wholly or mainly preoccupied with the international situation. There is much interest in at least six other matters.

The Trade Treaty negotiations are of great concern to many. Canada is especially afraid at the moment of the rumoured intention of the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to get rid of the depressing American wheat surplus by in effect dumping 100 million bushels in foreign markets. This problem of wheat is indeed in all probability the chief immediate obstacle to the early conclusion of a Canadian-American and a British-American Trade Agreement. The fears which Canadian interests, especially fruit and lumber interests, had that they might be sacrificed in order to give American

agriculturalists greater advantages in the British market seem to have been largely dispelled. Canada has according to all accounts already driven with Britain and the U.S.A. preliminary bargains which make it reasonably certain that there will be no undue loss to Canada from any British-American bargains, since what Canada has to lose as a result of the British-American agreement will probably be made up to her in other ways by Britain or America or both. But this wheat issue, arising in its full force recently, creates a difficulty which it may not be easy to surmount.

Generally speaking, Canada seems to have welcomed its own Trade Agreement with the U.S.A., which has been in operation for two years, and the Government has not lost by-elections, even in areas especially affected, because of the blessing that it has given to the idea of a British-American Treaty and a revised Canadian-American one. The chief discontent which has been aroused, at least so far as the Government's own supporters are concerned, is that because of the trade agreement negotiations the Canadian Minister of Finance did not this year include in his budget any provision for reduced customs duties. The Canadian Liberal Party, chiefly because of its western support, has traditionally been a low tariff, though by no means a free trade party. Canadian farmers want reductions in duties on manufactured imports, since they have to sell in a world market and dislike having to buy in an over-protected one. The Government has had to placate its low tariff supporters by promising that next year's budget will contain considerable reductions of duty, apart from any which are the immediate result of the Trade Agreements now nearing completion.

The results of the recent provincial general election in Saskatchewan, in which the local Liberal Government was returned to power with a reduced majority, are interesting not so much in this connection as in another. The Aberhart Social Credit Movement was making great efforts to extend its influence. It did better than the Conservatives, which did not return a single member, but not so well as the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (Canada's "Labour Party"), which remains the official Saskatchewan Opposition, and not well enough to encourage any hope of an early capture of the whole prairie area. Social Credit, even in Alberta, is running into difficulties. The disallowance by the Federal

Government of several of Mr. Aberhart's laws, and the later decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, confirming that of the Canadian Supreme Court, that these were unconstitutional, have therefore not merely been welcomed by opinion outside Alberta, but have failed to provoke the reaction in the province which might have been expected had the full enthusiasm of the Social Credit idea still persisted there. It is far from being the case that the movement is in early danger of defeat in its home province but it is now clear that it is not going to be any prairie fire sweeping all across Canada.

The Quebec situation is also giving less cause for alarm than it did. There was a time when many people talked of Mr. Duplessis' National Union Party, and its measures, as if Quebec had gone Fascist. There is indeed much that is illiberal, politically and economically, in Mr. Duplessis' record in office. Some observers feel that constitutional rights, of free expression as well as of property, are being so infringed there that the Dominion Government ought to exercise in Quebec as it has in Alberta its power of disallowance. Mr. Mackenzie King has, however, so far refused to do so. Nor is it clear that his chief reason for abstaining has been a party one, that is, fear of hurting the chances of the Dominion Liberal Party in Quebec in the next Federal general election. It is more probable that he feels that certain excesses were to be expected of a movement of discontent such as the long parliamentary dictatorship of Mr. Taschereau was bound to have provoked, and such as Mr. Duplessis has capitalised, and that these excesses are more likely to end if the movement is left alone than if French-Canadian separatism and sensitiveness is provoked by Dominion intervention.

Certainly Quebec under Mr. Duplessis looks to-day very different from the Austria of Dollfuss or Schuschnigg, to which alarmists compared its régime in the days immediately after it reached power. It seems unlikely that it will go very far along the road of local self-sufficiency, of French-Canada for the French-Canadian and let the rest of Canada take care of itself, which also at one time looked as if it was the course favoured by National Union leaders tired of the continued exploitation of French-Canadian men and resources by American and British-Canadian capital. Mr. Duplessis,

though eager for a " New Deal " for the French-Canadian, and not very sensitive to the complaints of vested interests which dislike his very French and Catholic policy, is showing increasing signs of being conscious that Quebec, whether it likes it or not, is part of Canada and cannot prosper apart from the rest of Canada, or on any basis of provincial semi-isolation.

In Ontario Mr. Mitchell Hepburn pursues his independent course, making much of his friendship for Mr. Duplessis, and continuing to show himself intolerant of radical labour organisations, and of party traditions. He has, however, apparently not made up his mind whether to seek next the leadership of the existing Dominion Liberal Party or to join with Mr. Duplessis in creating a new coalition for the purpose of dominating Ottawa as he dominates Toronto and Mr. Duplessis dominates Quebec and Montreal. He has, it is true, shown himself increasingly critical of the existing Dominion leadership, and looked likely to have an open trial of strength with Mr. Mackenzie King. It is said, however, that many of his own Ontario Liberal leaders have warned him against this course, and have said that if he persists in it they must side with Mr. King rather than with him. He may realise, before an open breach in the Liberal organisation is forced, that it is more likely to put the Conservatives back in power in what used to be traditionally Conservative Ontario than to put him in power in Ottawa.

One of the issues arising out of the Alberta, Quebec and Ontario situations is that of Dominion-Provincial relations, which is in any case now the subject of examination by a Royal Commission with which Mr. Hepburn will have nothing to do. It is felt in many quarters that the Dominion Constitution needs to be revised so as to give the federal Government greater power, and needs also to be revised in such a way as to provide a means of amendment in Canada (the British North America Act is Canada's constitution, and it requires an Act of the Westminster Parliament to amend it). The task of producing a revision, and a method of subsequent amendment, which will satisfy sectionalist Quebec, afraid of domination by the non-Catholic, non-French, majority of the Canadian electorate, and which will fit the necessities of the national economic and political situation, is, however, far from easy. Mr. King, with his habitual caution, is not likely

to commit himself on so touchy a matter until the Commission has reported and he has had ample time to judge Canada's reactions to its recommendations.

Some amendment of the constitution seems to be an essential preliminary to action in respect of the sixth domestic problem which is attracting Canadian attention. Mr. R. B. Bennett's Canadian " New Deal," declared unconstitutional over a year ago both by the Canadian Courts and by the Privy Council, Mr. Stevens' abortive attempt to found a new Canadian party based on an attack upon monopolies and other vested interests, the controversy in the Canadian Conservative Party as to whether it should, by adopting a positive programme of social and economic reform, force the Liberal Party into the position of a defender of the vested interests, are all consequences of the impact of the economic depression upon Canada. That impact has left Canadians conscious that economic calamities, like unemployment, and natural ones, like the droughts which have ravaged the prairies for several years, both demand more comprehensive measures than any single province can undertake. A Federal system of social insurance, for example, seems a wise policy in the light of depression experiences, as does a federal conservation and reafforestation programme in some of the drought areas. But as things are the hands of the Dominion Cabinet and Parliament are tied. And efforts to untie them, by amending the constitution, naturally provoke opposition from interests and individuals who fear the measures which a stronger Dominion government might initiate.

FRANK DARVALL.

THE PRESS IN NAZI GERMANY.*

AT times of international tension the newspaper kiosks in Berlin and other German cities are overwhelmed by hundreds of people demanding foreign newspapers, and almost without exception the vendor replies with a sly grin : " Forbidden! " This unchanging grin and the expressive shrugging of shoulders by the disappointed customers are significant for the efficiency of Press policy in Germany. Years ago, a Liberal Swiss newspaper reached a circulation five times as great in Germany as in Switzerland. After a fierce campaign of the Nazi Press it was forbidden for good. After five years of steady official support, the *Voelkische Beobachter* has attained a circulation of slightly over five hundred thousand ; most of its subscribers are people who think it advisable to take it owing to their professional position ; it is worth noting that the total number of party members in the Reich is estimated at between four and five million.

If repetition is the secret of successful propaganda, as Adolf Hitler points out in *Mein Kampf*, the Nazi Press ought to have achieved unrivalled results after five years of power ; if it has been less efficient than other propagandist instruments used by the Nazi régime, the reasons are of a psychological as well as of a material nature. In present-day Germany visual effects impress the crowd more than anything else. A march of troops hypnotises the mob almost without exception and repetition does not slacken the enthusiasm in any way. Even at the news films the audience cheer and clap when goose-stepping soldiers are shown on the screen. For the average German a squadron of bombers is a more convincing argument in favour of National Socialism than a dozen editorials oozing with eulogy. Pretentious phrases sound better if a speaker shouts them from a dais decorated with flags than if they are read in dull print, though, with occasional exceptions, the population grows tired of mass demonstrations too. These are factors against which even a masterly Press policy would be impotent. But in spite of vast organisation and unlimited financial resources, there are certain shortcomings inherent in the system. If it were more flexible it would be more convincing.

Ever since Hitler came to power, Nazi policy has acted on

* The author was a member of the Austrian Legation in Berlin.

the assumption of war conditions practically in every sphere of national life. When the Four Year Plan was proclaimed, the millions in Germany were told that the Reich was exposed to an economic siege. Every factory, every shop, every peasant house, was exhorted to consider itself as a troop unit in the economic struggle for the existence of the nation. All these slogans had a very stimulating effect at the beginning, but soon the majority became tired of them. Practical measures, demanding heavy sacrifices, were enforced, but, being compelled to comply with the necessities of daily life, the average citizen paid little attention to what his paper had to say about the advantages of things, the unpleasant effect of which he had full opportunity to experience. The same applies to the political and cultural spheres. The reader, who is reminded every day that Germany is threatened by the diabolical schemes of Bolshevism and international Jewry, stops reading as soon as he comes across these words. Even primitive minds gradually become suspicious when exaggeration goes beyond all limits.

Hitler's ideas of propaganda were conceived at a time when he was still impressed by the methods of war propaganda, and by the Socialist and Communist campaigns in the years when the German people was still suffering after its defeat. But national passion cannot be maintained at boiling point throughout a number of years. There comes a time when the fever must abate. The crisis of the last weeks reveals that, in spite of the tremendous cheering of the thousands in the Berlin Sports Palace, the majority did not fully respond to the recent propaganda campaign, because there had been so many similar ones before. It is inconceivable that the German population should have believed all the anti-Czech atrocity stories, or, as has been thought by many in this country, that they should have been ignorant of the dangers of a general war. Insulation is not so complete, and just because their own Press did not inform them of the greater issues at stake, they began to question the full truthfulness of the reports. Such results could have been avoided and they are chiefly due to the fact that propaganda work has, in the course of years, become too stereotyped. An over-abundance of organisation and hackneyed routine work has, as a consequence of monopoly, taken the place of the unerring *flair* which characterised Nazi propaganda in the past.

This is the daily routine of German Press policy : in Berlin a Press conference meets at noon or, if great events have taken place, special conferences are summoned. Every newspaper is represented by a permanent confidential envoy, who receives the instructions and has to communicate them to his editor-in-chief. Such instructions are strictly confidential and their communication to unauthorised persons is punished as betrayal of State secrets. Even capital punishment may be inflicted for this. In one case a member of the *Berliner Boersen Zeitung* staff, called Schwertfeger, was condemned to penal servitude for life, the charge against him being that he had informed foreign Press men of the contents of the instructions he had received at a Press conference. Such instructions are of a very detailed nature ; they contain indications of what news is not allowed to be published, how other news should be commented upon, how the headlines should run. The editor or leader writer very often finds himself obliged to do work similar to that of a schoolboy who has been set a composition. Criticism and praise are dealt out at the Press conference by the speaker of the Propaganda Ministry. He might, for instance, say that the article of the *Berliner Tageblatt* on the ill-treatment of Sudeten Germans by " Czech soldiery " was not strong enough in its attacks. Journalists who do not attain the standard demanded by the Propaganda Ministry may be struck off the official editors' list and thereby lose the right to continue their profession. I know of a case where the editor of an important Berlin evening paper was temporarily suspended, because in the second edition, for want of space, he did not put in a picture of Dr. Goebbels addressing a mass assembly, and greatly cut down the report of his speech.

In the provinces the newspapers are instructed by branch offices of the Propaganda Ministry, which sends out its confidential instructions by means of a vast system of teleprinters. Instructions of minor importance are issued by the official German News Agency. German correspondents abroad receive detailed instructions from their embassies or legations. Thus their reports must also meet the standard required by the authorities. The German journalist is, in fact, a public official and he rightly wears his professional uniform, which was first to be seen during Hitler's visit to Mussolini in April 1938.

Through the instructions issued at the Press conference and by their party connections, the leading German journalists possess a fair amount of knowledge. However, they can only make a very limited use thereof, not only for their publications, but also in their conversations with foreign correspondents. The difficulty of obtaining useful information is for all foreign correspondents a considerable handicap in their work. Whenever foreign newspapers bring unpleasant news about Germany, violent attacks, which are often of a personal character, follow in the columns of the controlled Nazi Press. More than twenty foreign correspondents have been expelled since the beginning of the Nazi Government. Their expulsion was usually accompanied by vilification. Accordingly, the relations existing between the foreign journalists and the German authorities are very bad. The Association of Foreign Correspondents in Berlin made repeated efforts to ameliorate the relations, particularly with Dr. Goebbels. After the murders of June 30th, 1934, the Propaganda Minister had spoken of foreign journalists as liars in a broadcast speech. After a certain time, during which contacts had been non-existent, it was agreed that an effort should be made to re-establish normal relations, and Dr. Goebbels accepted an invitation from the foreign journalists to spend the evening with them. While I was sitting at the same table as the Propaganda Minister, it struck me how absolutely incapable he and other leading Nazis are of speaking a normal language ; even from behind his beer mug, he could not free himself from oratory and he talked as if he were addressing a mass meeting. He never accepted an argument, but responded with passionate, sometimes even venomous, polemics. The look in his intelligent black eyes is hard, his face and fingers move incessantly, and the only thing he can fully command is his voice, which, even if rising, never loses its melodious tones.

Press conferences for foreign journalists are very rare, and it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Propaganda Minister attends them personally. If he can, he avoids all contact with foreigners. The last time I saw him was at the Press conference called after the invasion of Austria. As the Berlin correspondent of the official Austrian News Agency, I was " invited " by the Propaganda Ministry to attend it. In the reception hall of the Ministry more than a hundred

foreign correspondents had gathered together. Dr. Goebbels entered quite suddenly, followed by a dozen of his collaborators, who stood motionless while he read aloud Herr Hitler's proclamation, which was broadcast soon afterwards. There was no chance of asking any questions. The Propaganda Minister only denied three " lies " said to have been spread by the foreign Press :

1. That a German ultimatum had been addressed to Austria. In truth, there had been repeated ultimatums presented by Herr Buerckel, Herr Kepler, and by the German Military Attaché to Vienna, General Muff. The ultimatums had been addressed to the former Federal President of Austria, and Dr. Schuschnigg's farewell speech is not the only evidence for this fact.

2. That the telegram of Seyss-Inquart demanding German troops for Austria had been forged by the German authorities. From personal experience I know that, when this telegram was first published by the official German News Agency in Berlin, nobody in Vienna, including Dr. Seyss-Inquart, had any knowledge of his telegram. Its dispatch was not only denied by the Austrian Federal Press Chief, Colonel Adam, but also by Seyss-Inquart's private secretary, a Nazi, who, when asked about the telegram, thought it was a " foreign lie " and promptly and truthfully denied it. For this lack of instinct he was promptly arrested.

3. That German troops had crossed the Austrian frontier already on March 11th. As to this question, I have no first-hand knowledge when they marched in. After these three denials, Dr. Goebbels immediately left us.

Whenever foreign correspondents complain of being unable to obtain information, the Propaganda Ministry declares that the only thing they have to do is to ring up and ask. From personal experience I know that such calls are practically always made in vain. Very often important events take place in the evening, and it is useless to ring up then. The official on duty either does not know or, without hesitating, gives wrong information. There is reason to believe that this is sometimes done on purpose, as my own experience has taught me. In many cases, even leading officials give the most contradictory information. When Pastor Niemöller, after having been released by the Court, was straightway sent to a concentration camp, a foreign correspondent asked three important

officials of the Propaganda Ministry on what charge this had been done and how long he would be held in custody. He put his questions at a reception of Herr Rosenberg and within ten minutes had received three versions: Herr Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief, said the whole thing was a matter for the courts and that there must be new charges against the pastor. Herr Dietrich's deputy replied that there were no further charges and that he would only be detained for a short time until the excitement had died down. The third official, who unlike the others is no party man, gave an explanation which proved to be correct; Niemöller, he pointed out, was a political danger. His case must be considered not from the legal but only from the political side. He will remain in prison as long as there is any likelihood of his resuming his preaching. A totalitarian State cannot tolerate opposition.

The impossibility of working with the Propaganda Ministry led to the foundation of an unofficial news centre run by the staff of Field-Marshal Goering's mouthpiece, the *Essener National Zeitung*. This institution, known as the beer-table, or *Stammtisch*, has been in operation for several years. The meetings are held in a restaurant in the Potsdamerstrasse, once a week in normal times; but when there is acute tension, foreign correspondents usually find a member of the *Essener National Zeitung* there late in the evening. While German journalists in general are very reticent in their conversations with their foreign colleagues, the members of the *Essener National Zeitung* proffer their comments unhesitatingly. The information given by them is neither official nor semi-official, but is meant to represent "party opinion." Sometimes it comes from Field-Marshal Goering directly. Only a select number of foreign correspondents is admitted to the *Stammtisch*, which at times develops into a rival institution of the Propaganda Ministry, giving far better information than Dr. Goebbels' apparatus. Long before the *Anschluss*, while official statements were denying that the Reich had any intention of annexing Austria, the *Stammtisch* admitted such aims, and Dr. Schuschnigg's great speech in the Austrian Parliament, two weeks before he proclaimed the fatal plebiscite, was termed by the Goering men the Austrian Chancellor's "swan song." I have no doubt that some of the most important comments on the development of the

German-Czech crisis came from the same source. Apart from the *Stammtisch* a number of mediators volunteer special information to the foreign Press with full knowledge of the German authorities. The Ministries furnish them with certain news items, which they in turn sell to the foreign correspondents, who in most cases are fully aware of the ambiguous position of their informers but have to take what they can get.

The German authorities would gladly impose censorship on the foreign correspondents as well as on their own Press; but for obvious reasons they content themselves with watching and spying on them. Records are taken of their phone calls and their German acquaintances are supervised. At the restaurants or bars where the foreign Press usually meet, either the waiters or other individuals have to spy on them and report their conversations. Special built-in microphones to record conversations are a possibility which must always be reckoned with. Most Germans are afraid of meeting foreign correspondents socially, and those who furnish information to them usually communicate under assumed names and meet them at odd times and in circumstances which make supervision unlikely. On the other hand there is an astonishing number of people in Germany who, if they think they can do so without danger, are ready to volunteer information about things derogatory to the prestige of their country.

While the Nazi régime makes all possible efforts to prevent infiltration of foreign propaganda into Germany, and in no way underestimates the effects of foreign wireless reports, such as the German service of Strasbourg or the Moscow transmitter, its own efforts to influence the non-German public abroad have so far been a complete failure. The propaganda service in Czech from the Vienna station does not make the slightest impression in Czechoslovakia. At first a certain number listened-in, but I was asked by many people in Czechoslovakia if Germany really thought that this was the right way to make propaganda. They only laughed at it. The sad thing about all this is that those in charge of Germany's propaganda apparatus have become entangled in their ideology to such an extent that they no longer understand the mentality of other nations. They are on the way to forget that outside the German frontiers there is another world. Every day the gulf is growing deeper.

