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THE
NINETEENTH
CENTURY
AND AFTER



A MONTHLY REVIEW


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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCCXXXVII—JULY 1938

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WEST INDIES

By THE RIGHT HON. LORD OLIVIER, K.C.M.G., C.B.

THE recent outcry about the failure of British government in the West Indian Colonies has been in some particulars overdone. A Royal Commission, the time-honoured panacea habitually demanded by British journalists and members of Parliament, has been promised. Mr. Malcolm MacDonald knows as well as does Lord Harlech, his predecessor at the Colonial Office, that this is a mere political gesture and that Mr. Ormsby Gore was entirely justified in regarding it as unnecessary, the department having already access to all the recommendations for policy and all the information that could be expected to be supplied by a Royal Commission of any composition that was likely to be appointed.

Most members of Parliament are, however, like their constituents, exceedingly ignorant about West Indian affairs; and as the British Government will certainly have to face

demands for financial help at the cost of the British Exchequer or of British consumers, if the present state of affairs in the West Indies is not to continue, whether the Colonial Office makes such demands on its own judgment or on the strength of a Report next year by a Royal Commission, the Cabinet no doubt thinks it prudent to have the backing of some such document to comfort the consciences of its party supporters, to say nothing of mitigating the Liberal Opposition or the grumbling of Labour politicians who may point out that their constituents, including co-operative consumers, the unemployed, the slum-dwellers and the denizens of the special areas, may have prior claims to consideration at the cost of the British public.

I have myself complained in Parliament and in the Press that the Colonial Office would appear to have been culpably unaware of what has for years past been notorious in regard to the conditions of the wage-earning and labouring classes in the West Indies. I have given my reasons for that inculpation by references to the Reports of previous Commissions and to special books written on the subject, to which no regard has apparently been had by the Colonial Office. But Lord Harlech and Mr. MacDonald have both assured Parliament that the Colonial Office had in fact known a great deal about these deplorable facts, that it had long been greatly concerned about them, and had taken active steps to redress them. I do not propose to contest this defence; no good practical purpose could now be served by so doing. Nor do I entirely accept it. I am aware that some Secretaries of State and some Colonial Governors have considered the existing conditions sufficiently serious to warrant such action as they thought reasonable to redress them. No one, I think, will contend that those measures have been effectual.

Anyhow, the Colonial Office has now quite sufficient material to go on with for several years in directing West Indian public policy on lines that are obviously essential, and Mr. MacDonald has very reasonably and properly promised that he is not going to wait and do nothing until the promised Royal Commission shall have reported. The well-meaning amateur politicians who have voiced their distress at the state of affairs recently forced on their notice by 'labour disturbances' and 'riots' in the West Indies might have

overshot their mark had the Government taken them at their word and deputed its duties to the digestion of a Royal Commission. Fortunately both Mr. Ormsby Gore and Mr. MacDonald have themselves shown direct sensibility and a serious view of their own duties and powers of immediate action. Anyone who may desire to forecast what a fresh Royal Commission will report or repeat had better study the Report of the West Indies Royal Commission of 1897, and particularly a masterly and exhaustive memorandum, which accompanied that Report, on the agricultural resources of the West Indies by the late Sir Daniel Morris, Agricultural Adviser to that Commission, and subsequently Commissioner for Agriculture in the West Indies in the Imperial Department established by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. Another valuable document is the Report of the West Indies Sugar Commission of 1930, and especially part 4 of that Report and the appended memorandum by Mr. Gwilym A. Jones, now Commissioner for Agriculture in the West Indies on the staff of the Royal College of Tropical Agriculture located in Trinidad. Mr. Jones' memorandum brings that of Sir D. Morris up to date.

All the recent manifestations of breakdown in Colonial economy arise from the same fundamental cause—low prices for produce. They are the results of economic maladjustments operating still more distressingly in our own country among our own working classes. So far as concerns the price of the chief West Indian staple of export (sugar), Mr. MacDonald, like his predecessor, has made it perfectly clear that this is a question which His Majesty's Government regard as one of general Imperial policy; they intend to continue to deal with it by international negotiations, which do not appear likely to be affected by the results of a fresh Royal Commission's investigation of West Indian conditions. The West Indies Sugar Commissioners, in their Report of 1930, recommended that it should be dealt with imperially by a stabilisation of price. Mr. Snowden would have none of this, and I daresay the then First Lord of the Admiralty would have dissented also. The aim of the international negotiation now proceeding is to raise the world price of sugar to a level at which it can be economically produced and pay decent wages. The proposal of the 1930 Commission aimed only at raising

it to such a level within the British Empire, and would have cost the British consumer of sugar less than the international policy now being aimed at, because it would only have raised to the necessary level the price of sugar produced in the Empire or in such parts of the Empire as it might be applied to (*i.e.*, not necessarily to Dominions which already take care of their own sugar producers by heavy subsidies), while *per contra* the National Sugar Board would have obtained a set-off for the consumers by making a profit upon its dealings with non-Imperial sugar. The Commissioners saw no reason why British consumers should be mulcted for the benefit of Czechoslovakia, Java, or the American or Canadian financiers who had advanced money to speculators in Cuba to buy cheap sugar concessions from President Machado on the strength of United States tariff policy.

Obviously, however, the British Government in any sugar policy must consider the interests not only of Colonies under their own direct control, but also, at least, of India, and as these interests are not apparently to be reported upon by the proposed Royal Commission, it may be presumed that in regard to sugar prices Mr. Neville Chamberlain's Government will adhere to the so far ineffectual policy which they are now pursuing.

With regard to other West Indian staple exports, such as cocoa, coffee, citrus fruits and other minor products, it is obvious that the field to be dealt with is far wider than that of the West Indian Colonies only. The best that it appears possible to hope for from the Report of a fresh Royal Commission is that the British Government may feel induced either to vary its present policy in regard to the prices of primary products or to improve its efficiency.

Some people dispute the view I have myself long maintained, that the prices of West Indian produce do not admit of the payment of living wages, and say that sugar planters and manufacturers are now making enormous profits on their investments. Personally I do not believe this, but I am quite prepared to be convinced by audited balance-sheets. It was not so when I last investigated the facts. When I had done so I recommended that an audit should be kept of the business of all sugar-producing concerns in the West Indies which were obtaining public assistance either from

local subsidies or from Imperial Preference, or through the enjoyment of a local monopoly of land or productive capital, as is the case in several West Indian Colonies. It is open to His Majesty's Government to insist upon this obviously rational public policy. All that would be required to demonstrate whether the factories could pay higher wages or not would be the report of a capable chartered accountant.

Only one explanation appears to be possible of the fact that this recommendation was not adopted; and that explanation is creditable neither to the Colonial Office nor to the West Indian Governments.

Unless, however, the Colonial Office is to be held to blame for the general Imperial policy which has kept the price of sugar low, neither the Colonial Office nor any Colonial Government can be held to deserve much blame for the necessary results of that policy in keeping West Indian wages below subsistence level—a state of affairs which has at long last proved intolerable to the exceedingly patient labourers on the estates in all West Indian Colonies, and has resulted in strikes associated with excited disturbances kept down by armed force, the employment of which does not appear to have caused much injury to anybody except a few women, children and other wayfarers who had nothing to do with the riots.

The chief complaints which have been made of the inefficiency of Colonial Governments as having conduced to wretched conditions among the West Indian population, independently of those produced by low prices which those Governments could not control, have been (1) that housing conditions have been deplorable; (2) that public health and provision for medical care have been neglected; (3) that alternative industries to sugar and cocoa producing have been neglected; (4) that elementary education has been neglected.

Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Ormsby Gore before him have replied in some measure to these complaints, and in my opinion have made in regard to them a fairly good defence. The main basis of that defence is simply lack of funds. Secondly, it is an appeal to the principles of individualism and private property. Thirdly, the intransigency of local legislatures which constitutionally are able to control expenditure for public purposes.

I will deal first with the problem of housing conditions. The wretched quality of these is no new discovery to the Colonial Office or to the Governors of some Colonies. No fresh Royal Commission will discover anything unknown about them. They are, in fact, to-day a good deal better than I can remember them in several West Indian Colonies. The housing conditions are always bad where the labourers' cottages on estates are the survival either of old slave tenancies or of barracks for indentured Indian emigrants. They are always bad where the occupant either rents or builds a house for himself upon rented land. They are always much better where small settlers have been able, as in Grenada and Jamaica, to build houses for themselves on bits of land of their own. If any Government wishes to improve housing conditions, it must, in the towns, expropriate slum landlords, as it has had to do in this country, and build new houses publicly owned.

Several West Indian Governments have already dealt actively with this problem so far as local financial conditions have permitted. The Colonial Office has given instructions that the promotion of better housing is to be part of Colonial Government policy. The principal difficulty (to mention no others) will be financial. Some Governments, as it is, cannot make their revenue cover their public expenditure and have received or are receiving grants in aid from the British Exchequer. Unless their revenues can be increased as a result of improved prices for produce, they will need larger grants, even if they keep the already insufficient provision for public health and education down to its present level.

The improvement by well-disposed capitalist proprietors of the housing of labourers employed on and attached to estates will not meet the requirements of the situation. Unless the returns on production can be increased such investors will be no more able to maintain and raise the standard of housing than they have been in the past, unless they keep their wages down to their present level, which the recent disturbances have made it manifest that they will not be able to do.

If wages are raised, and the labourers are released from their present position, which they dislike, of being housed on the estates' property on condition of getting employment

—if they remain, that is to say, in a position of tied labourers, a position which they detest—such benevolent action will not avert industrial trouble. If wages are raised and sites, free of obligation to labour, are made available, the problem will solve itself. After emancipation it was solved by the freed slaves, either out of savings which they had made during slavery, or through the instrumentality of building societies. The houses of small proprietors in some of the most poverty-stricken districts of Jamaica—the savannahs of St. Elizabeth parish—are conspicuously among the best in the island. The present wage-labourers have no savings to fall back upon. In the absence of these they must either be helped from public funds by direct gifts (which brings us back again to the financial problem) or the problem of housing conditions can be dealt with in the light of the experience gained in this country during the last twenty years in dealing with similar evils. It is ridiculous to imagine that it can be solved by the antediluvian nostrums of charitable capitalism.

The problem of public hygiene and provision for medical care has by no means been neglected either by local Governments or by the Colonial Office. Here also, however, the principal difficulty has been financial. Public medical services and public hospitals have long been provided in all the West Indian Colonies, in substitution for the old system of estate medical officers and estate hospitals established under slavery. During the last hundred years there has been much variation of local policy in regard to this department of public administration. The familiar conflict between the political principles of individualism and State Socialism has raged in these Colonies as it has in this country, where hospitals are still regarded as preferable to be provided for by private charity, whilst the public medical service has only within recent memory been rationalised through health insurance legislation. In this sphere also, and that system is not yet quite satisfactorily developed in this country, the principal difficulty has been financial. I myself am best acquainted with the details of that difficulty in Jamaica, in which island, throughout the many years of my acquaintance with it, both the Government and the elected members of the Legislative Council have constantly been urgently striving to improve

their system of hospitals, and many thousands of pounds have been spent for that purpose.

When about eighty years ago the system of indentured Indian immigration was introduced in those Colonies in which planters could not procure sufficient local labour because they could not pay high enough wages, and many Creole labourers could manage to live without working upon the estates, the whole system of public hospital and public medical provision for those employed was penetratingly gone into, and special taxation was levied upon the estates to provide for those purposes. There has never been any propensity on the part of Colonial Governments to neglect this department of public administration, far less, indeed, than prevailed until quite recently in Great Britain, but the development of State policy in this department has been continuously obstructed and retarded, as it has in this country, not only by public financial difficulties and the protests of ratepayers and taxpayers, but by the conservatism, individualism, and professional solidarity of the medical profession itself. What is now chiefly needed in West Indian Colonies is the establishment of a system of health insurance. This is sure to be opposed very strenuously by the like influences as well as by narrow-mindedness on the part of the local health authorities. I will give two examples of Colonial Governors' difficulties in this sphere.

More than seventy years ago Mr. William Price, an Irishman, a member of the British Parliament, the proprietor of large estates in Jamaica, in a pamphlet written about the administration of Governor Eyre, pointed out that many of the charges made against the Jamaican negro of laziness arose from the fact that he suffered greatly from ill-health, and could not work hard for more than a few days successively without falling ill. Since then it has long been established by medical science, aided by the Colonial Office and Colonial Governments, that this lack of stamina is principally due to the prevalence of hookworm (an intestinal parasite), and that other endemic diseases, controllable by organised hygiene, contribute to it. The Jamaican Government and those of two of the Windward Islands were unable to organise measures to deal with this problem until they obtained

reluctant permission from the Colonial Office to accept the humane aid of the Rockefeller Institute of the United States, which, under the outstandingly efficient and sympathetic direction of Dr. Washburn, was able in Jamaica to establish, in co-operation with the public health authorities, relations which enabled them practically to extinguish hookworm in certain parishes (at a substantial financial cost), as well as to contribute materially towards dealing with some of the other endemic diseases. The assistance of the Rockefeller Fund has now been withdrawn, and Dr. Washburn has left the island. If the benefit of this work is not to be largely lost, increased expense must fall on Colonial and parochial funds. Where is the money to come from?

In public health administration Colonial Governors are sometimes impeded by obstacles of a character not quite unknown in this country, in cases affecting the sensibilities of local health authorities and parliamentary politicians. For example, early in the present (twentieth) century the Jamaica Government, with the encouragement of the Colonial Office, addressed itself to the problem of extinguishing malarial fever in those parts of the island where it prevailed. The London School of Tropical Medicine sent out expert and enthusiastic advisers to diffuse knowledge and application of the discoveries of Manson and Ross. These missionaries gave most helpful assistance. The first obstacle that had to be overcome was the scepticism of most of the medical men then practising in Jamaica, who clung to the time-honoured dogma that malaria was produced by the inhalation of nocturnal swamp vapours, and scouted the notion that it could be checked by destroying mosquitoes. Fortunately the Government were helped by a scientifically trained Canadian-born member of the Government Medical Staff, and by a private practitioner of scientific genius, the late Dr. Michael Grabham (who has the distinction of having given his name to a particular variety of mosquito). A Commission or Board was established, with a very efficient and energetic secretary as its executive officer. A 'malarial survey' of the whole island was made and, with the co-operation of the enlightened chairmen of some of the parochial health authorities, a comprehensive scheme was organised with a view to entirely preventing the breeding of malarial mosquitoes throughout

Jamaica, as was being done at the time in the zone of the Panama Canal under Colonel Gorgas.

Effectual progress was being made until the Governor who had promoted this scheme left the island. His successor considered it more advantageous for the general benefit of the island that the Governor should work in the closest possible friendship with the elected members of the Legislative Council—no doubt a laudable policy. The elected member for Kingston happened also to be at that time Mayor of Kingston, and the secretary of the Malaria Commission was not a *persona grata* with the Kingston Corporation, because when a grant had been given to that corporation out of the vote for a Malaria Commission fund the money had been frittered away without producing commensurate results; the work had been taken out of the hands of the corporation and placed in that of the Public Works Department under the direct guidance of the Commission. In the next session of the Legislature the Governor was persuaded that the vote for the Malaria Commission was a waste of public money, and the vote was struck out by the concerted action of the elected members under the leadership of the member for Kingston. The Malaria Commission then ceased to function.

More than twenty years later a Governor again took up with Dr. Washburn the problem of eradicating malaria. All the previous history of the matter had by that time passed out of memory in the island Colonial Secretary's office, and, incredible as it may appear, an entirely new malarial survey was made by imported American health officers and operations recommenced under Dr. Washburn's direction. When I was in Jamaica in 1931 I saw the two maps. There was no practical difference between them. In conversation with Dr. Washburn, of the Rockefeller Foundation, I found that there was also no practical difference in his method of dealing with the breeding places of the mosquitoes from that previously followed except that the dusting of swamps with Paris green had been substituted for treating them with paraffin oil, which had been the method followed by Gorgas in the canal zone. This use of Paris green was an improvement. Even after the twenty years' lapse of this work in Jamaica malaria prevention is now being better attended to there than

in some other West Indian Colonies, subject to funds being available.

It is no new discovery that such organised work is essential for the general safeguard of public health, and the work has been well done in West African groups of colonies under the control of the Colonial Office. I think it quite improbable that that department will neglect it in future; but recourse may have to be had to the Colonial Development Fund for assistance.

Whenever West Indian difficulties attract attention in England, a variety of suggestions appear in the British Press or are mooted in Parliament for dealing with the unsatisfactory features of local conditions. The kindly intentioned persons who offer advice make West Indians and the Colonial Office make everyone acquainted with West Indian conditions and history tired. All their suggestions are so familiar and have been so long tried out with all the energy of the Colonial Office and Colonial Governments and, the desperate self-interest of West Indians themselves.

Anyone who has studied the literary record of economic controversies in the West Indies for the first twenty years after the emancipation, until the position began to appear quite hopeless through the collapse of the prices of produce, will be astonished at the fertility of the intelligence which was during that period devoted both by Liberal statesmen at home and by intelligent local residents to saving their livelihoods on lines to which nothing new has been added, except what had been made possible by discoveries of improved agricultural and manufacturing science since that period.

One of the most familiar criticisms is that the Colonies are expensively governed and that efficiency might be increased and the economy of their resources assisted by the combination of Governments. These possibilities have been examined and reported on by successive Commissions appointed by the Colonial Office, including one quite recent Commission which reported upon the establishment of the Windward and the Leeward Islands, and convinced the Colonial Office that no practical purpose could be served by chasing that hare. No administrative economies can touch the fundamental cause of such administrative impotence as exists.

As regards local economy and finance, such economy, when I entered the Colonial Office in 1882, was regarded as the most important object of departmental control, and no charge against the Colonial Office that it has ever been neglected can reasonably be made. On the contrary, the efficient control of finance has been materially reinforced by the establishment of the Colonial Audit Department and other measures.

Not all Colonial Governors are efficient financial administrators, either by personal temperament—an essential qualification, disdained by universities—or by such training as they can be relied on to receive during their normal career as Colonial civil servants. Some of the most successful Colonial Governors have been ill-qualified in finance. Nor is it possible to rely upon deficiencies of Governors in financial talent being compensated by the guidance of the Colonial Office.

It would be idle to criticise retrospectively defects which might be pointed out in the recent administration of the finances of several West Indian Colonies. The Colonial Office can only rely upon the selection of the most capable Governors it can appoint, which it now habitually endeavours to do, the old political system having been superseded.

As the Colonial Office would doubtless admit, the advantageous administration of Colonial revenues is not generally enhanced when Colonial expenditure is placed under the control of the clerks of the Imperial Treasury, as is the rule when grants in aid are made to Colonial Governments from the Exchequer. The interposition of the Colonial Development Fund and its liberal and progressive-minded controllers has proved a considerable boon to Colonial financial policy in this connexion.

The island of Barbados, which is practically self-governing in regard to finance and most other departments of administration, has always prudently managed to keep itself solvent, for fear that it should have to ask for assistance from the British Exchequer and have its finances placed under control of the Colonial Office and the Imperial Treasury. It remains to be seen whether Barbados will be able to maintain efficient administration if present conditions affecting its sole industry remain unaltered.

On the other hand, neither the elected members of Legislative Councils in any of the West Indian Colonies with which I am acquainted exhibit any appreciable capacity for assisting in the sound and prudent conduct of finance. Nor is such assistance to be relied on from the nominated unofficial members.

It is frequently said that the British West Indies are suffering from over-population and that emigration is necessary to provide for maintaining the increase. None of the Colonies, except, perhaps, Barbados (and I am not at all sure even about Barbados), is over-populated in the sense that its inhabitants could not house and feed themselves in many cases better than they do now, if land ownership were distributed and labour organised for that purpose. They are, in fact, organised for the production of exports. Some of the islands are over-populated in the sense that, if organised on a food economy only, they could not produce a sufficient quantity of marketable exports to yield the tax revenue necessary for civilised State institutions. They could not pay for government on the present scale, to say nothing of bringing government up to a desirable level of efficiency, in provision for public health and education. Justice and police are adequately provided for at present. Some Colonies may be said to be over-populated in the sense that the available labour supply for well-capitalised large-scale productive enterprises is, or is becoming, in excess of the demand. The phenomenon of unemployment among wage-seeking labourers, familiar in all capitalised industry, is, in fact, displaying itself, and will be aggravated by more efficient capitalisation. Fifty years ago the position was very different. At that time sugar, cocoa, and banana planters who desired to develop or rationalise production on large estates could not obtain Creole labourers at the wages they could have paid, and in order to maintain or extend their industries had to import hundreds of thousands of indentured Indian immigrants.

With regard to the regions suggested as available areas for the transfer of surplus population, for longer than I can remember the question of the possibility of settling unoccupied land in British Guiana has been resolutely and minutely examined by that Colony's able Governors employing the

best available scientific and agricultural experts, with a view to ascertaining whether either the Creoles of British Guiana or immigrants from Barbados or other West Indian Colonies could settle there for agriculture. There is no such land available, unless possibly far inland in the mountains adjacent to Venezuela, at present inaccessible and unroaded. Jamaicans and Barbadians would rather starve at home than migrate to the tropical rain forests of British Guiana, even if it were not manifest that they would be likely to starve even more rapidly there.

A few years ago the British Government, having full information at its disposal in the Colonial Office about the character of this hinterland of British Guiana, allowed an international Commission to be sent out by the League of Nations to discover whether Assyrian Christians could be settled there. Before that Commission started it was pointed out in the British Press what their Report must finally be—namely, that the suggested area was quite unsuitable. The Commission duly so reported and the Assyrians remain homeless.

The Sugar Commission of 1929–30 suggested that certain lands in St. Lucia might be found suitable for Barbadian settlement. That suggestion appears to have been regarded as practical and is being tried out. No other area in the West Indies, except perhaps the Carib country in St. Vincent, offers any similar possible opening.

Any redistribution of settlement in Jamaica (where such redistribution is possible) would involve expropriation, which the island Treasury will not be able to pay for, and it will raise financial problems to be dealt with by the Imperial Government. The new settlers will have to be maintained for some time and financed for the development of their holdings.

There is an immense area of uncultivated land in British Honduras, much of which might be suitable for agricultural settlement; but almost the whole of such land belongs to a British company, whose policy is not to promote more agricultural settlement (the local labourers prefer wood-cutting), but to grow and export timber with local skilled labour, and the direction of which is closely associated with a member of the present British Cabinet. This fact has long

been recognised as the chief obstacle to the development of British Honduras (where I served as Colonial Secretary in the year 1890). I have never observed any sign of its recognition by any British Government. Possibly a Royal Commission might initiate a move in this direction. There is plenty of land on the coast and in the foot-hills of Costa Rica and adjacent parts of Central America very suitable for colonisation by West Indians; but it would need a politician of the type of Signor Mussolini to render such areas available for West Indian settlement; and it may be doubted whether even such a leader would be prepared to consider the Monroe Doctrine as a negligible part of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

It has already been pointed out that the West Indian sugar industry can only be kept solvent by a capitalisation which will reduce the number of wage workers employed, even if those employed can be paid higher wages. Those not in employment can be only reabsorbed into sugar production if exports are unrestricted, which the British Government has so far refused to provide for. Moreover, the question of the relation of cane farmers and labourers to the sugar factories has still to be dealt with. One of the recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1897 which was given some effect to in Trinidad was the promotion of cane farming, and attention has lately been called by writers in *The Times* to the system operating in Fiji, no doubt quite familiar to the Colonial Office, of 'vertical co-operation' between cane farmers and factories, giving the former a share in the profits of the combined undertaking. That principle was insisted upon about forty years ago by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain when he procured a grant from the British Exchequer to finance the establishment of a Government central factory in Antigua. The planters of St Kitts, where there is a similar large central factory owned by a British company, which deals with the whole of the canes produced in the island, have frequently claimed that a like arrangement should be established in regard to that factory, and the Sugar Commission of 1929–30 advised that if the factory interests of the West Indies were subsidised (as they have been) arrangements for that purpose and for the interests of the labourers should also be insisted on.

Co-operative cane farming in Trinidad not sharing in factory profits was organised, for the supply of the principal factory in the island, by Mr. G. A. Jones, who is now Commissioner of Agriculture for the West Indies under the Royal College of Tropical Agriculture, and whose experience is thus available. There need be no practical difficulty in organising such 'vertical co-operation' in sugar production throughout the West Indies except the opposition of vested interests. There is nothing new in the notion; it does not need a fresh Royal Commission to recommend it. The Sugar Commissioners of 1929-30 were, in fact, accompanied in their tour through the West Indies by an able and friendly representative of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company operating in Fiji, who told them something about that system. Whether it should be extended or not to the West Indies has depended since 1930 upon the will of the Colonial Office, confronted with the inclinations of the directors of sugar production, and will equally so depend after the proposed Royal Commission shall have reported. It is not necessary that action upon that idea should await that Commission's Report.

No discussion of West Indian economic problems is considered complete without the revival of the advice that West Indians 'should not keep all their eggs in one basket,' as if those unfortunate mortals had not been actively exercising the best of their brains on that problem for more than a hundred years, and as if the Colonial Office, with the aid of repeated investigations and the advice of those whom it considers the best qualified experts available in the British Empire, had not been devoting itself for the last fifty years to assisting the Colonies both to discover new staples of export and to organise their most advantageous marketing.

Those efforts are even now being energetically persisted in with the assistance of the Colonial Development Committee, and (I am glad to say) of a revived Marketing Board to replace the Empire Marketing Board, 'axed' a few years ago in the supposed interests of economy.

In connexion with land distribution amongst small settlers, we are also reminded of the importance of agricultural education. When, fifty years ago, Sir Henry Blake introduced into Jamaican public policy the promotion of

small land settlement, he attacked simultaneously the problem of the education of small settlers both in regard to their own food crops and to staples for export.

No more effectual agency for this purpose among a population of small cultivators has been evolved than the Jamaica Agricultural Society, founded by Blake, and now comprising more than 260 local branches; although the philosophy of that organisation and the inner reasons for its efficiency are not generally appreciated even by Governors of that island until they have lived a good many years in the Colony, and its methods have not yet been imported with any marked success into other Colonies where the character of the population may be different and where that system of organisation might not prove so suitable. Other Colonies, however, have had the advantage, first, of the remarkable work of the late Sir Daniel Morris and his successors in the Imperial West Indian Department of Agriculture; and in all the major Colonies there have long been established really efficient Agricultural Departments of the Government, the directors of which are all at this moment not only outstandingly capable and energetic public officers, but are recognised and trusted as such by the local public.

Further, Trinidad and other West Indian Colonies have had the advantage of the location in Trinidad of the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, which is greatly reinforcing their practice in regard to techniques of agriculture, the control of diseases and the preparation of staples for market.

When I came to England in 1913 and became Secretary to the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries I found that State organisation for the assistance of agriculture was in a far more backward condition than it was in West Indian Colonies. Mr. Walter Runciman and his successors in Whitehall Place have done a great deal to improve departmental and public assistance to British agriculture, but in the meantime neither the Colonial Office nor Colonial Governments have relaxed their attention to the same line of policy. What has been accomplished and what is still being done may not yet have effected all that might theoretically be demanded; but with such money and such human capacity as are available, I consider that all that Ministerial or administrative efforts could achieve is being effected.

The Labour peers among whom I sit in the House of Lords do not oppose measures passed by the House of Commons, on the principle that the House of Commons is representative of the electors. The Cabinet frames its measures in the same confidence, and can hardly be criticised for so acting.

In regard to Imperial economic policy it has chosen a certain line and declares that it will adhere to it. For improving the prices of sugar it has chosen to adopt a method that could not be relied on, as the results of the speculation have proved. It still remains to be seen whether it will consider that the preservation of West Indian industries and their workers is compatible with their duties to the British electorate and other Imperial interests; if they do not, the responsibility will lie with the British electorate. I do not myself in all respects agree with all established Imperial Colonial policy, nor do I consider that the Colonial service is in all respects efficiently staffed for the purposes I should like to see pursued. So long, however, as the British electorate does not share my opinions and those of the political party with which I have been associated all my life, I can do no more than express facts and judgments which have been impressed upon me by more than fifty years of contact with all West Indian Colonies. The dominant and most important among those judgments is that extensive disaster in those Colonies can only be diverted by establishing and guaranteeing an increased price of common grocery (white granulated) sugar in the British market, which, I estimate, subject to expert correction, would raise that price to 2½d. per pound retail.

Little or no complaint has been heard for many years about the administration of justice in the West Indies. That is because the High Courts administer justice on well-established principles of law generally regarded as common to all civilised European nations and communities, and most highly regarded and elaborated by jurists of the highest intelligence in countries inheriting traditions of both Roman and English civilisation; and the judicial bench is recruited from sources imbued by the same professional principles.

Reliance on British justice has been the strongest bond of Empire between Europeans and Africans. To this day most

British West Indian subjects believe religiously that Magna Carta and the Habeas Corpus Act are in force throughout the British Dominions. This, of course, is an illusion on their part, as they discover when they indulge in industrial or political agitation. Under recent Colonial legislation authorised by the Colonial Office the powers and discretion of the police to arrest and detain without bail what are described as agitators have been greatly increased. West Indians resent this and are liable to express their resentment in violent methods.

Recently the leaders of strikes in Kingston were arrested, imprisoned, and refused bail to await trial. The strikers refused to return to work until those leaders had been let out on bail. Subsequently bail was granted on appeal by the Supreme Court. The sequel has been that when the strike leaders were brought to trial on the charge of sedition on which they had been arrested they were acquitted.

One of the most dangerous features of recent Colonial policy and one of its most significant features, in the appreciation of the West Indian working classes, as it is also in the appreciation of West African natives, is the extension of executive power to arrest any person whose activities are inconvenient to established Imperial political or economic policy as seditious. The case of Wallace Johnson, now under appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, is an incidental illustration of this.

It is essential that the Nazification of British justice by its subordination to political or economic prejudice should be arrested if any part of the Empire in which African races predominate is to be saved from disorder.

OLIVIER.

CONCERNING PACIFISM¹

By JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET

THERE are many symptoms which lead us to suspect that the knowledge or ignorance which nations have of each other has become a factor of primary importance in politics. We may enter into this subject from many different points. I choose one which, it appears to me, leads straight to the heart of the problem.

Twenty years ago Great Britain—the Government and public opinion—embarked on a peace policy. We commit the error of labelling as pacifism several very different attitudes, so different that in practice they often turn out to be opposed to each other. Their common link is vague—the belief that war is an evil and the aspiration to eliminate war as a form of human relationship. But pacifists begin to disagree as soon as they take the next step and ask to what extent the disappearance of wars is possible. These divergences become superlative when they begin to think of the means necessary for the establishment of peace in this bellicose world of ours.

It is only too notorious that this English policy has failed. This must mean that *that* kind of pacifism was an error. The failure has been so great, so complete, that one might be entitled to revise the whole question and ask if *all* pacifism is not an error. But I will adopt the English point of view and suppose that the desire for world peace is *per se*, regardless of other considerations, excellent in itself. This only emphasises how great the mistakes have been in the appreciation of the possibilities of peace in present world conditions.

Generally speaking, the great shortcoming of British pacifism seems to me to have been an underestimation of the

¹ Translated and adapted by Professor A. Pastor.

enemy. This underestimation inspired a false diagnosis. The pacifist sees in war an evil, a crime or a vice. But he forgets that, over and above this, war is an enormous effort which men make in order to solve certain conflicts. War is not an instinct, but an invention. Animals do not know of it, and it is a purely human institution, like science or administration. War led to one of the greatest discoveries—the basis of all civilisation—the discovery of discipline. All other forms of discipline proceed from this original military discipline. Any form of pacifism is hopeless, and becomes futile bigotry, if it does not realise constantly that war is a formidable, an inspired technique, and not principally a technique of death, but an advanced technique of life, serving the ends of life.

Like all historical forms, war has two aspects: one at the hour of initiation, another at that of supersession. At the time of its invention it represented an incalculable progress. Nowadays, when we aspire to overcome war we only see its dirt, horror, lack of subtlety and insufficiency. In the same way we are inclined to curse slavery, without remarking the marvellous advance slavery represented when it was first instituted. In earlier times it was usual to kill the vanquished. A beneficent genius of humanity first thought that it would be better, instead of killing the prisoners, to preserve their lives and use their labour. Auguste Comte, who had great human sense—that is to say, historical sense—interpreted in this way the institution of slavery, rejecting the nonsense which Rousseau had said about it; and we must learn to amplify his remarks, looking at things human from two points of view—when they arrive and when they must depart. The Romans very subtly entrusted to two divinities the consecration of these two essential moments—*Adeone* and *Abeone*, the gods of arrival and of departure.

Because all this was ignored, pacifist policy made its task too easy. It was thought that in order to eliminate war it was sufficient not to make war, to disarm, or, at the utmost, to endeavour that others should not make war. As war appeared only in the guise of a pathological excrescence, it was thought that it would be sufficient to extirpate it and that *it was not necessary to substitute something else*. But the enormous effort which war represents can only be avoided if we understand by peace an even greater effort—a system of

immensely complicated efforts which, in part no doubt, require the happy intervention of genius.

The will to peace is therefore not of ultimate importance in a rational pacifism. It is necessary that this word should cease to signify good intentions and should mean a system of new relationships between men. The great damage done by sentimental pacifism to the cause of authentic peace consisted in preventing us from seeing the lack of even the most elementary techniques necessary for this end. Peace, for instance, means law as a form of such relationship. Pacifism seemed to suppose that such a law existed, that it was there at the disposal of mankind, and that only the passions and instincts of violence induced us to ignore it.

In order that law, or a branch of law, should exist it is necessary—(1) that certain men should discover certain ideas, or principles, of justice; (2) that propaganda and expansion of these ideas over the whole of the collectivity, or group, in question should take place; (3) that this expansion should become sufficiently dominant for these ideas to consolidate into 'public opinion.' Then, and only then, is it possible to speak of justice and equity. It does not matter that there should be no legislator and no judges. If those ideas really dominate the human mind they will inevitably act as instances of conduct to which it is possible to refer, and this is the true substance of Law and of Right.

In this sense no International Law, covering the inevitable causes of wars, exists, not only in the sense that it is not in force—*i.e.*, that it has not consolidated into a permanent norm of public opinion—but that it does not even exist as an idea. Since there is no such theory of International Law, how can one pretend that war should disappear? To pretend that things should happen magically because we wish them may well be described as frivolous and immoral. Only that desire is moral which is accompanied by a severe endeavour to prepare the means for a practical execution. We do not know what the 'subjective rights' of nations are, and we have not even a suspicion of how the objective law would look which could regulate their life. The ever-increasing abundance of international tribunals and committees of arbitration between

nations which we have witnessed during the last fifty years contributes to hide the lack of authentic International Law. I do not underestimate the importance of such bodies, since it is always important for the progress of a moral function that it should appear materialised in some special organ. But the importance of those international tribunals has been so far reduced to this appearance. The law which they administer is essentially the same which already existed before they were constituted. If we revise the subjects on which they have pronounced judgment we notice that they are exactly the same which have always been solved by diplomacy. Therefore, no essential progress has been made in the creation of a real law of nations.

A greater fertility could not be expected from an epoch which began with the Treaty of Versailles and the foundation of the League of Nations. It is necessary that we should avoid at all costs the error which the creation of the League of Nations represented—I mean, what this institution concretely was and meant at the time of its birth. It was not just an ordinary error; it is a profound historical one. The spirit to which it owes its being, the system of philosophical, historical, sociological and juridical ideas which inspired it, far from anticipating the future, were already historically dead at that moment. The League of Nations was a gigantic juridical machinery created for the administration of a non-existent law. The vacuum was filled fraudulently with omnipresent diplomacy which, dressing up in juridical robes, contributed to the general demoralisation.

Let the reader state clearly to himself any of the great conflicts at present existent between nations and ask himself if he can discover any possible juridical norm which makes it even theoretically possible to solve one of them. Which, for instance, are the 'rights' of a nation which yesterday had twenty million inhabitants and to-day forty or eighty millions? Who is entitled to the uninhabited, or thinly inhabited, portions of the globe? This example, the least subtle and most elementary, makes the illusory character of any pacifism clear which does not begin by evolving a new juridical technique. Doubtless the law which is here postu-

lated is a difficult invention. If it was easy it would have existed long ago. It is exactly as difficult as the construction of peace, of which it is only another aspect. But our age which has witnessed the invention of non-Euclidean geometry, of four-dimensional physics, and of discontinuous mechanics may, without undue fear, look towards this undertaking and decide to attack it in earnest. In a certain way the problem of new International Law belongs to the same category as such recent scientific progress. Here also the main task would be to liberate human activity from a certain radical limitation from which it has always suffered: law is static, and there is no form of justice which is not circumscribed by the clause *rebus sic stantibus*. Yet human affairs are not *res stantes*, but, on the contrary, historical phenomena—that is to say, pure movement and perpetual mutation. Traditional law is a collection of rules for paralytic reality. As historical reality changes all the time, it comes into violent conflict with the stability of law which becomes a kind of straitjacket. A straitjacket put on to a healthy man will certainly drive him raving mad. Hence, as I said recently, that strange pathological aspect of history which from one point of view at least makes it appear as an eternal struggle between paralytics and epileptics. The good which law pretends to be turns into evil, as the Bible tells us: 'For ye have turned judgment into gall, and the fruit of righteousness into hemlock' (Amos, vi. 12).

History is, before anything else, the change in the distribution of power, and as long as there are no principles of justice which, even if in theory only, regulate satisfactorily these changes, all pacifism is a waste of time. For if historical reality is, before anything else, such change, it is evident that the greatest injury is the *status quo*. The failure of the League of Nations—in practice, though not in theory, a gigantic apparatus constructed for the administration of the *status quo*—is not surprising.

It is now over seventy years that jurisprudence, both civil and political, has gone through an evolution in this direction. For instance, all modern constitutions try to be 'open' constitutions. Though this expedient is a little too simple, we may mention it here, for it shows the aspiration towards a changing law; but, in my opinion, the most hopeful task would be to analyse thoroughly and to try to define with pre-

cision the most advanced juridical phenomenon which has so far appeared in history—the British Commonwealth of Nations. One may argue that this is impossible, since, as Balfour said in 1926, in imperial questions it is necessary to avoid 'refining, discussing, or defining,' and Sir Austen Chamberlain referred in his speech of September 12, 1925, to a margin of 'elasticity' which escapes definition.

It would be a great error—one frequently made on the Continent—to see in this only the outcome of political opportunism. Far from it. Such statements express adequately the formidable reality of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and describe precisely the juridical aspect of this Commonwealth. Of course they do not define it, since it is not the business of the politician to define, and an English politician has the feeling that to define something is almost to commit high treason. But there are others whose mission is to do what politicians, and especially English politicians, are not allowed to do. In principle it is no more difficult to define a triangle than to define a fog, and it would be of the very greatest importance to reduce to clear ideas the effective juridical relationship which seems essentially to consist in margins of elasticity; for elasticity is the condition which makes a plastic law possible, and, if a margin is provided for, it means that a movement is being expected. Probably the Constitution of the British Empire is very similar to Einstein's 'mollusc of reference,' an idea which at first was thought quite unintelligible and is now the basis of modern physics.

The capacity for discovering such a new technique of justice is pre-affirmed in the juridical tradition of England with greater intensity than in that of any other country, and this is certainly not an accident. The English way of understanding law is only a particular instance of the peculiar character of English thought, in which the intellectual destiny of the Occident finds perhaps its extreme and purest expression—i.e., to interpret everything that is inert and material as pure movement, to substitute movements and functions for that which appears fixed and immovable. England has, in every sense, always been Newtonian.

The idea of a new law is not yet a law. Unfortunately the very name, 'International Law,' prevents a clear vision of what the reality of a law of nations would be, for a law appears

within certain societies, and International Law makes us, on the contrary, imagine a law which regulates relations between societies—that is to say, which operates in a social vacuum. The nations are supposed to come together in this social vacuum and, with the help of a pact, create a new society which, with the magic help of words, would become a ‘Society of Nations.’ The English have very wisely called this society a ‘League.’ This prevents equivocation, but, at the same time, places the participant outside the realm of law and frankly within that of politics. A society constituted by a pact is only a society in the sense which this word has in civil law—that is to say, an association. Such an association can only possess legal reality where a certain civil law and a society, which is not the result of any special pact, but the outcome of a long tradition of communal life, are pre-existent. Authentic society has only the name in common with such a ‘Society,’ created by a pact.

When we speak of nations we tend to represent them to ourselves as separate societies, but this is an abstraction which omits the most important aspect of reality. Doubtless the co-operation and communal relationship between Englishmen amongst themselves is far more intense than, for instance, such a community between Englishmen on the one hand and Germans and Frenchmen on the other. But it is evident that there exists such a community of Europeans, and for this reason, that Europe is a society, many centuries old, with its own history, in the same way as a nation has its history. This European society possesses an index of socialisation which is less high than that achieved in the sixteenth century by the particular societies called European nations. One may therefore say that Europe is a more tenuous society than England or France, but one must not misjudge its character as an effective society. This is of the utmost importance, for the only possibilities of peace which exist depend on whether or not there exists such an effective European society. If Europe is only a plurality of nations, lovers of peace may bid farewell once and for all to their hopes. Amongst unrelated societies there can be no peace. What we then call peace is only a latent and reduced form of war. Instead of imagining the

European nations as a series of disconnected societies, we should learn to see them as members of one society (Europe) within which greater nucleuses of condensation have been achieved. This metaphor corresponds much more closely to the reality of co-operation in Western Europe. My object is not to point to an ideal, but simply to express graphically what such a co-operation really has been since its initiation after the fall of the Roman Empire.

European society is not a society of which the members are nations. As in all authentic societies, its members are human individuals—that is to say, Europeans who, besides being Europeans, are also Englishmen, Germans, or Spaniards. Communal life implies only relations between individuals. But there can be no permanent and stable communal life without the appearance of what is *par excellence* the social phenomenon, namely, custom—intellectual habits or ‘public opinion,’ technical usage, customs which regulate conduct and produce law. The general character of usage lies in the fact that it becomes a norm of conduct which imposes itself on the individual, whether he likes it or not. The individual may, at his own risk, resist usage and custom, but precisely such an effort proves the operative reality of such a collective tradition. Society becomes, therefore, a group of individuals who are aware that they are subject to certain opinions and to a certain hierarchy of values. According to this, there exists no society without the effective validity of a certain conception of the world which acts as an ultimate instance to which it is possible to refer in the case of conflict.

Europe has always been a social whole of marked unity, without absolute frontiers or discontinuities, for there never has been absent that reserve of collective validities—common convictions and tables of values which possess that strange coercive power which is the essence of all that is ‘social.’ It would not be an exaggeration to say that European society existed before the European nations, and that these have been born and have developed in the maternal embrace of such a society. Englishmen may refer to Dawson’s *The Making of Europe*. However, Dawson’s book is insufficient, for he did not entirely rid himself of the arsenal of traditional concepts

employed in historiography. Few intellectual efforts would contribute more to illuminate the horizon than a history of European society without such 'idealisations'; but this has never been clearly *seen*, for traditional history completely obscures this unifying reality which I have *sensu stricto* called European society, and supplanted it by a plural, the Nations or Peoples, as, for instance, in Ranke's *History of the Germanic and Romanic Peoples*. The truth is that these peoples float in the continuous social space which is Europe, in which they move, live and have their being. The history I ask for would tell us the vicissitudes of this European continuity and would show us how the index of sociability has changed, how, on certain occasions, it descended dangerously, and, most important of all, how the proportion of peace in each period stands in direct relationship to this index. The last point is the most important in our present worries.

There can be no doubt that Europe is to-day desocialised—*i.e.*, principles of co-operation which have morally coercive power are absent. One part of Europe tries to bring about a triumph of principles which it considers new; another struggles to defend principles which are traditional. This is the best proof that neither possesses that coercive moral power and have either lost, or not yet reached, the position of points of reference. When an opinion has truly become operative it does not receive its strength from the effort which certain groups employ in imposing it. On the contrary, any given group tries to derive its strength by claiming to be representative of it. To fight for a principle is to declare that it is not yet, or has ceased to be, active. On the other hand, when it is entirely operative, all that is necessary is to use it, to refer to it, to take shelter in it.

When, on the contrary, an idea has lost its character of collective norm, we receive an impression half-comic, half-embarrassing, if somebody considers it sufficient to allude to it in order to feel justified and strengthened by it. This has happened all too frequently in England and in the United States, for instance, where the references to a supposed 'civilised world opinion' are concerned. We are perplexed. Does such conduct imply an error or a deliberate fiction? Is it nonsense or tactics? We do not know what to decide, for the function of expression may represent something quite

different for the Anglo-Saxon than for other European peoples. The obvious truth is that Europe has lived for several years in a state of war which is substantially more radical than at any other time in her past history. This seems to me confirmed by the fact that there not only exists war between peoples, but also within most nations. It is frivolous to interpret the authoritarian régimes of our times as the result of caprice or intrigue, for it is only too evident that they are inevitable manifestations of the state of latent or open civil war in which nearly all countries live at present.

The weakening of the community between the peoples of Western Europe is equivalent to an enormous moral distance between them. In the past common principles used to amount to a kind of language which made understanding possible. It was therefore not necessary that each nation should know well and *singulatim* each of the other nations. The separation is now complicated in a dangerous manner by another fact which is apparently opposed to it. For over a century we were told that new methods of communication had brought the nations together and unified life all over the world. But all this talk was an exaggeration. Human affairs begin as legends and only later become realities. In this case we see clearly that we were dealing with an enthusiastic anticipation. Some of the means which were to make approximation effective existed already in principle—steamships, railways, the telegraph and the telephone. But neither were the inventions perfect, nor had they been put into service to a large extent, nor had the most important inventions yet been made, such as the internal combustion engine and wireless telegraphy. The nineteenth century, overcome with emotion in the face of these first great conquests of scientific technique, began to pour forth torrents of rhetoric about material progress, etc., so that towards the end of the century people had grown tired of these commonplaces, although they thought that they were true—that is, they had persuaded themselves that the nineteenth century had in fact realised already what these empty phrases proclaimed. This has occasioned a curious mistake in historical perspective which makes it difficult to understand many of our present conflicts.

The average man, convinced that the previous century had achieved these great advances, does not realise that the period of inventions and their realisation has been only that of the last forty years. The number and importance of discoveries and the realm in which they have been effectively applied in this very short period is far superior to the whole past of the human race. That means that the effective technical transformation of the world is a very recent fact, and that this change is producing now—now and not during the last century—its radical consequences. To take only one instance: suddenly, during these last years, every country receives hourly, and even every minute, so great a quantity of recent news concerning events in other countries that this has produced the illusion of close proximity. In so far as public life is concerned, the size of the world has shrunk. The peoples have unexpectedly found themselves in active proximity to each other, and this happens precisely at the hour when the European peoples are morally at a great distance from each other. As we have just emerged from an historical epoch in which approximation was *apparently* easy, we tend to forget how great a caution is necessary in order to approach that wild animal with occasional angelic moods which is Man.

During the last few months there has been much talk of intervention and non-intervention of one country in the life of another, but we have heard nothing, or at least not with sufficient emphasis, about the intervention which at present the public opinion of one nation exercises *de facto* upon the life of another. This, in my opinion, is fraught with graver consequences than the intervention of Governments. A Government is, after all, a relatively rationalised organ within each society. Its interventions are deliberate, adjusted to right proportions, in accordance with the will of certain responsible individuals who cannot be entirely lacking in reflection and sense of responsibility. But the opinion of a whole people, or of large social groups, is an elemental power, impulsive and irresponsible, which offers itself defencelessly to the influence of every kind of intrigue. Nevertheless, public opinion, when it emits opinions on the life of its own country, is always 'justified,' in the sense that it is not incongruous with reference to the events which it is

judging. The realities which it is judging have happened to the judging subject. The English, when they emit opinions on the grave questions which affect England, are judging facts which have happened to themselves, which they have experienced in their own flesh and in their own soul, which they have 'lived' and which are, in short, part and parcel of themselves. How, therefore, can they be essentially wrong?

Exactly the opposite occurs where the opinion of one country about the events in another are concerned. It is in the highest degree probable that such opinion will be entirely incongruous. A people A. judges the affairs of a people B., based on the innermost essence of its own vital experiences, which are different from those of B. Can this lead anywhere except to an interplay of absurdities? Nothing is further from my mind than to limit the exercise of the free will of Englishmen and Americans by discussing their 'right' to emit whatever opinions they like on whatever subject they like. There is no question of 'rights,' nor of the despicable phraseology which hides behind this word. It is simply a question of common-sense. I maintain that the intervention of 'public opinion' of some countries in the life of others is nowadays a poisonous factor which generates warlike passions, since this public opinion is not yet governed by a technique adjusted to the change in distance between peoples. The Englishman and the American may be entitled to emit an opinion on what has happened or should happen in Spain, but such a right is an insult and an injury if he does not accept the corresponding obligation of being well informed as to the reality of the Spanish civil war, of which the first and most important part is its origin and the causes which have brought it about.

It is here that the present means of communication produce their effects which, for the moment, are evil. The quantity of news which one country constantly receives concerning events in another is enormous. How can it be easy to persuade an Englishman that he is not well informed concerning the Spanish war, or any other similar important event? He knows that English newspapers spend large sums on keeping correspondents in different countries. He knows that, although amongst those correspondents some fulfil their function with no small measure of passionate partisan-

ship, there are yet many others whose impartiality is unquestionable and on whose punctilious precision in transmitting precise facts it is not easy to improve upon. All this is true, and because it is true it is extremely dangerous. For it happens that if an Englishman goes in his memory over the last three or four years he will find that events have taken place of the utmost consequence to England and that he has been *surprised*. As in history nothing of importance occurs suddenly, the Englishman might well admit the possibility that he is far less well informed than he usually believes, and that that vast information which reaches him is composed of external data arranged without careful perspective, amongst which that which is authentically real escapes.

While in Madrid the Communists and their associates forced, under grave threats, writers and University Professors to sign manifestos, to speak on the wireless, etc. ; some well-known English writers signed another manifesto in which they guaranteed that those Communists and their friends were the defenders of democratic liberty. Let me avoid all exaggerated gestures, but let me invite the English reader to imagine what might be my first reaction faced with such a fact which partakes of the grotesque and the tragic. Fortunately, from my point of view, I have busied myself during many years to point out the frivolity and irresponsibility which are frequent in the European 'intellectual,' which I have denounced as a factor of the first magnitude amongst the causes of the present disorder. But such moderation is not 'natural.' It would, on the contrary, be natural that I should now engage in violent warfare against those English writers. The incident might serve as a further concrete example of the bellicose mechanism which produces mutual lack of knowledge amongst the peoples. A short time ago Albert Einstein thought himself possessed of the 'right' to emit an opinion on the Spanish civil war. Einstein enjoys the most complete ignorance concerning the past, the present and the future of Spain. The spirit which moves him to this insolent intervention is the same which has caused for a long time the general loss of prestige of the intellectual worker, which, at the same time, has had, as a consequence, that the world is drifting for lack of *pouvoir spirituel*.

Let me take another, more general example. The English

Labour Party has refused, by 2,100,000 votes against 300,000, to join forces with the Communists. These numbers show that for the English Labour Party the union with Communism—in other words, the 'Popular Front'—is not an unimportant question, but that the party would consider it a terrible disease for the English nation. But it happens that, at the same time, the same political group devotes itself to cultivating this infection in other countries ; and this is an intervention, one might even say a warlike act, since it has many characteristics in common with chemical warfare.

I am of the opinion that in the present world situation movements of public opinion in one country concerning happenings in another are real incursions into that country. This, by itself, would be already sufficient to explain why, at the moment when the European nations seemed nearer to a superficial unification, they have suddenly begun to shut themselves up in themselves and to convert their frontiers into isolating diving-suits. I believe that we have here a new problem of the greatest importance for international discipline, which is parallel to the juridical one which I have outlined. We have pointed to the necessity of a new juridical technique ; in this case a new technique of relations between countries is necessary. In England the individual has learned to observe a certain prudent reticence when he takes the liberty of emitting an opinion concerning another person. In England also the law of slander and libel is a social reality, and we have the even more formidable dictatorship of good manners. There seems to be no reason why an international opinion should not be similarly regulated.

But do not let us lose hope. It is true that at the moment European society seems volatilised ; yet it would be a mistake to believe that this means the disappearance or final dispersion of such a society. On the contrary, the present state of anarchy and superlative dissociation is one more proof of its reality. If this happens in Europe the reason is a crisis of the common European faith in the active values which are the basis of this greater society. The disease is thus a common one. The danger is not that Europe is diseased, but that this or the other nation enjoys excellent health, and that,

therefore, the disappearance of Europe is at least possible with the consequent substitution of another form of historical reality, for instance, entirely separated nations, or an Eastern Europe, divorced to the root from Western Europe. Nothing of the kind appears immediately on the political horizon; and since the disease is common and European, so will the convalescence be common and European.

First of all, it seems to me there will come an articulation of Europe into two different forms of public life: a new Liberalism, and that which, quite improperly, it is usual to call Totalitarianism. The secondary countries will adopt various transitional forms. And this will save Europe. Once more it will become evident that every form of life needs its antagonist. 'Totalitarianism' will save 'Liberalism,' giving it some of its colour, cleansing it, and, thanks to this process, we shall also see a new Liberalism temper the authoritarian régimes. This purely mechanical and provisional equilibrium will permit a new epoch of a minimum of peace, which is necessary in order that from spiritual confusion there may come forth renewed faith. Faith is the authentic power of all historical creation.

JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET.

*Don José Ortega y Gasset, born in 1883, a Professor of Philosophy in the University of Madrid after formative years of study in the University of Marburg, is a thinker and writer pre-eminent among those who have increased to an incalculable degree the 'awareness' of the modern Spaniard. He is probably better known in Germany than in Anglo-Saxon countries. Not only have several of his works been well translated into German, but competent studies have been published (Curtius, von Taube, Diebold, Count Keyserling, etc.). Hardly a problem, philosophical, aesthetic or political, has appeared above the intellectual horizon of Europe which he has not presented in his extremely personal style to the younger generation in Spain. Lack of space forbids an even brief survey of his thought; his approach to Spanish problems from *Vieja y Nueva Política*, 1914, through *España Invertebrada*, 1921, to the critique of the Republic in *Rectificación de la República*; his political theory (Mirabeau, 1927, and *La Rebelión de las Masas*, 1930, see the French translation with a recent preface); his philosophical and historical theories (*Meditaciones del Quijote*, 1914, *Personas*, *Obras*, *Cosas*, 1916, seven volumes of *El Espectador passim*, and, the most significant work in this category, *El Tema de Nuestro Tiempo*, 1923); his pedagogic ideas in *La Pedagogía Social como Programa Político*, contained in the volume *Personas, Obras, Cosas*, to *Misión de la Universidad*, 1930; art and literature *passim*, and explicitly in *La Deshumanización del Arte*, 1921, and *Goethe desde dentro*, 1933. For many years he presided over *La Revista de Occidente*, a distinguished summary of contemporary thought.*

*Together with Sr. Pérez de Ayala, known in London as former Ambassador of the Spanish Republic, and to the world as one of the most eminent Spanish living writers, and Sr. Marañón, physician, biologist and essayist of European reputation, he contributed to the foundation of a Republican party which prepared the way for the fall of the Monarchy. Like the other two (in regard to Sr. Ayala's views see *The Times* of June 10; concerning Dr. Marañón's a remarkable article in *La Revue de Paris* of December 15, 1937), he has refused from the beginning to recognise the Barcelona Government as the legitimate offspring of the original Republic.*

—A. P.

NORTH-EAST AFRICA—I.

By MAJOR E. W. POLSON NEWMAN

WHEN Napoleon said that 'Egypt is the most important country in the world' he did not foresee the coming of the internal combustion engine. Had he anticipated the conquest of the air and the opening up of remote and hitherto impassable regions by modern mechanical transport, he would possibly have extended his dictum to cover the whole of North-East Africa—i.e., Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Italian East Africa (comprising Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland), and French and British Somalilands. For thousands of years the Nile has made North-East Africa a most important area in the various stages of development of the political and economic world. Last century the opening of the Suez Canal for world shipping greatly increased the significance of this region. To-day aviation is rapidly making these countries into great transit routes for the swift movement of passengers and mails to and from distant parts of Africa and Asia. Motor transport is forging efficient routes for quick transit and trade in districts which have only known the meagre services of the camel, the mule and the ass. This means that North-East Africa is destined to see great changes before many years have passed. Most important in this connexion is the birth of a new Ethiopia, which will in course of time contribute an ever-increasing share in the development of the area served by the Nile and the Red Sea.

Serious as were the political repercussions of the Italo-Ethiopian War in Europe as well as in Africa, the net result is now in favour of co-operation in Africa between the European Powers chiefly concerned in that dispute, and between them and the now independent kingdom of Egypt. Great Britain and Egypt, realising two years ago the necessity of safeguarding their mutual interests, quickly decided to

settle their minor differences in the face of greater issues. The result has been the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance, which has at last put an end to what was known as the 'Egyptian Question.' When this was done, it gradually came to be realised that in the Mediterranean, in North-East Africa, and in the Red Sea Britain and Italy must be either firm friends or fierce foes, and that in reality their respective interests are complementary where they are not identical. It became obvious to the people of Britain that friendship and co-operation with Italy was the only sane course to follow. Hence, with the happy conclusion of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, we now see Britain with Egypt as her ally about to pursue a policy of African partnership with Italy, which must have a beneficial effect wherever its influence is felt. So comprehensive and detailed is this new Agreement that there is little room for misunderstanding, and it is encouraging that France is showing signs of following the British lead in seeking a satisfactory settlement with Italy regarding her interests in the Mediterranean and Red Sea. When this has been achieved and the respective agreements reached have been put into operation, the way will be clear for development and progress of a kind that is only possible in an atmosphere of friendly collaboration.

In this series of articles, the first of which deals chiefly with Egypt and the Sudan and the second with Italian East Africa and her neighbours, I am giving an account of information obtained during a recent journey to Cairo, Khartoum and Addis Abeba for the purpose of finding out on what general lines, political and economic, co-operation is now possible, or is likely to be made possible. As it is of course too early to form any definite conclusions on questions so full of factors calling for expert investigation, the object of these articles is rather to show the way in which people are thinking in the various countries of North-East Africa, and to give some idea of future possibilities. In Egypt I discussed these questions with Ministers and others both before and after the signing of the Anglo-Italian Agreement; in the Sudan all my conversations took place before this event; and I was in the capital of Italian East Africa on the day on which the Agreement was signed.

Situated on the Mediterranean and Red Seas, and with

the Nile and Suez Canal passing through her territory, Egypt is the central pivot on which all transit between North-East Africa and Europe must at present converge. Let us therefore begin by examining the effect of recent events on that country. With the coming into force of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty the internal affairs of Egypt are now in the hands of the Egyptians themselves. It is no longer a matter of British interest what party is in power in Egypt or what domestic policy that party pursues. There is as a result of this a noticeable consciousness on the part of Egyptian Ministers and officials of all grades that they are now standing on their own feet, and they are obviously anxious that their own efforts should succeed. Above all, they are determined to carry out the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in spirit as well as in letter, and to show the British people that their trust in Egypt has not been misplaced. Hence the Egyptians are at present susceptible to any British move that might be construed as interference with their internal affairs. Although many Ministries and departments must suffer from the loss of British advisers and administrative officials, it is in many cases remarkable to see the enthusiasm of Egyptian officials for their complete responsibility in the conduct of their affairs. Making due allowance for Oriental methods of doing things, there is no doubt that serious efforts are being made in all Ministries and departments to make Egypt worthy of the complete independence which she has now attained. The natural pride of the Egyptians in their country, in themselves and in the trust which Great Britain has placed in them, should go a long way towards ensuring success of their efforts. Moreover, their loyalty and affection for the young King Farouk has tended to bring about a certain unity out of the political differences that have long been the bane of Egypt. Wherever the King goes large crowds turn out to see him; and almost every day in Cairo crowds are to be seen making their way to some street many hours before the King is due to pass. His Majesty works hard, takes a keen interest in all spheres of Egyptian life, and is most anxious to acquire information on any subject that might be of interest to his country. In view of the future prospects of the part of Africa in which Egypt must always play a most important part, the new King has a great

opportunity of improving the political prestige and economic position of his country.

While hitherto nearly all the public services connected with Egypt have been in the hands of foreign companies, there is now a strong movement to bring as much of this as possible within the control of the Egyptians themselves. Three Egyptian steamship companies have now established services with Mediterranean and Red Sea ports. The Misr Sea Navigation Company, with a capital of £E.20,000 and a Government subsidy, maintains an efficient service for passengers and cargo between Alexandria and Europe; the Alexandria Navigation Company has also a capital of £E.20,000 and a Government subsidy; while the Pharaonic Mail Company has only recently been formed and has not yet been subsidised. As a proof that the Egyptians have not been slow in appreciating the value of aviation, the Misr Airworks Company has been operating since 1932 with a capital of £E.40,000 and a Government subsidy of approximately £E.60,000 per annum. Daily air services are maintained from Cairo to Alexandria, Port Said and Assiut, and twice-weekly services in the winter season to Luxor and Assuan; there is also a regular twice-weekly service to Baghdad and a daily service to Palestine and Syria. Another feature of the Egyptian tendency towards autonomy has been the recent development of industries in a country which is primarily agricultural. Since Egypt obtained in 1930 full liberty in the matter of tariff policy an impetus has been given to textile, sugar, leather and other industries, which help to reduce imports and give employment to many who cannot find work on the land. Fortunately the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Cairo is a progressive organisation which works with a view to the future; and there are prospects of increased industry when new roads are built according to the terms of the Treaty, and there is talk of using for industrial purposes the water-power of the Assuan Dam.

Although to every Egyptian national independence is a highly cherished possession, the feeling of the people as a whole towards Great Britain is now one of close friendship and respect. This is noticeable in most sections of the community, although there is a strong feeling in some quarters about Britain's attitude towards the Arabs of Pales-

tine. The Egyptians now feel that Britain is there as an ally in case of need, and that British support now guarantees Egyptian independence without interfering with it. During the last three years Italy's action in Ethiopia has caused considerable apprehension in Egypt, and this feeling was intensified by the large number of Italian troops in Libya, which seemed to be far in excess of the numbers required for the defence of that country. As these events caused a high degree of tension between Great Britain and Italy, many Egyptians feared that British and Italian interests were irreconcilable and began to think of a clash of armed forces in which Egypt would be the battleground. They foresaw a threat to their western frontier from the direction of Libya, danger to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in the south, interference with the waters of the Blue Nile, and difficulties in connexion with the Suez Canal. This fear, however, was not shared by more responsible Ministers, who realised that, if Italy's new position in Africa was strategically unfavourable to Egypt, the Sudan and the Nile Valley, its communications were most vulnerable the whole way from the shores of Italy to the ports of her new Empire. Moreover, all her traffic had to pass through the Suez Canal. These Ministers also realised that Britain and Italy had to be either on the best or worst of terms, and that the latter was in the long run unthinkable. Even before the signature of the Anglo-Italian Agreement I was assured on high authority that Egypt was in no way adversely affected by Italy's occupation of Ethiopia, but that, on the other hand, there were prospects of economic benefit arising from Italy's expansion in Africa. The general opinion in the Ministries of Cairo at that time was that the time had come for co-operation for mutual benefit. On my return to Cairo after the signature of the Agreement all fears had been dissipated, and opinion was practically unanimous in its appreciation of the comprehensive and definite nature of the settlement. In view of this there was a strong desire to co-operate with the Italians and to find a way of overcoming difficulties. Yet there seems to be little chance of Egypt being able to provide transit facilities that would relieve Italy of the heavy burden of the Suez Canal dues. Owing to the heavy freight charges over so great a distance and the necessity of transferring goods from river to rail (in some

cases twice over), there would be no saving either in the time or cost of transit. The only way in which Egypt can at present act as a transit country for Italian East Africa is in the matter of commercial aviation, which is likely to increase to a considerable extent in the near future for passengers, mails and light classes of goods. The Ala Littoria Company already runs four services a week each way between Rome and Addis Abeba *via* Benghazi, Cairo, Wadi Halfa, Khartoum and Asmara. But, as soon as adequate landing-grounds have been established in western Ethiopia and faster machines have been delivered, it is intended to accelerate the service so as to cover the journey in two days instead of four. Cairo will then be the 'half-way house' between Italy and Italian East Africa. As far as actual trade is concerned, Egypt's purchases from Ethiopia have been confined to coffee, hides and skins, and a few other articles, while her exports were negligible until the Italian occupation. Since then they have chiefly consisted of fuel for motor transport.

Naturally Egypt's chief interest in Ethiopia is the water of Lake Tana and the possibility of building a dam to store the water for release at the time it is most needed. In the Anglo-Italian Agreement definite assurances are given in this respect, although the procedure to be followed remains to be discussed. In recent years there has been divergence of views as to the advisability of building this dam, but the present Minister of Public Works in Egypt seems to favour the project. He has assured me that there are no technical difficulties, and that the cost would not exceed £E.1,000,000. Curiously enough, the only difficulties envisaged are of a religious nature, due to the fact that the raising of the level of the lake would flood certain Ethiopian churches and monasteries in the neighbourhood. It is further stated quite definitely in Cairo that any power station which the Italians might erect for generating electricity would not interfere in any way either with the proposed dam or with the water needed for irrigation in Egypt and the Sudan. The original arrangement with the previous Government of Ethiopia was that the contract for building the dam should be given to the White Engineering Company of America; but it is difficult to imagine the Italians foregoing the opportunity of carrying out the work themselves and paying for the undertaking in

their own currency. In these circumstances it is possible that an arrangement might be made whereby the Italians would sell the water to Egypt and the Sudan in exchange for sterling.¹ Indeed, this might be one way of helping to solve the currency difficulty to which I will refer later on. But it is as well to remember that the Sudan is the country that would benefit most from the construction of this work, as the water of Lake Tana itself only forms one-fiftieth part of that which passes through the Assuan Dam in Egypt. In many other kinds of constructional work the Italians have long rendered valuable service to Egypt, and there are about 50,000 of them in the country. In Cairo, a city which is rapidly increasing in size and importance, a large proportion of the new blocks of flats and dwelling-houses are Italian built, while among the less modern buildings to the credit of the Italian firm of Garozzo are the National Museum of Egyptian Antiquities (famous for the Tutankhamen treasures) and the Hotel Continental. Besides this the Italians conduct extensive business in banking and insurance, and supply a considerable number of artisans and workmen. As far as actual Italian influence and prestige are concerned, there has been no appreciable change as a result of the Italo-Ethiopian War. It is therefore apparent that the Italians are in a favourable position to participate in such development schemes as Egypt may carry out to meet the needs of changing conditions over a large African area. The Egyptians naturally want their country with its capital to be the centre of gravity of as many North-East African interests as possible; and they will undoubtedly make transit concessions if this is likely to bring benefit in other directions.

Before proceeding to deal with the position in the Sudan and Italian East Africa, let us briefly consider Egypt's position with regard to Libya. At this point it is essential to stop looking at atlases and to turn to large-scale maps. In the former, Libya appears to be a vast area of great importance in North Africa; in reality it is little more than a strip of cultivated coastal oases stretching along the Mediterranean littoral, with the well-appointed cities of Tripoli and Benghazi and a first-class coast road connecting Tunis with the Egyptian

¹ In the negotiations with the previous Ethiopian Government the sum of £E.50,000 per annum was mentioned.

frontier. The remainder of Libya consists of sand. In the same way Egypt, which also has a formidable appearance in the atlas, is in fact confined to the Nile Delta and Valley. Here also the remainder is sand. Hence, many things which look possible in a small-scale map may look quite unfeasible when the country is reproduced on a larger scale. It is also as well to remember that many places marked in comparatively large type on maps of these regions are in reality very small and insignificant when seen through European eyes. Some may be villages with a few huts, some may be centres where caravan routes meet, others may be water-holes. In many parts of Africa a water-hole is life or death to the inhabitants of a large region; it may be much more important to the people of that region than Birmingham is to England. Apart from the steamships plying between Alexandria and Libyan ports, the only other communications are the Italian air service to Benghazi and the caravan route to the frontier. While the road on the Italian side is finished right up to the Egyptian frontier at Sollum, on the Egyptian side it is still merely a track. When this trade route is opened up in the near future, it is possible that some small regular trade may replace Egypt's supply of agricultural produce for consumption by nomads across the frontier. Although in this region of nomadic tribes the frontier is continually being crossed for grazing and watering purposes, the relations between the Italian and Egyptian officials are cordial, as is proved by the lack of incidents. As the frontier control consists of a series of customs posts in a long line of barbed wire, it is remarkable that the movements of men, animals and merchandise is not accompanied by continuous friction. But a closer all-round contact between Egypt and Libya is an important factor in North-East African co-operation.

At a time when Egypt's position in the Sudan has been strengthened by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the Egyptians are anxious to improve communications and stimulate trade between the two countries. These questions are now receiving the close attention of the Sudan Permanent Committee of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Cairo, which is recognised as being of a semi-official nature. This committee has its counterpart in connexion with the Chamber of Commerce in Khartoum. There have been exchanges of

visits between these two bodies, and a report has been drawn up with definite recommendations. These deal with such questions as unity of communications by rail, telephone and telegraph, reciprocal preferential tariffs, and arrangements for exhibitions of each other's produce. The most important of these recommendations concerns the extension of the Egyptian State Railways from Assuan to Wadi Halfa to join the Sudan Railway connexion with Khartoum. As at present the journey from Assuan to Wadi Halfa has to be made by Sudan Government steamer through Egyptian territory, the Egyptians are naturally anxious to carry out this project. If this railway were constructed, direct rail communication would be established from Alexandria to Kosti on the White Nile (a distance of 1723 miles) and to Sennar on the Blue Nile (a distance of 1653 miles), from which point a line runs east to Gedaref and then north through Kassala to Port Sudan. The main obstacle in connexion with this project is the difficulty of building a railway through the rocky country south of Assuan; but this would seem to be a minor engineering feat when compared with the road-building being carried out over the mountain ranges of Ethiopia. It is also suggested that the navigation of the Nile between Assuan and Wadi Halfa should be greatly speeded up and carried out by Egyptian steamers. All these proposals are in the right direction, and if carried out would certainly help to bring the Sudan in closer touch with Egypt and Europe.

Few territories show the British capacity to control native races in so favourable a light as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, where under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty there is now a policy of gradually encouraging the Sudanese themselves to participate more in the government of their own country. Although this process must be slow and for some considerable time confined to junior officials, the tendency now is to replace junior British and Egyptian officials in outlying districts by Sudanese wherever possible, and gradually to give higher administrative and judicial posts to Egyptians as well as to British subjects. This should in course of time produce a better balance in the representation of the two partners in this hybrid form of administration. The imposing Government buildings of Khartoum and the high efficiency of the Sudan Government Railways, steamers

and hotels give a wrong impression of a country in which the European population is confined to a mere handful of British officials, British and foreign merchants, and a few missionaries. The great mass of the population is composed of native peoples of different races, languages and characteristics, living in districts differing greatly from one another. The Sudan has as yet been little affected by Italy's occupation of Ethiopia except in so far as the frontier districts are concerned. Here there is no longer any raiding from the Ethiopian side of the frontier, and the smuggling of arms has been reduced to a minimum. This is due to the systematic control of the arms traffic by the Sudanese authorities on the spot and to the excellent relations between the British and Italian frontier officials. As most of the latter are chosen from among English-speaking Italians, the relations at the frontier posts are such that local politics are merged into pleasant social relations. At Gambela, where there is a British concession for the navigation of the Baro, I found the British and Italian officials living and working together in the greatest harmony. This happy state of affairs has superseded a long period when Ethiopian raids were the curse of the Sudan frontier and formed the subject-matter of many pages in most Sudan Government reports. When the Italians occupied the Ethiopian frontier districts and began a systematic collection of native arms and ammunition, there was a natural desire on the part of the inhabitants to try to sell arms to the Sudan rather than give them to the Italians. This movement, however, has been frustrated on both sides of the frontier. The frontier line between Ethiopia and the Sudan has been for the most part demarcated, but there are districts, mainly in the south, where small exchanges of territory are necessary to regularise the position brought about by the nomadic nature of the frontier tribes. In some cases there are tribes which really belong to Ethiopia but live during certain seasons in the Sudan; and there are others in the Sudan which cross into Ethiopia for grazing purposes. Although these irregularities present no actual difficulties at the moment, the whole frontier line will have to be reviewed as a result of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. The Italian-Sudanese frontier now runs from Ras Kasar, a point on the Red Sea coast about half-way between Port Sudan and

Massawa, to Lake Rudolf, where the frontier lines of Ethiopia, the Sudan and Kenya join.

While the railways and steamers in the Sudan maintain most efficient services, the road system falls far short of that needed for the motor transport which has now superseded camel caravans on the principal trade routes. The roads are little more than tracks passable for motor transport in fine weather, with bridges built over rivers and ravines. The only tarmac roads in the country outside the chief towns are those being built from Juba to Aba in the Belgian Congo and to Nimule on the Uganda border. All roads leading to the Ethiopian frontier are mere tracks with no foundation, and in many cases their course is changed from one season to another. In wet weather these routes are impassable, and motor transport is stopped by order of the Government. While on the Italian side tarred roads are being built towards the frontier posts of Sabderat, Gallabat, Kurmuk and Gambela, the Sudan Government show no intention of building all-weather roads on their side until the pressure of trade makes this absolutely necessary. A point, however, to bear in mind is that, trade and transit excluded, tarred roads are essential for the Ethiopian rains and for the development of the country, while this is not so in the case of the Sudan. Also, apart from the fact that the Sudan Government disfavour road competition with their own railways and steamers, there are at present difficulties in the way of economic relations. But, as the Italians have every desire to make use of the Sudan transit routes for the greater part of western Ethiopia, possibly the Sudan Government will decide to run their own motor transport to feed their railway and steamer services, or come to some arrangement with private transport contractors. There are at present certain technical difficulties in the type of motor vehicles now operating in the Sudan. While the Italians' heavy lorries with diesel engines can be run economically, the light motor trucks of the Sudan have a heavy petrol consumption at £E.8 a ton. Experiments, however, are to be made with diesel engine lorries, and it is hoped that they will prove suitable for Sudanese conditions. In spite of these difficulties, transport lorries are already making their way from Khartoum to Addis Abeba *via* Kurmuk, Neggio, Ghimbi and Lekemti. But, although the Sudan is

the natural outlet for western Ethiopia and there are no transit dues as in Egypt, the currency question is a serious obstacle to all trade and transit arrangements. Some solution of this question must be found in any trade agreement arising out of the Anglo-Italian Agreement.

The present position is that a small but long-established trade continues between the Sudan and Italian East Africa by the transit routes of Kassala, Gallabat, Kurmuk and Gambela. The Sudan imports coffee, wax, hides and skins, and sells in return salt, cotton goods, artificial silk, linen and a collection of odds and ends. Many of the textiles mentioned come from Japan through the market of Omdurman. The great difficulty experienced by Sudan traders is that they receive payment in Italian lire which they cannot take out of Italian East Africa, and they cannot even have their credits transferred to Italy. Hence, Khartoum firms have frozen credits in Massawa and Addis Abeba, and are reluctant to continue business on these lines. The result is that a certain amount of private barter trade is carried on, and lire are smuggled out of the country and exchanged at Alexandria at the rate of 15s. per 100 lire. Yet there is in both countries a wish to exchange goods and services. While Italian companies in western Ethiopia have been instructed to sell to the Sudan rather than locally or to Italy, the Sudan authorities reduced a year ago the freights from Gambela to Port Sudan through fear of losing the transit trade. It now costs £E.6 a ton to transport coffee from Gambela to Port Sudan, which is 10s. less than the freight to Khartoum. On the Italian side there is a great need of sterling currency, and the authorities are trying to devise ways of overcoming this obstacle. Some of the suggestions may be quickly abandoned in favour of others, but they show the directions in which the Italian mind is working. Although the question of a British loan to Italy is never mentioned by Italian officials as falling outside their self-contained financial policy, official opinion in Egypt and elsewhere strongly favours such a course. The Italians have, however, already taken action to facilitate the investment of foreign capital in Italy in the terms of the Royal Decree Law No. 2375 of December 6, 1937, and the facilities given also apply to Italian East Africa. According to this measure foreign capital can be introduced into the country

for investment in approved enterprises and withdrawn in foreign currency at will. The rent, interest and profits up to a maximum of 5 per cent. on landed property, loans and bonds can also be withdrawn, as well as the dividends and interest (without limit) on bearer shares or bonds purchased or subscribed in Italy by foreigners. These facilities, which remain open till the end of next year, carry with them important exemptions from taxation. One paragraph in particular is worth quoting *verbatim*: 'Furthermore, such investments and securities shall not, even in the event of war, be confiscated, expropriated without indemnity, or otherwise blocked in such a manner as to prevent their free disposal.' It is now maintained that such investment of foreign capital would actually contribute to the more rapid realisation of Italian self-sufficiency; and it is claimed that, in view of the geographical position of western Ethiopia with regard to Egypt and the Sudan, British and Egyptian capital should find investment in that country attractive. It is also believed that in a country where the climate is almost European and cultivation is cheap foreigners will interest themselves in development projects. The Italians foresee here a means whereby they can reach self-sufficiency through a policy of producing at lower cost than elsewhere, and thereby overcoming competition in the world markets. In this way it is hoped that the produce of Italian East Africa will find a ready sale in the markets of Egypt and the Sudan. As a forerunner of the important development which the Italians expect in this extensive region of great fertility, the Banco di Roma has already opened branches at Saio, Lekemti, Gimma and Gambela. This bank has on two occasions applied for permission to open a branch at Khartoum; the requests were refused some time prior to the Anglo-Italian Agreement. As the business of such a bank in Khartoum would be done through the British and Egyptian banks, there seems to be no reason why this facility to trade should not be granted when the Agreement comes into force, provided that the arrangement is reciprocal in the event of British and Egyptian banks wanting to open branches in Addis Abeba.

One hears a great deal about the possibilities of the Ethiopian coffee crop as a means of exchange for Sudan goods and transit; but inquiries in the Sudan make it fairly evident

that there is little chance of increasing the present coffee purchases. Moreover, there is now a tendency on the part of the Sudanese to drink tea instead of coffee owing to the fact that it is easier to prepare. In 1936 the coffee imports amounted to £E.273,446, and the tea imports to £E.244,065. Although the extensive resources of high-class coffee in Ethiopia may well be of considerable value to the Italians in world markets in course of time, I cannot see how this is going to help them at the present moment in their economic relations with the Sudan. A more immediate remedy is likely to be forthcoming in the exploitation of the known gold resources of the country and in the discovery of new sources of supply. The prospects in Eritrea are now much brighter than a year ago; and there is no longer any doubt that gold exists in western Ethiopia, in reefs as well as in fine gold, the whole way from Lekemti to Saio. But the most comprehensive and long-range possibility of obtaining sterling is wrapped up in an idea of making commercial use of the vast downpour of water during the rains, which fall in different districts in different seasons of the year. Although this conception may at first sight seem fantastic, the fact remains that a country with annual torrential rains marches with countries to which water from outside their frontiers is a vital need. In Ethiopia, apart from the rainfall that swells the tributaries of the Nile, much finds its way into the Omo, which flows into Lake Rudolf, and into the Awash, which loses itself in the Danakil desert. There is also a great quantity which fills the torrents (dried-up watercourses) during the rainy season, and is either lost in the ground or fills no useful purpose. The idea is that by means of small dams and artificial lakes much of this water could be collected, partly for irrigation purposes within the country and partly for supplementing the water of the Nile tributaries during seasons when water is most needed in the Sudan and Egypt. Although there is of course no question of taking any action with regard to anything affecting the Nile waters without the full consent and collaboration of the Sudan and Egypt, it has been suggested that sterling could be obtained in payment for the extra water added by this means to the normal Nile supply. In other words, a scheme such as this might enable the Italians to convert lire into sterling by constructing

works and selling water. Against this the Egyptians say that they do not want any more water at present, and the Sudan's financial position is such that the purchase of extra water would be a heavy burden though possibly a good investment.² Yet the principle embodied in this idea may ultimately lead somewhere. An example of what the Italians hope to do by this means in Eritrea is worthy of note. It is proposed to build a small dam about six miles north of Keren to create an artificial lake from the water of the Anseba. This will be conducted by means of a canal and a short tunnel through the mountains to the Lebka torrent, which will in turn convey it towards sea level for the irrigation of the large plain north of Massawa. This forbidding district will then be made cultivable.

While it is true that exports from Italian East Africa have been reduced to a low level since the occupation, there are obvious reasons for this. The old export system collapsed with the war, and proper communications have to be established before the country's resources can be developed and trade can begin again on new lines. This means that a considerable proportion of the native population is engaged on road-building and other public works. In a plan for the construction of 7000 miles of roads 3000 miles have still to be built. Also, the long-established trade in hides and skins is now being completely reorganised on modern lines, and is almost at a standstill. These considerations, together with the increase of the European population from 2000 to 500,000, have temporarily reduced the export trade to small proportions. Now the Italians are anxious to sell to the Sudan, but have little to offer which the Sudan wants over and above coffee exports, valued in 1936 at £E.189,715. Both are agricultural countries. The Sudan's total imports from Ethiopia in that year were only £E.197,887, a figure which, in spite of the war, was higher than in the two preceding years. In the same year exports (chiefly salt) from the Sudan amounted to £E.46,362, which, owing to the war, was almost exactly double the figures of the previous year. As the great agricultural and as yet unestimated mineral resources of Italian East Africa are developed, there is no doubt that some kind of market will be found in the Sudan. Yet the real

² Sudan revenue, 1936, £E.4,462,309; expenditure, £E.4,204,917.

importance of the Sudan to the Italians will be as a transit country, and this I shall deal with at length in the next article. As an example of how the Sudan can serve Italian East Africa and at the same time benefit herself, an Anglo-Italian company has applied for a concession to exploit the timber resources of the Upper Dadessa Valley. This company proposes to float the timber down the Blue Nile to Roseires, and to have it cut and worked in the Sudan for export *via* Port Sudan. Negotiations are now in progress, and it is hoped that this is only the beginning of many enterprises of a similar nature.

That the natural resources of Italian East Africa are great is convincing to all who know that country, and in the series of articles which I wrote for this Review a year ago I endeavoured to state these resources in some detail. In this case, as in many others, it is necessary to see in order to believe; and for this reason it is probable that Press representatives will be encouraged to visit the country after the forthcoming rains, so that they can see for themselves the true position in Italian East Africa and what the country has to offer. Meanwhile, with development still in its infancy, there are as yet few products which the Italians can exchange with their neighbours for goods and services. Of these, coffee of high quality is the outstanding product ready for market, and its production can be greatly increased throughout large areas of the country. But, as the realisation of products for export, even the intensive cultivation of coffee, takes time, the question of exchanging goods and services with other countries is one which theoretically belongs to the future. The currency question is wrapped up in international finance. In order, however, to enable development to proceed quickly so that the Italians can have the necessary products to sell, something has to be done now to set the wheels in motion in a forward direction. At present things are moving in a vicious circle. The Italians need foreign currency with which to trade and pay for transit, in order to develop the country; and this they cannot obtain in the ordinary way till the country is developed sufficiently to produce what others want to buy. This circle has got to be broken by resorting to unusual means. Whether it be by a loan, by foreign investment, by concessions, by the employment of services, or by some ingenious system of credit, some way

must be found of enabling the British and Egyptians in Egypt and the Sudan to co-operate economically to the fullest possible extent with the Italians without any undue delay. The matter is not one for casual deliberation or conservative *laissez-faire*. This is not a matter of patching up a quarrel and then letting things take their natural course. Important issues are at stake, which call for a determined effort to overcome the difficulties in the way of satisfactory and harmonious co-operation between Britain, Italy, and Egypt in North-East Africa. I do not minimise the technical difficulties; the opportunity is there, and the result depends on what we choose to make it.

The next article will deal with the present situation within the frontiers of Italian East Africa; Italian relations with Kenya and with British and French Somalilands; and in detail with the transit routes between Italian East Africa and neighbouring countries.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

Cairo, May 1938.

THE MEXICO OF LÁZARO CÁRDENAS

By W. G. FITZ-GERALD

IN the twilight of a mid-March evening this stern little *mestizo* (of Tarascan Indian blood) called his Cabinet of ten into the national palace of the brightest and strangest of all New World cities. In very few words—as his manner is—President Cárdenas told them he was about to expropriate all the British and American oil properties to the value of £90,000,000. The talk went on all night.

‘What will you do with the surplus stuff?’ asked his amazed Foreign Office man, Ramón Beteta.

‘Sell it, or burn it,’ snapped his chief. ‘*Even if I have to burn with it!*’ The rest is recent history, and the result as yet in suspense.

To understand this sharp twist of the baffling Mexican maze, I must go back to July 1, 1934, when Don Lázaro was ‘elected’—though his ‘inauguration’ was delayed for five months. An Indian ascetic and silent soldier of thirty-nine was the begetter of ‘Cárdenismo,’ differing from his lurid predecessors as Franklin Roosevelt does from Andrew Jackson or Warren Harding. Racial traces show in his broad swart brow, small deep-set eyes, full lips and chubby chin. Impassive, too, is he; slow of mien and movement, with not a trace of ‘Spanish’ vivacity. Cárdenas answers questions in laconic, deliberate style.

‘I was bred to labour,’ he reminds you. ‘As a boy of eleven my father’s death left me to “manage” a family of seven, all of them younger than myself. So from the first I had to toil and think alone.’ Starting life as a printer’s devil at fourteen, he passed on to tax-collecting—an oppressive job the lad came to loathe. Lázaro wanted to read and educate himself; and this he was able to do as warden of a drowsy village gaol.

In 1913, when Mexico’s newest ‘trouble’ was three years old, he let out his one and only prisoner and the pair of them ‘joined the Revolution.’ From the ranks young Cárdenas rose quickly; at twenty-five he was already a General of Division. As such he threw in his lot with the bulky, one-armed rancher, Alvaro Obregón (who, as President-Elect, was murdered at the banquet-table), and also with that bull-jawed ex-schoolteacher, Plutarco Elías Calles. But all three *iefes* needed money to carry on in the ‘traditional’ way. Even in this matter Cárdenas was an original. When he borrowed from usurers in Vera Cruz, funds were sent him with a fulsome note: ‘Never shall we accept repayment from a national hero like Don Lázaro!’

A week later he wired to his agent: ‘*Pay them back!*’ From that day to this the man’s honesty has grown into a legend. When helping Calles to suppress the revolt of 1929 he was given 100,000 pesos in the War Office for a month’s expenses. Of this sum he returned 93,000 pesos with the curt intimation: ‘Seven thousand was enough!’ Then as Governor of Michoacán he cut his own salary in half and trimmed the State’s bureaucracy to the bone, whilst lavishing money on his rural schools and peasant welfare.

Next fell to him in turn the Ministries of the Interior and of War—to wind up in the Presidial Palace with a majority of sixty to one over his nearest opponent. In the interval before inauguration he set out to study in his own way the ‘Six-Year Plan’ of the National Revolutionary Party. He covered thousands of miles by air and rail or on horseback, often camping in the bush with hard-bitten cronies when night overtook them all. The new chief’s aim was to surprise State Governors and officials at their jobs, and to talk with poor peons in their *adobe* huts, as well as with rich and powerful *hacendados* who ill-used them. In this arduous quest of Mexico’s ‘Forgotten Man’ the President-Elect toured a primitive land eight times the size of Great Britain. He visited remote Yucatan, where Governor Felipe Carrillo tried long ago to uplift Maya Indian masses who slaved for fourpence a day and a measure of maize. Theirs was that ‘Freedom to Starve’ which to-day’s Chief Executive decrees must become a memory—like the ‘imperial’ fantasies of Augustin Iturbide and the fate of

Maximilian of Hapsburg, whom the bayonets of a foolish Napoleon III. upheld till his hapless *protégé* at last faced the firing-squad at Queretaro. Has any realm so strange a modern story as this one of oil and silver?

Its present apostle is a simple, self-taught soldier bent upon corporate efficiency in Mexican life at large. Noiseless and tactful, he has moved shyly behind the scenes, keeping out of the limelight whilst injecting his own socio-economic creed into likely disciples all over the Republic. It is useless to contrast Cárdenas with Porfirio Díaz, who brought in foreign capital, and with it his own 'iron peace' which lasted thirty-five years. That Indian autocrat—himself of the Mixtec breed—was lucky to reach his Paris exile alive. Many clamoured for that tyrant's blood and turned to the 'New Creole'—Victoriano Huerta—who, in his turn, was to die abroad as the victim of an incredible murder. Even on the way down to Vera Cruz the railway was dynamited so as to blow up old Don Porfirio's train.

To-day's 'Cárdenismo' reverses the Díaz 'foreign' policy of Mexico's progress; it fosters instead *internal* colonisation and the development of purely native industries. Natural resources are now to be strictly conserved, rural and urban enterprise created from the bottom up. Mineral and petroleum deposits will be zoned; and what geologists call the 'robber' industries—*i.e.*, those which take Nature's wealth out of the soil—must be so modified as to convert them into really 'productive' efforts. Thus the export of mineral riches is to be slowed down by the establishment of new metallurgical ventures in the Republic itself. In alien enterprise—or what Cárdenas calls *las inversiones extranjeras*—this dynamic Indian has scant interest. Mexico, he insists, must radically change her collective psychology towards foreign genius, and still more towards her own. For centuries, he points out, this has been a 'colonial' field whose resources were exploited by ruthless captains from abroad. So it is high time his people should aim at an 'autarchy,' self-sufficing and wide awake to the new spirit of our day. This need not mean isolation, but a due and dignified commerce with countries in the New World and the Old. In short, as the President puts it: 'A careful revision of our export trade and *native* production on a fresh basis of national

interests.' It is the old warning of Aristotle: 'The salvation of the State is the business of all its citizens.'

To grasp what he means one should glance at the ethnic make-up of a once immense republic from which the United States, in its 'expansive' period under Polk, Taylor, Pierce and Buchanan, sheared off half a million miles of her neighbour's territory. President Pierce wanted to annex Yucatan outright; and the 'Manifest Destiny' of his day is told in his own words: 'My policy will not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from this expansion. Indeed, America's position renders the acquisition of certain territory not within our jurisdiction pre-eminently important for our own protection.'

The latest Mexican census gives a population of 16,552,722. Of these, pure Indians figure at 4,620,880; *mestizos* (or mixed-bloods) number 9,040,590; and the 'whites' (or *criollos*) only 2,444,466. From the Conquistadores' day this virgin land has been exploited. The total value of silver mined up to 1922 was £600,000,000—or more than 155,000 tons in weight, according to Mexico's own Bureau of Mines: this was two-thirds of the world's silver-output for the past 400 years. In mining alone American capital has here \$500,000,000 invested. And the oil production shows odd vagaries which reflect the prevalent misrule and flight of foreign capital. Beginning with 2,713,500 barrels (of 42 gallons each) in 1909, we see output rise to the 'peak' of 1921 with 193,397,587 barrels. Then it declines steeply to the period 1930–36, when only 30,000,000 or 40,000,000 barrels were produced. In this industry the pioneer was the late Lord Cowdray (as Sir Weetman Pearson)—a tireless prospector in new fields to whom our own Government entrusted £1,000,000 in 1917 for drilling tests here at home during the worst year of the World War. To-day's direct investments of the United States in her 'southern neighbour'—whose border runs for 1600 miles—totals \$694,786,000; of this about \$200,000,000 was in the production and refining of petroleum alone. British stakes are nearly £200,000,000, nearly half of this being in railways. French capital figures at £60,000,000, Spanish at about £40,000,000, and German at £15,000,000.

On June 25 of last year President Cárdenas decreed the

'nationalisation' of 13,000 miles of railway under his Expropriation Law. Mexico, I may say, is already linked to all parts of North America by air-lines that reach New York in twenty-one hours, Chicago in fifteen, and Vera Cruz or Tampico in less than two hours. From the first, Lázaro Cárdenas has been hot on a radical creed which he calls *la Educación Socialista*. He has even erected this into a constitutional amendment; it is, in fact, an extension of his former activities as Governor of Michoacán. This includes vocational training for farmers, artisans and labourers, as well as an intensive study of local problems by regional and rural schoolteachers. Here no wordy theory is implanted as dogma, but all training—as Don Lázaro himself insists—must be: 'In tune with the Socialist tenets of our Mexican Revolution.' This, he explains, must be indigenous to the soil and based on the co-operative policy of the pre-Colombian Indians. To make himself plain the President here turns up a phrase from his first political speech: 'My sole motto shall be to subordinate all *personal* interests to the general uplift of the community.' Throughout this man's earnest life he has preached as the central idea of Mexican Socialism: 'The rally of our farmers and workers, so as to raise their standard of living.' (*'Para que sea efectiva la elevación de su nivel de vida.'*) Whether he can achieve his aim before 1940, time alone can show. But Cárdenas is in a hurry, knowing that Roosevelt also goes out of office two years hence. And a Republican in the White House might forget the 'Good Neighbour' policy.

