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independence; "kind words may clearly be followed by stern orders." Mussolini, the strong opponent of the *anschluss*, could reconsider the advantages of the axis. The lesson would be clear for Britain when faced with the bullying of a dominant Germany.

The *Daily Herald*, with huge headlines, "Germany invades Austria: Britain and France Protest as Terror Begins," featured a special article, with a picture of Dr. Schuschnigg, headed "Diplomacy of the Mailed Fist." It ended:

Let us all have the courage to be clear in mind. Unless some limit can be set to this terrible reign of force, we shall have war in Europe, war—who knows?—throughout the world.

How easily it could come. An ultimatum, not this time to Vienna, but to Prague. A Czech refusal to take orders from Berlin. Mobilization. France moves. And from that moment the die is cast, for us as for all.

There is no escape from danger save by working with redoubled power, taking every difficulty as a spur, for the reconstruction of the collective system.

How deeply willing is the British people to make that supreme effort has been shown this last week by the mighty response to Labour's inspiring campaign for Peace and Security.

Finally, the *Daily Worker*, having the advantage of a clear-cut philosophy to guide it, saw the European situation more as a whole than any other paper. It began by saying that the forces of democracy and reaction were at grips in three parts of the world; that Franco was making headway in Spain with aeroplanes, "properly nicknamed 'Flying Chamberlains' by the British volunteers," while in Austria, German troops massed on the frontier, and in France the forces of the Front Populaire had difficulty in forming a government against the reactionaries. It asked what part Britain was to play in this struggle. "Is it not possible for the Labour Party to rise to the occasion and invite all parties and organizations willing to play their part in the struggle for peace and democracy to participate in the crusade?"

Sunday's papers showed the same divisions of opinion. Only Lord Rothermere's *Sunday Dispatch* was openly pro-Hitler. In that paper Mr. Ward Price, one of Hitler's best

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advocates in this country, wrote a justification for the German invasion. In the *Observer*, Mr. Garvin, who has been the sturdiest of Fascist champions, put the best face on the matter from the German point of view; he criticized Schuschnigg's rashness in rushing the plebiscite at three days' notice, and added, quite incorrectly that "the voting age was raised to twenty-four to nullify the exceptional proportion of Nazis among the younger people." In any case, Mr. Garvin argued,

The one thing certain is that war itself could not reverse what has taken place. It could not restore the state of things in Central Europe to what they were before. A World War on the subject with Britain engaged would be an insanity and a crime, and there could be no question of it in any responsible quarter in this country.

Perhaps, Mr. Garvin argued, Hitler would show that, like Frederick and Bismark, he was capable of moderation after victory. In any case, "the moral for this country, and for every man and woman in it, is to re-arm harder; to strengthen every part of our programme, and to speed-up its execution with might and main."

The *Sunday Times* carried a disillusioned article by "Scrutator," who has been one of the ablest opponents of collective security and very anxious to make terms with Italy and Germany. The upshot of the paper's argument was that a terrible blow had been struck at the policy of appeasement and that the essential was a stronger Britain. It will be noticed that all the Conservative papers urge the same conclusion—no change of policy, but more armaments.

The front page of the *People* was something of a curiosity. Its news was headed "Austria Takes the German Invasion Calmly. Hitler Returns in Triumph to Boyhood Home." The *Sunday Referee* carried no editorial comment of any sort on the situation, though it gave an interesting account of Mr. Herbert Hoover's interview with Hitler. According to a special correspondent in Warsaw, who had interviewed him, Mr. Hoover told Hitler that he had never been a firmer advocate and admirer of democracy than he had after his visit to Europe this year, refused to be impressed by Hitler's account of the blessings of Fascism, and warned him of the catastrophe to which his policy was driving the world.

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The *Sunday Graphic* included an article from Mr. Beverley Baxter attempting to give an objective explanation of Hitler's action, but denouncing it as "an outrage against all democracy, a crime against civilization"; while the *Sunday Pictorial*, using immense black type for the word "Arms," concentrated on the need for far more rearmament.

Hitler invades Austria . . . and sends a shiver of horror down Europe's back. Chamberlain's elated defence speech has left Britain feeling far too smug and secure. The Empire is powerful—no mistake about that. But to-day it is our duty to reveal the *whole truth*, to tell you that we are still desperately in need of *arms! arms! arms!*

There remains the only "Left" Sunday paper, *Reynold's News*, which held that "Britain Can Still Help Austria."

Two courses are now open to the Government. They can:

- (1) Refuse to recognize Nazi-controlled plebiscite in Austria.
- (2) Make Germany responsible for the repayment of British loans to Austria.

Both these steps could be taken without breach of diplomatic relations—and so could the holding of Herr von Ribbentrop as a hostage for the safety of Dr. Schuschnigg.

Reynold's leading article was headed "Premier Chamberlain—the Cause of the Crisis." It argued that as long as Hitler feared that Britain might be against him he would not have dared to take his present action. The resignation of Mr. Eden and the opening of conversations with Italy and Germany were the signals for Germany to "grab Austria." It reminded us that there were still in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Spain, France and elsewhere popular forces prepared to resist Fascism; they would only be able to do this if Britain would give a lead; this could not come from Mr. Chamberlain's government. Therefore "the National Government must go, and quickly, if Europe's wobble into war is to be arrested."

For the "Left" (excluding the completely pacifist minority) the moral of Austria's seizure is the danger of continued surrender to the dictators. In urging a change of policy the Left is forced tacitly or openly to admit that such a change of policy now means not merely economic pressure through the League of Nations, but a grave risk of war for

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which Britain must be fully prepared. The Right accepted the last necessity with alacrity. For the first time, on the morning of Monday, the 14th, *The Times'* leading article openly suggested that conscription might be necessary. From the point of view of British politics the first result of Hitler's advance into Austria was the certainty of a further increase in armaments, conscription and the general political and industrial regimentation of the nation.

KINGSLEY MARTIN.

SOME FOREIGN BOOKS

THE "crisis" has produced a crop of very varied books in France nearly all of them pre-occupied with the difficulties arising for France from the aggressive dictatorships on her frontiers. The most general is *Problèmes de Politique Extérieure* (pp. 223: Alcan). This is another collection of lectures delivered at the Paris School of Political Science, and includes M. Mousset's on Danubian problems, M. Rivaud's on France and Germany, M. Pernot's on the situation in the Mediterranean and M. Osusky's on the issue—leagues of nations or alliances. The best is probably M. Pernot's, which is a remarkably lucid summary of a series of historical and geographical complexes, with special reference to France's problems in the Levant. He makes the useful point that it is Italy who seeks a Mediterranean "agreement"; as the *status quo* contents France and Britain, what re-arrangement precisely does Italy want? M. Georges Blondel's *Tempête sur l'Europe* (pp. iv 108: Plon) is the result of a voyage of exploration round our continent, the title being a quotation from one of M. Benes's speeches. The "tempest" M. Blondel thinks has not yet passed and that, thanks to the faults of everyone, a war situation has been allowed to arise. This analysis of the situation is brief but suggestive, though it is a little disconcerting that the only measure to alleviate it of which he has much hope is which he calls "l'éducation des esprits."

It is exactly forty years since M. Edouard Driault wrote what was to become a standard work (8th edition, 1920)—*La Question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours*. He has

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just completed a sequel *La Question d' Orient, 1918-1937* (pp. xxi 538 : Alcan). The treatment is perhaps less compact and there is more sentiment than there was in the older book, but the same profound knowledge and sound thinking is there for those who are willing to plough through a lot of summarising of familiar history to get to it. The general development of the Near Eastern question since 1918 is sketched through its phases—the abortive settlement of Sèvres, the definite settlement of Lausanne, the Near Eastern Ententes, the victory of Fascism and the pressure of the dictator states. The murder of King Alexander is seen as a turning point ; thereafter came the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the creation of the Berlin-Rome axis and the endeavours to detach Near Eastern states from the democratic powers, culminating in the claim to impose Fascism on Europe and particularly in Spain, where there is raging what M. Driault calls the “international civil war.” That effort provoked counter-efforts—unhappily M. Driault finished his book too soon to discuss Mr. Chamberlain's latest contribution to the latter—which he describes as the Peace Coalition. To M. Driault the Mediterranean looks like being the battleground between two rival conceptions of progress and civilization and it is there that the pacific Powers will have to stand their ground.

Démocraties en Crise, by Louis Franck (pp. 80 : Rieder) is a study of three “experiments”—Roosevelt's, Van Zeeland's, Blum's—mainly from the social and economic standpoint. The programme, legislation and achievement of each is carefully analysed and the conclusion is arrived at (1) that they represent a considerable advance in the direction of State intervention in the social and economic life, (2) that the result has been a set-back for the “expert,” and (3) that none of the three attempted any real *structural* reform. Further they showed the failure of the democracies to meet the needs of the international situation, but indicate the complete power “public opinion”, however inchoate, has won. That encourages M. Franck to believe that with respect of liberty, this fresh interventionism by the state might achieve important social progress—an optimistic conclusion from what is on the whole a pessimistic analysis.

The Roosevelt “experiment” is dealt with in two other

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books which appeared a little earlier. One is also from the pen of M. Franck—*L'expérience Roosevelt et le milieu social Américain* (pp. 386 : Alcan) and deals very largely with the social effects of N.R.A. The analysis and criticism of the measures adopted to meet the crisis, with the aim at once of applying scientific economic remedies to specific ills and satisfying the moral demands of an uncritical but lively public conscience, occupies more than half the book, while the latter part deals with social consequences and is really a criticism of American values which, if sometimes unfair because based on a purely European standard, is always acute and sometimes very suggestive. One gets from the book a sense of movement, of profound change which arises from causes outside the control of governments which try with only partial success to guide it ; in the other book L. Zahn-Golodetz's *L'économie planifiée en U.R.S.S. et l'économie dirigée aux Etats-unis* (pp. 160 : Nizet et Bastard) “directed economy” is contrasted with “planned economy” in a manner which suggests the achievement of progress by non-dynamic processes. This is a thesis of considerable merit which, taking America and Russia as types, contrasts in detail and mainly in theory the new form of capitalist economy and the experiment in “communist” economy. The distinction the author makes is that the former has no ends beyond itself, no matter what its type may be, while in the latter all the categories inherited from capitalism have undergone a *functional* change. The illustration of this thesis is very interesting, even if one has a suspicion that practice often refutes theory.

One of the best books provoked by the Far Eastern troubles was M. Bienstock's *Struggle for the Pacific*, published nearly two years ago. Those who valued it may be interested to know that it has just appeared in a French translation (*La lutte pour le Pacifique* : pp. 276 : Payot) bringing the story up to date. The additional matter is not large, but it serves to increase the usefulness of a useful book. Its readers will remember a valuable section on migration, and may like to have their attention drawn to a full-dress study of the problem by an Indian scientist, Mr. R. Mukerjee, published by the Italian Association for the Study of Population Problems—*Migrant Asia* (pp. xlvii 312 : Tipografia

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Failli, Rome). The author admits the difficulties confronting researchers because of the character of the information available, but he has given a remarkably documented account of the conflicting trends of Asiatic migration and its causes, and at the same time has assembled a mass of valuable data on food supply, standards of living, population, the origin of racial conflicts, the international aspects of the problem, and the chances of what—to be in the fashion—he calls “planned migration.” Some of his conclusions will obtain little assent, but none of them can be lightly dismissed, and no student can afford to miss at least consulting his book.

Among books on legal topics there are four worth the student's attention. Dr. F. Apelt's *Abhaengige Mitglieder voelkerrechtlicher Verbaende* (pp. 212: Rocher, Leipzig) is described by its author as a contribution to the theory of the legal personality in international law. It deals with the legal position of “dependent” (or rather “non-independent”) countries, and seeks to define the difference legally between colony and dominion, mandated territories and protected territories, and the position of a state whose sovereignty is unilaterally limited. The argument is involved and technical, but is of great interest to the student of the less obvious sections of international law. The Florence firm of Sansoni has published another collection of essays on Italian institutions—*La Camera dei Fasci e delle Corporazioni* (pp. 256)—by nine Fascist authorities. The most interesting are G. Chiabelli's on the “reform” of political representation and A. Navarra's on rulers and ruled in a Fascist state. The ruling idea is to explain the nature of “popular representation” under Fascism and, if the impression left on a liberal is that it does not exist, that does not rob this rather wordy disquisition on theory and practice of practical interest. To the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation is due the *Recueil des accords intellectuels* (pp. 232) which gathers into one volume agreements signed ensuring international co-operation in cultural matters.

R. T. CLARK.

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THE SPANISH PLOT. By E. N. DZELEPY, with a Preface by “Pertinax.” (King. 6s.). DEFENCE OF MADRID. By GEOFFREY COX. (Gollancz. 2s. 6d.). VOLUNTEER IN SPAIN. By JOHN SOMMERFIELD. (Lawrence & Wishart. 2s. 6d.). RED TERROR IN MADRID (An Eye Witness Record). By LUIS DE FONTERIZ. (Longmans. 2s. 6d.). STORM OVER SPAIN. By MAIRIN MITCHELL. (Secker & Warburg. 6s.).

IT must strike everyone who has been recently to Spain that the “war of ideologies” so emphasized by the isolationist Press evaporates in Spain, as the war proceeds, in inverse ratio to its growth in discussions outside. Inside Spain, the discipline and terrible necessities of a long war are gradually forcing the people into one mould which—whatever its defects—is perhaps the result least expected by those who, for excellent reasons, have long been convinced of the disunity of the Spanish Popular Front. It is a dogma of the isolationists that “whichever side wins” there is bound to be a succession of civil wars in Spain, culminating in a show-down between the Anarchists and the Communists. This may be so, although it leaves out of consideration two factors: first, that the anarchism of the anarchists is largely a matter of temperament and this peculiarly Spanish temperament is being as profoundly altered by the war and the educational experience of a social revolution as was the temperament of the French workers and bourgeoisie after the Revolution: secondly, the changes in Communist policy are not, I believe, purely tactical; they represent as fundamental a change in the Communists as the corresponding one in the Anarchists. Democracy? Supposing the Government win the war, it is difficult to believe that they can immediately restore to the falangists their full electoral rights.

Three of these books are written with the purpose of putting across a sectional view of the side the writers represent, communist party, pacifist, and horror-struck, outraged, disciplinarian aristocrat. Mr. Sommerfield, Miss Mitchell and Senor de Fonteriz all cook their impressions, and, to some degree, their facts, although it is noticeable that of these three writers, Mr. Sommerfield, writing from the point of

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view of a communist member of the International Brigade is, factually, far the most honest, and he even faces some unpleasant facts about the composition of the Brigade. The remaining two books, *The Spanish Plot* and *Defence of Madrid*, are less sectarian, and, in fact, more objective. Geoffrey Cox was the Liberal correspondent in Spain of the *News Chronicle*. His account of the defence of Madrid is graphic, fair, detailed, excellent journalism. Perhaps the most instructive of all these books is *The Spanish Plot* which is a well-documented account of the rôle played by the British Government in the Spanish War. I do not see how anyone reading this book could doubt that the National Government have consistently backed General Franco, and, incidentally, the Fascist powers, ever since the outbreak of the war. The real mystery lies not in the British Government's actions but in its motives, since the imperialist motives of Great Britain should surely impel our government to support the other side. M. Dzelepy sums up his evidence by concluding that the British are taking part in an anti-Bolshevik crusade, since they are convinced that the alternative to Franco in Spain is communism. Personally, I believe that the motives of the British Government are mixed. Anti-communism is certainly a strong one: but others are the belief that Franco, backed by Germany and Italy, will win; fear that an alignment of Fascist against democratic powers in Europe, the Fascist powers would be the stronger; the fact that Mussolini's preoccupation in Spain is a real preoccupation, and not a paying one; and, lastly, the conviction that, if the Spanish Government wins, the future of Morocco will be problematic, whereas, if Franco wins, we shall be able to bargain over Morocco. Knowing our diplomatic and business representatives in Spain who are continually pumping the Foreign Office with propaganda for Franco, and knowing the personnel of the National Government itself, we find that there are motives enough. Considering one by one the cases in which Great Britain has encouraged and tolerated Fascist intervention in the name of non-intervention, the failure of Franco's side to win long ago is truly astonishing. *Volunteer in Spain* is a very interesting account of Mr. Sommerfield's experiences as a fighter in the International

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Brigade. Mr. Sommerfield has serious defects as a writer, which are particularly apparent in the first half of his book: but the reader should not be impatient. The worst of these defects is his habit of switching over into Hemingwayese whenever the action of his book becomes tense. It is no exaggeration to say that his style is often an unfortunate combination of the vices of Mr. Hemingway with those of Naomi Mitcheson. Words like "pretty" (used adverbially), "Yeh," and sentences containing the maximum possible number of "and"s, build up Mr. Sommerfield's effects. "This is a fine war," said John. "Sure," I said. "It's a fine war." Personally, my impression of the International Brigade was not that everyone was suiting their behaviour to some rôle they had cast for themselves in Mr. Hemingway's film. However, when Mr. Sommerfield describes the actual fighting in the war, his style becomes restrained and his experiences real. I wish that he had made more of the earlier part: that anyone could dismiss Albacete in as few paragraphs as he has done seems to me extraordinary, and shows how much a writer can be out of touch with the experiences of his companions, since I am convinced that the memory of Albacete will live for ever in the minds of everyone connected with the Brigade.

For reasons which no one need inquire into, "de Fonteriz" is a pseudonym for one who held a great position in Madrid before the civil war. This anonymous grandee—grandee or no—is so typical of his class that one can only marvel at his mentality, which belongs to another age, except that the feudal aristocrats of to-day are prepared to use all the inventions of the modern world to wipe out the "mob." On the second page of his little pamphlet, he gains the sympathy of the attentive letter-writer to *The Times* by quoting a typical instance of Bolshevism under the Republic: An electricity firm had closed down its business, which, a year later, was purchased by another firm. "Although the latter was in a different line of business and had no connection with the old undertaking, it was compelled to take on all the men who had worked in the engineering shops and pay them "discipline" of Franco is inevitable and everything he does justified, so we concentrate on counting every act of violence

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compensation." After this, of course, we realise that the committed by the "Reds" as an atrocity. "De Fonteriz"'s list of atrocities range from horrible murders, many of which, I have no doubt, were committed, to such accusations as that the Spanish Government itself dropped a bomb which fell on to the British Embassy in Madrid. This writer maintains that the defence of Madrid was an unbearable act of cruelty on the part of the Spanish Government against the civilians of Madrid, who, by the heroic defence of their city are condemning themselves to the horrors of war. On the other hand, the attempt of the Junta to evacuate Madrid was even more monstrous: the kindest thing the government could have done would have been to surrender immediately to Franco. Luckily, the treatment which Franco would have then meted out to the Reds is something that need not enter into the calculations of the readers of this book. However, one cannot help wondering how the readers of this book explain (if they attempt to) the failure of Franco to win the war, since Senor Fonteriz is firmly convinced that the defence of the Spanish Republic is a monstrous crime against the members of the Republic, who, except for a few criminals, in no sense support the "People's Army."

Storm Over Spain is a pleasant touristic account of a journey in Spain immediately before the war, made by the author, who is Irish, and her Hungarian friend Tinka. Miss Mitchell has some interesting comparisons to make between the problems of agriculture in Ireland and Spain. She sympathises with the Republic, but, being a convinced pacifist, is unable to take sides. The true allies of the pacifists are the empire isolationists: the pacifists, however intelligent they may be, trot out the old arguments for isolation which you may read any day in a *Daily Express* editorial: everyone who fights becomes as bad as everyone else who fights, whoever wins in Spain things will be worse than ever; the only strength lies in refusing to touch evil. The only difference is that the *Express* believes in armed empire isolation, the constructive pacifist believes in unarmed individualist isolation in Arizona. But the Spanish Republic can be let sink for all the wistful sympathy of either of them!

STEPHEN SPENDER.

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GUSTAV STRESEMAN: HIS DIARIES, LETTERS AND PAPERS.
Edited and translated by ERIC SUTTON. Vol. II.
 (Macmillan. 25s.)

CERTAIN facts with regard to the editing of this book deserve mention. The title and date of the German edition from which this is a translation is not given. On the cover and title-page it is stated that the book is edited by Mr. Sutton, but there is a preface by the German "editors," and it must be presumed that the text of the book, other than the letters, diaries and papers by Stresemann himself, is by them. Their names are not given. Their views of the rights and duties of editors seem to be peculiar: for instance, they remark in their preface that—

"For the editors, the questions arose whether and to what extent Stresemann's observations, made at the very day and hour under the immediate impression of the event . . . should be here reproduced. We decided this question, in principle, in the affirmative. In a few individual cases—where, having regard to the judgment of events and to the persons concerned, such a course appeared to be justified by the facts—we have taken the view that we should remain faithful administrators of Stresemann's estate, if we modified the expression, and adjusted certain divergent views on matters where the facts have since become known, without alteration of the sense."

Apparently no indication is given in these cases in which the editors have altered what Stresemann really wrote—a fact that seriously impairs the value of the book. How expressions can be modified and divergent views adjusted without altering the sense we do not understand, and if the sense is not altered, there was no reason for altering what Stresemann wrote.

Subject to these reservations, the book is extremely interesting. It covers the period from January, 1925, to September, 1926. It includes, therefore, the negotiations for a security pact and the Locarno Treaty, the election of Hindenburg to the Presidency, and the entry of Germany into the League. The quantity of material available in the

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several sections is curiously uneven; for instance nearly 200 pages are given to Locarno and only about 30 to the abortive attempt by Germany in February, and the successful attempt in September, 1926, to enter the League. The quality of the documents selected for publication is on the whole high. They throw light upon the statesmanship of Stresemann, the policy of the Great European Powers at a crucial moment in European history, and tragically for the observer to-day upon the subsequent history of Germany.

The volume considerably increases one's respect for Stresemann as a statesman. In the years 1925 and 1926 he developed from a politician into a statesman, and, while he never ceased to be a good German, he grew into a good European. This evolution is, of course, particularly obvious in his handling of the Locarno negotiations. But even more interesting is it to observe this wider outlook, the increased certainty and poise, in their less obvious manifestations, for instance, in his firm treatment of difficult and dangerous situations in the internal politics of Germany and in his dignified, masterly handling of the bullying, bombastic Mussolini of 1926.

As regards history, the book contains no startling revelations, but it is absolutely invaluable for anyone who wishes to understand the situation of Germany and Germans in 1925. One remarkable thing is that it shows with terrible clearness those elements existing in the situation which led subsequently to the barbarization of Germany under National-Socialism. In a sense Stresemann's work may be summed up as an unsuccessful attempt to prevent that barbarization, to save peace and civilization in Europe by restoring a free and civilized Germany to the place which she had the right to claim in the hierarchy of European states. He very nearly succeeded. But he already had arrayed against him within Germany precisely those forces which, within five years, placed Hitler in power and destroyed to the very foundations the work of pacification which he had begun. Very significant from this point of view are some of the documents, *e.g.*, the report of what took place at a meeting of the Association of German Iron and Steel Manufacturers in December, 1925, "after the servants had left the room,"

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with regard to the necessity for a coup d'état; the violent attack upon Stresemann by Herr Hugenberg in January, 1926; the preparations for a *putsch* and a dictatorship in May, 1926. Equally significant is the fact that all those questions which the Nazis hold over the head of Europe, at the point of a sword, Stresemann too was holding over our heads, but concealed in an olive branch, the Germans of Czechoslovakia, the Eastern frontier, and colonies.

LEONARD WOOLF.

MICHAEL BAKUNIN. By E. H. CARR. (*Macmillan*. 25s.)

PROFESSOR CARR has given us, what is rare, an historical biography which is also a contribution to history. He has had a first-class opportunity in the life of Bakunin, and he has made the most of it. For there have hardly been any biographies of Bakunin, of any value, in any European language, let alone English; and in consequence his life and career have remained a lacuna in the knowledge of most of us even who are interested in the history of socialism. Again, Bakunin's peripatetic revolutionary activities, in Russia, Poland, Germany, France, Switzerland, in Berlin, Brussels, Paris, Dresden, London, Stockholm, Geneva, Bâle, Lyons, his imprisonments in Austria, in the Peter-and-Paul fortress at Petersburg, his escape from Siberia via Japan and U.S.A. which brought him world-fame—all this brings his career into touch with the main stream of nineteenth-century history at innumerable and often unexpected points. Or, to vary the image, Bakunin's life is so much of the stuff of the squalid and tattered underlinings to the respectable surface that the nineteenth century presents to us in the textbooks.

Yet the history of socialism and of revolution, which by no means occupied the centre of the picture in that age (except for the one solitary year 1848), has become of increasing importance in our time now that we can see to what those subversive activities, those romantic gestures and fantastic careers, the ridiculous capers and incredible hopes were leading. It is not the respectable Queen Victorias and Gladstones and Mills, or the Newmans and Mannings and Pio Nonos, or the Nicholases and Alexanders, or even the

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Bismarcks and Moltkes of the nineteenth century who have any message for this; it is the outcasts and exiles who matter, the unrespectable, Marx and Engels, Proudhon and Bakunin and Lenin. Professor Carr is fortunate in his choice of subject; he has written one of the best historical biographies I know.

And he has written with ease and great feeling for the background in place no less than in time—which makes, in spite of the book's length, for easy reading. The picture that is drawn of Bakunin's early years and family life at Premukhino, charming as it is, reminds one of a Turgenev interior or landscape, very literally, for Turgenev was a friend of Bakunin's and it is well known that the character of Rudin was modelled after him. Bakunin's career took him to many odd places off the beaten track, which Professor Carr's knowledge of the nineteenth century never fails to illuminate; in addition to Russian history, there is Poland and the different forces in the Polish nationalist movement, the situation in Sweden and Finland in the 1860's no less than Paris in 1848. Professor Carr has followed with admirable patience the vagaries of this exasperating career, the generosity, the devotion, the indiscipline, the endless squabbles, the absurdly sanguine programmes, the atmosphere of unreality that pervades it all, the debts, the broken promises, the squalor. Not a word of protest, hardly of criticism; he leaves the story to make its own impression, the reader to draw his own conclusions. This has its disadvantages, no less than its advantages.

For one thing, if one may venture a word of criticism of so excellent a book, it sometimes leaves the reader in the dark as to *what* Bakunin was actually doing. One has the impression of a great deal of sound and fury, but *what* was he doing? one asks. One knows very well what Marx was doing contemporaneously, editing or contributing to papers, studying hard, writing books, engaged in secretarial work for the revolutionary cause, intriguing. Perhaps our difficulty is due more to the subject of the biography than to its author. Bakunin was so very Russian; most of his time he seems to have spent in smoking and talking—I suppose it would be called propaganda.

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He certainly created a legend, and perhaps this is his one enduring achievement. Again this may serve to explain a similar failing in the book: it does not make clear *why* Bakunin thought what he thought, the intellectual processes by which he arrived at his position. Perhaps it does not matter so very much, for with Bakunin, more than with most intelligent people, his intellectual position was but a rationalization of his impulses. But the book is weaker on the intellectual side, as opposed to the purely historical, which is its strength.

What is it, after all, that Bakunin's position came to? It may be described in the words of the uneducated tailor, Wilhelm Weitling, which had such a decisive effect upon Bakunin's mind: "The perfect society has no government, but only an administration, no laws, but only obligations, no punishments, but means of correction." This may be all very well as an ideal, but since it rests upon a total misconception of human nature it is difficult to see that it has any importance whatever for politics. Bakunin seems to have attained to greater sense in the last year of his life when he wrote: "To my utter despair I have discovered and discover every day anew, that there is in the masses no revolutionary idea or hope or passion; and where these are not, you can work as much as you like but you will get no result." It seems a pity that it should have taken a whole lifetime, and such a devious route, to arrive at so much sense. This being so, one sees how right Marx was to insist upon discipline, order, authority. And it seems providentially right—if one may use the term—that it should be not the great Russian, but the German, who should have so affected Russian history. For Marx provides just what the Russians stand most in need of; they have enough Bakunin in their composition, and too much, already.

There is one phrase, a very conventional one but no less silly for that, which should be corrected: the reference on p. 438 to "the fundamental inconsistency of Marx, who hoped to create a régime of universal love through the medium of class hatred." Professor Carr should know that with Communism universal *love* is no more the end than class *hatred* is the means.

A. L. ROWSE.

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"THE AYES HAVE IT" (The Story of the Marriage Bill).
By A. P. HERBERT. (Methuen, 6s.).

THE Royal Commission on Divorce Law Reform reported in 1912; twenty-six years later Mr. Herbert's Marriage Bill becomes law. So is it always with the Reports of Royal Commissions when to carry out their legislative recommendations will not earn the Government of the day credit with its own partisans, and hence the justification for retaining, despite all its time-wasting possibilities, the system of private Members' Bills. As Mr. Herbert himself says (p. 72): "they are, in a way, the last expression of real democracy, for they are the sole machinery by which minorities can still not merely splutter, but endeavour to construct."

The Marriage Bill as a spectacular instance of legislation carried to success by a private Member is, then, for the student of politics, (as opposed to the reader with an eye solely on the cause of divorce law reform), a main element of interest in Mr. Herbert's book. But it has another. It is not often that the man responsible for an important Act of Parliament can subsequently find time to record his experiences in carrying his Bill into law, though it is precisely those records which are the most valuable for the "outsider." Mr. Morrison's most admirable book on "Socialisation and Transport," five years ago, is an instance to the contrary. But Mr. Morrison as a writer has not Mr. Herbert's advantages as a professional humorist. "The Ayes Have It" is the vivid entertainment one would expect it to be; it is quite the best first book to recommend to anyone anxious, as a good citizen, to understand the way in which business is actually done in Parliament, and to master the intricacies of its procedure; and the book incidentally reveals Mr. Herbert as a parliamentary tactician of a shrewdness which it must surely be hard to match.

FRANK HARDIE.

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THE CASE OF LEON TROTSKY. Report of Hearings on the Charges made against him in the Moscow trials. By THE PRELIMINARY COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. (Martin Secker and Warburg. 12s. 6d.) THE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE U.S.S.R. Volume I. Edited by JOSEPH STALIN and others. (Lawrence & Wishart. 2s. 6d.)

VOLUME I of the *History of the Civil War*, published in the Russian language in 1936, is an account of the March Revolution and of the epoch of the Provisional Government. It covers much the same ground as Trotsky's *History of the Revolution*, along with which it should be read. It exaggerates the part played by the Bolsheviks in bringing about the March Revolution. Bolshevism was neither a peasants' nor a soldiers' movement. Its strength lay in its discipline, and in the strategic genius of its leader, which enabled it to seize power, in the collapse which followed upon the Kornilov fiasco: when power, it has been said, lay in the street to be picked up. Something is sacrificed to the aim of showing that Lenin held, in April, 1917, the doctrine which was later formulated, of the possibility of building Socialism in a single country. The fact that Stalin was, at the outset, opposed to Lenin's April policy of all power to the Soviets, is suppressed. It is true that he soon accepted the insurrectionary plan. The reader must not look for impartial treatment of Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, nor for truth regarding matters on which Stalin was in controversy with opponents. If he is on his guard in these respects, he will find this volume a useful storehouse of facts, particularly in respect to the economic difficulties and the collapse of the military front, which led up to the Revolution of November.

The heart of the controversy which the preliminary Commission, sitting in Mexico, was set to investigate, is to be found in two questions: did Trotsky instigate political assassinations in the Soviet Union: and did he plot with Germany and Japan to bring about military attack? The defence rests upon disproof of the evidence of alleged intermediaries: and upon the incompatibility of Trotsky's life and teaching with the accusations made against him. One incident, the supposed visit to Oslo, by aeroplane, in the

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dead of winter, of an old associate of Trotsky, was investigated by a Norwegian newspaper of the Right, and proved to be false: because no aeroplane from abroad alighted at any of the Oslo aerodromes during the month in which the visit was alleged. It is seldom that negative proof can be so complete and so devastating. One obvious fabrication prepares us to mistrust the evidence of other supposed intermediaries.

Trotsky proved by reference to a mass of his writings and speeches, that he had, over a long series of years, opposed individual terrorism, as mischievous to the cause of Socialism: and that he had, during his exile, systematically advocated the defence of the Soviet Union against foreign attack. His critics have to choose between two conclusions. Either he was not guilty on the charges made: or he acted privately in opposition to his published doctrines. Much turns upon a statement made by him in 1932 that "Stalin must be removed" (page 277). The prosecutor, in the trial of January, 1937, at Moscow, argued that this meant assassination. Trotsky says that, prior to the victory of Hitler in Germany, the phrase meant peaceful removal by the action of the Party: a sort of analogue to the demands of the syndicated press in Britain that "*so-and-so must go*." After the triumph of Hitler, it meant a political revolution.

This brings us to what Trotsky did actually intend: though that did not fall within the scope of the Mexico preliminary commission. He did intend to bring about a fresh political revolution in the U.S.S.R.; and said so plainly. Stalin did not wait for him to do it. Hence the trials and the shootings.

The Mexican preliminary commission found that there was a case for further enquiry. The main International Commission, we learn, has, in a report of eighty thousand words, absolved both Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov, and found "strong justification for assuming that the Trials were frame-ups."

There is much of profound interest in *The Case of Leon Trotsky*, apart from its relevance to the question of his guilt or innocence. Whether Trotsky's memory on the point be correct or not, we cannot say: but he clearly stated, under

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examination, that the danger of bureaucracy, of a state controlled by a body of officials having vested rights in their offices, was the root of the opposition which resulted in his exile. Pressed to explain whether anything except a bureaucracy could manage a state which controls all production and distribution, he failed, perhaps because of his insufficient command of English, to make his meaning perfectly plain. But he seems to us (on pages 354 sq. of the volume) to convey the conviction that the people can only prevent their servants from becoming their masters, when they reach a certain standard of education and civilisation. Until this standard is reached, and until production is so abundant that there is enough to supply all the reasonable wants of all, he would apparently rely upon certain political devices: in particular upon restoration of the practice of open public discussion in preparation for the work of formal Congresses: and upon the substitution of the secret ballot for the open vote, for which the Constitution of 1936 has already provided. It is a vital question for the Socialist state: how to obtain a loyal Civil Service; and we do not think that Trotsky has revealed to us the secret.

Certain things in Trotsky's deposition throw invaluable light upon revolutionary, or upon Russian, mentality. His son, he says, if in the hands of the G.P.U., and told that confession was necessary in order to save his mother, might confess. One of the accused in the Moscow trials was a bluff soldier, of tried courage, N. I. Muralov, who, everyone was convinced, would never "confess." But he did confess. Trotsky says his deposition was false, but it was the false deposition of a simple soldier, told that war was imminent and that his confession was necessary to the safety of the State. V. V. Ulrich was the President of the Court which tried the Moscow accused. Trotsky says Ulrich was an honest man—caught by the machine; and adds: "It is a question of the régime." We should like to quote page 327 in full, because we see in it a picture of Trotsky, self-revealed; but the reader must look for it himself.

One more point, which throws light on Trotsky's own character. His hated opponent is the bureaucracy. But when he is asked whether a section of this body is capable of sabotage

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of Soviet industry in order to gratify Hitler and weaken the U.S.S.R. he gives an emphatic negative (page 391). An alliance with Hitler in order to avoid war, yes! An alliance with Hitler involving the destruction of Soviet economy, no! Here and elsewhere, in the proceedings, there is evidence of generosity in the man. Even of Stalin he has some good to say. "Stalin also was not born a master of frame-ups" (page 327).

We do not think anyone can hope to understand existing conditions in the Soviet Union without a close study of this fascinating record.

JOHN MAYNARD.

IRAQ. A study in political development. By PHILIP WILLARD IRELAND. (Cape. 15s.)

IR. IRELAND'S thesis fully answers to the description on the dust-jacket as an "exhaustive and authoritative study of the origins, development, constitution, economic organization, administrative and general problems" of Iraq. For most people the earlier chapters will probably be the most informing, dealing as they do with an almost forgotten period of Near Eastern history. The dominant impression they make is that of the frightful muddle created by the conflict of two policies—that of the Indian Government, "viewing Arab politics from the standpoint of the immediate needs of India," ignoring Arab nationalism, confident that "as long as the material well-being of the subject peoples was being advanced, no other standard need be set up by which to judge the administration"; and that of the Foreign Office, "aiming at Arab independence in Arab lands, with only such control as might guarantee friendly relations with Great Britain." Add to this dualism in British policy the problems created by French aims in Syria and by the need of justifying British action before world opinion in Geneva, and one gets some idea of the complications that attended the birth of modern Iraq. A striking chapter is that which describes the difficulties experienced by the British authorities in securing the election to the throne of the Emir Faisal. Those who have only

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known Iraq at the time when King Faisal had become a national hero will find it hard to realize how violent was the opposition from numerous quarters of Iraqi opinion, and for how long he was blamed by many of his subjects for his alleged pro-British policy.

Dr. Ireland rightly stresses the two essential needs of present-day Iraq—and, for that matter, of all Near Eastern countries: the purging of politics from ecclesiastico-religious influences, and the building up of an effective and reliable Civil Service with adequate security of tenure—two closely related problems. He points out the contrast between the promises made by King Faisal that there should be "no more Moslems, no more Christians, no more Jews, but only Iraqis" and the continued existence of "widespread opposition to the employment of any but Iraqis professing Islam." Nor can effective administration be expected from officials who are liable to lose their jobs through changes of government: the spoils system, tacked on to considerations of religious affiliation in all appointments, has proved a heavy handicap on the development of those new countries. The hope lies in the younger men being able to take a broader view of national unity and interests.

With this hope—which we believe to be well-founded—we commend Dr. Ireland's book as an essential guide to all who are interested in that fascinating country, so old in many of its ways, so young in its aims and aspirations.

R. H. SOLTAU.

GREAT BRITAIN AND PALESTINE. By HERBERT SIDEBOTHAM. (Macmillan. 10s. 6d.)

THE author has added to his many and long services for Zionism by the publication of this book. He has been its guide, philosopher and friend since those early days of the War when a comparatively small group of men, mostly centred in Manchester, first brought forward the idea of a Jewish colony in Palestine under British guardianship, and saw their vision gradually become a reality. The history of the Balfour Declaration, of the Mandate and the National Home are interesting in themselves,

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apart from their relation to present-day troubles, and in this book the story is told by someone who knew from within every snag in that particularly difficult river.

Perhaps Mr. Sidebotham is best known for his firm belief in the strategical importance of Palestine to the British Empire. In this he has shown a perspicacity and an understanding of world affairs which has been singularly lacking in our own Government. If Palestine was important fifteen years ago, he has no difficulty in showing how infinitely more important it has become since Mussolini has begun empire-building, and turning the Mediterranean into an Italian lake. For years Mr. Sidebotham, as "Scrutator" and "Student of Politics," has been drilling into our heads the strategic value of Haifa, before even the coming of the pipeline, or the development of the air routes. Now that we have learnt our lesson, we are faced with an internal problem which occupies the latter part of this book.

Two very useful chapters deal with the case for and the case against partition. These are argued out with the greatest fairness, and leave the impression that, if the boundaries can be fixed with rather more wisdom, then partition represents the most practical way out of an impossible position, and that even a small Jewish state might serve its uses both as a kind of headquarters for the race and also as a bastion for England against our common enemy, fascism. Mr. Sidebotham emphasizes the strategic importance of the new frontiers:

"Further, that part of Palestine whose well-being can make a direct contribution to the British peace on sea and on land must not only be made large enough to be strong and capable of its own defence, but its frontiers must so be drawn as to discourage the attack for which partition will provide a motive that did not exist before. Except on these conditions, partition will but complicate our problem, and weaken our power to solve it faithfully. If they are observed, there is a case for partition, and it may make for our greater strength and security by concentrating the districts for which we are in a military sense responsible."

The present reviewer stated a case for partition somewhat

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along these lines in a former issue of the *Political Quarterly*, and has never been quite forgiven by his Zionist friends, but it is useless not to recognize that in the new Europe the democratic Powers must think in terms of the *real politik* which dominates the civilized world, and must also be conscious of our own divisions and weaknesses. In this exceedingly unruly and unpleasant world a small concentrated Jewish State may have a better chance of survival than a Palestine predominantly Arab. Mr. Sidebotham's chapter on the new boundaries seems admirable, and confirms the impression that the Commission completed this part of their work in a hurried and superficial manner.

G. T. GARRATT.

HEREDITY AND POLITICS. By J. B. S. HALDANE, F.R.S. (*Allen & Unwin*. 7s. 6d.). RACISM. By MAGNUS HIRSCHFELD, translated and edited by Cedar and Eden Paul. (*Gollancz*. 10s. 6d.).

THESE two books, unlike in very many ways, yet essentially deal with the same question, that of the scientific study of the origin of the differences between men. They seek to find the natural units on the basis of which political organization can best proceed, and both of them imply the general conclusion that the proper unit is the whole human race. Hirschfeld advances this claim robustly in the face of the authority of Lenz who asks why our allegiance should be to "human beings" rather than to "mammals" or "vertebrates," with which we also have something in common. The question is summarily dismissed by Hirschfeld as a "false antithesis," but one may be what he calls a panhumanist and yet feel that the problem is a real one. Most people feel more united with some groups than with others. Moreover, they persist in recognizing the groups which they like or dislike, in spite of the scientific demonstration that such groups are not clearly distinct. The problem is to sort out the origins of these prejudices and to find whether any of them are due to unbridgeable distinctions between groups or if all are the avoidable results of methods of upbringing and political organization.

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Professor Haldane's book provides a most admirable study of the biological facts bearing on these and many related problems. His account of the principles of human heredity should be entirely comprehensible to the layman, though it never insults him with baby talk or is afraid to call things by their proper scientific names. The examples which he uses for illustration are not only interesting in themselves, but so well chosen that they give a picture of a real science of human genetics and not of a hybrid consisting of a huge body of facts about the fruit fly and a last chapter on man. The exposition is so neat and compact as to provide real pleasure in the reading, and there are characteristic and pleasing allusions and footnotes.

In few books has the relevance of biology to human affairs been so clearly brought out as in this one. But Haldane is not a scientific visionary making extravagant claims for what his science could do, if given a free hand. He writes throughout as a wise man, thinking first of human values and then of how biology can serve them. For instance he deals with the possibilities and impossibilities of eugenic control in a manner which even those who disagree with him would surely admit to be sensible and objective. Again in his discussion of the advisability of sterilization he balances most fairly the likelihood of human amelioration against the dangers of interference with the rights of the individual.

Hirschfeld's book is somewhat ponderous and diffuse, but also scientific in its general approach. It reads reasonably well for a translation, but is marred here and there by uncouth renderings such as "characterological." Many with little knowledge of the subject must have wondered about the real status of the author's Sexual Science Institute, broken up by the Nazis in 1933. From this book it will be plain, as many have no doubt long known, that Hirschfeld was activated by most sincere and humane ideas, whatever may have been the wisdom of his methods in furthering the cause which he championed, that of the sexual under-dog.

He gives an interesting survey of the factors by which "race" is established and marshals the evidence for the thesis that our segregation into groups is the result of impulses which are mainly political and emotional and only in small

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part genetic. Like other writers he has no difficulty in disposing of the scientific basis of such myths of nationalism as the Aryan purity and superiority, the call of the community of "blood," or the evil effects of miscogenation. It is useful to have these questions once again analysed, though as the author himself points out, the protagonists of racial doctrines like H. S. Chamberlain for example, have never claimed an exclusively scientific basis for their creeds. The racialist work secure in the knowledge that their activities are grounded not in cold reasonableness, but in the heat of human passion and needs. Unhappy mankind is divided against itself. To show that its divisions are unnecessary and can be abolished is a valuable labour indeed. But to think that the difficulties are solved by such an exposure would be to make the worst of academic errors of judgment, and one which Hirschfeld or the whole avoids.

It is to be hoped that both of these books will be very widely read and that they will serve to keep the ideals of a united humanity before the eyes of many, and to help them in making those difficult decisions between allegiances which confront us all.

J. Z. YOUNG.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

CAN CAPITALISM LAST? By FREDERICK ALLEN. 286 pp. (Collins). 7s. 6d.)

Deals very largely with Mr. Keynes as well as with capitalism.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN MODERN EDUCATION. By S. H. BAILEY. 309 pp. (Oxford Press). 15s.)

An exhaustive account of the study of international relations throughout the world.

EARLY BRITISH ECONOMICS. By M. BEER. 250 pp. (Allen & Unwin). 8s. 6d.)

Deals with the development of English economic theory from the 13th to the middle of the 18th century.

ALARMS AND EXCURSIONS. By SIR TOM BRIDGES. With a foreword by WINSTON CHURCHILL. 361 pp. (Longmans). 12s. 6d.)

The autobiography of a soldier who entered the Artillery in 1892.

WORKERS' FRONT. By FENNER BROCKWAY. 254 pp. (Secker & Warburg). 3s. 6d.)

An analysis of the results obtained by Popular Front governments in France and Spain and an argument in favour of a Workers' Front.

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AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN. By J. H. CLAPHAM. 577 pp. (Cambridge. 25s.)

This, the third volume, deals with the years 1887 to 1929.

NATIONAL FITNESS. Edited by F. LE GROS CLARK. 222 pp. (Macmillan. 6s.)

The authors, besides the editor, are Mary L. Gilchrist, J. R. Marrack, W. Lindesay Neustatter, E. H. Wilkins and W. le Gros Clark.

ROYAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY. By H. McDOWALL CLOKIE and J. W. ROBINSON. 242 pp. (Oxford Press & Milford. 14s.)

A study by two Americans of the significance and present status of Royal Commissions.

THE CASE FOR ELECTORAL REFORM. By S. R. DANIELS. 128 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 3s. 6d.)

An argument in favour of the transferable vote. Lord Hugh Cecil contributes a foreword.

BRITISH POLICY IN KENYA COLONY. By MARJORIE RUTH DILLEY. 296 pp. (Nelson. 12s. 6d.)

An American study of the British administration of Kenya.

ON "CAPITAL." By F. ENGELS. 147 pp. (Lawrence & Wishart. 2s. 6d.)

Contains a synopsis, reviews, and commentaries on Marx's book.

SOUTH OF HITLER. By M. W. FODOR. 317 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.)

The *Manchester Guardian* correspondent deals with present conditions in the states of Central and South-Eastern Europe.

WHEN CHINA UNITES. By HARRY GANNES. 276 pp. (Dent. 8s. 6d.)

An account of events in China from 1840 to the present day.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICER. By L. HILL. 231 pp. (Allen and Unwin. 3s.)

Mr. Hill is General Secretary of the National Association of Local Government Officers and gives an account of the Local Government service.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By W. IVOR JENNINGS and C. M. YOUNG. 364 pp. (Oxford Press & Milford. 18s.)

The book consists mainly of extracts from leading cases, connected by essays.

THE UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE. By ALVIN W. JOHNSON. 198 pp. (Oxford Press & Milford. 11s. 6d.)

A study of unicameral legislatures in the U.S.A.

THE REICHSWEHR CRISIS

By "MILES"

THE student of politics there are few incidents amongst recent events so full of interest and significance as the almost simultaneous "decapitation" of their fighting services by the two rival dictators, Stalin and Hitler. In both cases the superior striking force of the legitimate authority of the State was able to overcome without any apparent difficulty an opposition in command of the whole material forces of the country. In the case of the Reichswehr this breakdown of all traditional conceptions as to the power of armed forces within the community has been all the more astonishing—at least to the uninitiated—as it had not only repeatedly succeeded in imposing its will in former days, but, above all, was not, like the Red Army, a produce of the ruling party, but an independent power based upon a long and glorious tradition, infinitely superior in every respect to that of the regime.

To attempt to understand the Reichswehr crisis of January and February this year, not in its individual details, but in the atmosphere in which it took place, the issues which it decided, and the reasons why that decision fell out as it did, we shall have to go back, far beyond the accession to power of the Hitler regime, to the hectic days of that earlier revolution of 1918, in which the Reichswehr was born. At that moment the influence of the remnants of the old imperial army and of its officer corps was probably at the lowest point it had ever reached. In fact, one of the most curious phenomena of the reconsolidation of Germany after the defeat and the revolution was the degree of suspicion with which the leaders of the new republican regime regarded the men with the help of whom they had just managed to keep down the forces of anarchy and destruction.

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Without doubt there were many real as well as psychological reasons for that attitude. The men, who suddenly were called unprepared to direct the fortunes of the Reich, had for many years been accustomed to see in the officer the guardian, if not the representative, of the old order, to which they had been opposed and the profound modification or complete overthrow of which had been the goal of their political aspirations. Prejudices such as these acquired in a lifetime are not overcome in a moment. Nor was the attitude of large groups among the officers calculated to dispel their apprehensions. Undoubtedly with many of them the co-operation with the politicians of the Left for the restoration of the most elementary law and order was only envisaged as a short-time truce. Double-crossing was considered legitimate against an authority deriving its own legitimacy from a revolution which had "stabbed in the back" the last chances of a defence. And yet with all these factors taken into account the attitude of the new men remained singularly narrow and short-sighted. It is impressive to see, in the reminiscences of those most intimately in contact with the voluntary forces out of which the Reichswehr was to develop, their complete failure and disinclination to enter into and to allow for the feelings and the spirit of the men with whom they had to deal, and their surprise at reactions which it would have been easy to foresee—and wise to meet half-way.

The lack of a truly broad-minded and constructive policy on the part of those called into power by the revolution, which formed the ultimate cause of the eventual downfall of the Republic—is nowhere more conspicuous than in their attitude towards the bearers of the military tradition and experience. Few to-day would deny that the errors of judgment committed by the Allies in their treatment of the German people at and after Versailles have to a large extent been responsible for the breakdown of all elements making

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for a stability and the rise of unscrupulous radicalism in that country, but the attitude of the republican parties towards the Reichswehr and in particular the officers was scarcely more wise or less unfortunate. Incapable of making up their mind to trust and conciliate those numerous elements in the officers' ranks ready to accept the new situation without mental reservations, if without enthusiasm, yet equally unready to attempt to eliminate them in favour of more genuinely republican elements, the politicians of the Weimar coalition left the actual power of the men they distrusted unimpaired while on the other hand indulging in a long and uninterrupted series of pinpricks: petty mud-slinging in the Press and the Reichstag, lack of tact on the part of over-zealous officials, and a wanton trampling upon old and honourable symbols and traditions justly held dear by the soldiers, which served no useful purpose whatsoever, but contributed enormously to embitter the atmosphere.

The fatal effects of this petty and unwise attitude were not confined to the ill-feeling created by it within the ranks of the officers. No less dangerous was the inner estrangement of the republican groups from the army, an estrangement which their leaders, if they had been wise, should have tried to avoid by every means in their power. Instead, the adherents of the new regime were taught to see in the Reichswehr not so much the servant of the nation and the defender of its political independence against external aggression, but a highly suspicious and reactionary element of internal politics. The wall thereby created between the Reichswehr and large masses of the people was the more deplorable as it was based upon a misapprehension; for the Reichswehr was in fact neither primarily interested in internal politics nor by any means as reactionary in its views as it was generally represented. General von Schleicher's famous dictum: "The Reichswehr does not exist to protect obsolete

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forms of private property," was a political slogan, uttered in a particular situation, and therefore ought not to be taken *au pied de la lettre*; but it did certainly express a good deal of genuine conviction. From the trenches the Reichswehr had not only brought back a fundamentally different notion of military discipline and of the relationship between the leader and the led, but also a sincere and acute, if often extremely vague, feeling for the need of deeper unity in the nation than the Weimar Republic provided or aspired to. But even that conception was primarily inspired by motives foreign to internal policy. If it had its sentimental roots in the idea of a renewal of the old Prussian ideal of universal devotion to the State and the common weal—brilliantly set out by Oswald Spengler in his *Prussianism and Socialism*—it derived its practical interest for the leaders of the Reichswehr from its bearing upon the exigencies of the particular task, the special duty of the Reichswehr, which, before everything else, determined its attitude to all questions of domestic policy, the problem of national defence.

Unfortunately it was precisely in respect to this that the Reichswehr felt most acutely the lack of sympathy or even of understanding on the part of the politicians for the impossible position in which it found itself placed. Its official purpose, for which it was expected to train and keep prepared, was the defence of its country. But this task under the restrictions imposed upon it by the treaty of Versailles, it was absolutely incapable of fulfilling, even against a minor power. Thus the alternative before it was either to accept a state of things which made all its work a tragic farce, or else to try to bring about an equalization of armament and in the meantime to circumvent its restrictions by every means in its power. The politicians on the other hand, while equally violent in their denunciation of Versailles, failed almost always to appreciate adequately how galling and

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intolerable such a state of things was to high-spirited men expected to take a pride in their calling. Not a few of them were open pacifists, while the majority were inclined to consider the Reichswehr a kind of white elephant, maintained at considerable cost rather for the sake of patriotic sentiment than for any useful purpose. But they did not realize that it was asking too much of the officers to expect them to take the same view of their life work.

It was these considerations of national defence rather than machiavellian reactionary tendencies, which for the greater period of the Weimar Republic enshrouded the Reichswehr and the Ministry of War with its peculiar atmosphere of concealment and intrigue. Politically, as the events in 1923 showed, when General von Seeckt handed back without difficulty the dictatorship temporarily conferred upon him, the Reichswehr had accepted the existing state of things and confined itself to a strictly unpolitical attitude. And yet, by the death of Stresemann the Reichswehr had become the strongest political influence in the country, far stronger than it had ever been in the early excited times of the revolution. Adherents of the Weimar Republic are inclined to ascribe this development to the machiavellian policy of the officer class which profited by the fact that the Republican parties failed to crush them, when they might have had the power, but to the impartial observer the ascendancy gained by the Reichswehr between 1930 and 1933 was due to no consciously planned policy, but to the rapid disintegration of the existing forces, not only in Parliament, but outside, in the Trade Unions, etc., creating a vacuum through which the Reichswehr was sucked into the political arena, on the whole very much against its own will. No doubt General von Schleicher himself was ready to make use of any opportunity for political intrigue that offered itself to him, but even he would have preferred to keep behind the scenes to the end. As a whole the

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have upon those issues with which they themselves were primarily concerned: the economic staying power of the country and the morale of the nation.

Yet the fundamental weakness of the Reichswehr lay not so much in the deficiency of political understanding as in the complete lack of any political ambition or will of its own. With General von Schleicher it had lost the one man in its ranks with a genuine capacity for and interest in the struggle of politics. General von Blomberg, a sentimental figure, deeply attached to Adolf Hitler personally, owed his position to his complete lack of any political ambition and his willing acceptance of the Nazi's claim to political leadership. Among the other leading men in the Services the relatively few ambitious opportunists with a definite penchant for political intrigue, sensing where the stronger will lay, saw their chances not in backing the Reichswehr's independence, but in throwing in their lot with the party and championing its cause and influence within the Services. The mass of the officers was only too anxious to leave the political fortunes of their country in competent hands and to concentrate upon their own immediate duties, in particular in view of the almost herculean task imposed upon them by the rearmament.

Thus from the very beginning the relation between the Reichswehr and the Nazi Party was fundamentally unstable and fraught with inevitable conflict. For instead of the union of two equal partners, which it was proclaimed to be from the house-tops—at least in the initial stages of the regime—it was really a most curiously inverted *societas leonina* in which the immense material strength of one partner was backed by no corresponding will or purpose against the ruthless determination and unscrupulousness of the other. The result was that although the stronger side would have been perfectly willing to carry on this state of undecided condominium indefinitely, the weaker was acutely conscious

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of the vital necessity of upsetting it and asserting its own undivided supremacy. For while the political indifference of the Reichswehr had originally enabled the Nazi to establish its foothold, the material power concentrated in the Reichswehr's hands made it an intolerable menace to the regime as long as it continued to retain its practical independence.

In this struggle of the Nazi Government for the gradual subjugation of the Reichswehr and its reduction from a status of equality to one of political subservience—which characteristically enough did not lead to an open conflict before the recent crisis, five years after its beginning—the main asset of the Nazis, next to their stupendous unscrupulousness, was the halo of legitimacy and patriotism conferred upon them by the old Marshal von Hindenburg. On the other hand, as long as the Reichswehr continued to owe its allegiance to him rather than to the Government, it could always appeal over the latter's head to their joint superior, and by this means the first two rounds in the struggle, the appointment of General von Fritsch against the party's nominee, von Reichenau, as successor to General von Hammerstein as head of the army, and above all the crushing of Roehm's plans for the fusion of his S.A. with the Reichswehr on June 30, 1934, actually went to the Reichswehr. But when the old President died, four weeks later, before any adequate arrangements had been made to safeguard the Reichswehr's independence, the heads of the fighting services acquiesced in the *coup d'état* by which the defence forces were made to swear allegiance to Adolf Hitler personally: thus the Reichswehr found itself not only bereft of any legal basis for further opposition, but thrust back into a defensive which threatened to become more and more hopeless as time drew on and the regime consolidated itself.

Having once accepted the political supremacy of the Nazis, the Reichswehr found to its cost—as others had done

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before—that it had thereby committed itself to a course which allowed no stand nor permanently effective opposition—short of the complete overthrow of the whole regime. To take that extreme course, however, the leaders of the Reichswehr, whatever their inner revulsions or apprehensions, were neither willing nor able. Even if their objections to many of the aspects of the regime touching upon the question of national defence had been more pronounced, the dangers of the rearmament period allowed of no swapping of horses while crossing the ford. Moreover, the material foundations for such a *coup d'état* were rapidly crumbling under their feet. Once the leaders of the Reichswehr had admitted the doubtful patriotic claims of the Nazis and officially subscribed to the myth of the glorious national revolution and revival of the German people, they could no longer trust either officers or men to follow them, if they should suddenly attempt to turn against the regime and denounce what all the time they had suffered to be extolled. They might still be able to keep at least the group of high commanders fairly intact and even to force the temporary removal of an over-zealous Nazi partisan amongst them and thereby to maintain a certain power to make their opinion felt; but as the ideology of the Nazi regime gradually submerged more and more the whole life of the nation and penetrated all ranks, the possibility of a complete overthrow of the regime by the Reichswehr so fervently hoped for by many inside and outside Germany became more and more remote.

Moreover, in its struggle against the uninterrupted and unrelenting pressure brought to bear upon it by the Nazi Party the Reichswehr had no longer to deal with a comparatively open, direct and brusque onslaught as in the case of Roehm, which by threatening the social privileges and prestige of the whole officer class had ranged them to a man

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behind their leaders, but with an infinitely more subtle attack on the highly debatable ground of political loyalty, the ultimate mover behind which was the real power within the party: the S.S. and the Secret State Police. That most interesting of all forces within the jungle of Nazi politics had for years pursued a systematic underhand policy of extending its control over one department of state after the other, by permeating them with its own trusted henchmen. The first to fall under their control had been the weakest of all, the Ministry of Education. Then the Ministry of the Interior, despite the strong fight put up by Goering, had followed suit. Next the Ministry of Propaganda and of Agriculture succumbed without much resistance, but the Foreign Office on the other hand put up remarkably stiff fight, until at last it had to give in and its leading officials, with Minister von Neurath at their head, had to submit to their "honorary" enrolment in the ranks of the S.S. in 1937.

One of the last to hold out against them had been Schacht, who took his stand upon his purely personal allegiance to Hitler and categorically refused to accept any orders from the S.S. But when the S.S. had succeeded in surreptitiously removing a number of his subordinates one after the other and replacing them with men of their own choice, and he too found that his own ministry no longer obeyed him implicitly—he did not hesitate to draw the consequences and to insist upon being relieved from his post, until Hitler very reluctantly had to accede to his wish.