ERNST ALBERT.

MUSSOLINI AND THE JEWS.

THE adoption of the "racial" ideology by the Italian Government is a deplorable departure from its vaunted traditions. It has dealt another cruel blow to the Jewish people just at the time when its sufferings in so many countries might have been expected to arouse the sympathy of a civilised Power. It has caused the deepest and most painful disappointment to all who had hoped Signor Mussolini's repeated declarations of tolerance would continue to represent his Government's policy. The official explanation given for such a fundamental and retrogade change—the necessity of "preserving racial purity"—is manifestly absurd, for that could easily be achieved merely by forbidding intermarriage between Jews and Italians. To those who have followed developments in Italy during the last few years the new policy has not come altogether as a surprise, for there were ominous rumblings whose significance it was difficult to mistake.

The Fascist imitation of Nazi intolerance is all the more astonishing because the Jewish community in Italy is so small. Although dating back over two thousand years (for there were Jews in Rome even before the downfall of Judæa) the community has been fairly constant for centuries, indicating a ceaseless process of intermarriage, religious conversion, and assimilation. The total number of Jews in the whole country, at the last census in 1931, was less than 48,000, but according to the special census held recently there are 57,425 Italian Jews—certainly no formidable aggregation. There has been a steady drift from Judaism since the Jews obtained political emancipation upon the establishment of the Union of Italy in 1859, and particularly since the abolition of the Ghetto of Rome in 1870. Many Jewish communities in the smaller towns have died out during the past fifty years owing partly to this cause and partly to removal to the large cities, where racial fusion has proceeded even more rapidly. It would probably be difficult to find another country in Europe where the assimilation of the Jews to the predominant population has been so extensive and thorough.

The champions of "racialism" in Italy cannot urge the specious pretext that was advanced by the Nazis five years ago, that the Jews occupy too influential a position in political

and public life, for if it could ever have been said that there was such a period in Italy, it was before the War. Luigi Luzzatti, who was Prime Minister in 1905-11, was the first Jew in Europe faithful to the religion of his fathers who rose to such a position, and he had previously served as Minister of Finance on six occasions, besides holding other posts in the Cabinet. Simultaneously with his Premiership another Jew, Ernesto Nathan, was Lord Mayor of Rome (1907-13), without any question being raised as to the fitness of a Jew to direct the affairs of the metropolis of the Catholic world. Besides Luzzatti other Jews attained Cabinet rank, one of whom, Baron Sidney Sonnino, was also Prime Minister (1906, and 1909-10), while in an earlier period Daniel Manin (son of a converted Jew) distinguished himself by his patriotic and successful defence of Venice against the Austrians and became President of the Venetian Republic (1848-9).

Whatever reproach may be trumped up against the Jews of Italy, they cannot be accused of lack of patriotism or of valour, for despite their fewness in number they won 3,000 medals for bravery in the Great War. Considering that they had for centuries been denied any opportunity of exercising martial qualities, they produced a remarkable number of officers of high rank. During an audience that the King of Italy gave the late Zionist leader, Dr. Nahum Sokolow, in 1934, he mentioned that in his Army there were not fewer than eleven Jewish Generals. One of these, General Modena, the Commandant of Sardinia, was particularly mentioned by Signor Mussolini in his talks with Emil Ludwig two years earlier, when he poked fun at the theory of race and paid a tribute to the part that the Jews played in the public life of the country.

In the earlier stages of his revolutionary career, Signor Mussolini had the assistance of several Jews. His trusty lieutenant was a redoubtable Jewish airman, Aldo Finzi, who had co-operated with D'Annunzio in conducting the Fiume campaign, and who, after the victorious march upon Rome, was made Assistant Minister of the Interior. One of the Duce's closest friends is (or was?) the Jewish authoress of Milan, Margherita Sarfati, who collaborated with him for a time in editing the official organ of the Fascist Party, and afterwards became famous as the writer of his biography. When he set up a Commission of fifteen learned jurists to amend the

Italian Constitution and bring it into harmony with the principles of Fascism, he included three Jews, Professors Arias, Barone, and Levi, whom he entrusted with a particularly delicate part of the difficult task. In recent years at least two Jews have held State offices of importance—Guido Jung, who was Finance Minister until 1935, and Senator Ludovici Mortara, Lord Chief Justice and First President of the Court of Appeal. Moreover, there have been and there are still a number of Jews in the Fascist " Parliament," as well as—until the other day—some occupying responsible positions in the Party organisations in the various provinces.

The Jews in Italy have always shown absolute loyalty to the Fascist régime. A new constitution for the regulation of their affairs was decreed in 1930, whereby all the Jewish communities of the Peninsula and the Colonies were combined into a " National Union of the Italian Israelite Communities." This Union is presided over by a Rabbinical Council recognised by the Government and is allowed a wide measure of autonomy. Article 36 of the constitution provides that the Jewish communities shall work " towards the enrichment of Hebrew culture and share in the general religious and social activity of Jewry," and " maintain spiritual and cultural contact with Jewish communities abroad." The Government accordingly —until recently—showed sympathy with the Zionist movement and permitted Jewish delegates to attend both the Zionist Congress and the World Jewish Congress. The Duce has received the President of the Zionist Organisation, Dr. Weizmann, as well as other Zionist leaders, such as the late Lord Melchett (Sir Alfred Mond) and expressed his satisfaction at Jewish progress in Palestine. He also allowed and visited a " Jewish Palestine Pavilion " at the Near East Exhibition at Bari.

Signor Mussolini has so often given utterance to his sympathy with Jews and his contempt for anti-Semitism that his change of attitude is all the more astonishing. As far back as 1924, in consequence of various press attacks upon the Jews, the late Chief Rabbi of Rome, Dr. Sacerdoti, obtained a personal reassurance from the Duce, published in the *Epoca*, in the course of which he said : " Anti-Semitism is a plant which cannot obtain a foothold in Italy, where the Jews are citizens with full equality of rights with other citizens." In

1932 he said to Emil Ludwig, in a talk on the question of race :

> " Nothing will ever make me believe that biologically pure races can be shown to exist to-day. . . . No such doctrine will ever find wide acceptance here in Italy. National pride has no need of the delirium of race. Anti-Semitism does not exist in Italy. Italians of Jewish birth have shown themselves good citizens, and they fought bravely in the War."

In May 1933 the former editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, Herr Theodor Wolff, had an interview with Signor Mussolini, who said that " Italian Fascism knows nothing of Anti-Semitism, which is the shibboleth and the chief sound and fury of the German organisation." Similar statements were made by the Duce to other leading Jews and non-Jews on later occasions.

Nor was his sympathy confined merely to verbal utterances. Hundreds of Jewish students who were driven away from the Universities of Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Rumania, were welcomed in Italy and allowed to attend her universities either free or at half-fees. A Jewish nautical school was established at Civita Vecchia, with the help of the authorities, for the training of young Jewish sailors for Palestine. When the Nazi Government, at the end of March 1933, decreed a three days' boycott against the Jews in Germany, it was due to the personal intervention of Mussolini with Hitler—as I was informed by the late Dr. Sacerdoti, when I was in Rome a few months later—that the boycott was reduced to one day. And when the flight of the Jews from the Nazi scourge began, at least a few thousand found a hospitable reception in Italy.

The abandonment of this friendly attitude was undoubtedly a result of the Berlin-Rome axis. The process of conversion was initiated by Dr. Goebbels on the occasion of his visit to the International Film Exhibition in Venice in August 1936. He then had a long talk with his opposite number, Signor Dino Alfieri, and they agreed to co-operate in a propaganda campaign against Bolshevism, in which Judaism and Bolshevism should, wherever possible, be represented as identical. Their meeting was followed by the visit of an official delegation of the Fascist Party to the Nazi Congress at Nuremberg, which was reported at great length in the Italian press. From that time on there burst forth a veritable spate of anti-Semitic articles in many Italian newspapers and other journals, and a number of books devoted to the Nazi science

of " raceology " have appeared. The most important and sensational of these works, *Gli Ebrei in Italia* (" The Jews in Italy "), by Paolo Orano, published early in 1937, emphasised what the author construed as a conflict between the Jews' duty as Italian patriots and their attitude towards such questions as Zionism and the persecution of the Jews in Germany. Thereupon the Chief Rabbi of Rome made representations to Count Ciano, the Foreign Minister, and an official *communiqué* was issued on January 6th, 1937, to the effect that there was no change of any kind in the Government's attitude towards the Jews.

Despite this assurance, the first acts of discrimination were announced in February of this year : no book by an Italian Jew was to be published without special authority, no book by a foreign Jew was to be translated into Italian, no play of a foreign Jew might be produced, and no Jew must be allowed to broadcast. Again the Government denied that they contemplated an anti-Jewish policy. But before any decrees were promulgated there was published a document composed by a group of University professors under the auspices of the Ministry of Popular Culture, which provided the Government with the " scientific " backing that it needed for its purpose. It stated that the work of the Fascist régime was at bottom " racism," that the Duce in his speeches had often alluded to the theory of race, that it was time that the Italians professed themselves as " racists," and that the Jews were an alien element. Even then official circles claimed that the document was only of academic interest, but in September there at last appeared the first batch of anti-Semitic decrees, aimed at both foreign and native Jews alike.

It was announced that all foreign Jews who had settled in Italy, Libya, and the Italian possessions in the Ægean, since January 1st, 1919, must leave these territories within six months, and those who had acquired Italian citizenship must lose it. This ukase will affect about 12,000 persons and will bring fresh sufferings upon 4,000 refugees from Germany and Austria, although those above the age of sixty-five will be spared. Native Jews are to be victimised by a series of measures copied from the Nazi code. They are excluded from all educational institutions, whether as professors or pupils, and confined to purely Jewish establishments. Nearly one hundred Jewish University professors have already been dismissed.

Jews have been discharged from the civil service and from diplomatic and consular posts, and have had to retire from all State and public offices, whether as Admirals, Mayors, or officials of Fascist organisations and syndicates. The Jewish founder and principal owner of the Trieste *Piccolo*, one of the first newspapers to support Fascism, has had to hand over control to an " Aryan editor " ; Professor Roberto Almagia, who was to have represented Italy at the recent International Geographical Congress at the Hague, was told to stay at home, and the only Jewish member of the Rome State Symphony Orchestra was dismissed. Discrimination has also been introduced into the economic world : Jews holding leading positions in banks, insurance companies, and industrial concerns, have been removed, and Jewish owners of department stores have been warned not to advertise.

Early in October the Fascist Grand Council issued an elaborate *communiqué*, declaring that " world Judaism, especially since the abolition of Freemasonry, has been the instigator of anti-Fascism in every field," accusing immigrant Jews—particularly since 1933—of having " caused a deterioration in the attitude of Italian Jews with regard to the régime," and setting forth many supplementary details for the application of the new policy. Its definition of a Jew was not as far-fetched as the Nazi code, for it was limited to one who had both parents of Jewish race, or who was born of a Jewish father and of a mother of foreign nationality, or who, although born of a mixed marriage, professed the Jewish religion. (Grandmothers, unlike the law in Germany, were left in peace.) It exempted from discrimination, except as regards education in schools of every kind and grade, Jews belonging to families of those who had fallen in Italy's four wars (Libyan, Great, Abyssinian, and Spanish Wars), or of those who had fallen or who were injured in the Fascist cause, or been inscribed in the Party before 1924. But those who do not belong to any of these categories cannot be inscribed in the Nationalist Fascist Party, own or direct business firms employing 100 persons or more, own more than 50 hectares of land, or take part in military service in peace or war. Marriage is forbidden between Italian men and women and " persons belonging to the Hamitic, Semitic, or any other non-Aryan race." Jews dismissed from public employment are entitled to a pension ; there will be " no change with regard

to the free exercise of religion and the activity of the Jewish communities according to the laws now in force"; and Jews may establish secondary as well as elementary schools. The Fascist Council also declared that it "does not exclude the possibility of conceding a controlled immigration of European Jews into some zone of Abyssinia." But "this eventuality and the other conditions laid down for the Jews may be cancelled or rendered more severe in accordance with the attitude which Judaism adopts with regard to Fascist Italy."

In comparison with the barbarous persecution in Nazi Germany, the Fascist anti-Semitic code may, so far, be regarded as lenient. But it is only in its beginnings, and already the code is showing serious rifts. All Jews, even those promised exemption from discrimination, have been made to resign from the Stock Exchange. Although promised free exercise of their religion, the Jews have been forbidden to practise their ritual method of slaughter. These violations of official assurances are in the true Nazi tradition and are ominous of future practice. The Italian people, who have always been on the friendliest terms with the Jews, are amazed at the race-mania that has infected Mussolini, but in order that they shall be properly educated in the new doctrine a "Racial Department" has been created in all the principal universities, and a new weekly, *La Difesa della Razza* ("The Defence of the Race"), is issued for the purpose of vilifying the Jews in a pseudo-scientific fashion.

The frequent denials that preceded the official declaration of his anti-Jewish policy probably indicate that Mussolini had a serious conflict with his reactionary advisers or with himself before he agreed to such a humiliating conversion. None of the reasons advanced for this step—such as that it was necessary to protect the Italian race in its new Empire, or that "international Jewry" forms the "general staff of anti-Fascism"—can bear a moment's serious examination. The hostile measures are aimed at Jews who have played their proper part in the service of the State and in the expansion of the Italian Empire, and Jewish opinion in other countries, in denouncing the barbarities of Nazi Germany, was always at pains to emphasise the perfect equality enjoyed by Jews in Italy. Mussolini's change of attitude cannot be due to reasons of conviction.

ISRAEL COHEN.

NIETZSCHE, SPINOZA, AND HUMAN PITY.

READING Nietzsche lately with his invigorating aphorisms, his compelling watchwords "overcome yourself," "become the superman," "down with weakness," I was reminded of another philosopher who in classical and unromantic terms said very much the same thing. This was Spinoza, whose *Ethics*, like those of Zarathustra, are likewise a sort of modern stoicism, yet couched in a precise geometrical language which is poles apart from that of Nietzsche. Both are alike in their exaltation of the human will, both are alike in their contempt for human breakdown and in their acceptation of a grey, sombre, eternal nature in which man plays his transitory part. Both reject any supermundane deity and, without being irreligious, announce quite firmly that God in the old sense is dead.

They do it with a verve which is encouraging and which for a moment convinces. Spinoza, whose approach is objective and detached beyond all human conceiving, gives us a world of which we are part and stretches it out in front of us like a vast "sea of being" with lapping waves. The waves are ourselves, ebbing and flowing, and making little difference to the sea which always remains. And if you reject your ebbing and wish to continue an individual flowing, or if you envy the next wave which is slightly bigger than you are, or if you wish to be an eternal wave which never perishes, then it is because you have only half used your faculties and have not thought the matter out. Because the full life, the absolute, raises you above all the transitory nature of your surrounding and makes you see yourself, and everything else, "under the species of eternity" (*sub specie aeternitatis*). And although this is no easy thing to do, all men can do it. That is the doctrine.

If the objectivity of Spinoza with his relentless argument is like a cold bath, the subjectivity of Nietzsche may be compared to a volcano, to judge at least by the way he spits forth his bits of wisdom. He deals mainly in symbols, such as the Tarantula, the Snake, the Hermit, the Dwarf, the Eagle, and so on, but occasionally in actual human beings, with one of whom he begins. This is the Rope Dancer whom Zarathustra sees dancing on a tight-rope in the market-place and without any feeling of horror, watches as he misses his foothold and crashes to the ground. Zarathustra, unmoved by the fear of

the crowd, goes up to him and speaks to the dying man, who is lamenting his useless and bestial life, so evilly coming to an end. " Not so," says Zarathustra in brief, " your life has been an excellent one and you made light of danger. And because you did that I will bury you with my own hands." With these words of small comfort, which none the less were appreciated by the Rope Dancer, Zarathustra buried him, and all was over. The moral is that outward circumstances cannot destroy your integrity and Zarathustra was making the rope dancer realise it. In the false valuation of the world a rope dancer was like a dancing dog, who is taught his tricks by dint of beating, learning a useless skill and dying a contemptible death. Zarathustra, by supplying a new valuation, changes all this for the dying man. Integrity comes from the inside, not from the outside. The rope dancer had learned his peculiar trade, he had lived a dangerous life and now it was over. He had not been weak or cowardly. He had raised his own level to its highest point, and that was a gain. Nietzsche awards him honour and leaves him there. He is a model for others to imitate, that is all.

Now the first problem which arises in the mind when contemplating these two neo-stoic philosophies is a small point which neither of them has dealt with but which really is fundamental. It is simply this. What about the possibility of not integrating the personality, of not being able to work out mentally, as Spinoza would have it, the right balance? For when Spinoza has come to the end of his philosophical Euclidean geometry, when, having started from exact premises, and having followed straight paths, he shows us at the end that the thing can be done, what about those people, precisely those, who cannot follow or who, understanding, fail to implement the truth? And supposing also when Zarathustra had finished his eloquent, if brief, exhortation to the dying rope dancer, the latter had just not believed him, or rather just couldn't believe him? Rightly or wrongly a complete philosophy must allow for everything—both for success and for failure—and if it preaches success as do Spinoza and Nietzsche, even the refined spiritual success they do preach, it must find itself in a dilemma. For either success must be foolproof, which cannot be, or the philosophy must admit failure. And this, even reluctantly, neither of them does.

Now there is no doubt that through the centuries the one thing all men have sought is a redemption of this kind, a reintegration which will restore a fallen nature which feels unredeemed. Spinoza and Nietzsche, in their own way, are only doing what all the prophets and philosophers have done, sensing men as " sick " and trying to make them " whole." Perhaps the nearest approach to their position is the philosophy of stoicism in antiquity, in which, more obviously, appeal is made to the will and reason in the manner of Spinoza. Exercise sobriety; overcome your passions; practise renunciation; is the general summons, and no doubt those who could do it, obeyed. Marcus Aurelius is an ice-bath rather than a volcano—soothing rather than exciting, sad rather than hearty—and it is to be feared that Zarathustra would have condemned him. He would probably have condemned Spinoza for that matter. Nietzsche wishes us to enjoy life, not to renounce it, and his renunciation is one of false values. But in so many points, such as the condemnation of remorse, pity and the Christian virtues, the two meet and there is so large an element of stoicism in Spinoza that we can accept a *Weltanschauung* in common. Of all the philosophies throughout the ages these three, Nietzsche, Spinoza and Marcus Aurelius, are the most anti-idealist, the most worldly in the philosophical sense. They have no use for Plato, nor for Christ, and they would condemn outright all final values. In fact they condemn whole-heartedly all failure. They offer you redemption as a gift of your own free will—take it and be happy, if you can. But if you cannot, then you are in for it. For nothing in the world can save you then, nothing.

Now the real difference between these philosophers and the idealists is simply that the idealists offer you redemption too, whether in the next world of " ideas " or in the Christian heaven, but they also remember your weakness and take it into account. So important, indeed, does Plato consider weakness that he allows you many lives to overcome it and washes you perpetually clean. Christ does even more. For weakness' sake, of pride or passion, intellect or will, he made God descend upon earth, to bring more vitality among men. Precisely the very thing that seemed ludicrous to Nietzsche, the crucifixion of God, is the saving grace of the Christian faith. And for this reason. The Crucifixion in a sense was a failure, the failure of the man Jesus on earth. But it was also

a victory, because Jesus the man was also Christ the God, and God cannot fail. And the offer of Christ makes it really the offer of God to man, the gift of the perfect to the imperfect; which makes all failure in the end success. That is the point.