Certainly he has never spared himself, flitting all over a huge and difficult land to hobnob with scattered peons; nursing their babies, patting the cattle or resting in remote *pueblos*, there to drink goats' milk until he sickened with Malta fever and lost 33 lb. in weight before he was fit again. Yet he forbade any bulletin to be issued on his condition, even while cold packs and intravenous injections were being tried to restore the toughest of all 'nationalistic' champions. He wants the best native brains to be trained in oil and mining technics; and his *Kulturkampf*, or feud with the Church, is even more uncompromising than Adolf Hitler's own. Cárdenas feels that the Catholic hierarchy have in the past been too devoted to their huge estates and noble churches,

paying too little heed to the dumb masses who, under clerical sway, have remained illiterate, alike under Conquistadores, *peninsulares* and their Mexican-born sons the *criollos*, who treated the Indians as mere beasts of burden.

General Cárdenas has therefore vowed to 'fight superstition and defanaticise the people,' so as to make room for 'more lofty and enlightened ideas which will lead to the real social progress of our masses.' In short, he can see no lasting agreement between Church and State in 'his' Mexico. He also holds that science should be called upon patiently to solve the urgent problems of this fascinating land. The 'Six-Year Plan,' as the President sees it, aims at drastic improvement in farming methods, with irrigation and agricultural credits on modern lines. He seeks also to build a nation-wide network of highways, so as to link isolated regions with one another. And he would spread the population outwards from the metropolis in order to ensure a better 'balance' among the various sections, whose regional industries might soon interchange their products and goods. Here, indeed, is a 'large order,' one that seems beyond the compass of any man in so inchoate a land as this.

Proud, but still uncertain, his Indian polity, based upon Socialism, stirs a people who have lately seen their bold leader 'annex' outright the immense petroleum industry which foreign capital has created. The Mexico of last year was a buzzing hive of public works, land-division and eager social changes. But to-day it feels the numbing effect of a lack of funds, and with it diplomatic and financial hostility of bewildering array. Yet the Press, with radio broadcasts and ingenious films, all declare that Mexico is now to be freed from 'foreign domination'; that its upward-plodding toilers are at last bound for the fuller and richer life in this Cárdenas crusade. But these people are thinly scattered amid mountain plateaux, vast deserts and tropic valleys of remote lowlands. Off the beaten track one sees the half-finished dams of yesteryear which were to make the wilderness glow with grain and fruits. Road-builders who were so recently blasting and shifting rock now huddle in their grass-hut hamlets discussing the high prices of maize and wheat and beans. Their Labour bosses have thus far small comfort to offer, say, in the La Laguna cotton area, where 30,000

farmhands were last year working under Government control at decent pay. State financing of the land 'restitution' remains inactive; many Indians on the community farms are grinding up their seed-corn for daily rations, heedless of the next planting.

Those rich oil lands lie along the east coast, from the Texas border to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. South of Tampico lies the famous Poza Rica field, with its proven 800,000,000 barrels of petroleum still waiting to be won. Before that field was 'proved' £4,000,000 was spent by the Mexican Eagle concern, and one of its pipe-lines cost a further £1,000,000. All these rich areas now languish in pained expectancy. The wells have been 'closed in' by native workers; the great refineries of Tampico and Minatitlán are either idle, or else working at one-tenth of their capacity. When the workers 'took over,' reserve-tanks were nearly filled; it is now a question whether all that oil may not have to be dumped. Meanwhile, the Mexicans are trying hard to replace their former white bosses and technicians, in order to carry on an industry upon which so much depends.

'Labour, with our farmhands, the army and school-teachers'—so the President told cheering crowds in his last tour—'form the bulwarks of Mexico and her Revolution. We have done much already and must complete the victory in my term of office.' When Cárdenas came to the palace there were only 7000 Government schools; to-day there are over 13,500. The number of teachers, too, has been doubled, since education is a mania in this unlikeliest of lands. Ten big dams and irrigation schemes have been completed, seventeen more were projected, besides new railways and motor-roads; the President's goal for these last was set at 4000 miles. He has connived at strikes against low wage rates, and made State concerns compete with alien industry in oil. And more and more has the Cárdenas Cabinet dictated to the bankers. Months ago his Government signed a contract with the Mexican Eagle Company which secured to the State royalties of from 15 to 35 per cent. on the production; that was the thin edge of Don Lázaro's wedge. But it also brought a change in his attitude to Labour, whose leaders (he opined) should listen to reason in disputes that

hampered an output in which the Government had a stake. The present year will see yet more dividing of the great estates, and with it the rise of a new agrarian class of small 'capitalists.'

Physical development of the country is likewise envisaged, though now with more prudence in regard to costs. Cárdenas is not consistent; but he does aim to narrow the gulf that yawns between his 'plutes' and the very poor: 'If our people agree,' he says, 'we intend to push on without fear. Our farmers know that the Revolution must prove barren if all its strength is to be frittered in mere paper theories. What our workers long for is, first, knowledge, then more roads, with new transport and electrical power.'

It will be seen that he is a man of action, possibly intent—as his American critics say—upon a 'Peon Utopia' of his own impossible pipe-dreams. Last year he ordained that 700,000 acres owned by the Colorado River Company, and worth \$10,000,000, was to be handed over to land-hungry peasants under the New Agrarian Code. But his petroleum stroke—like that of Shah Mirza Riza Pahlevi in Teheran in 1932 against the great Anglo-Persian enterprise, when the D'Arcy Concessions were cancelled—fell with volcanic effect on the Republic. Nor could any enthusiasm of Press or people mitigate the shock. Prices in Mexico city shot up after the peso fell and extravagant tariffs had been imposed. Luxury-shops of the Avenida Madero in the capital had a starveling time; though, of course, this beautiful city of a million people is no more a criterion of Mexico than is Rio de Janeiro of Brazil's immensity, which trails away in Amazonas into jungle 'Unknowns' where naked savages still shoot poisoned arrows from the tree-tops.

Thousands of workmen were laid off after Cárdenas had drawn all the funds he could from the Bank of Mexico. In rural parts of the north, near Matamoras, sporadic 'troubles' broke out; and rumour ran that the expropriated oil concerns were engaged in a 'war of finance' against the President as their common foe. Meanwhile, those other Latin-American nations are watching his effort to oust foreign capital with the keenest interest. Even in the five minor Central American States this Cárdenas 'conquest' is praised. It is the same in Colombia, Venezuela and Peru, where the 'liquid gold'

is an economic factor of fabulous future, with concessions eagerly sought by British and American 'interests' which, all told, must have well over £1,000,000,000 sunk in this 'Empty Continent.'

Uncle Sam has never been popular in these exotic parts ever since Theodore Roosevelt's crowing in the University of California after he left the White House: 'I took Panama—and I talked about it afterwards! The interests of the American people demanded this. I had the power to do this—and I did it.' That same ex-President spoke also in the University of Chile, only to be rebuked by the veteran statesman, Dr. Marcial Martinez: 'What is of real value,' that caustic Minister said, 'are effective signs of good faith in political relations, instead of empty words that evaporate like water on hot iron.' Americans, I may say, find the 'Southern Brethren' of James Monroe's classic Message beyond all understanding.

So far back as 1876 State Secretary Hamilton Fish asked Caleb Cushing, his Minister in Madrid: 'Just what is the root cause of this endless tumult in the Iberian psyche?' 'It is,' Cushing replied, 'because the Governors are incapable of conducting, and the governed equally incapable of receiving, good government as we know it. They are all 'Spaniards' alike—as General Prim has so often remarked—whether you call them 'Peninsulars' or 'Colonials.' This thesis, however, will not account for Lázaro Cárdenas, nor for this Mexico of his which impinges on the United States so closely that in towns like Douglas (Ariz.) a strand of wire alone divides two civilisations that are poles apart in thought and feeling.

Silent and stubborn, this Indian ruler has determined to remould his highland realm. Of late he has shown much of Adolf Hitler's 'missionary' sense. Recent speeches reflect this with high-pitched passion. . . . Anyone who opposes the President is no patriot. 'If need be,' he urged after the Oil Decree was made known, 'we shall sacrifice all the constructive zeal that fired us, and readjust our losses from Mexico's own economy.' Intense, almost religious, conviction that he is right likewise marks Cárdenas as a New World dictator. Personally a modest man who loathes all former methods of 'pistols, crowbars and *pulque*' in

politics, he flaunts no fine uniforms, but only a grey lounge suit, even when reviewing troops. He works up to twenty hours a day behind locked office doors in the national palace. The cross-country rides which he loved are now cut out, since the battle is joined upon which his strenuous life is set.

That lavish five-coach Presidential train, with its radio sets and splendid dining and reception salons, to-day stands idle in the station siding. His private life has always been austere. Cárdenas eats only Mexican dishes and rarely has an hour to spend with his wife and young son. He neither drinks nor smokes, and forbids card-playing in public and even in the best clubs. Obstinate and impulsive, it is no secret that Don Lázaro issued his Oil Decree against the counsel of his ablest advisers, who thought both the time and the act inopportune. Those Ministers are either 'white,' or else of 'mixed' strain, well aware that their chief's programme is mainly planned for his Indians. The Labour leader—Vicente Lombardo Toledano—who actually prompted that seizure is an ex-Professor of Law and Philosophy; that man might be a Castilian.

Neither is anything 'Indian' to be remarked in Don Ramón Betata, the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, nor yet in Eduardo Suarez, the Minister of Finance, in whom the President puts great confidence. But to-day the consuming flame of 'Nationalism' rises here, as everywhere, with its slogans shouted from Dublin to Cairo and Jerusalem—'*Bilad il Arab lil Arab!*' ('Arab lands for the Arabs!'). Four out of the five judges of Mexico's Supreme Court handed down a decision against the oil companies on every count. And these men are appointed by the President for his term alone. Protests came from London and Washington—with hints from the latter that the Treasury's policy of 'silver purchase' might be ended; in 1935 this boon was worth £12,737,000, falling to half in the following year. What did it matter?

New duties were clapped on imported goods: motor cars were to pay from 60 to 150 per cent. more, typewriters 225 per cent., wireless-sets and gear up to 500 per cent. Meanwhile, all through the twenty-eight States humble folk remembered how their President—who, like Hitler, had

known penury and despair himself—handed out 11,000,000 acres of *latifundia* lands to his joyful Indians and *mestizos*. These lived mostly on maize bread, chili and beans, crowding big families into one-room reed shacks and wearing tattered garments till the cotton rags fell asunder.

Foreigners vow that this 'Messiah' is mad as he shows his placid, pale-brown face to forgotten hordes and explains the great fight between European and American '*Maschinen-intensitat*' and Mexico's own elemental power which is drawn from the soil. Who will come after Cárdenas? these aliens ask—incredulous, derisive or angry. Perhaps a crude savage like Emiliano Zapata, the so-called 'Attila of the South'—a maniac with twenty-six wives who wrote his crazy name in blood and havoc all over the land. That Indian '*policastró*' (of the Guerrero tribe) likewise sought to restore Mexico to 'his' people and shut out the white men for ever. But he wound up by dumping minted silver and other treasure by the ton into his pit-like strong-room; crucifying rebellious priests, and causing his foes to be devoured by ants with fiendish glee. . . . Such bogey-prophecy as this is absurd. A more accurate symbolist of to-day's Mexico is the rugged mural painter, Diego Rivera. That giant (himself a *mestizo*) persuaded Cárdenas to give safe asylum to Leon Trotsky, and even gave up his own house to that roving plotter—who, by the way, took sides in the oil seizure: 'As a private citizen enjoying the hospitality of Mexico.' Diego Rivera it was who painted a panel for the new Hotel Reforma showing a colossal Indian with a copy of *Das Kapital* under his mighty arm! It is useless for the oil magnates to point out that their workers receive twice the average wage paid in other industries. These hands continued to clamour for more and more in the naïve belief that Britons and Americans have 'money to burn.' Labour demands by the hundred were made, many of them quite ludicrous or fantastic.

Up to now President Cárdenas has refused our own and America's request for the restitution of those oilfields seized in March last. Compensation has been 'hopefully' promised, and pitiful 'contributions' to this end were made by the poorest folk—even Indian women and schoolgirls who tossed their silver trinkets or pesos and coppers into bags

and bowls in the vestibule of the Opera House. How will this upheaval end? And what repercussions will its success or failure have in the other twenty republics? No man can say as yet.

What is certain is that an honest ruler has arisen in Mexico, and his influence was luridly proven in the Chamber of Deputies. Here a tidy bonus of 5000 pesos (£280) was joyously mooted by a minority as a 'plum' for each and every member. But Cárdenas-men outvoted this parliamentary 'tip.' Thereupon hidden gunmen in the galleries whipped out pistols and sent a reckless fusillade of shots into the House. Two deputies dead and two more sorely wounded was the tale of an outrage worthy of the 'olden time.' Then up rose the Speaker—Don Luis Tavor—to point out how 'waste of public money is now a thing of the past; and the best elements in our Parliament are solidly behind their leader.'

I believe he was right. Former Mexican politics were based on the Don Quixote slogan: '*Mas vale salto de mata que ruego de hombres buenos!*' ('A leap from the jungle is better than any good man's prayer!'). But that bandit era of the Villas and Zapatas has slid into the past. The only doubt I feel is expressed in Lope de Vega's drama of *The Honest Brother*:

'Zelo y temor suelen ser
Hijos de amor y de honor.'
('Mistrust and fear full oft we see
Of love and honour born! ')

W. G. FITZ-GERALD.

CAMOENS AND HIS ADVENTURES IN THE EAST

By SIR DENISON ROSS

THE thoughts of Englishmen have of late been turned in the direction of our old ally Portugal. Several English missions have recently been sent to Lisbon, and last year English delegates attended the Tercentenary Celebrations of the University of Coimbra. In the course of these celebrations, due homage was naturally paid to the most famous student of that University, the poet Luis de Camoens, the author of the *Lusiads*. Although the *Lusiads* have been translated many times into English, they are not so widely known in this country as they deserve. They have, however, attracted the attention and earned the high praise of a number of famous English men of letters such as Johnson and Southey. Voltaire, while in England, wrote an essay in English on the epic poetry of the European nations in which he both highly praised and severely attacked the *Lusiads*. Nor is it generally realised that the *Lusiads* form only about one-third of Camoens' complete works and that he ranks among the foremost lyric poets of Europe.

The *Lusiads* (the name is derived from Luso, the son of Bacchus) recount in epic stanzas the story of the adventures of the Portuguese in India, beginning with the first journey round the Cape of Good Hope to India made by Vasco da Gama, and ending with the defence of Diu by John de Castro in 1546, the last great triumph of the Portuguese.

The first English translation of the *Lusiads* was made by Sir Richard Fanshaw, himself a poet, and published in 1655. It was never reprinted. This translation was probably known to Milton, who may, however, have read the original Portuguese. The next translation was Mickle's, which first appeared in 1776, and has been many times reprinted. It is rather a paraphrase than a translation, and it contains hundreds

of lines of his own invention. Dr. Johnson at one time intended to make a translation of the *Lusiads*.¹

Other English translations of the whole work or of part only are: Felicia Hemans (1819), Musgrave (1826), Quillinan (five books, 1853), Mitchell (1854), Aubertin (1872), Duff (1880), Richard Burton (1880). Lord Strangford, Burton and Aubertin also translated the lyrics.²

The Portuguese Sonnets of Elizabeth Barrett Browning, which in all modesty she gave out to be translations, are well known wherever English literature is read; these poems, which were of course original, were written in secret before her marriage and not shown to her husband till long afterwards. Less well known is the poem she published two years before her marriage called '*Caterina to Camoens: dying in his absence abroad, and referring to the poem in which he recorded the sweetness of her eyes.*' Here she put herself in the place of Caterina de Ataide, and Robert Browning in the place of Camoens.

Where tradition has once been given a fair start it is difficult for History to catch up with it. Truth may be stranger than fiction, but it is not as a rule as picturesque, and we are generally the losers by the exchange of the one for the other. In my reading I can recall no hero in history whose popular biography has been so completely demolished by later historians as that of Camoens. It is as though they in their search for the truth had been playing a game of skittles, and had bowled at the nine pieces; one after the other of them had tumbled down, and in the end there remained only the figure of Camoens himself.

Camoens must have had his full share of adventure in an age of adventure, but he tells us very little about himself and, although his poems abound in personal allusions, few of these are dated. Thus soon after his death his biographers began to co-ordinate his adventures and his poems in order to substantiate the former and to assign dates to the latter.

¹ The first book he ever published was a translation of Father Lobo's account of Abyssinia, but this was made from a French translation of the Portuguese original.

² The only complete translation of all Camoens' works is the German version by F. W. Storck. By far the best account of Camoens in the English language is the little book published by Aubrey F. G. Bell for the Hispanic Society of America (Oxford University Press, 1823). Short as this work is, it contains a summary of all the latest researches into the life of Camoens. The fullest biography and edition of Camoens and his works is that by Visconde de Juromenha (Lisbon, 1860).

Every line that could possibly be taken for a personal allusion was eagerly seized on. Unfortunately no finality has been reached even in our day, despite the devoted labours of many fine scholars, Portuguese, German and English—and yet one cannot feel any confidence in speaking about Camoens without reading all his poems and without wading through the more important biographies, old and new. Moreover, there is much in the Camoens legend which is essential to the proper understanding of the man and his work, and of the age in which he lived.

The date of Camoens' birth has never been ascertained, but it is supposed to lie somewhere between 1517 and 1524. His family belonged to Coimbra, but he himself was possibly born in Lisbon. He acquired his intimate knowledge of the classics and history at Coimbra, where he completed his studies in 1542, and no one can read the *Lusiads* without being impressed with his great learning, quite apart from the fact that most of the poem must have been composed far from a library.

Of his great passion for one or more Caterinas who inspired so many of his poems, and of whom one was possibly responsible for his banishment to Ceuta in North Africa, much has been told. Whether he went of his own free choice or as an exile we do not know. The situation is admirably summed up by Aubrey Bell, who says that

three Caterinas de Ataíde compete for the glory, and the more deeply one goes into the question the less solid foundation one discovers, although to deny the existence of Camoens' 'Natercia' savours almost as much of desecration as to doubt that of Dante's Beatrice. The essential fact beyond dispute is that all Camoens' early life centred round a passionate love at Coimbra or at Court, or both—for relations between Coimbra and the Court were frequent—and we need not grudge her the name of Natercia (Caterina) although it scarcely occurs in his poems, merely noting that the gold hair of his early love at Coimbra continues, and is evidently something more than a mere reminiscence of Petrarca's *trece d'or*.

It was probably in 1546 that Camoens sailed for Ceuta. The sea between the Peninsula and Morocco was at that period infested with pirates, the famous Barbary Corsairs and Sallee Rovers. Either on his voyage to Ceuta or at some later date he lost his right eye in a naval engagement to which

he refers in one of his poems. The portraits of this one-eyed hero are well known. It is interesting to note that in Fanshawe's frontispiece it is the left eye that is missing.

From time to time Camoens was engaged in fights with the Moors, and of these he speaks in his *cartas* with calm indifference; and no adventures or excitements, or even hunting lions with spears, could comfort him in his melancholy exile, during which he never ceased to long for his *patrio ninho amado*—and possibly for some young lady! He often refers to the sufferings and tortures to which some of his fellow exiles were subjected at the hands of the Moors, and many old prints give us an idea of the horrors perpetrated.

Camoens seems to have spent two or three years in North Africa. In 1549 Don Affonso de Noronha, who commanded the garrison in Ceuta, where he established a friendship with Camoens, was summoned to Lisbon and given the Governorship of Portuguese India. Camoens would naturally be anxious to accompany the new Governor to India, but there is no authority for the statement by Faria y Sousa that he enlisted for this purpose in 1550, when he returned to Lisbon. He did not actually sail for India till 1553.

He seems to have led a gay and reckless life in Lisbon in the interval, and earned among his comrades the nickname (*alcunha*) of *Trinca-fortes* (Swash-buckler). The loss of one eye, in spite of its honourable occasion, made him the sport of the ladies of Lisbon. One lady called him *diabo* (devil). To this the poet made a gallant reply and, addressing her as an angel, said he must be an exceptional devil since, contrary to the custom of other devils, he loved an angel:

Não posso chegar ao cabo
De tamanho desarranjo
Que sendo vós, Senhora, Anjo
Vos queira tanto o diabo
Dais manifesto sinal
Da minha muita firmeza
Que os diabos querem mal
Aos anjos, por natureza.

In another poem he said that if the name of devil suited him it was only right that he should take her.

Another lady nicknamed him *Cara sem olhos* (Face

without eyes): to her he wrote eight lines each of which contained the word *olhos* :

Sem olhos vi o mal claro
Que dos olhos se seguiu
Pois *Cara sem olhos* viu
Olhos que lhe custam caro
D'olhos não faço menção
Pois quereis que olhos não sejam
Vendo-vos, olhos sobejam :
Não vos vendo, olhos não são !

However, while he was waiting for permission to go to India he managed, as usual, to get into trouble. In June 1552, on the Festival of Corpus Christi, which was always celebrated in Lisbon with much pomp, a certain court official, while riding through the streets, was attacked by two masked horsemen. Camoens recognising them as friends joined in the attack on the official and wounded him ; presumably the official had no escort, but from the story as it is told, the fight does not appear to have been a very fair one. For this assault he was arrested and imprisoned. At the end of eight months the courtier recovered from his wound and forgave Camoens, who was thereupon released and received the King's pardon. This was dated March 13, 1553, and eleven days later he embarked for India, apparently as a substitute for another man.

For a man who was always getting into trouble it must have been a relief to set out on this great adventure ; and it is possible that the authorities in Lisbon encouraged his departure in every way. Nevertheless, he was unhappy to leave his beloved country.

In the Fifth Canto of the *Lusiads* he describes how the country faded from his view. I will quote the passage in the quaint translation of Sir Richard Fanshaw :

Now by degrees out of our sight did glide
Parts of our Country, which abode behind
Abode deer Tagus : and we *then* did hide
Fresh Syntra (About *this* our eyes did wind)
In the lov'd Kingdom likewise did abide
Our Hearts, whose strings could not be thence untwined
And, when as *all* the *Land* did now withdraw
The Sea and Firmament was all we saw.

The fleet of four was under the command of Fernao Alvares Cabral, and the ship in which Camoens sailed, the *San Bento*, was the only one of them to reach its destination. Before arriving at the Cape of Good Hope the weather was so bad that each vessel had taken its own course. Goa was reached at the beginning of September. It is pathetic to learn that the *San Bento* was wrecked on her return voyage.

Camoens describes his perilous voyage in his Second Elegy beginning '*O poeta Simonides falando,*' and elsewhere. In a very charming sonnet addressed to his beloved Caterina (whoever she may have been) he assures her that he keeps up his courage in spite of danger and of his absence from her :

Gentil senhora, se a fortuna imiga
Que contra mi com todo o ceu conspira
Os olhos meus de ver os vossos tira
Porque em mais graves casos me persiga.

From a letter written from India it would appear that he settled down quite comfortably in Goa, for he says :

In this land I live more respected than the bulls of Merceana and more peaceful than a cell of a preaching friar. As for the country, I can assure you it is the mother of hideous ruins and the step-mother of honourable men. Those who are on the look-out for money support themselves on the water like bladders, while those who devote themselves to arms are apt to rot like dead bodies on the seashore.

Camoens found his friend Noronha, the Viceroy, preparing to take a large fleet to the South in order to protect the friendly Kings of Cochin and Polea against the King of Pimenta. This expedition set out at the end of November and, although Camoens had only been six weeks in the country, he accompanied it and includes a description of it in his famous Second Elegy.

In February 1554 he accompanied the expedition of Manuel de Vasconcellos to the Red Sea. They called at Ormuz and thence proceeded to Muskat, where they captured six Turkish ships. Nothing else seems to have been achieved, and Camoens, who always, as he himself says, had 'the sword in one hand and the pen in the other' (*N'huma mão sempre a espada e n'outra a penna*), was able to devote himself to poetry

and, further, had an opportunity of studying the tropical scenery of the African coast. They returned in November.

Noronha was succeeded in 1554 by an old man of seventy, who died in the following year; and then came the Governorship of Francisco Barreto, whose character has been very unfavourably appraised by the early biographers of Camoens, although he was undoubtedly a most capable and vigorous Governor. It was at this period that Camoens wrote most of his fine verses and completed at least half the *Lusiads*.

Let us now pass to the Macao episode 1556-58. Here again legend and theory have come off badly at the hands of cold-blooded research.

The old story was that on the occasion of the grand investiture of the new Governor Francisco Barreto (1555-58), which was accompanied by public games, especially the *jogas de cannas* (a tourney with blunted spears and arrows) and *autos* (or plays and recitations), Camoens contributed a play called *Auto de Fildemo* and a series of pungent satires in which he painted in lively colours the vices prevalent in high society in Goa. Another poem was called *Disparates na India* (Follies in India). We know a good deal at first hand of the state of affairs in Goa in those days from the personal narratives of Linschoten, Mandelslo and Pyrard. I cannot here refrain from quoting a vivid description of Goa from *The Phantom Ship* by Captain Marryat, that prolific writer of sea stories, who, I fear, no longer enjoys the popularity he so well deserved a generation or two ago. This story, which is a variation of the Flying Dutchman theme, is laid in the seventeenth century:

Goa was then at its zenith—a proud, luxurious, superb, wealthy city—the capital of the East—a city of palaces whose viceroy reigned supreme. As they approached the river, the two mouths of which form the island upon which Goa is built . . . the Portuguese captain, who had often been there, pointed out to Amine the most remarkable buildings. When they had passed the forts they entered the river, the whole line of whose banks were covered with the country seats of the nobility and hidalgos—splendid buildings embosomed in groves of orange-trees, whose perfume scented the air.

‘There . . . is the country palace of the viceroy’ said the captain, pointing to a building which covered nearly three acres of ground. . . . ‘That is the Jesuits’ church, with their establish-

ment’ said the captain, pointing to a magnificent pile. ‘In the church now opening upon us lie the canonised bones of the celebrated Saint Francisco, who sacrificed his life in his zeal for the propagation of the Gospel in these countries. . . . The building you see now, on the water-side, is the viceroy’s palace; that to the right, again, is the convent of the bare-footed Carmelites; yon lofty spire is the cathedral of St. Catherine; and that beautiful and light piece of architecture is the church of our Lady of Pity. You observe there a building with a dome, rising behind the viceroy’s palace? . . . That is the Holy Inquisition.

‘. . . Now we open upon the viceroy’s palace and you perceive what a beautiful building it is’ continued the captain. ‘That large pile, a little above it, is the Custom-house, abreast of which we shall come to an anchor.’

. . . This street is the finest in Goa and is called Strada Diretta from the singular fact that almost all the streets in Goa are quadrants or segments of circles. . . . The houses were of stone, lofty and massive; at each storey was thrown out a balcony of marble, elaborately carved; and over each door were the arms of the nobility, or hidalgos, to whom the houses belonged. The square behind the palace and the wide streets were filled with living beings; elephants with gorgeous trappings; led or mounted horses in superb housings; palanquins, carried by natives in splendid liveries; running footmen; syces; every variety of nation, from the proud Portuguese to the half-covered native; Mussulmans, Arabs, Hindoos, Armenians; officers and soldiers in their uniforms, all crowded and thronged together—all was bustle and motion. Such was the wealth, the splendour, and luxury of the proud city of Goa—the Empress of the East—at the time we are now describing.

It was supposed that as a punishment for his plain speaking Camoens was banished to Macao in 1556, with the position of *Provedor dos defuntos e ausentes* (Commissary for the Estates of Deceased and Absent Persons). The story is vitiated by the fact that this post was a lucrative one and the appointment could not well have been a form of punishment; though it might be an excuse for ridding Goa of this hypercritical citizen.

The old legend goes on to relate that in Macao Camoens had amassed considerable wealth; that two years later he was sent for by Barreto; that he chartered a ship at his own expense and embarked for India with all his treasure; that he suffered shipwreck at the mouth of the Mekon river in

Cambodia and lost everything that he had, excepting only his precious manuscript of the *Lusiads*, which he managed to hold above water with one hand while he propelled himself swimming with the other.

Now Camoens himself never mentions Macao, and his reference to the Mekon river is not very definite. In verse 128 of Canto X he writes (in Fanshaw's translation):

The River Mecon

.....
Upon his soft and charitable Brim
The wet and ship-wrackt SONG receive shall Hee
Which in a lamentable plight shall swim
From sholes and Quicksands of tempestuous Sea
(The dire effect of Exile) when on Him
Is executed the unjust Decree:
Whose repercussive Lyre shall have the Fate
To be renowned more than Fortunate.

I am not one of those who would wish to shatter the whole story or attempt to prove that Camoens never went to Macao at all. Have we not his very own grotto there which is shown to all visitors, in which I like to think that he composed more than one Canto of the *Lusiads*? Recent researches have, however, thrown new light on the whole matter. Unfortunately, I have been unable to obtain a copy of Jordeo de Freitas' work on the shipwreck of Camoens, published in 1915; but I take it that a certain Captain Lionel de Sousa, who had conducted negotiations with the Chinese, was annoyed with the appointment of Camoens as *Provedor* and may have ordered his arrest in Macao in 1558.

More interesting is a recently discovered manuscript of Diogo Couto (the great historian and friend of Camoens), who says the poet was wrecked off the coast of Siam and lost everything but his manuscript, and that there was drowned a lovely Chinese girl who had set sail with him. On this tragic event Camoens composed several sonnets, among others the one beginning:

Alma minha gentil que te partiste
Tam cedo desta vida descontente
Repousa tu no ceu eternamente
E viva eu qua na terra sempre triste.

Since thou, Oh gentle spirit, with this life
Dissatisfied, so early hast departed,
Be thine eternally in heaven to rest,
Whilst upon earth I live on, broken-hearted.

This poem was hitherto regarded as an elegy on Caterina de Ataide.

Probably Camoens did not return to Goa till 1559 or 1560. But the early historians make him return while Barreto was still Governor (1555-58) and have Camoens sent immediately to gaol on account of defalcations in Macao, only to be released by Barreto's successor Constantino de Braganza (1558-61), whom the poet accompanied (according to Faria y Sousa) on his expedition to Daman; and in 1561, under Constantino's successor, Dom Francisco Coutinho, Conde de Redondo, Camoens is again in prison for debt. On the other hand we know that Redondo and Camoens were on very good terms, and it is hard to believe that he would allow so distinguished a poet to spend so much time in gaol!

During this period he wrote many of his *redondilhas*, and possibly the famous lyric to the slave-girl Barbara, beginning:

Aquela cativa
Que me tem cativo
Porque nela vivo
Ja não quer que viva . . .

This lyric has been translated into 120 languages, but most versions were made 'by special request'!

In 1564, Redondo was succeeded in Goa by Dom Antão de Noronha, with whom the poet had seen service in Ceuta many years before. The truth is that we know practically nothing of what Camoens did between 1561 and 1567.

Camoens had, no doubt, had quite enough of India by this time and was always looking for an opportunity to 'go home,' as Anglo-Indians say, the Portuguese expression being '*ir para o Reyno*.' (Newcomers were called *reynal*.) However, in the small overladen ships of those days, it was never easy to obtain a passage, and always expensive. Pedro Barreto, who was sailing to Mozambique to take up a new post, offered to take Camoens on board and to provide his daily rations free, and the poet, who was probably in debt, eagerly accepted this offer. This only took him as far as

Mozambique, however, and it was two years before an occasion offered for Camoens to proceed on his homeward journey to Lisbon, where he arrived in April 1570. It is interesting to note that on the ship that carried him home were his two friends Hector de Sylveyra the poet and Diogo de Couto the historian. Hector, however, died within sight of the rock of Cintra.

Camoens' troubles were by no means at an end. The plague of 1569 was still affecting the daily life of Lisbon, and for this reason there was a long delay in printing the *Lusiads*, which finally appeared in 1572, and curiously enough there were two separate impressions of this first edition.

From the date of the publication of the *Lusiads*, Camoens was granted a pension, apparently on condition that he should live in Lisbon. We know nothing of his last years, though we have a long and unreliable account of them from Mariz (1613), who tells us that Camoens used to send his faithful Javanese slave to beg food for him in the streets.

In 1578, King Sebastian set out a second time for Africa. He was killed at the famous battle of Alcázar Kebir, where three kings perished. This disaster spelt ruin for Portugal, for, following on the death of Sebastian, the succession of his house came to an end and Portugal entered on her sixty years' subjection to Spain. He was succeeded by his uncle, Cardinal Henry, who had been Regent during his minority. Henry reigned from August 1578 to January 1580. His unpopularity may be judged by the following verses which were sung in the streets at the time of his death :

Viva El-Rey D. Henrique
No inferno muitos annos
Pois deixou no testamento
Portugal aos Castelhanos.

At his death the throne was left vacant ; there were four claimants besides Philip II. of Spain, who was eventually crowned King of Portugal.

Camoens died on June 10, 1580, not only a neglected, sick and poor man, but also a heart-broken patriot. It was his fate, like that of Belisarius and Pachecho, mentioned in the *Lusiads*, to die in a hospital on a pauper's bed : '*morrer nos hospitaes em pobres leitos.*' He was buried in the Church

of St. Ann of the Franciscan Friars and his tomb bears the following brief but expressive epitaph composed by his friend Gonçalo Coutinho :

Aqui jaz Luis de Camões
Principe
Dos Poetas do seu tempo
Morreo no anno de 1579.

In conclusion, I take this opportunity of reproducing the very curious poem which Fanshaw wrote and printed under the portrait of Camoens, which forms the frontispiece to his translation :

Spaine gave me noble Birth : Coimbra, Arts :
Lisbon, a high-plac't love, and Courtly parts :
Affrick, a Refuge when the Court did frowne :
Warre, at an Eye's expence, a fair renowne
Travayle, experience, with noe short sight
Of India, and the World ; both which I write
India a life, which I gave there for lost
On Mecon's waves (a wreck and Exile) tost
To boot, this POEM, held up in one hand
Whilst with the other I swam safe to land :
Tasso, a Sonet ; and (what's greater yit)
The honour to give Hints to such a witt
Philip a Cordiall, (the ill Fortune see !)
To cure my Wants when those had new kill'd me
My Country (Nothing—yes) Immortall Praise
(So did I, Her) Beasts cannot browze on Bayes.

E. DENISON ROSS.

THE CARE OF THE INSANE—I.

A SURVEY

By DR. HENRY WILSON

AMONGST the general public, the problems of the insane commonly excite revulsion, morbid interest, or complete apathy. Imagination can be stirred by the more striking manifestations of insanity, as, for instance, gross delusions, abnormal states of excitement, noisiness, destructiveness, abuse, and suicidal acts, and we are liable to forget the less striking but equally important conditions where the symptoms are little marked.

The lunatic talks a different language from us. He makes absurd charges. He speaks of his utter unworthiness; he is rude, interfering, or mute, apathetic, unable to care for himself; in short, he is a social nuisance. We cannot argue with him, for rationality as we know it is not his. He rejects our help or scandalously misinterprets our intentions. He lives in a world of his own which makes him unapproachable, or because of which he tries to force his fantastic ideas down our throats. The lunatic has been outcast because we normal people could tolerate no such disturbing influence amongst us. But he has also aroused the imaginations of the speculative, who have tried to explain the lunatic by astrology, spiritualistic forces, transmigration of souls. Less occult persons have brooded over the strange behaviour of the insane. Hippocrates wrote of him; each in their turn, the great medical writers of old, advanced theories satisfying to their protagonists.

That he is treated as well as he is despite the incongruity of his ideas and the effect which he produces upon his *milieu* is to be wondered at rather than criticised. But society outside those in intimate contact with the insane can be divided into that large group of those who are passive and

uninterested about mental disorders, and that small group, often the very salt of society, who will always take up the cudgels on behalf of those who seem to them oppressed. The unfortunate inhabitants of our big mental hospitals call for an awakened interest. Some wise and large schemes, stimulated by more than philanthropy, will be needed before the many problems of the mentally disordered are solved. In passing, we may add that any apathy which is laid at the doors of those dealing with mental cases may be the result, and not the cause, of the widespread reluctance to face the public discussion of these problems.

Properly speaking, mental hygiene deals with the insane, the defective, the neurotic, eccentric and delinquent. Only the provisions made for the first named are our immediate concern. Together with the defective they form a number of the population (one in every hundred) for whom statutory provision is made, and it is our purpose to consider how adequate is that provision, and how prescient our legislative and sociological approach.

Social expediency has been the primary consideration in approaching the insanities. The patient has been a menace to his environment and segregation has been imperative. That when we remove the patient we should also treat him has been glossed over. Numbers of factors have contributed to this fatalistic attitude. 'Out of sight, out of mind' has produced an apathy alongside fantastic ideas about mental illness and about mental hospital conditions. Actually one-third of the patients recover. Many relapse. One out of every four patients admitted has been in a mental hospital before. Are these relapses an essential part of the disease, or can they in any way be checked? It has seemed that time alone effects the cures, and a complaint that 'no treatment was given me' may seem to have some truth in it.

The aim of the mental hospital must be the protection of society, the protection of the patient, his care, his treatment, and the prevention of relapse. These same principles should be applied to the patient who is mentally ill but remains outside the hospital; but space does not allow us to follow that problem. Improper detention is very rare; the regulations of the Lunacy Act and the supervision of the Board of Control compel caution, even if it is not universally

present. But, judging from the fully published reports of the Board,¹ what may be regarded as inadequate care still exists.

There are patients who have to be protected from their own violence, from their suicidal impulses, from their refusal to take nourishment. The more serious measures adopted to prevent such difficulties must be reported to the Board, as must all major accidents and fatalities. These measures are rapidly becoming rarer, and, though the recovery rates do not show appreciable improvement, such facts should speak of improved conditions.

Care comprises nursing attention, and the prevention of a patient's deterioration by suitable measures to rouse his interests in the outside world. Thus a great deal of simple routine, daily papers, entertainments, cinema shows, are an integral part of asylum life, and their mundane commonness in the world at large must not blind us to their necessity in an institution's routine. Yet such reminders of the normal world have only recently become usual in many hospitals. The Board of Control's reports show how frequently it seems left to them to suggest improvements in the patient's lot. Doubtless such remarks are introduced in order to implement a superintendent's demands upon his committee, but the stimulatory activities of the Board are visible in other directions. Local authorities have the power to make financial contributions to a patient between his discharge from hospital and his resuming work. It would seem that this is seldom done. Can it be denied that this is but an example of widespread indifference to the welfare of the mental patient by the local authorities to whom he is by statute entrusted? Three thousand discharged cases were helped in 1935 by the Mental After-Care Association—a voluntary body. Should such difficult and delicate work be left merely to private philanthropy? Remarks in the reports clearly indicate that the Board feels that it must continually suggest improvements in dress, in lavatory arrangements, in cooking amenities, the need for which is often self-evident. That such criticisms should be necessary arouses the disquieting feeling that the

¹ To be obtained from H.M. Stationery Office, Kingsway, London, W.C.2: *General Survey*, Part I. Part II. is a reprint of the reports of the Commissioners of their visits to each hospital, and a summary of research work.

belief that 'anything will do for the insane' is still prevalent in some quarters. The true obstacle to improvement is public indifference, not the administrative hierarchy of mental hospitals. Adequate attention has not been given to that important time which passes between a patient's removal from home and his entrance into the mental hospital. This used to take the form of residence in the observation ward of the infirmary. By the 1930 Act the patient may pass more easily into the hospital, or, if he is lucky, into some new admission block for which his fellow-citizens have too often begrudged expense. But the observation wards are still the lot of many unfortunate persons. Here they may stay for fourteen days, occupying beds next to acute alcoholics, and attended by nurses and doctors with little or no mental hospital experience. It is an accepted principle that the course of a patient's illness depends greatly upon the influences in its early stages, and the medley of human material reported from the observation ward suggests a flagrant defiance of this knowledge because other provisions are not available. Real knowledge of these conditions more than of those at the hospitals themselves would startle public opinion into widespread efforts for the insane.

These comments concerning the details of care and attention are brought forward as indicative of a spirit which still prevails about the mental hospital. They pass appropriately into the subject of treatment. The treatment of the insane is full of difficulty. It comprises segregation, rest, expectant treatment, and drugs which may be sedative or curative. Measures which prevent a patient sinking into his own fantastic world, such as entertainment or occupation, are *real* treatment. The charge that there has been *no* treatment of a patient is probably always false. But because mental disease in its course takes as a rule far longer than physical ailments a sense of therapeutic lassitude may seem implied. Some diseases recover spontaneously, and attempts to correlate the length of their course with forms of treatment or with no active measures have failed. The patient, therefore, not only lives in an irrational world, but his illness behaves irrationally, for his recovery, or the reverse, bears little ratio to the amount of therapeutic ardour or complacency.

In the old days, indeed, the illnesses were left to evolve of

themselves. It was thought that checks could not be placed upon deterioration in disorders which ran a chronic course, and that spontaneous recovery was little helped by drugs. The part played by sepsis in the insanities (still an uncertain problem) was not appreciated. Noisy patients were confined in padded rooms, insomnia was regarded as an unchangeable feature of some illnesses and its disappearance portended recovery. Padded rooms are now the exception, whilst the bill for sedative drugs has greatly increased. Noise has given way to quiet, as occupations have been found even for the most boisterous. The chronic course of the disease which used to be labelled dementia præcox is now known to be less than universal: even when remissions do not occur, its more striking features can often be checked. Experiments with many forms of fresh treatments are being made, and the hospitals where the old pessimism prevails are diminishing in number.

It cannot be pretended that pessimism does not still exist. The mental patient's stock is often tainted, his previous life seldom marked by mental resilience. Is the pessimism rational? Do the new therapeutic suggestions, whether for massive doses of sedative, or the removal of mild infections, offer spectacular results? The influence of the doctors' past experience, the character of the chronic asylum inmates, the influence of the outside public, and particularly of the lay committee, are all factors. When hospitals contain such a dead weight of the chronically disabled, when scepticism, ignorance, and thrift weigh with the councils' representatives, lack of enthusiasm amongst the medical officers is not surprising.

A demand on the part of the public for great advances is unlikely to be gratified. Sympathy may be felt with those who insist upon progress first and generosity second. The actual advances in quieter conditions in the hospital, greater relief of the progressive illnesses, the beneficial rôle of active occupation (in place of the old wards filled with listless, idle, yet able-bodied men and women), should be accorded due praise. But, as we hope to show, further progress will be delayed if the present administrative methods and unco-ordinated work continues.

The first essential must be a survey of the whole problem,

present conditions, future hopes, staffing, administration, buildings, treatment, after-care, and prevention. Such a survey would require a Commission. The mental hospital patients in England and Wales number 150,000. Five-sixths of these are accommodated in the big county and borough asylums. In the smaller areas these receive 500 patients or less, in other districts up to 3000 are accommodated. About 25,000 patients are provided for in the hospitals for middle-class patients and the nursing homes known as licensed houses.

Medical staffs vary from two to eight. In some hospitals one medical officer may be in charge of as many as 400 patients. The proportion of nurses to patients is one to six, or slightly more in the big hospitals. In addition the artisans, engineers, painters, gardeners, domestic staff and laundry maids, and clerical staff are often resident within or near the grounds.²

In these circumstances, linked with the isolated position of some hospitals, the asylum becomes a self-contained unit, not only with its artisans, but with its own farm and dairy produce.

Mental hospitals cost local authorities £8,500,000 a year, an average of 26s. 6d. per patient per week.³ The cost (excluding loan charges) varies from 18s. 1d. in a hospital of 1300 patients, to 32s. 6d. in a hospital of 260 patients. Variations within these limits are not wholly accounted for by size. In one of 800 patients the weekly cost is 31s. 3d., in another of 1300 it is 30s. 4d. Those with over 2000 beds vary from 19s. 3d. to 25s. Similar variations are found in food, costing from 3s. 2d. to 7s. 5d. The cost of the medical staff varies from 9d. to 2s. 3d.; the cost of nursing from 4s. 6d. to 11s. 5d. (except in the instance of one small hospital); the cost of medicines varies from 1.0 pence to 7.9 pence weekly. The contribution to the rates varies from 7d. in a mixed agricultural and mining district to 3s. 5d. on a new hospital in a depressed area. The cost of consumption to the community has been assessed at £4,000,000 per year.

The Mental Hospitals Committees of the local authorities are responsible for the running of the hospitals and are the

² So great are the numbers of these in the more expensive homes that the ratio of sane to insane may rise to three to one.

³ Mental deficiency institutions cost £1,250,000, or 28s. per patient per week.

watch-dogs of finance, leaving to the medical superintendent matters of more technical importance. He knows that the committee's purse is not a long one, that drastic changes in a hospital of 500 beds may be reflected in the rates. This knowledge and his own experience of the capricious results of treatment are in themselves a check on rash expenditure. It is through the medical superintendent that the suggestions of the Board of Control are explained to the lay committee, who must then approach the finance committee of the county council. They on their part have a duty to the ratepayers, to whom they can offer little of a spectacular nature to justify big expenditure. The general irrationality of the insane discourages new and costly measures: the ordered routine of the hospital life is a matter of self-congratulation.

The Board of Control, which, twenty-three years ago, succeeded the old Commissioners in Lunacy, is a body of seventeen serving under the Ministry of Health. Its chairman, Sir Laurence Brock, is assisted by his four senior and twelve junior Commissioners. Ten of its members are medical, five legal. Before this Board and its secretariat all the papers relative to every patient in mental hospitals and mental deficiency institutions are sent. Such certificates must be absolutely correct; the Board must know all about hospital finance and must approve all structural alterations and all new buildings, whether for patients or staff. Every hospital is visited at least once a year by two Commissioners. Patients in the small hospitals or homes are seen oftener. The Commissioners' reports on each hospital are published annually, and are considered by the local committees, but seldom attract public notice.

When first appointed, the Commissioners' duty was one of vigilance. Gross abuses had occurred; public opinion demanded that persons should not be illegally detained, and that charges of cruelty and ill-treatment should be investigated. The present need for this is less than it was formerly, but a proper insistence upon a number of points, sometimes comparatively small, continues, and is apt to make the Board appear in an unfavourable light. On the occasions of the visits of the Commissioners an unbiassed spectator at a hospital might sometimes feel that they were not well-intentioned public servants but inquisitive officials of the

C.I.D. The functions of the Board tend to be misunderstood, and the fact that it is a suggestive and supervisory capacity which it exercises, and not an executive one—for it *cannot of itself initiate changes*—is forgotten. To read the reports of the Commissioners makes this clear. They are filled with information (sometimes of small value, at any rate in relation to the huge problem of mental disorder) and with suggestions. They sometimes have to note, and go on noting annually, that valuable suggestions made in the interest of the patients have not been carried out. Yet the Commissioners, other than the superintendents and medical staff of the hospitals, are the sole qualified protectors of the patients.

Local authorities provide some 126,000 beds for the insane. Overcrowding to the total extent of over 2000 occurs. But as some hospitals are not full, this figure gives a rosier account of the position than it should. One hospital of 2000 patients is overcrowded by 250 by day and 80 more beds are used than there is adequate space for; another of 2900 patients is overcrowded by 550 by day, by 150 at night. New buildings are being sanctioned in many areas, specially the erection of up-to-date admission blocks: two new hospitals have recently been built. Yet honesty forces one to admit that in many areas matters are by no means ideal. Asylum dysentery was a scourge of the past, yet there were 480 cases of dysentery and 93 cases of enteric fever reported during 1935. Mental hospital architecture presents a picture similar to certain old houses which have been added to indiscriminately. Would it be an understatement to say that 20 per cent. of the accommodation at least is antiquated beyond hope?

Further, accommodation is regarded as a mere matter of insane persons per cubic foot. If a man has lived in such and such a county, to that county's asylum he goes. This criterion means that, though each asylum has its load of chronic patients, the number of special cases where research may be rewarded is small. Scattered over the country, for instance, are a number of persons in whom the ordinary swings of circular insanity occur with extreme rapidity, or cases of mental confusion associated with certain rare toxins. A medical officer may see and study one such case with no chance of comparing his findings with such cases sporadically occur-

ring elsewhere. His observations are lost. Theoretically it should be possible to collect such cases and to obtain a real bird's-eye view of the condition. The research summarised in the Board of Control's reports is full of interest, but some of it loses value because the cases summarised are *not* really similar, and control groups are small. Mental disorders are a huge group of illnesses the differing types of which are not clearly delimited, and the present hotch-potch methods of mixing *all* cases and having too little opportunity for real study may extend the mirage which at present envelops the problems of insanity.

We have already referred to treatment. There is no doubt that the new conditions—more rest, more occupation, more contact with the outside world, payment for work done, the central stores where small purchases can be made, up-to-date libraries, entertainments—have all produced a better atmosphere and less deterioration. The condition of those forced to remain in asylums is better and less degraded, but it must not be assumed that new experiments alone are a sign of progress.

A large percentage of the insane were until recently thought to belong to two groups: the one, which we will call A,⁴ is the type who tend spontaneously to recover no matter what the treatment, much or little; the second, B,⁵ are just the reverse—they are insane and remain so, despite all efforts at cure. The doctor's function became custodial, a function that none of his brothers in other branches of the profession share. This attitude altered when it was realised that cases are found in group B where recovery actually occurs and is maintained. In group A, when the condition recurs (as it so often does) precipitating factors can sometimes be seen at work. Mental processes are not so disordered as they once appeared; the difficulties have been due to the complexities of the mental manifestations. If progress is to be maintained we want more documentation, not only of mental symptoms, but of the mental patient's physical and environmental changes.

Such documentary evidence is only available in a few

⁴ The manic-depressive insanities.

⁵ The schizophrenics.

hospitals,⁶ and in them it may be argued that the results do not justify the effort involved. All would agree that many medical officers' duties are too diffuse to permit of adequate note-taking. Patients can be divided into those deemed quite chronic, those with doubtful futures, and those who will recover. The accommodation of the patients runs roughly along such lines too, and both treatment and clinical observation is directed most upon the latter. Several hospitals could boast up-to-date measures of therapy; it is doubtful if any could assert that the treatment was all that the medical officers wished it to be. The asylum world is moved with many fresh ideas about the treatment of the insane, but it is at present not organised in a way that makes the experiments with such new procedures easy, co-ordinated, or readily assessed. The recent visit of one of the women Commissioners of the Board of Control to the Continent and her careful report upon a new form of treatment indicates the new approach to the problems which is afoot.⁷

Apart from the efforts of the Mental After-Care Association, attempts to care for the recovered patients have been scanty. The patient returns to an atmosphere where his illness is metaphorically consigned to the cupboard and where it rapidly becomes the skeleton, faintly or grossly affecting the whole atmosphere. Although we know so little of the causes of mental breakdowns, we have done too little to help the patient or his relatives adopt a healthy outlook on his discharge. Some way of giving the patient a real and not a false optimism about the future, and a satisfactory approach to the relatives so that they may understand the individual's temperament and difficulties, is required. Such work is being undertaken by the psychiatric social workers attached to the progressive hospitals and must be extended. But must the appointment of such persons be left to local committees? Health visitors are an accepted part of other medical services, and the need of similar support in mental health treatment should be axiomatic. Follow-up schemes are now an accepted part of other branches of medicine. Their value not only to the patient but to the medical man's knowledge

⁶ For good documentation see recent papers on depressive states by Dr. Aubrey Lewis, of the Maudsley Hospital, in the *Journal of Mental Science*.

⁷ *A Study of Hypoglycamic Shock Treatment in Schizophrenia*, by Dr. Isabel Wilson.

of the natural history of disease is proven. Yet the Cinderella of medicine lags behind. Real progress in the treatment of the insanities can only come when the patient's life outside the hospital is scrutinised, and the effects of success, disaster, turmoil, or infection are observed. Towards such information committees guided by parsimony and scorn can contribute little. Yet prevention can only be successfully organised on the basis of complete knowledge.

What is the evidence which a Commission investigating mental hospital conditions would acquire? The witnesses would be the Board of Control, county councillors, medical superintendents, matrons, learned psychiatrists, solicitors and representatives of the Lord Chancellor and the Master in Lunacy.

What is likely to be forthcoming? The Board of Control would speak of their supervisory powers, their investigations into patients' complaints, their efforts to improve the lot of the insane. They would have to reveal that their powers were limited to enforcing the legal carrying out of the Lunacy Act and the Mental Treatment Act. Their architect has to pass or to condemn proposed alterations in structure. They can initiate nothing. They may write 'The matter which has impressed us most is the disability under which this hospital labours with regard to the absence in it either of modern facilities, or of any which (it seems to us) can be adapted to serve as such for the reception and treatment of recent cases of mental disorder.' But without the co-operation of the councils this state of affairs cannot be remedied.

The Board's evidence would bear tribute to larger social activities, more quiet and occupation, pleasanter wards, better investigations. But the evidence would also show that recovery rates were not improving markedly, that dysentery and enteric (much reduced) still break out, that sanitary amenities are still deficient, that some nurses sleep in rooms adjacent to patients and use the same lavatories and baths, that in some hospitals there is no adequate convalescent accommodation, that the numbers of nurses are inadequate, and there is in many hospitals overcrowding. Of one they write 'how difficult it is to keep up a high standard of hygiene under the antiquated conditions prevailing in the older buildings.' The possibility of persons being

admitted on their own written application and not under certificate (five years after the Act permitting this came into force) is definitely discountenanced at one hospital where 'If they were admitted in present circumstances it would militate against their coming again.' At a few other hospitals similar conditions prevail. At others where the tuberculosis rate is high, no X-ray treatment has been available. The rate quoted of tuberculosis amongst the staff suggests that cases are overlooked.

Were overcrowding to be investigated further, a very complicated state of affairs would be revealed. Under its stress every hospital has difficulties in finding the best ward for each patient. He may be drafted into a particular ward although it is recognised that this is contrary to a sound principle. And there he tends to remain as overcrowding defeats principles. Evidence of patients in mental hospitals who might be cared for elsewhere would be given. Perhaps the most enlightening information would come from a survey of Continental schemes, of the colonies for the chronically yet quiet insane in Belgium, of the generous accommodation for epileptics, etc., in Scandinavia. Medical superintendents might be asked, 'How would you utilise your present accommodation if you could do so, irrespective of numbers or types of illness, and supposing you could select from 10,000 mental patients those who might come to your hospitals?' Such a survey would show that overcrowding and 'under-treating' must continue so long as hospitals are merely county units. They must be drawn into a larger scheme.

The councillors, members of the mental hospital committees, might have an uncomfortable time from examining counsel. 'How do you account for maintenance rates varying from 20s. per head per week in one hospital to 29s. 6d. in another of the same size,⁸ clothing in some costing 7s. and in others less than 3s. 6d., medicines varying from 1d. to 1s. 6d.? Are these charges comparable with extra facilities, better accommodation and recovery rates, or not? Is your work purely routine, or are the members of your committee

⁸ These figures do not represent the extremes, but are of two hospitals of equal size. The lowest weekly cost (excluding loan charges) is 18s. 1d. in a hospital of 1300 patients, to 30s. in a hospital of 800 patients.

inspired by a live interest in the problems of mental disorder ?'

The examination of the medical superintendents might be as enlightening as it is difficult. There would be a danger that it was the progressive rather than the reactionary chief who appeared before the Select Committee. The same advances, and very real advances, as the representatives of the Board of Control stressed would be enumerated. Many real improvements are being made. To the question 'Is the medical and nursing staff adequate and the accommodation sufficient?' the answer would be 'No.' Asked about the advances in the treatment of the insane, the witnesses would probably answer that whilst the purely environmental conditions were much improved, and the possible theories of causation of these illnesses numerous, yet little seemed to alter their evolution and course. Apart from the malarial treatment of general paralysis of the insane no striking advance had been made: some spectacular results had recently occurred in other forms of therapy, but they were not yet appreciably altering recovery rates. Indeed, whilst the future was bristling with possibilities, the witness, from his long experience, was not too optimistic. Certain skilful questions might elicit that such pessimism was the result of the isolation of the mental hospital, of its large load of chronically and hopelessly disabled, of the intellectual superiority of the sane to the insane. The witness might stress his impotence in the face of his council's parsimony. He could dilate upon the unwillingness of the elected representatives to sanction expenditure upon treatment which produced such small visible results. He could show a case for the time and care spent upon the nursing of the sick as compared with more but less successful forms of active therapy. He could quote examples where the stigma attaching to mental illness had hindered practitioners and relatives from taking early measures for treatment. He would show his despair that the quality of probationer nurses was so poor, though he would wax properly proud about the skill of the fully trained mental nurse. He might deplore his own burden of purely administrative duties, his loss of touch with the patients and their problems, the overload upon his assistant medical officers who care for 300 or more patients each, and the lack of satis-

factory grouping of the cases. The impression gained would be of an experienced administrator battling with a county problem which should be a national one, of keenness for improvement frustrated by old buildings, by the slowness of his patients' recoveries, by a dead load of chronic material, and by public parsimony and apathy. For seldom can extremes meet so nearly as they do in a mental hospital, the actively dangerous so close to the vegetable-like demented patient who needs caring for like a baby; the devilish excitement of the acutest ward compared with the peaceful and unaltering routine of the administrative offices.

The evidence of the matrons would doubtless elicit the fact of the skill of the mental nurse in restraining a suicide, in calming a noisy patient, in finding occupation for a restless one. The probationers are admitted young (at eighteen), the majority have not had a secondary education, a large number come and go having no sense of vocation for a skilled occupation. They start at a better salary than probationers in other hospitals (about £30 per year with board and lodging), and they maintain their pecuniary advantage. After three years the nurse should pass her examination in mental nursing, and she will be examined about certain common physical conditions—burns, fractures, fevers—of which she may have seen practically nothing. Only a few spend any time at a general hospital. Few opportunities of mixing with nurses at different hospitals is possible. Opportunities of widening the nurse's culture is left to her own ingenuity and taste. Her off-duty times are becoming longer. The old sixty-six-hour week is being replaced (in some hospitals) by a fifty-four-hour one. It is symptomatic that the Board of Control's reports hardly mention nursing conditions. There is mention of unsatisfactory accommodation for nurses, but it is certain that the Board would like to make proposals, yet is hampered by its own powerlessness, and probably hindered by its knowledge of how baffling a problem it all is. Yet the conditions under which the nurse lives, works, gains experience, and can visualise an attractive future are cardinal if we are to ensure that her contribution to the patient's treatment is the very best. After three years she leaves to obtain general nursing experience, and (as yet)

her previous training has no value⁹ in the new hospital where she starts as a probationer at a salary less than she has ever had before. The probabilities of her returning to care for the mentally ill are not large. Matrons have constant difficulty in filling senior posts. Many women will not return to mental nursing. Their reluctance is due to many factors, least of which is the divorce between general and mental nursing. This separation is one which the Nursing Council themselves could adjust if public opinion was fully alive to it.

The matrons would verify the general shortage of nurses. Would they be able to suggest schemes whereby mental nursing could be made more attractive? There is in the mental hospital an apathy about the difficulties of adequate staffing. Has mental nursing really fired anyone's imagination? Is it a problem which must remain unsolved, or is the cleavage between sane and insane to be reflected in a similar cleavage between professional nurses and doctors on the one hand and the probationers on the other? The probationer in some hospitals does not feel an integral instrument in treatment. She feels she is essentially a poor tool, and that her senior's attitude is unalterable, that she is judged in the mass and not as an individual anxious to learn. Set lectures she attends, clinical demonstrations are few.

There are three types of individuals who would not be likely to appear before a Select Committee. They are assistant medical officers, nurses, and recovered patients. Each of them might support, in part, present conditions. Each would have criticisms the validity of which the Committee would have to assess. The assistant medical officers would stress the huge number of patients for which they are responsible, their inability to spend sufficient time with those who would reward their efforts, the conflicting loyalties of time spent in research and time spent in social activities (games, entertainment, etc.) with the patients. As a recent letter in the *British Medical Journal* has shown, there is a feeling amongst medical officers that research work is over-valued as a means of promotion. Some would wish to do it but feel they lack experience and direction. In one mental hospital the pathological material is forwarded to London, over 150 miles

⁹ Changes in this are very gradually occurring in a few areas.

away. An enormous field of investigation exists, but as present organised the medical officers cannot use it. Their function is custodial rather than clinical.

The nurse's testimony would support the matron's. She would stress the isolated position of the hospital, the poverty of social contact outside the institution, the difficulties of learning about disease as a whole, and as a bigger problem than her own specialised mental nursing. There are women who have been attracted to this vocation, but who have not continued in it because of the conditions involved and the sense of being despised. Whilst poverty of accommodation plays its part, a misunderstanding of the nurse may play a larger part in her dissatisfaction. Some compensation ought to be made to the nurse for the slowness with which her patients recover, and the patience she herself needs. Pecuniary benefit is not adequate recompense: the drawbacks in her profession are cultural ones; they require appropriate stimulation of her interests outside the dry bones of institutional care.

The contributions to these problems made by ex-patients have for the most part come from those whose prejudices are apparent or whose imaginations have been unchecked.¹⁰ There are many who are grateful for the care of the hospital, specially those who have recurrent maladies. And it would be easy to underrate these because of their silence. Some have been shocked by their proximity to noisy patients, but upholders of the present régime might remind us (with reason) that the mental patient is much wrapped in his own world, and that disaster, loss, or surprise means much less to many mental patients than to the sane. It is complained that 'no treatment is given' by those who forget that separation from an unbearable home situation, rest and temporary security are in themselves treatment. Perhaps the best pointers to the situation are to be found in the Board of Control reports. Of one hospital it is said, 'A hospital which has no suitable provision for convalescent patients cannot be said to cater adequately for the voluntary type of patient' and of those previously mentioned where the hesitancy to admit such patients is supported by the Board themselves in view of the

¹⁰ Phyllis Bottome's book *Private Worlds* is imaginative. Other books have been written with an axe to grind.

existing limited and unsatisfactory accommodation. Nurses and doctors may be criticised as complacent, but, in view of our very limited knowledge as to what effects cure other than time, such complacency *may* have some excuse. The strongest criticism of all may come from those patients whose illness is a real reaction to environmental conditions but who have gained no help in managing their lives better. Without fuller investigation of such cases little progress can be made. The new social workers must play their part here. They are part of a hospital's necessary equipment for which the most financially harassed council must be responsible.

To summarise, a Commission would discover mental illness being treated as a local concern. In addition, members of the committee have no *real* knowledge of the problems involved and must accept what doctors or matrons say without its being easy to check this. The most senior and experienced member of the medical staff, the superintendent, is too full of routine administrative duties to have time for clinical work. Scattered over England and Wales are over 100 other experienced men who are similarly divorced from intimate contact with the patients. In the universities it is the professors who frequently and wisely elect to teach the first year's students. But the asylum superintendents lose such contact with new material. A mass of research work is undertaken, but it shows little co-ordination, and medical officers anxious to undertake research are chary of doing so for lack of experience and guidance, quite as much as from lack of time. From county to county the same thing goes on—no co-operation, no sorting-out of cases into big groups.

Probationers are entering hospitals attracted by pay and supposed prestige. They are going to be lectured to upon illness they have seldom or never seen, and to take examinations about matters on which they are equally uncertain. They will leave in three years with scanty knowledge of general nursing. Their seniors have a regrettable tendency to settle into the hospital routine, and to imagine that the hospital world, being so large, is a true microcosm which needs little stimulation from the bigger and saner world outside.

The Board of Control, which may stand to the public as an emblem of security for the insane, is powerless to do aught

but see that legal formalities are complied with, and to approve or destroy plans for structural improvements. Their suggestions must be translated by the superintendents to the local committees, whose reactions are more directed by financial considerations than by foresight.

Indeed, the present conditions, improved as they are, are still detrimental to patients, staff, relatives, and the taxpayer. They do nothing to remove the stigma of mental disease. What is a national problem is being treated as a domestic one, and the directing inertia lies with the representatives of the local councils, whose main concern is finance, and not health, and whose ignorance of the real conditions is pathetic. Indeed, the problem, like the domestic skeleton in the cupboard, is marked by secrecy and fear. A sense of inferiority permeates the hospitals which should be illusory. It is not so because the mental hospital staff are infected with the uncertainties of the superintendents and the Board of Control, who have not made persistent claims upon the managing committees. The fear of the finance committee and the pessimism of the doctors have wrought havoc with the therapeutic morale of the institutions.

All the criticisms are not true of every hospital, nor is any hospital ideal. Whilst apathy exists, it is the lay, and not the skilled, administrators which are open to most cavil. Attempts to regard present conditions as purposely malign would gain no support from an impartial committee hearing all the evidence. But indifference may be not only as sterilising but as crass as brutality, and the substitution of the latter by an enlightened programme is overdue.

In a further article suggestions are made for the amelioration of the conditions outlined here.

HENRY WILSON.

THE SUPREME DIFFICULTIES IN TEACHING HISTORY

By F. S. MARVIN

MR. H. G. WELLS, both in his recent address to an international gathering of teachers in London and his article in the May number of this Review, stirred up deep problems and deeper feelings which it would be impossible to review adequately in a few pages or lay to rest in a volume. Those of us who follow Acton in thinking 'that universal history should not be a burden to the memory but an illumination of the soul' would not wish any such review to be attempted here. Any solution which would satisfy an ideal such as that must be lived out to the full span both of our years and our mental powers. It is not a matter for a brief display of sword-fence, either on the platform or on paper. Yet one feels that something should be said—partly to explain the spirit in which most teachers, at least in this country, are now facing their task, partly to emphasise the supreme difficulty of doing it well, partly to encourage the willing worker and show something of the value of his work. There is no need to contradict much of what Mr. Wells has been saying; a great deal of it falls into its proper place if we once envisage the problem as a whole—the *child*, or at least the young learner, confronted by the mass of the most vital, most contentious and most comprehensive knowledge which he can ever meet with all his life. Most vital, because he is actually learning about his own being in the social world; most contentious, because there is no fact presented to him about which there are not many sides to be considered; most comprehensive, because man's being, if we limit history merely to that, has its roots in the universal order—is, in fact, Nature come to self-consciousness and contemplating herself.

It is clear at once, when one grasps these facts about the

nature of history, that its adequate presentation to the young is unattainable. The wisest among us may be beginning to understand a little about it when he dies; for the young the best we can do is to arouse an interest, give some fertile roots, and above all avoid the fatal result of making them hate or neglect it later on. The three aspects of the mighty theme, which we mentioned above, may give some clue to the task, some hints as to avoiding its worst perils.

The first was that it is a vital thing for all men to know some history, because in it they are learning about their own nature as parts of a society with its roots in the infinite past and constantly changing. Now here we touch on a feature of history on which doubtless Lord Acton would have agreed in principle with Mr. Wells and yet on which in practice their teaching shows the widest difference. Mr. Wells starts his exposition in the famous *Outline* with the gaseous nebula before the appearance of man, and throughout he is possessed by the conception of the race as a whole, an organic being which has appeared from that nebula and has held together and should hold much more closely in its career through time. Here is a great philosophic truth; but can it be apprehended by a child? Is it—except as a vague formula—within the reach of an average adult at our present state of development? Acton would have agreed that history should cover the evolution of the race, but when he came to deliver his inaugural lecture at Cambridge on the 'Study of History' he selected the last four centuries as the period most vital to our right conduct; to know them as the historian should was the question of life and death for modern men. And in his subsequent lectures he treats of the Reformation, the Puritan Revolution, and all the leading topics which fill the text-books of schools and colleges, with, of course, immense knowledge of detail and the keenest interest in the moral character and rightness of judgment about the chief actors he describes. How is the teacher or the reader of history to proceed? Is he to attempt the Actonian method, extended over the whole history of man, or is he to give the preference, as Mr. Wells would have him do, to the growth of the common concerns of man—trade, discovery, communications and, above all, science? It is impossible for any human being to do all; he must select and he must generalise. But when thinking

primarily of the young, it is essential to remember that the bald generalisation killeth; it is the personal detail, the stirring event—unfortunately, even of a war—which rouses the keenest interest and leads one on to pursue the subject. About those dim pre-humans in the nebulous past the man of science has every reason to inquire and the intelligent child has a wide scope for imagination. But neither the man of science nor the child can apply to them the canons of investigation or of moral judgment which to Acton were the highest qualities and gifts of history.

We have no wish or space here to work out the sort of compromise which is imposed upon every student or teacher who appreciates the many sides of the subject. But all are needed in some degree, not only for the ideal treatment, but even for the passably practical. Mr. Wells is right in seeing the human race as one, rooted in the animal and rising from it. Lord Acton is right in holding that comparatively recent events, such as the settlement of America and the making of the British Constitution, are of great moment to the modern man and that he should endeavour to understand both how they came about and the sort of people who took the lead in producing them.

Anyone who admits the necessity of both must agree as to the supreme difficulty of teaching or understanding history.

The last point mentioned brings us naturally to the second main aspect which we noted as one of the great barriers surrounding history and making it hard to grasp. History is full throughout of uncertainties and contention. From one point of view this is its greatest educational advantage, but from another it adds enormously to the burden and difficulty of the teacher. Are we to treat such a man as Napoleon as one of the greatest geniuses who ever lived, foiled in accomplishing to the full his beneficent plans, or as one of the most selfish and pernicious forces, causing the world untold suffering and putting back the achievement of the free and peaceful progress of mankind? Mr. Wells, as we know, has no hesitations about any such conquering character, but Mr. H. A. L. Fisher certainly has. It is a stiff dilemma to propound even to the keen age of sixteen to eighteen years. We shall not attempt to solve it here, but it introduces another

opposition which runs like a red thread through all Mr. Wells's writing about history—that, namely, between nationalism and internationalism. On this it is easier—and, indeed, necessary—to say a decided word. The spirit of nationalism, of course, defeated Napoleon, and it was, for that time and purpose, often allied with evil, reactionary and corrupt things. Who can read, for instance, of the monstrous proceedings of the press-gangs during the Napoleonic Wars without boiling with indignation? Yet they were seriously considered necessary for the national task of defending the independence and free Constitution of the country. Here again is a dilemma stimulating to the youthful mind, but surely one that should leave no doubt or hesitation as to the propriety and value of a national spirit in itself. Here one must part company definitely with Mr. Wells. It is both a necessary and a valuable thing that the young should love best the people and the things—scenery, institutions, customs, language—among which they have been brought up. Such love is one of the strongest cements of human nature, and is by no means necessarily bound up with a hatred of others or even any feeling that the things we love best are in themselves and universally better. Many a seaman comes back with affection to his native fog, and one has known people who even preferred the inky Irwell to the pearliest streams of other lands. At its worst the spirit of nationalism is a raging curse; at its best it is consistent with the purest spirit of humanity and a lively curiosity about what other nations do and a readiness to imitate them for good reason shown. It is striking how on the list of the world's great men those shine out the brightest who also served and loved their native land. Shakespeare may be taken to head it, and one may add as many as one will beneath him.

Are we to say that all this feeling, with its differences and particularities, is a noxious thing and should as soon as possible be superseded by the union and uniformity which the inventions of science have made conceivable? Is humanity, in short, to be a heap of smooth round pebbles or a jigsaw puzzle, hard to piece together but making an interesting picture when accomplished and exercising our wits abundantly in the process?

One might easily find a better analogy than this, and indeed

one was found, and exquisitely expressed, over twenty years ago when the World War was entering on its destructive career.

Each party and each nation [said Sir James Headlam-Morley¹] adds its own contribution; all have a common origin and all spring from the same root, . . . but we know nothing and will know nothing of a formal and authoritative rule combining all Europe into one realm whether political or intellectual. For we know that unity and permanence do not belong to this life and our nearest approach to truth is to be found not in a settled system but in the thousandfold interactions of half-truths and partial systems:

Life like a dome of many coloured glass
Stains the white radiance of eternity.

A unity there is, but it is the unity of the countless and varied flowers that carpet the meadows in spring, the unity of the common spirit of life which animates them all.

The third main characteristic of history which creates such great difficulties in teaching it is its comprehensiveness. It contains, or has connexions with, all the objects of human observation, with everything on which human life is built or out of which our universe of knowledge has been made. Thus law and literature, art and science are all parts of history, just as much as the political and social framework of our life which constitute the main bulk of history as generally presented. This makes the task of presenting it an overwhelming one, but yet, like the other main characteristics which we have mentioned, it contains a strong attraction and a bright and obvious line of approach which teachers and thinkers generally are increasingly ready to adopt. If all branches of knowledge are parts of history, we may and should approach the main stem by means of the branches. Regard and teach them historically and you are constructing the great fabric of history in the most natural and solid way. If, therefore, the teacher of art or law or science presents his subject-matter in a historical spirit, he is laying the best possible foundations for the historical synthesis which is to hold together and crown the whole. An increasing amount of such work is being done in books and places of instruction on all subjects, but the practical crux remains of, Who is to do the synthetising? It will have been noticed that law, art, science, theology and

¹ *The Unity of Western Civilization* (Oxford University Press: chapter on Education)

the rest, which should all be viewed historically, are just those disciplines for which a self-contained organisation is most easily formed, and in which for the most part it was already in existence before these wider views of history came into prominence. The schools of art or law, theology or medicine were all there and working with more or less efficiency before the comprehensive views on history, either of the Actonian or the Wellsian school, were entertained. This fact gives an obvious and substantial reason why the 'historians proper' have for the most part devoted their attention to the history of government—the story of how the orderly communities of mankind have attained their stability and their constitution. This was the subject left over to them; it is also one to which the notion of centrality, of holding the rest together, could most obviously be attributed. Man must have learnt thus to live in ordered communities before knowledge and art, law or any branch of connected and co-operative thought could make way. This, no doubt, is the reason why such a man as Acton, who in theory accepts a comprehensive view of history and actually puts religion in the highest place among man's activities, in practice devotes most of his study and nearly all his teaching to the political side.

Truly the field is vast and still largely incoherent, but the bands of workers are increasing largely also, and a considerable body—the keenest, if not the majority, of the teachers and students of history—have an open mind to the wide stretches and highest possibilities of their field of work. It would be a gross mistake to dismiss the main body of our teachers of history as concerned only with the dates and circumstances of kings and battles or as propagators of a narrow and hostile nationalism which denies humanity or leads on to war. Few of them can be fully equipped philosophical historians. Most of them are anxiously feeling their way to a larger view of their subject than prevailed in the days of Mrs. Markham or Little Arthur. It must, as we have shown, be the most difficult and long-drawn task in education. In one clear sense it can never be completed, for not only is fresh history being lived every day, but every day we re-read the past in a new way.


An interesting experiment has lately been tried by a committee under the auspices of the League of Nations Union in London. They set out to discover, by questionnaires

widely distributed and by personal inquiry : How is history actually being taught in English schools ? How far is it purely national ? Does it take account of the common man and the common interests of mankind ? How does it deal with wars ? How far does the teaching go back into ancient and even pre-historic times ? One may easily imagine the difficulty of obtaining any precise information on such points, except so far as they come under the purview of the over-dominant external examinations. About these there is abundant information, open to anyone ; but about what actually goes on in the class-room and the private study of the pupils it is exceedingly difficult to know in our non-dictatorially governed country. However, a good deal of information came into the hands of the committee, and they have boiled it down and added such comments and advice as their united wisdom could produce. The document containing this will shortly appear—a short and straightforward affair which may appear commonplace to many who have thought much about the question. But it makes quite clear and lays special stress on two or three leading points which have arisen in this discussion.

In the first place, one gains the general impression that practically all our schools are now making a real effort to attain an international point of view in teaching history. This does not mean that they do not give the bulk of their time and attention to the history of England. It is natural that they should do so. But it does mean that teaching about early civilisation, which is common to all, is now very general, and that in later times European history, often of course in relation to English, is the rule and not the exception. There is little trace of any directly hostile or perverted account of other people, though again—quite naturally—in presenting the story of England's own development and rise to power it is generally assumed to have been a good thing. It was well, for instance, that we beat Napoleon and with our allies won—if we did win!—the Great War. But particular acts of the English in the past, as, for instance, the treatment of Jeanne Darc, are as strongly reprobated as they could be by the most impartial judge. It is also now practically universal to lay great stress on economic and social affairs. Science, too, is beginning to show its head and will become inevitably

the main channel by which the sense of the common effort of mankind will make its way into the minds of all nations. Possibly in some cases—*e.g.*, the United States or Switzerland or Sweden—more may have been done already to reach this higher and humanitarian level. The default in a good many other cases is notorious. To rise still higher, while retaining a firm grasp of the realities of history, must be a gradual process, for the field is so vast and so beset with difficulties—factual as to the truth of what is presented, judicious as to the choice among the infinite material, psychological as to the reaction on the learner's mind. The right solution remains as the supreme crux for education in the future, and the nearer all nations approach to it the more stable will be the foundations of peace and rational progress for the world.

F. S. MARVIN.



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A SHORT ACCOUNT OF TOKENS

THEIR USE AND PRODUCTION

By BASIL G. HUNT

JUST as Love tokens and Scottish Communion tokens represent a sincere pledge, so is token coinage the outward sign of an urge to maintain trade at times when it would be difficult to do so by means of ordinary currency. Briefly, tokens are 'coins' of copper, brass or base silver, issued for the purpose of supplying an adequate amount of small change by individuals who guaranteed to redeem them at any time in bulk; they were prepared to exchange them for a corresponding value of crowns, guineas, or other easily obtainable coin.

In the course of English history they appear in quantity on three occasions, the first of which is considerably earlier than the other two. It was during the reigns of Charles I. and Charles II., especially after the Restoration, that they were first minted for the use of taverns, borough corporations, and retail tradesmen of small means, who found that the scarcity of regal coin of the realm was hampering their trade. This scarcity had threatened to become acute for some years, for the reason that no allowance had been made in the issue of new money for the growth of provincial trade. Since the time of James I., who had granted to Lord Harrington a licence for the striking of farthings, no addition had been made to the amount of copper change in circulation besides those farthings which Charles II. allowed to be issued by the Duchess of Richmond and Sir Francis Crane. A small number only date from the Commonwealth and are to be met with on rare occasions. Charles II. himself had no copper money struck till the twelfth year of his reign (1672). From that year onward new coins were minted almost every

year until 1679, after which there comes another period of complete stagnation. Thus the tradesman who dealt in small sales or the man who made his living by selling pints of beer and ale in both town and country taverns found his business becoming more and more paralysed as the shortage of coin increased. He resorted, therefore, to a practice which hitherto had not been used to any great extent: he had tokens struck in his own name.

They were of three denominations—pennies, halfpennies, and farthings, the former value being of less frequency than the latter. These seventeenth-century issues are usually circular, though they are sometimes to be seen in the shape of a heart, and are made of copper, brass, and even lead. There are some known which are stamped on leather, but these are extremely rare. On the obverse of the token the merchant puts some symbol of his calling: a fishmonger may well have a lobster, or the proprietor of the Vine Inn a bunch of grapes or tun of wine. Some issuers sported the arms of their city guild or company; thus there are many grocers who make use of the coat described—argent, a chevron gules between nine cloves sable. On the reverse side of the token are the initials of the issuer, surrounded by the continuation of the legend from the obverse. An actual example may make the matter clear; a farthing from Loughreagh, County Galway, reads as follows. Obv.: 'DANIELL KELLY. MER.' (A sugarloaf.) Rev.: 'IN LAUGH-REAGH.' ('rd.' between two lozenges.)

From a number of tokens taken from a single locality it is a matter of little difficulty to form a very fair idea of the place itself as it was nearly 300 years ago. One has first-hand evidence of the taverns, their keepers, and the dealers in the chief commodities of the time, while it is interesting to note how many streets and roads there are that have not changed their name during the passing of so many years. Though these tokens are of some age and rarity, in most cases they do not fetch more than a few shillings; in fact, with a little judgment and a few pence, one can often make purchases that are well worth one's while. Of their type they are most instructive, but artistically they do not approach the standard set by those issued at the latter end of the next century. Their use was forbidden by several proclamations,

which actually had but little effect. They were finally and decisively suppressed by Act of Parliament in 1680, after which they gradually disappeared from general circulation.

The British people were free from any embarrassing shortage of coin from that time onward until half-way through the reign of George III., when a similar situation arose. Conditions had changed, naturally, during the intervening hundred years, and the type of token at this time was employed by the larger business concerns and by the better class of tradesfolk rather than by the tavern-keeper and by the general dealer in the provinces, as had happened previously. Although George III. ruled longer than any previous monarch (his was, in fact, the longest reign up to that time), he so neglected the welfare of his people as to issue copper coin on nine occasions only during the sixty years of his reign. For the first ten years he issued none at all; each year from 1770 to 1776 small quantities did appear, but after this latter date there came a gap of some twenty years during which no new issue took place. In 1806 the whole coinage was re-designed and improved generally; but what of the gap which preceded?

Trade within the country was in a far worse plight than before. Owing to improved conditions of transport and an advance in industrial methods, the provincial manufacturer found his sphere of activity growing rapidly. The Industrial Revolution had created conditions never before necessary to face. The employer or promoter of business found it impossible to proceed with his endeavours with such a shortage of small change. He could neither pay his men easily, nor could he deal profitably with his customers; for though he had the capital, he lacked the means of converting it into a form suitable to use with the individual purchaser. So it came about that he, too, decided to cease struggling with a badly worn and depleted supply of change. He commissioned die-engravers to design tokens for him, and these were at first confined to the three usual denominations, though others, such as threepenny pieces, were current during the first decade of the nineteenth century.

These tokens were payable over a wider area than their predecessors. They were not usually confined to the establishment of one single person; they were 'payable in Lan-

caster, London or Bristol,' 'Anglesey, London or Liverpool,' or even 'current everywhere,' as their edges announce in various cases. Some were more confined and were 'payable at Parker's Old Birmingham Warehouse' or 'at the Black Horse, Tower Hill.' As a general rule, however, they may be said to have possessed greater freedom of circulation. Their designs provide exceedingly interesting material for study, for they may be looked at from so many points of view. They are so numerous, and comprehend such a vast range of subjects, that they are bound to supply something of interest to every specialist. As they are typical of the time of the Industrial Revolution, it might be appropriate to consider them from that point of view first.

At a time when machinery was supplanting man-power, and men were struggling their utmost against the invasion of new inventions which threatened to rob many of their means of livelihood, it might be expected that tokens embodying current thought would represent both sides of the matter. Very many exist, therefore, bearing all types of new machines from looms and printing presses to spirit stills. Engineering ventures, such as the Gloucester and Berkeley Canal and the first barges to be built of iron, are mentioned on others; while there are those which support the rights of the hand-workers, and include the lace-maker of Leighton Buzzard and the hop-picker of Lamberhurst, in Kent, to mention but two out of a host of examples.

Artistically there are many which might well be collected solely on their merit of being works of art. Among these I would include the Scotia Rediviva specimen from Ayrshire, which bears a very fine bust of William Wallace in a Greek helmet—a strange contrast which luckily does not detract from the appearance of the piece. Indeed, such tokens were probably issued as medals rather than actual currency, but the worn state of many of them proves that they have been in circulation. This fact presupposes a sorry state of monetary chaos to have occasioned such a complete reversal of their original purpose. Among the busts and figures adorning the series of industrial tokens, mention must be made of one of particular interest—that of John Wilkinson, ironmaster, of Willey, in Warwickshire. This engineer, who held many ideas that were greatly in advance of his time, is chiefly to

be remembered now for his scheme to build boats of iron, a proposal which gave rise to much scepticism at the time, but which was, of course, entirely successful. He was the first man to have tokens issued in any number, bearing his own head on the obverse and a selection of varying designs on the reverse. These appeared in 1787 and were engraved by I. Hancock.

John Wilkinson is portrayed as a middle-aged man of genial countenance, wearing a wig and high-collared coat, at the neck of which a cravat is seen to spread from inside a large-buttoned waistcoat. On the reverse is the interior of a forge with a man engaged in shaping bars of iron under a large mechanical hammer. Behind him are the open doors of a blazing furnace. A second design bears on the reverse a figure of the god Vulcan hammering at an anvil, which typifies rather the human element in industry, although through the medium of a god.

Such quantities of these tokens were issued that their number is far in excess of any other series known. More than 100 variations of his halfpenny tokens have been catalogued. It was only to be expected that there would be a section of general public to voice strong disapproval of these happenings, although they were all for the best and wrought a great deal of good. Therefore a token bearing an obverse similar to the one here described stole its way into circulation, and it was at first sight hard to distinguish it from the original issue until one examined the reverse. Here, instead of the workman engaged in honest toil, was a legend whose inference is obvious: 'AND HE SAID, LET US MAKE PENNYS AFTER MY OWN IMAGE.' This counterfeit is, incidentally, very rare. Further evidence of this feeling is forthcoming from the *London Magazine* of 1787, in the pages of which the following satire is to be found:

In Greece and Rome your men of parts
Renoun'd in arms or famed in arts,
On splendid coins and medals shone,
To make their deeds and persons known;
So Wilkinson from this example
Gives of himself a matchless sample;
And bids the iron monarch pass
Like his own metal, wrapt in brass!

Which shows his modesty and sense,
And how and where he made his pence;
As iron, when 'tis brought in taction,
Collects the copper by attraction.
So this in him, 'twas very proper
To stamp his brazen face on copper.

A number of Cheshire tokens from Macclesfield bear the head of Charles Roe, who, as the actual inscription runs, first established the copper mines there. These were also current in great numbers. Thus it can be seen from the first specimens to be quoted that contemporary metal industries made full use of the service afforded to trade by token payment. A third industry of the same sort was the Birmingham Coining and Copper Company, while the Mining and Copper Company in the same district co-operated in the production of a large quantity of copper halfpennies. Anglesey is responsible for some 250 issues, which is almost eight times the rest of Wales put together. The reason for this great amount from a small area was the presence on the island of the Parys Mining Company, a concern which attempted to mine gold. These tokens are very common, and the pennies bear exactly the same design as the halfpennies—namely, on the obverse the bust of a hooded Druid, surrounded by a border of oak-leaves and acorns. The reverse shows the cypher 'P. M. Co.' and the words 'PROMISE TO PAY THE BEARER ON DEMAND ONE PENNY' (or halfpenny, as the case may be), while round the edge one can read varying legends, of which the most usual is 'PAYABLE IN LONDON, ANGLESEY OR LIVERPOOL.' It is to be noticed that the letter 'N' in this inscription is almost always retrograde.

Shops and concerns whose names have long since died, or which have formed the forgotten nucleus of some modern business, are often to be seen on tokens. An outstanding example is that of Pidcock's Menagerie, which used to be housed in Exeter Change, off the Strand. It was absorbed into the Surrey Zoological Gardens, and thus can claim direct ancestry of the present Zoo. Pidcock issued some fifty halfpenny varieties which all bore representations of his animals. The lion fondling a dog, the fearsome wandleroo, the two-headed cow, the nyghau and the orange-crested cockatoo are all included. Each die has been inter-

changed with all the others in the series, so that the collection is arranged in as many different ways as possible. The engraver entrusted with the work was C. James, of Martlett Court, Bow Street, and he succeeded in executing a very pleasing series, some of which are rare enough. Lackington's bookshop, in Finsbury Square, accounted for the issue of several thousand halfpennies; in his case the great number is due to many impressions from the same dies, and not to any frequent change of design. A legion of other shops and stores are known to have contributed to the stock, most of them limiting the wording and design to the advertisement of their own particular brand of merchandise, be they sellers of worm powders or of grass seed.

Certain individuals, such as Skidmore, who ran a furniture repository in Birmingham, issued sets with designs based on series of buildings. His collection of churches is perhaps best known, though the Bath buildings and the set of Birmingham buildings engraved by I. Ottley for Kempson, who was a maker of medals and buttons in the same district, are close rivals. He is, indeed, a lucky man who can say that he possesses a number of any of them. Their price is, of course, greatly increased when they are offered for sale in groups, as their attraction is partially lost if they are considered singly.

It is tokens of this type that were intended for artistic medallions more than anything else, and that explains why they are usually found to be in better condition than those issued to be used as currency pure and simple. National victories, battles in war, boxing, and the field of politics all have their share, and such heroes as Lord Howe, Admiral Jervis, who pursued and defeated the Spanish fleet with only fifteen sail, and even Mendoza, have pennies and halfpennies dedicated to their memory. Possibly the rejoicing over the release of political prisoners affords some of the most interesting material. The trials of D. Eaton and John Thelwell, the affair of John Horne Tooke and his fellow-members of the London Corresponding Society, who were arrested for treasonable dealing with people across the Channel, were all commemorated and in force. The Corresponding Society had held strong sympathies with the revolutionaries in France, and their subsequent acquittal was the sign for an

outbreak of riotous satisfaction. Many tokens were struck for the occasion, and the engraver was careful to include in his design the names of all the learned counsel who had helped to bring the case to a successful conclusion.

And the number continues to mount up. It would be impossible to devote less than a book to an adequate survey of all their different aspects. Let it suffice to say that by the end of the century they had been issued in such profusion that they might almost be said to have occasioned their own increase. In this way: tokens which were never intended for currency began to appear purely for the benefit of collectors, and these seem to have been fairly numerous even in those early days, for there are many books published on the subject before 1800. Pye, incidentally another inhabitant of Birmingham, produced in 1795 *Provincial Copper Coins or Tokens*; Conder, of Ipswich, in 1798 his *Arrangement of Provincial Coins, Tokens and Medalets*; and, lastly, Denton and Prattent their *Virtuoso's Companion*, which acts as an extensive addition to Pye's work, though it is considerably scarcer and less well arranged. These are all most useful books of reference, though they had not the chance of obtaining as much detailed information as the more modern publications.

A dealer in coins and medals by the name of T. Spence is to be found mentioned on the edge of many tokens, notably those of the Pidcock series. This gentleman, who had suffered a term of imprisonment on the charge of high treason, kept a shop in Holborn, where he dealt in books, prints, medals, and the like. It may be justly said that it is in no small measure due to his activities that the decline of tokens came about, for he issued many bearing political slogans and crude cartoons. From this he derived considerable personal gain, and he so destroyed the real purpose of tokens by giving them a value of the wrong sort. This change in their worth is made more evident by the striking of a specimen as follows: Obv.: A connoisseur smoking a pipe, at a table spread with medals; behind him a servant in the act of placing a fool's cap upon his head. 'TOKEN COLLECTOR'S HALF-PENNY. PAYABLE ON DEMAND. 1796.' Rev.: An ass and a mule saluting—'BE ASSURED, FRIEND MULE, YOU SHALL NEVER WANT MY PROTECTION.' Round the edge there are the words 'ANY SUM GIVEN

FOR SCARCE ORIGINAL IMPRESSIONS,' which has the appearance of being a scandalous piece of profiteering. Another reverse exists to this token, reading as follows: 'Two boys riding a race upon asses—' ASSES RUNNING FOR HALFPENCE.' There is a subtle pun in the wording of the former, for the word 'mule,' besides meaning the stubborn beast, also signifies an impression taken from two interchanged dies, a very common practice which accounts in part for the great number of issues.

Of all periods this must have been the most depraved, when the hobby—one might almost call it a mania—was at its lowest moral ebb. The many thousand pieces current up to this date kept the market so flooded that the years 1799 to approximately 1811 passed without further issue with the exception of 1801, when the latter part of Pidcock's set and a few others made their appearance. From the year 1811 they were published in fair profusion until their final abolition six years later. Tokens of this time are to be seen in many more denominations than during the preceding thirty years. In silver they were now current for the sum of 2s. 6d., 1s., and 6d.; while the values in copper were 3d., 2d., 1d., $\frac{1}{2}$ d., and $\frac{1}{4}$ d.

It was no longer an age of experiment; their use and practicability had been both known and proved for some time. Consequently, the collector is not confronted with that array of artists' proofs, rare issues, and unique specimens that he had to delight him before. No more lessons were given by Hancock, senior, to his son for the collecting public to quarrel over. They had to be content with the few impressions that existed of the talent shown by the young son of a gifted father. The engravers themselves had become more skilled, and there was no need to scrap so many dies, as had been done before, by reason of frequent misspelling and inaccuracies.

These tokens of the nineteenth century are almost all of a purely industrial type. The extensive variety of earlier years has gone; the neighbourhoods of Bristol and Birmingham predominate, with the ironworks at Newcastle and Glasgow close after them. Ponderous in weight and comparatively inartistic, they are reminiscent of the first coinage of George III. rather than the tokenage of his earlier years. In many ways they are similar to the 'cartwheel' pennies of

1797, and they give the impression of being the spent force of a glorious age, one that has settled down to acknowledge nothing but stern necessity. Indeed, the general history of these years—the conflict with Napoleon and the unrest in many populous districts of the country—goes to justify this characteristic. It is certain that they lack any charm or attraction that allows them to rival their predecessors.