Thus by the end of 1937 the only power that had not yet come under the control of the S.S. was the Reichswehr. In fact, one of the most outstanding signs of the Reichswehr's special position within the State had been its complete exemption from the jurisdiction of the Secret State Police. Whereas the latter could arrest and prosecute every other subject of the State, members of the party not excepted, in

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the case of those belonging to the Reichswehr, the S.S. was obliged to put its material before the military authorities, who could then order a prosecution to be instituted by a military court or not, as they deemed fit. This privilege in the state of public insecurity reigning in Germany was so highly appreciated by all protected by it that in not a few cases ex-officers rejoined the army again for the sole purpose of benefiting from it. On the other hand, this exemption from its otherwise practically unlimited sway was the greatest thorn in the side of the S.S., who for several years strove hard to remove it. In this struggle one of the "lighter" episodes was the S.S.'s abortive attempt to burgle the Ministry of War and recover incriminating documents relating to the shooting of General v. Schleicher which the Reichswehr had secured in an equally remarkable manner. The Reichswehr for a time held its ground but in the long run found it more and more difficult to maintain a position which was originally the expression of an actual balance of power, but had become more and more an anomaly and an anachronism as the party's preponderance had increased and its grip over all spheres of private and public activity tightened. One of the most significant symptoms of the gradual waning of the Reichswehr's power of resistance had been in March, 1937, the removal from his post of Colonel Thomas, head of the all-important Kriegswirtschaftsamt (Department of Military Supplies) and for years one of the most powerful men within the Reichswehr if not in Germany. Having vainly opposed the commercial treaties negotiated with Franco, Colonel Thomas was forced to resign his post and later on was transferred to General Goering's ministry where he would be under close control of the S.S.

Thus the conflict of Jan.-February of this year was really a kind of clash between two offensives. Or rather the Reichswehr leaders, glad to find in Marshal von Blomberg's

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marriage an unexceptionable ground not only for getting rid of him but for pressing home their other demands as well, were met by a counter-offensive of Herr Himmler's, happy to avail himself of this opportunity to pay off old scores and to extend his sway over the last stronghold within the Third Reich, still unconquered by the S.S. This struggle, further complicated by a score of other figures and minor issues drawn into it, ended inevitably once more with a defeat of the leaders of the Reichswehr owing to their unwillingness and incapability of going to extremes. The result has been the liquidation of the position of semi-independence still held by the Reichswehr and the reassertation of the party's control over it through the assumption of real instead of nominal command by Adolf Hitler himself. Moreover, through the retirement of a number of leading generals, the "ring of High Commanders," upon whom the Reichswehr's power of opposition had mainly rested during the last years, was effectively broken up and the key positions transferred to men of undubitable allegiance. A similar purge of the lower ranks has since eliminated the open opponents of the party. How far beneath that *Gleichschaltung* the new army leaders have succeeded in maintaining a certain independence it is difficult to judge. Certainly the resistance said to have been successfully put up by them in such questions as the choice of army chaplains, or the retaining of the traditional military salute, is mainly dictated by questions of interior discipline, but no longer by any opposition to the claims of the Nazi regime as such. Of greater interest in this connection is the fact that the attempt to disregard the natural forms of subordination by allowing junior officers to sit in judgment with representatives of the S.S. on the political reliability of their superiors met with such prompt and overwhelming resistance on the part of the whole officer corps that it had immediately to be suppressed. Far less significance on the other hand

would probably have to be attributed to the complete rehabilitation of General von Fritsch, rumours of which have persistently occurred in the press. Such a rehabilitation would be the very kind of inexpensive and politically meaningless gesture by which the resentment still felt in the army could be appeased without detracting anything from the increase in control gained by the regime; just as the posthumous rehabilitation of General von Schleicher, exonerating him from having treacherously conspired with foreign powers, was a personal triumph of his friends, but without any influence upon the further increase of the party's control over the army.

Far more serious, and the decisive question in connection with the Reichswehr crisis, is the degree to which Herr Himmler and the S.S. have succeeded in achieving their objectives. Herr Himmler's candidature for the post of commander-in-chief amongst half a score of other applicants has not met with success; but his prospects were more than doubtful from the beginning as it was hardly likely that Herr Hitler would allow the accumulation of such an immense power as the command of the S.S. and the fighting forces in the hand of any of his subordinates. The immunity of the fighting services from the control by the Secret Police on the other hand, the Magna Charta of the services, seems to have been *de facto* abolished by precedent, even if the legal position should not yet have been made entirely clear. In practice, as the example quoted above shows, its effective application may still meet with considerable difficulties.

THE TORY POLICY OF PEACE

By H. N. BRAILSFORD

ON every occasion that offers, Mr. Chamberlain and his party proclaim that they are following a policy of reconciliation and peace. If one accepts their conception of peace, their boast is justified. They have already ended the bitter quarrels that separated England from Eire and Italy. It is possible and even probable that these achievements will be crowned, though not at an early date, by an agreement with Germany and the conclusion of a Pact between the two Western and the two Central Great Powers. When that is accomplished, Mr. Chamberlain will challenge the Labour Party and defeat it in a general election. He will claim that he has not only kept the country out of war, but reconciled its enemies, while increasing its armed strength. Official Labour, unfortunately, has in this situation no inspiration more helpful than the reiteration of its faith in Geneva. It has persuaded itself that the ardour of its socialist convictions forbids it to consider even a temporary accommodation with the Liberals.

Of these achievements the treaty with Eire calls for frank congratulation. The quarrel had been swollen to costly extremes by the stupid arrogance of Mr. Thomas, but it could never have been easy to adjust. Mr. Chamberlain, who commonly displays in the House a rigid and graceless personality, behaved on this occasion with a rare magnanimity. The angry dispute over the annuities, peculiarly delicate because legal opinion was far from unanimous about it, has been settled by scaling down the Irish obligation to one-tenth of its capital value. The miserable tariff war is ended. Finally, the Empire has abandoned, with no compensation save good will, its right to use and fortify certain Irish harbours as naval

bases. There is nothing to criticize in this generous settlement, save Mr. Chamberlain's omission of any public statement that might have advanced the unification of this sundered island. Mr. de Valera was ready to offer statesmanlike terms for the first steps towards a federal structure, but the Orange rulers of Ulster remain as intolerant and unyielding as ever.

In the settlement with Italy, on the other hand, this commentator can discover no mitigating feature. Doubtless it ends for a time, or at least conceals, the dangerous feud that had raged between the Empire and this ambitious Mediterranean power since the eve of the Ethiopian affair. Those who welcome peace at any price may congratulate themselves on a success that fills the progressive half of British opinion with anger and shame. Mr. Chamberlain's motive seems to have been the straightforward wish to remove an obvious cause of war. It is fairly clear that he never belonged to the school of thought, dominant in the staff of the Foreign Office, which wished to buy the support of Italy in order to break the Rome-Berlin axis and encircle Germany. On the contrary, his purpose seems to be to reconcile Italy, in the hope that he may thereafter use her good offices to arrange terms with her quasi-ally. His ultimate objective is to revive the plan that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald arranged with Mussolini, only to discover that neither the French, nor their satellites in Central and Eastern Europe, would then have anything to do with it. The conception of a four-power pact revives, in a more formal and organized shape, the nineteenth-century notion of the European concert. The root idea is that these four great Powers will, by bargaining among themselves, contrive to manage the affairs of the Old World. It is assumed that they can banish war, at any rate among their four selves. They may bind themselves, especially in the air, by mutual pledges against aggression on the Locarno model. Optimists hope for a stabilization, if not a reduction, of armament.

The weak point of the arrangement is that two of these Powers are attached to things as they are, while the other two are radicals bent on expansion. The suspicion follows that Tory England is not unwilling to buy peace at the expense of the Soviet Union. Hitler's claim for the restoration of the former German colonies may be, as the Foreign Office supposes, nothing but a rather crude essay in blackmail. What he really wants may still be, as it was when he wrote "Mein Kampf," not colonies overseas, but the Russian borderlands. So the imperial Abraham looks hopefully towards this ram caught in the thicket, and diverts the sacrificial knife in its direction. That may be too crass an interpretation of the thoughts of Downing Street. What one may fairly say, and all that one ought to say, is that the Soviet Union is to be excluded from the managing club of the four great Powers. The assumption is that France, swinging to the Right, can be induced to abandon the Franco-Soviet pact, or at least to allow it to decay, while Czechoslovakia, after somehow placating her German minority, will drop out of the power-pattern of Europe by neutralizing herself on the Swiss model.

Must we revise this statement of the Tory policy of peace in the light of the events that made the week-end of May the 22nd memorable? There is good reason to believe that in reply to Hitler's threatening troop movements, Lord Halifax instructed the British Ambassador to inform him that in the event of an attack on the Czechs, this country would be involved, not directly, but in support of France. This warning has been interpreted by Mr. Churchill and others as evidence of Mr. Chamberlain's conversion to a rudimentary form of "collective security." In effect it was nothing less: subjectively it may have been very much less. There is no reason to suppose that Mr. Chamberlain was moved directly by any concern for the Czechs. He told the American Press

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in the plainest words that he thought they ought to cede the Sudeten regions to Germany. He took this action because he wished to avert from the French, and therefore from this country, any risk of war. Since M. Daladier's visit to London, the two countries have been, in plain words, allies. Arrangements have been made (I rely again on disclosures made to the American Press) that provide for unity of command in any future war, and for the pooling of warlike stores. One can, by a process of inference, arrive at the arrangement that must have been reached between London and Paris. Given this alliance, London must have informed Paris that French action to support the Czechs would be a *casus fœderis*. It is equally clear that the French understand that, in any emergency arising out of the Spanish Civil War, they must not expect British aid. In short, Mr. Chamberlain's policy of peace is highly selective. That is not "collective security" as the Wilsonian school understands it. The guiding principle of British policy is not the disinterested maintenance of universal peace. Its purpose is, narrowly, to maintain the French alliance by paying the minimum price. The French, in their present mood of timid modesty, are not exacting allies. They require support in the Czech question (since honour demands that they shall back Prague), but they dare not demand it over Spain as well. It follows that we do Mr. Chamberlain no wrong if we adhere to our statement that his policy is based on an older model than Geneva.

This Tory conception of a workable organization for Europe stands in sharp contrast to the two alternatives that find favour among progressives. It is opposed to the ideal of a universal League of Nations, though the Tories propose rather to ignore than to scrap that institution. Even more is it opposed to the expedient of the Left—a mutual defensive alliance, within the framework of the League, between Britain, France and the Soviet Union. This is conceived as an

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"ideological" group, an international People's Front. Its advocates assign to it the task of defending "democracy" against "fascism," and tend to forget that these three great powers, which in their internal politics follow a left-ward direction, are on the world stage conservative "Haves," with open spaces and ample sources of raw materials to protect.

After this glance at Mr. Chamberlain's wider policy of peace, let us turn to the Italian treaty. It was achieved on the Italian side by remorseless military and political pressure. Roman money and wireless propaganda fostered the Arab revolt in Palestine. The Fascist control of Spain threatened both the main sea-routes of the British Empire, and as directly those of France. Finally and chiefly, by concentrating a big army in Libya, a nearly worthless colony which has been developed solely for strategical ends, the Duce openly threatened Egypt with invasion. The positive value of the treaty to the British Empire lies in the cessation of this hostile pressure. The garrison of Libya will be reduced, rather slowly, to half its present strength. Italian support for the Arab rebels will cease, though this service may now be passed on to Berlin. As to Spain, the familiar promises of the gentleman's agreement are renewed. The central clause of the treaty is, doubtless, the general undertaking to exchange information as to all military dispositions in the Mediterranean region, which includes North-east Africa and Arabia. This is an arrangement that means, according to the traditions of diplomacy, a fairly high degree of confidence and friendship. It should clear away, if both sides "play fair," the poisonous suspicions of recent years. It may, and indeed ought to pave the way for some limitation of armaments. At the same time, various pledges of old standing are solemnly renewed, notably as to Lake Tana; the *status quo* in Arabia is recognized and provision made for some small rectification of the frontiers of Abyssinia.

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Morally all this is secondary. The real significance of the treaty is that it provides for the formal recognition of one of the Roman Empire's conquests, and seems to sanction the other. A use has at last been found by Tory statecraft for the League: it is to condone the aggression which it vainly sought to prevent. The scandal of this arrangement is greatly aggravated by the fact that Abyssinian resistance continues: it is indeed doubtful whether the Italians control half the country. But it is the Spanish clauses that are decisive for our verdict on this treaty. All the world has read them as a tacit licence from the British Empire to Italy to complete the destruction of the Republic. The governing fact about the negotiations is that Mr. Chamberlain undertook them while Mussolini was still engaged upon the conquest of the Peninsula. To choose this moment to enter upon a new era of friendly intimacy with Italy was to proclaim that Britain is at least indifferent to this act of aggression. Mr. Eden's stipulation that the Italian troops should withdraw from Spain before the negotiations started was the least that any honourable standard of international morals required.

To be sure, the Duce does repeat in this treaty the offer he has been making at frequent intervals since December, 1936, to withdraw the troops whose existence he simultaneously denied. Reference is made as usual to the efforts of the London Committee to obtain a general withdrawal of foreign combatants. We have, however, seen too much of that notorious committee to feel much interest in its further doings. The really operative pledge that Mussolini has given is to withdraw his army and material when the war is over. In the literal sense this undertaking may be fulfilled. If and when the Republican armies are destroyed and the workers disarmed, the Moors should suffice, with the Carlists and the Phalanx, to hold the masses down. Spain need not become a vassal specifically of Italy. The intention is rather that she shall

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revolve around the Rome-Berlin axis. Germany has given no pledge of withdrawal, and for military purposes it should suffice that some of her officers and technicians should remain. These (and for that matter Italians) can readily dodge any undertaking to evacuate, by taking service in the Tercio, the Foreign Legion. As for the Balearic Islands and other strategic positions, whether on the Atlantic coast or near the Straits, no sane expert ever supposed that territory would be ceded. It is enough that land should be leased for civilian airports, or that harbours should come under some privileged arrangement.

But the main tie will be economic. Downing Street clings to the belief that General Franco must come to the City of London for a gold loan. Possibly he may, but that will not prevent exchanges on a barter basis of German and Italian arms, machines and services against Spanish raw materials. The best for which the City can hope is that it may be admitted as a third partner in the exploitation of this Fascist colony. The older empires are now cast for the part of parasites upon their younger rivals. If the British Government is complacent over the prospect that England and Germany may obtain a strategic stranglehold over Spain, the explanation doubtless is that it aspires to a relation of permanent friendship with the Fascist axis. If a conservative London, with Paris firmly in tow, can live in lasting amity with Fascist Rome and Nazi Berlin, it need not be much disturbed even if the Germans should establish themselves on the Bay of Biscay and along the Pyrenees, while the Italians make themselves at home in Majorca and perhaps in Malaga. Mr. Chamberlain's startling eulogy of Mussolini as a statesman and of Fascism as a system of government revealed the drift of Tory thought.

The views of the Left on this treaty may be summed up in a few sentences. First, we do not share the belief, even now, that the Republic is virtually destroyed. It can resist for

several months yet : if it could obtain an adequate supply of arms and food, it could win the war. Second, on its record, we doubt the good faith of Rome, though Mussolini, nearing exhaustion, may sincerely welcome a truce. But the ultimate ambition of the Roman Empire is to acquire Tunis and Egypt, and this can be managed only during a general European war. As we see it, with that possibility ahead of us, the axis is to-day gaining all the vital strategical positions—first the Rhineland, then the gates of the Danube and finally Spain. It is in vain that Britain arms, if she has already surrendered these keys. Spain, as we see it, was the ideal ground on which Fascist aggression should have been met and defeated. France has access by land, as she has not to Central Europe, and Britain the command of the encircling seas. A gallant nation fought for the common cause and asked only for its legal right to buy arms. The iniquity of this betrayal is surpassed only by its folly.

Our verdict on this Tory policy of peace is, in short, that it is narrowly selective. It will defend, first of all and all the time, the British Empire, its closed fields of investments, its preferential markets, the squalid hovels of Jamaica and the jute-workers' slums in Bengal. It will also defend France and Belgium—not their people, not their culture, but their coasts that fringe the Channel. And after that—Portugal, Irak and Egypt. If necessity compelled us to select, we should do it on a different principle. We should pay some regard to the survival of the higher culture-values—freedom, humanity and integrity of thought. The Tory selection, when we analyse it, appears to be based on the indispensable but limited principle of self-preservation—meaning, thereby, not merely our corporeal selves, but the estates and the mortgaged properties that maintain the standard of life of a privileged class. Class, indeed, talks audibly in any attempt to define this policy. If the Spanish Republic is sacrificed, and if

Russia is blackballed in the future club of the Great Powers, the reason is that they stand on the wrong side of the barricade of class. But it is in the dealings of Mr. Chamberlain with the Roman Empire that considerations of class obtrude themselves most clearly. First during the Abyssinian affair and again in the prolonged Spanish crisis, a sharp choice presented itself. Effective resistance to Italian aggression in either field would have meant the beginning of the end of the Duce's dictatorship. Downing Street dared not push him over the precipice, dared not even let him fall, because it saw no alternative government, save a Popular Front or some other incarnation of advanced democracy. It is not positively Fascist in its sympathies. It would welcome, in Spain or in Italy, a conservative but constitutional monarchy. But it will protect Fascism, when the alternative is the effective participation of the working class in political power. Its ultimate principle of selection is the maintenance, not merely of its own privileged standards, but of class-rule, abroad as at home.

REFLECTIONS ON THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

By A. L. ROWSE

THE fundamental fact about the European situation is that the upper classes have practically everywhere regained the control which they lost by the lunacy of 1914-18. Perhaps the circumstances of those years are not exactly to be described as "lunacy," for Marxists and historians very well understand that they flowed naturally from the pre-war international order: they were the consequences of the nation-state system in the era of economic imperialism—in other words, the "international anarchy." From that, what else was to be expected? Well, now the upper classes are back again in the saddle; and, naturally enough, they bring back with them the old international order, or rather disorder. We are back in the pre-war days—pre-war in an all too threatening sense. That is the real meaning of the diplomatic tension which is going on in Europe, the relapse into the old system of alliances, under the crumbling façade of collective security, and in spite of the professions made, particularly in Great Britain, to the contrary. Here is the real explanation of the lining-up of the powers, the shifting and changing uncertainty of the smaller states, the frantic manœuvrings for position. Position for what?—one may ask. Well, we all know, or should know, what these things are symptoms of, and to what they lead.

It must never be forgotten that this country led the way in this direction, the triumph of the European Reaction under which we live, defeated, disillusioned, driven almost to despair, like the men of 1848 living on into the age of

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Napoleon III and Bismarck. The year 1931 is the decisive turning-point in the history of post-war Europe. The years of the Labour Government of 1929-31 gave us the last, belated attempt to make the Liberal post-war international order function, to get appeasement as a preliminary to disarmament and a real collective system at work in Europe. The upper and middle-classes of Great Britain deliberately chose the way of reaction in that year.

1931 gave the signal to the upper classes for the recovery of their position, the resurgence of reaction, throughout Europe. Léon Blum himself once told me of the difficulties the formation of the National Government, with MacDonald at its head, created for the French Socialist Party in the elections of 1932. Before that, they had a very good chance of coming back the largest party in the Chamber and of forming a Government. The National Government, MacDonald's defection, the "example" of Great Britain, were everywhere used with great effect against Blum and his party. The Radicals were returned much the largest party in the state, their Conservative wing the stronger. That led to Doumergue and Laval, the unrestrained rule of the capitalist classes at home, deflation and depression in economic affairs, and the betrayal of the collective system to Mussolini by the French upper classes. After Hitler's arrival to power, perhaps nothing could have been done; by 1936, when Blum came in as the head of the Front Populaire, it was almost certainly too late.

In 1933 there followed the worst blow of all for Europe, when Germany went finally and wholly over to the Reaction, encouraged by important sections of the capitalist classes in this country, notably the City. In 1934 Vienna fell; that was the real end of Austria. In 1935 Mussolini won his Abyssinian Empire, and the disintegration of the collective system was complete. Each stage in its disintegration, from

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the betrayal of the Disarmament Conference and Japan's aggression in Manchuria to Mussolini's conquest of an empire athwart our Mediterranean, African and Red Sea routes, was accompanied by delighted applause from important sections of English upper-class opinion. (Hitler once threatened that there would come a day when "heads should roll in the sand," and lived to see his threat carried out. If the day should come when we see the ruin of this country's and the Empire's security brought about by the sabotage of these sections among the upper classes, it is to be hoped that they will not fail to receive their appropriate reward.)

And yet, the Reaction had not wholly triumphed. A Popular Front of Liberals, Socialists and Communists had been called into being in both France and Spain to resist the onward march of Fascism; and for a time began to make way. But not for long. The Spanish situation revealed the underlying facts of politics at their crudest. The Spanish upper classes, aided and abetted by European Fascism everywhere—with arms and aeroplanes, recruits and technicians from Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, but supported by the active sympathies of the French and English upper classes, too—entered into a rebellion against the democratic government elected by the Spanish people.

In France, as in England and America, the great "democratic" countries, the Right resorted to less crude methods than overt rebellion or clubbing their opponents on the head in the streets or in concentration camps. Their technique has been more elegant, but hardly less effective. In England, where the methods of the upper classes in politics are most accomplished, they found that taking in their opponents paid best: the MacDonalds, the Snowdens, J. H. Thomas. But the method they have resorted to in general in all these countries is the same: that of political, economic and especially financial sabotage. The importance

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of this technique, and particularly the regularity and generality of its use, has not been much commented upon as yet, perhaps not even widely noticed. Yet it was extremely effective in this country in the last months of the Labour Government: the constant denigration and undermining of confidence in Britain's financial position in the capitalist press, the daily lucubrations of the City editor of *The Times*, the persistent suggestion of "crisis."

Since then the technique of sabotage has become much bolder, more unscrupulous, more shameless. France, where the Left is stronger than in most countries, has been the chief field for its exercise. A Left government in France is always met by a run on the exchange; and if this is not sufficient to bring it down, as with Herriot's government of 1924 or Blum's in 1937, there is always the Senate, like the House of Lords, in the background, ready to do its duty. It was the Senate which wrecked Blum's second government this spring. "*Moi, j'ai confiance dans le Sénat*," said the middle-class proprietress of a bookshop to one of her bourgeois customers in my hearing at Avignon, the morning that Blum's financial plan was published. The Senate justified her confidence and that of her class.

There are all sorts of morals pointing in every direction, any number of lessons in practical politics, to be drawn from that by the Left. It looks in this year of grace 1938 as if it is now impossible for any government of the Left to govern against the will of the capitalist classes. Even Roosevelt's administration, with an enormous majority in the country behind it, has been obstructed, stultified, and for long periods rendered almost null and void by the sabotage of the Right. They just will not play. Perhaps one ought not to be surprised; it is what one should expect. But the lengths they will go to is surprising; one cannot help being morally shocked, when one remembers that the whole appeal of the

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Right is to patriotism and national feeling, that many elements of the Right do not mind the ruin of their country, provided that they retain their position of privilege and power over their compatriots among the ruins.

The behaviour of the Right in France has been beyond belief shocking. With patriotism on their lips and all the time vilifying Blum as a Jew and an internationalist, they have seized any and every occasion to bleed the country of capital, export their holdings, make a profit on each devaluation which they have rendered necessary by their financial sabotage, and salt the proceeds safely away abroad before the next. They have been determined by hook or by crook to bring down the Front Populaire government resting on a large popular majority in the country. At a time of immense national danger, and in face of the national enemy, they have been prepared to weaken France, refusing to allow a real national government to be constructed on the basis of the popular majority, rejecting Blum's patient and patriotic offers with contempt and contumely. No one can deny that Blum has acted with great sense of responsibility and loyalty to the interests of France—indeed critics on the extreme Left may say that in some respects, notably as regards Spain, he has gone too far to placate the enemies of the working class for the sake of national unity in confronting the European danger. No one can deny that Blum is a man of great integrity, singularly incorruptible in the marasma of French politics. A proper investigation of the back-purlicus of the Right in France would reveal much that is not only unsavoury, corrupt, but a good deal that is actual treason against the State. There are groups on the Right that are in touch with Hitler and prepared to do his bidding; there are others who take their orders from Mussolini—it seems that the Roselli brothers were murdered not by Italians, but by Cagoulards acting on instructions from Rome. While

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Dormoy was at the Ministry of the Interior these investigations were beginning to be made; that was another reason why it was so essential that socialist government should come to an end. No one on the Right wanted the chances of an understanding with Mussolini prejudiced.

It is interesting to observe the persistence with which they go on hoping to pick up the crumbs from the table at which Mussolini and Hitler feed together; though what France can conceivably gain from an agreement with Italy in which France makes all the sacrifices, it is hard to see. Do they think that they can get Mussolini to fight Hitler for them by making concessions to him, giving up Spain to him for example? What a fearfully dangerous game for France they are playing. Italian policy has been a *politique de pourboire* ever since 1860. If Mussolini gets concessions out of France (the same holds good of Great Britain), he will only use them to get a higher price out of Hitler in the next round—perhaps Corsica, Nizza, Tunisia—who knows? The only safe way for France, as for England too, is to see that the Spanish Republic holds on so long that Mussolini and Italian Fascism are exhausted and overstrained by the double effort in Abyssinia and Spain. Then there may come about the sort of régime in Italy with which a defensive bloc of Western powers is possible—Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain: it would be a strong bastion of peace in the West and in the Mediterranean. Moreover, we should not then be so powerless to affect the issue in Central Europe. Along with Czecho-Slovakia and Russia, we should be in a strong enough position to maintain peace against would-be aggressors. This is the conception of foreign policy which not only the Left in Great Britain and France stands for, together with the great bulk of the smaller powers and the democratic forces everywhere; it is also the conception of policy which the vision and understanding of Mr. Churchill sees to offer

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the only security for the safety of this country and the peace of Europe.

It has been the happy good fortune of this country and the sheet-anchor of our security throughout our history, that our interests have coincided with those of the great majority of European countries as against those of any too-powerful state, whose aggressive designs have threatened the independence and sometimes the very existence of the rest: Spain in the sixteenth century, France in the seventeenth and eighteenth, Germany at the end of the nineteenth and in the twentieth. German commentators with characteristic obtuseness have put this effect down to our "Machiavelianism," our "gold," or our "hypocrisy." What they fail to observe is that this traditional policy, which certainly served our ends, also served the interests of the rest of Europe on the whole, or they would not have adhered to it. The League of Nations was an attempt to generalize this conception and enable it to serve world-purposes. That is why British policy is peculiarly closely associated with the League idea. That is why all those elements in Great Britain which have so disliked and undermined the League have done such a disservice to British interests, no less than the interests of Europe as a whole. Hence, too, the reason for the failure, the confusion, the contempt into which British policy has fallen, the disintegration of the League and of the European system, since 1931—since the British governing classes have been distracted between the contrary pulls of their class-sympathies abroad and what is the plain interest of this country and of Europe as a whole.

It is the sabotage of large elements among the upper classes in England and France—for Hitler and Mussolini have many friends whom they can count on in both—which is responsible for the frustration and confusion in the foreign policy of the democratic countries. And it can only be

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ended in one way—by the Left gaining power and making it operative. It is all a problem of power, and it is a question whether the Left in these years and in these countries has ever yet attained sufficient power to make its will prevail. And it must be admitted that, apart from its regrettably insufficient sense of power, its lack of realism and determination, the Left plays into its opponents' hands in the matter of financial and economic sabotage. It makes the mistake of demanding more economic concessions than the existing system can stand; when the breakdown comes therefore in increased unemployment, falling off of production, rising costs and prices, the Left in power, or rather in office without real power, is made to take the responsibility. There was a certain element of this in the "crisis" of 1931. But the introduction of the forty-hour week in France is a glaring example. Almost everyone of any intelligence on the Left would now admit that it was a mistake; that it was trying to bite off much too much at one time, that it has imposed an altogether too heavy burden upon the French productive system. It is not fair to blame Blum for it, however: it was the result of the spontaneous pressure of the working classes after the long strain imposed upon them by the deflationary measures of Laval, issuing in the series of successful strikes which accompanied the beginning of Blum's government. It may be opined that Blum himself knew it was a mistake and that the masses had gone too far. But here, too, there lies a moral of the greatest importance for the Left. The masses must be given leadership, and authoritarian leadership. It is no good leaving them to their own devices: they do not know what is good for them. It is disastrous for the leadership to follow in the wake of the rank and file. It is humiliating and dangerous for a leader of the working class to have to go down like Blum and *plead* with the workers on the Paris Exhibition to work hard

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enough to get it finished. They must be made to work, in their own interests, in the interests of their class, and in order that their cause may ultimately triumph.

Of course, there were extenuating circumstances. But it would have been far better if Blum had strengthened his hold on power and stayed there. When once you have full control of power you can make what reforms and concessions you choose later on as opportunity offers. It is *power* that counts in politics, not momentarily pleasing the people.

If this holds good in the sphere of social reform, it is still more true in that of high financial policy. This is the rock upon which social-democratic governments are apt to split almost everywhere. The financial policy of the first Blum government was characterized by a deplorable spirit of indecision, hesitation and compromise. Blum himself can hardly be held responsible for it. He was faced with a succession of crises in industry, which he handled with skill and on the whole with success, a perpetual crisis in the foreign field which the Spanish Civil War threatened to turn into a European War. It does not seem that Vincent Auriol, Blum's second in command, had the grasp necessary for the Ministry of Finance; to some extent the situation resembled that in which the Labour Government was placed through the incompetent obstinacy of Snowden in 1930-31. A succession of mistakes was made. Devaluation ought to have been effected straight away; instead of which the Government waited until millions of gold francs had been lost to the reserve, and a vast flight of capital had taken place abroad. But far more important here, again, than any actual financial measures, was the question of power. The Government should have assumed complete control of the financial position, with exchange control and all, from the first. There would have been the opposition of the Radicals,

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or some of them, to consider. But they would not have dared to break the Front Populaire in all the strength and enthusiasm in which it then stood with the masses.

The moral for any government of the Left is that it must always make the utmost of every opportunity that is presented; it must exploit its initial advantage to the very maximum. The Labour Government when it came in with a good deal of enthusiasm behind it in 1929 did no better, indeed a great deal less well, than Blum in 1936-7. But though he gave the French workers the five-day week and a new industrial charter, he failed to entrench himself in power. When he came back to office in March of this year, he had learnt, intelligent man that he is, the lessons of his first administration. He took over the Ministry of Finance himself, and prepared a financial plan which for the first time covered the whole French financial situation and made proposals for dealing with it as a whole.¹ The plan was masterly; but by now the political opportunity for applying it had gone by. The enthusiasm and strength behind the Front Populaire had greatly subsided; the French bourgeoisie were no longer afraid; the Senate treated him, the Prime Minister of France, and the most distinguished person in French politics, with open contempt. Next day they wrecked his government, and with impunity. Oh, what morals there are for the Left to learn—if only they are capable of learning them! The chief of them all are: (1) to go slow as regards economic reform until you are sure of *power*; (2) always exploit what opportunity is given you right up to the maximum.

It is much the same story with the Spanish situation and the policy of non-intervention. Blum has been greatly blamed by the Left for instituting it. But we do not know the full circumstances of the case as yet. It is fairly clear

¹ Cf. the very favourable opinion of *The Times* economic correspondent, which Blum quoted at length in his speech to the Senate, *le Populaire*, April 13, 1938.

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that the responsibility is not his—except in the sense that if he had been a Hitler or a Mussolini, i.e., a real leader and not the head of a parliamentary coalition, he would have seen to it that his will prevailed. There was the British Government with its clear indication to the French that it would go no further than a policy of non-intervention. There was the extremely dangerous internal situation in France, with the army largely officered by Catholics: open intervention, the only proper reply to Hitler and Mussolini, might have meant civil war in France, as they well knew. There was probably nothing for it but non-intervention for Blum. And non-intervention on the assumption that it would be adhered to, or at least not too widely departed from, was probably the best policy all round. Nobody can have foreseen the extent to which the Fascist powers would break their agreements—the actual waging of a war upon the Spanish people. Certainly the Spanish Government itself had no conception of the lengths to which Mussolini and Hitler would go. A member of the Labour Party delegation to Paris in September, 1936, to consult Blum told me that the Spanish Government had assured them that, given reasonable non-intervention, they would win the war. Perhaps one more example of the ridiculous optimism of the Left in politics.

But surely no one should have trusted Mussolini or Hitler's word for a moment; they are the self-declared breakers of agreements; if it happens to suit your interest to break a pledge, then break it—that is their creed. It has served them well, so long as fools allow themselves to be taken in. *The non-intervention policy should have been made conditional from the first*—like the subsequent Anglo-Italian agreement. A conditional non-intervention agreement might have had the effect of very considerably limiting the aid Franco received from outside. If there were any difficulty

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in the matter, the French and ourselves could have used our overwhelming naval power to put a cordon round Spain and seen to it that there was genuine non-intervention.

It is the Machiavellianism of the Fascist powers that has changed all that. And the only way to meet Machiavellianism is with more Machiavellianism. In the latest phase of the Spanish conflict it appears that the French have realized that and are prepared to play Mussolini and Hitler at their own game. But what makes it so difficult to meet them on their own ground is the sabotage of large elements among the upper classes.¹ Hitler and Mussolini know that they can count on their aid to distract and confuse the will of the "democratic" countries. It is the European class-conflict cutting across the former national divisions which complicates the picture. There is nothing more disingenuous and insincere than the parrot-like reiteration of the British Government that they will have no part nor lot in the ideological conflict that is dividing Europe. In fact they have played a most important part in it and it is clear on which side. There is no doubt that the British Government, no less than the upper classes, want Franco to win in Spain—though it plainly goes against the interests of this country.

One may go further: it is British policy in these years since 1931 which has been responsible, more than any other single factor, for the disintegration of Europe. We are the power which by our position in Europe and outside are in a place to lead the European concert. The point was made to me last year by a very penetrating Italian publicist that the disorganization of contemporary Europe is due to our

¹ Cf. the revealing, if restrained, words of the Paris correspondent of *The Times* on the Czecho-Slovak crisis (May 23, 1938): "In Berlin, it is felt, there can be no illusions about the position of this country, provided that Herr Hitler forms his judgment upon the communications received from his duly accredited diplomatic representatives. It is known, however, that reports on French conditions reach him through other agencies, which are often in touch with elements less representative of French foreign policy. The dangerous potentialities of such unofficial diplomacy are only too evident."

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abdication. No doubt Mussolini regards it as our degeneration, and hopes to take our place in the Mediterranean, if no further afield. The clue to that abdication, the loss of our former leadership in Europe, is to be found in this—that since 1931 the British governing class, or large sections of it, have been following their class interest in the conflicts raging abroad rather than what is to our national interest. At the very least they have been confused in purpose by the dichotomy; at the worst they have been guilty of collusion and sabotage. Hitherto in our history the problem has not much arisen, for the two, the class-interest of our ruling classes and our national interest, have coincided. But with the challenge of the working-class movement to their hold on power, the situation has changed. One cannot avoid seeing that the one line that runs consistently through the tergiversations, the betrayals, the confusions of British policy in these years is the determination not to see a victory for the Left anywhere, certainly not to aid it—even though it is to the interest of this country that we should. What a change from the days of our great success as a nation, from Canning and Palmerston! No wonder they have brought us to such humiliations, to such a pass as we are in now.

Take the cardinal importance of their anti-Russian policy in disorganizing Europe and the Far East. It is the British governing classes who have been the undying enemies of the U.S.S.R. and kept Soviet Russia isolated from normal and helpful contacts with the West. And this, even though it is our plain interest to collaborate with Russia against aggression in the Far East and in Europe. The result is that Japan has been enabled to run amok over China, conquer large tracts of the country, destroy the peace and threaten our large interests there. It has been the consistent aim of British imperialism to weaken Russia *vis-a-vis* Japan. Now that they see the danger from Japan, they are willing enough to

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collaborate with Russia in aiding the Chinese. Practically all sections of the British upper classes would now welcome a Japanese defeat. How ironical it all is! For they are largely responsible for the over-development of Japanese power, as they are for Mussolini's in the Mediterranean. Both could have been dealt with quite simply, and without much danger to ourselves, if our ruling classes had played a straight game with collective security since 1931, in friendly association with the U.S.A. on one side and Soviet Russia on the other. In fact, however, throughout the Far Eastern crisis of 1931-2 practically the whole of the Conservative press and the Conservative Party were on the side of Japan—at the risk of alienating America, at the risk of raising up a first-class danger to ourselves in the Pacific. They are largely responsible, then, for the disintegration of the position in the Far East.

The same is true of the situation in Europe. For there can be no overwhelmingly strong system of collective security against the aggressor powers in Europe, unless Russia is in it. How clearly Mr. Winston Churchill sees this, and yet how timidly he has to put the point in his campaign speeches for collective security, because of the susceptibilities of Conservative opinion! They *will* not take the necessary steps to safeguard our security and preserve the peace of Europe, because of their hatred of Communism. They are first-class material for the psychological appeal of Hitler's disingenuous campaign against Bolshevism, designed to split the "democratic" countries in two and frustrate their unity and effectiveness in action. The only alternative policy which the governing class can put forward is the desperate gamble of making concessions to Mussolini and Hitler, in the name of conciliation and with the hope of buying them off. It is the policy of paying Danegeld.

We have seen that there is no reason to suppose that however much they concede to Mussolini, he can now move

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away from the Berlin axis and come over to the side of Great Britain and France ; or, secondly, that there is any limit to his ambitions in the Mediterranean. Nor again, is there any more hope of success to be gained from the second objective of their policy, buying off Hitler : "conciliation" with Germany, as they put it. For that involves accepting Germany as the dominant power in Central Europe, if they *will* exclude Russia. It means a German Mittel-Europa, and the return of the ex-German colonies too. All that we fought the war of 1914-18 to gain will have been lost by the supineness, the fatal confusion in aims, the sabotage of the British governing class since 1931. They had it in their hands to save the peace of Europe ; they had only to follow our proud, traditional rôle of organizing and leading the majority of European powers—the core of a collective peace-system. But they refused to do it ; some of them have done all they could to advance the cause and clear the way for the aggressors. Their responsibility is clear when one reflects that no one foresaw a war on the European horizon in 1931 ; whereas, now, no one can exclude its possibility.

But it looks at last as if the facts of the European situation are driving the British governing class to a clearer alignment, now that the confusion of the past seven years have brought us into imminent danger of war. Though the British Government is mainly responsible for selling the Spanish Republic, in the hope of buying Mussolini's support, they seem at last to have realized the danger of allowing Czecho-Slovakia to be broken up and absorbed by Germany. The importance of Czecho-Slovakia is that it is a microcosm of the whole European situation. If its independence goes, it will mean that we are faced with a Europe under German domination. It may be that at the last moment the British Government will join with France and Russia in safeguarding the independence of Czecho-Slovakia. That would be the

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better way ; but what nonsense it makes of British policy in the past seven years ; what bankruptcy in retrospect it reveals !

The issue in Europe seems to be clarifying itself along these lines, though British policy will do all it can to avoid a clear decision. For a clear decision might aid the democratic powers, the forces of the Left throughout Europe. It might bring about the end of the Reaction : it will not last for ever. The British governing class well understands, none better, how precarious is the hold of the Reaction even in the moment of its widest success. It might be defeated or checked somewhere or other—in Spain, or in Italy (1935 !)—and then what would follow ? Hence the British Government's insistence upon a policy of concessions to Fascism, "conciliation" all round—at the expense, of course, of Republican Spain and democratic Czecho-Slovakia. They are instinctively right—if not the longest-sighted governing class in Europe : they know that another war would destroy their order, and they are out to preserve it. Whether they will succeed over the next phase in Europe's history or no, depends on whether Nazi Germany can play the game of moderation, content to fulfil her aims gradually, piece-meal, by economic expansion in Central Europe rather than by military aggression. Royer-Collard said of the July monarchy that Louis-Philippe saw very well that France could not stand a war ; what he did not see was that France could not stand a peace.

It may be the same with Hitler. If the Nazi régime can pursue its aims moderately, without bringing about a war, then there will be peace in Europe—for a time. Nobody supposes that it can last beyond a certain time, so long as the present international order remains what it is. Meanwhile, so long as there is not a war, what a good thing the Nazi régime is for the upper classes of Europe. Not only in Germany, where they have been "saved" from Liberalism and Socialism, but everywhere else : the danger from Nazi

Germany keeps the Left in France and Great Britain in order, stultifies their social aims, brings them into line over national defence, prevents them from gaining power, or if they gain it from exercising it. Really, if Hitler did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him; and some of the upper classes have had a pretty good hand in inventing him and keeping him going. But the end of the process, if some measure of collective security is not re-established, is a Europe dominated by Germany.

I have long been haunted by the thought that the upshot of British post-war policy, its evasions and confusions and duplicity, might be to postpone the day of reckoning for a time, at the expense of making Germany ever stronger against the rest of Europe. So that when our generation comes to face the responsibilities bequeathed to us, we may find Germany so strong that we cannot resist and are faced with defeat for this country and our friends later in our lives. It is by no means an impossible prospect. When all would have been so much easier if only our ruling class had played straight with the collective system since 1931. But on the basis of the existing order no collective system is ultimately possible. The conflicts of national state-sovereignty are ineluctable; a true, functioning international order presupposes the victory of the Left, at any rate in Great Britain, France and (probably) Germany. Meanwhile, it is the nature of the existing system to keep us ever on the brink of war. And, as I say to the "democratic" electorate in my own constituency: if you like it, go on voting for it. Alas, they do not understand what one means; they go on voting for it; and the tragedy is that they will pay for their folly not in their own lives—that would only be justice—but in those of their sons.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ANSCHLUSS

By GENEVAN

TWO principal misapprehensions have been fostered about Germany's occupation of Austria. They are important because both seem to have some success in obscuring the issue with which the European powers were then faced, and in helping to obscure further related issues with which they must inevitably be faced shortly.

The first misapprehension, and the weaker, concerns the *legality* of Germany's action. It is sought, (e.g., *inter alia* "Voelkischer Beobachter" *passim*, during the days following the Anschluss) to point out that the three principal actions, the appointment of the Seyss-Inquart Government, the entry of German troops into Austria, and the announcement of Austria's incorporation into the German Empire were legal actions brought about by the constituted government of Austria—in other words, it is sought to prove to a credulous world that Germany did not take Austria, but that Austria gave herself to Germany.

The second misapprehension concerns the true state of opinion in the country. It is sought, in fact, to prove that Austria not only gave herself to Germany, but that she did so in an orgy of enthusiasm unmarred by any afterthought, undisturbed by lingering doubt or fragment of (mistaken) principle—that, in fact (to quote a popular judgment in England), "the people seem to have wanted it, after all." The apparatus of German propaganda, with camera and film and the fade-units of radio equipment, with sight of crowds and sounds of their cheering, with demonstration, mass-meeting, procession and parade, with projection and concentration in the streets of men, women and children brought thither by special train, lorry, bus and blackmail, has concentrated on persuading the world that not only had

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Germany's action every legal justification, but every political and moral one as well. To accept that persuasion is to find a convenient salve for the conscience of the Western Powers in respect of the Anschluss, and to lay opinion open to the same obscuring misapprehension of the greater issues which lie before us. To anyone who has studied both conditions in Austria before the Anschluss and the exact course of the events—as far as determinable—which brought it about, this thesis of the real will of the Austrians is as patently a creation of propaganda as is the thesis of the legality of Germany's actions on March 11th and 12th.

There has already been published matter enough to demonstrate the falsity of the latter thesis. Nothing better, more detailed or authoritative on the true course of events is likely to appear for some time than the account given by a French observer in a contemporary review.¹ At the risk of it seeming ridiculous to employ space in disproving what no sane observer could consider anything but a legal fiction to excuse political motives, the main points may be mentioned here.

First, the Seyss-Inquart Government was appointed under pressure of a German ultimatum; under the same pressure Schuschnigg first called off his plebiscite, and then resigned. That ultimatum was a violation of the Austro-German agreement of July 11th, 1936, and that of February 12th, 1938. For Seyss-Inquart to say there was never an ultimatum is merely to play with words: that the ultimatum was delivered verbally still makes it none the less an ultimatum.

Second, the entry of the German troops into Austria, even according to the fiction maintained (though created a little too late) by the German and Austrian National Socialist Governments, was obtained in response to an appeal from the Seyss-Inquart Government for help against attacks which

¹*Revue de Paris*, May 1st, 1938. Article signed "Viator."

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had been made on National Socialists in Vienna and an armed rising of the workers. Of that creation more presently. The German troops entered in spite of the fact that the German ultimatum had been complied with in every point, in spite of the due and formal appointment of the Seyss-Inquart Government. In fact, only *after* the troops had crossed the frontier was the story fabricated of an appeal to the German Government, to substantiate which the German press invented the thin device of a telegram from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler (time unstated) asking urgently for German troops. The French writer, "Viator," states categorically that no such telegram was ever sent. It is impossible to check the absolute truth of the matter, but there is every reason to suppose that "Viator's" statement is founded on conclusive information. The French writer also states categorically that the first detachments of German troops crossed the frontier between a quarter and twenty-five minutes past eight on the night of the Friday (the writer of this article has information absolutely corroborating this estimate, which indeed is corroborated by every serious observer of the events and by every serious newspaper correspondent reporting them), that is, before there had been any announcement of an invitation to Germany to "protect" the Seyss-Inquart Government, which itself was not constituted and announced till after one o'clock in the morning.

Thirdly, the announcement of Austria's incorporation into the German Empire (Article I of the decree on the Anschluss, announced in the evening of March 12th) is made perfectly legal by paragraph 1 of Article 77 of the new Austrian Constitution of 1934, which passes the function of Federal President to the Federal Chancellor if the former should have resigned. President Miklas had resigned, that evening. The only discrepancy is that the announcement preceded by many days the plebiscite by which the Austrian

people were to decide whether or not their country was to be incorporated in Germany. The thesis of the formal "legality" of these actions is a thin pretence to cover a steady intention: it is only surprising that such a pretence should have been thought necessary.

More seriously confusing is the impression given and gained abroad of the real state of opinion in Austria—not only of the strength of the active National Socialist organizations, but also of the acquiescence in the Anschluss, if not the enthusiasm for it, of the great majority of Austrians. The complete absence of resistance of any sort, the impressive demonstrations, the total and immediate collapse of the patriotic Austrian organizations, the failure even of the rather advertised potential support for Schuschnigg of the Socialists—all these things combine to reinforce the carefully propagated idea that the Schuschnigg Government was supported by nothing but an inconsiderable minority, and that in the Anschluss the real will of the Austrian people has indeed been expressed.

To explain this collapse, the most frequent argument used is the failure of Schuschnigg to come to terms with the Socialists, who could have supported his Government against all-comers and, under pressure of anti-National Socialist feeling, would have done so if given the right inducement. That, however, is only half an explanation of the events. It is perfectly true that Schuschnigg failed to attract the Socialists to co-operate with his Government, but the element of greatest contemporary and international importance is the reason for which he failed. It is to be found only partly in the irreconcilable temperaments of the two parties concerned, and in the legacy of hatred and bitterness left by the civil war of 1934. The reproach of failure to conciliate the Socialists, indeed, may be made with more justice to the other tragic figure of post-war Austria, Dollfuss,

than to Schuschnigg. That Schuschnigg was temperamentally and ideologically as opposed to the Social Democrats as was Dollfuss is beyond doubt: if it needed illustration, his creation of his own section of the armed Heimatschutz body, the Ostmärkische Sturmsharen, nearly two years before the crisis of February, 1934, would alone be enough. But, whatever his limitations, which were considerable, he was not a fool, and it needed someone removed by only one degree from that estate to see the necessity, in the face of National Socialist agitation and terrorism, of effecting a reconciliation with the great body of the workers and with their Trades Union and Social Democrat leaders.

It is true that he began this work late; it is true also that only at the last moment, in the face of real danger to the Austrian State did he, through the Mayor of Vienna, Schmitz, offer real concessions to the workers—and obtain an immediate and whole-hearted response. There is also no doubt whatever that he could have obtained that response earlier; that, in particular, he could have obtained such vigorous support in Styria, as would have quelled with scarcely a struggle the young energumens of the National Socialist movement who ruled the streets of the Styrian towns. The work towards conciliation of the S.A.G. (*Soziale Arbeitsgemeinschaft*) promised success—how great a success, in some districts particularly, has never perhaps been realized. Even under the conditions in which it worked it achieved one notable if tardy demonstration—nearly one and a half million workers' signatures to a resolution of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government, signatures given in the majority of cases (as the writer of this article can personally testify) with no particular enthusiasm, in some instances under a certain amount of pressure, but given none the less.

Schuschnigg's failure to exploit this potential support of the workers is doubtless to be explained in part, but only in

part, by the opposition to anything Social Democratic of his middle-class and more reactionary supporters, and also by the almost traditional opposition of the Catholic influence which had contributed no small obstacle to conciliation in the presence of the Christian Trades Unions. Another considerable and perhaps hitherto unappreciated obstacle, too, to the progress of conciliation or of Austrian patriotism as opposed to pan-German National Socialism was to be found in the personnel of the Patriotic Front organization itself. In it were assembled a distressingly large number of ne'er-do-wells of the reactionary middle-class category, possessing, to quote a worker's judgment, no ability but that of "sitting through the seat of their uniform trousers in the coffee-houses and pubs." Styria and Upper Austria in particular were afflicted by these inactive leaders of the Austrian Nationalist movement.

Yet all these elements are in reality insufficient to explain why no effective progress at all was made towards conciliating the biggest and most important organized body of opinion in the country until it was too late for the conciliation to bear fruit. The only sufficient reason to explain the paralysis afflicting in this vital respect the Schuschnigg Government (that is, largely Schuschnigg himself) is to be found in German intervention, in secret violation of the agreement of July 11th, 1936, and culminating in the interview between Hitler and Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden, which led to the "agreement" of February 12th—intervention of an order betraying an absolutely clear *machtpolitische* intention and which made of Austria as international a question as the Sudeten-German problem itself now is: though indeed much more is at stake in Czechoslovakia than was the case in Austria, and the measure of international concern can no longer be maintained to be moral or abstract. It is regrettable, to say the least, that the essential diplomatic documents for

the history even of the last month of Austria's existence are unlikely now ever to come to light. Of the police archives, well known as is even the Tavs Plan almost down to its details, not even a photostat of that, for instance, is now probably to be found outside Greater Germany, nor is any ever likely to come out. German intervention can, indeed, never be proved. That it was real, and that it and none other was the deciding factor in Austria's internal state and in her final absorption by Germany is probably doubted by few, ignored by some, unknown to others. That it was fear of Germany, or rather an historically pathetic hope of conciliating her which paralysed Schuschnigg and prevented him from saving Austria—or, he could say, precipitating a crisis—there are illustrations enough, even if reading between the lines of that pathetically cautious document, Schuschnigg's own book, *Dreimal Oesterreich*, were not enough in itself.

As one illustration: towards the end of January, i.e., before the Berchtesgaden meeting, there was planned in Graz a large-scale mass meeting of the workers in demonstration of their support for Austria's independence and in counter-demonstration against the National Socialists, who had recently been having it all their own way in the city. The workers' meeting was much advertised and promised to be a success. Almost on the eve of it, on instructions from Vienna, it was cancelled. There was to be "no provocation"—though experience showed that there would not by any means necessarily be clashes between workers and National Socialists. Scattered meetings were allowed and were held with some success, but no principal mass meeting. The National Socialists triumphed; the workers could do nothing. It is plain that the order for "no provocation" came from the Chancellor. Underlying this attitude was, on the one hand, a time-gaining pretence of believing in the diplomatic game of "agreements" with Germany and, on the other, a

conviction on which was based a real physical fear. As late as the first days of February a deputation of Austrian Trades Union leaders, which offered an open alliance against National Socialist agitation, was told, nay, begged, to moderate its enthusiasm—and to its disingenuous question “Why?” was told bluntly “Because THEY will march in.” As corroborative evidence of the justification for this attitude one may instance the menacing outburst about “alliances with the Marxists” of German Press and radio at the slightest sign of progress towards a settlement with the workers, and the last very successful Nazi rumour of the many that had been used in the long and excellently conducted campaign of misrepresentation and agitation. This was the rumour which was launched as the excuse for calling in German troops on the night of March 11th, namely, that the Government (in Vienna the blame was put on Schmitz, the Mayor of the city) was arming the “Reds,” i.e., the workers in general. (On this subject “Viator” affirms categorically that Schmitz refused the suggestion of some of the workers’ leaders that arms should be issued to them. It can also be stated that in Graz the same suggestion was also discussed, and as firmly dismissed.)

It is not necessary to enlarge on the ostentatious courting of the detested Marxists by the National Socialist Government of Greater Germany once their potentialities as supporters of Austria’s independence were unrealized and unrealizable.

To deal finally, for a moment, with a remaining aspect of the Anschluss: what happened to the resistance of the remaining “patriotic” Austrians, legitimists or whatever else they were, who made up the estimated proportion of thirty-three per cent “Austrians” (thirty-three per cent Socialists, thirty-three per cent Nazis), who would have carried the plebiscite against Hitler and robbed him for ever of any possibility of justifying his absorption of Austria by

quoting an indeterminable popular majority in favour of being absorbed? What happened to the Army? Why, in short, did *all* resistance collapse, not merely that of the Socialists for lack of opportunity?

The answer is pathetically simple. The one (civil) side was armed, and the other was not. Those who were armed had learned to be ruthless. The brilliantly unscrupulous machinery of that ruthlessness is too well known to need repetition. The fear that it inspires can be imagined. Resistance in the circumstances could only be military resistance. The Army was loyal: the para-military Front Militia, which had absorbed the remains of the Heimwehr and Ostmärkische Sturmscharen needed to be mobilized adequately. The Army received the order not to resist—after London had told Austria she could expect no help and Paris had answered that France had no Foreign Minister. It is unnecessary to discuss to what extent or at what cost they could have resisted the elements of the German Army entering the country. The thirty-three per cent, shorn of its leaders and unprotected against the German Army and Air Force, submitted.

There were people who sympathized in a liberal spirit with the struggle of the Austrian National Socialists against the conditions prevailing in their country, conditions of depression and inertia, as a cure for which the vigour of a dictatorial régime on National Socialist lines seemed proper. Those people believed that a National Socialist Austria was possible, and even perhaps that Hitler thought it was possible and, therefore, supported it. They could not see that a National Socialist Ostmark of Greater Germany was the only thing possible. That is strange. But still stranger is that there were some Austrians who believed so, too.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S PRESS CONFERENCES

By LINDSAY ROGERS

FROM the outset of President Roosevelt's administration his friends and enemies have been in agreement on at least one point: the President has a remarkable talent for appealing to the electorate over the wireless and has displayed stellar qualities of showmanship. Since the American presidency is an institution separate from Congress, its head must pay attention to methods of impressing the country with his personality, his objectives and his abilities. A Prime Minister need not devote much time or thought to such a problem. His successes or failures with the legislature will determine his standing with the country in so far as policies are concerned. The informality of Parliamentary debate discloses the kind of person that he is.

Observers of the Washington scene have long been aware that, in the use of the Press, Mr. Roosevelt was proving himself much more adroit than most of his predecessors; that he was making a governmental institution out of his Press Conferences: the meetings twice a week with the Washington newspaper correspondents. The average conference has one hundred attendants. When it is previously known that anything of high importance is to be discussed, the number of conferees may reach two hundred. From these meetings there emanates news which in importance frequently rivals the news that results from Congressional deliberations or even from the relations of the executive with the legislature. The correspondents ask questions. The President answers them. His secretary may have suggested questions which the President wishes to answer, or

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he may elucidate without prior interrogation. Students of politics have paid some attention to these conferences, but their observations have had to be based in large part on what, to adapt the phrase that the French use about their Chamber of Deputies, may be called "*la cuisine de la maison blanche*." Now the workings of the Press Conference are more fully disclosed. The five volumes of *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* which have just been published (and which have been edited under his supervision) contain the proceedings of some of the Press Conferences which the President held during his first four years in office, with annotations by himself indicating the importance that he attaches to these regular meetings with the correspondents.

In order to protect the President in the event of a controversy over whether he did or did not say something which the newspapers report, a stenographic record is kept. The Public Papers contain the stenographic transcripts of forty-eight of the three hundred and thirty-seven conferences that were held during Mr. Roosevelt's first four years in the White House. There has been editing and expurgation, but the transcripts are in sufficient detail to give the flavour of the conferences and to permit more accurate generalizations than have been possible hitherto on their importance as a channel of Presidential publicity.

Before Theodore Roosevelt, few Presidents had felt it necessary to pay any attention to the methods by which they sought to elicit public support. When Grover Cleveland, for example, wished to bring a matter to the attention of the country he made a speech or penned a message to Congress. The change began with Theodore Roosevelt. He made his messages to Congress more argumentative and more dramatic than had his predecessors. He inspired articles in the newspapers and magazine press. He wrote

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letters to friends which were published before the friends received them. He was adept at sending up trial balloons which would indicate the drift of public opinion. He had his friends among the journalists and would let one of them announce that the executive contemplated a particular course of action. If the response was favourable, the action might be taken. If the repercussions were critical, then the President would change his mind and the popular conclusion would be that the journalist had guessed wrong. Roosevelt's successor—Mr. Taft—had an entirely different attitude towards the Press and the country. Before he entered the White House—when he was Secretary of War—he had been jovial and frank. As President he became formal and secretive. He battled for little. His chief struggles were defensive and they were uninteresting. His principal engagement was against Congressional insurgents and here he was on the unpopular side.

The advent of Woodrow Wilson wrought another change in the Presidential office. As leader of a party which had not held office for sixteen years he had a programme of drastic reforms which he wished to force on the statute book. With that programme he had great success. At the beginning of his administration he instituted the practice of meeting the correspondents to answer their questions. But when foreign problems became important—Mexico and neutrality—he was unwilling to risk the indiscretions that might result from discussions with a large number of journalists. He therefore abandoned the conferences and no more were held until the administration of President Harding.

He and Mr. Coolidge were in a sense titular executives. Most of their utterances on public questions seemed carefully to avoid any reasoned discussion of pending issues. In their conferences with White House correspondents they refused to appear in mental undress. President Harding had resumed

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Mr. Wilson's practice, but made a spectacular slip in declaring that the phrase, "insular possessions," in the Four-Power Treaty did not cover Japan's home islands. Thereafter the correspondents could ask questions only in writing. The President could prepare his replies and never be taken unawares. President Coolidge for the most part insisted on the same protection. During much of his administration, the President's views were represented as coming from a "White House spokesman"—a mythical personage who sprang forth full panoplied from the forehead of the god of publicity. Instead of quoting the President directly or of getting from him a private statement of his views so that, without quotation, they could interpret him correctly, the correspondents were compelled to report the opinions of "White House spokesmen" or "a spokesman for the President" or some other anonymous authority.

This system enabled the President to talk all he wanted to and yet to say nothing which he could not instantly disavow or withdraw. Criticisms of the device of a White House "spokesman"—they were many and severe—resulted in the sudden relegation of the mythical individual to the obscurity from which he had come. President Hoover rarely permitted himself to be quoted directly by the Press and, like his immediate predecessors, carefully eschewed mental *déshabillé*. Anything he said was issued in mimeographed form. Questions by correspondents had to be written, but he ignored so many and refused to answer so many others that the practice of holding the conferences fell into desuetude.

President Roosevelt reinstituted them. His buoyance and resilience permit him to enjoy the give and take of question and answer. He is a "ready man" and while his critics might maintain, in Macaulay's phrase, that the readiness had been encouraged "at the expense both of fulness and exactness," none can deny that he possesses it in a high

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degree. It is excellently displayed in his relations with the Press.

At his first Press Conference held in the midst of the banking crisis on March 8th, 1933 (and fully reported in the Public Papers). Mr. Roosevelt discussed the procedure he proposed to follow. He told the correspondents that they could ask him any questions that they wished to, but that he would use his own discretion as to whether he would reply. They would inquire about some matters on which he would be insufficiently informed. Some statements would be given out and on them direct quotation marks could be used. But there were two other purposes of the Press Conferences. "The first is 'background information,' which means material that can be used by all of you on your own authority and responsibility. . .

"Then the second thing," continued the President, "is the 'off the record' information which means, of course, confidential information which is given only to those who attend the conference. Now there is one thing I want to say right now about which I think you will go along with me. I want to ask you not to repeat 'off the record' confidential information either to your own editors or to your associates who are not here; because there is always the danger that, while you people may not violate the rule, somebody may forget to say: 'This is off the record and confidential,' and the other party may use it in a story. That is to say, it is not to be used and not to be told to those fellows who happen not to come around to the conferences. In other words, it is only for those present."