I suppose that all philosophies are faced with this flaw and probably the best philosophy is the one which reduces it to a minimum. The aim of metaphysics is, of course, to explain the universe, and it is only natural that when it comes up against the flaw it does its best to ignore it. The Epicureans, for example, who adopted the philosophy of Democritus, held that the world was a congruence of atoms, fortuitously coming together and then dissolving again as time goes on. These atoms were small, hard and indestructible, and their one great property was to fall through space, occasionally colliding with each other and so forming plants, animals, etc. If asked why they collide, instead of falling into parallel lines, the answer is quite simple. They did not fall straight but slant, and this slant, or *clinamen*, explained why they managed to collide with each other. The flaw in the atom then is the *clinamen*, that is the original sin which disturbs harmony and brings unrest into the world. For without the *clinamen* the atom would just go on falling, quietly and serenely, to all eternity. It is the *clinamen* alone which prevents it. In this way the Epicureans leave the final mystery unsolved and practically admit they are up against a blank wall.

So also, curiously enough, are their descendants the modern atomists. After breaking up the bricks of the universe into the tinier bricks called molecules, the brick-like solidity vanishes and atoms of a new kind appear—charged with positive and negative electricity, electrons and protons—and nothing else. The mystery lies in the fact that if one wishes to ascertain the velocity of an electron, one can do it, and if one wishes to ascertain the position of an electron, one can do it. But what cannot be done is to ascertain both the velocity and the position, since as far as can be seen, the one excludes the other. The very means adopted to fix the position at once alters the speed, while the speed, once ascertained, shifts the position. Granted this may be a flaw in physical science, not in metaphysics, it remains a flaw quite comparable, and even much more fundamental, than that of the Epicurean. There seems to be a mystery which it is impossible to fathom.

But, after all, the Epicureans with their idle gods in the intermundial spaces, never sought more than to frighten away the ghosts of the afterworld. In life there was only a physical event, a concourse of atoms, and hence there could be neither success nor failure. The atoms which had come together once again dissolved, and that was all. Such a doctrine, though it might appeal to the aristocratic few, was too objective to enjoy popularity with the many, and it was stoicism, rather than epicureanism, which spread abroad in antiquity. By its very objectivity and cold-blooded account of what happens, epicureanism leaves out the guts and marrow of human enterprise. In the last analysis men want real success and real defeat, and this philosophy drains the meaning out of either. The Stoics, on the other hand, laid all emphasis on human effort and their failure is simply in the defect of their own virtues. "Grin and bear it," said the Stoics, and men did so, or at least, some men did so. There were, of course, a number who just couldn't, but they are not mentioned.

The philosophies which have no use for failure belong to certain epochs and cannot be transplanted. The Stoic school, for example, was an offshoot of Greek philosophy which became popular in the decadent days of Greece and, above all, in the Roman Empire. No one talks of " grin and bear it " when there is anything to hope for, and for a long time men hoped, and hoped not in vain. Then, however, the Macedonian conquest finished Greece and later Rome " put the lid on " everything. More than half the world were slaves of the other half, the iron laws of the Empire spread over the universe, and to be free and independent had ceased to have a meaning. There was nothing to do, nothing to think of, and hope having died, men turned to the " grin and bear it " philosophy, even if a frenzied Caligula should issue his fiat before dawn. *Eadem sunt omnia semper*, said Marcus Aurelius, and with nothing else to believe, men believed that, although the Marcomanni at their gates might have told them better. Meanwhile, the Christians, who lived and thrived on failure, were undermining the monopoly of the stoic Romans and the end was near.

As an historical event it is best to regard the stoic philosophy as the aftermath of a glorious adventure when joy is over and only regret remains. The Greeks had explored the seas and founded lovely cities : they had built the lofty rhyme and

carved deathless statues. Then came Philip of Macedon and, after him, Rome. Alexander and Cæsar, it is true, had their adventure. They turned the world upside down and decided its future for years to come. But in doing so they carved out destinies for other men and stood for ever in their way. This will explain how, centuries later when the world again went a-roving over many lands and seas, high hopes were once more raised and some even fulfilled. But after Columbus and America; after Galileo and the stars; after Luther and his defiant "*ich kann nicht anders*" came a sad time and again the lid fell, only partly, it is true. But it fell enough in the eighteenth century, all-enlightened as was the régime, to explain away the philosophy of Spinoza and his freezing morals. "Grin and bear it" was once more abroad in the world and a revival of stoicism, visible as early as Descartes, had a lot to do with it. And in between the two stormy but hopeful periods of the Renaissance and the French Revolution there arose the stately edifice of the eighteenth century, more closely resembling the last centuries of antiquity than any that has been before or since. A social background of aristocrats and peasants had taken the place of Roman landowners and slaves. Despotism in politics and paternalism in government. A common Greco-Latin-French culture stretching from Petrograd to London, and philosophy instead of religion as the mental pabulum. A temporary equilibrium between two cataclysms, you might well say, between the religious wars and the wars of modern economics. So it was. That is what "grin and bear it" means. Spinoza gave the tone to the whole age.

The case of Nietzsche, to go back now to our beginning, is somewhat more complicated. The age he lived in, besides being an age of frustrated hopes for the masses, was also an age of great promise for the future, and on this promise he lived. For Spinoza, as for the Stoics, the problem of the masses did not present itself, partly because an industrialised world did not exist, partly because neither Spinoza nor the Stoics had much interest in the lower classes. In fact, it seemed to Nietzsche that only the Christian religion, which he abhorred, had introduced a problem of the masses into the world and seeing Christianity rampant again in the nineteenth century he turned and rent it. The great virtues were those of the individual. No individual properly integrated

should need or ask for pity and the great weakness of the century seemed precisely this humanitarian tendency. This, Nietzsche thought, derived from the slave morality of the Christian religion, from the exaltation of the weak over the strong, of the meek over the proud, and by exerting an influence in an anti-biological direction was sapping the vitality of the race. Down with mildness, down with weakness, down with pity. "Let your bath be ice water," says Nietzsche, "make yourself impregnable, make yourself strong." If all of you do this (and he is exhorting everybody) then there will be no more weak people in the world and no longer need for pity. Pity weakens resistance, undermines the human fibre, destroys the virtues of the strong.

What Nietzsche forgot, in these outbursts, was that the conditions under which men live have something to do with their ethics, and "like effects tend to produce like results." The great slave power of the ancient world, which grew up on the tomb of the ancient Roman freedom, produced a helplessness in the Roman proletariat which may well be compared with that of the workers in the nineteenth century and which had similar results. In a world which is free men can make their own living, as the Roman peasant had once made it before the Punic wars, but when the world is bought up and monopolised, as it became in the days of the great *latifundia*, then independence goes. No wonder then that to the helpless slaves and workers of ancient Rome a religion of pity appealed and that Christ offered the one haven to turn to. So also it seems clear that between the eighteenth century in Europe and the nineteenth there lies as deep a gulf, if not deeper, as between the free Roman peasant and his landless descendants. For the workers of the great cities mass unemployment and mass poverty were the daily experience of life and no wonder that pity, in its humanitarian form, developed to an extreme degree. It is one thing to exhort a healthy and capable individual, with no economic problem to face, to pull himself together and be strong. It is quite another to do it to the unemployed when the situation is beyond their control. For in the first case of human weakness "original sin" is in question, to which even the strongest can succumb, in the second a worse position outside the free will of man.

All this was overlooked by Nietzsche, perhaps because he was a South-German and lived a large part of his life in Italy

where industrial conditions were not far developed. But it is easy to see how his *Zarathustra*, while leaving the helpless masses cold, would appeal to the cultured few who had no conception of economics nor of the influence of material conditions on human thought. The optimism of Nietzsche is the optimism of the progressive nineteenth century, the optimism of a Hugo and a Tennyson, dazzled and also blinded by the physical possibilities of science. His announcement that "God is dead" comes straight from this also, the glory of human achievement makes God superfluous, man is the master of things and holds the key to knowledge. Unfortunately, by talking this language and glorifying the superman, which really meant a fine ideal of individual self-control and sacrifice, he played right into the hands of the ruling classes in Germany who found his doctrine so congenial to their "blood and iron" nature. Meanwhile, God and religion taking on the new form of the Marxist philosophy and the class struggle, were making headway with the masses, and a clash was inevitable. Nietzsche (slightly debased), Carlyle and Samuel Butler (also debased) fit aptly together and suit well a Fascist world.

The gist of it is that we are still looking for our philosophy of failure and have found nothing final in the various philosophies of success. The doctrines formed by the aristocrats for the benefit of the few break down when the many are restless, and they are restless now. On the other hand, the bloodless philosophies built up on a mass foundation, such as the Marxist philosophy and the Stoic creed, do not satisfy men who still hope and are not yet so exhausted that they will just "grin and bear it." At the same time humanitarian religion, which brings transcendental things down to the natural level, is defeatist in the long run, and in this Nietzsche was right. It is not sufficient to help people. One must help them to help themselves. Charity should be the exception, not because we are deficient in it, but because we have too much of it. When there are no poor at all, there will be no one to exercise charity on and that is what we desire. If charity has become the rule because too many are poor, then something has gone wrong with the world.

Now it is plain that this failure can be put right and will be, however long the process will take. When men are back at work again under normal conditions, as they were in the

medieval centuries, then we shall return once more to the individual and ask him with more success to talk about life and eternity. From every individual functioning adequately it is likely the same answer will come. We like to produce and to exert our powers and most of the time we do it well. But we feel inside us a certain flaw of the will and the intellect which sometimes hinders us and prevents us doing our best. We are lazy perhaps, or over-zealous, bad-tempered or stupid, angry perhaps or malicious, we are not quite sure what we should be. But since this flaw comes from nature and is part of our being we accept it willingly, while fighting against it. And if you, as a philosopher, have something to tell us about it, why it is there and whether God willed it, we should be most glad to know. For when we would succeed we often fail, and others with us. Hearing this you, as a philosopher, will answer: there is a flaw in the world and a big one too. That is why we offer salvation. For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son . . . There seems, after all, to be no answer but this.

F. McEachran.

SUB-CARPATHIAN RUTHENIA.

A LITTLE-KNOWN and very beautiful country, only some 5,000 square miles, with a three-quarters of a million population, has just become one of the factors in the tangled scheme of European politics. It has a well-marked frontier in the north, one of the most romantic in the world, and one of the most perfect. It runs for miles along the knife-edge ridge of the Carpathians, scarcely five feet wide in places, with a sheer drop into Poland on the one side, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia on the other. When the mists come up it is as wild and lonely as can be, and the dripping fir-trees loom out ghost-like about the cleared boundary line; and there are masses of wild campanula to give colour effect. There was hard fighting here during the war, and the remains of trenches and gun emplacements can be seen still. If one is inclined that way, and has nothing better to do, one may dig up bombs and unexploded shells. . . . Near the railway terminus at Uřok (pronounce Oorrjok) there is a war cemetery—a wonderful situation up there in the mists, the Polish frontier not fifty yards away.

The Carpathians curve round to make the Eastern borders, but on the south the frontier is more irregular, crossing from one side to the other of the Theiss. The census of 1930 showed 115,000 Magyars living about the valley of the river between Berehovo and Chust. These, of course, provide the reason for the partition now decided on. The main-line railway to Bucharest runs through this valley, at one point crossing into Rumania and running through it for some twenty miles. A branch line then takes one back into Ruthenia. Other minorities comprise some 95,000 Jews, 35,000 Czechs, a few thousand Germans and Rumanians, and some hundreds of gypsies, Poles and Yugo-Slavs. The majority call themselves Russians, some 450,000, but even these are divided in religion between Greek Catholic (Uniat), about 350,000, and Russian Orthodox, 100,000. Altogether an intriguing racial and cultural mix-up, the more marked since each community keeps well apart, retaining language, customs, and sometimes characteristic costume.

The capital—one must now use the past tense—was Užhorod, formerly Unghvar, a county town of Hungary, and now to become so again. It is a very old city, having existed

for perhaps 1,000 years, and was used as an outpost fortress by the Hungarians. It was connected with the activities of the Magyar Nationalists of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries (Bethlen Gabor and the Rakoczy) against the Habsburgs, and suffered several sieges. As a punishment for the revolt of 1703 its inhabitants were all made serfs till the middle of the nineteenth century! It was here, too, that in 1645 many of the local Greek Churches joined the "Union" with Rome to form the Greek Catholic or Uniat Church.

It is a picturesque place, lying on both sides of the river Už. The main station is some way from the centre of the town, to reach which one passes through a quarter almost entirely Jewish. Many of the inhabitants wear the long black gaberdines, the black low-crowned "Fagin" hats. The men are all bearded, and men and boys disport long curls over the ears. Even those not so distinguished have most of them a pretty obvious Jewish physiognomy. The names over the shops read Rosenberg, Goldblum, Klein, and so on. It is common to be told that *all* Užhorod's 26,000 are Jews, and even if this is an exaggeration there must be few who hav'n't some Jewish strain. One may distinguish four categories. The very strictly orthodox follow minutely the Law of Moses, and have an inconspicuous wooden synagogue outside the precincts of the original town. They keep very aloof. A less strict and wealthier section have a fine modern synagogue, with a striking oriental dome, filled in with coloured glass. Then there are Jews who, whilst still acknowledging their race, have discarded the gaberdine, and perhaps other things appertaining to the religion as well. They own shops in the main part of the town, and run the two chief hotels, and are pretty prominent generally. Finally, there are many who have dropped Judaism altogether. Being usually dark they are wont to describe themselves as Magyar. With these may be included the many of mixed stock.

Officials claim that there is no anti-Semitism. If this be true one reason would be that the economic factor does not create jealousies, for the Jews have no rivals but themselves. Their rivalry is sufficiently keen to keep prices down, so that the peasants coming in from the countryside are not seriously exploited. This applies to all the towns. On the other hand in the villages where perhaps there are only one or two "general" shops, of course run by Jews, the latter have a

monopoly, which may be abused. But even in the villages intercourse appeared to be friendly. It was common to see the " Jew " standing in front of his shop chatting amicably with Gentile customers. But there are some abuses. There is the objectionable type of Jew who runs the liquor shop, and gets the peasants into his debt. It is common for a peasant to say that " half his cow belongs to the Jew." Sometimes the Jew seems to have a pre-emptive claim on all the peasant's products, so that one cannot even buy a fowl on the ground that " the Jew's " permission must first be obtained. However, the Czechoslovak authorities are (or were) dealing with the matter in a civilised way. They do not persecute the Jew or Jews, but tackle the problem from the peasant end. They are providing facilities for his education, for learning better farming methods, and for agricultural credit, and seek to wean him from the drink habit. It is claimed that there has been much progress, but there is still drunkenness and rowdiness on occasions, and the population as a whole exhibit much poverty and backwardness. But it can be said definitely that there is great advance from the conditions of Magyar times.

Of course not all Jews are liquor-vendors and money-lenders. The majority are ordinary traders. Others are artisans, in metal and textiles. Quite a number are farmers, and good sturdy specimens at that. The trouble about them indeed is that they are usually much more efficient at the game than the Russian peasants, so that they tend to become richer, to buy up land, and eventually metamorphose into landlords and owners of the village stores. Of course this tendency would be cured with the advance of education amongst the peasants. The latter are shrewd enough, and quite capable of advancement. And they are a friendly charming folk when they have not looked too much upon the new wine served from the low wooden booths marked with characteristic names like Gersh, Oelbaum, Rosenblum in Russian characters! Incidentally it is worth remarking that all the wine is new, because the native product has no keeping quality, a fact providing further excuse (if such were needed) for drinking it off in substantial quantities. But it is not the wine, but the spirit brewed from potatoes, which causes the chief trouble.

After being told that practically everyone one meets or sees is a Jew it is natural to ask wherefore so many churches?

At Užhorod there is a great Greek Catholic Cathedral, standing boldly on one of the lower hills overlooking the river. It dates from the nineteenth century, and is rather bare inside, the chief objects of interest being silver vessels alleged to have been presented to the community by Maria Theresa. The principal difference from a Roman Catholic Church is that there are no carven images, not even on the crucifix. The picturesque old castle nearby is connected with the cult. It was presented to the Bishopric by the sempiternal Maria Theresa as a theological seminary, and you can still see the grave-looking frocked youths passing in and out. There is a Roman Catholic Church and a Lutheran one, and finally a Russian Orthodox. The latter was built after the war to commemorate fallen Russian soldiers. It is a striking little object near the left bank of the Už, being built of coloured concrete in the florid Eastern style reminiscent of St. Basil of Moscow. The communities patronising the Christian churches are said to come in mainly from the countryside. The Roman Catholics are chiefly Magyar (and in these days Czech), the Lutherans, German and Magyar. Probably a good many de-Judaised Jews and " Non-Aryans " have attached themselves to one or other of these cults.

The " countryside " is indeed always invading the towns, and the markets present lively scenes. On week-days there is the continual procession of carts, or men and women on foot carrying huge bundles of their products. They all wear characteristic peasant costumes (Jewish peasants, however, being distinguished by their black coats, black hats and bushy beards.) Russians and Magyars are clean-shaven as a rule, or adorned only by a moustache. Even when the khaki of the soldier is donned, the Jews still keep their beards! If it is raining (as it often is) the peasants wear heavy sheepskin coats. They wear them in the fields, too, where they are certainly effective for keeping one dry, if somewhat tiring to work in!

Officials in Užhorod before the retrocession were mainly Czech. The plea was that Ruthenians, having been kept down by the Magyars, could not provide the talent (or, it might be whispered, the honesty) required. But " autonomy " was already in the air last August. Meanwhile it must be recorded that the brief Czech administration had carried out great improvements. The streets were being relaid with modern

surfacing, and a new quarter, with fine modern buildings, houses, banks, administrative quarters, and a " county hall " for the future Parliament under " autonomy," was developing along the banks of the Už, where an esplanade has been laid out. The place exhibited great possibilities for becoming a fine capital town. It ought to be recorded, too, that the Czech administration did a great deal for education. Under the Magyars there were hardly any schools which taught in the Russian tongue. Now, in the whole region, there are over a thousand elementary and nursery schools, divided in proper proportions. There are four Russian " Middle " schools, three Czechoslovak, two Jewish and one Magyar. There is also a gipsy school!

The country immediately around Užhorod is rather dull, but one can take a train up the valley of the Už, and get scenery beaten only by the High Tatra in Slovakia. The trains leave at an uncomfortably early hour, as is their unpleasant custom, but in compensation you see the peasants, foresters, and Jewish traders going to work or business. And you will be fairly certain to find in your carriage at least one Rabbi, or anyhow strictly orthodox gentleman, who, at the mystic hour of seven, will produce a velvet bag wherefrom he will draw the amulets and fillets containing the great words of the " Law "—" Behold, the Lord thy God is one God . . . and thou shalt love, etc. . . . and these words shall be in thine heart . . . and thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thine hand, and they shall be as frontlets between thine eyes." All of which he duly proceeds to do, kissing each article as he takes it out. Then standing up he reads from his " Torah " for twenty minutes or so. Nobody, Jew or Gentile, takes much notice, but afterwards Jews (who have not fortified themselves thus) come and talk respectfully with the old man, doubtless hoping to get some reflection of his holiness. Or you may see another old gentleman, with dreamy almost effeminate face, light auburn hair and beard, and long ringlets reaching almost to the chin, sitting reading for the whole journey from a sacred book that rests on a velvet cushion embroidered with Hebrew letters.