Owing to the lack of silver in the country, tokens for the sum of 1s. and 6d. were struck—in many cases from metal obtained in quantity from the capture of Spanish dollars. Sometimes the actual dollars were countermarked with the head of George III., sunk in an oval which was later to be changed to an octagon when the former became subject to the attentions of many forgers. This practice of countermarking gave rise to the expression 'to stamp the head of a fool upon the neck of an ass,' a saying which may be taken as a fair example of what the nation thought of their king at that time. Unfortunately, the treatment given to these countermarked dollars was so abused that they were eventually recalled to be restruck by Messrs. Boulton, of the Soho Works at Birmingham, in the form of Bank of England tokens. In some cases the imprint of the original Spanish design is visible through the restrike.

However, the majority of shillings and sixpences minted for local use are light and insubstantial. The designs on them are often similar to those on earlier issues. For example, John Voss, a draper in Swansea, did not go to the trouble and expense of having new dies designed. In 1811 he is using the same die, with a slight alteration, as Padley and Andrews of the same town, and this is identical in design to the one which he was using for his pennies more than ten years earlier. Other merchants contented themselves with filling the whole of one side with the lettering of their names and addresses, while they make simple use of the town or city coat-of-arms for the other. As in the case of silver tokens, the copper ones are prosaic in design and their scope of portraiture is strictly limited. Many are based on the regal coinage, having Britannia on the reverse; but in place of the king's head on the obverse one often finds the Duke of Wellington, or even a Roman emperor!

Tokens existed in the Colonies also, and for a far longer

period than is usually thought. A specimen of no great rarity is that issued by Keeling, proprietor of a store in Gibraltar. There are two values, both in quartos, each bearing the arms of the Rock on one side and the name of the issuer with the value on the reverse. Possibly the greatest number of Colonial tokens issued from the year 1820 onwards are those issued in Canada and the neighbouring British Colonies (as they then were) of Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. The banks of Quebec and Upper Canada, the Banque du Peuple and the Bank of Montreal all contributed their share, which ranged from intricate floral designs to a more commonplace dried codfish wishing 'SUCCESS TO THE FISHERIES.'

The same system existed in Australia and New Zealand at approximately the same time, though its actual origin is of somewhat greater antiquity. The first known token to be issued exclusively for the use of any British Possession in the southern hemisphere is another form of countermarked dollar, this time so hacked and altered in appearance that it is barely recognisable. A circle, eleven-sixteenths of an inch in diameter, was punched out of the centre, while round the uninjured ring there were stamped the words 'FIVE SHILLINGS.' A sprig of laurel completes the circle. On the reverse the words 'NEW SOUTH WALES' leave no doubt as to its origin. Meanwhile a use had been found for the piece which had been cut out. This was roughly milled and bore a design which announced that it was current for the sum of 'FIFTEEN PENCE.' Thus the total value of the former Spanish dollar in New South Wales was reckoned to be 6s. 3d., while in England the Bank of England was offering 5s. 6d. for it.

Tokens were made necessary in Australia by the fact that prior to 1855 all coin current in the country had to be minted in the United Kingdom. In the year 1855 the Sydney Mint was established and began its work, which eased the shortage prevalent at that time. Australian tradesmen's tokens are very numerous, and really form a study in themselves.

BASIL G. HUNT.

THE 'NEAR WHITES' OF SOUTH AFRICA

By G. H. CALPIN, Editor, the *Natal Witness*

It has been well said of the Union of South Africa that its Government is without an effective opposition capable of offering an economic alternative to the Hertzog-Smuts coalition, going under the name of Fusion but with the official title United South African National Party. Lacking a sound opposition the responsibilities of criticism have devolved to a larger extent than is usual upon a Press which, though supporting the principles of Fusion, has felt freer to criticise the detailed practice of it. This entirely happy tendency finds a substantial parallel in another direction, one only possible in a situation where the Government has a large majority. I refer to the greater liberty and responsibility shown by departmental chiefs and to the various commissions of inquiry into conditions requiring investigation. Critical analysis of the Government's policy absent in the House, it has fallen to the duty of framers of departmental reports and commissions of inquiry to investigate and survey their several spheres in a manner not before seen.

No better example of this can be offered than the Report of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Cape Coloured Population of the Union, an investigation set up in July 1934, the published findings of which have just been released. The term Cape Coloured is applied to that section of the non-European population which is of mixed origin so that its members cannot be classed as Indians, Bantu, or European. Cape Coloureds—and they are no longer, of course, confined geographically to the Cape Province—find their origin in the intermingling of the slaves of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries brought from East Africa and Madagascar, with one another, and with Hottentot blood (itself by no means unmixed), later to be followed by an admixture of European

with it and Malay. The three factors, slave, Hottentot, and European, have since been added to by contact with the Bantu, so that the imagination cannot err in its picture of a human conglomerate passing in physical features, hair texture, and skin colour from near white (sufficiently near to pass over the border and be accepted as European), through muddy creams to a variety of browns and near blacks. With them must be numbered the numerous immigrants calling themselves St. Helena people and Mauritians.

The term 'Coloured,' then, has so far defied easy definition, and even that recommended by the Commission of Inquiry was not approved without dissentients.

The typical Cape Coloured may be defined [it reads] as a person living in the Union of South Africa who does not belong to one of its aboriginal races, but in whom the presence of coloured blood (especially due to descent from non-Europeans brought to the Cape in the 17th and 18th centuries or from aboriginal Hottentot stock, and with or without an admixture of white or Bantu blood) can be established with at least reasonable certainty, (a) from a knowledge of the genealogy of the person during the last three or four generations; or/and (b) by ordinary direct recognition of characteristic physical features (such as colour of skin, nature of hair, and facial or bodily form) by an observer familiar with these characteristics.

Falling within this definition are almost 768,000 people, a very significant number aside a European population of only two millions and athwart a native population of six millions. The relation between this heterogeneous community and the European on the one hand and the Native on the other forms the main theme of the recent Commission's Report. The tradition of inferiority under which the coloured peoples live is by no means so marked to-day as it was thirty years ago. The 'near whites,' that is those whose non-European 'taint' reaches back into the dim past, while they cannot claim a social equality with the European or even with those of their community who have passed over the border (and there are many in every walk of life), admit no differentiation or inequality in ability. Their disabilities are due to racial discrimination and lack of environmental opportunities in education and the professions and political recognition rather than

to incapacity. Indeed the tests devised by Mr. Blignaut, M.A., and in Arithmetic by the American, Courtis, applied to 454 European children of average age 11.7 years and with an average I.Q. of 99 (*i.e.*, Std. III. of the South African primary School) and to 180 Coloured children, chosen from 'good' schools where the instruction given is carried out by Coloured teachers, while showing a superiority of the European, by no means indicates an inherent 'inferiority' of his less fortunate fellow. The European being in the ascendant is too prone to lump all Coloured people in one class, and that an inferior one, and the colour bar legislation of the State has encouraged this attitude until to-day it is an entrenched belief and principle of the European outlook. The 'Coloured,' therefore, disunited and split into more social classes than even the European, suffers a social inferiority, in that he lacks co-operative effort, and a politico-economic infirmity forced upon him by the whites. He is confined to the more lowly tasks in general, and when doing 'European' work is too often condemned to a non-European wage. He, with the Native and the Indian, is part of the great labour source drawn upon by industry, commerce, domesticity, and, rightly or wrongly, the State has decided he shall for the most part remain so. Reform, then, and recognition, when it does come, comes slowly; and recently it has not come at all.

The crux of the economic position is to be found in the Government's labour policy. In 1924 the Ministry in power, conscious of the infiltration of non-European labour in industry and commerce as a threat to the stability of the white worker, introduced the 'civilised labour policy' by a circular issued from the Prime Minister's office. It laid down a definite policy that whenever possible 'civilised' labour should be substituted in all employment offered by the Government for that which could be classified as uncivilised. The definition of the terms is significant.

Civilised labour is to be considered as the labour rendered by persons whose standard of living conforms to the standard generally recognised as tolerable from the usual European standpoint. Uncivilised labour is to be regarded as the labour rendered by persons whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities of life as understood among barbarous and undeveloped peoples.

In practice, following these instructions and the subsequent encouragement to industry and commerce to do likewise, 'civilised labour' became 'white labour' and it soon came to be recognised that the determination of whether a person is civilised or not was governed by the wages he earned. 'If wage rates are to be based on existing standards of living, then it becomes impossible for the Cape Coloured not yet on a civilised standard of living ever to attain it.' The Government's aim and intention may not have been directed consciously against the Coloured and it is true that the effect on Native labour was even more detrimental than upon the Coloured, but there is no doubt that the Prime Minister's circular found a responsive action in industry and elsewhere where the term 'civilised' was automatically interpreted as 'white.'

An unfortunate disability is added to this in the attitude of the trades unions defining the position of the coloured worker in the industrial structure. At the beginning of the present century the migration from country to town had not taken on the serious aspect it possesses to-day, and the four provinces, separate in government, had their own regulation for the organisations of industrial workers. The Cape Federation, for example, did not subscribe to colour prejudice in its membership, whilst the Transvaal had merely to distinguish between European and Native, as it possessed practically no Coloured population. After Union in 1910 the need for a national basis for trades unions was imperative and it found expression in the Trades and Labour Council of to-day. It, however, is not unanimous regarding the position of the Coloured worker. Thirty-one unions have accepted non-Europeans as members; twenty-two others do not exclude Coloured in their constitution but have not so far admitted them to membership; fifty-six others forbid entry in their constitutions.

These conditions are not conducive to the presentation of the case for the Coloured worker, in that they do not permit him an easy access to executive position when he is a member of a union, and restrict his activity to passive acquiescence in the decisions of the European where he is not. The Commission in advising trades union organisation for Coloured workers in the hope that such will offer a path to industrial

progress is fully aware of the difficulties in the way. The Industrial Conciliation Act does not recognise separate unions in the area for any trade, and it is difficult to conceive of separate unions acting with such complete accord and sense of co-operation as will eliminate the internal dissension and bridge the gulf already existing on a racial basis. Despite that, however, the Commission claims for the recommendation a possible way out of an extremely difficult situation.

It will be readily agreed that the Coloured worker is in more than one cleft stick. If separate trades unions are set up within the same trade, those Coloureds who already have the privilege of membership in some trades will have given up their membership for the problematic benefits of joining an organisation not yet acceptable under the Conciliation Act.

But trades union organisation is by no means the main disability of the Coloured workman. Wage Acts and industrial legislation have played their part in the vicious circle, and to understand some of the chief anomalies besetting the Coloured community it is necessary to refer again to the Industrial Conciliation Act and also to the Wage Act of 1924. The former seeks to encourage collective agreements between employers and employees on wages and conditions of work, acting somewhat on the lines of the Whitley councils in England; the latter 'imposes' conditions in industries where the workers are unorganised and fixes minimum wages. There is nothing in the Wage Act that reflects the colour bar. In practice, however, the Coloured worker who might be only too willing to sell his labour for less than the minimum wage is unable to do so. Further, as the employer has no option but to pay the minimum rates laid down in the regulations he is more inclined to pay that wage to workers of his own race. Illegal evasions of the Act are by no means uncommon. For example, to the writer's knowledge, there are factories where the owners have devised the most ingenious methods of avoiding the payment of the minimum wage. A certain furniture industry employing non-European labour, before engaging a man at the statutory wage, requires of him a declaration that he has borrowed a sum of money, say £50, and agrees to repay a given sum per month. This is a condition of his getting a job at all. He is only too willing at the end of the month on receiving the pay envelope containing

the statutory wage to return a portion of it through the proper legal channels arranged by the owner.

In the words of the Industrial Legislation Commission's Report, 'Equal pay for truly equal work should be the fundamental wage policy.' It is interesting to note that the Cape Coloured Commission divided in the discussion on wage and industrial legislation, three of them going so far as to recommend 'that all artificial barriers erected to protect the European be removed.' This is a considerable advance even in the sphere of non-political and non-partisan expert inquiry, and when taken with the other main recommendations of a unanimous nature presents an aspect of progress that will not be lost on readers who are conversant with the past history of the relation between non-Europeans and Europeans in the Union of South Africa.

Gertrude Millin in her book *The South Africans* writes :

It has not yet happened in the history of South Africa that a really Coloured man, a man so dark that he could not, even by a general conspiracy of evasion, pass as white—it has not yet happened that such a one has distinguished himself in any branch of achievement whatsoever. No Cape Coloured man has risen to high rank in commerce, art, science, the professions, or politics. Hardly any Coloured man, indeed, has even gone so far as the son of some aboriginal chief, rich in land and cattle, who, now and then, struggles through an English or Scottish university to a profession, and then comes back to South Africa to practise that profession. The young African, it is true, does not gloriously succeed either. His difficult circumstances apart, he has not the persistence, the temperament, the tradition, the mental quality, the general capacity, to compete against his white colleagues. But yet, in merely making the attempt, he does something which seems to be beyond, not only the ambition, but also the means, of the young Coloured man.

This, it will be agreed, is a discouraging picture, drawn as it is by one who should know her South Africa. But it is a picture that reflects the partial truth rather than the whole; it is a picture of pessimism and despair, one drawn without a complete appreciation of the external forces that keep the Coloured people where they are. Environment is undoubtedly the main factor in social development. Mrs. Millin would, I believe, revise her opinion that inherent inability to rise is the determinant of the position of these people.

Were it possible, for example, to raise the status of the Coloureds on the lines recommended by the Commission it is reasonable to suppose that the environmental advantages would find a quickening response among them. If anything is to be learned from history it is this. There was a time in Britain when what Mrs. Millin writes of the Coloured peoples could have been written with equal truth of the labourers of England, and signs are not lacking in South Africa of the emergence of the essential will to progress that precedes the means of accomplishment of it and which so characterised the movement towards the Democracy of Britain. As a present indication of that urge the beginnings of the co-operative movement are discernible in places far removed from the Cape where the majority of the Coloured peoples live. In Durban, with the willing help of interested Europeans, a co-operative society, governed and financed by Coloureds for their exclusive use, has already begun trade, and in Pietermaritzburg, the capital city of Natal, some £500 was forthcoming in March when the first meeting was held to discuss the project. It is interesting to note that the upward movement follows closely that which began in England from the inspiration of the Rochdale pioneers in co-operation through retail distribution. The societies will be affiliated to the provincial co-operative societies for Europeans but will have separate constitutions and self-government.

These first efforts at community co-operation are not without significance, for they deny the absence of will which has too readily been accepted as the main cause of the Coloureds' failure to achieve. It is not easy for the English reader to assess their value, chiefly because he is largely unacquainted with the locale and the deteriorating political conditions to which he is completely unused. Political recognition in Britain moved forward certain of its success. Political recognition for the near whites of South Africa is worse to-day than it was before Union in 1910 and much worse than obtained in 1850. In 1836 the Coloured person might call himself a citizen of Cape Town, in that he had a municipal vote, a £10 property qualification and could offer himself on equal terms with the European as a commissioner of the Municipality and, indeed, in 1840 a Coloured man was elected wardmaster. In Natal, when a separate Government

was formed in 1845, the qualifications for the franchise were property to the value of £50 or annual rent of £10 and an age limit of twenty-one. There was no mention of race or colour. It was not until 1865 that the first statutory colour bar was enacted by a legislature in South Africa, but even this did not abolish the Coloured franchise. The Orange Free State, since the Bloemfontein Convention in 1854 when the British Government handed over the territory to the white settlers, has never recognised the claims of the non-European to complete citizenship but insisted upon a segregation diametrically opposed to the policy of the Cape. A similar condition held for the Transvaal, the 'Thirty-three Articles' for which were drawn up in 1844 and laid down that 'no bastard may sit in our meetings as a member or judge up to the tenth generation.' The policy of 'no equality' was extended by the Grond Wet in 1858. 'The people will permit no equality between the white and the Coloured inhabitants, neither in Church nor in State.'

It will be recalled that by far the greatest majority of the Coloured were resident in the Cape, so that until Union they, together with their fellows in Natal, were politically equal with the Europeans. It was in the Orange Free State and in the Transvaal, where numbers were few, that the colour bar was predominant. The great test, however, was to come with the struggle for Union, from 1907 to 1910. It was then that the public both in South Africa and England watched anxiously the direction the colour question would take. 'Equal rights for all civilised man,' the principle of Cecil Rhodes, was already the policy of the Cape and Natal; 'No equality in either Church or State,' the entrenched opinion of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. It was the conflict of traditional trusteeship and of traditional overlordship; of the new idealism of Democracy and racial realism. On it the union of the four separate and responsible Governments almost split. Said Mr. Merriman, the Prime Minister of the Cape in January 1908:

It is impossible to govern large masses of men unless we give them the same political rights under the peculiar circumstances of the country.

The Draft South Africa Act, however, came as a bitter

blow to the Coloured. Its Colour Bar clauses were a denial of the promises of public men. The North had won; the South had lost. 'Union with honour,' said W. P. Schreiner. 'What a contrast!' exclaimed Mr. J. W. Jagger. 'White criminals could become members of the Union Parliament five years after the expiration, but people with coloured skins were never to be allowed to aspire to such a position.' The protests were carried to the Parliament of Britain by the Archbishop of Cape Town, Sir Gordon Sprigg, Sir William Bisset Bavry, Sir Charles Abercrombie, appealing, not for an extension of rights, but for the rights entrenched in the Charter of the Cape sixty years before. To no avail. The South Africa Act was ratified by the Imperial Government.

We do not forget, and we ought not to forget, that, besides Briton and Boer, South Africa contains a vast population of His Majesty's Coloured subjects, and we may feel the strongest confidence that the same wide liberality of treatment, which has made Union possible, will be as promptly shown to those Coloured races.

Mr. Asquith's generous hopes of 1910 have yet to take practical shape.

The time is not yet when they shall. The Colour Bar remains, and will continue to remain, the main plank in the Union's political philosophy. It reacts against the Coloured, the Indians, and the Natives, in varying degrees of intensity, and, of late, as European racial ideologies have permeated the social and political thought of the country, it is being strengthened in its purpose to keep South Africa for the White Man. It would be a fatal mistake to imagine that this political direction belongs to the Afrikaans element of the nation alone. Natal, the 'British' province, as has already been mentioned, was the first to introduce it in legislation, and does not intend at the present to reverse its decisions in municipal franchise regarding non-Europeans. The same whittling away of rights has proceeded in the case of Indians and Natives.

The Commission of Inquiry, in tracing the history of the situation, made little comment upon the justice or injustice of these tendencies, for the good and sufficient reason that they were not entitled to do so within the terms of reference. But the inferences are too clear to escape notice. The observer of

the political and social scene cannot fail to appreciate the position or the policy of the Government. General Hertzog, the Prime Minister, even if he wished, could not 'liberalise' his policy without threatening the coalition upon which stability rests, though impartial judgment will appraise the situation as one wherein the standard of European living is menaced at every turn by the downward swing of non-European standards.

A point must finally be reached when, from sheer necessity and in his own defence, the European in South Africa will be forced to reorientate the whole of his philosophy.

G. H. CALPIN.

IRELAND AND DR. DOUGLAS HYDE

By J. F. RUTHVEN

WHEN on April 22 the English Press announced that a 'College Professor' was to be President of Eire—and that De Valera and Cosgrave had agreed as to the suitability of Dr. Douglas Hyde—bewilderment ensued among many of the younger generation in this country. Why, they asked, should the compiler of *Love Songs of Connaught*, *Religious Songs of Connaught*, *Legends of Saints and Sinners*, and the *Literary History of Ireland* be called out of his retirement in the county Roscommon to inhabit the former Viceregal Lodge in Dublin? Poetry is not now regarded in England as a qualification for political advancement. But in ancient Ireland the bards ranked next to the kings; they were law-givers, sages, genealogists and chroniclers.

The present writer was not one of those who supported Dr. Hyde's revival of the Irish language; nor who has approved of the separation of Ireland from England. The ensuing explanation, therefore, is not the special pleading of an advocate, but a dispassionate effort to see the circumstances through the eyes of the Southern Irish.

Scotsmen to-day do not execrate the English because the Duke of Argyll defeated the Jacobite forces at Sheriffmuir, or because the Duke of Cumberland overthrew Prince Charlie's champions at Culloden. Even in the Highlands where the people are Celtic, the restitution of forfeited estates to the heirs of the rebel peers, and the subsequent establishment of a royal residence at Balmoral, sufficed to heal old wounds. And though 'Charlie is my Darling' may still be sung in Scottish drawing-rooms, there is nothing now left of the bitterness and wrath which smouldered after the tragedies of 1746. But in Ireland the past lives on, with a tenacity incomprehensible to average Englishmen. In London a statue of

Cromwell can be put up outside the Houses of Parliament, though he reduced Parliament to zero and ruled as absolute dictator. Such English politicians as feel no incongruity in Cromwell the regicide being on a pedestal at Westminster are little able to realise that in Ireland much of the antagonism of peasants to landlords has arisen, not from class hatred, but from the thought that those landlords in many cases were descendants of Roundhead settlers after the massacre at Drogheda, or intruders after the Battle of the Boyne. This resentment against aliens has been the dominating note in Ireland, reverberating despite 'legislative oppression, . . . spoliation and extermination, tumult, turbulence and bloodshed.' As emphasised more than fifty years ago by an Anglo-Celtic member of the Royal Irish Academy, education for the Irish people during the penal times was 'meagre, narrow, and restricted. . . . Yet under all the difficult conditions, the spirit [of patriotism] survived though it languished; the fire did not die though it paled.'¹ Why did the Irish people flock to the standards of Robert Emmet, Lord Edward FitzGerald, and Parnell?—'aliens' all. Because upon their flag was 'inscribed, vaguely but comprehensively, the one word "Ireland." . . . This sentimental fidelity is the ruling characteristic of the Celt.'¹

Owing to the earlier persecution and expulsion of the old aristocracy, the conditions in Ireland were totally different from those in England. Prefacing a selection of Irish verses from 1600 onwards, the above-quoted antiquarian pointed out that, except Sheridan and Lysaght, nearly all the poets were 'of immediately humble birth.'

'We say "immediately humble," for possibly they were all descendants of ancestors who in remote ages, or even later, were kings, or chiefs, or hereditary bards. But in Irish biographies there are no Surreys, or Buckhursts, or Byrons, or Swinburnes—no aristocratic writers. . . . From the peasant class, or a social grade but one degree above it, most of these 'Irish song writers are taken. . . . Their own language was proscribed. . . . The wonder, therefore, is not that these singers should have been peasants, but that there were any singers at all. . . . In the ancient days the bards

¹ *Celtic Irish Songs and Song-Writers. A Selection: with an Introduction and Memoirs.* By Charles MacCarthy Collins, M.R.I.A., Barrister-at-Law (London and Dublin, 1885, p. 15).

were of the kin of princes, were rewarded with lands and castles, were circled with privileges; were regarded with a sacred awe. But in the later days those who made songs enjoyed no privileges, but struggled through countless difficulties. . . . Considering how little education was available, 'the productions of these Irish song writers are marvellous for their poetic power, their purity and truth.' Should not their country, therefore, 'preserve their names, make familiar their songs, and endeavour to bestow on them a little fame? . . .'²

This appeal in 1885 seemed to fall upon deaf ears. But seven years later there arose in the person of Douglas Hyde the destined recreator of Irish national literature. It was in the winter of 1892 that he expressed to the Literary Society of Ireland convictions which were to have far-reaching results:

'When we speak of the necessity for de-Anglicanising the Irish Nation, we mean it not as a protest against imitating what is best in the English . . . but rather to show the folly of neglecting what is Irish. . . . How was it that a nation which long ago was "one of the most classically learned and cultured" in Europe has become one of the least so?'

His answer was that the Irish had latterly fallen away from Irish tradition without having become English. Ireland had lost its old 'language, tradition, music, genius, and ideas.' By a renaissance of culture he proposed to revivify the national soul. His Gaelic League, for the promotion of Irish language and literature, was 'non-political.' The late Lord Monteleague, the late Sir Henry Bellingham, and a few other Irish patricians of English descent agreed with him that to allow the suppressed nationalism of the Irish a legitimate outlet in literature and the arts would or should be a benefit to all ranks. And from the early twentieth century onwards to 1916 Dr. Hyde's popularity was great.

Then came, during the Great War, an increase of anti-English sentiment—fostered by world-revolution forces working upon Irish patriotism. But Dr. Hyde absolutely refused to countenance the rebellion in 1916. That he dared to say 'No' resulted in a decline of his hitherto extraordinary popularity; and in 1925 he was rejected for the Senate. In an English Sunday paper there appeared a protest by Stephen Gwynn, himself Anglo-Irish:

² *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26.

'Of the total first preferences cast, Dr. Douglas Hyde, founder of the Gaelic League and its president for some twenty years, receives 1710; while Mr. Thomas Toal heads the list with 14,210. There is no man better known in Ireland than Douglas Hyde; and fifteen years ago there was none so popular. . . . Incomparably the most distinguished of these before the electorate, he stands about fiftieth in a list of seventy-six.'³

While British public opinion never realised that if Dr. Hyde had assented to the 1916 rebellion the whole of Southern Ireland would have risen, the Sinn Féin elements could hardly forgive him for holding aloof. This was the supreme test of his magnanimity and patience. Not even his most intimate friends heard from him a word of condemnation of the ingratitude of a people to whose cause he had devoted himself from boyhood. He resigned his presidency of the Gaelic League he had created; but as Professor of Irish in University College he continued his work with the graciousness and courtesy always characteristic of him. In 1932, on his retirement, expressions of appreciation were heard once more. Nevertheless, it appeared as if his career was at an end. In his country home, with his books and sports, he led a secluded life, in striking contrast to the days when the freedom of the cities of Dublin, Cork, and Waterford had been conferred upon him amid acclamations from all Southern Ireland.

Scant would be the reward in England of the historian who endeavoured to renew in us the fervour of the Crusades, or the spirit of Drake, Nelson or Wellington. He more probably would offend the living by praising the superiority of the dead. But the Celtic-Irish temperament (as distinguished from the Anglo-Irish) has always looked back to 'days of old' when Hibernia was the 'land of saints and heroes,' in the belief that if Ireland could be freed from English rule Ireland would blossom again into learning and valour, honour and prosperity. Mistaken are our 'sociologists' if they imagine the Irish aversion to England arises from Republican or democratic jealousy. The Irish are not 'democratic.' Irish peasants in the eighties of the last century used to pay their rents to the Land League instead of to their landlords, not out of class hatred, but because they regarded many of the landlords as 'foreigners.' Cromwell and then William

³ *The Observer*, September 27, 1925.

of Orange (usurpers both) so dispossessed the Catholic nobility that the armies of France and Spain were enriched by some of the best fighting material in the world. When it was long afterwards remarked to Napoleon Bonaparte that the battle of Almansa (1707) was one of the few in which the French beat the English, he answered: 'Yes, but the English were commanded by Ruvigny, Lord Galway, a Frenchman; and the French and Spaniards by James Duke of Berwick, an Englishman.'⁴ Although in Ireland a few of the Anglo-Norman Catholic nobility (such as the Prestons: Viscounts Gormanston) held on through the penal times, the majority became exiles after the Battle of the Boyne; and the defeat of the English forces at Fontenoy was largely due to the vigour of the Irish brigades. But though the calamitous scattering of the old Irish nobility into foreign lands deprived the people of their hereditary leaders, it did not extinguish their nationalist sentiment. And it is the revival of that sentiment—not Republicanism, as such—which has prompted the Irish to take every advantage of the surrenders begun by Asquith and Lloyd George; culminating this spring in the complete separation which His Majesty's 'democratic' Ministers carried through without consulting the English electorate. When, too late, many people here deplore the abolition of the King's authority in Ireland, they forget that the King was only a name to the Southern Irish. A rumour arose *circa* 1903 that there was to be an Irish equivalent to Balmoral. If such had been established, and if the sovereigns had attended the Dublin Horse Show every year and the Royal Family had become well known, Irish sentiment might have attached itself to the Crown, and there might never have been a rebellion in 1916. The Irish are affected chiefly by personality; and where a modern person and an antique tradition become associated in their minds fervent devotion ensues—as in the case of Douglas Hyde. By inviting Douglas Hyde, an Anglo-Irish Protestant, to the position of chief dignity in Catholic Ireland, de Valera and Cosgrave have

⁴ The Palace of Liria, sacked and burnt by the Reds in 1936, was built in honour of that victory at Almansa, after which the King of Spain created the first Duke of Berwick Duke of Liria and Xérica. His present representative, James, tenth Duke of Berwick, Liria and Xérica, and seventeenth Duke of Alba (now representing National Spain in London), wrote in 1925 a Life of his ancestor, the first Duke, containing interesting particulars about the war in Ireland.

shown genuine patriotism. For Dr. Hyde, despite his Anglo-Norman ancestry, is an incarnation of the spirit of the traditional Celtic Ireland.

The continued adherence of Ulster to Britain, so emphatically proclaimed, recalls to memory that the division between North and South goes back into the mythical ages. Long before King Henry II. landed in Ireland—invited by Dermot King of Leinster—a war had raged between Meave (Mab), Queen of the South, and Concobar (Conor), King of the North.

St. Patrick, a Briton, succeeded for a while in reconciling North and South. In our time no such reconciliation seems possible. But the tale of sundry fire-eaters that Mr. de Valera intends a war of aggression against Ulster appears most unlikely. For if he now cherished any such project he would not have selected Douglas Hyde, who in 1916 refused to go to war against England, as head of the State. Always Dr. Hyde has maintained that the regeneration and emancipation of Ireland would be achieved, not through warfare, but by a renaissance of national literature, music and art. However 'unpractical' this may seem to such Englishmen as care for none of these things, the calling of Douglas Hyde to the head of the Southern Irish State is one of the most remarkable events of our time. 'Scarcely before the Day of Judgment will Ireland be subdued by the English,' wrote the mediæval Giraldus Cambrensis. And, in Queen Elizabeth's day, Spenser deplored that it was the 'fatal destiny' of Ireland that nothing intended for her good could prosper. But perhaps that tragical destiny is worked out to its end. If any mortal can promote a better understanding between Ireland and England, it is Douglas Hyde. His career has embodied a blend of courage, constancy, consistency, and courtesy. Let us therefore—even if we regard the separation as a hazardous experiment—hope that through him the age-long discords will be resolved into harmony, and the old grievances be ended for ever.

JOCELYN FITZGERALD RUTHVEN.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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THERE WERE GIANTS IN THOSE DAYS

By C. B. FRY

TWENTY years before the turn of the century until ten years afterwards cricket flourished in its golden age, and cricketers were bigger, braver figures than they have become in the darkling decline into the present twilight of utilitarianism.

If anybody doubts this, let him ask a caricaturist old enough to have an opinion. A good caricaturist, above all men, must have a palate for a personality; must be able to sum up in a moment the distinctive flavour of a character, and to transmit his impression with a stringent economy of comment. Let your good caricaturist decide which generation supplied the spectator with cricketers of personality—the pre-war age or the present. 'Look on this picture and on that.' On the one hand we have 'a tun of man' with a beard unfurled like a banner, or a dark curve of lissom grace, a fluttering silk shirt clothing a flow of serpentine movement;

or again, the little apple-faced shrimp batting first for Surrey, flinching from fast bowlers—and still there successfully flinching with 200 against his name; or a round-faced man with fiery eyes and jet black moustaches—the quintessential W. L. Murdoch; or . . . but one could expand indefinitely.

That is the first picture. The second is of the present age. If I were a good caricaturist I should portray the present age as a gigantic score-board adorned with huge totals. In fact, I would not know how else to portray the heroes of to-day. They are entries in score-sheets, names in the list of averages, having for the most part no special distinction of personality. There are cricket-loving school-boys still to be found who can describe to you the appearance and manner of Trumper or Hill or Tom Hayward; who among lyric poets, outside the *Manchester Guardian*, could conjure unforgettable pen portraits out of, say, two-thirds of the men batting for a national side to-day?

Now it is not accidental, this change of calibre. It has come about as a result of a change of motive—an altered attitude to the fundamental principles of the game. In a word, cricket has ceased to be regarded as a physical fine art.

The first reason for the decay of cricket as an art is to be found in the vulgarisation of the game. The amateur has almost disappeared, and with the amateur the playing of cricket for its own pleasant sake, for the satisfaction of the æsthetic impulses it provokes, rather than for the bare result of the match, or its effect on the decimal points of the Championship table. In the heyday of the game there were enough amateurs taking part to lead one to believe that cricket was being played because twenty-two men wanted to play it, not because 22,000 wanted to read about it.

Look at the team that played for England thirty and forty years ago: W. G., Ranji, A. C. MacLaren, F. S. Jackson, A. E. Stoddart, R. H. Spooner, R. E. Foster, L. C. H. Palaret, G. L. Jessop, J. R. Mason, B. J. T. Bosanquet—products, most of them, of a gracious leisurely standard of civilisation that has vanished like the Iron Age itself. Look up the twenty best public school cricketers of ten years ago, the potential Spooners and Jacksons of to-day. How many of them are playing first-class cricket this season? You would not exhaust the fingers of one hand—excluding the thumb.

When country house cricket vanished from England, the game at its most charming died; and the type of cricketer produced in this gracious nursery died with it. It is no longer the leisured amateur who leads the game and sets the style. The tune is called by the impresarios who stage the great commercial circus—the Press and the professional cricketers battling for their living, and therefore necessarily too cautious to take a risk which may deprive them of vital material advantages.

Not only has the game itself become vulgarised: the very publicity, pomp and circumstance of its production have actually conspired together to rob it of mystery and charm. Once upon a time a cricketer disappeared like a brown bear as soon as the last ball of the Scarborough Festival was bowled. Nothing was heard of him from September to May, when his sudden reappearance as the object of a nation's interest vested him with all the fascination of mystery—and in those days he was called unrevealingly 'Mr.'

A. J. L. Hill of Hampshire, a name suddenly on everybody's lips. Who was he? What did A. J. L. stand for? How and where had he lived through the winter months—this sudden invader, strange as a Martian, of the stage of national interest? To-day it is your fault (certainly not mine) if you do not know what Fleetwood-Smith's Christian name is, what he has for breakfast, or the colour of his braces. There is not a detail of a cricketer's life, off the cricket-field, which has not given an omnivorous public indigestion.

Now the fact—the lamentable fact—is that most cricketers are at their most interesting on the cricket-field; few of them are otherwise personalities sufficiently heroic to stand the scrutiny of publicity. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico* is especially true of cricketers.

That is the reason, of course, for the appearance of 'fine writing' in cricket journalism. Nowadays a clear, unadorned description of a cricketer or his performance is unworthy of the historic importance of such an occasion as a Test Match. A Macartney becomes the D'Artagnan of cricket. An innings by Woolley is a Mozart scherzo. Makepeace at the wicket is the incarnation of a dour Lancashire landscape—his strokes echo the sound of clogs on cobbles; while an R. H. Spooner conjures up a vision of gracious Aiburgh lawns, and a Hendren bats in a Cockney accent.

As opposed to this, read how old John Nyren wrote of Aylward—in the days when cricket was a game played within sight of the 'Bat and Ball,' where the ale was so strong : would have put the souls of three butchers into a weaver :

'Aylward was a left-handed batter, and one of the safest hitters I ever knew in the club. He once stayed in two whole days, and upon that occasion got the highest number of runs ever gained by any member—one hundred and sixty-seven !

'Aylward was a stout, well-made man, standing about five feet nine inches ; not very light about the limbs, indeed he was rather clumsy. He would sometimes affect a little grandeur of manner, and once got laughed at by the whole ground for calling for a lemon to be brought to him when he had been in but a little while. It was thought a piece of finickiness by those simple and homely yeomen.'

Or again, there is the portrait of that 'anointed clod-stumper' Tom Walker : ' . . . Tom's hard, ungain, scrag-of-mutton frame : wilted, apple-john face (he always looked twenty years older than he really was), his long spider legs, as thick at the ankles as at the hips, and perfectly straight all the way down—for the embellishment of a calf in Tom's leg Dame Nature had considered to be a wanton superfluity.'

Tom's skin was described as being 'like the rind of an old oak, and as sapless. I have seen his knuckles handsomely knocked about from Harris's bowling, but never saw any blood upon his hands—you might just as well attempt to phlebotomise a mummy.'

You can take your choice between the ancient and modern styles of writing. I know which I think does the better justice to cricket. My choice smacks of Hazlitt and homespun statement ; you can have your frills and furbelows and dress your game up in the artifice of prose until it is exquisitely unrecognisable.

But a palpable instance of the change in the game comes to mind. In the golden days, when the subject of batsmanship was under consideration, it was taken for granted that '*le style, c'est l'homme même*.'

A professed batsman might make only ten runs in an innings. It was taken for granted that he made those ten in style. If he got a 'duck,' he got it like a batsman. To-day that cannot be assured. It cannot be taken for granted that

he has shown a mastery of the exquisite art of batting if he has made 300 runs ; all that can be taken for granted is his score. In the golden age of cricket a batsman would win no laurel for a mammoth score unless he had got his runs in the grand manner. It was a prolonged disgrace to play a big innings without elegance.

Now that criterion of judgment was a sound one. Cricket is an art—not a by-product of accountancy. It is because batsmanship is an art that the beautiful is also the good, the effective. A stroke that is æsthetically satisfying is a good stroke ; an ugly stroke cannot be. But it may be argued that batsmanship of to-day is not perversely ugly, only utilitarian—or, as the Australians, with their gift for æsthetic expression, would say, functional.

Well, I am not in love with the standards that proclaim that the batsman who makes the most runs is the best batsman. Stretch the analogy and you have Ella Wheeler Wilcox as a better poet than A. E. Housman. Runs are a part of batsmanship, not the sum of it.

They are, however, the obvious foot-rule for comparison of the Old Masters with the modern practitioners. Even in this respect they are an untrustworthy guide. You cannot say that, because Paynter scores more runs than did W. G., Paynter is the better run-getter. There is that in the equation that is variable—the quality of the bowling the two men played against.

In the Test Matches I have seen this season I have seen enough long hops and full pitches to capitalise a village attack for a season. I do not mention the half-volley which the modern batsman—50 per cent. of him—treats reverently as very formidable. Now, before the war, long hops and full pitches were simply unknown in Test Matches. No bowler ever bowled such balls ; no batsman could ever count on scoring a major proportion of his runs from such birthday presents. The boundaries W. G. or Trumper or Johnny Tyldesley scored in Test Matches were scored—had to be scored—off good-length balls. You had to make strokes if you wanted a score, even a small score, in those days. You do not have to be a batsman to make runs off long hops outside the leg stump, and if you bat for an hour in a Test Match to-day you will certainly be presented with enough opportunities of this sort to raise your average by twenty.

At once the question arises, Why is the bowling of the 1930's so much looser and more unkempt than the bowling of the 1900's? Is it accident, or the result of an ordered process of decline, or the natural consequence of the worship of some false god of theory?

I believe that modern bowling has become as loose as modern metres or modern manners because bowlers work to a definite theory—the theory of the infallibility of swerve. In days of old—probably when Lambourne, 'The Little Farmer,' bowled the first off-breaks—bowlers were fully aware that balls swerved on their way to the batsman. They regarded it as part and parcel of the nature of a ball, and no more. The essential things were length, direction, and break; you swerved incidentally. To-day not to concentrate on swerve would be a hideous solecism. You have only to read Robert Wyatt's illuminating book to be assured of that. Length and direction may look after themselves, but swerve you must if you want to be socially eligible in cricket circles.

Well, the best swerver I ever saw in my life was J. Barton King, of Philadelphia, and much marl has gone into Test wickets since he gave up hanging the ball on the air. Spofforth, the finest bowler I ever saw send down a ball, declared that in early life he deliberately set out to become a swerve bowler, and duly became one. Then in his maturity, when his judgment was at its best, he put away childish things, his addiction to swerve among them. He observed that the mastery of this art did not compensate for the loss of accuracy it involved. What was good enough for 'The Demon' himself should be good enough for the children of modern light.

There is one other indictment to be made against swerve: it has conspired with the googly to deprive batsmanship of strokes. It does not get more batsmen out for fewer runs. If it did it would need no apology, be open to no possible objection. It does not get more batsmen out; it merely reduces the interest of their performance. It is not the stab of the gladiator's sword, but the entanglement of the *retiarius*.

It has not, of course, ensnared all modern batsmen. Though I am *laudator temporis acti*, I am not blind to the fact that even this age of robots contains its rare heroes: the august Walter Hammond, for instance, who stands a magnifico at the wicket while the field is changing over, holding

his bat in his hand as if it was as light as a ring on his finger, and as nearly a part of him. He is a beardless Hercules with a willow club.

Then there is McCabe, who bats like a master out of the golden age: a gentleman rather than an amateur, to whom the game is more than the score. He bats for his side's sake rather than for records. He has audacity in the grand manner. At Nottingham, as in Sydney in 1932, his very attitude echoed the immortal words of Foch: '*Je ne peux plus me défendre; alors j'attaque.*'

There is also Bradman, second only to McCabe among modern Australian batsmen in the opinion of those who set an æsthetic standard above the mere compilation of runs. Bradman has brought certain innovations into cricket. He has invented the open stance tennis stroke. He has deformed cricket and magically converted the bad strokes of rustic batsmen into effective precision. The secret of his success lies in the fact that he gets into position to play his stroke quicker than any other batsman. His eye and his shrewdness combine to conjure into slow motion all but the fastest balls delivered to him.

Perhaps while I am dealing with Australian cricketers I may be forgiven a brief digression to explain what often puzzles English students of cricket—Australia's ability to hold her own at the game against a country with a population seven times the size of her own. At first glance it appears only reasonable to suppose that the most populous country ought to win. As Father Ronald Knox wrote of a parallel case, it is reasonable to expect more stamp-collectors, albinos, and cricketers in the bigger population. But the figures are delusive. The potential cricket-playing populations of the two countries are not so far apart. As I have already pointed out, English amateurs of promise are almost invariably unable to develop that promise, which robs our country of probably well over half the potential strength at its command. Perhaps a team that could, on proven natural ability, beat the Rest of England is waiting now to be recruited in city offices, not having touched bat or ball except on Saturday afternoons since the days it left its various public schools.

Another great advantage enjoyed by Australia is the lucky accident of the Sheffield Shield tournament. It is sometimes

said that Australians do not indulge in Test Trial Matches. As a fact, all their first-class matches are Test Trials. A member of a State eleven plays six first-class matches a year—few enough for every performance to be noted and appreciated at its exact worth, and for no performer to have a chance of being overlooked. There are not fifty first-class players in Australia on Australian rating. Every selector must know all about all of them. How is it possible for a selector to know the form of every one of 300 English cricketers through a season of thirty games?

But English and Australian cricketers are not the only cricketers in the world. There is, among South African batsmen, Dudley Nourse, worthy son of a worthy father, the best batsman to come out of Africa since the elegant H. W. Taylor himself. And there is Mushtaq Ali of India, a sovereign batsman among the many beautiful stroke-players of his country. If batsmanship is an art rather than a physical exercise (and unless it is, it is nothing), I am not sure that it is not to the Indians that we must go in order to see it in its greatest refinement. Stamina and the unrelaxing concentration that comes with it are perhaps the only qualities lacking in the best of present-day Indian batsmen. I may say that the people who say that Prince Ranjitsinghi's excellence was a fluke are in error.

Batsmen—yes, there are, of course, batsmen of heroic stature that still survive. But where are the bowlers? Where are the bowlers capable of going through a whole team of batsmen by sheer bowling ability, unassisted by treacheries of wicket? Where is the bowler in the line of Sidney Barnes, who, on a perfect wicket in Australia, got out the five greatest batsmen in the team in an over or two for six runs? Where, and oh where?

There was, *once upon a time*, such a bowler of the name of Larwood; now buried out of sight of Tests deeper than the immemorial Richardsons and Lockwoods of old. There is Kenneth Farnes, the accepted premier exponent of his kind. On the point of achieving success on a batsman's wicket he must be named. He bowls academically and impersonally, without that '*Carthago delenda est*' feeling against the tribe of batsmen that should be the motive of the fast bowler's life.

There is the tireless and relentless O'Reilly, whose first-rateness emphasises my point by being unique. There is no one else.

When I played in my first Test Match at Nottingham, the Australian attack consisted of Ernest Jones, M. A. Noble, Hugh Trumble and W. Howell—a bowling strength capable of getting out the haughtiest array of batsmen for as small a score as you will find in *Wisden*. My wife watched that match played in 1899, sitting next to Arthur Shrewbury. He told her that he thought that Australian team an excellent batting side, but, by the standards of his time, which stretched from the 'seventies to that day, rather weak in bowling.

Trumble, Noble, Jones and Howell did not compare with the bowlers of old, he declared—with Spofforth, Giffen and their comrades-in-arms.

Do not think that the answer to the riddle is to say that cricket is not as good as it was, and it never was. There is more in it than that. Something has gone out of the game which is more than mere virtuosity. The world, and cricketers with it, becomes steadily more standardised, and we might almost say stadiumised. You must look at the averages to pick the likeliest team against Australia. Once it was not so. You had to look at the individuals playing cricket—because in those days they still were individuals.

I defy you to match W. G. of the golden era among the cricketers of this deflation age. He was more than a cricketer; he was a national institution. He was a symbol of his land and time; the quintessence of the English yeoman type. As much part of the English pageant as the Changing of the Guard, or Ascot or Stratford-on-Avon. As unshakable and eternal. I can see him now, a jolly mountain with the most famous beard in history (bar Moses' or that of Pheidias' Zeus at Olympus). There were, of course, two W. G.'s—the youthful athlete the world has forgotten, and the mountainous figure with its flat, brown beard and tiny red and yellow cap, who outlived, in the cricket-field, his own generation and the next.

In his younger days W. G. used to keep fit running hurdle races and quarter-miles against all comers, and beating them

more often than not. In his middle age the Derby horse developed into a Grand National competitor; and old W. G. kept hearty through the winter running with the beagles three days a week. Until an age when most men have developed into pavilion bores, W. G. remained a source of inexhaustible energy. He would bowl for three hours, hit up a double century, and when stumps were drawn set off half running, half walking, for the station with his gargantuan cricket-bag in his hand. 'Give me my bag!' he would squeak; 'you can't manage it!'; and off he would go down the road with that enormous luggage worthy of a porter's truck, pursued by a crowd of street urchins who cheered him on until he had left them behind by running them off their legs.

His voice was a keen piping—a clarionet, reedy but not shrill. When he and his brothers had a family row it was like listening to the squealing of elephants—fantastically high notes issuing from these leviathans. His oblong face was richly florid, with high cheekbones like small rosy apples; his dark eyes brilliantly lambent, like blackberries lit up from the inside.

He loved cricket and played it as Mrs. Battle played whist—to the rigour of the game. When Jones parted his beard with a fizzing bumper, he did not suggest breaking off diplomatic relations with Australia. If he had been imbued with the modern sentiment of piling up multiple centuries, the whole world of bowlers would rarely have got him out; for in his day it was known that the second hundred is much easier to get than the first; and the third, granted stamina, easiest of all. Only in his day, in three-day cricket, once a batsman had reached his century, to help himself to more runs would have stamped him as gourmand rather than gourmet. W. G., like the cricketers of his day, played to the score or the situation of the game, always with his eye on the time limit.

As for wet wickets, W. G., taking the rough with the smooth, accepted them as part and parcel of the game—to be overcome by sheer batsmanship, not to be submitted to as hopelessly impossible. I have memories yet of seeing the Don, that invincible run-getter on pipe-stem wickets, twice out in three balls on wet turf in Tests in Australia, and I have

no memories at all of his having played a batsman's (or even a long) innings in such conditions. But a wet or crumbling wicket would never have daunted W. G. You had just as much chance of getting a hundred on it; you had to play more keenly, that was all.

But it is not W. G. alone whom the perspective of history shows to be peerless. There was also Ranji. The huge bearded figure in that brilliant red and yellow cap perched on the very top of his head was the supreme all-round player and captain; but Ranji was the greatest bat of all time. There was a time in the golden age when I was considered some sort of batsman myself. I remember in those days batting opposite Ranji, watching him play his magic strokes, and feeling myself a child beside his omniscience.

There was no stroke known to cricketers that was not known to Ranji, but there was none that Ranji would rather play than the leg-glide he himself discovered and perfected. As a result, you would suppose that you would never find a bowler fool enough to give him a chance to play that stroke. You would be wrong. Balls perfectly tailored to be leg-glided rained down upon Ranji. He seemed able to attract to himself the very ball he most desired to see bowled. That was something other than the mere technique of going through the correct motions with willow against leather. It was typical of the man's approach to life: it was Ranji translated into terms of the cricket-field.

He was the pluperfect batsman on a broken wicket, and more than good on a wet one. Like W. G., he was an adept at placing his strokes all round the wicket with the nice accuracy of a tennis champion. You could not set a field for him to a modern fast bowler; he would have broken the bowler's heart with his delicately deflecting bat guiding the ball with the same stroke where he pleased between mid-off and point.

W. G., Ranji; and these names might be expanded through the line of Trumper and MacLaren. . . .

Perhaps we shall see again batsmanship excellently true, beautiful and good, if modern batsmen can be induced to form a correct concept of their art. Batsmanship is a branch of the art of movement. See it as a form of eurythmics with a bat thrown in and success is within your grasp. Regard it as

nothing more than hitting a projectile with a club and your proficiency will be more problematical.

There are not a few modern batsmen who would be the better for a little study of mechanics. Again and again I see the same faults exhibited, becoming by degrees an integral part of a batsman's method: the forward stroke played as a stab instead of a swing; the drive played with heave instead of flow; the hook played with the hips jerking away from the movement of the arms so that the result becomes Arms *minus* Body instead of Arms *plus* Body.

Times pass, and styles with them. I should find myself in agreement with any critic who declared that it would be wrong to expect the best batsmen of to-day to bat like the best batsmen of the year 1900. So long as they bat like themselves and not like the second best batsmen of to-day I am satisfied. This is a *staccato* age, and the style of its cricket champions may well mirror its spirit and temper. If W. G. is the true symbol of the first-class game as it emerged from the English countryside and, say, R. E. Foster fairly representative of batsmanship when it was a gentleman's recreation, perhaps a Paynter, an Edrich or a Bradman may typify the batsmanship of to-day—that of the run-getting machine with a distinctive personality of its own.

The ant, I am sure, is more praiseworthy than the eagle; and, indeed, I am not asserting that the future will not have its giants. I insinuate no such pessimism, but I do declare that well may those who have known the heroic age echo the words of Francis Thompson:

It is little I repair to the matches of the Southern folk,
Though my own red roses there do blow,
For the land is full of shades as I near the shadowy coast
And a ghostly batsman plays to the bowling of a ghost.
And I look through my tears on the soundless clapping host
As the run stealers flicker to and fro,
Oh my Hornby and my Barlow, long ago!

It was a golden age, and I am glad to have lived in it.

C. B. FRY.

NORTH-EAST AFRICA—II.

By MAJOR E. W. POLSON NEWMAN

IN comparing the present situation in Ethiopia with that of last year, it is obvious that there has been a forward movement in material construction, development, and scientific investigation, with a certain set-back in public security. Public security is essential for good administration and material development. Although most newspaper reports received in England from sources varying in unreliability have been very wide of the mark in the interpretations which they have put on outbreaks of Ethiopian armed resistance, there certainly have been (and still are) local disturbances in certain parts of the country. These are of two kinds: (a) brigandage with plunder as its object, which has received an impetus from the support of a number of minor chiefs who have not submitted to the Italians and still possess arms and ammunition; and (b) tribal resistance to certain local Italian administrators whose youth and inexperience have led them to commit serious errors of judgment and conduct. It is important to appreciate the nature and significance of these two distinct forms of lawlessness.

In the first case, the trouble is confined to one or two localities in Amhara (the land of the former ruling race) and to a remote district in the extreme south-west. Minor chiefs, deprived of their feudal rights to extort money and produce from the people, have resorted to brigandage. They loot the villages, compel people to follow them, and with the arms and ammunition at their disposal attack the Italian supply depôts. Trouble of this kind is purely local and sporadic, and its sole object is personal gain. It now seems clear that the reason for the exceptionally peaceful conditions during my visit to this country last year is that at that time the native inhabitants had not yet recovered from the war, and many had not yet

returned to their districts and villages. Moreover, the chiefs in question had not yet realised that the feudal system had come to a sudden end. A feudal system, bad though it may be in itself, cannot be overturned without causing upheaval and disturbance for some period of time. The chief difficulty in suppressing this form of lawlessness is that the perpetrators are in reality brigands, who become peaceful cultivators of the soil at the first warning of approaching soldiers or police.

In the second case, the trouble has been confined to the Gojjam, an Amharic region south of Lake Tana which has long been hostile to the ex-Negus, and whose inhabitants submitted peacefully to the Italians. Unfortunately, serious mistakes were made by some inexperienced and unsuitable Italian officials, who did not realise their responsibility to their own Government and to the natives under their control. The result was a revolt which needed a considerable military force to suppress, and the removal to Italy of peccant officials. Hitherto the Italians have been faced with the difficult task of building up a large colonial civil service out of such personnel as has been at their disposal in Italian East Africa. As it has naturally been impossible to find anything approaching a sufficient number of experienced men, it is surprising that there have not been more such occurrences. This is partly due to the lack of national consciousness and cohesion in a feudal system, and to the fact that most of the Ethiopian chiefs have submitted to the Italians. In order to remedy this defect, energetic steps have been taken in Rome to set up special training colleges for young Italians considered suitable in education and temperament for colonial administrative work. Those who qualify, it is understood, will then have first-hand experience under instruction in Africa before being appointed to posts in the colonial service. Whatever trouble there may be now or in the future, it is quite certain that there is no organised opposition of any kind to Italian rule. Referring to the present somewhat disturbed situation, H.R.H. the Duke of Aosta describes Ethiopia 'as now suffering from the immediate reaction of a strong inoculation. When this passes off,' he says, 'convalescence from an age-long malady will become apparent.'

Under the heading of development and material construction road-building still takes first place, although this

year the pressure of work has been somewhat slowed down and less money is being spent in this direction. The vital communications involving the heaviest expenditure of money and man-power are now practically completed. The main arterial road from Addis Abeba to Asmara and on to the port of Massawa has now a first-class tarmac surface nearly all the way, the mountain difficulties near the Termaber Pass being overcome by means of a tunnel. This is the principal trade route of Ethiopia, and more and more of the traffic of the Jibuti railway is being diverted to this channel, thereby accounting to some extent for the serious drop in the railway traffic returns. Another factor contributing to this fall is the good road for motor traffic now connecting Addis Abeba with Dire-dawa and Jibuti. But in a plan for the construction of 7000 miles of roads 3000 miles still have to be built. The road from Dessié through the Danakil Desert to the port under construction at Assab is nearing completion, and that from Gondar through the Semien Mountains to Asmara is finished, so that the capital of Amhara is now easily accessible from Massawa. While the roads to the south and to Somali-land are of secondary importance and are gradually extending, those from Addis Abeba to the west and south-west are receiving close attention. These are the future trade routes to the Sudan frontier, and are therefore the roads with which this article is chiefly concerned. The roads under construction to Lekemti and Gimma will eventually be extended respectively to Gambela (for the Baro steamers) and to Kurmuk (connected by Sudan track with Er Renk on the White Nile and Roseires on the Blue Nile). These routes pass through most fertile regions which are already showing signs of agricultural industries, and are rich in timber. In the air the passenger and mail aeroplanes of the Ala Littoria maintain a daily service between Addis Abeba, Dire-dawa and Jibuti; and twice weekly services between Asmara, Assab and Jibuti, and between Asmara, Dire-dawa and Mogadishu. In road-building, in the aviation services, and in all constructional work natives are employed in certain capacities and are paid accordingly; but, generally speaking, the money reward for labour holds out little inducement to work. The peoples of Ethiopia have never been educated up to the level of wanting the products that money can buy. This not only hinders pro-

duction and trade within the country, but is also responsible for a situation, not uncommon elsewhere in Africa, in which the natives are disinclined to work more than is absolutely necessary for the bare essentials of life. Hence native labour cannot reach its full value, nor can production for native consumption progress, until education and development have succeeded in stimulating the desire for a higher standard of living. For this reason alone I think the Italians are right to push ahead with constructional work which may at first sight appear to be unnecessarily elaborate. Imposing edifices and other outward signs of European civilisation not only impress the natives, but arouse in them a wish to participate in a way of life which appears to them glamorous. It is of the utmost importance to the Italians that the native peoples of Ethiopia should develop a definite incentive for productive work and become consumers of Ethiopian products. Education, therefore, should go hand in hand with constructional work and the introduction of European amenities, and there is every indication that these are the lines on which the Government are working. At present the native population is rather a dead weight.

In Addis Abeba conditions are considerably better than last year, although the great increase of the European population has caused some temporary discomfort. The streets are assuming broad, smooth surfaces, and motor traffic is much heavier. The Ethiopians now walk for the first time on concrete pavements, and pedestrians are even encouraged to cross the street on the 'dotted line.' Many new buildings have been put up, and a new and well-organised stone market-place is now almost complete. This forms part of the native quarter of the new capital, which will be built on more or less level ground about 600 feet lower than the present town. The plans for broad avenues and elaborate buildings have already been approved, and work is to begin shortly. The conditions for Europeans and the general amenities of life are steadily improving, although the question of bringing a sufficient supply of water to the town awaits a solution. There have been many additions to the number of shops and general stores, and there is no shortage of ordinary domestic needs, or even of the lesser luxuries. There is no truth in the report, published in a British newspaper, that the Italians here

are reduced to eating cats, dogs and monkeys! Colonisation is still quite in its infancy, and so far very few Italians are settled on the land. Colonisation can only proceed in the wake of public security, road-building, and the provision of accommodation; and the way is not yet clear for settlers in anything but small numbers. Fortunately, the discovery of more limestone near Diredawa has removed one of the building difficulties. Meanwhile, expert investigation continues throughout the country with a view to concessions for industrial colonisation; and, as stated in my first article, facilities are now offered for the investment of foreign capital.

Up to date the Italians have been devoting their energies to consolidating their newly acquired territory and equipping it with the more essential needs of modern life and progress. Yet the whole structure is practically immobile, and the time has come to set it in motion. This cannot be done under conditions at all favourable until the Anglo-Italian Agreement becomes operative, with recognition by Great Britain of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia, and a trade agreement for trade and transit facilities over the frontiers of surrounding British and Anglo-Egyptian territories. Not only will 'recognition' strengthen the Italian position politically, but it will ensure co-operation for the public security of the frontier districts and through the subsequent trade agreement go a long way to setting the wheels of progress in motion. Italian Ethiopia, now established as a reality beyond all doubt in spite of local disturbances, will then form a living part of the world's political and economic structure.

There are several political questions awaiting 'recognition' for settlement with the Italians. The frontier lines of British Somaliland, Kenya, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan need in some places to be delimited, in some places to be demarcated, and in others to be rectified. At present there are localities where there are working agreements under unsatisfactory conditions. It is most undesirable, in the interests of both nations and the native tribes, that this should continue, as loose local arrangements of this kind must lead sooner or later to serious irregularities endangering public security on either side of the frontiers. Also, the status of British subjects (chiefly Arab and Indian traders) needs clarification, and little can be done in this direction until

economic relations are stabilised by a trade agreement. The question of missionaries awaits decision. On the one hand, it is contended that European missionaries can give valuable help to the Government owing to their close contact with native races, who think in terms of the 'white man' irrespective of nationality. On the other hand, it is argued that foreign missionaries are a disturbing element among the native peoples, especially if they are Protestants in a country governed by a Catholic Power. There is truth in both these contentions, and it is a mistake to generalise: everything depends on the individual missionaries concerned. The outstanding fact, however, is that the greatest need for work of this kind is on the purely medical side. There is then the question of Ethiopian refugees, of which there are 150 in the Sudan, 5000 to 6000 in Kenya, and 1300 to 1400 (including women and children) in British Somaliland. As these people are now being supported at the expense of the Governments concerned, it is important that early steps be taken for their disposal and settlement. It remains to be decided by Britain, Italy, and Egypt exactly what is to be done regarding the building of a dam on Lake Tana and such electrical works as the Italians may suggest. But of all outstanding questions the most important is that of a trade agreement between Britain, Italy, and Egypt to facilitate trade and transit between Italian East Africa on the one hand and British Somaliland, Kenya, and the Sudan on the other. This would comprise the regulation and facilitation of trade over the frontiers, the settlement of transit questions, and the finding of at least a temporary solution of the currency difficulty already outlined. But before discussing the transit aspect of this question it is necessary to describe the outlets of Italian East Africa, and to give some account of Italy's relations with French Somaliland as being all-important in North-East African co-operation. It is also as well to know what Italy wants.

The eastern part of the Italian territory depends on the ports of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the possible outlets being Massawa, Assab, Jibuti (in French Somaliland), and Zeila and Berbera (both in British Somaliland). Massawa is the best natural harbour on the Red Sea, and has considerable possibilities; Assab is a small bay, where a new artificial harbour is being built; Jibuti is a large bay without harbour-

works; Zeila is an open roadstead with coral reefs; and Berbera is the only sheltered anchorage on the south side of the Gulf of Aden. The southern part uses the Somali ports of the Indian Ocean—Mogadishu, Merca, Brava, and Kismayo, all of which are open roadsteads. There are also possibilities of trade across the Kenya frontier through Moyale and elsewhere. The natural outlet for the western half of Ethiopia is by way of the Sudan and the Nile; and here there are established transit routes at Kassala, Gallabat, Kurmuk, and Gambela. An agreement for the improvement and use of these outlets, with facilities in the Sudan for road, railway, and river transit and the use of Port Sudan, would be of great mutual benefit to all parties concerned. It is in this direction that most can be done to co-operate with the development of Italian East Africa in the interests of Britain, Italy, and Egypt. From the Italian point of view, the use of these Sudan outlets would be more economical in time and money than the heavy transportation of western Ethiopian produce over the high mountains to the Red Sea ports. Moreover, as Italian East Africa develops, these ports will become insufficient to handle the full traffic of both east and west. On the British and Egyptian side there is the immediate prospect of increased revenue for the Sudan and the possibility of future financial benefit to Egypt through transit and development projects. Each of the Sudan transit routes will be referred to later in detail.

The chief significance of French Somaliland lies in the port of Jibuti and the Jibuti-Addis Abeba railway. Although the distance by rail to the Ethiopian capital is 492 miles, only 56 miles are in French territory. While Jibuti is a French coaling station and port of call for vessels trading with the East (particularly with the French Asiatic possessions, East Africa, and Madagascar), the town and port have long relied on the Ethiopian transit. Jibuti has a strategic importance to France much resembling that of Aden to Britain. The French have found Jibuti a very paying proposition in the last few years, when money has flowed in from transit dues and many other sources; but this position has now been greatly weakened by the growth of Massawa, for Italians prefer to use their own port. As a result of the sharp fall in the railway traffic returns and the construction of an Italian port at Assab,

the prospects of Jibuti continuing to finance itself look remote unless steps are taken to rectify the position. There are no French colonists in Somaliland, nor are there any industries worthy of mention, and the internal situation has seriously deteriorated. When in Jibuti last year I regarded the situation as serious, and now it looks as if French Somaliland must either become a dead weight on the French Treasury, with internal discontent owing to the flight of prosperity, or full co-operation with the Italians must come before it is too late. There has been talk of improving the railway system and increasing its carrying capacity, but substantial inducements will be necessary to persuade the Italians to continue using this outlet. The port itself provides good anchorages and is protected from the north and west, but the landing facilities are still only sufficient to handle the Ethiopian traffic as it was in 1935.

The British Somaliland Protectorate is of value to Britain as the African counterpart of Aden, commanding the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and as a country suitable in some ways as an air base. Otherwise it is a doubtful asset. The harbour of Berbera lies within a low sandy spit extending westward for nearly $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and gives complete shelter from all but westerly winds. At the pier-head there is a depth of 10 feet of water at high tide. Zeila, once suggested as a possible port for Ethiopia, is situated on a low sandy spit nearly level with the sea, and is difficult to reach owing to coral reefs. Its only merit as a possible port lies in the fact that it possesses a pier suitable for dhows at high tide, while ships of 2000 to 3000 tons can get within 2 miles of the shore. The town consists of a few ramshackle houses and a narrow little street with, at a reasonable distance, the district officer's house, in front of which is an ancient cannon and a modern flagstaff. There are no railways in the protectorate, but there are about 1000 miles of serviceable motor roads and tracks. Last year an agreement was reached between the British and Italian Governments for the use of the ports of Berbera and Zeila and for transit through British Somaliland.¹ This agreement provided for the opening for transit of two roads connecting with Zeila and one leading to Berbera. As, however, the Zeila outlet proved impracticable, such traffic as passes

¹ *Vide* 'Italian East Africa—III.,' *The Nineteenth Century*, August 1937.

through the protectorate takes the route from Jijiga through Hargeisa to Berbera. But the port works at Berbera have not yet been begun, and the Italian transit through British Somaliland is small. When the general agreement becomes operative there will be more incentive to push on with things in this quarter. Meanwhile, steps have been taken to fix grazing rights in the frontier districts, where five or six tracks have been arranged for migratory tribes. It remains to settle the frontier, making allowance, for example, for tribes dependent on the State of Harar but spending a part of the year in British Somaliland. The negotiations in Berbera leading to these results were typical of the good feeling between British and Italian officials in this part of Africa.

In the relations between Italian East Africa and Kenya there is a good deal to be done both on the political and economic sides. While the frontier between Kenya and Italian Somaliland was demarcated in 1925 (when Jubaland was handed over to Italy), the northern frontier of Kenya with Ethiopia badly needs revision and demarcation. At Moyale, for example, the British and Italian posts are separated by a small ravine in the middle of a bush country, but there is no definite frontier line. Maps differ as to the frontier, Menelik's line being quoted by some people and refuted by others. Hence difficulties occur almost daily with native troops, traders and migratory tribes. Although good relations between the frontier officials make the position easier than it would otherwise be, the situation is most unsatisfactory. In Kenya the refugee question is acute, and their passage over the frontier recently gave rise to incidents. Of the trade routes between Kenya and the Italian territories Moyale is the most important. As both are agricultural countries of an African type, the trade is parallel rather than complementary and consequently small. It consists chiefly of raw skins, coffee, cattle and sheep, goats, salt, oil seeds, cotton (from Italian Somaliland), and miscellaneous products. With the construction of roads the Italians hope to supply products for European consumption, and to increase the exchange of cattle and sheep for breeding and other purposes. They anticipate making an extensive study of what has been done in Kenya for the breeding of cattle and sheep; and, owing to the great variety of crops that can be grown

in different altitudes of Italian East Africa, it is hoped to build up an export trade to Kenya in some of these products.

Before passing on to the area of the transit routes between Italian East Africa and the Sudan, it is as well to mention a region in the extreme south-west of Ethiopia, where centres such as Magi and Gardulla are important for trade across the Kenya and Sudan frontiers. These centres are far from the Nile and from the railways of Kenya and Uganda; but a large and uncontrolled trade is conducted in this remote area, and it should increase with the development of these districts and the improvement of roads. The frontier lines in this area are very vague, and these districts have not only been grossly misgoverned in the past, but provided a battle-ground for the Murille and Donyiro of Ethiopia on the one side, and the Turkana of Kenya on the other. Moreover, the peoples of these districts have been in the habit of using the Sudanese province of Mongalla as a base for raids into Kenya and the Sudan. It is therefore of political as well as economic importance to everybody that this part of the country should be opened up for legitimate trading.

The Sudan eastern frontier can be divided into four more or less well-defined sections, according to the habits and practices of the local inhabitants. From the Kenya frontier to the Boma plateau (lat. 6° N.), west of Magi, such population as there is on the Sudan side is chiefly composed of savage pastoral tribes subject to Ethiopia and related to the Turkana of Kenya. Further north, from the Boma plateau to the Daga valley (lat. $9^{\circ} 15'$ N.), are the Nilotic Nuer and Anuak, who are cattle-owning savages. While other Nuer stay permanently on the Ethiopian side, there are many who have long been accustomed to migrate during the dry season of the year to the Ethiopian side of the frontier-line, which for the greater part is quite unsuitable to local conditions. This marshland area is much favoured for intertribal fighting. Further north still, between the Daga valley and the Dinder River (lat. 12° N.), is the district of Beni Shangul, which became part of Ethiopia in 1897, and has for centuries been ruled by Moslem feudal chiefs who look upon the land and people on the Sudan side as belonging to them by hereditary right. In Ethiopia the feudal system is no longer legal, but the law makes little or no impression on these predatory

chiefs. Lastly, the section between the rivers Dinder and Setit is mainly populated on the Ethiopian side by people who live by various forms of plunder and lawlessness. In these circumstances Anglo-Italian co-operation is most essential to maintain peace and security along a frontier through which pass the trade routes to the Nile Valley and Sudan railways. But the frontier line itself must be rectified and properly demarcated throughout its whole length as soon after the Anglo-Italian Agreement becomes operative as is reasonably possible. Once this is done, the co-operation of civilised Powers on either side should bring about a state of tranquillity such as has never prevailed in these remote parts.

Another question awaiting regulation with the Italians is that of the Gambela enclave, where a trading post on the Baro in Ethiopia (known as the Sobat on the Sudan side) was in 1902 leased to the Sudan Government by the Emperor Menelik. This is the first of the four main transit routes between Ethiopia and the Sudan which will now be described in detail. These routes, from south to north, are: (1) Gambela-Malakal (on the White Nile); (2) (a) Kurmuk-El Gahak-Er Renk (on the White Nile), and (b) Kurmuk-Roseires (on the Blue Nile); (3) Gallabat-Gedaref (on the Sudan railways); and (4) Biscia (terminus of the Massawa-Asmara railway) to Kassala (on the Sudan railways).

Gambela has long been the most important outlet for Ethiopian coffee on the western side of the country. In 1936 the total exports of coffee to the Sudan by frontier stations amounted to £E.189,715, and of this £E.139,887 passed through Gambela. A good deal of this coffee has hitherto been collected at Buri and brought to Gambela by a superior track made by the British firm of Gellatly, Hankey & Co., of Khartoum; and supplies have also come from the Saio district by means of a rough track. But so far there are no proper road communications with this or any of the other points of transit. Although motor vehicles have on occasions succeeded in getting through from Addis Abeba to Gambela, the journey is still a very rough passage. When new roads are built to the Sudan frontier, the activities of this whole area will assume an entirely different aspect. Among other exports by this route are wax, hides and skins, while imports have chiefly consisted of salt, Japanese cotton goods from the

market of Omdurman, and various odds and ends for native consumption. It is, however, only from June to October that the Baro is navigable. During these months Nile steamers maintain a service each way between Gambela and Khartoum (a distance by river of 849 miles² with a journey of about thirteen days). On the White Nile section of the journey there is a more frequent service between Khartoum and Malakal, taking from five to six days to cover the distance of 509 miles. Navigation is possible on the White Nile itself, at almost all seasons and without transshipment, from Alexandria to Wadi Halfa and from Khartoum to Rejaf (near the frontiers of Uganda and the Belgian Congo).³ The seasonal restriction of navigation is confined to the Baro, the worst section being that on the Italian side of the frontier (east of Nasir). With a view to the possible improvement of conditions in order to extend the period of navigation, Italian naval experts have recently been carrying out investigations, but the results are not very promising. It seems that the most that can be done is to extend the navigation period by two months by blowing up rocks and building up banks to prevent overflowing.

The distance from Gambela to Nasir, the first centre of any importance after crossing the Sudan frontier, is 143 miles. As there is no road, the only means of communication in the dry season (about eight months in the year) is by canoe. Nasir is the headquarters of the Eastern Nuer district, and has a wireless station as well as a landing-ground for aircraft. From this point to Malakal the distance by river is 197 miles, and there is a track for light motor traffic in dry weather. Hence during the greater part of the year communications between Malakal and Gambela depend on this track and the vagaries of native canoes. Malakal is a place of growing importance. Besides being the chief town of the Upper Nile province of the Sudan and a centre of the Egyptian Irrigation Department, there is a wireless station and a seaplane mooring area. Malakal is a place of call for the Imperial Airways South African service of flying-boats, and is now within a

² Authority for most distances given is the *Sudan Almanac*: War Office, 1938.

³ Passage through the Nile irrigation works is as follows: Locks at the Jebel Aulia and Assuan dams, at the latter of which there is also a navigation canal; locks at the Esna, Nag Hamadi, Assiut and Delta barrages. As the Zifta barrage has no lock, river traffic can only pass when the subsidiary weir is submerged.

little over two days from Southampton. From here to Kosti, on the Sudan railways, the distance of 311 miles is covered in about three and a half days by Nile steamer. From Kosti it is a matter of 237 miles by rail to Khartoum and 691 miles to Port Sudan. A great disadvantage of the Gambela route is the long period of storage made necessary by seasonal transit, so that merchants have to be out of pocket for many months besides incurring the consequent risk of fluctuations in prices. Ethiopian coffee, reaching the Sudan chiefly through Gambela, is consumed in Khartoum, to the west of the Nile, and in the southern districts; but in the districts served by rail from Port Sudan most of the coffee used is from Kenya. In 1936 the Sudan imports of Kenya coffee amounted to £E.58,473, compared with £E.189,715 from Ethiopia. Although Ethiopian coffee is well known for its flavour and aroma, and is of a high quality suitable for blending with that of Brazil, it has hitherto suffered so much from bad handling in transit as to make large quantities only suitable for native consumption. Yet its market has been maintained in spite of its high price, its greatest fall being 10 per cent., compared with as much as 50 per cent. in the case of other coffees. The Italians have therefore good reason to hope that, with improved selection, grading and methods of transit, this product will secure an assured position in the world markets. There is little doubt however that, with the increase of coffee and other exports, and the building of tarmac roads to the frontier, Gambela's position will diminish owing to the long distance from Khartoum and Port Sudan and its dependence on a seasonal river traffic. Yet, if a road is built from Gambela to Nasir for the dry season and the Baro channel is improved for the wet season, it is likely that this river port will continue to handle a certain proportion of export trade. Gambela's most formidable competitors will be the alternate routes to the Sudan by way of Kurmuk.

Kurmuk, situated on the frontier between the Ethiopian region of Beni Shangul and the Blue Nile province of the Sudan, has several important advantages. This point of transit occupies a central position on the frontier; is nearer to Addis Abeba on the one hand, and to Khartoum and Port Sudan on the other; has two alternative transit routes—to the White and Blue Niles respectively; and is to a consider-

able extent independent of seasonal transit. Although on both sides communications are still confined to rough tracks passable for motor vehicles in dry weather, the new Italian road system is steadily pushing forward in this direction. The road from Addis Abeba to Lekemti and Ghimbi is already finished for some distance at the Addis Abeba end, and will be extended to Kurmuk; while Saio and Gore will also be connected with Kurmuk by road as soon as the work can be carried out. This point of transit will then serve a most extended area producing quantities of timber, and also coffee and other agricultural products. Hitherto a certain proportion of Ethiopian coffee and other produce has reached the Sudan by this route, and motor vehicles are now making the journey with difficulty from Khartoum to Addis Abeba. In 1936 the Sudan imports from Ethiopia through Kurmuk amounted to £E.47,311, compared with £E.140,362 through Gambela; but, as already stated, it is probable that the position will be reversed as traffic increases.

One route from Kurmuk, where there is a district headquarters and a landing-ground for aircraft, follows a Sudan track⁴ through Ulu to El Galhak on the White Nile (a distance of 128 miles). It then follows the river north to Er Renk (a further 53 miles), which is a regular port of call for the Sudan Government steamers. There is also an alternative track direct from Kurmuk to Er Renk *via* Wisko and Gulu, but any saving in distance is probably more than counter-balanced by difficulties of transit. The former route also has the advantage of reaching the Nile quicker. From Er Renk to the railway at Kosti is a matter of 108 miles, or about twenty-seven hours by Nile steamer. The other route, which connects Kurmuk with the Blue Nile at Roseires (the limit of navigation), is the most promising of all. Its chief advantages lie in the fact that the road from Kurmuk to Roseires continues from there to Suki on the Sudan railways, thereby providing a means of transit during the season when the river is not navigable. When the river is navigable, the rains render the road impassable. There is also a road to the river port and important trading centre at Singa, situated on

⁴ For a description of these tracks *vide* 'North-East Africa—I,' *The Nineteenth Century*, July 1938.

the opposite bank of the Nile from Suki and about 14 miles further upstream. The distance by road from Kurmuk to Roseires *via* Wisko is 120 miles, and from Roseires to Suki 128 miles, making the total distance to the railway connexion with Khartoum and Port Sudan a matter of 248 miles. By river from Roseires to Suki is 135 miles, the journey taking from two to four days, according to whether the direction is up or down stream. The Blue Nile is navigable as far as Roseires from June to December, and the Sudan Government maintain each way a fortnightly service of steamers. As there is no lock in the Sennar Dam, river traffic to Khartoum is not possible; but there is a good road (Sudan standard) from Suki to Khartoum, a distance of about 200 miles. As mentioned in my previous article, this route offers a road and river outlet for the valuable timber of the Ethiopian forests; and it remains to be seen whether the wood can be got out this way at reasonable cost. In the case of the forests of the southern Sudan, the cost of transporting the timber to the river is so great that much of it is cut up and used as fuel for the river steamers. At present the only obvious disadvantage of this route is that there is no special freight tariff, as in the case of Gambela.⁵

The route from Gallabat (on the frontier north-west of Lake Tana) to Gedaref (on the Sudan railways about half-way between Suki and Kassala) is of minor importance now that Gondar has its outlet *via* Massawa and the Red Sea. With a seven months' wet season this route will probably be confined to the local needs of the region south of Lake Tana, unless the rapid development of western Ethiopia, and an ever-increasing transit traffic over the Sudan frontier, make it necessary to use every available route. Hitherto a certain trade has been carried on through Gallabat, the distance to Gedaref being about 96 miles. The road is passable for motor transport from January to May and during November and December. Coffee, livestock, butter, and honey are exported from Ethiopia, while exports from the Sudan consist chiefly of cotton goods (mainly Japanese), artificial silk, linen and oddments.

The transit route *via* Kassala has the advantage of having the shortest distance of all (18 miles) between the frontier

⁵ *Vide* 'North-East Africa—I,' *The Nineteenth Century*, July 1938.

and the Sudan railways at a point 343 miles from Port Sudan.⁶ There is an Italian railway (950 m.m. gauge) connecting Massawa with Biscia, 75 miles east of Kassala as the crow flies. From there two roads lead to Kassala, one *viâ* Sabderat, where there is an international wireless station, and the other *viâ* Tessenei, where the Italians have important cotton plantations. As however Eritrea is so far a poor country most of which depends on Massawa, there is little traffic *viâ* Kassala. In 1936 the imports to the Sudan by this route amounted to £E.10,214, compared with £E.47,311 *viâ* Kurmuk and £E.140,362 *viâ* Gambela. Here we have the most favourable transit conditions of which little use can at present be made.

Before closing this detailed account of Sudan frontier transit it is as well to explain that Port Sudan is a most up-to-date port with an excellent anchorage providing ample room for several vessels to moor. There are five berths fitted with the most modern equipment; the railway runs alongside the quays; and there is every facility for obtaining coal, water and oil. There is also a dockyard for repairs, a wireless station, a first-class hotel—in fact everything needed to make a port of this size thoroughly efficient. In 1936 the number of vessels entering the port (including ships of war but not native craft) was 1148, with a total net registered tonnage of 4,020,134. There is ample scope for increased traffic.

In North-East Africa three great European Powers (Great Britain, France, and Italy) have possessions of varying importance, which will increase as the years go by. Egypt is a link between these Powers and their African possessions. As a result of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Egypt is now developing a new and independent policy both at home and abroad. She aims at extending her influence and prestige in Africa, and at benefiting materially from co-operation with others. She wants to strengthen her ties with the Sudan, and to join in the opening up of communications southward. The Sudan is the geographical centre of trade and transit by land, river, and air throughout this vast region and beyond. Khartoum, now within two days of London, has direct air services with Egypt in the north; with Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Portuguese East Africa, and the Union

⁶ Kassala to Khartoum by a good Sudan road is 268 miles.

of South Africa in the south; with Italian East Africa in the east; and with French Equatorial Africa, Nigeria, and the Gold Coast in the west. These pioneer air services are but the forerunners of more substantial movements to come. On land the road communications of the Sudan call for improvement to meet the development on twentieth-century methods of Italy's new empire. From the north and east, and possibly also from the south, the pressure of development will soon increase the importance of the Sudan. With this will come opportunities of a greater prosperity. But nothing will result from sitting and waiting for things to happen, or in saying that there is insufficient money to grasp opportunities. The Sudan should show a readiness to meet the new situation by deciding to undertake such works as would help to set trade and transit in motion without incurring too heavy expenditure at the outset. Further works could then depend on circumstances. The policy adopted might well be one of compromise between the British method of not building good roads till trade makes them absolutely essential and the Italian system of building roads to create trade.

Naturally the new situation in North-East Africa has its effect on the Suez Canal. As Italian shipping now stands second in the Canal returns, it may be taken for granted that Italy will soon demand representation on the board of the company, to which she is entitled in the terms of the Concession as one of the 'nations principally interested.' The same applies to Germany. The time will then surely come for a renewed demand for reduction of the Suez Canal dues, which are a formidable obstacle to trade and transit in this area and beyond. These dues are, on the average, ship for ship, from 10 to 20 per cent. higher than those of the Panama Canal, which cost three times as much to build, costs much more to maintain, and yet more than pays its way. How long is the world of to-day going to stand for this private profiteering to the detriment of its trade?

While certain European questions can be solved in Africa, the settlement of most of those dealt with in this series of articles depends on the turn of events in Spain.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

Addis Abeba,
May 1938.

THE QUESTION OF ALEXANDRETTA

By PHILIP P. GRAVES

EXCHANGES of population, emigration, massacre—all these have greatly changed the ethnographic map of the Nearer East since 1914. Asia Minor from the Ægean to the Taurus and the Halys is purely Turkish; and the flight or destruction of the Armenians of Cilicia and the assimilation of the more or less Arab *fellabeen* of its coast have made that fertile trans-Taurine province as Turkish as Konia or Kastamuni. But once across the border of Syria this homogeneity of population and religion—or laicism—disappears. Mandatory Syria is a mosaic of peoples and sects mostly Arabic-speaking and governed in decreasing co-operation with its French masters by Moslem Arabs, but including three numerically important racial and linguistic minorities, one of which has the support of a powerful neighbouring State.

This is the Turkish population of the Sanjak of Alexandretta in the north-western corner of Syria. It has been long established in the marches between Arab and Turk. The description of its ancestry as Seljuk or Turcoman rather than Osmanli is correct in so far as these Turks entered the country fully four centuries before Grim Selim conquered Syria from the Mamelukes. With the expulsion of the Crusaders and the disappearance of the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia it became the dominant element in the region which the Ottomans called the Sanjak of Iskanderun, and the 'new Turks,' in their desire to connect Turks and Hittites, have named 'Hatay' from the 'Khatti' of the cuneiform texts. Whatever its origin, its Turkish quality has never been in question, and there is no doubt that before the war the Turks formed the majority of the inhabitants of the Sanjak and that they are still its strongest community.

The other elements of the population of the Alexandretta-

Antioch region, henceforth 'the Sanjak,' are Arabs, Alawites, and Greek Orthodox Christians, who all speak Arabic, Armenians and Kurds speaking their own languages (and usually Turkish or Arabic as well), and a sprinkling of Maronites and Jews in the towns. Of these the Arabs, Moslems of the Sunni persuasion, claim to be the strongest; but in the country of Antioch the heretical Alawites overflowing from the Latakia region are the largest non-Turkish community, and may indeed outnumber the local Turks. Their religion is a curious amalgam of extreme Shiah beliefs—their sacred book, the *Majmu'*, goes so far as to assert that Ali 'created' his father-in-law Mohamed!—with traces of Christianity and a large body of pagan beliefs (*e.g.*, transmigration and the adoration of the heavenly bodies), which are variously stressed by the four rival sects of these 'Nuseiria' or 'little Christians.' One of them practises a fertility cult, perhaps derived from the worship of Astarte, which furnishes fanatical Moslems, to whom *Omne ignotum pro horrifico*, with startling and indecent tales at the expense of the Alawites in general. Less prejudiced observers give a favourable account of them, notably French officers who have had to do with Alawite militiamen and gendarmes.

Most of the Armenians in the Sanjak were deported in 1915-16 and suffered heavily. One group beat off attacks by second-line troops and Arab levies on their stronghold on Jebel Musa and were rescued by the Allies and conveyed to Port Said, where they remained until the end of the war. The French evacuation of Cilicia in 1921 was preceded by the flight of the Armenians, whom they had employed as soldiers and police and who expected the worst from the incoming Turks. Many of these immigrants settled in the Sanjak, and the non-Turk, and indeed anti-Turk, elements were further increased by Kurds who had been involved in the rebellion of 1926, or, like the Circassian immigrants after 1921, disliked the political, social, and sartorial reforms of the Nationalist Turks. 'Old Turks' also entered the province.

Like Cilicia, on which it borders, the Sanjak was transferred to the French by the British Army in 1919. It was involved in the subsequent struggle between the French and the Turkish Nationalists, but the Alexandrettan Turks were less numerous and militant than their northern brethren.

Kemalist Turkey, however, retained her interest in them. On October 20 M. Franklin-Bouillon, an ambitious and plausible Radical-Socialist politician, signed an agreement at Angora with the Nationalists on the backs of the British and Greeks, which terminated the Cilician fighting. Article VII. bound the French mandatory Government of Syria to institute a special administrative régime for the Sanjak whereby the local Turks obtained cultural freedom, Turkish became an official language, and the province, though attached to Syria, was granted a large measure of home rule. This agreement was endorsed by the relevant articles of the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923). Article III. confirmed the frontier between French Syria and Turkey which had been provisionally fixed by the prior agreement. By Article XVI. Turkey renounced 'all rights and title' to territories beyond its frontiers as laid down in the Treaty without prejudice to any special arrangements concluded with neighbouring States. The French kept their word, and the Sanjak was peaceful even when the greater part of Syria rebelled against them. Brigandage on the border ended in 1926, when the French Government, as mandatory for Syria and Lebanon, signed a treaty with Turkey by which the greater part of the Turco-Syrian frontier was definitely fixed, regulations were adopted for common action against border raiding, and the French confirmed their previous undertakings concerning the administrative autonomy of the Sanjak, which enjoyed an unusually happy and unchronicled existence for the next ten years.

There was, however, a serious weakness in these agreements. None provided for the situation that must arise whenever France surrendered her mandate over Syria, to which Alexandretta was legally attached. In 1936 that situation arose. After long friction with sophisticated Lebanese and turbulent Syrians, the French Government decided to substitute for their Syrian mandate a treaty of alliance with an independent Syrian State, which would come into operation in 1939. A treaty to that effect was signed at Paris on September 9, and was followed by a similar treaty with Lebanon. The Franco-Syrian treaty produced immediate reactions in Turkey, where the Press, while congratulating the Syrians, expressed the hope that justice would be done to the Turks of the Sanjak. A subsequent exchange of views between

Paris and Angora revealed a wide difference of opinion as to the future status of Alexandretta. At the end of November the French tried to close the discussion by a Note in which they expressed their view that negotiations could serve no useful purpose until Syria acquired her full independence three years hence. They added that the agreements already concluded provided only for the administrative autonomy of the province and did not, in their opinion, affect the territorial integrity of Syria. In their reply the Turkish Government disputed the French view, claimed that the Sanjak was entitled to as full independence as were Syria and Lebanon, and added that the French Note appeared to them to be tantamount to a repudiation of the obligations already accepted by France in 1921 and 1926, in which case they could only suppose that their own obligations under these treaties might also be considered null and void.

In this dispute the French certainly had a strong legal case. Their previous agreements had merely provided for the special administrative needs of the Sanjak. Article XVI. of the Treaty of Lausanne seemed to be decisive in that the Government of Angora had thereby divested themselves of any legal title to interest themselves in the future political attachment of Alexandretta. There was also much to be said for the French contention that to convert Alexandretta into an independent State would be contrary to the terms of the mandate. Nor was there any reason to expect that the League Council would look with favour on the independence of a small and defenceless territory owning a fine potential harbour and thus exposed to predatory ambitions. But although the Turks' case was weak in law, there was much to be said for their contention that their brothers in the Sanjak should not be transferred to Arab rule. Their rights, like those of other Syrian minorities, might be guaranteed by the Franco-Syrian treaty, but the experience of the Assyrians in Iraq and the overt and covert support given by the Syrians to anti-Zionist dacoity in Palestine justified Turkish anxiety. This was increased by outbreaks of violence in the Sanjak itself, in which local Turks and Arabs, gunmen imported from Syria, and counter-gunmen from Turkey joined in turn. Meanwhile Angora was taking the desire of the Quai d'Orsay to postpone discussion very ill. President Ataturk, whom the

world prefers to call Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, and his entourage were none too Francophile. The attempts of Orient Freemasonry to save Javid Bey's life after his condemnation for treason in 1926 had rankled; the Nationalists regarded French high finance with an aversion inflamed by memories of that paradise of usurers the Hamidian régime.

On December 9, 1936, Turkey requested that the dispute should be placed on the agenda of the next Council meeting, and that urgent measures should be taken to protect the Turks of the Sanjak. The French had suppressed disorder sternly, and the Alexandrettan Turks feared that they would be driven into the Arab State by French and Syrian coercion. The Council proposed that French and Turks should agree to measures of urgency pending the discussion of the fundamental problem. They agreed, and negotiations followed at Geneva in which Herr Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister, acted as mediator on behalf of the Council. On December 15 Dr. Aras, the Turkish Foreign Minister, M. Vienot, French Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Herr Sandler arrived at an interim agreement. Next day the Council decided that the ratification of the Franco-Syrian treaty should be postponed pending a general settlement, that three observers should visit the Sanjak to study the situation and report, and that on their arrival the French reinforcements should be withdrawn. Dr. Aras abstained from voting on the ground that his own proposal that Turkey and France should send observers to Alexandretta had been rejected by the French.¹ The Turkish delegates then left for Paris to continue the discussion of the substance of the dispute.

They made no progress until, on January 6, something happened which was to exercise a profound influence on the subsequent policy of the French Government. Early that morning the Turkish President, who was staying in Constantinople, ordered a special train and set off for Konia, the headquarters of the Southern Command. At Eskishehir there met him another special train carrying Ismet Pasha, Prime Minister of Turkey, Dr. Aras, the Minister of the Interior, and the Chief of the General Staff, who had come from Angora. After a conference lasting several hours the President went on alone to Konia and Ulu Kishla, 70 miles

¹ The observers sent represented Norway, Belgium, and Switzerland.

nearer the border. Responsible Turks explained his action as a final proof that their Government's determination never to allow the Sanjak to fall under Arab rule was no bluff. The inspired *Jumhuriyet* announced on the same day that Turkey would go to any lengths to defend her honour. The French Government, though professing not to take these threats seriously, were perturbed. The Ghazi, after visiting Ulu Kishla, returned to Eskishehir, where he again conferred with his Ministers. New proposals for the Sanjak were transmitted to the Quai d'Orsay through Bay Suad Davas, the Turkish Ambassador. By January 10 the crisis was over. It had left its mark. Attempts were made, indeed, to explain it away as the result of a post-prandial decision of the Ghazi, from which he had been dissuaded by his Ministers, and notably by the Chief of the General Staff, who had reminded the President that, since the last class of conscripts had been sent home, only recruits were available for military operations. The tale is more picturesque than probable. The President must have been fully acquainted with the state of the army, and it is hard to believe that 'the communicative warmth of a banquet' could overheat that cool and realistic intelligence.

The observers reported to the League Council in time for its next meeting in January 1937, and meanwhile direct negotiations, in which M. Avenol, Secretary-General of the League, took part, were resumed. The Turks were now demanding complete independence for the Sanjak within the framework of a federation including Syria and Lebanon, in which each State should have the right of veto even in foreign affairs. The British Government, desiring a settlement of a dispute between two friendly States, proffered their good offices to both, at the same time urging that any settlement should be within the terms of the French mandate and should set up no precedent which might prejudice other mandated territories. With Mr. Eden's help the main lines of a decision were reached at this session. The Turks dropped their claim for Alexandrettan independence, and agreed that the Sanjak should be demilitarised and enjoy complete autonomy within the Syrian State, which should control no more than its foreign relations and its Customs, and under the supervision of a resident French delegate of the

League of Nations. Turkish and Arabic were to be the official languages. Two agreements—a Franco-Turkish treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Sanjak and a Franco-Turco-Syrian treaty guaranteeing the existing frontier—were to be negotiated. The Council also appointed a Committee to draw up a Statute and Fundamental Law for the Sanjak. These were completed in time for the Council meeting of May 24. Five days later France and Turkey reached a 'final' agreement on the above terms. Their representatives solemnly assured the Council that they accepted the Statute, the Fundamental Law, the settlement and the obligations which it entailed. Congratulations abounded. Only in Syria the Arabs grumbled and protested, but, since the French Chamber had not yet ratified the treaty promising them independence, they went no further. Otherwise all was expected to go well.