Under these rules all important policies and many unimportant matters are discussed in the Press Conferences. The newspaper correspondents know the President's mind far better than does Congress. They learn of important projects before or at the moment they are communicated to

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the legislature. Presidential messages to Congress which deal with complicated subjects—for example, finance—are explained in Press Conferences before they go to the legislature. In the case of the most spectacular proposal of his administration—additional justices of the Supreme Court of the United States—the President was careful to explain it at a Press Conference as well as to send it to Congress. The most discussed conference was that which followed the decision of the United States Supreme Court declaring the National Recovery Administration unconstitutional. It was then that the President discoursed for an hour on the Supreme Court's decision and used his oft-quoted figure of speech: "We have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce." This conference is one of the forty-eight that are fully reported in the Public Papers. At its conclusion, the correspondents asked whether they might quote the horse-and-buggy remark directly. The President said: "I think so," and his secretary added: "Just the phrase." There followed one or two other inconsequential questions and the conference was over. Next day the newspapers reported the President's views at great length, but only this one sentence was directly attributed to the President.

During his first administration, Mr. Roosevelt met with the correspondents almost as frequently as a Prime Minister appears in the House of Commons during the life of a Parliament. But there are significant differences. What the Prime Minister talks about is determined by the legislative time-table and the questions he is asked by members of the House of Commons. What is discussed in the Press Conferences is within the sole discretion of the President. On occasion, he may and does refuse to reply. The newspapers cannot report what questions go unanswered. What appears in the Press, therefore, is only what the President is willing to have appear.

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Secondly, a Prime Minister is always confronted by an opposition. In the Press Conferences, although they ask questions freely, the correspondents, out of respect for the Presidential office, must refrain from anything which resembles heckling. Mr. Roosevelt, in other words, is able to get his views before the country without immediate challenge and reply. The newspapers report the "background" information which attributes views to the President without interrupting the reports to suggest that the views are inconsistent with views previously expressed, or that they are based on inadequate factual material. Such analysis and criticism come later in editorial utterances or in speeches by opposition leaders.

In the third place, the President can and does use the Press Conferences to prevent the discussion of certain matters. He can keep news from "boiling over." He may, that is to say, discourse to the correspondents "off the record" and outline some contemplated policy so that no mention of it can be made in the Press. Such an injunction of secrecy must be maintained until he gives his consent to its removal. Frequently intelligent and inquisitive correspondents would have been able to discover for themselves that certain policies were contemplated. Their doing this and then using the information may be barred by Presidential utterances which are "off the record," and which disclose information which would soon have reached the correspondents.

Finally, because the President is the judge of what he wants to be published, he can use the conferences to distract attention from proceedings in Congress or from other matters which are in public controversy. It has been said, and there is some evidence to support the suspicion, that while the President had had in mind for some time a speech on foreign affairs along the lines of the famous "quarantine" speech

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he made in Chicago, there was deliberate timing so as to drive from the front pages of the newspapers the discussion of Mr. Justice Black's return from Europe and the statement that he might make about taking his seat on the Supreme Court of the United States despite the revelation that he had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan. That is a spectacular instance of the President being willing to lessen public attention to matters which are embarrassing to him and to attract public attention to himself and matters which will give the people something new to think about. The same kind of strategy, however, is used frequently in Press Conferences. It is a strategy which, as is obvious, can be greatly to the advantage of the executive.

The published records of the Press Conferences throw a bright light on one important aspect of the Presidential office; it has to deal with a tremendous range of complicated questions and must handle the trivial along with the important. Hence Mr. Roosevelt has discussed with the Press many matters which, under other systems of government, would be kept entirely within departments and would not come before a Cabinet. In part, the devotion of his time to petty matters results from his habit of mind which makes him interested in details. In part, it is compelled by the Presidential office which both legally and politically is a conduit through which a vast amount of detail has to flow. A President of a different temperament, impatient of detail, might be able to circumvent political and legal restrictions and, on certain matters at least, to have them dealt with entirely by subordinates for whose decisions he would accept responsibility.

But apart from the minor matters in which Mr. Roosevelt takes a personal interest, there is a tremendous range of public questions on which, in the conferences with correspondents, he must seem to be omniscient. At one conference,

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for example, the President began by saying that he had no particular news. Then he was asked about the proposed improvement of the Washington airport facilities and a controversy over the character of the memorial that should be erected in honour of Thomas Jefferson. He then turned to the work of the Interstate Commerce Commission and jumped from that to the desirability of trade unions making a public report of their receipts and expenditures. There was some discussion of the Trades Disputes Act in Great Britain and Mr. Roosevelt, without going into details, remarked that the British system was worth studying. He was then asked about government loans to railroads and replied without giving any information. He was not sufficiently familiar with a proposal of the Governor of Pennsylvania that the anthracite coal-fields be taken over by the national government or with a recent increase in Mexican tariff rates to talk about them.

Approaching conferences that he was to hold with automobile manufacturers, the possibility that the Tennessee Valley Authority would buy out certain public utilities, the educational value of the motion picture of "The March of Time" on Nazi activities were broached, but did not stir the President to loquacity. His conferences with business leaders were returned to; there was some discussion of economic planning, and questions and answers on agriculture with particular reference to an alleged inconsistency between limiting acreages for certain crops and restoring lands to cultivation through the Reclamation programme. Then followed a discussion of prices—were they too high or in some cases not high enough? Finally, the correspondents asked about holding companies. At a previous conference the President had said in an offhand way that all holding companies should be abolished. That remark secured large headlines and it had to be explained away at subsequent

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conferences. Only certain kinds of holding companies had been meant. Rarely, however, does the President commit such an indiscretion. His readiness is usually sufficiently exact.

But it must be, as I have said, readiness on such a wide range of matters as to limit fulness and exactness on some policies that are of fundamental importance. The President himself seems to realize this. In May, 1935, the House of Representatives passed a resolution inviting him to transmit to the House the transcript of a conference with the Press on the attitude of certain types of business organizations towards legislative proposals. President Roosevelt replied that he did not believe "that it would be advisable for me to create the precedent of sending to the Congress for documentary use the text of remarks I make at the bi-weekly conferences with the newspaper representatives here in Washington.

"It is my desire that these conferences should continue on the free and open basis which I have endeavoured to maintain at all times. To create the precedent of permitting questions and answers which come up at a Press Conference to be transcribed and printed in the Congressional Record or other official document would mean that I no longer would feel like speaking extemporaneously and informally, as is my habit, and it would bring to me a consciousness of restraint as well as a necessity for constant preparation of my remarks. The simple truth is that I do not have the time to give to such preparation for a Press Conference." In some cases he does prepare himself carefully—always on the financial estimates and occasionally on special subjects such as those covered in the "horse-and-buggy" conference. The question is, however, whether the President should not prepare himself before he makes statements on any matter of public importance.

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In addition to the student of politics, the analyst of Mr. Roosevelt's personality will find these transcripts of Press Conferences to be of great interest. Informality is their dominant note. The President calls many of the correspondents by their given names. They joke about his first salary cheque, the excellence of the beer that Mr. Roosevelt has presented to the Press Club, and who is going to win an intercollegiate boat-race. The records also show some levity in dealing with matters of great moment. The hostile critic may think that they show irresponsibility. I give one illustration—taken from a discussion of the London Economic Conference (May 10th, 1933). The record as it appears in the Public Papers reads in part as follows.

"Q. Mr. President, do you or do you not consider the settlement of the war debts vital to the success of the Economic Conference?

"*The President.* Have I stopped tickling the toes of my mother-in-law? (*Laughter.*) Yes or no?

"I don't know, it is too ticklish a question to answer. Are my mother-in-law's feet ticklish? (*Laughter.*) In other words, of course, some cleaning-up of the debt issue would be a fine thing, but it is not necessarily tied in with the success of the Economic Conference. The two are not necessarily wired together. They may be, what shall I say, 'platonic friends'?"

Whatever one thinks of the humour one must have a friendly feeling for a President who does not take himself too seriously; who, in editing his Public Papers, does not wield a blue pencil on a colloquy like the one which I have quoted.

In one conference that the President had with teachers in schools of journalism, to illustrate to them the method of his Press Conference, he talked about the attitude which the newspapers were manifesting towards his Administration.

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He thought that news stories were being "coloured"; that there was a growing tendency on the part of the public not to believe what they read in newspapers. "Lack of confidence in the Press to-day," he declared, "is not because of the editorials, but because of the coloured news stories and the failure on the part of some papers to print the news." He here voiced in vague terms a complaint which he made more explicit in one of the notes of comment which he has written especially for the collection of his Papers. He complained that the overwhelming number of newspapers in the United States had criticized the New Deal and this despite the fact that the popular endorsement had been overwhelming. He thought that the majority of newspaper correspondents were friendly to him and approved his objectives. He knew some correspondents who wrote "unfriendly" articles not as representing their own views but because they were expected to do so by the owners of their papers. He made it clear (as he has in Press Conferences since the Papers were prepared for publication) that he regretted the great popularity of so-called "columnists" or interpretive writers who purveyed gossip and, in his opinion, sometimes misrepresented his plans and purposes. It is only recently that Mr. Roosevelt has been expressing such views. Since his defeat on the Court proposal which encouraged the opposition to become more critical, Mr. Roosevelt has seemed more and more sensitive. He has yet to learn that he must take the bitter with the sweet. A wise politician, conscious of his strength, does not complain of the opposition's tactics. In the United States the Press is an important and indispensable part of the "opposition"—far more so than in a country which has Parliamentary government.

Writers on politics have frequently noted the paradox that representative institutions developed in an age when illiteracy was general, when electorates were small, and the

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transmission of intelligence was slow. Thus institutions which have changed but slightly during the last century now function in a period when electorates are vast, education is popular, and the Press is cheap (I refer only to price). Moreover, the cinema and wireless have political potentialities which, as yet inadequately comprehended, are of tremendous and perhaps ominous significance. "Political inventiveness has in general fallen far short of the originality displayed in other fields than politics by the citizens of progressive or civilized states." That judgment was expressed by Professor Dicey in the introduction of the 1915 edition of his "Law of the Constitution." President Wilson had just begun to hold his Press Conferences. The historian may call President Roosevelt a political inventor. He could not procure a patent on the original idea of Press Conferences, but he could obtain a patent on the uses to which he puts the device. He has made the Press Conference a part of the American governmental machinery and has thereby annoyed, even if he has not yet alarmed, the Congress of the United States.

THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

By KINGSLEY MARTIN

IT is well known that about the time of the abortive conversations between England and Germany last winter, one of Germany's demands was the suppression of articles and cartoons in the British press, which represented leaders of Nazi Germany in an unfavourable light. The demand was backed by a list of newspapers and cartoonists whose criticism was annoying to the Führer. The suggestion was naturally resented in this country as foreign interference with internal life of England; the Press also disliked the implication that the British Government had the power, even if it had the will, to dictate the attitude of British newspapers. One wonders whether the suggestion was made on the assumption that the British Government intended to introduce legislation abolishing the existing legal rights of free speech in this country, or whether it was assumed that the Government's influence could in fact achieve results which transcended the limitations of its legal powers. Possibly it was thought that the Press was like the B.B.C., which is also constitutionally an independent organization, though in practice seldom found in disharmony with the Government on questions of foreign politics. In any case the German Government's attempt was not surprising; it is the common assumption in Fascist countries that any legal structure that gives the individual rights against the government is an absurd relic of a libertarian age which should be abolished lest it breeds Socialism.

The "freedom of the Press" is a technical term. It means the right which the Englishman possesses at common law to print what he wishes without prior censorship, prohibition or restriction by the Government. This right to start a

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newspaper and to say what one wishes in it without permission was only gradually established during the long struggle for individual liberty which was the political aspect of the economic victory of the middle-class over the feudal aristocracy. But it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the last of "the taxes on knowledge" was removed and the right of unlicensed printing, as Milton had called it two centuries earlier, could be regarded as completely won. During the last eighty years, then, one may say that the full meaning of the freedom of the Press has been realized in the sense attached to the phrase by the philosophers of individualism from Milton and Locke to Bentham and Mill. The individual was at liberty to start a newspaper and to say what he liked in it just as he was at liberty to start a shop and sell in it what he pleased. The only restrictions were such practical considerations as the capacity to find the capital necessary to start the shop or newspaper. The criminal law only interfered when the individual, in exercising his right to sell or print what he pleased, sold something that was poisonous or printed something that contravened the laws of blasphemous or seditious libel or offended against some special statute like the Mutiny Act of 1797.

The growth of totalitarianism on the Continent and various threats to democracy even in countries which still regard the State as the servant and not the master of the public will, makes it urgently necessary to take stock of the actual situation. How far does this legal freedom from State interference in practice ensure freedom for the critic of Government policy? The question is all the more important because in countries in which democratic rights have been surrendered very little fight has been put up either by the Press or by its readers.

One reason for the lack of public protest at the loss of a

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liberty for which our grandfathers gladly suffered persecution is immediately obvious. The pioneers of liberty who won the rights of free worship, free speech, freedom from arbitrary arrest, free publication, and a political vote were practical men struggling against an oppressive system; they struggled not for an abstract liberty, but for the concrete opportunity to do things that they wanted to do and which the law prevented them from doing. Old laws and administrative despotism prevented them from occupying positions and making money in fields which were naturally theirs. The services of the monopolistic State were manifestly inefficient; they asked for "freedom" because they intended to perform these services themselves and were sure that free competition would ensure the best services as well as services that would be remunerative to the individual instead of to place-holders and monopolists. To-day the grandsons of these pioneers have used this freedom to get into the saddle: they have themselves become the State which was their grandfathers' enemy, while the workers who helped in this struggle for "the rights of man" and who shared, as far as legal victory was concerned, in the triumph of the individualist cause, have less reason to believe in the benefits of individualism to-day than rationalist fighters like Carlile and Hetherington a century ago. In one industry after another they have seen Free Trade and open competition, though still legally established, in fact restricted by the growth of the new monopoly of wealth. The remedy they see in such cases is not, as a rule, an attempt to return to the old system of *laissez-faire*, but an advance—or reversion, if you will—to a State monopoly on the assumption that the State can to-day be transformed into a public service organization, controlled in the public interest and not in the interests of privilege and wealth.

Commercially, the Press has been through precisely the

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same stages as other industries; you are as legally free to start a national newspaper to-day as you were fifty years ago, but Lord Northcliffe declared, before he died, that he had made it impossible to establish a national newspaper with a capital of less than £2,000,000 (If he meant establish as a paying proposition he seems to have been right. The stories of the *Daily Herald* and the *Daily Worker* are apposite). At this stage, in other national industries labour demands nationalization. But the Press is a special case. In the absence of social revolution, which would make the proletariat the dictator, the working man sees quite clearly that the present position gives him a better service than a nationalized Press could do. To-day he may have had to fall back on the capitalist to enable him to produce the *Daily Herald*, and he knows that any working-class paper labours under immense disadvantages in comparison with its capitalist rivals. But Labour and Left Wing opinion does find expression. To surrender the legal right of unlicensed printing would be to pass the minds as well as the bodies of the workers over to the control of the employing class.

Men do not want freedom as an abstraction, but as the necessary condition for certain concrete benefits. If legal freedom does not produce, as the individualists thought it would, a satisfactory service, the mere absence of legal restriction ceases to be a matter upon which men feel strongly; they begin to listen with attention to those who promise the substance of service and opportunity which *laissez-faire* failed to bring. Therefore, if we wish to rebut Germany's request to-day, it is not enough merely to say that we in this country believe in freedom from Government censorship; we must consider in addition how far the Press serves the interests of the mass of citizens and how far it has become a plutocratic monopoly which has destroyed in substance the freedom which the law formally guarantees.

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I know of no subject of social investigation less easy to deal with than the service actually provided by the Press. There are many reasons for this. The nature of the service is psychological even more than it is material. We can measure the efficiency and speed with which the financial pages supply the ups and downs of the day's markets. But the efficiency with which the world's news is supplied cannot be estimated except in terms of our own personal opinions and political preferences. Apart from this overriding difficulty there is the unusual problem of an industry into which there have been no public inquiries and which, since it is itself the principal channel of publicity, possesses the best possible means of guarding its own secrets. Thus there are many books of journalistic gossip and a few that provide indiscreet pictures and shrewd generalizations about the nature and social effects of the modern Press. But no basis of scientific investigation or statistical information yet exists. The nearest approach to such an investigation has just been published by P.E.P.¹ Its report on the British Press is the result of an elaborate piece of co-operative investigation in which a number of men with good practical knowledge of Fleet Street have contributed. It gives an excellent account of the structure of the newspaper industry; it supplies the facts about the actual newsprint on which papers are printed and the recent financial transaction by which newspapers have changed hands; and it tells us who to-day owns the Press and how those who write and print it are paid and organized. On all such matters the P.E.P. report is valuable and comprehensive. Its later chapters cannot be so comprehensive, though they, too, are valuable. When one comes to discuss such problems as the influences brought to bear on the selection and display of news, and their effect on the reader, no report can be more than a well-selected series of examples

¹ *Report on the British Press*, P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning), 16, Queen Anne's Gate, London, S.W.1.

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which indicate tendencies which will certainly be more prevalent in one newspaper office than another. P.E.P. is to be congratulated on being more outspoken than writers on the Press have usually been about the influence of the proprietor and more particularly of the advertiser. And though their discussion of the relations of the Press and the public is limited, it is sensible and honest. The report, as a whole, thus provides a great deal of useful material for those who wish to give a considered answer to the question I have raised above, how far the German leaders might get their way in obtaining a favourable Press in England, short of Fascist legislation in this country.

I want first to consider the present position of the Press in relation to Blackstone's definition of the liberty of the Press as consisting "in laying no previous restraints upon publication and not in freedom from censure for criminal matters when published." It will then be necessary to ask further how far influences and circumstances might *gleichgeschalt* the British Press without further changes in the law.

Suppose the British Government had wished to comply with Germany's proposal. What legal weapons would have been at their disposal? The legal doctrine of Blackstone still holds good; there is liberty to print what one wishes on the understanding that one may be punished if one disobeys the law. The laws which the journalist may offend in writing can be grouped as follows: First there are laws to defend public morals. One may still commit blasphemous libels and obscene libels; and there are also laws dealing with lotteries and sweepstakes and restrictions upon reports of divorce cases and of some types of hearing in juvenile courts. These restrictions are not for the moment relevant. Then there is the law relating to contempt of court, which in certain circumstances might have considerable political significance. In so far as it protects the accused person from

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prejudicial gossip and comment the law is obviously useful. But the other branch of the law of contempt which protects the judge from anything which might cast doubt on his impartiality or competence has been so widely interpreted that most papers to-day are afraid of criticizing any decision or words that emanate from the higher courts. The newspapers have been much more careful since the leading case of 1928 in which the editor of *The New Statesman* was brought to book for saying that certain types of litigant could scarcely hope to receive justice in Mr. Justice Avory's court. This case clearly illustrated the helplessness of the offending paper, editor, writer and printer. On an accusation of having "scandalized" one of His Majesty's judges, they may have to appear before a bench of judges, from whose decision there is no appeal. This court has unrestricted powers to imprison for any period and impose a fine of any sum. In these circumstances no editor of a responsible paper has any choice except to apologize abjectly and throw himself on the court's mercy. He might, of course, if he had only himself to think of, prefer to justify his criticism and be sent to prison; he would certainly gain notoriety, applause for his courage and, if his criticism reflected a popular discontent, he would undoubtedly gain popularity and prestige. In such circumstances the Court would probably feel impelled by public opinion to limit the period of imprisonment. The effect might even be to make criticism of judges more possible in the future. But an editor, who might personally prefer such a bold course, would probably be deterred by the court's power to inflict a fine calculated to bankrupt the newspaper. It will be seen that in the hypothetical case of a judge who should display political bias and disregarded the liberties that he is supposed to safeguard, no paper of standing would be in a position to do more than put up a very guarded protest; the only remedy would be redress by both Houses of Parliament.

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The third set of restrictions which the journalist must remember are the laws of libel. Criminal libel is a weapon now seldom used, but still held in reserve—as the Lord Chief Justice hinted in a recent case. About the general effect of the law of civil libel I do not wish to speak at length here. It has become the journalist's nightmare and the breeding-ground for a new type of legal racketeer who lives on a species of blackmail paid out by newspapers which prefer settlement out of court to the costs and uncertainties of legal action. The effects of the law are good as well as bad; few people who have watched the course of French politics would wish the English Press to be accorded the liberty of personal slander enjoyed by Paris newspapers. On the other side one must set the excessive costs and punitive damages sometimes awarded in cases where a simple apology and payment for any actual damage done would appear to meet the case. As a result, newspapers have become regrettably timid about exposing public scandals even when they are notorious throughout the length and breadth of Fleet Street. The P.E.P. report draws attention to the peculiarly harmful effects of the libel laws in relation to the City. Honest criticism of new issues or of doubtful gambles by financiers are as dangerous as they are obviously in the public interest. I well remember my own difficulty when the nature of the pepper scandal first became clear. That there had been shady dealings was obvious, and it was certainly in the public interest that some of the principal persons involved should be exposed for their dealings in other matters as well as in pepper. But the risk was too great. In certain circumstances, the severity of the English law of libel may have very important political effects. One could name, were it not for the law of libel, one or two persons holding positions of great public responsibility who might never have reached those regions if the public had been

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aware of the manner in which they had acquired their money.

The fourth type of legal restriction on the Press was originally designed to deal with foreign spies and the selling of official information likely to be of use to an alien power. This apparently innocuous law was passed, as the P.E.P. report reminds us, in 1889 because no legal proceedings could be taken against a Foreign Office copying-clerk who revealed the details of the Anglo-Russian Agreement to the *Globe* newspaper. Its scope has been extended to remarkable lengths. Under the subsequent Acts of 1911 and 1920 the courts in 1932 imprisoned a *Daily Mail* reporter who obtained advance information about wills from Somerset House, while the facts about naval concentration in the Mediterranean during the Abyssinian dispute were suppressed during the entire dispute; in a case at Stockport, in August, 1937, a reporter was fined five pounds for refusing to disclose the source of information he had received, though that information came from no more secret source than a police circular. This case was a striking warning of the lengths to which the Press might be muzzled by the Official Secrets Act. News collecting and news printing will be dangerous trades indeed if the publication of information of so apparently harmless a character is brought within the scope of legislation designed for use against spies and traitors.

Finally, we are left with the large powers of the Government to punish sedition. The vague doctrine of seditious libel under Common Law gave almost unlimited scope for prosecuting any words which can be construed as calculated to stir up class against class or indeed as likely to bring His Majesty's Government into contempt. These powers have not been used for generations, but they still exist and might be revived in a crisis. Where sedition has been punished in recent years it has been done under special Statutes. The original Mutiny Act passed during the naval mutiny in

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1797 was not used between 1803 and 1912, when Tom Mann and the printers and publishers of *The Syndicalist* were convicted under it for urging soldiers to disobey their officers if they were ordered to fire on strikers. At that very time, as the P.E.P. report notices, the Unionists, including several ex-Cabinet Ministers, were openly calling for a mutiny in the army in the event of the military being used to coerce Ulster. On November 30, 1913, the *Observer* said that every Unionist ought to prepare to leave the Territorials and advocated resistance to recruiting. But the Asquith Government prosecuted neither the *Observer* nor Sir Edward Carson. In 1931, after the Invergordon incident, the 134-year-old Act was again invoked, this time to send the printer of the *Daily Worker* (who incidentally was not a Communist) to gaol, though it was not shown that the paper had "incited" any particular sailor or sailors. Presumably this Act was regarded as inadequate, and the Incitement to Disaffection Act of 1934 was passed after a long struggle in which the Government was induced by public pressure to accept a number of important amendments. This Act is, I think, the first British statute to contravene the principle laid down by Blackstone that a man is only a criminal after he has committed a crime. It introduces the novel principle that a man can be convicted for his presumed intention; he may be held guilty of an offence if he has in his possession literature which might make a soldier or sailor seditious or mutinous if it were shown to them. So far the Act of 1934 has only been used once when a student of Leeds University was sentenced to a year's imprisonment for trying to persuade an R.A.F. Corporal to become a Communist and steal an aeroplane to help the Spanish Government. But as in the case of libel, it is the existence of the Act rather than the frequency of its use that is important. Just as many scandals are well known in Fleet Street, but not given to the world

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for fear of the penalties of libel, so articles advocating the Quaker point of view are sometimes suppressed because the publisher and, in the case where the paper or book is printed under contract, the printer also, fear to run the risk of words which the court might construe as being likely to seduce a soldier or sailor from his duty. P.E.P. report quotes two cases in which printers have refused to take the risk and blank spaces have been left to show the public how the Act worked. It is important to notice that these cases appeared in *The Friend* and in *The New Leader*; as things stand at present it is the pacifist and the adherent of the I.L.P. who are likely to suffer under the new Act, especially at a time of intensive recruiting. It was commonly believed that the Act was aimed quite as much at Communists as at Christian pacifists, but the constitutional attitude of the Communist Party (whose policy is at present to support the idea of collective security against Fascist Powers) makes the Act, for the moment at least, irrelevant to their propaganda.

This survey of the legal restrictions on the Press shows that the Government of Britain is a long way from possessing the legal powers to control the Press which would be necessary if Hitler and Ribbentrop were to be made immune from criticism. Only in the Incitement to Disaffection Act do we find the Fascist principle common to all totalitarian and authoritarian governments that a man may be prevented and punished for an act which he has only presumed to have intended and has not actually done. It is, as the P.E.P. report points out, highly unlikely that this libertarian principle would survive the outbreak of another war. The wide provisions of D.O.R.A. provided a sufficient censorship between 1914 and 1918, and a similar measure of restriction is doubtless waiting in a pigeon-hole to be used in case of war.

II

In war conditions, censorship is more likely to be imposed

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to prevent praise of Nazi Germany than to stop criticism of Hitler. But the German leaders were thinking of peace-time restrictions, the result perhaps of influence rather than of legislation. If we assume, as they were presumably assuming, a by no means impossible situation in which a British Government was determined on a rapprochement with Germany, involving participation, say, in a Four Power Pact directed against the U.S.S.R., the majority of the Press could, I think, be relied upon to maintain the necessary discretion about German news. The P.E.P. report remarks that Foreign Office pressure was enough to quiet British Press comments during the week-end when Hitler entered Austria and that it was only after its seizure that the word was given for free comment. The Foreign Office method is to impose the obligation of confidence upon Press correspondents; it is difficult, in this country at any rate, to betray information confidentially imparted and to resist the accompanying hint that in so delicate a situation, and with war possibly hanging in the balance, nothing should be said to exacerbate feeling or embarrass His Majesty's Ministers. The incident of the Laval-Hoare proposals was singularly instructive. In that case a conference of British journalists was held in Paris; some of them saw Sir Samuel Hoare himself. The correspondents were solemnly requested not to publish any rumours or private information they might obtain about proposals to Italy; it would be all right in a few days' time, but discretion was essential at so delicate a moment. The correspondent of one well-known British paper has told me that when he listened to this request he actually had the Laval-Hoare terms in his pocket and other correspondents were no doubt in a similar difficulty. The back-doors of the Quai d'Orsay are not so well guarded as those of Whitehall. Confronted with this request, British correspondents were profoundly embarrassed. If the terms were to go through, the request for

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secrecy was certainly reasonable. On the other hand, some of the correspondents regarded the proposals as scandalous in themselves and felt sure that in any case they would leak out in the French Press. How combine professional duty to their papers and to the public with their feelings as gentlemen? In the case of the journalist I have mentioned the problem was solved by the dispatch of the terms to his newspaper accompanied by a covering note to the editor explaining the circumstances. He also enclosed a colourless message which his editor could print if he felt it necessary to accede to the official request for secrecy. England being England, the editor of this paper kept back the news (which indeed he could hardly believe to be true). But the irrepressible Pertinax and the irreverent Madame Tabouis promptly gave the whole story to the French Press. We have here a nice illustration of the problem. As long as France remains a democracy it will not be easy to maintain a successful censorship over the British Press in foreign affairs, but given a sufficiently delicate situation there are very few papers in England which would care for the responsibility of publishing material which may embarrass the Government—particularly a Conservative Government. There will be small Radical or Communist papers which will follow the old conservative injunction "to publish and be damned," but the great organs of opinion are both too conscious of responsibility and under too many obligations to Whitehall to run the risk. Given a Socialist Government in power, I am by no means sure that the same influences would operate. In that case I should not expect the Rothermere or Beaverbrook Press to maintain in relation to a Left government those traditions that have been so successfully transmitted to Radical and Socialist newspapers. From the Nazi point of view these facts should not be discouraging. Provided the general intentions of the Government and the ruling class were to establish friendly relations

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with Germany, the number of papers unamenable to influence is very limited. The old independent *Morning Post*, so outspoken and critical of Government incompetence even during the war, has died and been buried in the rising bulk of the *Daily Telegraph*. *The Times*, controlled by persons who have the reputation of wishing for conciliation with Germany, is close to the Government, and though occasionally very effective in criticism (it led the attack on the Laval-Hoare terms), *The Times* could probably be relied upon at a crisis to say nothing upsetting to German susceptibilities. The *Observer* needs no persuasion to take the same line, at least as long as Mr. Gavin edits it. Lord Rothermere, once the most vigorous of all Hun-baiters, has long been pro-Nazi, while Lord Beaverbrook is the chief crusader in the cause of national isolation and an intimate friend of the present Prime Minister. Lord Camrose, in charge of the *Daily Telegraph*, and his brothers, who control innumerable newspapers, follow the general policy of supporting the Government. The problem would only arise in the case of papers which were now in opposition to the Government. Here one must not be dogmatic. Much would depend on the situation and on the type of approach made. The Government would have to consider different techniques in the case of the *News Chronicle*, the *Daily Herald*, *Manchester Guardian* and a number of other independently owned provincial papers, but provided that no hint of coercion was implied and that the situation was one in which it could be suggested that peace was at stake and that everything depended on national unity, I should expect private influence to produce the required measure of discretion almost everywhere. The only daily paper certainly not amenable to influence would be the *Daily Worker*, which if Germany's proposals were accepted by the Government, would presumably have to be silenced by some other method. I doubt whether new legislation

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would be necessary for the purpose. To-day, the *Daily Worker* adopts a constitutional line of policy; it should be remembered that it was more than once successfully prosecuted when its policy was more revolutionary than it is to-day.

In brief I should say that while the extreme Left would not be amenable to "influence," and while certain weekly papers with influential but limited circulations would be difficult to manage, most of the daily Press, if properly handled, could be brought into line without special legislation. The *New Chronicle*, the *Daily Herald* and the *Manchester Guardian* would all need separate and careful treatment, but if I were Prime Minister I should not despair of success.

At the Queen's Hall meeting on June 8, when distinguished writers of very varying political views united to declare their opposition to Fascism, a well-known journalist assured the audience that most British journalists were anti-Fascist and that those "worthy of the name" could be relied upon not to betray the cause of freedom, whatever efforts might be made to control the Press. The first part of this statement is certainly correct, and that in itself provides some reason for doubting the second part. For if the majority of British journalists are already the employees of papers which present views in which they profoundly disbelieve, it seems to me not impossible that they could be persuaded to remain at work even if the Press became a good deal more pro-Fascist and subject to Governmental influence than it is to-day. The managing editor of a great Conservative paper told me the other day that on the whole staff of the paper and of its accompanying evening paper he had been unable to find more than half a dozen of Conservative opinions. Yet you will find nothing in either of those papers which is not Conservative. Are the journalists consciously advocating views which they detest? Have they been offered so much

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cash on condition that they forget that they are Socialists or Radicals? Of course not. Such questions are crude. Journalists learn from the necessity of earning their living to become mere technicians. They live double lives: at work, they write up the news in a way they know their paper will accept; political colour is given by the headline, and the ultimate decisions about the choice of leading news stories and the suppression of other stories are made by those in higher authority. In his other, private life the journalist usually expresses more or less Left opinions; he knows too much to believe in the *status quo*. But he is apt to work off his outraged feelings in cynical comment, finding some comfort in describing himself as a prostitute in a system he cannot alter. Journalists are excellently organized to maintain their standard of living. Politically speaking, they are as helpless as they are influential. Possibly it is to the question of organisation and professional independence that those who mind about maintaining the freedom of the Press should turn their attention.

THE GROWTH AND DECAY OF TOWNS

By HENRY A. MESS

THE title is of course too big for the actual subject. It is not intended to deal with the growth and decay of towns all over the world and throughout history, impressive phenomena which have given rise to a good deal of moralizing and some political speculation. In this article there will be considered a number of cases of growth and decay which belong to our own country and either to the present time or to comparatively recent times; and with regard to them the concern will be mainly with questions of civic consciousness and of municipal boundaries. The nineteenth century witnessed a number of mushroom growths, and we in our day are seeing some rapid expansions; we are also witnesses of a number of cases of decline and decay. In earlier periods of history growths and decay sometimes attracted comment, but the processes were not fully recorded nor were they scientifically studied. We are far more aware than in any previous age of the changes which are taking place, and we have a better technique of record and of analysis.

There is not, so far as I am aware, any agreed definition of a town. Some authorities¹ would refuse the title to any aggregation of less than 10,000 persons. That number seems to me to be too high. The sociological difference between a town and a village is that the inhabitants of a village are a face-to-face group, all knowing each other. The limit for that kind of group is probably nearer to 5,000, and even at that figure village mentality has usually passed into small-town mentality. The distribution of houses over area is also

¹ E.g., Makarewicz, quoted by Maciver, *The Elements of Social Science*, page 57.

important; many of our urban districts are not towns but groups of small towns or of large villages. Town implies a continuum of buildings. But size and continuity are not by themselves enough; two other elements are necessary to constitute a group of houses and families a town; the inhabitants must have a sense of the town's existence, and they must have some organization or organizations through which to express their sense of community. A mere continuum of houses is not necessarily a town; we shall discuss later in this article the problems of conurbations. And in point of size there is possibly an upward limit beyond which town or city consciousness is so attenuated as to have little value, with corresponding difficulties for local government. In this connection London problems immediately occur to our minds.

I

I come now to my main theme, which is the ways in which different processes of formation of towns affect the attitudes of their inhabitants to those towns, and the interactions between their attitudes and the development of local government. Let us consider some of the ways in which a large urban aggregation may arise.

1. A large town may arise by the expansion of a small town over what was previously open country. In this, the simplest case, it is not difficult for the expanded population to retain its sense of community and indeed to have a greater interest and greater pride in their town. Nor has there normally been any great obstacle in the way of extending the municipal boundary, though the opposition of rural district council, and at a later stage of county council, may have to be faced.

2. It is more likely that during the growth of a large town there will be absorption of surrounding villages, and these may have long traditions of community life. In such case

these become secondary foci of civic consciousness, and some remnant of the village tradition may last surprisingly long. English local government has been built on the parish, and the parish church has its place in local sentiment even to-day. Where an old village becomes the nucleus of a modern ward, there may be a political consciousness which is absent in the ward that is merely an arbitrary division of area and of population without roots in the past.

3. In some cases a village has itself expanded into a fairly large town, and in such cases a good deal of village mentality usually persists long after village conditions have passed. Quite often the village mentality is feudal mentality. I know one grim industrial town in county Durham, with a population of about 25,000, whose elder inhabitants were speaking of the "Squire" only a few years ago. The squire has not lived there for many years past; the manor house is a hospital; the present "squire," who owns the freehold of nearly all the town, deals with the town almost entirely through an agent; yet some glamour still attaches to his name and position. Miss Jennings tells us that to this day the Duke of Beaufort is received with considerable ceremony when he visits his town of Brynmawr.¹ The feudal element is by no means negligible in modern town sentiments; and where it is present it does probably act as a preservative force, it has some value as a cohesive device.

4. In other cases a number of urban communities, large or small towns, which were formerly separated from one another by belts of open country, and which had each its own community life, have expanded until they have become contiguous. They are the chains of towns for which Patrick Geddes invented the term "conurbation." It is in connection with these that there arise the most interesting and the most difficult questions of relation between consciousness

¹ *Brynmawr*, by Hilda Jennings, page 76.

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and organization. Not merely are these towns contiguous, but commonly by reason of modern transport facilities their populations move about freely over the whole area, for such purposes as working, shopping, worshipping, getting education, getting recreation. Has the conurbation ceased to be many towns and become one town? We cannot say that, but it may be on the way to becoming a single town or city. Should we call that area a town which has its own local authority? That would be to fly in the face of facts, the facts of change, of inter-penetration. On the other hand the mere creation of a borough, or extension of a borough, does not necessarily make the new area a town; to say so would be to ignore another set of facts, the reality and power of of sentiments. A town, like a nation, must be conceived partly in subjective terms, in terms of the consciousness and sentiments of a population; but, again like a modern nation, it normally requires some kind of geographical unity and separateness, and its own organ of government. Geographical definition, civic sentiment, municipal status: all three seem to be needed for the existence of what can be described without reservation as a town—at least in modern England. The three interact; they do not always develop simultaneously.

Let me illustrate these points from the conurbation which I had the opportunity to study very closely, the Tyneside group of towns. A hundred years ago there lay along the banks of the Tyne four considerable towns: Newcastle, with some 15,000 inhabitants; Gateshead, North Shields, and South Shields, with some 8,000 inhabitants apiece. There was a small town, Tynemouth, with about 4,000 inhabitants. Wallsend and Jarrow were large villages with about 1,000 inhabitants each. And there were a number of smaller villages and hamlets. There could be no doubt whatever that the towns were separate towns; they were separated by stretches of open country, they had their own local

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government; each town contained a diversity of social classes, and each had a strong town consciousness. The towns grew, they absorbed neighbouring villages, until to-day there is an almost unbroken stretch of buildings with a population of about 850,000. No stranger to the district could guess where Newcastle ends and Wallsend begins, or where Gateshead ends and Felling begins, or would realize that when his car passed over a level-crossing he was passing from Hebburn into Jarrow.

Nor is it merely that the towns have become contiguous. They have in many ways inter-penetrated. The Homes and Workplaces Table of the Census of 1921 was witness to that. Between 10 and 60 per cent. of the working population of every Tyneside town went daily to work in some other town; between 9 and 50 per cent. of the workers in every Tyneside town had come in from outside. But the whole group of Tyneside towns was nearly self-contained. And there was, and is, a similar movement for shopping and for other purposes.

Are there twelve towns along the Tyne, or is there one great town? An uninformed visitor might easily assume the latter to be the case. And some of us who are well informed consider that it is a mental illusion which makes the inhabitants still think of a dozen separate towns. Yet for local government purposes they do so remain; and the local authorities, with one or two exceptions, have refused to accept the emphatic verdict of a Royal Commission.

In part it is a case of time-lag; the dozen towns have become organically one, but the realization of that fact has not yet come. An obstacle to realization, or at least to admission of the fact, is the vested interests of councillors and of municipal officials. In part it is a matter of money, in part of prestige. The opposition of some towns is clearly, indeed frankly, based on the fear that their rates would rise.

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But towns which would stand to gain are equally emphatic in their opposition. Town sentiments are strong; and in part their strength and their nature is a carry-over of ancient feuds; Newcastle was for centuries the tyrant of the river, and the tradition of hostility to Newcastle is unbelievably strong in some of the towns. I have heard a mayor of Tynemouth lash himself into fury as he recited the misdeeds of the Novocastrians in the time of Queen Elizabeth.

There is a good deal that is amusing to the outsider in these fierce local feuds. Cheek by jowl there stand two small industrial towns, both poor and ugly and none too well governed, to the visitor black pot and black kettle. Between the two towns, or perhaps it is more accurate to say between their two Councils, a feud exists. The actual grievances? The only one to which I was ever able to pin them down was that prior to 1902 there was a Joint Burial Board, and the councillors of the larger town, being slightly more numerous, secured for their own people the best places in the cemetery.

This impercipient change which has actually taken place, this persistence of ancient town patriotisms of an aggressive kind, stand in the way of the emergence or creation of a new sentiment appropriate to the new facts. And in the absence of that sentiment it is impossible to create the new machinery appropriate to the new conditions. Yet some change is taking place. The mere fact that Tyneside has been described as a whole, that the position has been analysed, has helped to create an idea of Tyneside. And a great deal of voluntary social service has been organized, in the main—but not altogether—deliberately, on a Tyneside basis, and the advantages of such a basis of organization have been clearly demonstrated. The beginnings of a Tyneside consciousness and sentiment exist. And this consciousness is likely, I think, to grow in strength.

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There is a somewhat similar position on the Mersey, but the river there is a much greater geographical barrier than is the Tyne. There also the social survey was of the conurbation, a survey of Merseyside. There also a good deal of voluntary social service is being organized on a Merseyside basis; there is a Merseyside Charities Fund, and a Merseyside Civic Society is just being floated. And the financial and other effects of the amalgamation of a number of services have been considered. But there also local jealousies are strong and the sentiment of the larger community is very weak.

The Teesside conurbation is, I believe, even further from evolving a sentiment of any strength or organizations based on such a sentiment.

5. There have been a number of cases of the amalgamation of neighbouring towns. On the Tyne, North Shields and Tynemouth, once quite separate communities, were amalgamated many years ago into the county borough of Tynemouth; there are remnants still of the older sentiments, but there is also a strong borough sentiment, and I do not think that anyone would wish to see a reversion to the older state of affairs. And where amalgamations are effected, that is usually the case. Common government is itself a powerful unifying force, setting a common stamp upon an area and its inhabitants, and operating powerfully to intensify the sentiment which attaches to the community so governed. Common government, if it is to be democratic and successful, presupposes a degree of community, but it also strengthens community.

There are many devices by which the initial strains can be eased. The county borough of Plymouth was formed by an amalgamation of three towns: Plymouth, Stonehouse, and Devonport. The first and last of these had strong civic consciousness; and these consciousnesses have not entirely died with the growth of the new consciousness and new

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loyalty. It is, I understand, a convention of civic life that in the choice of Lord Mayors of Plymouth the claims of Devonport to a share of office shall receive consideration as well as the claims of political parties.

6. There is the special case of London. That presents a problem indeed for sociologists and for politicians and for all who care about questions of citizenship. It is a problem which fills the minds of many able persons with something like despair. I can only indicate briefly a few of the elements of it.

London developed originally from two foci, the ancient city of London and the ancient city of Westminster. The mediæval city still retains its identity as area and administration; its local authority is one of the richest in the world, its civic life is amongst the most ornate in the world. But London long since overflowed the square mile. The City stood in the main aloof from this new development; there has developed in consequence a new organ of administration, the London County Council; and a new civic centre, the County Hall. And though the County Hall has not the tradition, and does not attempt to emulate the pageantry of the Guildhall and Mansion House, its real power and importance are giving it increasing prestige, especially among intelligent persons who are not deceived by appearances. But the existence of two civic centres does confuse the consciousness of Londoners, and probably weakens their civic sentiments.

Within the London County Council area there are the Metropolitan Boroughs, with their claims on local patriotism. Some of these have as their kernels ancient villages; when my father was a young man, sixty years or so ago, residents in Stoke Newington still "went into the village"; and where this is so, there is some persistence of an old tradition of community. The London boroughs appear to differ much

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in degree of borough consciousness and sense of civic obligation; Mr. Rhodes has recently pointed out¹ the relatively high proportion of citizens voting at Woolwich elections.

But just as London overflowed a century or so ago its ancient boundaries, so in recent decades it has overflowed the County Council boundaries; and to-day we have Greater London, a huge urban agglomeration, some thirty miles across, but ill-defined, and containing some seven or eight million inhabitants. Within this area there are a number of former villages, a number of what were—perhaps still are—towns, as well as a number of mushroom areas on what was not long ago pasture land. To a foreign visitor this huge urban stretch is all of it London; he does not know, and he would find it difficult to grasp, that it is municipally governed by over 100 separate local authorities.

What is the nature of London consciousness? I do not know, and I do not think that anyone knows. Does an inhabitant of Willesden think of himself as a Londoner? An inhabitant of Finchley? Of Barnet? Of Croydon? I know that in some of the county boroughs, West Ham for instance, there is a strong local sentiment and very definite objection to any suggestion of incorporation in the London County Council area. But most inhabitants of West Ham would say that they were Londoners, many of them would feel some pride in London, would have some feeling that St. Paul's and Westminster Abbey and other historic buildings were in their city. But on the whole the effect of the spread of London outside the County Council area has been, I think, to weaken previously existent civic consciousness without bringing into being any sufficiently compensating sentiment related to the larger city.

Greater London has been recognized as one city to the

¹ "The Exercise of the Franchise in London," *Political Quarterly*, Jan.-Mar., 1938.

extent that for several functions new organs of administration have been created: there is, for instance, the Metropolitan Water Board; there is the London Transport Board; and there is in existence, though too badly financed to be effective, a Greater London Town Planning Committee. But for many important purposes, e.g., the development of technical education, Greater London has no organ of deliberation or of expression. Whether Greater London will develop a civic consciousness, and organs with which to express that consciousness, is a question which cannot at present be answered. This can be said fairly safely, that, if it is to do so, it will only be done by the invention of new cohesive devices and new forms of government.

7. I come now to the case of urban communities which have been deliberately and rapidly brought into being in areas where formerly there was no population. There are the garden cities of Letchworth and Welwyn and there is the Hampstead Garden Suburb. And there are the large Council estates of which Becontree is the most conspicuous example.

(a) Let us take first, though they did not come first in time, the new Council estates. All over England local authorities have been putting up groups of new houses, different in type from most of the earlier houses, and have been moving families into them. Some of these new estates are on a large scale, the largest of all being the London County Council's estate at Becontree. Here the London County Council built 22,000 houses in eleven years, and in 1932 these houses contained 103,000 persons. What it did not realize, what was not realized for a considerable time, was that to build 22,000 houses and to assemble 22,000 families does not of itself create a town; it creates a wilderness of puzzled and discontented persons. And much the same was happening on the outskirts of other cities. But natural

forces worked to change the situation. As Professor Barker has said: "You cannot put some thousands of people together on a definite and demarcated area, without their beginning to think of themselves as a community."¹ Organizations began to grow: tenants' associations, concerned primarily to represent common interests in relation to the common landlord, but expressing other interests also; garden guilds; various recreational societies. But there have been many obstacles to the rapid growth of community spirit at Becontree and on similar estates. Professor Barker stresses three peculiarities of these new estates. (i) They are the result of an act of immediate total creation; (ii) They are composed of persons who belong to one social and economic level; (iii) The estate is not a separate unit of local government. To this may be added that in the early years there has usually been a complete absence of the buildings necessary for social life.

Still the community does begin to organise itself; associations come into being, makeshift accommodation appears. The process can be much facilitated by the provision of leadership and of buildings; and a recent and important development in the social life of this country has been the growth of Community Associations and the building of Community Centres. There is now in existence a powerful National Committee fostering such developments, and local authorities have powers under three Acts of Parliament² to subsidize them. These Community Associations are doing a great deal to transform aggregations of rehoused families into true communities. In the course of their work a number of interesting problems have emerged. There are questions arising out of scale of the new estate and its propinquity to parent town or other inhabited area. It is

¹ *New Housing Estates and their Social Problems*, National Council of Social Service publication.

² Education Act, 1921; Housing Act, 1926; Physical Training Act, 1937.

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generally held now that 1,500 to 2,000 families are sufficient to constitute a separate community, but that smaller groups are best dealt with as part of the parent town or other neighbouring town.

In the case of Becontree the London County Council built this huge new estate right outside its own area. It was intended at the start that Becontree should become a township, a community. This has not occurred, and it does not look as if it will occur. Why not? In the first place, because the London County Council began its building operations in three separate parts of the estate, two of them being fairly close together, but the third being remote from either. The consequence was that from the start there were two, if not three, centres of population and foci of nascent local sentiment. Such beginnings of social life as tenants' associations and sports clubs grew up in duplicate. In the second place the estate fell within three different local government areas, the borough of Ilford, the borough of Barking, and the urban district of Dagenham. The tenants in different parts of the estate have realized that their destinies are bound up in many important particulars with their fellow-citizens of those municipal areas. They tend to think of themselves as living in East Barking¹ or New Ilford. Thirdly, whilst the London County Council desired to develop a township, it was only a housing authority building outside its area; it had no direct powers to establish or to foster industries, and in this respect it was in a greatly inferior position to the companies which initiated Letchworth and Welwyn. The London County Council had not even educational powers in Becontree, and it was a considerable time before a disconcerted Essex County Council established adequate schools. The verdict of Mr. Terence Young is that whilst the London County Council intended to create a

¹ T. Young, *Becontree and Dagenham*, page 237.

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township, and has taken infinite trouble to correct the impression of two estates, it has actually failed to create a community feeling and has hampered attachment to other areas.¹

The growth of Watling, another of the London County Council estates, has been studied carefully by Mrs. Durant, part of whose forthcoming book on the subject I have been privileged to read. The Watling estate consists of 4,000 families and it is outside the London County Council area. When the first families arrived in 1927 there was no provision for recreation, there was no street lighting, the nearest shops were half an hour's walk away. The new arrivals were regarded with disfavour by the middle-class community at Hendon, and it was an offensive letter in the local press which goaded some of the inhabitants of the new estate into forming an association to protect their interests. The community association, which later obtained a salaried officer seems to have been successful in engendering a good deal of awareness of Watling and aspiration for Watling, and to have built up a network of societies. This public spirit appears to have dwindled. Mrs. Durant offers several probable complementary explanations. One is that the economic crisis of 1931 split up what had seemed a relatively homogeneous population, most families falling within income limits of three to four pounds a week, into separate classes. A second explanation is that the population has proved to be a shifting one; there are 4,000 families now resident at Watling, there are 3,600 families which have moved away from it. One reason for this has been the scarcity of accommodation for small households, such as young couples who have no children as yet and old couples whose children have left them; the marriage of a young couple usually means a removal, it may mean three removals. Again, the

¹ T. Young, *Becontree and Dagenham*, page 92.

local industries do not offer suitable openings for the type of worker for whom the estate has been planned, the skilled manual worker and the lower-grade clerk; the Colindale factories offer mainly unskilled work and blind-alley jobs for young persons. And lastly, whereas the Watling estate was in its early stages a clearly delimited urban aggregate with a rural fringe, the surrounding area has now been built up also, so that the boundaries of Watling have been blurred and awareness of Watling is more difficult to maintain. On the point of local government, Watling has done as well as could be hoped, since its area coincides fairly closely with the Burnt Oak ward of the borough of Hendon. But it is doubtful whether the Watling estate is going to develop further, or even to maintain, the sense of community which at one stage seemed to be emerging.

(b) The earlier experiments of Letchworth, Welwyn, and Hampstead Garden Suburb were initiated by small groups of persons who had a clear conception of what they wanted, and who were not so limited as to functions as a statutory authority is limited, especially a statutory authority operating outside its own area. In particular Letchworth and Welwyn were planned from the first as towns; provision was made for industry as well as for a residential population; considerable thought was given to education; and it was intended from the first to foster a strong town consciousness. One considerable difficulty has been that of local government; it was desirable in each case that the new community should become a separate local government area at the earliest possible moment. Both Letchworth and Welwyn have achieved this, the urban districts created being almost co-terminous with the estates. I think I am right in saying that in the case of Welwyn there was considerable opposition from the Rural District Council of the area in which the town had grown up, but that the claim received the support

of the County Council. The matter was important; we have seen how the chance of Becontree developing as a single community was lessened, if not destroyed, by the fact that the estate falls within three local government areas. The consciousness and the organization of the Hampstead Garden Suburb community has been damaged by the fact that population and area are divided between two local authorities, the boroughs of Hendon and of Finchley. This operates adversely in such ways as that the Residents' Association has to operate through two local government committees. It may be because its political consciousness is thus weakened that the Hampstead Garden Suburb has to this day neither public library nor swimming bath. The one public elementary school is provided by the borough of Hendon. The inhabitants have, however, been able to express the unity of the suburb in respect of secondary education, the secondary school being managed by a board of governors on which both boroughs are represented.

II

I come now to the subject of the decay of towns, and I shall treat this briefly, not because there are not many and important things to say about it, but because for the most part they lie outside the narrow scope of this paper.

Decayed towns are common enough in England as elsewhere; and if they have decayed long enough, they can be very pleasant, sometimes artists' paradises. Of their ugly years of decline and of the sufferings of their derelict populations we know nothing. It is another matter when the towns are decaying under our eyes. Much has been written about the sufferings of the distressed areas, about the devitalizing of the populations, the injury to social life, the difficulties of carrying on local government; and those of us who have lived in such areas can confirm the truth of it.

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Yet the impression which I have received has also been one of the tenacity and capacity for resistance of well-established communities. Towns can be damaged easily; they are not easily destroyed. Their growth may be a matter of decades; their disappearance is a matter of centuries. The figures as to growth and decline of population witness to this. As a nineteenth-century example I will quote the case of Long Lode, a village in Somerset. (It is true that it is a village and not a town, but that does not affect the argument.) I have a special interest in this village, because one side of my family comes from it. A hundred years ago it had a population of about a thousand. Its fortunes were affected both by agricultural depression and by the replacement of river transport by the railway. When I saw it about 1912 many of the houses were standing roofless, and the population had dwindled to three hundred. But this diminution had taken seventy or eighty years to accomplish, and the village still survived. Towns grow far more rapidly than that. The township of Hedworth in the county of Durham quadrupled its population between 1861 and 1871. Becontree, as we have seen, sprung from nothing to over 100,000 in eleven years. One of the most sensational declines in recent times has been that of Merthyr Tydvil, but even in this case the population only dropped from a peak of 81,000 in 1911 to something like 66,000 at the present time, or by less than 20 per cent. in sixteen years. Its growth had been more rapid than that at various periods.

In distressed areas there is often a starving of social services, both statutory and voluntary, but there is not necessarily an enfeeblement of social consciousness. Indeed there may be an enhancement of it. I doubt whether the inhabitants of Jarrow have ever been more town-conscious than in these years of intense industrial depression. Certainly the sufferings, the needs, the claims of Jarrow have been

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loudly and persistently voiced by its town council. Possibly this would not have been the case in a former period; it may be a result of the growth of the doctrine, and to some extent of the practice, of national responsibility for local distresses.

The effects of recent declines of industries and of populations on the structure of local government have so far been small. They have been most apparent in the field of public assistance; in areas where a large proportion of the population is on the verge of destitution it has been found very difficult to maintain integrity in the administration of the poor law, and we have seen the supersession of Boards of Guardians and of Public Assistance Committees in several areas, and the transfer of relief of long term or uninsured unemployed persons from local administration to the national Unemployment Assistance Board.

There have been no greater changes. The industrial depression was the occasion of the appointment of the Royal Commission on Local Government on Tyneside, but the case for change was really independent of it; and nothing has been done, nor seems likely to be done. The Royal Commission on the Status of Merthyr Tydvil did indeed recommend that the town should lose its county borough status and revert to municipal borough status, and the ground for its recommendation appears to have been its inability to carry out with diminished resources the duties of a county borough. But it seems doubtful whether the original promotion was justified. In any case no action has been taken. For an instance of wholesale de-grading of towns on the score of changed fortunes we have to go back to the Reform Act of 1832, and that made adjustments to centuries, not to decades, of change.

The most serious decay to-day is not the result of decline of population or of wealth; it is the decay of civic sentiment

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which may occur whilst a town is growing and while it is prospering. It is an internal decay which arises from such causes as the blurring of boundaries, the changed habits which the automobile has brought, and the multiplied distractions of modern life.

III

It now remains to summarize. A town can be considered in three aspects. There is the aggregation of buildings and of persons; there is the sense of community; and there is the social machinery, including the machinery of local government. The developments of the three are inter-related, but they do not necessarily proceed at parallel rates. Scale of population influences mentality and sentiment; and there may be an upper limit beyond which an urban aggregation cannot grow and maintain any strength of common consciousness. The relation between size of population and strength of sentiment is different at different levels of mechanical invention and of social invention. There is often a time-lag between change of scale and the transition to a new mentality. Social machinery has also to be adapted to changes in scale, and with regard to that also there may be a time-lag.

Certain conditions may be laid down as favourable or unfavourable to the growth of a new town. The inhabited area should be continuous; failure to observe this condition militated against the chances of Becontree becoming a town. The inhabited area should also be marked off clearly from other inhabited areas; the decline in Watling sentiment is to be attributed in part to the disappearance of an obvious boundary. The population should be stable, and stability is related to housing accommodation and to industrial opportunity. The community should be entirely within a single local government area; both Becontree and Hampstead

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Garden Suburb illustrate the difficulties where this is not so. And it should become a unit of local government at as early a moment as possible.

The growing together of urban areas which were originally distinct gives rise to special problems. A new town may be created by fusion; but commonly there is a considerable time-lag before consciousness and sentiment adapt themselves to the new situation; and a still longer time before there is a change in local government. The processes may be shortened by analysis and description. Vested interests and conservative habits impede the change.

Decline of population and impaired fortunes affect town life seriously, but they impede expression rather than destroy either sentiment or machinery of local government. A town once strongly established, in numbers and sentiment and social organization, is very resistant to disintegration and loss of identity.

In conclusion there is much about local sentiment in this article, but the term is not analysed. In whose minds is the sentiment, how widely diffused is it, how strong is it, and in what kind of attitudes and actions does it issue? These are questions on which much might be written, and much more needs to be discovered. I cannot enter on them here. It will be sufficient if what is written leads readers to believe that these contemporary phenomena of the rise and decay of towns offer valuable material to the sociologists, and that conversely the analysis of them by sociologists should be of value to those faced with the practical problems of administration.

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A ROYAL COMMISSION AT WORK.

By F. J. OSBORN

MANY social problems that have been studied and agitated by reformers have been neglected for decades by harassed and preoccupied statesmen; indeed, that situation is accepted as normal. The "great city" problem is in a class by itself. Not only has it been neglected by statesmen; it has been almost wholly neglected by reformers. An elementary analysis reveals that many of the evils most fashionable among reformers are associated with and primarily due to the overgrowth of cities both in population and area; but even the most radical and thoughtful of these reformers seem unwilling to make that analysis. There are active and enthusiastic "movements" for clearing slums, for housing, for improving health services, for physical fitness, for more play-space, for better industrial working conditions, for countryside preservation, for increasing leisure and for giving people more purchasing-power. Yet a vast social phenomenon which largely destroys any progress made in each of these spheres of reform has been, during over a century of devastating advance, almost wholly ignored. In every other sphere, *laissez-faire*, if not defeated, has at least to face a fierce army of critics. In the sphere of town development, the fatalistic view that "cities must grow" has blighted thought and paralysed action in all sections of opinion from the left to the right.

This is not the place to go into the reasons for this curious gap in the perceptions of constructively-minded people. An example of the resultant indifference of public opinion is to be noted in the very small amount of attention given in the

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press, even in the serious political reviews, to the extremely interesting and supremely important proceedings of the Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population, which has been taking evidence in public since October, 1937.

The Chairman of the Commission is Sir Montagu Barlow, and the other members include representatives of industry, commerce, governmental administration, local government, organized labour, and the professions concerned with development, town planning and economic research.

The terms of reference of the Commission are: "To inquire into the causes which have influenced the present geographical distribution of the industrial population of Great Britain and the probable direction of any change in that distribution in the future; to consider what social, economic or strategical disadvantages arise from the concentration of industries or of the industrial population in large towns or in particular areas of the country; and to report what remedial measures if any should be taken in the national interest."

In his opening remarks at the first public session, Sir Montagu Barlow referred to the growth of Greater London, which in the ten or twelve years before 1933 increased its population by 1½ millions, while the urban areas of over a million population had increased by 6·5 per cent, as against 4·7 for the country as a whole. He mentioned that Sir Malcolm Stewart's last Report on the Special Areas described the London growth as "a national menace," and gave some indication that the strategical considerations involved may be of vital moment in the event of another war. He went on to say:

"But apart from that it is clear that issues of immense national importance are involved. For instance, issues of health: are the health conditions of the population in the

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towns, apart from the slums, below the standard for the community as a whole, and if they are, are they capable of being improved? Issues of industry: for instance, what are the causes which influence industry, when new factories are opened, to choose so often a location not in the country, but either in or on the fringe of great towns? Issues of transport: for instance, is it reasonable that so many urban workers should have to spend an hour a day or more in travelling to and from their work, in overcrowded buses and trains, and is that congestion likely to get worse? Those are all large issues, and there are many others."