The inhabited valleys lying between the spurs of the Carpathians are very wild, and houses and villages are as crude as can be imagined. Practically everything is built of wood, and there are a number of sawmills connected with the hardwood

industry. This provides a considerable export to London for use in the furniture trade. Villages are usually straggling untidy hamlets, with a shop at each end and perhaps one in the middle, with the invariable Jew standing in front of it. Agricultural methods are primitive, but the soil is poor, and century-old habits are difficult to change. If the country had remained unified a solution would have been to change from subsistence farming in these remote valleys, and develop the wood industry and electrical power, with a certain amount of animal and poultry culture. Extra supplies of food might have come from improved methods and organisation in the more fertile plains. These plains, now returning to Hungary, are intensively but primitively cultivated with maize and sunflower (for seed-oil), tobacco and wine. The tobacco is bad, and only smoked by the poorer classes. The population is largely Magyar, but curiously even Magyars expressed appreciation of what the Czechs had done, and even the Germans one met—though they announced the usual " grievances "—expressed no liking for Nazism.

But the most delightful part of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia is in the east, where the Carpathians curve round to meet the Rumanian borders. There are two small towns, Rachov and Jašina, and it is not going to be easy to get to them now! Rachov is situated on the Theiss, a little below the point where it is joined by its tributary, the White Theiss. The river flows between the railway station and the main part of the town. The latter is quite small, with streams running through its streets to join the Theiss. The houses are mostly small one-storey affairs, and some are built of wood. The setting is beautiful, with wooded mountain slopes rising all round, and the air is keen and invigorating. There is an excellent hostel—The Tůristky Dům. And as with Užhorod, the first impression one gets is that it is a Jewish town. On the Sabbath almost every shop is closed, and grave, bearded figures in black robes, flat-crowned hats trimmed with fox fur, and long curls over the ears, move solemnly through the streets on their way to the synagogue. You can't even buy fruit on the Sabbath, for all the trade is in the hands of the Jews!

On Sunday the scene changes. The peasants come flocking in from all around, on foot mostly, but some on bicycles; a few, chiefly old people, in country carts. Some have to cross

the Theiss by a float drawn along a rope guide. They all wear the most gorgeous costumes, men, women and children, worked with beautiful embroidery in which red predominates amongst blues and yellows. Not even a colour photograph could give any idea of the effect when seen under a bright sun with the background of glowing green in the fields and wayside banks, the darker shades of tree-covered slopes, and the sparkle of the running waters, here glittering like a diamond, there whipped to snow-white foam by some passing gust of wind, or broken against obstructing stones or rocky ridges. These costumes are all "home-made," the work being done chiefly in the long winter evenings by the light of sun-flower oil lamps.

The moving throng times itself to arrive in the town by 11 o'clock when the church services begin. If you turn back with the same purpose you will hardly meet a soul unless it be an occasional Jewish peasant family, or an "emancipated" youth in ordinary dress on a bicycle. In the town itself, just before 11 o'clock the sight is noteworthy. All along the main street is a sea of gorgeous costumes, broken only by occasional Jewish women who wear ordinary Western dress. And the Jewish pedlars are busy now, taking all the money the peasants have to spend. There is a regular Sunday fair going on for the supply of "pins and poking-sticks of steel, what maids lack from head to heel," and more prosaic things like soap (apparently civilisation here has marched so far), toothbrushes, braces, scissors. There are stalls with fruit and cakes and sweetmeats, with the prettiest children in the world (at least they seem so in their delightful costumes) crowding round them, and attracting* "crowns" (about 2d.) from the pockets of soft-hearted tourists. Outside one church the obliging Israelite—tell it not in Gath—was ready to supply crudely painted "ikons" of the Madonna and Son, in highly decorative but tawdry frames. Business is business. But, apparently by some convention, though the pedlars have it all their own way, Jewish shops don't open on Sunday morning.

The principal church stands facing the bridge over the Theiss, and is Greek Catholic. It was crammed full, with people standing at the back, and the singing was good to hear. There is also a Russian Orthodox Church away on the opposite side of the river. It is built entirely of wood, the interior

* I don't want to give the impression they begged—they didn't.

brightly but pathetically decorated with crude paintings on wood, and garlands of paper rosettes. The community is entirely peasant and very poor. The synagogues are elusive, being just ordinary square-built structures standing inconspicuously amongst the houses. But if you look down on one from above, you will see the Star of David traced out on the roof.

The surrounding country is all most beautiful. There are several modest mountains that can be comfortably climbed, culminating in the lordly Pop Ivan (Father John) of some 6,000 feet. The chief, one might say the only, industry is "wood." Rivers run down all the valleys, and at some high point most of them are dammed, with wooden dams filled in with stones and provided with sluices. The felled trees, stripped of their branches, are rolled down the mountain slopes to the bed of the river, and when a sufficient number have collected, the sluices are opened and the logs washed down till they reach the sawmills.

The political future of this fascinating land is uncertain. Hungary, with the approval of Poland, would like to absorb it all, in order to strengthen the barrier against the "*Drang nach Osten.*" Mussolini would approve this, too. And now that Hungary has got back the fertile plains, with Užhorod and Mukacevo, it seems likely that the mountain valleys must follow. One can only hope that the political change will not suspend the advance the people were making in both material and spiritual development under the brief period of Czech rule.

A. S. Elwell-Sutton.

NON-VIOLENCE IN ISRAEL.

ABOUT seven hundred years before the commencement of the Christian Era the Assyrians, having developed in the direction of military aggression, found that no man need labour at home, nor yet pay taxes, so long as the bowmen and the pikemen together with their shield-bearers could march forth and conquer the world. A successful raid upon a neighbouring people meant tribute in the form of slaves, and articles of virtu, enough to pay amply for the foray and leave a surplus. Such was the reward of a nation that faithfully served its war-god: so woe betide the stubborn foe that burned its crops, destroyed its agricultural implements, and put up a determined resistance. If, after the defeat of their armies in pitched battle, such a people showed a tendency to turn lethal weapons against the oncoming hordes of Assyria, then they were obviously not very likely to become docile slaves, and it seemed reasonable, under a primitive military system, to exterminate such very troublesome folk—besides, was not such dogged defence a slight upon the unconquerable deity who inspired and led the Assyrian fighting forces?

The ten tribes of the Hebrews, resident in the northern kingdom of Judea, being themselves warriors of no mean calibre, and having, too, an invincible war-god of their own to serve, neither gave nor expected quarter when "the Assyrian came down like a wolf on the fold"; but, in spite of minor successes here and there along the battle front, the aggressive Assyrian ultimately triumphed, and, taking into consideration all the conditions of the warfare of the period, it is fruitless to surmise upon the possibilities of the survival of the vanquished. Notwithstanding the absence of machine-gun and poison gas, of air raid and liquid fire, the total male population, small indeed by comparison with modern figures, would have been completely exterminated, the women and children made captive, and ultimately assimilated.

Those theorists who trace the ten "lost" tribes to all corners of the real and imaginary globe—to the British Isles no less than to lost Atlantis—demonstrate quite clearly their own total ignorance of the methods of primitive warfare, and of the social conditions that made such methods, not a matter of mercy and the milk of human kindness, or the lack of it,

but of applied economics. There is absolutely no reason to assume that after the completion of the Assyrian invasion, any considerable body of Hebrews remained either to tell the tale, or to migrate to the British Isles, or even set afoot the germ of a renaissance of Hebrew culture locally. Such complete extermination was (and still is) the reward of valour when faced by an aggressive and an unscrupulous foe.

However, if the ten tribes of the northern kingdom were annihilated to a man, there were still two tribes of Hebrews left in the southern kingdom: lambs for the slaughter no doubt, had the Assyrian phalanx come on; but the reign of a bully being proverbially short-lived, among nations no less than among individuals, the Assyrian war-god found himself beset by a deity after his own kidney, one with "an ensnaring net which encircles the hostile land"; and as the military power of Babylonia grew, so the wars of Assyria became desperate defences rather than arrogant aggressions. This circumstance saved from either extinction or assimilation the two Hebrew tribes of Southern Judea; hence culture flourished under the guidance of pious priests, and worthy kings; and if, by the efforts of chance, either the former or the latter proved corrupt or tyrannical, the kind fates, having perhaps a benign eye cast upon futurity, arranged affairs so that both calamities did not beset the people at the same time.

Manasseh, the King, cruel and oppressive, was counterbalanced in the interests of culture by good priests who codified the Deuteronomic Law, and concealed it in a safe and secret place in the Temple of the Lord at Jerusalem. There it would doubtless have remained had it not been that in the succeeding reign the land was blessed by that worthy though youthful monarch, Josiah, who, in the eighteenth year of his sovereignty and the twenty-sixth of his age, gave orders to Hilkiah, the high priest, to take silver and "deliver it into the hands of the doers of the work . . . to repair the breaches of the house, unto the carpenters and builders, and masons, and to buy timber and hewn stone to repair the house" (2 Kings xxii, 3 *sqq.*). In other words, extensive renovations were undertaken in the Temple, and during the course of the work the Book of Deuteronomy came to light. "And Hilkiah the high priest said unto Shaphan the scribe, I have found the book of the law in the house of the Lord. . . . And Shaphan read it before the king. And it came to pass,

NON-VIOLENCE IN ISRAEL.

ABOUT seven hundred years before the commencement of the Christian Era the Assyrians, having developed in the direction of military aggression, found that no man need labour at home, nor yet pay taxes, so long as the bowmen and the pikemen together with their shield-bearers could march forth and conquer the world. A successful raid upon a neighbouring people meant tribute in the form of slaves, and articles of virtu, enough to pay amply for the foray and leave a surplus. Such was the reward of a nation that faithfully served its war-god: so woe betide the stubborn foe that burned its crops, destroyed its agricultural implements, and put up a determined resistance. If, after the defeat of their armies in pitched battle, such a people showed a tendency to turn lethal weapons against the oncoming hordes of Assyria, then they were obviously not very likely to become docile slaves, and it seemed reasonable, under a primitive military system, to exterminate such very troublesome folk—besides, was not such dogged defence a slight upon the unconquerable deity who inspired and led the Assyrian fighting forces?

The ten tribes of the Hebrews, resident in the northern kingdom of Judea, being themselves warriors of no mean calibre, and having, too, an invincible war-god of their own to serve, neither gave nor expected quarter when "the Assyrian came down like a wolf on the fold"; but, in spite of minor successes here and there along the battle front, the aggressive Assyrian ultimately triumphed, and, taking into consideration all the conditions of the warfare of the period, it is fruitless to surmise upon the possibilities of the survival of the vanquished. Notwithstanding the absence of machine-gun and poison gas, of air raid and liquid fire, the total male population, small indeed by comparison with modern figures, would have been completely exterminated, the women and children made captive, and ultimately assimilated.

Those theorists who trace the ten "lost" tribes to all corners of the real and imaginary globe—to the British Isles no less than to lost Atlantis—demonstrate quite clearly their own total ignorance of the methods of primitive warfare, and of the social conditions that made such methods, not a matter of mercy and the milk of human kindness, or the lack of it,

but of applied economics. There is absolutely no reason to assume that after the completion of the Assyrian invasion, any considerable body of Hebrews remained either to tell the tale, or to migrate to the British Isles, or even set afoot the germ of a renaissance of Hebrew culture locally. Such complete extermination was (and still is) the reward of valour when faced by an aggressive and an unscrupulous foe.

However, if the ten tribes of the northern kingdom were annihilated to a man, there were still two tribes of Hebrews left in the southern kingdom: lambs for the slaughter no doubt, had the Assyrian phalanx come on; but the reign of a bully being proverbially short-lived, among nations no less than among individuals, the Assyrian war-god found himself beset by a deity after his own kidney, one with "an ensnaring net which encircles the hostile land"; and as the military power of Babylonia grew, so the wars of Assyria became desperate defences rather than arrogant aggressions. This circumstance saved from either extinction or assimilation the two Hebrew tribes of Southern Judea; hence culture flourished under the guidance of pious priests, and worthy kings; and if, by the efforts of chance, either the former or the latter proved corrupt or tyrannical, the kind fates, having perhaps a benign eye cast upon futurity, arranged affairs so that both calamities did not beset the people at the same time.

Manasseh, the King, cruel and oppressive, was counterbalanced in the interests of culture by good priests who codified the Deuteronomic Law, and concealed it in a safe and secret place in the Temple of the Lord at Jerusalem. There it would doubtless have remained had it not been that in the succeeding reign the land was blessed by that worthy though youthful monarch, Josiah, who, in the eighteenth year of his sovereignty and the twenty-sixth of his age, gave orders to Hilkiah, the high priest, to take silver and "deliver it into the hands of the doers of the work . . . to repair the breaches of the house, unto the carpenters and builders, and masons, and to buy timber and hewn stone to repair the house" (2 Kings xxii, 3 *sqq.*). In other words, extensive renovations were undertaken in the Temple, and during the course of the work the Book of Deuteronomy came to light. "And Hilkiah the high priest said unto Shaphan the scribe, I have found the book of the law in the house of the Lord. . . . And Shaphan read it before the king. And it came to pass,

when the king had heard the words of the book of the law, that he rent his clothes" (2 Kings xxii, 8 *sqq.*). It was clear that all sections of the community fell very short of the high moral standard set in that document, and the young king, together with his counsellors, concluded that the mumbling and rumbling of the mighty storm, which was to be heard in contemporary international politics, was but a warning from the ever-merciful Jehovah. Perhaps, if the Children of Israel abandoned their false gods—hedonism symbolised by Baal or what you will—the oncoming destruction might be averted.

The young king and his advisers, possibly history-conscious, were not unmindful of the catastrophe which, about a century earlier, had befallen their brethren of the northern kingdom; and this utter defeat they attributed, not to inferior military ability on the part of the defenders, nor yet to superior force of numbers with the aggressor, but entirely to the Hebrews' disobedience to their almighty God, and the consequent withdrawal of His aid in the combat. It seemed obvious that the Assyrian invasion had been, and that the expected forthcoming Babylonian invasion would be, the direct result of the Children of Israel's delinquency, and their slackness in matters of religious ritual, for the storm, the wind, the seedtime and harvest being in His hands, it followed or seemed to follow that political affairs no less were controlled from on high. "Thou shalt have none other gods but Me," was the commandment, yet, owing to laxity in religious observances —"Thus saith the Lord, Behold, I will bring evil upon this place, and upon the inhabitants thereof, even all the words of the book which the King of Judah hath read: because they have forsaken me, and have burned incense unto other gods. . . . And the king sent, and they gathered unto him all the elders of Judah and of Jerusalem . . . and he read in their ears all the words of the book of the covenant which was found in the house of the Lord" (2 Kings xxii, 16-17; xxiii, 1 *sqq.*).

Jehovah was surely powerful to save as well as to destroy, and since He would do the latter to transgressors, He might reasonably be expected to do the former for the righteous. A religious reformation seemed to be the best method of defending the land against the invading armies of the Babylonians, for if the nation were righteous the Lord would not permit the people to perish.

One of the most outstanding evils of the age was that the Israelites still worshipped in among green trees, in the "high places" where the idolatrous population, who, for their iniquities, had been dispossessed of the land in days gone by, had set up their shrines, and offered sacrifice to heathen deities. Who could tell what abominations before the Lord might be performed in these antique sacred glades? "For when I brought them into the land, which I lifted up mine hand to give unto them, then they saw every high hill, and every thick tree, and they offered there their sacrifices, and there they presented the provocation of their offerings, there also they made their sweet savour, and they poured out their drink offerings" (Ezekiel xx, 28). So the young King Josiah, with implicit trust in the power and justice of God, determined upon a course of conduct that should satisfy the Lord, for in the book of the law it clearly said: "Ye shall utterly destroy all places, wherein the nations which ye shall possess served their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the high hills, and under every green tree: and ye shall overthrow their altars, and break their pillars, and burn their groves with fire; and ye shall hew down the graven images of their gods. And ye shall destroy the names of them" (Deut. xii, 2-3).

We can picture the militant priests setting out from Jerusalem, and travelling into the remote and rural districts, where, in spite of the distress of the peasantry, the old groves were destroyed as the enthusiasts cried, "Hear O Israel, the Lord thy God. The Lord is one God" (*Shema*), followed by the declaration that His was one Temple, and that at Jerusalem. After this the simple country folk needs must make a long pilgrimage on foot over dale and down to offer sacrifice at the Temple of the one true God. The Children of Israel had indeed become "the people of the book," and the last vestige of pagan rite was removed from their religion. Now Jehovah must undoubtedly be pleased with his chosen people, and, come what may, their trust in Him, implicit and unshakable, must be rewarded: but still, international affairs remained menacing—the rising tide of Babylonian pomp and power threatened to overwhelm the land. In the words of Sir James Frazer: "Menaced by the extinction of their political independence, it apparently never occurred to them to betake themselves to those merely carnal weapons to which a less religious people would instinctively turn in such an emergency.

To build fortresses, to strengthen the walls of Jerusalem, to arm and train the male population, to seek the aid of foreign allies,—these were measures which to the gentile mind common sense might seem to dictate, but which to the Jew might appear to imply an impious distrust of Jehovah, who alone could save his people from their enemies" (*Place of the Law in Jewish History*).

Thus it was, on a basis of pure religion, and as a result of absolute trust in God, the ancient Jews conceived of non-violent behaviour in the event of military aggression; and barely a generation later they were given the opportunity of putting their pious theory into practice. The Babylonian armies, resistless as a spring tide, came flooding over the land, but not a bow was drawn against them: unhindered they swept down upon the city of Jerusalem, from whence they carried off the king and the flower of his people into captivity, as easily as they drove the flocks and herds before them. Prisoners being valuable products of war, it is not likely that any were killed, provided they were healthy, and suitable for sale in the slave markets.

Does this complete capture of the land and the entire alienation of the people prove the theory of pacifism false? No doubt the less pious, or the more militaristically-minded in Israel, at that time, were not slow in declaring that it did; of boasting that an armed force could have defeated the incoming armies; but to-day, looking down the telescope of time, we of Christian civilised Europe of the twentieth century A.D. can (provided always that we avoid the Nelson touch!) see quite clearly how eminently successful this, the first recorded instance of non-violence, really was. Had Josiah instituted, in place of the religious reformation, a military dictatorship, the Jews might have put up a very good fight, but it is hardly conceivable that they could have defeated, or even resisted for long, the conquering march of Babylon.

Still, it is reasonable to assume that as captives in a strange land they bewailed their hard lot, and murmured against God, against the king and against the priests who had so authoritatively denounced violence as a means of preservation; and the years passed on. That which had been a great and a mighty people, possessed of a land and a political independence, gradually assumed the status of an alien group,

bound by that great book (perhaps the greatest in all the classic literature of the world), i.e. the *Torah*—the Law. In captivity, to the Book of Deuteronomy was added the Book of Leviticus, and in the heart of a pagan land the worship of the one true God flourished.

Meanwhile the Aryan hordes of the North, following in the footsteps of their Semitic predecessors, built up an aggressive military machine, and Babylon fell before the onslaught of these barbarians. Aryans out of Persia, led by Cyrus the Great, invading the proud and hitherto unconquered land, found in the midst an inoffensive, highly moral people who, dispossessed and enslaved, were a people yet, keepers of a stringent and strange code of laws, worshippers of an abstract deity, and spiritually unconquerable. This, the first Aryan contact, was a matter for rejoicing among the Jewish people, for Cyrus the Great released them from their captivity and restored them to their native land, where they once more developed a national consciousness and erected a politico-economic system on the sound foundation of their national religious creed—the *Torah*. Famed for their just dealings, strict commercial integrity, and prompt payments, they built up a world power and at length set military guards upon their caravan routes. Meanwhile, westward over the blue deep of the Mediterranean, Rome was growing for good or ill, and history repeating itself—Titus destroyed Jerusalem, and sacked the Temple.