But nothing went well. Turks and Arabs rioted at Antioch and Alexandretta. The French proclaimed martial law, and the suspicions of Angora were not appeased even when a League Commission set out in October to prepare for the election of an Assembly in the Sanjak. It consisted of Swiss, Belgian, Dutch and Norwegian members, with Mr. T. Reid, a former Mayor of Colombo and member of the Legislature of Ceylon, as its president. None of its five members had any experience of Near Eastern administration, but their intentions were excellent—too excellent, perhaps, for the realities of the Levant. The new régime came into force in the Sanjak on November 29, and Geneva again buzzed with congratulations. A week later, however, the Turkish Government denounced the Treaty of 1926, alleging that French officials in the Sanjak were favouring the non-Turks. They also protested at Geneva against the penal measures embodied in the draft electoral law by which intimidation and bribery might be punished by as much as twenty years' imprisonment. Whoever was responsible for the draft must have been singularly ignorant of the wicked Near Eastern world if he expected local courts to punish over-zeal so draconically. In January the Council agreed that the draft law would have to be revised. Meanwhile sporadic disturbances continued. The League still hoped, and its Commission, now under a Norwegian president, since Mr. Reid had

accepted a post on the 'fact-finding' Commission in Palestine, resumed its preparations for the Alexandrettan election.

The Commissioners' methods have incurred some sharp criticism in quarters that had at first seemed friendly. They based their scheme on a division of the population into six communities—Turks, Arabs, Alawites, Kurds, Armenians, and Greek Orthodox Christians—and formed a seventh unit out of the less numerous and important sects or communities such as the Maronites and Jews. This was the old Turkish 'Millet' system, and, had the Commissioners followed it faithfully and insisted that the heads of each community should help to prepare their lists and instruct their electors how to vote, the Sanjak might have passed quieter days. Unfortunately they were induced, apparently with the full consent, if not by the promptings, of French and Turks alike, to democratise the system by allowing the would-be voters freedom to choose their community. This meant in practice that Turkish and anti-Turkish propagandists and their attendant roughs made a dead set at all uncertain groups, especially at the luckless Alawites, in order to win or compel them to their side, and that disorders multiplied. But the Turkish faction, now very much in the ascendant, overdid intimidation and finally lost the support of many of their own Conservatives. The local French officials were said to have generally supported the non-Turks, and it is possible that some did so, either through dislike of Turkish methods or with a natural desire to give loyal minorities a fair deal. In any case, it was clear by mid-May that the Turks would not get anything like the percentage (48 to 60 per cent.) of votes that they had confidently expected.

And this was all the more awkward because the French Government had by now made up their minds to fall in with the wishes of Angora and give the Turks of the Sanjak a statutory majority in the local Assembly. A variety of circumstances had driven them to this realistic decision. They desired a general agreement with Turkey. M. Bonnet, who had succeeded M. Delbos as Foreign Minister in April, knew that Dr. Aras had been throwing out hints, which grew broader as time passed, that compliance with the wishes of Angora on the subject of the Sanjak was an essential condition of any such agreement, and that if France would not

pay the price—well, Turkey and Italy, now good friends again, might come together. The Turkish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bay Noman Menemenjioghlu, was more precise. In conversation with M. de Tessen at Geneva in March he had argued with invincible logic that, since France had agreed in principle to recognise the special position of the Alexandretta Turks, it would be only just to see that they obtained a representation in the Alexandretta Assembly corresponding to their numbers. Twenty-two seats out of forty-one would satisfy them—and Turkey. To this Mr. Bonnet agreed, without perhaps realising what difficulties awaited him in consequence of the excessive zeal shown by the official and unofficial agents of Angora. He hoped to reach this most desirable result without offending the League, to which France professed devoted loyalty. But he must reach it, and soon. Otherwise the Grand Turk might take another journey towards the border, or Dr. Aras might strike a bargain with Il Duce. With Germany glaring at Czechoslovakia and French influence in Republican Spain threatened by Nationalist victories, German technicians and Italian aircraft, a breach with Turkey would be a disaster.

The troubles in the Sanjak continued. The French postponed the elections. On May 29 Dr. Aras, addressing the Kamutay (the Grand National Assembly of Turkey), explained the troubles by the statement that France was doing everything to prevent a Turkish success in the election, and that Turkey's relations were excellent with every Power but France. The Committee set up by the League Council to watch events from Geneva met in the beginning of June, and, in the absence of agreement as to what steps should be taken, recommended France and Turkey to negotiate directly. The two Governments needed no such advice. The British urged the French and Turks to agree. M. Bonnet had decided that the Turks must have their majority. On June 3 the French authorities, who had already suspended the registration of voters owing to an affray wherein seven persons were killed, declared martial law in the Sanjak and placed a military officer in charge of it; some French officials were transferred, some local officials dismissed. The election was again postponed. The League Commission suddenly found its difficulties multiplying. The local authorities were arresting

Arab, Alawite, and Orthodox members of the electoral boards, and other notables. A Turkish band invaded the premises where one such Board sat and fired over a hundred shots near where the British delegate was at work. Then came the cruellest blows of all; on June 21 the Turkish Government decided not to recognise the Commission. Next day the Turkish delegate to the League asked the Secretary-General to recall it. The French Government followed suit a day later. But the Commissioners did not wait to be recalled. Their chairman, M. Reimers, had laid their grievances against the French authorities before the Secretary-General in two outspoken telegrams and had announced that he and his colleagues had decided to leave.

The Turkish majority had still to be obtained. A way was found. Turkish military and diplomatic experts under General Asim Gunduz, Deputy C.G.S. of the Turkish Army, arrived at Antioch on June 12 and conferred with General Huntziger, the commander of the French forces in Syria. There was a brief outbreak of Arab wrath, a last riot in the Sanjak, arrests at Damascus, where bombs were said to have been thrown at the Prime Minister of Syria, and even in Palestine a sympathetic strike of Arab labourers. But the movement died down: whether in consequence of French use of the still unratified treaty as a lever, or, as some perhaps over-anxious British observers apprehended, of a half-promise that the Mufti of Jerusalem would be left undisturbed to intrigue against British and Zionists from his retreat at Al-Zok in Lebanon, it is impossible to say. The Franco-Turkish negotiations moved on to their goal. On July 3 the two generals signed a Military Convention at Antioch whereby the Sanjak was to be garrisoned and its peace and integrity guaranteed by 2500 Turkish and as many French troops, who were to remain there until the new Constitution of Alexandretta was functioning normally again. Two days later the Turkish troops arrived, warmly welcomed by the local Turks, and there is now every prospect of a Turkish success in the election if it is held while they are there. Responsibility for maintaining order remains with the French, and when both forces have been withdrawn 1000 local militia and/or gendarmes will keep the peace. On July 4 M. Ponsot, the French Ambassador to Turkey,

and Dr. Aras signed two important instruments at Angora. The first was a ten-years treaty of friendship between the two nations, by which each undertakes to join no military or economic combination aimed against the other and to give no assistance to any Power engaged in aggression on the other while this aggression lasts. Both Governments declare their intention to maintain peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and to consult one another to that end. By the second agreement the two Governments recognised, and the French Government undertook to apply, the autonomous status of the Sanjak on the basis of the preponderance of the Turkish element there, on the express understanding that Turkey had no territorial claim to the province.

An interesting diplomatic struggle has thus ended in a marked success for the Turks, who have played their cards—except in the Sanjak—with old-fashioned skill, and who will be for practical purposes supreme in Alexandretta. Compelled to choose between a serious diplomatic reverse and the successful negotiation of a general agreement with Turkey at the expense of the Arab Nationalists, the minorities in the Sanjak and the League Election Commission, M. Bonnet has followed the national interest. But was it necessary for the French Government—who must have been warned by their officers, and who could have warned the League of the danger of imposing democratic institutions upon communities divided by bitter memories of the recent past and fears for the future—to lend themselves so cynically to preparations for a 'free election,' the results of which had been arranged in advance? Their treatment of the Election Commission appointed by the League of Nations may well be left to that very independent if rather doctrinaire body the Permanent Mandates Commission, which will, no doubt, have something to say on the matter next September. The Syrian Government are probably too weak to make any effective protest, and they have still to prove—if they can—that the anti-Turkish elements in the Sanjak desire direct Arab rule. But the diplomatic recognition of the interest of Turkey in the Turks of the Sanjak raises a wider issue. It may yet provide the German Reich with a diplomatic precedent for its interest in the German minority in Czechoslovakia.

PHILIP P. GRAVES.

THE AUGUSTAN EXHIBITION IN ROME AND ITS HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

By EUGÉNIE STRONG

The record of the Human Past is not all contained in printed books.—CHARLES NEWTON.

AN exhibition of unusual extent and splendour was inaugurated in September last in honour of the bimillenary of the birth of Augustus, founder of the Empire. The exhibition, however, as its official name *Mostra Augustea della Romanità* implies, is not restricted to the principate of the great Emperor or to his doings; the whole history of the Empire from its origins to the aftermath is illustrated and made to contribute to the significance of Augustus as central figure of a great pageant; he stands here as symbol of Rome's civilisation and of her sway.

The exhibition is of a novel kind. It was obviously impossible to move large monuments, while recent experience had only too sadly shown the danger of transporting works of art and industry from place to place. The distinguished and experienced director of the *Mostra*, Professor G. Q. Giglioli, who has been its organising spirit from the first, determined to show what could be done by means of casts, models, photographic reproductions and enlargements—the whole helped by an artificial illumination which for beauty and effectiveness is without precedent. No one need fear that he is being invited to visit some dreary museum of casts. The technical perfection attained in these reproductions is such—so exactly are texture and even colour imitated—that it is often difficult to believe that we are not in the presence of originals. The object that has claimed such an expenditure of skill, industry, and patient craftsmanship is not the mere diffusion of knowledge. Here is history reanimated to an

end. The promoters of the *Mostra* had likewise in view the infusion of pride in the past as an incentive to action in the present and the future. '*Romanità*,' the Roman spirit, is the keynote and the challenge. The inscriptions on either side of the entrance call upon Italians to remember the extent of Rome's glory and the virility of a race that could so conquer and consolidate; the innumerable quotations from ancient and modern authors, hung like tapestry on the walls of several rooms, extol the power, the beneficence, the tolerance of Roman rule, and invite the new Italy to look upon and emulate the works of old Rome. This lesson is steadily kept before the spectator as he travels in space—from Britain and Germany to the African and Asiatic provinces of the Empire—or in time, from the beginnings of Rome till the imperial ideals gradually merged into Christianity, to be born anew in the conscience of the modern world.

The *Mostra* occupies the whole of the Palazzo dell'Esposizione in the Via Nazionale. The central or chief floor is given up to the historical series of monuments; the lower to architecture; the upper to arts and crafts. The staging of the whole is admirable. The dominating feature of the great octagonal vestibule is of Victory, symbol of Rome's destiny, represented here by the winged Victory of Brescia recently copied to be placed at the entrance of the Brenner Pass. About it are portrait statues of three of the greatest successors of Augustus—Tiberius, Hadrian, Constantine—together with the Roman Wolf (from the celebrated Capitoline bronze), shown here as guardian of her people, without the disfiguring Twins. A spacious hall is next devoted to monuments testifying to Roman conquest and power: triumphal reliefs from Adamklisi, from Beneventum, from Carpentras and Saint Rémy, from Ephesus and Tripoli, from the arches of Titus and of Septimius Severus and, in the place of honour, the facsimile of the 'Testament of Augustus,' the *Res Gestæ* inscribed on the *pronaos* of the temple of Augustus and Rome at Ancyra (Ankara). Before passing into the presence of Augustus we are conducted through a series of rooms illustrating the origins of Rome, the expansion of the State and the growth of imperialism which preceded the Empire. A rich series of monuments witnesses to the Romans' pride of race. Their whole

legendary past—Horatius, Marcus Scaevola, Æneas, Romulus and Remus, Tarpeia, the Rape of the Sabines, all the lays of ancient Rome—are vividly presented in a profusion of reliefs, coins, mosaics and wall-paintings. Here also are large models of Etruscan and Latin warriors, the mysterious black stone not yet clearly deciphered from the Forum, and the Apollo of Veii, most famous, if we except the bronze Wolf, of Etrusco-Latin sculptures. Illustrations from coins, it should be noted, are given here, as throughout the exhibition, in photographic enlargements which bring these invaluable historic documents within the range of appreciation for the general public; the effigies of the early kings thus enlarged should please the schoolboy making first acquaintance with the Tarquins. In the centre of the room a plough is stuck in a large rectangular patch of real earth as record of the plough with which Romulus traced the circuit of his city—a symbolic ceremony repeated whenever a Roman colony was founded.

Serious history begins in the following rooms. The conflicts with Etruria and Samnium, Rome's gradual conquest of the Italic peninsula, the invasion and defeat of Pyrrhus, the Macedonian and Punic wars, are documented by innumerable casts and photographs of monuments and statuary as well as by maps and plans. A whole armoury of Roman, Etruscan, Greek, Italic and Samnite weapons has been gathered together; conspicuous among them is the helmet of Hieron I. of Syracuse, the model of which, seen here in its historic setting, probably attracts more attention than ever does the magnificent original at the British Museum. In the present tragic hour of Spain's history a poignant interest attaches to the new plan of the military devices adopted in 133 B.C. to starve out the garrison of Numantia. The inscribed marble *cippus*, found in the Italian excavations of Cyrene, reproduces the will by which Ptolemy Neoterus of Cyrene left his kingdom to the Romans (155 B.C.). Next come the Gracchi; the great Empire builders and dictators—Sulla Marius, Pompey, Cæsar; the Eastern campaigns; the first civil wars; the dramatic career of Sulla, *dictator felix*; the rise of Cicero; the Triumvirates. Much that is shown in the room exclusively dedicated to Cæsar is already familiar, though his military operations (sieges of Alessia and Avaricum,

the famous bridge across the Rhine, the bridge of hurdles across the swamps of Breuil le Sec) derive fresh interest from the models and maps in relief executed by the *Istituto Storico e di Cultura dell' Arma del Genio*. Except for the later idealised statue in the Capitol and the basalt head at Berlin, the portraiture of Cæsar is prudently limited to coins, statues or heads passing as his being as a rule uncertain or even spurious.

After these prolegomena to empire we pass into the presence of Augustus—true centre, as the catalogue points out, of the vast historical synthesis. The Emperor is represented idealised as his own Genius, holding the cornucopiæ of peace and plenty (statue in the Vatican). Other portraits show him as military commander (Prima Porta statue), as *pontifex maximus* (statue from the Via Labicana), divinised with ægis and sceptre (Strozzi-Blacas cameo in the British Museum), and with these are grouped the best examples of his numerous effigies, whether executed in his lifetime or posthumous. A facsimile of the *fasti consulares et triumphales* (a treasure of the *Museo dei Conservatori*), justly described in the catalogue as the fundamental document for the history of Rome, is shown here together with a large map of the territories added to the Empire by Augustus. Finally a tall cruciform pillar of luminous glass, inscribed with the words from St. Luke's Gospel, records the census in the days of Cæsar Augustus and the birth of Christ—the obscure event destined to change the face of the world.

Other rooms are devoted to portraits of the family of Augustus (the fine cameo with the profile of Claudius, at Windsor, was specially cast for this exhibition by permission of H.M. the King) and to the Augustan poets; to the private life of the Emperor—his entourage, friends, colleagues, servants; to the monuments of his principate, in Italy and in the provinces. Of the *Ara Pacis* (most celebrated of Augustan monuments) only a few details appear here and there in the *Mostra* in illustration of special points. No model of it was prepared, since the altar itself is soon to be re-erected as near as possible to its ancient site, and inaugurated on September 23, two thousandth birthday of Augustus.

A room consecrated to the imperial cult is important for the light thrown, by numerous inscribed altars and *cippi*, upon the religious policy of Augustus and the much-debated

question of emperor-worship in his time. A room along whose walls are arranged a series of luminous photographs of the Campanian coast takes us to sites beloved by Augustus, and to Capri, where he erected the imperial villa afterwards sumptuously enlarged by Tiberius. The everyday life of the Augustan age is not forgotten: a charming feature of the exhibition is the paved street, imitated from one lately unearthed in Rome, which leads to a reconstructed villa of Augustan date with its full complement of living and sleeping apartments.

A long gallery is given up to the army. Facing the entrance is the reconstruction of the magnificent Flavio-Trajanic battle-piece, perhaps the finest example of its kind in the world which at a later date was barbarously cut up into four slabs to adorn the Arch of Constantine. In the beautiful little 'Chapel of the Eagle' (*Sacrario dell' Aquila*) a splendid eagle-topped standard is set up in a niche against a gold background adorned with effigies of flying 'Victories' from the Arch of Septimius Severus at Leptis Magna. Prætorian and legionary standards are massed at the sides. Eight sections are devoted to the legions; it is not without emotion that we read the proud names *Adiutrix*, *Victrix*, *Fulminata*, *Augusta*, *Flavia*, *Ulpia*, *Partica*, and so on. The examples of Roman camps along the Rhine and in Roman North Africa are specially good. Among numerous engines of war is the model of the movable tower which the Romans brought against Massada, last stronghold of the Jews, in the rebellion of A.D. 70. Military *stelae* (many of them from Roman Britain) are here in numbers. These various records of valour and devotion, discipline and endurance explain better than any text why the Romans considered military training the indispensable preliminary to civil service.

After the army comes the navy, represented in a hall dominated by the colossal statue of Agrippa, Augustus' admiral of the fleet and victor at Actium. Models of every kind of battleship and views of harbours (Misenum, Puteoli, Centumcellæ, etc.) illustrate Rome's command of the sea and show how, by sheer force of will, an agricultural people could be transformed into a great seafaring and naval power. The mercantile marine, merchantmen, and even light river craft, docks, lighthouses, shipyards, are not forgotten.

Law—Rome's greatest and most enduring gift to civilisation—is presented in well-arranged historical sequence: from the laws of the Twelve Tables, as reconstructed by the eminent Italian jurist Pietro Bonfante, to the *Digest* of Justinian shown in a facsimile of the fine version in the Laurentian Library. Inscriptions displayed as here in facsimile and arranged historically prove attractive even to those most ignorant of Roman law. The marriage laws of Augustus and his measures for the increase of the birth rate, which have no doubt influenced modern legislation on the subject, are naturally given prominence. Of peculiar interest is the *Lex Regia Vespasiani*, from which Cola di Rienzi claimed to derive authority for restoring the ancient liberties. Private law is as fully represented as public; marriage contracts, wills, birth certificates and death certificates, bills of sale, transfers of property, etc., are exhibited in large numbers. The severity of the 'Hall of Magistratures,' which comes next, is relieved by a magnificent illuminated model of the Curia of Sabratha, meeting-place of its municipal Senate.

With Augustus the Empire is fully established. The tale is resumed with Tiberius and carried on through a long series of exhibits illustrative of the period from the Flavians to the Antonines when the Empire reached its highest point of expansion and prosperity. In the later section, 'Defence of the Empire,' a huge map of the Roman *limes* stresses the necessity which had now arisen for strongly fortified frontiers against barbarian aggression. Details may be studied in the models of the 'Roman Wall' in Britain; of the *limes* of the Rhine country; of the fortified bridgehead at Deutz, near Cologne, constructed by Constantine in 310. Of the gateways of Rome fortified by Honorius, the Porta S. Paolo is shown in a fine model patinaed to the actual colour of the stone. In the same room may be seen what had long been lacking to a good knowledge of later Roman sculpture—casts in actual size of parts of the Arch of Calerius at Salonika, together with well-chosen examples of the late imperial portraiture from Gallienus to Arcadius. This series justifies the admiration now accorded to the art of a period long considered as decadent. The type of the monuments exhibited in this hall, and not least the fortifications, indicates the insidious approach of dismemberment and the weakening of the

central power; the body politic was failing and yielding to new spiritual forces.

Accordingly a hall of basilican type contains a large and well-arranged collection of examples of early Christian art brought together in order to show, in the words of the catalogue, 'Christianity forming with "*Romanità*" one single element against the barbarians.' Here are numerous plans and models from the catacombs; the earliest effigies of SS. Peter and Paul; models of primitive Christian basilicas (including the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem); records of martyrdoms; portraits of the early Popes. A central position, against the end wall, is assigned to the model of the magnificent porphyry sarcophagus reputed of Constantia, daughter of Constantine, but no doubt intended originally as that of the great Emperor himself. At the side a tall luminous cross proclaims the fulfilment of the promises held out by the inscribed cross in the hall of Augustus: *in hoc signo vinces*.

The historical sequence, though all-important, does not suffice; details have to be filled in from the large number of exhibits on the lower and second floors. On the lower floor the large-scale reconstructions and models, even of whole cities and ports (Ostia, Civitavecchia, Leptis Magna), coloured and recessed as in stereopticon views, materialise the sense of all-embracing empire aroused by the shifting illumination of the maps on the main floor. Even more impressive than the number and size of individual cities is the spectacle, to which two rooms are devoted, of Roman roads and the system of intercommunication. Here, besides reconstructions, views and maps (including an ingenious map of Horace's journey to Brindisi), are milestones, inscriptions, reliefs with sometimes enlivening incidents of travel, and also models of the vehicles employed. On this floor, too, are models of triumphal arches, theatres, amphitheatres (that of the reconstructed Colosseum is accompanied by another showing the machinery that lifted the wild beasts from their cages to the level of the arena), *capitolia*, temples, palaces, villas (Hadrian's at Tivoli—that of the Quintilli) and houses, the apartment house of Rome and Ostia conspicuous among them. Aqueducts and baths are there, of course, and, less familiar to our ideas of ancient Rome, excellent works of hygiene, including a detailed model of the great military hospital at Xanten, in Germany.

On the upper floor the exhibits are, for the most part, on a smaller scale. It is not the power and majesty of empire, but the intimacy of Roman life, that is here brought home to us. The fine series of portrait busts is given less for the persons represented than as illustrating this popular form of art (Palmyrene portraiture is especially well illustrated). The room of silverware displays an art of domestic luxury; here are admirable electrotypes of the collection from Hildersheim, the so-called 'Treasure of Attila' from Vienna, that of the 'Casa del Menandro' from Pompeii, others from the British Museum, from the *Cabinet des Antiques* of Paris, and that of Traprain from Edinburgh—the last named too little known out of Great Britain, or indeed within it. A great deal of care has been expended on the fashions, in clothes and in hair-dressing, of Rome and the provinces. The scenes of family and school life are fascinating. A curious relief from Virunum shows a group of mounted youths belonging to the *Juventus*—an organisation for the young resembling that of the modern *balilla* and *avanguardisti*. The reminder is constant that 'youth must be drilled and disciplined so that they learn to despise feasts and banquets.' One illustration of school life gives the birching of a pupil in a manner suggestive of the austere discipline of Victorian England.

To the religions of the Empire no less than four rooms are devoted. Social service is well represented. Among public charities we note the provisions recorded on the famous *Tabula Alimentaria* for the adoption and training by the State of poor children and orphans. In other rooms are illustrated games and pastimes, sports, racing and the racecourse; letters and sciences; medicine, surgery, astronomy, music; industries, trades, agriculture and farming in all their branches, fisheries and fishmongers; the bank and the counting-house (*haute finance* and *petit commerce*), offices, shops with their salesmen and customers, inns, taverns (*caupona*). Besides plaster models of the great Roman libraries (of Hadrian at Athens, of Celsus at Ephesus, the library of Timbad and the two libraries of the Forum of Trajan), a full-sized reconstruction in wood of a private library with its fittings and furniture elicits admiration. The important section of fine arts (which should be enlarged) draws for illustration upon reproductions of sculpture and of painting supplemented by

photographs so arranged as to show the development of spatial perspective in the art of Rome.

The grandiose model of the ancient *Urbs*, presented to the *Mostra* by the City of Rome, which should have found a place among reconstructions of the cities of the Empire, has been allotted, for lack of space elsewhere, a larger room on this floor. It has been worked up with the utmost care by Professor Colini and by the architect Gismondi (to whose skill so much in the exhibition is due) from the *Forma Urbis* of the late Rodolfo Lanciani. This vision of the Imperial City sums up the manifold impressions left by a visit to the *Mostra*.

Instead of closing, as originally announced, on September 23 next, the *Mostra* is to be kept open till towards the end of the year, when the gallery in the Via Nazionale is required for other exhibitions. A number of the more important pieces will then go to enrich the *Museo dell' Impero Romano*; and it is officially announced that a *Mostra della Romanità*, exceeding the present one in size and splendour, will be permanently lodged in a new building which is to form part of the 1942 Exhibition. These changes, we must hope, need not seriously interrupt the lessons of the *Mostra*: its vindication of archaeology as providing history with documentary evidence as precious as that of the texts—its co-ordination of these monumental records into one huge framework exhibiting the life and activities of the Empire from which springs our modern civilisation.

EUGÉNIE STRONG.

THE CARDWELL SYSTEM AND INDIA

By SIR CHARLES HARRIS

IN introducing the Army Estimates last March, the Secretary of State intimated that he was about to discuss officially with the Secretary of State for India changes in our Army system affecting the arrangements, financial and other, for the supply of the British garrison in India. From the viewpoint of a commander having sole control of our Regular Army and surveying the Imperial field at large, he said, its distribution was faulty: too many troops in India and too few in the Middle East for our greatly increased liabilities. After providing in each area a sufficient garrison for its defence at the outbreak of war, we should aim at holding a strategic reserve in a zone whence it could be directed most rapidly to those alternative places most likely to be threatened; and the location of such a reserve should change in the light of changing conditions and requirements. But the supreme commander attempting redistribution on such lines would find himself blocked, as regards India, by 'rigidities' of which he mentioned four: the 'predetermination' of the numbers of units in India and of their establishments; the fact that since units there are interchangeable with those outside, while the cost of new equipments for them falls on India, the pace of re-equipment of the Army generally is influenced by the speed at which India finds money; that as regards pay and other 'amenities' the British Government is controlled by what India will afford; and that the terms of the soldier's service and the length of his stay in India must also be arranged with that Government. Armies, he said, above all other institutions, must be able to adapt themselves to changing times; and accordingly he, without waiting for the results of discussions with India, would proceed to achieve, for the Army outside that country, the best attainable

form of organisation. Both the Secretary of State and Mr. Amery (who spoke later) seemed to regard these 'rigidities' as rooted in the Cardwell System, and an impression is abroad that, but for the conversations now proceeding, a decision (already arrived at) to abandon that system would have been announced then and there. What exactly is this system that so paralyses progress?

The state in which forty years of neglect between Waterloo and the Crimean War had left our military affairs beggars description. In the middle of the war a large number of hitherto independent departments were flung together into a sort of War Office, with a new Minister (Secretary of State for War) at its head. For the next fourteen years little further progress was visible, and at the end of 1868 the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief, sitting a quarter-mile apart, still exercised a confused dual control, exchanging formal letters and each enjoying direct access to the Sovereign; commissions and promotions in the Army were still purchased for hard cash, cavalry and infantry regiments practically belonged to their officers, each one forming a single independent unit, and their men, in the main, were enlisted 'for life,' with service pensions at twenty-one years. Behind these men nothing existed but recruits drilling at the regimental depôts; there was no Reserve. But, after much discussion, past muddles had precipitated certain conclusions in the minds of thinking men.

(1) Most of our Army was locked up in the Indian and other distant garrisons, though railways, steamships and telegraphs had revolutionised transport and the problems of war. As Gladstone had put it in 1861: 'Our present system is founded upon a state of things which has entirely passed away. Our communications with our Colonies were rare, slow and uncertain, and it would have been very dangerous indeed to trust to the principle of supporting them from the centre; but now . . . communications with the world in general are constant, rapid and certain, and England is the very centre of those communications'; and he advocated 'keeping our great mass of force at home and supplying the Colonies as they might require.' This was intended to have a further effect: 'No country which is not primarily charged with the ordinary business of its own defence is really, or

can be in the full sense of the word, a free community.' Consequently we should withdraw the Regulars from the antipodes and other self-governing areas, not merely to relieve the Home Exchequer, but to stimulate the spirit of self-reliance.

(2) Long-service recruiting, with prolonged periods of foreign service in its train, had definitely failed to keep the ranks full, to say nothing of any Reserve. General Peel, introducing the Army Estimates of 1867, explained the appointment in 1866 of Lord Dalhousie's Royal Commission by 'the great difficulty experienced in procuring recruits for the Army; . . . in point of fact the question then was, and now is, whether the British Army should be allowed to collapse.'

(3) After the Mutiny, the following direct question had been put to another Royal Commission: How far the European portion of the Army (in India) should be composed of troops of the Line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only? The majority of the Commissioners answered, positively enough:

However good the local force of the late East India Company has proved itself to be, still it is the opinion of the majority that a local force deteriorates more than one which, by frequent relief, has infused into it fresh European notions and feelings and a vigorous system of European discipline, and this would more particularly be the case in a climate like that of India. . . . The very nature of a double army would, in a great measure, deprive the Line army of the valuable experience it would acquire in India, whilst the local army would in like manner be debarred from all the benefits of field service in Europe. . . . The local army of India, as now constituted, is more expensive than the Line in its non-effective charges. A double system of recruiting, the natural result of a double army, would operate most injuriously on recruiting in general, and it would be next to impossible to carry it on satisfactorily, or with good results, if worked by two distinct authorities.

With such half-wrought materials as these ready to his hand, Cardwell in December 1868 was commissioned, as Secretary of State for War, to rebuild the whole edifice, and within five years he had done it. The War Office and Horse Guards were united, and both it and the Army were reformed;

Purchase was abolished, concentration replaced dispersion as the guiding principle of distribution of forces; and, in particular, the Line infantry (then the chief component of the Army) was reorganised, not as regards higher field formations and so on, but in its vital, quasi-physiological processes of recruiting, drafting, circulation of officers and men through its unit establishments, and formation of reserves. The Cardwell System, in its meaning to-day, ignores all his other achievements and denotes only these internal reforms.

His plan was simple, elastic and economical. He changed the terms of service to a first period of twelve years, part with the Colours and part with the Army Reserve he thus created—i.e., in civil life, with a daily retaining fee. Senior non-commissioned officers and a limited number of rank and file were allowed to re-engage to complete twenty-one years' service for pension, instead of passing to the Reserve, and the Reservist might be invited, when needed to augment the Reserve, to continue for the thirteenth to sixteenth years from enlistment in the Reserve (Section D). He set up, as the normal unit of Line infantry, the regiment of two battalions, with a defined recruiting area and a small fixed *dépôt* in it as the permanent *pied à terre* of the regiment and of the local Militia and Volunteers which were now allied with it: one battalion to be normally abroad and the other at Home, exchanging places at long intervals; and with men transferable as required to any of the three sub-units. A typical soldier's life-story would be: some months of drill at the *dépôt*; a year or more in the Home battalion to complete training; drafted to the battalion abroad to complete his Colour service (normally seven years for infantry, a compromise between the necessity of building up a Reserve and India's insistence on economy in sea-transport); return to pass five years in the Reserve; if not drafted abroad, pass to Reserve direct from Home battalion at the end of his seventh year, unless he consented to go earlier to augment the Reserve. The battalion abroad thus contained only trained soldiers ready to take the field for local defence. If reinforcement from Home was necessary, the Reservists produced by both battalions were available to mobilise the Home battalion with men in their prime, immature and unfit men returning

to the dépôt until wanted. Until Haldane at last realised Cardwell's ideal of equal numbers of battalions at Home and abroad, there were always some regiments with both abroad; the dépôts of these were enlarged to handle more recruits, and Provisional (training) Battalions, not confined to a single regiment, were formed to complete the training of drafts. The other regiments went their way undisturbed.

Out of sight, out of mind; old-fashioned officers, forgetting the invisible Reservists and looking at the Home battalions after the drafts had gone, derided them as 'squeezed lemons,' and with recruiting slack and money tight their strength was certainly liable to fall too low. At first, also, there was much scepticism as to how the 'paper' Reserves would look when (if ever) they mustered. Moreover, to form the two-battalion regiments, Cardwell allied ('linked') each Home battalion with one abroad, for drafting purposes. This was unpopular; and when in 1880 Childers developed the linking into permanent union, so that the Fighting Forty-Fourth and the Queen's Own became for all time the first and second battalions of the Loamshire Regiment, uniformed alike, with a joint dépôt and sharing the battle honours of both the old regiments, whatever care had been taken in selecting the partners so wedded, the unpopularity developed into fury of both officers and men with the civilian who had not only abolished Purchase but had shown the way to this last violation of *esprit de corps*; and Cardwell (in retirement) bore most of the blame. But on the substitution of battalion training for dépôt training of drafts, which was at stake, it had been impossible for him to give way. It was the keystone of the arch, and, relying on his military advisers, the most enlightened British soldiers of their day, he had closed his ears, set his teeth and seen it through. It was essentially a matter to be decided by experience and, after a successful first mobilisation for Wolseley's Arabi campaign in 1882, the Wantage Committee of 1892 gave its unanimous judgment:

'The advantages of the system of regimental training for men destined for India over the alternative and far more expensive system of dépôts can hardly be overestimated. The recruits acquire more interest in their profession and better teaching in the higher spirit and discipline of a soldier's life. When a recruit enlists he wants to enter the Army and not a military school, and there can

be no doubt that the variety and excitement of regimental life compare favourably, in his estimation, with the routine of life at the dépôt. . . . The Committee have no hesitation in stating their belief that the double-battalion system is not only the most economical, but also the best machinery which can at present be devised for furnishing the foreign drafts and effecting the reliefs.

This wisdom was justified within ten years by the quality of the mobilised battalions sent out for the South African War, and again by that of the organised 'Old Contemptibles' of 1914. But Cardwell had 'had a bad Press' and his name, covering (as it had come to do) Childers' crowning insult to the old Army, roused prejudice in the popular mind, though all soldiers of note had long been on his side. Mr. Arnold-Forster, whom political hazard had made Secretary of State under Balfour in 1903, still hoisted the anti-Cardwell flag, though a few years earlier he had had the worst of a set-to with Lord Haliburton on the merits of the System. He spent his two years of office in working at a plan to supersede it by dividing the Regulars into two armies, 'General Service' and 'Home Service,' with different terms of service, pay, etc.; all foreign service falling to the former, which would be predominantly a long-service force, drafted from large dépôts and having only a few battalions at Home, maintained in instant readiness to take the field as a striking force. Suffice it here to say that he failed to convince either his Prime Minister or his Army Council; and Balfour, in view of repeated failure of his own side to produce a sound reform, passed the word, as leader of the Opposition, that the Liberal scheme must have a fair (non-party) examination. The new Government had decided in 1906 to 'uphold the system in its integrity and develop it further in accordance with its author's intentions'; and Haldane in 1908 published a calculation showing that, with no change in the establishment of the Army, if drafting reverted to dépôts the Expeditionary Force must lose one cavalry brigade and two complete infantry divisions, while the annual saving (at the then level of costs) would scarcely exceed half a million. The 'secret' of this remarkable result lies in the use, by Cardwell, of the same men to serve the double purpose of training machinery in peace and fighting units on mobilisation. One cannot expect different critics in the Press to make their objections logically

consistent, and the Military Correspondent of *The Times* seems (June 17) to have discovered a new fault in the System. He points to the 'relatively large surplus force' which it leaves on a general mobilisation at home, after bringing up our foreign garrisons to the new standard required for defence at the outbreak of war, and shakes his head over the temptation to commit this surplus in support of France, to our own undoing. Surely this pronouncement rivals Campbell Bannerman's famous objection to the creation of a thinking department for the Army!

The System, then, deals only with the internal vital processes of the units of the Army; it has nothing to do with pay, amenities or equipment, nor does it (as often alleged) break down unless there is rigid equality of the numbers of battalions at Home and abroad, though it works the better the nearer such equality is approached. We can now return to the viewpoint of our Supreme Commander, which is useful for a preliminary glance at the problem of distribution, premising that, as he does not and (unless through a vast political cataclysm) cannot exist, his views have to be harmonised with realities—to be precise, with certain fundamental features of our relations with India: (1) the separation of Exchequers, (2) the employment in India of an agreed number of troops of the British Army, and (3) the principle that India pays the cost of her own defence. These fundamentals existed before the System and would continue to exist if it were abandoned. More than finance is involved; but if India, having a difference with us, elects to conduct it on the financial plane, is she not following the course we ourselves took with our early kings? Taking the four named rigidities:

(a) The number of British troops in India is agreed from year to year only, and since 1914 four cavalry regiments out of nine and seven infantry battalions out of fifty-two have in fact been withdrawn. The System does not even distinguish a battalion in India from one elsewhere abroad, or care how it changes locality; and the real difficulties in the way of Mr. Amery's expeditionary force 'somewhere East of Suez' are financial. Any of those troops coming from India must be taken over by the British Exchequer, and all of them must be housed (expensively) in the chosen area.

Secretary of State's condition of mobility, must be rehoused as often as the balance of power shifts. One previous question should be mentioned but cannot be here discussed: troops in hot countries cannot be packed into passing ocean tramps, and much seems to depend on where 'East of Suez' is, and on points within the Admiralty sphere, before it becomes clear that, when troops are hurriedly wanted at some now unknown spot, it may not be, after all, quickest to embark them in England, as Gladstone foresaw.

(b) Re-equipment, *pari passu*, of the British units both in and out of India is an old problem; and so long as a part of the British Army one and indivisible exists there, and the broad military view is maintained that identical patterns strengthen both wings of it by enabling either to reinforce the other, the measures to be concerted as to priority and pace of such changes are not affected by the plan on which the personnel is provided and replaced. Such measures in the past have been concerted without any suggestion that India should not pay her share towards the common purpose; but perhaps we must now expect to find, among the growing-pains of her adolescence, some greater tenderness in that region. Here, again, the trouble is not caused by the System and would not be cured by abandoning it.

(c) India's protest against the increased cost to her arising from the newly announced 'amenities' for British Regulars has the same characteristics: neither novel, nor caused by the System (which does not touch pay), nor removable by abandoning it; unless, indeed, it be done as an incident in other and more fundamental changes. As the post-Mutiny Commission (quoted above) saw, you cannot have substantially different standards of pay in one and the same army, nor work successfully a common scheme of recruiting for armies that are really two—Cardwell or no Cardwell.

(d) The last rigidity, that 'the terms of service of a soldier and the time he must spend in India must be decided in the light of the existing arrangements,' is a little obscure. With 57,000 individual Britons living under discipline in India, some orderly system of comings and goings is obviously necessary; and Cardwell left everything open to arrangement between the two Governments according to the conditions of the day, except the fixed twelve years within which the

soldier's first period of Colour service and his Reserve service must be fitted. Whatever it may be that ties our Commander's hands, it is not the System.

It is difficult to see how the King's government is to be carried on if an improved organisation for the part of the Army outside India, involving the abolition of the Cardwell System, is to be carried through unilaterally, leaving the part inside India in suspense. In settling with India by agreement under present-day conditions, we should hold fast to the principle that she pays the cost of her defence, including such emoluments for British personnel as are found to be necessary. If, on purely defence grounds, it be decided that India is now substantially over-garrisoned, a settlement of the present 'amenities' dispute might possibly be reached, consistently with that principle, by a reduction of the garrison, leaving it to the British Government to decide whether to maintain on British establishment the numbers brought away or to disband them. But as regards re-equipment the case is different. A note to Vote 11 of the Army Estimates refers to an item in Civil Estimates¹ for a first payment to India of £200,000, part of a total of £600,000 'to assist the Government of India in meeting the capital cost of mechanising certain units of the British Army in India.' If India, having found the plea of poverty accepted as justifying a subsidy for re-equipment, hangs back, presses for its further extension to 'amenities,' and obtains it as the price of progress, it is difficult to see where we can halt on that path; and it is not to be expected that any official, military or civilian, will show reluctance to exploit, in the interests of his local exchequer, these breaches in our lines of financial defence.

Consule Planco there were in the House of Commons keen economists who would have laid bare this unobtrusive little military item in our Civil Estimates and insisted on the fullest publicity for it; but to-day, it seems, 'nobody knows and nobody cares.'

C. HARRIS.

¹ Class II., Vote 11, India and Burma.

NATIONAL PLANNING IN AGRICULTURE

ITS POSSIBILITIES AND ITS LIMITS

By SIR E. JOHN RUSSELL, D.Sc., F.R.S.,

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IN a crowded country like Great Britain where large importations of food from overseas are possible the policy underlying home agriculture must necessarily be in the nature of a compromise. The townsman wants cheap food and the countryman hopes for higher prices; the two desires can never be reconciled. The best direction for seeking a compromise is to show that the advantage to the nation of a prosperous agriculture is worth paying for; and just as sweated industries were closed down because of the evils involved, so a poorly paid agriculture, with its inevitable consequences of drift from the land and inefficient use of natural resources, is also bad for the community.

This is widely recognised, and numerous schemes have been adopted by successive Governments for ameliorating the agricultural position. Much interest has centred in the possibility of working out some large-scale plan for agricultural development. It is proposed in the following pages to discuss this question and see how far a planned agriculture would be practicable.

Three difficulties must be faced from the outset. Agricultural production, unlike industrial production, is not entirely under control: crops can be grown only where the natural conditions are favourable, and their yields are profoundly affected by the weather. Agricultural production is necessarily slow, depending on the growth of plants and the birth and growth of animals. None of these processes can be hastened. Any plan, therefore, must be based on sound

knowledge of local conditions, and it must take account of the time lag, which may be anything from nine months to two years, between the starting of production and the delivering of the final product. The third difficulty is less tangible but no less serious: the day's work is so dependent on the weather that it can only be finally organised on the day itself and must be left to the discretion of the man on the spot, and in consequence the countryman has developed a habit of independent action that makes him unwilling to accept whole-heartedly the dictates of authority. Although in the Great War there was considerable control, it was achieved only at enormous expenditure of money and effort, and heavy compensation had to be paid afterwards in consequence of the mistakes of some of the controlling authorities.

These difficulties are at a minimum in the totalitarian States, where the Government controls consumers and producers alike, and where no Government action can be hampered by adverse criticism. Russia, Germany and Italy each has a planned national agriculture, and each of these countries can point to impressive material achievements, but in no case is it possible to estimate the cost. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the cost would have been any less in this country had we used the same methods or that the results would have been any greater. No peace-time plan would be acceptable in this country that involved rationing of the consumers, or underpaying of the workers, or compulsion on the farmers. We start out, therefore, on the assumption that any plan must be related to the Englishman's accustomed diet, and that no substitutes will be acceptable.

Broadly speaking, the total quantity of food (apart from milk and eggs) at present consumed is about $8\frac{1}{2}$ cwt. per head per annum, or about $2\frac{1}{2}$ lb. per day. It falls roughly into four groups: (1) flour; (2) meat and fish; (3) potatoes; (4) fruit and vegetables, of each of which we consume about 200 lb. per head annually—rather more than $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. daily; and a fifth group: sugar, butter, cheese and other foods, of which we consume about 140 lb. annually. The consumption is not static: that of meat, vegetables, fruit, sugar, butter, cheese, eggs, has steadily increased; that of bread tends to decrease,

while that of potatoes and, until quite recently, fresh milk has remained unchanged for many years.¹

At present we produce about 40 per cent. of our total food. As these foods are grown at present, it needs about $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres of land to feed one 'head of population,' but on our present English yields a smaller area, about $1\frac{2}{3}$ acres, would suffice.

The present area of our cultivated land in the United Kingdom is 32 million acres—just under 25 million in England and Wales, $4\frac{1}{2}$ million in Scotland, and $2\frac{1}{2}$ million in Northern Ireland and the islands not included in these divisions. This 32 million acres would provide our present food for 19 or 20 million people, and we are about 47 million. There are no improvements in sight that would enable us anything like to bridge the gap. I see no hope that we could ever provide from our own land the whole of our accustomed food. Of course, if we were willing to alter our dietary, we could feed more people than we do at present. I shall not hazard a number, but I should not controvert the possibility of feeding 30 or even 40 million people if we sufficiently raised our efficiency and tightened our belts. We should need to concentrate on the foods most economical of land; our dietary would be based on potatoes, cabbage (eaten as such, or made into soup or sauerkraut), cheese, some milk, pigs produced as bye-products, a few fowls, ducks and geese as bye-products of waste corners, very little beef or mutton, little butter and very thin beer—not the divinely ordained diet of the Englishman; and so as a peace-time proposition we need not further discuss it. We are, in short, confronted by two hard facts—that we cannot from our own land supply

¹ The figures are of sufficient interest to quote them here:

ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF FOODS OF POPULATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
(Lb. per Head)

Period:—	1909-13	1924-28	1934
Wheat	211	198	197
Potatoes	208	194	210
Meat	135	134	143
Fish	44	42	—
Vegetables	60	78	98
Fruit	61	91	115
Sugar	79	87	94
Butter	16	16	25
Cheese	7	9	10
Margarine	6	12	8
Eggs (number)	104	120	152
Fresh milk (gallons)	19.5	20	18

to our population the whole, or anything like the whole, of our accustomed diet, and that the community will not accept in peace-time a restricted and substituted diet.

There are, however, two general directions in which we could arrange to raise our agricultural production: we could intensify all our present activities so as to increase our output on present lines; or we could concentrate in certain directions, the most important being:

(1) Defence; (2) National health; (3) Maximum employment of men on the land.

Hitherto our policy has been the general uplift of our agriculture. The existing machinery for improvements works well and is continuously being developed to meet changing conditions. The recently established Land Fertility Scheme fits well into this line of policy. In order to get the best out of it, agricultural experts should be told the figure at which they should aim: whether the present 40 per cent. should be raised, say, to 50 or to 60 per cent., either of which would be feasible. Any such general rise would necessarily react on commerce, shipping, and the cost of living, and some balance would have to be struck to ensure that the advantages gained from additional home production of food did not involve greater losses in other directions. Further, there should be some definite plan on which agricultural land is taken for other purposes. Since 1914 there has been a complete loss of 480,000 acres of agricultural land in England and Wales, and, so far as one can judge, no thought was ever taken about the loss of food-producing power thus involved.²

² The decrease in acreage of land in cultivation has been much greater, amounting to 2½ million acres, but 1·65 million of this has reverted to rough grazing and 116,000 has been put under forest. The actual figures are:

ENGLAND AND WALES
(Thousand Acres)

	1914	1919	1936	Loss or gain between 1919 and 1936
Arable land	10,998	12,309	9,120	3,189 loss
Grass land	16,115	14,439	15,743	1,304 gain
Total cultivated area	27,113	26,748	24,863	1,889 loss
Rough grazings	3,782	4,121	5,433	1,312 gain
Forest	1,884	1,884*	2,000†	116 gain
Other purposes (towns, villages, roads, etc.)	4,357	4,383	4,837	454 gain
Total land area	37,136	37,136	37,133	

* 1924 Census.

† 3200 thousands for Great Britain—an increase of 0·2 since 1924.

PLANNING FOR DEFENCE

The basal facts are well known. We produce at present only about 40 per cent. of our total foodstuffs, and even this is not entirely on our own resources: a considerable fraction, which has been estimated at about one-quarter, depends on materials brought in from outside—imported feeding-stuffs, and residues of manufacturing processes, *e.g.*, oil-cakes, maize feeds, wheat offals, etc. More important still, the 40 per cent. home production is very unevenly divided among the various foods. We produce practically all our liquid milk and potatoes, about half our meat, one-fifth of our sugar, but less than 20 per cent. of our bread and cheese and less than 10 per cent. of our butter.³ Grain and fat are, indeed, the weak points of our present agricultural production so far as defence is concerned, and great efforts would be needed to increase supplies—particularly of grain. About 8½ million acres of wheat would be needed to supply 47 million people with the present 200 lb. of flour per annum. In 1936 our acreage was 1·8 million, so that for complete supply we should need another 6½ million acres, or somewhat less if, like the Germans, we gave up our luxurious type of bread and accustomed ourselves to something much coarser where the wheat is more fully utilised and also mixed with other grains. The gain would be less than it looks, for wheat offals are valuable animal foods, and if we eat them ourselves we should lose both meat and milk in consequence. Where could this extra wheat area come from? Little, if any, could be got out of the great

³ The proportions of foodstuffs for the United Kingdom, home-produced and imported, are as follows:

	Home-pro- duced (per cent.) 1935	Imported (per cent.)	
		1935	1936
Beef and veal	52	48	48
Mutton and lamb	43	57	56
Pork and bacon	50	50	48
Poultry (Great Britain)	76	24	25
Eggs	66	34	38
Milk (liquid)	100	—	—
Cheese	30	70	71
Butter	10	90	91
Wheat	26	74	77
Barley	46	54	55
Oats	92	8	10
Potatoes	96	4	6

parks and commons on which longing eyes were often cast in the last war; these are usually on land that cannot readily be cultivated. Certain areas of land, riverside or estuary, are convertible into arable or grass land by drainage, embanking, and other ways; not, however, at a profit under peace conditions, though it might well be done as a contingency defence measure. A considerable area—nearly $5\frac{1}{2}$ million acres in England and nearly 10 million acres in Scotland—is classed as ‘rough grazing’ or deer forest: between this and permanent grass land there is no fixed line; the marginal land is sometimes in the one group and sometimes in the other. It would be only a matter of expense to push the cultivated grass further into the waste: it would necessitate fencing, and often provision of water and some kind of shelter; but as a contingency defence measure this also would be possible. The further the cultivation was pushed, the greater would be the cost. But the chief source of the additional arable land needed for war-time agriculture would always be the considerable reserve of cultivable land now under permanent grass but capable of being ploughed up and put into arable crops, when it would yield much more human food than if it had remained as grass. This was done during the last war, and a great deal of experience was then gained.⁴ The nation got through, but the margin was at times perilously narrow and the cost was extremely high. Much of the trouble arose from the need for improvisation, and one of the greatest lessons taught by all this saddening experience was the need of being prepared.

It must be admitted that in some respects the position is worse than in 1914. There are 2 million acres less arable land in Great Britain and there are fewer agricultural workers: horses and implements are also fewer and personal experience of arable cultivation is less. But as against this the general organisation of the agricultural community has much improved. The farmers are now formed into a great union, the National Farmers’ Union: the workers have the National Union of Agricultural Workers and the Agricultural Section

⁴ Part is recorded by Sir Thomas Middleton in his admirable monograph *Food Production in War*, published in 1923 under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; part was recorded in the files of the old Food Production Department of the Ministry of Agriculture; and much of it still survives in the counties among those who had to do with the war-time Agricultural Committees.

of the Transport and General Workers’ Union; and both farmers and workers are represented on the Agricultural Wages Board. Farmers and workers are accustomed to work together and to think on a larger scale than before. The Women’s Institutes reach practically every woman in the country and could organise the woman’s work on a grand scale. Finally, the landowners are organised through the Central Landowners’ Association.

Farmers have been schooled to change by the vast upheavals of the last twenty years, and they have developed a new mental alertness and power of adaptation. Each country now has a competent agricultural organiser, often with one or more assistants; the counties are grouped into ten divisions; and their officers are linked up with specialist advisers, who, in turn, are associated with the Agricultural Research stations and the universities. The chain is complete from the research station to the farm and the connexion is steadily improving. A food-production programme drawn up by the central authority could be carried out much more smoothly than in the last war. Representatives of these various staffs, acting in conjunction with the experts of the central authority, could allocate to each division its share in the food-production programme; each divisional staff could subdivide its share among the counties; and the county staff could continue the process and allocate the work required from the various farming regions of each county, basing the allocation on the numerous soil surveys carried out since 1919. In conjunction with the farmers’ and workers’ organisations the final allocation among the individual farms could be arranged. The experts could indicate areas of waste that are reclaimable, though not at a profit; areas that could be drained and embanked so as to be made considerably more productive; stretches of grass that could advantageously be ploughed or areas of land where the farming could advantageously be intensified. They could also work out reasoned estimates of the quantities of fertiliser and feeding-stuffs, the implements, power units, and livestock required; they could ascertain what steps could be taken for substituting labour, and study such possibilities as flying labour corps like the old ‘shock brigades’ of the Russian collective farms.

Plans of this sort obviously need a great deal of working out and are best prepared in the quiet atmosphere of peace-time. But it is insufficient simply to leave them on paper: some skeleton organisation would need to be put into operation and kept functioning regularly. Grass land cannot be ploughed up simply by giving the order. Ploughs and horses or tractors are needed and special technical knowledge and skill on the part of the farmer and the worker. The plan should ensure that in each region where much ploughing-up would have to be done there were farmers possessing the necessary equipment and knowledge, forming centres from which the carrying out of the programme could spread. Some ploughing-up should be continuously in progress in those regions where the so-called alternate husbandry is practicable: this system is well known in Scotland and the West of England, and could be extended.

Once the ploughing-up is done, however, certain technical problems arise which caused very serious trouble in the last war, and have not specifically been studied since, although the necessary knowledge is steadily being accumulated as the result of the present admirable arrangements for research in agriculture. But if a state of preparedness were needed early, these technical investigations should be systematised and speeded up. Improvisation when the contingency has arisen is both costly and inefficient.

A plan for defence, then, involves the framing of estimates of the amounts of food which we should aim at producing in time of war; reclamation of potentially fertile land; recording in each region the grass fields that could advantageously be converted into arable land so as to provide the additional amounts of food required; ensuring that ploughing-up and laying-down again becomes a regular peace-time routine in a certain number of farms in each region, thus disseminating the knowledge of arable cultivation and the implements necessary; and finally a research programme specifically directed to the technical problems that would become acute if corn cultivation and fat production were to be greatly extended.

We need not attempt to penetrate the veil of official secrecy as to what is actually being done. I have dealt with the defence problem at length because it affords the easiest

case of planning likely to arise in this country. Persuasion would be needed for the preliminary work, but compulsion would be available if the contingency arose and war broke out.

PEACE-TIME AGRICULTURE

(i.) *Planning for National Health*

Let us now turn to the pleasanter aspects of planning for agriculture in peace-time. We could, if we wished, plan for an agriculture that would make the maximum contribution to the health of the nation. Two preliminary conditions must be fulfilled. First of all we must know from the medical authorities what foods we ought to produce: then there must be some arrangement for ensuring that these foods would be purchased from the producer at a remunerative price. In a general way we already seem to be producing the things most needed for health: our home contribution of milk, fruit,⁵ vegetables, eggs, poultry—all commendable as health-givers—is much larger than of other foods. We may be reasonably certain that overseas wheat is at least as good as our own for bread-making, and so in this search for health-giving foods we should not concern ourselves with wheat-growing. But we do not know whether, from the health point of view, fresh meat from home-bred animals is better than meat which has been in cold store for several months and transported many thousands of miles before it reaches our tables. If it is, then we should aim at increasing our meat supplies, as we could easily do.

If a statement could be drawn up by the medical authorities showing what ought to be produced at home there would be no difficulty, apart from prices, in getting it done. We can never be self-sufficing in fruits, because our three favourites are apples, oranges and bananas, of which only apples can be grown here: in consequence we produce only about one-quarter of our total consumption of fruit. We could, however, and probably shall, do more in the future.

The chief trouble about farming for national nutrition, however, lies, not on the farm, but in the kitchen. The nutrition expert may prescribe as much as he likes, and the agriculturist may produce the food, but nothing will happen unless the housewife will cook it. And in her defence one

⁵ Excluding oranges and bananas.

must recognise that the difficulty of running a house steadily increases; the modern young woman will do anything rather than prepare food. Hence the increased consumption of tinned and preserved foods. Whether these are or are not as good as fresh food from the point of view of national health is of course a question for medical experts, but the necessity for producing them must be taken into account in any planned extension of fruit and vegetable production.

(ii.) *Planning for increased Employment*

Personally I attach far more importance to planning for an increased number of men on the land. This necessitates more 'intensive' cultivation, which requires considerable labour, rather than the 'extensive' kinds, which do not. For example, the production of vegetables and of fruit may employ ten to twenty men per 100 acres, but the production of wheat requires only about two or three and, under efficient mechanisation, less than one man per 100 acres. On this scheme, therefore, we should not normally aim at much corn production, but rather at vegetables, fruit, poultry, pigs, milk and cheese: we should extend also the intensive production of meat, producing as much of the animals' food as possible at home. It would be easier to draw up a plan of production than to attract the men on the land so as to carry it out. For the plain fact is that young people no longer like the idea of working on the land: the boys much prefer a garage or a factory, and the girls an office, a shop or a factory. The trouble is only partly economic: the actual wages on a farm do not compare badly with those in the town when allowance is made for the very large difference in rent, the absence of travelling and incidental expenses, the facts that there is in general no short time and no risk of unemployment.⁶

⁶ The average minimum wages fixed by the Agricultural Wages Boards have been as follows:

AVERAGE MINIMUM WAGES OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
(Shillings per Week)

	s.	d.		s.	d.
1914*	18	0	1928	30	6
1917	25	0	1933	30	7
1920	46	10	1937	32	7
1924	28	0			

Wages for 1938 still being fixed, but several counties already pay 34s. The actual wages commonly average several shillings a week higher.

* This 1914 value is given for comparison only; but it is not strictly comparable with the others, as there were then no Wages Boards and no fixed minimum wage. It includes an allowance of 1s. 3d. in kind.

Part of the trouble is due to the difference in amenities. The townsman usually does not have to work out in the rain. He is not far from a cinema, and the way is not usually very muddy: he can on Saturday afternoon in winter watch real professionals playing football instead of village amateurs; further, his wife likes the shops better. These disadvantages will always remain to tell against the village. Fortunately there are country children whose interest in the countryside has been developed by enthusiastic teachers who would like to remain there. The chief source of supply of farm workers and farmers must always be the country children—sons of workers and of farmers—who either of choice or necessity remain in the country; but the figures show that their numbers decrease continually, in spite of the improvements in wages and in housing. The numbers issued by the Ministry of Agriculture make very sad reading: they show a fall of 110,000 regular men and boys, and of 230,000 total workers, including women and casuals, during the fifteen-year period 1921 to 1936.

It speaks much for the farmers and farm workers of the country, and for the effectiveness of the constant help of the Ministry of Agriculture, that, in spite of this fall in numbers, there is no fall, but on the contrary an increase, in the gross value of the agricultural output.⁷ Some of the *émigrés* might be willing to come back if cottages were available. From the social standpoint the most important source of new labour is the group of men no longer employable in industry. Strenuous efforts at land settlement are now being made, and most valuable experiments are in hand by the

⁷ The gross value of the agricultural output in England and Wales is as follows:

Year	Value (£ millions)	Agricultural index	Value calculated to pre-war = 100 (£ millions)	No. of workers (thousands)
1908*	127.2	90	141.3	—
1925	225.3	159	141.7	803
1931	202.7	120	168.9	717
1932	189.7	112	169.4	697
1933	184.8	107	182.7	716
1934	201.8	114	177.0	688
1935	209.4	117	179.0	673
1936	208.2	122	170.7	641

* Excluding glass-house produce and honey.

Figures for net values would give a truer picture, but they are not available.

Society of Friends, the Land Settlement Association, and the Carnegie Trustees, which are revealing the difficulties and the possibilities of dealing with this peculiarly intractable problem. At the present moment Glamorgan is one of the most interesting social laboratories in the country, for there several types of agricultural settlement are being tried. Well-known schemes are in operation at Potten (Bedfordshire), Andover and other centres. These aim, however, rather at social amelioration than at rural development. By far the most hopeful way of achieving results would be to set up fairly large farming units on co-operative or collective lines for those sons of middle-class parents who would dearly love a country life if this were possible for them, and who at present either go overseas or take less congenial work in the town because they lack capital or country connexions or the art of selling their produce. Unfortunately a development of this kind makes no sentimental appeal, but if one were thinking simply in terms of maximum return for effort expended this would be, in my view, the line to take.

Great hopes were at one time centred on small-holdings and considerable sums of public money have been spent in establishing them—well over £10,000,000 since the war. Yet the number falls steadily, and the last figures available (those for 1936) were the lowest on record: since 1915 the holdings under 5 acres have decreased by 28 per cent., and those between 5 acres and 20 acres by 22 per cent.; on the other hand, those between 20 acres and 50 acres have diminished only by 5 per cent. It is a hard, wearing life, and not only the man but his wife and children must toil also. Nevertheless, a certain type of man succeeds in keeping on. There are, of course, social advantages in small-holdings, and they have often served as a ladder up which an ambitious farm-worker has risen to become a larger farmer.

Well-organised large estates, such as those of Mr. and Mrs. Elmhirst at Dartington Hall, of Messrs. Chivers, of Histon, and others, afford considerable possibilities for increasing rural employment. We do not yet know enough about it to do much planning on these lines.

This problem of land settlement is essentially one for

proper scientific treatment: it must be approached with an absolutely open mind free from political or economic bias.

OPERATING A PLAN

If a plan were worked out for the development of our agriculture, how could it be put into operation? Not by compulsion, except in time of war. You must use persuasion. The essential requirement is to improve the remuneration of the farmer and of the workers, especially of the leading hands, so that a boy beginning on a farm may see that there are prizes available.

The underlying difficulties of improving the economic position are, of course, the long periods of time involved in agricultural production, during which the outgoings are fixed by various official and commercial bodies but the prices of the finished produce are quite unknown. Clearly the farmer must limit his risks: he cannot possibly embark on any speculative procedure, or even work to his fullest capacity; he must allow himself a wide margin of safety.

If, however, the farmer were working under a contract he could considerably reduce this margin of safety; he could lay himself out to produce to the best of his ability and pay, without discussion, the wage intended or stipulated in the contract. There are, of course, considerable difficulties about contracts of this kind, but a number of trials have been made.

A good deal of experience is thus being gained in regard to the working of contracts in agricultural production, and we should soon know how far they are practicable.

The other problem—how to reconcile a contract price with a world price—is economic and outside my purview: but as the need for paying a fair wage to the worker and giving a fair return to the contractor is recognised in industry, so it should be recognised that the partners in agricultural production merit their reward.

Until, however, this problem of relating price of agricultural produce to cost is solved there can be no effective planning.

E. JOHN RUSSELL.

AMEND THE BANKRUPTCY LAW!

By W. S. CHANEY

CAREY STREET is sometimes described as 'the road to ruin,' for the Bankruptcy Court lies at the end of it; but for many it is the path which leads, not to destruction, but to unmerited salvation. 'Unless you accept my offer of a half-crown in the pound I shall go bankrupt, and no one will receive anything,' is the pleasantry with which a debtor not infrequently greets his creditors.

It is only too true. At the time of the receiving order the debtor, even if he lives in the most exclusive part of May-fair, will have nothing but the clothes in which he stands. The furniture will belong to his wife, as will the house in which they live; he will have neither income nor capital, nor assets of any description. Yet, whilst he is a bankrupt, he will continue to dine at the best hotels, visit the theatre, and live in luxury attended by a numerous staff.

The purpose of a Law of Bankruptcy should be twofold—one, to protect impecunious persons from oppression at the hands of their creditors; the other, to ensure that all their assets are made available for the payment of their just debts. The Bankruptcy Act, 1914, has succeeded handsomely in the first objective; it is contended that it has failed in the second, and in its operation it is becoming the haven of refuge for the dishonest debtor.

There is a Law Reform Committee which from time to time considers the desirability of amending the law of the land to bring it more into line with modern requirements, and it should be asked to give the Bankruptcy Law its early attention.

Impecuniosity is as old as civilisation, but the status of bankruptcy is of comparatively modern origin and is entirely a creation of statute. The common law did not recognise it.

The debtors' prison is a memory of the not so long ago, when a man who could not meet his obligations went to prison and languished there until his friends paid them for him. An extract from *The Times* of May 19, 1838, tells of one Bailey, an insolvent who made application 'to file his schedule,' having been in prison about a twelvemonth, his want of means preventing an earlier application. It is right that this harshness should have been erased from our legal system, but in the very proper anxiety to relieve from oppression it may happen that injustice is unwittingly caused to the innocent.

Although the protective cloak of bankruptcy had not been fashioned in mediæval times, statutes were from time to time enacted giving powers to certain tribunals to administer the assets of impecunious persons, the first of them being as early as the reign of Henry VIII.

To come to more modern times: in 1831 permanent commissioners were appointed for the London district and later for country districts to deal with bankruptcies, and they continued to function until 1869. In that year were passed two statutes which laid the foundation upon which have been built in later years the protective covering under which the debtor of to-day may seek shelter. One of them was the Debtors Act, 1869, the preamble of which stated that it was an Act for the abolition of imprisonment for debt, and, with certain exceptions, imprisonment on that ground has ceased to exist since that date. One of the exceptions is that the court may commit to prison for a term not exceeding six weeks, or until payment of the sum due, a debtor who makes default in payment of any debt due under any order or judgment of any court, where the court is satisfied that the person making default has or has had the means to pay the sum in respect of which he has defaulted. The onus of satisfying the court as to the debtor's means is a very heavy one, so heavy, indeed, that if the debtor is uncommunicative and the creditor has no inside information of the debtor's domestic affairs, which is the usual experience, the onus is impossible to discharge. Some county court judges require such a high standard of proof that the remedy by way of judgment summons, which is the procedure by which this section of the Debtors Act is invoked, is really ineffective, and a creditor who knows quite well that his debtor has the means to pay

has the galling experience of watching him in the witness-box looking extremely spruce and well-fed, and blandly explaining to the judge that no order for payment of his debt should be made because he has been out of work for six months, and his wife pays the rent and household expenses (for debtors' wives *always* have private means).

The other Act of 1869 was the Bankruptcy Act, which set up for the London district a Court of Bankruptcy, and for the rest of the country the jurisdiction was vested in the local county courts in place of the commissioners previously referred to. This Act contained 136 sections and laid the foundations for our present Bankruptcy Law. It was repealed in 1883 by the Bankruptcy Act of that year, but the structure of the law remained unchanged, though the jurisdiction of the London Court of Bankruptcy was transferred to the Supreme Court of Judicature and is exercised by the High Court of Justice.

Section 35 of the Act of 1883 provided that a bankrupt should become subject to certain disqualifications, as, for example, sitting as a member of either House of Parliament or becoming a town councillor, and that these disqualifications should only cease if the bankruptcy was afterwards annulled, or the bankrupt on getting his discharge also obtained a certificate that his bankruptcy had been due to misfortune without misconduct. Subject to that, the disqualifications were life-long. By an amending Act of 1890, however, a limit of five years after discharge was placed on these disqualifications, and this still remains in force.

Shortly before the Great War a Committee was set up by the Government to inquire into the then existing Bankruptcy Law and to make recommendations as to any amendments which might be found desirable. The Committee issued a unanimous Report that 'the law and practice relating to the investigation of the conduct of debtors required no alteration, and that there was no evidence of dissatisfaction on the part of the commercial community with the main features of the existing law and procedure.'

That, of course, was a view expressed on pre-war conditions. Nevertheless, in 1914 a consolidating Act was passed, and this statute is to-day the insolvent debtor's charter of liberty, though it has been once amended—in 1926. The

Bankruptcy Act, 1914, did not change the main feature of the structure of our Bankruptcy Law, which has, in fact, remained unaltered since 1869—namely, a central clearing-house in which the insolvent may seek asylum and be relieved from the personal responsibility and trouble of settling with his creditors, the work being performed for him by the officials appointed to administer the Bankruptcy Law.

When the Bill of the 1914 Act was introduced into the House of Commons the President of the Board of Trade explained to the House that it contained a provision making it an offence for an undischarged bankrupt to engage in trade under cover of an assumed name without disclosing his bankruptcy, and he advised the members of the House that this would cover the case of a man starting up in business again under his wife's name. The provision in question is contained in section 155B of the Act. It makes it an offence for an undischarged bankrupt to engage in any trade or business, under a name other than that under which he was adjudicated bankrupt, without disclosing to all persons with whom he enters into any business transaction the name under which he was adjudicated bankrupt. That is the section which members were told would prevent a person trading in his wife's name. To-day the bankrupt who wishes to continue trading arranges for his wife to open up in her own name ostensibly a new business in the same line and on the same premises, and he is employed as manager at a salary. That is not an offence under the section.

In the years which followed the close of the war it became evident that a new order of things had come about, and another Committee was appointed to consider what changes were desirable in the Bankruptcy Law to meet post-war conditions. As a result the Act of 1926 was passed.

In recent years there has been a tendency to tighten up the Bankruptcy Law, but the process has proved to be extraordinarily difficult and not distinguished with any great success, largely due to the pattern of the legislation and to the anxiety of the legislators to avoid any possibility of hardship to the bankrupt.

One of the objects of the Act of 1926 was to fill in the gaps in the list of offences which may be committed by bankrupts.

Under the 1914 Act it was only a criminal offence for a bankrupt not to keep proper books of account of his business if he had already been a bankrupt on some previous occasion or had compounded with his creditors. By the Act of 1926, however, the section was extended so as to make it a criminal offence even if the bankrupt had not been through the Bankruptcy Court before ; but at the same time a great deal of the usefulness of this extension was destroyed by the insertion of a clause relieving a trader, in the case of goods sold by way of retail trade to the actual customer, from the obligation of keeping a record of all goods sold and purchased, showing the buyers and sellers thereof in sufficient detail to enable the goods and the buyers and sellers to be identified. One would have thought that such a record was just as important in the case of a retailer as in any other case, and of course the absence of any record of this kind makes it virtually impossible to find out what the bankrupt retail trader has been doing at the expense of his creditors.

When the 1926 Act was under consideration in the House of Commons, objection was taken to the section making it an offence for a trader not to keep books of account, on the ground that this would cause grave injustice to the small shopkeepers, many of whom, it was said, could not read or write. It is a little surprising to find shopkeepers branded as too illiterate to keep books, and yet the Milk Marketing Board, with the sanction of Parliament, requires every farmer in the country to make full and complicated returns of his milk production and sales, under the threat of severe penalties for any default. In consequence of the opposition in the House of Commons, the section requiring a wholesale trader to keep proper accounts was further watered down so as to exclude cases in which the unsecured liabilities do not exceed £500, or the omission to keep the books is honest and excusable. The Act also provides penalties for failing to disclose all the assets to the trustee in bankruptcy ; for contributing to the bankruptcy by rash and hazardous speculation ; and for various other fraudulent practices by which creditors are prejudiced. These look very formidable in print, but it is quite another story when it comes to proving a case to a jury in open court. It is rather like the notice which reads ' Trespassers will be Prosecuted,' which is some-

times described as a wooden falsehood, since the threat is incapable in law of being put into execution. There is nothing wrong with the administration of the Bankruptcy Law ; it is the law itself which is tending to put a premium on dishonesty.

Just as the sympathy of the public is more generally centred on the murderer than on his victim, so is the interest of the debtor more safeguarded than that of his creditor.

It is the contention of the writer that the Bankruptcy Act is out of date and is fashioned from quite the wrong angle for the needs of the public in the year 1938. Bankruptcy is not a crime, but it has for too long been regarded as a misfortune. The onus ought not to be on the creditor to prove that his debtor has acted with dishonest intent ; it should be for the debtor to explain candidly to his creditors how it has come about that they have lost their money, and if he cannot explain it satisfactorily he should suffer. Before passing to the solution which is suggested, let us examine some of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and some of the statistics issued by the Board of Trade.

Section 14 requires a debtor after a receiving order has been made against him to file a statement of affairs giving full particulars of his assets, debts and liabilities. This statement has to be made on oath, but the only penalty for not filing the statement (so long as he does not actively conceal his property) appears to be that he may at once be adjudicated bankrupt, which is precisely the status which the debtor may be desirous of obtaining !

The next stage in the proceedings is the public examination of the debtor, and section 15 of the Act requires the debtor to answer on oath all questions which may be put to him. This hearing is to enable the debtor to be examined as to his conduct, dealings and property. The columns of the evening papers constantly provide examples of these examinations, and beyond assisting the news editor to fill up space it is doubtful what other practical value they possess. The debtor admits that he has lost £40,000 of other people's money ; he admits that the loss is in part due to unfortunate speculations, in part to having a good time, and generally living beyond his means. The Official Receiver points out to him that he has been very careless and that it is entirely

his own fault, which the debtor graciously acknowledges, and, everyone being satisfied, the public examination is then declared closed. To appreciate the importance of the public examination it is worth while attending one. At its highest it may be said that it does no harm and it might do good; it provides an opportunity for the creditor to ask rather fierce questions of his debtor, which is always some consolation to a man who has lost his money, and sometimes his only consolation.

The public examination being concluded, the debtor is then adjudged bankrupt, unless the creditors accept a composition of so much in the pound. A trustee is appointed, and it is his duty to realise all the assets disclosed and to divide the proceeds amongst the creditors. To assist him in the task, the Act contains provisions requiring the debtor to discover all his assets to the trustee, and enabling the trustee to have examined by the court the debtor or his wife or any person suspected to have in his possession any property of the bankrupt. These provisions are without doubt valuable safeguards, though they are comparatively rarely used owing to the lack of evidence necessary before the machinery can be set in motion. There is no effective cure for trading on the following lines:

A carries on business as a furrier, on premises owned by his wife B; his two sons C and D are employed in the business as salesmen; his daughter E is employed in the business as his secretary. A draws £10 a week, C and D £6 a week each, E £3 a week, and B as landlord gets £3 a week rent. The total family earnings therefore amount to £28 a week, or £1450 a year, and the whole family live in the flat over the shop. After three or four years A goes bankrupt with liabilities of £25,000 and assets *nil*. All the family continue to live in the flat and a new furrier's business is started in the shop below. This time C and D are partners, each drawing £8 a week. A, the father, is now the salesman with a salary of £6 a week, because, being a bankrupt, he can no longer appear as a partner. E, the daughter, is now the book-keeper, still earning £3 a week, and B, the mother, remains the landlord at the same rent.

Family earnings total £28 a week, as before. This lasts perhaps four more years, by which time C and D file their

petitions with liabilities £30,000 and assets *nil*. By this time, also, father will probably have obtained his discharge, so that yet another furrier's business will be able to open its doors on the same premises and the team will be as originally constituted. With a family of five this game may be played indefinitely with infinite variety and endless amusement to the players. It may be argued in extenuation that the creditors have only themselves to blame if they lose their money, and this is to some extent true, though it is not the whole truth. By skilfully playing one against the other, by paying cash for a time to lay the foundations for credit transactions, and above all by hiding the true position from the creditors, a business may be run at a loss for a number of years, goods being obtained on credit and the proceeds being utilised, not for paying the bills, but for providing the family salaries.

If a man goes into a restaurant and has a meal costing half a crown without having any money in his pocket with which to pay, he may be convicted of the offence of obtaining credit by fraud, and may be sent to prison. A more unscrupulous person can carry on a business and obtain thousands of pounds worth of goods on credit knowing full well that when the day of reckoning comes (and he will stave it off until he has hidden away all his assets) he has only to file his petition in bankruptcy and can then refer all his creditors to the Official Receiver, from whom they will hear that 'there is no prospect of any dividend for the unsecured creditors.'

So long as a person is an undischarged bankrupt he remains under certain disabilities; for instance, he cannot obtain credit without disclosing his bankruptcy, nor act as a director or manager of a company without leave of the court, but a bankrupt may apply for his discharge at any time after his adjudication and the court has a discretion either to grant the application or to suspend it for any period it thinks fit.

Under the Act of 1914, if a bankrupt had committed a criminal offence in connexion with his bankruptcy, as by falsifying his books, he remained a bankrupt, except in special circumstances, for the rest of his life; but by the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act, 1926, the provision was altered, and in every case now the court has a discretion to

grant his discharge. Upon discharge, with certain limited exceptions, the bankrupt is freed from all his debts.

An action is brought against a debtor to recover a sum of money which he has wrongfully obtained. He strenuously defends the action, and ultimately judgment is given against him for the amount claimed and the costs, which may run into many hundreds of pounds. The debtor at once files his petition, stating that he has no assets (though he had money, apparently, with which to fight the action), and the unfortunate creditor has a judgment which is worthless, and he has increased his loss by the costs of the action which he is left to pay.

But the layman will ask, Does the Bankruptcy Act not provide machinery for uncovering the assets of a bankrupt, and penalties for fraudulent debtors? The answer in both cases is in the affirmative, but there is no legal machinery which will prove that the furniture in A's house belongs to him, if both he and his wife swear that it is her property. Similarly, prosecutions under the Act are comparatively rare, for the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and it is a heavy one to discharge. Moreover, the question of expense has to be considered. Prosecutions cost money. They are undertaken generally by the Director of Public Prosecutions, sometimes by the Board of Trade, and unless the case is both good and bad—good from the point of view of proof of guilt, and bad from the view-point of protecting the public—proceedings will not be undertaken.

Many of the offences require proof of an intent to defraud; juries are sympathetic and are reluctant to find the necessary intent. If the Director of Public Prosecutions took action in all the bankruptcies in which there appeared to be a *prima facie* case of a breach of the law of bankruptcy, the courts would have to sit for half the year dealing only with this class of offence. Many of the cases are of insufficient public importance to justify proceedings (though the creditors concerned may have different views). In many other cases there is suspicion, and plenty of it, but no proof. The result is that the criminal law is seldom invoked.

Now let us turn to the statistics published by the Board of Trade in their Annual Report on matters within the Bank-

ruptcy Acts. The figures quoted are taken from the Report for the year 1936.

In that year the total number of receiving orders made was 3194, of which no less than 2030 were made on petitions presented by the debtors themselves. In other words, two-thirds of the bankrupts in that year achieved that status on their own application, and not by the action of their creditors.

Let us now see how the creditors fared in the estates which were administered by the Official Receiver in 1936. These totalled 3333. The total liabilities ranking for dividend in these estates—in other words, the creditors—amounted to £2,216,412 and the net assets available for distribution amongst them to a mere £231,032, so that these debtors had run up debts to the tune of ten times more than they could meet. The costs of administration amounted to £108,693, or 41 per cent. of the gross assets.

To complete the picture, let us look in more detail at the dividends which creditors received on the amount of their debts. In the year 1936, 4105 estates were finally wound up. In 2160 of them, or rather more than 50 per cent., the creditors received not a penny. In 1205 they received less than half a crown in the pound, so that, including those who received nothing, in more than 75 per cent. of the cases the creditors received less than half a crown, and in 60 per cent. of them less than one shilling.

During 1935, seventy persons were prosecuted for offences against the Bankruptcy Acts, and seventy-five in 1936. Of these latter, fifty-two were offences of not keeping proper accounts, only one was charged with concealing his property, and only eight with gambling or hazardous speculation. Yet, as has been mentioned, in 1936 the liabilities incurred by bankrupts were ten times as great as their assets. Moreover, there were 1302 applications for discharge from bankruptcy dealt with in that year, and in 698 of them, or more than 50 per cent., it was found that the bankrupt had continued to trade after knowing himself to be insolvent, and in 694 cases the bankrupt had failed to keep proper books of account in his business. In 119 cases the bankrupt had already been bankrupt on a previous occasion or had previously made a composition with his creditors.

From which classes in the community are bankrupts

chiefly recruited? The following figures are taken from the Annual Return :

	1934	1935	1936
Building trade . . .	600	727	762
Clothing trade . . .	800	641	589
Food and drink trade . .	1274	1233	1169
Farmers	288	224	215
Directors and promoters .	103	120	82
Other occupations (about fifty)	2419	2213	2030

It is an undoubted fact that the lawyer will in most cases hesitate to advise his client to present a petition in bankruptcy until he has exhausted all the other means of enforcing payment of his just debts. It is not an uncommon thing to find a man going bankrupt two and three times within a few years, and on each occasion for liabilities of such prodigious amounts that make the ordinary man in the street blink in astonishment.

It may be argued that where a debtor has contributed to his own insolvency by rash speculation or riotous living, or in certain other circumstances of a like nature, his discharge from bankruptcy may be suspended for a number of years. That is in many cases an empty threat, like suspending the driving licence of someone who employs a chauffeur ; it will not prevent him from carrying on business again by employing his wife and daughter as nominal directors whilst he continues to run it in the background ; and if his mode of life is not affected, why worry to get a discharge? It is the undoubted fact that in many cases the bankrupt does not trouble even to apply for his discharge, so little does it affect him.

That in these days dishonest debtors (and they are legion) should be able to dictate to their creditors how much in the pound they will pay them, by a threat of allowing the law of bankruptcy to operate if they refuse, is a matter of grave public concern. It is easy to be destructive ; but can the law be strengthened without occasioning hardship? It can, and the reform I would advocate would have no terrors for the

honest debtor and would involve him in no hardships. Becoming a bankrupt should be made a criminal offence punishable by not less than three months' imprisonment, unless the debtor can prove to the satisfaction of the Official Receiver (and the onus of proof would be on the debtor) that his insolvency has not been contributed to by any dishonesty, recklessness, riotous living or fraudulent or negligent conduct of any kind, or that his assets are sufficient to pay his creditors not less than 15s. in the pound. If satisfied, the Official Receiver would be required to issue to the debtor a certificate which would relieve him from criminal liability for becoming bankrupt.

Immediately a man found himself getting into financial difficulties he would call his creditors together, tell them the truth about his finances, and ask them for their authority to carry on trading, instead of, as at present, piling up liabilities without their knowledge and without any hope of being able to meet them. If they gave consent, he would be in no fear of a criminal charge if he subsequently failed. Under this law creditors would stand a reasonable chance of being paid, and the Bankruptcy Court would cease to be the 'open sesame' to fraudulent trading.

W. S. CHANEY.

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

By SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG-JONES, M.D.

‘IT IS BETTER TO WHIP THE BOY THAN TO HANG THE MAN.’

IN March this year (1938) the Report of the Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment (appointed May 1937) was issued. The Committee consisted of ten members (three were women), including one doctor—namely, Dr. Robert Hutchison, now President of the Royal College of Physicians. It is, in my opinion, a revolutionary Report in so far as it involves a complete and unusual change in the punishment of crime. The Report commences by stating ‘we are not satisfied that corporal punishment has that exceptionally effective influence as a deterrent which is usually claimed for it by those who advocate its use as a penalty for adult offenders.’ After stating that corporal punishment is purely punitive and is out of accord with modern ideas, the Report deals with three types of offenders—(1) the young delinquent under fourteen convicted summarily by the magistrates of an indictable offence and ordered to be whipped; (2) adults convicted in the superior courts of any one of a long list of offences, but also including in this category boys under sixteen convicted of certain specified offences; and (3) those who had offended against prison discipline, and that of Borstal institutions (of which there are seven).

The Committee recommend that all existing powers (of summary courts of jurisdiction) to order young offenders to be birched or flogged should be repealed; and this in the face of and in spite of a definite increase in juvenile crime, which has more than doubled during the last five years. The Committee admit that there has been no evidence of brutality or cruelty of any kind in the infliction of flogging, and also that the physical effects of flogging have been

exaggerated by its opponents, yet corporal punishment is to be repealed. During ten years (1925–34) corporal punishment had been administered in 343 instances, and only four of these offenders had been removed afterwards to the prison infirmary, and only in one case was the detention longer than one day, yet the Committee recommend that corporal punishment should cease. It was believed that the whipped offender became the hero of the gang in consequence of corporal punishment. May it be asked, Is not the young offender who escapes punishment altogether a greater hero for his pals to emulate than if he had been captured and flogged?

The following appears in the Report (p. 35):

The Lord Chief Justice was good enough to consult the Judges of the King’s Bench Division on the general question of the powers of the Supreme Courts to order punishment and to furnish for our information a memorandum summarizing their views. . . . The memorandum furnished by the Lord Chief Justice showed that the Judges of the King’s Bench Division consider that corporal punishment operates as a deterrent and are of the opinion that it is desirable to retain the existing powers. . . .

But in spite of the opposition of the Judges the Report proceeds: ‘. . . We accordingly recommend the repeal of all the existing powers to impose sentences of corporal punishment on persons convicted on indictment.’

After hearing evidence from prison governors and stating (p. 114) that ‘the fear of corporal punishment does exercise a strong deterrent influence in restraining violent prisoners, who would otherwise commit serious assaults on prison officers . . .,’ they stated: ‘. . . we have come to the conclusion that the time has not yet come when this power can be safely abandoned’ in prisons, although they advise the repeal of corporal punishment for offences committed in Borstal institutions. On p. 30 it is stated that ‘the representatives of the Chief Constables Association explained that they had advocated the use of birching . . . as it was the only penalty available which laid sufficient emphasis on the punitive element’—yet the Commission recommend its repeal. Further, the council of the Magistrates Association did not support the Commission advising repeal.

The abolition of the powers of the superior courts to

impose sentences of corporal punishment will call for the repeal of various sections of existing Acts, some dating far into the past. This applies (1) to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, by which a youth under sixteen convicted of unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under thirteen, an offence hitherto liable to corporal punishment (but now to be abolished), will now be exempt. Other Acts are recommended for partial repeal, such as (2) the Diplomatic Privileges Act, protecting the ambassadors of foreign countries from detrimental harm and interference; (3) the Treason Act, authorising corporal punishment as a penalty for the offence of aiming a firearm at the Sovereign; (4) indecent exposure under the Vagrancy Acts; (5) importuning by a male person; (6) procuring; (7) living on the earnings of prostitution; (8) robbery with violence. These and other crimes are liable at present to corporal punishment, but in future will be free if corporal punishment is to be entirely abandoned.

It is claimed that there is a marked difference between corporal punishment administered by the prison official and that by the parent or by the teacher; both the latter are said to be accepted by the offender as natural and a part of routine discipline, but hardened young ruffians rarely condescend to notice any fine distinctions about the chastiser. It is quite different from the code of honour of a public-school boy who submits to the authority of the house captain or the captain of games and respects his ruling. Schoolboy age (five to fifteen) is the most momentous period in the life of the individual. It is the time when the instinct of power and the gratification of the senses (especially taste) are almost irresistible. In the young, to thief and to lie are the most frequent transgressions, and, if the boy is to be saved from future catastrophe and tragedy, not only are rebuke, admonition and reproof necessary warnings, but corporal punishment is essential as a deterrent. We are all familiar with this type as well as with the anxious parents. Is the country ready for a break of this magnitude in the protection of its citizens, and will it abandon corporal punishment as a deterrent to crime? There is one more point: one objection to corporal punishment offered by the Committee is that it creates sexual excitement. Although this is far-fetched, it is a tribute to Freudian psychology, which regards all primitive trends of

the mind as sexual. This pan-sexualism has caused a feeling of disgust and revulsion on the part of many medical men, but Freud has expressed the view that a medical training is a positive disqualification to an analyst. Personally, however, I should much disapprove of treatment by psycho-analysis being in other hands. Every British subject must be horrified at the treatment accorded to this distinguished psychologist by his own country, but they cordially welcome his reception into their own, however much they may disagree with his teaching.

It is much to be regretted that the topic of sexual perversion should be introduced into the treatment of the young offender. There is no need to bring bestiality into the administration of justice, and sadism (or the voluptuous and pleasurable infliction of pain on another) has no place in the corrective treatment of wrongdoing, for there should be no satisfaction of abnormal instincts in the reformatory treatment of the young offender. It is the perverted imagination—or may it be called the ‘intellectual narcissism’?—of a Freudian to discuss sadism and masochism (the love of self-torture) as aspects to be considered in the administration of justice. On p. 33 the Report states that ‘conscious sadism is recognised as a form of sexual perversion, and a system of judicial corporal punishment may pander to the unconscious impulses which, in essence, are sadistic and sexual . . .’; also: ‘. . . corporal punishment has the effect of satisfying sadistic impulses in those who order it or inflict it, and possibly also in appealing to masochistic tendencies in those who suffer it.’ Are there any readers of the Report—which is not a neuro-pathological essay—who will admit this, and who believe that corporal punishment must be the outcome of mental regression?

Let me state that the main object of punishment is the protection of society, and I shall define punishment as the infliction of pain for wrongdoing (*i.e.*, for the violation or the transgression of a law). A wrongdoing, forbidden by statute as injurious to the public welfare, is a crime. A crime may be either a commission or an omission: the commission of a grave act, such as manslaughter, is a crime; so also is an omission, such as the neglect of children. At any rate, punishment is the infliction of pain for wrongdoing, and the

State, through the law, inflicts punishment for its non-observance. Crime is not sin, although sin is also the transgression of a law—namely, the moral or the divine law; but sin is pardonable through forgiveness and amendment, and, as taught by some authorities, there are venial or pardonable sins, but there are others also described as deadly. The chief aim of the punishment of crime to-day is not only the infliction of mental pain, but the reformation of the offender.

Punishment has been somewhat arbitrarily divided into (1) retaliatory or retributive; (2) deterrent; and (3) reformatory. All punishment aims at deterrence. As a former Judge is reported to have said: 'You are *not* punished for sheep stealing, but so that sheep shall not be stolen.' Although reformation is the chief aim of punishment to-day, in former times wrongdoing was punished by vindictive retaliation; the offender had to sacrifice an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth (*lex talionis*), which signified inflicting a penalty on the offender corresponding as nearly as possible to the offence committed. If the crime was serious, the penalty would be serious; if the offence was trivial, the penalty would be light. All offenders would thus be treated alike for the same offence. The adjustment of punishment to crime is a matter of social welfare, and, as the prison doctors have to be consulted before corporal punishment can be inflicted, it is of much concern to medical men.

In the course of time many circumstances have occurred to modify the forms of punishment in regard to crime. Too much attention was formerly given to the offence and too little to the offender. Gradually, however, the retributive or retaliatory form of punishment came to be regarded as markedly vindictive and revengeful. 'He got his deserts,' it was stated; but revenge must not enter into punishment, for punishment is not a substitute for private revenge. Cruelties, atrocities, and brutal penalties were in the past inflicted upon criminals as retributive justice, and the treatment of crime thus became a disgrace. Torture, flogging, branding, mutilating, and death were carried out in the name of justice even for slight offences, but with the progress of civilisation and social evolution retaliatory punishment has been abandoned. We now realise that all crimes are not equal, nor are all offenders alike: some are educated and have been brought

up in cultured surroundings, whilst others are brought up in want, squalor and wretchedness; but justice must be administered to rich and poor alike—to the popular as well as the unpopular—without fear or favour. Further, it was later realised that all lawbreakers should not all be treated alike. It would be wrong to hang one man for stealing a loaf whilst another was hanged for murdering his wife, and to punish all equally would be to put a premium on the worst crimes and would be brutal and uncertain. It has been claimed by Socialists, and with some assent, that as crime was the product of social conditions, and due to the environment for which society was responsible, then society had no right to punish crime. Society ought to have suppressed the causes of crime, the responsibility for this being placed upon the community. Further, they asserted that it was the duty of society to get rid of the temptations to crime on behalf of those tempted but who had yielded to instincts not properly trained, and that it was the duty of society to provide special agencies for the prevention of crime—such as education, employment, protection against drink, provisions for the use of leisure—and so make individual members of society less disposed to crime. The answer to the question 'Why should I be punished?' is that the inflexible administration of the law is essential to social progress. Crime is an offence against society, and society must punish the offenders. Society without law is reduced to chaos and barbarism. Indeed, punishment for crime is the fundamental instinct of civilisation. It is the duty of society to enforce the law and not yield to weak sentimentalism. The growth of social order is impossible without punishment; but punishment must not outrun public opinion and thus create sympathy with the offender and make martyrs of criminals. As rightly entreated in the Book of Common Prayer, divine guidance is invoked for those 'who indifferently administer justice.' Difficulties have been raised as to the relation between the crime and the punishment, how to apportion punishment to the offence. This is difficult, but psychology helps and refers us to the feelings of pain and pleasure. Bentham declared that Nature had placed mankind under the governance and direction of two sovereign masters—namely, Pain and Pleasure. These determine what we shall do or ought to do. These two

feelings govern us in all we do, all we say, and all we think. Every act of conduct demonstrates and confirms this; not only does the individual, but the community, recognise this. The convincing principle is the universal tendency of all human beings to promote their own happiness and so avoid distress, wretchedness, unhappiness and misery—a principle described as 'utilitarian.' Bentham classifies pain under twelve headings, three of which relate to the present subject—namely, (1) the pains of the senses; (2) the pains of the memory; and (3) pains dependent on links of association. The aim of society is to correlate the social instincts, so as to foster peace and order and thus to secure the greatest happiness to the greatest number.