Evidence has so far been given by the Ministry of Health, the Department of Health for Scotland, the Board of Trade, the Electricity Commissioners, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Labour, the London Passenger Transport Board, the London County Council, the Associations of County Councils and Cities in Scotland, the Convention of Scottish Burghs, the Scottish Economic Committee, the Port of London Authority, the Federation of British Industries, a number of Development Councils and City Corporations, the Town Planning Institute, the Slough Trading Estate, the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association, and several other organizations and individuals. The Defence departments have also given evidence at sessions *in camera*.

It is impossible in a short article to summarize the memoranda presented or the significant discussions to which they have given rise on examination by members of the Commission. A formidable array of facts and statistics on the growth and location of industry, and on other aspects of town development, has been gathered together. Indeed, the information submitted as to the location of industry in this country puts completely out of date all existing textbooks on the subject, and goes a long way to meet the

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demands of students and administrators for a complete survey of the physical distribution of industry. In particular, high value attaches to the really admirable survey document submitted by the Ministry of Labour, which deals in detail with the changes in the relative importance of individual industries, the effect of these changes on the geographical distribution of the insured population, and the changes in the working population in a well-selected sample of large and medium-sized towns. Though not supported to the same extent by newly-prepared statistics, and dimmed in its effectiveness by a quaintly antiquated point of view, the Board of Trade's Memorandum contains a very complete description, trade by trade, of the present regional distribution of Great Britain's industries. None of the other official memoranda submitted add substantially to the data on the broad question of industrial distribution, throw much light upon future trends, or make very helpful proposals as to how the undesirable trends may be checked. Some, however, such as the contribution of the Electricity Commissioners, add some valuable facts and figures on their special subjects. The Ministry of Health's evidence contains an indispensable description of the history and working of the Town and Country Planning Acts, and some interesting data as to the costs and difficulties of local government services in towns of different sizes. The Board of Agriculture's evidence, while disappointingly short-sighted and unimaginative in its general outlook, contains useful tables of changes in the areas of land under cultivation. The other Departments, on the whole, repeat in different forms of words conventional and uncritical views as to the location of industry, views which are expressed with greater enthusiasm, but with no greater scientific documentation, by the Federation of British Industries. On the other hand, the Scottish authorities, and the bodies representing the depressed areas, are far less

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respectful to the present forces determining the location of industry, while the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association not only sets in opposition to these forces sociological issues of the first importance, but challenges the economic validity of the present localizing factors and their success in serving even the interests of industry itself.

Few of the Government Departments giving evidence have felt it their responsibility to take a general view of the issues before the Commission and to seek a policy which deals with the vast economic and social issues involved. Mr. Humbert Wolfe, who in his *viva voce* evidence in supplementation of the Ministry of Labour's memorandum showed a wider grasp of the issues than any other official witness, gave a possible reason for this when he said: "The Government itself is so articulated that each Department can only deal with a special point which comes within its own experience." This provoked from a member of the Commission, Mr. G. W. Thomson, the comment that the articulation of the Government had the unfortunate effect of making the Government inarticulate.

Alone among the English Departments, the Ministry of Labour seriously doubted whether the decisions of industrialists in siting their factories were always based on complete knowledge of their own ultimate interests or inspired by the highest wisdom. In paragraphs 120 and 121 of their memorandum they say:

"In the past, the individual industrialist has decided for himself where to establish his undertaking, but the consequences of his decision do not end with himself. They affect other individuals and the community as a whole. The decision to transfer an undertaking to a new district may involve unemployment for large members of workpeople for whom it had hitherto provided a livelihood. It may affect Local Authorities in regard to the provision of housing and

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other services and may have an important effect in increasing the rateable value of one district and reducing that of another. It may involve direct financial consequences to the State. . .

"The individual industrialist may ordinarily be expected to know where he can carry on his business at a profit. Sometimes, however, considerations of an economic character do not play the decisive part in determining the selection of the place for his factory by an industrialist; he may be influenced by purely personal preferences or by fortuitous circumstances such as the original location of a business, small in origin, which has grown to great dimensions. . .

"Apart, however, from the strictly economic questions . . . there are considerations of a social nature closely affecting the welfare and contentment of labour. . . Even from the narrower point of view of the consideration of the suitability of a given site for a particular purpose there must be relatively few industrialists who are in possession of all the facts which would enable a decision to be taken not only as to where the enterprise could be carried on profitably, but as to where it could be carried on most profitably."

Perhaps the readiness of the Ministry of Labour to contemplate State measures to restrict the settlement of industry in the greater towns, and to promote it in other areas, is due to the prominence with which the terrifying facts as to recent changes in industrial distribution have come before them in their own work relating to transfers of labour. Far too little public attention has been given to such facts, for instance, as that the number of insured persons in employment in the South increased by 1,923,000 or 46.5 per cent between 1923 and 1937, while in the rest of the country the increase was 431,000 or only 8.2 per cent.

Another witness drew attention to the even more startling fact that, if factory trade workers alone are regarded, the increase between 1930 and 1935 in persons employed in

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Greater London was 141,900, while in the rest of the country there was a *decline* of 2,600. In the national circumstances the anxiety of the Ministry of Labour is more appropriate than the philosophic calm of the Board of Trade or the theoretic satisfaction of the Federation of British Industries.

Much the most entertaining episode in the career of this Commission so far has been the discussion on the evidence of Mr. Frank Pick on behalf of the London Passenger Transport Board. Mr. Pick began by saying that he had been "rather shocked" by the terms of reference of the Commission, which asked them to consider the social, economic or strategic disadvantages of large towns and did not expressly ask for the consideration of their advantages. He went on to say that there was everything to be said for encouraging concentration in great towns because of their industrial and economic amenities, and also because it was the only way to preserve the amenities of the countryside. He objected strongly both to the present inducements to industry to go to the depressed areas and to any possible restriction on its settlement in London, on the ground that the former were uneconomic and the latter would be bureaucratic. His defence of the free play of competition stirred a lady member of the Commission to remind him of the precedent set by the formation of the Transport Board in substitution for the former competitive chaos of London transport. Mr. Pick declared that the further growth of London must on no account be checked before its population, now 9,500,000, reaches about 12,000,000; this on the double ground that a population of 12,000,000 will be necessary to make remunerative the contemplated extensions of the London Transport system, and that a metropolis which is not expanding is a metropolis in decay. But for some reason which is not clear on reading this

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evidence, not only will the population "stabilize itself" at 12,000,000, but the Board do not appear, at that not very distant date, to be alarmed about a metropolis no longer expanding. It is obvious on these figures, also, that it is contemplated that London will continue to expand (as is indeed almost certain if no restrictive measures are applied) long after the population of Great Britain as a whole begins to decline; but functional articulation seemed to remove any concern for this from the Board's purview.

The definiteness of the Board's picture of future London was refreshing, but it is difficult to see any validity in the calculations submitted in support of it. Broadly the idea seemed to be that a "12 to 15 miles" radius represents "the limit of the patience of the strap-hanger," and that within that radius a density of 40 people to the acre is "not unreasonable" as an "overall average." Also the Board is at present providing traffic facilities for another 650,000 people, and "demands from Local Authorities and so forth" would, if met, make provision for another 750,000 and thus take London up to about 11,000,000. Mr. Pick concluded: "That may not be the end. I put 12,000,000 as leaving a reasonable margin." Such are the scientific data on which the destinies of millions are based. A quotation from the record of the Commission is better than any further comment on the planning of London from the Transport angle:

"(Mr. Parker Morris) (*Question* 3389): Are you working on the plan of providing railways to meet the population or on the reverse plan of providing the population to fit the railways?—(Mr. Pick): We are providing railways to meet the population which is already on the East side; we are providing railways to meet population still to come on the North side. Both principles are in execution. We prefer to be ahead of the people because it is cheaper to build your railway.

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"3390. But, in fact, you can never be ahead of the congestion which arises in the peak hours?—(*Mr. Pick*): You can never get on top of that.

"3391. And the further London expands I suppose the greater will be the number of standing passengers?—No. There will be standing passengers, but there are limits to everything.

"3392. *Chairman*: The limit of the patience of the strap-hanger?—Yes.

"3393. *Mr. Parker Morris*: And that limit is the 12-million limit and the 12 to 15 mile radius?—I should not like to say that. I have not studied his limit from that point of view. It is our limit, not his. It may be he will think he can do even more than that; I do not know. The point is this. You will always have what we call roughly 100 per cent overload at the peak hour on the railways. It is a sort of inevitable thing; I cannot explain it, but people go on piling themselves up to that. When they get over the 100 per cent standing factor they begin to think it uncomfortable and unfair, and then the trouble begins and we get complaints about unreasonable congestion and so forth.

"3394. You are content to work on a plan that a 100 per cent standing is inevitable in the peak hours?—We are not content, but we have to accept it as a fact. . .

"3397. Your evidence therefore is that with the present system of transport London is likely to become fairly well built up to about 12 to 15 miles?—The railway termini will be on the 12-mile zone and that will have an influence beyond, so it will be 12 to 15 miles. That is the logical development of transport as it now exists.

"3398. And you think London ought to grow to that limit?—Naturally."

The London County Council evidence collected together some interesting population statistics, but was a very

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incomplete picture of the London problem, no figures being given of the distribution of population density, shortage of open space, overcrowding, traffic congestion, or housing costs, and the references to town planning policy being vague and general. The evidence as a whole seemed to be drafted with the intention of glossing over the social disadvantages of excessive growth. But, rather surprisingly, the Council, in their formal conclusion, said:

"In the Council's opinion the extent of the development already exceeds the aggregate which would have been desirable on town planning principles."

The chief reason given for this view was the fact that industrial workers, who "are in greatest need of the relaxations and restorative virtues of the countryside," are cut off from it by cost and distance, and that the problem of daily travel to and from work is "almost insoluble." The Council did not oppose the control of the location of industry by the State, provided that exemptions were made for small businesses, for public utility undertakings and for extensions of existing premises, and that London were safeguarded against a total decline of employment. Mr. Herbert Morrison, in his replies to questions, showed a clearer view of the whole problem than is discernible in the printed evidence; but it was plain that the Council are in the mood to wait for a lead from the Commission or the State rather than to give a lead themselves in a policy of decentralization.

A careful study of the Ministry of Health's printed and verbal evidence shows how far the State is from giving the necessary lead. The Ministry are only partially conscious of the effects of State policy on the size of towns and the distribution of population; they cling tenaciously to the theory that ideal administration should be as neutral as the "invisible hand" of Adam Smithian economics on this issue; and they discourage, for instance, rate allowances to industry

as an interference with natural processes at work in distribution. On the slum subsidy issue they keep their minds fixed on political necessities and successfully ignore just those consequential economic effects which are prominent in their minds on the issue of rate allowances to industry. They even quote the fact that only 232,887 acres of land are yet included in approved town-planning schemes as defence of the harmlessness of town-planning in affecting the distribution of the industrial population. They doubt (see Sir John Maude's answer to Q. 479) whether on public health grounds there are objections to large towns—a state of scepticism which is hardly possible to anyone who appreciates the cumulative effect of the evidence before the Commission. But while no point of view, and still less any policy, emerges from the Ministry's submission, it is clear that they are disturbed about the general drift of things, and they make a useful contribution by their statement that the national control of the location of industry is administratively practicable, though they express some doubt as to whether it would be acceptable to industrialists.

A definite policy of limiting the size of great towns by restriction of the further settlement of industry has been advocated by the Town Planning Institute, and by the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association, as well as in memoranda submitted at the request of the Commission by Sir Raymond Unwin and by Dr. W. A. Robson. Together these documents, which are symptoms of a growing consensus of opinion among practical students of the subject, provide much of the material upon which a great national policy could be formulated. The Town Planning Institute's evidence, together with their recently published report on National Planning, disposes thoroughly of any complacent view that the present machinery of statutory planning is adequate to the task. The Institute state quite categorically

that, if no further measures are taken, the fringe growth of great towns will continue, and all the problems with which the Commission is dealing will worsen. They see the solution in a better guidance of the siting of new industries and in the preservation of wide stretches of countryside adjoining the towns—the latter necessitating a national fund for compensation and betterment.

The Garden Cities Association's evidence is more complete than any other evidence before the Commission in its economic and sociological analysis of the growth of towns, and in documenting with facts and figures the disadvantages of the present situation and the continuing trend. They do not propound any simple solution, but advocate a well-thought-out policy including a definite restriction of industrial settlement in overcrowded zones, the stiffening up of by-law and zoning policy to restrict density, a compensation fund to preserve wide areas of rural land around the towns, a reorganization of housing subsidies to check instead of promoting centralization, and a positive policy of the development of existing small towns and of new towns. Dr. Robson's extremely valuable study of the London situation is coupled with a full discussion of the possible changes in administrative and local government machinery that could make a national planning policy effective.

The general conclusions derived from reading the proceedings of the Commission are :

(a) That the Commission is a very able body which is concentrating its attention rigorously on the extremely important and difficult problem of the size of towns.

(b) That the evidence has proved overwhelmingly the urgent necessity for the treatment of the problem as a major national issue, and the impracticability of its solution in the absence of national planning and some definite limitation of the siting of industry in great towns, while preserving the

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freedom of industry to choose its own location subject to such absolutely necessary restrictions.

(c) That the great contribution the Commission is in a position to make is to hammer out a positive and constructive policy from the various useful suggestions that have been placed before it.

The Report of the Commission will be awaited with great interest not only in this country but in all parts of the world. For the problem of the great city is one of the most difficult and dangerous problems of our civilization.

SURVEYS

GOVERNMENT DIRECTORS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES

AS a result of the criticisms levelled against the Board of Imperial Airways by the Cadman report on Civil Aviation, the chairman and managing director have resigned and Sir John Reith has relinquished his post as Director General of the British Broadcasting Company to become full-time chairman of the Airways Company. This constitutes an unprecedented interference by the Government in the management of a heavily subsidised public company. Although the Government has the right to nominate two or more directors to the Imperial Airways Board, the Chairman is not specifically mentioned, and Sir John is not appointed by the Government but by the Board, "with full concurrence of the Government." At the same time Sir James Price, until recently deputy director of the Ministry of Labour, has been nominated to the Board, but not as a Government director. In view of the other commercial directorships held by many Government directors in other concerns, the Cadman Committee's insistence on a full-time Chairman was pertinent. Presumably it means that Sir John cannot become a director of other commercial concerns not allied to Imperial Airways. It is to be hoped this will constitute a precedent to be followed by all Government directors. The appointments of Sir John Reith and Sir James Price, made as they were at Government instigation, follows the practice of recent years of choosing Government directors from the ranks of retired Civil Servants or public officials. A case in point is the recent appointment of Sir Maurice Hankey to the Board of Suez Canal on his retirement from the Civil Service after a career of great distinction.

For political and other reasons the State is a large shareholder in a number of private concerns. To the boards of these and to certain other companies in which it is not a shareholder, the Government appoints directors. The oldest and largest Government shareholding is in the Suez Canal Company, in which 39 per cent of the outstanding shares are held by the British Government. Their approximate value at current market prices exceeds £48,000,000, and these

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contributed to the Treasury during the fiscal year 1936-37 £2,248,437. The Suez Canal has an international board at present numbering twenty-eight. Maximum membership is thirty-two with twenty-one representing French interests, ten British and one Dutch. Of the British directors three are appointed by the British Government and the remaining seven represent shipping interests.

The Government's second largest shareholding is in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In this it holds £11,250,000 of Ordinary Capital Stock which equals just over 55 per cent of the equity capital, and £1,000 of Preference Stock. Its value exceeds £45,000,000 and last year's income was £2,062,500.¹ Of a board of fourteen the British Government appoints two. In Imperial Airways the Government's holding consists of the total Deferred share capital, £25,000. This equals, however, only 1½ per cent of the capital. The Government has the right to appoint one or more directors, and in practice has appointed two. To these companies must now be added Cable & Wireless. Under a new agreement recently concluded, the Government will receive £2,600,000 of capital in Cable & Wireless Limited on which the income on the standard dividend of 4 per cent amounts to just over £100,000. In this case the Government has to approve two of the directors of both the operating and holding companies. Taking the Cable & Wireless and Imperial Airways shares at their nominal value and the market value for the Suez Canal and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company shares, the Government has investments in public companies of nearly £100,000,000 on which the income at present is approximately £4,500,000 a year or 4½ per cent. Satisfactory as this income is, it is not of great importance as all these investments can be considered as strategic holdings, each being acquired for political reasons.

The acquisition of the Suez Canal shares is historic and known to every schoolboy. The original purchase was made in 1875 when the shares of the Khedive of Egypt were acquired for the Government by Rothschilds for £4,080,000, the Khedive to receive the dividends on the shares until 1894.

The Government became a shareholder in the Anglo-

¹On basis of dividend announced for year ended December 31, 1938, Government's income for current fiscal year will be £2,812,500. Suez Canal income has declined with depreciation of the franc.

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Iranian Oil Company in May, 1914. Oil as a fuel for the navy has many advantages, but a navy cannot be made dependent upon oil unless certain and accessible supplies are available. This was recognized as early as 1909 when the Anglo-Iranian (Anglo-Persian until 1935) Oil Company was formed. The prospectus remarked that: "it is common knowledge that the British Navy has hitherto been hampered in its desire to substitute oil for coal by the difficulty of ensuring regular supplies when they are most wanted—in time of war—and that it has long been desirous of seeing other sources of supply opened up. Hitherto, Burma (where the Admiralty had contracts with the Burmah Oil Co.) has been practically the only source of supplies of oil in large quantities in the British Dominions. The outlet of this company's pipelines (i.e. the A.I.O.C.), though not in the British Dominions, is at the head of the Persian Gulf, and so under British control . . ."

By 1914 the British Government was convinced by its First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, that in its race with Germany, if it was to base its supremacy on oil, it would have to have control of an assured supply in time of war. In May, 1914, a convention was therefore signed with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Under this the Government, by subscribing to £2,000,000 of Ordinary and £1,000 of Preference shares, provided the money for capital development necessary to fulfil a contract to supply the navy. At the same time it obtained control through holding a majority of shares. The Government obtained the right to appoint two directors to the Board with power to veto any resolution, subject to appeal to the Government. The company held, however, a letter from the Government stating that they did not intend to make use of this right of veto except in regard to matters of high general policy. This is interesting in view of the pressure to ban the sale of oil to Italy during the Abyssinian war. Government action could have been taken through the Anglo-Iranian. The Government's participation increased in proportion with the capital during the Company's great expansion following the war, both in Iran and, in association with the Iraq Petroleum Company, in Iraq. The Government's voting power now equals 52.7 per cent.

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Imperial Airways shareholding is the result of the subsidising of civil air routes mainly within the Empire. Although Imperial Airways was formed in 1924 and has been in receipt of Government subsidies since that date, it was not until 1928 that the Government became a shareholder. Under an agreement signed in that year, the Government received its £25,000 of Deferred shares free in cancellation of the company's obligation to repay subsidies received. These shares are entitled to half of the balance of profits after 10 per cent has been paid on the ordinary shares. As the dividend on these has never exceeded 9 per cent., the deferred have so far gone dividendless. These deferred shares carry 26 per cent of the voting power, but where a matter of control arises 51 per cent.

The Cable & Wireless holding results from the sale of Post Office beam wireless stations to enable cheap cable and wireless communication to be provided within the Empire and to assure the maintenance of strategic communications. Following the important wireless cable conference of 1928, the existing English cable companies were taken over by Cable & Wireless (first known as Imperial and International Communications) to which was also sold the Government owned Empire Cables. In addition the Post Office beam wireless stations, whose competition with the commercial cable companies was largely responsible for this move towards unification, were rented to the company for £250,000 per annum. This spring, as part of a new agreement with the Government, Empire cable and wireless rates were reduced to a uniform level. The freeholds of these beam wireless stations are being sold to Cable & Wireless for £2,600,000 of capital stock. This stock is to be handed over to the Government by the companies which Cable & Wireless controls. The new standard revenue of the concern is fixed at £1,200,000 which is the approximate equivalent of a 4 per cent dividend.

Through these shareholdings in Suez Canal, Anglo-Iranian Oil, Imperial Airways, and Cable & Wireless, the Government has a financial stake and a definite voice in maintaining communications within the Empire by air, sea and cable as well as in strategically situated and highly-profitable oil concessions.

In addition to the above, the Government has the right

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to appoint directors to the boards of British Airways, British Sugar Corporation, Agricultural Mortgage Corporation and Scottish Agricultural Securities Corporation.

Furthermore, it was the general practice of the Treasury when giving its guarantee under the Trades Facilities Acts, to take the right to appoint a director or representative on the board of the company concerned. This has been exercised in twelve cases.¹

This growing tendency for Government representatives to serve as company directors calls for the laying down of principles which should govern their appointment, and a general definition of the form of control they should exercise. This is especially important as in practice it is found that the holding of a Government directorship is often followed by appointment to other boards. In answer to the question on what principle Government directors were appointed, put by Mr. John Parker, M.P., on May 16 this year, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury replied :

"Government directors are appointed for the purpose of representing such Government interests as may be involved in connection with the company concerned, and the selection of individuals is determined by this consideration."

There has been a lack of plan in the appointment of Government directors. In fact the selection made invites the suspicion that in some cases Government directorships have been given to retired Government officials as a pension supplement. In other cases relations with the Government have been completely lacking, notably where directors have been chosen from the normal run of commercial enterprise. As commercial interests will constitute the majority of the board in any case, this seems to destroy the purpose of government appointment which is to ensure contact between the Government and business. Of the thirteen directors appointed to the companies referred to above, ten have been in Government or diplomatic service. It can be argued that

¹Anglo-Scottish Beet Sugar Corporation, Electricity Distribution of North Wales and District, International Power and Paper Co. of Newfoundland, North Wales Power Co., Athens Piræus Electricity Co., James Powell & Sons (Whitefriars), Sheffield Coal Company, Tata Power Co., Wayagamack News, Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, Royal Mail Lines and Prince of Wales Dry Dock Company.

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this is as it should be since the holding of a Government directorship should be but an extension of Government office. If this is so the rules which apply to Government service should be made to apply to Government directorships. This is far from being the case and the appointment from Government service to a Government directorship is not without advantage, particularly in preparing the way for other remunerative commercial directorships.

An examination of recent appointments to Government directorships is of interest. In the case of the Suez Canal, one of the Government directors, the late Sir John T. Davies, K.B.E., was private secretary to the Rt. Hon. Lloyd George from the time he became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1912 until 1922, the year in which he ceased to be Prime Minister. Sir John Davies was then appointed a director of the Suez Canal Co. and subsequently held a number of other directorships including that of the Ford Motor Company. He is to be succeeded by Sir Maurice Hankey who is to retire from the triple position of Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, Secretary to the Cabinet and Clerk to the Privy Council. During the war he was first Secretary of the War Council and in 1916 when Mr. Lloyd George formed a small War Cabinet, Sir Maurice Hankey was appointed its Secretary. In 1919 he received a grant from Parliament of £25,000 for his many services. As a director of Suez Canal he can receive £5,000 a year. Another British representative on the Suez Canal is the Earl of Cromer, whose family name is Baring. After serving in the Diplomatic Service and in the Foreign Office he was in 1913 Managing Director of the banking firm of Baring Brothers & Co. Since then he has been closely attached to His Majesty's Household of which he has been Lord Chamberlain since 1922. It was in 1926 that he was appointed to the Suez Canal Board and he holds a number of other directorships. The third British Government representative is Sir Ian Malcolm, K.C.M.G., who served in the British Diplomatic Service and was a member of Parliament from 1895 to 1906 and from 1910 to 1919. As such he was assistant private secretary to Lord Salisbury and later Parliamentary secretary to the Chief Secretary for Ireland. At the Paris Peace Conference, he was private secretary to Lord Balfour.

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Sir George Barstow, who was controller of Supply Services for the Treasury from 1919 to 1927, was appointed by the Government to the board of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its subsidiaries in 1927. A year later he became a director of the Prudential Assurance Company, of which he became Deputy-Chairman in 1935. Other directorships are also now held by him, and he also represents the Government on the Board of the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation. The other Government director on the board of Anglo-Iranian is Sir Edward H. Packe, K.B.E., who was appointed in 1919. He had served as private secretary to various ministers from 1900 to 1919, and was attached to the Admiralty Staff from 1914 to 1919. He also serves on the boards of a colliery and of a steel company.

Sir John M. Salmond, G.C.B., Marshal of the Royal Air Force, became a Government director of Imperial Airways on May 22, 1933. Here, outstanding among Government appointees, is one who has the obvious qualifications. A year later, on May 28, 1934, he was appointed a director of the Shell Transport and Trading Company, chief British partner in the great Anglo-Dutch oil combine. In contrast to Sir John Salmond's selection as the Government representative on the Imperial Airways Board is that of Sir Francis L'Estrange Joseph, colliery magnate and director of a number of companies, including the Rio Tinto, owners of Spanish mines. Here is a case where the Government has appointed from the ranks of commerce a director whose possession of special ability to represent the Government is not so obvious. Critical as the Cadman Report is of the Board of Imperial Airways, no comment is made in it upon the Government directors. The fact is, however, that the suggested lack of co-operation between the board and the Air Ministry is an implied criticism, because if Government appointments are to serve any useful purpose at all, it would lie in the direction of acting as liaison officers between the Government and the company concerned. The Cadman report indicates that in the case of Imperial Airways this was not done. The appointment of Sir John Reith as the new full-time Chairman should remedy this state of affairs.

The Government director on the Board of British Airways

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is Viscount Monsell, P.C., who from 1931 to 1936 (as Mr. Bolton Eyres-Monsell) was First Lord of the Admiralty. He was a Member of Parliament for the Evesham division from 1910-1935, and chief Conservative whip from 1923-1931.

When the British Sugar Corporation was formed in 1936 to absorb the heavily subsidised sugar beet companies, the Government appointed Lt.-Col. Sir F. H. Humphrys, G.C.M.G., as its Chairman. The two other Government appointees to the Board were Sir Louis J. Kershaw and Major J. Leslie. Lt.-Col. Humphrys served in the army from 1900 onwards, and held a number of Government appointments in India. From 1929 to 1932 he was High Commissioner of Iraq and from 1932 to 1935 British Ambassador at Baghdad. Since he was appointed to the Chairmanship of British Sugar Corporation he has become a director of Carreras Tobacco. He is also deputy Chairman of Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers and British Portland Cement Manufacturers. His colleague, Sir Louis Kershaw, served in the India Civil Service from 1890 to 1934 and was on special duty with the Government of Burma 1934 to 1935, prior to which he held various Government appointments in India. A year after becoming a director of British Sugar Corporation, he joined the board of Burmah Oil Company. The third Government director, Major J. Leslie, is occupied with commerce, being a director of the shipping and colliery firm of William France, Fenwick & Co. He is chairman and managing director of a number of colliery companies and also a director of the Commercial Union Insurance Company.

The conclusion to be reached from this examination is that appointment to something which is neither a Government nor commercial job, needs more specific definition than it has as yet received. The appointments rest in the hands of the Prime Minister or the Minister responsible, and do not have to be specifically confirmed or approved by Parliament. The Prime Minister appoints the Government directors of the Suez Canal and Anglo-Iranian Oil, while the Secretary of State for Air appoints those on the two airway companies' boards. The Minister of Agriculture appoints the chairman and the two additional directors on the British Sugar

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Corporation Board. In exercising their right these Government Ministers have been catholic in taste, but certain trends are noticeable. Appointees fall into three classes. Ex-Government servants, party office-holders and business-men. The first is the largest group and could well provide those best fitted to act as liaison officers between the Government and commercial concerns. To do so, however, first it is essential that those selected are experienced in the field of activities in which the concern is engaged. An ex-Governor-General by way of hypothetical example may be a first-class administrator, but how much will he know of sugar beet? In such a case one drawn from the Ministry of Agriculture's staff might be better suited. It is reasonable to assume that from the Civil Service staff of the Ministry concerned amply qualified Government representatives can be found. Further, to avoid the possibility of divided allegiance, would it not be preferable for Government directors to continue as Civil Servants and to receive their salary from the Government? If desirable the Government could recoup itself from the company, but the director should be employed by and responsible to the Government instead of as now being in the anomalous position of being appointed by the Government, paid by the company and responsible neither to the shareholders nor to Parliament. As far as their seats on the board are concerned, Government directors at present occupy a privileged position. Being Government appointees they cannot be removed by the board or by the shareholders. Where the Government has the right to make appointments to commercial boards its appointees have not always definite responsibilities to the Government nor are they subject to Parliamentary control.

If Civil Servants were appointed they should continue to be subject to the restrictions which govern them to-day. Most important of such restrictions would be that, being in the Government service, they would not be permitted to take directorships of other concerns without permission. Were it desirable that they should serve on other boards then arrangements for their appointment by the Government would have to be made. Finally the selection of Government directors, while naturally being made in the first place by the Minister

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concerned, should in every case be subject to confirmation by Parliament.

Government participation in private enterprise is tending to increase. It appears to be preferred by the present Government to public ownership. In the interests of democratic government it is essential that there be no suspicion of nepotism or political jobbery. It can only be avoided if that traditional Civil Service standard of disinterestedness be demanded of all who represent the Government on the boards of directors of public companies.—ERNEST DAVIES.

SOME FOREIGN BOOKS

THE continuity of German policy since Prussia became a great power is the theme of *La Victoire des Vaincus* (Denoel: pp. 432) by André Fribourg. Much of the ground covered is familiar and the author would hardly claim the exposition to be anything but polemical. From that point of view there is not much for the student, but even the student will find a good deal that is useful in the careful compilation of data on the preparation to resume an aggressive, imperialist policy and on the remarkable list of successes the policy when resumed has achieved. The successes in tearing up the Versailles settlement have so far been won without war, but the point when war will be necessary is within sight. The arbiter will be Herr Hitler and his decision is still doubtful.

Much more solid—possibly too solid—is J. Benoist-Méchin's second volume of his *Histoire de l'Armée allemande* (Michel: pp. 696). This concluding volume begins with the Baltic adventure and the period of the *coups d'état* with Seeckt and his colleagues struggling to build up the professional army and keep it out of politics; this includes a remarkably interesting account of a little known episode both militarily and politically, the Polish insurrection in Silesia. Disarmament and secret re-armament precedes the advent of National Socialism which transforms after considerable difficulties the professional into a national army. Much of this is important historical writing which puts in a new light the Schleicher intrigues, the Roehm "purge" and the "stellenbosching" of Fritsch and Blomberg. The book

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concludes with an account of the present organisation and of the army as the supreme organ of the new form of "tyrannus." Political rather than military, the book fails to deal adequately with things of peculiar military interest like doctrine, strategy, mechanisation and the air arm, but it is one of the ablest contributions to contemporary history of recent months, full, sound and based on wide and careful study. It can be neglected by no student of Germany.

The Baltic adventure with which M. Benoist-Méchin begins is treated in detail in the second and third instalments of the official Reichsarchiv work—*Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskaempfen deutscher Truppen and Freikorps* (Mittler: pp. xii, 160: xii, 208). This is now frankly an official glorification of the "heroic war" of German soldiers, professional and volunteer, to preserve the Reich frontiers from aggression (actually it was in origin an attempt at compensatory expansion) and the Reich itself from internal disruption. The second volume takes up the tale from January, 1919, to the second capture of Riga in May; the third tells the tale of the gradual fizzling out in hardship and despair of a great adventure. The narrative is restrained and severely technical except where the compilers had to deal with the political situation. The story is almost unknown and although the lively personal narrative of one of the protagonists, Major Bischoff, in his *Die letzte Front* (Schuetzen Vlg.: pp. 270, 2nd edition) is easier to read, this will long be the standard work on an episode which came within an inch of having decisive result and which, allowing for all the deceptiveness of fine writing, does remain in its own way an epic.

From the Baltic to Spain is a far cry and the average book on the Spanish war is far below the standard set by the Reichsarchiv writers. There are, however, two that merit study. The first is by one of the best military writers in France, General Duval—*Les Leçons de la Guerre d'Espagne* (Plon: pp. vi, 248). The "lessons" as such take small space, but we have a fair, though distinctly anti-republican account of the origin of the civil war, the creation of two "national" militias in which Franco, disposing of a multitude of officers and some regular formations, had the advantage and a

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detailed account of the campaigns in the North. The astounding state of the pre-war army is explained and the methods used to create the two hardened armies now fighting is well set out, though Gen. Duval has never been able to set aside his professional prejudice against a militia. Like his fellows he never seems to take into account that actually the present militiaman is better trained and in a harder school than were most of the professional officers who took the field in 1914. The "lessons" are rather vague, for a civil war is not a fair test. Rules are otherthrown by necessity and it is here that the professional may learn. It is not orthodox for aircraft to break an enemy line but it was done in Aragon. Tanks should not fight isolatedly but they did outside Madrid. Much of that is to the general "regression," but he recognises that "manœuvre" has regained its old function and in "manœuvre" the infantry is still queen. Santander was won by mobile infantry with a miserable complement of light artillery.

The second book—H. Klotz's *Militärische Lehren des BuergerKrieges in Spanien* (author's own publication: pp. 175)—is whole-heartedly republican. While General Duval reduces foreign troops fighting for Franco to thousands, Herr Klotz runs them into six figures and he concentrates on the results achieved by the arms sent in by Germany and Italy. This part is largely personal observation and is most useful, particularly on the value and employment of tanks. Of more general interest is the strategico-political section which ends the book and which is possibly the clearest, if most sensational, analysis of the situation in the Mediterranean if Franco wins. Herr Klotz does not share the touching faith that Franco as a proud Spaniard will liquidate his allies. They are his masters and if they dominate a Franco Spain it will be almost impossible for the Western democracies to avoid defeat in a European war. Both books deserve very close study and not only by military students.

R. v. Schumacher and H. Hummel have produced a remarkably interesting if somewhat verbose book *Vom Kriege Zwischen den Kriegen* (Deutsche Vlgges, Stuttgart: pp. 304). They begin from Liddell Hart's thesis that the really successful war is that which beats an enemy before there is any fighting in the field. They regard the present political situation as a

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manœuvring for position which is intended to put the possible adversary into a position in which he cannot fight. Naturally the issue as between Germany and the "enemy" is not clearly stated, although Germany's will to peace is, and the authors range from the protection (or exploitation) of national minorities to the control of raw materials and from the monopolisation of "war potential" to intellectual propaganda. There is neither fairness nor soundness in the analysis and not all the "facts" are facts, but there is a mass of odd information here which throws a flood of light on the policy and mentality of the new Germany. The useful parts have to be quarried out, for like most modern German politico-historical writing this takes *Mein Kampf* rather than Ranke as model.

This is the new diplomacy. Paul-Henri Michel takes us back to the old in his *La Question de l'Adriatique, 1914-1918* (Costes: pp. lxxxiv, 298). This is mainly a collection of documents (282) culled from all the various official sources on the war-time negotiations concerning the Adriatic—Austria with Italy, Italy with the Triple Entente, Serbia with all the others. It is a handy collection of great use and its value is much enhanced by a brilliant introduction weaving the complicated series of negotiations into a coherent narrative. The "Adriatic business" is a forgotten episode now, so forgotten that every now and again its history is distorted for contemporary purposes. M. Michel not merely gets the facts right, but contrives in so getting them to set the story in proper perspective and correctly assess not merely the importance of the episode to the conduct of the war but the lessons that may be drawn to-day.

Of other books I may mention a remarkably clever little book on the Jewish question. Angered by the repeated accusations of the Jewish tendency to crime, Liebman Hersch dug into Polish police statistics to compile *Le Juif délinquant* (Alcan: pp. 104), with vindictory results for his co-religionists. The interest may be specialised but the figures are interesting. In 1924-1925 the condemned per 100,000 inhabitants for crime of all sorts was Jews 246, non-Jews 813.8 and the percentage of Jews as compared with non-Jews 30. The chief Jewish offences were fraudulent

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escape of military service, and fraud ; in every other category non-Jews more than held the field ! This was an interesting investigation and was competently carried out.

In *Pour une politique d'Empire* (Alcan : pp. 208), Eugene Guernier returns to his task of emphasising the value to Franco of her African colonies into special reference to the Trans-saharan railway and Morocco. The second part dealing with the status of Morocco from the economic point of view, particularly oil, and is a useful repertory of facts, and the case for revision of treaties and systematic exploitation ably, if patriotically, stated.

Last year the Association Juridique Internationale held a conference on recent constitutional developments and the proceedings have now been published under the title *Regression des Principes de Liberté dans les reformes constitutionnelles de certains états démocratiques* (Rivière : pp. 216). Those taking part included Signor Nitti, Professors Vermeil, Eisenmann, and Scelle, and a variety of legal experts from the democratic countries. "Democratic" was liberally interpreted, for Polish, Greek and Rumanian lecturers told of the encroachments on liberty in their countries which are to all intents and purposes authoritarian. The homage paid to literal democracy is timely, if academic, and there is some solid fact and reasoning in the detailed accounts, even from countries apparently above suspicion, how totalitarian principles have been applied to the detriment of a literal democratic system. The sad words of a Swiss delegate are particularly impressive.

Just a brief mention may be given to two German books sent me—Richard Thoma's *Die Staatsfinanzen in der Volksgemeinschaft* (Mohr, Tuebingen : viii, 150) which discusses the financing of the economic restoration and the armed forces in Germany to date, the problem of wages in the totalitarian state, the control of production and trading activity and how far the state really can profitably control them when the concept of a people's society—all for each and each for all—is still unrealised, and Heinz Lunan's *Karl Marx und die Wirklichkeit* ("La Phalange" Brussels : pp. 104), a rather laboured and specialist "investigation into the element of reality in the economic views" of Marx as seen in *Das Kapital*.

R. T. CLARK.

BOOK REVIEWS

MEN WITHOUT WORK. A Report made to the Pilgrim Trust. (Cambridge University Press. 447 pp. 7s. 6d.)
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND ASSISTANCE IN BRITAIN. By PERCY COHEN, C.B.E. (Harrap. 272 pp. 8s. 6d. net.)
BRITISH UNEMPLOYMENT POLICY SINCE 1930. By R. C. DAVISON. (Longmans. x and 136 pp. 7s. 6d.)
A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO SOCIAL SERVICE. By J. G. HENRIQUES. (George Allen & Unwin. 344 pp. 10s. 6d. net.)
UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE IN LIVERPOOL. (University Press of Liverpool. 64 pp. 2s. 6d. net.)
NATIONAL FITNESS. Edited by F. LE GROS CLARK. (Macmillan. xii and 222 pp. 6s. net.)

OF the six books listed above, the first is easily the most important and deserves to be taken last for special notice. To say this is no reflection on the others in the list, for none of them is without substantial merit ; each of them should find a place in any library of the social sciences.

The second and third books on the list go naturally together. Mr. Cohen provides a comprehensive and detailed description of the twin schemes for helping the unemployed in Great Britain, by insurance and by assistance, established by the Unemployment Act of 1934. His arrangement of the material is clear and workmanlike, and makes his book peculiarly suited for reference. Mr. R. C. Davison covers the same ground in outline only, but at the same time does more in the direction of expressing judgments and making criticisms. Mr. Cohen perhaps is a little too ready to be uniformly approving. He regards our insurance and assistance schemes as having reached "safe anchorage." He records the statutory duty of the Unemployment Assistance Board "to take steps to improve the employability and promote the fitness of those who become its beneficiaries" without pointing out how little in practice the Board, with its more urgent preoccupations of other kinds, has felt itself able to attempt in performance of this duty. He praises in generous terms the work of the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee.

Mr. Davison is less certain of the safety of our anchorage. Of the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee he says that its partnership with the Ministry of Labour has

"worked admirably" from 1935 to 1937, "but friction is possible." "Parliament may not always be content to sit at the feet of an independent, non-political Committee, which has none of the wider responsibilities of government and is unmoved by sectional interests." Of the wisdom of the more startling experiment of 1934—the constitution of the Unemployment Assistance Board as a national agency for relief, in substitution for local agencies and with novel absence of relation to Parliament, Mr. Davison is frankly doubtful. "It can be said to the credit of the Board that they had made a resolute attack upon their problems. They had lived down the ill effect of their start and had in three years established a national assistance service which was respected and even popular." But if in 1934 the transitional payments scheme administered by local authorities had been reformed in place of being abolished, we might have achieved a system which "would have corresponded better with social realities and have rendered the constructive development of our social services considerably easier than it now is."

Mr. Davison and Mr. Cohen taken together describe both the wood of unemployment measures and the trees—and a description of trees and wood alike is necessary for full understanding. They are both, moreover, in general so well informed and so judicious that no harm can be done by pointing out one minor error in each. Mr. Davison, on page 41, speaks as if the income limit of £5 a week applied to all workers, whereas it applies only to non-manual workers. Mr. Cohen, on page 14, states that on the advice of the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee conditions have been eased for married women under the Anomalies Regulations; the only relaxation of those regulations has been for seasonal workers.

The Citizen's Guide to Social Service, by Mr. J. G. Henriques, includes a brief description of the national agencies described by Mr. Davison and Mr. Cohen in a more general account of all the agencies, statutory and voluntary, that are now engaged in dealing with unemployment and poverty and seeking to promote welfare. Mr. Henriques, like Mr. Davison though from a different angle, is doubtful about the Unemployment Assistance Board and stresses the advantage of

voluntary agencies. He outlines a useful scheme for co-ordinating the existing state and voluntary services into a whole, regarding recipients as families and human beings instead of as isolated cases, for housing, education and the rest.

National Fitness, described as "A Brief Essay on Contemporary Britain," is really a series of essays by different authors, with the main theme that the work done during this century to promote health among school children has been limited to curing disease and its effects, without adequate attempt to raise all children positively to a general level of fitness. A large proportion of the children, it is argued, are insufficiently fed and the amount of money available for their maintenance is inadequate. Fresh air and exercise as well as food are insufficient in many cases.

Men Without Work is a report made to the Pilgrim Trust by a body of investigators who, by means of a grant from the Trustees, were enabled to make a scientific and detailed study of unemployment. The investigators worked on lines laid down by a Committee under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of York, who contributes an Introduction. Very wisely, the Committee decided to limit its field and to survey, not unemployment as a whole, but one particular class of unemployment—long-period unemployment, defined as the condition of those who had been out of work for a year or more. About a thousand men and women out of the 250,000 in this condition at the time of the enquiry were selected as a sample, for examination both by their records in respect of employment and assistance, and by personal visit. They were drawn from six districts chosen to represent as far as possible the varying economic circumstances of different parts of the country: Deptford and Leicester as parts of the prosperous South and Midlands; Liverpool, as a great city of high normal unemployment; Blackburn, Crook in Co. Durham, and Rhondda, as centres of the depressed staple industries. The result is a soberly drawn yet vivid picture of the realities of long unemployment, which no practical administrator and no student concerned with social problems can afford to neglect. Invaluable in itself, the Pilgrim Trust Enquiry, with its combination of statistics and field work, is even more important as an example of method in the social sciences.

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It is impossible here to do more than name a few outstanding results. One is the division of long unemployment into two types, described as "residual" and "industrial." The "residual" type is the long unemployment found even in prosperous areas in a prosperous year and indicating almost certainly some personal disability as its cause; "industrial" long unemployment is that which has arisen in the special areas through decay of particular trades. Another feature is the analysis of attitudes to employment; taking the long-unemployed men of all ages and all occupations together, 29 per cent are described as "still thinking in terms of work," 43 per cent as "beginning to accept state of unemployment," 28 per cent as "adjusted to state of unemployment." A vivid touch is the description of the Liverpool unemployed as living in an "all-pervading atmosphere of football pools, greyhounds and horses"; the grim background is that in Liverpool of 1936 "there was a compact body of rather more than 3,500 young men under thirty-five who had not had a job worth mentioning for a year." Yet another grim fact, illustrating the psychological strain of unemployment, is the number of men in the sample who were living apart from their wives.

The *Report on Unemployment Assistance in Liverpool* is a local pendant to *Men Without Work*; its main theme is to make the case for further co-ordination of all the different agencies dealing with poverty in various forms. This, which is also the main objective of Mr. Henriques, is one of the two principal themes which occur continually through nearly all the books now under notice. The other principal theme is the unsatisfactory relation of wages in employment to assistance in unemployment. In many cases (according to the standard adopted by the Pilgrim Trust enquirers—in three cases out of every ten) the income of a long-unemployed man is too low for the elementary needs of his household; yet in many such cases also it is not appreciably lower than his wages, and may even be higher. "There is every reason to think," says the authors of the Report, "that a general increase of allowances where it is most needed would enlarge the volume of unemployment." "Deplorably low earnings," says Mr. Davison, "are at the root of part of the trouble"

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with unemployment assistance, "but higher wages cannot be secured by means of higher public relief; England learnt that lesson prior to 1834."

Unemployment, in fact, is only a phase of poverty which, under the existing system of flat wages without family allowances, continues for many households through employment and unemployment alike. Here, of course, is the explanation of the malnutrition which the authors of *National Fitness* discover. The last thirty years have witnessed remarkable progress in the general standard of living, in the development of insurance against sickness, old age and unemployment, in the organization of social services of every kind. But—for an appreciable proportion of all workmen, having children means passing below the poverty line till the children begin to earn. But—an appreciable proportion of the people are rotting in chronic idleness. But—in the prosperity of 1937, £80,000,000 was spent on providing incomes for unemployment. Progress is undoubted; complacency would be absurd.

W. H. BEVERIDGE.

CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HERETIC. By J. A. HOBSON.
(Allan & Unwin. 5s.)

FOR more years than most of us can remember, Mr. J. A. Hobson has done ceaseless battle for the cause of humanist economics. Until quite recently he was cold-shouldered by nearly all the academic economists; but of late Mr. Keynes and some others have recognised that there is a large element of truth in his specifically economic doctrines, as well as in his general humanistic approach. As Mr. Hobson points out in this volume of retrospective reflection, it was enough to ensure ostracism, in the days when he began to write, even to question the supreme virtue of abstinence, or to doubt that the more men saved out of current income the richer and happier they were destined soon to be. Mr. Hobson himself was forbidden to give University Extension Lectures on economics for the sin of uttering this damnable heresy; and in the same ostracism must be found the explanation of the singular fact that Mr. Hobson has never occupied any position as a teaching economist in this country.

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I myself remember how, when Mr. Hobson's *Industrial System* appeared, I was warned and lectured at against it by a sequence of pundits in my undergraduate days; and by that time the opposition was a good deal less virulent than it had been ten years earlier. But to-day even those who strongly disagree with Mr. Hobson's views do not dispute that he is one of the greatest living economists, and every year brings the younger generation a step nearer to acceptance of some of his principal contentions.

This book, however, brings out very clearly that the "over-saving" theorem, large as it has loomed in the controversy which has raged round Mr. Hobson's writings, occupies only a small space in his general outlook. His fundamental tenet is an assertion, based largely on Ruskin, that Economics cannot without gross distortion and sacrifice of essential values be built up into a quantitative science apart from other social studies and neutral in relation to all ethical considerations. The Ruskinian characterisation of "wealth" and "illth" underlies all Mr. Hobson's work; he maintains persistently that the true subject-matter of economics is human welfare, and that the economist cannot reasonably discard all considerations of welfare that will not be measured by the rod of market valuation. He insists on looking behind market values to the social and human relationships from which they are derived; and in this spirit he entirely refuses to take the existing distribution of incomes or property, or the existing price-system, or the existing set of bargaining relationships, as a *datum*, which it is no business of the economist to criticise.

Mr. Hobson, indeed, criticises everything, from a *cui bono?* standpoint which has much in common with Bentham's. His essentially critical temper makes him very sparing of attempts to construct: so that, though he is in a sense a sort of Scientist, he remains temperamentally within the circle of the older Rationalism. He is suspicious of systems, and very eager to establish the individual's right, within the social framework, to seek truth and happiness in his own way.

It is of a piece with Mr. Hobson's rationalism that his *Confessions* make no sort of autobiography. He mentions many friends, and some events that have greatly influenced

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his life. But every name and every incident comes in not for its own sake but on account of its contribution to the growth of Mr. Hobson's views. About himself, he is quite singularly modest; and about others, though there are many warm words of praise, there is almost nothing that is intimate, or even personal. What concerns Mr. Hobson is that the humanist conception of economics, as one aspect of a wider study of society—art, and not science, though invoking science at many points—has grown, is growing, and ought to be encouraged. To this cause he has given his life; and for very many years it must often have seemed to him that he was kicking vainly against the pricks. He can hardly feel that now, even if new creeds which deny his humanism much more completely than the Victorian economists ever denied them are to-day threatening to overrun all Western civilisation. For, over a large part of the world, men are learning his doctrine, even if they are but tardy and half-hearted in accepting it. Mr. Hobson sees this, and, as he looks back over his long record of humanist propaganda, can feel confidently that he has not written in vain. Certainly this account of his mind's odyssey was well worth writing, and will help many of his admirers to a clearer understanding of the unifying spirit which lies behind his sociological and economic doctrines.

G. D. H. COLE.

CONSUMERS' CO-OPERATION IN GREAT BRITAIN. By A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS, P. SARGANT FLORENCE and ROBERT PEERS; in consultation with COLIN CLARK, MARGARET COLE, C. R. FAY, R. F. HARROD, JOHN HILTON, J. JEWKES, H. A. SILVERMAN, T. H. SEARLS and LEONARD WOOLF. 546pp. (*Allen & Unwin*. 1935.)

THE first interesting thing about this very competent and comprehensive work is the manner of its production and publication. It used to be observed that the ignorance of economists and social theorists about the Co-operative movement, and their tendency to ignore it altogether, was only equalled by the unwillingness of Co-operators to admit even the possibility of flaws in their movement or to listen to what any outsider thought about it save in the way of unalloyed admiration. Neither of these

observations is any longer true, for the C.W.S. has financed this inquiry throughout and has allowed to be published, with its blessing, findings some of which, in spite of the generally favourable tone of the report, cannot but have caused it some pain; whereas the writers of the book, as is comically clear from one or two phrases, were both surprised and impressed by the movement when they came to study it, and it will not be their fault, at all events, if students of economic, political and social problems are not urged to give much more time to the study of Co-operation. All honour to both parties; and all hopes that their effort may bear good fruit in their several fields.

The contents of the book include a very full description of the formal structure and working of the movement—its internal political skeleton, as it were. The report adds an extremely valuable section, containing much material that is nowhere easily available, of its economics, its policy of prices and of investment, its expansion into various fields and its failure to expand into others, etc. For this section, apart from any other, the book would be well worth buying. In it, as in other chapters, there are a number of kindly criticisms made. The charges amount, in sum, to a certain lack of imagination and enterprise and a less immediately obvious, but possibly more dangerous, lack of flexibility in the face of changing external circumstances.

For the student of politics undoubtedly the most interesting fact brought out is that here is democracy existent, working, and working on a wide scale in an undemocratic world—the world of British business. A democracy that is sometimes, perhaps, sleepy; but a democracy. And it is a democracy because—as the report might have stressed rather more definitely—it is a society of equals. Too many people, in discussing democracy, forget that the Greek inventors of the word in their discussion of it laid equal if not greater stress upon the word *isonomia*, equality of rights. This the Co-operative movement provides: members of a retail society, whatever their incomes, are equal one with another. (This is not, unfortunately, true of the English Wholesale, where a large, rich retail society can exercise a very large voting power. The Scottish

Wholesale, wiser in its generation, has put an upward limit to the votes of large societies, which may partly account for the impression of greater democracy given by the movement in Scotland.)

This may seem obvious. What is not so obvious is that this *isonomia* has only been made possible because the movement has been built up by persons of approximately the same income-level, or of incomes, at least, so nearly equal that their differences did not create differences of class-feeling. Despite a sprinkling of middle-class members (usually idealists) the Co-operative movement is at bottom a class, though not a class-conscious, movement. Therein lies the basis of its democracy; thence comes its power to retain the devoted services of its directors and managers at salaries utterly incomparable with the "rewards for talent" in fields outside; thence, also, its conservatism in recruiting from outside sources which have not been trained in its democratic equalitarianism; and thence, finally, the indefiniteness of its political relationship with the Labour Party—which appears unduly to puzzle the authors of the report. The political aims of Co-operation are undefined *vis-a-vis* the aims of Labour, not only because the membership of both movements is so largely the same, but because a movement practising equalitarian democracy in trade must basically ally itself with one demanding equalitarian democracy in politics: at the same time, nevertheless, the Co-operative movement, which can provide for some of its members the supreme gift of a responsible job which is actually getting something done, feels that it cannot sink its identity with either the Labour Party or the Trade Unions, whose energies must, from the nature of the case, be expended largely in opposition.

It is tempting to pursue others of the interesting speculations suggested by the report: for example, the question of the relative merits of Co-operative products—why should it be supposed that they would be better than the best that a firm like Cadbury's, which lives by a wide trade among the not-so-poor, can provide? The point is that they are so much better than the worst. But space forbids; and it only remains to add that Professor Peers, who undertook the final recension of all the material, has performed with admirable

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skill a task which only those who have had the experience of editing a collaborative book can adequately appreciate. If ever there was a vindication of the Socialist's (and the Co-operator's) belief that distinguished public service can be obtained from no motive other than the advancement of truth and social knowledge, it is here.

VICTORIAN CRITICS OF DEMOCRACY. By B. E. LIPPINCOTT.
(University of Minnesota Press.)

THE student of politics and political thought in the nineteenth century should read this book, which comes from America. There exists a fairly widespread delusion, shared even by some historians, that in Great Britain during that century the triumphant progress of democracy, both in theory and practice, was, if slow, sure. The ordinary man, reading the names of Carlyle, Ruskin, Matthew Arnold, James Fitzjames Stephen, Maine, and Lecky, would never connect them in his mind with an anti-democratic movement. But in fact these six writers were the protagonists in a reaction against democracy and of authoritarian philosophy which was extremely influential in the upper and middle classes. Mr. Lippincott has done a useful service and written an interesting book in tracing the sources and nature of this political current. His method is to devote a chapter to each of his seven exhibits and to analyse them systematically. The system is to divide the chapter into five sections, which are designed to answer the following five questions: (1) "What are the distinctive characteristics of the writer, and, in virtue of these, what place does he hold in the thought of his time?" (2) "What are the influences that go to shape the writer's thought?" (3) "What are the writer's basic assumptions and how do they affect the structure of his thought?" (4) "What is his criticism of democracy, and his criticism of the ideas and institutions in which it works?" (5) "Is his criticism of democracy valid?"

This form of analysis has its disadvantages. It makes each chapter a very thorough study of the particular writer, but it leads to a good deal of repetition, particularly in the sections which deal with influences or which trace the

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resemblances and differences in the various writers' outlook and views. Nevertheless, Mr. Lippincott's book is, as we have said, interesting and valuable. He brings out very clearly the strongly authoritarian or anti-democratic attitude of these seven writers. Their views were not, of course, entirely the same; for instance, Arnold and Ruskin differ profoundly from Carlyle and Maine. But all of them either hate or fear democracy and look to some form of authoritarianism as the only possible means of saving Britain from chaos. Their political philosophies were determined by various assumptions or prejudices. Most of them assumed that common people were incapable of political judgment and that democracy would inevitably involve the disintegration of society. Some of them, like Carlyle, thought it outrageous that working men or niggers should be happy and that the only decent form of society was one in which sadistic megalomaniacs were given carte blanche to make the world a wilderness and shambles in order that "great writers" might extol them as "great heroes." All, except Ruskin, were secretly or openly obsessed by the fear that democracy threatened the property owner, by the conviction deeply embedded in the mind of every nineteenth-century middle-class man and woman that if you do not keep the poor man poor, you cannot keep the rich man rich.

Mr. Lippincott's judgments are nearly always sound and his reflections intelligent. On one point, however, it is difficult to agree with him. He frequently states or assumes that the anti-democratic or authoritarian doctrines of these seven seers or preachers had no effect upon their contemporaries. That is a curious and rather short-sighted view of nineteenth-century history. It implies that there was an irresistible and unresisted progress of democracy in Britain from 1832 to 1914. But in fact throughout the greater part of that time the upper and middle classes were highly successful in preventing the democratization of Britain and in sterilizing political democracy as it slowly established itself. In their resistance and sabotage of democracy those classes derived strength and comfort, not to speak of inspiration, from the "critics" of democracy dealt with by Mr. Lippincott.

LEONARD WOOLF

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A CENTURY OF CITY GOVERNMENT. MANCHESTER 1838-1938.

By SHENA D. SIMON. (*Allen & Unwin*. 12s. 6d.)

MANCHESTER has always, it seems, been a self-conscious metropolis—or it has, at any rate, for a century. In its imperialist and Jacobite days it wore its superiority on a less jaunty sleeve, perhaps, but the new industrialism of the steam engine, mechanisation, and the royal supremacy of cotton made Manchester one of the world's great cities, and Manchester has never doubted the essential rightness of that historical experience. 'Only occasionally,' writes Lady Simon in her quite admirable interpretation of local government in Manchester in the last hundred years, 'only occasionally have I made comparisons between Manchester and other cities, and my aim has been to show her in a truthful rather than in a particularly favourable light. With all her faults—and the worst are those that leap to the eye—I am so passionately convinced that there is no other city in the country that is her equal, that to suggest she needs whitewashing—except literally!—would seem a sheer impertinence.' Comparisons—but why? As an immigrant to Manchester a little before the 'Great' War, the writer of these lines had learnt, even before he began to comb a certain area near 'Owens College' for undergraduate lodgings, that Manchester was unique and masterful and privileged. A chosen city. Had it not a civic personality, a throbbing vitality unknown to its specious rival, London, even unknowable there, but perhaps reproducible in faint outline in Liverpool? Had it not the Gaiety Theatre, which made a new epoch in the history of the English drama, and the best Pantomime in England, and its German-made Hallé concerts that had no British equal? Had it not a 'new' civic university, geared to the life of a vast industrial concentration but cosmopolitan nevertheless and honouring the arts (some of them) as well as the sciences? Had it not the cheekiest trolley-boys in England, and a Watch Committee with the same sort of rugged individualism as the Lancashire comedians, whose conquest of the entertainment market was already distinctive? Was there not the *Manchester Guardian*, known to the world, and the Rylands Library, worth millions of pounds (as one was always told) and established to the

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glory of nonconformity and cotton? And the Ship Canal, not yet paying dividends it is true, but . . . ? And this, and that—not forgetting the most valuable derelict site in England and the pre-Raphælite glories of the Art Gallery and the painful granite setts of even the leading streets, and the wildness of Angel Meadow, the drabness of Hulme and . . . Somehow, Manchester made one accept even its meanest features with pride and its highest claims as modest understatement. It is this jannock sort of Manchester which Lady Simon has got down on to her interesting and varied pages.

In 1835, De Tocqueville had said of Manchester, without exaggeration as an abundant and gloomy contemporary literature proved, 'Everything in the outer appearance of the city attests the individual power of man; nothing the regulating power of society. Human liberty reveals at each step its capricious and creative force. Nowhere is apparent the slow and continuous action of government.' Lady Simon's valuable book is a historical essay upon the slow and continuous action of government in a community in which flourished the most tenacious and acquisitive economic individualism. She traces the expanding structure of the city's government; the rise of its social services and the widening of their scope in response to a social conscience that, through the instrumentality of voluntary associations and salaried public officials, was always forcing initiatives upon elected councillors; the growth in range and efficiency of the city's public utilities, not forgetting the Ship Canal, until they have rendered obsolete the old question of private *versus* public enterprise in the sphere of their operation and in adjacent territories.

The hero of this admirable book is not the succession of City Fathers nor of constructive officials, but it is 'public administration' itself. Like technology, public administration is cumulative, largely irreversible, creative. It issues, as this study shows, from outside the Council Chamber as well as within—from the nameless co-operating democrats who vote, as well as the paid and unpaid führers who, ultimately, render their wants articulate and do their bidding. And the moral of Manchester's civic history is that economic

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individualism simply is not adequate to the common purposes of a great city.
H. L. BRALES.

ROYAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY. By HUGH M. CLOKIE and J. WILLIAM ROBINSON. (*Humphrey Milford*. 242pp. 14s.)

IN view of the long history and great importance of Royal Commissions in the public life of Great Britain and the British Empire, it is remarkable that no English scholar should have produced a study of the subject. Yet no book has appeared in England since Toulmin Smith published his diatribe entitled *Government by Commissions Illegal and Pernicious* in 1849. It has been left to two American political scientists to present the first serious study of Royal Commissions past and present.

The present work is a sober and careful account of the Royal Commission of Inquiry considered as an organ of government; or, rather, as an organ to assist government through the provision of information, the giving of advice and the moulding of public opinion.

The authors trace the development of the inquistorial Commission from the Middle Ages up to the present day. They show that the golden age of Royal Commissions occurred in the mid-Victorian period, and especially between 1850 and 1860, when 74 Commissions were appointed, and between 1860 and 1870, when on an average six a year were created. Thereafter the number fell to an average of four a year at the end of the century. The figure rose to an average of 4.7 during the first decade of the twentieth century, but since then there has been a sharp decline persisting to the present day, when the average is as low as one or two a year. The authors believe that the contemporary decline is likely to continue although there is little likelihood of the Royal Commission disappearing altogether. They ascribe the decline to a number of causes, such as the rise of non-official, departmental or interdepartmental committees able to perform the same kind of task and to employ the same type of personnel as the Commission. This is no doubt entirely sound as an analysis, but it raises the question whether Professor Clokie and Dr. Robinson were wise in confining their study to the one institution. Would it not have been

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better to have embraced other organs engaged in similar tasks, especially as the sub-title of the book is "The Significance of Investigations in British Politics"? In other words, would not function rather than constitutional status have provided a better basis for the subject-matter of the monograph? The authors admit that the reports of a number of recent departmental committees have been more important than those of many Royal Commissions. As illustrations one need only mention the MacMillan Report on Banking, the Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers, and that of the Hadow Committee on Local Government Officers.

If the authors had adopted a more functional approach they would have dealt not only with official Committees, special Courts of Inquiry, (such as those set up under the Industrial Courts Act), Parliamentary tribunals of the kind created to inquire into the Savidge case, Boards of Inquiry establish to investigate Civil Service and public scandals, but also with non-official agencies for investigating subjects of political importance. A vast amount of research is to-day conducted by the Social Science faculties of the Universities, by such bodies as P.E.P. and the New Fabian Research Bureau, of a kind which did not exist fifty years ago; and hence in those days the Government was compelled to rely almost exclusively on the Royal Commission.

The book includes a long chapter on "Royal Commissions and Politics" and one on the procedure of the investigatory commission. These contain a number of points that need clearing up. On page 114 the authors state that the two main political purposes served by Royal Commissions are that of procuring information upon some major topic of political dispute, and that of conciliating public opinion. On page 167 they assert that "It has never been the duty of investigative bodies to determine policy; their task is to narrow a field of contest, to bring the disputants to an 'issue,' and to suggest a 'most approved' choice." Neither of these statements is correct as it stands. In many cases there is no political dispute or conflict in the field of inquiry to which a Royal Commission is assigned. The Government merely requires knowledge and advice as to what,

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The book includes a long chapter on "Royal Commissions and Politics" and one on the procedure of the investigatory commission. These contain a number of points that need clearing up. On page 114 the authors state that the two main political purposes served by Royal Commissions are that of procuring information upon some major topic of political dispute, and that of conciliating public opinion. On page 167 they assert that "It has never been the duty of investigative bodies to determine policy; their task is to narrow a field of contest, to bring the disputants to an 'issue,' and to suggest a 'most approved' choice." Neither of these statements is correct as it stands. In many cases there is no political dispute or conflict in the field of inquiry to which a Royal Commission is assigned. The Government merely requires knowledge and advice as to what,

if anything, should be done. Secondly, the formulation of recommendations concerning policy is definitely a most important function of the Royal Commission—its very *raison d'être* in many instances. And it is a misleading view to identify the process of formulating recommendations with the conciliation of contending interests.

It is nevertheless true that much of the so-called evidence which is taken by Royal Commissions consists of nothing more than statements by sectional or group interests of what they want or think should be done. This is a comparatively recent phase of Royal Commission history, and curiously enough receives no attention whatever from the authors. But if one compares, for example, the evidence taken by the Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations of 1835 with that of the Royal Commission on Local Government, 1923-29, an immense divergence in method and attitude is to be perceived. In 1835 the Commissioners toured the country holding local inquiries and digging out the facts they considered essential. In 1923 the Commission sat in London listening to the demands of the various associations of local authorities and made little or no attempt to investigate local conditions for themselves. The growth of organized interest groups has transformed the nature of Royal Commission work, with results which are often unfortunate.

Professor Clokie and Dr. Robinson are occasionally lacking in "feel" in regard to the relation between Royal Commissions and the making of policy. In reference to the Simon Commission on India, for example, they describe the Report as "a work of great wisdom and penetration," a "landmark in Indian constitutional evolution," an opinion which few authorities on Indian government would endorse. They then remark that "the weakness of the Commission procedure was revealed when it became evident that the Government intended to treat the matter, if not as a political issue, at least as one not to be completely divorced from political prejudices" (p. 118-9). As if the future Government of India could possibly have been treated in any other way than as a political issue, or be divorced from "political prejudices"! Again, it is no longer true to say that when oral evidence is included, it is the usual practice for

responsible Ministers rather than Civil Servants to present the views of their departments on important questions of policy (p. 182). One need only mention, as striking instances to the contrary, the crisis-provoking statements of the Treasury officials before the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, Sir Maurice Hankey's evidence before the Royal Commission on the Manufacture and Trading in Arms, and the opinions expressed by officials of the Board of Trade and Ministry of Health before the recently appointed Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population. The practice of Ministers appearing before Commissions seems to be becoming increasingly rare, and an important constitutional question is raised as to the propriety of officials expressing views on policy which are identified with their departments but which do not necessarily represent the considered views of the Government or even of the responsible Cabinet Minister.

On the question of the personnel of Commissions the treatment is also somewhat unsatisfactory. The authors note the various methods of composing the membership of a Commission; and they observe, in passing, that the direction of the Arms Commission of 1935, which they cite as a typical example of the use of a Commission investigation for the purpose of evading criticism, was set by the personnel of the body (p. 130). Yet in a later passage they remark that if the Government has in mind simply the satisfying of a public demand for investigation of a current problem, "it is clear that the choice of distinguished nonentities will serve just as well as the selection of the most experienced and capable persons available." One might almost say that just the contrary is the case. Where the Government is apathetic or negative in its attitude, a very able and energetic Commission, by stimulating public interest, may be able to force it to take action in spite of its indifference.

The criticisms which have been made in this review should not be allowed to detract from the merits which belong to this useful and interesting work. The subject is of great importance and the authors have performed a valuable service in providing a succinct and readable account of the life-history (up to the present time) of an ancient and

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highly significant institution to which English public life is immeasurably indebted.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1936. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. Assisted by V. M. BOULTER. (Oxford Press and Milford. 38s.)

THIS annual volume issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs is as good as ever—and as depressing. Every year when one reads Professor Toynbee's admirable narrative and analysis of international affairs, of what happened in the world 12 to 15 months ago, one notes with horror that the year dealt with by him was not only worse than what preceded it but better than what has since followed it. The principal theme of the present volume is the defeat and disruption of all those forces in the world which stood for peace and collective security. It works itself out in the *saute qui peut* from the League, in the increased volume and tempo of menace from the aggressive dictatorships, and in the inevitable finale of universal rearmament.

In 1936, as in 1935, the dictators struck only one major blow against a pacific system of international relations. In 1935 it was Mussolini with his attack upon Abyssinia; in 1936 it was Hitler with his military occupation of the Rhineland. This Nazi coup in the Rhineland was, owing to the importance of its effects, the major international event of the year under review. Mr. Toynbee's account of it occupies only one-tenth of the book, a hundred pages in section I of Part III. But its effect, following closely, as it did, upon Mussolini's successful conquest of Abyssinia, can be traced upon almost every page of the volume. It confirmed the view which statesmen in the smaller states had taken as a result of French and British policy during the Abyssinian affair, namely that the democratic League Great Powers were not prepared to take any risk in defence of the collective and pacific system, or even to stand firmly together in resisting the *machtpolitik* and aggressive coups of the fascist powers. On the other hand, the fact that all the Great Powers, fascist and democratic, had already embarked upon an immense competition in rearmament showed that there was an intention somewhere

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some time to resist. No man in charge of the policy and destiny of a small state could doubt, unless he were blind or imbecile, that a major European war was practically inevitable in a very short time in a world of triumphantly aggressive dictatorships, of a League reduced to impotence by Britain and France, and of Great Powers everywhere heavily armed against one another.

The small Powers faced by this situation have been forced to choose one of three policies: (1) to attempt to withdraw from their obligations under the League Covenant into a position of isolation and neutrality; (2) to withdraw into the circle and shadow of the dictatorships; (3) to forge the closest possible defensive alliance with those states most likely to afford them protection against fascist aggression, *i.e.* with France and Russia. Throughout Parts III and IV of this survey, in which the international relations of European states are dealt with, the increasing tempo of these three movements is noticeable. It appears in the change of Belgian policy towards neutrality which was announced in the speech of King Leopold on 14th October, 1936; in the loosening of the Little Entente which paved the way for the seduction of Bulgaria and Rumania from the orbit of France into that of the Berlin-Rome axis; in the detachment of Poland from France and the improvement of her relations with Germany; and finally in the attempt of Czechoslovakia, who had nothing to hope for except aggression from the dictators and who could see no safety in isolation and neutrality, to draw closer to France and Russia.

But even further afield the disastrous effects of the retreat from collective security by France and Britain are evident. The admirable section dealing with the Chaco dispute and the ending of the war between Bolivia and Paraguay is well worth reading from this point of view, for the shadow of Abyssinia hung over the long drawn-out discussion of sanctions and embargoes.

Mr. H. V. Hodson once more writes the section on world economic affairs, and Mr. D. A. Routh contributes an excellent account of the Montreux Conference which led to the convention altering the regime of the Straits. In Part V there are three sections of peculiar interest, one dealing with

the Egyptian negotiations and the Treaty of August, 1936, another with the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanon Treaties, and another with the extremely sagacious policy of Ibn Saud towards his neighbours in the two-and-a-half years following his victory over the Yaman.

HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS. By C. A. MACARTNEY. (Oxford University Press. 504pp. 25s.) WATCH CZECHOSLOVAKIA! By RICHARD FREUND. (Nelson. 112pp. 2s. 6d.)

THE contrast between these two books is the contrast between the publicism of journalists and the publicism of scholars. Mr. Macartney is a scholar and can dissect an acute political situation with the dispassionate interest of the medical profession. Mr. Freund, however, is a journalist and, like all serious journalists to-day, his interest goes beyond describing a situation to saving it. Bereft of the slogan of impartial politics which Mr. Macartney, as a Chatham House writer, must try to follow, he is able to give a more actual, if also a more superficial, picture of the present situation. His book suggests the answer why the revision which Mr. Macartney shows to be so desirable is, in one country at least, for the moment impossible. Mr. Macartney's careful work is a handbook for a future peace conference. As a guide to present policy, it is full of useful information, but remains academic. This is because it studiously avoids all reference to the foreign relations of the states concerned or to the diplomatic struggle in Europe as a whole. It fails therefore to give the framework in which the question of revision becomes actual.

Mr. Macartney considers the questions of the treatment of minorities and the revision of frontiers in each of the five countries concerned. In each of the Succession States it is a matter not only of the Hungarian minority but of the Slovak, Rumanian, Yugoslav majorities which formerly lived under Hungarian rule. All of these, he admits, though not wholly satisfied with their present lot, would nevertheless be strongly opposed to a return to Hungary. Even the Slovaks, of whom scarcely more than 200 families (Mr. Macartney gives the figure 526—the Slovak nationalists marked down as

dangerous by the Hungarian Minister of the Interior) were really national-conscious after the war, are to-day more chauvinistic than the Czechs, both in their treatment of the Hungarian minority and in their attitude to frontier revision. The Slovak Autonomist Party under Father Hlinka, though its policy and propaganda are such as to play straight into the hands of Hungarian, and indeed German revisionism, vigorously repudiates Magyar sympathies.

The position of the Croats has certain resemblances. Their opposition to Yugoslav centralism is far stronger than that of the Slovaks to the centralist Czechoslovaks, but they are equally opposed to a return to the pre-war position. In Transylvania, curiously enough, the opposition to the centralism of the Regat comes not so much from the Rumanians as from the Hungarians. Mr. Macartney found among the Hungarians of Transylvania a revival of the Transylvanian spirit which is very different from the pure irridentism of the other Hungarians of the former Kingdom. "Clearly," he writes, "if they had to choose between a Magyar and a Rumanian national state they would prefer the former. They would, however, prefer to either a Transylvania in which they could enjoy national liberty and develop their particular local institutions undisturbed."

The opposition of the Hungarian minorities to the present *status quo* is as intransigent as the opposition of the Successor States to its alteration. The opposition of the Hungarians is not only, or even mostly, due to their treatment by their new masters. "The degree of leniency or severity with which they are treated is to them," writes Mr. Macartney, "really irrelevant, and the fact that the regime is milder in Slovakia than in Transylvania or in the Voivodina does not affect their resentment against it, since that resentment is directed less against the character of the (Czechoslovak) rule than against its very existence."

Mr. Macartney, however, believes that minority policy is important and that fundamentally it is the same in each of the countries concerned. This policy, he considers, is to impose the will of the national majority on the national minority and to make of a country containing many nationalities the national state of one alone. He shows that

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though "Rumania for the Rumanians" may have been the slogan of a fortunately short-lived Government, it also represents a tendency which is everywhere growing more pronounced. Economic pressure, together with the education and advancement of the peoples whom the Hungarians had successfully repressed, results to-day in a fierce competition for jobs, in which the minorities are the first to go under. And the worst, he thinks, is yet to come as the economic situation deteriorates and the international tension grows stronger. He mentions only two possible ways of avoiding this catastrophe.

The first he regards as necessary but ineffective. "Better minority protection," he writes, "is one of the most urgent needs of to-day and ought to be a first object of consideration whether the frontiers are modified or left intact. But it is useless blinking the fact that no minority protection yet devised has prevented any state from doing with its minorities precisely as it wished."

The difficulties of the second—revision—he just touches on when he writes: "One cannot fairly suggest that no local concessions should be given to Hungary at the expense of Slovakia. . . . Czechoslovakia is a fine but delicate structure, which a little pressure here or there might shake very badly. . . . The strip of plain to the south is vital for economic reasons and to make communications. Ruthenia is vital to enable the structure thus built up to keep in touch with its allies; and so on. And in the minds of many, Czechoslovakia is vital to the balance of European Powers."

This reserve with regard to the very existence of one of the chief countries of which he has been writing (and which he has found politically and socially superior to any of the others) is no doubt due to Mr. Macartney's desire to be impartial. Mr. Freund has no such scruples and his book is a vigorous and lucid defence of Czechoslovakia against Nazi-German expansion. In his mind—and not in his alone—Czechoslovakia is not only vital to the balance of European power but to the continued existence in Eastern Europe of freedom, democracy and international law. When the best lack all conviction, it takes a journalist to say it.

SHIELA GRANT DUFF

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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN MODERN EDUCATION. By S. H. BAILEY. (*Oxford University Press*, 1931.)

THE publication of this volume is a notable event. It marks the culmination of a series of inquiries dating back to 1931. In that year the League of Nations Committee on Intellectual Co-operation decided to set on foot an investigation into the study of international relations in different countries. Mr. Bailey undertook this task for Great Britain, and it was the standard he set in this work that led to his being entrusted with the duty of co-ordinating the results of the various national inquiries in a single study. This compact, well-arranged and readable volume is the result. His survey covers, in successive chapters, research, higher education, secondary education, adult education, and a group of miscellaneous activities classed as "international contacts," ending up with a short chapter on the scope of the subject and methods of teaching.

Mr. Bailey's object is to describe and not to philosophize. Nevertheless, his volume "gives furiously to think." "The study of international relations," he tells us in his opening sentence, "was almost unknown in educational institutions before the War." How amazing this will seem to the future historian!

A hundred years and more after the Industrial Revolution had set the world on the course of world-interdependence the phenomena of that great social process, familiar to the banker, the merchant, the manufacturer, the journalist and even the old-time diplomat, were still ignored in academic circles. Yet Mr. Bailey's statement is not too strong. There is no getting away from it by the argument that what is to-day called "international relations" was studied in pre-War days under another name. It was not. Take, for instance, the historians. The Cambridge Modern History, planned by Lord Acton in the decade before the War, treats the history of "the Latest Age"—its final volume—as a juxtaposition of the histories of individual countries. The theme of interdependence which we to-day can discern running through it is totally ignored. The same is true of every one of the bundle of studies which together make up the complex whole of international relations. The economists

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who, in theory, had taken the world for their province since Adam Smith, had in practise averted their eyes from its concrete phenomena. They worked in complete isolation from the international lawyers, who, for their part, ignored the need for the framing of general rules for the carrying on of economic and social activities across the frontiers of states. It is true that, in principle, the lawyers (or some of the more "advanced" of them) claimed the existence of an "international community," just as already Adam Smith had discerned the existence of "a great mercantile republic." But in practice they were content either to be the obedient servants of the chancelleries or to sit theorizing in their ivory towers. This attitude indeed still persists in some quarters to-day. Mr. Bailey quotes a statement by one of them denouncing the danger of the "contamination" of international law by contact with political forces.

One is tempted to speculate on the reasons for this extraordinary timidity or short-sightedness on the part of those who should have been leading the world's thought and educating its statesmen. One cause is undoubtedly the rigidity of academic organization. This made it difficult for the broad and uniform conception of social science to find a lodgment in universities. It is a commonplace plan to-day that international relations is a study of the phenomena of the contemporary world—of the *totality* of its phenomena, from raw materials at one end of the academic scale to states of mind at the other. This is, and nothing less than this, is what Foreign Secretaries have to deal with in their daily work—and not Foreign Secretaries only, but Ministers in many other Departments. But the very idea of social science as a comprehensive whole is very recent—at least in Great Britain. Perhaps the most interesting feature of Mr. Bailey's work and of the movement of which it is the emanation is that it is forcing the academic world to re-survey its field of study and to adjust its organization and teaching methods to meet the challenge of "The Great Society." Had that been done in 1918, or—still better—in the preceding generation, the history of the last twenty years would have been very different.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

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THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICER. By L. HILL. (*Allen and Unwin. 231pp. 5s. net.*)

MR. HILL has been well known to a wide public for nearly thirty years as the first General Secretary of the National Association of Local Government Officers. The Association has grown under his brilliant leadership into a powerful organization with more than 100,000 members, and invested funds of some £2,000,000, and he is therefore entitled to our admiration as one of the most successful exponents of our times of the modern art which may be called "social engineering." He thus writes with the highest authority on the subject which he has chosen for his book.

A single volume compressing into a manageable space the masses of facts about the Local Government Service has been wanted for a long time, and here at last we have one. Mr. Hill has set out for us the relationships between the local authority and its officers, and the conditions under which they serve. Their recruitment and training is dealt with in an exceedingly—even excessively—detailed manner: a ready source of reference is for instance provided for the inquirer who desires to learn the contents of the five Subsections of Section 11 of the Fertilizers and Feeding Stuffs Act, 1926 (though less is said on topics which some may consider to be more important, such as the qualifications and training of directors of education). This is, however, nothing more than a maladjustment of balance, and is in any case offset by his interesting treatment of other topics, in particular of the Whitley Council movement in local government.

Mr. Hill is much more at his ease when he is dealing with broader subjects, such as the study of public administration, and the relationship between the local government officer and public opinion. Here one feels that his heart as well as his mind is contributing to what he has to say. Like so many other people who are deeply concerned about the welfare of the society in which they are living, Mr. Hill bewails the relative scarcity of really penetrating studies of present day problems. "The professional economist," he says, "has no time for public administration, but in spite of all that there is 'economics' in derelict areas, in insanitary working-class

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dwelling, and in contaminated milk and foodstuffs." He deplores the widespread bias against local government as such, and the corresponding prejudice in favour of private enterprise. His remedy is to persuade local authorities "to adopt a public relations policy and keep in step with modern methods of publicising their achievements and their contributions to the nation's welfare." An excellent remedy, so long as local government is fundamentally sound, as indeed for the most part it is. But local government has its weaknesses; let it be remembered, for instance, that some authorities in the depressed areas have failed to adopt the School Meals Act, *not on grounds of cost*. So the remedy must be applied with the greatest caution, for there are, after all, only short steps from "public relations" to indoctrination, and from indoctrination to *lèse-majesté*.

Mr. Hill is, of course, by no means blind to these weaknesses, and not the least valuable parts of his book are those in which he points many of them out. Security of tenure, he tells us, needs further examination; the system of article-d pupilage is "not good enough for local government"; the Hadow Report went badly astray in suggesting a Central Advisory Committee without official contact with the Whitley system; these are some of the points raised which should receive careful attention on the part of the councillors and officers who have the opportunity to initiate the reforms which are so urgently needed. It is to be hoped, therefore, that *The Local Government Officer* will be used as a guidebook as well as an encyclopædia.

T. S. SIMES.

WAR AND DEMOCRACY. ESSAYS ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF WAR. By E. F. M. DURBIN, JOHN BOWLBY, IVOR THOMAS, D. P. T. JAY, R. B. FRASER, R. H. S. CROSSMAN, and GEORGE CATLIN. (Kegan Paul. 10s. 6d.)

THIS is a pudding which has suffered from a plurality of cooks. It consists of six essays by seven writers, and the essays are distributed into three "Parts."

The title is a misnomer, for whatever else the book may be, it is not a study of the relation between war and democracy. The division of the six essays into three "Parts" is arbitrary. The book is, indeed, little more than an excuse for combining

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six essays on war in a single publication; it is a pudding into which seven cooks have arbitrarily inserted six plums.

If the plums were all good, the reader would have little cause for complaint. Unfortunately, while some of them are very good, others are very bad. Let us begin by saying grace for the good food before we go on to the ungracious task of grumbling at the bad. Much the best essay in the book is the first. It has two authors, Mr. Durbin and Dr. Bowlby; it is called "Personal Aggressiveness and War," and it has an appendix with the title: "An Examination of the Psychological and Anthropological Evidence." The authors have succeeded in finding something new to say about war, and something which is not only new, but extremely valuable. They attempt to treat the subject scientifically, to examine the psychological and anthropological evidence, and see whether it provides any answer to the question why, in fact, men fight, whether as individuals or in groups. They have not been content to confine themselves to the more obvious cases and causes of individual and social violence. They go back to the beginning and examine the evidence, which now exists in some quantity, of the causes of violence or aggressiveness in animals, particularly the apes, and children. They use the facts supplied by anthropologists to discover what are the causes of fighting among primitive communities. They also call in the aid of modern psychology, and make interesting use of its important discoveries with regard to the development and suppression of hatred and aggressiveness in childhood and the subsequent transference of these impulses from the original to an innocent object. The authors would be the last people to claim that they have done more than break new ground, but they have done enough to show that it is fertile ground. Even in this short essay they have thrown new light on the causes of war, and even upon the possibility of preventing it.

Three other essays in this book deserve praise. Mr. Crossman's essay on "Collective Security and Dictatorship" is admirable, though it has little or no connection with the first, or indeed the last, in the book. It is a short and extremely clever discussion of what the short-term policy of the Labour Party should be towards Germany and Italy. It is to be

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hoped that members of the Party Executive and Labour M.P.'s will read Mr. Crossman's analysis of the present position of the League and of the possible effects of an "Anti-Fascist Front." Mr. Jay's "Nationalism and Capitalism" is also admirable, particularly his devastating criticism of the theory, dear to many Marxian socialists, of the connection between imperialism and war. Mr. R. B. Fraser contributes a good essay, in which he criticises the attitude of pacifists to collective security.

The book is completed by two essays which are of poorer quality. Mr. Ivor Thomas writes a bald, perfunctory account of the history of Europe between 1815 and 1914. Its irrelevance is not concealed by the fact that it is labelled "War and its Causes, 1815-1914." It throws no light upon war or its causes or upon democracy. It is fatally easy to avoid the labour of thought by writing journalistic sentences which conceal an absence of meaning; e.g.

"The decline of Spain was due primarily to a hardening of her arteries and a tightening of her aristocratic hide. The rise of Italy, Germany, and Japan to virile nationhood is to be attributed less to material possessions than to a new-discovered mental vigour."

Mr. Catlin, in the last essay in the book, deals with "Pacifism, Marxism, and Peace." Here the verbal pretentiousness exceeds Mr. Thomas's, though it is different in kind. Its origin is the university rather than Fleet Street. If Mr. Catlin had written what he had to say on a half sheet of note-paper, it might have been worth saying and even worth reading. Diluted in 54 pages of print and wrapped up in an intolerable number of brackets and parentheses and swaddled in heavy irony it leaves the reader, at the end of the book, with a feeling that he has just, and only just, escaped choking from a world of wool and cobwebs. Mr. Catlin is so intent upon writing impressively that he forgets to write grammar or sense. For instance:

"Mr. Laski has stated a perfectly sound sequence of economic likelihoods. He prefers to treat them as certainties immanent in history, rather than exploring how they may be obviated."

No one can state a sound sequence of economic likelihoods.

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It is ungrammatical to say that "he preferred to sit at home rather than going for a walk." There is no such thing as "a certainty immanent in history." It is impossible to obviate an economic likelihood.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. By SIR MAURICE AMOS. 178 pp. (Longmans. 7s. 6d.)

A study of the principles of the American constitutional system. The last chapter is devoted to the New Deal.

PEACE WITH THE DICTATORS? By SIR NORMAN ANGELL. 328 pp. (Maitland. 7s. 6d.)

Begins with a statement of the German and British case and endeavours to frame a British policy on an understanding of the dictators' intentions.

THE CRUMBLING OF EMPIRE. By M. J. BONN. 432 pp. (Allen & Unwin 15s.)

A study of the imperial system and of the change which is taking place owing to its break up.

PERSONS AND PERIODS. By G. D. H. COLE. 333 pp. (Macmillan. 12s. 6d.)

A collection of essays dealing for the most part with social changes since the 17th century.

SCIENCE AND LIFE. By J. G. CROWTHER. 96 pp. (Gollancz. 1s. 6d.)

Volume XII in "The New People's Library" deals with "What science does in modern life," "the social origin of electrical science," and the way in which science is used to-day.

EUROPE REHOUSES. By ELIZABETH DENBY. 284 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 14s.)

The author has had long experience of slum clearance and rehousing in London and has studied rehousing abroad.

TRUTH IN HISTORY. By WILLIAM A. DUNNING. 226 pp. (Oxford Press and Milford. 14s.)

Essays by the well-known Professor of History and Political Philosophy in Columbia University.

AMERICAN TESTAMENT. By JOSEPH FREEMAN. 576 pp. (Gollancz. 16s.)

This book by a Ukrainian Jew who at seven years of age came to America was chosen by the American Writers' Congress as the best autobiography of its year.

BEFORE THE WAR. VOL. II. THE COMING OF THE STORM. By G. P. GOOCH. 447 pp. (Longmans. 10s.)

Studies in the diplomacy of five statesmen: Grey, Poincaré, Bethmann-Hollweg, Sazonoff, and Berchtold.

ARTHUR HENDERSON. By MARY AGNES HAMILTON. 461 pp. (Heinemann. 15s.)

Mrs. Hamilton has written an excellent biography in which the personal qualities and achievements of Arthur Henderson are displayed.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1919 TO 1937. By E. L. HASLUCK. 347 pp. (Cambridge Press. 8s. 6d.)

A useful account of international affairs since the war; the arrangement is by localities (e.g. Central Europe and America) and countries. The final chapter is devoted to the League.

IMPERIALISM. By J. A. HOBSON. 386 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d.)

A new and revised edition of a very well-known book.

BANTU BELIEFS AND MAGIC. By C. W. HOBLEY. 369 pp. (Wishart. 15s.)

A new edition of a standard work first published in 1922.

CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN. By FRANK JELLINEK. 657 pp. (Gollancz. 8s. 6d.)

Written with inside knowledge from the Government side between August, 1936 and August, 1937.

THE DOMINIONS AS SOVEREIGN STATES. By A. B. KEITH. 769 pp. (Macmillan. 25s.)

An account of constitutional usage in the light of recent history, particularly since the Statute of Westminster.

HERITAGE OF YESTERDAY. By RICHARD VON KÜHLMANN. 200 pp. (Hodge. 7s. 6d.)

A historical survey of world politics from the time of Napoleon to the present day by the well-known German diplomatist and statesman.

ITALY'S FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY, 1914-1937. By M. H. H. MACARTNEY and PAUL CREMONA. 353 pp. (Oxford Press. 12s. 6d.)

A study of the various aspects of Italian foreign policy during and since the war.

THE LABOUR PARTY IN TRANSITION, 1931-1938. By D. E. MCHENRY. 320 pp. (Routledge. 7s. 6d.)

The book is the result of an investigation of the Labour Party by an American during 1935 and 1936.

THE MIDDLE WAY. By HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P. 382 pp. (Macmillan. 5s.)

The book deals with the relation of democracy to the economic system and the way out of the existing crisis.

EDUCATION IN THE COLONIAL EMPIRE. By ARTHUR MAYHEW. 291 pp. (Longmans. 6s. 6d.)

The author, who is joint secretary of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, deals with the history of the educational policy and the various colonial educational systems.

EVERYDAY LIFE IN RUSSIA. Compiled by BERTHA MALNICK, with drawings by PEARL BINDER and 15 photographs. 282 pp. (Harrap. 12s. 6d.)

The author is a Research Scholar of Newnham and has visited Russia three times and lived there in all four years. The book is made up of "documentary" evidence ranging from decrees to statements of private persons and the letters of children. It would have been more convincing without the photographs which seem to be designed to show that the Russian proletariat has the same foolish smile as the film stars and bathers whose photographs appear *ad nauseam* in the silliest bourgeois picture papers.

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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

By W. IVOR JENNINGS

I

THE Constitution of the British Commonwealth, even more obviously than the British Constitution, *n'existe point*. In spite of what de Tocqueville said about the latter, it is in fact a complex of institutions, laws, conventions and practices which make it one of the most detailed and closely co-ordinated in the world. The Constitution of the British Commonwealth, on the other hand, has undergone a process of disintegration on the legal side which has not been met by any corresponding process of integration on the side of convention or practice. It does indeed exist, but its limbs are so weak that it seems that a breath would cause them to break.

The legal structure of the British colonial Empire, as it existed in 1914, was built up on a foundation of two authorities, Parliament and the Crown. As legal institutions for the whole Commonwealth, both have been severely weakened since 1918. It is, perhaps, still a legal principle that Parliament can enact laws for any part of His Majesty's dominions. But that, as Lord Sankey remarked in this connection, is pure theory. It is not even certain as a legal proposition; for the Statute of Westminster declares that no Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested and consented to the enactment thereof. This is fortified by a similar statement in the preamble to the Statute. Moreover, the Status of the Union Act, 1934, an Act of the Parliament of the Union of South Africa enacted under the

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authority of the Statute of Westminster, has provided that no Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall extend to the Union unless extended thereto by an Act of the Parliament of the Union. The Constitution of Eire goes even further, and declares that "the sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws for the State." It may be that the Privy Council would declare, with Sir Edward Coke, that the Acts of a sovereign Parliament could not bind its successor, and that in consequence no Act of a Dominion could prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom from passing such laws as it pleased; but the Privy Council has no jurisdiction over Eire, and it is by no means certain that the South African courts would accept the traditional English interpretation.

Even in the eyes of the law, therefore, the authority of Parliament must be regarded as restricted. According to convention or constitutional practice it must be considered to be even more limited. It could not legislate for any Dominion without its consent and (omitting Newfoundland, which is of no importance for our present purposes) such consent would very rarely be given. The abdication of Edward VIII was a very special occasion. Even so, Canada passed legislation to confirm the "request and consent" of the Dominion Government, South Africa and the Irish Free State passed their own legislation, and only Australia and New Zealand, neither of which is within the legal provision of the Statute of Westminster (though the preamble applies), were content with the Imperial legislation. It may be said generally that Imperial legislation will never be applied to South Africa and Eire, and that, apart from special legislation applying to the Crown, legislation will never be passed for the other Dominions except constitutional legislation for Canada and (where necessary) New Zealand. The Parliament

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at Westminster in other words, is no longer an organ common to the whole Commonwealth.

"Common allegiance to the Crown" was referred to in the Balfour Declaration and in the preamble to the Statute of Westminster. It is commonly said that the increase in the powers of the Dominions, and especially the enactment of the Statute, has extended the powers possessed by the King personally. The reverse is the truth: as a matter both of law and of practice, his authority has diminished. In relation to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, his legal powers have not been diminished, unless the abolition of the right of the Crown to grant leave to appeal from Canadian courts in criminal cases is considered to be such a power. The only recent change in relation to these Dominions is that the powers which the King exercises personally are now clearly exercised on the advice of the Dominion Ministers. The intervention of a British Minister is usually required, though that is now a merely formal matter. It is this fact, no doubt, which has given rise to the belief that his authority has increased; for it is thought that contradictory "advice" may sometimes be given. It may be that advice will be given by British Ministers in relation to the United Kingdom which has a tendency opposite to that given by a Dominion Minister in relation to that Dominion. For instance, he may be advised to ratify a treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom and not advised to ratify on behalf of a Dominion, or *vice versa*; but his duty then is to accept the advice on both sides. It may be that he will do his best to persuade the two Governments to reach some accommodation, but he was perfectly at liberty to advise accommodation beforehand, and there is no real increase of authority.

In relation to South Africa there is definite diminution in his functions, as a result of Union legislation of 1934. There is no longer any obligation on the Governor-General to

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reserve for the royal assent certain kinds of constitutional amendments, though the Governor-General may be advised by the Union Government to reserve any Bill. In certain circumstances, also, acts of the Union Government which require to be formally expressed under the Union Great Seal no longer require the sign manual, so that personal application to the King is unnecessary. Further, the King does not appear in the Constitution of Eire, though he continues to exercise formal functions under the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act, 1936. This apparently means that there has been no real diminution of his legal authority in respect of Eire, except that he no longer appoints a Governor-General; even so, he would be a bold king who tried to persuade Mr. de Valera not to do some act which he had decided to do.

Further, "common allegiance" does not involve a real and effective common nationality throughout the Commonwealth. It is true that by Imperial legislation all persons born within His Majesty's dominions are British subjects; but this fact does not imply that British subjects as such have of necessity any particular status in a Dominion. In Eire a "citizen of Ireland" is not a British subject, and a British subject who is not a "citizen of Ireland" is for nearly all purposes an alien. Elsewhere, a British subject as such has no right of entry, except in the United Kingdom, though once he has satisfied the Dominion law by residence or domicile he may (provided that in the Union he is a person of European descent) acquire the electoral franchise.

Nor is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council a court for the whole Commonwealth. It has no jurisdiction over the courts of Eire; it hears no criminal cases from Canada; it takes very few constitutional cases from Australia; and its jurisdiction in respect of South Africa, which is seldom sought or exercised, can easily be taken away.

The effect of a declaration of war is still a matter of some

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controversy. Technically, war is declared by the Crown, and every British subject is *ipso facto* at war with the enemy. On the other hand, no Dominion as such would be at war unless the King or the authority prescribed by the Dominion Constitution declared war on its behalf; and if the King declared war on behalf of a Dominion he could do so only, by convention, on the advice of the Dominion Ministers. In the case of Eire the assent of Dail Eireann would be required in accordance with the appropriate provision of the Constitution; and a proclamation, if issued, would be under the Irish Seal. In the case of South Africa, also, any proclamation would be under the Royal Great Seal of the Union.

II

The development of the law thus exhibits a process of disintegration; nor have conventional devices been created adequately to restore the unity of the Commonwealth. The proposals of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the Round Table group, and New Zealand for an "Imperial Council of State" or an "Imperial Parliament of Defence" fell flat in 1911 and have never seriously been revived. It has sometimes been assumed that the Imperial War Cabinets of 1917 and 1918 conducted the war. In truth, they did nothing of the kind. Even while they were sitting the British Cabinet went on with its work, and the Imperial War Cabinets were really Imperial Conferences dealing with the problems of the war from the standpoint of the Dominions. It is quite untrue to suggest that the Imperial War Cabinets "advised the King"; Cabinets, in fact, rarely do anything of the kind; what they do is to order the Departments to take appropriate action. The Imperial War Cabinets had no authority to order any Department or any Government to do anything whatever; their decisions required the concurrence of the (British) War Cabinet and the Governments of the Dominions. It is true,

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however, that the two Imperial War Cabinets gave more prolonged and detailed study to the problems involved in the conduct of the war than would have been possible with ordinary Imperial Conferences. They were a device for securing common action which might possibly have been carried into the realm of foreign affairs and imperial defence after the war.

An attempt was in fact made at the Conference of Prime Ministers in 1921. The Summary of Proceedings compared its work with that of the Imperial War Cabinets. The Prime Ministers were invited to meetings with members of the British Cabinet called to deal with Imperial and foreign questions of immediate urgency (not, be it noted, ordinary meetings of the Cabinet). It was thought by Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon when it was all over that the Conference had laid down the lines of a "common foreign policy" whose instrument was to be the Foreign Office. Accordingly, it was intended that meetings should be held annually "or at such longer intervals as may prove feasible," in order that the general direction might be determined and the Foreign Office carry out the common foreign policy. "In former days," said Lord Curzon, "the policy of Great Britain was the foreign policy of Great Britain alone. Now it is foreign policy of the British Empire"; and he added that the Foreign Secretary now spoke not for Downing Street alone but "for the State which constitutes the British Empire."

The attempt was, however, doomed to failure. Though the Foreign Office thought that it could promise the use of Dominion troops in the defence of French territory, it became necessary to insert a clause in the draft treaty exempting the Dominions from obligations unless they consented to them. Though no invitations were sent by the United States to the Dominions to attend the Washington Conference, the Dominions insisted that the British representatives could not

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bind them, and that they must have separate representation. Finally, Mr. Lloyd George's appeal to the Dominions to assist in the defence of the Dardanelles neutral zone met with checks from Canada and South Africa. Chanak was the grave of the notion of a "common foreign policy." Moreover, Canada's insistence on discussing the implications of Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the separate signature of the Halibut Fisheries Treaty, showed that Canada at least had a distinctive foreign policy dependent on close relations with the United States. The idea of a common foreign policy had clearly disappeared when the Imperial Conference met in 1923. Since then there has been no suggestion that such a common policy exists. Indeed, the Dominions have withdrawn from all European problems. The intervals between Imperial Conferences have lengthened, as the dates show—1921, 1923, 1926, 1930 and 1937. Even the statement in 1937 that the representatives of the Governments concerned "found themselves in close agreement upon a number of general propositions" had to be qualified by a footnote pointing out that this involved no diminution of the right of the several Governments to advocate and support their statements of policy as submitted to the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, the Dominions cannot allow the British Government to go on its own sweet way. Even if the constitutional difficulties can be overcome, so that a Dominion may remain neutral in the next war, it is certain that there will be such a large body of pro-British sentiment that most of the Dominions will find themselves involved in any such war. Some of them, Canada and New Zealand in particular, are by no means pleased with the Chamberlain policy, though Canada is more pro-Chamberlain than the United States. We shall not know for a generation what part the Dominions have played, but it seems reasonably certain that they generally

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toned down the policy of the British Government. At the same time, they are necessarily concerned about their own defence, because none of them could rely on its own strength if it became at war with a neighbour. Canada in particular relies quite openly on the British Fleet to defend the Atlantic coast, and what is cautiously termed "a friendly fleet" to defend the Pacific coast. Australia and New Zealand are much concerned with the Pacific fleet, and South Africa has some interest in the Suez Canal. Eire is dependent almost entirely on British support.

It follows that the Dominions must be concerned in British defence policy. A difference has, however, always been made between foreign policy and defence policy. The former must be generally acceptable to the appropriate Parliament, but it is one item of policy among many. Primarily, the electoral support of any Government depends on its internal policy. To some extent, therefore, the external policy of a Government is an accident. It is reasonably certain, for instance, that if an election could be held in the United Kingdom on the issue of foreign policy alone the present Government would be defeated. Certainly it would have been defeated six months ago. The problem of defence is in a different category because defence involves parliamentary votes, and it is fatuous to suggest, as Sir Joseph Ward suggested in 1911, that an "Imperial Council of State" can determine what contributions a Dominion shall make to imperial defence. The answer is that the contribution of any Government must depend on the amount that it can persuade its Parliament to appropriate.

This is so obvious that it has never been suggested since 1918 that there should be an "Imperial Peace Cabinet" to determine questions of defence. At the same time we have the curious paradox that there has been machinery for the discussion of defence problems while there has been no

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machinery for the discussion of foreign policy. It was agreed in 1912 that Dominion representatives should be summoned to the Committee of Imperial Defence when questions of naval and military defence affecting the Dominions were under consideration. The representatives concerned were, generally, the Dominion High Commissioners in London, though on occasions they might be Dominion Ministers. This practice was renewed when the Committee of Imperial Defence was re-established after the war, and is still continued. The explanation is, of course, that the question is primarily one of expenditure by the British Government. It is true that, as a result of such consultations and the pressure of the British Government, the Dominions have recently incurred considerable expenditure on their own account: but the main share of the cost falls on the British taxpayer, and the Dominions have really been urging more expenditure in the Pacific and the Mediterranean for their own benefit. The fact remains, however, that there is effective machinery for consultation on defence questions, and no effective machinery for consultation on foreign policy. Some Foreign Secretaries, particularly Mr. Henderson, have tried to secure collaboration at Geneva, but otherwise there is nothing except the infrequent Imperial Conferences and the occasional despatches.

On economic matters there is far more collaboration than is commonly realized. Major economic questions must inevitably be determined by local political conditions, and the process of bargaining which began at Ottawa in 1932 and has continued to this day is primarily a conflict of separate and competing economic groups with sentiment intervening. It is unnecessary to argue the case for "Empire Free Trade" economically, because it is just nonsense to assume that, for instance, a Government which has to seek votes in Ontario and Quebec is going to allow the free competition of British manufactured goods. It is even more absurd to suggest that

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the British Conservative Party is likely to antagonize its support in the counties by encouraging the importation of Dominion primary produce. Tariff policy in any country consists in playing off one economic group against another in order to secure the maximum of votes; it has nothing to do with waving the flag or singing the National Anthem. On less important matters like agricultural research, entomology, mycology, tropical diseases, forestry, shipping, and the like, there is, however, a good deal of co-operation, though few of the recommendations of the Imperial Committee on Economic Consultation and Co-operation, which reported in 1933, have been carried out. Such minor collaboration is important, though it could be matched with examples of collaboration drawn from Europe, and especially through the technical activities of the League of Nations.

III

It must be assumed for present purposes that closer collaboration among the nations of the Commonwealth is an advantage. Such a proposition is distinctly arguable on both sides, and there are clear disadvantages as well as advantages in having an extra-European brake to British foreign policy. However, let it be understood for present purposes that sentiment if not material interest must induce Great Britain as well as the Dominions to seek as close a collaboration as the circumstances warrant. We may exclude at the outset the nebulous ideas of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain; neither an Imperial Federation nor a *Zollverein* is practical politics. The question is now to secure collaboration among six or seven autonomous nations.

The Committee of Imperial Defence has provided an admirable solution for securing common advice if not common action in matters of defence; and such matters include not only the technical arrangements capable of being suggested

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by the Chiefs of the Staffs but also the more political questions—the distribution of fleets and armies according to the prevailing international tension—which are the concern of the Committee of Imperial Defence itself. Defence and foreign policy are, however, inextricably entwined. The Defence Policy and Requirements Committee of the Cabinet has been for practical purposes a foreign policy committee, though it has also been in direct and close relations with the Committee of Imperial Defence. So far as the available information goes, it appears that the High Commissioners for the Dominions have not been summoned to meetings of this Committee, nor to meetings of the Cabinet when foreign affairs are under discussion. There seems to be no reason why this should not be done. The old policy of excluding all but Cabinet ministers from Cabinet meetings broke down during the war, and it is not maintained in its entirety now. It is not uncommon for Ministers not in the Cabinet to be summoned, and it is a common practice for such Ministers and even senior civil servants to be placed on Cabinet committees. The Committee of Imperial Defence itself is not, of course, a Cabinet committee (though the statement that it is is often made), but it bears a very close analogy, and one civil servant is a permanent member, while other civil servants as well as the High Commissioners are frequently summoned. The time is past when the Cabinet can, without preparation, pass in its stride over the item “Foreign Affairs (if any)” which traditionally appears at the head of the Cabinet agenda. The Defence Policy and Requirements Committee set up in the first instance as a result of the Italo-Ethiopian War is presumably still in existence; if it is it should be converted into a permanent Foreign Affairs Committee; if it is not, it should be re-established with wide terms of reference.

If the High Commissioners are summoned to such of its

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meetings as are concerned with general questions of foreign policy, they would not be able to pledge their Governments. They do not and cannot pledge their Governments when they attend the Committee of Imperial Defence and its sub-committees. They can do no more than emphasize the points of view of their Governments, either with or without special instructions from their own Cabinets. They cannot be members of their own Cabinets, since they cannot effectively take part in Cabinet discussions perhaps thousands of miles away. They should, however, be of the same status as Cabinet ministers and have Cabinet experience in their own country. This is not merely in order that they may discuss with British Cabinet ministers on an equal footing, but also in order that they may be familiar with the process and the problems of their own Governments. The example of Australia, which maintains a High Commissioner of Cabinet rank, is one to be followed.

If the High Commissioners are to be effective, both they and the Government they represent must receive full information. It is not known whether the High Commissioners as such are kept fully informed; but the Dominion Governments certainly receive as full information as the members of the British Cabinet, other than the Foreign Secretary himself. All Foreign Office papers of importance are endorsed "King, Dominions, Cabinet," and are circulated accordingly. They are sent to the Dominions by the Dominions Office. The technique of turning into code must be undertaken somewhere, and it really matters little whether it is undertaken in the Treasury, the Foreign Office, or the Dominions Office. When the Dominion Prime Ministers insist, as they have done at several Imperial Conferences, that communications should pass from Prime Minister to Prime Minister, they appear to assume that thereby they will receive better and more personal attention. In fact, the

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opposite result would follow. The British Prime Minister is an extremely busy person. If he is wise he delegates everything which is not of immediate and substantial importance. When occasions occur for which his personal attention is necessary, he gives it. Lord Baldwin was, for instance, personally concerned with the communications to the Dominions about the abdication of Edward VIII. It is, however, impossible to assume that the ordinary circulation of despatches, even in time of emergency, will be undertaken by the Prime Minister himself. If he accepts responsibility, the execution will be left to a private secretary or to the departmental officials of the Treasury. The Dominions Secretary is less pressed with work, and his work is of less importance. Consequently, he is able to come rather further down the scale of business and to attend personally to matters which no Prime Minister could touch.

The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. W. M. Hughes, has recently suggested that the Dominions Office is superfluous, and that Foreign Office matters should come from that Office. The complaint is really one of delay. The use of the Dominions Office instead of the Foreign Office ought not in itself to cause delay; in fact, the reverse is likely to be the case. When an emergency has to be faced quickly, the Foreign Office may be hard put to it to deal with foreign adventures, and the need of rapid communication to the Dominions may easily be overlooked, while the first thought of the Dominions Office will be that the information must be sent to the Dominions at once. The delay of which Mr. Hughes complains is probably inevitable in all ordinary matters. If, for instance, an important despatch comes in from the British Ambassador in Rome, it will be laid before the Foreign Secretary as soon as it is decoded. The Foreign Secretary will discuss whether immediate action is required and, if necessary, action will be taken. In the meantime, he

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By HUGH DALTON, M.P.

THREE questions suggest themselves. First, what is the Foreign Policy of the various Dominions? Second, how is the Foreign Policy of this country affected by the existence of the Dominions as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and by the fact that they have each their own characteristic outlook on the international scene? Third, how, and with how much success, is the Foreign Policy of the British Commonwealth "co-ordinated"?

I will deal with this last question first. As between governments, there is "information" and there is "consultation." Of exchange of information there is plenty, probably at times too much, for conscientious public men are always in danger of being drowned in detail, or suffocated beneath a mountain of print. Some of the information, moreover, arrives late and stale.

There is also plenty of consultation. This takes a number of different forms. There are full-dress Imperial Conferences; there are annual meetings of the British Empire delegations at the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva; there are occasional personal contacts between visiting Ministers and the Governments whose countries they visit; there are regular contacts of Dominion High Commissioners with the Government in London; finally, there is continuous communication between all the Governments of the Commonwealth by cable. Which of these forms shall be used in any particular case turns on time and opportunity. I recall that in 1929, when the Labour Government took office in this

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country, we carried on consultations with the Dominion Governments for several months by cable on the subject of signing the Optional Clause, and put the finishing touches to our agreement when we met in person at the League Assembly at Geneva. I recall also that in 1930, when an Imperial Conference met in London, we secured agreement to a programme of action at the Disarmament Conference. This agreement, covering much detail, would have been far harder and slower to settle by cable and without personal contacts. Unfortunately in 1932, when the Conference met, our successors in London went back on this programme.

Two Australian Ministers have recently spoken their minds on this question.

Mr. Hughes, speaking at Melbourne on August 8th, with his habitual septuagenarian vigour, denounced the Dominions Office as an obstruction to effective consultation and declared it to be a complete anachronism. "The Australian Government," he said, "could not exercise an effective voice in Imperial policy unless they were fully informed of events while situations could still be moulded by appropriate policy. There was a tendency, for which geographical circumstances were partly responsible, to confine the news given to the Dominions to information given after the event, or when a situation had so developed that the only practical alternative was reluctant acquiescence. The Dominions Office now acted as a net in which messages were entangled. If the Dominions were to have an effective voice in moulding British foreign policy, the messages must all come direct from the Foreign Office or the Prime Minister to the Dominion Prime Ministers. This was not impossible, because it was the practice often followed at present."

Mr. Menzies, speaking in London on June 21st at the Chatham House annual dinner, said, "in spite of the theorists, the foreign policy of the British Commonwealth is to a large

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extent in the hands of the Foreign Secretary of this country. The great issue of peace and war will be much more determined by the gentleman who sits in a room looking across the Horse Guards Parade than it will be by my colleague in Canberra, or one of our colleagues in Ottawa or Pretoria. The nations of the world will not be prepared to sit down for a few weeks or months while the members of the Commonwealth have an intimate chat as to what they are to do. Consequently we must devote ourselves increasingly to the problem of finding out how we can accelerate and complete the process of consultation. I suggest that, instead of assuming that consultation with the British self-governing communities may quite frequently and appropriately be consultation after the event, we should be directing our minds to see how far it cannot be made possible to consult every Dominion at the right moment and with a mind which is open until that Dominion has spoken."

Mr. Menzies went on to describe how a Cabinet meeting was once held in Australia by inter-connecting all the widely-scattered Ministers by telephone and how "more recently we sat in our Cabinet room at Canberra and had a conversation by every member of the Cabinet with our distinguished High Commissioner in London. I see no limit to that kind of thing, and I look forward to the day when the triumphs of science . . . will enable us to speak with one voice."

No doubt the technical problems of communication are rapidly becoming easier. Australia and New Zealand, geographically the most distant of the Dominions, are now within seven or eight days' travel of London by air, and a conference of Commonwealth Ministers, in London or in any Dominion capital, could now be assembled in little more than a week. Alternatively, what the Australian Postmaster-General did for his colleagues could now be done for Ministers in all parts of the Commonwealth, and simultaneous

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consultation over the long-distance telephone could be arranged between all the capitals.

None the less, in times of swiftly-moving crisis, an inevitable limit may be imposed on the process of consultation by the need for a quick decision. To enter, or not to enter, a war already begun in Europe might have to be decided within an hour. A warning that, if war were to begin, we should enter, might have to be given at equally short notice. Nor can we exclude the possibility that a decision might be taken by others, in the form of a sudden air attack, or other direct enemy action, against this country without declaration of war. The best we can do, in view of such possibilities, is to know each others' minds as perfectly as we can beforehand. But such knowledge will be apt to be imperfect, in so far as either the United Kingdom or the Dominion Governments refrain, in the traditional British fashion, from committing themselves in advance to definite action in hypothetical circumstances.

How far will the process of consultation, even if improved and developed to the utmost that is practically possible, result in an agreed Commonwealth policy? No easy answer can be given to this question. But an approach to an answer can be made by examining the first of the questions raised in this article. What is the Foreign Policy of the various Dominions?

The Dominions, including India and Eire, are all members of the League of Nations and hold, by rotation every third year among themselves, a seat on the League Council. Their representatives have played a considerable part at Geneva, not always in agreement with those of the Mother Country. It may be argued that, on the whole, there has been a steadier loyalty among Dominion Governments than among those of the United Kingdom to the principles of the League Covenant.

But, on the other hand, there is a constant influence from

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several of the Dominions against what they are inclined to regard as undue British preoccupation with Europe and against more than a bare minimum of British "commitments" on that Continent. It will be recalled that in 1925 no Dominion accepted the commitment of the Treaty of Locarno. Mr. Casey, the Australian Federal Treasurer, speaking at Chatham House on April 20th, 1937, said "we know of the antipathies and jealousies, the hopes and fears that have developed in Europe over the centuries, but these things do not mean very much to us out there. We read in the Press about the troubles in Europe, but we find it extremely difficult to take it all at face value. The whole European stage seems to be behind a veil, rather misty and unreal. These things which are close to you, and naturally very real to you, seem very much less real to people who are half the world away." "We do individually hope and pray," he continued, "that you will not get embroiled in European affairs to anything more than the minimum extent you believe to be necessary. This feeling is largely unspoken, because after all it is your affair, and you know much more about it than we do, but I believe the unspoken thought throughout the whole of the Empire has been to try to pull you away from Europe." He added that "any world movement that appears to threaten the ability of the British Fleet, or some appreciable portion of it, to move freely eastwards would be of great concern to us in Australia." But he had no immediate fear of attack by Japan.

The last general election in Australia in the autumn of 1937 was largely fought on questions of defence and foreign policy. The Labour Party had opposed Australian co-operation in sanctions against Italy. They had accused the Lyons Government of being mere Yes Men to the anti-Labour Government in London. They were accused, in turn, by Ministerialists of advocating isolation and of repudiating the League of Nations and collective security. Mr. John Curtin,

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the able Leader of the Labour Opposition at Canberra, whom I met in Australia in January of this year, told me that his Party was not isolationist, nor hostile to the League, but that they calculated that, if serious trouble arose in Europe, Australia would, in fact, have to look after her own defence. For this reason the Labour Party was for spending money on the air force rather than the navy. In his "policy speech," with which he opened the election campaign, Mr. Curtin declared that "the strength of Australian defence must lie in aviation. The Lyons Government has so far provided only eight squadrons, or 96 'planes, while there is not far away from us a power equipped with a sea-borne 'plane strength of not less than 300 'planes. For the capital outlay of £7,500,000 Australia could have an aerial fleet of 25 squadrons, or 300 'planes. Ships of the Australian navy, which cost double that, have been towed out to sea and sunk as obsolete. If we cannot afford, as we cannot, a floating navy equal to that of a world power, it is yet within our means to sustain an air fleet equal to any that can be brought against us." He added that "self-defence has become increasingly a question of industrial preparedness." Labour gained votes and seats in the election, notably in the Senate, and is now within a short distance of a majority in both Houses. Mr. Curtin told me that, if Labour wins in Australia in 1940, he believes that close and friendly co-operation in foreign policy would be easy, if there were a Labour Government in London, but more difficult if the Chamberlain Government, which his party distrusts, were still in power. And I recall that we had full co-operation in 1930-1 with the Australian Labour Government of those days.

The present Labour Government in New Zealand, which now holds the Dominion seat on the League Council, is a sturdy supporter of a whole-hearted League of Nations policy. In a notable statement at Geneva in September, 1936, it

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declared that the Covenant should be strengthened rather than weakened, that sanctions should be immediate, automatic and complete, that the Covenant should be separated from the Peace Treaties, that a definite proportion of the armed forces of League members should be an international force under the control of the League, that a tribunal should be set up to rectify international grievances, and that a survey should be made of the effect of economic conditions on world peace. This statement added that New Zealand was prepared to join in the collective application of force against any future aggressor.

Mr. W. J. Jordan, the New Zealand High Commissioner in London, who represents his country at Geneva, has spoken very freely in the League Council on the aggressions against Abyssinia, Spain and China. He has maintained that the sanctions imposed against Italy were not complete enough and were not effectively applied, that the so-called Non-intervention Committee is not the right body to deal with an invasion of Spain by foreign powers and has by its operations assisted the aggressors, and that China should at least have received economic and financial help from the League. More than once he has differed openly in debate from the representative of the United Kingdom Government. The New Zealand Government has also played a very active part in the work of the International Labour Office.

New Zealand to-day is to the Left of the other Dominions. But I recall that in 1929-31, under a Conservative Government, she was to the Right of them, suspicious of all League obligations, and needing more persuasion than any of the rest to accept the United Commonwealth Foreign Policy, which we were then working out. I remember the New Zealand representative of that day saying to me, half reassured after a first meeting with British Labour Ministers, "Well, I don't think Arthur Henderson is the sort of man who'll let

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the British Empire down." And I remember Mr. Henderson on another occasion, finding New Zealand's resistance to one of his proposals rather stiff, saying: "I must put Brennan on to that chap, to see what he can do." And Mr. Brennan, the Attorney General in the Australian Labour Government, succeeded in removing the last objections.

Yet New Zealand, whatever Government is in power, is more ready than any other Dominion to pledge herself in advance to help this country if war comes. "We hate all this war propaganda," said Mr. Walter Nash, the present Minister of Finance, "but if an attack is made on Britain, we will assist her to the fullest possible extent."

Canada differs from Australia and New Zealand, and still more from this country, in being invulnerable. As Senator Dandurand once said at Geneva, "in this association of mutual insurance against fire, the risks assumed by the different states are not equal. We Canadians live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials. A vast ocean separates us from Europe." Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine would still cover her, even if the worst happened in Europe or in the South Pacific. None the less, Canada has often played a good hand for peace. Her unfortified frontier with the United States has long stood as an example which others have not followed. She was a pioneer at Geneva for international arbitration, and in 1929, vexed by the obstructive timidity of our Tory predecessors, she would have signed the Optional Clause, regardless of what the United Kingdom or the other Dominions did, had not the British Labour Government joined with her in pressing successfully for a united gesture by the whole Commonwealth. In general, she is more reserved than Australia and New Zealand towards plans for co-operation within the Commonwealth. She has less appetite than they for consultation which may end in commitment. Because she is invulnerable, she can afford to

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be indefinite. This tendency is less marked in the Conservative than in the Liberal Party, which now governs Canada. The C.C.F., or Labour Party, is weak and exists as yet only in a few parts of the Dominion. But, with luck and good leadership, it may grow strong enough to hold the balance of power between the two big parties after the next election. It would, I think, respond to a constructive League policy pursued by a Labour Government at Westminster.

In the Union of South Africa, the Government is still dominated by "the two old Generals," Hertzog and Smuts. The Dutch Nationalist opposition, with a policy described by one of their opponents as "a wonderful combination, anti-Capitalist, anti-British, anti-Jewish and anti-Native," made little headway at the recent elections. The Labour Party is, and is likely to remain, negligible. Next door is South-West Africa, a mandated territory of the Union with a largely German population subject to Nazi propaganda. Mr. Pirow, the Minister of Defence, is for giving Germany some of her colonies back, or some other colonies, but not South-West Africa nor Tanganyika, both of which, he thinks, are too near the Union. The Generals are inclined, so far as Europe is concerned, to be mildly pro-German. General Hertzog seldom speaks on international affairs without referring to the injustices of the Versailles Treaty. General Smuts never forgets that, if he had been listened to at Versailles, it would have been a far better Treaty. Apart from possibilities of war, the political future of South Africa is more uncertain than that of the other Dominions. Though the Government is satisfied with South Africa's present status in the Commonwealth, based on the Statute of Westminster, the Nationalists advocate a plebiscite on secession, and the native problem is a black question mark on the horizon.