Once again a subject people, it became the duty of the Hebrew priests to convert the pride of nationalism into the fervour of religious feeling; hence, the Pharisees, following the lead in pacifism set by the Levitical priests of old, harped on the Law—the Law—the Law, and, misunderstood even to this day, earned for themselves, in the estimation of the superficial-minded, the appellation of prime hypocrites. Notwithstanding this, the work of religious reform was successfully carried through, and the Jews, once more dispossessed, wandered forth, a non-militant, law-loving minority, their *Siva Torah* (Scroll of Law) carried, sacred and dear as life itself, in their arms, as, midst insults and blows, they were driven from one foul European ghetto to the next, spurned, spat upon, robbed, and not infrequently slaughtered in herds like cattle contaminated by foot-and-mouth disease. Yet, through all these vicissitudes "the people of the book"

remain a people, the manifold Hitlers of two thousand years having failed to exterminate them, or divorce them from the *Torah* of God.

The Jewish people, saved from extinction by conceiving of, and putting into practice, the "Christian" ideal of non-violent resistance to aggression, became very much the "chosen" people inasmuch as they have preserved the Bible, and propagated the basic creed of the fatherhood of the abstract God—the creed out of which both Christianity and Mohammedanism have grown. Not only in sacred affairs, however, is this, the modern West, a debtor to the Jews, and an inheritor of the wholesome effect of non-violence in Israel. Pent up in European ghettos the Jewish people evolved an intensely urban consciousness, and developed laws beneficial to the town-dwelling community long before the need for such was felt by gentile neighbours. The question of party walls, ownership of upper stories of dwelling-houses without reference to the land, of the right of privacy, and of the formation of commercial combines to preserve goodwill, were all matters satisfactorily settled by Jews in the Middle Ages.

Jewish benefactions to Western culture are so numerous that a vast literature exists on the subject; yet even here in England, the Jewish community, which has provided not one model for Tussaud's "Chamber of Horrors" but many for her gallery of great men, finds it necessary to speak up in its own defence.

The rising tide of anti-Semitism, which is the direct result of, and inversely, the main support of, gangster politics in the world to-day, is so grave a sign of the death throes of culture that all who read aright stand stark and appalled beneath the forecast shadow of the calamity that is imminent. The last shred of finesse and chivalry having been abandoned in both the theory and practice of war, it would appear that pacifism and pacifism alone is the hope of the world; and if, in accordance with custom, precedent is sought in history, then the modern West must turn once more to the ancient East, and through the pages of the Bible learn that pacifism in the days of Josiah the King saved the Jews who survive, a distinct and admirable people, in spite of the tremendous odds against them, which they have pacifically resisted for over two and a half millennia.

JULIAN FRANKLYN.

YELLOW BUTTERFLIES.

THE first impression gathered by looking at the incredible thousands of a museum collection of butterflies is of an endless kaleidoscope of colour. It seems that there can be no tone or shade, no combination of tints which the mind of man could conceive, that nature has omitted to lay on this most gorgeous of her palettes. More considered examination shows that these colours are, to a large extent, grouped in families. Here there will be a long series of metallic blues, there dark sombre tints prevail: the reds in one group have a scarlet note, those in another are carmine, and although it would be fatal to try and classify butterflies on merely their colour schemes, an experienced lepidopterist can usually assign an unfamiliar species to its proper family at sight.

In spite of all the astonishing variety, the more one studies butterflies, the more apparent it becomes that one fundamental colour underlies all this exquisite painting and if, in the course of study, descriptions of species are read, it will soon become certain. The word "fulvous" constantly recurs, whether the insects be the modestly tinted beauties of the British Isles, or the brilliant denizens of the tropics. Whole families of butterflies are richly yellow, varying from deepest orange to palest primrose, while many which, at first sight, seem anything but yellow, are found on closer inspection to have a fulvous foundation, overlaid, it may be, with darker markings. It is specially notable in moths, the larger proportion of which have their undersides of uniform fulvous shades, whatever vagaries of colour and pattern appear on the upper surface. So constant is this underside colour in moths that it is rare for the underside even to be mentioned in a description. This uniformity fits in perfectly with what we know concerning the evolution of butterfly colouring. Scarcely any will dispute the statement that it is protective, the dominant if not the only weapon with which butterflies can hold their own in a complex and warring world. In this eternal struggle the underside of a moth only participates for a brief, but none the less significant period, to which I will call attention later: at all other times the patterns and colours of the upperside come into action, for the underside is completely concealed.

I have used the term butterfly as the French use *papillon*, to mean any member of the order Lepidoptera—an ugly,

awkward word, if ever there was one—because there is really no hard and fast dividing line between butterflies and moths. The French, it is true, speak of *Papillon du jour* and *du nuit*, but although this is perhaps the most satisfactory division, it is not conclusive, because there are plenty of moths which are as active in full sunlight as any butterfly, though differing greatly from butterflies in structure. Perhaps the most obvious difference between butterflies and moths is the manner in which the wings are disposed at rest. Moths dump their wings flat or fold them to the sides of the body in various ingenious ways, but butterflies carry them erect, closely pressed together above the body. In this extremely simple manner the bright and conspicuous colouring, almost invariably confined to the upper surface of the wings, is instantly hidden, closed up so effectively that the insect often seems to disappear completely. In addition to concealing the vivid colour, this action immediately reduces the visible surface by half, and if the alighting butterfly intends to remain and perhaps sleep, it halves the exposed area once more by sliding the upper wings back between the lower.

These rigid habits explain clearly enough for a child to understand the distribution of colour on the wings of the butterfly. The bright colours are intended only for display during flight, the dull or cryptic patterns of the underside are to aid in concealment. The perfection of this arrangement and the certainty of its purpose are emphasised by the trifling circumstance that the tip of the upper wing, which projects a little beyond the lower when drawn back, is invariably coloured, in harmony not with the rest of the upper wing but with the lower one. Mark this, for instance, in those rich orange, black-spotted fritillaries, where the central part of the upper wing is coloured beneath almost as above, while the tip has the paler and often greenish tint of the under-wing, even to the possession of silver spots fitting exactly to a glittering pattern on the lower wing. See it again in the Red Admiral and Painted Lady, where most brilliant red, white and blue bands and spots disappear in the sleeping attitude and the projecting tip cannot be distinguished from the lower wing; more significantly still, perhaps, in the common cabbage butterfly, whose upper wing tip is the same powdery yellow as the lower wing.

If a number of butterflies, say a hundred species, were

selected at random from a world-wide collection and divided into two parts, one containing the darker and the other the lighter than average, it would be found on inquiry that the natural habitat of most, if not all, the light ones, is open or "desert" country, while the dark ones are forest dwellers. There would inevitably be exceptions, but in every instance these would prove to be species of a family whose members, on the whole, conform to the rule—for some special reason these have wandered from their normal sphere. A notable example is the British "Wood White," almost the only one of an enormous family of desert butterflies to be encountered in woodland shades, and this may well account for its rarity.

It is clear that in open country a light colour is not so conspicuous as a dark one, while light colours stand out boldly in the partial gloom of trees; and this is most positive evidence that the colours, varied though they be, are adapted on broad lines to environment. Whether they belong to the woodland or the desert system, yellow has outstanding advantages over any other colour when the issue is one of exposure or concealment. If two objects exactly similar in other ways are respectively blue and yellow of such depth and intensity that they are equally visible in full sunlight, it will be found that the degree of decreased visibility in weaker light accelerates much more rapidly in the yellow object, which will, in fact, cease to be visible long before the blue. This is so manifestly advantageous that scarcely any other evidence is needed to explain why so many desert species are bright yellow, especially on the undersides, which are exposed during the hours of darkness.

The prevalence of yellow shades, particularly on the undersides of moths, makes it at least probable that the primitive forms in this order were all more or less yellow. The colour on a butterfly wing is, I should imagine, the most plastic in nature, for it is laid on in the form of minute scales overlapping like the tiles of a roof. It has no connection with the structure of the wing or its functions as a flying organ, nor does it, like fur of mammals or feathers of birds, serve other purposes, as the conservation of heat. Any changes which take place are concerned solely with the *appearance* of the creature; and without labouring the point too much I can safely assert that it has two functions only—concealment from enemies and attraction for friends. The final stage in the

butterfly's fourfold metamorphosis is a purely reproductive one, in which the pairing of sexes and deposition of eggs in suitable situations are the only objects. Mating takes place on the wing and the fact that bright colour such as appears on the upper side of butterfly wings and on the under-wings in moths, is visible only when they expand in flight, makes it certain that sexual attraction is the purpose of brilliant colour and pattern.

The period during which butterflies are a-wing is comparatively brief. Few are found flying in temperate latitudes except between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. less than one-third of the twenty-four hours, and even during this period flight is not continuous. Many species, whether diurnal or nocturnal, have very restricted times of flight, perhaps not more than an hour or so daily. For the rest of the time they remain motionless, sitting on stems, leaves or flowers, their bright sexual allures hidden, their cryptic underside markings blended perfectly with their chosen resting-places. They resemble leaves, alive or dead, flower-buds and seed-pods: pieces of stick, bird droppings, stones and earth, bark of trees, anything, in fact, which is the normal environment of the creature; and, as a rule, the more closely a butterfly is identified with a particular object, the more nearly will its appearance resemble it. The Common Veneer or grass moths, for example, are able to fold their wings into a tight roll, so that when they alight on a grass stem they mimic the flower or fruit of the grass.

I remember seeing for the first time several specimens of the beautiful Pandora Fritillary flying round a Robinia tree. Every now and then one would disappear and as it had manifestly alighted on the tree I carefully examined all the branches within reach. There were dozens of these butterflies resting on the twigs, their wings tightly closed and drooping from the stems in exactly the same way as the leaflets. The exactness with which the green colour of the hind-wings matched the leaves was most striking, and the irregular silvery lines breaking up the colour increased the resemblance so that concealment was almost as complete as if the insects had been covered over.

This incident suggested to my mind why the majority of butterflies have yellowish undersides. With few exceptions they are all associated with plants, some with a large variety of more or less allied species, but most with only one species.

In their feeding, caterpillar stage, their natural situation is on the leaves, and it is a commonplace that, for the most part, caterpillars are green, and, moreover, green of the same shade and tone as the leaf. Indeed, seeing that the colour is in the first instance derived directly from the leaf, it would be strange if it were otherwise. There are, of course, plenty of caterpillars which resemble other things—twigs with or without thorns, spiders, woodlice and so on—but always some cryptic resemblance is palpable when the creature is studied in its natural environment; and since the necessity of sexual attraction does not arise in this stage, there is no clash of interests causing the complicated variation seen in the winged stage. The comparative uniformity among caterpillars is as obvious as the immense variety among butterflies.

Generally speaking, the stages of butterfly growth follow closely that of the plant. Newly hatched caterpillars are found on the bright green tender foliage, which, by the time the feeding and resting stages have passed, is becoming mature and even sere. In real desert country, where these yellow butterflies are the most abundant, this stage is swift to the verge of hectic. Seasonal rainstorms awaken the vegetation and rouse the insects to active life. In a few weeks, spring growth has been followed by drying and fading foliage; and butterflies reaching the winged stage at this time burst from the chrysalis to a world, not primarily green, but yellow or brown. The butterfly leaving its chrysalis is incapable of flight, its wings being crumpled and soft, and it sometimes remains hanging for hours. This is a time of great peril, for the creature though sluggish is not entirely motionless, compact and partly hidden: it has lost, too, its protective armour. Its only hope of escape is invisibility and of all the colours which would, at this time, provide the most perfect camouflage, none could be so universally useful as yellow. It is noteworthy that when such butterflies as *Pierinae* are white or very pale yellow on the upper side, they have a large proportion of deeper yellow on the underside, especially of the hind-wings. The significance of the uniform fulvous undersides of moths also strikes one at this point, for it is only when it leaves the pupal envelope with crumpled, useless wings that this part of a moth is visible. When they have expanded and developed it is no longer exposed.

When we consider the varied conditions which have

operated since the first butterflies came into being, their distribution into regions with varied climate and altered flora, we can, if we appreciate the significance of this yellow colour, have little difficulty in accounting for variations from it. The tendency to green on the hind-wings of butterflies associated with more or less evergreen trees ; the deep sombre browns of those which hibernate in districts where deciduous trees are predominant ; the dots and dashes of the enormous family of " blues," affording concealment in the open, no matter what kind of grass they alight on. As I have pointed out, scale colouring is the most plastic medium of painting conceivable, and in a single species like the common blue, or the Tiger moth, long series of variations are readily discovered. Butterfly colouring is, indeed, the most mutable natural phenomenon. It is necessary that it should be so, for it is impossible, in this group, as it is in many others, to discover alternative aids to survival. For the butterfly, the invisible cloak is the only security.

HERBERT MACE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

So What ?

THE hushed bewilderment that followed the Peace of Munich was even more symbolic of the kind of conditions and the type of men on whom depends the peace of the world than was the crisis that preceded it. Many of the plain people began to wonder what the next " crisis " would bring. This paper is written six weeks after Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler signed their famous declaration about their two countries never wanting to go to war again and about making consultation the method of resolving any future difficulty. Yet so far no precise intimation has been made from the one side about the nature of future claims outside Europe, nor from the other side about the policy by which it proposes to meet them. The vast suffering masses who will pay the penalty if next time there is to be no *deus ex machina* to rescue them from the politicians' mischief are left in complete ignorance of what their governments propose to do about it. Why should not Herr Hitler state his further policy ? Why should not Mr. Chamberlain state his answer to it ? Why should not the resultant discrepancy be the subject of immediate conference ? Must the world for ever live from hand to mouth, uncertain what the political bosses will next explode ?

The more experience one has of the ways of high diplomacy the more difficult one finds it to understand them. The abiding truth seems to be that the nations as organised societies have not progressed beyond the stage where governments grab what they can either without a fight, or after a fight if they think they can win. War is still the instrument of national policies, and greed is still the motive. That is why the British Government immediately after the signing of what amounted to a pledge of peace with Germany redoubled its armaments for potential use against Germany, and why the German Government took the pretext of British rearmament for a further intensification of its own armaments. The plain fact was that Britain in the last week of September was not in a fit state to engage in war with Germany, and Germany knew it ; and that though both Governments protested their desire for peace and for disarmament, they neither of them trusted each other to honour that protestation in its elementary meaning.

Who shall argue, in the present stage of human evolution, that the British Government was wrong in maintaining that a limitation of armaments by agreement was an unattainable ideal so long as British armed force was far below the German in strength; that in other words it would be Germany's policy to reduce and stabilise proportionately from the present level? Herr Hitler in effect admitted as much on November 6th, when speaking at Weimar he said: "My principle is that the German is either the first soldier or he is no soldier at all. And as they cannot, will not, be no soldiers, they are the first soldiers. . . . If the rest of the world speaks of disarmament, we are fully ready, but under one condition, that first there be a disarmament of the war agitation." By "war agitation" he meant British rearmament coupled with the bellicose attitude of the Opposition spokesmen at Westminster. No offer came from him that he would disarm down to Britain's strength. So the armaments race went on in the egregious name of a desire for disarmament, neither side stating what the objects were that they hoped to achieve through the rivalry of force, on whatever level that force might ultimately be stabilised.

Those of us who were young enough during the last war to see plainly the nature of what was happening, and old enough to see through the thin deceptions of the statesmen in every country who conducted the war, were astonished by many things, but by none more than by this: that even when the war had been in progress for four years, no statesman would say what his country was fighting for, except for vague and nonsensical ideologies such as "honour," "liberty" and the like. In the British House of Commons, the Government of the day was asked long after the war had started to state its war aims. And the Government of the day refused to state them, the argument presumably being that the enemy must not know what we were fighting for, or at the least that we must not commit ourselves to a programme, lest victory should give us the opportunity to grab still more.

So now, we are given the spectacle of Britain and Germany arming against each other, declaring their desire for peace, disarmament, and the settling of disputes by negotiation, yet refusing to state what exactly they want. Herr Hitler obviously—and in this he is little worse and no better than his forerunners in any other country in the world—quite

simply wants what he can get. It is necessary, therefore, to consider international affairs from the lowest basis of human conduct. There is no higher yardstick than that of unbridled greed and of the relative strength to indulge it. It is in such a spirit that we must assess the true chances of future peace in Europe. By the most melancholy of all the circumstances, we cannot accept at their face value the high-sounding moral precepts enunciated by the political leaders. From time immemorial governments have devastated the earth with prayers in their throats. It is one of the deepest of philosophical puzzles that the plain and gross stupidity of war is countenanced and even justified by sanctimonious argument.

In the last week of September political argument was conducted on the sanction of war. Herr Hitler would probably not himself deny that he used the threat of war as a means to his end. And the world must dance to so macabre a tune. Civilisation, deriving in its origin from a collective instinct of self-preservation, has been perverted into the chief instrument of man's destruction. Armed forces, the presumptive means to a nation's security, are the guarantee that the nation will suffer periodic devastation. Is it impossible that the vicious circle should ever be broken? In the present circumstances, where armaments are accumulated on a greater scale than has ever been known in the history of the world, is there no ray of hope? Particular issues and particular circumstances, such as those arising from Central Europe and from competitive annexation of colonies, are mere manifestations of the greater problem. Unless one is to despair of the human race and to accept as proved the failure of whatever divinity conceived of the human race as the highest experiment in life, it is necessary to seek and to find an explanation of this human tradition of mutual massacre.

Science has made its most spectacular advances in quite modern times. The navigation of human beings through the air in craft designed on the pattern of living birds, navigation under the sea that apes the technique of living fish, the mastery of air waves as the transmitting medium for sound and sight over vast distances: these are inventions that fall within the memory of our time. In our time, too, and by a proportionate progress, the technique of war has made spectacular advances. The whole weight of scientific achievement is trained, not only upon the purposes of human amenity

and benefit, but upon those of human destruction. Yet there's a divinity that shapes our ends, despite the stupidity of those who would obstruct it. The very progress of scientific and military technique must in the end ensure, by a sort of homœopathic principle, the rescue of mankind from their sway. When the last world war started aeroplanes were in their infancy. Blériot did not cross the Channel till 1909. The first British aeroplanes that crossed the Channel after the war started could carry only enough petrol for the twenty-mile hop. The British Government (for instance) could in 1914 comfortably send an expeditionary force across the sea to do its bidding. But now? There are those of us who remember the last week of July 1914 and the last week of September 1938. In the former case the dominant popular concern was that of chasing alleged German spies round the coast, of spotting flash-light apparatus alleged childishly to be sending messages to "the enemy." It really was, in the retrospect, rather childish. In the second case the urgent prospect of war sent gas masks to millions of homes in the country, threw up trenches in every park. An expeditionary force? No one gave it a thought.