How is this to be done in regard to the lawbreaker? His or her reform is difficult and often hopeless. We have given up revenge as punishment. We cannot weed out the criminal by death, for this admits impotence, nor can we extirpate the wrongdoer; but we can regard crime with abhorrence, we can present examples of punishment, we can remind the evildoer of pain, and we can thus hope to deter the potential criminal. It is pain which is the most effective warning, admonition, preventive, and deterrent to wrongdoing. Pain is Nature's penalty for the violation of her laws. Every conscious being, from the lowest to the highest, profits in its continued existence by the instincts of pain and fear. The child that burns its hand in the flame suffers pain, which is Nature's warning to avoid fire. The child bitten by a dog remembers the hurt, and in future is deterred by fear from stroking strange dogs. No human being is exempt from fear. It has been described as 'the standing dish in the banquet of life.' Fear is of vital importance to the welfare of the child, and the warnings of pain and fear are far more effective than the softer methods of gentle coaxing and wheedling persuasion. Pain, again, is a most important factor in personal and social training. To inflict unnecessary pain is wrong, and to inflict revengeful pain, even on the worst of men, is unjustifiable. To give pain as punishment is just only so far as the pain you inflict is less than the pain you prevent. This is the justification for corporal punishment, and which is admitted by those on whom it has been inflicted to be the most powerful deterrent; but a simple deterrent is insufficient

in so far as it omits the moral element, which calls loudly for the help of the spiritual adviser. Punishment must not only deter, but it must be severe enough to be recalled and to cause the criminal to refrain. It is the anticipation of future good by the use of present correction. Pain is used as a corrective to prevent some future evil. It is not inflicted to avenge the past, but to prevent future wrongdoing. It is the fear of pain that reminds the schoolboy that he is out of bounds, and it is the fear of the proctor that modifies the conduct of the undergraduate. Only the hardened sinner is without fear. We know that the mind and body are intimately associated, and the Laws of Association connect wrongdoing with pain. The fear of pain has proved to be the strongest deterrent from the cradle to the grave. The parent who spares the rod spoils the child. In adult life fear induces courageous endurance, and our prudential considerations are based upon fear, and it is the fear of leaving our dependants without means which is the foundation of life insurance. Why do we insist as a community upon vaccination, and why do we boil our water and our milk? It is through the fear of disfigurement, disease and death—the fear of small-pox, typhoid and tuberculosis. It has been objected to by some that deterrent punishment is vindictive, that not only is the crime hated, but hatred tends to be applied also to the wrongdoer. This is legitimate, provided it is kept within reasonable limits and for desirable ends—namely, the deterrence of crime, which is mischievous and leads to painful consequences. The wrongdoer must be held responsible as a possible wrecker of society. He must be punished by associating wrongdoing with discipline and pain, which alone will help to make punishment effective.

With the wave of prison reform initiated by John Howard (1726–90) and Elizabeth Fry (1780–1845) a century and a half ago to end the disease-ridden and filthy surroundings of prisons, followed by the reforming plans of William Crawford (1788–1847) for Pentonville Prison, the treatment of criminals has proceeded, after many Commissions and Parliamentary Committees, under more sympathetic and rational conditions, until to-day we have arrived at the stage of reformatory punishment when the rehabilitation of the criminal, and especially the young delinquent, is the chief, if not the only,

aim and purpose. This is not to be effected by the abolition of corporal punishment. Crime must be punished, and the infliction of pain sanctioned by authority will remain a strong deterrent to wrongdoing. Our prisons have now become reformatories where industries are appreciated and encouraged where every inducement to good conduct is fostered, where health is cared for and opportunities are seized to show to the wrongdoer the error of his ways. In addition, many of our prisons are provided with entertainments by means of the cinemas and wireless, lectures are given and concerts held and it is becoming a question whether interest in the wrongdoer, in particular the young delinquent, has not banished from public sympathy the honest, hard-working citizen struggling against overcrowding, ill-health, and unemployment to keep out of prison.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG-JONES.

HARLEY STREET, THE LAW COURTS AND WESTMINSTER

By HUGH WANSEY BAYLY

THE late Mr. Justice Avory has the following aphorism attributed to him: 'Harley Street is not wanted at the Law Courts.' I cannot trace the occasion or date of this epigram, but several lawyers and doctors have told me that they recall some such phrase but cannot place it. Sir Squire Sprigge, editor of the *Lancet*, writes me: 'I remember some such aphorism having been attributed to Sir Horace Avory. He was always a little quick to point out that medical opinions, which sometimes upset juries, were only opinions and not affirmations of accepted precedents.' I have a clear memory of being impressed by some such expression of opinion by a distinguished judge, which can well serve as my text.

Medical science is every year finding out, proving beyond all possible shadow of doubt, that many crimes are the direct result of illness or accident for which the unfortunate 'criminal' is in no way responsible. That an individual should be sentenced to legal punishment for an act that is the direct result of a disability caused by illness or accident appears to the humane Britisher to be an intolerable injustice. But the public must be safeguarded. Now, in the very great majority of trials in the criminal courts, the medical history of the accused is either not gone into, or is given insufficient weight and is disregarded. May I give illustrative instances?

An ex-service man (George Jordan) committed suicide at Knowle Mental Hospital in October 1927. At the inquest the coroner said: 'By reason of his war service this man underwent injuries which made him assume the attributes of a criminal, whereas he was a splendid, honest man.' At the autopsy a piece of shrapnel was found in his brain. No medical witness appeared at his trial, and his wife was not

permitted to give evidence. This man sacrificed in duty to his country what was greater than his life—his reason. And this tremendous sacrifice entitled him to the loving care, kindly guardianship, and the high respect of a grateful country, instead of which he was first dishonoured by being sentenced to prison as a common criminal, and later was sent to a criminal lunatic asylum. I appealed at the time for the obliteration of the stigma of crime and for a generous pension for his widow, but without avail.

More than a year ago I was subpoenaed to give evidence in a case that came up for trial at the Norwich Assizes. While there I was asked to give evidence as an expert witness in another criminal case—one of sexual aberration—and for a quarter of an hour I was privileged to address the judge, jury and bar on an unpleasant subject of which they were all apparently entirely ignorant. The verdict was 'Not guilty,' and counsel expressed the opinion that if I had not by the merest chance been in court, that man would have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The commissioner (now a judge) made one feel very proud of the British Bench—so scrupulously fair, so humane, so astute, so dignified was he; but the wisest of judges and the most intelligent of juries cannot weigh evidence that is not laid before them. Three other cases were tried whilst I was waiting: two sexual offences, and one of housebreaking by a youth. To me they were extremely interesting, and *all* might have been—I do not say they were—the direct results of illness or accident. Yet their medical history was not sifted, although in one case (the housebreaking), after the verdict of 'Guilty,' when considering where to send the lad, a history of 'epilepsy' emerged.

I once happened to be in the Central Joint Lobby of the Houses of Parliament, when a little man passed through, escorted by two policemen, from the House of Lords, where his appeal against the death sentence for murder of a girl child had been dismissed. My heart was full of pity for that little, insignificant, furtive man, cowed by the majesty and dignity of the Supreme Court of Appeal—for he appeared to me to be obviously a degenerate of feeble mentality.

Early in May of 1936, a man aged twenty-five was sentenced at the Leeds Assizes by Mr. Justice Singleton to

two years' hard labour for thrashing four small boys. The judge expressed his regret that he could not order him to receive the same sort of treatment 'that for some reason *that I cannot understand* you thought it right to give to little children.' According to the evidence of the police surgeon, he had a history of sleepy sickness and had previously been twice convicted of similar offences. He said in his evidence: 'I know it is wrong, but I cannot help it.' Now, Professor Arthur J. Hall, M.D., F.R.C.P., in his book on *Epidemic Encephalitis* (sleepy sickness), as long ago as 1924 expressed the views of the medical profession when he wrote:

Seeing that an initial attack of epidemic encephalitis may occur without symptoms, or at least unrecognised as such, and that it may be followed by residua either mental or otherwise . . . the whole subject raises medico-legal questions of great importance.

A great number of cases have now been recorded in which a complete change of character has occurred after this illness, with periodic outbursts of violence or of immoral behaviour in children or young people who before contracting sleepy sickness were normal and amiable and exemplary in character. Colonel the Right Hon. Josiah Wedgwood, M.P., the Hon. R. D. Denman, M.P., and myself wrote to the Home Secretary about the above-mentioned case. In his letters of reply, Sir John Simon wrote that before the prisoner was dealt with at the assizes

he had been under medical observation, and the court had before it information from the prison medical officer, who had studied the defendant's condition while he was in custody awaiting trial. He was not at that time certifiable as insane or mentally defective, and *as the law stands at present* a court has no power, when dealing with an offender who is not certifiable, to order for his protection and for the protection of the public any form of detention other than imprisonment. The question whether the law should be amended in this respect is one which has been carefully considered by the Committee on Persistent Offenders, and their recommendations with regard to the amendment of the law have been noted for consideration *when an opportunity for legislation arises*. (My italics.)

The Committee to which the Home Secretary referred reported in 1932, and its recommendation was little more than a repetition of the advice of a Committee of 1926. But

nothing is done. As the question is not political or highly controversial and involves no vested interests, we are entitled to wonder whether, in fact, anyone cares. If the Home Office is too busy, let us have a Ministry of Justice. It is one thing to reject the advice of a committee: it is another to note it, to consider it, and to do nothing. The irresponsibility of many such offenders has been recognised by the medical profession for more than fifteen years. It is time they made their feelings on the subject known, for they, too, are officers of justice.

After reading the Home Secretary's letters I wrote to him again, saying:

I venture to point out that medical observation in prison, whether before trial or after sentence, is quite useless as regards establishing mental instability when under the influence of certain stimuli not present in a prison environment. It is well known that a person suffering from some such abnormal mental condition as 'fetishism,' except when in the presence of the 'fetish,' is apparently sane and normal.

In all criminal trials the family history as well as the personal medical history of the accused should be most thoroughly investigated, the latter especially as regards head injury, sleepy sickness, a phobia of some kind, monomania, epilepsy, hereditary mental instability, and delusions. They should be placed for a period of at least three months under the observation of doctors experienced in mental disease, for, though the prison doctor can be relied on to give an absolutely honest opinion on the case, these cases are often so complicated and difficult that an expert alone has the experience on which a reliable opinion can be based. 'Free will' is not absolute; we are all of us 'chips of the old block,' and to a considerable, a very considerable, degree the slaves of heredity.

I was horrified and indignant at the majority of court-martial death sentences during the war, when a patriot volunteer whose self-control had been broken by 'shell shock,' or who was abnormally sensitive to war fears, owing to his mental make up, was shot at dawn for desertion in the presence of the enemy. The majority should have been discharged from the army for reasons of health. The real coward should be treated as an inferior being lacking in one

of the fundamental masculine virtues, and so unworthy of admiration or retention in the ranks of the 'happy warriors.' Healthy feminine women will always despise him. The only sound 'punishment' for persons with any anti-social hereditary taint is that of sterilisation, so that they cannot pass on to another generation those inborn, anti-social, abnormal characteristics for which the unfortunate possessor is not responsible. If such inborn or acquired (through illness or accident) characteristics threaten danger to a fellow-citizen's life, health, or to the peaceful security of his home or person, the 'criminal' should be segregated to an area, an island by choice, where he would live under medical supervision. Sterilisation of persons with morbid mental characteristics acquired through illness or accident is quite another matter, as such acquired characteristics are not hereditary.

Surely the time has come, and indeed is long overdue, when the law should be altered so that persons suffering from morbid mental conditions the result of illness, accident, or heredity should be treated as irresponsible mental cases rather than as responsible criminals—even though they may not have any obvious delusions and so be certifiable as insane. The Bench, the Bar, solicitors and juries are quite naturally ignorant of morbid psychology, and it appears to be a grave miscarriage of justice, for which legislators rather than lawyers are responsible, that morbid mental states should be punishable by law. The accused should always be given the benefit of the opinion of a medical expert, while the evidence of the police or prison surgeon, though certainly honest and valuable, should not be accepted as final.

H. WANSEY BAYLY.

THE CARE OF THE INSANE—II.

SOME REMEDIES

By DR. HENRY WILSON

THE facts given in the previous survey of the administration of mental hospitals can be of little value if they do not stimulate praise for those who have done so much for the mentally disabled, and awake demands for the public support of those who spend their lives in the service of the insane. This support will achieve little if it is not tempered with clarity and criticism, and a desire for alteration in the conditions already outlined. Many approaches to such problems can be envisaged. We propose to sketch an ideal solution, forgetting for the moment the obvious hindrances to such plans, and then to consider how far such principles could find expression in the not-too-distant future.

First, we need to ensure that legal conditions attaching to the insane are properly carried out. Legal considerations must take their proper place in any ideal scheme, but they must not bulk too large.

Secondly, the public has a right to demand that the moneys spent upon the insane shall show some uniformity from district to district. At present this is not so, and there is a case for making purely lay administration a matter for more centralised control.

We now pass to the third side of our ideal hospital arrangement, that dealing with the patients and medical and nursing staffs. What would idealists demand? Briefly, atmosphere and progress, both vague entities dependent upon each other.

By atmosphere we mean something that can be sensed rather than described. It depends upon culture, upon co-operation, upon sympathy and hope, upon forward-looking

and public-spirited effort, and upon adequate relaxation. Character and personality imbued with a sense of responsibility to society are its mainsprings, but environment may encourage or stultify it. How is it to be maintained and enriched? It will wilt under an unsympathetic régime, and there is always the danger that efficiency may conceal this. Some mental hospitals, with their isolation, are indeed huge units where it is difficult to maintain friendship or to avoid strife. Some of this is temperamental in origin, but social entertainments, compulsory periods away from the hospital atmosphere, and arranged expeditions would ease stresses. The mere reduction in working hours will not of itself waft away temperamental clashes; mental hospitals have as much need of proper working conditions for efficiency as modern factories. It is satisfactory that nurses have now few domestic duties; doctors should be relieved of duties such as dispensing and formal clerical work. Sabbatical years are needed for medical officers and for senior nurses. The gulf which separates the medical from the nursing profession in any big institution is a most difficult one to bridge. Can hospitals become more definitely imbued with the teaching ideal? It is this which is known to stimulate atmosphere in general hospitals, and whilst mental nurses train and attend lectures, ward-teaching as such is rare. Slow recovery-rates, the poverty of abnormal physical manifestations, ignorance about the patient's previous life, have all their part to play here.

We find ourselves passing into a consideration of ideal treatment. We should want the conditions of mental observation wards changed. We want to ensure early and adequate rest, and we then pass on to our theoretical needs for continued treatment. Occupational therapy, physical exercises, the wireless, have come to stay, and further extension of these is likely if once the cleavage between sane and insane can be lessened. These measures are not mere play-things; they are not merely methods of filling in gaps. Occupational therapy should be used as an opportunity of training patients to a better use of leisure when they recover. We have stressed the gulf between sane and insane, for this influences the enthusiasm of the staff towards occupation of the patients.

In our ideal hospital complete physical and pathological examinations would be made not once but at regular intervals. We know too little of pathological details: not obscure information requiring costly apparatus, but quite simple information which partially trained nurses might obtain for us. Weights are chronicled, not graphed: so with hours of sleep, adequate graphing has advantages for prognosis, for treatment, and for teaching.

But this is not all. We want more documentation, more clinical records, and the present overworked medical man cannot furnish these. We want those who are trained in research methods, and laboratory assistants. We want information about family history, a tiresome, time-consuming pursuit, for we really do not know enough about our patients. Could we know all, we might understand more, to the benefit of patient, doctor, taxpayer. That such investigations might show more industry than insight we admit, and the appointment of adequate supervisors is an obvious need, but, thus equipped, the possibility of conferences in which all the higher members of the staff could share becomes a certainty, with an effect upon the whole institution's morale. We need to prepare the recovering patient for his life outside, the relatives for his reception. We want adequate information about his life outside. Follow-up schemes which have proved so useful in other branches of medicine are needed in psychiatry, not only to help the patient, but to help ourselves in learning more of the natural history of disease. In all this we are claiming that mental illness behaves rationally if we could but see all the threads, that it is not something clearly delimited from physical ills, and that the separation of the mental hospital from the general hospital has been one of social expediency, but not of medical expediency.

But the most efficient investigations, case reports and follow-up schemes will achieve nothing unless the personnel of the hospitals themselves is satisfactory. We have spoken of the difficulties in finding mental nurses. A committee is at present considering this, and a Government Committee is shortly to make further inquiries. Ideally, mental nurses should have secondary education, evidence of wide interests, and show signs of real character and adaptability. They need regular time-tables, a fifty-four-hour week at most, with

opportunities for recreation within the hospital and for social contacts outside. The higher members of the nursing staff should enjoy the status they deserve in the external world, as do the medical superintendents. The experience of matrons would be of value to some of the voluntary organisations of the social services. How many of them give it? How often is it sought?

If these represent ideal conditions, can steps towards them be taken? It would seem essential that the first move is to take the control of mental hospitals from county committees and to vest it in a central organisation. The latter, which we will call a commission, should take over the work of the Board of Control and extend it. Upon it should be represented not merely medical and legal experts but sociological and cultural ones. Until this is done the danger of continuing to think of mental treatment in the old ways will continue. We need a body which will regard insanity as a cultural catastrophe, which is implemented with sufficient power to provide hospitals with adequate equipment, and can approach the problem knowing that it has all the hospitals of the country at its disposal. Further, both for doctors and nurses the mental health services should be regarded as part of a national and not merely as a county concern.

At the outset the supposed commission should relegate legal and administrative problems to their proper yet important place. An administrative separation of these matters from the important question of active treatment should be instituted. We must still urge that legal and financial abuses must be checked; such abuses, already rare, will disappear if conditions are such that the contagious influence of active treatment and research replaces apathy and pessimism.

The next steps concern nursing. A commission of the sort suggested would make it one of its first duties to investigate the present difficulties by conferences, by co-operation with the General Nursing Council, by liaison with educational and employment bureaus, and with any further opening of the vocational guidance movement. It would not remain blind to economic considerations and prejudices, but progress might be expected when the problem ceased to be local and become general. The character of the women upon

such a commission would be a determining factor in the advances which would be made. Such a body should have powers to increase the scope of the probationer's experience. Her divorce from general medicine and, in some cases, her merely custodial duties must be altered, for a life in which the relationship between mental nursing and general nursing is a real one. When we send our sons and daughters to the universities we give them far more than a professional training; we give them that opportunity to mix with others which promotes that width of experience we call culture. Few intelligent women look towards mental nursing with any such expectancy, for the opportunities of mixing with those in other pursuits which the universities or training centres offer are denied them. Hostels or arrangements whereby all sorts and conditions of nurses (children's nurses, sanatoria nurses, general nurses) meet are an urgent need. The vocation of nursing should imply a qualitatively similar education in culture as the vocation of teaching or of the law. At present the mental nurse is self-depreciatory. She belittles herself beside the general trained nurse. There may be good grounds for this sometimes, but not as a general rule. The nurse shares with the rest of those treating the insane a sense of inferiority which should be illusory.

If the liaison between general hospitals and some mental hospitals suggested later is practical, that co-operation should include co-operation between matrons, and some experience for probationers in general as well as in mental nursing. Mental nurses would not be the only gainers. One factor, perhaps small, in the general intolerant attitude towards the insane might be mitigated if general nurses knew more of mental patients. Nurses penetrate everywhere, they cannot help discussing their experiences; and if such experiences included some survey of the mentally ill as they really are, and not as they are imagined, enlightenment would surely be helped.

As regards the medical staff, it should be possible largely to relieve superintendents of purely administrative routine and to release them for clinical and teaching work. Assistant medical officers, whose numbers would be increased, would be relieved of some petty duties. The doctors would belong to a national mental health service, and better opportunities

for reasonable changes, for fresh experience, and for 'sabbatical years' would be given. Any prolongation in the medical training of students is fraught with difficulties. A short period of residence for the fifth-year student within the mental hospital, such as occurs more frequently in Scotland than in England, would certainly be of advantage to the future practitioner, and also to the hospital staff.

Under present conditions too little consideration is given to the many-sided character we expect from the medical officer. He must have wide medical experience, he must have social gifts, he needs to lecture to nurses, he must have the capacity for dealing with harassed relatives: his chances of promotion are enhanced if he undertakes research and contributes articles to journals. His needs may be thought of as clinical and social. The importance of the latter in stimulating the apathetic, in taking part in games and occupational therapy (in its widest sense) cannot be understressed, but such qualities do not always go along with a type of mind who can initiate research. Such distinctions should be recognised, and this can more easily be done if the medical officers are members of a State service than where they are attached to a county body.

The hospitals contain many doctors who could undertake research if this were organised. It is true that certain bodies for this do exist, but co-operation between them is not good. Research directors are needed. Take one provincial town as it is at present, with five mental hospitals (public and private) accommodating 2000 patients. Here is a valuable amount of material for the research student, but, owing to the absence of any co-operation between the five hospitals, an exceptional opportunity is missed. Owing to the lack of real power behind the central organisation, similar situations must occur throughout the country.

It becomes clear that individual hospitals as at present organised cannot further our ideal schemes, and the present accommodation and disposal of patients would have to be reconsidered.

We need three types of hospitals—those for the new cases, those where active treatment is in progress, and those where custodial care alone supplements nursing attention. In the latter senile cases and the epileptic insanities could be housed.

There are a number of hospitals so limited in space, so antiquated in arrangement, that they are unsuitable for ambulant cases, or for active occupation of the patients. These would be suitable for such senile cases, but it is not admitted that even here more clinical observation could not be undertaken. Such cases offer a field for investigation in problems of vascular disease and in neurological topography, a subject in which this country is behind the Continent.

The provisions for the new patients are being much improved by the building of new admission blocks in many areas. Whether such schemes are financially satisfactory has been overlooked in the urgency for improving accommodation and imagining that hospitals must ever remain county responsibilities. The special equipment of such admission blocks for, say, sixty patients is *pro rata* much heavier than if the same equipment were available for 300. Such blocks are often at a great distance from a general hospital, and they are staffed by medical officers who are not wholly responsible for these new cases, and whose time to equip themselves for full investigations is limited. Differently organised hospitals, serving, therefore, more than a mere county area, are required, where saving in overhead expenses, in medical officers' time, and in general grouping on a large scale is possible. Few present hospitals could serve such a purpose, and a survey of the possibilities of each of the present hospitals, as we suggest later, would be necessary.

The last group of hospitals is those in which active treatment is in progress. We have referred to the small number of cases upon whom a new form of treatment has been reported, and the impression is often left that such cases are not entirely comparable. Some means of collecting larger groups of similar cases is desirable, as well as making sharper distinctions between those thrust together. To take instances of possible groupings, those with insanities due to heart disease, those suffering from general paralysis of the insane, those suffering from character defects (the eccentrics and unemployables), the potential suicides, are all moderately distinct conditions who would be available for more satisfactory study if the medical personnel were increased and uniformity of surroundings could be assured. Such groupings are being aimed at by the London County Council, but are

also possible in the other districts if we ceased to think merely in terms of counties and boroughs.

With such larger classification experimental results would have more validity. Take for instance the possibility of a control group of chronic patients doing one form of occupational therapy entailing heavy physical work and those occupied in a more sedentary way. A great deal has been written upon the chemical changes in certain conditions, but we are still in doubt as to whether any of these are typical. This is probably due to the relatively small number of cases at present reported upon.

It is a debatable point as to whether hospitals could be set apart for potential suicides. At present these patients are mixed with others; terror reigns at the thought of some self-destructive act. An old slogan, 'All depressed persons are likely suicides,' is still accepted as true. Has there been any real attempt to differentiate between the different qualities of suicidal gestures and treat them appropriately? Has there been a continued attempt to share with the bewildered, anxious creature contemplating self-destruction his worries and his appalling qualms? Many recovered patients are deeply thankful for the difficulties placed in their way; others regret that their pseudo-bluff was not called earlier, and resent, and go on resenting, the furtiveness with which they were followed. We started removing the chains from the insane in 1796. We have not yet had the courage to envisage a scheme whereby the huge and important problem of suicidal intent can be studied and treated in a large and (presumably) enlightened way, so that if unnecessary bondage exists it could be lifted.

Much was expected from psycho-analysis. This has thrown many interesting lights upon the possible causation of the insanities, but as an instrument of rapid cure has been disappointing. It should be possible to appropriate space for more research into such treatment, as the present organisation of hospitals forbids this. Reasonable time and adequate material must be forthcoming; the insane offer this: the organisation could be set up were the will to do it there.

Typhoid-carriers and tuberculous patients could be more easily nursed in isolation. The ordinary rules of hygiene for

such persons are difficult in an ordinary hospital, and are more so in a big mental hospital. The transfer of defectives from asylums to the new colonies is proceeding at a fair rate; but it should be possible to utilise some present hospitals for defectives alone, if the county responsibilities were substituted by national planning.

The disadvantage of local as compared with national schemes is apparent in research and early treatment. The difficulties of research cannot be underrated, and its poverty in immediate results should not be scorned. A National Commission could not only foster it and add to its prestige; it could by suitable publicity interest the laity in it and combat popular misunderstanding. The Board of Control is keenly sympathetic to research, but its reports show that it feels its interest cannot go further than fatherly concern. If mental hygiene is to become an integral part of the new 'Keep Fit' and other movements, some lucid explanation of the sort of investigations which research is undertaking should be made public, for, despite our ignorance upon many problems, sufficient is known to make simple mental hygiene clear to all.

The foregoing suggests widespread changes. It is not meant to postulate immediate and enormous rebuilding schemes. Suppose England and Wales were divided into, say, six areas, excluding London. A population of 30,000,000 is served. If there were main admission hospitals at Portsmouth, Bristol or Cardiff, Liverpool or Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham and Cambridge, these could form the unit from which the mental health services, not of a county, but of a large district, could be planned. Co-operation with well-equipped general hospitals would be possible, a co-operation which would include medical, pathological, and nursing liaisons. A director of research would be stationed at these centres, and compilation of living records (not legal antiquities alone) could be undertaken. A survey of the present accommodation by individuals scientifically restrained yet stimulated by enthusiasm would enable the country to consider what could be done now in the matter of rearrangement and what could be undertaken in, say, twenty or thirty years. A five-years plan would be of small use. Such changes as are envisaged are very large. As a first step towards real

measures county distinctions must be abolished. Whilst we may expect many changes in outlook even in twenty-five years, in mental disorders we deal with a far bigger weight of chronic patients than in any other branch of medicine, and this, therefore, makes for some stability. That such a scheme would make for heavy travelling expenses and so forth we cannot deny. Transfer of patients over long distances at present occurs, since counties with limited accommodation house some of their patients in less pressed hospitals many miles away. Any step likely to give the impression that the insanities contain many different types requiring different types of accommodation and treatment will contribute something to a sounder public opinion.

The commission which has been sketched would be faced with the problem of promoting mental hygiene, of removing the stigma attaching to mental disorder, and of encouraging the early and efficient treatment of those showing abnormalities of conduct. Such a programme extends beyond that of the insanities. It has been estimated that almost twenty times as many persons as those in mental hospitals (*i.e.*, 1 in 15 of the population) are in need of some form of adjustment in their outlook, for such persons are potential disturbers of domestic and industrial peace. The enthusiasm for physical fitness must not disregard the need for mental harmony. Indeed, the emphasis upon the physical alone may be detrimental to an awakening on the part of the population of the importance of mental peace. It is clear that insistence upon such factors had far better come from some national organisation with administrative powers than from individuals. The dissemination of *knowledge* as compared with fantastic untruths about mental hospitals, the basic factors of mental hygiene, our appetites and their control, our stresses and their modifications, the interaction of mind and matter, could be as common knowledge as the facts of physical health, and are a necessary pre-requisite to a modification of that stigma which surrounds mental illness. Temperaments have moulded history; adventure and vacillation are qualities of mind which can be traced and perhaps explained.

The opening of out-patient clinics in large centres which was permitted by the 1930 Act has resulted in 165 new clinics in England and Wales. In London in 1935, with its popu-

lation of 9,000,000, 3650 patients were referred to the Maudsley Hospital and its adjuvant centres. These figures do not cover the cases dealt with by general hospitals and special clinics. Figures for the country as a whole are difficult to compile; but in areas with a population of 2,000,000, 500 new cases attended the clinics in 1935. When the numbers attending London general hospitals are imagined the discrepancies existing in the London and country services are clear.

In some of these clinics the service is mainly consultative, in others therapeutic. They are staffed by mental hospital officers whose energies are already diffused. Exception can be taken to the present association of the clinic with the mental hospital, but the continuation of such a bond under present administrative arrangements can hardly be altered. Such clinics require adequate social personnel, and their extension in the face of public parsimony is difficult. If the whole problem of mental hygiene were directed by a central administrative commission the limitations which must face a local committee would be eased. Mental hospital officers cannot both claim to be overworked in the hospitals and to have time to deal adequately with the new clinics.

Our proposals aim at bringing mental disorders into line with the other problems of the Ministry of Health. They are relegated at present to a separate report, and, though the administration must differ from that dealing with nutrition, tuberculosis, maternal mortality, venereal disease, mental disorders can claim an importance as great. To the proposals outlined many objections can be raised. It may be objected that a side of medicine already overloaded with dead weight would become moribund under the further influence of bureaucracy. This would depend upon the personnel and power of the suggested commission. It would depend upon the ventilation and circulation of fresh ideas in the hospitals and in the administrative hives. In one's criticism of the present it is of the structure, tradition, and accepted limitations which we complain. To raise criticism against persons is to misinterpret conditions. For the steam-roller of county finance, though driven by persons, is mechanical and uncomprehending.

Any such schemes would cost money. They would,

however, create savings. If the present hospitals were all to be scaled down to 18s. per patient per week, the annual expenditure would be £6,750,000. If the cost were 31s. per week, the cost would be £10,000,000. If the cost of treating all mental disorder, clinics and subsidiary mental hygiene, were comprised under a figure for each *hospital* patient, similar to the figure for the consumptive in-patient, the cost would be £16,000,000, equivalent to a charge upon each person in England and Wales of 8s. per year. The difference between £6,750,000 and £10,000,000 alone requires elucidation. The present ratio of patients to doctors is 275. If this were reduced to 150, an extra expenditure in salaries and maintenance of £200,000 would be necessary. It is clear that it would not be difficult to spend on the insane a figure equivalent to that spent upon the consumptive, but if this is done a commission constituted as we have suggested would be a necessary safeguard.

There are obvious objections to wholesale transfers of patients such as the scheme for more specialised hospitals presents. The relatives would not be enthusiastic; the fluctuations in the illnesses themselves would make some of the suggestions difficult of administration. But patients are willing to travel many miles to see recognised experts, and such specialisation amongst the hospitals themselves would be appreciated by the relatives and would awake the public to the very diverse nature of the insanities. At present the colloquial 'luney-bin' only too aptly summarises the non-differentiation between the cases.

HENRY WILSON.

THE LEGALISATION OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA¹

By ROBERT HARDING

THE end desired by the supporters of legalised voluntary euthanasia is simple; the means by which that end may be attained demand very careful consideration and, above all, adequate public discussion. The proposal is that those who have attained years of discretion and who are suffering from incurable and fatal illness of a painful character shall, if they unmistakably desire it, but not otherwise, be allowed and helped to substitute a tranquil death for the slow, lingering and agonising death which Nature so often inflicts. Is not this proposal reasonable and benign? Let those who think it not so explain, if they can, the poverty of argument displayed by those who opposed the Bill and who, by an alliance with the forces of indifference, preoccupation and established prejudice, secured its defeat.²

The law and public opinion alike insist that animals shall be put out of their suffering by some painless and expeditious means; but, no matter how clearly fatal the malady or how intense the suffering of a human being, or how fervent his prayers for release, the law decrees the continuance of his sufferings, relieved only by narcotics which are often of little value and seldom more than transient in their effects, for the sufferer soon becomes semi-immune against drugs. The dose which produced four hours' sleep only gives three, and then two, and then scarcely any. The patient begs the doctor to administer a larger dose. To accede makes him liable to a criminal charge,³ to professional ruin, to social disgrace; if

¹ A Bill for the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia was rejected by the House of Lords, December 1936, but will be reintroduced on some suitable occasion.

² *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, Tuesday, December 1, 1936, vol. 103, No. 11; price 6d. net: H.M. Stationery Office.

³ For he is, not infrequently, able to estimate the chances of an increased dose or injection proving fatal.

he refuses, the patient will charge him with cruelty and his own conscience will endorse the charge.

In answer to the question Are there any definitely incurable diseases and maladies? Lord Ponsonby quoted from the late Lord Moynihan:

Are there, indeed, cases of which it may with unequivocal certainty be said that death is inevitable and that, with all the many modern possibilities of treatment both medical and surgical, there is no slightest prospect of recovery? You will learn on highest authority that to this question we may confidently answer 'Yes.'

Lord Dawson of Penn endorsed this view, for he said:

We have to face this fact, that there are diseases which are by their nature incurable.

It appears that the contest between medical science and malady furnishes hope up to a certain point beyond which death is inevitable, for Lord Dawson added:

That is not to say that that disease is incurable at the outset, but a disease will reach a stage when we know that by its nature it cannot be cured.

And long after all hope of cure has gone the suffering continues and can be very severe. What we claim, therefore, is that, at this point, or at any later time, the sufferer, *and no one else*, should have the right to decide whether the life shall be continued or not.⁴ Similarly, we claim that those who themselves would object to receive euthanasia have no more right to deny it to others than we, who believe in euthanasia, would have to impose its acceptance on them.

It seems necessary here to throw off the reserve which generally, and rightly, surrounds our domestic sorrows and to explain why I, a layman, in no way connected with the medical profession except as an occasional patient, should be interesting myself in a movement for the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. It was my unhappy lot to watch by the bedside of one I loved after all hope of recovery had been abandoned. Although terribly afflicted in body, my wife

⁴ The question to whom but to himself a man's life really belongs is answered by many voices. Personally, I would suggest that each of these voices is but the disguised voice of a slave-owning mentality born in slave-owning ages and, therefore, now decrepit and senile. Of course, when a slave committed suicide he did, in fact, wilfully destroy his owner's property. Admitting for a moment that a man's life belongs to 'the State' or 'the community,' of what value to either is a dying man?

retained perfect mental competence, and she begged me to find means to terminate her sufferings by some kind of tranquil extinction of life. Guided by relatives and intimates who, like myself, loved her dearly, I spoke to the doctor. He said: 'I am not even allowed to consider that; my duty is to save life if I can and, if not, to prolong it.' To prolong it after all hope of recovery has had to be abandoned and when nothing remains but weary and continual pain with only occasional intervals of unconsciousness under drugs! Then I vowed that, if ever it should be in my power, I would lay before others the bitter lesson learned in the school of sorrow.

Now, what are the possible objections to the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia? I will first treat of one common objection—'What husband would like to give his consent to the terminating of his wife's life?' The answer is: 'No good man would willingly do this.' But when death is patently inevitable, should we not prefer that the sad parting should be effected with avoidance of all unnecessary pain to the dying?

The proportion of deaths in great agony is fortunately small. But shall we withhold our sympathy from a sufferer because he is one among many who are not suffering? As though in a train accident, where, of 800 passengers, one is pinned under the *débris*, we were to say to him: 'Oh, don't make such a fuss; there are 799 passengers who are not in the least hurt.' The question is not one of proportions. The fact that a sufferer's misery is exceptional does not allay his pain; it should not suppress or divert our interest.

Lord Dawson of Penn said in the House of Lords:

If one goes back fifty years I think it will be true to say that the medical profession concentrated all its endeavours on the maintenance of life despite the nature of the illness and even despite sometimes the imminence of death. It was an accepted tradition that it was the duty of the medical man to continue the struggle for life right up to the end. With time that has changed. There has gradually crept into medical opinion, as there has crept into lay opinion,⁵ the feeling that one should make the act of dying more

⁵ In the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* of Friday, May 21, 1937, under the heading 'Czecho-Slovak Law; The Death Penalty,' it is stated that 'Several humanitarian reforms have been made in the law. For instance, the death penalty will no longer be passed on anyone who, from pity or on earnest entreaty, hastens the death of an invalid

gentle and more peaceful even if it does involve curtailment of the length of life.

We who believe in the legalisation of euthanasia wish to legalise it on terms which shall guard against error, accident, haste, misunderstanding, or the administration of euthanasia so long as there is the faintest hope of the patient's recovery. To this end we propose that two medical practitioners shall certify:

- (I.) That, to the best of their knowledge and belief, death is inevitable;
- (II.) That the suffering which must intervene before natural death is believed by them to be severe;
- (III.) That the patient has signed a demand for euthanasia; and
- (IV.) That they believe that, at the time of so signing, the mental faculties were such that the sufferer appreciated the significance of his signature.

Dr. C. Killick Millard, quoting from a paper read before the Willesden Medical Society by Dr. C. E. Goddard, Medical Officer of Health for Harrow, in 1901, enumerates some of the complaints which might become the subject of an application for euthanasia. Those who contend that to legalise euthanasia for incurable sufferers might facilitate crime appear to forget how easy crime is at the present time in such cases. The patient is very frequently unable to leave the bed and, still more often, unable to get about sufficiently to obtain the necessities of life. In many cases simple neglect will result in death; in others, a sudden noise or movement or an unsuitable position. Those who defend harsh and old-established practices are apt to speak as if human society was composed largely of heartless scoundrels. The onus of proof is on our opponents. Let them set forth, if they can, a set of imaginary circumstances within the realm of possibility in which the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia could have the effect of facilitating crime.

It is suggested that the sufferer may, when voluntary suffering incurable pain.' If the 'earnest entreaty' and the 'incurable pain' are placed, so far as is humanly possible, beyond all doubt, and the 'no death penalty' becomes 'no penalty whatever,' who shall say that this is not a reform which our humanity demands?

euthanasia becomes legal, sacrifice himself out of consideration for relatives and attendants who are nursing him. John Donne's reply to this suggestion seems conclusive :

And, in a shipwreck, may I not give my plank to another and drown ?

When Father Damien went to tend lepers he knew that he was going to his death. Captain Oates went to voluntary death sooner than endanger the lives of his friends. Do we despise these men or the thousands who have done likewise ? Sir Thomas More wrote in his *Utopia* :

If the disease is not only incurable but, also, full of continual pain and anguish, then, the priest and the magistrate exhort the man, seeing that he is not capable of discharging any of the duties of life, and, in protracting his existence, is wearisome to others and a sadness and misery to himself, that he shall abandon this painful life as he would escape from a prison.

The legalisation of voluntary euthanasia will, of course, modify our attitude towards the unfortunate suicide—that is, the poor person who, in many cases, inflicts grievous cruelty on those who (had he given them the opportunity) would gladly have helped him out of the distress that drove him to self-destruction. Here it should be pointed out that, until recently, the law added to the suffering of the relatives by declaring any real estate the suicide might leave 'forfeit to the Crown.' Can we be sure that the current prohibition of voluntary euthanasia is not equally inhumane and stupid ? Public opinion to-day tends to regard suicide with pity ; juries are loth to declare it *felo de se*. The suicides we are here contemplating, however, are those of persons hopelessly afflicted—the victims of some painful and incurable malady. Let us, then, consider the circumstances attending an act of suicide on the part of such persons, first as it, unfortunately, happens under existing law, and then as it would take place under the voluntary euthanasia proposed.

To-day the sufferer is afraid to speak to anyone about the act he is contemplating. He has no opportunity to secure painless means. His intimates must not listen if he should speak of such things lest they be charged with complicity or even with wilful murder. Under legalised voluntary euthanasia, how different would be the state of affairs ! The sufferer

would discuss the possibility with relatives, pointing out that the pain he endures is growing greater and the periods of respite shorter. The relatives, too, would discuss it among themselves, with the doctors and, perhaps, with a minister. Consultation with a third medical referee would follow and, on his decision, a merciful and peaceful end ; instead of a furtive escape (the fall from a window, the gas fire, the razor, or a draught of some corrosive and searing disinfectant) would be substituted the deliberate farewells, the affectionate last word and—euthanasia. Instead of the abiding recollection of horror and of the knowledge that death came in the small hours of the morning to the patient when he was alone, save, perhaps, for the hired nurse, would be substituted the certitude that death came in kindly guise—death, indeed, bereft of its sting, faced with triumph and a smile among friendly faces, 'downward a mask of jet, upward a coronet,' to one who could truly say, with the unknown Greek poet, 'having death as my ally, I fear no shadows.'

Many, not long ago, held it wrong to use chloroform, for pain, they said, was ordained by God. But reason conquered this, like other prejudices against the innovation. Some would have us believe, likewise, that voluntary death is a violation of Christian doctrine and practice, invoking the early Fathers and the tradition of eighteen centuries, preferring that truth should be hidden and mercy withheld rather than that new truths should prevail. Others, more merciful and more tolerant, cannot admit it to be wrong to end a life which has become a burden to the patient and to those around him. Do we not praise those who, of their own free will, go to certain death to vindicate truth or to rescue others (perhaps utter strangers)—the martyrs, the heroes of pit and mine and sea ? A violation of Christian doctrine ! Does not Christ himself say : 'All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them' ? The Bible nowhere forbids voluntary relinquishment of life ; much less should we forbid it when its relinquishment is conceded, after full inquiry, in sorrow and love and for a reasonable and sufficient cause. Our opponents seem to have gone to Shakespeare for their theology and to the Bible for their dramatic poetry. To what source Shakespeare went for his information that 'The Everlasting had fix'd His canon 'gainst

self-slaughter,' no commentator tells us: probably he was merely reflecting the current theology of his time.

Our opponents sometimes tell us that when the doctors find that a case is hopeless, and that the patient cannot experience anything but pain right up to the moment of death, they do in practice now give some draught or injection which they have reason to believe will be fatal. Such critics seem content that what we desire should be done, but only on condition that it is done loosely, without safeguards and in contravention of existing law. Yet they charge us with seeking to endanger the public safety! It may or it may not be true that doctors already practise euthanasia. But if they do so, they must do it furtively. Is it just to place medical men in a position in which they must, by an act of mercy, lay themselves open to criminal prosecution? Is it not better that what is done should be done openly and legally and after an examination by a second expert?

Even those who oppose the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia are constrained to make very considerable admissions. The Archbishop of Canterbury, for example, in a speech in the House of Lords, described how, in certain circumstances and in certain conditions, as in cases of heroism and self-sacrifice for adequate objects, suicide might be justifiable, but not why it could not be justifiable in cases of severely painful and inevitably fatal illness. He began by saying that he 'hesitated to speak,' and that he 'must confess that the question is, to him, a very difficult one, one in which principle and compassion contend,' so that he 'found it not at all easy to make up his mind.' He went on to speak of 'the broad basis of the clear moral principle that no man is entitled to take his own life.' This enunciation of principle was followed by the admission that some men *are* entitled to take their own lives. He concluded by asserting that it was better to leave the whole matter to the doctors, who, by the way, strongly object to the whole responsibility being left to them.

By common consent we regard the wishes of the departed as sacred. Should not the wishes of those who must shortly leave us be treated with a like reverence? If the afflicted desires to endure the suffering right up to its natural end, who are we to question that wish? But, on the other hand, who gave others the right to question the decision of some poor

soul who is weary of the pain, whose case is certified as distressing and as inevitably fatal, and who clearly and explicitly demands the release of death? Supporters of euthanasia include such persons as Lady Denman, Lady Horsley, Sir W. Arbuthnot Lane, Dr. W. R. Inge, the Rev. F. W. Norwood, Professor Laski and Mr. H. G. Wells. Are they without tender impulses and humane instincts? Are they and many others who support the movement ill-balanced in their judgments?

Father McGillivray has set forth the objections of the Roman Catholic Church to the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia in a pamphlet⁶ in which he describes the aims and objects of the V.E.L.S. with commendable impartiality. He accuses the advocates of euthanasia of appealing to sentiment rather than to reason. He also says that we do not base our contention on fundamental principles. Now, we cannot discuss human pain and sorrow without reference to human sentiment, and, as to fundamental principles, compassion is surely a basic Christian principle. The rack, the thumb-screw, the branding-iron, the whipping-post, the public gallows, and many other institutions, have disappeared less as the result of reason than of sentiment. Sentiment has abolished, in most countries, the slave trade, the frequency of capital punishment, and other 'time-honoured' practices based on 'fundamental principles' which had the support and approval for centuries of Christian men and women and of the Christian clergy. Father McGillivray complains that the advocates of euthanasia have no sense of what is 'right' and what is 'wrong.' The accusation might be just were it proposed to make euthanasia compulsory and not permissive. We would compel no man against his will; the application of euthanasia to persons unable to express their wills—*e.g.*, children or those mentally afflicted—is no part of our scheme. Father McGillivray states that extreme sufferers very seldom wish to die. The truth of this assertion is doubtful, but its validity does not affect our argument.

It has been said that legalised euthanasia would impair the confidence of patients and their friends in the medical profession. The argument is that, when it is known that a

⁶ *Suicide and Euthanasia*: Catholic Truth Society, 38-40, Eccleston Square, S.W. 1 price 2d.

medical man may, in an extreme case, turn his gifts from the prolonging to the extinguishing of life, he will be looked upon as a potential executioner. Yet the specialist is called in to pronounce an opinion as to whether an operation is necessary, and we do not regard him as one who *wants* to operate, necessary or unnecessary. Although operating is his profession, we have confidence that he will avoid it if he can. We trust him; why should it be different with other doctors? In two cases within my own limited knowledge the afflicted has longed for release and deplored that voluntary death was illegal. In each case a near relative has told me that, had euthanasia been legal, the doctor administering it would not have fallen but risen in his esteem and confidence. But should experience prove that there is, in fact, loss of confidence, then the administration of euthanasia should be placed in the hands of doctors not in ordinary practice. There seems to be an impression that when once the doctors know that the extinction of human life is no longer a crime against the law they will tend to take the whole matter into their own hands without waiting for legal formalities. To this objection we reply that what is suggested would be just as much a contravention of the law after the passing of the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill as it is now. The surreptitious administration of lethal narcotics is tolerably easy as the law stands; our protection against it is the sure shield of professional and personal honour which characterises the members of the medical profession. Moreover, under the Euthanasia Bill, it is the patient, not the doctor, who decides whether euthanasia shall be applied for.

It is sometimes said that the legalisation of euthanasia might tend to harden men's hearts and so produce a race lacking in tenderness. But would not the legalising of euthanasia have precisely the contrary effect? It is those who love animals who take them to the lethal chamber when they are irremediably ill or injured, and it is the brutal and heartless who let them linger in pain.

It is further suggested that the sufferer might be subjected to corrupt or mercenary influences by those who expect to gain by the death. The risk is small but real. But let it be borne in mind that, under the Euthanasia Bill, two medical men must certify officially that, to the best of their belief, the

sufferer is of sound mind and that the affliction is painful and inevitably fatal. Then, so long as there appears to remain the faintest hope of even a temporary abatement of the suffering, the afflicted person is at perfect liberty to say—and that after the receipt of the authorisation papers—‘I will bear the pain as long as I can, I will battle with it, but I am greatly comforted and fortified by the knowledge that I have my papers and, if it becomes unendurable, I can send for the doctor and end it.’

It is said that medical men might err. Yes, doctors are human and not infallible. Even to-day, with all our care, operations are sometimes performed which omniscience would know to be unnecessary and useless or worse. But we are not omniscient, and the best we can do is to reduce error to its minimum.

We are told that diseases regarded as incurable to-day may be found to be curable after some years, or even after months. We reply that the moment the discovery is made of even an experimental or prospective remedy, from that moment the disease (in the particular stage of development suspected to be amenable to the new discovery) automatically drops off the list of maladies for which euthanasia can be granted.

Finally it is said that God gave life, and God alone has the right to take it away. In the words of Lord FitzAlan: ‘The Almighty reserves to Himself the power to decide the moment at which life shall cease.’

We content ourselves with just two comments on this view. First, the argument is either false or it proves too much. If it be wrong in any circumstances to shorten life, it must be also a contravention of the will of God to lengthen it. So this argument must either be erroneous or it must condemn the doctor, the chemist, and all who take medicine. There are, indeed, even to-day, those who refuse medical and surgical aid, basing their refusal on religious grounds. And, secondly, how can the legal taking of life, as in war or capital punishment, be justified by those who take Lord FitzAlan's view?

I would sooner place my confidence in the spirit underlying the writings of Jeremy Taylor, who is thought by some to be the greatest of English divines. In his *Rules of Holy Dying* he says:

If you please to visit an hospital, which is indeed a map of the whole world, there you shall see . . . men whose souls seem to be borrowed, and are kept there by force of art and medicine, whose miseries are so great that few people have the charity or humanity enough to visit them, fewer have the art to dress them, and we pity with incivility or with a transient prayer, but we do not feel their sorrows. . . . So we contract by our unmercifulness a guilt by which ourselves become liable to the same calamities. [IV. 3.]

And again :

If our death could be put off a little longer, what advantage can it be in thy accounts of nature or felicity ? They that three hundred years ago died unwillingly and stopped death two days, or stayed it a week, what is their gain, where is that week ? [VII. 1.]

Who can doubt, having read the whole of his classic essay, that he would be an advocate of Euthanasia ?

ROBERT HARDING.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Medical Aspects of Crime, by Dr. W. Norwood East, H.M. Commissioner of Prisons, Director of Convict Prisons, etc. (J. & A. Churchill Ltd.: 437 pages; price 18s.).

Sir John Simon commends this book 'to the attention of all who give serious thought to the problem of the causes and the cure of crime.' The Home Secretary supports one of his own permanent officials, and so the book can be accepted as setting out official views. The author is content with the *status quo* as regards the legal and medical aspects of crime.

The first four chapters are given to the 'Medical Aspects of Prison Administration' from the middle of the sixteenth century till the end of 1934. The felons and debtors of old slept in dirty, dark and airless dungeons, upon straw that was unchanged for months; they were half-starved, their water ration for all purposes was three or four pints of water per day. They died in 'multitudes' of gaol fever (typhus) and small-pox; the justices and judges appear to have been entirely callous to their sufferings, though occasionally a doctor raised a protest—usually in vain.

Insane persons were often detained in prisons, sometimes temporarily and sometimes permanently, up to the middle of the nineteenth century. Both the legal profession and the public appeared oblivious to equity. The asylum was, however, in some ways as bad as prison; thus in 1840 the Barming Heath Asylum was reported by Mr. Serjeant Adams as having 'two men who had been chained to their beds for four and a half years, one woman fastened in a coercive chair by a large cuirass of thick leather, and twenty to thirty persons in manacles.' 'In 1864 the epileptic and mental cases from the various convict prisons, or from county and borough prisons, where cells were rented by the Government, were sent to Millbank instead of to Dartmoor.' In 1879 complete separation of the weak-minded class ('dangerous,' 'epileptic' or 'harmless') took place at Parkhurst Prison, and the different categories were housed and treated separately. Parkhurst Prison still receives all convicts requiring prolonged observation on account of doubtful mental conditions.

In the chapter given to 'Observations on Attempted Suicide' it is interesting to note that physical disease is not a common cause—which is either alcoholism, unemployment and destitution, domestic troubles, and morbid mental states. A long chapter on 'The Relation of the Skull

and Brain to Crime,' dealing chiefly with 'phrenology,' leads nowhere. Most readers will delightedly accept Dr. East's conclusion that in imprisonment the 'association system' is greatly superior to the 'cellular system,' and that therefore 'cellular imprisonment as a system should be replaced by detention in association for short and long term prisoners,' and that 'cellular confinement should be restricted to the hours of rest.'

The most interesting chapters to those of us whose gaze is fixed on the future rather than the past are those in which the problems of 'Inefficiency and Adolescent Crime,' 'Medical Aspects of Crime,' and 'Insanity and the Criminal Law' are discussed. The first of these three tremendously important chapters recognises that the law must be altered owing to the recent separation of groups of symptoms, and the acceptance that they were manifestations of one infectious disease of the influenza group, which was called 'encephalitis lethargica' or 'sleepy sickness,' and which often produced moral deterioration. Dr. East truly writes: 'Public opinion became aroused by the inadequate provisions which were available for protecting these patients and the public from the consequences of the moral changes which were induced by the disease. The Mental Deficiency Act of 1927 followed.' Under this Act 'moral defectives' are defined as 'persons in whose case there exists mental defectiveness coupled with strongly vicious or criminal propensities, and who require care, supervision and control for the protection of others.' The condition must exist 'before the age of eighteen years'; so many cases of moral delinquency following sleepy sickness contracted over eighteen do not come under this Act.

The Lord Chancellor's Committee on Insanity and Crime reported in 1924, and Dr. East recalls that the British Medical Association recommended 'that a person should be held to be irresponsible if prevented by mental disease from controlling his own conduct,' but that at present the law is clear that a person of unsound mind may commit a crime. Dr. East considers that inquest verdicts of 'suicide while temporarily insane' are often contrary to the evidence, and that in law insanity is tested by different standards. Some law sentences, as reported by Dr. East, have indeed been Gilbertian in their grotesque absurdity. Thus at the Liverpool Assizes in May 1929 a certified lunatic pleaded guilty to an offence, and entered into a recognisance to be of good behaviour for two years and to remain in a mental institution until he was discharged. Later he escaped from the institution and was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment for this breach of his recognisance! The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed his appeal and quashed the sentence on the ground of irresponsibility.¹

Dr. East points out later in the book that in 1934 the Home Office issued a circular to magistrates stating, *inter alia*, that 'in certain cases of mentally abnormal offenders, when arrangements can be made by the friends or relations for the offender to receive proper care and treatment, and the circumstances warrant a lenient course, it is often a proper pro-

cedure for the court to deal with the case by dismissal or by binding over; . . . but to bind an offender to adhere to such an arrangement by a condition in the recognisance was inconsistent with the voluntary position in which the Mental Treatment Act places an applicant for mental treatment.' This is rather vague and unsatisfactory, and what appears urgently necessary is a precise legal definition of insanity and legal irresponsibility on mental grounds.

Dr. East begins his chapter on 'Medical Aspects of Crime' with two expressions of opinion that every reader will accept:

(1) 'The prevention of crime and the provision of alternatives to imprisonment in suitable cases are important problems of social hygiene.'

(2) 'Conduct that outrages the moral sanctions of society is not necessarily criminal in the technical sense.'

Dr. East suggests that a delinquent should not be encouraged to believe that he is an irresponsible mental invalid, and 'in regard to sexual reactions that a sexually normal man is often a man who holds in control some abnormal impulse.'

The reviewer is always suspicious of virtues based on 'self-control,' as he considers that the majority of men and women follow the line of least resistance, and that the writer, the reviewer, and the reader of this book are sober citizens, not because they exercise self-control, but because alcoholic excess is distasteful to them.

Occasionally the lay reader will come upon a paragraph that is difficult of interpretation. Dr. East thinks that legal and public support of Mental Deficiency Acts will be withdrawn if 'extreme medical views concerning the relation of crime and mental defectiveness become general.' Perhaps public opinion, like medical opinion, is more amenable to the influence of the progress of knowledge than that of much ecclesiastical or legal opinion, that so often is based on the dead past. Dr. East fears psychologists, and says that they 'might allow the rapist, fire-raiser, fraudulent company promoter, burglar, murderer and other criminals freedom and facilities to commit further crime.' There seems little ground for such fears. He is perhaps over-sensitive to the criminal's feelings when he writes: 'Too seldom is it realised that criminals resent the suggestion that their mental condition is a fitting subject for inquiry.'

The author agrees that 'imprisonment often fails to check sexual deviations,' but concludes that 'the psychological investigation of every adult found guilty of a crime is impracticable and would be unprofitable.' Why? It is common knowledge, and indeed quite understandable, that the evidence of most police surgeons tends to have a bias on the side of the police; so, presumably, most prison surgeons tend to have a bias on the side of prison administration and the law as it stands. Dr. East clearly tries hard to be unbiassed by his long and distinguished association with the prison service, but he cannot quite escape from the influence of the years. His report of the trial *Rex v. Vent* is interesting as appearing to demonstrate an unintentional bias of a prison surgeon against a prisoner. Vent's counsel evidently considered Vent insane and unfit

¹ *Rex v. Green, Emmott*, *The Times* report, February 25, 1931.

to plead, but the prison surgeon gave evidence that Vent was in a fit state to plead. Vent pleaded guilty of murder. Shortly after, Vent was transferred to Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum!

The reviewer agrees with Dr. East's opinion that 'a distinction between the common case of a prisoner with strong impulses and little resistance and the infrequent case of a sufferer from a compulsion syndrome is desirable in a criminal court'—with the reviewer's reservation that perhaps the occurrence of compulsion syndromes is more common than many, including Dr. East, think.

This book, which deserves wide reading as setting out official views, leaves the impression that much revision of the law is still necessary before justice and equity are brought into line, and before definitions of responsibility for crime are laid down that safeguard equally the public, the criminal, and the person who offends as the result of illness, accident, or a hereditary taint.

H. WANSEY BAYLY.

DYING BEYOND ONE'S MEANS: THE BURIALS QUESTION

Burial Reform and Funeral Costs, by Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P., and Professor Hermann Levy (Oxford University Press, 12s. 6d.).

Oscar Wilde enriched social life with a famous epigram about dying beyond his means. He might very well have added a more practical remark—that the majority of English people are buried beyond their means. The University of Oxford has had the courage to present the public with the first general statement on the whole present question of funeral costs, which are increasing rather than lessening in these days of social economy and drastic civic reforms.

In the past the burial question was one of sanitation, and, though the insanitary conditions have been abolished, the whole question of cemetery space must sooner or later be faced and dealt with in so thickly populated and spacially limited an island as Britain. The obvious thing is that a dead man when buried occupies more space by lying flat than he did when standing upright in life. How much longer and how much further are the dead to encroach on lands which should be used for children's playgrounds, open parks, or garden allotments? The progress of cremation is slow, and few English graveyards have reached the conditions in old Irish yards where, for sentiment's sake, the dead are thrust ten deep amongst their ancestors. The alternative is to enclose

more and more acres under *mortmain* indeed, and the Ordnance Map of London shows the huge percentage of green space which is allocated to the dead. Cremation has many advantages, but cheapness does not appear to be one of them yet.

The burial question is not one which any man can avoid. Once in a lifetime everyone requires burial himself, and the wise man will see that his heirs are not encumbered with a costly funeral of the nature recounted in the pathetic final lines of Tennyson's *Enoch Arden*:

The little port
Had seldom seen a costlier funeral.

Whether a man passes to dust or ash by worm or flame, he will be happier if he knows that he will not add a personal quota to the death duties which await to crush his family, and that he will not permanently occupy some square feet of ground which could find better economic uses than preserving his body from rot, and even a higher æsthetic value, than is lent by the majority of sepulchral monuments in the land.

These present authors have surveyed the ground and found that funerals are costly in all classes, but excessively so amongst those who can afford them least. They have some valuable suggestions as to how these costs can be lessened. No doubt the class of undertaker has improved immensely since the days of 'Mr. Mould.' But unfortunately the burial business is continually exploited by the Industrial Insurance Offices and in some cases by the undertaking profession. What can be done? When the whole business is scrutinised carefully, it will be seen that something will have to be done. A Funeral Commissioner could be appointed with authority, and cemetery superintendents could be made intermediaries between the bereaved public and the money-making undertakers.

Sir Arnold Wilson has supplied some interesting information in his Introduction. Urban cemeteries are growing at the rate of half a square mile every year; but as sometimes £2000 sterling are paid per acre, the graves are often correspondingly expensive. To avoid the stigma of the pauper's grave there are over 80,000,000 policies in existence to-day. Nevertheless, one in eleven of those who die in Greater London is buried at the cost of the rates in a common grave.

Without insurance the majority of workers in the humbler

professions cannot meet funeral expenses of members of the family, and the questions immediately arise: Can the costs be reduced? Are the costs increased for commercial reasons, and is there needless display and unnecessary luxury underground?

The French have a system of '*pompes funèbres*' which becomes familiar to those who live in France. The eight different classes of funeral are carefully graded and the mourners can choose exactly how much they wish to spend. A cheap funeral is not regarded as shameful, and there are no extras, once the type of burial has been decided.

It is good to hear from Sir Arnold Wilson that the funerals conducted by Public Assistance in this country are no longer conducted in a manner to dishonour the dead or to shame their relatives. In France, he recalls, there is an intermediary between the mourners and the undertaker which is a real want in England. Also, that in America there was an investigation of the whole subject financed by a great Life Assurance Company. Since 1848 there has been no investigations in this country. Prayers for the dead have been the subject of Royal Commission and excited Church Congresses, but the means and costs of funerals have been avoided as discussion both in philanthropic and ecclesiastical circles.

There can be no doubt that the whole burial question is in a state of unsettled confusion. Appendices show the differences in fees in twenty-five London cemeteries, as well as the extraordinary differences in interment cost for children. The ideal system would provide uniform fees by law: fixed tariffs, with economical coffins and uniform headstones, as in the striking case of the Imperial War Graves cemeteries, where sepulture is neither of the rich nor the poor, but equally honourable in the splendid equality of Death.

The German system is worth the consideration of reformers and undertakers; for presumably a change for the better can only be brought into existence by agreement between both, and that is not likely to take place without considerable legal pressure. Full information can be obtained in Germany without charge, and mourners are protected thereby from being overcharged or solicited to incur higher expenses than they can afford.

Undertaking is a trade which possesses singular advan-

tages. The demand never varies. Disease may sometimes be held up by the doctors, but Death never goes on strike. The bereaved are always at a disadvantage when bargaining with the undertaker, having not the least idea what the worth of a coffin or of its accessories can be. The bill is un-itemised, which means that an order for a funeral and its accessories is converted into a single contract. The undertakers stand at the gates of Death, and it is difficult to avoid their suggestions or impositions without coming under the accusation of wishing to dishonour the dead. The poorer classes find an absurd and unjustified outlay almost necessary in order to proclaim the respectability of the deceased. It is difficult to decline the conventions imposed by the undertaking business. A generation ago there was a movement, sponsored by Lady Winchilsea, for introducing coffins made of wicker, if we remember. The idea of saving thousands of pounds worth of timber for household use or fuel was a good one, but the undertaking fraternity made it impossible to adopt what would have proved a great national economy. If coffins are inevitable, it is well to know that the Germans have produced a standard coffin for 35s.—'a figure regarded, as the writers of this book discovered, with unconcealed contempt by the trade.'

The German undertakers are willing to reduce or enhance their bills by deducting or adding certain requirements. This entails the advantage of presenting an itemised bill—in other words a tender, which the bereaved can consider in relation to their means. It is worth while remarking that 'a plain earth funeral with the best Berlin firm may be had from £7 10s., which is half of what would be asked as a minimum even in the poorest districts of London.' Although the London County Council can find a coffin for burial under Public Assistance for about 25s., this is described by the trade as out of the question for decent folk. 'The lowest prices ruling for working-class people is from about £5 upwards.'

The curious historical fact is that coffins only became general at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1698 only one burial in a coffin is named out of seventeen funerals. Costly funerals were not considered necessary to the due respect for the dead in ancient or modern Christian practice. The Funeral Service of the Church of England makes no

mention of coffins. Sooner or later, they will be discovered to be an economic incubus as well as a hindrance to the processes of Nature.

Well, what can be done in the meanwhile? At least they can be made and kept cheap. Statistics show that something drastic ought to take place.

A draft has been prepared of a Bill for registering undertakers, but this would tend to reduce the competition, which is fortunately prevalent, and probably lead to a Board as powerful as the Medical Council in the world of medicine. But Parliament could always insist on introducing strict State control. Fixed price-lists would inevitably follow, and we should no longer have such instances as are recorded in this book. For instance, an old-age pensioner dying in an almshouse on 10s. a week left an undertaker's bill for £15 10s. And in the case of a young man dying in a London hospital in June 1937 the minimum price quoted by the undertakers was £18 12s. 'Efforts to reduce the amount by the substitution of a cheaper coffin were unavailing.' Yet the full funeral that can be provided for dead war pensioners, according to the contract accepted by the Government, only costs £1 15s. A certain form of reduction of expenditure on coffins, it is pointed out, could provide a sum 'amply sufficient to provide all insured adolescents from fourteen to twenty-one with free dental treatment.'

Uncriticised and undiscussed, the whole burials question remains at the mercy of those who are most interested to make business and profit out of it. The War Graves and any Quaker cemetery show the possibilities of uniformity and economy. Germany certainly gives an example to this country with its Commissioner, Directorate, and price committee; but 'a deeper gulf than the North Sea separates such an organisation from the National Association of Funeral Directors in England.'

All professions have to live, even those which live by Death. All professions are subject to scrutiny and legislation in the modern State. The time is ripe for undertakers to show their accounts and to answer to the nation for their stewardship.

SHANE LESLIE.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*



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PORTUGAL TO-DAY

By MAJOR ERIC WAKEHAM

To those who knew the Portugal of early republican days not the least surprising post-war event in Western Europe is the emergence, the remarkably rapid emergence, of a new regenerated Portugal from the ashes of political chaos, the slough of despond, and the virtual bankruptcy of the old. Such a feat, achieved despite the world depression of 1931 and during a period of political upheaval in Europe (not to mention a ghastly civil war waged just across her only land frontier), merits attention, and indeed applause.

From the fall of the monarchy in 1910 until May 1926, when the army marched from Braga to oust the bickering politicians in Lisbon, the country had suffered eighteen revolutions, bloody or bloodless, and over forty Governments—some honest in intention but victims of frustration or general political instability, others incompetent or mer-

cenary, budgeting over the brief period of expectation of governmental life and for no longer. Budgets were often monthly: huge deficits were met by the simple but illusory expedient of raiding the savings banks or merely printing more notes.

In 1925 the fiduciary circulation had reached £18,000,000; the escudo, from being worth four shillings or more, fell to 150 to the pound sterling: Portugal's war debt to Great Britain exceeded her yearly revenue, half of which was absorbed in 1924 by the army. The public debt stood at £100,000,000; the visible trade balance was adverse to the tune of £17,000,000. These are astronomical figures for a small country which is agricultural and not industrial, and which even to-day, with a rapidly increasing birth rate over recent years, has less than 8,000,000 inhabitants.

Such was the position bequeathed to General Carmona on his assuming the head of the Government set up by the military *coup d'état* of May 1926. Only after subduing with heavy fighting serious revolts in Oporto and Lisbon in February 1927 could General Carmona, who to-day remains the elected President of the Republic, turn to the urgent task confronting him. Having assumed the Presidentship by decree, he allied firmness and unity of purpose with commendable restraint, a hitherto rare quality in Portuguese politics. The country, by now sceptical of most Governments and inured to the antithesis of progress of political parties fighting for the spoils of office, suddenly discovered to its amazement that the régime, while determined to suppress opposition, was in truth patriotic. Attempts by political agitators to discredit the Government with the League of Nations served only to strengthen public opinion in support of the Government. It was from this date (1926) that the embryo of Portuguese regeneration was conceived, though two years elapsed before a star unrivalled in the Portuguese firmament of modern statesmen sternly reorganised her finances, and two more elapsed before the Constitution of the New State, founded on the sociological theory which places the association before the individual, was born.

The revenue of 1926-27 fell short of expenditure by £7,000,000. Annual deficits over a long period had averaged £5,000,000. In April 1928 General Carmona, with the

majority of the country behind him, turned in search of a financial saviour. At that date Dr. Oliveira Salazar, a deeply religious, energetic young professor of economics, was working in the cloistered calm of the University of Coimbra. To him came the Presidential summons. After a night spent, it is generally believed, in prayer, this son of a country inn proprietor came to Lisbon. He did not stay long. Unable to accept conditions which would baulk all possibility of reform, he took the next train back to Coimbra. The generals capitulated, and Dr. Salazar, armed with the powers desired, returned to Lisbon, and faced the situation with the concentration, grasp of concrete and essential details, determination and tireless capacity for work which are such marked characteristics of his nature.

Public opinion, its sensitive national pride affronted by the control and supervisory conditions stipulated by the League of Nations Financial Committee to a proposed loan, was ready to make the necessary sacrifices for financial rehabilitation. Dr. Salazar, eschewing quack remedies, imposed these sacrifices. Taxation was increased, machinery for the collection of taxes overhauled, graft was attacked, and within the year the young professor of Coimbra had achieved the first budget surplus of Portugal since 1914, and only the third since 1854. From that day to this Portugal has never failed to balance her budget; indeed, the present year was ushered in with the tenth budget surplus, and regeneration has continued—not without some private grumbling from vested interests of the old régime or occasional overt opposition, quickly suppressed, by subversive elements.

The surplus of revenue over expenditure for 1937 amounts to £1,899,000, bringing the total surpluses since 1928 to £14,400,000. The gold reserve in the Bank of Portugal has steadily increased. The floating debt was extinguished in 1934. Exchange is maintained constant with sterling. Portuguese stocks stand high in the foreign market.

Nor is it only in the financial sphere that progress has been achieved. Much has been done in the economic life of the country. Roads and communications have increased and improved to a degree astonishing to those who recall but a few years ago the few roads, the ox and mule tracks which were the normal links of communication in rural districts, and

the general state of telegraphic and telephonic amenities then available. Ten years ago omnibus services were practically non-existent. To-day about 2000 omnibuses ply over some 10,000 kilometres of roads. In 1926 the number of telephones installed by the State (in Lisbon and Oporto the telephone services are operated by a British company as concessionnaire) was under 5000: to-day they number well over 36,000, and the localities linked to the main system show a proportional increase. Schools have multiplied and the problem of instruction in them has been faced. Classes are even held in the army for the yearly influx of conscripted recruits in order thus to overcome the illiteracy prevalent among the lower classes, and a pleasant example of the will to instruct the youth of the nation was given recently by the inclusion of scholastic instruction to the caddies in their off hours at the club-house of the golf course at Lisbon's seaside resort.

Progress has continued in the corporative State instituted in April 1933 by Dr. Salazar, who had taken over the additional portfolio of Premier in June 1932, and now holds those of War and Foreign Affairs in addition to Finance. By its Constitution, approved by a plebiscite in the preceding March, Ministers are appointed by the President of the Republic, who is elected for seven years by national suffrage, and are responsible to him alone. Suffrage is to the heads of families in the first instance. Administration is carried out through the parish, municipal and provincial councils, which in turn send deputies to the Chamber of Corporations. This Chamber is composed of the heads of the twenty-four corporations or guilds representing all national enterprise and effort, from cereals and livestock to finance, from journalism and printing to fisheries, mines, national defence, wines or forests. By a system of guilds and labour contracts entered into by employers and employees an endeavour is made to rationalise production and to stabilise relations between labour and capital. Both are legislated for, and the workman, with his hours of work and holidays stipulated, and the employer, secure from strikes or lockouts, are protected by Government action.

The corporative Chamber, as merely a consultative body, reports on Bills introduced to the National Assembly—a body

of ninety members elected for four years, half by the corporations and half by direct vote under electoral law. The Assembly has no power to overthrow the Government, which reserves the right to issue decrees having the force of law. Such is the framework of the New State Constitution, evolved avowedly to preserve continuity in the Executive and thus to give breathing space after the earlier political chaos in which to allow reforms—essential if the country was to recover—to take effect without upheaval.

By active encouragement of all elements at its disposal the New State is doing everything within its power to see that such continuity shall be lasting. Apart from the army of some 139,000 available on mobilisation, the navy, of some fifteen sloops and other smaller vessels, the air force of small numbers, the Republican Guard of 7000 to 10,000 armed and picked men, and the various police forces, some 60,000 of the Portuguese Legion are sworn to defend the country and the social order, to combat subversive doctrines, 'sacrificing personal activities, riches, and life if necessary,' in doing so. The force, which is a voluntary body incorporated about eighteen months ago, after the mutiny in two naval ships and bombs in Ministries and public buildings had proved the presence of subversive elements, is trained on military lines under the supreme direction of a general, lately transferred from the post of adjutant-general of the army. Though scarcely yet mature enough to be a formidable fighting machine against seasoned troops, the Legion forms a nucleus for a second line of defence in time of war, and possesses a naval brigade, a small air force, some mechanical transport, a motor detachment armed with light automatics, and some cavalry. The *Mocidade*, or youth movement, for the moral and physical training of youth from the age of seven until of age to enter the Legion, instils in the young the ideals and aims of the New State.

At first glance, very obviously, the political system, the Legion and the *Mocidade*, the latter resembling as it does the *Ballila* organisation of Italy, seem to be replicas of the methods adopted in the totalitarian States of Germany and Italy, and as such are apt to be labelled by the foreign critic as Fascist or National-Socialist. The label is facile but inaccurate, and the Portuguese are at pains to show that although the members

of the Legion and the *Mocidade* may be regimented and salute each other with the outstretched arm of the Fascists, although coloured shirts play their part in the organisations, there the resemblance ends. There is truth in the statement, although to those ignorant of the Portuguese mentality and its intense nationalistic outlook such arguments smack of the disingenuous. The truth is that, however much some Portuguese may admire the ways of Fascism or National-Socialism, neither cult is suited to the national mentality or character. As Dr. Salazar said recently, they have not neglected to learn from every modern source which in their view has something concrete and good to offer, nor to learn from the lessons of the past. But whatever compromise evolves from these sources, it remains fundamentally Portuguese, based on Portuguese history, traditions and their own particular genius. This is undoubtedly true: nothing else would be lasting. No good Portuguese to-day will admit for one moment that anything foreign can be better than something truly Portuguese.

It is well to remember that in permitting the introduction of such methods into Portugal Dr. Salazar was undoubtedly influenced by the necessity, not only of rehabilitating the country financially, economically and politically, but by his great task, as he himself said, 'of overcoming pessimism, lack of confidence and fear of life,' of 'striving to invigorate the soul and body of the nation,' and of guaranteeing that the civic discipline so lacking in the past shall be instilled in the youth of the nation for the benefit of the future. It is this necessity of almost remaking a national character that accounts for the over-emphasis of nationalism so often noted by impartial observers.

Although this fortuitous resemblance to totalitarian régimes no doubt gives opportunities for those connected with such régimes and their Portuguese friends to take advantage of the similarity, it would be inaccurate to ascribe a totalitarian aim to Dr. Salazar. On more than one occasion deputies in the National Assembly, and even Dr. Salazar himself, have pointed out that the system of government in Portugal is not totalitarian. An analysis will show that at least in theory, and, when emergencies due to the proximity of the Spanish war have passed, possibly in practice, the

régime, although fully authoritarian, is *not* totalitarian. Personal inviolability, liberty and inviolability of religious beliefs, the freedom of expression of thought in any form, inviolability of domicile and secrecy of correspondence, no arrest without a charge, freedom of meeting and association, etc., are guaranteed by the Constitution, although, it must be admitted, clauses with wide powers annul these guarantees if necessary for the safety of the State. It is idle to pretend that all these desirable conditions of life are carried out in practice at the present moment. The Press is censored and in part controlled, and it would be a rash man who dared to give free expression to advanced views repugnant to the régime. But these, it is to be hoped, are manifestations of a transitional period in the life of a nation which, as a survey over its past will prove, has lacked cohesion and civic discipline, and which at present, owing to the Spanish Civil War, lives on the verge of a state of emergency. They are necessary, it would seem, if any order at all is to exist in Portugal, and discipline, if not present naturally, (and hence evolved over centuries by common consent of the people) must be imposed from the top if chaos is to be avoided.

No totalitarian régime would have allowed, even encouraged, since the national broadcasting station was put at his disposal, such a broadcast to the nation as was made by the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon last Christmas. In this the Cardinal denounced in trouncing terms all political cults which suppress the legitimate liberties of man and which render unto Cæsar the things which are God's.

Communism [he said] preaches class war and hatred. Totalitarian statesmanship and policy, while unfurling the flag of holy war against Communism, oppress consciences by the exclusive cult of race or nation, suppressing legitimate liberty, the rights of human beings, and the right of worship. All totalitarian attempts to dominate the body and the spirit have failed. To-day the peril is that Cæsar aspires to divine honours as absolute master of consciences. The Church has no political party. If it condemns Communism and totalitarian Cæsarism, it is because both are opposed to Divine Law—the first denying God, the second absorbing Him. The cult of race or nation is a return to paganism. The nation is not the absolute end.

The people of Portugal are highly religious. From Dr.

Salazar downwards each one will firmly re-echo the Cardinal's words, and such views have their impact, not only on internal politics and colonial missionary endeavour, but to some extent on foreign policy, particularly when, as at present, the strains and stresses of foreign affairs centre round Spain.

Throughout the centuries the major preoccupation of Portugal has been fear of invasion from Spain, with the possible resultant loss of independence. The analogy between the position of France and Germany and that of Portugal and Spain is no great exaggeration and is freely admitted by intelligent Portuguese. Neither good wind nor good marriage comes from Spain, says a Portuguese proverb. Popular opinion corroborates the statement, whatever the necessities of international politics and diplomatic usage may dictate. Akin only to the Galician, the Portuguese in general consider the Spaniard as a swashbuckling braggart from whom in the seventeenth century they won, with blood and sacrifice, their independence.

Bordered on her only land frontier by a large and powerful neighbour, Portugal has ever watched events in Spain with more than particular interest. She does not forget the various invasions over this 600 miles of frontier, open in many places to land attack, the domination of Castille, the 'sixty years of foreign yoke' inaugurated in 1580 by Philip II. of Spain, the contraction of empire during this period. Nor does she fail to celebrate annually the battle of Ameixial, by which in 1640 final independence was achieved. The Napoleonic invasions of Portugal, signs of which are still pointed out on the royal tombs in the abbey of Alcobaça, remain fresh in the memory of every educated Portuguese and keep alive the danger of a Spain in hostile hands, whether Spanish or foreign. When, as is apparently firmly believed, such hostility is bred of international Communism, all forces, political, ethical and religious, in Portugal would present united opposition. Early in the present conflict in Spain, and even before it, Spanish Left-wing extremists announced their intention, since reiterated, of forcing Portugal willy-nilly into a federation of Iberian socialistic States. Confronted with such a threat, Portugal reacted with wholehearted moral support of General Franco, the man who, it is stated, was combating so dire a threat to the independence of Portugal. Hence Portugal's attitude at

the outbreak—and since—of the Spanish Civil War. She was perfectly frank about it, openly avowed her moral support of General Franco, and indeed has recently, after a period of waiting and watching, officially recognised the Government of General Franco as the Government of Spain.

Nevertheless, Portugal subscribed to the Non-intervention Agreement, with reservations due to her special position in the Iberian Peninsula, sceptical as she was of the good faith of some Governments. When frontier control was suggested, Portugal, sensitive of sovereign rights, refused international control of her land frontier, but, lest such refusal should suggest active sabotage of the agreement, offered full facilities for frontier observation by British observers attached to the British Embassy in Lisbon. Such observation continued until the withdrawal, after the *Deutschland* incident, of Germany and Italy from the sea-control scheme—a withdrawal which Portugal considered upset the equilibrium of control in a manner unfavourable to General Franco. The British observers still remain in Portugal, inactive but awaiting agreement in the latest scheme propounded by the Non-intervention Committee.

The British Foreign Office apparently failed at the outset of the Spanish Civil War fully to realise Portugal's deep fear of the Communist menace, and failure immediately to define a clear policy left Britain's ancient ally with a sense of mystification. Thus it was that Germany and Italy, with their recognised support of General Franco, achieved at one period a fortuitous and possibly passing popularity in Portugal at the expense of Great Britain. Of such opportunity full advantage was taken: hints of the decay of British statesmanship, lack of realism, the decadence of democracy (the real meaning of which is scarcely understood even by its adherents in Portugal, since democratic government in Portugal in the early days of the Republic was largely a misnomer for political party intrigue), and similar opinions were freely vociferated. For a time the more impressionable of the Portuguese, as opposed to the level-headed Dr. Salazar, swallowed the unctuous cordial, offered in large doses. But not for long. The significance of the *Anschluss*, the suppression of religious thought in certain countries, the firm bonds of friendship between Great Britain and France in the cause of peace and appeasement, is not lost upon the Portuguese.

Like other nations, Portugal requires peace within and without her borders to continue her reconstruction at home and overseas. Like Great Britain, she desires that the present conflict in Spain should be confined to Spain, and that a Spain of whatever complexion should confine herself to her own territories. Emphasis recently laid on the necessity of recognition of the full independence of Portugal as a fundamental axiom in any Spanish policy dealing with Portugal is not without considerable significance. Evidence is not lacking of some perturbation at some possible results of German economic penetration as the result of intervention in Spain. Nor is it ignored that, at least at one period, others besides Left-wing extremists in Spain were alleged to have designs on Portuguese independence. The circulation of a pamphlet purporting to reproduce a publication of the *Falange Española* recently caused a stir in Portugal. The pamphlet, entitled *The Spanish Empire*, portrayed a double-headed eagle bearing the arms of Spain, Portugal, and those of King Philip II. of Spain, the monarch who initiated the 'sixty-years foreign domination.' Although the origin of this obvious implication against Portuguese independence was at first reported to be communistic and inspired merely to embarrass relations with General Franco, a Portuguese special correspondent in Spain showed the untruth of such a conjecture.

Whatever the immediate strains and stresses of foreign affairs, the broad basis of the foreign policy of Portugal remains constant. The question is one of strategy born of geographical situation and tempered to the resources at her disposal. Defence against invasion and aggression at home, the defence of a colonial empire stretching from the Atlantic to the China Seas, and the maintenance of communications ranging from Lisbon to the Azores, Madeira, Cape Verde and Portuguese Guinea, from Príncipe and São Thomé Islands to Angola, Mozambique, Goa, Macao and Timor, are fundamental considerations which no Portuguese Government can ignore. Bordered on the one side by a land frontier open to attack from Spain and on the other by nearly 500 miles of seaboard open to attack by a preponderant naval force in the Eastern Atlantic, Portugal has a double problem of defence for her homeland alone. Nor does the addition

of aircraft to the machinery of destruction, and their ever-increasing effective range, diminish the problems of defence. Lisbon is within daylight flying distance from France, Germany and Italy, while Southampton is but six hours' flying time away, and Gibraltar less than half that time.

The problems of defence are vast problems, the successful solution to which must demand in a general conflict, or indeed for a full sense of security at any time, powers of resistance greater than the limited resources of Portugal can supply. The home army, organised on a basis of four divisions, with the requisite ancillary units and staffs in addition to the frontier garrisons and general reserves, may be assumed to total on mobilisation about 139,000 men. Reserves of perhaps five times that number should be available, with an expanding second line of defence in the Portuguese Legion. The army is in process of rearmament as rapidly as the foreign race in armaments will allow of sales to Portugal. The army air force, though expanding within the finances available, is small in comparison with that of many European nations: the naval air arm is even smaller, and the navy itself, however imbued with the spirit of those magnificent seafarers of the Vasco da Gama, Albuquerque or Cabral era, can scarcely be expected to withstand in home defence alone the superior naval might of some Powers—not to mention the question of maintaining open sea communications over a hemisphere. Nor can Portugal's finances—sound, stable and expanding daily as they are—expect to equal in bulk or reserves the vast sums at the disposal of some Powers.

It is evident, therefore, that in her problems of defence, on which her very existence may depend, Portugal requires the aid of a Power with the necessary naval, military, air and financial resources available to guarantee her integrity against aggression, and to which Power Portugal, in turn, can offer reciprocal advantages. The only Power fulfilling these conditions is Great Britain. No mere sentiment or trade advantages alone are responsible for the continuance over more than five centuries of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. The basis is strategical. True it is that the treaty dating back to 1373 was originally commercial rather than military, that the treaty of 1386 with John of Gaunt appeared to have few outside implications for Britain. In 1661, however, a secret

article in the treaty embodying the marriage settlements of Catherine of Braganza with Charles II. bound Britain 'to defend and protect all conquests and colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal, as well future as present,' against all the King of Portugal's enemies. This article was reaffirmed in 1899, and subsequent confirmations of the alliance tend to show that a certain responsibility for aid in defence of Portugal and her oversea possessions is accepted by Great Britain.

Britain for her part has vital sea communications flanked by Portugal, her islands and possessions. A study of the map will show the extent of menace to these communications with South Africa, the Mediterranean, and to the Americas *viâ* the Azores, should the ports and coasts of Portugal or her possessions be in hostile hands. Just as the sea routes to the centre of the British Empire converge in the English Channel, so do those to the Cape, India and the Americas converge within the triangle Lisbon-Azores-Cape Verde. It is therefore with the understanding of full reciprocity that the naval, military and air minds of the two nations will discuss joint problems. The arrival last February of a British Services Mission in Portugal and its continued stay there up to the time of writing shows that the value of personal deliberations in questions designed to achieve mutual invulnerability is not ignored.

Britain and her Empire will appreciate the benefit of friendly ports and coasts on the flank of her major sea communications, their advantage as refuelling or refitting bases, as indeed the value of their denial to hostile forces, and the lack of hostile menace over some 2500 miles of vital sea routes. Portugal for her part will no doubt appreciate the value of sea power in general possessed by her ally and the resultant sure strategical defence of her seaboard and communications with her colonies, while her own naval forces provide local tactical defence.

In the past command of the sea has enabled Britain on many occasions to bring land reinforcements to help Portugal preserve her independence. Excluding the fortuitous arrival in 1147 of English crusaders, who helped King Affonso Henriques to capture Lisbon from the Moors, Britain has rendered aid to Portugal on seven occasions. In 1385 500

English archers helped King João I. to gain the victory over the Spaniards at Aljubarrota, and this force, later increased to 2000 lancers and 3000 archers under John of Gaunt, helped to put the House of Aviz firmly on the throne and to end Spanish attempts against it for the next 200 years. In 1580 Queen Elizabeth, who had never accepted the Spanish occupation of Portugal, sent an expedition under the Earl of Essex to Portugal—the only expedition which failed in its mission. Again in 1662 some 3000 veterans, mainly remnants of Cromwell's Ironsides, under Lord Inchiquin, helped in a series of battles to break the power of Spain in Portugal. Ten thousand men under the Earl of Galway supported Portugal in the War of the Spanish Succession in 1704 and cleared Portugal of the invader, and fifty-eight years later the arrival of Sir John Burgoyne with an English army in answer to an appeal from Portugal resulted in the repulse of the invader and the signing of peace within a year. In 1796 Spain again declared war on Portugal, who again appealed to Britain. The House of Commons voted Portugal a subsidy of £200,000 and sent a force of 6000 men under Sir Charles Stuart, which was sufficient to deter the suggested invasion. In 1807 the Duke of Wellington started his series of victories, which culminated in Waterloo, by driving the invader from Portuguese soil. Portugal will not forget these episodes of history which in no small measure helped to preserve her independence. Nor will she undervalue the support of her powerful ally in a grasping world in which certain nations cast envious eyes on the colonial possessions of others.

The alliance exists, and will exist, as Dr. Salazar has said, to the mutual benefit of both nations. It is vital to one, advantageous to both, and is, without exaggeration, a force for peace in Europe and beyond.

ERIC WAKEHAM.

THE BOMBING OF HARBOURS AND SHIPPING THEREIN

By J. M. SPAIGHT, C.B., C.B.E., LL.D.

THE question whether a belligerent is or is not entitled to bombard a harbour and the shipping therein has arisen in an acute form in the Spanish Civil War. It is a question which is of vital importance for this country. Nothing, said Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on June 23, 1938, could be more detrimental to us than to legitimise or affirm by our action unregulated bombing from the air. 'What consequences,' he asked, 'might not that have to ourselves when we should be depending upon neutral ships entering our ports in time of war?'

The issue has been clouded at times by the presentation of the question in a form in which it virtually answers itself. In the House of Commons on June 21, 1938, for instance, Mr. Noel Baker posed it in terms of the *indiscriminate* bombardment of commercial ports distant from the battle front. In *The Times* of July 1, 1938, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond quoted General Franco's statement that 'ports have always been considered legitimate objectives in every war,' and challenged the truth of it if it meant that *indiscriminate* bombardment of maritime towns and their harbours had been an admissible practice in the past.

One can readily agree with both Mr. Baker and Admiral Richmond. The point, however, is rather whether the actual harbour of a coastal town or port may be bombarded with discrimination; that is, whether it is legitimate to attack, not the town or port as a whole, but the waterfront—the docks, dock gates, breakwaters, buoys, beacons, piers, jetties, cranes, derricks, capstans, winches, warehouses, and in general those parts of the port which are immediately concerned in the loading or unloading of vessels. That question is not so easily answered.

In the House of Commons on June 14, 1938, Mr. Chamberlain, referring to the attacks upon ports and ships in Spain, said: 'There is no precedent for attacks from the air, because aircraft was not previously developed. This action gives rise to a series of new problems in regard to which there is no previous experience.'

It is true that air bombardment presents new features and that there are no internationally agreed rules governing it. There are, however, rules governing the bombardment of ports and shipping by naval forces, and as the bomb is, after all, only another kind of shell, launched by gravity instead of propellant explosive, the naval rules, or at least the principles underlying them, should serve as a guide to what is permissible and what is not permissible in bombardments from the air. They are more apposite than the rules (such as they are) governing bombardment on land, for the circumstances of the latter are not so analogous to those of air bombardment as are the circumstances in which naval bombardment takes place.

There is, indeed, a fairly close similarity between a naval raid—such, for example, as the German cruiser raid against Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby in December 1914—and an air raid upon a town far distant from any battle front. There is in each case the element of surprise. In each case the giving of warning of the intended attack could be claimed to be excluded by military exigencies. In each there is no question of the capture of the port or town attacked. The bombardment is in each case an end in itself, a self-sufficing operation of war.

What are the rules governing bombardment by a naval raiding force in such circumstances? Is the naval commander entitled to destroy the harbour works with his guns? May he do so even if the harbour is a commercial one, far from any scene of active operations? May he shell merchant vessels in the harbour? If he may not, may he still bombard the harbour itself, even though a chance shot may hit a ship? It is possible to answer these questions definitely. There are specific rules governing the action of a naval commander in the various situations contemplated above.

Because these rules exist, it is now hardly relevant to quote instances of prior bombardments of commercial ports,

such as the bombardment by the United States of Greytown (S. Juan del Norte), in Nicaragua, in 1854, or our bombardments of Taganrog in 1855 and of Canton in 1856. Our admiral's action at Canton was denounced by many speakers in the House of Lords on February 24, 1857, and in the House of Commons on February 26 and 27 and March 2 and 3, 1857, in terms which might provide modern politicians with a selection of vituperative expressions to apply to air bombardments. The debates will be found in *Hansard*, old series, vol. cxliv., for 1857. But that is all old history now.

The rules now governing naval bombardment are laid down in Convention No. IX. of the Hague, which was signed in 1907 and to which all the great Powers are parties. Article 1 of the Convention forbids the bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings and buildings. Article 2, however, qualifies that prohibition as follows :

Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war material, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and ships of war in the harbour, are not, however, included in this prohibition. The commander of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, after a summons followed by a reasonable interval of time, if all other means are impossible, and when the local authorities have not themselves destroyed them within the time fixed.

He incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be caused by a bombardment under such circumstances.

If for military reasons immediate action is necessary, and no delay can be allowed to the enemy, it is nevertheless understood that the prohibition to bombard the undefended town holds good, as in the case given in the first paragraph, and that the commander shall take all due measures in order that the town may suffer as little harm as possible.

The word 'plant' ('installations' in the original French), which is used in the first sentence of the Article, was intended, it is recorded in the Report of the Committee which drafted the Article, to cover works not used solely for military purposes, such as railway centres and floating docks. Coal stocks, Dr. Pearce Higgins states (*The Hague Peace Conferences*, p. 355), would also be covered, and oil storage depôts could now be reasonably added.

The effect of the specific reference to 'ships of war in the

harbour' is to ban by clear implication the deliberate bombardment of merchant vessels. The Article, it will be noted, enumerates exceptions to the rule that undefended ports may not be bombarded, and if other vessels than warships were intended to be included among the exceptions, they would have been expressly mentioned. It is clear, however, from the Article as a whole, that a pier or dock may be bombarded even if the result is unavoidably to damage a merchant vessel which happens to be alongside.

The objectives enumerated may be bombarded even in a commercial harbour ; it is the character of the objectives, not of the harbour as a whole, that is the criterion. The question whether in such a harbour there are *installations* of the kind in question must often be one of some difficulty. The fact that a port was notoriously being used in connexion with the maintenance of current naval or military operations would be an important factor of any decision upon this point.

The principle of the 'military objective' which is embodied in the naval rules is also that which nominally underlay the practice of air bombardment in the Great War. According to the belligerents' own statements, as published at the time, their bombing airmen invariably aimed only at military objectives, and these were, broadly, of the same kind as those described above. It must be added, however, that the belligerents interpreted the term 'military objective' in a rather elastic fashion at times. It was held to cover, for instance, industrial centres and, indeed, what has been called 'psychological bombardment' was not wholly unknown to the practice of 1914-18, though no hint of this was given in the contemporary *communiqués*.