Eire is not eager to be classed as a Dominion. "We, too," one of her leaders has said, "are a Mother Country."

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She has now won virtual independence, marred only by the fact of partition. But I think she knows in her heart that she would lose that independence, if Britain were defeated in a European war.

In India the Congress Party proclaims that its aim is, not Dominion status, but independence and that, given independence, it would give strong support to a policy of collective security. But we are not there yet.

I turn to the third question raised at the beginning of this article. How is the foreign policy of this country affected by the existence of the Dominions as members of the British Commonwealth, and by the fact that each has its own characteristic outlook on the international scene? How far the foreign policy of the present Government has been affected by consultation with the Dominions I do not know, though the Dominions' inclination against intervention in Europe may have encouraged the Government's general attitude of short-sighted weakness towards the aggressive policies of the Dictatorships.

The foreign policy of the second Labour Government was assisted by the active co-operation of the Dominions at Geneva and in our preparations for the Disarmament Conference. They also warmly approved our successful efforts to improve Anglo-American relations, which had been cold when Sir Austen Chamberlain was at the Foreign Office and again deteriorated badly in the evil days of Sir John Simon. If the influence of the Dominions urges us away from Europe, equally it urges us towards the United States. Mr. Casey, in the address from which I have already quoted, said: "We believe in Australia that the United States represents a tremendous moral force for good, and that probably Britain is the only country in the world that can, in the course of time, unlock that store of moral force. We are very conscious of the United States across the Pacific, and we hope and

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believe that the English-speaking countries will eventually be able to get together to enforce—I think it is not too strong a word—peace upon the world.” Canada and New Zealand would be of the same mind, and so would Eire.

But “eventually” is not an adverb which can govern foreign policy, and the dangers of to-day are immense and imminent. Since 1931 there has been a grim simplification of international relations. I doubt whether the full meaning of the threat from Europe to this island, to its sea communications with the Dominions, and to the Dominions themselves, with the exception of Canada, is yet realized overseas.

Professor Toynbee, in a brilliant article on “The Issues in British Foreign Policy,” published in *International Affairs*, May, 1938, analyses the dangers and the possibilities, including the possibility that we should deliberately abdicate from our position as a Great Power and voluntarily dismantle the Empire for the benefit of the three chief aggressor States. This course, which has considerable superficial attractions, he rejects on rational and not merely on sentimental grounds, and concludes, in spite of all its obvious difficulties due to our past mistakes, in favour of a policy of collective security.

A British Government, which does its duty in frank consultation with the Dominions, must seek to bring home to those who live far away from Europe the menace, to all we value, of a Germany bestriding this continent like a Colossus. But consultation should not be limited to Collective Defence, which, if seen in advance to be sufficiently powerful, will prevent aggression. There should be consultation also on methods of Collective Discussion—which is the counterpart of Collective Defence—of any proposal made by any State for peaceful change in international arrangements, and on the degree of Collective Concession which, as part of a general settlement, the British Commonwealth might make.

CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL INTERCOURSE IN THE EMPIRE

By JOHN COATMAN

THE subject of this article is the element in the great complex of inter-Imperial relations least appropriate for official intervention. Cultural and intellectual relations are essentially things for free development, and control (as apart from unconditional financial support) by governments could only warp and bias them. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that in an association of free nations like the British Commonwealth, official institutions touch our subject only, as it were, at second hand. Their primary purpose is to foster certain practical interests, mainly economic, although the cultural and intellectual value of their work should not be underestimated. It is in the unofficial agencies of the Universities, the Press, Broadcasting, and other activities, that we come into closest touch with our subject.

Beginning, therefore, with official agencies, pride of place must be given to the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research of Great Britain, which, among its many other activities, maintains close and constant relations with analogous bodies in the other British countries, such as the National Research Council of Canada, or the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in New Zealand. The work carried out by the Department is severely practical, and most of it is undertaken with a view to immediate and tangible results; nevertheless, the fact that in the very centre of all the Commonwealth Governments there are these bodies acting in co-operation in the furtherance of scientific research is an important element in the common intellectual life of the

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Empire. The Standing Conference for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research to which, since the Imperial Conference of 1926, the High Commissioners for the Dominions, and the Colonial and India Offices, have practically all accepted invitations to send representatives may appropriately be mentioned in this connection. It is possible to enumerate more than a dozen other official bodies charged with scientific or medical researches specifically designed to benefit the whole Empire, but most of these, including now the Imperial Economic Committee, have objectives which are too technical or commercial to find a place in this article.

The Imperial Agricultural Bureaux, and the Imperial Institute, however, have a wider scope and are without any doubt influences of first-class importance in the intellectual life of the Empire. The Imperial Institute is charged with dual functions. One side of its work is purely technical and scientific, and so does not concern us here beyond the fact that it is a clearing-house for the whole Empire in such matters. The other side of its work, however, which is steadily growing in scope and importance is its educational and publicity work. The Institute's film library and display rooms are one of the recognized centres of attraction for visitors to London, and its authorities pay special attention to school children, and others from all parts of the Empire, and also circulate Empire films to schools. In fact, the Imperial Institute is developing a new personality and is gaining influence and popularity because its educational work is meeting a real demand from British subjects at home and overseas who want to understand the inner meaning and essential character of their great Society.

The Imperial Agricultural Bureaux, eight in number, are controlled by an Executive Council which is an inter-Imperial body, its members being appointed by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India,

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whilst one is nominated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It derives its annual income from contributions by all the Governments concerned. Each of the bureaux is attached to an appropriate research institute in this country, its work dealing with some specialized branch of agricultural science. Each bureau keeps in touch with workers in its particular subject throughout the Empire, sending them the results of its work. The importance of this will appear from the following extract from the report of The Imperial Committee on Economic Consultation and Co-operation which met in 1933: "The work of the agricultural bureaux is more thorough, more specialized, and more definitely directed to the study of particular subjects of interest to agricultural research workers than that done in the international field." It will be seen at once, what a powerful intellectual force the Agricultural Bureaux are in the life of the whole Empire, and their influence and inspiration are of incalculable value. Further, it must be remembered that their work is supported and reciprocated by official and non-official agencies in the other Empire countries.

Nevertheless, as we have seen, Governments can be only a useful and influential auxiliary in the matters we are now discussing. The various peoples concerned must work out their own destiny in this truly vital field of human relationships, and in the work, the lead must be taken by teachers of all grades, from university professors downwards, by writers and artists, Press men and broadcasters, film producers and a host of others. Every improvement in communications of all kinds will strengthen and speed up the influence of the various Empire peoples on each other, and the importance of all this free intercourse is reinforced when we consider that in future the foundations of the Empire itself will rest on the established harmony in the cultural and intellectual relations between its peoples.

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A South African quoted at the Toronto Conference on British Commonwealth Relations in 1933 put this point well when he said: "It is just exactly these cultural relations on which the only kind of unity that is now possible, or has ever been worth while having depends . . . What lies before us now is a cultural struggle . . . Personal contacts and the fostering of common beliefs, traditions and practices are the only forces that in the long run can counteract the effect of the thousands of miles of salt water which Burke pointed to as the *causa causans* of the regrettable incident of 1783." At the same Conference the Committee which discussed 'Co-operation for purposes other than Foreign Policy' reported that "there was general agreement that co-operation in the intellectual sphere was perhaps the most important form of co-operation."

What then are the existing non-official means for co-operation in intellectual affairs? We must turn first to the Universities, since they are the intellectual power-houses of their countries, and here we come at once to the Universities Bureau of the British Empire. The beginning of the Bureau goes back to 1912, but it was in 1919 that the British Government first gave financial assistance to its very valuable activities. The main functions of the Bureau are to collect and distribute information on matters of interest to the Universities of the British Empire, to arrange conferences and assist communications and the interchange of information between the Universities, and between them and the Governments, other public bodies, and learned institutions and societies of the British Empire and foreign countries, and to facilitate the interchange of students and teachers between Empire and foreign Universities.

Article 18 of the Articles of Association also vests the Council of the Bureau with power to "appoint in consultation with the appropriate groups of Universities special

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Committees to study and report on questions of interest to the Universities in more than one region of the Empire . . ."

There is no need to enlarge on the work of the Bureau, since it is well known. Its detailed activities are numerous, including the administration of post-graduate scholarships and other awards, appointments to Universities in different parts of the Empire, and the exchange of University teachers of various grades. The Bureau's Handbook for Students has led to a great increase in the number of enquiries from overseas regarding the conditions of admission to, and study in, Universities. Expert advice is placed at the disposal of students by the Bureau. The great value of the work being done may be seen from two of the resolutions passed at an Extraordinary General Meeting of the Bureau held at Cambridge in 1936 on the occasion of the last quinquennial meeting. The first recommended that the Executive Council should set up a Committee, under Article 18 of the Articles of Association quoted above, to enquire into the possibility of exchanging members of University staffs, while the second asked the Council to enquire from overseas Universities the extent to which degrees of British Universities are accepted as qualifications for teaching posts in the Dominions.

A number of scholarships and other awards have been instituted for the purpose of bringing students from the overseas countries of the Empire to this country, but these are still comparatively few in number. The Rhodes scholarships are, of course, the outstanding example, but the post-graduate awards of the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire, which bring Canadian graduates to British Universities are an example of what might be done by other British countries.

The flow of students to this country from the overseas Empire is somewhat impressive, but the flow the other way is, unfortunately, not nearly so strong. Thus, during the

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academic year 1937-38, no fewer than 3,463 students came to our Universities from other British countries ; this number, incidentally, easily exceeding the 2,617 students who came from the rest of the world. Of the Empire students, 1,415 came from the Dominions (South Africa 546), 1,408 came from India, and 602 from the Colonial Empire including 160 from the West Indies, 73 from Nigeria and West Africa, and 103 from Ceylon. Many of these young men and women return to be the intellectual and official leaders of their countries and, therefore, the importance of this interchange of students on the cultural and intellectual life of the Empire need not be stressed.

Before we leave the Universities, mention should be made of the Joint Standing Committee for Empire Educational Work which was formed under the Chairmanship of Dr. T. Drummond Shiels after a conference of Empire Societies called by the Secretary of State for the Dominions in 1934. Its purpose, as stated in the Universities Yearbook is "to co-ordinate and to develop the educational work of all the non-party Empire Societies in London which include such activities in their programme." The personality of the Chairman is a guarantee that the interests of the more backward and needy parts of the Empire will not be overlooked.

Passing from the Universities to the lower stages of education we notice the League of the Empire standing out prominently. In the words of the League's Annual Report for 1936, "the chief work of the League of the Empire is the interchange of teachers between the Mother Country and the Oversea Dominions, and the League is recognized by the Board of Education as the official agency for this purpose." The 1936 Report says that year broke all records ; "no less than 174 exchanges between teachers in this country and those in the oversea Dominions were effected, making a total of 2,974 teachers since the inception of the scheme." The

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allocation for 1936 deserves to be quoted on account of its interest. It was :

Canada	75
Australia	64
South Africa	27
New Zealand	7
Newfoundland	1
Natal to Vancouver	1

The last is of especial interest.

There can be no doubt of the extreme importance of this work for the cultural and intellectual life of the Empire, since the teachers concerned are those who deal with the children of their different countries from the earliest and most impressionable years onward. The interchange of Public School teachers is nothing like so large or so thoroughly organized. Nevertheless, there is a steady flow both outwards and inwards from and to this country, and the numbers of those concerned are on the increase.

Before leaving this side of our subject it is worth while mentioning the exchange of scientific experts which goes on constantly between this country and the various Dominions. Again, the flow is not in one direction only, since scientific experts from the Dominions are called upon to advise the Government of the United Kingdom in regard to specific problems.

Closely allied to this process of interchange of teachers of all grades is the process of bringing children from other Empire countries to the United Kingdom and taking our children to the oversea Dominions. Within the last few years, visits of school children (including in this term Public Schoolboys of all the British countries) have been numerous and are steadily increasing. The Royal Empire Society's tours for Public Schoolboys have long been firmly established, and boys and girls from other schools are now having similar

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opportunities. This summer, for example, the generosity of a Bradford business man sent fifty secondary schoolboys to Canada. This balances the visit of a party of Canadian boys and girls to Great Britain earlier in the summer. This summer, in addition to the above, Rhodesian schoolgirls are here, and a party of British girls are in South Africa.

This increasing flow of schoolchildren to and from this country is for purposes primarily educational, and the visits must have a deep and beneficial influence on the minds of the young travellers. Of all the post-war developments in our subject, these exchanges of teachers and taught are the happiest and, in the last analysis, probably the most important.

It will be appropriate to mention here the educational work carried out in different parts of the Empire by the Royal Empire Society, which, of course, is a strictly non-party body. It makes available for schools various kinds of educational equipment, it provides contacts, and awards prizes for knowledge of imperial history and affairs. Its work is reciprocated in the various overseas countries by unofficial organizations and individuals and is a factor of recognized value in inter-imperial relations.

In addition to visits from schoolchildren, the growing practice of adult associations both here and overseas to visit each others' countries must not be overlooked. The visits of groups of farmers, for example, to Empire countries other than their own, has results which go beyond purely practical and professional ends, and the same can be said of other similar groups of travellers.

We come now to another development—largely post-war—of great importance to our present enquiry, namely, the holding of inter-Imperial Conferences on specific matters of common interest. For example, the Agricultural Research Conference of 1927 led to much closer continuing co-operation between scientific workers all over the Empire and, indeed,

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can claim to be the parent of the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux. The number of these Imperial Conferences is already impressive, and although some of them have objectives which appear to be restricted and technical, their value as meeting places of, and opportunities for the exchange of views by, men and women from all over the Empire is great and need not be demonstrated. Of course, from every point of view, the meetings of the British Association, especially when held in one or other of the overseas British countries, are the most impressive and influential, and their immense importance to our subject leaps to the mind immediately. The annual Empire Press Conferences also go overseas in due turn, and in them we have an agency which influences and moulds public opinion all over the Empire directly, continuously, and powerfully. We need reflect only for a few moments on the part played by the Press in the development of the British tradition and in the public and intellectual life of all British countries to appreciate the significance of these Press Conferences.

A catalogue of the various inter-Imperial Conferences would be out of place, but the post-war conferences on Education may be mentioned, whilst those organized by the Royal Institute for International affairs may be given a brief description. The first was held at Toronto in 1933. The second is to take place in Sydney this autumn. The Toronto Conference was attended by delegates of the highest eminence and authority from every Empire country, who discussed the whole field of Commonwealth relations of all kinds with the frankness which comes of complete freedom from official control and the knowledge of men who fully understood their subject; some of them, indeed, having formerly been members of the Government of their own country. The report of the Toronto Conference is easily the most valuable source of information on the various forces and cross-currents

in public opinion all over the Empire on the subject of commonwealth relations. The forthcoming conference at Sydney should, in view of what has happened in the Empire and the world since 1933, be of even greater interest than that held at Toronto. In any case, the great significance of such conferences can be easily perceived, and there is little doubt that these and other unofficial gatherings which have been mentioned have a truly creative part to play in Empire cultural and intellectual relations in the future.

With the Cinema and Broadcasting we come to agencies of immense potentiality to our subject. Broadcasting is the more powerful because it is more ubiquitous and continuous, besides having the advantage of an apparent personal approach to each individual. Moreover, by its aid, the most influential men and women in a country can address their fellows directly and its employment in education is becoming both more extensive and more effective. Naturally, these two agencies have not escaped the notice of both Governments and peoples all over the Empire, and their importance to the latter's cultural life is widely appreciated. Everywhere the desire to use these two instruments in the common cultural interests of all peoples of the Empire is clearly marked, and in some British countries legislation on the lines of our own Cinematograph Films Act of 1927, which insists on a quota of British (*i.e.*, Empire) films, has been passed. The Ottawa Conference accepted a resolution passed by its sub-committee on 'Films and Radio' which, "recognizing that it is of the greatest importance that a larger and increasing proportion of the films exhibited throughout the Empire should be of Empire production, commends the matter . . . to the consideration of the Governments of . . . the Empire . . ." The contents and the source of the resolution are an index to the effective interest shown in this subject. Since 1932, British film making has markedly progressed, and now

promises to play in the near future a part in the cultural life of the Empire no less beneficial than Broadcasting.

Recent events have made the B.B.C.'s Empire and Foreign Broadcast Services a household word. Every part of the Empire receives programmes from England transmitted at times suitable to its geographical position. The recent amalgamation of Home and Empire Broadcasting activities means that the overseas countries will henceforth receive a continuous service of the best programmes which the B.B.C. produces. Not only such obviously important matter as news, talks, and topical features are broadcast, but some of the leading sporting, social and public events are broadcast as they are actually taking place. We need only think of the effects of such broadcasts as King George the Fifth's Christmas talks to his people, the accounts of his last illness and his funeral, King Edward's abdication and the coronation of King George the Sixth, to realize something of the incalculable power of broadcasting. On a more homely level, broadcasts of the Derby, the Test Matches, and the Boat Race project something of the very essence of the British tradition to British subjects overseas. In return, for Broadcasting, like most of the agencies mentioned in this article, is by no means a one-way traffic, we get in this country programmes from the Broadcasting stations of our sister Dominions. Apart from ordinary programme material, and relays of important ceremonies from overseas, well-known authorities, speaking from their own countries, regularly keep listeners here informed of the march of events and opinion in other parts of the Empire. There is, in fact, great and increasing co-operation between all Empire (and, happily, all English-speaking) countries in Broadcasting, and already Canada and this country have exchanged Broadcasting officials. The B.B.C. training school shows signs of developing into a centre from which strong co-ordinating influences will radiate

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to all British and English-speaking countries, since in addition to British, it has already had American students. In a word, this youngest of the great cultural agencies of the Empire has already grown more powerful than most of the others, and it is difficult indeed to see any limits to its future possibilities, especially when it is ultimately reinforced by television.

We have seen that the development of cultural and intellectual relations in the Empire is best left to unofficial agencies and the free growth of sentiment and opinion. Nevertheless, Governments can still do much that they have hitherto left undone. They could, for example, endow the study of various aspects of Imperial relations in their Universities and thus dissolve a state of affairs which at present is a reproach to every Empire country, particularly our own. They could also establish scholarships to bring school and university students from other parts of the Empire to their educational centres and send their own students in return. Indeed, this is an ideal subject for co-operation between a number of Governments. Then, too, the Government of the United Kingdom could amend the Copyright Act so as to extend to one library in each Dominion the privilege of receiving a copy of all publications, a privilege which is at present confined to half a dozen libraries in this country and Eire. Further, all Empire Governments might combine to finance the reproduction, by appropriate methods, of the priceless treasures of manuscripts and rare books in the British Museum and other collections in this country, so that they might be available for students all over the Empire.

By doing these and other similar things, Governments could act in this sphere in the way most appropriate to them, namely, by providing material resources for unofficial agencies to use in the development of cultural and intellectual relations inside the Empire, a process which we have seen to be already vigorous, many-sided, and constantly developing.

THE EMPIRE AS SACRED TRUST:

THE PROBLEM OF AFRICA

By LEONARD BARNES

IT is, of course, Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant which speaks of "the well-being and development" of certain colonial peoples as forming "a sacred trust of civilization." And the mandate system, whose working the League Council supervises, seeks to carry out under a form of international guarantee this principle of trusteeship.

But the language of the Covenant has, in this instance, proved acceptable to those who are responsible for the colonial policy of Britain. We are frequently reminded in the public utterances of these authorities that the Covenant, in enunciating the trusteeship principle, merely gave formal expression to a body of practice which had long been regarded as a permanent feature of British Colonial administration. Nor, we are assured, is there any point of dispute between the several political parties. All are at one as to the need for founding colonial policy on the trusteeship principle, and perhaps also for asserting that we know our imperial business without instruction from the League.

Such unwonted accord among habitual enemies ought perhaps to incline us to scepticism in asking what exactly is involved in trusteeship. If people whose business it is to differ from one another, agree here, does it not stand to reason that "trusteeship" can be no more than a vague and decorative notion to which anyone can attach any meaning he pleases—one of those "masked words" of which Ruskin spoke in *Sesame and Lilies*, and which J. A. Hobson in

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Imperialism brilliantly examined and found to be the means whereby we endow ourselves with an almost preternatural power of self-deceit? We have to be on our guard lest trusteeship should go the way of the white man's burden and the dual mandate and turn into a bad joke under our noses.

The conception of the ruler as trustee naturally did not make its first appearance in the League Covenant. Locke, in his *Essay on Civil Government*, expresses the view that the legislature does not possess arbitrary power, rather it acts pursuant to a trust, which is violated by all that does the people harm. An even better-known passage is in Burke's speech on Fox's India Bill in 1782, where he submitted to Parliament the proposition that "rights and privileges derived from political power are all in the strictest sense a trust." Burke also insisted that in regard to India it was the British people who were in the last resort responsible for the trust's execution.

Such an attitude was certainly then a novelty in British colonial history. In the normal 18th century view, the function of a colony was to produce the maximum wealth for representatives (not always, or pre-eminently, official representatives) of the colonizing power. Burke's humaner idea was taken up, developed, and in the end built into the structure of British colonial policy by Wilberforce, Fowell Buxton, and the philanthropic school, until to-day every cadet in the colonial service believes that he is responsible before all else for the moral and material protection and advancement of the colonial population under his charge.

What we seem to mean, then, when we talk of trusteeship is that we have abandoned the 18th century conception of a colony, and propose to conduct our relations with colonial peoples with a view to their social progress rather than to our material gain. We need not strive officiously to avoid gain if it comes our way, and we are entitled to use our colonies

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as an instrument of policy for injuring other industrialized countries with whom we happen to be in commercial rivalry. But we are pledged, as trustees, not to compel colonial peoples to produce wealth for us instead of for themselves.

We claim, in a word, that our imperial economics are welfare economics, involving the development of peoples rather than of territories, and estimating costs and utilities, not as salable goods and services or mere monetary values, but as experiences, injurious and beneficial respectively to the ordered social growth of our wards.

II

There thus arises the conception of the British Empire, including the colonial empire, as constituting in a real sense a single Commonwealth. The term British Commonwealth of Nations was originally invented as a composite title for those autonomous, equal, and freely associated countries which are known also as the self-governing Dominions. Britain, too, was commonly suffered by courtesy to include herself in this sacred band. But India and the colonies were not—at least to begin with. Their existing status was too obviously subordinate. They might not be without the law; they were lesser breeds none the less. And what was more unfortunate still, their inhabitants had dark skins. The term British Commonwealth, like the term Dominions, was intended among other things to mark the fact that those to whom it was applied had emerged from the twilight of colonial dependence into the full noon of sovereign nationhood. It would defeat its object, and offend the very Dominion susceptibilities it was designed to flatter, if the coloured dependencies were indiscriminately lumped together with White Australia and White South Africa under its banner.

In recent years, however, the tendency has been more and

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more to use British Commonwealth as though it were co-extensive with British Empire, and even to substitute the former for the latter, on the grounds that "Empire" carries with it connotations which are pejorative and therefore inapplicable. For, after all, if we do genuinely act in accordance with our professions in this matter of trusteeship, is it not literally true that Britain has no colonies? A colony is a territory which is obliged to produce wealth for others than its own inhabitants. But this vicarious moneymaking is precisely what we claim to have eliminated not only from our relations with the Dominions, but also from those with India, tropical Africa and the rest. If these premises are well grounded, Mr. John Coatman has logic on his side when he says: "Thus we see that from end to end of the British Empire there is no essential difference anywhere between any of its parts, and therefore in a real sense the whole Empire is one Commonwealth."¹ The British Empire family consists of majors and minors certainly, of trustees and wards if you like, but not, on your life, of parasites and hosts.

Surprisingly large numbers of people in Britain still accept some such picture as representing the facts. The help which masked words like Commonwealth and trusteeship lend to this mass self-deception is very powerful—so much so that the self-deceivers are enabled to ignore a great volume of material and now readily accessible evidence, because it happens not to harmonize with the sentimental logic for which the masked words clamour in their minds.

Observers of this kind appear to place their chief reliance on the following points.

First, the verbal declarations of successive British Governments on general colonial policy. Undoubtedly these declarations uphold the principle of trusteeship, and it is interesting to know that they do so. But they are irrelevant

¹ *Magna Britannia*, page 72.

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to the immediate question, which is of what we do in the colonies, and not of what we say we would like to do.

Second, that Britain draws no tribute from the colonies. Apart from the "voluntary" contributions to the cost of imperial defence made by certain colonial Governments, it is true that the British exchequer enjoys no receipts from the public funds of the colonies. Indeed, the boot is on the other leg. By grants-in-aid and other subventions the British exchequer occasionally contributes small sums to colonial funds. But none of these facts invalidates the contention that much of the wealth which a given colony produces is permanently withdrawn from it and goes to enrich absentee property owners or traders rather than the colony's inhabitants. How this process operates we shall consider in a moment. Meanwhile it may be said that the main agency is unofficial industrial and commercial enterprise, not the Governmental machine.

Third, that there has taken place in late years a "remarkable development of many of the dependencies in material wealth, and consequently, in the standard of living."¹ Here again there is no denying that economic development has taken place. The overseas trade of the colonies has trebled in the last twenty years; and the aggregate of colonial revenues rose from £10½ million to £72 million between 1910 and 1927. But to imagine that there has been a corresponding general rise in the standard of living of colonial peoples is a blunder so wild and so elementary as to impair all confidence in the officials who make it, and all credence in the propagandists who popularise it.

III

The belief that the economic development of Africa necessarily enriches Africans ignores the actual conditions

¹ Warren Fisher Committee Report, 1930, page 5. (Cmd. 3554).

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in which colonial production and trade take place. There may, of course, be such enrichment; cotton-growing in Uganda and cocoa-growing in the Gold Coast are, or have been, examples of it. But extensive African impoverishment can also accompany what from the European standpoint appears as the winning of fabulous new wealth.

A classic example of this process is described by the late Rev. James Henderson, of Lovedale, in a memorandum published as an appendix to the Select Committee Report on General Hertzog's Native Bills in 1927.¹ Dr. Henderson shows that in the fifty years which followed 1875, the years of the large scale exploitation of South Africa's diamond and gold resources, the consuming power of one characteristic native area (the Ciskei) fell by more than 50 per cent per head. Anyone who had inferred from the soaring figures of South Africa's overseas trade between 1875 and 1925 that the standard of living of South African natives had universally risen during the period, would have been mistaken.

In general, overseas trade is a fallacious index of the wealth of a colony so long as any attempt is made to equate wealth with social well-being.² It is not hard to see why. Take as an example the case of copper in Northern Rhodesia.

The output of copper, all of which is sold outside the colony, was worth some £12 million in 1937. Of the £12 million £5 million went in dividends to shareholders (all non-residents). Half a million was paid as royalties to the British South Africa Company, which is quite functionless so far as the copper industry is concerned, but which happens to own all the minerals in the colony by virtue of a so-called treaty made forty years ago with Lewanika, King of the Barotse.

¹ S.C.10, 1927.

² On this point c.f. W. M. Macmillan, *Africa Emergent*, page 71.

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An approximate income and expenditure account for the industry for 1937 reads as follows:

		£	£
By Copper exported ..	12,000,000	To Dividends	5,000,000
		„ Royalties	500,000
		„ Income-tax	700,000
		„ Salaries of 1,690	
		„ Europeans	800,000
		„ Wages of 17,000	
		„ Africans	244,000
		„ Balance (other costs	
		of operation, main-	
		tenance, stores,	
		freight, insurance,	
		etc)	4,756,000
	£12,000,000		£12,000,000

Of the above figures,¹ the £12 millions appears in the Customs returns, and may be taken, if you like, as an index of "the economic development of Northern Rhodesia." But to speak as though copper mining had made that sum available for increasing the social welfare of Africans in the Colony shows either too much ingenuousness or too little. In point of fact, African consuming power is directly raised only by what is paid in miners' wages and by that part of European salaries which is spent on hiring domestic servants, say £350,000 in all. Even when all indirect benefits to Africans are taken into account, their gross gain can hardly be put higher than £1 million. And in order to arrive at a net figure expressive of welfare economics, we have to set against the gross figure (a) whatever is injurious in the impact of the new economic order on the minds and bodies of the African tribespeople, and (b) any net diminution of the food supply of Africans that may be occasioned by the diversion of tribal man-power from agriculture to mining.

This account of the copper situation gives the typical

¹ For a fuller account of them and their meaning, see *EMPIRE*, July, 1938, page 22.

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pattern of our behaviour wherever mineral production is concerned. Broadly, we appropriate the natural resources, develop them in our own ways and for our own purposes (ways and purposes which wholly ignore the pre-existing structure and function of African society), and of the wealth so produced carry out of the country £11 for every £1 we leave behind. When we call the procedure trusteeship, we are perhaps using the term a little loosely.

Results nearly as advantageous to Europeans and hardly less unfavourable to Africans can be obtained without any complete alienation of natural resources. The Nyasaland tobacco industry furnishes an example of this alternative process. Two tables will indicate the position.

A. PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THE INDUSTRY AND DERIVING THEIR LIVELIHOOD THEREFROM :

Europeans—Growers, supervisors, buyers, transporters, graders, packers, etc.	240
Africans—Growers on Native Trust land and private estates	90,000
Labourers	30,000
	120,000
	120,240

B. INCOMES DERIVED FROM THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY :

Europeans	£
Africans	241,405
Government	198,150
Railway	106,500
	105,000
	£651,055

These figures¹ do not include profits accruing from the sale of the exported tobacco, except in so far as they are returned to and circulated in Nyasaland.

¹ They are taken from a report (T.N.40) dated March 5th, 1938, published by the Nyasaland Tobacco Association, and signed by the Director of Agriculture and the Comptroller of Customs, among others.

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It is worth noting

- (1) that the railway is privately owned (by Europeans), though the Government has a contingent liability in respect of loan interest commitments ;
- (2) that the annual income per head from tobacco is £1,000 for Europeans, and 33s. for Africans.

A new technique has been developed for securing this apportionment of the wealth the industry produces. Europeans are given by statute the monopoly of the marketing of the crop, and even in some cases powers of compulsion over its producers. Nyasaland tobacco is an instance of the new system in a pretty complete form. Every phase of the industry—growing, processing, grading, marketing—is under the control of a Board with full statutory powers. Africans are not represented on the Board.

In late years the systematic creation of trading and marketing monopolies of this kind has become more and more a matter of British official policy. Commodities to which the policy has already been fully or partly applied in Africa alone are tobacco, cotton, cloves, coffee, and cocoa. It is intensely unpopular among the colonial peoples affected, and is at least in part responsible for recent disorders in more than one dependency.

Something of the African feeling in the matter was brought out in the evidence given to the Cocoa Commission which has been investigating since last March the Cocoa strike on the Gold Coast.

Sir Ofori Atta, one of the chief African witnesses, emphasised the following points :

- (1) What has all along seemed odd to the African farmer is that, while the European merchants fix the price of their merchandise, he himself is at the mercy of the European buyers (who are the same merchants acting in another capacity) in regard to the price of his own product.

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(2) The farmer gets a fixed price irrespective of quality, since grading is done at a later stage, so that the higher returns from cocoa of the better qualities go to merchants.

(3) The same firms are organized as a ring both for buying African produce and for selling European manufactures. When, therefore, the world price of cocoa rises, the merchants increase (irrespective of cost prices) the price of some staple goods which are most in demand, thus depriving the farmer, who spends almost all his earnings in purchasing imported goods, of the benefit of the increase in the price of cocoa.

(4) By controlling produce prices and the prices of trade goods, the merchants have turned the farmer's ability to work into a commodity, and have reduced him to full economic dependence.

The examples of copper, tobacco, and cocoa are perhaps enough to show that the old-fashioned conception of exploitation is still successfully operative in Africa. It may operate at the point of production, as in the case of copper; or at the point of exchange, as in the case of cocoa; or at both points, as in the case of tobacco. Possibly it was a vision of these facts that moved Dr. Arnold Toynbee to ask "What are we to say of a trustee who returns his own property as part of his ward's property in order to escape paying his own income-tax, and at the same time converts his ward's property to his own uses?"¹

It is of great importance to notice that the economic subordination in which African life is being increasingly held necessitates in turn a methodical encroachment on the democratic rights of Africans. The question of political government has been dealt with in another article, and cannot be considered here. But it is in point to observe that in the last ten or fifteen years the whole field of colonial legislation dealing with sedition and allied offences has been worked

¹ *International Affairs*, Vol. XV. No. 1, page 46.

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over afresh, and the authorities have assumed new and extensive powers. By anyone who troubles to study these laws as they now operate, the boast of British democratic rule in colonial territories can at once be seen to be empty.¹

The gaols of the West Indies, for instance, are thronged with men who have been heavily sentenced for sedition—the substance of their offences being that they urged their compatriots to organize in trade unions for the purpose of resisting the very types of exploitation we have just been examining.

The old liberal imperialism, whose conceptions gave shape to the trusteeship principle, took it for granted that political and civil liberty would be open to Africans, and that education and the direct example of white men would then mean their automatic advance to the level of civilization reached by their conquerors. This assumption, and it is a vital one for those who speak of trusteeship, is being more and more falsified throughout the dependent Empire to-day.

IV

It would be a simple task to run through the chief products of tropical Africa in turn, and to show in respect of all of them that trusteeship is a mere word. The word is a lie or an aspiration according to whose mouth it is found in. In neither case does it correspond with present actuality.

Enough, however, has been said to bring out the main point; namely, that the fundamental problem in tropical Africa (at least for those who seek to transform trusteeship from a word into a fact) is to develop the internal market, or, in other words, to raise the colonial standard of living. Africans must be given a very much larger share than they get at present of the wealth their country produces.

How is this to be done? Any detailed answer to so large

¹ See *Hansard*, December 20th, 1935.

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a question cannot be given in one short article. All that can be attempted here is to outline certain general considerations that may be relevant.

First, post-war experience has finally disposed of the old hypothesis that African consuming power could best be increased by increasing Africa's output of primary products for export. In general, supply now exceeds effective demand for tropical products, and in view of the population trends in Europe and America is likely to continue to do so, unless social changes on a grand scale lead rapidly to the more equal distribution of income and property in those continents. The terms on which tropical countries were originally drawn into the international division of labour have, in fact, radically altered.

Second, since an expanding demand for African exports is improbable, and since African wealth obviously cannot be increased by the mere restriction of African output, some third means of adjusting demand and supply needs to be discovered. In principle, such a *tertium quid* will be bound to involve encouraging (a) the increased production and exchange of subsistence crops in the colonies, and (b) the development of local manufactures.

Third, the experience of India and the Dominions suggests that the growth of secondary industry in colonial countries is both desirable, and, on a long range view, inevitable. From the standpoint of Britain, however, such a growth in Africa, would mean an expansion of the market for certain capital goods and a decline in the market for certain consumption goods, followed, if the colonial industries were successful, by a rising demand for other and generally more complicated types of consumption goods.

Fourth, the possible hardships likely to arise from such a shift in British industry could be foreseen and neutralized by appropriate Government action. But on a short-range view

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the shift might well imply a conflict between the interests of Africa and those of British employers and even of British workers. This being so, it is probably Utopian to expect British policy ever to identify itself with the requirements of a sincere and energetic trusteeship. Indeed, trusteeship and African interests only meet at the infinity of colonial independence, where the status of ward and guardian alike disappears. Unfortunately the same forces which make genuine trusteeship Utopian also preclude Africa's self-determination. The economic and the political issues are bound up together beyond all disentangling.

Fifth, it is in any case impossible to say at present what economic policy ought to be followed by any given colony, since we lack essential information about its economic structure and potentialities. A series of detailed studies designed to supply this want is urgently needed. One such study is, it seems, about to be undertaken for West Africa under the auspices of the Leverhulme Trust (see *The Times*, August 5th, 1938).

Sixth, we may be sure that there will be little economic advance for the African so long as his trustees begin their duties by removing the natural resources of African territories from African ownership, and until the trading and marketing monopolies that dispose of Africa's exported wealth are transferred to democratic African control based on the principles of co-operation.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CROWN COLONIES:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT

By CHARLES RODEN BUXTON

“WHAT is the main purpose of the British Colonial Empire?” said the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Malcolm Macdonald, addressing the Oxford University Summer School on Colonial Administration, attended by 180 Colonial officials. “I suggest that it is the gradual spread of freedom among all His Majesty’s subjects, in whatever part of the Empire they live. . . Even among the most backward races of Africa, our main effort should be to try and help these people to stand a little bit more securely on their own feet. In spite of the great variety of conditions and circumstances, we can see that process going on, and we can say confidently that the trend is towards the ultimate establishment of the various colonial communities as self-supporting and self-reliant members of a great commonwealth of free peoples and nations. . . The important thing at the moment is to recognize the whole design which we are aiming to attain, and to ensure that as far as is humanly possible whatever changes are necessary are effected so as to be in harmony with the general aim.”

In answer to questions in the House of Commons, Mr. Macdonald was more explicit. On the ground of the principles of democracy, he accepted the suggestion that it is the policy of the Imperial Government to enfranchise all literate Colonial citizens “as soon as possible,” though he added that “the character of the franchise must necessarily vary according to local circumstances.”

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Had Mr. Macdonald weighed his words? If so, he was reasserting the traditional British policy, and his statement of policy was important. But he was setting himself against a new doctrine, which has won widespread acceptance; and he is in for trouble. The Editor of *East Africa* lost no time in calling him to order. “It cannot be too strongly stated that, in the view of almost every European, official and non-official, missionaries included, with experience of the territories to which this journal is devoted, nothing could be more catastrophic than a policy of conferring a vote upon every African attaining certain literary standards. That way lies conflict. . . The whole basis of the system of Indirect Rule, which underlies British administration from the Sudan in the north to Southern Rhodesia in the south inclusive, is the use of African systems of government—which know no ballot-box, but which nevertheless give expression to the wishes of the clan or tribe. In British East and Central Africa it is only a few political agitators among the detribalized Africans who occasionally clamour for the vote—without awakening any material interest on the part of their detribalised fellows—and it would be lamentable for them to be able to interpret any assertion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies as a promise that the vote would ‘as soon as possible’ be granted to literate natives. . . Since Mr. Macdonald cannot be unaware of these facts,” adds the Editor, “and of the importance that he should not be misunderstood in connection with them, the ambiguity of his answer must have been unintentional, and due merely to hasty phraseology.”

Up to the turn of the nineteenth century, the policy of the British Colonial Office was on the lines of Mr. Macdonald’s recent pronouncement. On the two broad issues of Colonial policy, it pursued the ideal of autonomy (possibly ending in independence) as against the French ideal of

assimilation to the mother country ; and it pursued the ideal of democracy through representative institutions, as against the ideal of permanent authoritarian rule. The policy consisted of a succession of acts, all tending in the direction of gradually expanding democratic institutions, always contemplating the same system, roughly speaking, for white and coloured colonial communities—the difference being one of time, not one of kind. A representative assembly, based on a franchise, and involving equal citizenship for every qualified inhabitant, whatever his colour, was to be the final outcome. It was not without a bitter struggle that these principles were applied, even to what are now the Dominions.

Earl Grey, whose tenure of the Colonial Office (1846 to 1852) was epoch-making, laid foundations on which his successors built. His own words about West Africa were : “The real interest of this country is gradually to train the inhabitants . . . in the arts of civilization and government, until they shall grow into a nation capable of protecting themselves and of managing their own affairs.”

The old catchwords still persist in certain quarters, and serve to give rotundity to perorations about the Empire. “Where is there so much democracy as in the British Empire?” asked a leading speaker at the Labour Party Conference, in the course of a denunciation of the Fascist States. This is connected, of course, with the habit of thinking of the Dominions first, and of the 390,000,000 coloured British subjects as a mere adjunct. In a book of 323 pages, *The Empire in the World* (1937), by Sir Arthur Willert, K.B.E., and others, seven pages (with thirteen more on tariff questions) are devoted to what is summarily described as “The Rest of the Empire.” As if to compensate for the disproportion, however, the writer becomes quite lyrical in his praise—through the Colonies and India, he writes, “Great Britain stands before the world as the

greatest trustee and champion of democratic liberty.”

These ideas, however, convenient as they may be to the orator, are not in the ascendant to-day among those who shape Colonial policy. Mr. Macdonald must be under no illusions as to that. The idea which is now in the ascendant is that of an entirely separate type of government “suited to the African.” This idea has led to a theoretic justification of what is called “segregationism” in the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. It is applied in principle more widely still, under the innocent title of “parallel development.” (Let us remember that parallel lines never meet, and in this case they are not intended ever to meet.) There are to be two eternally separated communities. There are to be two systems side by side, and two forms of citizenship. No one has yet explained what is to prevent the White Parliament from exercising all the main functions of government, and the Native Parliament from being completely devoid of power.

These views have been fortified by recent anthropological study—in itself of profound interest and value, but too often utilised as a convenient excuse by politicians who believe in racial domination, and privileged classes which are, or conceive themselves to be, threatened by economic competition.

It must not be supposed, however, that the supporters of the new view lack arguments. The work of the anthropologists has, of course, added much to our knowledge. Colonial Governments are increasingly taking advantage of it, especially in the difficult task of building up “Native Administrations,” under Indirect Rule, where no obvious chief and council present themselves. It is vital that we should build on scientific foundations, as far as may be possible. We have learned much, in particular, about the close inter-connection of all the various elements—religious,

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legal, social and so forth—in a primitive culture. Yet when all this is said, there is still a danger of forgetting that tribal systems are already passing through a phase of disintegration ; and of ignoring the historical facts which show that “advanced” races have passed through stages not very dissimilar, and left them far behind.

Then, again, it is pointed out that at least a long delay, and a period of painful transition, are involved in the democratic ideal. The ballot-box (though not necessarily involved in the democratic process) is at least an obvious butt for ridicule.

The first full theoretical statement of the case for “segregationism” is to be found in the Report (for 1937) of the statutory Native Affairs Commission in South Africa. It is there claimed that a full and frank recognition of the permanent separateness of the races is the prelude to a new era of respect for Bantu civilization, with the elimination of all jealousy and fear on the part of the Whites. Freed from the haunting fear of Black domination, the White Parliament will listen with sympathy to the claims of those who are not its constituents. This Report is a document of extraordinary interest. To the present writer, it teaches a lesson not intended by its authors. It reveals the fact that the real issue is not between common citizenship and “parallel development,” but between common citizenship on the one hand, and on the other the authoritarian principle, full-fledged and permanently established—the *Weltanschauung* of the Nazi.

Turning now to the traditional British ideal of self-government, the first point to note is that it has been much longer in the field. It has made considerable advances in India, Burma, Ceylon, and the West Indies. The method of election is practised, not only in British dependencies including West Africa, but in Dutch Java and French West Africa and

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Indo-China. In the French West Indies manhood suffrage on the same basis as in France is enjoyed by both white and black citizens ; Martinique and Guadeloupe each elect two deputies and one senator to the French Parliament. The Native franchise for Parliament existed in the Cape Province up to 1936, and still exists (on a separate electoral register) for the election of three European members representing Native interests. It is still on the Statute Book, though little used, in Natal and in Southern Rhodesia. Egypt and Irak, countries connected by special relations with Britain, have adopted the system.

It is, in fact, what coloured people in many parts of the world, rightly or wrongly, have shown that they want. This is a fact which cannot be ignored. No doubt they are passing, with their nationalism and their democracy, through a political phase about which we in the West are beginning to be sceptical ; but the fact remains ; and to disappoint these hopes and expectations would be a serious matter, fraught with danger. With the growing unrest in our Empire, and the increase which this involves in its vulnerability to attack, we cannot afford to ignore these considerations.

The argument concerning the long delay, and the period of transition, is one which can be met by hastening the process of education and economic development. The main reason why the African cannot take a greater share in government is not his rapidly disintegrating tribal systems, but his deplorable poverty and backwardness.

Above all, what we British know and understand is the Western system of government, or rather that which we (rejecting authoritarian or totalitarian claims) conceive the Western system to be. That is what we are equipped to teach. We cannot teach what we do not know. This principle applies to economics, education and religion, as well as to government. If we do not know what is best, if

we have disturbing doubts as to whether Western civilization is a good thing or a bad thing, we have no right to be in Africa at all.

In his recent book, *Africa Emergent*, and especially in the two chapters, "The Birth of African Politics" and "Africa in the Modern World," Professor W. M. Macmillan has given us the results of some real political thinking such as is not often found in books on the Empire. Broadly speaking, he confirms the view indicated above. The only thing we are capable of teaching is the idea of representative self-government on the Western model. This is not to say that he does not give full weight to the case for "Indirect Rule" through Native institutions. But it must be regarded as a stage. "Ultimately the only remedy, short of dictatorship, is the advancement of the African people to a stage at which they are capable of sharing effectively in a representative system, and making their own interests felt. Many as are the drawbacks to an illiterate people electing a Government by vote, there has yet to be found any other way of preventing the domination of interests, or of checking intrigue and nepotism, which are already a danger to Native Administration."

His opinion on South Africa, as one who has made notable contributions to its history, are especially valuable. "Experience in South Africa, where till 1936 some thousands of Africans shared the franchise on a common roll with Europeans, affords critics no substantial evidence that the use of the ballot-box is in any way unsuited to them. The Transkeian system, the proudest boast of South African administration, is based throughout on parliamentary principles, and in no sense African. It is said, perhaps, that the 'blanket' voters, typically those of Herschel, learned to look for political favours from the member they supported, losing the art of self-help. The economic state of Cape Native

areas gives no indication that the favours they received were substantial. The chief benefit of the vote was freedom from the restrictions suffered by the unenfranchised Natives of other provinces—'passes' and the full rigours of the 1913 Land Act. The onus is on those who reject parliamentarianism for Africans, to show how freedom can be permanently safeguarded, except by giving the Government political reason to pay regard to the opinion of all classes. This, therefore, is a preliminary answer to the objection, much heard in South Africa and widely accepted elsewhere, that the linking together of such different elements as Europeans and Africans in one political system must result in an unfortunate clash and set race against race. Not the linking together of black and white, but the total exclusion of all but a fraction of the Natives of South Africa from any share in its government, has already encouraged that over-hasty resort to repression which has more than once been turned even against European dissidents. It has proved highly dangerous to the rights of Labour and other minorities that, for example, any serious industrial dispute at once gives rise to a demand for firm handling of 'agitators,' for fear of their teaching spreading disaffection among rightless, discontented Africans. But to ascribe the heat generated by the 'Native Question' to the effect of enfranchising some Africans is flatly against the facts of history, in those parts where the experiment has actually been tried."

We talk glibly of self-government in our Colonies, but it is strange how little serious thinking has been given to this great issue. Professor Macmillan's book presents the most illuminating discussion I have yet found. Mention should also be made of Mr. Leonard Barnes's *The Duty of Empire*, and in particular of Miss Margery Perham's *Nigeria*, which contains most suggestive speculations, based on minute study of facts, as to the relation of "Indirect Rule"

to the central government of a colony in the future. From another point of view the speeches, and the instructions to administrative officers, of Sir Donald Cameron—relating both to Nigeria and Tanganyika—may be regarded as the most important documents, since they represent the experience of one of the greatest of British administrators. His analysis of what is implied in the phrase “not yet able to stand alone,” in the Mandates Article of the Covenant—with the emphasis on the “not yet”—is of the highest interest.

For the actual facts as to the existing Government systems in all the various Empires, nothing can equal Appendix X in *The Colonial Problem* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937).

I submit that this great issue should be faced more seriously, because every step now taken, however small, must be judged in the light of the ultimate ideal of government which we have in view.

The traditional British ideal for a colony is that of a self-governing state on broadly democratic lines, with a British type of civilization, preferably associated with the British Commonwealth of Nations, but entitled to independence, in the last resort, if it so desires. The new British ideal, if one may call it so, seems to be a dual one—some colonies are to be self-governing states of a distinctively African (not British) type; in others the supreme power is vested in a Parliament elected by Whites, with a Native Parliament, strictly limited in its sphere of competence, ruling a Native community.

The French ideal is that of a territory permanently united with France, whose citizens are French citizens and bearers of French culture. Other ideals are possible. If, for instance, we suppose an international administration during the period of tutelage, or at least a high degree of international control, might we not contemplate an ultimately

independent state whose citizens had not learned to be merely “good Africans,” nor to “think French,” nor for that matter to think British, Belgian, Portuguese, or what not, but had learned simply to “think European”—a product of Western civilization as a whole?

At any rate, our policy during the necessary period of tutelage—especially our educational policy—must be influenced at every turn by the goal towards which, consciously or unconsciously, we are aiming. Assuming, as the present writer cannot help assuming, that the traditional British ideal is the right one, it remains to indicate the lines on which present policy should proceed.

First of all, it should endeavour to shorten to the utmost the period of tutelage. The pace of this process must vary in each dependency, but in every part of the world the period could be shortened by a more active policy of economic development, especially in the matter of Native agriculture. This in its turn would necessitate, for the time being, the abandonment of the principle that each colony must “pay its way” year by year. If we are “trustees,” as we claim, we should surely be prepared to spend some money on our “wards.” The acceptance of this principle would render possible an increased expenditure on “nation-building” services, such as health and education. These are cramped by the present lack of taxable capacity which so severely restricts the annual revenue of a colony.

With self-government consciously in view, education would certainly not be limited to those technical forms of teaching which are supposed to provide all that the African needs in his present condition of backwardness. A general education would be as much the aim as it is in England. The three R’s, and the elements of English, would not be crowded out by “practical” subjects. In particular, since we have drawn the African, without asking his leave, into

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the Western economic system, we should give, in the more advanced schools, such training as would enable him to understand that system—the elements, at least, of world history, economics, and sociology. Dr. Norman Leys (*Manchester Guardian*, June 9, 1938) has pointed out that one of the deeper causes of discontent is that the Native, lacking this knowledge, suspects that we are exploiting him, even where we may not really be doing so. Gold Coast cocoa prices and West Indian sugar prices are examples.

The difference between an Empire which knows what it wants, and an Empire which does not, appears above all in the attitude adopted towards the educated African. "It is perhaps most noticeable," writes the Hon. H. A. Wyndham in *The Atlantic and Emancipation* (1937), "in the respective attitudes of the two policies to Africans whose education and European proclivities separate them from their unchanged tribal compatriots. To France, aiming at the eventual assimilation of West Africa to her language and culture, such Africans are in the advanced guard of the movement. To Britain, looking forward to the evolution of a distinctive African policy, they are the negation of it."

If we seriously mean self-government, we must no doubt make up our minds to inconveniences and irritations. It is accepted doctrine at home that responsibility can only be learned by having responsibility placed on one's shoulders. So it is with the "Native." Officials must bear, as best they can, slowness of development, inefficient methods, failures of justice or of honesty, which they could have avoided if they had been allowed to do the things over the heads of the ruled. The better the official, the more painful this duty becomes.

But while accepting this necessity, we must press forward with deliberate preparation for self-government. This will consist in (a) a more rapid increase in the number of

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Government posts open to Natives; (b) more representation of Natives on legislative bodies; (c) training in local government on the English model (the conditions in Lagos do not differ essentially from those of Deptford or East Ham); (d) constant consultation about, and explanation of, Government measures; (e) greater freedom for the Press. There should be a public pronouncement, as wide and emphatic as possible, as to the British Government's intention in the matter of self-government; and it should be accompanied by something like a time-table (reckoned, say, in decades) showing the degree of progress expected at each stage.

There remains the question of "Indirect Rule"—the main practical controversy. "Indirect Rule" must be accepted as the main line of advance under present conditions. But "Indirect Rule" does not, so far as I can see, provide the machinery for the central government of a colony. While it is sometimes inevitable, and is in many cases desirable if subject to the strict surveillance and constant stimulus demanded by Lord Lugard and Sir Donald Cameron, it is, and must always be, essentially a form of local government. To provide the machinery for the Central Government, we have already established the principle of the Legislative Council on the British model; and I do not believe we can go back upon it. In the normal course of development, the Executive power, now vested in the Governor (with or without an Executive Council), would be transferred to a Ministry responsible to the Council, so soon as that Council becomes sufficiently representative of the whole population, coloured as well as white, to justify the transference. Elasticity is essential. It may be that we shall discover something better than the Westminster model; if so, let us apply it to Africa, as we shall apply it to ourselves.

Provided this kind of development is kept in view, it is

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right to govern for the time, in many cases, through African institutions and in accordance with African customs. But this system must be judged by the ordinary tests which we apply at home, by its success (to use Professor Macmillan's words) "in handling the prosaic duties of local government, routine work very much like that of our county and borough councils and magistrates' courts."

I shall conclude with a quotation which, for me personally, has a special interest. It is from *The Slave Trade and Its Remedy*, published in 1840 by my great-grandfather, Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton.

"But what is the true remedy? It cannot be too deeply engraven upon the minds of British statesmen, that it is beyond our power to rescue Africa, if the burthen is to fall wholly and permanently on ourselves. It is not the partial aid, lent by a distant nation, but the natural and healthy exercise of her own energies, which will ensure success. We cannot *create* a remedy; but, if it be true that this remedy already exists, and that nothing is wanting but its right application—if Africa possesses within herself vast, though as yet undeveloped, resources—we may be competent to achieve the much less onerous task of calling forth her powers, and enabling her to stand alone, relying upon the strength of her own native sinews."

On these words Professor Macmillan comments as follows: "Consciously or unconsciously, the framers of the League Covenant were echoing a phrase of Thomas Fowell Buxton's when they contemplated the need to help Africa to 'stand alone.' It may be that the 'philanthropists' oversimplified the problem, and thought in terms of a quick, clean break with the past. Nothing short of simple faith in human equality could have won the struggle against the owning interests in slavery—and but that such faith is out of fashion, reconstruction would be easier to-day."

THE EMPIRE AS AN ECONOMIC UNIT

By

THE RT. HON. LORD MARLEY, D.S.C., D.L., J.P.

THE foundation of the British Empire was mainly economic in character. The original North American settlers, with the exception of a few religious non-conformists, were the merchant adventurers and representatives of the joint-stock and charter companies (such as the London Company and the Massachusetts Bay Company) who were sent out to secure profits for the shareholders. Constantly these settlers were ordered to send home products of value. The Colonial system had begun. In some cases, as in that of the Plymouth Colony, the original shareholders were paid off and the settlement became entirely independent except for a recognition of the authority of the King. Thus exactly three centuries ago saw the forerunner of the Statute of Westminster, with the famous definition of Dominion status. Later there were similar economic and political developments in the East, such as the East India Company, originally seeking the interests of the shareholders by trade in spices and luxury goods. As the demand for profitable trade and settlement brought the Companies into conflict with local interests, as well as with representatives of other nations, the English Government was forced to take an ever increasing share in control and administration, and from this there developed the early inception of Colonies and subsequently of Dominions.

A further change in the character of the early oversea settlements was brought about by the use of coal power for machine production in England, and the beginning of the industrial Revolution. There gradually grew up the need for raw materials for the factories, and the oversea possessions

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became an important source of supply. In fact, new areas were occupied largely because they possessed these very raw materials which were needed for the new system of power production. The development of industrialisation brought further demands for new materials, and gradually began to increase the volume of production till it was beyond the absorptive capacity of the English people, despite the rapid growth of the population. Accordingly the economic interest in oversea possessions began to turn towards markets, to absorb the surplus products of the English factories. Mercantilism was followed by the development of the colonial system or the monopolistic organisation of trade. Under this system the colony could export its produce only to the mother country, and could import only the products of that country. Incidentally, this system laid the foundation of the British mercantile marine. Moreover, the prohibition or discouragement of industrial development in the colonies, so that settlers were compelled to buy the products of English factories, was an additional source of constant friction. The American war of independence was largely due to this policy, and in time the loss of the American colonies caused a modification of the rigidity of the colonial system.

The nineteenth century saw the growth of finance capitalism, in which the ever increasing wealth of England was used not only to finance exclusive exploitation of raw material production, but also to lay the foundations of industrialisation in the colonies and the principle of colonial economic independence was affirmed and accepted. This economic independence of the colonies called for special measures to secure the growth and prosperity of the newly-founded industries. Tariff barriers and protective policies were adopted throughout the world, resulting in a general diminution of international trade, or at least a check on its continued growth. Professor Papi, in his recent book (*The Colonial Problem*, 1938)

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has described what he calls the descending spiral movement in the economy of the various countries, and he points out that by 1914 the economic situation engendered by protective tariffs had become very serious; trade in raw materials was impeded; every market was burdened with abundant production at high cost; and a course of progressive impoverishment began to be experienced. The advantages of economic imperialism thus became a reality of growing importance. But other nations advanced along parallel lines and the rivalry of competing imperialisms caused the wars of the nineteenth century. This development gradually made evident the advantages of political unity in the Empire as well as the need for a common imperial defence policy. The colonial policy of Joseph Chamberlain was the highest peak of this stage of imperialism, and its strength (indeed its very possibility) was derived from the cheapness and the efficiency of our sea-borne communications. At that time shipping compared favourably with the heavy cost of railroad communications in the great land masses such as North America and Russia, and the submarine and airplane had not become a menace on the one hand, nor the airplane and the automobile an aid on the other, to turn the advantage in the direction of the land empires. The Great War of 1914 was the latest example of this clash of imperial rivalry, and its results have shaken the foundations of many of the old beliefs. In particular the political unity of the British Empire was severely strained. There was considerable opposition to participation in the war in each of the Dominions—particularly in the case of Canada. And this opposition to common action has been strengthened in later years, and is seen in the movement towards political self-determination applied to the doctrine of collective security and action under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. A notable example of this change was evidenced in the speech delivered in the

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Canadian House of Commons by the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, on the 24th May, 1938, in the course of which he said: "So far as the Canadian Government is concerned, the sanction articles of the League Covenant have ceased to be effective by general practice. . . . Canada was wisely bound by no commitments to remain neutral or to engage in war. When the issue arose the Canadian Parliament would decide. Canada offered no advice to the British Government, and was not bound by their decisions. The time had come to cease speaking of the Dominion's as if they were a peculiar half-fledged type of community identical in their interests and views."

Furthermore, the old security of sea power was threatened by the success of the submarine menace. The economic links of Empire became weakened by comparison with the greater advantages of trade with geographically nearer foreign countries. This was naturally reflected in political development, and the failure of the British Government to recognise the changed situation—notably in the Chanak incident with Turkey—was followed by the deliberate non-participation of the Dominions in the Treaty of Locarno. The 1926 Imperial Conference was therefore mainly occupied with the problem of finding a satisfactory definition to cover this development. Dominion autonomy was the result, with the submergence of the British Empire in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The definition was comprehensive: "The Dominions are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." The lesson of the American war of independence had at length been learnt. The fact was at last realised, that the only link between the various constituent parts of the

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Empire, apart from the shadowy thread of common allegiance to the Crown, and the more real but diminishing pull of family affection, was the link of common and mutual economic advantage. The Statute of Westminster, passed into law in December, 1931, legalised the position, and is either legally adopted or incorporated, or else tacitly accepted, by all the Dominions. It only remained to attempt to build up a mutual economic advantage, and the Imperial Conference at Ottawa in 1932 adopted the policy of imperial preference as a means of securing its realisation. From this has sprung far-reaching and unexpected results in an impoverished and distracted world. Ottawa raised the spectre of economic conflict between the British Empire and the rest of the world; as long as the British Empire had been an area of relatively free trade it raised but little active opposition. But Ottawa directed British and Dominion trade from foreign to empire channels.