The really stupid people, who do not recognise and therefore cannot welcome the potential effects of that difference, are behaving as stupid people always will. They are suggesting that the governments should exchange undertakings about poison gas, that the bombing of civilians should be foresworn. Why? So that the governments may continue to wage their wars without danger to their own armchairs? There is not a chance that the stupid people will achieve the slightest success in their propaganda. When the next war starts, and within a few hours of its starting, long before an expeditionary force could go into its first action, politicians, men, women and children will be exterminated by the million. That fact is known. The politicians of the four Western European Powers were badly scared in the last month of September. That is as good a state of affairs as could be. Let the scientists make aircraft more and more devastating in range and power. Let it be known that Berlin, London, Paris and Rome will equally be razed to the ground as soon as war begins. And war will not begin. Who knows but that the war that did not happen in the last week of September 1938 did not happen because of the general realisation of what would be involved? Herr

Hitler's own funkhole in his Berchtesgaden fortress would not have saved him. If only war could so certainly cease to be a sheltered enterprise that the heads of governments that made it would be as likely to be shot to bits as anyone else, then men could turn their minds in security to other pre-occupations than those of war.

It is arguable that the disguised blessing above suggested is confined at present to the Great Powers of Western Europe. A distinction has also to be made between "great" or "world" wars on the one hand and minor wars on the other. The last "great war" was so called in the main because the Great Powers of Europe were fighting against each other; that national organisations on the biggest scale were using their immense resources in men, material and wealth in an attempt to destroy each other. The main argument is not affected by the fact that Abyssinia, China and Spain have been or are the scene of actual war. The "war" in Abyssinia was a case of colonial conquest. In Spain it is a case of revolution, or civil war. In the Far East Japan's onslaught on the vast continent of a disorganised and militarily undeveloped nation cannot be regarded as analogous to a Western European war between such nations as Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

In each of those three cases the Great and indirectly interested other Powers have not been involved. The sanctions theoretically applicable under the League of Nations Covenant against Italy were called off when it was seen that their application might produce a major European war. Japan's inroads into China have in the like spirit been localised. Spain has not led to a major war in Europe, despite the active intervention in Spain itself of certain interested Powers. In each case something has prevented the Great Powers from plunging into another world war. Is it not at least arguable that a world war has in the last few years been prevented by the general recognition of the probability that in the future a world war will be conducted at the primary and main expense of politicians, civilians, women and children, and will therefore result in almost certain revolution in each of the countries concerned?

A fact of gigantic present interest is that European frontiers affecting the prestige of Great Powers in Europe have been redrawn without a war. Can memory produce any analogy to what took place on October 1st, 1938? By the cumulative

experience of history, and by the traditional practices of international diplomacy, the blunders that were made in the Treaty of Versailles ought to have led inevitably to another war. The rules have all been broken. In the past few years the stock argument of many who resented the Hungarian, Polish and German propaganda against Czechoslovakia has been that frontiers in the nature of things could not, never had been, redrawn except as the result of war. It is a fact of historic importance that such an argument has now been proved wrong. It was not even as if the last week of September were an isolated and therefore perhaps an accidental case in point. The " crisis " of May 21st last was a fair parallel. Czechoslovakia then mobilised, confident that France and Britain would fight for her. The war was in that case hedged off, just as it was four months later.

It may be argued that in recent European diplomacy the very threat and the relative strength of armaments have been decisive without the physical arbitrament, just as money is transferred from one country to another by book-entries without being physically shipped across the ocean. In other words what may be called shadow force has done the work of active force. Even so the blessings of aircraft are for ever to be remembered. And if costly armaments can decide issues without being used, it is at least conceivable that relative strength, which is still the decisive factor in international competition, may itself come to be transfigured into tokens less costly, less terrific and less nonsensical. If it be the case that the sort of great war we experienced from 1914 to 1918 has by the march of science become unlikely to be repeated, a beginning has at any rate been made, and the prohibitions may then extend in their turn to the smaller wars.

Aftermath.

It is not to be expected in politics that anything will ever run smoothly. The conflict of emotions, prejudices, opinions among masses of people must remain a constant disturbing factor in human affairs. After the peace of Munich was signed on September 30th, and a vast upheaval thereby narrowly saved, public opinion in the four countries primarily concerned underwent a process of adjustment to the facts thereby presented. Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were further

concerned in the actual redrawing of their frontiers. Certain new facts came to be established. One of the most reassuring of them was the discovery that in Germany the upper classes, middle classes, large sections of the army and the higher strata of the working classes revealed only feelings of profound relief over the escape from disaster and of proportionate gratitude to Mr. Chamberlain as the saviour in chief.

That circumstance is one of considerable importance to one's estimate of the influences that will decide the remaining issues in a general settlement. For the first time during the Nazi régime it was not Dr. Goebbels who fashioned public opinion in Germany, nor Herr Hitler who was made the hero of the historic occasion. No matter how firmly imposed was the dictatorship of opinion, it was impossible to conceal the fact that Mr. Chamberlain had flown three times to German territory within a few days, had suppressed his nationalist prejudices, had risked all on a single heroic bid for peace. As a result of the Goebbels control of opinion it had not been generally appreciated in Germany how near to war they had been driven. When in that memorable week the realisation came to them with overwhelming force the result was of equally memorable interest. Herr Hitler appeared on the balcony of the Chancellery in the Wilhelmstrasse to take the salute of the Berlin garrison that was on its way to the Sudeten front. He stood before an utterly silent crowd, except for a few hisses. There was not a single cheer to greet him. Herr Himmler's organisation, the Gestapo, meanwhile was pouring in reports that all over Germany (especially in Austria) there was no enthusiasm for war.

The paradoxical exception came from the bedrock working classes who are so fanatical in their worship of the Führer that they would blindly follow him into the jaws of death itself. Thus we were given another illustration of the essential fact that national socialism is a literally true label. Herr Hitler is a socialist. The National Labour Front, the Strength Through Joy (*Kraft durch Freude*) and other organisations are boldly designed to confer substantial benefits upon the working classes. As in all other countries the working classes in Germany are the great majority of the people.

When on November 8th Herr Hitler, speaking at Munich on the fifteenth anniversary of the Nazi *Putsch*, referred to himself as " the arch-democrat " he was not being funny (he

never is) nor flippant (he cannot be). In actual fact he told no lie when he made this statement: "I became German Chancellor according to the rules of parliamentary democracy. I obtained a clear majority in Germany." When he went on to say that he now enjoyed "the unanimous approval of the German people" he was performing a familiar hyperbole so well known to political practice. When he went on still further to say that "I, the arch-democrat, have removed the dictatorships of Schuschnigg and Beneš. I attempted to remove them by democratic methods—by plebiscites. That proved impossible. So I brought the vitality of the whole German people to bear on the question," he had become intoxicated with his own oratory, a not unfamiliar effect of Herr Hitler's political practice. But there is no doubt of Herr Hitler's hold over the German working classes. With his gaunt arithmetical logic he makes the upper classes pay for his bribery of the working classes—and that also is a familiar socialist practice in all countries. The paradoxes are inexhaustible. It is the British socialists who hate Hitler most. Yet Herr Hitler is adored by the German working classes, from whom he has totally removed (it is true by the means very largely of armaments work) the spectre of unemployment; and he is unpopular with the German upper classes, whose interests are openly flaunted by him.

The effect of Mr. Chamberlain's three flights to Berchtesgaden, Godesberg and Munich is likely to be a major factor in the future relationship between Germany and Great Britain. In this consists one of Mr. Chamberlain's greatest services to his generation. It may well, in his own words, mean "peace in our time," because henceforth (if Mr. Chamberlain is careful by speech and action to retain his influence) his name is a word to conjure with among the German people. Even the working classes share in the general gratitude to him though they combine it illogically with adoration of the Führer. The war party in Germany, headed by Herr von Ribbentrop, has received a severe set-back. As a result of the last week in September even Herr Himmler is known to have gone over to the moderates headed by Field-Marshal Göring and Baron von Neurath. Before that he was a 100 per cent. firebrand of the Ribbentrop type. But he is a man young enough (he is only 38) to recognise facts. The reports of discontent in Germany all had to come into his hands, and he learnt the lesson. Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, had an excellent effect in further consolidating the pacific feeling of the moderate group.

Italy, too, is now a factor of pacific strength. Mr. Chamberlain, speaking at the Guildhall banquet on November 9th, could declare that the decision now to put the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16th into operation was "if not the result of Munich, was certainly connected with it." Signor Mussolini by the very force of circumstances has become one of the peacemakers. It is not only the fact that Herr Hitler's achievements have robbed Signor Mussolini of his own achievements in Central Europe and have therefore accentuated the old-standing personal antagonism between Führer and Duce. It is the further fact that the risk Herr Hitler took of war in the last week of September made it impossible any longer for Signor Mussolini to avoid the clear issue with Herr Hitler.

The two met at Kufstein before the Munich Four Power Conference began. The story is told on high authority that Signor Mussolini on that occasion at once declared: "There must be no war." Herr Hitler's answer was: "I want a war now. If we don't fight now we will fight later under worse conditions." Führer and Duce then withdrew alone to a carriage and quarrelled at the top of their voices for two hours. Signor Mussolini won. Such is the story. It may be a bit muddled, though its general purport is indisputable. What is difficult to believe is that Herr Hitler who, on the Wednesday of that week, is known to have become alarmed over the danger that he had overplayed his hand and was confronted with the possibility of a great war (which he did not want) instead of a small war (which he did want) and indeed to have revealed his anxiety to reach an understanding with Mr. Chamberlain to prevent the war, should by the following day have expressed to Signor Mussolini a desire for war, whether great or small. Maybe it is a hopeless quest to keep pace with the vagaries of Herr Hitler's mentality.

So far as Great Britain was concerned, the aftermath of Munich was less satisfactory than anywhere else. The British people during crisis week itself really were "running round in circles with the wind up," digging trenches, fitting gas masks. The scene in the House of Commons on the Wednesday afternoon (September 28th), when Mr. Chamberlain announced

the fact of the invitation to Munich, will live in the annals of British parliamentary history. Contrary to his reputation, the Englishman is not a phlegmatic but a deeply emotional creature, though he contrives normally to conceal the fact. On that famous day salt tears ran down British cheeks, unashamed. Yet the moment the danger was over the critics emerged. Mr. Duff Cooper immediately resigned from his Cabinet post as First Lord of the Admiralty, explaining to the House of Commons on October 3rd that Mr. Chamberlain's Berchtesgaden-Godesberg-Munich policy had " stuck in his throat." And the parliamentary Opposition, whose salt tears were now dry, reverted to their democratic duty of opposing the Government of the day.

Sir John Simon on that day scored an easy but brilliantly executed triumph over the feeble protests against a peace so lately and so warmly welcomed. He concealed the force of the argument that Herr Hitler had again won his point without war, while being prepared to risk war. But the truth, he said, was that the Czech State had originally been constituted in defiance of the principle of self-determination ; Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations had been ignored, and the French and British Governments had now saved Czechoslovakia from a destructive invasion by facilitating the only alternative solution. Lord Halifax, in the other House, that day made a good remark when, in rejecting the old nonsense about having a war to prevent a worse war, he declared simply that he would hold on to a 1 per cent. chance of peace till he died.

There was a month's lull at Westminster ; and then the flood-gates reopened with depressing effect. Mr. Chamberlain returned after a much needed holiday and faced the House on November 1st. In the interval much encouragement had been given by various spokesmen not well disposed to the Government to a sense of impatience and uneasiness about the reality of the opportunity of peace created at Munich. Mr. Chamberlain had never concealed his own opinion that the Munich arrangement was not an end in itself, but a means to a general appeasement of Europe. On November 1st he reaffirmed his opinion simply that a new era of peace had begun. Mr. Attlee made the Prime Minister's task much easier by the exaggerated gloom of his own diagnosis of what Munich had produced. For instance, he asked the Prime Minister what we were going

to do about German economic " penetration " in Central and South-Eastern Europe. An easy one. Mr. Chamberlain merely had to remind him, in the spirit of a patient schoolmaster, of an abiding principle in elementary economics. " It is not in our interest," he said, " to see any part of the world remain poor."

Mr. Chamberlain has the supreme gift of using simple words, understandable by children. When at Heston, starting out on his famous third journey, he gave as his slogan : " If at first you don't succeed, try, try, try again," his technique was perfect. So in the present case it is one of the oddest fallacies of cheap imperialism to resent prosperity in other countries. It is also one of the oddest of present perversities that the chief spokesman of the British Left, by the tactical exigencies of parliamentary opposition, feels himself constrained to argue the case for cheap imperialism. " If," continued Mr. Chamberlain in the same elementary and patient strain, " by means of international trade between Germany and these countries the economic position of these countries is improved, you may be quite certain that we shall get our share of the trade." Why, indeed, is the world at present so impoverished ? Simply because each country is trying to prevent prosperity in every other.

But the main source of wonder to plain people after the Munich peace was the spectacle of intensified rearmament. Mr. Chamberlain's answer, as given on November 1st, was that " unilateral disarmament will help nobody." The argument, for which there is historical justification, is that Britain's relative disarmament had become a danger to the peace, by offering temptation to the more exuberant German influences. Also it has been proved that one of the reasons why the 1932 Disarmament Conference failed was that a disarmed Britain had no " pawns " to bargain with. In these matters, political human nature being what it is, ideals have to be reached through a balance of rival power. As long ago as March 24th last Mr. Chamberlain gave it as his object to reach a limitation of armaments by agreement. On November 1st, starting from the premise that the ultimate object of any government was to improve the standard of living of the people—he did not say how woefully and consistently every government in the world has failed in that object—he declared that such an aim is " irreconcilable " with " the continued piling up of armaments."

Through the initial phase, therefore, of establishing an equality of armaments—the responsibility for which rests upon Germany's military strength—he declared that " What we are aiming at is, first, the limitation of armaments by agreement, and in the end their practical abolition. . . ." In his Guildhall speech Mr. Chamberlain added another relevant observation to this apparent but misleading paradox, between rearmament and the peace of Munich. " It is the man," he said, " who is conscious of his own weakness who can least afford to be generous in his dealings with others because he will always recoil from yielding to the claims of justice lest his action should be attributed to his fear of the consequences of resistance."

The cheerful thing in present circumstances is that it is the fire-eaters, the war-at-any-price people, the Ribbentrops and the Churchills in every country who are disgruntled. The peacemakers are in the ascendant. Having circumvented one of the most difficult and dangerous diplomatic problems of our time without recourse to war, it becomes easier, for the precedent is set, to approach the rest in the like spirit. The precedent, indeed, was enshrined in simple language immediately after the Munich Four Power Agreement was signed. The very fact is in itself practically important that Herr Hitler's signature with Mr. Chamberlain's is affixed to a three-point declaration, affirming first, that Anglo-German relations are of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe (which no one can deny); secondly, that the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement are symbolic of the desire of the two countries never to go to war with one another again (which no one can resent); and thirdly, that the two countries are resolved to use the method of consultation for the settlement of still outstanding problems, and that they are resolved thus to remove those difficulties, thereby to assure the peace of Europe. The prospect of peace in Europe and in the world is better to-day than it has been since the Versailles Treaty was signed nearly twenty years ago. When M. Clemenceau then decreed " And now to work! " he was badly premature. He could have said it now with reason behind it.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

November 12th, 1938.

No. 447. *December 1938.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

FULL REVIEWS 749

THE AGE OF REFORM; ITALY UNDER MUSSOLINI; THE THIRTY YEARS WAR; HUMAN NEEDS IN MODERN SOCIETY; OUR NOBLEST HERITAGE; PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND; THROUGH THE FOG OF WAR.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES: CRITICAL REALISM; EUROPE AND THE CZECHS; REVOLUTIONARY PORTUGAL; THE BRUNELS, FATHER AND SON; SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW; THE FLASHING STREAM; THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN FORCES IN THE GREAT WAR; THE LONSDALE KEEPER'S BOOK; SQUARE-RIGGER DAYS. 760

THE AGE OF REFORM.*

The latest addition to *The Oxford History of England* is a really valuable contribution by Mr. E. L. Woodward on *The Age of Reform, 1815-1870*, which links up with Mr. R. C. K. Ensor's volume *England, 1870-1914*. This series is designed, of course, as a comprehensive work dealing with all the manifold sides of our national and imperial history. In a period of fifty-five years which witnessed the early stages of so many movements now regarded as fundamental in our national life, compression and adequate treatment are particularly difficult to reconcile and it is not surprising that this new volume, with more than six hundred pages of text, is the largest yet published in the series. An immense quantity of material has had to be sifted and Mr. Woodward has presented his analysis with conspicuous care and lucidity. The book will be found most useful as a concise work of reference and especially valuable to the reader who seeks a short authoritative survey of some particular aspect or movement. While all the chapters are interrelated to make a composite whole, each one is designed as a special separate study. It

**The Age of Reform, 1815-1870*, Vol. XII, *Oxford History of England*. Oxford University Press. 15s. net.

follows that this work is necessarily too departmentalised and detailed to serve as a short general appraisement of the period viewed as a whole. In this connection it is well to note Professor G. M. Trevelyan's short survey of the century which earlier this year in a second edition has been extended up to 1919 under the title, *British History in the Nineteenth Century and After, 1782-1919.*

In a volume of this character it is perhaps inevitable that in the treatment of some topic at least the reader will be disappointed. He may feel, for example, that inadequate consideration has been given to the early growth of town amenities and particularly of facilities for the enjoyment of leisure by the working classes consequent upon the agitation of Chartists and reformers; and that insufficient significance is attached to the Ten Hours Bill of 1847. In dealing with the campaign leading to the Reform Bill of 1867 Mr. Woodward curiously omits all mention of Bright and treats as of almost decisive importance the Hyde Park disturbance which "convinced conservative opinion that electoral reform could not be delayed." Many readers will feel that the importance of the press during this period has been neglected and particularly the influence of the radical journals. Upon other topics we might well wish for more elaboration, for instance upon the foreign policy of Castlereagh and Canning. Such examples of criticism, however, are mainly those of emphasis rather than of pure omissions, and of course the author has to contend with severe restriction of space.

No doubt critics may disagree with some of Mr. Woodward's concise and definite estimates of the great figures of his period. But they are opinions which the historian is entitled to hold and which recognise the results of research. For example, he acknowledges the now generally accepted view that Canning differed from Castlereagh more in method than in principle. The former "agreed more with Castlereagh's decisions than with his methods." Of Palmerston he is less critical than some historians, while conversely it may be felt that he does not do full justice, for example, to Disraeli or Newman. In view of recent efforts to rehabilitate the reputation of the Prince Consort it is interesting to have Mr. Woodward's view that he "was no genius, and something of a prig," ambitious, "awkward and tactless," and "never fully understood his position." In his chapter on English literature

while dealing with poetry after 1832, many will agree with his opinion that "Tennyson and Browning came very near to imaginative genius of the highest order, and that the work of other men was of good quality and remarkable for variety as well as technical skill."

Mr. Woodward has included some valuable chapters on Ireland and India and the Empire during a vital period of imperial growth. In dealing with the Durham Report he is careful not to overstress the novelty of its recommendations for responsible government, the seeds of which had been sown with the War of American Independence.

ITALY UNDER MUSSOLINI.

The latest addition to the *Modern States* series, edited by Professor R. B. Mowat, is an admirable little book.* Mr. Sencourt knows the country, the people, the language and the literature, and he commands a style of unusual distinction. He seems particularly attracted to the Latin countries, for he has written several works on France, Spain and Italy. After a brief historical retrospect he comes to the constitution of United Italy, which he describes rather unkindly as government by talk. The Italians, he is convinced, were not and are not able to govern themselves in our time-honoured English way. Readers of Croce's impressive history of modern Italy will remember that his picture of pre-war politics is very much more favourable. It all depends on our standard of measurement. Compared with England, the Italy of Crispi and Giolitti made a poor show. Compared with France under the Third Republic she can quite well hold up her head.