The various memoranda of 1917-18 which are reproduced in the volume entitled 'Appendices' of Mr. H. A. Jones's official history, *The War in the Air*, disclose the views taken at that time of the potentialities of air-power. The important results which it might accomplish were recognised at an early date, and the right of action claimed for the air arm was at times far-reaching. The Second Report of the Prime Minister's Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence against Air Raids, dated August 17, 1917, looked forward to a day when the 'devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale' by air

forces might become the principal operations of war ('Appendices,' p. 10). It is true that Sir Douglas Haig, in his comments of September 15, 1917, upon this Report, declared himself unable to agree with the large claims which were made in it for air-power, but admitted that air action might have valuable results in crippling the enemy's naval and military resources. He thought, too, that the bombing of populous centres might be justifiable, and effective, as a means of retaliation for similar acts by the enemy (*ibid.*, p. 15).

Retaliation can be pleaded, unfortunately, for any and every transgression, given that modicum of excuse for it which war often affords. Long-distance air raids, however, it was pointed out by Marshal Foch in a memorandum of September 13, 1918 (*ibid.*, p. 33), were not true reprisals; they were 'a means of warfare which were first used by the enemy and which we are therefore forced to use in our turn.' They included, said this memorandum, attacks on the industry, commerce and population of the enemy country; and the same three objects of air attack were expressly mentioned in the Heads of Agreement for the constitution of an Inter-Allied Independent Air Force drawn up in the autumn of 1918 (*ibid.*, p. 41).

The first call upon the air force, said Marshal Foch in another memorandum, dated September 14, 1918, must always be for the needs of the army, but, he adds, 'it can, in quiet times, act on the morale of the enemy people or against industrial establishments, which is its secondary function' (*ibid.*, p. 29). How the primary and secondary functions are related to one another had already been shown by Mr. Churchill, then Minister of Munitions, in a paper dated September 21, 1917. 'Our air offensive,' he said, 'should consistently be aimed at striking at the bases and communications upon whose structure the fighting power of his [the enemy's] armies and his fleets of the sea and of the air depends.' He goes on, however: 'Any injury which comes to the civil population from this process of attack must be regarded as incidental and inevitable' (*ibid.*, p. 19). In other words, the moral effect is obtained as the by-product of an operation which has a military justification.

Systematic and recurrent bombing of the enemy's industrial towns 'until the morale of workmen is so shaken that

output is seriously interfered with' was advocated in another important memorandum of the war years, and here, again, the link between military and psychological effect is to be discerned. The memorandum was one drawn up by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office, in January 1918 (*ibid.*, p. 26). Recurrent bombing, it stated, 'interrupts industrial production and undermines public confidence.' A similar view was expressed in a memorandum issued by British G.H.Q. in France in February 1918, which referred to the effect of the raids into the interior of the enemy's country in 'inflicting material damage and delay on his production and transport of war material' and in 'lowering the morale of his industrial population' (*ibid.*, p. 93).

It is significant that when, in February 1918, something in the nature of an offer to restrict long-distance bombing was made in the Bavarian Chamber, our Government decided that freedom of action should be retained for the development of such bombing. The fundamental criterion, said a paper prepared by the General Staff, War Office, at that time, was whether operations of this kind 'manifestly subserve military interests and are justifiable on the grounds of military necessity' (*The War in the Air*, vi., pp. 102-3).

It is evident that military interests are served and that the attack is justifiable when it is directed at a harbour which is in fact used as the base of an enemy's naval forces. Our aircraft repeatedly bombed the harbour at Bruges in the Great War and, with Italian aircraft, that at Cattaro. Durazzo was bombarded from both sea and air. The harbour of Cartagena, which is the base of the Spanish Republican fleet, would clearly be a legitimate objective.

If, again, the harbour, though not a naval base, is an important railway centre and importing place for military supplies, it can hardly be regarded as exempt from attack either under the rules of 1907 or the usage of war established in 1914-18. It was because Dedeagatch, in Bulgaria, was such a place that it was bombarded by the British and French fleets on October 21, 1915. Their fire was directed, according to the British *Official History*, on the railway station and bridge; rolling-stock, the harbour works, warehouses, shipping and coal and oil supplies. 'As a port and railway centre,' says Sir Julian Corbett, 'Dedeagatch was ruined.'

So, too, the port of Valencia was 'all but destroyed,' according to *The Times* correspondent at Hendaye (June 23, 1938), by the Spanish Nationalist aircraft, and, ignoring any difference in the position due to the régime of so-called Non-intervention, one would have difficulty in condemning the latter bombardment if the former one is approved. The bombing of the harbour at Valencia cannot, indeed, be regarded as unlawful, and that view was in fact implied in the words used by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his answer to a question in the House of Commons on May 2, 1938. A recent raid on Valencia, he said, was apparently aimed at 'a shell factory, the harbour and other adjacent military objectives.' He considered, therefore, that we should not be warranted in making a protest founded on the allegation that the attack was aimed at the civilian population.

It is when one comes to ports which are not such clearly important links in an enemy's chain of communications and supply that the question of their liability to be bombarded, or, rather, of the liability of any harbour works therein which could be used for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, becomes difficult. In *The Times* of June 2, 1938, that journal's correspondent at Barcelona referred to the raids up and down the Levante coast; they were directed, he said, at the harbours, railway stations and roads, and 'in any war,' he added, 'these are militarily important.' If they are, their liability to bombardment cannot be contested. It is different when the port is predominantly a commercial one and its activity as such obviously outshadows any such casual use for military or naval purposes, as could be pointed to in almost any port of a country which is the scene of war.

To bombard a commercial port with the object of stopping the enemy's trade in general and bringing economic pressure to bear upon his country as a whole cannot be justified under the Hague Convention of 1907, though precedents would not be difficult to find in some of the practices of the Great War. The argument that as a belligerent is entitled to destroy his enemy's sea-borne trade by capturing enemy ships and such neutral ships as attempt to run blockade or carry contraband, so he is entitled to destroy an enemy port by bomb or shell with the same object, is wholly untenable. It would involve a very dangerous extension of naval practice.

Hostile attack is justifiable when it is directed at a military objective. Would not a ship loaded with munitions in the harbour be such an objective, it may be asked, and therefore liable to be bombarded? A suggestion to that effect was made, indeed, in the Spanish Nationalist Press in answer to the British protests against the bombing of ships. The Nationalists, said the correspondent of *The Times* at Burgos on June 29, 1938, 'allege that a great deal of war material is unloaded daily in the ports of Republican Spain, and that the ships in which it is brought are legitimate military objectives.'

The plea is entirely inadmissible. It was made in connexion with the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915 and was disposed of, once and for all, by the Washington Rules of 1922, now embodied, as revised, in the London Naval Treaty of 1930. These rules are as follows:

(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.

(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

The effect of these rules is to disallow the assimilation of munition-carrying merchant vessels to military objectives on land. Unless she refuses to stop on summons or resists visit and search, a merchant vessel may not be sunk or disabled until the safety of the crew and passengers has been provided for; and a merchant vessel does not cease to be a merchant vessel when she enters harbour.

While the deliberate bombing of a merchant vessel in port must be regarded as a breach of international law, accidental bombing is another matter. 'The British Government,' said Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on June 23, 1938, 'has always made a distinction between attacks on British ships which might be called accidental

inasmuch as the ships were close to some objective, and that a hostile aeroplane aiming at that military objective might unwillingly involve a British ship in the attack. We made a distinction between that kind of attack and an attack which was deliberately aimed at a British vessel.' So, too, Mr. R. A. Butler, replying on June 3 to a question about the bombing of ships at Valencia, stated that some of the berths there had been exceedingly close to places which could be considered as military objectives, and the ships which had been hit in these circumstances could not be said to have been the object of deliberate attack. Where the attack appeared to be deliberate, protest had been made to the Burgos authorities.

The line which our Government has taken in connexion with the bombing of Spanish ports and shipping therein can be supported by an appeal to the principles of international law. These principles are to be sought in the practice and rules of naval bombardment and in such usage of air bombardment as has been built up in the last twenty-five years. It is regrettable, nevertheless, that principles only have to be quoted and that it is not possible to refer to chapter and verse of a definite convention or code of rules for air bombardment as the authority for the British contentions. The international law of air warfare should be regulated; indeed, the law of bombardment as a whole is in need of overhaul. The present situation is unsatisfactory. It is not clear, for instance, what a military objective is, or how far a legitimate bombardment may become illegitimate if it is conducted without due care. Until rules upon the subject are formulated and agreed, condemnation or approval of any given bombardment will tend to vary with the ideological bias of the commentator upon it, whereas the question is eminently one which ought to be susceptible of objective appraisal.

J. M. SPAIGHT.

BRITISH BLOCKADE-RUNNERS.

1861-65 AND 1936-38

By SIR CHARLES OMAN

AMONG the many ingenious pieces of propaganda which are being used to discredit the Government of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, I know of none more insincere than the accusation that it is causing the deaths of scores of British sailors, and the destruction of a certain amount of British merchant vessels, by its refusal to interfere in the naval operations now in progress around the coasts of Spain. I have just received a formidable list which purports to give the names of ships 'interfered with, attacked, or sunk during the war in Spain 1936-38.' It is stated that 'Franco has made over fifty deliberate attacks on British shipping, while engaged in legitimate trade to Spanish ports.'

The one thing that does not emerge from this plausible document is that we are dealing with cases of blockade-running during a state of war. The 'legitimate trade to Spanish ports' means the running of cargoes into Bilbao, Gijon and Santander in 1937, or Alicante, Valencia and Barcelona in 1938, while those places were in a 'war area.' There are a few cases quoted where the interference with British ships was a little further out to sea, and *might* have been on the recognised trade routes up the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar; there are no cases quoted of British ships having been stopped, captured, or sunk in waters really remote from Spain. The phrase 'legitimate trade' brings up a point of international law: can it be ruled that if one of the parties in a long civil war has not been 'recognised as a belligerent,' it is technically lawful for any ship to make a claim to enter any port in the war area without molestation? This is, of course, absurd; the fundamental fact is that war exists, and that a blockade has been proclaimed by one of the parties

concerned ; that such a party has not been formally recognised as a belligerent does not make any practical difference to the situation, though English Opposition journals still go on calling the Nationalists 'rebels' and describe their action as piracy. To call the side 'rebels' which is in possession of two-thirds of Spain, and now owns all its ports save some six or eight, is mere political quibbling. I am reminded, when I see the terms 'rebel' and 'loyalist' bandied about, of the old sarcastic English rhyme of Jacobite days

Now which 'pretender' is, and which 'the king,'
God bless us ! is a most perplexing thing.

The standing fact is that a civil war exists, and that it is notorious that the coasts of Spain still in the hands of the Republican Government are very dangerous regions to approach. Every British shipowner knows this, and if he cares to risk his vessel and the lives of its crew for purposes of financial profit, or (conceivably, but I think rarely) for political reasons, that is his business, and not the concern of the British Government. The civil war and the blockade are notorious, and if any shipowner chooses to take the risks for his private ends, he is in the same position as if he ordered his captain to steer out into the middle of a tornado or a swarm of icebergs. Which means that he is morally responsible for anything that may happen.

The reason which I have for writing this note is that I have nowhere seen any clear statement of the fact that the conditions off the coast of Spain at the present moment had their exact parallel in the Atlantic nearly seventy years ago, when scores of British unarmed merchantmen were being captured or sunk, and hundreds of lives lost, during a period of over four years. The British Government never interfered, save in the case of the well-known *Trent*, which was not a blockade-runner, but a mail steamer passing eastward, away from the war area, between two neutral ports. Lord Palmerston, the most belligerent of British Prime Ministers, looked on, with distaste no doubt, while the blockade-runners were being hunted or sunk, but made no attempt at 'intervention.' Where his sympathies lay, we may judge from the case of the *Alabama*, which was to cost us so many millions. But the *Alabama*, of course, was not a blockade-runner, but

a warship *in posse*, allowed to depart from a British port by what looked somewhat like official collusion or neglect to act promptly.

Otherwise the conditions of 1861-65 were clearly parallel to those of 1937-38, save that it was 'rebels,' and not the Government, which profited by the blockade-running, and that they had been 'recognised as belligerents'—a legal phrase without any serious influence on the face of the situation, except so far as that a blockade-runner could not be called a 'pirate' unless he resisted capture by force of arms, which, as a matter of fact, he never did, all his ships being unarmed and built for speed alone.

The blockade established by the United States Government over the whole coastline of the Confederate States was at first very sketchy—some ports not being watched at all, others by only one or two rather inefficient sailing vessels or converted peace-time steamers. But as the war went on the blockade was tightened; an important port, such as Wilmington, was watched by a squadron close inshore, by an outlying cordon of ships always on the move, and by other cruisers far out at sea, on the look out for captures far beyond territorial waters. As an example of the provocative nature of the perfected blockade, we may mention that Federal cruisers used to hang about just outside the British ports, which were the usual bases for blockade-runners, particularly Nassau in the Bahamas and Bermuda. They kept beyond the 'three-mile limit,' but pounced on any ship that came outside the harbour, and captured it if found carrying goods—often arms—intended for a Confederate destination. The blockade-runner had to wait for a dark night or a stormy day when he ran out of the British water, and then to make his best speed into the Atlantic in the hope of eluding the watcher.

What would English Opposition papers say to-day if General Franco kept warships just three miles out from Malta (or, for the matter of that, from Marseilles) and searched every vessel that came out, whatever its nationality? This is what the Federal Government did in 1863-65. Occasionally blockading zeal went very far indeed, as when on October 5, 1863, the *Wachusset* ran into the Brazilian harbour of Bahia, and cut out a Confederate vessel from under the nose of the

astonished captain of a Brazilian corvette, the guardship of the port, who contented himself with letting off three innocuous shots in protest. Of course this liberty would not have been taken with the British or a French Government; but it shows what a blockade might mean in 1863.

I see much stress laid on the fact that some at least of the British blockade-runners of to-day are said to be bringing into Valencia or Barcelona, not munitions of war, but foodstuffs. The same was being done off the American coast in 1864: one of the most interesting books written by a blockade-runner, Thomas E. Taylor, contains a story of December 1864 which is well worth pondering. Having delivered a cargo at Wilmington, he went up to Richmond to report his arrival; there he met the Commissary-General of Robert E. Lee's army, who divulged to him, under promise of secrecy, that the troops in the Richmond lines were practically starving, and had in fact rations for less than thirty days. He promised to pay the equivalent of 350 per cent. profit on any flour or meat that could be got into Richmond in three weeks. Astonishing as it may sound, Taylor fulfilled the conditions; he ran his vessel, the *Banshee II.*, out of Wilmington to the British port of Nassau, a matter of 570 miles, through a close blockade, and loaded up with 2100 barrels of salt pork and beef which cost him £6000. Starting back on Christmas Day, 1864, he ran the blockade again through the middle of Porter's sixty-four ships, which were besetting the harbour forts of Wilmington, and delivered his goods through a salvo of shells, none of which disabled the *Banshee II.* The food got to Lee's starving army within *eighteen days* after the Commissary-General had made his offer, and was paid for in the best 'Sea Island' cotton, which when delivered at Liverpool fetched £27,000. It only reached England after another dash through the blockading squadron in vile weather. Wilmington fell just two days after Taylor got through the blockaders for the *third* time. Its last artery of communication with the outer world being severed, the army of Lee, worn out by privation as much as by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, ended its gallant career in April. Who can dispute the fact that foodstuffs are as much munitions of war as shells and cartridges?

The fact that the blockade-runners' trade is full of adven-

ture, and cannot be carried on without much courage and ingenuity, must not blind our eyes to the fact that it is taken up for mere financial profit, and is carried on by persons reckless of everything save the huge gains involved, and deliberately risking the lives of the crews of their vessels. Some individuals, no doubt, make large sums of money, but it is doubtful, on the whole, whether the gains to the trade cover the losses. The Government of the United States published at the end of the great war of 1861-65 tables showing that in the four years 1149 blockade-runners were captured, and 335 burned, sunk, or driven on shore, or otherwise totally destroyed. A large majority of these vessels had sailed under the British flag. The number of lives lost was never ascertained, but in the 335 ships sunk or burned must have been very considerable, something infinitely greater than the total of thirty-five fatal casualties on British ships scheduled in the pamphlet which I have just received. I cannot make out that Lord Palmerston's Government was ever attacked by the Opposition Press on this particular point, though he was criticised bitterly enough on other pleas. Everyone understood that the blockade-runner was deliberately taking risks for gain, without any consideration of the public interest of his own country.

It does not impress me favourably when I note that many of the technically British vessels recently listed as destroyed had been purchased from small neutral traders a few weeks back, and that the casualties on board are shown to have been in numerous cases Greeks, Lascars, and sailors of doubtful nationality. The plea of injury to British national pride does not ring true.

I may make another remark on propagandist telegrams dealing with the misadventures of blockade-runners. Such careful stress is laid on the fact that a vessel has been sunk or bombed in the *harbour* of Valencia, Barcelona, or Alicante, that it would seem to be inferred that when a blockade-runner has reached its destination it ought to be immune from further molestation. This is surely absurd: in the old wars a pursuer did not refrain from shelling the pursued because the latter had reached his destination, but only because the sea-forts of the harbour were strong enough to compel the blockader to keep out of danger. In cases where the harbour defences

were non-existent or ineffective, the pursuer continued to molest the escaping vessel. Cases can be quoted from the American Civil War in which a blockade-runner, reaching a practically undefended harbour, was then fired on, and driven ashore or sunk. The only distinction between such cases and those of to-day is that pursuit by aeroplane over a hostile port is now possible. I cannot see that this makes any essential difference in the situation. But evidently there is a tacit plea that bombardment of a blockade-runner in harbour is something much worse than the molesting of the same vessel on the high seas. And I detect an insinuation that there is also something sinister in firing on an escaping vessel when it has got within the three-mile limit of the shore: the schedule 'off Valencia' or 'off Barcelona' would seem to imply that a blockade-runner ought to become immune because it has run into the territorial waters of the side which it is serving. This, I think, is a lingering survival of the idea that the Spanish Nationalists have not been properly recognised as belligerents, and that the three-mile limit is therefore sacrosanct as against them. Can any rational observer of the situation feel that he can be moved to reprobation by this theory?

To sum up, blockade-running is an industry conducted for private gain by certain individuals, contrary to the interests of their country, and to the warnings of their Government. I can see nothing sympathetic in it—especially when I think of the loss of life incurred by the unfortunate crews cajoled into service by these profiteers.

CHARLES OMAN.

THE BALKAN COUNTRIES IN BRIEF

By F. YEATS-BROWN

I. ALBANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA, AND ROUMANIA

TRAVELLING through South-Eastern Europe, one is at first appalled by the mutually irreconcilable claims of neighbours and minorities. Obviously Everyman cannot get everything he wants; it is tempting, therefore, to conclude that the Balkans is still a viper's nest, ready to poison Europe with its hates. But nothing could be further from the truth.

In Central Europe, and further north (in Danzig and Memel), problems exist whose solution may render peace precarious. Not so in the Balkans. Dissatisfied peoples there are, of course, but they are united as never before on certain points of view: several common denominators can be found for their outlooks and their policies.

First and foremost, each country has a genuinely pacific programme of reforms—in agriculture, development of roads, railways, industries, and educational systems—which would be interrupted by war. General staffs may have their plans, but the military are in the background; and the emphasis is on peace and progress everywhere. One is reminded of a pre-war parody:

If you, my dear, were Bulgar
And I, your love, were Greek,
We'd vote dissensions vulgar
And Constitutions *chic*.

Secondly, there is the growing commercial influence of Germany, a country regarded with respect rather than affection. There is a fear—I believe unfounded—that the *Swastika* flag will follow the path of trade. Further, and in spite of the distrust of German aims, there is a current leading away from democracy and the League of Nations. Lip service is paid,

here and there, to parliamentary institutions, but in practice all the Balkan States are governed by dictatorships. Finally, there is a rising tide of athleticism and female emancipation.

So much, and it is a great deal, the nations of South-Eastern Europe have in common. The Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Roumania and Czechoslovakia, united to keep Hungary from demanding a revision of the Peace Treaties) and the Balkan Alliance (Yugoslavia, Roumania, Greece and Turkey, restraining the ambitions of Bulgaria) have lost their former scope: nowadays both the Entente and the Alliance are concerned with finding points of agreement with their neighbours, and are concentrating on practical questions of trade, which emphasise their common interests, rather than on racial and territorial ambitions, which lead to bitterness. Pre-war ideas of conquest are almost completely in the discard. No one in Tirana, Sofia, Bucharest, Ankara, or Athens imagines that war will solve any problem; nor are the statesmen of Belgrade of a different opinion, although I did hear talk there, amongst the dreamers who always exist in a Slav nation, of a great empire extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea.

I saw a dervish kicking a football with his bare feet in Tirana, and I saw little boys practising at a goal on the parade ground at Kruja, that ancient citadel which even Mahomed II., the conqueror of Byzantium, failed to capture from the Sons of the Eagle. Travelling up to Serajevo, I saw a veiled lady (for the Yugoslavs do not suffer from the Turkish craving to copy the West) leaving for a seaside holiday with her children: she had an expensive camera and a vacuum-flask slung from her shoulders, and wore the fashionable cork shoes: it was a charming picture of old and new. Would she, I wondered, come out of her *purdah* and wear a backless bathing dress in the seclusion of some Adriatic beach? In Bucharest I saw 5000 girls in gym. dress fall on their knees and intone the Lord's Prayer—a beautiful spectacle, and an encouraging one to a Christian who believes that youth should be disciplined, but not paganised. People who do such things are not on the brink of any insane adventures.

With regard to dictatorships, it may be—in fact it is—a sad thought that our once-venerated parliamentary institutions are no longer emulated. On the other hand, the prestige

of Great Britain has risen enormously, startlingly, since Mr. Chamberlain came to power. The Balkan dictators are all friendly. In Albania the shrewd King Zog encourages his subjects to learn our language, and the Herbert Library in Tirana is always packed with students. Prince Paul, the First Regent of Yugoslavia, has many ties with England, and his able Prime Minister, M. Stoyadinovitch, loses no opportunity of showing his friendship. King Boris, without question the most popular man in Bulgaria, is trying to steer his country back to the party system: he detests being an autocrat, but for the moment there is no one to take his place. In Roumania, on the other hand, King Carol enjoys the rôle of a reformer with all the enthusiasm of his Coburg ancestry. Those closest to him—M. Dimitri Dimancescu, for instance, the Director of Propaganda, and M. V. V. Tillea, a former Minister, who was intimately concerned with the inauguration of the present reforms—are as much at home in London as in Bucharest.

In all the Balkan capitals Germans are in evidence. After the 1931 crisis Germany was compelled to buy her raw materials from those who bought from her, and the countries which before this date were being developed with French capital have now become German spheres of action. Yugoslavia exports 36 per cent. of her goods to Germany, Bulgaria 47 per cent., Roumania 27 per cent., but the proportion of Germany's relative imports is only 3 or 4 per cent. Obviously she has the whip hand. But I do not myself believe in the danger of a German hegemony in South-Eastern Europe for the reason I have already given: nationalism is in the ascendant in these countries.

In Yugoslavia a small Nazi Party has appeared, and has been promptly suppressed. Bulgaria, being more Slav, is immune, although I believe that German influence is strong in the army. Roumania had her Iron Guard, with an honest and idealistic leader who was determined to purge the country of corruption. Unfortunately his methods were unpractical. The King came to the conclusion, and rightly, that the country would have no peace so long as M. Codreanu and his rivals disputed for power, so he took the bold step of abolishing politics altogether. By my bedside, in one of the leading hotels in Bucharest, I found the following notice:

In accordance with the law for maintaining public order, we

would call the attention of guests to the necessity of avoiding political meetings or discussions in the hotel. In the event of non-observance of this rule, we shall be obliged to request the guest, or guests, to give up their accommodations immediately.

Of course, nobody obeys this injunction. Roumania is still a comparatively free country, except for members of the Iron Guard. But the King is playing a dangerous game, which he can win only if he achieves the aim of Codreanu's half-million supporters—namely, to abolish corruption in high places, and to return to Christian principles of government. One must hope that he will succeed.

The aims of these dictators are identical. One of the cleverest of them (who asked me not to quote him in person) said to me :

We are a small country, and have suffered terribly in the Balkan wars, and in the Great War. We must have peace, to build up the ruins of the past. Certainly we would like our frontiers rectified, and we wish that our people living under foreign domination were better treated, but we have no intention of risking a war to put these matters right. We know too well what war means. Nothing but direct invasion of our territory would induce us to fight.

Nothing? [I asked]. Suppose a war breaks over Czechoslovakia, don't you think you might gain something by taking sides?

No. We should remain neutral as long as possible. But there will be no war over Czechoslovakia; not until the Spanish war is finished, at any rate, and not then, if there is any statesmanship left in the world.

Those who ventilate the Croatian difficulties of Yugoslavia, the dangers of Macedonian irredentism, the desire of Bulgaria for the return of the Dobruja, and for an outlet in the Aegean, are writing of the problems of yesterday or tomorrow. They are questions in the background. To-day each nation is concerned with safeguarding its independence and developing its resources.

Education is spreading rapidly in the lands that used to slumber as the *pashaliks* of the Turkish Empire. (And in Turkey itself the most surprising changes of all have occurred.) The Balkan nations have drawn together even more closely since the *Anschluss*. They see breakers above them, in the waters of the Upper Danube, and are determined to possess

their own river in peace. Their future belongs, not to Germany, or any Great Power, but to themselves alone.

It would be easy to give statistics showing how each of these countries is striving for self-sufficiency, but the fact is obvious in their very atmosphere. One has only to see how little Albania is being transformed into a modern country, slowly but surely, or to walk with the crowds on that grandest of all promenades the Kalemegdan at Belgrade, or to stroll through the new and well-planned avenues of Sofia, or to stay in teeming, crowded, prosperous Bucharest, to feel that in each capital there is a pride in national destiny, an eager self-confidence, a resolution to effect reforms by brow's sweat rather than by bloodshed, which is utterly unlike the sullen plotting of 1910-14.

II. TURKEY AND GREECE

When I arrived at Istanbul, a full moon shone over the Golden Horn, and the evening star hung like an ornament between the slender minarets of the mosque of Eyoub. Little has changed in old Stamboul. The trams, the crowded bridge, the air of ruined splendour are the same as they were twenty years ago.

In the interior of Turkey, however, the changes are amazing. At Ankara, Kemal Atatürk, in fifteen years, has planted a new capital of 140,000 people, and a million acacia trees, doubled the revenues of his country, bought and built thousands of miles of railway, established fifty new factories. In the Industrial Exhibition at the capital I was shown how the coming generation was being trained to take its part in this new Turkey. It was a most impressive spectacle. There is no eyewash in this exhibition. Young Turks of both sexes are doing work demanding skill and precision: a nation of craftsmen has arisen from the baggy-breeched, befezzed, slow, sturdy Anatolian peasants of the war years.

I saw boys in a model foundry pouring molten metal; boys making furniture, learning carpentry and the use of lathes, learning engineering lay-out, and building a house; girls making artificial flowers, modelling hats, and cooking; and boys and girls making rush-work chairs, cutting out clothes, and learning book-keeping by writing-up the accounts

of the exhibition. These were the trades I saw in actual operation. There were others, of course, such as mining, timber, ceramics, cellulose, and chemical industries, which do not lend themselves to exhibition. Three peasant women had come to see a boy who worked at a welding outfit: no doubt he was a relation. I saw them staring at him, in overalls and goggles, while he made a shower of sparks with his oxy-acetylene blower. An hour later, when I passed that way again, they were still there, in open-eyed wonder.

Besides the work of the apprentices at the exhibition, many specimens of handicraft have been sent by other pupils from the forty-six new technical schools throughout Turkey. In 1930 there were 3000 industrial apprentices. This year there are nearly 15,000.

Nor has agriculture lagged behind industry in the new Turkey.

For seven hundred years we have oppressed the peasant and left his bones in foreign parts. . . . This country is worth making into a paradise for our children and grandchildren, and it can be done only by agriculture and economic activity. . . . The arm which wields the sword may grow tired, but the hands which work the thresher and reaper will grow stronger and stronger.

Thus Kemal Atatürk, in words inscribed at his model farm, below a picture of him driving a tractor.

These great results have not been achieved entirely by kindness. It is the fashion to say that Turkey is a democracy, but the fact is that Atatürk still rules with an iron hand: rules through his Cabinet, like other dictators, may be; but little escapes the master mind. The Parliament at Ankara makes minor criticisms on approved occasions, but there is no opposition, which is the first principle of democratic government as we understand it. Travel is under supervision of the police, as the visitor will soon discover, and a strict censorship exists. For instance, the film *Lives of a Bengal Lancer* was banned—and in no other country in the world, I think—because it was said to glorify imperialism.

Again, there is a tendency to attribute the emancipation of women, the spread of education, and the westernisation of Turkey to the rule of Atatürk. This is inaccurate, as anyone will admit who remembers the aims of the Committee of

Union and Progress, or has read the books of Halidé Edib Hanoum. But when all is said, Atatürk is a genius who has achieved marvels—indeed miracles—for his country. He has not only set his people to constructive tasks, but has kept them there, so that if he were to die to-morrow the results of his work would endure. And of his popularity there is no question: he is loved even more than he is feared.

His anti-religious prejudices are well known and can be explained by the anti-national character of Islam as well as of the Orthodox Church in the old Turkey, which he saved from the tender mercies of Europe. Irreligion is definitely established in the Republic (which is officially described as 'nationalist, laic, democratic, State-socialistic, and revolutionary'), but the godless are not fanatical. For instance, the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief (the two most important men in Turkey after the President) are devout Moslems, and go to the mosque at least every Friday. But the mosque is in the old town of Ankara. No religious buildings exist in the new city, except a chapel attached to the French Embassy, which the Turkish Government has asked should be made as inconspicuous as possible. No priest or mullah is allowed to appear in public in the clothes of his faith. Mullahs go to their devotions in overcoats and Homburg hats: only when within the mosque do they put on their turbans and call the faithful to prayer. Even visiting clergymen must disguise themselves as civilians. To call a country free where such restrictions exist would be laughable, if it were not rather sinister. We seem bent on finding pagan friends. . . . However, there is much to admire in Atatürk's régime. The air line from Ankara to Istanbul is excellently managed: I was glad to be in it, and glad to see that it is served by four-engined Handley Pages.

In Greece I found another dictatorship, but one openly confessed. General Metaxas is an unostentatious dictator, a sturdy, broad-shouldered, active man of sixty-seven. Like General Franco, he avoids personal publicity: I searched long in Athens to find his photograph. He is respected even by his enemies, who admit that he is honest, without personal ambition, and an extremely capable administrator. In the land that invented democracy, however, it would be too much to say that the dictatorship is universally popular.

The remarks of a taxi-driver with whom I discussed this question (and that it can be discussed is significant) are worth quoting, for I am told that they represent a certain body of opinion: 'I was a Veniselist,' he said. 'I hate the censorship, and I hate not being able to talk about politics, but we had to have a change, and anything was preferable to Communism. I must admit that things are better now than they have been for a long time.'

Communism was a serious threat to the safety of Greece in 1936. The technique of the Comintern is well known: a revolutionary situation is produced by strikes and riots. As in Spain, so in Greece, detailed instructions from Moscow have been discovered for fomenting civil war. The result of the election of January 1936 (for once fairly held) was a balance of parties in which fifteen Communists held the casting votes. Orderly government became impossible. General Metaxas stepped in, in August, by universal consent, to save the country from anarchy; and within a year this countryman of Ulysses had cleared up an Augean stable of political jobbery and incompetence.

In these events King George II. showed great skill and discretion. That I do not refer to the personal part he played is only because, as a constitutional monarch, he prefers to remain in the background. Everyone except the professional politicians rejoiced in the decisive measures taken by the new Government. To-day, eighteen deputies are under detention, well treated, living on islands which would be considered paradises by a less fortunate people than the Greeks. There were no executions by the Metaxas Government, and arrests were far fewer than in the many previous revolutions. Metaxas has come to stay for the simple reason that he has 'delivered the goods.' This is not to say that the régime may not change in details.

'We shall never return to the parliamentary system [he told me]. A system like the Portuguese may be the best for us. However, we have been only two years in office, and have been busy correcting the mistakes of the past, so it is too soon to prophesy about the future. We keep an open mind, and in close touch with the people.'

'But how?' I asked.

General Metaxas smiled. 'A Parliament wastes time, and does not necessarily reflect public opinion. We have sounded all classes.

The Greek people could never be held by force: our Government is popular, otherwise it would not exist. Facts are on our side. In the first six months of 1936 workers lost 159 million drachmas (£275,000) in pay in strikes, lock-outs, and riots. Since then there has been industrial peace. We have introduced the eight-hour day in eighty spheres of industry, and Sunday rest everywhere, for all professions. Before August 1936, the average wage of workers was 35 drachmas a day for a ten-hour day: it is now 55 drachmas for eight hours. Women received from 8 to 22 drachmas for the same period, and apprentices 5 to 15 drachmas: now their respective wages are 30 and 25 drachmas. Nearly three-quarters of a million workers have signed collective contracts on this scale, giving them also fifteen days' holiday a year with pay. We have reduced our unemployment by nearly 100,000. We gave jobs immediately to nearly all our 2870 workless veterans. Last year we were able to give 200 drachmas to every unemployed man at Christmas, instead of 20 drachmas, as in previous years. Before we came to power the gold reserve in Greek banks had dropped by £2,000,000 sterling in a twelvemonth: now it is continually increasing.'

'What do you consider the most important of the reforms you have inaugurated?' I asked.

'That is difficult to answer. Everything was to do in August 1936. We have tried not to neglect any of the urgent problems. We had to create an air force and anti-air raid organisations, for these were practically non-existent. We had to re-equip the army, and we have done it without raising a loan. There was shocking disorder in our finances and in our industries. One of the best proofs of the return of public confidence is that savings bank deposits have increased by three milliard drachmas (£5,000,000). Government securities are constantly rising in value. We are paying particular attention to the physical and moral education of youth, and have spent a lot of money on a school for gymnastic teachers, and on a physical training equipment throughout the country.'

General Metaxas is a man of figures rather than rhetoric. I talked to him for an hour; he kept to facts, and made no prophecies or generalisations. One generalisation, however, it is safe to make about present-day Greece: the country as a whole is contented, and is prospering as it has never done since the days of Byzantium.

F. YEATS-BROWN.

THE LINGUISTIC STRUGGLE IN BELGIUM

By KEES VAN HOEK

AN observant British tourist following the Dover-Ostend route could have witnessed history in the making, recently, had he known what was going on along the railway line to Brussels.

It began at Ostend, where the old bilingual Flemish-French inscriptions 'Oostende—Ostend' speak to him now in but one tongue. At Bruges the Flemish name *Brugge* alone remains; Gand now proclaims itself to be solely *Gent*. Only Brussels is bilingual: *Bruxelles—Midi, Brussel—Zuid*.

Had he been staying in any of these Flemish cities he would have noticed the wholesale smashing of bilingual nameplates—the last phase of a linguistic battle which has been going on for years.

Belgium, the battleground of Europe throughout history, had always been a pawn in the hand of others—Spanish, Austrian or Napoleonic—until the Congress of Vienna joined it to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Much was to be said for the union of the Low Countries: Metternich knew Europe better than Mr. Lloyd George at Versailles. Geographically they were a unity; agricultural Holland and industrial Belgium balanced each other admirably. Religious intolerance wrecked a great conception. Catholics were at that time frowned upon in Holland, and Belgium was predominantly Catholic. This shortsightedness provoked in 1830 the revolution by which the south seceded from a union, which had lasted barely fifteen years, to become the Kingdom of Belgium.

There was and is no such thing as a Belgian language. The northern half of the population bordering on Holland speaks Flemish, the southern half, adjoining France, French.

There is as little difference between Flemish and Dutch as there is between American and English, though certain Flemish dialects are as puzzling to a Dutchman as strong Yorkshire to a cockney.

Having torn itself away from Holland with the help of French bayonets, the ruling classes at Brussels resolved to build their State as a French outpost, leaning strongly on their 'great Latin sister.' Every administrative, religious and educational activity was exclusively conducted in French. The educational system conducted in a foreign tongue inflicted lasting injury upon the culture and the development of Flanders—one-half of the country and one-half of the population. For long years French ruled supreme. The greatest Flemish poet, the priest Guido Gezelle, was put in charge of an English convent in Bruges as a punishment that he might forget Flemish! Generations grew up who, realising that only French could give them posts, parted with their Flemish birthright and, like all apostates, became more violently anti-Flemish than the Walloons. Ultimately, however, the injustice and shame inherent in the system began to pervade the Flemish masses. One of the leading Belgian statesmen of to-day, who only last year refused the premiership, told me once that his native town was entirely Flemish, only the police and the officials did not understand it! When he went to school Flemish was a forbidden language; he lost his good marks one term because once, in a moment of danger, he had cried out in Dutch. At the University of Louvain he founded a club of Flemish students; the fact was sufficient to bar him from any post in his native country, though his scientific distinctions were of the highest. . . .

A few years before the Great War the Flemish began to concentrate their forces, but war forced upon them a temporary unity with the Walloons against the abhorred invader. In the trenches of the Yser more than three-quarters of the soldiers were Flemish. But the language of command remained French. Attempts to alter this were punished with great severity—even with penal servitude. In occupied territory, on the other hand, the Germans, utilising the latent discontent of years, decided on an administrative decentralisation of the country. They instituted a Council of Flanders, a sort of Flemish Cabinet Council. The great mass of the

Flemings refused to accept justice from the hand of the enemy, but some of their finest and saintliest men, who had long ago given up hope of justice under Belgium, accepted.

When the Armistice came, their leader, Dr. Borms, was condemned to death—a sentence later commuted to one of rigorous imprisonment for life. Nothing was done to alleviate the righteous demands of the Flemish. Intoxicated by victory, the French element settled down to their old game and all Flemish demands were slighted contemptuously until the Flemings of Antwerp, drawn from all parties, elected Dr. Borms, imprisoned for high treason, to represent Antwerp in Parliament. Eighty thousand voted for the 'traitor,' 2000 for the French-speaking official candidate, who was nevertheless declared elected as Dr. Borms had lost his civic rights. Antwerp's resounding slap in the face was the first lesson which Brussels understood. A few months later Dr. Borms was liberated, and an amnesty enabled the return home of many Flemish fugitives, 'Activists' as they were called, to mark their difference in political views from the moderates, who hoped for Flemish equality within the framework of the Belgian State. With the extension of the franchise and of popular education the Flemish movement grew by leaps and bounds. Every new election saw the number of Flemish deputies mount at the expense of the Walloons. For, though the division was originally roughly half and half, the Flemings, mostly farmers and seamen, have the larger families, whilst with the Walloons, mostly industrial workers, the death rate almost exceeds the birth rate.

Every new Government was met with fresh demands from the Flemings, whose numbers began to count heavily. Reforms had already given them—first their Flemish primary education, then a secondary system of their own; and finally one of the two State universities—that of Gent—had to be turned over to them, showing how far radicalism had advanced, particularly amongst the younger generation, how the Brussels Centralisers always gave in too late, thus spoiling the effect of their concessions. The Government, confident that it had done the right thing in the right way, had all its leading representatives on the platform for the inaugural session. But when the Belgian national anthem was struck up, the thou-

sands of students rose in a body and sang the Dutch national hymn.

How deep the gulf has widened is registered also by the steady growth of the Flemish Nationalist Party. They reject Belgium as a fatherland, holding that Flanders should be at least independent, though they would prefer reunion with Holland. Every new election has seen a steady increase of their parliamentary strength. Much as Holland sympathises with the aims of Flemish equality, it frankly prefers their realisation within the framework of the Belgian State. For not only would a union of Flanders with Holland turn the Netherlands into a Catholic State, but it would make the Netherlands a neighbour of France. Dutch policy thoroughly approves of Belgium as a buffer State, though at the same time it welcomes the growing power of the Flemings, whom Holland recognises as blood-relations.

Those powers who opposed the Flemish fight for equality have lost heavily in the gamble. Amongst these must be counted the Catholic Church. The leading ecclesiastics, led by the late Cardinal Mercier, tried to stem the Flemish tide, even with pastoral letters. But numbers were against them. Flanders is staunchly Catholic; in Wallonia anti-religious Socialism is strong among the workers, freethinking among the *intelligentsia*. What is left of the Catholic Church in Belgium had to bow to Flemish wishes, but not without losing its hegemony in the battle.

The same is true of the Liberal Party, which in Belgium has always been obscurantist. Long the power in the State, it has remained to the very end the French clique, to-day hopelessly outnumbered by the Socialists.

One after the other the old bulwarks which were considered indispensable for the unity of the Belgian State have fallen. Only a few weeks ago the Chamber—where the majority of the debates are now held in Dutch—accepted by a large majority a law dividing the army into Flemish and Walloon regiments, a measure considered unthinkable ten years ago.

In foreign policy the Flemish majority forced a reorientation away from France—whose vassal their 'ally' Belgium had been for so long—to absolute independence. Thus King Leopold, who speaks faultless Dutch, and Dutch only in

Flanders, won back the Flemish sympathies which his father had lost. A law accepted some years ago made Flemish the only administrative language for Flanders, French for Wallonia. But the authorities were slow in removing the bilingual nameplates, which were only typical for Flanders, as no Walloon community would have tolerated Flemish. Until some months ago a man, Grammens, rose and took the law into his own hand; he and his friends started first to over-paint, finally to smash up, all such nameplates in Flanders. His action has forced the Government's hand anew. M. Spaak had to give strict orders that the law should be obeyed—Flemish only in Flanders, French only in Wallonia, and bilingualism for the Brussels conglomeration.

Against the rising tide of Flemish hegemony, irrepressible because natural growth cannot be stemmed, the Walloons now seek desperate remedies. On the battlefield of Waterloo a demonstration took place last month in which leading Walloon spokesmen turned from Belgium to France, as do the Flemish nationalists to Holland.

Only by yet greater concessions can the unity of Belgium, still desired by the vast majority, be kept. A Socialist M.P., a prominent Walloon, has tabled a Bill for administrative decentralisation with a Chamber consisting of ninety members for Flanders, ninety for Wallonia and twenty for the Brussels conglomeration. The Flemings have refused this bid to guarantee Wallonia an equality, to which numbers do not entitle it. They demand the 'retaking of Brussels,' once a Flemish city, as the market-place, with its Flemish town-hall and its guild houses, testifies.

The battle of tongues in Belgium offers an interesting parallel with that still proceeding in South Africa. Belgium has failed where the Union has succeeded, and that because the British element have shown not only a greater sense of fair play, but have adopted a more far-sighted policy. They accorded loyally and with good grace what they knew could later be demanded as a right. From the excitable Walloons the Flemish had to wring one concession after the other, and not a single one has been given with good grace. Even of those laws which were designed in mutual agreement to bring appeasement, they boycotted the fair execution.

The language frontier runs across Belgium, through

Brussels, dividing the country in almost equal areas, from the south-western French frontier to the north-eastern Dutch frontier. When bilingualism was decreed for formerly exclusively French Brussels it was played about in this fashion: RUE NEUVE became RUE NEUVE-STRAAT instead of RUE NEUVE-NIEUWSTRAAT.

Such pinpricks are largely responsible for the growth of feelings which have inclined the Flemings to policies so radical that the moderate leaders are now having a hard task in adjusting a complete equality of rights within the framework of the Belgian State. If, as can be assumed, they succeed, they will have saved the very existence of Belgium. But Belgium has ceased to be a Latin State; its reorientation to the north is now irrevocable.

KEES VAN HOEK.

SOUTH AFRICA'S 'SPECIAL AREA'

By D. R. D'EWES

RECENT concentration of liberal thought in South Africa on native policy has tended to make people forgetful of the country's Cape coloured population, whose poverty gives them an equal appeal to the white man's humanity, and whose past gives them a bigger appeal to his gratitude. Early this year there appeared, however, a Government Report which has brought public opinion sharply up against the problem of the coloured people, and has set the Cabinet, the churches and social workers busy devising ways of improving their lot. The Report was drawn up by a Commission appointed three years ago to investigate the economic and social position of the Cape coloured people throughout the Union. Its general conclusion is that wherever there are coloured people in South Africa there is a sociological 'special area' in which malnutrition, stunted ambition and depravity lead in a vicious circle to more malnutrition more cruelly stunted ambition and deeper depravity.

The Cape coloured population of the Union numbers about 800,000, against 2,000,000 Europeans and about 6,000,000 natives. They are a people of mixed blood, ranging in colour from a complexion white enough to pass for Mediterranean European to black. Chronologically their original stock was Hottentot, a primitive race of pastoral natives who inhabited the Cape when the Dutch first established the settlement in the seventeenth century. A slow but steady infiltration of white blood began from the earliest days of the settlement, when there was little colour prejudice, and the marriage of Eva, a Hottentot woman, to one of the East India Company's servants was celebrated with public approval. Later, inter-marriage was looked upon with social and official disfavour, but there has always been a small number of such marriages, and the promiscuity of a seaport has been sufficient, in Cape

Town, to maintain a stable ratio of European to non-European blood in the coloured stock. To this original mixture were added slave stocks brought from the East Indies and from tropical Africa. These imported non-European stocks predominate in Cape Town and the Western Cape Province, the more obviously Hottentot type being now found only in the remoter country districts. The mixture of types is so great that it is impossible to draw up any satisfactory type or race definition. The coloured folk are distinguished from the natives, however, by the fact that they are wholly detribalised and that they have adopted the languages and (as far as they are able) the manner of living of the white man; from whom again they are set apart by their non-European blood. In religion most of them are nominally Christians, a small section (the Cape 'Malays') having retained Moham-medanism.

These people have done the unskilled and semi-skilled work of the Cape since the beginning of the settlement and, as early nineteenth-century manufacturers took it for granted that there should be a 'working class' ready to labour for long hours by day and sleep in dingy terrace houses by night, so the South African employer of the same period took it for granted that there should always be a supply of cheap coloured labour whose housing, feeding and morals were not his concern. Here, as in England, a better sentiment has gradually evolved, but its progress has been much slower than in England.

It has been obvious for some time that the coloured people are economically stationary and that some of them, indeed, have been slipping back. The Coloured Commission's Report has shown us what, in terms of human welfare and national economics, this stagnation of the coloured people means. It means that the Western Cape Province (where most of the Union's coloured folk live) has in its midst a considerable number of people who, because, in the Coloured Commission's euphemism, they are 'economically submerged,' are chronically undernourished. This means again that they are readily susceptible to disease infection; the tuberculosis figures are striking: according to the Cape Town Medical Officer of Health, the prevalence of tuberculosis among Europeans in Cape Town is about equal to that in England

and Wales; but the figures for the whole population are nearly four times as great. The European mortality index in Cape Town is 200; the non-European is 1200. Because, again, of their 'economic submergence,' the coloured people are forced into the cheapest dwellings that low wages can find; usually into overcrowded houses, sometimes one room per family. Such circumstances give little encouragement to either temperance or morality, with the result that among the bulk of the lowest paid workers there is no social stigma attached to either drunkenness or illegitimacy, which are regarded as a normal part of life. With parents who do not care—or are too drunk to care—children grow up without home discipline and with very little schooling. They early drift into petty crime, and sometimes band themselves into gangs which may in time graduate to major crimes of violence. There is a special type of coloured hooligan in the Cape Peninsula, locally called 'skollies,' who in the poorer districts are as big a menace to law-abiding citizens as the street robbers were in Samuel Johnson's London. Every year or so in Cape Town there is an epidemic of violent crime committed by 'skollies'—often the rape of European women, but more often stabbing affrays following drunken quarrels. A few months ago there was such a serious increase in knifing cases in the police courts that magistrates began to order lashes with the cat-o'-nine-tails as the regular punishment. It has stopped the epidemic, but the causes of 'skollidom' remain.

The 'skolly,' however, is the extreme product of the social conditions under which most of the coloured people live. The excessively gloomy picture in the last paragraph shows the worst side of life among the very lowest paid coloured workers, and has to be considerably modified before it can be accepted as typical of the people as a whole. Even among the lowest paid workers there are parents who try as hard as they can in unfavourable circumstances to bring their children up decently. They send them to school, discipline them, and endeavour to give them a better start in life than they had themselves.

Nor is there a lack of openings for coloured workers who want to rise above the unskilled labour level. There is a field of semi-skilled work in the railways, the building and other trades, and regular employment is offered for coloured motor-

car, lorry and horse-drawn wagon drivers. There is skilled work for coloured carpenters, bricklayers, masons, and so on. In the professions there are openings for coloured teachers, lawyers, doctors. In the Cape Province, in addition, there is even scope for their political ambitions, for they may become city and town councillors and members of the Provincial Council. Dr. A. Abdurahman, indeed, one of the leaders of the coloured community in Cape Town, is a member both of the Cape Provincial Council and of the Cape Town City Council. In the latter body he held, for many years, the very responsible office of chairman of the Streets and Drainage Committee, which controls all work falling under the City Engineer's Department. He was also a member of the Coloured Commission from whose Report most of the facts in this article are drawn. Moreover, there are a number of contracting and trading firms owned, run and staffed by coloured people which give good service to the public and reasonable profit to their proprietors.

With these considerable avenues of employment open to them, why, it may be asked, do the bulk of the coloured folk remain 'economically submerged'?

There are two answers. The first and easiest in a country where tradition has bred a superiority complex into the whites is that the bulk of the coloured people have not the capacity to rise higher. Although there is no medical or psychological evidence proving that the coloured man is inherently inferior to the white, there is, nevertheless, some truth in this argument. A century ago most of the coloured people were slaves. They were treated with varying degrees of severity or kindness, but all of them were provided with food and lodging by their masters. Their immediate necessities were always supplied, and having little chance of advancement they had no need to worry about or plan for the future. The natural result was a habit of extreme improvidence. There was the same distinction between 'field hands' and 'house servants' that there was in the Southern States of America in slave days. The 'field hands' were the unskilled labourers, earning their keep by sweat and accommodated in the roughest of quarters. The 'house servants' were the trusted ministers of their masters, often becoming their confidants, who developed both a touching loyalty to their owners and, by constant

association with the household, a more civilised and more responsible attitude towards life. There were, in addition, slaves with great artisan skill who took a pride in their work and were justly respected by their masters.

The freeing of the slaves a century ago could not, at a stroke, turn the improvident 'field hands' into responsible citizens. They remained in the same sort of position that they occupied before, the only difference being that whereas they had formerly been owned and housed and fed in return for their labour, they now received wages. Not being used to this relative economic independence, they spent their wages on drink and sank into a state of squalid resignation to their lot. The children they begat have followed in the same path—how could they do otherwise, with such parents? The submerged hundred thousands, therefore, are submerged partly because of a tradition of extreme improvidence, often expressed in drunkenness and other vice, from which it is almost impossible for them to rise without a great deal of assistance.

The house servants and craftsmen, on the other hand, retained, on manumission, both the habits of independent work and of responsibility that were traditional to them. Some have slipped back, but their descendants form the majority of that respectable and self-reliant element in the coloured population which is a standing proof of the potentialities of the race.

But, although many South Africans would be content to dismiss the matter thus, this explanation of coloured submergence is not enough. It may be true, the liberal will argue, that the labouring majority of these people were bred in habits of improvidence and depravity; but have any attempts been made to eliminate this evil tradition by education, and have they any real chance of rising out of the day-labourer class?

The answer is that at present they have not a real chance. The churches have done their best to supply education by opening schools—which were later subsidised by the Provincial Education Departments—but education is not compulsory, so that educable children born to careless parents are allowed to grow up illiterate. On the whole the coloured people have acquired a strong belief in the value of education,

and even the least provident of them often make some effort to send their children to school. But all too often they are forced to leave, after barely learning to read and write, in order to fill out the family budget by going to work, and since there is a shortage of schools it is inevitable that many of them must grow up wholly illiterate.

These illiterates and semi-illiterates have no future except as labourers. Until fifty or even twenty years ago they were always assured at least of a job, even if it was lowly paid; but lately they have had to meet a threat from both above and below: from the 'poor white' on the one hand and the native on the other. The 'poor whites,' rural Europeans who have been driven off the land by agricultural depression, South Africa's disastrous system of land succession or by plain improvidence, have begun to drift to the towns seeking work as labourers. Since most employers are Europeans it was natural that these people should be given preference over the coloured—a tendency encouraged by the 'civilised labour' policy of successive Governments which, although nominally intended to encourage the employment of men whose 'standard of life is such as is customary among Europeans,' whether they are white or coloured, has in practice proved to be hardly distinguishable from a white labour policy. Because of the colour of his skin—and, to be fair, usually because of his superior physique and education—the white labourer is a serious threat to the coloured labourer. At the other end of the scale the Bantu has also drifted towards the urban areas in search of work. His standard of living is lower than that of the coloured man, and he can therefore afford to sell his labour for a lower wage. This, plus his usually superior physique, has enabled him to displace the coloured man in the rougher kinds of work. The Cape Town City Council, which takes a serious view of its responsibilities towards its coloured population, has made it a matter of policy to give as much employment to coloured workers as possible; and the South African Railways do the same in the Western Province of the Cape. But one serious difficulty is that much of the coloured labour offering is physically unfit for heavy work. The Harbour authorities, for example, have lately been recruiting labour for preliminary work on the new Cape Town Docks. Of the coloured labourers applying for work, three

out of four were rejected as physically unfit. It is true that those who offered themselves are mostly men who have been unemployed for a long time, and that there is always a high percentage of unfit among the unemployed, but even allowing for that, the Harbour rejection figures are startling. Apart from outright minimum wage legislation which would apply to coloured workers, therefore, and at the same time guard somehow against both European and native competition, there seems no hope of permanently improving the economic position of the unskilled coloured labourer. Progress, if there is to be progress among them, must start with the children.

But here, although there is a chance for them to get on, they are again faced with artificial obstacles. The first obstacle is the shortage of schools and the lack of compulsory education. Supposing, however, that they manage to stick at school until Standard Five or Six (the educational minimum for apprenticeship in a trade), they are again faced by an artificial barrier. The apprenticeship legislation of the Union, drawn up to protect apprentices from exploitation by unscrupulous employers, demands among other things that the employer to whom apprentices are indentured must undertake to give the apprentice regular employment during the whole period of his indenture, such employment covering the whole field of work which is included in the trade the apprentice is learning. Most of the coloured contractors and artisans—the employers who would naturally enrol coloured apprentices—are men in a small way of business who find it difficult to give the necessary guarantees of regular employment and wide experience. European contractors tend to prefer enrolling European apprentices, both because of their natural desire to help their own people and because, as a rule, the European apprentice is better educated. Since wages throughout apprenticeship are regulated by law, without differentiation of colour, the coloured lad cannot off-set his educational disadvantages by accepting a lower wage.

If the coloured lad is able to surmount this obstacle and in time qualifies as a trained artisan, he has further difficulties to face. In the smaller towns, where wage-fixing legislation does not apply, he is able to undersell his European competitors. But in the bigger urban centres artisan wages are fixed by law, with no colour differentiation. Since there is no economic

advantage to the employers—most of them Europeans—in employing coloured artisans, they tend again to give preference to their own people. So that although at present, with a building boom keeping all contractors extremely busy in Cape Town, there is no unemployment among coloured artisans, they are usually the first to be dismissed when business begins to slacken, and the last to be engaged when business picks up. The coloured workman is further handicapped by the fact that some trade unions—though by no means all—do not allow coloured membership. The Coloured Commission was divided in its recommendations on this point. Two members recommended separate trade unions for coloured and European workers to co-operate in negotiations with employers, while the other three members recommended that trade union colour bars should be forbidden by law.

If the coloured schoolboy has ambitions higher than the carpenter's bench or the mason's trowel, and if his parents have the means to keep him at school, he may aspire to 'white collar' employment. Here his choice of work is very severely restricted indeed. He cannot enter the Public Service or the Railway Service in the clerical grades, for this would mean that he might in time be in a position of superiority over Europeans—a thing which, owing to colour feeling, is unthinkable in South Africa. He cannot enter the big commercial and industrial firms for the same reason. Moreover, the public would resent having to deal with coloured officials in the higher grades of work. The prejudice may seem irrational to those who live in countries where there is no colour problem, but its existence cannot be ignored by the Government departments which serve the public or by business firms which depend on public goodwill. (Nor, incidentally, is this prejudice confined to South Africa. Coloured students and visitors even in England encounter it at times: a few months ago a number of liberal-minded public men in Britain, including Sir Norman Angell, Professor Berriedale Keith and Dr. Carter, formerly Archbishop of Cape Town, thought it serious and widespread enough to justify a joint letter to *The Times* appealing for more liberal treatment for coloured medical students in Britain.)

Almost the only outlet for the coloured young man who aspires to a 'white collar' salaried position, therefore, is

teaching. Nearly all coloured schools are now staffed exclusively with coloured teachers, and since their number is gradually increasing, there is an expanding field of employment. The result of this narrowing of opportunity, however, is definitely unhealthy. Many of those who do qualify as teachers have no real vocation for the work; they have merely drifted into it as the only alternative to what they regard as less genteel occupations. To a lesser degree the same evil appears among the smaller number who become clergymen in the religious denominations which encourage coloured men to offer themselves for service in coloured congregations. The percentage of real vocations among those offering themselves is lower than among Europeans, with the result that the general quality of the coloured ministry and the coloured teaching profession (which is already low on account of inferior training) is badly depressed.

If the coloured youth has more exalted ambitions still, it is possible for him to go on to take his degree. Most of the Union's residential universities have a strict colour bar, but there is none at the University of Cape Town, which is the oldest and one of the biggest in the country. Several coloured students enrol there annually, and many of them have done brilliantly. But even for graduates it is depressingly hard to enter any profession except that of teaching. If they wish to become lawyers it is almost impossible for them to find a firm in which to serve their articles. European firms will normally refuse them, and there are very few coloured legal firms. Moreover, once they have qualified as attorneys, they cannot expect the rich reward from their profession that their European colleagues accept as a matter of course. Europeans are unwilling to be represented by coloured lawyers, and their own people are too poor, on the whole, to form a profitable *clientèle*. If they wish to become doctors they have to go overseas. Owing to the prevailing prejudice it is impossible for them to obtain entry as students to the teaching wards of the South African hospitals.

There is, of course, nothing in law or custom to prevent a coloured man from setting up business on his own account as a contractor or a shopkeeper, and there are numbers who have done so successfully. But for the great majority lack of capital and lack of business training make it impossible.

Politically, in the Cape Province, the coloured man has extensive rights. He can enrol as a parliamentary voter, subject to a literacy and a small property test. He cannot offer himself as a candidate for Parliament, but he can become a member of the Provincial Council or of a town council. But even his franchise is less powerful than it was. The coming of votes for women in 1930 meant that the European franchise was doubled, while the coloured, since coloured women have not been given the vote, has remained stationary. Moreover, in 1931 the literacy and property test was abolished for European voters, giving the white people universal adult suffrage, while coloured voters remained subject to the test. In the other three provinces (the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Natal) they have not even the limited franchise which they hold in the Cape.

To make this study representative it is necessary to describe briefly the position of the coloured agricultural labourers, who form 44 per cent. of the coloured adult population. In the Western Cape Province nearly all the farm labour is coloured. Wages, as is the way with farm labour throughout the world, are extremely low, and housing is often unsatisfactory. On some of the better farms the labourers are housed decently and cleanly in small but well-constructed cottages with enough separate rooms to allow segregation of the sexes. On the worst the labourers are housed in miserable hovels which keep out the weather, but have no other marks of a home. Wages vary from half a crown to three shillings a day in the Western Cape Province, where the stable economic position of the wine and fruit farmers permits them to be more generous towards their labourers, to ten shillings a month, with rations and firewood, in the remoter country districts. One of the most unfortunate marks of the rural coloured labourer is his strong addiction to drink. It is hard to find one who is a teetotaller, and not very easy to find one who does not fuddle himself with wine on Sundays. It has been suggested that the 'tot' system is responsible for this intemperance. Farmers in the Cape are allowed to serve 'tots,' or rations of wine, to their coloured labourers in stated quantities and at stated intervals throughout the day. Those who oppose the system argue that, although the 'tot' itself is insufficient to cause drunkenness, and that although it may

do the labourers no immediate physical harm since it consists of unfortified wine, it stimulates the craving for drink which seems inherent in the rural coloured folk, and that it is therefore the reason why, on Saturdays, the coloured farm labourers stream to the nearest towns to buy week-end supplies of heady fortified wine. The farmers argue that the 'tot' is harmless; indeed, many of them assert that it has definite food value. They accuse bottle-store proprietors of being the real panderers to the labourers' unfortunate craving. A majority of the Coloured Commission recommended the abolition of the 'tot.'

The authoritative revelations in the Coloured Commission's Report of the hopeless economic and social plight of the bulk of the coloured people have seriously disturbed the responsible public in South Africa. Reports of the Cape Town Municipal Health Department, an elaborate organisation maintaining a comprehensive system of infectious diseases and health clinics throughout the Cape Peninsula, have been enough to show that the circumstances of the coloured people are extremely unsatisfactory, but it needed the Commission's comprehensive Report on the whole problem to demonstrate the degree of misery and depravity among the poorer coloured people, and the obstacles to coloured advancement throughout the Union.

Except by the few who cling inveterately to a base and vicious prejudice against the coloured folk, it is recognised that something must be done, and done without long delay, to improve their opportunities. Unless this is done there can be little doubt that the coloured people will slip even lower than their lowest classes have slipped already, and the Union will be burdened with a considerable population of debauched unemployables, chronically diseased, and a constant moral and physical threat to the more fortunate inhabitants of the country.

Since this aspect of the coloured people's problem, on analysis, resolves itself into the problem of poverty, it is necessary to increase the opportunities for coloured employment, especially in the higher employment levels. Given a sympathetic Government and sympathetic local authorities, this is not as difficult as might appear. There are, for example, fairly extensive branches of railway work, above

the labourer grade, which are now confined to Europeans but which from their nature ought to be open to coloured men of good character and reasonable education. For instance, there are train services serving coloured or native areas which are used almost exclusively by non-Europeans. The ticket examiners on these routes are now Europeans. It would be natural, and not in conflict with colour prejudice, to give such work to coloured men. Again, it seems natural that coloured residential areas in cities like Cape Town, which have a big coloured population, should be policed by non-European policemen under European officers. Both these suggestions are made by the Coloured Commission, and the second has already been adopted. The Department of Justice has begun the recruitment of sixty coloured police constables for work in Cape Town. The men must be of good physique, literate, and of good character. Although the pay offered is only six pounds a month with uniform allowance and the usual sick benefits, there has been a rush of suitable young coloured men to enrol—clear proof of lack of profitable openings to those coloured youths who have escaped the moral and physical dangers of their environment.

The railways, too, although they have as yet made no move to appoint coloured ticket examiners and similar officials to serve coloured travellers, have established at Kimberley the Pioneer Battalion, a training school for coloured bedding boys and train attendants. The institution is run on the same lines as the Special Service Battalion, which trains unemployed white boys for railway and other work. The boys are enrolled for a year, during which time they are fed, housed and paid a shilling a day by the Administration. They are set up physically by drill and given intensive training in railway work. The strength of the Pioneer Battalion is a hundred, so that it will train and place in employment a hundred boys every year.

Sixty policemen and a hundred railway attendants a year are hardly adequate to solve the employment problems of a people numbering nearly 800,000, but these moves are at any rate a beginning. It is expected that the Government will give serious consideration to the complex of problems involved and will introduce legislation next Session to improve the economic—if not the political—position of the coloured

people, although at the time of writing there is no hint of the form such legislation will take.

One of the most difficult aspects of the problem is the lack of effective leadership among the coloured people themselves. As has been suggested above, the problem, although superficially a colour problem, is fundamentally the problem of poverty; it is a class problem complicated by colour prejudice. In European countries the workers have developed their own leaders, often very good leaders, who have been able to organise their followers and lead them to better wages and better working conditions. Rich philanthropists and Radical politicians recruited from the leisured classes have helped, but the drive for reform has come from the organised opinion of the workers themselves, directed by leaders of their own choosing. The coloured people have developed no real leaders. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they have not yet, as a people, shown a capacity for being effectively led. Some of their more prominent men have tried to be leaders, but the jealousy of rivals, and the apathy of those whom they have aspired to lead, have nullified their efforts. The trouble is that many of the men who might be expected to be leaders do their best to get away from their people. In the words of the Coloured Commission's Report:

Though it does not hold for all, there is a discernible tendency among the upper classes of the Cape Coloured to keep separate from the lower classes, and to be unwilling to be placed on a level or grouped with them, without due recognition of the differences that do exist. While class distinction and separateness are, of course, not peculiar to the Cape Coloured, they do, especially when taken in conjunction with another factor still to be discussed, militate against unity of feeling and action among the Cape Coloured and against the acceptance of a common Cape Coloured leadership for the furthering of wise community interests. This tends to leave unchecked tendencies for the individual to devote himself to his own interests, or only to the interests of a small group, rather than to matters of more general import to the Cape Coloured.

Notwithstanding the degree of truth in the statement that the leader is born and not made, it is also true that a number of additional influences, of what may broadly be called an environmental nature, have been hampering the development of Cape Coloured leadership. The Cape Coloured do not find among their past generations the names of revered leaders whose lives might be the source of inspira-

tion and pride to them; and, generally, the past history of the Cape Coloured has not been favourable to the growth of that feeling of racial pride which is in other cases transferred to an outstanding member of the 'own' group, so strengthening and aiding his leadership. Coupled with this is the prestige of the European, and a habit . . . to look to the European to show the way; or, at least, to consider that the social and economic structure of South Africa gives the European, acting as leader or representative, an added influence and power. If we add to this the dearth of a class of Cape Coloured of sufficient leisure, means, or education to devote itself to wide community interests, it will be clear that it is only in the case of an individual of exceptional qualities and ability as leader that the influences we have named do not to-day prevent Cape Coloured leadership with a wide following from coming into being. And since accepted leaders are, in their turn, potent binding community forces, the result is in a double way unfavourable to the formation of large unifying Cape Coloured organisations.

It is believed by many of those Europeans who have given the problems of the coloured people serious thought that until they overcome their fatal habit of division among themselves they will never progress very far. Sympathetic Governments, Municipalities and private firms may offer them more opportunities for profitable employment, but that will only improve the lot of separate individuals among them. Their only real salvation as a community is to develop the solidarity which is at present almost wholly lacking. No matter how much is done for them above, they must themselves give a good hearty heave at their own shoestrings if they are to make any permanent real advance as a class, and it should be the aim of any legislation affecting their welfare to create conditions in which this disciplined urge to improvement may develop.

D. R. D'EWES.

Note.—Since this article has dealt with the coloured man's lack of opportunities for improving his position, it would not have been relevant to go into the health and social welfare work done among the coloured people by public authorities, by the churches, and by private charity. Such welfare work has been energetically undertaken in the past, and it is being steadily extended. [D. R. D'E.]

THE RHODESIAS AND AMALGAMATION

By S. H. VEATS

THE Royal Commission under Lord Bledisloe which is to visit the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland

To inquire and report whether any, and if so what, form of closer co-operation or association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is desirable and feasible, with due regard to the interests of all inhabitants, irrespective of race, of the territories concerned, and to the special responsibility of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the interests of the native inhabitants,

will have to deal with a problem which has been discussed and debated for more than two decades. Broadly speaking, throughout the discussion the demand for amalgamation of the Rhodesias has come from those two countries and the opposition to it has come from the Imperial Government. But that is not to say that there has always been unanimity either between the two countries or among the people of either country. Opinion has veered considerably. Time was when the North was opposed, and the leader of the elected members could see no advantage in amalgamation. Now he is among its strongest advocates. To-day some doubts have arisen in Southern Rhodesia which have brought with them stipulations. There was a time when amalgamation could have been secured had not Southern Rhodesia rejected it. That was way back in the years 1914-16 when the Chartered Company made a proposal to amalgamate the administration of the two Rhodesias. Southern Rhodesia had then its eyes on self-government, to which it has since attained, and it was felt that amalgamation might delay it. But even then there was not unanimity, for Colonel Raleigh Grey, then a member of the Legislative Assembly, addressed a meeting in

Salisbury at which there was passed a resolution agreeing to amalgamation. But the 'Noes' had it, and all attention was turned to obtaining self-government. The importance of the discussion at that early stage is probably to be found in remarks made by the then High Commissioner (Lord Buxton) which contained a statement of the Imperial Government's attitude which, it is hoped, still holds good, for it was a promise that the matter would be left in the hands of the people of the Rhodesias. The High Commissioner said :

I think it is right and fit I should take this opportunity of just saying this : that after careful consideration of the matter by the Secretary of State, it does not appear to him or to me that any Imperial interest is affected by the proposal : by which I mean that no Imperial interest would be affected by amalgamation on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, by leaving matters as they are ; and I may say at once that the Imperial decision on the matter will be dependent on the people of Rhodesia themselves, so far as it can be ascertained. If you desire amalgamation, I can safely say that His Majesty's Government will not stand in the way. On the other hand, if you are opposed to amalgamation, I can safely say it will not be forced upon you, so far as the Imperial Government is concerned.

The subsequent history of the matter has left the impression in the Rhodesias that the principle there laid down has been departed from, for on many occasions when both countries have pressed for amalgamation it—or even discussion of it—has been declined by the Imperial Government. Years later—1930—the Empire Parliamentary Association sent a delegation to Northern Rhodesia (Messrs. J. Allen Parkinson, M.P., then Lord of the Treasury, Mr. H. Leslie Boyce, M.P., and Mr. P. J. Pybus, C.B.E., M.P.) and they, reporting on the visit, wrote :

Sharing the same environment and struggling with the same difficulties, the two Rhodesias, despite their competition, having no feelings of antagonism towards each other and common problems, have lately induced unity of outlook. We, who only partly understand our own difficulties, shall render our best service to Northern and Southern Rhodesia if we allow them to work out their own salvation.

Discussion waxed and waned through the years till in 1928 a stage had been reached at which it was felt possible to

hold an unofficial conference between two representatives of Northern Rhodesia and the Ministers of self-governing Southern Rhodesia. The stage of discussing the terms of amalgamation had then been reached and with the sanction of the then Premier of Southern Rhodesia, the Hon. H. U. Moffat, C.M.G., a memorandum was issued detailing the points which had been discussed and the points agreed on. They were :

1. No division of Northern Rhodesia.
2. Roman-Dutch law to be the legal code, but English solicitors to be allowed to continue in practice in Northern Rhodesia. [Note.—Roman-Dutch law prevails in Southern Rhodesia and English law in Northern Rhodesia, but this notwithstanding arrangements have now been made for a joint Appellate Court.]
3. Northern Rhodesia to have a larger number of members in Parliament at first than the strict quota on a population basis. [Note.—Previously a member of the Southern Rhodesian Government, the Hon. W. M. Leggate, C.M.G., Secretary, had publicly stated that 15 members would be guaranteed.]
4. Northern Rhodesia to have direct representation in the Cabinet.
5. The Sinoia-Kafue line to be surveyed.
6. An all-weather road from Salisbury to a central point in Northern Rhodesia to be built and a scheme of mechanical transport from Southern to Northern Rhodesia to be evolved. [Note.—A road has been built in Southern Rhodesia to the Zambesi Escarpment and the Beit Trustees are at present engaged in erecting a bridge across that river at Chirundu, while Northern Rhodesia, at present having a surplus, is considering the building of a road from Lusaka to the bridge.]
7. The mineral rights of the two Colonies to be acquired by the Government from the B.S.A. Company, if possible. [Note.—Since then the Government of Southern Rhodesia has purchased the mineral rights of that country from the B.S.A. Co. for a sum of £2,000,000.]
8. Purchase of the B.S.A. Company's land rights in Northern Rhodesia 'if they can be acquired on reasonable terms.'
9. The land settlement policy at present in force in Southern Rhodesia to be applied to Northern Rhodesia.
10. The present rates and privileges of civil servants in Northern

Rhodesia to be guaranteed under any change of government.

11. Southern Rhodesia's mining laws to be applied to Northern Rhodesia.
12. The Land Bank facilities of Southern Rhodesia to be extended to Northern Rhodesia.

Round about this time the Hilton Young Commission was in Northern Rhodesia. The majority report was against amalgamation, but the chairman issued a minority report in which he suggested a partition scheme: he suggested the division of Northern Rhodesia into three parts, the north-eastern section to be amalgamated with Nyasaland and administered under Crown Colony government, the central portion to be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia in self-government, and Barotseland to be made a native state. The partition scheme has never been very popular in either of the Rhodesias, though in more recent years it has been revived to some extent by Colonel Gore-Browne, who is the elected member for the Broken Hill area and who has lately been advocating some scheme of closer association less than amalgamation, to which reference will be made later.

The most definite and authoritative pronouncement on amalgamation by the Imperial Government was that made by the Right Hon. J. H. Thomas, then Secretary of State for the Dominions, in 1931. In view of feeling in both countries in favour of amalgamation the Premier of Southern Rhodesia (the Hon. H. U. Moffat, C.M.G.) had asked that a conference be called on the subject. Mr. Thomas's statement was :

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has given careful consideration to the request, received from the Government of Southern Rhodesia and from the elected members of the Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia, that a conference should be held in order to consider the possibility of amalgamating Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia under a Constitution similar to the present Constitution of Southern Rhodesia.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are not prepared to agree to the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia at the present time. They consider that a substantially greater advance should be made in the development of Northern Rhodesia before any final decision can be formed as to its future.

It must be remembered that it is less than eight years since His

Majesty's Government assumed direct responsibility for the administration of Northern Rhodesia.

Very considerable progress has been made during these years, but even greater changes, affecting the whole of the balance of various interests in the country, are almost certain to result from the development of the mining industry. At present the European population is scattered over a wide extent of territory, while the problems of native development are in a stage which makes it inevitable that His Majesty's Government should hesitate to let them pass even partially out of their responsibility.

On the other hand, His Majesty's Government, while considering that amalgamation is not practicable now or in the near future, do not wish to reject the idea of amalgamation in principle, should circumstances in their opinion justify it at a later date, and fully realise the prejudicial effects upon the progress in both countries if such a rejection were regarded as a permanent bar to their future evolution. Their view is that for some time to come Northern Rhodesia should continue to work out its destiny as a separate entity, observing the closest possible co-ordination with its neighbours and especially with Southern Rhodesia.

His Majesty's Government feel that in order to prevent misconception they should state at the outset that the conditions of any scheme of amalgamation, if and when it arises for actual discussion, must make definite provision for the welfare and development of the native population. Barotseland would necessarily require separate treatment and arrangements may possibly have to be made in regard to other parts of Northern Rhodesia. Without going into details of these contingencies, it is sufficient that it should be indicated that the territory to be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia would not necessarily have boundaries coterminous with the present boundaries of Northern Rhodesia.

It will be remembered that in order to secure as great a measure of continuity of policy for the future as may be possible the Secretary of State for the Colonies and I arranged some few weeks ago to confer with members of the two Opposition parties on this matter. The conclusions which I have announced are of course those of His Majesty's Government, but I am happy to think that, as a result of the conversations referred to, they are likely to commend themselves to members on the other side of the House.

Please inform your Ministers that having regard to the view which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom take in this matter they feel that a conference at the present moment to discuss the questions involved would not serve a useful purpose. His Majesty's Government, however, fully appreciate the advan-

tages of the closest co-operation between Southern and Northern Rhodesia on matters of policy which are of common interest to both territories and are at all times ready to facilitate consultation between the two Governments with a view to such co-operation.

It does not seem that this attitude has been modified by the Imperial Government despite the developments in both territories. Public opinion has been disappointed, and in Northern Rhodesia dissatisfaction with Colonial Office control has grown considerably and amalgamation has been more and more looked to as the only means of salvation. That is so despite certain constitutional advances which the then Governor, Sir Hubert Young, succeeded in introducing.

The agitation for amalgamation soon grew stronger in the North, and when Mr. (now Sir) L. F. Moore suggested that the South's interest in the subject was waning Southern Rhodesia's Prime Minister (there had been a change of Governments and a change in the style and status of the Colony's leading statesman), the Hon. G. M. Huggins, at once reaffirmed the South's continued interest in the subject. As a result a Convention was held at the Victoria Falls in January 1936. No member of the Southern Rhodesia Government could, obviously, attend, but the Convention had the Government's sanction and approval. All political parties in Southern Rhodesia were represented. In view of the Imperial Government's attitude no official representatives of Northern Rhodesia could attend, but all the elected members were present. This Convention agreed to the following resolution :

This Convention is of the opinion that the early amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, under a Constitution conferring the right of complete self-government, is in the best interests of all the inhabitants of both Colonies.

Other resolutions agreed to by the Convention were :

That this Convention considers the following suitable terms on which amalgamation could take place :

- (a) The establishment of one Government embracing Northern and Southern Rhodesia and consisting of (1) a Governor ;
- (2) a Legislative Assembly ; (3) a Legislative Council ;
- (4) a Public Service ; (5) a High Court.

That the headquarters of the Government be Salisbury.

That the existing electoral acts of the two territories shall apply respectively until changed by legislative enactment by the Government of the Rhodesias.

That the number of members of Parliament to be returned shall be not less than seven for Northern Rhodesia and not less than thirty for Southern Rhodesia.

That the respective public debts of both Colonies be a debt charge on the Colony of Rhodesia.

The Legislative Council to be partly nominated and partly elected, save that the only nominated members shall be not more than three nominated thereto in the interests of the native inhabitants.

The law to be administered in Northern Rhodesia and in Southern Rhodesia to be the same as is now respectively administered until changed by legislative enactment by the Government of Rhodesia.

It was decided too that in the event of a draft Constitution being prepared it should be submitted to the electorates of both countries by means of a referendum.

The reply of the Imperial Government to representations made arising from this Convention was announced in October 1936 by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald as follows :

The question of the amalgamation of the territories is governed by the decision announced by His Majesty's Government in 1931 which was only taken after a most thorough examination of the whole problem and also after consultation with members of parliamentary parties then in opposition. Although it was made clear in that announcement that His Majesty's Government did not wish to reject the idea of amalgamation in principle if circumstances should justify it at a later date, the announcement was definitely intended as settling the question for some time to come, and I do not feel that during the period of five years which has elapsed there has been such material change in conditions as would justify reconsideration of the decision reached after so much thought in 1931.

A further point that arises is that although there may be a body of opinion among European agricultural settlers in Northern Rhodesia which favours amalgamation, the unanimity which was reached at the Victoria Falls Conference was obtained only on the basis of a Constitution conferring the right of complete self-government, and I understand that there are some members of the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia who would definitely reject the idea of amalgamation on any basis short of this.

The attitude of His Majesty's Government to this suggestion

as it relates to Southern Rhodesia will have been made clear by the recent publication of Sir Herbert Stanley's despatch relating to the proposed amendment of the Southern Rhodesia Constitution.

There matters stood till representatives of both territories were in England for the Coronation when further discussions took place, culminating in the statement in the House of Commons by the Marquess of Hartington that it had been decided to send a Royal Commission to inquire into the subject, and the subsequent announcement that Lord Bledisloe had been asked and had agreed to accept the chairmanship of the Commission.

That, in summary, is a history of the discussions on amalgamation. What will the Commission find on its arrival in the Rhodesias? Southern Rhodesia's attitude was outlined by the Prime Minister when he spoke in Bulawayo early this year :

During the four years of his office in the Colony he had arrived at the absolute conviction that for the economic development of Southern and Northern Rhodesia amalgamation was absolutely essential.

That is a view which has been confirmed not once but many times by Parliament, and if a referendum were taken to-day the probability is that it would favour amalgamation. Not that there would be no opposition. The basis of the opposition would be as indicated in the resolutions passed at Victoria Falls.

That Convention was inclined at first to favour a demand that dominion status be a *sine qua non* of amalgamation, but the term 'complete self-government' was agreed on. It was a compromise, and it can be said that the majority of the delegates present, including Northern Rhodesians, were in favour of amalgamation under a Constitution similar to that enjoyed to-day by Southern Rhodesia. Those were the terms of the original resolution, and the change was agreed to in order to secure unanimity. The demand for complete self-government (what is really in mind is the withdrawal of the reservations concerning native policy in Southern Rhodesia's Constitution) comes from the Labour Party and the Reform Party, and though they feel very keenly on the subject it can be doubted whether the majority of the

people would put aside amalgamation if those reservations were not withdrawn, for, in the main, there is a general feeling that the reservations do not constitute any burden on the Colony.

In Northern Rhodesia the demand and desire for amalgamation has grown with the years and the realisation that self-government is far away. There is intense dissatisfaction with Colonial Office rule, and even the concessions recently granted—an equality of numbers of official and elected members in the Legislative Council and consultation before official policy is enforced—have not been sufficient in any way to allay the dissatisfaction which is prevalent. Recently the leader of the elected members, the Hon. Sir Leopold Moore, has publicly stated his adherence to the principle of amalgamation, and that is the view of the elected members as a body. It is true that Colonel the Hon. Gore-Browne has put forward an alternative suggestion, but he has put it forward only as a proposal to be made in the event of full amalgamation, being rejected. At the two public meetings at which he has discussed the matter (Abercorn and Broken Hill) the vote has been in favour of full amalgamation though he has secured permission to proceed with his alternative scheme if it is found that amalgamation is out of the question. This scheme has not been discussed in Southern Rhodesia at all.

The scheme embraces the early amalgamation of the departments of posts and telegraphs, defence, European education, agriculture, prisons and police, and, if possible, customs: a common native policy with a common Native Development Board; the Governor of Southern Rhodesia to be High Commissioner for the three territories with a Federal Advisory Council, the recommendations of which would come up for discussion in the Southern Rhodesia Parliament and the Legislative Councils of the other two territories: the Legislative Councils to remain as at present constituted but local self-government to be encouraged. The difficulties inherent in this suggestion are due to the difference in constitutional status of the territories. Southern Rhodesia is self-governing and the last word in policy in that country must rest with Parliament. If that were freely admitted Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland might find Southern Rhodesia's Parliament, in which they had no say, deciding policy for their territories.

On the other hand, if it were not freely admitted there would at once be the feeling that some of Southern Rhodesia's self-governing powers were being taken away, and that would not be tolerated in Southern Rhodesia for a moment: while it may be true that the majority of people would not stand out for complete self-government it is equally true that nobody in Southern Rhodesia would contemplate for a moment—not even to secure amalgamation—any further powers being invested in the Imperial authorities. That is the rock on which Colonel Gore-Browne's scheme must flounder.

The official attitude in Northern Rhodesia is, of course, that of the Imperial Government, but it is doubtful whether the Royal Commission will get a great deal of assistance there because the Governor will have gone to his new post at Trinidad and several of the senior officials (far too many the people think) are comparatively new to Northern Rhodesia and its problems.

It would be interesting to discuss the pros and cons of amalgamation, but the subject is too wide to be dealt with in the limits of one article: each aspect of the matter has its particular interest—the native question (and not the least interesting of the Commission's task will be to investigate the progress of the native under Colonial Office rule and under self-government); the economic question: the defence question, and so on. There is one big question, however, to which a reference must be made. It is a question which may prove difficult to handle in these days of international unrest. Northern Rhodesia, though it 'enjoys' (most people apart from the officials there would say 'endures') a form of Crown Colony government, is not a Crown Colony. It is a Protectorate and it has never been annexed to the British Empire. There are a score of reasons why it should be annexed, one of them being that the natives are technically aliens, but whether the present is the most opportune time to deal with a question of annexation is a matter for decision by people with closer knowledge of international affairs than the writer can claim to possess.

So far as the two Rhodesias are concerned the visit of the Royal Commission is awaited with keen interest: it should resolve the question of amalgamation one way or the other for some time to come, and in Northern Rhodesia it has pro-

voked that hope of some relief from the Colonial Office yoke which, pleasant or not as the fact may be, is regarded there as an intolerable one.

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Since the above was written amalgamation has been the subject of a public statement by the Leader of the Reform Party, of discussion at the annual congress of the United Party in Southern Rhodesia, and has been referred to by the retiring Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Hubert Young, K.C.M.G.

The Leader of the Reform Party, Sir Hugh Williams, Bart., has sent to the Press for publication a letter in which he says the party has, for the time being, decided to adopt a different attitude and not, at the moment, insist on complete self-government as a *sine qua non*. He considers the position has changed since the Victoria Falls Convention.

This is due to the raising of the issue about the Protectorates (Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Swaziland) between the Imperial Government and the Union Government. This undoubtedly makes it difficult for the Imperial Government to comply with the conditions of the Victoria Falls resolution. For it to give Greater Rhodesia complete responsibility for several million natives at present under its control, whilst refusing to do the same for its neighbour the Union, which is already a dominion, would be a wanton stirring up of strife between members of the British Commonwealth. We must, I think, recognise that in the changed circumstances we cannot expect at present amalgamation and complete self-government. We may expect either, but not both. The question then arises, are we to put the Victoria Falls resolution into cold storage until a more favourable occasion; or are we to accept (or ask for) amalgamation under Southern Rhodesia's present Constitution? After weighing all the considerations as carefully as I can, the conclusion I have come to is that we should adopt the second course. That is to say, we should be prepared to accept amalgamation under the present Constitution of Southern Rhodesia.

He says his party has consistently stood for a Greater Rhodesia, meaning a union of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland and the Tati Concession of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and he insists that the attitude now adopted implies no weakening in the conviction that Rhodesia should have complete self-government.

At the United Party congress there was passed a resolution, as amended on the initiative of the Prime Minister. It reads:

That congress, while reaffirming its approval of the principle of amalgamation, was of the opinion that as the subject was of such national importance it should not become a party matter and should be left to the free vote of the electorate as and when the conditions governing amalgamation were known.

Sir Hubert Young in a farewell speech in his capital, Lusaka, expressed the faith

I have ever felt in the future of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

This great tract of country, inhabited by over four million natives and 75,000 non-natives, has always been to me a potential unity rather than a trinity, and I have worked ever since my arrival in this country to impress this upon the authorities at Home. It was at my instance that the conference of the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, under the chairmanship of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, was instituted over three years ago, and I am proud to think that it may be to some extent as a result of this that His Majesty's Government has now decided to send out a Royal Commission to report whether any, and if so what, form of closer co-operation or association between the three territories is desirable and feasible.

It would not be proper for me to express any detailed opinion on a question which is just about to be considered by a Royal Commission, but I think I may be allowed to express the hope that their report will at least result in the strengthening of the ties which already bind us together.

We have in this great area magnificent mineral and agricultural resources, a fine population of loyal and hardworking natives, and a leavening of European settlers and industrial workers capable with the assistance of the natives of developing these resources to the highest possible extent. We share a common outlet to the sea, and so far as the two Rhodesias are concerned, a common railway system; but what has always impressed me most is that from their diversity, no less than from their unity, the three States are in a unique position to work out in consultation with each other a sound and just relationship between the two communities, whose homes will always be in this part of the world.

S. H. VEATS.

REFORMING THE CORONERS

By GILBERT LESLIE

SECOND CLOWN : ' But is this law ? '

FIRST CLOWN : ' Ay, marry is't ; crowner's quest-law.'

Hamlet.

FOR several hundred years the chief duty of the coroners has been to inquire into the cause of death in those cases where the public interest requires an investigation to be made ; and the law relating to them was consolidated by the Coroners Act, 1887. Section 3 of that Act provided that ' where a coroner is informed that the dead body of a person is lying within his jurisdiction, and there is reasonable cause to suspect that such person has died either a violent or an unnatural death, or has died a sudden death of which the cause is unknown, or that such person has died in prison, or in such place or under such circumstances as to require an inquest in pursuance of any Act . . . ', the coroner shall hold an inquest. This has since been modified by section 21 of the Coroners (Amendment) Act, 1926, which enables a coroner to order a post-mortem examination to be made, and to dispense with an inquest if the result shows that the death was due to natural causes.

In 1935 over 67,000 deaths were reported to the coroners, and over 31,000 inquests were held. In 11,000 cases it was found unnecessary to hold an inquest as a result of a post-mortem examination ordered under the provisions of the Act of 1926, and in 18,000 cases as the result of inquiries by the coroner ; in the remaining cases even inquiries were deemed unnecessary. The coroners, therefore, are concerned with a large number of deaths every year ; and on the whole their machinery works fairly well—but it has been freely criticised, and most of the criticisms are justified by the facts.

Complaints have been frequently made that, because their sphere is not properly defined by the law, the coroners do not confine their activities to the matters which really concern them, but wander off into realms of criminal or civil liability. In 1935, for instance, an inquest at Weymouth on an old man, who had been found dead with his head against a coal fire, aroused much criticism. It lasted seven days and took the form of a trial for murder. A large part of the proceedings was taken up in discussing the circumstances in which the deceased had executed a codicil to his will. A woman was cross-examined for three days, and letters containing reflections on her character and conduct which had been written by the dead man were read. The counsel who appeared for the police and the solicitor who represented her—we might say who defended her—made speeches to the jury as if she were being tried for murder ; and although there was no evidence which would justify her arrest, it was clear to everyone that she was being accused of murder. In the end the jury returned a verdict of accidental death, and said that in their opinion she had nothing ' to do with it.'

In certain circumstances a coroner is bound by the law to investigate criminal matters, for by section 4 of the Act of 1887 his verdict must state ' so far as such particulars have been proved . . . who the deceased was, and how, when and where the deceased came by his death, and if he came by his death by murder or manslaughter, the persons, if any, whom the jury find to have been guilty of such murder or manslaughter, or of being accessories before the fact to such murder.' So, although the coroner does not preside over a trial, the verdict of his jury takes the form of an express finding of guilt. A verdict of *guilty* results in the committal of the accused person for trial—it has no other effect in law, though in fact it may place a life-long stigma upon him. A verdict of *not guilty* at his trial frees him from peril, but the fact remains that the coroner's jury found him *guilty*.

Although the law sometimes compels a coroner to deal with a case where crime is suspected, the investigation of crime and the committal of suspects for trial are no longer two of his most important duties. In the course of the last century the police became better equipped than the coroner for making investigations into criminal matters, and the

magistrates became the better tribunal to decide whether there is sufficient evidence for a suspect to be committed for trial. In 1926, Parliament recognised that times had changed, for it enacted that if the coroner is informed 'before the jury have given their verdict that some person has been charged before examining justices with the murder, manslaughter or infanticide of the deceased, he shall, in the absence of reason to the contrary, adjourn the inquest until after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings'; and that if the inquest is resumed the finding must not be inconsistent with the result of the criminal proceedings. In 1935, 182 inquests were adjourned in accordance with this provision.

The coroner's duty to investigate cases of suspected murder is of practical importance only where the police have been unable to find enough evidence to justify the institution of criminal proceedings, or where they have been unable to apprehend a suspected person. Since 1926 the coroners have been concerned with very few of these cases; in most the verdict was 'murder by some person or persons unknown'; in the remainder the police had been of the opinion that there was not enough evidence to justify an arrest.

The Weymouth inquest caused an outcry; and the Home Secretary appointed a Departmental Committee 'to inquire into the law and practice relating to coroners and to report what changes, if any, are desirable and practicable.' Lord Wright was appointed chairman; and the members included Sir Archibald Bodkin and Sir Farquhar Buzzard. The Committee heard much evidence, and in February 1935 published a valuable report in which nearly all the problems affecting coroners were discussed. They considered the murder cases which coroners have investigated since 1926, and reported that they were 'inclined to think that in some of these cases the decision not to charge the suspect was wrong; and the consequence has been a very painful investigation or, as it has rightly been called, an "experimental trial" before the coroner.' They went on to say that, though these cases are few in number, 'they are very serious in character because they shock the public conscience of this country, and outrage the views of the public on the manner in which a criminal charge—especially of a capital nature—should be advanced.'

This language is strong, but it is more than justified by the facts.

An experimental trial before a coroner differs greatly from a hearing before examining justices. The suspect is subpoenaed to attend, and is called as a witness. It is true that he is told that he need not answer any questions unless he wishes to do so, but if he fails to answer any the jury will draw their own conclusions. There may be no evidence against him, but the object of the questions will be to elicit his guilt. The laws of evidence are not always observed; and as a rule the advocate representing the suspected person is not permitted to make a speech. In the end the jury returns a verdict which may take the form of a finding of guilt. The procedure to be followed by justices was laid down by Parliament and is fair; but coroners are bound by no code of procedure, and the rights which a suspect normally possesses in England are not adequately safeguarded at inquests.

It has been thought possible that a coroner's inquiry into a case where crime is suspected may sometimes serve a useful purpose in bringing out information; but an assistant commissioner of Metropolitan Police, who gave evidence before the Committee, was of the opinion that 'the private questioning by the police of possible witnesses or possible suspects was more likely to elicit information than the proceedings at an inquest'; and the representatives of the chief constables who gave evidence 'disclaimed any desire to use inquests as a means of extracting incriminating evidence from suspected persons.' It does not seem, therefore, that experimental trials are of much use in obtaining information, and it is impossible to justify them on any other ground.