It is clear that other countries are perturbed by a policy which establishes preferential duties over a large part of the world; it is a break in the policy of most favoured nation treatment; and it is an obstacle to foreign trade with the Empire market. Ottawa agreements made the mistake of fixing a standard preference, so that it was impossible for the Dominions to reduce tariffs to other countries. So important is this factor that the *Economist* (1st May, 1937) says that "Ottawa and the British tariff together have constituted the greatest obstacle erected against the trade of foreign countries since the crisis of 1929." The whole problem was examined last year by the economic Committee of the League which reports: "there is a grave danger that intra-imperial commercial arrangements which are exclusive in form may constitute not merely an impediment to the restoration of trade outside the area they cover, but also an impediment to a restoration of stable international relations." Thus

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Ottawa not only tended to set up barriers to general international trade, but it was an important contributory cause of the aggressive military and trade adventures of Germany, Italy and Japan, by causing their gradual exclusion from the British and Dominion markets. What were the immediate results of the Ottawa decisions? The world was just recovering from the depth of an economic crisis of unprecedented severity, a crisis which in Britain swept the Labour Government into oblivion and split the opposition into irreconcilable factions, in America obliterated the Republican Party, and in the world destroyed the edifice of the gold standard and generally weakened its whole economic structure.

The warnings of the 1927 Economic Conference were unheeded. The fiasco of the 1933 Conference was an indication of the beginning of the growth of economic nationalism and economic imperialism, which themselves merely made the crisis worse. It must of course be realised that raw materials are not equally distributed throughout the world, and economic nationalism, behind protective barriers, can only bring security if other countries do not adopt a similar policy. If the smaller countries also adopt protection, then the security of the larger groups is threatened, because the attempt at self-sufficiency by the poorer countries make it vital that they also should be possessed of territory producing at least some raw materials. In other words, colonial possessions have little value in a world of free trade, but become a vital necessity in a world of closed economic frontiers. The demand for colonies becomes an economic necessity and not an expression of mere political imperialism. This fact is beginning to be realised in the economic structure of the British Empire; partly because of the rise of aggressive demands for colonies by Germany, Italy, Japan and (to a lesser degree) by Poland; but also because of the actual tendencies of trade in the British Dominions. The direction

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of trade, in spite of preferences in one direction and tariffs in another, is tending to move towards the rest of the world, rather than to remain within the confines of the Empire. This fact was recognised at the 1937 Imperial Conference, which, on the initiative of the Dominions, decided that "all practicable steps should be taken to secure the stimulation of international trade, as an essential step to political appeasement." It was repeatedly emphasised during the discussions organised by the Royal Empire Society in November, 1937 (see *The Crucial Problem of Imperial Development*—Longmans, 1938).

The pull of currency facilities, of geographical proximity, and of mutual needs for raw materials and manufactures, has become increasingly evident, and is worth a brief examination, in its latest effects on inter-imperial trade, since the coming into force of the Ottawa Agreements.

The figures of export trade are here examined for the three years: 1931 (pre-Ottawa); 1935 (to show the long range effect of Ottawa); and 1936 (or 1937 where available—to show the general tendency to-day). It is noteworthy that whereas in most cases the percentage of exports going to

PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS GOING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
AND TO THE EMPIRE.

From	To	1931	1935	1936	1937
Great Britain..	Foreign countries ..	56.2	52.0	50.8	51.7
	Empire	43.8	48.0	49.2	48.3
India	Foreign countries ..	56.2	53.9	54.7	
	Empire	43.8	46.1	45.3	
South Africa..	Foreign countries ..	37.7	44.5	46.9	51.5
	Empire	62.3	55.5	53.1	48.5
Australia ..	Foreign countries ..	45.7	37.5	40.8	45.6
	Empire	54.3	62.5	59.2	54.4
New Zealand ..	Foreign countries ..	6.8	10.5	14.1	17.7
	Empire	93.2	89.5	85.9	82.3
Canada	Foreign countries ..	61.9	47.4	49.6	
	Empire	38.1	52.6	50.4	
Irish Free State (Eire)	Foreign countries ..	3.1	6.9	7.2	8.2
	Empire	96.9	93.1	92.8	91.8

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Empire countries showed a considerable increase between 1931 and 1935, yet in every case without exception the figures in the two latest years show a smaller percentage of exports going to the Empire and a larger percentage to foreign countries. The figures for imports show similar results.

The inescapable fact emerges that foreign trade is becoming more important to the Dominions as well as to Great Britain. The Dominions have realised this position, and within a very brief period after the conclusion of the Ottawa Agreements, steps were taken to modify some of its results. Canada's close connection with the United States is both political and economic. The maintenance of peaceful relations with the United States is the corner stone of Canadian policy, and it is essential to Canadian security that it should be one of the axioms of the policy of the Empire as a whole. The political relationship is based on the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 (one of the most remarkable international agreements ever signed), ensuring the absence of military forces along the common frontier; and the International Joint Commission, which deals with questions involving rights and interests on the frontier. The relationship is cemented by the daily exchange of thousands of visitors, by the hundreds of thousands of Canadians living in the States and Americans living in Canada, by the possession of a common monetary unit, common news services, common railroad running agreements, and widespread common use of educational and cultural facilities. The economic relationship is indicated by the immense volume of United States investments in Canada, estimated by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics to amount in 1933 to nearly four billion dollars, as compared with less than 2½ billion dollars from the United Kingdom and only 95 million dollars from all other countries. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1935 between the two countries has

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resulted in great benefits to both. United States exports to Canada increased from \$308 million in 1935 to \$369 million in 1936, or nearly 20%. Canadian exports to the U.S.A. increased in the same period from \$266 million to \$340 million or about 36%. If these figures are further analysed we find that in the same period United States imports from Canada increased by 32% and from all other countries by 17%. Canadian imports from U.S.A. increased 18% and from all other countries 12%. Of Canadian goods imported into the U.S.A., those with lowered duties increased 35%, others only 11%.

Over the past four years the United Kingdom's trade with Canada, though it has increased absolutely, has declined in proportion to the total, while that of the United States shows appreciable increases on both sides of the account. Can it be wondered at that Canada is one of the most pressing supporters of an Anglo-American trade treaty.

But Canada is not concerned only with the United States. She has recently concluded an important Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom (dated 23rd February, 1937) the essence of which is to change the basis of the Ottawa preferences from the principle of a fixed amount of preference—which makes it impossible to reduce duties against foreign goods—to a basis of maximum duties on Empire goods. This is to enable Canada to increase her trade with other foreign countries, and it is to be hoped that the same principle, already being adopted by Australia, will be applied throughout the Empire. Moreover, Canada has concluded trade agreements with other countries, notably in 1936 with Germany, and in general it has to be realised that Canada is now an industrial country with a most important international position in respect of both trade and finance.

Australia, in a more isolated position than Canada, nevertheless shows many similar lines of development. Her

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preoccupation with an increase of foreign trade is illustrated by the new Trade Agreement with Japan which deals with the exchange of wool for textiles. Australia has been hampered by the Ottawa restrictions, and is also concerned with the successful negotiation of the Anglo-American treaty. In view of the marked retrogression in trade for the current year it is considered vitally necessary for urgent measures to be taken to stimulate foreign trade. The recent discussions in London were directed to this end, with the corollary of the modification of Ottawa. The objects of the discussions were to protect the Australian manufacturer against British competition, to safeguard Australian primary producers in the British market, and to make it easier for the Commonwealth Government to negotiate trade agreements with foreign countries, by introducing greater elasticity into the system of guaranteed preferences. The "Memorandum of Conclusions" (20th July, 1938. Cmd. 5808) after a reference to world peace and a sentence on the defence of Australia, goes on to recognise the need for a population increase in Australia, supports the development of Australian industry, and accepts the necessity for trade agreements between Australia and foreign countries as a contribution to the expansion of international trade. Moreover, the Memorandum accepts the advantages of the maximum rates of duty over the old Ottawa fixed preference duties, and states that the Australian Government "will proceed forthwith to investigate the possibility of adopting such a system." These represent substantial advances, and we may hope for a strengthening of the economic position of Australia, by a more even development of trade with all parts of the world.

New Zealand is vitally concerned with Empire trade, but the very danger of so limited a market has been realised. A move towards industrialisation may be seen in the plans for developing her iron and steel industry, and the trend towards

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increasing trade with foreign countries is all to the advantage of New Zealand economy.

South Africa is in a special position, for the maintenance of gold values is mainly in the hands of the United States, where the President has the power to devalue to a considerable extent. As gold is far the most important of South Africa's exports, being 75% of all her exports in 1936 and 68% in 1937, it is clear that devaluation would be disastrous. Consequently the need for friendly relations with the United States is of decisive importance.

In general it will be seen that the economic links of Empire are tending to become weaker, whereas the strength of individual Dominions is growing. As Mr. Malcolm MacDonald said in a recent speech to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, "The Dominions are destined in the future to be great sovereign nations . . . and this presupposes great industrial as well as agricultural activity." He conceives the British Empire as consisting of six first-class Powers, and certainly the rise of Dominion nationalism is apparent. It is now no longer possible to count on an Empire foreign policy. The recent speech of Mr. Menzies to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, reported in *The Times* of 28th June, points out the difficulties of mutual consultation. Mr. Mackenzie King has repeatedly voiced the problem. But greater than these is the intractable task of finding a line of action advantageous to each Dominion, as well as to the mother country. In view of her military preoccupation in home waters, Great Britain can no longer use her naval forces for distant Empire defence. Moreover, to the vulnerability of Britain to air attack must be added the danger of interruption of food and raw material supplies in time of war. This danger is greater than at any period in history, and provides yet another obstacle to an Empire political policy. The development of economic Dominion

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nationalism is having a further effect on British economy. The Federation of British Industries in a recent Memorandum (*Times*, 15th July, 1938) pointed out the danger of the increasing adverse balance of visible imports over exports, and pleads for the assumption by the Government of greater powers than they now possess in connection with negotiations with foreign countries, as of increasing importance as compared with concentration on imperial trade.

The importance of the Empire in the cause of world peace cannot be exaggerated, but peace to be lasting must be based upon justice, which to-day means economic justice. It is vital to avoid the closing of the door to foreign trade with the Empire, or to give colour to Germany's pleas that she can only secure the materials and the markets that are vital to her from a colonial Empire of her own. As the *Economist* (1st May, 1937) says: "If we pursue that road it must inevitably end in a clash." A clash must and can be avoided by a recognition of economic facts. The only solution is the policy of economic appeasement, as initiated by Secretary Cordell Hull, together with a move towards making accessible to all nations the raw materials and markets of the world. No sectional interests, no national interests must stand in the way of economic appeasement. The British Empire is in a unique position to make a collective contribution to the solution of world difficulties. The "retreat from Ottawa" can well become the "advance from Ottawa," towards a more just and lasting international economy. Such an advance will have its political repercussions in the strengthening of the limited group of powers which still support democracy, and possibly to many this collective defence of democracy may be the most important result of economic appeasement.

THE COLONIAL CIVIL SERVICE

By HAROLD J. LASKI

I

IT is difficult to suggest what are the purposes of the British Colonial Empire to those who are responsible for its maintenance. They would themselves repudiate any crude and simple notions like "power" or "profit"; and they would be able to point both to declarations of ends sought, and to real achievements effected, which contradicted the simplicity of any such explanation. The idea of "trusteeship," on the other hand, which has become so fashionable in our own day, is too flattering to the results obtained. It is hardly compatible with the historic incidence of the facts. It is a word whose sound is too noble for the squalid results too often attained; for, in many cases, whether the test taken be standard of life, public health, education, or growth of fitness for self-government, the colonies remain, in large degree, the slums of empire. The last Royal Commission on Palestine was virtually a declaration by the British Government of an administrative breakdown. The enquiry into Trinidad revealed grim conditions of economic inadequacy. That the centennial year of emancipation in Jamaica should have been accompanied by widespread riots—in the main the clear outcome of grave material want—and the appointment of a further Royal Commission—is not a compliment to the success of British rule. Africa presents even more complicated issues; and no one can read the brilliant volume in which Professor Macmillan has incisively defined their nature¹ without a sense that, whatever be the verdict upon the result, there are few aspects of those issues in which a claim to have fulfilled the concept of trusteeship could be seriously maintained.

¹ *Africa Emergent*. (London, 1938.)

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"Progress since the War," Lord Harlech has written,¹ "has been achieved in typically British fashion by a process of trial and error." The phrase is, I think, somewhat too portentous for the facts involved. For, in the first place, the claim that there has been progress would not be easy to establish by any objective standards; and the claim seems implicit that there is a conscious and single-minded direction of policy the virtues of which "trial and error" are seeking to prove by experiment. It is more than doubtful whether this is the case. So far as any clear post-war trend may be observed, it is perhaps the attempt in Africa to see what can be done with Lord Lugard's principle of indirect rule; and of this it may be said with some emphasis that, so far, any verdict upon its results must be negative in character. For, so far as it has gone, it has not proved itself able to absorb the educated African; and it is at least possible that its implications, as they are worked out, will support a policy of segregation which, as it operates, fails inherently to fit the consequences of the impact of Western civilisation upon the African. And the entrance of new factors into the situation, the arming of large native populations by Mussolini, the revival of German colonial ambitions by Herr Hitler, the impact upon the whole of Africa of capitalist decline, make the whole outlook a grimly uncertain one. We have been told on the highest authority that Great Britain will defend its title to its colonial empire, if this be challenged; but what that empire is for, apart from the material power it embodies, it would not be so easy to explain. Certainly we could not truthfully plead in the court of history that the well-being of its native populations has been, either throughout, or in more recently history, the predominant motive of its maintenance.

¹ Preface to Charles J. Jeffries, *The Colonial Empire and its Colonial Service*. (Cambridge, 1938.) p. viii.

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II

Any attempt to discuss the Imperial Civil Service in a brief space is rendered difficult by the complexity of its organisation. Though there has been, in one sense, a real unity in that service ever since the *Fisher Report* of 1930¹, it still remains, in a large degree, an aggregation of separate units upon which the facts, both functional and territorial, prevent the imposition of a unified purpose. A service that has to supply officers for areas so different as Jamaica and St. Helena, for Kenya and Cyprus, for Palestine and Honduras, for the Malay States and the Gold Coast, cannot be thought of geographically in a unified way; and appointments that have to be made in realms so different as those of administration, law, medicine, police, geology, education, biology, customs, and forestry, to take only outstanding classes, does not permit of any appreciation of simple criteria. The effective responsibility for all appointments, as also for the main promotions, lies in the hands of the Colonial Office; but it is also clear that, for the most part, the decision to promote must mainly be a judgment made there upon reports received from the higher officials of different colonies.

All appointments to posts carrying an initial salary of £400 a year and upwards are made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the advice of an Appointments Board. The method of selection is by competitive interview. Of 927 colonial appointments made by the Secretary from 1927-9, 407 were of graduates from Oxford and Cambridge. But this total does not put the appointments in a proper perspective. For of the 260 administrative posts to which appointments were made in those years—the posts from which, effectively, practically all the highest officials will be ultimately chosen, 236 or 90% came from the two older universities. It is clear therefore that the effective direction of the service is in the

¹ Cmd 3554.

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hands of much the same type of official as controls the Colonial Office itself. Broadly, the other universities have access mainly to scientific and technical posts.

After appointment, practically all candidates are sent for a year's course of training to either Oxford or Cambridge. The course there given is, roughly, divided into three main groups of subjects: (1) the Colonial system of accounts, tropical hygiene and first aid, field engineering and surveying; (2) law and native languages, with special reference to the area to which the candidate has been allocated; (3) anthropology and imperial history, together with tropical forestry and agriculture. At the end of the course, the candidates must pass an examination, upon which their seniority is dependent, upon the subjects of the course.

After passing out of Oxford or Cambridge, the candidate usually becomes a district officer in the colony of his appointment. Then he proceeds upwards. He may become, after some years, a provincial commissioner. He may be transferred to the secretariat, with the possibility of promotion to another colony, and thence to an important colonial secretaryship or even to a governor's post. Some ten officers at a time are seconded, at five to ten years' seniority, to posts in the Colonial Office itself, where they normally stay for two years. There is no single salary scale in the service. It is, however, approximately true to say that the average salary of an officer who does not reach the highest posts in the service will run, allowances apart, from about £350 to £1,000 per annum; and the scale usually extends over a period of twenty years. There are some 120 posts above this scale, appointments to which are usually made from within the separate territories involved; and there are, further, some 80 posts which may be regarded as "open" to the higher officers in any area of the service. Of posts carrying a salary of more than £1,500 per annum there appear to be some 50 in

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the whole administrative service of the Colonial Empire.

I propose here to discuss the administrative branch of the service only (one to which some 70-80 appointments are made annually), partly because that is the branch in which policy is mainly made, and, partly, because the consideration of scientific and technical services would take me too far afield. But two things in general preamble must be said. First, that it is clear that a good deal of policy is subject to the interpretation of the administrative mind by purposes and facts communicated to them by specialists from other branches of the service; and that, second, that policy is, in its turn, subject to detailed scrutiny and control in London, in part from the Colonial Office itself, and, in part also, from the Treasury which remains the effective master of the financial aspects of colonial policy. It is important to note that, especially since the War, a considerable effort has been made to give the permanent officials of the Colonial Office some experience of overseas service; after a few years' service as assistant-principals, it is now normal for a Whitehall appointee to have two years in a colonial government. Conversely, as I have pointed out, there are usually some half-score of colonial officials in Whitehall at any given time; and two recent Permanent Secretaries of the Department had long years of colonial experience prior to their appointment.

III

Any generalisations upon the Colonial Service meet the *a priori* difficulty that in so complex a structure nothing is likely to be universally true. The comments, therefore, that I propose to make are all subject to exceptions, both of area and of persons, upon which, in given instances, important emphasis would have to be laid. Subject to this limitation, I believe that the following general conclusions could be justified:

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1. The administrative service is drawn from too narrow a source. Broadly, it represents the "public school" mind. It has been trained, therefore, to the acceptance of the historic assumptions of empire. It is a mind capable of efficiency and the team-spirit within the limits those assumptions impose. It is rarely a mind which questions them, or looks to innovation in fundamentals.

2. As a service, further, it tends, as a whole, to be narrowed to the conditions of its particular area. It is not well acquainted with experiments conducted outside. Normally, little effort has been made for interchange of view with the experience of other colonial powers; most notably nothing serious has been done to learn the lessons implicit in the extraordinary handling of its backward peoples by the Soviet Union.

3. The service tends to look for "sound" men, rather than for innovators; it does not easily welcome criticism. That has been shown, in recent years, by its hostility to work of men like Dr. Leys and Mr. McGregor Ross, by its neglect of warnings about Jamaica from men of the standing of Lord Olivier and Professor Macmillan. It is notable that a recent expression of sympathy for the strikers in the West Indies led to the resignation and transfer of the two officials involved.

4. The service is trying to run the Empire "on the cheap." It is evident from the statistics of the incidence of disease among Africans that the medical service could be quadrupled with immediate social advantage. The scientific treatment of agriculture is only in its beginnings. The main burden of education is still left to the missions, instead of being accepted as a necessary governmental responsibility. Recent reports on housing show that no serious attempt is made to enforce minimum standards of sanitation. The adequate use of trained anthropologists is in its infancy.

5. There is evidence of definite hostility in the service to

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the normal British ideas of civil liberty. Legislation represses nascent trade unionism. Native criticism, particularly the criticism of educated Africans, very easily becomes sedition. The concept of "law and order" has been accepted on the basis of adjusting its limits predominantly to the needs of white enterprise dependent for its success upon cheap and obedient coloured labour.

6. The service suffers from the absence of any continuous and effective criticism in Great Britain. It comes only into the limelight on great occasions, *e.g.*: the discovery of gold in Kenya, or the outbreak of riots in the West Indies. Otherwise, it is subject to the pressure (*a*) of interests in the colonies themselves which are chiefly concerned with no more than the making of profit for the white man, (*b*) of the poverty of the colonies themselves which makes all improvements subject to rigorous financial limits. The service wants (and gets) mainly "sound" men; and, by this it means men who will not raise those questions which arouse the angry attack of white settlers who may be prejudiced by them. Those who raise these issues are "unsound" men, cranks or fanatics who do not normally rise in the service.

7. No large-scale tendency has developed in the service to use the ability of educated coloured people in its higher ranks. That there is a growing supply of such men is known to all students of colonial affairs. They have practically no chance of a career; and they do not even get the chance of effective consultation with, much less appointment to, the commissions of enquiry which have been a feature of colonial policy since the War.

8. Taking the service as a whole, it is probably notably fair-minded and moderate; and there can be little doubt that there are many individual instances of officials who have given all that is in them to the help of the areas they control. The difficulty is that even their best effort can do little for a

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number of reasons : (1) Few colonial secretaries stay a long enough time at the Colonial Office to work out an effective and positive policy of their own ; in just over a century there have been 53 secretaries of State, an average tenure of just over two years. (2) Each colony has to work on the assumption, subject only to relatively small variations, of internal self-sufficiency. The chance of any large-scale development that is not pushed by some important economic interest, *e.g.* : a railway, is therefore small. (3) In almost every area, local policy depends very largely upon the personality of the governor of the time. An active and able governor may initiate a relatively important change ; the result of his effort may languish unless he is supported by the same zeal and capacity in his successor. (4) In any colony where settler opinion is vocal or important, *e.g.* : Kenya, the fact that they can raise difficulties for the Colonial Office in the House of Commons or in the Lords limits a good deal the degree to which any innovation is locally possible that may be disapproved by that opinion. (5) The distance of the Colonial Office from the "men on the spot" necessarily makes its control gravely bureaucratic in character. The tradition is to follow precedent, not to interfere if "no new principle" is being raised. The result, as Professor Macmillan has pointed out,¹ is that "any wrong step once approved may itself become the authority cited by Colonial Office apologists for approving worse." There are striking examples of this notably in the fields of native taxation and registration. (6) Sufficient attention is not given in the shaping of policy in major matters to the opinions of the colonial peoples themselves. The demand of the Government of South Africa for the transfer of the Protectorates to its rule would, in view of the former's reactionary native policy, be a definitely retrograde step ; and it is known that it is strongly opposed by

¹ *Africa Emergent*: p. 267.

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native opinion. It is nevertheless quite uncertain whether South Africa will not have its way. (7) The tradition of the Colonial Office is negative. So long as events in a colony do not result in criticism in Parliament, it is content to abstain from action. In Jamaica in 1935, for example, the Schools' Medical Officer reported that out of every 100 children examined, 44 were absolutely undernourished, and that in the rural parishes 96 out of 100 suffered from hookworm. There is no evidence that the Colonial Office took any special action on these grim facts ; had they affected white children in the colony, the instant storm of indignation would have resulted at once in angry protest. (8) There is a grave tendency in the service to inflict heavy sentences on native "agitators" whose crime, on investigation, turns out to be nothing more serious than an urgency to organisation for better living conditions. A good example is the recent sentence of ten years' imprisonment imposed on Ulric Grant in Barbadoes ; he was found guilty of organising only. In answer to a protest from Mr. Creech-Jones, Mr. Ormsby-Gore (Lord Harlech) declared that it would be "improper for him to comment on a sentence passed by a judge on a decision by a jury, and as the exercise of the prerogative of mercy did not lie with him, but, under the Constitution, rested solely with the Governor, it would be highly improper for him to intervene." Bad as this case is, it is unfortunately typical of what occurs where the native demand for civil liberties touches the delicate issue of trade-union organisation.

The real weakness of the whole system lies in the fact that the fundamental principles of colonial policy are, in this country, no one's concern. There is no well-organised opinion alert about native questions. There is no effective continuity of criticism. The only exceptions to this in the post-war years has been in Palestine ; and it is not improbable that Zionist criticism of official policy there has been at least

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partly responsible for the latent anti-Semitism of some of the officials there. That, perhaps, explains the curious contrast between the tenderness with which the Arab revolt has been treated compared to the stern measures taken in the West Indies. Nothing, in fact, is done on a big scale for the colonies unless some untoward event draws public opinion to watch events in one of its areas, and, too often, the only result of that attention is a Royal Commission, which diverts attention, and is followed by a return to the wonted apathy. It is not too much to say that in all major matters native acquiescence is identified with native loyalty; and any departure from that acquiescence is disregarded since it questions the basic assumptions upon which the colonial empire rests.

"This service," writes Professor Macmillan,¹ "... (like the Indian Civil Service) is acquiring an equally high reputation for intellectual ability, integrity and devotion to duty." In the large, this is true. But it should be added that the service is also acquiring the characteristic defects of the Indian Civil Service—refusal to examine the postulates of its work, lack of imagination, complacency about the larger issues, absence of sympathy for the educated members of the subject peoples, desire to evade the fundamental controversies. Many of its members are literally overwhelmed by the sheer burden of the day's work; this is especially true of the good District Officer who is too often compelled to give up to minutiae of administration the time and thought that ought to go to the consideration of its main principles.

At the back of all this lies the deeper doubt whether capitalist imperialism, even when mitigated by its foundation in political democracy, can ever truly serve the interests of those whose destinies it controls. The service is, after all, built upon the assumption that the long-run effects of

¹ *Op. cit.*: p. 271.

A CANADIAN LOOKS AT THE EMPIRE

By NORMAN MACKENZIE

AS it is assumed that the views of "The Canadian" designated in this title are both representative and objective, it is essential that the attitudes of the more important groups in Canada towards the Empire be described.

The first and largest group¹—about fifty per cent of the total population—are Anglo-Saxon or Celtic in origin, and as one might expect of those who trace directly to the British Isles, it is this group which is most strongly attached to Great Britain and the Empire. But it is a mistake to assume that even this group or any of the smaller sub-groupings within it are united in their attitude towards the Empire. The most vocal and seemingly the most influential of these sub-groups is composed of ardent, emotional Imperialists. They are, in the main, Tories and, as one might expect, are generally in warm sympathy with the Conservatives in Great Britain. Whether they would as readily support a Socialist government in Britain is uncertain, but one can be sure that they would be uncomfortable if called upon to do so. This group contains most of the "best people." Some of them are first generation stock, but the larger number are Canadian born who for sentimental, class or economic reasons—e.g. the United Empire Loyalists—are more British than Tory England. There are many, however, within this Anglo-Saxon Celtic group who are Canadian rather than Empire minded in their outlook. Some of them, of Irish origin, have not forgotten the fact of their origin; others dislike the policies and actions of Tory Britain; still others feel that the future of Canada is inevitably North American and

¹ The 1931 Census gives the following divisions based on paternity:

French	2,927,990	Scottish	1,346,350
English	2,741,419	Irish	1,230,808

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that the Empire connection is geographically unnatural and politically expensive in terms of foreign entanglements and wars. But this group is negative, rather than positive like their Imperialist fellow-citizens. The result is, in my opinion, that if a major crisis involving the Empire occurred, the Imperialists, because they are vocal and aggressive, will carry Canada into that crisis with them. But they will meet with a good deal of individual resistance from the members of the second sub-group if this group is called upon for personal participation and sacrifice.

The second major group consists of those of French origin, roughly about thirty per cent of the population. At the moment, their cultural leaders fear and dislike the North American way of life which they consider wholly materialistic and a menace to the continued existence of French-Canadian culture. For this reason they probably welcome their British connection as a sort of counter-weight to or bulwark against Americanism. But they are essentially and thoroughly "French-Canadian" and are generally opposed to any commitments to or association with Great Britain and the Empire which may result in their being involved in an Empire war.

The third major group consists of those of alien birth, i.e., who are not of Anglo-Saxon, Celtic, or French origins, about twenty per cent of the total. Within this group are representatives of almost every race and nation. The more important (as of the year 1931) are Germans 473,544, Scandinavians 228,049, Ukrainians 225,113, Hebrews 156,726, Dutch 148,962, Poles 145,503, Indians and Eskimos 128,890, and Italians 98,173. It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that all of these form a single group which differs fundamentally from the Anglo-Saxon and French Canadian groups. True, they have no cultural, racial or sentimental attachment to Great Britain or the Empire, but in the second and later generations the majority of them tend to adopt the

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North American outlook and way of life, and in their attitude towards the Empire are probably not unlike the sub-group mentioned earlier, the Canadians of Anglo-Saxon origin who are North American rather than Empire minded. It is important to emphasize this, because this group is increasing in numbers, and as they become "North American" they will tend to counter-balance the French-Canadian elements, who are at present gaining upon the Anglo-Saxon stock.

Cutting across all three of these major groups are other loyalties which affect the attitudes of Canadians towards Canada and the Empire. The most important are the ideological loyalties—Fascism and Communism. Mixed up with these are the national loyalties of groups towards their mother countries. There is no doubt that the Germans in Canada are influenced in their attitude towards Britain—and to most Canadians Britain is the Empire—by the policy and "philosophy" of National Socialism in Germany. Similarly, though to a lesser extent, the Italians. Communists, too, and many others of Leftist sympathies are influenced in their feelings towards the Empire by the attitude of the British Government towards Leftist movements and towards the U.S.S.R.

The Roman Catholic Church has a very real influence in Canada, particularly in Quebec,¹ and there is no doubt that the attitude of Canadian Catholics towards the Empire is affected by the attitude of the Empire towards such events as the war in Spain or towards countries and movements, as for example the U.S.S.R.

What I have tried to do, in this brief statement, is to suggest that the Canadian views of and attitudes towards Britain and the Empire are both mixed and varied, so that it is difficult if not impossible to define accurately "The Canadian View of the Empire."

¹ The 1931 Census gives 41.3 per cent or 4,285,388 Roman Catholics in Canada.

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Having examined Canadian opinion briefly, I propose next to examine Canadian policy—that is the policy of the Government and of the political parties—in respect of the Empire. Down to 1914, Canada was to all intents a colony and was treated and acted as such. True, Canadian Governments, both Conservative and Liberal, insisted upon fiscal and tariff autonomy; tried to exercise a measure of control over "Canadian" treaties; and found it difficult if not impossible, at times, to reconcile Canadian and British interests. Sir Wilfred Laurier was fully aware of the implications of Britain's control over Empire foreign policy upon Canada, but he thought he could solve this problem by rejecting consultation and the responsibility which accompanied it and hoped that he would be free to decide Canada's policy and actions according to the circumstances.

August, 1914, found Canada acting as an integral part of the Empire. But as the Great War dragged on, the interest groups, described above, began to be more clearly defined and to act in accordance with their sentiments or interests. Sir Robert Borden and the Conservatives who were in office at the time were whole-hearted believers in and supporters of the Empire. But they were sufficiently realistic to know that the Canadian people would refuse to allow a situation to continue in which they could be and were committed by the policy of a Government and Parliament over which they had no control. They therefore insisted upon and were given a voice in the conduct of the war through War Conferences and War Cabinets. They were given separate and independent representation at the Peace Conference and in the League of Nations, and they were consulted, in form at least, on Empire foreign policy. But no organization or practical procedure for consultation and for "Empire" control over "Empire" foreign policy survived the war, and with the return of the Liberals to office in 1921, the Borden policy of

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Canadian participation in and responsibility for a common Empire foreign policy was abandoned and the Laurier tradition of no consultation, no responsibility and an independent Canadian foreign policy revived. As the "twenties" were years of peace and as the League of Nations seemed to be functioning adequately, Empire relations and foreign policy generally presented no particular difficulties to the Liberal regimes of that decade. In 1931, when the invasion and conquest of Manchuria occurred, the Conservatives were in power at Ottawa and a National Conservative Government ruled in London.

This caused the first real doubt and unhappiness in Canada about Empire relations that had occurred since the war. Mr. Cahan, who represented Canada at the meetings of the League dealing with this problem, sympathized with and supported Sir John Simon and the British Government. The Government of Canada were less certain of the wisdom of this attitude, but at least they did nothing about it. Many Canadians, however, were disturbed by what they believed to be a betrayal of League principles and an alienation of potential United States co-operation. For they realized that if the League methods were not made effective and if there was to be a return to the old methods of power politics, then the whole difficult and unsolved problem of Empire foreign policy would be revived. At the same time it must be admitted that no political party in Canada had any enthusiasm for League action which would or might require Canadian participation in military sanctions. The Conservatives were still in office when sanctions were invoked against Italy; and Canada, together with all the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and practically all the members of the League, supported this action. The Liberals who succeeded them a few weeks later continued this policy, but they publicly rebuked the Canadian representative who

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had, in a committee of the League, proposed an oil embargo against Italy. With the conquest of Ethiopia and the collapse of sanctions, Mr. Mackenzie King in a series of speeches claimed freedom of action for Canada in respect of both League and Empire and seemed to welcome this opportunity of ridding himself and his government of these League responsibilities for sanctions. In a speech delivered before the seventeenth ordinary session of the Assembly of the League on September 29, 1936, Mr. King said: "The Nations of the British Commonwealth are held together by ties of friendship, by similar political institutions and by common attachment to democratic ideals, rather than by commitments to join together in war. The Canadian Parliament reserves to itself the right to declare, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time, to what extent, if at all, Canada will participate in conflicts in which other members of the Commonwealth may be engaged. . . The Canadian House of Commons, by unanimous resolution, has made the adoption of undertakings to apply either military or economic sanctions subject to the approval of Parliament. What I have said and quoted does not mean that in no circumstances would the Canadian people be prepared to share in action against an aggressor; there have been no absolute commitments either for or against participation in war or other forms of force. It does mean that any decision on the part of Canada to participate in war will have to be taken by the Parliament or people of Canada in the light of all existing circumstances; circumstances of the day as they exist in Canada, as well as in the areas involved." Despite this definite repudiation of commitments to either League or Empire, which he has repeated on several occasions, Mr. King has done nothing in a positive way to ensure that this freedom of action will be possible if and when a crisis occurs. In respect of the League, around which there are no strong

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feelings of an emotional kind, no problem exists. Mr. King's negative policy, coinciding as it does with that of the majority of League members, in effect means that League sanctions will never be invoked and therefore are not a problem.

The situation in respect of the Empire however is totally different. Here, everything except the divided state of Canadian opinion outlined above, makes for participation in Empire wars. It has been so in the past, and neither Mr. King nor anybody else has done anything in a positive way, after the fashion of the South African and Irish Free State status and neutrality measures, to lessen the chance of it happening again. Meanwhile, sentiments strengthened by propaganda, economic interests, participation in Britain's rearmament programme (particularly in respect of aviation), suggest that if Britain is involved in war, Canada's choice will already have been made for participation. True, Mr. King told the Canadian House of Commons just before it was prorogued that his Government was not prepared to allow the Government of the United Kingdom to establish and control schools or camps in Canada for the training of aviators for the Royal Air Force. But a few days later, after the matter had been discussed in the Press, and no doubt after consulting his colleagues in the Cabinet, he qualified his statement and said that his Government was prepared to co-operate with the United Kingdom Government in this matter, but that any such schools established in Canada must be under the control of the Government of Canada. While Mr. King and the Liberals seem to be unable to free Canada from the obligation to participate in Empire wars, assuming that they want to do so, the Conservatives seem to have just as much difficulty about ensuring that participation in advance—again assuming that they so desire. At the Conservative convention which met in Ottawa in the early weeks of July, 1938, the

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ultra-imperialists made a determined effort to achieve this. The French-Canadian delegates from Quebec tried to ensure that Canada would not be under any obligation to go to the assistance of the Empire. Neither group was successful. The final outcome was the usual compromise in the form of the resolution that "we believe that the defence of Canada and the preservation of our liberties can best be promoted by consultation and co-operation between all members of the British Commonwealth of Nations"—which may mean a lot or nothing. The C.C.F.—the third party in Canada—while it is unlikely to elect any considerable number of members to the Federal Parliament in the near future, does represent the views of a considerable body of Canadian people. It polled 400,000 votes in 1935. In the main it seems to be opposed to overseas commitments whether they be League or Empire. This attitude is the result of a mixture of pacifism, isolationism and socialist reluctance to participate in capitalist wars. Recently, however, like movements of the Left in other countries and at a time when it is probably too late to do any good, this party has come out strongly in favour of collective security, but it still denounces participation in Imperialist wars, whatever that may mean. The Communists are too small a group to be politically important save in a propagandist way, while the "Social Creditors" seem to have much the same mixed sentiments about the Empire as the Liberals and Conservatives.

Other matters which influence Canadian opinion and policy in respect of the Empire are geography and economic interests. Canada's position on the North American continent makes her relations with the United States of paramount importance. It is conceivable that Canada, or at least the individuals who inhabit Canada, could exist and carry on, even though they were not part of the British Empire. It is practically inconceivable that they could continue to exist

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in their present way of life, or for that matter any other of their own choosing, if the United States willed otherwise. For that reason the most important concern of Canadian foreign policy must always be that Canada shall never find herself in any combination hostile to the United States. Despite this, however, sentiment plays such a small part in the relations of Canada and the United States as contrasted with the Empire relationship, save in a negative way—for many Canadians are jealous of and strongly dislike the United States—that the foreign policy and actions of the United States Government rarely if ever become a matter of controversy in Canada, as does that of Great Britain. There is no feeling that we will ever be called upon to send troops to assist the United States as there is in the case of the Empire. True, the United States, like Canada, is thousands of miles away from the world's "hot spots" while London is only seven minutes distant from potential air raids. But there is far more than distance or danger in the difference with which Canadians view the United States and the Empire. In addition to the fact, which consciously or unconsciously most Canadians recognize, that we must at all costs ensure that the United States is always on our side or neutral, there is the further feeling, resented by most of the ardent imperialists, that the Monroe Doctrine applies to Canada. This is true, so it is argued, not because the United States loves Canada so much that they are prepared to fight to protect her, but because the United States in her own interests cannot permit any aggressive Asiatic or European power to establish bases in Canada from which they would threaten the industrial centres of the United States. This all tends to complicate our relations with the Empire, for if we are automatically committed to support the Empire, it is conceivable that this might bring us into opposition to the United States. For that reason, the more ardent supporters

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of the Empire in Canada tend to ignore the existence of these facts of geography. The more intelligent of them, like Mr. Meighen, bend their efforts towards preventing the Empire from being involved in situations which might endanger relations with the United States. There is no doubt that the firmness of Mr. Meighen's opposition to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty when he was Conservative Prime Minister in 1921 was due to his belief that it was a menace to good relations between the Empire (and, therefore, Canada) and the United States. The isolationists seem prepared to allow Great Britain complete freedom in shaping Empire policy even with the United States, apparently on the assumption that if a crisis does occur as a result of this policy, Canada can and will leave the Empire rather than fight the United States. The Far East plays little part in the life of Canada or in the policy of the Government, save as it affects the larger issues of her relations with the Empire and the United States. True, we have some 75,000 Orientals in Canada, most of them in British Columbia, and this gives rise, from time to time, to anti-Oriental agitation. We also find in the Orient a limited market for our exports, which include many of the raw materials necessary for the conduct of a war. But believing as we do that none of the great Asiatic powers would undertake the difficult task of invading us, particularly as that would probably mean taking on the United States as well, we refuse to get unduly excited about what happens in the Far East.

The rest of the Western Hemisphere, too, which we loosely describe as Latin America plays a small part in our thinking about the Empire or foreign policy. There are those in Canada who believe we should be members of the Pan-American Union and attend Pan-American Conferences and there seems no logical or important reason why we should not do so. Most of the interest in this question is

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confined to academic, isolationist and French-Canadian circles. The academic group approves generally of any widening of our international contacts. The isolationists see in this a political and economic alternative to Europe, if that continent becomes submerged in war and revolution. The French-Canadians probably see in it, because of its large Latin-American membership, a counterweight to the English-speaking American materialism of the United States and English Canada, in whose shadow they constantly live. The Empire-minded tend to disapprove of it as a possible competitor for Empire loyalty, while the majority of Canadians ignore it completely, probably because Latin-America plays such a small part in the economic or cultural life of Canada. Owing to events in Europe, North Africa and China, and to the attitudes of governments towards these events, the League of Nations and Collective Security no longer (or at least not at present) play an important part in Canadian affairs. There are many Canadians who believe that the unity of both Canada and the Empire can only be maintained in a world in which war has been controlled or in one in which Canada and the Empire can avoid participation in war. The League of Nations and Collective Security offered an intellectual solution of this problem. The failure of governments to make the League principles and procedures effective—and for this failure the Great Powers must bear most of the blame—means that there no longer exists any mechanism or method for preventing or avoiding war save the old ones of diplomacy, armaments and alliances or, where feasible, isolation. These have not proved adequate in the past and these same Canadians are sceptical about their efficiency in the future. The result is that they adopt a somewhat fatalistic attitude about League, Empire and even the future of Canada itself. If nothing happens, if war does not occur, or if Britain and the Empire can keep out of war, these things

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will go on much as they are at present. If war does come, they anticipate suffering and disaster and a very questionable future for either Canada or Empire in their present political forms. These are some of the factors which shape Canada's views and policies in respect of the Empire.

Let us turn now to the question implicit in the title to this article: What do Canadians or what does "A Canadian" think of the Empire? The just reply—which I believe is shared by the majority of Canadians—is that the world would be a less pleasant place for Canada and for Canadians if the British Empire were destroyed. Such a fate does not seem possible if war can be prevented or, failing that, if participation in it can be avoided. Canadians therefore examine the reports of Government policy in Great Britain with the greatest interest. They witness the steps taken to avoid participation in war and they approve of them. They learn of the increasing armaments of Britain and, in the circumstances, they approve of that. They hear of the measures being taken to avoid war and they approve of these measures. But in all cases the better-informed among them ask themselves whether all of these are not mere stop-gaps, which may postpone war but which do little or nothing to ensure that it will not occur in even more disastrous form in the near future. They consider their own country, Canada, relatively secure from the dangers of invasion. They see the Imperialists among them and, they believe, the Government of the United Kingdom, trying to construct an effective Empire collective system, based on a common defence policy. They believe that other parts of the Empire, and notably Great Britain herself, occupy a much more dangerous position than Canada does and are therefore more likely to be attacked or drawn into war. They know by experience that participation by Canada in such an event is tragically expensive. They see the Government of the United Kingdom seeking safety

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in isolation or in trying to limit its commitments to those areas which are vital to the protection of British interests. Some of them ask themselves: why, if the British Government finds the policy of supporting a general collective system unwise or dangerous or if it seeks safety in isolation or limited commitments shouldn't Canada adopt the same policy and retire into her North American security, such as it is? But the more realistic believe that the emotional pressure for participation in any major war in which Britain is engaged, will carry Canada into that war. At the same time they know that there is sufficient opposition to such action on both rational and emotional grounds, to make general and extensive preparation for such participation either in consultation or defence politically hazardous. In other words they realize that for the time being they can neither go in for Empire co-operation in an intelligent way or stay out of it. At the moment, the tide of propaganda and public sentiment seems to be running in the Empire direction; that means our involvement in any Empire war which may occur in the near future. But such involvement will make the task of maintaining Canadian unity difficult if not impossible. It may make the cost of continued existence within the Empire prohibitive, but for the present there seems little that one can do about it save to hope that no Empire war occurs. Taking a long view of this situation and these problems, time would seem to be against continued Canadian membership in a centralized Empire, whose policies in major questions are and must be dictated by the needs of the United Kingdom geography and the expense of participation in Empire defence. All suggest that unless the Empire and the world can solve the problem of how to prevent wars, Canada will tend more and more to develop her own policies and to become what she really is—a North American nation or at least part of a North American nation.

AN AUSTRALIAN LOOKS AT THE EMPIRE

By JOHN A. MCCALLUM

I WAS born a colonial of the old British Empire which reached its zenith in 1897. To-day I am outside that Empire but am a member of a Commonwealth which is part of a British Commonwealth of Nations. The old Empire still exists. Its armed forces and public servants still keep the peace and restrain the heathen in six continents and a hundred islands. But Australia is no longer part of that Empire. It is a sovereign state with its own diminutive Empire in New Guinea. And in place of the simple assertion of unswerving loyalty to the homeland which colonials in 1897 regarded as a sufficient Imperial tie, we have a series of Declarations and a Statute, which must have strained the wit of many men to discover, and defy the wit of any man to understand. This much, however, I deduce from the "metaphysical niceties" of the Balfour Memorandum and the lawyer-like evasions of the Statute of Westminster. My rights and duties as an Australian citizen constitute the whole of my rights and duties as a British citizen. In the Crown colonies and India I have no share.

This position I find unsatisfactory. I could be content to be a fully fledged citizen of a new nation, and if this were the eighteenth century I should be quite satisfied to watch the Britons of Britain run their Empire while the Britons of Australia developed their continent. But we do not live in the eighteenth century. The small nations can no longer live by organizing an efficient militia and avoiding entangling alliances. They can live only by entering an alliance strong enough to resist predatory powers, or by becoming part of some super-national aggregation.

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The British Empire to-day is the larger aggregation to which Australia must adhere for protection. It possesses for most older Australians a sanction far higher than any *alliances* or new federation would have. Its roots are in the *dim* past, and most of the sentiments which dignify life are associated with it. But this sense of a mystic origin prevents the precise weighing of mutual advantages and obligations which a deliberately formed alliance would necessitate. Consequently we have formed a Commonwealth of *nations* within the Empire on the assumption that the *Dominions* have no definite obligations to one another, and none to Great Britain except that of not declaring their complete political independence. The mother country, on the other hand, has shed none of her former responsibilities. She must shoulder the full cost and care of the Crown colonies and must govern India while preparing it for Dominion Status. She must protect the sea routes, which are as vital to the *Dominions* as to herself, and she must undertake the diplomatic juggling which to-day is the only method of averting or delaying war.

I can only regard the present organization of the Empire as provisional and transitional. If that were the view of everybody concerned, we could accept the Statute of Westminster as an admirable instrument of Government. The mother country, which has organized the machinery and understands the technique of governing "*backward peoples*," must retain undivided responsibility for that task. She must control the navy and inevitably must pay for it. She must hold the balances which decide for peace or war. But only on the understanding that the *Dominions* are undertaking other duties which concern the whole Empire, and that they have rights which in some measure compensate for their inability to perform the primary functions of sovereign states, and only on the further understanding that they are preparing

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themselves for fuller participation in the affairs of the British Commonwealth.

Now it is just these indispensable understandings which are lacking. No Dominion is preparing itself for fuller participation in the affairs of the Commonwealth. No Dominion is doing work for the whole Empire which adequately compensates Britain for the enormous cost of re-arming. And no Dominion has a voice in international affairs which is proportional to the hazards and losses it will endure if some mistake of a British diplomatic conjurer plunges the whole Empire into war. It follows that our present Balfour Memorandum and Statute of Westminster status are logically unsatisfactory and actually dangerous.

We may disregard logic which has no appeal for Englishmen or Australians except those of Scottish ancestry. The danger concerns us all. It arises, in the first place, from two contradictory conceptions of "Dominion Status." To some, this strange offspring of metaphysics and jurisprudence is an instrument designed to maintain British unity by placating the national feeling of the former colonials. To others it is a device for securing independence while saving the face of the British Government. I often wonder what was actually in the minds of the men who drafted the documents which so admirably synthesize these incongruities. To Lord Balfour, of course, men were but flies and the whole of human experience a mere summer. What an achievement to spin a glittering spider's web which would hold a few flies together for even a few moments! But there were some for whom the British Empire had unrivalled intrinsic importance, and others for whom their own Dominion nations had a similar unique value. They all agreed to ignore their real differences and accept a superficial compromise. In accepting this compromise we must ask whether we are tending toward unity or dissolution.

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There is a positive drive and a no less dangerous drift toward dissolution. In Britain, it is only the drift which must be arrested. Nobody who swings any weight in the homeland wants to break up the Empire. But the drift at times equals the Pilate-like criminality of one who washes his hands of the matter which most concerns his honour. The British Government seems to have learnt only one lesson from its unsuccessful attempt to maintain the integrity of the Empire by armed force in 1776. You must not coerce oversea Britons by using political and military force. But if powerful business interests in Britain force its Government into policies which may antagonize the Dominions, the history book has no clear lesson, and so policy drifts.

In all the Dominions there is a dangerous drift, in some a deadly drive toward dissolution.

New Zealand stands out as the one Dominion which is steadfastly for the British Commonwealth. Mr. Savage's recent dissent from the Chamberlain policy attests this as clearly as the "Yes" attitude adopted by all former Prime Ministers. His view was, so it seems to me, that the League and the Covenant were a necessary element in the defensive system of the British Commonwealth. You may class this view as self-interest masquerading in a robe of righteousness or as the pedantry of sentimentalism, or damn it any way you will. It was a gesture, none the less, in opposition to the reversal of British Commonwealth policy by unilateral action on the part of the Imperial Cabinet. It is fair to assume, therefore, that whether governed by "yes-men" or "no-men," New Zealand regards the Union of the whole Commonwealth as vital.

In Australia centrifugal tendencies are powerful. One could not estimate their strength or the strength of counter tendencies without making a thorough survey of the Australian economy and of the social and political sentiments

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which it has generated. But certain broad tendencies are clear. The development of secondary industries has created vested interests which demand the whole Australian market for their goods, and has evoked a feeling of resentment among British manufacturers. It has also by skilful propaganda strengthened the sentiment that Australia should be "first." At the same time, the shrinking of the British market for certain primary products has promoted an opportunistic attitude among our exporters. Wool, for instance, must be sold, and if Japan is an expanding market, then the *quid pro quo* that Japan demands must be granted, whatever Lancashire may think! Thus on the two "capitalistic" fronts the forces making for dissolution of the Empire gain ground. But there is no corresponding gain for the centripetal forces in the ranks of Australian Labour. Inevitably, the Trade Unions and the political party, which is their creation and, too often, their creature, are primarily concerned with the material conditions of existence. Inevitably, and rightly, when they transcend what is base and enjoy the pure aether of self-denying sentiment, they join the oppressed against the oppressors. But this mood of pure righteousness has not yet led them to accept a four-square British Commonwealth as the best instrument available in an imperfect world, for withstanding oppressors. The cosmopolitan in outlook have looked to Geneva or Moscow. The narrow in outlook have consistently refused to look outside the bounds of Australia.

Confessedly, separatist opinion in Australia is considerable. But as I give it my unwilling ear, I feel that its shrill little voice may be the herald of disaster. A little known Sydney journal, *The Publicist*, conducts an insistent campaign for "Australian Culture." It does not advocate the secession of the Australian Commonwealth from the British Commonwealth. That would be quite too Victorian or pre-Victorian.

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It does not demand a new Washington to arise and deliver Australia from tyranny of a new King George. If my inferences from its studied defiance of what most Britons consider decent is sound, it would consider three of the Royal Georges better than George Washington, and George Washington himself as the pre-incarnation of George V and George VI. But that is incidental. What *The Publicist* advocates is important because it shows a shrewd appreciation of tendencies current in Australia, of which most Australians are unaware. It says, in effect, the British Empire is rotting away. Let it rot. When the process is complete Australia, provided its people have learnt to be self-reliant, will be an independent State.

My knowledge of the other Dominions is slight. But the prevailing sentiment in Canada seems separatist or indifferent; a large part of South Africa is hostile, and Eire, after having peacefully conquered Great Britain, still luxuriates in its divine discontent. In all, it is an understatement to say that the centrifugal forces are making headway and not meeting any serious opposition.

The problem confronting us is to strengthen the centripetal forces. These include mutually profitable trade relations, sentimental ties, and some closer constitutional understandings.

The beginning of wisdom, in discussing the first, is to reject the project of an Imperial Zollverein. The conception of an Empire living almost on its own resources and ready to defy the rest of the world was always unsound, and to-day bears no relation to reality. The material existence of Britain depends on her profitable trade relations with countries outside the Empire. Her chance of retaining her overseas possessions depends on the goodwill of France and U.S.A. at least. These obvious truths should not need to be stated, but policies which neglect them are constantly advocated by

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the irresponsible. And it is necessary for British public opinion to recognize that the Dominions also must live and trade with their neighbours whether these are Empire countries or not.

But the second and greater part of wisdom is to recognize that the absence of mutually beneficial trade between the mother country and any particular Dominion means the ultimate loss of that Dominion. To put an extreme case: If Australia continues to buy and sell less in the British market and to buy and sell more in the Japanese market, she will eventually drift from the British to the Japanese Empire.

The practical policy that must be evolved from these two pillars of wisdom cannot be stated in the cant terms of commercial slogans. I believe that the injunctions to "buy British" and "buy in the cheapest markets" are equally mischievous. All that we can lay down as a condition of Empire continuance is that the modicum of inter-Empire trade necessary to keep a Dominion within the British commercial orbit must be preserved. In a world where quotas and tariffs abound, this can only be done by agreements negotiated between the British Government and the Government of the Dominions. The difficulties involved in framing such agreements are too obvious at this moment, when our Ministers are returning empty-handed from London. I can give no advice except the truism that we in Australia and you in Britain must develop a public opinion which will strengthen the arms of negotiating Ministers so that they can resist the siren song of local vested interests. The broad truth is that we must trade with those we love, or we shall find ourselves loving those with whom we trade. And to us in Australia, this latter course means not only that we must eventually drift away from our political connection with Great Britain, but also that we must abandon the generous humane Western

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European tradition and accept the sleek, cruel attitude toward reality which dominates Japan.

The cultivation of sentiments which will promote Imperial union is the second part of our problem. That sentiments can be manufactured like cars and spare parts is too apparent. Dr. Goebbels' success is merely the laboratory demonstration of what psychologists have been teaching us for years. We may have to adopt such methods to escape annihilation. All my native impulses resist such a policy. I believe there is a wild natural growth and a cultivated garden growth of decent sentiment which will outlast the factory product. Let me apply this to the practical problem of keeping the British Commonwealth intact.

For over thirty years we have experienced a flood of well-intentioned Imperial propaganda. I have watched it as a schoolboy and as a schoolmaster. My deliberate opinion is, that it is not merely useless but positively mischievous. The reaction of the healthy Australian schoolboy is exactly that described by Kipling in "Stalky and Co." to the "jelly-bellied flag flapper." Young Australians and, I believe, young Britons everywhere, do not incline toward the pompous person who tells them the British Empire is a "good thing." They whisper to one another that there must be something secretly wrong with the British Empire if that sort of man comes here to tell us that sort of thing.

Yet we must have Empire propaganda, or education, or both. And we must have some concept of Empire which can be successfully "put over" to the unintelligent and accepted by the intelligent. It must be capable of crystallisation into a slogan, but since I am writing for the intelligent and not trying to "put it over" the unintelligent, I am not now concerned with that problem. Let us state our concept clearly and make it the rock of our salvation. "The British Commonwealth of Nations, and the British Empire in the

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narrower sense as consisting of the Crown colonies and India, together constitute an organization which gives the people born within it a better chance of living a good life than many other political organizations. The British Commonwealth and Empire is not as good as some non-existent political organizations you have traced out in your day dreams. It may not be better than the French or American Republics. That does not matter. The point for every person within the British group of people's is that he will risk everything good by leaving the British connection, and he will retain some good and perhaps gain more by remaining within it. Above all, he will retain the power to make some important decisions in the ordering of his own life. In other words, he will have some part of the thing we call personal liberty!" I hope some person will frame less clumsily this basic concept of the British Commonwealth. For the notions I have inadequately expressed are those that Britons in all quarters of the earth must accept if the British Empire is to endure.

Last, I approach the "lion in the path," the apparently impossible British Imperial Constitution. Twenty years ago in a hospital at Birmingham I read *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, by Lionel Curtis, the purest soul who ever bumped his head against the clouds and yet avoided stubbing his toes on the hard earth. When I handed it back to the Christian gentlemen who had lent it, I said, "This is magnificent, but it won't work." He replied, "But we British people must keep together in some way." I agreed. Yet, twenty years after we have not found the way. As I have indicated, trade relations and common sentiments must prepare the way, and some constitutional understanding must establish it.

I hope my ungenerous jibes at the Balfour Memorandum and the Statute of Westminster have not conveyed the impression that I regard them as mistakes. Considered as

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halting places, they are admirable. But if we consider them as a permanent British Constitution we are lost. They mark the furthest point of our drifting. We must either drift further apart—to be blunt, we must either separate for ever, or find some constitutional device for closer union.

Ultimately, I believe that constitutional device will take the form of some federative instrument of government. But not yet. Not, I fear, until long after we are dead and buried. The immediate problems are: First, how can the governments of the different British Sovereign States find a common policy; second, how can the citizens of the British Commonwealth make decisions on problems common to all of them?

The first problem, at the moment, can only be solved by exchanges of opinion between governments. None of us are ready for an Imperial Government which would supersede His Majesty's Government in Great Britain. But this problem would largely solve itself if we fairly faced the second problem.

The citizens of the British Commonwealth are not able to make even a reasonable snap judgment on issues which may decide their destiny. Many, of course, do not want it. But a considerable minority wants a voice, however ineffectual, amid the myriad voices which shape or strive against its destiny. There are people in the Dominions who would make every sacrifice for the Empire, if they were sure that their small voice was considered before the sacrifice had been arranged. No convention will be summoned in our time to draw up a constitution for the queer collection of peoples which has been assembled under the Union Jack. Instead we must face the disquieting possibility that we may drift apart or be broken up by the superior force of some group of aggressive Powers. But if we remain in the communion of shared tradition, experience and free interchange of thought may preserve our existing sovereign states as potential partners in the future British Commonwealth.

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By DONALD COWIE.

IT must be pointed out at once that New Zealand contains the purest British stock of any of the Dominions. Until the close of last century immigrants from the homeland supplied the greater part of the population increase; and from 1901 to 1932 the same source supplied 29 per cent. of the annual increment. It was not until 1925 that this Dominion had its first native-born Prime Minister. Therefore the attitude of New Zealanders towards Britain has always been filial and friendly, very much as that of an independent and growing son to his father. Australia was colonised first by British misfits, whose temper has tintured the national disposition towards the homeland ever since; South Africa is partly Dutch, and less than 50 per cent of Canadians derive from Britain. But New Zealand was colonised exclusively and under happy auspices by the best type of Britons. Her sons and daughters still speak of the United Kingdom as "Home." The compliment is returned by the many Englishmen who regard New Zealand as by far the most satisfactory of the Dominions.

When those carefully-selected shiploads of English gentlemen, traders and decent yeomen began to arrive at remote *Aotearoa* in the forties of last century they found to their great satisfaction that geographical and climatic conditions very nearly matched those of the country they had left. Certainly it was somewhat disconcerting to discover that men and beasts, vegetation and ideas of social justice matured far quicker than in Britain, and there was some foolish trouble with the dispossessed Maoris, but fundamentally this was a new Albion of the South, and settlement proceeded smoothly

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without undue racial metamorphosis. Britain was a remote abode of autocratic Colonial Office muddlers and well-meaning family relations; Australia across the water was a rough haunt of convicts and unscrupulous traders; the rest of the world, let alone a unified British Empire, might scarcely have existed.

Indeed, the sole concern of those early, hard-working British settlers in remote New Zealand was that they be left by the homeland and the world to pursue their sweated pioneering in peace. Unfortunately it was necessary to obtain troops and money from Britain to prosecute those wretched Maori Wars. One epigrammatic politician of the period was moved to complain that he would "rather be governed by Nero on the spot than by a Board of Angels in London." The usual pile of acrimonious correspondence on points of administrative detail had passed between harassed Governors and their Executive Councils and the indifferent, distant Colonial Office. But it must be insisted that New Zealand's isolated geographical position and the manner of her settlement combined to encourage a certain exclusiveness or insularity of temperament among her people at that stage. The pioneers were digging themselves in.

Towards the end of the century, however, a number of factors operated to bring the people of New Zealand in closer contact with overseas developments and interests. Wool and frozen meat were sent in increasing quantities to London, and in return large sums of money were borrowed from Britain to promote land development and public works. Then New Zealand became for the first time conscious of her position as an outpost of British civilisation in the Pacific. In the same way that Britain and the United States recently haggled over the possession of Pacific islands for air bases, European nations in the last quarter of the nineteenth century scrambled for vital anchorages on the new Pacific

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steamship routes. An unversed New Zealand Government actually wrote to Downing Street asking that ships of war be sent to annex (on behalf of New Zealand) the entire archipelago of South Sea Islands. Unfortunately, however, Downing Street at that time had hands filled elsewhere, and after the Secretary for the Colonies had pronounced it to be "crude and undigested," the grandiose New Zealand plan was dropped.