The author's low opinion of the Parliamentary régime in Italy naturally prepared him for the acceptance of Fascism. "Whatever its misdeeds, Italy needed it. Its roughness must be accepted with its decision, its insolence with its patriotism." Mr. Sencourt is too civilised and humane to approve of Mussolini's violence, but he has no doubt that on balance he has done more good than harm. The chapter on the Advent of Fascism is perhaps the most interesting in the book, for it contains the author's striking picture of the Duce. "The shrewd judgment of the King had seen that the journalist

* *Italy.* Robert Sencourt. Arrowsmith. 3s. 6d.

of Milan, with his great head, his broad shoulders, his heavy blacksmith frame, his heavy jaw, his burning eyes, his large utterance, his portentous force of personality could hammer Italy on his anvil. . . . The man, no doubt, had his faults of harshness, of egoism, of pride, of unscrupulousness. His master was Machiavelli. . . . With every year he advanced in knowledge, in wisdom, in power. His very features changed their character. . . . He understood what music Young Italy expected; he gave it—and always with trumpet and clangour." There is little in these brilliant pages of characterisation to which Mussolini would take exception. To make omelettes, as the French say, you must break eggs, and Dictators are at all times prepared to do so.

To emphasise the unique qualities of the Duce is to concede the extreme improbability of the system surviving its founder. Much of his work, such as the statesmanlike settlement of the old feud between the Vatican and the Quirinal, will remain; and Italy will doubtless retain her status among the Great Powers which he, more than any of her rulers since Cavour, helped to give her. But government by a superman, commonly called dictatorship, will disappear when no arm is strong enough to stretch the bow of Ulysses. Dictators never leave heirs. When the whole Fascist experiment is over in Germany and Italy it will become possible to balance the achievement against the immense spiritual devastation which inevitably accompanies the destruction of the rule of law in a civilised community.

G. P. G.

THE THIRTY YEARS WAR.*

No adequate one-volume history of the Thirty Years War existed in English till Miss C. V. Wedgwood, well known as the author of *Strafford*, filled the gap. Her book is remarkable in many respects. It is based on a vast knowledge of the printed material in all the necessary languages. Take for instance the account of the battle of Nördlingen, one of the turning-points of the war. It depends on the report of General Horn from the Swedish side, on the Spanish reports which are to be found in two collections of contemporary documents, and on recent critical studies chiefly by German authors. Such

* *The Thirty Years War.* By C. V. Wedgwood. Cape. 18s.

a careful comparison of all available facts and points of view enables the author to present us with the results of independent research. The bibliography at the end of the volume contains books recently published, and thus becomes a useful supplement to the existing German bibliographies. For English readers a brief list of authorities in English is added.

All historians dealing with the Thirty Years War had to face two chief difficulties. The first lies in the religious bias which even after such a long interval handicaps impartiality. Miss Wedgwood is extremely fair on this point. She is anxious to do justice to all personalities who have been neglected because of denominational prejudices; for instance, the Emperor Ferdinand II and Elector John George of Saxony. She is critical towards men such as Gustavus Adolphus and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, who have been glorified by legend. The former, I suggest, might have found the natural limits of his conquests, since he was a born ruler with very strong national instincts (cp. page 331).

The second difficulty concerns the last stages of the war which, after the disappearance of the chief characters, Tilly, Gustavus and Wallenstein, threatens to be rather dull after the thrilling beginning. The author has found a double solution which is as skilful as it is justified by historical truth. She stresses the rôle of Spain, whose final collapse was inevitable after the battle of Rocroi. This marked the turning of the tide and at last convinced the Emperor in Vienna that he could no longer hope for victory. The French historian Henri Hauser was quite right, in my opinion, when he gave his marvellous volume the title: "*La Prépondérance Espagnole 1559-1660.*" Furthermore, Miss Wedgwood has revealed the peace discussions to be a problem in political psychology. They were an abbreviated version of the whole war, diplomatically and legally; they proved very dramatic and somewhat disheartening, bringing new types and new passions on to the stage.

Miss Wedgwood's book has three outstanding qualities. It is written by an artist of brilliant literary gifts. Many of her biographical portraits will last. She says, for example, of the Elector Frederick V: "Ironic fate had given him no vices, and all the virtues most useless to a ruling prince." Maximilian of Bavaria is described as follows: "He was lanky,

lean and small, with mouse-coloured hair and a pasty complexion, his speech and features much affected by adenoids. His manners were polished and his conversation fluent and well informed, but the shrill pitch of his voice startled those who were not prepared for it." A real masterpiece, perhaps the most attractive page of the volume, is the comparison between the two Ferdinands : " Ferdinand III had neither the intense faith in his mission nor the trust in his God which bore up his father ; he had not the singleness of purpose which gave the old Emperor a touch of greatness. He was too clever to be happy, not clever enough to be successful. Ferdinand II was either very shrewd or very lucky ; Ferdinand III was neither."

The second admirable quality of the book is the way it preserves the balance between military and diplomatic history. Any history of a great war is in danger of becoming somewhat too sanguinary, which means too monotonous. Certainly, Miss Wedgwood discusses military technique, the life of general and soldier, the economic side of warfare as represented by provisions and billeting. The background of the battles is vividly painted to scale ; and point is given to all this by the treatment of the great problems of international policy. Firstly the Thirty Years War was a Bohemian war. Bohemia wanted to become once more a free, independent country, dowered with religious, constitutional, national liberty. Secondly, the Thirty Years War was a German war. German Protestantism of different shades was considered by the Emperor to be heresy, but even more to be political rebellion. Was the Emperor powerful enough to build up autocratic rule in the shape of denominational absolutism on the Spanish pattern ? Finally, it was a European war. Spain helped the Emperor because she wanted to reconquer the Low Countries and to hold the central line along the Rhine against France from Milan to Antwerp, comprising the Valtelline, Alsace and the Palatinate. The Swedes could not beat the Emperor, but France beat Spain. Habsburg hegemony was no longer possible in Europe. The author has emphasised all these major points of universal history, and thus her account, illustrated by many picturesque details, has gained depth and vigour.

My last point is a warm acknowledgment of the author's fine instinct for all questions of civilisation. She has not toned

down the rudeness of the age, she has sketched a realistic picture of the cruelties and the atrocities as they are attested by first-hand evidence. Without sentimentality, without dramatic overstatement, in a serious and conscientious way, she has described the war as a terrible economic and social catastrophe, a lamentable breakdown of Germany and Central Europe, feared and opposed by many intelligent and worthy people, enjoyed and exploited by an unscrupulous minority of war-mongers and war-profiteers. We are grateful for an excellent book which should be read by everybody who wants to know how Bohemia, Germany and Europe were linked together, how a bad war led to a bad peace, and how eventually this bad peace necessarily created worse wars.

VEIT VALENTIN.

HUMAN NEEDS IN MODERN SOCIETY.*

Dissatisfaction, frustration and a sense of the futility of life abound in every nation and every class, so far as thought finds expression. Can science and practical policies shed light upon the problem of our discontent and help towards its solution ? Our writers, one a trained psychologist, both with experience among working-class organisations, have set themselves with skill and courage to find a way out of the familiar difficulties.

The first section of the book handles psychology so as to give a popular presentation of the part played by " self-regard " as the central motive in the evolution of a personal character, which in its higher reaches requires an expansive and intensive regard for others. A premature education in conscious altruism is deprecated as lacking in reality and continuity. For man is an animal with driving instincts and sentiments dictated by his vital needs, and not until these are satisfied does any wider social feeling than that of the family become operative. But wider social feelings have their place among the instincts, and, where scope exists for their play, the failure to fulfil them gives pain. Hence in modern civilisation where there are for many people leisure and opportunities for wider co-operation, the class and national conflicts which interfere with their social co-operation block human progress. In all psychological analyses there is room

* By B. J. Reynolds and R. G. Coulson. Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d. net.

for disagreement and many readers will think that the assertion that " Everybody forms some more or less clear ' Ideal Picture ' of himself as he wants to be, or feels he ought to be " (page 59) is an exaggeration. Most people throughout their life have no such picture, no general notion of what they " are after." So too the general attribution of a sentiment of " self-abasement," demanding for its satisfaction a god, prophet, or leader, is a very dubious statement. Admiration for a " Führer " is something quite different. But however this may be, there can be no doubt that cultivation, civilisation and progress with security depend upon the expansion and elevation of self-hood in the membership of groups.

This being so, we come to the issue, How is this higher self-hood attainable ? It requires justice, sympathy, goodwill, in ever widening circles. But the movements of strife and the exercise of force seem to have gained strength in modern times. Are wars and revolutions instruments of security and progress in the long run ? It is not necessary to expose their futility. What then is the way by which appeals to reason, justice and sympathy, the truly constructive powers, may assert themselves ?

Here we come down to the practical experiments our authors have tried in working-class clubs and societies for the education of citizens. Organised efforts to expound political and ethical principles are found to have little result. Class sentiments, group antagonisms everywhere block the way to those free positive feelings of personal sympathy and co-operation which are the only means of winning the unity of social conduct that will make possible the personal sacrifices of the rich and ruling classes and furnish a social-economic system that will " deliver the goods " in the sense of popular equality of opportunity and general well-being. The danger of an official bureaucracy which will seize power from the rich and domineer over the poor under the name of " socialism " is stressed as a serious difficulty only to be overcome by getting these increasing numbers of officials into human relations with other citizens and workers. How far this is a feasible policy for peace and security will remain doubtful, but that it is an important contribution cannot be denied.

J. A. H.

OUR NOBLEST HERITAGE.*

With a sentence of illuminating criticism unfinished, with but " his halfe cours y-ronne " in this study of the six centuries of our great tradition of verse, Death silenced this poet, this sensitive and devout lover of poetry. His references to later and modern poets, such as e.g. Milton, Herrick, Wordsworth, Keats, Mr. de la Mare and Mr. T. S. Eliot, deepen our regret for the loss of his detailed discussion of them. Mr. Drinkwater had disclaimed any intention of compiling a critical history, his aim was " to record the impression that English poetry has made upon a mind that for over thirty years has been engaged constantly under its influence and frequently in its practice." As a poet, he is able to reveal to us some intimation of the process we call inspiration, and to speak authoritatively on the technique of his craft—the sonnet structure, value of rhyme, heightened effect produced by an unfamiliar word, or the unexpected use of a familiar one. Milton's special pleading against rhyme, because he had decided on blank verse for his epic, is respectfully countered. The imperishable qualities of true poetry are shown to persist from age to age, under differing conditions : " He (Shakespeare) and his fellows, the magnificently original and impenitently traditional poets of their time, wrote poetry not a note or, merely linguistic considerations apart, a phrase of which would have been out of place in Chaucer or would be out of place in the poet whose poems are not yet written." Mr. Drinkwater is an enthusiast for Chaucer, for his fresh, vivid colouring and his skill as a narrator ; he finds his narrative tradition carried on in Marlowe's *Hero and Leander* and Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis*, though for the most part our poets turned rather to lyrics and drama. *The Faërie Queene* appeals less to this critic than do Spenser's lyrics ; with his elegy on Sidney we see " the arrival of English verse at its golden age." The quotations, whether of verses or entire poems, scattered liberally throughout these pages, add greatly to their charm ; some are familiar, some less so. Among the latter is Richard Corbet's " Rewards and Faeries " poem, from which Kipling borrowed a title. It must, we think, be admitted that most of the seventeenth-century lyrics unearthed by the author for his Warton Lecture, here

* *English Poetry.* An Unfinished History. By John Drinkwater. Methuen. 1938. 6s.

printed, are not, save for a line here and there (e.g. " I make fine Weather in my Soul "), on the level of the better-known ones preserved by chance (or, perhaps, by wise choice?). It is impossible in a brief notice to treat of the varied themes of this enchanting book, which must delight all who have any feeling for verse.

E. G. S.

PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND.*

Broadly speaking, in his learned and lucid volume Canon Maynard Smith reviews the state of England from 1509 to 1521, but does not in the least confine himself within these years. He looks before and after, and all the time he wants to grasp the mind of the men who made the Reformation. Of the width of his view there is as little doubt as of the depth of his reading. There is no research, but there is what is perhaps better, interpretation. The strength of this massive volume is the effort to see the men who made the Reformation as they actually were, not greater and certainly not less. He sees them with kindly eyes, so kindly that we felt almost tempted to ask him what were the abuses that caused one of the deepest movements in our history. At the same time, the religious condition of the people has been so sorely misunderstood that it is well to read such agreeable accounts as the author provides. His fair-mindedness is conspicuous in his chapter on popular religion, superstitions and abuses. Here he endeavours to strike the happy mean between, let us say, Dr. Coulton and Cardinal Gasquet.

Much as we like Canon Maynard Smith on movements, we like him even better on men. In the history of Lollardy John Wyclif and Reginald Pecock have full justice done to them, and so too in the history of Scholasticism have St. Thomas Aquinas and Cusanus. The author is clear that while the Renaissance touched the elect, the Reformation touched the rank and file. This emerges in his careful examination of the satires, the ballads, and the romances of the time; and he proves himself apt in extracting the grain of wheat amid the chaff of ephemeral writings. It is abundantly evident that the mass of these writings left the deep-seated impression that something was radically wrong with the Church, and

* *Pre-Reformation England.* By H. Maynard Smith. Macmillan. 25s.

that the sooner this something wrong was put right the better. The generalisations on the literature of the people are acute and tolerant. One of the notable chapters analyses the teaching of Colet the Puritan, More the Christian humanist, Erasmus the latitudinarian, and Henry VIII the traditionalist. Able as all the analyses are, that on the King is notably so, and we commend it to all who care to grasp the mind of the man who, not for the first time in history, made his conscience his accomplice. It is not quite the estimate that Professor Pollard has provided for us, but it is, nevertheless, a penetrating piece of portraiture. The index on such men as Chaucer and Hilton, Rolle and Starkey, is far from worthy of this book.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

THROUGH THE FOG OF WAR.*

Captain Liddell Hart has seldom been as brilliant and fascinating as in this loose collection of essays dealing with various outstanding personalities of the World War. While the personal factor has always had a particularly strong attraction for him, constant preoccupation with the subject for many years has resulted in crystallising his opinion into a series of vivid and sharp-cut pictures, which the reader is not likely to forget. An introductory survey of " The World War in Brief " in the almost incredibly short space of twenty-one pages is followed by a series of pen-portraits of which the four short pages devoted to Ludendorff are, perhaps, the best appreciation that much-discussed figure has ever received at anybody's hands. Among British commanders the by no means flattering portraits of Allenby and " Wully Robertson " are the most impressive; far more so than the longer essays on Haig, Lawrence, Ian Hamilton or Foch, while a number of smaller sketches of British, French, Italian, Russian military leaders are hardly more than snapshots. These biographical sketches forming about half the volume are supplemented by digests of a number of personal memoirs of particular importance for the understanding of the World War and by short analyses of the outstanding episodes of the War on the West Front and at Gallipoli, the latter of particular interest in the contrast of the British and Turkish views

* Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.

of the same events, as revealed in the memoirs of Liman von Sanders and Kannengiesser Pasha, as well as some outstanding " episodes " dealing with the invasion of Belgium, the German surprise attack on the Aisne in the summer of 1918 and the costly American offensives in the autumn of that year.

In an epilogue, " Some Lessons of History," Captain Liddell Hart attempts to work out, not the value and use of this or that aim or method, but far broader, general lessons, chief amongst which he places " the importance, even for military efficiency, of searching for the truth without regard to other considerations." The tendency to camouflage history, from a mistaken conception of loyalty, is not merely liable to obscure the tactical and technical lessons of warfare, but above all to create false confidence by portraying all men as uniformly brave. Another lesson is that the most dangerous folly of all is man's failure to recognise his own aptitude for folly ; a common affliction of authority to which the pretence of infallibility is instinctive. In these circumstances Captain Liddell Hart finds that the basic virtue in the deepest sense is accuracy. It applies to private as well as to public life. Sweeping judgments, malicious gossip, inaccurate statements which spread a misleading impression—these are to him the symptoms of the moral and mental recklessness that gives rise to war. Studying their effect one is led to see that the germs of war lie within ourselves—in the convenient belief that " the end justifies the means," the attempt to bring about progress by compulsion, not by economics, politics or religion.

H. Rosinski.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

It is always a pleasure to welcome a new volume from Professor G. Dawes Hicks, for his work is invariably marked by clarity of thought, cogency of reasoning, and felicity of style. All these qualities are present in his new book, entitled *Critical Realism, Studies in the Philosophy of Mind and Nature.** The range of the volume is wide, for beginning with careful exposition of the author's view of perception it contains vigorous criticisms of the philosophical views of many recent writers, and ends by a very interesting comparison of the Monism of Spinoza and the Monadism of Leibniz. The book is, therefore, of great interest and value.

* By G. Dawes Hicks. Macmillan. 15s. net.

It is impossible within this brief notice to give particulars of these various and often abstruse discussions. It must suffice to indicate the general standpoint of Professor Dawes Hicks. At the outset, having cleared the doctrine of Kant from certain crude misunderstandings, he proceeds to criticise the great philosopher for the too exclusively scientific standpoint from which he proceeds, and for the abstract heterogeneity he sets up between sense as characterised by receptivity and thought as characterised by spontaneity. As the result of this opposition " the cardinal principle of the Kantian theory may be said to be that *the act of synthesising or combining is the very act of knowing.*" In opposition to this Professor Dawes Hicks holds that the act of knowing is " an act of *discriminating*, of *distinguishing*, of *comparing*, features which, as presented, are already synthesised in ordinary experience " (p. 7). This fundamental position dominates all the following discussions. It may be remarked that there is occasion for caution and humility in the fact that after centuries of argument, and despite the progress of philosophy and psychology, the nature of perception, the starting-point of knowledge, is still a subject of acute controversy between philosophers.

J. S. L.

* * * * *

Miss Shiela Grant Duff's *Europe and the Czechs* (Penguin Books) costs sixpence but is worth a great deal more. In a little over two hundred pages she tells busy folk all they want to know about a fine people and an interesting country. She writes with admiration of their achievements in history and with the deepest sympathy of the recent tragedy. Yet she is not blinded by her feelings, for she is an experienced observer of European politics. The chapter entitled " Sudeten German Politics " faces the situation frankly. " To-day it appears a grave mistake on the part of the Czechs not to have been more conciliatory towards the Germans. But then, as now, conciliation meant handing extensive power to actively hostile Germans." What would have happened if the Prague Government had offered the so-called Fourth Plan (Cantonal administration on the Swiss system) years ago, we cannot know. Hitler is a Pan-German, and his desire to incorporate Austria and the Sudeten districts of Czechoslovakia in the Reich was independent of the institutions in those countries. It would, however, have been far less easy for him to proclaim himself the deliverer if the Germans beyond his frontiers had been contented with their lot. Everything, however, is relative. Comparing the treatment of minorities in Czechoslovakia with, let us say, Polish Ruthenia, or South Tyrol or Macedonia, the Czechs come out very well. A second edition contains a supplementary chapter on the September crisis.

* * * * *

Revolutionary Portugal (1910-1936), by V. de Bragança-Cunha,* is a sad book. The Monarchy had its faults, but in the author's opinion it

* James Clarke & Co. 7s. 6d.

was better than what followed. Affonso Costa, the leading figure of the young Republic, was a violent anti-clerical, and the finances of the country, never its strong point, went from bad to worse. The performance of the Portuguese troops in the world war was equally unsatisfactory. After this slashing attack on the Republic the reader might expect praise of the Salazar-Carmona régime. That, too, is sharply criticised. The upright character and incorruptibility of the ex-Professor of Economics who has governed Portugal for ten years, first as Minister of Finance and later as Premier, is recognised, but he is deprived of the laurels which many writers have placed on his brow.