Since 1926 coroners have been concerned in the investigation of few cases of suspected murder, but they have inquired into a great many cases where the death has been caused by a motor accident. Where someone has been prosecuted for manslaughter the Act of 1926 applies; otherwise the law does not prevent an inquest from being held. If an inquest takes place, there are two dangers: first, that the jury may find someone *guilty* of manslaughter where there is no evidence against him of criminal negligence, or where there is insufficient negligence to warrant a prosecution for manslaughter, and the appropriate charge would be dangerous or even

careless driving; secondly, that they may return a verdict of accidental death, and perhaps add a rider exonerating all parties from blame, where a prosecution for manslaughter or for some other offence ought to be brought.

It not infrequently happens when a coroner's jury has found someone *guilty* of manslaughter that the authorities take the view that the charge could not be made out and offer no evidence at the trial so that the prisoner is immediately acquitted. An inquest held at Mitcham on October 12, 1936, illustrates the vagaries of coroners' juries in these cases. After a twenty-minute retirement the jury returned into court and the foreman said they had decided that there had been a 'lack of due care and attention on the part of the driver,' but in answer to the coroner he agreed that there was nothing criminal; the coroner then said: 'Therefore your verdict will be accidental death?' But the foreman replied that none of the jury could accept that; so, after being directed as to the law for a second time, they again retired. This time they returned with a verdict of manslaughter! The coroner declared that in his opinion there was no evidence to support a criminal charge, but that although he disagreed with the verdict, he was bound to accept it. A verdict of manslaughter is followed by the committal of the accused for trial, and both he and the local council will be involved in needless expense if the facts do not justify such a serious charge. The other danger, that the verdict of accidental death may be wrongly returned, does not have this effect, but it may discourage the authorities from prosecuting in a case where they feel criminal proceedings should be brought—especially if there is a rider of exoneration—and it may also discourage the institution of civil proceedings.

At the present day the coroner's jury does not fulfil a necessary, or even a useful, function when it considers questions of criminal liability in motor-accident cases. There are other authorities much more competent to decide whether, and for what, a prosecution should be launched. The present system leads to unjustifiable committals, and to lucky escapes, and has nothing to commend it.

The Committee made recommendations which would prevent coroners from holding experimental trials and would modernise the law relating to inquests. If their proposals

are made law, the verdict will merely state who the deceased was, and how, when and where he came by his death. No one will be committed for trial on a coroner's inquisition, and it will no longer be possible for a coroner to ask for or accept a verdict of murder or any other crime against any particular person. Where crime is suspected, but the inquest proceeds, the rules of evidence will be strictly observed, and the suspect will not be put on oath unless he desires to give evidence. If he does give evidence, the questions put to him will be directed simply to eliciting his statement and he will not be cross-examined on the inconsistency of his evidence with that of any other witnesses. Such inquests, moreover, would be even less common than they are to-day; for it is proposed that where a chief officer of police requests it—on the ground that he is investigating the circumstances—the coroner shall adjourn the inquest for one or more periods of fourteen days, in order to allow the police to complete their investigations. An adjournment to enable inquiries to be made is already a very common practice, though not a universal one; it is compulsory only when someone has been charged before examining justices with murder, manslaughter, or infanticide.

In view of the present state of the law, coroners cannot be blamed for sometimes investigating criminal issues; but there is little excuse for the way in which many of them investigate questions of civil liability. Occasionally it may be difficult for a coroner to know exactly when to stop the discussion of some matter on the ground that it is irrelevant; but many of them not only allow irrelevant civil issues to be investigated, but embody the result in the verdict or in a rider attached to it. And juries are worse offenders than the coroners in including irrelevant particulars in verdicts and riders. For instance, in motor-accident cases, unless there has been such a wicked degree of negligence that someone is guilty of manslaughter, the coroner is not concerned with questions of negligence at all, yet some coroners habitually ask their juries to return the verdict that so and so was guilty of 'negligence not amounting to criminal negligence.' It is noticeable, however, that the verdict never states that the deceased was negligent. If, in the opinion of the coroners, civil negligence is relevant, why is the deceased never found to blame? His conduct is frequently criticised, but the verdict

is always 'accidental death.' If, on the other hand, they agree that civil negligence is irrelevant, why do they not confine their verdicts to what is pertinent?

It is especially in motor-accident cases that civil questions are investigated, and alleged acts of negligence considered which are often so trifling that they could not possibly have anything to do with any matter properly before the coroner. They are usually raised by persons who desire to bring or to discourage civil proceedings, and the Committee were correctly informed that there is 'a growing tendency for coroners' courts to become more or less the preparing ground for civil actions.' Some coroners rightly object to this: on August 5, for instance, the Manchester coroner said, 'This court must not be made a fishing-ground for questions regarding compensation'; but others are more tolerant.

It is not only in motor-accident cases that irrelevant matters are investigated. Verdicts are sometimes returned that the deceased died from an accident 'arising out of or in the course of his employment'—doubtless with a view to the dependants obtaining workmen's compensation. Perhaps some such notion was behind a verdict returned last year at Elland at an inquest on a canal boatman who had fallen overboard: 'accidentally drowned in the execution of his duty.' Sometimes there is even an attempt to assess for the purposes of pension the extent to which war services contributed to the death. The coroners and their juries seem to forget that in each case there is a proper tribunal to deal with the matter they have purported to decide—a tribunal equipped to consider the facts, apply the law, and, unlike the coroner, empowered to give a judgment binding on the parties. The coroner's decision has no effect in law; but it must often give rise to unfounded hopes or fears. The Committee rightly proposed that coroners should be prohibited from dealing with questions of civil liability.

Riders and animadversions provide another example of the tendency of coroners to go outside their proper sphere; and allied to these are the pronouncements on an infinite variety of topics which some of them are apt to make. Animadversions, rebukes, reprimands, and riders of censure are not uncommon, but they are objectionable on a number of different grounds. The conduct of the censured person

was not an issue at the inquest, and he may have had no adequate opportunity of giving his version of the facts. In any event, he cannot appeal; and, since the coroner's remarks are 'privileged,' he cannot obtain redress by bringing an action for defamation. The remarks may cause serious harm, for they will probably be widely reported. They may or may not be well-founded; but even though all the facts are before the coroner, he is not a judge or magistrate and should not inflict what is undoubtedly a punishment. An inquest is neither a criminal court nor a court of morals. If the law has been broken, the guilty person should be prosecuted, not censured at the whim of a coroner; and if the law has not been broken, the coroner should not attempt to deal with moral questions—as the Committee said, the facts will be reported and those who read them will be able to judge for themselves.

A few examples of censures and criticisms may be found interesting. In February 1936 an inquest was held at Sunderland on the death of the local goalkeeper, who had died a few days after being knocked out in a goal-mouth scrimmage. Allegations of rough play were made, and a witness said that the match was a disgrace to first-class football. The deceased suffered from diabetes, and the pathologist who gave evidence said that the rough usage he had heard described would tend to precipitate an attack of diabetic coma, and that the cause of death was, first, diabetes and, secondly, heart failure. The referee had not been warned to be present, as he was clearly not guilty of any culpable negligence, and the coroner very properly asked the jury not to censure him as he was not there to answer for himself. Notwithstanding this request, after announcing the verdict, the foreman said: 'We are of opinion that the referee was very lax in his conduct of the game, and as a rider we wish to add that we urge the Board of Management of the Football Association to instruct all referees that they must exercise stricter control over the players to eliminate, as far as possible, any future accidents.' In spite of the efforts of the coroner to keep the inquest fair, the jury were able to return a rider (which was widely reported) criticising the referee. The latter part of the rider was made with a view to preventing future accidents, and for that reason it is less objectionable than many others which have not this excuse.

One of the chief constables who gave evidence before the Committee mentioned an inquest on a nineteen-year-old girl who had had sexual relations with a much older married man. The medical evidence showed that the suspicion that he was responsible for her death was unfounded, but at the request of the jury the coroner censured the man for his relations with the girl. The prize example, however, is perhaps the following: 'We find, after carefully considering all the evidence, that Mr. T—— was accidentally killed by being knocked down by a motor-car driven by Mr. A——, but the jury are of opinion that there has been a certain amount of negligence on the part of the driver of the car, and they wish to pass a severe vote of censure on him.'

We have already observed that a rider of exoneration may discourage the authorities from prosecuting in motor-accident cases, but this is not their sole effect. The dependants of the deceased may have a good cause of action; the rider does not affect their rights, but it may have the effect of causing them to be waived or too easily compromised—especially by people without legal advice. It is not only riders which are objectionable, but also remarks as to liability by the coroner. On August 30, 1937, an inquest was held at Leeds on a man who had been killed by falling down a hoist shaft. The verdict was 'accidental death during the course of his employment' (!), and the coroner said that, in his opinion, 'the machinery of the lift was faulty and caused the fatality. No one was to blame.' In another recent lift-accident case a London coroner also went out of his way to exonerate the employer from blame. Such remarks or riders are not so objectionable as rebukes and censures, but they deal with matters outside the scope of an inquest.

The Committee proposed that verdicts and riders of censure or exoneration should be prohibited (this prohibition not to extend to recommendations of a general character designed to prevent further fatalities); and they also recommended that the practice of making animadversions should cease. They did not expressly deal with the talkativeness from which some coroners suffer. Coroners are not experts on all subjects—though some of them make pronouncements with as much confidence as if they were. A good many criticisms could be heard no more if the coroners would learn

to curb their loquacity. Bacon said that 'an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal'; but no one has yet found an adequate and printable description of coroners who talk too much—and it is certainly not for want of examples.

Coroners have been criticised, not only for failing to keep within their proper province, but also for the way in which they perform what is peculiarly their own work. This is notably so in suicide cases—where the usual verdict is that the deceased committed suicide 'while of unsound mind,' or (what comes to the same thing) 'while the balance of his mind was disturbed.' In only 66 out of 5156 cases in 1935 was the verdict *felo de se*, and in most of these it was only returned because the deceased had committed suicide in order to escape arrest on a serious charge. The late Dr. Edwin Smith, coroner for the Western District of London, once remarked that suicide is the only enterprise where if a man succeeds he is called insane, and if he fails he is called sane. The law does not presume a man to be insane merely because he attempts to destroy himself; and if he fails in his attempt he is guilty of a misdemeanour. The Committee reported that if the tests used by the criminal courts or by medical authorities were to be applied in cases of suicide, 'only a fraction of the persons on whose death these inquests are held would be found to be of unsound mind at the time when they committed the act. The evidence of eminent medical authorities has shown how little justification there is in the great majority of cases of suicide for a verdict that the deceased was of unsound mind and how completely inadequate is the procedure for determining that issue at inquests. The verdict was rightly described as being almost in the nature of a dishonest verdict.' And it cannot be doubted that if the deceased had killed someone else instead of himself, in most cases no question of insanity could be raised, with any hope of success, at his trial.

Suicide is not only a felony: it is also an ecclesiastical offence, and the use of the Burial Service is unlawful where the deceased was of years of discretion and in his senses. In the old days a suicide was buried at cross-roads with a stake through his heart—unless it could be said, as one of the clowns was able to say of Ophelia, that 'the crowner hath sat . . . and finds it Christian burial.' If the deceased was

insane at the time, he was innocent of the ecclesiastical offence, so he was buried like anyone else ; and he was not guilty of the felony, so his goods were not forfeited to the Crown. Coroners' juries, therefore, had very strong charitable motives for declining to find the verdict *felo de se* ; and even now it is returned very reluctantly.

Suicide 'while of unsound mind' or 'while the balance of the deceased's mind was disturbed' is the most usual verdict to-day ; but 'suicide while temporarily insane' is still common in some places—although in 1922 the council of the Coroners' Society resolved that it should no longer be returned. These verdicts serve no useful purpose : they may sometimes please the deceased's relatives, but they may harm them or their descendants by placing the stigma of insanity on the family. At an Ashburton inquest last year the coroner said that it would be insulting the deceased to suggest that he committed suicide while insane ; but this view is rarely heard expressed at inquests. The verdicts vitiate inquest statistics, for no one believes that they show the true facts. They bind no other tribunal ; and they are not even received as evidence in other courts. The verdict *felo de se* is also objectionable and also useless ; it has no deterrent effect ; and, as the Committee said, it should be no part of a coroner's duty to attribute felonious responsibility.

The Committee propose that in suicide cases there shall be no inquiry into the state of the deceased's mind—save in so far as it may throw light on the question whether he took his own life—and that the verdict shall simply be 'that the deceased died by his own hand.' These proposals would prevent many incorrect verdicts from being given in the future. The use of the Burial Service would still be unlawful, but since 1880 the minister has been permitted to use 'such service, consisting of prayers from the Book of Common Prayer and portions of Holy Scripture as may be prescribed . . .,' so there is no longer any real hardship. The friends of a sane man can hardly complain if, as a result of his breach of the law, the funeral service differs from the ordinary one. It will always be possible, moreover, for the Church to devise a procedure of its own for satisfying itself of the state of the deceased's mind ; or, with the consent of Parliament, to change the law. It is not a valid argument against the proposed

reforms that they would prevent Christian burial from being obtained for suicides by the false pretence that they were of unsound mind at the time they committed the act.

The Committee made some controversial proposals with regard to the publication of reports of inquests on suicides : *i.e.*, that the Press should be forbidden to publish an account of the proceedings, but only the fact that an inquest has been held, the name and address of the deceased, and the verdict that the deceased died by his own hand. It has almost always been possible for the Press to report the proceedings, as inquests are normally held in open court. In Scotland the Procurator Fiscal makes his investigation in private and no report is possible. The reports are often of news value, but there are a number of reasons for stopping their publication. A report of the particulars of one case is frequently followed by a series of imitative suicides ; the publication of the names of poisons is obviously dangerous. Dr. Crichton Miller told the Committee that in his view the publication of details is calculated to lead those of suicidal tendencies to take their lives. Others argued that publicity merely influences the means employed. Be that as it may, the Committee arrived at the conclusion that the knowledge of an attractive method is an important factor in influencing the potential suicide in making up his mind to destroy himself. The prohibition of reports might well lead to a reduction in the number of suicides ; though no one can be certain that it would have that effect. It might lead to an increase in the number ; for more people may be deterred by the fear of the effect of publicity on their survivors, and on their own reputations, than are encouraged or influenced by the suggestion of a particular means.

Quite apart from the effects which publicity may have upon those who are contemplating or who may contemplate suicide is the effect which it may have upon the members of the deceased's family and his friends. Letters are sometimes read at inquests which deal with intimate personal matters or make reflections on living people, and their publication may cause harm. They may have been written when the writer was excited or overwrought ; they may be malicious ; they may contain quite unfounded allegations. Even the publication of the verbal evidence may cause unnecessary pain to the

survivors. Ample grounds can be found for the proposed prohibition; and it should not prove difficult to enforce it. Last September the *Observer* published a note by its Istanbul correspondent in which he said that a few years ago a law was passed in Turkey which prohibited the publication of any news connected with suicide. It was thus hoped to curb the noticeable increase in the number of cases. It is difficult to tell whether the measure has had any satisfactory or direct result, but some cases of suicide cause a sensation which it is almost impossible to hide. In such cases the newspapers do not mention suicide, but nevertheless they manage to let their readers know what was meant. It is, however, impossible for the Turkish papers to deal at length with the emotional side of the news. Even that result is something, but, judging from the successful regulation of reports of divorce proceedings, it would not be difficult to enforce the prohibition here.

Most of the reforms proposed by the Committee would achieve their purpose—though in some instances we wish that they had been rather bolder. For instance, they did not deal with the problem of organising the appointments and districts of coroners in the way in which they dealt with most of the other matters that came before them. There are far too many coroners: in 1935 there were 309 (some of whom held more than one coronership). There were 203 county, 107 borough, and 44 franchise coronerships. Under the Act of 1926, with a few exceptions, the franchise coronerships are gradually being extinguished, and when they have gone the number of coronerships will have been reduced from 354 to about 310. They vary very much in importance: only 13 take up the whole time of the holder, and of these 11 are in or near the County of London, but 81 of the county and borough coroners have so little work to do that they receive less than £100 a year. Nearly all coroners hold office for life, with no retiring age and no pension.

The Committee said that many of the part-time coroners have little experience, or prospect of experience, in the conduct of their duties, but that it did not seem practicable as an immediate measure to recommend a complete or thoroughgoing reconstruction of that body. They therefore contented themselves with saying that greater use should be made of the power of combining small coronerships or

merging them in larger districts, and that as vacancies occur in non-county boroughs of less than 75,000 inhabitants the coroner's district should be merged in that of the neighbouring county. They said that if they were starting a fresh system the problem would be comparatively simple, but that, in view of the present arrangements, they did not feel able to recommend that all coroners should be full-time officials. At the present time the county councils are responsible for the appointment of county coroners and, in practice, for making the initial move in regard to an alteration of coroners' districts. The Committee considered that on each vacancy it should be specifically considered whether an enlargement of districts should not take place. But these proposals do not go far enough: the work of the coroners should be reorganised on a national basis. The coroner's work has nothing to do with local government; and in order that the whole system may be gradually reformed with a view to the creation of large and more or less uniform districts, each in charge of a full-time coroner, the appointment of coroners and the regulation of their districts should be made a responsibility of the Lord Chancellor or the Home Secretary. The local councils do not appoint county court judges or magistrates, and there is no real reason why they should appoint coroners. A central authority would be more competent to judge qualifications; and in some places at present one cannot be reasonably sure that party politics do not enter into the choice and that there is no wire-pulling. The Minister, moreover, would be able to enforce a retiring age and organise a national superannuation scheme.

Before 1926 men without any professional qualifications could be appointed coroners, but the Act of that year provided that in future only barristers, solicitors, or qualified medical practitioners, of at least five years' standing in their professions, should be appointed. Most coroners are solicitors in private practice: in 1935, 268 were barristers or solicitors (some of whom also possessed medical qualifications); 37 were doctors, and four had no professional qualifications. The Committee recommended that in future only barristers or solicitors should be appointed, because the sifting of evidence requires a legal training and the medical aspects of the case can be dealt with in evidence by experts. They also

took the view that whenever possible service as a deputy coroner should be regarded as a necessary qualification, and that coroners should have had some training in forensic medicine.

The London County Council used to insist that candidates should be both legally and medically qualified. In practice this meant that doctors who had been called to the Bar were appointed. A doctor could be 'called' after eating his dinners and passing the examinations although he had never been inside a court of law. The ability to weigh evidence is not by any means necessarily acquired by passing examinations or even by eating dinners; but only one of the London coroners appointed under the double qualification rule has had any considerable practical experience of the law. In view of the Committee's recommendations, the London County Council recently decided that in future only barristers or solicitors will be eligible, but that in making appointments due regard will be given to experience as deputy coroners; and it is to be hoped that this practice will be extended by Parliament to the rest of the country.

A writer in the *Law Times* has expressed doubts as to the competence of lawyers to deal with difficult medical cases, and suggested that coroners should be appointed in pairs consisting of a doctor and a lawyer, so that the medical cases could be heard by an expert. We should prefer to see Parliament give legal coroners—who would be full-time officials—the right to obtain the services of a highly qualified medical assessor. An assessor would be more likely to possess up-to-date knowledge than a retired doctor who had been appointed a coroner; and as his services would be required only occasionally, men of very high standing in their profession would be found willing to act who would be unlikely to abandon their practices and accept a full-time post. Even in medical cases a whole-time legal coroner would normally be preferable to a part-time medical one. Although a coroner should possess some knowledge of forensic medicine, he cannot be expected to have the knowledge which an assessor should have, and which it is necessary should be available in some cases. It is true that he can hear evidence; but unless he is an expert, or has expert assistance, he will not know the important questions to ask and will be

absolutely in the hands of the witnesses. An intelligent and independent assessor sitting with a coroner might well make discoveries which would make the cost more than worth while.

Some of the verdicts to which we have referred do not reflect on the coroners, but on their juries. These are generally chosen by the coroner's officer, 'who often chooses them in a way that best suits his own convenience.' The case of *R. v. Divine, Ex parte Walton*,¹ shows how this system may work. It revealed that in Hull the practice was for the coroner's officer to select eleven jurymen out of a list or panel of sixteen or seventeen, so that some were summoned over and over again. The High Court held that it was improper and very objectionable to draw the jury from a small panel of regular jurymen; but the Committee reported that in some places there is still a regular body of men who are summoned from time to time. They were informed of one town where the jury is regularly constituted of the inmates of a workhouse! In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that odd verdicts are sometimes returned: perhaps the marvel is that they are not more common. This may be because juries are often guided by the coroner: in August 1937, for instance, an inquest was held at Bury on a man who had fallen down a pit 20 feet deep. A post-mortem examination showed that death was due to hæmorrhage, which was the cause, and not the consequence, of the fall. The jury first returned the verdict 'death by misadventure'; the coroner asked them to reconsider this, and after a second retirement they returned the proper verdict—'death from natural causes.' Sometimes it is not the stupidity of the jury which leads to a verdict which (so far as one can judge from the reports) is obviously wrong, but their sympathy. Such a case seems to have occurred at Sheffield on August 10, 1937. Five witnesses said that they thought that a man had deliberately thrown himself in front of an omnibus, but the jury returned a verdict of 'accidental death.' 'A merciful verdict,' said the coroner. A curious case occurred at Leeds on September 1, 1937. Inquests were held together on a husband and wife: the husband had shot his wife, sent for the police, and as they arrived shot himself. The verdicts were 'wilful murder' and 'suicide while

¹ [1930] 2 K. B. 36.

temporarily insane.' It is almost inconceivable that both these verdicts were correct—*i.e.*, that the man was sane when he shot his wife and insane when he shot himself.

In no other sort of inquiry is a jury deemed to be necessary in these days, and after the reforms have been introduced there will be even less reason than there is at present for having them at inquests. If they always return the verdict for which the coroner asks, they are unnecessary; if they return a different verdict, it will probably be because they have failed to understand the evidence or have been swayed by their emotions. In clear cases they are superfluous; in difficult cases the trained mind of the coroner will be more likely to arrive at the truth than a small body of jurors. They cause inquests to last longer than they would if no jury were present; and, moreover, if the jurors are summoned at short notice and are chosen at random from names on the jury list, they must inevitably suffer much inconvenience.

The Committee, however, did not propose the abolition of juries; but they recommended that a jury should not be summoned, except in the cases where it is obligatory, unless there are grounds which appear to render its presence desirable. At present juries are not summoned in about two-thirds of the total number of inquests, but in certain cases they are compulsory—*e.g.*, where crime is suspected; where the death is the result of a street accident; or where the death has to be reported to an inspector, etc.; and the Committee propose that juries shall continue to be summoned in these cases. They thought, however, that coroners should take a greater interest themselves in the empanelling of juries; that service on their juries should be more easily borne by all classes of society; and that jurors should be chosen from the jury list. They also recommended that at least two women should serve at inquests on women or infants.

We have no space to consider most of the other proposals of the Committee, but two are especially important. They proposed that a committee be established to draw up a code of rules of procedure for coroners similar to those which govern the procedure in the High Court and in the county court. It is surprising that this has not been done before now. The code would make uniform what at present more

or less depends on the views of the individual coroners, and would, no doubt, also standardise the forms of the various possible verdicts. This proposal is one to which it is scarcely possible to object on any ground. The other was that a disciplinary committee should be set up, identical in personnel with the Rules Committee, to consider complaints against coroners; but this is highly controversial. No such body exists for magistrates, and if the other recommendations of the Committee are adopted it may be doubted whether such a body will be necessary. But if it is, we prefer the suggestion contained in the minority report of Mr. Rutley Mowll, that the coroners themselves should set up such a committee, which, in proper cases, should make complaints to the Lord Chancellor. The Committee recommended that the Lord Chancellor should be authorised to remove coroners reported to him by the disciplinary committee, if he thinks fit to do so; and further, that he should have a definite responsibility to remove one who has, by conduct connected or unconnected with his duties, shown himself unfit to be a coroner.

The Committee appointed in 1908 published its second Report in 1910, but it was not until 1926 that the Coroners (Amendment) Act was passed. In April 1937 Lord Dufferin and Ava told the House of Lords that, 'when opportunity offers,' the proposals 'will probably be the subject of future legislation,' and we venture to hope that it will not be long before the Government introduces and passes another Coroners Amendment Act. Reforms are certainly overdue, and those which have been proposed would meet most of the criticisms which have been heard in the past. They would increase the efficiency of inquests and enhance the prestige of the coroners. At present coroners are not as much respected as they ought to be: one of them told the Committee that he had had to rebuke a representative of the Press for eating sandwiches in court! The law has remained unmodernised for far too long; but the proposed reforms would bring it into accord with the changed conditions of the present day.

GILBERT LESLIE.

EXAMINATIONS

By F. McEACHRAN

MOST people agree that something is wrong with examinations and that they ought to be reformed, but they rarely define, and seldom know, what they mean. Sir Philip Hartog's masterly *An Examination of Examinations*¹ is conclusive, so far as it goes, in showing that the system does not, and cannot, meet the needs of those which it was designed to serve, and that it is largely fortuitous in operation. Professor Valentine has shown that it is unreliable, at any given age, as an indication of individual capacity a few years hence.² Schoolmasters and schoolmistresses are almost unanimous in regarding it as one of the principal obstacles to a sound system of education. No apology, therefore, is needed for this attempt to reveal the root of a recognised evil by approaching it from what is, perhaps, a new angle.

Some sort of examinations will always be necessary just so long as tangible proof is required that a pupil has a definite skill or knowledge. If this were all that examinations implied to-day, no one could quarrel with them. But of recent years a new sort of examination has arisen which has little to do with a student's actual career. Lower school certificate, school certificate, matriculation certificate (a school certificate with five credits), higher school certificate, and so-called 'public' examinations are so many milestones to-day on a boy's way into life, but are not designed to make the going more cheerful or the boy more efficient. Certain subjects taken in school certificate secure exemption from some other examination like the solicitors' or architects' preliminary, but this is simply a convenient arrangement for both bodies concerned and does not affect our argument. The point is that fifty years ago there were few, if any,

¹ Macmillan: London, 1935.

² *The Reliability of Examinations*, University of London Press.

preliminary examinations; a boy became a solicitor by passing through a solicitor's office, or a business man by simply going into business. Nor is there any reason to doubt that this method of procedure was in any way inferior to that followed to-day, nor to believe that, in the absence of an examination system, the schools and universities failed to produce great scholars. Indeed, there is reason for believing precisely the opposite, as I shall shortly try to prove. But the word 'examination' to-day bears a double meaning, being used to connote 'systems' of testing individual capacity which differ fundamentally, both in method and object.

'Public' examinations differ fundamentally from 'efficiency' examinations. The test or examination a lawyer might give a boy in his office, like the mediæval *disputatio* when the bachelor was 'examined' by his masters, or the student in the hospital 'examined' by his doctors, was based on a common experience which master and pupil had gone through together. The master knew what the pupil's intelligence was like and what information it had absorbed; the pupil understood his master and what he would be likely to ask, for they had worked together and they had a common relation to the subject of which the examination was a natural culmination, whereas a 'public' examination must by its own nature remain remote from the pupil's experience.

What is meant by this may easily be seen in contrasting, shall we say, the Oxford and Cambridge scholarship examinations, which still preserve a large element of the old efficiency examination, and a typical 'public' examination such as the higher school certificate. In the case of the scholarship the number of candidates is comparatively few, no 'set' books are required, and the only requirement made is that examiner and examined should have gone through a similar intellectual experience, whether in history, philosophy, languages, or whatever the subject may be. But with the thousands of pupils who present themselves for the school and higher certificates, in which multitudes of papers have to be marked in a short time, this is obviously out of the question, and naturally all sorts of mass production methods are adopted which are inevitably linked up with the system itself.

The first and obvious mass production line is for the

examiner to 'set' a definite book or a given period of history and so to limit, on his side, the possibilities of the candidates outwitting him. Having thus got control of the candidate, he reads up the book carefully himself and proceeds to set questions on it, leaving as little scope as possible for flights of the imagination. The drama *Bajazet*, for example, might be set for the French classical drama, and once 'set' would be pounced upon, read, re-read and put into English, analysed and dissected until it was a mere *corpus mortuum* of its former self. It is no use arguing that teachers are 'supposed' to take 'set books' in their stride and that other works of Racine should be read also, such as *Andromaque*, *Athalie* or *Phèdre*, for time simply does not allow it. The curriculum is overstocked, anyhow, and what is 'set' is definite, circumscribed, concrete and easily dealt with—so easy that it is the first thing both teacher and pupil can make certain of.³

In this connexion I remember visiting a secondary school in a country town and attending a French lesson for the school certificate, involving the reading of some 'set' book for boys and girls of about sixteen. When I showed some surprise that the children did not read aloud in French before translating, the lady teacher confessed, looking a trifle harassed, that she had given up trying to teach them to speak French. In any case, the oral part of the examination only carried fifty marks, and their accents were terrible even in English, not to mention French. It was of the utmost importance that a fair number should pass the examination, and so the wretches slogged away, day after day, night after night, putting a text into English which was never meant to be put into English and which could have been read exhaustively in French in about one-fifth of the time. Now the remedy for this state of affairs is not, as the reader may over-hastily conclude, to strengthen the marking value of the oral examination. That would drive the miserable teacher crazy.

The remedy is to free the woman and children from the obsession and let her, in consultation with the headmaster, decide what these children really are capable of doing. Only people on the spot can decide a thing like that; they alone

³ C. W. Valentine mentions a school where the Hanoverian period in history was done by the same pupils four years running, for the sake of ensuring success in the school certificate (*The Reliability of Examinations*, p. 16).

are with the children and partake in their experience. Nor is it possible, as the Board may imagine, to solve this problem by allowing the teacher to choose and suggest a book to the Board—for more than one reason. It is often difficult, until reading has actually begun, to know when a book is suitable, and a step once taken cannot easily be retraced. Secondly, as in most cases the choice would be an easier book, the marking would have to be harder to make a fair comparison with other children doing harder books. And, lastly, the teacher in most cases will not take the responsibility of choice on himself. He (or she) is liable to get the blame if the children do not pass, and he naturally prefers to take his chance on the syllabus. He is then technically on the right side.

With regard to history examinations, a friend of mine, who spent one hot summer marking certificate papers, told me how astounding it was to what extent the history answers are as like as two peas. To a question on the character of Walpole the answers came pat, each neatly arranged in four or five sections, mentioning his indefatigability, his imperturbability, his corruptibility, and something else I forget, each section receiving its due quota of marks. Very probably the answers all came from the potted history-books now on the market, which, without any pretence of being educational, just tabulate the whole of English history, each event or character with its proper label or tag. Now suppose a boy, not having crammed himself with the 'potted' history and its stock labels, were to produce a first-class essay on Robert Walpole from his own creative sources, how could he then be marked at all, and on what basis? Without the four sections (which are exhaustive, according to the potted history) there are no means of giving him marks, whether, say, 20 per cent. for one section or 40 per cent. for two. He has not dealt with any section. Ought he to receive 100 per cent. or zero? It is impossible to say. Value is the one thing that cannot be marked, and it is quite clear that Shakespeare, examined on Roman history, might easily fail on the question of Julius Cæsar or Coriolanus. What he might do in the English grammar paper I shudder to think. . . .

The whole conception of examining boys in vast numbers by people who do not know them is based on false premises

and forms one of the most glaring misdevelopments of the modern world. Like many such developments, it has grown up unconsciously, and for that very reason has escaped critical attention so long. Everything in the world which is really of value comes from free growth in individual human beings, and any attempt to control it from somebody outside must ultimately fail, not without doing damage on its way.

Imagine, for example, there had been a board of sculptural examiners at Athens in the old Greek days, laying down the law about sculpture to the people in the various towns—Sicyon, Tenea, Tegea, Thebes, Tanagra, etc., which devoted themselves to sculpture—and ask what result might have arisen out of it. Let us suppose that set canons had been laid down by the central Athenian board and budding young artists, inspired by the environment they lived in and the human nature about them, compelled to follow the rules laid down in Athens. No one in his senses thinks that the glorious sculpture of Greece could have arisen under such conditions, and we have only to bring the argument nearer home to perceive how significant its implications are.

I remember in this connexion talking to the staff of a school where the higher school certificate had been taken for many years, without any conscious reflection on why it was taken or to what purpose. I was informed on good authority that the higher certificate course in French and German lasted two years, and the 'set' books had to be read during six terms, and no other books. One of the books being read was *Der Schimmelreiter*, by Theodor Storm, a rather long *novelle*, with a very difficult vocabulary, although quite a good book for anyone who really knew German. The boys who were reading it said that in the previous term they had spent the whole term preparing 50 pages in all (out of 200), and 'preparing' furthermore, consisted of looking up the English of each word and writing it in the book over the German, then translating the whole aloud into English next day.

The rate of movement was about two pages a day in a lesson of one hour. No attempt was ever made to read the German as German, and, in any case, the German was too hard to be read by these particular boys. There was the 'set' book, there were the boys and they had been brought together, and, curiously enough, the assumption was the

whole time that the system was right, whatever else was wrong. The books set must be good books for boys; the Board had set them. The preparation must take six terms; experience had shown that this was the right length of time. Boys must write English words over the German words; the German was too difficult to be read as German, and also it was essential to be able to revise quickly for the examination. Again, since pieces are set to be translated, the whole book must be put into English as often as possible. Now practically every one of these statements is a fallacy, although they do not, on the face of it, appear to be so. We will take them roughly in order.

With regard to setting the right books, the examining board are not only not always right, but, by the very nature of the case, almost invariably wrong, for quite simple reasons. The amount of German teaching in schools is different and cannot be standardised without doing great harm. Some schools have a five-years course, others have three or less; some have intelligent boys on the modern side, others (more numerous) have less intelligent boys. Some have good teachers, others do not, and so on, so that to assume that boys of seventeen will necessarily know enough to read any particular book is itself a fallacy at the very outset. No board can possibly know what the attainments of boys of any age in any school are anywhere, and there is no means of informing it. The conditions differ in every school.

Secondly, the argument that six terms were required for this book because it was hard was an argument that proved absolutely nothing. On the same logic, twenty terms might be required, if the boys had the book forced upon them several years earlier, and, owing to its difficulty, had to go on doing it repeatedly. The real point was that, owing to its difficulty, it was impossible to get very far with it, and most of the work was wasted. Ice was broken one day, only to close up overnight, leaving them still frozen-in next day.

Thirdly, it was precisely because they would go on writing the English word over the German that they never learnt German words, or felt they needed to. All they had to do to translate was to read off the English with a few conjunctions and prepositions and the trick was done. Fourthly, revision ought to be real revision—i.e., a rapid repetition of something

that has really been absorbed and does not need much more effort. Here, however, as absorptions had never occurred, revision had become simply the refurbishing-up of something which ought never to have been done—*i.e.*, the writing-in of English words.

Fifthly and lastly, the argument that boys cannot read German as German is merely an argument against the particular book used in this case, and in no wise against the possibility of boys reading German, provided only they are given a book on their own level. The way for children to read German is to start from simple German and rise imperceptibly to more complex German, their relation to each level being one of almost complete mastery from the start. If, as in this case, the gap between the child's knowledge and the book set is too great, the result, quite naturally, is an artificial attempt to bridge it, by the insertion of English words over the German text. And only when the child really does know some German, when his knowledge of the language is not too remote from his knowledge of English, will it be time to put German into English as an artistic and stylistic exercise. Here again, as in the case of the French teacher in the secondary school, only action on the part of the teacher could save the situation and the pupil from the worst possible dry-rot. Seen from the side of the examination, all the arguments for this procedure were justifiable and could not easily be refuted. Seen from the side of the pupil, none of them were worth a moment's consideration. Yet such is the effect of the examination on the mind of the teacher that he becomes numbed in the face of actuality and accepts the situation as given. I might add that the mentality of headmasters and governors, and public opinion, in counting heads as signs of progress also has something to do with it.

As we have now considered in detail some of the evils of the examination system, I will return to the original point and explain briefly how this competition system actually came into being. For hundreds of years, even down to quite recently, as far as the middle classes are concerned, a boy would, generally speaking, become a solicitor by the simple process of looking round for an office, and in most cases he would find one somewhere, no qualifications being wanted except an average capacity, good manners, tidy

appearance, and so on. It could happen, of course, that a slight overlapping might occur, if too many boys decided to become doctors or solicitors in a given generation, but this in actuality could only happen when the market expanded or became restricted for some special reason. To a surprising extent boys make their decision for reasons of which they are not immediately conscious, such as parental tradition or market conditions, and in most cases in the history of England there has been no overlapping. There was (there should be) an average of one job for one boy, and it will be seen, after a little reflection, that this is the natural state of affairs. As society gets more populous it should throw up more jobs in proportion, so that no country, as often erroneously imagined, is really over-populated. Great Britain, with its 45,000,000 people, has, it is true, its large unemployment problem, but so have Canada and Australia, with their comparatively small population, which goes to prove that it is not just numbers of people that causes unemployment.⁴ What does happen, of course, is that countries get dislocated in their economic structure, and it is this really which is the key, not only to the population, but also to the examination problem. Examinations are to the middle and upper classes what unemployment is to the working classes; they reflect in their different way a crisis in economics.

In other words, as long as one boy turned up for one job in the English middle-class society no employer ever thought of asking much in the way of qualifications; probably the parents' reputation and that of the school were enough. A day came, however, when two or even three boys began to turn up for one job and the employer rubbed his nose in a certain perplexity. He knows he cannot tell from a boy's school career whether he will be any use in business, but the problem here has advanced to a further stage. He has to choose between two boys at least (one having been eliminated for bad manners or untidiness) who would do equally well, to judge by appearances. How is he to decide between them on a fair basis, without disappointing, or perhaps annoying, the parents? The employer naturally finds a way out in demanding school qualifications, and it is very probably the collective

⁴ Australia, with about 7,000,000, had more than 500,000 unemployed at one time. Canada, with 10,000,000, about 1,000,000.

pressure, exercised by thousands of boys and parents in this predicament, which forced the school certificate into schools.

On this background the development of the school certificate from being purely a school certificate to becoming a certificate with five credits can easily be followed. The latter has, in point of fact, very little to do with the university; it is simply a consequence of the fight for jobs.⁵ At first, a school certificate alone sufficed to get a boy a job, then other boys came along holding this document, and one, two or three credits became necessary to distinguish a winning candidate. Finally, these cancelled out because all boys had them, and now a certificate with five credits is almost *de rigueur*. Remember that in these matters employers are not to blame, and it is not much use appealing to them. They have, say, twenty boys turning up for a job, ten of whom look equally capable. Matriculation is a convenient way of deciding between them, and when it cancels out because all boys have it, then the higher certificate⁶ will be asked for. It is, indeed, already asked for sometimes, and requirements in some places have even outstripped it. It is said that the departments of certain famous stores in London now ask for a First Class in Oxford Greats, and even then have to turn people away. Let us hope this will not become general.

As this is not an economic treatise on the nature of the crisis, I do not need to go into an explanation of why it has occurred, and all I wish to do is to emphasise that the cause is economic. Everywhere, not only in examinations, the signs of it may be seen, and it is, therefore, of the utmost importance to realise that the growth of our examination system, together with the growth of an enormous secondary school population, does not mean an increase in real efficiency. It is not often realised that the influx of boys on the scholarship system into secondary schools and the rapid growth of these schools is as much due to the fear of an uncertain

⁵ The Northern Universities, through their examining body, have, I believe, now definitely separated the school certificate from matriculation. The effect will probably be to tighten the hold which the higher certificate has on schools.

⁶ The immediate necessity of the higher certificate in schools is not easy to account for. Many of the best public schools flatly refuse to have it, and it looks as though its existence is a sort of 'backwash' from the whole system. 'Public' examinations having come in lower down in the school, headmasters feel they must have one for the top form.

economic future as to a genuine desire for knowledge or education. Before the war the British artisan, confident in his own future and that of his children, despised black-coated workers and preferred his children to follow his own way of life. Now he will do anything to get his children into a 'safe' occupation, not because he is less stalwart and courageous than before, but because he knows what unemployment means and sees no future for industry. Similarly, the appearance of *careers masters* in public schools, where boys have the best chance in the world of getting a job, does not mean that the public schools are developing an interest in their pupils' future which they lacked before, but simply that the public school class are now feeling the crisis. The high-water mark has risen to their level, that is all. Realising this and realising the function that examinations play, schools can at least be put on their guard and probably do much more in the way of real education for their children than they now do. In any case, only a percentage will get the jobs, and it is indifferent to the employers whether they are got by means of higher certificate, matriculation certificate, or no certificate at all. The important thing is that while they are at school at least they should be educated and not sacrificed to a Moloch system of examinations.

A few words may conveniently be said in conclusion on the research into examinations which has been done in late years, beginning with Professor E. Y. Edgeworth, whose memoirs on *The Statistics of Examinations* appeared as early as 1888 and 1890. Nearer to our own time the whole matter has been ably reviewed by Sir Philip Hartog in 1918 in the work *Examinations and their Relations to Culture and Efficiency*,⁷ where, as in these pages, professional and non-professional examinations are carefully distinguished. It is worth remarking that the concession he makes in this work of a certain efficiency value in examinations (although of no cultural value) he actually withdraws in his more recent work *An Examination of Examinations*.⁸ He reports here, for example, that it was found in the case of school certificate scripts that when fourteen experienced examiners re-marked fifteen scripts which had all received the same moderate mark from previous

⁷ Constable: London, 1918.

⁸ Hartog and Rhodes, Macmillan: London, 1935.

examiners, the new examiners between them allotted over *forty different* marks to the several scripts.

Another work of importance is Professor Valentine's *The Reliability of Examinations*,⁹ in which he points out how the marks a candidate receives may vary with the character of the questions, with the particular examiner, with varying standards in the same examiner, with particular good or bad 'form' of the candidate, with the coaching he has received, and so on. He points out, further, that although in the case of scholarships in secondary schools borderline marks are always carefully considered, the fact remains that a fresh examination might easily produce a completely new border. He suggests, by way of reform, the possibility of a 'second chance' in another examination, and also a reconsideration after the first year at secondary school, when, apparently, an order of merit is often found which remains stable for good. Finally, J. L. Gray and Pearl Moshinsky, in a careful statistical work, *Ability and Educational Opportunity in English Education*,¹⁰ have revealed a serious lacuna in the relation of the ability of English children for higher education and the opportunities afforded it.

These inquiries, it is true, stop short at the actual examination itself, and do not pretend to investigate the deeper, probably economic, roots that lie beneath. They serve an important purpose none the less, and one that grows in significance with every year that passes. Greater knowledge is the key to all reform, and leads in the end to complete understanding.

F. MCEACHRAN.

⁹ University of London Press : London, 1932.

¹⁰ The Play House Press : London, 1935.

THE ISLAND SYMBOL

By E. H. VISIAK

A SYMBOL in the universal sense—a mental abstraction in concrete form—is a wonderful thing. A picture-word, a verbal hieroglyph, with profound imaginative content, it conveys an idea, a feeling, or a group of related ideas and feelings, and as such it is a commonplace but not a stereotype or *cliché*; the quality of its significance has never worn dull—that is to say, if it is a true, and not a mere arbitrary or superficial, symbol. The older it is the more vital it is. It can be described only in terms of its own imagery, in picture or figurative language: as a tree, for example, that has rooted deeper and deeper in the instinctive or subconscious; as an island that grows up, coral-like, out of the ocean. The island symbol itself is particularly significant.

The idea of the island—the 'island feeling,' as it has been called by Mr. Walter de la Mare—is peculiarly attractive to the imagination: a fact attested, incidentally, by the experience of publishers (it was a publisher who altered *The Sea-Cook*, Stevenson's original title, to *Treasure Island*) in the popularity of stories about islands. This attractiveness is due, in general, to two diverse yet complementary instincts: the instinct for security and the instinct for liberty, which are implicit in the imaginative concept of the island; the island impregnable and inaccessible, a kind of fortified castle, or moated grange, of the sea; the island as the undiscovered bourne of the free, adventurous spirit, romantic with mystery.

To English people, the first, or *security*, instinct has become an inherited consciousness of their 'tight little island,' endeared by the old-fashioned sentiment of 'England, home, and beauty.' This insular home-like feeling, an aspect of the security instinct, was known in classical and ancient no less than in English historical times. It was appreciated

by the early Greeks, themselves an 'island race,' and was expressed by Homer. Odysseus, struggling back from Troy to Ithaca, his island home, was continually held up in his course and detained by other islands: islands with enchantresses upon them—Circe and Calypso, and the Sirens; islands and enchantresses that suggest illusory images of Ithaca, and also of Penelope, Odysseus's absent consort. One is reminded of a much later study in romantic nostalgia: that of the hopeless quest, in Herman Melville's *Mardi*, of the beautiful Zillah, who is chased from island to island.

It is odd that one writer in whom this 'island feeling' is peculiarly evident was not himself an islander. In Jules Verne's *Mathias Sandorf* the island of Antékirtta, with its ultra-modern fortifications, is a fascinating embodiment of the security idea; while in his *L'Ile Mystérieuse* the craving for remote and strange adventure is completely satisfied—at any rate, to all who retain their power of illusion, which is, paradoxically, a form of truth. At the same time, the 'home' aspect is rendered by the qualities of practical resourcefulness and snug adaptability that are manifested by the castaways, who make themselves comfortable in the cavity of a volcano.

These qualities, which are characteristic of castaways on desert islands in adventure fiction, are inherited, of course, from *Robinson Crusoe*, of which the imaginative significance is involved no less in the material things themselves than in the practical uses to which they are put. Defoe created them, as Crusoe discovers them, with a childlike apprehensiveness and relish. That is to say, the things themselves are seen in their intrinsic values, and accordingly imaginatively *possessed*. In one way, Crusoe himself comments upon this in the reflection that their respective values cannot, in that remote and solitary place, be reckoned in terms of money. It was no 'treasure island' as was the island in Poe's *Gold Bug*, the scene of a cache revealed by a cryptogram—the pioneer of piratic treasure islands in fiction. Nor are too many things provided by the wreck in *Robinson Crusoe*. There is not a 'plethora' of them, as Robert Louis Stevenson pointed out that there was in *The Swiss Family Robinson*, an island story still popular with schoolboys.

Robinson Crusoe was not written for schoolboys. It was

written by Defoe principally as a means of escape from himself in miserable circumstances, when he was an exile from his home in a mean lodging, and with a price upon his head. It is to a desert, not treasure, island that the spirit hies.

Now, in actual fact, the national sense of an island as being secure from attack has been put in jeopardy by the development of aviation; it might, therefore, be supposed that the island in its imaginative significance would equivalently lose in value, and this not only in its aspect of security, but in that of freedom also. Neither of these effects, however, need follow; for there are still islands sufficiently remote in the Pacific for any practical imaginative purposes, and ways and means of defending an ideal island from hostile battleplanes will always be conceivable. An excellent hint may be found in Sir Francis Bacon. The island in his *New Atlantis* was secure from attack for the simple reason that nobody in the outer world was aware of its existence—nobody, that is, except certain travellers now and again at considerable intervals of time; but their narratives were not believed, and, in fact, no early seventeenth-century or pre-seventeenth-century man of the world could well be expected to take such narratives seriously. He might, in fact, as he generally did, believe in golden *El Dorados*, but not (among other outlandish figments) in New Atlantean aeroplanes ['Wee have some Degrees of Flying in the Ayre'], submarines ['Wee have Shippes and Boates for Going under Water'], telephones ['Wee have also meanes to convey Sounds in Trunks and Pipes, in strange Lines and Distances'], loud-speakers ['Wee represent Small Sounds as Great and Deepe'].

Again, the island was remote and obscure, hidden away in a great 'Wilderness of Waters,' which rendered the chances of its discovery infinitesimal. These, however, were not the only, or even the chief, reasons why the existence of the New Atlantis remained unknown. Few indeed were the travellers whose lot it had been to land there; fewer still were those who returned to civilised—or, speaking comparatively, *uncivilised*—parts. The truth is that any chance discoverers of the island found themselves in such exceedingly pleasant conditions that hardly any one of them wanted to depart; and, as there were no immigration or alien restrictions, they were free to remain—as free as they were to depart.

(with a ship provided free of charge) if they desired to depart. But except, as I have related, for rare instances, they knew when they were well off—where, in Milton's estimate of one's proper country, it was *well with one*.

The New Atlantis, however, was no 'fool's paradise.' There was nothing meretricious or illusory about the island: no magical voices or ethereal airs such as enchant us in Shakespeare's *Tempest*, which is the supreme poetical presentation of the island idea, as the *New Atlantis* is its scientific presentation. The New Atlanteans used no drowsy drugs, unless medicinally. No lotus grew there such as emasculated Tennyson's lost mariners, who:

... sat them down upon the yellow sand,
Between the sun and moon upon the shore;
And sweet it was to dream of Fatherland,
Of child, and wife, and slave; but evermore
Most weary seem'd the sea, weary the oar,
Weary the wandering fields of barren foam.
Then some one said, 'We will return no more';
And all at once they sang, 'Our island home
Is far beyond the wave; we will no longer roam.'

The *New Atlantis* (1623), of course, was inspired by the Platonic tradition of the submerged island-continent of Atlantis,¹ of which Bacon believed, with Hakluyt, that America was the wreck. In this sense Atlantis may be said to be submerged in the subconscious, no less than in the Atlantic Ocean; for Bacon's work was the precursor of a whole literature of island fiction, in which states of ideal civilisation were described after the model of Plato's *Republic*. The discovery of America, and especially of the strange isolated civilisations of Mexico and Peru, aroused at the time a great deal of speculation, suggesting the fancy that somewhere there might be found an ideally happy and virtuous community; so that, through Plato, this kind of island fiction was, in effect, the progeny of the Old World and the New; the mental product of Greek and English—both islander—imagination.

Neither Bacon nor his contemporary readers, however,

¹ Plato's *Timæus* and *Critias*. Notable modern writers: Ignatius Donnelly, *Le Plongeon* (in deciphering Mexican hieroglyphics), Ben Leslie, Lewis Spence, W. Scott Elliot, Rudolph Steiner.

would have called his essay in this kind of ideal civilisation literature 'Utopian.' That pessimistic designation—since Utopia means *Nowhere*—was introduced by Sir Thomas More, who took the title of his *Utopia* (1516) from Rabelais. Rabelais—who is said to have been born in 1483, the same year as Luther—originated satirical island fiction; a voluminous literary archipelago, mainly represented in its earlier—seventeenth and eighteenth-century—periods by, respectively, Bishop Hall's Latin burlesque, *Mundus alter et idem* . . . (1607) and Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), the title of which is supposed to have been suggested by the former work. The scene of *Mundus alter et idem* . . . (a broad satire on the vices²) was laid in the then scarcely more than mythical island-continent of Australia. It was thus collaterally related to the *New Atlantis*; and this more significantly than its author knew, for as America was believed to be the wreck of Atlantis, so Australia is held by some theorists to be a remnant of an antique continent called Laputa (so, too, by the way, is Easter Island, which, with its weird, gigantic stone figures, constitutes an *actual* 'mysterious island').

As the great progenitor of satirical island fiction, Rabelais abounded in burlesque islands. Examples are: Evil Island; the islands of the Papefugues and Papimanes (satirising religious wars); Chaneph Island, or the island of Hypocrisy; Canerabin, the island of Thieves; the island of Odes; the island of Clogs; the island of Monks; the island of Satin (where certain decretals are shown, which if people would only read, would make an end of all war, and a furnace of love and charity towards one's neighbour—*except in the case of heretics*!); the island of Sharping or Gaming. In regard to later and up-to-date publications of satirical—or, at any rate, *admonitory*—island literature, they are as various as H. G. Wells's horrible vivisectionist extravaganza, *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, and Barrie's play, *The Admirable Crichton*, in which a servile butler becomes an island dictator.

Specifically political island fiction was probably originated by Barclay (1582–1621), whose *Argenis* develops political themes in Sicily. The most prominent example of this kind is James Harrington's *Oceana* (1650), which was written to

² Milton calls it in his *Apology against a Pamphlet* . . . , 'the idlest and the paltriest Mime that ever mounted upon banke.'

advocate certain reforms in the administrative machinery of the Commonwealth.

Romantic island fiction has its source in the *Tempest*, which is the poetic version of the island idea as *Robinson Crusoe* is its prosaic version. From this elevated source it declined into such bizarre drivel as Matthew Lewis's *The Isle of Devils*, a little-known and very scarce poetic romance published in Jamaica in 1827. In this the hero and heroine land and propose to settle on an island because it appears so beautiful :

An isle with verdure gay and bright
Which seemed an emerald set in silver.

They subsequently learn, however, of its sinister repute. Hideous faces are seen for an instant, and vanish. A monstrous dwarf appears. The fiend who is the lord of the island kills the hero, and becomes the heroine's slave. She is rescued by a monk, and becomes a nun.

Another very scarce island poetic romance, in which the hero and heroine are natives of the Tonga Islands, and the content though sentimentally presented is accordingly primitive, is *The Ocean Cavern*, published anonymously in 1819. It carries on the title-page the appropriate verses, from More's *Lalla Rookh* :

Oft in my fancy's wanderings,
I've wish'd that little Isle had wings ;
And we, within its fairy bowers,
Were wafted off to seas unknown.

In prose, again, romantic island stories and romantic adventure island stories are numerous, especially stories about South Sea islands ; notably R. L. Stevenson's *The Beach of Falesá*—that *tour de force* of elemental passions—and, no less notably, the pearl island of the monstrously religious Atwater in *The Ebb-Tide*. Another memorable romantic island is in Joseph Conrad's *Victory*. This is the retreat of the noble Swedish recluse Heinz and his girl lover—a sub-tropical paradise, which is shattered by the shot from the rifle of the sinister, skeleton-like ' Plain Mr. Jones.'

This island, as Jules Verne's *Ile Mystérieuse*—but with a very different effect—is dominated by a volcano ; and volcanoes are naturally associated with actual islands, some

islands, in fact, being *en bloc* island-volcanoes rather than volcanic islands. This, in respect of the island idea, has a peculiar significance, for it deepens and intensifies the sense of insularity in the aspect of *solitariness*. By relating this feeling, through the image of the aspiring volcanic summit and ascending steam and smoke, with the sublime sentiment of exaltation, it impressively suggests the paradox that only through exalted solitariness and aspiration can the spirit attain essential reality and communion. In addition to this, the volcano is symbolic of dynamic genius, whose energies are generated by repression and sublimation. Repression is occasioned in the actual volcano by obstruction in the crater ; sublimation, or transmutation, by the conversion into steam of sea-water which has leaked through into the interior caverns. Now, the sea, which mythologically gave birth to Venus, is analogous, in this connexion, to the fermenting element in the volcano as a symbol of genius, which is effected through the sublimation of crude emotional instincts in excess. After all, it was a genius, the god of fire and metallic industries, whose workshop smoked and flamed in the bowels of Lemnos, the volcanic island upon which he had fallen from heaven.

To the volcanic island in classical story may be added the myth of the ' floating island ' of Delos—a prodigy that is not without parallels in actual fact³—which Apollo is said to have bound down to the sea-bottom. Spenser's ' Wandering Islands ' in *The Faery Queene*, of course, were suggested by Delos, and generally, in fact, the island symbol in poetry was thrown up, through the hyaline renaissant element, from classical sources. There is, for instance, Tasso's Isle of Armida, and Giles Fletcher's *The Purple Island*, a poetic composition in which the nine-line stanza of *The Faery Queene* is reduced to eight.

That the highest felicity should often have been associated with islands shows clearly how deep-rooted is the island idea in the very needs and longings of humanity ; it is as though there had been an island Golden Age, although the Celtic dream-like quality which characterises some of these islands is suggestive rather of silver. Such half-romantic, half-mystic

³ As shown, for instance, in *The Floating Island in Derwentwater, its History and Mystery, with Notes of other Dissimilar Islands*, by G. F. Symons, F.R.S. (E. Stanford : Simpkin Marshall, 1888).

islands are the Arthurian Avalon or Ynysgientian (*i.e.*, 'Glass Island'—glass, in various forms, being characteristic in mystical lore) and the Cornish sunken island of Lyonesse. (It is odd, by the way, that among these mythical islands there should be a French *Ile Verte* and a Portuguese *Ilha Verde*.) There is, however, one mystical island which in brightness and efficacy is incomparable. It is the subject of a mediæval legend cited by Baring Gould in his *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*, from which I quote :

The monk who incited S. Brandan to undertake his mythical voyage, told him that he had sailed due east from Ireland, and had come at last to Paradise, which was an island full of joy and mirth, and the earth as bright as the sun, and it was a glorious sight ; and the half-year he was there slipped by as a few moments.

Even if Paradise were surrounded by land, as it was in the Bible, it would still be mystically an island. The earth is an island, the planets are islands, and the stars are islands of fire. The universe is full of islands, whether they be surrounded by earth, water, or air. The universe itself is an island in the ocean of infinity. Our souls are islands—sundered *at what distances* ! It was from an island, according to Plutarch, that a loud voice was heard over the darkening sea announcing the death of the Great Pan. It was on an island that the early saint saw the vision of the New Jerusalem, and heard a ' great voice as of a trumpet.'

E. H. VISIAK.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

PRIZE-GIVING at a secondary school four hours distant from London took me from Parliament for a day. Opposite me was a man with *Punch* in his hand and some back numbers of *Public Administration* by his side. Local government was clearly his job, and he was going on holiday, for his family occupied the rest of the carriage. I borrowed his back numbers, offering him in exchange some *Parliamentary Debates*. He rejected them firmly but seized on my *Modern Law Review* : he had, clearly, studied law, so I asked his opinion of the growing tendency of local authorities to insure with commercial companies against their legal liabilities to employees under the Workmen's Compensation Acts. Mine-owners had their mutual insurance associations ; why not local authorities ? Were not insurance companies apt to contest cases which the local authority would have accepted ? I had heard of a corporation employee, struck by lightning whilst at work, whose widow's claim had been successfully contested—by an unwilling corporation ; she had no trade union behind her and could not afford to appeal from the county court. There was, too, in that day's *Times*, the report of an unsuccessful appeal by the Rhondda District Council against an award of £600 to the widow of a man killed whilst in the council's employ. The Court of Appeal declared the case to be unarguable and, fortunately for the widow, would not allow it to be taken to the House of Lords.

The assistant town clerk—for such he was—was unimpressed. Local authorities could not afford to be uninsured : a mutual insurance association would save little ; the insurance companies' business was to accept legal liability and not a penny more. It was wrong for public companies to be more liberal in such matters to employees or their dependants than commercial firms.

I mentioned the steep rise in rates all over England—at least a shilling in the pound in the last five years—observing that income tax was related to income, but not rates, which were, broadly speaking, heaviest where people were poorest. Distraint upon goods in default of payment for rates was increasing: the fact that statutory undertakers—suppliers of electricity, gas, and water—could use the same procedure did not make things easier. He begged me not to blame officials; they were seldom guilty of originating schemes for spending money, which usually began as election stunts. Progressive persons enjoyed spending borrowed money: the Ministry of Health smiled upon them and all Ministries badgered local authorities to spend more. Most of the responsibility was on the shoulders of officials in Whitehall and of Parliament. It was surprisingly easy to borrow. The outstanding loan debt of local authorities in Britain was £1700 millions and increasing by £50 millions a year: it would soon equal the 'National' Debt.

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The prize-giving was one of the best I have ever attended. The attendant ceremonies of 'Commem.' followed lines which would have rejoiced the heart of Milton, who in 1641 (*Against Prelaty*, ii.) urged our magistrates to take into their care the 'public sports and festival pastimes' that 'inure and harden our bodies and civilize adorn and make discreet our minds.'

First came an admirable gymnastic display, in which all boys took part; then a swimming and diving contest. Lunch followed and, after a short interval, parents and boys assembled in hall. Instead of relegating all boys but the prize-winners to remote galleries, or excluding them in favour of their parents, they occupied the front rows, for this was their day. The chairman of the board of governors was brief, and witty: the headmaster deplored the suicidal competition between unendowed schools in a costly 'amenities-race' to satisfy parental whims and the short-lived enthusiasms of architects and educationists. The process of education should include a large element of mental discipline. Learning should not be made too easy: to master an unattractive and apparently useless subject at the cost of much pains was the best possible

preparation for life. To allow boys to specialise in what they liked best helped them to pass examinations but weakened their powers of growth.

Up to this point I felt that the level of organisation was high. There was enthusiasm in the air: almost every boy had been doing something. Every speech and every item in the programme was well thought out and had its own significance. But when I stood up to play my part and to distribute the prizes I was disappointed. Apart from a cricket bat and pads nothing on the table before me seemed appropriate. There were rows of electro-plated miniature cups; several boys won two or three. The number annually distributed, and melted down later, must run into thousands. I glanced at each book as I gave it: Lytton's *Last Days of Pompeii*, Longfellow's *Complete Works*, cheap Bibles (minus the so-called Apocryphal Books), pot-boiling books on Natural History and the Wonders of Science—a meaningless miscellany.

'Did the boys choose these?' I whispered to the master at my side. He shook his head. 'Who did, then?' He smiled, but did not reply.

Here, surely, is an opportunity for the next Headmasters' Conference, or even for the Board of Education. At least 200,000 books must be presented every year to the boys and girls of England. Properly organised, it should be possible to provide finely bound and finely printed editions of a few hundred great works for a fraction of the price now casually paid for random selections and cheap reprints.

But this is a digression. I delivered my oration: the votes of thanks provided the anti-climax. Boys and parents trooped out to watch the cricket and take tea, and I soon found friends and acquaintances. One parent had served with me in the Punjab, another in Arabia: one was the daughter, another the widow, of an old friend. An 'old boy,' now serving his apprenticeship as a mining engineer, applauded a sentence in my speech in which I urged boys to get experience of manual labour, if only to help them to understand the outlook of those who live by it. A boy who had taken prizes for school work and swimming asked my opinion of the British and Indian Armies as a career: his parents were in Ceylon; he had not seen them for three years.

He looked wistfully at two boys who were taking tea with parents fresh from Singapore.

I later met an inspector of the Board of Education: he thought that, during the next decade, a number of the smaller public boarding schools of England would automatically disappear, many of them dating from the sixteenth century. It was a tragedy, but they could not compete with the rate-aided secondary schools. Yet the boarding school was never more necessary than now, when half the boys who went to such schools were, in these days of small families, the only boy in the family. Schools charging high fees would survive. Those who could not afford them were mainly serving their country abroad, in the Services or in business; to find a boarding school within their means would be harder than ever. Yet, in his view, boys from such families were the backbone of the best schools, and the smaller schools scattered all over England were as necessary a part of our education as the better-known foundations with 400 or more boys each. The middle class alone in England has hitherto believed sufficiently in education habitually to sacrifice much in order to give their children of the best. It should be the business of the Board of Education to prevent the smaller public schools, which such parents can afford, from 'automatic' catastrophe.

Service in the parish church, attended by boys and parents alike, brought the day's proceedings to a fitting climax and a close. It was opened with the traditional bidding prayer, which mentioned the name of the founder and benefactors and closed with Luther's great 'Now thank we all Our God.' We filed out uplifted, and after dinner enjoyed, again in hall, a detective play, admirably staged and faultlessly played.

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I caught the last train from a distant station. At the first stop a gunner corporal entered, after bidding goodbye with three smacking kisses to a remarkably pretty girl. He sighed as the train gathered speed and looked to me for sympathy. 'That's that,' he said; 'shan't see her again for three months.' 'Engaged?' I inquired. 'Yes,' he said; 'she gave me this to-day,' and he showed me a large ring on his finger. 'It's brass, but as good as gold to me, and her name and mine are on the inside.' 'When'll you marry?' I asked. 'That's

what I want to know,' he replied, offering me a 'Woodbine' from a packet tucked in his cap. 'She's eighteen; I'm twenty-two. I've four years to serve and am due for India. She wants to go out with me. Her mother says she must wait till my time is up: her father's doubtful, but says he can find me a good job on a delivery-van. He is in the fish trade and comfortable, y'know. D'ye know India? What's married life like for a sergeant?'

'Better than single, I reckon, with the right girl.'

'She's the girl for me all right, but her mother talks as if I was a film gangster out to see-duce an heiress. She got Alice—that's her name—to have her fortune told by an old woman, who told her to make sure that the man she would marry had skill and energy and caution. And, d'ye know what? She told me just now I lacked one of the three and she wouldn't tell me which—girls are that artful!'

I agreed that she did not lack brains.

'What's the answer to her?' he asked, not rhetorically.

'Prove your skill and energy and let her call you a caution.' (He laughed.) 'I ask you straight, supposing the old people won't let her marry?'

'You can take 'em to court?'

'Aye, but then I'll get up against 'em, and I don't want that.'

'You can wait four years.'

'Then like as not I'll lose her.'

'Bring the old people up to Aldershot to see a parade or two and the new married quarters and the guns, and show them what a good place the Army is.'

'That's an idea.'

We discussed other alternatives before falling asleep in our respective corners. Aroused by the ticket-collector at the chilly terminus, we parted ceremoniously. I wished him good luck: 'I think you're right,' he said; 'caution's her job, not mine, and she's not the cautious sort. I'll be showing her Jhansi all right this winter.'

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A few days later I was a guest at the celebration at Bedford of the 250th anniversary of the foundation of the Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment—known to our grandfathers as

the 16th Buckinghamshire Regiment. Proceedings began in the parish church of St. Paul's. The nave was full of serving and retired officers and men. Those serving were in uniform; all were bemedalled. They were an inspiration to the eye—solid men of forty upwards, with a few Chelsea Pensioners and disabled men on crutches or in wheeled chairs in places of honour. A few carried on their breasts war medals of the last century: many wore the Mons Star. In the aisles were younger officers and men, all in uniform. The lords lieutenant and high sheriffs, mayors and members of Parliament of the two counties took their allotted seats. The Mayor of Bedford entered in his scarlet robe, with his civic train of uniformed officials, and took his place in one of the transepts. The colours of the Regular and Territorial battalions were brought in and handed by the bearers on bended knee at the chancel screen to one of the three officiating clergy; the standards of the Old Comrades Association, borne by spectacled veterans, were likewise received. The place of such symbolism in our national life is not appraised at its full worth: these banners meant as much to every man in the church as did the older colours hanging aloft in the transepts, under which the forefathers of these men fought of old, for causes not unworthy but now forgotten. Twenty years ago school cadet corps would have found a place in such a ceremony: it is an indictment of our political parties and of our self-styled intellectuals that they were deprived of War Office grants and official status some years ago. Boy Scouts, of course, were absent: the support of the Churches, for what it is worth, to that movement has been purchased by eliminating anything which might encourage a youth to regard the defence of his country as his business. I was not alone in wishing that boys as well as men could have been within the church to take in through eyes and ears something of the unexpressed spirit of unselfish service which the ceremony betokened. The National Anthem was followed by Isaac Watts' paraphrase of Psalm xc., 'O God Our Help in Ages Past' ('The Old Hundredth,' which would have been familiar to the men who first joined Colonel Douglas' Regiment in 1688, might have been more appropriate), and a psalm. The lesson was read by the Colonel of the Regiment, Lieut.-General Sir Henry Jackson:

I will not fail thee nor forsake thee. Be strong and of a good courage, . . . that thou mayest prosper whithersoever thou goest . . . be not afraid, neither be thou discouraged, for the Lord thy God is with thee.

And they answered Joshua saying 'All that thou commandest we will do, and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will go.'

The sermon, by the Rev. J. H. McKew, M.C., Assistant Chaplain-General, was as fine a *discours d'occasion* as I can remember—finely delivered, in well-turned periods of great simplicity. The upward turned faces of men, many of whom did not attend church often enough to regard a sermon highly, showed that he had struck the right note. His references to regimental history were apt; he invoked Bunyan, a man of Bedfordshire, and quoted Mr. Valiant for Truth:

My sword I give to him that shall succeed me in my pilgrimage, and my courage and skill to him that can get it. My marks and scars I carry with me to be a witness for me, that I have fought his battle who now will be my rewarder. . . . So he passed over, and all the trumpets sounded for him on the other side.

He seemed to hesitate for a moment, and a thousand men, moved by a sudden impulse, raised their chins as though to tell him to continue. His voice rang out again: 'Those 16,000 men of this regiment who fell in war "were a wall to us both by night and by day."'¹ Marshal Foch said truly of them, "I know that they will hold the line." The Lord hath done great things for us already, whereat we rejoice. The tradition of loyalty that has passed from father to son for these many years among men of this country cannot die, and it is the glory of the Christian faith that, like Mr. Valiant for Truth, we believe that we are one with the great company that passed over. The soul of a nation lies in the past no less than the present. It is for us to prove ourselves worthy of our great heritage.'

The colours and standard were handed back, and the congregation streamed across the road to the Corn Exchange, where 1000 officers and men sat to dinner whilst the regimental band played in the gallery. A few men dressed in sixteenth-century military costumes served to remind us how little the facial traits of our ancestors have changed. They

¹ 1 Samuel xxv. 16.

seemed to have stepped bodily from the frames of old portraits. Silver trumpets announced successive speakers. It is the fashion to decry after-dinner speeches, but there is no more popular item than a good speech. We heard no bad ones, but it was not without significance that by common consent the Colonel of the Regiment and the Mayor of Bedford received the palm. I have been present at many ceremonies in Germany and France and Italy. I have seen none in which military and civil elements were more harmoniously blended: none in which officers and men were able so freely to enjoy each other's company.

The lesson is clear. The link between Regular and Territorial regiments and their counties and county towns is weak, but, wisely annealed from time to time by such gatherings, it may yet serve its original purpose—to keep alive the spirit of local patriotism and good fellowship, which is the basis of all that is best in our system of government.

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On the Monday morning I went to Letchworth to address the Summer School of the Independent Labour Party, whose custom it is to invite a political opponent to meet them every year in argument. The topic chosen was 'Your political creed—and mine.' I spoke for an hour, with Campbell Stephen, M.P., as chairman; questions and a discussion, summed up by James Maxton, M.P., took a further two hours. The audience numbered about eighty: six out of seven were men, including an Indian, and an Italian who spoke in French. Youth predominated: every man present was paying his own expenses. The questions were direct and challenging but courteous: the discussion was pertinent. The Italian alone exceeded the time limit. I made no attempt to dwell on things which united us—acceptance of the Christian principles (anti-religious doctrines are no part of the I.L.P. creed), parliamentary methods, and reliance on the ballot-box and loyal acceptance of its verdict. I tried to bring out the vital difference between what they advocated—destruction of Capitalism, disbelief in the Monarchy, and in the value to humanity of the British Empire—with my own belief in the basic utility of Capitalism, the possibility of controlling it by parliamentary action, the immense value of the Monarchy

and of the British Empire—all three institutions still alive and vigorous. My audience challenged every point: State control of Capitalism had been tried for 300 years, and had failed. Capitalism was dying and could not be kept alive except by increasing doles from the Exchequer. The Monarchy, which those who controlled Capitalism could use to their own advantage, was valueless to-day. The British Empire, founded on crimes, was to-day an anachronism. Controlled Capitalism was the slogan of Fascism and National-Socialism: Socialism was succeeding in Russia, where everything was against it: applied here it would give far greater results than there. I retorted that they suffered from 'the illusion of Power' and, like the dictators, over-estimated the capacity of adults to change their outlook and their way of life. If the electorate consisted mainly of people between twenty and thirty much might be achieved, but they would always be outnumbered by the over-thirties, who had 'settled down' and voted for safety. It was said of Tories that they were over-cautious: that was what most people wanted in their representatives, whether in business or in politics.

The I.L.P., not yet affiliated to the official Labour Party, are not inclined to compromise or to a policy of gradualism: they are as independent as their name suggests; their parliamentary representatives are effective debaters with a rare knowledge of parliamentary forms. They are reputed to practise and to believe what they preach, though I found it hard to imagine, as Mr. Maxton suggested, that the day might come when he and I might conscientiously believe it our duty to shoot each other in order that our respective principles might prevail.

As usual on such occasions, I got more than I gave: there was no lack of courtesy but no softening of differences, no blunting of the edges of controversy and no converts, but I was conscious that I was speaking to men whose patriotism, though it had few points of contact with my own, was real; the presence of a few foreigners seemed only to emphasise their attachment of the rest to much that, thank God, inhabitants of these islands still have in common.

My primary thesis was that the ultimate test of a political system was its ability to ensure national survival. A family, a class, or a nation, which could not perpetuate itself, had lost

its biological title-deeds. There could be no stability or prosperity when the effective adult population was falling, and the proportion of ineffective persons, the old and the halt, which was carried on their backs, was rising. Children were consumers of primary products, not producers. A drop in their numbers—there are half as many now as in 1913—was bound to have profound social consequences. If I thought that the I.L.P. programme would succeed in checking the impending shrinkage of population at a moment when that of Russia, Italy and Japan was rising, and when the fall in the birth rate in Germany had been stayed, and that the remedies in which I now had faith would fail, I should not hesitate to proclaim my conviction, and act accordingly.

This issue is as vital in Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and in white America as in Britain. They had reached maturity under Capitalism; could they survive without it?

I said that the basic creed of the I.L.P. was hostility to Capitalism, which they wished to destroy wherever it existed. They opposed Russian Communism, which was a form of State Capitalism; they were hostile to National-Socialism and Fascism, which also retained, under strict control, the framework of Capitalism.

I was not unaware of the evils attendant on uncontrolled Capitalism, but I believed it could be and was being controlled in the public interest. At least a fifth, if not more, of all aggregations of capital were under statutory control to-day; I would gladly see the assumption by the State of responsibility for some commercial activities which, to my mind, were no longer proper subjects for private profit—such as industrial assurance, third-party insurance, and workmen's compensation. I should welcome a truly national system of health insurance, with uniform benefits to replace the wasteful overlapping of thousands of approved societies and independent branches, friends only in name and divorced by distance from all personal relationships, with members who had lost all control of or interest in most of these societies. In this matter I was ahead of most of my party, but was convinced in general that the capitalistic system should not be abolished, but developed and controlled.

I wished more men to own property, not merely houses

and motor cars, but land and the means of enjoyment of life and of production and distribution, and I regarded the right to own property as necessary to freedom.

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After lunching with what James Maxton termed 'the young wolves,' I took train to London, sharing the carriage with a young naval leading stoker and a public-school boy leaving England for the first time for a counting-house in Singapore. He pitied me my busman's holiday and plied me with questions about Indian ports and the Far East: some I answered; to others the stoker replied, from knowledge more recent than mine, gained on the East Indies and China Stations. They both might have, in their respective idioms, answered the I.L.P. speakers more effectively than I had done.

'It is surprising what a lot these sailors pick up,' said the young clerk, when the sailor deserted us for the buffet-car. 'Yes,' I replied, 'there's scarcely a village in England or a street in a town which lacks a man who has seen more of the world in the service of the Crown or as a seaman than you or I ever will.' 'I think we're apt to forget about them,' he mused, 'yet when I come to think about it the house butler and the porters and most of the staff at school had been abroad. Let's go and give him a drink.'

We found him with three of his cloth, all of different ships, all returning from leave, too deep in their own 'shop' to be disturbed. 'How should one treat Chinese and Indians and all the rest when one goes out?' asked the embryo merchant. 'I'll give you three principles,' I replied:

'First, try to exchange philosophies like goods and make a profit on the deal but, in your own interest, stick strictly to your own conventions, and don't lose your English philosophy, but add theirs to it.

'Secondly, do not think of other races as higher or lower than ours on some scale of your devising, but as on the same latitude on a different line of longitude—lines of longitude do not meet in any place where man can live, but they converge.

'Thirdly, learn not only the language but all the conventions and mannerisms which make people feel that you have been at pains to study their feelings.'

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A day later I was on another busman's holiday to speak at a political meeting in the provinces. As I sat in the dining-car a shy youth of sixteen in naval uniform took his seat opposite me.

'I'll take the short lunch,' I remarked to the steward.

'Is there a long lunch?' inquired the boy.

'Yes, sir,' said the steward.

'Then I'll take it. My dad,' he added to me, seeing me smile, 'said nothing about a short lunch: it's the first time I had more than a bun and a stick of chocolate on a train.'

We soon made friends; he was glad to learn of his right to a second helping of anything: he had more of everything.

Should he tip the steward? If so, how much? He had paid a taxi-driver his legal fare and no more and the man had seemed hurt. I explained what was customary. It was his first journey alone; his father was a sergeant in the Army: he was a naval apprentice at Greenwich and loved the work. The teaching was as good as the food and the company he kept, and led to a steady living in after years. This type of boy—all three Services are breeding them—is a standing example of the aptitude of the younger generation of elementary-school boys for technical education and the value of a year or so away from home at a boarding school or even in lodgings.

The great success of the Ministry of Labour Training Centres points in the same direction, as also does, indirectly, the still very high industrial accident ratio among young persons. It is on these lines rather than by keeping more children to a greater age at elementary, senior and secondary schools that the Board of Education can secure what it at present lacks, the whole-hearted support both of pupils and parents.

* * * * *

The meeting was, as usual, pronounced a great success it was held in private grounds of great beauty. The kitchen and flower gardens were open to view: the swans and ducks were gorged with bread and cake; a score of stalls did a good trade and the side-shows were making money. A policeman was on duty: I asked him what necessitated his presence. He explained that fortune-tellers and 'find-the-lady' experts sometimes secured access to such festivities and made a big

haul in a corner before they were discovered. He knew every one of them for miles round: so long as he was there they would not come. The cleverest of the lot were old women with glib tongues who lived on the road and would never enter a casual ward, so greatly did they dislike the compulsory (and often very uncomfortable) bath. They could always get a sixpence, often more, from anyone who stopped to talk to them: they knew all the local gossip and often got nearer the truth in their fortune-telling than a magistrate could get in court.

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Next day I set out to walk in my constituency.

I had not gone far before I heard the sharp click of bat striking ball and, looking over the hedge, saw a cricket match in progress. I found the gate and walked in. It was on a private ground: sheep had kept the grass in the out-field short: the pitch itself was railed off when not in use by iron fencing on wheels which were serving to pen the sheep in a corner. The opposing village had come some eight miles by lorry. Both teams were suitably dressed, mostly in white: the umpires wore white coats. Bats, balls, pads and wickets were of the best. The bowling was good, but the batting was spectacular—free hitting followed by fast running: the aim was to make as many runs in as short a time as possible and to declare the innings closed at half-time, leaving the other team to make as good a showing if it could. There were few spectators, and I was told that some of the best players on either side were in camp with the Territorials. A flight of aeroplanes passed overhead unnoticed. The afternoon was hot and oppressive: I heard distant thunder. A very small boy by my side said to me: 'If they're afraid of thunder, tell 'em it's guns. If they're afraid of guns, tell 'em it's thunder.' He seemed to fear neither himself, and must have been repeating the chance phrase of some old cynic. Then he turned to me enthusiastically: 'See that man batting: he's my dad; he'll knock 'em about.' The batsman fulfilled his son's promise, smiting two for six and making thirty or more in five overs before he was caught at long field and rejoined his admiring son. He was tall and straight and large boned, with a great head of fair hair; he could not have been over twenty-five years of age: he was, he told me, now head cowman on

a nearby farm, but had begun life for four years in the Coldstream Guards. He might have been a policeman, but preferred to stick to his village and his friends.

'It's a good game,' he said, 'better than darts: it's a pity we can't play on Sunday and make a day of it. There's church at eight for those who are particular: I'm a bellringer myself and could generally get off for half an hour to ring; the church is only five minutes' walk. Anyway, the parish would come to no harm with only five bells.'

'Why not play on Sunday?' I asked: 'what is there to stop you?'

'The women,' he replied: 'they don't hold with it, nor the parson, nor the squire, nor most folk, for that matter. Sunday's walking-out day: Sunday's the day for the garden and a joint on the table and a proper pudding to follow, and the children sitting round good and proper watching their dad.' And he patted the boy on the head.

'My wife would say naught, and the single men would be all for it unless they were courting. It was just an idea, that's all'—a compendious statement of the case.

An older man joined us—no player now, but a keen onlooker and former captain. He was a master-plumber and counted himself 'a bit of an artist' at cricket. The game to him did not consist in scores and averages, but in style. He sometimes took a holiday and went to a county match, or even to Lord's; he went less often now: matches were too often spoiled by the passion for averages and the preference for a sure draw as compared with a chance of winning. Batsmanship was not all runs. Half the joy of cricket to him was the society of other men, half of them outsiders: half the rest was sun and air and light and colour—with both teams nicely fettled up and well turned out. The game itself made up the rest, and that, he repeated, was style first and scoring next.

My next destination was the house of a local probation officer, less than an hour's walk away; he had telephoned to say he would be at home. He and his wife were just back from a much-needed holiday and he had some difficult cases to talk over. 'It is wearing work,' he admitted: 'a parson generally has some loyal helpers and only one in a hundred of his flock goes flagrantly astray. All my flock have gone astray once, often many times: some are wild and untameable, born

200 or more years too late; others are misfits in the world as it is because they are dull-witted, others because their ambitions are greater than their abilities; they are the hardest to handle. Then there is drink, which turns some men and a few women into sots or devils, and laziness, which makes some men prefer the dole to work. A married man with a small family who is only worth £2 a week, if that, can get 35s. on the dole: the temptation is great.'

'What about matrimonial disputes?' I asked. 'I have read a lot about them in Blue-books and daily papers.' 'The new Act is doing good,' he said: 'if a couple know that they cannot "thole out together," as they say, one of the two can apply to court for a separation order (minus the clause prohibiting cohabitation); on my report, made after full inquiry, the magistrates will generally grant it. It may be made the basis for a divorce petition three years later—not an unbearably long time for most of them, but long enough to give them a chance to get together again, as happens in perhaps one case in three.'

We discussed several individual cases—of peccant boys, truant husbands, slovenly wives and adventurous girls. Those of his flock whom he had been able to send to the armed forces of the Crown had practically all done well: they found there what they needed—companionship, an interesting life, and a modicum of discipline. He had as many cases where the wife was a sloven or a nagger as where the husband was a drinker or a brute. Where the wife was at fault the husband could and generally did desert her, paying maintenance more or less regularly, and leaving the rest to the parish, but men often deserted merely because they had 'had enough.' He knew of one man aged thirty-three with unsatisfied court orders against him for the maintenance of his legal wife and two children, totalling £60, and two unpaid affiliation orders from other parts of the country, added to which he had committed bigamy. Six months' hard labour had purged all these offences: he would not pay; would avoid arrest as long as he could, and go to gaol again, but not until he had become a father again. He was a nice-looking, pleasant-spoken fellow too, but untameable and uncontrollable by the law.

Neglected children were another problem. He knew of three, affectionately but inefficiently cared for by their dead

mother's very old parents; their father had deserted the family before the mother died: he sent a few shillings irregularly. The house was dirty, the children ill-fed and ill-clothed but not unhappy. It would be cruel and wrong to send them to an institution. The relieving officer ought to give the grandparents more than he did—they only had 10s. between them—but the children came from another county, and he and his public assistance committee objected to paying for 'strangers' children.' The other county authority said that they would do their duty by the children if they were sent back to the county, but not otherwise—it was reminiscent of the treatment of adult vagrants in the brave days of Henry VII.

'Where does the parson come in?' I asked. 'He doesn't,' was the reply, 'except in rare cases: this poor little family lives within 200 yards of the parsonage, in a back street in a prosperous area. There's lots of money collected for "the sick and needy," but I doubt whether it goes to the right people. I don't know why, but parsons nowadays do not seem to set great store by visiting and don't know what is going on as they did.'

The other cases we talked of were all of the untameable kind—young wolves, not sheep.

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I left him, intending to walk to the nearest railway station; the sound of lusty music in the distance showed that a travelling fair was near. On a footpath leading that way I overtook an acquaintance with his three children, just back from a week by the sea. It was 'no go,' he said: the place was overcrowded and over-noisy: too many people selling trash; no good nigger minstrels, and no donkeys for the kids. Donkeys were, in fact, dying out: there was, he had heard, only one man in all England breeding them now. Would the travelling fair die out too? He hoped not—it was a good and natural sort of pleasure; he would let his children get all the fun they could; it would be something for them to remember. A good fair was far better than a cinema.

I found it well attended: it was nearly eight o'clock; the tunes to which the 'horses' and swing-boats went round included the latest German popular tunes.

'Folk don't know where they come from, and I don't tell them,' said the showman; 'they like them well enough: I've had no trouble except with some Jews on Hackney Marshes. I had to cut them out there.'

This was a motorised unit; the horses had gone, like the donkeys: the owner could cover more ground now and, with luck and good management, took money four days a week. One of the party had a motor bicycle on which he went ahead to arrange for camp sites and bill-posting. In some villages the land was 'held so tight' that no place for the fair could be found. In others there were difficulties about using even the village green, on which tennis courts and the like were being built these days. It was, he said, about the only bit of Merrie England to be found outside a dance-hall or a cinema, and he hoped it would last his day.

An old man with a vacant look on his face was sitting on the steps of one of the lorries.

'Is he one of yours?' I asked.

'It's my uncle: his mind's gone. He does what we tell him, though, and handles our gear well enough. He would be happy nowhere else. It's a case of body to let with vacant possession, I'm thinking.'

He went off to give some direction and returned to me. 'We showmen,' he said when he came back, surveying his kind as dispassionately as his clients, 'are as old as England, and as English: we're not gypsies and we're not Jews, who mostly run the cinema racket. My father and his before him have been in it—six generations, anyway, perhaps more, beginning with fencers and bear-wards, employing jugglers and making the children learn play-acting. Maybe, we're older than Shakespeare: anyway, he knew of us and had nothing against us. People want to be amused, and want music to dance to; they want bright lights and a bit of noise and fun. We give what folk want and cheer the world up, in spite of all the laws and the gentlefolk whom I've known to deny us a field, 'cos we keep them awake.'

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Next day I went to open a bazaar in aid of the 'Free Churches' in my constituency. It was an unpretentious affair, for the congregation was small, as well as poor. The

village was not thirty-five miles from London, but its population is less to-day than in 1910, though it enjoys (and pays heavily for) 'all modern conveniences.' Women and old people predominated, for the opening hour was 3 p.m., but the minister told me how great was the shortage of young people. Children at school were less than half as many as in 1910, and, as a result, there was less going on for youth. Forty years ago four churches could offer social amenities and fellowship to all members according to age and sex. They could do so no longer; the cities claimed the most active and, on the whole, the best equipped, less on the chance of better money than for the sake of variety.

A stranger would have thought the gathering unimpressive; I knew better. Before me sat the chairman and two members of the rural district council, men with responsibilities and practical knowledge the value of which is generally underrated by the bowler-hatted inspectors who occasionally descend from Whitehall to hold inquiries and, incidentally, to urge the need for spending more (borrowed) money. In the front row were three sisters: one taught in an elementary, one in a secondary school; the third had taught in a university: an influential trio, whom long days in the school treadmill had not soured or depressed. There, too, was the postmaster and the rate-collector and, I noted with pleasure, the local vicar was there with his wife.

The minister began with a finely phrased prayer, well suited to the occasion and to his audience, and called on me to play my part. I defended bazaars, for their own sake as well as for what they brought in, as social institutions well suited to our needs, and of great antiquity, for we read in Stubbes (1583, *Anat. Abus.* 95, *The Manner of Church Ales*) that

Against a Christmas, an Easter, Whitsonday or some other time, the Church-wardens . . . provide . . . mault which beeing made into very strong ale or beere it is set to sale either in the Church or some other place assigned to that purpose . . . they repaire their Churches and Chappels with it; they buy bookes for service.

I reminded my audience of Lord Baldwin's claim that the work of a member of Parliament 'properly viewed is a kind

of ministry'² and urged them to keep alive that unity in diversity which is one of the best features of English life. Democracy as we understand it is possible only when there is an underlying consciousness of unity as a nation. Any faction striving exclusively for its own ends must wreck the system.

The speech ended, I made my purchases of food and other things made by the hands of the stallholders. At the gate leading to the road half a score of small children had gathered; they were scantily clad, for it was a hot day, but looked slatternly and ill cared-for. There was no unemployment thereabouts, and few large families: an old resident saw me giving them some of the home-made sweets I had bought. 'Twenty years ago,' he said, 'there would have been twice the number, but they would have been better looked after and better fed, though on plainer stuff. Baker's bread and buns don't make good teeth or good bone or good complexions. We're not progressing, so far as I can see, in bringing up children.'

I handed in my package at the station to be put on the train I hoped to catch further up the line. It had stopped raining: the air was heavy with moisture but loud with the song of birds. I passed a new aerodrome, sixty-five acres of good arable land lost for some years, and a few acres, covered by permanent buildings, for ever. A contractor's gang was laying water-pipes: some were West Indian negroes, which did not seem right; half the rest were Irishmen, 'better workers than we can get from the exchange for a short job,' explained the foreman. Close to the kerb on either side stood, for mile after mile, great telegraph-poles, all imported, each with forty or fifty wires: I wish the P.M.G. would put them underground; he would prevent a few hundred fatal accidents every year.

A furlong distant from the road, their presence disclosed only by a visiting army truck, a London Territorial Searchlight unit in high spirits were getting ready for night duties. I produced my card and was trustingly shown their elaborate gear. As I walked on I caught up a tramp, now known as a 'casual poor-person,' and defined in the Poor Law Act, 1930, section 163 (1), as 'any destitute wayfarer or wanderer applying for or receiving relief.' He told me that he was 'a

² February 11, 1926: *On England*, p. 196.

regular,' which meant in his case not a Regular soldier but an habitual vagrant, though that term exists in law to-day only in Scotland. I gave him some cigarettes and he told me his story over the space of a mile. He had fallen out with his wife and family years ago, and left them. Sued for maintenance, as he held unjustly—for it was she who in his eyes was to blame—he had gone to prison again and again, losing his job each time. Then he 'threw in his hand': he would not go on working to provide for a woman whom he believed to be unfaithful: if he could not work for himself he would not work at all. That was ten years ago; since then he had done no regular work: he was fifty-five and looked more. Casual wards were better than of old, though further apart: he got a bit of money now and then working for farmers, but his arms no longer had their old skill—his strength was all in his legs.

He asked for money towards a pair of boots. I thought of Plautus³:

De mendico male meretur qui ei dat quod edit aut quod bibat. Nam et illud quod dat perdit et illi producit vitam ad miseriam.
(He deserves ill of a beggar who gives him to eat or to drink; For he both loses his gift, and prolongs for the other a life of misery.)

'It'll be a waste of money,' I suggested.

'I tell you this,' he replied, 'I don't cost the public a quarter of what those paupers in the workhouse do: they're kept year in, year out, for nothing. I'm not sleeping in a casual ward more'n a few months in the year. No one's got to look after me, and I'll die on the road with luck. It's not my fault I've fallen out of the way of working: if anyone will put me back I would stay on a job, but no one wants me at my age.' I thought he had answered me fairly, if not conclusively, and we parted amicably.

Another mile brought me to a village and a publichouse, where I stopped for bread and cheese, etc. It was just after opening time, and several members of the British Legion were sitting outside and some younger men, including two Territorials, though not in uniform or 'embodied.' We got talking about war and the prospects of peace. They had read

with disapproval the callous, blatant, hate and fear-breeding appeals to prejudice in some daily and evening papers. A quotation from an old commonplace book came to my mind as they talked, I reproduce it here:

'Hatred of an enemy,' wrote a soldier of distinction in 1916, 'is not common among soldiers. . . . I find it rather among those who, having no outlet in suffering or in action, seem to discover in hatred the sensation of activity which they have missed elsewhere. They are to be pitied, . . . but the contagion of this spirit is deadly. . . . Soldiers carry the load of war with aching bones, hating it but hoping to save others from it in future.'⁴

'That's not the spirit,' said one—an ex-sergeant, pointing to a hideous cartoon, in which hideous, bloated figures represented four of the great Powers, facing a pair of angelic robed figures, impersonating Britain and France. 'If that's the game, I'm not for it: I've seen it before. Better fight on either side for what you believe in than sit at home with poison-pens, and that's what the man who wrote this—and this—is doing.' 'If I listened to what newspapers say, I'd go pacifist,' said another, 'but I don't: I trust the Government. They're not fools, and I go with my own folk, right or wrong.'

The conversation started a train of thought which led me when I reached home to take up St. Augustine's treatise *Of the City of God*, written, in the opening years of the fifth century, at a crisis in the world's history. He is astonishingly modern—from his classic definition of a miracle, '*Portentum ergo fit non contra naturam sed contra quam est nota natura*' ('A Miracle is wrong not against Nature but against our acquaintance with Nature'), to his emphasis on race. 'In the struggle for life, some perish and others succeed; the less give way to the greater and acquire the qualities of the predominant type' (bk. xii., ch. 4). (Elsewhere he seems aware of the theory of sound-waves.) A marginal note in my father's handwriting led me to Lecky's *European Morals*:

The Roman had learned to value Force very highly . . . his moral feelings were almost bounded by political limits, acting only, and with different degrees of intensity, towards his class, his country and his allies. Indomitable pride was the most prominent feature of his character.