But it is fairly certain that the bulk of New Zealanders were not disappointed at this failure. Once again it is possible to visualise sturdy farmers and taciturn traders returning with grim concentration to field and shop. Neither did they evince much enthusiasm when their nervous representatives attended the first Colonial Conference; nor were they unduly interested when boatloads of their sons departed for that ridiculous Boer War. Admittedly the colony rose as one man to shout an emphatic negative when federation with the new Commonwealth of Australia was suggested in 1900; and New Zealand voices were notably loud at the Trafalgar centenary of 1905 in "witnessing to Heaven the necessity and beneficence of a navy, the financial support of which, singularly enough, was left almost exclusively to the meaner-minded inhabitants of the British Isles."¹ And it was gratifying to be informed by Whitehall in 1907 that New Zealand was no longer a childish colony but at last an independent, adult Dominion.

Nevertheless, New Zealand's attitude towards Britain and what Joseph Chamberlain and Rudyard Kipling had been pleased to christen her Empire was entirely negative and non-committal in those Edwardian days of mounting prosperity and leisurely politics. The menace of Germany was dimly recognised, but complete confidence was placed in Britain's strength and prestige to warn off enemies or repulse them

¹ *New Zealand: A Short History*, by J. C. Beaglehole. (Allen & Unwin, 1936.)

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quickly if they attacked. Although New Zealand had enjoyed independent sovereignty for over half a century, until the European war of 1914-1918 her international status and her international interests were completely subordinate to those of Britain. During that war, however, New Zealand assisted the mother country, not only in the field, but also in the council chamber; and afterwards she became an original and independent member of the League of Nations. Since the war, therefore, New Zealand has become increasingly conscious of her world position, of her position as a member of the British Commonwealth, and inversely, of her incipient nationhood. The recent trend of power politics, especially the emergence of a great *bloc* of nations with similar militaristic ideas and ambitions, has forced this Dominion to look to her defences and revised her policies. Because of such events as the failure of the League to prevent the annexation of Manchuria by Japan, and the conquest of Abyssinia by Italy, followed by the Spanish civil war, the Japanese invasion of China proper, and the Anschluss, New Zealand has definitely been forced "to think for herself." Previously she relied upon the strength or prestige of Britain to protect her shores and trade routes in an emergency. But the difficulties of maintaining vital communications across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific during those European war years could not soon be forgotten. New Zealanders asked themselves what would have happened had there been no Anglo-Japanese Alliance at that time.

Still it must be admitted that until the last few years successive Dominion governments did not translate any misgivings they might have had into open policy. The principal concern of most British governments in this age has been the conduct of foreign relations, but until the coming of Mr. M. J. Savage's Labour Government it was the exception for a New Zealand administration to concern

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itself with events outside the home sphere. This Dominion deplored rather than hailed the Statute of Westminster. Representatives of Liberal-Conservative New Zealand governments at post-war Imperial Conferences were always tacitly opposed to the other Dominions in their request for more power in imperial affairs. In the words of a Dominion commentator, "All that New Zealand asked was that it should be given a voice in the internal relations of the Empire, but that when the Empire spoke it should speak with one voice. That idea of partnership rather than standing alone was more than mere words. . . . New Zealand had remained more closely bound to Great Britain, constitutionally, economically and in defence than the other Dominions."

Until recently the New Zealand Department of External Affairs, supposed to advise the Government on matters of imperial and foreign policy, consisted of only two or three civil servants working on a part-time basis. New Zealand administrations have had neither the machinery nor the advisers to help them make up their minds on fundamental issues. The present Labour Government is little better off as regards equipment and personnel, but a great and significant change has taken place in the attitude of politicians towards the Empire and the world in the last three years.

Undoubtedly this change has been implemented by the election of a strong Labour Government with humanitarian ideals and definite ideas about the conduct of international relations; but it has also been in part the product of that new awareness of vulnerability and nationhood mentioned above. Three-quarters of the overseas trade of this Dominion, a country that has no domestic market of importance, is done with remote Britain, and that trade is sea-borne. New Zealanders see the Pacific dominated by Japan, and Japan ranged by the side of Germany and Italy, if not in belligerent alliance, at least in tacit understanding. They know that the British

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navy has its Singapore base, but they realise that for a base to be effective it must be manned, and Britain cannot be in all places at once. They have a very small population, but occupy a large country with great agricultural and mineral wealth. They are afraid.

Since Labour has been in power the outward official expression of this fear has been a vigorous re-affirmation of faith in the system of collective security, and several practical proposals have been made for implementing that system. The present New Zealand Government believes wholeheartedly that the League of Nations provides potentially the best machinery for the preservation of international peace. But as representative of a nation of farmers, pre-occupied since earliest days with problems of livelihood, it also holds the belief that peace can only follow the establishment of world economic security. When Mr. Savage returned from the Imperial Conference of last year he told the House of Representatives that their delegation had been "firmly convinced that unless there was something in the nature of an economic settlement, there would never be anything in the nature of peace. . . . The main reason for war and unrest is that the people of the various nations are not buyers to the same extent as they are producers."¹ This attitude, however, was consonant with complete faith in the Genevan principle, particularly if the League were reinforced by the establishment of an International Equity Tribunal and an International Police Force. The extent to which this section of opinion is willing to go was demonstrated when the Dominion put forward her proposals for the reform of the League Covenant at the end of 1936. Mr. W. J. Jordan laid down the following three points as necessary for the effective application of sanctions: "(1) Sanctions should be immediate and automatic; (2) economic sanctions should

¹ *The Dominion*, New Zealand, September 30th, 1937.

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take the form of the complete boycott contemplated already in Article 16 of the Covenant; (3) sanctions should have behind them the certainty that the Powers applying them would be able, and, if necessary, prepared to enforce them."¹

But even the most radical and idealistic New Zealanders realise to the full that their country by itself is helpless to promote the principles enunciated above. They appreciate wholeheartedly the value of the imperial connexion. Thus we find those same Ministers who have been such outspoken supporters of the League deliberately turning round from time to time to affirm their faith in arms and imperial loyalty. Announcing a new defence scheme last year the Minister for Finance (Mr. Walter Nash) stated that "until the League becomes effective, the Government must take the steps necessary inside its powers to defend the Dominion."² And when Mr. Savage returned from the last Imperial Conference he stated categorically (in almost the same words as those used by his Liberal-Conservative predecessors on similar home-coming occasions):

We did not agree on everything—far from it—but our objectives were about the same. If Britain is in difficulties to-morrow, I do not think there will be much division. I think about the same thing will happen as happened last time.³

But the present New Zealand Government is by no means fully representative of the country. It was elected to office in 1935 on a wave of popular reaction against the cautious depression policy of a Liberal-Conservative coalition; and it may be said that the temper of the people to-day, thanks to better prices for their all-important export produce, is far more individualistic than it was then. Socialist councils were unseated at the recent municipal elections, and Labour

¹ *The Times*, September 30th, 1936.

² *The New Zealand Herald*, September 29th, 1937.

³ *The British Australian and New Zealander*, August 5th, 1937.

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will have a difficult tussle at the General Elections in November this year. To complete an account of New Zealand's attitude towards the conduct of imperial and world affairs, therefore, it will be necessary to pass in review not only governmental policy but also the disposition of the opposition parties and the man in the street.

To-day the official opposition in Parliament is provided by a revised version of that former Liberal-Conservative group, self-dubbed the National Party. Just as the National Government of Britain has its conflicting wings of opinion, so does the New Zealand party present two main dispositions towards the conduct of relations with the Empire and the world; but it is significant that the dominating section of opinion closely approximates to that of the Labour Government itself. At the time of the crisis over Mr. Eden's departure from the Foreign Office, an official organ of the National Party went so far as to describe the event as the unravelling of "another strand in the already frayed bond of Imperial diplomatic unity."¹ It was pointed out in broad terms not only that a Four Power Pact of Mr. Chamberlain's devising would be unacceptable to New Zealand opinion, but also that a departure from Geneva would deprive the Empire of an invaluable focal point. The well-informed and influential paper concluded:

There is much to support the contention that if Mr. Chamberlain's faith in the League becomes openly faint and perfunctory, the Monroeism of Canada will receive an impetus and the internationalism of the New Zealand and South African Governments will be at odds with British policy. Yesterday Geneva was in a sense the diplomatic capital of the Commonwealth; to-morrow there may be no such capital at all.²

¹ *The Christchurch Press*, New Zealand, March 1st, 1938.

² *Op. cit.*

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On the other hand a prominent spokesman of the right-wing opposition group recently condemned the Labour Government, representative of "the smallest Dominion, which was spending a paltry 2 or 3 per cent of its taxation on defence," for at once "criticising Britain, which was spending 50 per cent of her taxation for a similar purpose," and "actually harassing and humiliating her in the councils of nations." Undoubtedly there is a growing body of opinion in the Dominion which will eventually entitle a government to make large increases in the present skeleton defence forces. Supporters of the right and left alike have been forced to the conclusion in recent years that New Zealand must eventually be prepared to defend herself. The conclusion has been arrived at regretfully by all shades of political opinion, even by the small group of people in both the Labour and Conservative ranks who wish to see their country independent of Britain and developing her own distinctive ideas and institutions, for defence costs money that is already urgently needed for expanding social services. But it is recognised now that, willy-nilly, a share must be taken in the responsibilities of Empire before it is altogether too late.

It has been pointed out that New Zealand is the most British of the Dominions, the most isolated, and, until recently, the most bound up in her own affairs and oblivious of the outside world. Reference has been made to the lessons of the 1914-1918 war and the invasion of the Asiatic mainland by Japan. More than any other single factor, that particular Japanese aggression has awakened New Zealand in recent years. When they give careful thought to the matter New Zealanders can argue that even in the event of a world war Japan would hardly find it worth while to invade their country and occupy it. But time and time again bellicose speeches by Japanese admirals—who wish to expand by sea southwards, as against the Asiatic ambitions of the

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land-lubbing general—have swept away reason and produced something very like popular panic. Supposing Britain were defeated in a world war, ask the people, what then? Japan could do what she liked with a completely defenceless New Zealand. Even the comforting sense of so-called racial superiority has been dulled in recent years by the consciousness of Japanese strength as an under-cutting, dangerously efficient commercial competitor if not conqueror of Britain in the Pacific and Australasia. A sensible newspaper can say that "there is a growing feeling among New Zealanders that the destiny of their country is intimately bound up with the destinies of other Pacific peoples and the cultivation of friendly relations with these peoples should be a cardinal point in New Zealand policy."¹ But the mass of the people are more impressed by the words of itinerant alarmists who visit their shores and give newspaper interviews; breakfast table messages like the following having dangerous effect:

Only the Chinese—and fortunately there are 470,000,000 of them—stand between Japan and a vast Empire in the Pacific, embracing the ancient Eastern lands and extending down to Australia and New Zealand. If China cannot hold out in this war the Japanese may rapidly push forward their plans, cut a canal through Siam, circumvent the great British defensive base at Singapore, and assume command of this part of the world.²

It should be noted, however, that New Zealand is not alone in the Pacific in her fear and distrust of Japanese ambitions and methods. The United States, Canada and Australia already form with this Dominion a *bloc* of opinion, if not of political or military alliance, that has proceeded out of necessity but is quickly bearing fruit in public and governmental disposition. Scarcely a day passes in New Zealand

¹ *The Christchurch Press*, New Zealand, October 26th, 1937.

² Interview in *The Christchurch Press*, New Zealand, November 10th, 1937.

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but a politician or newspaper appeals for closer identification of policy with the United States. Here is a typical and significant pronouncement:

To the Pacific Dominions it has always seemed that imperial policy in the Pacific should be based on the cardinal need for friendly co-operation with the United States. It is particularly necessary, now that United States policy is at a critical stage of development, that this point of view should be strongly urged in London. . . . To put the matter plainly, the attitude of the British Empire should not be such as to discourage the United States from assuming wider responsibilities in the Pacific.¹

Nevertheless it must be added, in conclusion, that New Zealand contains very few imperialists of the Pall Mall club complexion. The British observer looks at the Empire as a whole, but the New Zealander's view is necessarily conditioned by the fact that he lives in an outlying part of the Empire. There is less amity between New Zealand and Australia than there is between Britain and any of the Dominions. To the New Zealander, however intelligent, travelled and broad-minded he may be, the other Dominions are commercial competitors and rivals for the mother country's economic hand, whereas the inhabitant of the mother country tends to regard all the Dominions as one, and therefore has a broader view of Empire. New Zealanders are extremely loyal to British traditions and the imperial Crown, but they are also hard-headed farmers and business men who would be unnatural if they did not think of their own skins and livelihood first. So long as they depend upon Britain for defence and a ready market for their surplus produce, so long will they willingly subscribe to the doctrine of imperial unity. A future projected beyond those conditions is both unhappy and imponderable.

¹ *The Christchurch Press*, January 6th, 1937.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EMPIRE

By MARGARET BALLINGER, M.P. (*Cape Eastern Circle*)

SOUTH AFRICA, in spite of its small population of ten million persons, is probably the most complex of the countries comprising the British Empire. This complexity is the natural product of the diverse national and racial character of that population, reinforced by differences of historical circumstance and cultural tradition.

The two million Europeans who constitute the dominant political force are themselves derived from two stocks which have not only a record of political conflict but, even within the common fold of Union, have tended to represent two different social and economic interests. The older Afrikaner stock has been predominantly rural and agricultural in character; the newer English stock, although also rooted in the soil, has been increasingly identified with the industrial and commercial and, therefore, the urban side of South African life. It is true, the opening up of the country since the Boer War, and more particularly since the Union, has inevitably tended to blur the lines of division and to superimpose something of a national outlook on our sectional interests. But so far, the divisions are only covered over—they are not smoothed out; and indeed the covering is still extremely thin, as recurrent emotional crises both in Parliament and outside raised by questions of national flag and national anthem continually remind us.

The much larger non-European group is considerably more diverse in character than the European group. It consists of some six and a half million Bantu and approximately one and a half million "other coloured," a term which covers Indians in Natal and a diversity of races and mixtures both there and throughout the country, but mainly

located in the Cape Province. All these groups have much in common. They are all alike the victims of economic weakness and political insecurity founded on the general attitude of the white minority to the colour issue. But in the past, the dividing influence of differing cultural heritages has tended to outweigh the unifying force of common needs, not without some judicious encouragement from the European rulers. There are signs, however, of a growing sense on the part of the more advanced sections of the community that there is, in fact, no security for any coloured group save along the line of recognition of the rights of all men irrespective of race—a movement towards a united colour front that is increasingly unifying both the outlook and the action of all the coloured groups in the country.

Out of such a diverse field, a common attitude on any important issue is not to be expected, least of all on a matter of such vital importance both in the traditions and in the future of each and all sections of the people as the Empire. What we have is a number of attitudes which, although they do not follow national and racial lines exactly, tend to be broadly typical of national and racial groups.

To the mass of English speaking South Africans, and also to a section of the Afrikaan-speaking people mainly belonging to the old Cape Colony, the Empire has been and continues to be the object of profound loyalty and reverence. In the years before the war, these emotions were based, here as elsewhere, on the belief that the British Empire, whatever its origins, was, in practice, not the guardian of democratic rights, since such rights were not challenged in theory, but the means by which these rights might be extended to the ends of the earth. Those who experienced them conceived of the Empire as the custodian of civilization as 19th century liberation defined it, exploiting the resources of the world, possibly at the expense of some but for the benefit of all.

They visualised the future of the world as a progressive movement towards a peaceful internationalism which, founded on the British Commonwealth of Nations, should be in effect an extension of the achievement, both in the material and the spiritual field, of the Empire itself. This belief and this hope were alike founded on the open door to immigration and to trade for which, in the main, the Empire did in fact stand, and on the declared principle of trusteeship for backward people in respect of which the gap between theory and practice had not become so conspicuous as progressive industrialisation was to make it.

In these latter days, since the War, when the prospects of a peaceful and prosperous internationalism have got lost, and democracy has not only been seriously challenged but is definitely on the defensive, loyalty has taken on the aspect of a faith. With little apparent appreciation of the extent to which the policy of a closing door, adopted at Ottawa, has helped to focus if not to create the present menace of resurgent nationalism, and of the extent to which, with Italy astride the Mediterranean, Britain must guarantee South African security if Imperial unity is to survive, English speaking South Africa clings to the belief that so long as the British Empire lasts the future must be safe. In this belief all sections of the Afrikaans-speaking people tend to share, although their approach is their own, and as a result of the need and desire to play a South African part in the process of saving the future, expenditure on defence makes its characteristic appearance in budget speeches, and a new Singapore begins to take shape on the shores of Table Bay.

Against the traditional enthusiasm of the English-speaking South African for the Empire stands the typical Afrikaner whose attitude is begotten of a widely different tradition. To him the Empire stands, not for democratic liberty and

the full and free development of personality, but for conquest and exploitation. He remembers the Boer War, but not as the prelude to settled self-government inducing the flow of capital essential to industrial development. He does not dwell on the circumstances that industrial development has made possible a rising standard of living for all sections of the European population. He remembers the Boer War as an adventure of foreign capital which destroyed that political isolation his pioneering forebears had preferred, at considerable cost, to progress dependent on the restrictions of ordered Government. He remembers that that capital involved a change in the economic and social structure of the country all too rapid for an unprepared pastoral people, and he sees in the poverty, spiritual as well as material, of an alarmingly large section of his people who could not stand the pace, a price for progress that offends his national pride. The increasing initiative shown by numbers of these unsuccessful country people in seeking rehabilitation and a wider future in the towns, which has been the most encouraging social feature of recent years, does little to reconcile him to the source of industrial development, since in the town he finds his language spoken predominantly in the ranks of the working class. And in so far as it is a working class with all the insecurities characteristic of that class, aggravated enormously by the presence of a large native population whose low standard of living is a constant menace, he remembers as a symbol of the situation of his people that the mining industry, which defeated him and conditioned all his subsequent existence, still sends some sixty per cent of its profits out of the country to overseas investors.

In the circumstances it is not surprising that the chief characteristic of South African life is a resurgent Afrikaner nationalism backed by a strong and cultured revival. On the domestic side, this nationalism is antipathetic to the

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mining industry as an imperialist enterprise, supports a policy of high tariffs against foreign manufactures in an attempt to safeguard white employment, and in these days of depressed agriculture, demands increasing subsidisation of rural economy on the basis of extended mining taxation. But it has an external side also. While chafing at the imperial bond in relation to itself, its ambitions turn to an imperialism of its own. This imperialism won its first victory as long ago as the "Great War" with the conquest, and virtual cession under the wide terms of the C. Mandate, of the old German colony of South-West Africa. On this foundation it has grown and expanded until it has blossomed forth, not only in the determination to retain that territory, but in the declaration in the face of German and other imperialist ambition of what amounts to a Monroe Doctrine for Africa. These imperialist ambitions are shared to a greater or less extent by all sections of the European population and explain what unanimity there is to-day on imperial unity and more particularly towards imperial defence; but while for the South African of British tradition they represent merely emergent nationhood, for the Afrikaner nationalist they are fortified and reinforced by the psychological necessity to redeem his own past and unwilling subjection.

But the foundations of Afrikaner nationalism and the enduring quality of its antagonism to the imperial connection are not to be explained merely by the fact of conquest and the natural reaction against it. They go much deeper, to an essential circumstance behind that conquest, the conception of an abiding difference in attitude towards the large non-European population whose presence constitutes the main problem of South African life, complicating every other issue.

The source of this conflict is at least one hundred years old, but it is still a force of no mean order, as the historical developments to which it gave rise are kept green in the

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memory of the people. As this is being written, preparations are being completed for the start of that reverent five months' pilgrimage by wagon from Cape Town to Pretoria and Blood River which is to mark the centenary of the Great Trek and to commemorate that pioneer effort, the memory of which is the cherished heritage of the Afrikaner people. But the Trek was itself the direct product, the immediate outcome of this very conflict of ideas. Undoubtedly the basic causes of the movement were economic in origin, the refusal of the British Government to satisfy increasing land hunger at the expense of neighbouring tribes, and the effects of slave and Hottentot emancipation on a labour market effectively controlled by the employers; but these causes assumed the status of a difference in principle as, against the doctrine of equal civil rights for all irrespective of colour, upon which the Imperial Government based its action, those who determined to Trek from the control of a policy they did not like enunciated the doctrine of "no equality in Church or State." The statutory recognition of this latter principle in the new states which the Trek produced widened the breach, as the Cape Colony, once launched on the faith of equal rights, embarked first on representative and later on responsible government on the basis of a franchise without colour bar. It was indeed this divergence in practice as well as in principle that proved the main obstacle to Union even after the Boer War had removed the barrier of different political allegiances, and eventual Dominion status was only achieved on the basis of an uneasy mutual tolerance of divergent outlooks and a scarcely veiled anxiety as to which should eventually obscure the other. It is a striking fact that subsequent events have all favoured the policy of differentiation at the expense of the Cape tradition of an inclusive civilization. The trekker tradition is entrenched on our Statute in land laws that deny the Native free access to

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land, in a Native Representation Act that scotched effectively the idea of common citizenship by abolishing the old Cape Franchise, and in industrial legislation which leaves the dispossessed peasant a defenceless proletarian. Yet these victories have not been a source of reconciliation between the older population and the Empire—rather the reverse. The very circumstance that the condition of victory has been the willing co-operation of mining interests, predominantly British, and Natal farming interests, strongly imperial in attachment, has tended to deepen the gulf by throwing into relief the fact that the conflict is as it has always been between the men on the spot and the absentee trustee who can afford to put human rights before the advantages of cheap labour, at least in theory.

In recent years this ground of antagonism has been strengthened by the pronouncements of the Imperial Government in regard to the paramountcy of Native interests in territories predominantly native in population, and it has in turn reinforced local imperialist tendencies. With such a possible divergence of view in mind, it is increasingly felt that South Africa must dominate Africa not only in fact but in idea. Such an objective is not menaced by the existence of other British colonies in Africa since, wherever white settlement exists to any extent, the "colonial" attitude on race contacts tends to prevail. The only real danger arises where Imperial control is direct and European settlement is either non-existent or is too small to make itself effectively heard. And here undoubtedly lies the explanation of the urgent desire on the part of the Union for the transfer of the South African Protectorates. On the economic side, the Union of South Africa has everything to lose and nothing to gain by the incorporation of these territories; but the loss will be worth while to those who desire it if the unity of African policy on this crucial question of the relationship

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of black and white can be carried one step forward to effective security.

This brings us to our final, and in the long run perhaps our most important, consideration, the attitude of the Native people of South Africa to the idea and to the fact of the Empire.

In the past, there has been no doubt as to this attitude. It has been one of passionate loyalty and trustful confidence rooted and grounded in the very circumstances which created and culminated in the Great Trek. To the Bantu, as to all the coloured people of South Africa, the significance of the Trek was the willingness of Britain to sacrifice imperial ambition and even political unity for the defence of the weak and the principle of equal rights for all who could show the capacity to advance, the symbol being the grant of self-government to the Cape Colony on a uniform basis for all men. The circumstance that the absence of any sort of economic security made political freedom more of a shadow than a reality evoked no grievance since that was itself a circumstance without colour bar. And as colour bar legislation and practice lifted their heads ever higher in the other states, the absence of such in the Cape Colony became increasingly a positive ground of loyalty not only in the Cape itself but among the native people of the whole of South Africa. To every man and woman of colour, the Cape Franchise stood for the solid intention and the effective trusteeship of the British Empire.

The Boer War, and the establishment of Union a few years later, tended if anything to strengthen non-European loyalty. The successful determination of the Cape liberals to entrench the Cape tradition behind the Act of Union, in addition to removing any anxieties that might have been felt as to the basis on which Union was to be achieved, encouraged the non-Europeans of the other Provinces to hope for a

gradual assimilation of their own position to that of their more fortunate fellows, and the implications of Dominion status as we know them to-day had not yet been dreamt of. In the quarter of a century which has supervened since Union, however, a remarkable and serious change has taken place both in the outlook and the attitude of the people. To-day in place of profound and articulate loyalty, there is at best doubt and hesitation, at worst an openly expressed belief that they have been betrayed, that they were mistaken in placing any confidence in the promises and principles of white men since, in the last resort, white men will not stand against their own fellows on the side of people of other races.

Explanations are not far to seek for this changed attitude—or rather changing attitude, for old loyalties take long to die, and with a little encouragement can easily be brought back even from the brink of the grave. They are to be found in the almost parallel course of Dominion status towards sovereign independence and, contrary to all hopes, of discriminating legislation the object and the effect of which have been to establish uniformity of practice throughout the country in respect of Natives on the model of the Trekker tradition of the north. The Natives themselves, and with them all the non-European groups in the country, have viewed this process with both alarm and dismay, as it revealed a progressively widening gap between them and the Imperial control on which their confidence had been founded. At first they could not believe the obvious implications of the situation. It was beyond the bounds of their imagination that Britain would ever surrender her responsibility for and her control over their future, that she would ever resign her power and her right to interfere on their behalf and in their defence. Only experience could induce them to understand that the self-government for which the Empire had come to stand had in fact come to mean self-government not for the

people but for Europeans; and that in fulfilment of that, their future had passed into the hands of those whom they feared and distrusted, the masters whom circumstance had forced them to serve.

It is the distrust begotten of this experience which lends particular significance to the question of the transfer of the British Protectorates which the South African Government is so anxious to achieve. In a very important sense, the fate of this issue is, for the non-European people of South Africa, the final test of the good faith of the Empire in the matter of trusteeship. Clinging to the remnants of their old loyalty, they are still prepared to believe that Britain drifted into the present relationship with the Union without realizing where she was going, or that she was forced into it by her need to give particular consideration to a defeated people. But the control of the Protectorates is a matter quite outside any consideration of that kind. In their eyes, there is no obligation on the Imperial government to hand over the Protectorates to the Union until the Native people on both sides of the present frontier are persuaded, as at present they are far from being, that the interests of the population of the Protectorates will be best served by so doing. In this regard, to them there can be only one meeting ground for the imperialist demands of the Union and the paramountcy of native interests in predominantly native territories, and that is the willing acceptance by the Natives themselves of the transfer. If this implication of the theory of paramountcy is accepted and acted upon, Native confidence in the Empire can be restored throughout South Africa. If it is repudiated on this occasion, if Britain yields to the pressure of the Union against the wishes of the people themselves, there is little doubt that the loyalty of all non-European groups in the country will suffer a final shock, the effects of which will be felt far beyond our boundaries.

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By P. TRIKAMDAS

INDIA has been a British possession for more than 150 years now and for generations the British people have been taught to regard her as the brightest jewel in the Crown. They have also been taught to guard this jewel and if necessary to defend the right to possess it with their lives. It is neither vanity nor pride which actuated the British ruling classes to inculcate this idea in the minds of the common people. The prosperity of England has been largely due to her hold on India. England wants large and unrestricted markets to dispose of her tremendously large quantities of surplus manufactured goods, and where can you find a better or bigger market than in India? This is the British side of the picture, but not the whole picture. There are certain traditions in England whereby the ordinary Briton regards oppression and cruelty with horror. The love for personal liberty is also fairly strong. These traditions and this love must be pampered. The politician or statesman who chooses to disregard them so far as words are concerned, no matter how much he disregards them in fact, does so at his own peril. An illusion of liberty has been built up for the people and this illusion must be kept up at all cost. This has led to the theory of trusteeship, the idea of the White Man's burden of civilizing the heathen and backward peoples who would cut each others throats as soon as this precious trusteeship is withdrawn. Unfortunately the British public has swallowed this and their conscience is at ease. Little do they know of the wretchedness and poverty and ruthless suppression of the wards.

India potentially is as rich as any country can dream to be, but her people are as wretched and as poor as no other people, with the possible exception of the Chinese. But the

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British people know nothing about it. The ordinary Englishman, the proverbial man in the street, believes that India is frightfully rich and that every Indian can buy up at least half of England if he chose to dig up his mythical hoard of gold. The Aga Khan with his racy ostentation and the despots and rakes and exploiters strutting under the names of Maharajas have to some extent contributed to keep this myth alive. The power of persistent propaganda is so great that a generation or two of educated and even eminent Indians came to believe in the myth. There was Ranadé, a distinguished lawyer and judge, a reformer and a vigorous thinker who believed in the civilizing mission of England. There was Surendranath Bannerjee who talked about the "Divine dispensation of Providence" which brought England to rule over India. Thanks to that curious mixture of conservative and rebel, Mahatma Gandhi, the myth has been finally and irrevocably blown up so far as the Indian people are concerned. Even he for a time believed—not in the civilizing mission of England—but in her traditions of liberty, justice and fairplay and hoped for a fair and square deal for India. Luckily the Amritsar massacre of 1919 shattered this faith, and ever since he has been an implacable enemy of British Raj in India. He characterizes the British Rule as satanic. Harsh as it may sound to a Britisher it is nevertheless true, and lest it might be considered as prejudice on my part, I propose to give a few facts a little later to show that the Mahatma is right. As he once said, the very word "Empire" stinks in his nostrils. And most Indians who know anything about the Empire are equally sick of it. India to-day stands not only for the removal of British control over her administration but also for a complete break with the Empire. I propose to examine both the reasons for and the implications involved in India's determination.

From 1875 till about 1915 was the period when the faith

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of vocal and educated Indians, nurtured on Mill and other Liberal thought, in the good intentions and good faith of England held good. They believed that England was a democracy and that as soon as we were sufficiently fit for it this great democracy would extend to us the same freedom that it so greatly prized. These eminent Indians and leaders were mostly from the land-owning and professional classes. They were apparently free to follow their professions and to own their estates and apart from the feeling of resentment engendered by their exclusion from participation in the administration of the country they were but dimly conscious of the ruthless exploitation of the masses, their wretchedness and their misery. The earlier demands were mainly concerned with administrative jobs. There were exceptions like Dutt, Dadabhai Naoroji and Gokhalé who knew something of the poverty of the people, but even they had their faith in Britain's sense of justice, as is evident from their characterization of the Indian administration as un-British. They felt that the great British public had only to know the truth and all the troubles of India would vanish. Tilak was perhaps the first Indian leader who had none of these illusions and he set about the task of destroying the myth of British good-faith. He was dealt with by being jailed by the British and shunned as a pestilence by the other Indian leaders, but his work was bearing fruit and soon the Moderate leaders were compelled to add the demand for Home Rule to their previous prayers for greater share in the jobs. Tilak returned with greater prestige from his incarceration, and in the meantime things were moving in the world. The war had started and Tilak felt that England's difficulty was India's opportunity. The people however were not sufficiently conscious, much less organised, and Tilak and also Mrs. Besant set about doing this. For the first time in Indian politics these leaders and their followers went down to the

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masses in the cities and in remote villages and started stirring them up. Neither of these leaders however had any concrete plan by which to enforce their demands in the face of their rejection by the British. But this mass awakening and the difficulties which the Allies were facing in 1917, as also the possibility of renewed and greater terrorist activities, brought the promise from the British Cabinet to introduce reforms, the ultimate objective of which would be to secure Parliamentary Government to India.

No sooner was the war over when, side by side with the preparations for the introduction of the meagre reforms, began the forging of laws giving very wide powers to the Executive over the liberties of the people. The Indian leaders were perplexed. They fought in the Imperial Legislative Council to their utmost ability to no avail, but they did not know what to do. Gandhi had in the meantime returned from South Africa. He had gained considerable prestige in the country by his espousal of the cause of the peasants, by his utter sincerity, and by his defiance of the restrictive order served on him in Champaran. Gandhi's formula was that what one man can do millions also could. He pointed out that the British rule could only endure so long as it found co-operation from the people and that if this co-operation was withdrawn the Indian administration would come to a standstill. He also pointed out that prayers and petitions and the childlike faith in British goodwill were of no avail and that if we were to enforce our demands we must resort to direct action. He had tried it in South Africa and to some extent succeeded. The response of the people was spontaneous and amazing in its extent. But the response of the Indian Government was also as quick but not so amazing. Ruthless repression followed, in which the Jallianwalla massacre at Amritsar was but an incident. General Dyer boasted that his savagery in firing over an unarmed crowd

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of men, women and children cut off from all retreat till his ammunition gave out had saved India for the Empire. Little did he realise that in fact Amritsar was the beginning of the process which would ultimately sound the death-knell of the British Empire and which in any event wiped out the political party which still clung to its faith in Britain. Henceforward England might find Indians still ready to serve as administrative officers, but there would not be a friend even among these servants. They were mere mercenaries and no longer faithful and willing servants. Gandhi started as a reply to these repressive measures his first movement of civil disobedience. It was not yet non-co-operation. A few laws like the Salt Act and the law under which literature was proscribed were selected for defiance, and I am and shall always remain proud of the fact that I happened to have been one of this band of law-breakers. When a small incident of counter-savagery by the people took place at Chauri Chaura, Gandhi, who was absolutely insistent on non-violence, voluntarily suspended the movement. But soon he was to launch his non-co-operation. That was the first lesson on a large scale in mass organization and direct action. With the jailing of a few thousand the movement came to an end, but the will to resist had been created and the possibilities of direct action demonstrated. In the period of ebb Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das put forward the plan of ending or mending the sham system of responsibility parading as diarchy by obstructionist tactics in the legislatures. In the meantime the organization of the Congress was setting up its branches in the remote villages and the people were being prepared for another struggle. The revision of the Constitution had been promised decennially, and as the tension was growing the preparations were begun by the appointment of the Simon Commission. The Congress had prepared and put forward the Nehru Constitution and wanted no com-

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missions to judge Indian ability to govern the country. The Moderates took umbrage at the omission of the appointment of any Indian on this Commission, and its boycott was complete and unanimous. A school of thought led by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash Bose, the present President of the Congress, had in the meantime grown up inside the Congress which would be satisfied with nothing less than independence, involving complete severance from the British Empire. Gandhi and Motilal Nehru would be satisfied with Dominion Status provided the promise and its fulfilment were forthcoming in the near future. The Calcutta Congress at the end of 1928 gave the British Government one year to make this promise. But none was forthcoming, and at midnight at the end of 1929 the Congress by its overwhelming majority changed its objective to independence. We fought for four years. Hundreds of thousands of us were locked up in jails and a few hundred thousand witnessed and suffered the police barbarities of savage attacks with formidable staves, and in numerous cases with bullets all on perfectly peaceful and unarmed demonstrators. In a sense we failed in our objective, but taking a long distance point of view we are nearer our objective to-day and we are even more determined to be rid of the Empire than ever before.

For the moment the Congress has gone into office in the provinces, not in the spirit of compliance but as a means of further preparation for a fight with Britain. It may be asked why we are determined to be out of the Empire. In order to answer this question we must ascertain what the Empire means to us. To the Dominions the Empire might mean something, as they have common culture and blood ties, but even these who are kith and kin no longer wish to tolerate the idea of being tied to the apron strings of British foreign policy, British wars, and the greater glory of the British Nation. India has no such ties. Indians have been

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treated as pariahs in South Africa and discriminated against in every other Dominion, while India had to keep her doors open to all who choose to give her the benefit of their presence. At one time we used to be told that after all the Dominions were masters in their own houses and that England could do no more than use her good offices with them on our behalf. There were some who believed this. But Kenya finally disposed of this myth also. The other colonies like Fiji, Trinidad, British Guiana are no different. Indians must because of their colour bear the mark of helotry, and this also in Crown Colonies under the Colonial Office. Whenever any measure of self-government is extended to any of these colonies the self-government is only for the Whites. In trade agreements also India has usually had to give more than she got. Only a little while ago it was announced that Australia intended to open its doors to British and *other Europeans*. To this Empire the other Europeans mean much more than Indians. We have had enough of this Empire. India has always been remarkable for its catholicity of outlook. We have had no racial or colour prejudice so far, but England and its Dominions have done enough to make us wish sometimes that the arrogant White races were exterminated from the face of the globe.

We are told very often that in these days of mad armament races and sheer panic which is dominating Europe we might any day be in the midst of war. Would not India be a gainer by having the protection of the Imperial defences? We are told that if India were left to her own devices she would fall a prey to some other Power. It would be rash in this mad world to deny the possibility of anything, but most of us do not think it probable. We believe that we are quite capable of looking after ourselves. Within a short time we should be able to organize a citizen army of a paltry fifty million, a precaution and a privilege we are denied to-day,

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so that we may not be able to rise against the British and send them packing. We think that with an army of that description any Imperialist power would think several times before attacking us. We are told to take a lesson from the happenings in China. Analogies can however be stretched too far. India and China are substantially different. China, whatever her cultural unity, has never had a strong central government, and the brigands, who masquerade as Marshals and Generals, will never let this happen till the last one of them is dead. Japanese aggression is for the first time creating a geographical patriotism among the Chinese and welding them into a nation not merely culturally but for all purposes. India, thanks to Britain, needs no such lesson. We have felt the sting so strongly that we will not let the serpent sting us twice. However we are quite willing to take the risk.

In addition to all this we have a stronger and a more cogent reason for wishing to be out of the Empire. The Indian poverty is so great that without a large measure of Socialism India can never tackle this problem. We know that the ruling classes in England will not tolerate this. Their attempts to stem the tide of Socialism in Australia and New Zealand would be amusing if at the same time it were not tragic. Any compromise with Britain always implies safeguards whereby British Capital would always continue to dominate us and to hold us in its stranglehold. For this purpose if need be England would create a strong Indian capitalist class and place it in power along with the princes and big landholders and go to the utmost limit to uphold the power and prestige of these classes, and thus make India safe for the Empire. India has had enough of her princes and landowners. If the people were free to deal with them, not one of them would retain his privileges and his power for oppression. We are told that property rights must be respected. The world unfortunately has discovered that

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most property rights are acquired by successful brigandage, and their longstanding acquisition does not in any way make them more justifiable or sacred. So much for the Empire.

Quite a number of English people believe that India should be grateful to England for its beneficent rule and that our demands for Swaraj and self-determination display our ingratitude if not our rank madness. Let us therefore examine how far these claims are justified. England had an unfettered chance of doing all she liked for India for 150 years and the result is as follows: (1) About 8% of us are literate; (2) we have one hospital for every 20,000 square miles; (3) one school for perhaps 50 villages; (4) the peasants who are the majority of the population are almost invariably in debt, partly due to their own fault but mostly to the lack of interest in their well-being on the part of the Government; (5) millions do not get a square meal a day and are living in a state of chronic starvation; (6) there is no social legislation for the workers—not even health insurance; (7) the majority of the workers get less than subsistence wages. This might sound startling, but an example will suffice to show what I mean. The Government of Bombay (before the Congress took office) has compiled some statistics of the cost of living of the workers. Every earner has to support on the average 3.4 persons, including himself. The cost of living for this unit, for the worst of housing, the worst of food, no change of clothing and no amusements, has been worked out at Rs.50 per month. The average wage does not come to more than Rs.22½. It might be asked how then do they live? The answer can be more convincing if you could actually see how they do it. They crowd 12 to 15, 4 to 5 families in one room—to save the rent, and they have not enough even of their miserable food. Most of them sleep on the footpaths and in the monsoon crowd the narrow corridors of their tenements. (8) We have

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been deprived of arms and left to the mercy, apart from foreign invasions, of wild beasts who, in the country districts, make merry on our crops, our cattle, and sometimes on our carcasses. (9) At every step we are met with the racial arrogance of our rulers. (10) The Government has not hesitated to licence public houses at every street corner in the towns and one or more in every village so that they might find enough money to pay their army and their services. (11) Even our roads are incredibly bad unless they are military roads.

I could multiply this list almost indefinitely, but to those who are not satisfied with it I should recommend a visit to the nearest psychiatrist for a cure of their perhaps unsuspected sadism.

We have little reason to thank England for her rule. Whenever we take over the Government with unfettered power—not as we have done under the present Constitution—we shall have to start with the elementary things England started doing 150 years ago. We have no patience to wait any longer, and quite a number of us—not optimists but hard-headed men of the world—give England at the utmost 10 years more in India. This period will be very critical in shaping the future relations between England and India. We are hoping that wisdom will prevail and India might be conceded her independence. India then might still remain friendly to England and help to build up a collective security for the world of democratic nations if there are any left at the end of that period. Thanks to the Congress and its enlightened leadership of men like Gandhiji and Jawaharlal Nehru, paradoxical as it may sound, Indian Nationalism has so far been kept free of that narrow and stupid militant nationalism so prevalent in the world to-day and dreams of realising international peace and amity through its national freedom. Strange as it may seem, the future of democracy,

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apart from the Scandinavian countries, lies in the democratic sentiment which has become deeply ingrained in the Indian mind. A free and democratic India would be the greatest bulwark against the rising tide of barbarism represented by Nazism and Fascism.

I fear, however, that these hopes are going to be belied and India will be forced into bitter struggles to gain her independence. The lesson of Ireland and the unquenched hostility which the Irish are still feeling towards the British, though recent, seems to have been forgotten. Any way, India is a bigger prize and may not be relinquished quite so easily. Although every shade of political opinion in India has made it clear that the Federation is unacceptable, although every legislative assembly has passed resolutions to that effect, the British Cabinet still wants to foist this unwanted monstrosity on India. Lord Lothian has put forward a formula whereby he does not propose to amend the Government of India Act, and yet hopes that the Congress will swallow Federation. The suggestion is that the princes should introduce some form of democratic government, and that, in consideration for this blessing and benefit on the subjects of the states, Congress should accept the states as their partners in the Central Government. This suggestion is not acceptable to us because we know that the introduction of democratic government will be a sham. Apart from this we know that the princes who are secure in their misrule because of British bayonets at their disposal will act in the Federal Assembly as British agents. India wants independence, not any subterfuges of make-belief responsibility, and is not going to be gulled or bullied into accepting any such thing, and India is going to fight soon enough to wrest power from Britain.

In this fight we know we have to rely solely on our own strength, and we are expecting little or no help from the British Labour Party. There is however a suggestion which

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I want to make. In the present panicky international situation which might easily degenerate into war, the British Government is doing no service to the British nation by keeping India from her birth-right. Britain in her present difficulties will have a rebellion on her hands in India. Those who are looking ahead might, if they so choose, put before the British people the whole truth. Congress has made no secret of its intentions. These may be seen in the resolution on war appended hereto. Even though they may not be able to give us any effective help in our struggle this gesture might keep us from developing that bitter hostility towards the British people which you find in Ireland.

CONGRESS RESOLUTION ON FOREIGN POLICY AND WAR DANGER

"In view of the grave danger of widespread and devastating war which overshadows the world, the Congress desires to state afresh the policy of the Indian people in regard to foreign relations and war.

"The people of India desire to live in peace and friendship with their neighbours and with all other countries, and for this purpose wish to remove all causes of conflict between them. Striving for their own freedom and independence as a nation, they desire to respect the freedom of others, and to build up their strength on the basis of international co-operation and goodwill. Such co-operation must be founded on a world order and a free India will gladly associate itself with such an order, and stand for disarmament and collective security. But world co-operation is impossible of achievement so long as the roots of international conflict remain and one nation dominates over another and imperialism holds sway. In order, therefore, to establish world peace on an enduring basis, imperialism and the exploitation of one people by another must end.

"During the past few years there has been a rapid and deplorable deterioration in international relations, fascist aggression has increased and an unabashed defiance of international obligations has become the avowed policy of fascist powers. British foreign policy, in spite of its evasions and indecisions, has consistently supported the fascist powers in Germany, Spain and the Far East, and must, therefore, largely shoulder the responsibility for the progressive deterioration of the world situation. That policy still seeks an arrangement with Nazi Germany and has developed closer relations with rebel Spain. It is helping in the drift to imperialist world war.

"India can be no party to such an imperialist war and will not permit her man-power and resources to be exploited in the interests of British imperialism. Nor can India join any war without the express consent of her people. The Congress, therefore, entirely disapproves of war preparations being made in India and large scale manœuvres and air-raid precautions by which it has been sought to spread an atmosphere of approaching war in India. In the event of an attempt being made to involve India in a war, this will be resisted."

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AUSTRALIA'S EMPTY SPACES. By SYDNEY UPTON. (*Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.*)

THIS is an interesting book, though with a tendency to repetition. The author is a civil engineer, who is not an Australian, but seems to have visited many of the less accessible parts of that Continent. He considers that most of the spaces which are now empty will remain empty, though much of the land which is now settled could carry a substantially larger population. "The fact that practically the whole of tropical northern Australia is ineffectively occupied to-day is solely due to the unsuitability of the country for settlement, even by coloured people. This unsuitability is due to the shortage of water, to the rainfall being either too low, too seasonal or too erratic, and particularly to the infertility of the soil." But "meanwhile Australia has to be held by the white race, and it can so be held only by the cooler and better areas of the continent being more intensively developed and settled with white people in the next few years." He gives much detailed information regarding both the tropical coastal zone and the great Dead Heart, which is sheer desert. He argues, moreover, that this desert area is increasing. "All through the present geological age a process of desiccation has been going on in Australia," a process which has been hastened on the margins by reckless deforestation. There is evidence of diminishing rainfall within recent years over considerable areas, of the depletion of artesian water supplies through excessive boring, and of increasingly severe and prolonged droughts. Undoubtedly also there is much soil erosion both by wind and water, aided by overstocking and by rabbits. Thus Mr. Upton paints a very gloomy picture. He writes throughout like a pessimist conscious of a mission, and his book will serve a useful purpose in helping to dispel ill-founded optimism on the possibilities of settlement both in the interior of the continent and in the coastal region of the Northern Territory. A high official at Canberra said to me, "We Australians are a race of Gascons," and many romantic enthusiasts, as well as propagandists with an axe to grind, both in this country and

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in Australia, have put the most fantastic fables into circulation. The truth concerning some of the country, into which adventurous men and women have made gallant but vain forays in search of homes and fortunes, is told in Mrs. Myrtle White's *No Roads Go By* and in the books, too little known in England, of Ion Idriess. There is already a notable Australian literature on the Never Never Land and the Out Back.

None the less Mr. Upton has exaggerated his case and has taken little account of some important and favourable factors. His proposals for afforestation on a great scale, for irrigation and water conservation programmes and for the creation of large inland lakes, e.g.: on the Murray River, are admirable, though they will need both time and money. He toys, too, with the still more ambitious idea, which must have a strong attraction for the imaginative engineer, of linking once more with the sea, as in past ages, the beds of the great salt lakes, now usually dry but lying below sea level, in South Australia. "If a great part of Australia's arid interior were again submerged beneath the waters, it might not only economically solve problems of navigation, irrigation and settlement, but might in all probability bring about a small but perceptible increase of rainfall over the surrounding desert and also a sensible rise in the static water level in the neighbourhood." But this, I think, is a project only for the distant future.

The North of Australia consists of three regions, North Queensland in the east, the Northern Territory in the centre, and the Kimberleys, the northernmost part of Western Australia, in the north-west. Regarding agricultural settlement in the Northern Territory, Mr. Upton's pessimism is supported by that of many other authorities. But there is no reason why Australians should not make the neighbourhood of Darwin as healthy and as habitable as Americans have made the Panama Canal Zone, which lies several degrees nearer to the equator. And Darwin, now that it has become the first Australian port of call for air-borne mail and passengers from this country, and with the recent decision to make it both a naval and air base, supplementary to Singapore, will certainly grow rapidly in importance and population. Regarding the future of the Kimberleys, opinion

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is divided, some good judges thinking well of the possibilities of part at least of this very varied region. The valuable iron ore deposits on Yampi Sound are right on the seaboard, and here at least industrial development is certain. But Mr. Upton misses entirely the significance of the results already achieved in Northern Queensland. Here, along the eastern coastal lands and on the plateaux behind them, is a white population of more than 150,000. On the coast the principal occupation is the cane sugar industry; on the plateaux there is forestry and varied agriculture. This community is the high light of the White Australia policy. It is by far the largest white population dwelling anywhere entirely in the tropics. Standards of living and of health compare well with those of other parts of Australia, and still better with standards in this country. The infant mortality rate in England and Wales, for example, is fifty per cent. higher than in tropical Queensland. Within this area there is fertile soil, good rainfall, excellent natural resources, and every reason to anticipate a further increase in population.

There has been a good deal of Italian immigration into Northern Queensland, and in other parts of Australia also Italians, Jugoslavs and even Albanians are being absorbed and assimilated, though not, as yet, in large numbers. A White Australia which aims at a substantially greater population within the next generation must make up its mind to draw steadily on the Continent of Europe, including the healthy peasant stock of Italy and of the Slav countries. And there should be room both in the towns and on the countryside for some of the Jews who are to-day being hounded out of Central Europe.

There is, however, a strong sentiment in Australia in favour of "infiltration" and against the formation of foreign "pockets" and alien communities. The immigrant, it is held, should be absorbed in the general life of the country and become a "good Australian" as speedily as possible. This sentiment is hostile to mass migration, whether of Jews or other foreigners, to particular districts. Australian Labour is also very suspicious of immigration that might break down Trade Union standards, lower wages and intensify unemployment.

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Australia, as much as any country in the world, needs a national plan. This is impeded by inter-State rivalries and by the excessive powers of the States, as compared with the Commonwealth authorities at Canberra. There is an urgent need for the geographical dispersion of industry, now much too highly concentrated round Sydney and Melbourne.

One of the weakest points in Mr. Upton's book is his failure to emphasise the great industrial possibilities of Australia, based on the possession of large supplies of coal, iron and other minerals, and, in Tasmania in particular, of hydro-electric power.

In the next generation industrial development is likely to add even more than the further growth of primary production to the strength and prosperity of Australia and so make possible a permanent increase of population. This may, indeed, diminish the value of Australia as an export market for Great Britain, but it will strengthen the British Commonwealth as a whole and, from the point of view of Australian defence, it may not be a disadvantage that most of the tropical north should remain empty and so afford no effective foothold to an invader.

HUGH DALTON.

BRITISH POLICY IN KENYA COLONY. By MARJORIE RUTH DILLEY, Ph.D. (Thomas Nelson & Sons, New York. \$3.00.).

A BOOK of 282 pages designed to recount the political history of a remote British dependency with a record as complex and turbulent as that of Kenya Colony is indeed something of a venture for an American writer who makes no claim to have ever been near the place. Nevertheless she has made a success of the undertaking. By competent and painstaking study during two years in the libraries of the Colonial Office, the India Office, the Royal Empire Society and the British Museum Reading Room, as well as from other sources which include hitherto unpublished material, she has compiled Kenya political history as revealed in documents. These vary from official despatches and declarations of the Imperial Government in Parliamentary

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debates and papers to frothy outpourings in election addresses in the Colony, perfervid yearnings in the East Africa Press and reports of after-dinner speeches. All are here—an invaluable collection. In so far as the political dreams of the Kenya whites have tarried or miscarried, this is in no small measure due to the revealing character of the writings and speeches in which their politicians have always indulged—and to the skilful use made of such material in the British Press and Parliament.

Except for the last eight pages, in which this acute observer indulges in "conclusions," she leaves the reader free to take quoted assertions and statements at their face value. Admittedly she has not had the close experience that enables a Sir Donald Cameron to provide such a dazzling slant light on East African affairs as that reports of a "mass meeting" often only imply that five or seven Europeans have foregathered in a bar. The writer's studied avoidance of partisanship gives the book a peculiar value as she deals in turn with governmental organisation: imperial control: settler organisation: their struggle for the vote and for financial control, the former soon attained, the latter still withheld: the doctrine of trusteeship, on paper and in practice: the Indian Question: "paramountcy," white and black: the so-called "dual policy": labour supply, and the overshadowing chicanery of policy and performance in connection with African land-rights. The documentation of the text is prodigiously minute; among the first 274 pages only ten are without footnotes giving chapter and verse for the matter quoted.

The chapter on native lands deserves careful study. It illustrates, among other things, the inveterate hostility of the leaders (perhaps one should rather say the more talkative) of the settlers to any activity in their affairs by a Labour Government in Britain, and it relates in satisfactory detail the episode of Governor Grigg's unsuccessful attempt to contest explicit orders concerning African lands which he had received from Lord Passfield—an attitude of resolution on the latter's part which is not always remembered to his credit, and which the Governor probably found sufficiently mortifying at the time.

Compression is inevitable in a book of this size, but at

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times facts are given in such terse outline as to lose much in dramatic value. In dealing with finance there is a statement:

"By proclamation of August, 1922, the Governor declared that native taxation should be reduced from sixteen shillings to twelve and this has continued to be the rate of native direct taxation."

No one could realise from this that the rise of African direct tax to 16s. had caused wide discontent, that native meetings up to 5,000 strong had been held to discuss this and other grievances, and that the contemptible upshot was rifle-fire in the streets of Nairobi by armed police (with military in support hard by) into a packed crowd of African men and women. Further, when in 1918, for the first time in British history, white men and women were together enfranchised at the same time and on precisely the same terms, it is an understatement of picturesque moves that had been afoot for some time, outside settler circles, to hint that it was the "need of white votes" that produced the victory. When it came, it was only achieved, in a legislative council exactly split, by the casting vote of the Governor, General Northey.

It is a pity that the writer missed the point that the Morris Carter Commission's "findings" on the subject of the White Highlands were in large measure the result of guidance, outside their terms of reference, which was sent to the Chairman while at work in Kenya by the Secretary of State in London, and without disclosure to Parliament, which had approved the original terms. Two years later, when questioned about this exploit by Mr. James Milner in the House of Commons, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (now Lord Swinton) maintained that all that he had sent to the Chairman was "a definition." The fact that it proves to have been an entirely novel one, of his own invention, that the Commissioners accepted it as an instruction and acted upon it to the letter, and that they apparently felt sufficiently uneasy about the request for, or the receipt of, this guidance to say nothing about it in the whole of the four thousand pages of their report, is a chain of events that will entirely justify any subsequent British government in treating the whole report as invalid and issuing fresh instructions.

The narrative ends with the year 1936 and the last fi-

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lines in the author's well-supported conclusions read:—

"Settler policy is short-sighted from the point of view of its own interests, as well as those of the Empire as a whole. Surely there are settlers in Kenya who do not approve the policies and tactics of the group who have made the name of the Colony synonymous with much that is unpleasant in politics."

It is interesting to note how this conclusion is supported by later happenings even of the last few months. A revision of an ancient and villainous labour law has found its way on to the Statute Book. Here was a chance for liberal-minded opinion in the Colony to make itself felt. The new measure still besmirches the Colony's record with the provision of criminal penalties for breaches of labour contracts, a piece of studied oppression from which the overwhelming majority of coloured workers in the British Empire have long ago been freed. With Olympian calm and assurance, the Kenya legislators still insist that it shall be a criminal action for a worker to strike if his master orders him to work; that if anyone "unlawfully" attempts to entice a worker to leave the service of his employer he shall be liable to a fine up to £150 (say, thirty years' cash wages for an African) or imprisonment up to six months; while, if such an abnormality as a striker, i.e.: one who leaves work without permission for more than a week, should appear on the industrial horizon, the masters enjoy the support, under compulsion of law, of the entire population, white, brown or black, in refusal knowingly to "harbour" the striker, under penalty of a fine up to £10 or imprisonment up to one month.

In the home-country of our author there were 4,700 strikes last year (1937). Forty per cent. of these lasted for a week or less. More than fifty per cent. involved fewer than one hundred workers. But none of the workers were criminals because they struck, nor were their leaders fined thirty years' wages because they called a strike. The Kenya bosses act otherwise. The date of this legislative triumph of theirs is April 25, 1938—not 1838. There is a minimum wage law in the Statute Book too, but year after year has passed without a minimum wage being fixed.

WM. MCGREGOR ROSS.

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THE CRUMBLING OF EMPIRE. By M. J. BONN. (*Allen & Unwin. 1955.*)

THIS is a curious book. Dr. Bonn is an extremely intelligent man; his knowledge of his subject and indeed of history is encyclopædic; he has the rare power of analyzing with considerable subtlety the psychological and economic causes which have produced a complex historical situation. His subject is empire and imperialism in the world of to-day, a subject intimately connected with the world's present discontents. In many ways the book is admirable and does justice to its subject. Dr. Bonn has been at immense pains to make his analysis of an extremely complex historical development as thorough and complete as possible. He is careful to distinguish the different forms and motives of empire, the various species and sub-species of imperialism. He pins each into its place by definitions; he traces their evolution through the network of cause and effect and estimates the survival value of their inherited or acquired characteristics. The result is a study of considerable value both to the historian and the politician, for it should help them to understand the anatomy and the natural history of empire. The reader will find that Dr. Bonn frequently compels him to look at familiar facts from new angles, and that he thereby acquires a new vision of nineteenth-century history and of contemporary problems.

It is, however, a curious book, because despite these great merits it leaves the reader finally with a sense of frustration, disappointment or even confusion. It is not easy to put one's finger on the cause of one's dissatisfaction. The feeling of the present reviewer is that the fault is mainly due to dislocation or disintegration between Dr. Bonn's thesis and his working out of it. His thesis is accurately indicated in his title. It is that we are living in an age of "counter-colonization" or of the crumbling of empires. Throughout the book he frequently assumes or states explicitly that empires are breaking up and imperialism breaking down. There is, of course, an obvious sense in which this is true, but a strictly limited sense. There has been in the twentieth century a counter-movement to the peculiar type of imperialism which developed in the nineteenth century. The nineteenth

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century type of imperialism consisted in the open or masked use of their power by European or Europeanized states to acquire control over "undeveloped" countries and peoples. The motive and object of this "expansion" was mainly economic exploitation. A marked feature of it was the scramble for colonies. Against this particular type of imperialism there has been a notable reaction in the twentieth century, due to two causes. By 1900 practically all the available undeveloped countries and peoples had already been appropriated either as colonies or spheres of influence by the imperialist powers. The era of conquest and colonies came to an end because there were no more worlds to conquer or colonize. Here comes in the problem of the unsatisfied powers. But there was not only this inevitable slowing down and stopping of the active movement of nineteenth century imperialism, there was also an active movement against it. It came from the subject or undeveloped peoples themselves. They have learnt from their masters the ideas and ideals of nationalism and democracy, and they have demanded freedom from foreign control and exploitation. Throughout Asia and in Egypt the revolt has had considerable success, and in this limited sense it is true to say that we live in an age of counter-colonization or counter-imperialism.

But if it is only in this limited sense that Dr. Bonn intends us to understand his thesis of the crumbling of empire, then the greater part of his book is irrelevant and confusing. For he usually uses the word empire in a much more extended sense, namely, either any very large composite state or even any large state which has incorporated any of its parts by force. Thus he sometimes talks of the U.S.A., Soviet Russia, and even China as if they were empires differing from the British Empire mainly in being "continental." But to do this is to compare things by their unimportant resemblances rather than by their important differences, a fault in political method to which Dr. Bonn is too much addicted and which leads him into digressions confusing both to himself and to the reader. And the main point is that it is extremely doubtful whether the age we live in can be called with any accuracy an age of crumbling empire, in the larger sense. It looks for

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the moment, at any rate, to be much more like an age in which there is a struggle for the redistribution of empire.

Nov 54. 1930

GERMANY'S FIRST BID FOR COLONIES, 1884-1885: A MOVE
IN BISMARCK'S EUROPEAN POLICY. By A. J. P. TAYLOR.
(Macmillan. 7s. 6d.)

MR. TAYLOR has written a book of considerable interest, and its sub-acid style gives it a pleasantly astringent flavour. It is a detailed analysis of the three-cornered negotiations between Bismarck, France and Great Britain from December, 1883, to October, 1885. This was the period of Bismarck's sudden display of interest in colonies and of the acquisition of South-West Africa, the Cameroons and Togoland, and the northern part of New Guinea. Mr. Taylor is concerned to discover and explain the real motives of Bismarck's colonial policy during these years. There is a considerable amount of documentary evidence on the subject; Mr. Taylor has made good use of it, and his book is thoroughly documented.

The ordinary view of historians is that Bismarck cared nothing for colonies, but that in 1884 and 1885 the pressure of public opinion, fomented by the well-organized propaganda of the Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation, was too much for him and forced him into some colonial adventures. The main thesis of Mr. Taylor's book is that this view of the Bismarckian policy is mistaken, and that Bismarck's truculent attitude towards Britain and his acquisition of South-West Africa and New Guinea were moves in a deliberate and subtle game. He was not really interested in the colonial question or in the acquisition of a colonial empire; his main object was the creation of a conflict, or the appearance of a conflict, between Germany and Britain. At the moment he was toying with the idea of an entente between Germany and France, and his quarrels with Britain were to be the guarantee that his overtures to France were serious. Mr. Taylor's exposition of his thesis is entertaining, and on the whole it may be said that he probably proves three-quarters of his case. At any rate, his book is well worth reading.