"The Portuguese Premier, whose ruthlessness is almost too much even for Machiavelli, firmly believes that the efficiency of the New State is incompatible with the freedom of the individual citizen. Anyone who disagrees with him is labelled *mau português*, or 'evil Portuguese,' and as such is ruthlessly exterminated. Repression is still the first instrument of government, and an iron censorship is applied to the Portuguese Press. . . . As the Portuguese Dictatorship grows in power, however, it grows in fear." Even the economic position, declares the author, is becoming increasingly precarious. What the Portuguese themselves think of their rulers we do not know. In any case, dictators do not care very much.

* * * * *

*The Brunels, Father and Son** is an attractive and intimate sketch of the great engineers, Sir Mark Isambard Brunel and his son, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, by the latter's granddaughter, Miss Celia Brunel Noble. It is not intended as a technical biography and does not compete with the standard lives. It is rather an account of their private lives and qualities and of some of their great achievements from a personal and family angle, drawn against the social background of the Victorian scene in which they laboured and struggled. The boring of the first Thames tunnel opened in 1843, Isambard's outstanding feats in the construction of the G.W.R. system and in shipbuilding, including the first transatlantic liner and the tragic but magnificent failure of the *Great Eastern* steamship, are examples in a vivid and dramatic narrative which the lay reader will thoroughly enjoy. It may well lead him to a closer study of the Brunels' place in the material and technical progress of their age.

* * * * *

Sir William Holdsworth has published his Tagore Lectures, delivered in December-January 1937-8, in *Some Makers of English Law*,† thus rendering generally available in a permanent form a work of real usefulness and value. As "a short biographical history of English law" it provides a concise analysis and record of the immense contribution and influence of lawyers in the historical development of our legal

* Cobden-Sanderson. 15s. net. † Cambridge. 15s. net.

system. Sir William naturally opens with Bracton, whose "book marks the true beginning of the common law"; and he concludes with Maitland and Pollock, whose influence as jurists he ranks almost equally together. Of English judges, none are specifically dealt with later than Mansfield, Eldon and Stowell. The book is not, and is not intended to be, exhaustive or a work of research. As the author says, most of the information will be found scattered in articles and particularly in his *History of English Law*. But he has brought together the material in a most convenient and lucid form; and as an introductory account, carrying the full weight of the author's learning and reputation, it will appeal to the student and may also be read with great advantage by the layman.

* * * * *

The Flashing Stream,* a play by Charles Morgan, is a demonstration in action of Mr. Morgan's thoughts about singleness of mind. The abstract interest in mathematics, though with a practical end, is interwoven with an almost equally abstract love interest. The necessarily severe limitation of the characters, four or five naval men and a highly trained mathematical woman at their work, to a dramatic piece, adds to the difficulty of bringing out all the ideas driven into it. There is, therefore, a Foreword and an Essay on Singleness of Mind, both by the author, to explain further what he means. The *Foreword* expounds a modern attitude to sex (which is nevertheless as old as the hills). Leaving behind the "chromium-plated" school of the 1920's, who believed in indulgence, he remarks: "The notion that a man and a girl who love each other are necessarily fools if they abstain . . . or postpone . . . is not accepted by the young to-day." Continuing in the *Essay* on the higher compulsion of an absorbing interest, he speaks of the conditions necessary to singleness of mind, the only remedy against the violence of the modern world. "The Spirit of Man is indestructible and singleness of mind is its instrument."

* * * * *

The publication of *The Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919* will be appreciated not only in the Dominion itself, but by all those who wish to assess and understand in detail the significance and achievement of Canada's great effort in the Allied cause. Since 1921 Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, who is Director of the Historical Section of the Canadian General Staff, has directed the collection and sifting of masses of material both from Canadian and other sources, including British and German official histories and information. In publishing Volume I† in the General Series, Colonel Duguid has written a detailed and lucid narrative, supported by numerous documents and

* Macmillan. 6s.

† $2.00, and separate volume of appendices and maps $1.50. The King's Printer, Ottawa.

was better than what followed. Affonso Costa, the leading figure of the young Republic, was a violent anti-clerical, and the finances of the country, never its strong point, went from bad to worse. The performance of the Portuguese troops in the world war was equally unsatisfactory. After this slashing attack on the Republic the reader might expect praise of the Salazar-Carmona régime. That, too, is sharply criticised. The upright character and incorruptibility of the ex-Professor of Economics who has governed Portugal for ten years, first as Minister of Finance and later as Premier, is recognised, but he is deprived of the laurels which many writers have placed on his brow.

"The Portuguese Premier, whose ruthlessness is almost too much even for Machiavelli, firmly believes that the efficiency of the New State is incompatible with the freedom of the individual citizen. Anyone who disagrees with him is labelled *mau português*, or 'evil Portuguese,' and as such is ruthlessly exterminated. Repression is still the first instrument of government, and an iron censorship is applied to the Portuguese Press. . . . As the Portuguese Dictatorship grows in power, however, it grows in fear." Even the economic position, declares the author, is becoming increasingly precarious. What the Portuguese themselves think of their rulers we do not know. In any case, dictators do not care very much.

* * * * *

*The Brunels, Father and Son** is an attractive and intimate sketch of the great engineers, Sir Mark Isambard Brunel and his son, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, by the latter's granddaughter, Miss Celia Brunel Noble. It is not intended as a technical biography and does not compete with the standard lives. It is rather an account of their private lives and qualities and of some of their great achievements from a personal and family angle, drawn against the social background of the Victorian scene in which they laboured and struggled. The boring of the first Thames tunnel opened in 1843, Isambard's outstanding feats in the construction of the G.W.R. system and in shipbuilding, including the first transatlantic liner and the tragic but magnificent failure of the *Great Eastern* steamship, are examples in a vivid and dramatic narrative which the lay reader will thoroughly enjoy. It may well lead him to a closer study of the Brunels' place in the material and technical progress of their age.

* * * * *

Sir William Holdsworth has published his Tagore Lectures, delivered in December-January 1937-8, in *Some Makers of English Law*,† thus rendering generally available in a permanent form a work of real usefulness and value. As "a short biographical history of English law" it provides a concise analysis and record of the immense contribution and influence of lawyers in the historical development of our legal

* Cobden-Sanderson. 15s. net. † Cambridge. 15s. net.

system. Sir William naturally opens with Bracton, whose "book marks the true beginning of the common law"; and he concludes with Maitland and Pollock, whose influence as jurists he ranks almost equally together. Of English judges, none are specifically dealt with later than Mansfield, Eldon and Stowell. The book is not, and is not intended to be, exhaustive or a work of research. As the author says, most of the information will be found scattered in articles and particularly in his *History of English Law*. But he has brought together the material in a most convenient and lucid form; and as an introductory account, carrying the full weight of the author's learning and reputation, it will appeal to the student and may also be read with great advantage by the layman.

* * * * *

The Flashing Stream,* a play by Charles Morgan, is a demonstration in action of Mr. Morgan's thoughts about singleness of mind. The abstract interest in mathematics, though with a practical end, is interwoven with an almost equally abstract love interest. The necessarily severe limitation of the characters, four or five naval men and a highly trained mathematical woman at their work, to a dramatic piece, adds to the difficulty of bringing out all the ideas driven into it. There is, therefore, a Foreword and an Essay on Singleness of Mind, both by the author, to explain further what he means. The *Foreword* expounds a modern attitude to sex (which is nevertheless as old as the hills). Leaving behind the "chromium-plated" school of the 1920's, who believed in indulgence, he remarks: "The notion that a man and a girl who love each other are necessarily fools if they abstain . . . or postpone . . . is not accepted by the young to-day." Continuing in the *Essay* on the higher compulsion of an absorbing interest, he speaks of the conditions necessary to singleness of mind, the only remedy against the violence of the modern world. "The Spirit of Man is indestructible and singleness of mind is its instrument."

* * * * *

The publication of *The Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919* will be appreciated not only in the Dominion itself, but by all those who wish to assess and understand in detail the significance and achievement of Canada's great effort in the Allied cause. Since 1921 Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, who is Director of the Historical Section of the Canadian General Staff, has directed the collection and sifting of masses of material both from Canadian and other sources, including British and German official histories and information. In publishing Volume I† in the General Series, Colonel Duguid has written a detailed and lucid narrative, supported by numerous documents and

* Macmillan. 6s.

† $2.00, and separate volume of appendices and maps $1.50. The King's Printer, Ottawa.

was better than what followed. Affonso Costa, the leading figure of the young Republic, was a violent anti-clerical, and the finances of the country, never its strong point, went from bad to worse. The performance of the Portuguese troops in the world war was equally unsatisfactory. After this slashing attack on the Republic the reader might expect praise of the Salazar-Carmona régime. That, too, is sharply criticised. The upright character and incorruptibility of the ex-Professor of Economics who has governed Portugal for ten years, first as Minister of Finance and later as Premier, is recognised, but he is deprived of the laurels which many writers have placed on his brow.

"The Portuguese Premier, whose ruthlessness is almost too much even for Machiavelli, firmly believes that the efficiency of the New State is incompatible with the freedom of the individual citizen. Anyone who disagrees with him is labelled *mau português*, or 'evil Portuguese,' and as such is ruthlessly exterminated. Repression is still the first instrument of government, and an iron censorship is applied to the Portuguese Press. . . . As the Portuguese Dictatorship grows in power, however, it grows in fear." Even the economic position, declares the author, is becoming increasingly precarious. What the Portuguese themselves think of their rulers we do not know. In any case, dictators do not care very much.

* * * * *

*The Brunels, Father and Son** is an attractive and intimate sketch of the great engineers, Sir Mark Isambard Brunel and his son, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, by the latter's granddaughter, Miss Celia Brunel Noble. It is not intended as a technical biography and does not compete with the standard lives. It is rather an account of their private lives and qualities and of some of their great achievements from a personal and family angle, drawn against the social background of the Victorian scene in which they laboured and struggled. The boring of the first Thames tunnel opened in 1843, Isambard's outstanding feats in the construction of the G.W.R. system and in shipbuilding, including the first transatlantic liner and the tragic but magnificent failure of the *Great Eastern* steamship, are examples in a vivid and dramatic narrative which the lay reader will thoroughly enjoy. It may well lead him to a closer study of the Brunels' place in the material and technical progress of their age.

* * * * *

Sir William Holdsworth has published his Tagore Lectures, delivered in December-January 1937-8, in *Some Makers of English Law*,† thus rendering generally available in a permanent form a work of real usefulness and value. As "a short biographical history of English law" it provides a concise analysis and record of the immense contribution and influence of lawyers in the historical development of our legal

* Cobden-Sanderson. 15s. net. † Cambridge. 15s. net.

system. Sir William naturally opens with Bracton, whose "book marks the true beginning of the common law"; and he concludes with Maitland and Pollock, whose influence as jurists he ranks almost equally together. Of English judges, none are specifically dealt with later than Mansfield, Eldon and Stowell. The book is not, and is not intended to be, exhaustive or a work of research. As the author says, most of the information will be found scattered in articles and particularly in his *History of English Law*. But he has brought together the material in a most convenient and lucid form; and as an introductory account, carrying the full weight of the author's learning and reputation, it will appeal to the student and may also be read with great advantage by the layman.

* * * * *

The Flashing Stream,* a play by Charles Morgan, is a demonstration in action of Mr. Morgan's thoughts about singleness of mind. The abstract interest in mathematics, though with a practical end, is interwoven with an almost equally abstract love interest. The necessarily severe limitation of the characters, four or five naval men and a highly trained mathematical woman at their work, to a dramatic piece, adds to the difficulty of bringing out all the ideas driven into it. There is, therefore, a Foreword and an Essay on Singleness of Mind, both by the author, to explain further what he means. The *Foreword* expounds a modern attitude to sex (which is nevertheless as old as the hills). Leaving behind the "chromium-plated" school of the 1920's, who believed in indulgence, he remarks: "The notion that a man and a girl who love each other are necessarily fools if they abstain . . . or postpone . . . is not accepted by the young to-day." Continuing in the *Essay* on the higher compulsion of an absorbing interest, he speaks of the conditions necessary to singleness of mind, the only remedy against the violence of the modern world. "The Spirit of Man is indestructible and singleness of mind is its instrument."

* * * * *

The publication of *The Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919* will be appreciated not only in the Dominion itself, but by all those who wish to assess and understand in detail the significance and achievement of Canada's great effort in the Allied cause. Since 1921 Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, who is Director of the Historical Section of the Canadian General Staff, has directed the collection and sifting of masses of material both from Canadian and other sources, including British and German official histories and information. In publishing Volume I† in the General Series, Colonel Duguid has written a detailed and lucid narrative, supported by numerous documents and

* Macmillan. 6s.

† $2.00, and separate volume of appendices and maps $1.50. The King's Printer, Ottawa.

was better than what followed. Affonso Costa, the leading figure of the young Republic, was a violent anti-clerical, and the finances of the country, never its strong point, went from bad to worse. The performance of the Portuguese troops in the world war was equally unsatisfactory. After this slashing attack on the Republic the reader might expect praise of the Salazar-Carmona régime. That, too, is sharply criticised. The upright character and incorruptibility of the ex-Professor of Economics who has governed Portugal for ten years, first as Minister of Finance and later as Premier, is recognised, but he is deprived of the laurels which many writers have placed on his brow.

"The Portuguese Premier, whose ruthlessness is almost too much even for Machiavelli, firmly believes that the efficiency of the New State is incompatible with the freedom of the individual citizen. Anyone who disagrees with him is labelled *mau português*, or 'evil Portuguese,' and as such is ruthlessly exterminated. Repression is still the first instrument of government, and an iron censorship is applied to the Portuguese Press. . . . As the Portuguese Dictatorship grows in power, however, it grows in fear." Even the economic position, declares the author, is becoming increasingly precarious. What the Portuguese themselves think of their rulers we do not know. In any case, dictators do not care very much.

* * * * *

*The Brunels, Father and Son** is an attractive and intimate sketch of the great engineers, Sir Mark Isambard Brunel and his son, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, by the latter's granddaughter, Miss Celia Brunel Noble. It is not intended as a technical biography and does not compete with the standard lives. It is rather an account of their private lives and qualities and of some of their great achievements from a personal and family angle, drawn against the social background of the Victorian scene in which they laboured and struggled. The boring of the first Thames tunnel opened in 1843, Isambard's outstanding feats in the construction of the G.W.R. system and in shipbuilding, including the first transatlantic liner and the tragic but magnificent failure of the *Great Eastern* steamship, are examples in a vivid and dramatic narrative which the lay reader will thoroughly enjoy. It may well lead him to a closer study of the Brunels' place in the material and technical progress of their age.

* * * * *

Sir William Holdsworth has published his Tagore Lectures, delivered in December-January 1937-8, in *Some Makers of English Law*,† thus rendering generally available in a permanent form a work of real usefulness and value. As "a short biographical history of English law" it provides a concise analysis and record of the immense contribution and influence of lawyers in the historical development of our legal

* Cobden-Sanderson. 15s. net. † Cambridge. 15s. net.

system. Sir William naturally opens with Bracton, whose "book marks the true beginning of the common law"; and he concludes with Maitland and Pollock, whose influence as jurists he ranks almost equally together. Of English judges, none are specifically dealt with later than Mansfield, Eldon and Stowell. The book is not, and is not intended to be, exhaustive or a work of research. As the author says, most of the information will be found scattered in articles and particularly in his *History of English Law*. But he has brought together the material in a most convenient and lucid form; and as an introductory account, carrying the full weight of the author's learning and reputation, it will appeal to the student and may also be read with great advantage by the layman.

* * * * *

The Flashing Stream,* a play by Charles Morgan, is a demonstration in action of Mr. Morgan's thoughts about singleness of mind. The abstract interest in mathematics, though with a practical end, is interwoven with an almost equally abstract love interest. The necessarily severe limitation of the characters, four or five naval men and a highly trained mathematical woman at their work, to a dramatic piece, adds to the difficulty of bringing out all the ideas driven into it. There is, therefore, a Foreword and an Essay on Singleness of Mind, both by the author, to explain further what he means. The *Foreword* expounds a modern attitude to sex (which is nevertheless as old as the hills). Leaving behind the "chromium-plated" school of the 1920's, who believed in indulgence, he remarks: "The notion that a man and a girl who love each other are necessarily fools if they abstain . . . or postpone . . . is not accepted by the young to-day." Continuing in the *Essay* on the higher compulsion of an absorbing interest, he speaks of the conditions necessary to singleness of mind, the only remedy against the violence of the modern world. "The Spirit of Man is indestructible and singleness of mind is its instrument."

* * * * *

The publication of *The Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919* will be appreciated not only in the Dominion itself, but by all those who wish to assess and understand in detail the significance and achievement of Canada's great effort in the Allied cause. Since 1921 Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, who is Director of the Historical Section of the Canadian General Staff, has directed the collection and sifting of masses of material both from Canadian and other sources, including British and German official histories and information. In publishing Volume I† in the General Series, Colonel Duguid has written a detailed and lucid narrative, supported by numerous documents and

* Macmillan. 6s.

† $2.00, and separate volume of appendices and maps $1.50. The King's Printer, Ottawa.

maps, many of which are included in a separate volume of appendices, from the outbreak of war to the formation of the Canadian Corps in September 1915. It covers in particular the raising of the first contingent and its active service overseas, including its part played at Ypres, Festubert and Givenchy. The volume also deals with the history of the Second Canadian Division up to its arrival in France in September 1915. Much care and skill has obviously been exercised in the compilation of this great work, which is most properly designed largely as a factual analysis and record upon which the reader is enabled to draw his own conclusions.

A revised edition has been published of the first volume* of the Official History of *Naval Operations*. Since the late Sir Julian Corbett wrote in 1920 a quantity of new material has become available, notably on the German Official History *Der Krieg zur See*, and in monographs issued by the Naval Staff of the Admiralty. The new information has enabled many points in the text to be clarified, elaborated or amended. In particular, doubts and obscurities in the action in the Heligoland Bight have been removed and the account of the cruise of the German raider *Berlin* before the entry of Turkey into the war has been entirely recast in the light of the new knowledge. The corresponding volume of maps also has been revised and republished in a second edition.

* * * * *

A new volume in the Lonsdale Library of Sports and Pastimes is the *Lonsdale Keeper's Book*† edited by Mr. Eric Parker. It is a comprehensive work with contributions in particular by keepers of some of the great sporting estates. From their practical knowledge and experience they express their views and practice in managing moors and in rearing and feeding game. Among other contributors are Mr. Dugald Macintyre, Mr. Frank Wallace and Mr. Eric Taverner, who describes the duties of the river keeper and ghillie. The volume is illustrated with sixty photographs and sketches.

69525

* * * * *

Square-Rigger Days‡ is a most interesting work edited by Mr. Charles W. Domville-Fife, who has collected together a series of articles from living seamen who spent their early days at sea in the sailing ships. In the most part these contributions form an authentic and vivid account of life and labour at sea during the [illegible] days of sail in most parts of the globe from the 1860's to the early years of the present century. These "autobiographies of sail" not only indicate the hardships, courage and endurance of the seaman, but include accounts of starvation, shipwreck and mutiny told with a simple and dramatic intensity which will thrill the reader. Apart from the reading matter, the fine collection of photographs provides a pictorial record which alone makes the volume worth while.

* Vol. I, Text and Volume of Maps. 31s. 6d. net. Text only, 21s. net. Longmans.
† Seeley Service & Co. 15s. net.
‡ Seeley Service & Co. 15s. net.

5L
M56, M62
M62 . 154