⁴ *The Nation*, October 21, 1916: 'Some Reflections of a Soldier.'

³ *Trinummus*, Act II., sc. 2.

Can we hope to modify a human characteristic so ancient—for it was doubtless equally true of the makers of earlier empires? Not, I think, by listening to those who would bid us make war in defence of international law (which exists for practical purpose only in one version, and that our own). In the words of the late Dr. Figgis:

The duty of making earth a fairer place to dwell in yields to instringency to that of helping men to see what is harder still, that they have not long to dwell here, and that how they live is more important than what they live on.

ARNOLD WILSON.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE CONCERT OF GREAT POWERS

By PROFESSOR R. B. MOWAT

AN eminent American journalist, Frank Simonds, published a book seven years ago called *Can Europe Keep the Peace?* On the whole, the Europeans are happy peoples, for they all possess very attractive countries and by temperament they are optimistic and cheerful. There appears, therefore, no very good reason why they should make war upon each other. The only really depressed masses of people are the peasantry in one or two countries—Poland and Hungary are reckoned to have a particularly poor peasantry—but nowhere are they bellicose. If there are any people anywhere willing to provoke a war, they are to be found only among the *bourgeoisie*, the happiest class in Europe.

Three times within six months large-scale war seemed on the point of breaking out. The first was the so-called 'now

or never' crisis, February 21—the name is undoubtedly due to a misapprehension—when Mr. Eden resigned from the Cabinet and when the Prime Minister decided to make a Mediterranean Agreement. This is not to say that, in default of an agreement, the British and Italian Governments would have gone to war; but undoubtedly there was tension and many people were apprehensive. The second occasion when war looked like breaking out was May 21, after Herr Hitler, with a great show of military force, had carried out the *Anschluss* with Austria and the Czechs mobilised their army. The third occasion was August 15, when the Sudeten German affair became acute and when Herr Hitler called out forces for the annual manœuvres on a scale amounting to something like general mobilisation. It may be that only the fact of the Runciman mission being in Prague and at work prevented the outbreak of war in August.

The rapid deterioration in the political situation in Europe can be dated clearly from one thing—from the Abyssinian dispute. It is this which destroyed the Pact of Locarno and led to the paralysis of the League of Nations. Yet though the Italian Government began the Abyssinian trouble which started the international *débâcle*, there is every reason to believe that the Italian Government desires to avoid a general war. It requires all its resources for the development of the empire. The Soviet Government used to be a disturbing influence, but it seems now to have given up working, at any rate on the surface, for world revolution. And it is clear, after more than two years' experience, that the Powers are not going to fight over the Spanish Civil War. Nobody accuses the French or the British of being militarist or bellicose. The conclusion seems almost inescapable that the disturbing element is in Germany.

To say this is not to level an accusation; it is merely to state what appears to be the last term in the analysis. If the German people or the German Government disturbs the European situation, this is because it has grievances, because it is dissatisfied. Probably the chief cause of dissatisfaction, unacknowledged, perhaps unrealised, is that the Germans lost the war. This does not mean that they want to fight another, so as to have the feeling of winning; but it means that they feel, or some of them feel, dissatisfied and rather

prone to take offence. A lost war makes for national sensitiveness which ought to be regarded sympathetically, but silently, by neighbours. The British lost the war known as the American Revolution in 1775–82 and remained sensitive about their defeat for a good many years, but they have forgotten about it now. Viewed as a whole, the German military effort in the last war compares favourably with that of the *Entente*, as the odds were heavily against Germany.

With the fall of the Hohenzollern Empire the Germans lost the feeling of being a very great Power. They had coined an expressive word, '*Machtfreudigkeit*,' which described their feeling of joy in the might and pomp of the empire created by Bismarck in 1871. Lord Beaconsfield said after 1878 that there was now a dominating Power in Europe—Germany. For the rest of the period of the Hohenzollern Empire the opinion of the German Government on any subject was treated with the greatest respect; the attitude it was taking or was likely to take received the closest attention from the Foreign Ministers of all the other Great Powers. Germans who remembered or knew by tradition the insignificance in international affairs of the pre-1866 *Bund* (Confederation) rejoiced in their new-found, splendid, dominant empire. Their colonies, acquired after 1888, were not regarded as vital elements in imperial life, but as a legitimate expression of it, as an interesting side-line; the German navy, which after 1900 began to show the imperial flag in every corner of the seven seas, was a magnificent representative of the empire and a source of satisfaction, of *Machtfreudigkeit*, to the hitherto only land-conscious Germans.

Between the end of the war and the rise of the National-Socialist Government the Germans had little *Machtfreudigkeit*. Care must be taken, however, not to hold an exaggerated view of the psychological or political depression of the Weimar Republic. The citizens of the Weimar Republic, young and old, were self-respecting and patriotic, and were proud of the progressive character of their political institutions. Until the world economic depression came in 1929 and brought upon the German people severe unemployment, there was no widespread discontent with the existing political or social system. Nevertheless, the Weimar Republic could

hardly be called one of the Great Powers of Europe, though it was coming along in that direction, and in good time would have arrived.

All this, however, has been changed—and changed almost in the twinkling of an eye. National-Socialist Germany has become the dominating Power in Europe. This does not mean that it is stronger than the rest of Europe, or stronger than the Franco-British Alliance; but it does mean that the German State, the 'Third Reich,' is so strong that it dictates the rhythm of European politics. The other Powers must make their movements conform to those of the German Government. Germany has the initiative, as it had in the time of the Hohenzollern Empire. From Mr. Baldwin's appeal, in a public speech, to Herr Hitler in 1936, 'to lift the black cloud that hangs over Europe,' to the first days of September 1938 when all eyes were fixed on Berchtesgaden and Herr Hitler meditating on the Czechoslovak-Sudeten question, Germany was obviously the dominating Power in Europe. In this fact is all the *Machtfreudigkeit* that the Germans can want. They are in the position now of being probably Europe's strongest single Power. This fact, once it is generally recognised, should make for European appeasement. The Germans, back again in their old place among the European Powers, have every reason to be content, a satisfied people, as Bismarck said that they were after 1871, and as Signor Mussolini has declared Italians to be.

The agitation in Germany, particularly in August 1938, over the Czechoslovak-Sudeten question is explicable as part of the growing consciousness of the German Government or people in its attainment of dominance. The agitation was not due to race consciousness, for there are German minorities elsewhere than in Czechoslovakia with as strong claims for race sympathy as the Sudetendeutsch. The Government of the Third Reich remained outwardly tranquil in regard to conditions among the 250,000 Germans of the Italian Tyrol or the 741,000 Germans in Poland. The agitation over the Sudetendeutsch question was an expression of the Third Reich's power. The Reich's political relations with Italy and Poland were good, but had for some five or six years been troubled in regard to Czechoslovakia. It was therefore quite natural for the National-Socialist Government to take an

interest in the discontented German minority of Czechoslovakia and not to be particularly respectful of the feelings of the Czechoslovak Government. And, also quite naturally, the National-Socialist Government, finding that its championship of the Sudetendeutsch made it the cynosure of the eyes of all Europe, made it to be coaxed and courted from every side, went on exploiting this situation and enjoying its sense of power. In view of the way in which the German State had been badgered and buffeted in its time of helplessness, the present situation had a large element of ironical humour in it. Besides, the German Government had right on its side, and the other Governments must have been conscious of this. For it was derogatory to the German name to call the restored Bohemian State Czechoslovakia when neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks were much more numerous, nor more civilised, than their 3,000,000 German fellow-citizens. It was as if the United Kingdom should be called Anglowallia and the Scots and Northern Irish were left out of the reckoning. The restored State could properly have been called Bohemia; there is no reason why it should not be called that now.

The position of a dominant Power is attended with considerable risk. It is apt to provoke a reaction among the other States, as happened in the time of Louis XIV., of Napoleon, and of the Kaiser Wilhelm II. The dominant Power, if it has not the feeling of partnership with the other Powers, may have the feeling, instead, of isolation and even of encirclement. The present rise of Germany to dominance has provoked a race in armaments. According to M. Paul Reynaud, the fate of Europe depends upon the answer to the question who wins this race. The chances are that the Power or Powers with the longer purse win it, if their efforts are directed with intelligence. What Europe is tending towards now—if in the meantime it can avoid war—is a Balance of Armaments. It would obviously be far better if this could be attained by an agreement for limitation of armaments than by all the Powers reaching the limits of their financial resources. Statesmen, however, have to put up with what is attainable; an arms-limitation agreement simply cannot be had at the moment. The armaments race of the last three years has probably already produced a Balance of Armaments between the groups in which, unfortunately, the

Great Powers of Europe are divided. The balance is not likely to be even; no political or military balance ever is. It may exist, but it is always unstable.

When a Balance of Armaments has been reached—this may already have been done—there remains an essential step to be taken, the restoration of the feeling of partnership. The fundamental trouble of Europe now comes from the fact that the German Government, though it has ground for satisfaction in so far as its feeling of power is concerned, is still in a condition of international isolation. It has, it is true, the comfort of the Rome-Berlin Axis and of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but these things do not amount to a great deal—certainly to much less than the old Triple Alliance or the Concert of Europe. The German Government is living in a kind of moral isolation. Mr. Baldwin once said that dictators were extremely difficult people to establish touch with. They will not go to Geneva; they act through Ministers who themselves do not always know their masters' intentions. And yet, unless contact is established and something like the Concert of Europe restored, the present international unrest on the Continent is sure to go on until perhaps it produce something worse. A dominant Power, always treated as a stranger, gradually comes to accept the position of Great Disturber. Had it been practicable to establish personal relations at an earlier stage with Herr Hitler the course of history might have been different.

The restoration of the Concert of Europe cannot at the present time, unfortunately, be sought through Geneva. Yet the means to it has been provided by one of the two chief dictator Powers themselves. In 1933 Signor Mussolini proposed a Four-Power Pact to Ramsay MacDonald, then Prime Minister, who with Sir John Simon was on an official visit to Rome. MacDonald agreed to the pact; the French and German Governments also acceded, but it never was ratified. The project, therefore, was *non avenu*, but it could be revived.

Herr Hitler told Mr. Lansbury in 1937 that he was prepared to collaborate in a Conference which President Roosevelt should take the initiative in summoning. There has been no general conference or congress since the World Economic Conference of 1933, which was a hopeless failure. No Government likes to risk the loss of prestige or influence

which would be the result of another failure. Another political conference with political aims, meeting, disputing, breaking up in anger, might produce conflagration—at any rate, this appears to be the apprehension. Nevertheless, the risk can be faced, and with due care and preparation should be avoided. A conference should meet on the invitation, and under the chairmanship, of a non-League Power; and only a Government with great international influence could hope to achieve any success in the chairmanship. The President of the United States, a country absolutely without political or territorial interests in Europe, is obviously marked out as 'honest broker' of the conference, as Bismarck was at the Congress of Berlin. The United States, however, is not the only disinterested country in the world; it is not beyond the wit of man to designate some alternative convener and chairman. There have been many Conferences of London and of Paris. If somebody should propose that a conference be convened at Berlin or Rome, no objection need be raised from any quarter.

A conference cannot meet in the void. It must have business to do. The new European Conference should aim at finding, what undoubtedly exists, the element, or some of the elements, of solidarity in Europe. All States have an interest in peace, and all have an interest in wealth. It may be that the time will soon—when Balance of Armaments is attained—be ripe for a Conference on Limitation of Armament; but it is more likely that a proposal for the meeting of an Economic Conference could meet with general acceptance. Only a very select list of agenda would have any chance of success; the vital matter, accordingly, would be the framing of the agenda. This would best be done in a small, secret, preparatory Conference of Ambassadors, assisted by economic experts. There would thus be two conferences—the preparatory and the main.

The vital matter is not who should propose a conference or who should preside, but that there should be a general will to hold a conference and to achieve agreement on some selected objects. Once a single success has been registered, Europe will turn over a new leaf. One agreement will lead to another; the feeling of partnership among the Great Powers will grow.

Professor Erich Brandenburg has written and published a book in Germany called *Europe and the World* (1937), which could not have appeared if disapproved of by the authorities. It emphasises the cultural solidarity of Europe and looks to a realisation of this for the restoration of tranquillity. It is not known whether the German Government would respond favourably to an invitation to attend a conference. *The Times* correspondent at Berlin reported on September 2 that the German Government desired a settlement of the Sudeten question to be 'the starting-point of real European collaboration.'

Since the Italo-Abyssinian affair no question has aroused so much controversy as the Czechoslovak-Sudetendutsch question. Until there is a permanent settlement, this question will obviously continue to be seriously disturbing. Yet a permanent settlement is extremely difficult to attain owing to the fact that there does not appear to be an equal readiness to compromise on both sides. There is evidence that good judges were apprehensive about the stability of a Czechoslovak State containing large racial minorities.

On October 4, 1916, Mr. Balfour declared in a memorandum :

To Bohemia, Germanic civilisation is profoundly distasteful. Whether an independent Bohemia would be strong enough to hold her own, from a military as also from a commercial point of view, against Teutonic domination—surrounded as she is at present by German influences—I do not know ; but I am sure the question deserves very careful consideration. If the change is possible, it should be made.¹

Clearly, Mr. Balfour was thinking of a Slav State, freed from German culture and penetration, not a State with more than one-fifth of its population belonging to the German race. Mr. Lloyd George in the latest volume of his *War Memoirs* states that at the Peace Conference of Paris, 1919, Dr. Benesh advocated the establishing of Czechoslovakia with wide frontiers because it would be the barrier against German expansion towards the east. It seems a little ironical, however, to include 3,000,000 Germans in a State which was to have for its chief rôle the barring of German expansion. It

might have been argued that Czechoslovakia would exercise a firmer check on the eastward-straining Germans of the Reich without having to cope with over 3,000,000 Germans inside the State.

In an essay on *Frontiers*, originally published in 1918,² Professor C. B. Fawcett, now of the University of London, wrote :

An independent State of the Czechs of Bohemia, with or without the Slovaks of Northern Hungary, would have a militarily indefensible frontier unless its boundary were drawn along the crests of the heights which enclose Bohemia in the west, north and south-west. But if its boundaries were so drawn it would include a large majority of Germans ; and, as these Germans would have at least the moral support of the vast body of the German nation around Bohemia in their resistance to any at denationalisation, the risks of conflict might rather be increased than diminished by their inclusion in a Czech State.

The Czechoslovak authorities have not tried to denationalise the Sudetendutsch or any of the other Germans included in the State ; rather they have secured the full cultural individuality of the German minorities through the German university and schools. Nevertheless, the risk of conflict exists.

On the other hand, the Sudeten mountain frontier is historic and customary, with 800 years of history behind it. The crest-line of a mountain has generally been held in the past to be the strongest strategic line and has doubtless been strongly fortified by the Czechoslovak military authorities. Usually, however, the strength of a mountain frontier lies, not only in the difficulty of the *terrain*, but in the fact that, in Europe, it is almost invariably also (like the Pyrenees) a racial or linguistic frontier. Unfortunately the Sudeten mountain frontier is not a racial or linguistic line. It is moreover doubtful whether it is to-day a very strong strategical line. Any point in a crest-line, once seized, makes a breach, for second and third lines of defence are usually dominated from the elevation of the first. Mr. J. M. Keynes has declared his view (*New Statesman*, March 26, 1938) that it would be worth while rectifying the Bohemian frontier because 'racial frontiers are safer and better to-day than geo-physical

² *Frontiers* : Macmillan, 1921.

frontiers.' *The Times*, in a much-discussed editorial of September 7, 1938, suggested that 'the advantages to Czechoslovakia of becoming a homogeneous State might conceivably outweigh the obvious disadvantages of losing the Sudeten German districts of the borderland.'

The case of the Sudeten Germans can hardly be considered without relation to other minorities, who have, in justice, an equal right to be heard. The problem is obviously now one of the most difficult presented to statesmen; the great value of Lord Runciman's mission was—in addition to the helpful suggestions which it was able to make—the time which it gained. The most important thing is that whatever settlement of the Sudeten question is made should be made by agreement, and not by force. A leading article in *The Times* on September 9 summarised the whole matter very wisely:

The hope of permanent peace must be the one objective not only for the Czechs and their minorities but for every other nation that may be affected by their futures. If they can come to an assured agreement under which Czechoslovakia remains a sovereign State in its present form, and the Sudeten Germans are granted the self-government to which they are entitled within such a State, then, no doubt, that is incomparably the better way. But no other way can be ruled out altogether if it offers an alternative to perpetual quarrels, in which the rest of the world is bound sooner or later to become involved.

It has been suggested in several quarters that there should be a plebiscite in the Sudeten areas. The history of plebiscites is, perhaps, not as encouraging to advocates of justice as might at first sight appear. Votes taken under conditions of 'mass psychology' and of various open and secret forms of pressure are not ideal expressions of popular opinion. The first step would be to ascertain where there is a linguistic-racial boundary, and then to decide what the population wants within that boundary and how it may be satisfied with due regard to the general interest. If this first task—the ascertaining of a reasonable racial-linguistic boundary—is to be undertaken, it could appropriately be done by a nominee of President Roosevelt and a representative from one or two other disinterested Governments.

Lord de la Warr declared at the Assembly of the League

of Nations on September 16 that the Covenant had come to be regarded as an instrument for the maintenance of the *status quo*, whereas 'its real essence lies in the recognition of the policy of peaceful change.' Had the League been used for revision by the States-members, it would have been seised of the present difficulty long ago—the kind of difficulty which it is admirably qualified to deal with. As things are, affairs have drifted to the acute danger-point and were developing, as Signor Mussolini said a few days later at Trieste, 'with the speed of an avalanche.' Had it not been for the remarkable initiative of the Prime Minister, announced on September 14, catastrophe seemed inevitable. Lord Baldwin, as I have mentioned, once said in one of his speeches on foreign affairs that one of the special handicaps of diplomacy in this age is the difficulty of getting into personal touch with dictators. The Prime Minister's journey to Germany on September 15 shows how a courageous and generous initiative can overcome this difficulty. Personal touch between the heads of Governments of the four Western European Great Powers is what has been lamentably lacking since the rise of dictatorships in Italy and Germany. The Prime Minister's action may be a first step towards a renewal of the Concert of Europe. If this result were to be achieved, consideration would have to be given to other disquieting matters besides the Sudeten German question. The discussions between the British and French Prime Ministers in London on September 18, following on Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Herr Hitler, indicated that this wider consideration would be given. The Anglo-French *communiqué* of September 19, announcing agreement of the two Governments on the policy to be adopted for a peaceful solution of the Sudeten German question, concluded with the hope that 'thereafter it will be possible to consider a more general settlement in the interests of European peace.'

The Berlin correspondent of *The Times* stated on September 2 that it was the earnest hope of the German Government that a settlement of the Sudeten question would prove the starting-point of real European collaboration. So there is hope.

R. B. MOWAT.

PERPETUAL PEACE

Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg in 1724, and there died eighty years later after a life of Spartan simplicity necessitated by his delicate health, for his stature was small, his frame twisted and his body feeble. During an academic life of forty-two years he became famous as the exponent of a new philosophy and, later, notorious because it appeared to be inconsistent with Christian doctrines as then expounded. From 1793 to 1798 he was forbidden to speak or write on religious subjects. In 1795 he published in Latin a comparatively little-known essay on Perpetual Peace, here reproduced in Miss M. Campbell Smith's translation¹ in abbreviated form, as a serious contribution to current thought. The footnotes are Kant's.

WE need not try to decide whether this satirical inscription (once found on a Dutch innkeeper's sign-board above the picture of a churchyard) is aimed at mankind in general, or at the rulers of states in particular, unwearied in their love of war, or perhaps only at the philosophers who cherish the sweet dream of perpetual peace. The author of the present sketch would make one stipulation, however. The practical politician stands upon a definite footing with the theorist: with great self-complacency he looks down upon him as a mere pedant whose empty ideas can threaten no danger to the state (starting as it does from principles derived from experience), and who may always be permitted to knock down his eleven skittles at once without a worldly-wise statesman needing to disturb himself. Hence, in the event of a quarrel arising between the two, the practical statesman must always act consistently, and not scent danger to the state behind opinions ventured by the theoretical politician at random and publicly expressed. With which

saving clause (*clausula salvatoria*) the author will herewith consider himself duly and expressly protected against all malicious misinterpretation.

FIRST SECTION

*Containing the Preliminary Articles of Perpetual Peace
between States*

1.—'No treaty of peace shall be regarded as valid, if made with the secret reservation of material for a future war.'

For then it would be a mere truce, a mere suspension of hostilities, not peace. A peace signifies the end of all hostilities, and to attach to it the epithet 'eternal' is not only a verbal pleonasm, but matter of suspicion. The causes of a future war existing, although perhaps not yet known to the high contracting parties themselves, are entirely annihilated by the conclusion of peace, however acutely they may be ferreted out of documents in the public archives.

If, however, according to present enlightened ideas of political wisdom, the true glory of a state lies in the uninterrupted development of its power by every possible means, this judgment must certainly strike one as scholastic and pedantic.

2.—'No state having an independent existence—whether it be great or small—shall be acquired by another through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation.'

For a state is not a property (*patrimonium*), as may be the ground on which its people are settled. It is a society of human beings over whom no one but itself has the right to rule and to dispose. Like the trunk of a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on to another state is to do away with its existence as a moral person, and to make of it a thing. Hence it is in contradiction to the idea of the original contract without which no right over a people is thinkable.² The custom of marriage between states, as if they were individuals, has survived even up to the most recent times,

² An hereditary kingdom is not a state which can be inherited by another state, but one whose sovereign power can be inherited by another physical person. The state then acquires a ruler, not the ruler as such (that is, as one already possessing another realm) the state.

¹ *Perpetual Peace*, by Immanuel Kant, translated with Introduction and Notes by M. Campbell Smith, with a preface by Professor Latta (George Allen & Unwin, 1915).

and is regarded partly as a new kind of industry by which ascendancy may be acquired through family alliances, without any expenditure of strength ; partly as a device for territorial expansion. Moreover, the hiring out of the troops of one state to another to fight against an enemy not at war with their native country is to be reckoned in this connection ; for the subjects are in this way used and abused at will as personal property

3.—‘ Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall be abolished in course of time.’

For they are always threatening other states with war by appearing to be in constant readiness to fight. They incite the various states to outrival one another in the number of their soldiers, and to this number no limit can be set. Now, since owing to the sums devoted to this purpose, peace at last becomes even more oppressive than a short war, these standing armies are themselves the cause of wars of aggression, undertaken in order to get rid of this burden. To which we must add that the practice of hiring men to kill or to be killed seems to imply a use of them as mere machines and instruments in the hand of another (namely, the state) which cannot easily be reconciled with the right of humanity in our own person.³ The matter stands quite differently in the case of voluntary periodical military exercise on the part of citizens of the state, who thereby seek to secure themselves and their country against attack from without.

The accumulation of treasure in a state would in the same way be regarded by other states as a menace of war, and might compel them to anticipate this by striking the first blow. For of the three forces, the power of arms, the power of alliance and the power of money, the last might well become the most reliable instrument of war, did not the difficulty of ascertaining the amount stand in the way.

4.—‘ No national debts shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state.’

This source of help is above suspicion, where assistance

³ A Bulgarian prince thus answered the Greek Emperor who magnanimously offered to settle a quarrel with him, not by shedding the blood of his subjects, but by a duel : ‘ A smith who has tongs will not take the red-hot iron from the fire with his hands.’

is sought outside or within the state, on behalf of the economic administration of the country (for instance, the improvement of the roads, the settlement and support of new colonies, the establishment of granaries to provide against seasons of scarcity, and so on). But, as a common weapon used by the Powers against one another, a credit system under which debts go on indefinitely increasing and are yet always assured against immediate claims (because all the creditors do not put in their claim at once) is a dangerous money power. This ingenious invention of a commercial people in the present century is, in other words, a treasure for the carrying on of war which may exceed the treasures of all the other states taken together, and can only be exhausted by a threatening deficiency in the taxes—an event, however, which will long be kept off by the very briskness of commerce resulting from the reaction of this system on industry and trade. The ease, then, with which war may be waged, coupled with the inclination of rulers towards it—an inclination which seems to be implanted in human nature—is a great obstacle in the way of perpetual peace. The prohibition of this system must be laid down as a preliminary article of perpetual peace, all the more necessarily because the final inevitable bankruptcy of the state in question must involve in the loss many who are innocent ; and this would be a public injury to these states. Therefore other nations are at least justified in uniting themselves against such an one and its pretensions.

5.—‘ No state shall violently interfere with the constitution and administration of another.’

For what can justify it in so doing ? The scandal which is here presented to the subjects of another state ? The erring state can much more serve as a warning by exemplifying the great evils which a nation draws down on itself through its own lawlessness. Moreover, the bad example which one free person gives another (as *scandalum acceptum*) does no injury to the latter.

6.—‘ No state at war with another shall countenance such modes of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible in a subsequent state of peace : such are the employment of assassins (*percussores*) or of poisoners (*venefici*),

breaches of capitulation, the instigating and making use of treachery (*perduellio*) in the hostile state.'

These are dishonourable stratagems. For some kind of confidence in the disposition of the enemy must exist even in the midst of war, as otherwise peace could not be concluded and the hostilities would pass into a war of extermination (*bellum internecinum*). War, however, is only our wretched expedient of asserting a right by force, an expedient adopted in the state of nature, where no court of justice exists which could settle the matter in dispute. In circumstances like these, neither of the two parties can be called an unjust enemy, because this form of speech presupposes a legal decision: the issue of the conflict—just as in the case of the so-called judgments of God—decides on which side right is. Between states, however, no punitive war (*bellum punitivum*) is thinkable, because between them a relation of superior and inferior does not exist. Whence it follows that a war of extermination, where the process of annihilation would strike both parties at once and all right as well, would bring about perpetual peace only in the great graveyard of the human race. Such a war then, and therefore also the use of all means which lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden. That the methods just mentioned do inevitably lead to this result is obvious from the fact that these infernal arts, already vile in themselves, on coming into use, are not long confined to the sphere of war.

SECOND SECTION

Containing the Definitive Articles of a Perpetual Peace between States

A state of peace among men who live side by side is not the natural state (*status naturalis*), which is rather to be described as a state of war: that is to say, although there is not perhaps always actual open hostility, yet there is a constant threatening that an outbreak may occur. Thus the state of peace must be *established*. For the mere cessation of hostilities is no guarantee of continued peaceful relations, and unless this guarantee is given by every individual to his neighbour—which can only be done in a state of society

regulated by law—one man is at liberty to challenge another and treat him as an enemy.⁴

I.—'The civil constitution of each state shall be republican.'

The only constitution which has its origin in the idea of the original contract, upon which the lawful legislation of every nation must be based, is the republican. It is a constitution, in the first place, founded in accordance with the principle of the freedom of the members of society as human beings: secondly, in accordance with the principle of the dependence of all, as subjects, on a common legislation: and, thirdly, in accordance with the law of the equality of the members as citizens. It is then, looking at the question of right, the only constitution whose fundamental principles lie at the basis of every form of civil constitution. And the only question for us now is, whether it is also the one constitution which can lead to perpetual peace.

Now the republican constitution apart from the soundness of its origin, since it arose from the pure source of the concept of right, has also the prospect of attaining the desired result, namely, perpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war out of their own property; they must

⁴ 'All men who have the power to exert a mutual influence upon one another must be under a civil government of some kind.'

A legal constitution is, according to the nature of the individuals who compose the state:

(1) A constitution formed in accordance with the right of citizenship of the individuals who constitute a nation (*jus civitatis*).

(2) A constitution whose principle is international law which determines the relations of states (*jus gentium*).

(3) A constitution formed in accordance with cosmopolitan law, in as far as individuals and states, standing in an external relation of mutual reaction, may be regarded as citizens of one world-state (*jus cosmopoliticum*).

This classification is not an arbitrary one, but is necessary with reference to the idea of perpetual peace. For, if even one of these units of society were in a position physically to influence another, while yet remaining a member of a primitive order of society, then a state of war would be joined with these primitive conditions; and from this it is our present purpose to free ourselves.

do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself, and which they can never pay off on account of the new wars which are always impending.

II.—‘The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states.’

Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, living in the natural state of society—that is to say, uncontrolled by external law—injure one another through their very proximity. Every state, for the sake of its own security, may—and ought to—demand that its neighbour should submit itself to conditions, similar to those of the civil society where the right of every individual is guaranteed. This would give rise to a federation of nations which, however, would not have to be a State of nations.⁵ That would involve a contradiction. For the term ‘state’ implies the relation of one who rules to those who obey—that is to say, of lawgiver to the subject people: and many nations in one state would constitute only one nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since here we have to consider the right of one nation against another, in so far as they are so many separate states and are not to be fused into one.

The attachment of savages to their lawless liberty, the fact that they would rather be at hopeless variance with one another than submit themselves to a legal authority constituted by themselves, that they therefore prefer their

⁵ Kant expresses himself, on this point, more clearly in the *Rechtslehre*, Part II., § 61: ‘The natural state of nations,’ he says here, ‘like that of individual men, is a condition which must be abandoned, in order that they may enter a state regulated by law. Hence, before this can take place, every right possessed by these nations and every external “mine” and “thine” [*id est*, symbol of possession] which states acquire or preserve through war are merely *provisional*, and can become *peremptory* valid and constitute a true state of peace only in a universal *union of states*, by a process analogous to that through which a people becomes a state. Since, however, the too great extension of such a State of nations over vast territories must, in the long run, make the government of that union—and therefore the protection of each of its members—impossible, a multitude of such corporations will lead again to a state of war. So that *perpetual peace*, the final goal of international law as a whole, is really an impracticable idea [*eine unausführbare Idee*]. The political principles, however, which are directed towards this end, (that is to say, towards the establishment of such unions of states as may serve as a continual approximation to that ideal), are not impracticable; on the contrary, as this approximation is required by duty and is therefore founded also upon the rights of men and of states, these principles are, without doubt, capable of practical realization.’

senseless freedom to a reason-governed liberty, is regarded by us with profound contempt as barbarism and uncivilisation and the brutal degradation of humanity. So one would think that civilised races, each formed into a state by itself, must come out of such an abandoned condition as soon as they possibly can. On the contrary, however, every state thinks rather that its majesty (the ‘majesty’ of a people is an absurd expression) lies just in the very fact that it is subject to no external legal authority; and the glory of the ruler consists in this, that, without his requiring to expose himself to danger, thousands stand at his command ready to let themselves be sacrificed for a matter of no concern to them. The difference between the savages of Europe and those of America lies chiefly in this, that, while many tribes of the latter have been entirely devoured by their enemies, Europeans know a better way of using the vanquished than by eating them; and they prefer to increase through them the number of their subjects, and so the number of instruments at their command for still more widely spread war.

The method by which states prosecute their rights can never be by process of law—as it is where there is an external tribunal—but only by war. Through this means, however, and its favourable issue, victory, the question of right is never decided. A treaty of peace makes, it may be, an end to the war of the moment, but not to the conditions of war which at any time may afford a new pretext for opening hostilities; and this we cannot exactly condemn as unjust, because under these conditions everyone is his own judge. Notwithstanding, not quite the same rule applies to states according to the law of nations as holds good of individuals in a lawless condition according to the law of nature, namely, ‘that they ought to advance out of this condition.’ This is so, because, as states, they have already within themselves a legal constitution, and have therefore advanced beyond the stage at which others, in accordance with their ideas of right, can force them to come under a wider legal constitution. Meanwhile, however, reason, from her throne of the supreme law-giving moral power, absolutely condemns war as a morally lawful proceeding, and makes a state of peace, on the other hand, an immediate duty. Without a compact between the nations, however, this state of peace cannot

be established or assured. The practicability or objective reality of this idea of federation which is to extend gradually over all states and so lead to perpetual peace can be shown. For, if Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic,—which by its very nature is inclined to perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom among the states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation would extend further and further.

III.—‘The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.’

We are speaking here, as in the previous articles, not of philanthropy, but of right; and in this sphere hospitality signifies the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by its owner without hostility. The latter may send him away again, if this can be done without causing his death; but, so long as he conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as an enemy. It is not a right to be treated as a guest to which the stranger can lay claim—a special friendly compact on his behalf would be required to make him for a given time an actual inmate—but he has a right of visitation. This right to present themselves to society belongs to all mankind in virtue of our common right of possession on the surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, we cannot be infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile ourselves to existence side by side: at the same time, originally no one individual had more right than another to live in any one particular spot. Uninhabitable portions of the surface, ocean and desert, split up the human community, but in such a way that ships and camels—‘the ship of the desert’—make it possible for men to come into touch with one another across these unappropriated regions and to take advantage of our common claim to the face of the earth with a view to a possible intercommunication.

The intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a

cosmopolitan right is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of the unwritten code of law—constitutional as well as international law—necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realisation of perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring to fulfil the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we flatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal.

FIRST SUPPLEMENT

Concerning the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace

This guarantee is given by no less a power than the great artist nature (*natura dædala rerum*) in whose mechanical course is clearly exhibited a predetermined design to make harmony spring from human discord, even against the will of man. Now this design, although called Fate when looked upon as the compelling force of a cause, the laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is, when considered as the purpose manifested in the course of nature, called Providence, as the deep-laying wisdom of a Higher Cause, directing itself towards the ultimate practical end of the human race and predetermining the course of things with a view to its realisation. This Providence we do not, it is true, perceive in the cunning contrivances [*Kunstanstalten*] of nature; nor can we even conclude from the fact of their existence that it is there; but, as in every relation between the form of things and their final cause, we can, and must, supply the thought of a Higher Wisdom, in order that we may be able to form an idea of the possible existence of these products after the analogy of human works of art.

The provisions Providence has made are as follow: (1) she has taken care that men *can* live in all parts of the world; (2) she has scattered them by means of war in all directions, even into the most inhospitable regions, so that these too might be populated; (3) by this very means she has forced them to enter into relations more or less controlled by law.

1. Even if a people were not compelled through internal discord to submit to the restraint of public laws, war would bring this about, working from without. ‘Given a multitude

of rational beings who, in a body, require general laws for their own preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, is secretly inclined to exempt himself from this restraint: how are we to order their affairs and how establish for them a constitution such that, although their private dispositions may be really antagonistic, they may yet so act as a check upon one another, that, in their public relations, the effect is the same as if they had no such evil sentiments.' Such a problem must be capable of solution. For it deals, not with the moral reformation of mankind, but only with the mechanism of nature; and the problem is to learn how this mechanism of nature can be applied to men, in order so to regulate the antagonism of conflicting interests in a people that they may even compel one another to submit to compulsory laws and thus necessarily bring about the state of peace in which laws have force. We can see, in states actually existing, although very imperfectly organised, that, in externals, they already approximate very nearly to what the Idea of right prescribes, although the principle of morality is certainly not the cause. We may say, then, that it is the irresistible will of nature that right shall at last get the supremacy. What one here fails to do will be accomplished in the long run, although perhaps with much inconvenience to us. As Bouterwek says, 'If you bend the reed too much it breaks: he who would do too much does nothing.'

2. The idea of international law presupposes the separate existence of a number of neighbouring and independent states; and, although such a condition of things is in itself already a state of war, (if a federative union of these nations does not prevent the outbreak of hostilities) yet, according to the Idea of reason, this is better than that all the states should be merged into one under a power which has gained the ascendancy over its neighbours and gradually become a universal monarchy. For the wider the sphere of their jurisdiction, the more laws lose in force; and soulless despotism, when it has choked the seeds of good, at last sinks into anarchy. Nevertheless it is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to attain to a permanent condition of peace in this very way; that is to say, by subjecting the whole world as far as possible to its sway. But nature wills it otherwise. She employs two means to separate nations, and prevent

them from intermixing: namely, the differences of language and of religion. These differences bring with them a tendency to mutual hatred, and furnish pretexts for waging war. But, none the less, with the growth of culture and the gradual advance of men to greater unanimity of principle, they lead to concord in a state of peace which, unlike the despotism we have spoken of, (the churchyard of freedom) does not arise from the weakening of all forces, but is brought into being and secured through the equilibrium of these forces in their most active rivalry.

3. As nature wisely separates nations which the will of each state, sanctioned even by the principles of international law, would gladly unite under its own sway by stratagem or force; in the same way, on the other hand, she unites nations whom the principle of a cosmopolitan right would not have secured against violence and war. And this union she brings about through an appeal to their mutual interests. The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner or later it takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces which lie at the command of a state, the power of money is probably the most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled—not, it is true, exactly from motives of morality—to further the noble end of peace and to avert war, by means of mediation, wherever it threatens to break out, just as if they had made a permanent league for this purpose. For great alliances with a view to war can, from the nature of things, only very rarely occur, and still more seldom succeed.

In this way nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through the natural course of human propensities: not indeed with sufficient certainty to enable us to prophesy the future of this ideal theoretically, but yet clearly enough for practical purposes. And thus this guarantee of nature makes it a duty that we should labour for this end, an end which is no mere chimera.

SECOND SUPPLEMENT

A Secret Article for Perpetual Peace

A secret article in negotiations concerning public right is, when looked at objectively or with regard to the meaning of

the term, a contradiction. When we view it, however, from the subjective standpoint, with regard to the character and condition of the person who dictates it, we see that it might quite well involve some private consideration, so that he would regard it as hazardous to his dignity to acknowledge such an article as originating from him.

The only article of this kind is contained in the following proposition: 'The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war.'

It seems, however, to be derogatory to the dignity of the legislative authority of a state—to which we must of course attribute all wisdom—to ask advice from subjects (among whom stand philosophers) about the rules of its behaviour to other states. At the same time, it is very advisable that this should be done. Hence the state will silently invite suggestion for this purpose, while at the same time keeping the fact secret. This amounts to saying that the state will allow philosophers to discuss freely and publicly the universal principles governing the conduct of war and establishment of peace; for they will do this of their own accord, if no prohibition is laid upon them. We would not be understood to say that the state must give a preference to the principles of the philosopher, rather than to the opinions of the jurist, the representative of state authority; but only that he should be heard.

That kings should philosophise, or philosophers become kings, is not to be expected. But neither is it to be desired; for the possession of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise of reason. But it is absolutely indispensable, for their enlightenment as to the full significance of their vocations, that both kings and sovereign nations, which rule themselves in accordance with laws of equality, should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear, nor forbid the expression of their opinions, but should allow them to speak openly. And since this class of men, by their very nature, are incapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for purposes of political agitation, they should not be suspected of propagandism.

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By W. A. HIRST

IN the 300 years of its history International Law has experienced no shock comparable to that inflicted upon it by the Great War. There was a general belief in 1914 in the various conventions and agreements made by nations to do and abstain from various acts on the principle that the horrors of war ought to be mitigated both for combatants and non-combatants—it was believed, in a word, that these agreements would be respected, that international law was strong and practically inviolable.

Many of the theories on the subject were, indeed, fantastic. We were told that modern war was so horrible that all men with one accord would refuse to participate in it; and, again, it was seriously maintained that victory was as injurious to a State as defeat, and that men and nations would therefore abandon war from the spirit of self-interest. Refuted by experience as these theories were, they still linger in the Paradise of Fools. But wiser and more moderate men did with reason believe that international law was as inviolable as ambassadorial rights. Great was the disillusion.

The violations in the Great War were notorious. It is only necessary to mention such as the bombardment of unfortified towns, the use of poison gas, the sinking of ships without warning and without provision for the safety of the crews. Most of the pledges made at the two Hague Conferences were ignored.

Now, it is important not to expect more from this form of jurisprudence than it is able to perform. The root of the mismanagement of international troubles (in which the pacifists are the chief but by no means the only offenders) lies in the misapprehension of an all-important principle.

This is Sovereignty. Of it the definition of Austin is the best that has ever been given. He says :

If a *determinate* human superior, *not* in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receives *habitual* obedience from the *bulk* of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including that superior) is a society political and independent.

Now, this is the key to the whole international situation.

There is in the world no sovereign power capable of issuing positive commands to the States, for they are all sovereign. Nor is it necessary to point out that nationalism has reached a point of intensity and strength unparalleled in the history of the world, and therefore no State will ever voluntarily surrender or limit its sovereignty. Since 1919 we have heard a great deal of loose talk about sanctions, an international police force, renunciation of war, and the like. But there is no means of carrying out any such actions.

When the League of Nations was founded some spoke of a super-State which would possess a permanent army and navy and keep peace throughout the world. Such a vision was too absurd to last long. It is vain to expect half a hundred States to agree on their respective quotas, that a mob of fifty nations, some hostile to one another, could form an effective military force, and that it would be necessarily stronger than any aggressive Power or group of Powers. It is vain to suppose that there would be any means of coercing the recalcitrant except by warlike measures taken by this incongruous army. International law has no sanctions.

This is why Holland called it 'the vanishing point of jurisprudence ; since it lacks any arbiter of disputed questions, save public opinion, beyond and above the disputant parties themselves.' In fact, it can rest only upon expediency. The League of Nations professes to administer international law. In its judgment, Japan was acting aggressively and unjustly in the Far East. But it took no steps to coerce Japan ; it would not have been expedient, or even possible, to do so. Similarly, in the consideration of oil sanctions against Italy, inquiry was directed exclusively to expediency and possibility. Now, it is obvious that municipal law, administered in that fashion by a tribunal of any country, would soon be a byword for partiality, corruption, and mis-

carriage of justice. There is, then, no analogy between municipal law and international law.

As an example of the futility of the attempt to legislate internationally, we may note Article X. of the Covenant, which says :

The high contracting parties agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war lends itself to grave objections, and direct the executive council to devise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented . . .

Clearly, if the practice is objectionable, it ought to be expressly forbidden. But the League knows that such a prohibition would not be obeyed.

The weakness of the position is shown by the most authoritative of text-books. Observe Wheaton's definition : 'It is now possible to define international law as that body of rules which by custom or treaty civilised States regard as binding upon themselves in their relations with one another.' So far this is unexceptionable ; but he adds, 'and where violation gives the injured party a legal right to redress,' and he justifies this addition on the ground that the Treaty of Versailles *proposed that the German Emperor should be tried* 'for a supreme offence against international morality.' The fact is that neither nation nor individual can be punished unless the great Powers of the League are able and willing to do so.

Undoubtedly the League ought to be reconstituted, and the Covenant drastically altered.

It is Article XVI. which has been the chief stumbling-block, and the reason is that in every line it infringes sovereignty. It begins with a reference to Article XII., which forbids any member to go to war without the preliminary of a long process of inquiry or arbitration. To commence hostilities in defiance of Article XII. would be considered 'an act of war,' and it would be the duty of all members of the League to sever all trade and financial relations with the offending party or parties. This, as we know, is an act of war in itself, which might or might not be replied to in kind by the belligerent. But the height of unreality is reached when we find the Powers of the League committed to 'the prevention of all financial, commercial or

personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, *whether a member of the League or not.*

Thus English or French cruisers are pledged to detain any United States ship that is bound for peccant ports. Further, any citizen of the Republic, who happens to be taking his family to an aggressor country, is liable to be seized (like the Confederate agents on board the *Trent*) and presumably interned in a foreign land until the particular conflict has ceased. To allow such a futility to remain in its Covenant is to stultify the League. It is true that when the article was drafted it was supposed that the United States would be a member, but, in any case, the impracticability is patent.

This article has been the despair of commentators—none can make any sense out of it. For example, Oppenheim says :

Whether the League itself may become a belligerent or not, cannot be regarded as settled yet ; but that through its appropriate organ, the Council, it may recommend and induce some or all of its members to wage war, there can be no doubt. . . . There can be no doubt that war remains war, even when waged with the blessing of the League spirit. The Covenant of the League . . . has not altered, in point of law, the institution of war.

The Covenant, as it stands, is based on rottenness. It lays down uncompromisingly the principle of arbitration before war. Yet Paraguay and Bolivia fought to their hearts' content for years without any effective hindrance from the League. Japan, it is notorious, engaged in war with China, Italy committed an act of war against Greece, and so on. Everyone knows that if Colombia and Peru chose to go to war, they would fight to a finish in defiance of the League. All dead wood in the Covenant must be cut out.

Indeed, the League is now so ineffective that it is needless to consider it any further in the light of an active peacemaker. Let us see what can be done to strengthen international law—seeing that respect for it and its moral force was the main security for peace a quarter of a century ago. Chile and Argentina, Russia, Japan, Great Britain, the United States (in the case of Colombia), all were helped in avoiding or terminating war by its potent influence. It is, as we have

seen, 'international morality.' It is the *natural law* of Grotius, 'the dictate of right reason pronouncing that there is in some actions a moral turpitude or in others a moral obligation, according as they agree or disagree with the rational scheme of Nature.' He was well aware that international law could not be backed by sanctions, for he recognised—what now so many ignore—that sovereignty (*summa potestas*) resides in each State. Indeed, we shall not be far wrong in stating that he is always right, and that our modern would-be arbitrators of law are always wrong when they disagree with him. That is to say, he is right in every important principle upon which international law is based—in this the first and greatest treatise on the subject.

To make international law respected it is necessary to create a moral atmosphere. Now this was vitiated a quarter of a century ago, mainly by the action of Germany, who claimed 'a place in the sun'—*i.e.*, her Government complained that Great Britain and other Powers had monopolised the valuable empty spaces of the world. Russia also, by various ambitious enterprises, notably in Persia, was causing anxiety. Desire for a neighbour's possessions at last brought about the war.

The same conditions may possibly bring about the same results. It is needless to repeat the familiar tale. Germany, Italy, and Japan, at least, are complaining of narrow territory and demanding a share in the good things of the world. In the last war the peoples of the earth were amazed to see a total disregard of almost all the humane conventions which had been (in large measure) respected in the past—in a word, they wondered at the ineffectiveness of international law. It would be well to appreciate the change in world politics. In the old days professional men fought all battles, and the people at large went on with their daily round. Byron began his pilgrimage by a visit to Spain. The Peninsular War was raging, and he visited battlefields and moralised on the lurid drama without the faintest sense of any obligation to participate. Even in the Boer War—where much was at stake—the volunteers formed a comparatively small part of the combatants, and at the beginning of the campaign it was expected that very few indeed would be required. Even with conscript nations it was expected that only the trained

levies should shoulder the risks of war. But now the State is God in some nations, and in all there is the passionate determination to secure self-preservation; and, therefore, each nation is a fortress occupied by a garrison of the whole population, and each member is liable to all the rigours of war. We must expect aerial bombs to fall upon all and sundry, great guns, which may have a range of seventy miles, to strike down men, women, and children, and, in every way, what was forbidden in 1907 will be practised in 1957.

It is not likely that there will be much improvement on that side. Probably the callous sinking of ships will not be repeated, for Germany, being in a peculiarly desperate situation, employed desperate remedies. But all kinds of poison gas will be used (otherwise the pains bestowed upon its manufacture and perfection are futilities), and we see before our eyes bombs dropped indiscriminately on Spanish cities. Doubtless, also, unprotected towns will be bombarded, and probably fishermen and, in fact, all non-combatants will be made prisoners of war, if the enemy thinks that their capture would be worth while. All this because nations are fighting against nations, not armies against armies. It might be advisable to appoint conventions which would draw up a list of prohibited practices. Possibly a State would hesitate to incur the moral odium which would result from transgression. But it would baffle the ingenuity of the Law Lords or Sir Gilbert Murray to devise sanctions in this connexion.

We are repeatedly told that we must remove the causes of war. The desire for expansion is alleged as the most likely cause; and, we ask, what can international law do in this matter? Debates in Parliament and official announcements assure us that the matter of redistribution of tropical colonies is under consideration. With the best will in the world our collective wisdom must have the greatest difficulty in removing the grounds of discontent. Practically every square mile of territory that is of any value belongs to someone, and it is hardly reasonable to expect the *haves* to divest themselves in favour of the *have-nots*. Nor is it probable that the inhabitants of lands owned by Great Britain or France would welcome being handed over to some clamant competitor for colonies. There is no need to elaborate the point.

First of all, we must scrap all the notions of the ideologists—abstract justice, self-determination, freedom of the sea, war to end war, and the rest of the stock-in-trade of that class. We must have plain international morality coupled with political acumen. The panacea of to-day is a conference or a congress. That they always fail is nothing against them in the English mind; our people always stand loyally by failures. But the Laval-Hoare 'crisis' did at least one good thing—it elicited a pledge that important affairs would henceforth be handled by people who know something about them.

When such questions were brought forward, Lord Palmerston was always hostile. He said:

I confess also that I consider that it would be a very dangerous course for this country itself to take, because there is no country which, from its political and commercial circumstances, from its maritime interests and from its colonial possessions, excites more envious and jealous feelings in different quarters than England does; and there is no country that would find it more difficult to discover really disinterested and impartial arbiters. There is also no country that would be more likely than England to suffer in its important commercial interests from submitting the case to arbiters, not impartial, and not acting with a due sense of their responsibilities.

His words still hold good in principle, but it is almost universally felt that 'something should be done.'

It may be hoped that the inquiry will be undertaken by real diplomatists, preferably without reporters, and that only the interested Powers shall be represented, for nothing has been a greater shock to world opinion than the spectacle of Nicaragua and Ecuador deciding that England and France shall incur loss and danger in the supposed interests of a barbarous Power. The suspicions and jealousies which several of the participants entertain, notably Germany and France, or Japan and Russia, would make the proceedings extremely difficult. And—a not unimportant detail—there is a scarcity in the matter to be distributed. Japan and Russia (with good will) might make a deal, with or without the consent of China. But everything that Germany suggested would be viewed with suspicion by France, and to restore to Germany her former African possessions would be absurd—first, because she proved herself a bad neighbour, and,

secondly, because the inhabitants desire no change. Portugal, at a price, might possibly accommodate Germany; but the Portuguese are a proud people, and our South Africans would resent German propinquity. In fact, the Portuguese Government has put forward a definite *non possumus*. But the whole subject-matter of such a conference would provide the most prickly problems of this century.

If a series of satisfactory settlements were made, international law would be strengthened, for it would be impossible to repudiate the treaties. As Wheaton says, 'the essential sources of international law are custom and treaties.' Custom is obviously at the base of any kind of law, and treaties are the normal means of carrying international law into effect. In some cases they form a part of the code itself. Thus in 1871 Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria, Italy, and Turkey made a declaration to the effect that they reckoned it to be an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can be released from the engagement of treaties, or modify their stipulations, except with the consent of the contracting parties amicably obtained. It is true that this was a device to legalise Russia's breach of faith in regard to the Black Sea. But this principle was respected (except in 1908) until the eve of the war. If we could guarantee inviolability for this declaration, most of the perils to international law would disappear.

In the past the practice, improving by degrees, of civilised States has had great weight. In 1898 both Spaniards and Americans eschewed privateering, although neither of them had renounced it by treaty. But since the war this respect has been diminished, by avoidable causes. One is the League of Nations. That half a hundred States should bind themselves to measures which it is impossible to keep, which they habitually disregard, derogates from the majesty of law. Again, the various pacts and agreements tend the same way. Locarno and Kellogg Pacts and the like, in the first place, bind Powers to various courses which may, in many conceivable circumstances, imperil their security. To avoid such a danger any Power would disregard such a treaty. Again, these agreements usually attempt to perpetuate the peace treaties which several countries regard as unjust and injurious. Thus are agreements brought into disrepute.

Statesmanlike procedure will in time produce satisfactory results. The diplomatists of the various Powers, instructed by their several Governments, should make practical treaties, not lending themselves to such visionary schemes as the renunciation of war or such impossibilities as the limitation of armaments. If Japan, Italy, and other ambitious nations knew exactly what steps on their part would be regarded benevolently and what with concern, a constant source of friction would be removed. The interference of the League has merely aggravated dangerous embroilments. The League should confine itself to the task of suppressing international abuses, such as the drug traffic, and forwarding plans for international benefit. For this it has ample machinery, and its action would do nothing to endanger, but rather to forward, the peace of the world.

It is not necessary to say much about the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. On the face of it such a tribunal is valuable, and it has from time to time effected the settlement of various small disputes. But in the clash of arms (when any vital principle is at stake) the Court is silent. It was never heard in 1914 or 1935. No doubt the more influential and trusted the Court becomes, the better it will be for international relations. But its scope is limited. Prediction is always risky, and in a world that has lost its stability the future of international law is not easy to foretell. When it was founded by Grotius, the disorders and abuses of the times had wearied mankind and a remedy was demanded. Grotius said:

I saw in the Christian world a licence in waging war of which even barbarians would have been ashamed—*vel barbaris gentibus pudendam bellandi licentiam*—and men rushing to arms on trivial pretexts or none at all. Further, when once they took up arms, they showed no respect for God's law or man's law.

We have seen appalling licence in carrying on war and a great readiness to fly to arms, be the objects great or small. Clearly it is time to reform. To redress injustice (some of which arises almost inevitably from the peace settlement), to cultivate a spirit of comity, and to keep troth—all these things are necessary. The economic phenomena of to-day have taken on an unexampled complexity, and the fiery

nationality which prevails makes it difficult to give nations the opportunities which they desire. That they may not take them by the sword, that they may hold themselves bound by treaties, with the opportunity to revise them when necessary that they may show a spirit of reasonableness—to secure these great and signal benefits is the task of international law. Let us respect sovereignty and treaties, let us endeavour to humanise war, let us banish vain schemes of unpractical visionaries, and international law will regain its authority.

W. A. HIRST.

THE PLIGHT OF THE SHIPYARDS

By SIR ARCHIBALD HURD

THERE are sixty shipbuilding yards—some larger than others—in Great Britain and Northern Ireland which can turn out simultaneously 2,000,000 tons of merchant ships. By the middle of next year 75 per cent. of that capacity will be unemployed; the building berths will be empty, the naval architects and draughtsmen idle, and the craftsmen existing on what is usually described, if erroneously, as ‘the dole.’ The plants will, for the most part, be silent and most of the personnel suffering deterioration in skill for want of work.

That is the gravity of the crisis which is developing, owing, on the one hand, to the price of new tonnage having advanced beyond the figure at which British shipowners, exposed to keen, and in most cases uneconomic, competition on all the trade routes, can afford to build; and, on the other, to old-established customers under other flags having been led by various expedients to place orders in foreign instead of British yards. As Mr. R. S. Johnson, managing director of the firm of Cammell, Laird & Co. (which has recently launched the new Cunard White Star liner *Mauretania*), has boldly declared, shipbuilding in this country is on the downgrade: ‘We are being pushed on one side by foreigners, and every country but this seems to be using its brains, as well as subterfuge and subsidies, to capture the shipping trade of the world, and, as a result, a large portion of the shipbuilding of the world.’

Mr. F. E. Rebbeck, then president of the Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation, put the matter before the nation in a prophetic statement some months ago, when the first signs of crisis were discernible. He stated that a deadlock was

occurring; that deadlock, as his successor, Mr. F. Cresswell Pyman, has lately reminded the country, is tightening, with distressing possibilities. Eighteen establishments are still fairly busy with Admiralty contracts for battleships, cruisers and torpedo craft belonging to the programmes of earlier financial years, but no new orders from the naval authorities will be placed until early next summer, as only 'token sums' have been voted by Parliament for the men-of-war of the programme for 1938-39. Generally, shipbuilding activity in this country within a few months will be at a lower ebb than for many years. The plight of the shipyards means not only unemployment in the various centres of the industry on the coasts; the reactions will be felt in a hundred inland cities and towns which contribute various kinds of ship equipment, as well as by steelmakers, miners, and railway workers normally engaged in the transport of shipbuilding material of all descriptions.

When the Great War was drawing to its close the Board of Trade appointed a Committee, with Sir Alfred Booth as chairman, to inquire into the future of shipping and shipbuilding, and the references in its Report to the latter industry are of peculiar interest in view of the subsequent course of events. It recalled that in the years 1892-94 eight out of every ten merchant ships (81.6 per cent.) under all flags were of British construction, as well as a large proportion of foreign men-of-war. Orders at that time came from all quarters of the earth—the United States, Japan, China, the South American republics, Germany, Italy, and even France and Scandinavia. As late as 1914 the proportion of merchant ships of the world built in this country was as high as 61.1. 'There are few important industries,' it stated, 'where the predominance of British manufacturers has been more marked than in shipbuilding and marine engineering.' They admitted that, compared with twenty years previously, the output from British shipyards and marine engine works had shown a decline in the proportion which it bore to the world's output; but added that 'the normal production of British shipyards was, before the war, still greater than that of all foreign shipyards put together.' For some years the British output had, in fact, formed a fairly stable proportion of the world's new tonnage, and the national trading account showed year by

year considerable ship exports, to the great profit of the nation as a whole.

It was apparent in the early years of the present century that the British position was being undermined.

At one time British shipbuilders delivered many vessels to German owners; this trade was, at the outbreak of war, practically extinct, and German competition was being met in other markets, but, so far as we have been able to ascertain, generally successfully met. Italy has in recent years largely increased the output of vessels, but substantial orders still come to this country from Italian owners. Japan, at one time a large buyer, is now a seller of vessels. Holland, Norway, Sweden and Russia, as also Greece, have been, and were immediately before the war, good customers.

At this time the competition between British firms was unrestricted by any community of interest; as separate and distinct units they were putting up a good fight against heavy odds. 'But what,' the Committee asked, 'is to happen after the war?' On that issue, Sir Alfred Booth and his colleagues forecast keener competition by foreign firms than in the past. 'This war,' it added, 'has shown foreign nations the advantages of a national mercantile marine, and the value of encouraging national shipbuilding facilities.' Much new shipbuilding plant, they pointed out, had been put down abroad, and the experience which had been obtained by foreign countries during the war was likely to enable them to compete more nearly on even terms with British shipbuilders. No doubt was entertained that the demand for tonnage for some time after the war would be so great that the capacity of the shipyards in every country would be fully occupied, but the strength and ability of those engaged in the British shipbuilding industry were likely to be brought to a test later, when the world's most urgent requirements had been satisfied.

Various recommendations were made, and the advice that the leaders of the industry should get together in the spirit of self help was immediately acted upon. The Shipbuilding Employers' Federation was strengthened in order to deal with all production problems—wages and hours and conditions of work, and is working well under the direction of Mr. John S. Boyd; National Shipbuilders Security, Ltd.,

was formed later, with Sir James Lithgow at its head, to rationalise the shipyards, and has reduced their output capacity by about one-third; and the Shipbuilding Conference was organised under Sir Amos Ayre in order to develop and co-ordinate the commercial policy of the industry. In spite of these measures, however, the proportion of the world's shipbuilding carried on in Great Britain and Northern Ireland has continued to decline. In the March-June quarter of this year the percentage of work in the world's shipyards which was in hand in this country was only 36.7 per cent., less than half of what it was in the later years of last century; and nearly one-third of the ships under construction abroad were for registration in a country other than that in which they were being built, including some cargo liners, as well as oil-tankers and coastal vessels, for British shipowners.

Lloyd's Register of Shipping supplies periodically infallible statistics on the shipbuilding situation. At the end of March 1937 it recorded that 41.4 per cent. of all ships building for service under all flags was progressing towards completion in the yards of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; three months later the proportion was about the same (41.6 per cent.); at the end of September it showed a slight decline to 40.8 per cent.; by the end of the year, owing to the great activity in European and Japanese yards, it had dropped to 38.8 per cent.; on March 31 last it sagged to 37.6 per cent. and then continued to fall, being 36.7 per cent. at the end of June.

In the first six months of the present year great activity continued in all foreign yards, except those of the United States. Work was begun on 554 ships of 1,323,472 tons gross, and only 112 of those ships, of 330,001 tons gross, were under construction in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. One-third of the tonnage in hand in Continental yards during those six months was intended for registration in a country other than that of the builders, the orders including cargo liners and oil-tankers for British firms. Germany, Japan and Holland had in hand on June 30 a vast amount of work—396,953 tons gross, 290,332 tons gross, and 280,856 tons gross respectively; Italy, Sweden and Denmark were also busy, the first named being occupied on 136,787 tons gross and the last named on 107,075 tons gross.

DECLINE OF SHIPBUILDING IN GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND in relation to World Construction

Year.	British percentage.
1892-94	81.6
1895-98	73.5
1899-03	59.9
1904-08	59.7
1909-13	61.1
(1914-1920 Production abnormal owing to the Great War)	
1922	41.8
1923	39.3
1924	64.0
1925	49.5
1926	38.2
1927	53.6
1928	53.6
1929	54.5
1930	51.2
1931	31.1
1932	25.8
1933	27.2
1934	47.5
1935	38.3
1936	40.4
1937	34.2
1938 (January-June)	31.6

These were the shipbuilding conditions which were revealed by *Lloyd's Register* at the end of June; the pre-eminence of the British shipbuilding industry, reflecting the depressed condition of British shipping, had gone; instead of building 81.6 per cent. of all the new tonnage for the world's fleets and a good many of its men-of-war, the establishments of Great Britain and Ireland were responsible for only 31.6 per cent. of the merchant tonnage and only a few foreign men-of-war of small size, with the prospect that the proportion would be far less by the end of the year.

The explanation of this movement is twofold. In the

first place, since the National Government came into power it has introduced a tariff to protect some industries, and those not the most necessary to an island community; it has voted subsidies in support of other industries, such as sugar-beet growing, which has been aided to the extent of £21,000,000; and it has imposed import quotas in order to encourage home and Empire production. By these means the standard of living, based on high wages, has been raised to the benefit of 75 per cent. of the working population, which has never been so prosperous as to-day, working shorter hours, consuming vast quantities of imported food, and many now have holidays each summer with full pay. Shipbuilding employers, and the employers in the ancillary industries concerned with ship equipment, had to keep pace with this upward movement or suffer all the ills flowing from strikes, even though they realised that their action would handicap them in obtaining orders from British shipowners, subject to the operation of the economic laws which still apply to their international industry, and lead to the loss of contracts from the owners of fleets under foreign flags who had been accustomed to have ships built in the yards of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

In the years following the conclusion of peace great and famous yards had been either closed and their plants dispersed or had been sterilised by National Shipbuilders Security, Ltd., under Sir James Lithgow, so as to concentrate building in the most efficient establishments, thus promoting efficiency and economy, and shipbuilders had been drawn together in a community of interest through the Shipbuilding Conference so as to present a united front. But these and other measures have proved inadequate as a counterpoise to the influence of the economic policy of the Government and the generous scale of its social services, the cost of which has risen from £35.5 to £421.5 millions. Tenders continued to be unacceptable to British shipowners, and shipowners in other countries went to foreign rivals with their orders, while Japan, now independent of British firms, continued to assist her national shipbuilding and shipping industries in every possible way.

The conditions which were created in the course of a few years in the yards of the continent of Europe were without parallel in the history of shipbuilding. The position

was such that a leading British expert claimed, on irrefutable evidence, that 'if the workers on the hulls in British shipyards had been prepared to labour without wages and their employers to forego all hope of profit, orders which are now being carried out in some Continental yards could not have been secured, so great is the advantage in price which foreign builders can offer to all comers, British and foreign.'

Many reasons can be given to explain why the shipyards of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have lost foreign orders which would otherwise have come to them in the past as a matter of course. After the Great War foreign shipbuilding establishments on the continent of Europe were extended and skilled labour was trained on a scale beyond anything hitherto known. There was no longer any secret in successful ship construction; knowledge of naval architecture and marine engineering had become diffused throughout the world. In particular, Scandinavian firms gained a lead in the production of internal combustion engines for the propulsion of ocean-going as well as coastal ships, while at the same time they studied new devices for making the steam engine both more efficient and more economical. Within a few years of the close of the Great War all firms, British and Continental, were on much the same footing in regard to knowledge and technique, while in the internal combustion engine foreign firms had obtained a notable lead. Nevertheless, British firms continued to compete successfully for many open contracts by reason of the prices quoted and times of delivery as well as quality of craftsmanship. They had nothing to fear under conditions of ordinary economic competition. As late as 1930 the work for foreign owners was valued at upwards of £20,000,000, no inconsiderable contribution to the balancing of the national trading account.

In succeeding years conditions underwent a change. In some cases, as was illustrated a year or two ago by the orders placed in Germany, 'frozen credits' were liquidated by building ships, especially oil-tankers, while in other cases barter arrangements were made to the advantage of both parties, by which the products of one country, such as fish, coffee, oil, coal, timber and other commodities, were offered in return for ships. Scandinavian firms, in particular, benefited by depreciated currencies, and in some cases Governments

and municipalities co-operated to make these advantages decisive in securing contracts so as to maintain employment in the shipyards. Moreover, many foreign firms gained an advantage from the lower standard of their wages and their longer effective working hours. Their taxation was also lighter. Shipbuilders on the Continent were thus placed by a combination of circumstances in a position to undercut British prices.

At first their success was confined to orders from foreign shipowners, but in the last few months they have secured contracts from British owners, not only for ocean-going ships, but for coastal vessels. That they have been assisted by standardisation, especially in regard to tankers, is true, but in similar circumstances British firms would have adopted the same means to economical and cheap construction; mass production can be applied only when a succession of contracts is placed by one or more owners for ships from which much the same service is required.

Under such unfair conditions of competition, British shipbuilders have seen, first old foreign customers of many years standing, and then certain British owners, desert them. During the past two years work for British shipowners of a value of upwards of £5,000,000, which would have given much-needed employment in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, has been placed in Continental yards, while it has become the rule in France, the United States, and other countries to penalise shipowners who do not patronise for building, as well as repairs, their national firms, irrespective of the price paid, the quality of the workmanship, and the time of delivery. Not only has the export of merchant ships from this country shrunk to small proportions, but foreign-built vessels, cargo liners and others, are now being imported into this country. That is the lowest depth of humiliation. This movement away from British yards is continuing at an increasing pace—since the cost of production is much higher than abroad.

Abroad the administrative machinery of the State as well as 'cheap money' and other advantages have all contributed to divert work from the yards of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, while the British Government has given no aid to the industry, apart from the temporary aid of

the Trades Facilities Acts and the modest scrap and build scheme, which was in large measure a failure, and the loan, at a profitable rate of interest, to the Cunard White Star Company. Under the Anglo-Turkish agreement provision was, it should be added, made for orders for new ships to be placed in this country. The amount of money involved in these orders will be inconsiderable, but the principle has at least been recognised.

Thus the shipbuilders of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stand defeated—first, by the favour shown by the National Government, by means of the tariff, subsidies and import quotas, to a variety of non-essential industries, and, secondly, by the various uneconomic expedients adopted on the European continent as well as in Japan. Ships cannot be constructed in our shipyards because the cost is from 40 to 50 per cent. greater than it was two years ago. As an illustration of the impasse which has arisen, we have the recent lightning visit of Sir Edward Beatty, president and chairman of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, whose trains and ships encircle the globe. He came to this country to order, in association with Lord Craigmyle, two passenger liners which were to maintain, with the aid of subsidies towards their operating cost from the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji, the All-Red Route across the Pacific Ocean. He was soon satisfied that ships built at prices which had to be asked by the prospective builders could not be made to pay, so he again boarded the *Empress of Britain*, leaving behind him a statement signed by himself and Lord Craigmyle that everything was in order except the shipbuilding price. As that was so high, the construction of the two ships would have to be postponed. So the Americans will still go on operating their subsidised service across the Pacific to the injury of British prestige and trade. It is much the same on other trade routes. In many cases designs have been pigeon-holed, and in others British owners have placed orders in Continental yards, because only at their prices is there any hope that a profit can be made on the vessels. Foreign owners, who have been coming to this country for many years with contracts, have also, as has been stated, been tempted from their old allegiance.

Free Trade, as an economic policy, has been buried, but Ministers still profess to believe in the Freedom of the Seas. They have left British shipowners and shipbuilders to fight, without defence, against all the effects, on the one hand, of the British Protectionist policy, and, on the other, of ill-designed forms of flag discrimination and the power of purses filled from the treasuries of foreign taxpayers. There are 2000 fewer ocean-going ships on the British register than in 1914, when lack of merchant shipping nearly brought the Allies to defeat, and only one quarter of the rationalised capacity of the shipbuilding industry of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has any prospect of employment during the coming winter on merchant work.

It may be argued, 'What is the good of building more ships for service under the British flag, since 159 vessels of 444,045 tons gross are tied up in idleness round the British coasts, and many which still have crews on board and are trading are involving their owners in heavy losses?' The basic remedies are simple. First, British buying power should be used to support British shipping and shipbuilding, and, in particular, Imperial preference, now applied to goods, should be extended to their transport overseas; secondly, a subsidy on a mileage basis should be paid, where necessary, on all British ships, liners and tramps; thirdly, a bounty should be available for all new vessels built for service under foreign flags, with an import duty on the value of all liners, tramps or coastal vessels built abroad for registration in the United Kingdom. By these means the decline of British shipping would be arrested, without affront to the United States, and other foreign shipping, supported by uneconomic expedients or operated in conditions which British seamen would not tolerate, would be penalised; vessels of twenty years or more, amounting to 11,000,000 tons, would be under a handicap in competing with modern and efficient vessels; and the British merchant navy would, in a few years, be re-established in its former strength and the shipyards of Great Britain and Northern Ireland would once more be humming with activity.

The root of all the troubles of shipbuilding, as well as shipping, is that the Board of Trade is concerned with too many industries and interests, with the result that the President

can give only perfunctory attention to the needs of the maritime industries, which not only employ not far short of a million men, but constitute the first line of defence of the people who live in the British Isles, not to mention the people of the Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates, all in varying degree sea dependent. The fact is that Mr. Oliver Stanley, worried, like Martha, over many things, is inclined to regard the problems of sea transport as though they were in water-tight compartments—ships, shipbuilding and personnel; whereas they are so closely related as to be inseparable. There is a growing feeling that the cure for all the troubles lies, as Lord Lloyd has reiterated, in a policy of greater and more concentrated administration—the setting up of a Ministry of Marine, embracing, under a Cabinet Minister, everything connected with transport of passengers and goods by sea. The maritime industries are now more or less subject to several departments, and pre-eminently to the Board of Trade, the Home Office, and the Ministry of Health—a condition of chaos and not of order. It is time, in the opinion of many shipowners, foremost among them Sir Robert Burton Chadwick, with experience as shipowner and Minister, that a Ministry of Marine should be created, thus co-ordinating everything connected with the commercial sea interests of this country and of the whole Empire, and affording to them proper representation in the Cabinet and in Parliament.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

A STRAIGHT TALK TO AUSTRALIA

By L. ST. CLARE GRONDONA

WE have recently been treated to a homily by Mr. R. G. Menzies, Attorney-General in the Australian Federal Government, on the situation which has arisen out of the Statute of Westminster whereby the Dominions are all sovereign States with allegiance only to the Crown. While it appears that a species of genius attached to the endowing of the Dominions with complete political freedom, the fact remains—the Statute of Westminster notwithstanding—that most of the self-governing countries under the British Crown are still, and will long continue to be, dependent both economically and strategically upon Great Britain. This is certainly true of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

Canada's major dependence economically is, of course, on the United States, and, if she does not depend upon her powerful neighbour as well as upon the United Kingdom for her defence, why is it that she neither maintains her own navy (apart from a few survey ships) nor makes any contribution towards the upkeep of the Royal Navy?¹ In contrast, Australia, with only 60 per cent. of Canada's population, at least spends ten times more on defence than does the elder Dominion. And Australia's not inconsiderable navy would normally be placed under British Admiralty orders immediately on the outbreak of hostilities—as it was in 1914.

For all the constitutional independence of the Dominions, foreign countries know full well the quarter on which they in fact depend for their existence; and this does not make the task of Great Britain in maintaining friendly relations with foreign Powers any the easier. Because none of these latter can understand why Great Britain, paying the piper, does not call the tune.

¹ See postscript, p. 433.

The attitude of certain of the Dominions is very like that of the dog in the manger, and this is especially true of Australia, where a mere 7,000,000 people are holding up the proper development of a country rather larger than the United States. Whether Australia could ever support a population equivalent to that of the United States of America is purely an academic question at this stage. No one with any knowledge of this island continent would deny that it could support quadruple its present population; and so could New Zealand, which now has only 1,500,000 inhabitants. Indeed, Canada's 11,000,000 might at least be doubled without any great penetration into the far north. On the other hand, South Africa, with its 1,500,000 whites and 9,000,000 natives, has not much room to spare.

It is Australia, however, which must appear to the rest of the world as the most selfish of all countries. Geographically this vast island would seem to be the natural outlet for the surplus people of Eastern countries whose teeming hundreds of million inhabitants have no chance of achieving in their own lands those higher standards of living which contact with Western civilisation has made them aspire to. Nevertheless, Australia puts up a colour bar and says, in effect, 'none but white men admitted.' This would not be so bad if white men were, in fact, admitted in anything like the numbers requisite to the white Australians' establishing a moral right to maintain so exclusive a policy.

But what are the facts? So jealous are the Australians of the living standards they have succeeded in establishing that a majority of them regard every new arrival as a potential wage-cutter, and, in consequence, immigrants are frequently subjected to both social and economic ostracism. And any Government which essayed to encourage the immigration of Britons and Continentals on the scale which sheer common-sense demands would lose office at the next elections; and both Federal and State elections are held every three years.

I know there are hundreds of thousands of Australians who deplore this attitude of their compatriots, but the latter are in the majority, and the result is that more British-born people have left Australia than have gone there during the past seven years; and there is a public outcry every time a few hundred Italians or other Continentals arrive.

New Zealand's migration policy is similar to that of Australia, but, being a much smaller and relatively much more densely peopled country, it is a great deal less in the lime-light. Canada has, of course, admitted considerable numbers of Continental settlers, but there have been singularly few from Great Britain—or indeed from the Continent—of recent years.

There is no room for doubt that the antipathy on the part of Japan towards the British peoples which has recently been so noticeable is due in no small measure to the white Australian policy, which, in the estimation of the Japanese, is a sort of permanent insult. Furthermore, we may be tolerably sure that the frequent outbursts in the Australian Press against the immigration of Italians are widely publicised in Italy, where they cannot possibly engender other than enmity. It would be of little avail to inform the Italians that, under the Statute of Westminster, Australia's policy in regard to immigration is not Great Britain's business. One can almost hear the jeers, led by El Duce, with which such a statement would be greeted.

In the estimation of most people in Great Britain the White Australian policy is understood and sympathised with, but what is inexplicable is that the Australians, determined as they are to exclude Asiatics and coloured peoples, are not straining every nerve to build up their population at least from Great Britain, as well as from Continental countries. It should not be inferred from this that the people of Britain do not understand that foreign settlers—especially Southern Europeans—are difficult people to assimilate. They are clannish and band together to maintain their own social communities, and they are accustomed to, and are prepared to put up with, a much lower standard of living than that of the Australians. Italians and Greeks have in fact virtually monopolised the fruit and fish distributive trades in certain of the Australian States, and they have practically secured control of cane-sugar production in North Queensland. But these are all the better reasons why special facilities should be offered for the settlement of such people in areas where the first generation will not be brought into contact with the present-day Australians, the most perfervid of whom must surely now admit that only Southern Europeans (among white

people) are ever likely to settle permanently in large sections of the tropic north of the Commonwealth—areas which in their empty state are a constant menace to the territorial integrity of the country as a whole. That such a policy might lead to political trouble in the future is simply to choose the lesser of two evils. And a wise mixing of foreign immigrants in isolated areas, coupled with an insistence on English being taught in schools, would probably produce a new generation whose members in the aggregate would be far more loyal to the country of their common adoption than to any of the individual countries from among which their progenitors had migrated.

Far be it from this writer—who is an Australian—to discount the wonderful development which has been achieved in parts of this island continent by a population much smaller than that of Greater London. And we may all rest assured that it will never be forgotten that 460,000 Australians—every man a volunteer—sprang to arms in the common cause of Empire in the dark days of 1914-18. All I want to stress is that the present policy of Australia is doing so much to aggravate the 'have-not' countries that not only Australia but Great Britain may have to pay dearly for such folly.

That, like ourselves, the Australians may for the most part detest the political systems of certain foreign countries is beside the point. Hundreds of thousands of foreigners are anxious to get away from such countries, and the British Dominion which affords these people sanctuary can surely reasonably anticipate that they and their progeny will ever be its loyal and grateful citizens.

L. ST. CLARE GRONDONA.

P.S.—Since this was written Mr. Roosevelt has definitely vested Canada with the mantle of United States protection against aggression. This puts the Canadians in clover. One wonders if the already harassed Americans will now commence to compare their *per capita* defence expenditure with that of the Canadians.

L. ST. C. G.

THE MEDICAL CURRICULUM

By T. B. LAYTON, D.S.O., M.S.

THOSE that turn into a side street of the Borough of Marylebone to consult a specialist seldom realise that he is a teacher as well as a doctor, and that during his active life one-third of his time is given to instruction while he is attending to the sick. The subject of medical education is always before him, and there is an ill-defined and wonderful something called the 'Medical Curriculum' which he is constantly trying to improve and to bring up to date so as to keep it in touch with modern knowledge.

Sometimes the general public shares his interest, usually in the form of a demand for far-reaching alterations. Occasionally this interest coincides with some special discussion among medical educationists. This has recently happened owing to the debate on the Osteopaths Bill being followed by the publication of a Report of representatives of the three universities and other bodies for whose examinations the bulk of candidates make up the medical students of London.¹

The Medical Curriculum does not cover the whole of medical education. It is that period from the date when the student enters upon his or her 'medical studies proper, *i.e.*, anatomy and physiology' (30), until he or she has registered at the General Medical Council and is thus entitled to earn a living as a qualified medical practitioner. The education of a doctor includes also post-graduate education, which extends throughout his career, as well as the general education preparatory to an entry in the Medical Curriculum, and the continuation of this by self-education during the years spent in the latter (23). There are many who think that the standard of general education required for an entry to the medical profession should be raised, but this must not be interpreted

¹ Figures in brackets refer to paragraphs in that Report.

as a demand for the degrees of the older universities (22), nor for any screwing up of theoretical standards in the entrance examinations. Rather should it be meant as a desire for a wider culture and interest in life continued and developed throughout the career of the medical man or woman, and for the development of education as a whole so as to make 'the transition from one course of instruction to the next as little abrupt as possible' (18). Chemistry, physics and biology are known as the basic sciences which must precede the medical studies proper. As long ago as 1870 Huxley was urging that these should be taught in our 'ordinary and common schools,' that they 'ought to be got rid of, as branches of special medical education; they ought to be put back to an earlier stage, and made branches of general education.' They have been taken out of the Medical Curriculum, but we have not reached the time when all school boys and girls would devote 'a reasonable proportion of their time throughout the school period to the natural sciences' (27). In the meantime, we are in a stage of transition and are faced with making special arrangements pending their inclusion in that liberal general education of which we are to-day within a measurable distance.

At once arises a problem that meets us again at every stage of the student's career: the problem of knowledge for future use and knowledge for knowledge's sake. It should be possible to utilise the knowledge needed for practice to instil the general principles upon which that practice is based; and yet it is the most difficult thing in the world to do. Medicine is an art, not a science, and it is an art with a very definite object. 'What is the best that I can do for the patient that is before me under the conditions in which he is living and I am working?' That is the thought of every doctor when faced with a patient. It is that thought as a subconscious part of his mentality which makes him a 'clinician.' All other individuals, medical or lay—called by Hippocrates 'those standing by' (τοὺς παρόντες)—are working to this end. It may be in a laboratory or a department for special investigations, in a dispensary or an instrument-maker's shop, as a nurse, a masseur, a bath attendant or a shorthand-typist. Anyone whose work does not bear finally upon the treatment of the patient is out of place in the medical

world to-day. Why, then, should we not teach the students only such physics, chemistry, and biology as can be seen to have a direct bearing upon therapeutics? The answer is that, first, it will not work, and, secondly, the method is impracticable. Though medicine is an art, and not a science, it is nothing if not scientific. Treatment not based upon science is mere empiricism. We must therefore teach our students a scientific approach. But science is a sly jade, and if hunted is inclined to disappear and to be lost altogether. A more indirect approach is needed and some subjects to be included without direct bearing upon treatment. No medical man to-day will, for instance, make his decoctions from the leaves of herbs grown in his own garden, and yet botany remains, because it has many lessons to teach in physiology and its rising branch of genetics, and without it the student could not learn to think in terms of evolution. There are certain rigid materialists who would exclude it altogether, who would have the adolescents of both sexes taught their zoology by taking ticks and lice as their exemplars, and would replace the patient earthworm that Darwin studied by the round ones (Nematodes) that occasionally inhabit the human gut. Others feel that though the medical man and woman will have to listen to Nature in her strident notes, it is better to start the young with a knowledge of her softer modes. We have therefore to arrange a syllabus (Appendix A) which will enable the student to think scientifically without converting him into an expert chemist, physicist, or biologist (29). We may the more readily cut down these basic sciences to-day because biochemistry and biophysics have become a part of physiology (46, 47), and much must be repeated therein that used to be included in the preliminary courses.

And so we pass to the 'medical studies proper.' How long should they last? And when should they begin? It is probable that the less compulsion there is in these matters the better. There must be some irreducible minimum for the period of study, and there is general agreement that this should not be lengthened beyond the present five years (22). As to when it should start, it is better to defer this to the age of eighteen (30). Whether this should be made compulsory is another matter. There are those who would have it so. To the writer this would be wrong. Compulsion in anything

is bad where it can be avoided, and persuasion will have the desired effect with the majority. Compulsion would bear hard upon the boy or girl from the secondary schools. Some of the greatest members of our profession have come from these, and until secondary education at these is prolonged to the age of eighteen a compulsory regulation of this nature might exclude them. If it did so to one such student in ten years, it would more than neutralise any good that it might do by keeping out unsuitable material. In the early years of this century the curriculum could be begun at sixteen and be ended at twenty-one. It seldom was, but the compulsory regulation was reasonable, for it would have been absurd for the State to have allowed registration, with its attendant responsibilities, to those whom the law still considered as infants. Shortly after the war the Medical Curriculum was not lengthened, but was deferred for a year by the removal from it of the basic sciences, and it is to-day impossible to register as a doctor before the twenty-second birthday. To bring in the compulsory regulation under discussion would defer the possible date for a doctor to earn his living to the age of twenty-three. There are not many minds subtle enough to harmonise such a postponement of the curriculum with a resolution that its minimum length 'be not extended beyond the present period of five years' (22 and recommendations 1 and 2).

We may briefly consider the means used to decide when the student should proceed from one to another of his courses of study and how he should be finally absolved from them. It is a matter that has disturbed the minds of medical educationists over many years. The wisest of the writer's teachers and colleagues put it thus. He did not deny that there were many things to be said against examinations, but he felt that against none of the systems devised to replace them were there fewer criticisms than against their system. What seemed the truth in 1913 seems so to-day. So long, then, as examinations are necessary we must devise them so that they are episodes in a student's career, and not its end. The greatest difficulty is with the student himself. With an examination before him he will study or cram for it to the exclusion of all else, and once he has passed it he will pay no more attention to the subject unless he is to meet it again at

some subsequent examination. It is wrong ; but it is human, and it is a fact. Of recent years there have arisen a number of secondary examinations at intermediate stages between the main ones, and these latter have been allowed to be taken in parts. To cut the examinations down to two, to remove all accessory bits, and to compel the student to go in for the whole examination at once should be our aim for the future (33, 45, 49, 92). This should give a two years' clear run before the pre-clinical examination (54), and after this a further two and a half or three years before the final.

During these five years the student needs to see medicine steadily and to see it whole. This is a most difficult thing for him to do. His teachers are all in pigeon-holes, and there is a regular flutter in the dovecot if one so much as puts his head around the corner and peeps into that of his next-door neighbour. Each one struggles for the poor student's body and strives to implant upon his mind his own ideas that he feels are essential to salvation. How are we to make 'the transition from one course of instruction to the next as little abrupt as possible' (18)? This transition is of a double nature. In the pre-clinical period the student is occupied with the study of the normal human being—as to his structure in the form of anatomy and as to his functions in physiology. In the clinical period he is occupied with the study of the divergences of the human being from these normal structures and functions. In part he does so as a science called pathology, in part as the practical study to fit him for his life's work known as clinical medicine. There are two great switches in a student's career. The first is when he passes from thinking in terms of parts of the human body, such as the heart or lungs, to terms of theoretical diseases, such as inflammations, tumours or metabolic disturbances, and the second when he passes from these latter to dealing with a human being whose mind or body is not quite as it should be.

First, then, we must bring the human being into his career at the first possible moment. In the old days of apprenticeship he was faced with the patient from the very first day. We cannot go back to the apprenticeship system, but we have lost much with its passing, and must try to compensate for this. The teaching of anatomy needs to be more vital, with more time spent on the living subject by means of radio-

graphy or the study of movements—perhaps with the aid of cinematograph films—and less time spent in the cutting up of the human body, from which process the subject derived its name. There are those who urge that the students should no longer dissect the whole body (39). They are mostly physiologists and physicians. The anatomists and surgeons do not see their way to this. Perhaps the former should draw up a schedule of what they would leave out for the consideration of the latter. They would probably start with the muscles of the back and the articulations of the dorsal vertebræ, and would be brought up at once by the evidence recently given in the House of Lords on the Osteopaths Bill. Probably the situation is not so serious as it seems and is tending to solve itself. Members of conferences tend to be persons of middle age, each intent upon his or her own duties and to estimate the teaching in subjects other than their own by their memories of how it was taught them thirty or even forty years ago. Much of what is advocated is coming into existence in the schools that are up to date. Perhaps what is most needed is a book on Anatomy that is not a text-book. A text-book describes the whole body in detail as a work of reference. The student needs a book that covers the whole body, and which goes into detail in parts, while leaving others but sketchily surveyed.

But if anatomy is overloaded, physiology is still more so (46). Men and women all over the world are pouring out work monthly, all of which has to be digested and is passed on to the poor student. Teachers tend to tell of the old as well as the new—it is difficult not to do so. There is need for some great codifier of physiology, one who will make no single further discovery, but who will eliminate what is no longer needed from the knowledge of the past. He will probably thereby advance knowledge more than any researcher. Here again it is possible that things are not so bad as they may seem to one who has not been in close touch with the teaching of physiology for twenty years ; but there is certainly much to be done, and perhaps it best can be done by bringing the patient into the Physiology Department. 'The object to be aimed at is that the head of the Physiology Department should have access to patients or command the services of some member of the clinical staff to give appro-

priate demonstrations. It should be made clear that the student at this stage is not in this way to receive instruction in medicine, but in physiology. He should be shown patients, not as examples of disease, however typical, but as examples of deranged functions' (48). Probably, however, the greatest lightening of the student's burdens at this stage will come, not from any improved regulation of the General Medical Council or syllabus of the examining bodies, but by improved liaison work between departments, and the school in which this is working most smoothly will best combine that scientific outlook and practical application which is so necessary in the student's career. To attain this the Physiology Department is in a very important position. Through biochemistry and biophysics it needs to keep in touch with the Departments of Chemistry and Physics and through histology and neurology with the Anatomy Department. The elements of pathology and experimental pharmacology are closely allied to physiology (49, 51), while psychology is a branch of it (53 and Appendix C). As the liaison officer between the various departments of the medical school and the clinical staff of the hospital the position of the head of the Physiology Department cannot be over-estimated.

In the clinical period the student is working in the wards and out-patient departments of the hospital and is beginning to have some responsibility in the care of the sick. Again, there are two subjects, but the relation of one to the other is somewhat different from that of physiology to anatomy. There is clinical medicine, which in its widest sense includes surgery and all special departments, and there is pathology. Now pathology, as well as all the subjects that have gone before, is subservient to clinical medicine. It has arisen from it, and at the end of the last century could all be taught by the physicians and surgeons. A part of it, bacteriology that deals with the organisms that invade the body rather than with the body itself, arose directly from surgery and had already acquired a separate organisation; but since the turn of the century the whole subject has grown to gargantuan proportions and has become split up into numerous subsections each in the hands of professors or readers who spend none of their time in the treatment of the sick, and who possibly have never done so. How are we to teach pathology

in such a way that the student can go out into the world with a knowledge of the processes of disease upon which he can base his treatment and which will last him the rest of his life? It should be done from a strictly utilitarian standpoint. The student will have learnt science from his physiology and what has gone before it. He can continue to learn pathology as a science; but he must have the subject so put before him that it is at every stage taught him in direct application to his art. How to do this is a difficult matter. Rules and regulations can help but little—the spirit of the school in which he works and the personal influence of individual teachers will have the greater influence.

The development of special departments and of specialisms provides a difficulty in the teaching of clinical medicine. It is a process that is bound to continue. Limitations of activities have proceeded along two lines: where the limitation is anatomical, as in diseases of the eye or the skin, and where the limitation is pathological, as with tuberculosis, or therapeutical, as with light and ray treatment. Everyone agrees that the sub-division of the student's education must go no further, but the departments in which he works are tending to become more limited even when they retain the title of general. Whether anything can be done to counteract this tendency, especially on the surgical side, it is hard to say. On the medical side, the same tendency is beginning for one man to pay particular attention to one group of diseases even where the limitation has not as yet attained to the dignity—or the reverse—of a special department. And yet, as everything else splits up into smaller departments, there is the greater need for the general physician; and perhaps the education and development of these in an increased number is one of the most important things in medical education to-day. In the meantime, the student is encouraged to view clinical medicine as a whole by the width of outlook of the physicians and surgeons both on the general and special sides, by his working in more than one special department at the same time, and by the character of the examination that he must meet at the end of his three years. The standard of doctor that is still being turned out by the English and Scottish medical schools shows that, with all our anxieties with regard to his education and the curriculum, the results are good.

There is, however, one branch in the clinical period in which we are definitely deficient—that is, the subject of Preventive Medicine (75-79). In the past this has been looked upon chiefly as a matter of sewage farms and closets. The subject of Personal Hygiene (Appendix E, j-m) is still untaught in our medical schools. The teachers there are all concerned with getting the sick person well. There is no one whose life's business is that of keeping the well person fit. The student can only get this by joining the medical unit of the senior division of the Officers' Training Corps and learning it practically from the officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps attached. There is room for great changes in this matter; and perhaps the increasing influence of the London School of Hygiene will make itself felt in the near future, but in all probability some pressure from without upon the schools and universities will be necessary before any improvement is made.

And yet the subject offers a means of carrying out the aim of making the transition from one course to another as smooth as possible. It offers a bridge whereby the study of physiology can be brought over into the clinical period. It is, in effect, the application of the principles of physiology to everyday life. While agreeing that its importance must be 'realised by teachers throughout the whole curriculum' (75), something more is needed in the form of a special practical course which will leave the formal lectures to deal with these other matters in State medicine (Appendix E, a-h) that cannot so easily be dealt with practically.

But there is another bridge that should be built between the pre-clinical and clinical periods. This should be done by throwing pathology back into the former (51, 52). Much of pathology overlaps physiology. All that part which deals with the normal reactions of the body to irritation and to injury and the repair which ensues when the damage is not too great should be taught at the time when the student studies the normal processes of the body. It should be taught as pure science; the applications thereof will leap to the eye when the student starts to see inflammations and other forms of irritation, and if well taught it will give a foundation upon which the clinician can build more surely than he can at present.

We may sum up by saying that in the Medical Curriculum we want to teach the student science, and then to have a scientific outlook while he applies this to his art. That we have but five years in which to do it, and that in these years the student has still to grow physically and to develop mentally and morally. That the great difficulty is to decide, not what might with advantage be put in, but what may with safety be left out. Of course, no one pretends that the newly fledged doctor knows everything. His education extends throughout his life, partly by hard experience and partly by post-graduate study. Between the under-graduate and post-graduate stages there is another more fully developed in this country than in others owing to our elaborate system of higher degrees and diplomas. To this the term 'graduate' education might be applied, and it would be well if such a period could be made compulsory so that the young doctor could earn his or her living on a small scale under some senior as a guide and with some, but not full, responsibility (96).

There is one aspect of medicine kept for the last because it transcends all others. It is the mental aspect. It cannot be taught in the laboratory, and it may upset all laboratory teaching. It prevents any investigation upon animals, however valuable, being absolute in its application to man. It is a reason why miracles still happen; and it is also a factor in many of our tragedies. It is probable that our generation, brought up in modern scientific methods, is deficient in it in comparison with our predecessors. Physiology and pathology seemed to promise so much that we are only now realising their limitations. Psychology is but a part of it, but the early study of the processes of the mind should be instilled into the student (53 and Appendix C). It is almost entirely self-taught, not merely by observation of patients, but also by knowledge of the world. It was summed up for all time by the greatest of medical teachers:

Life is short, the Art long. Opportunity is fleeting, experience fallacious, and judgment difficult. One must be ready not only to do one's own duty, but also to secure the co-operation of the patient, of those who help, and of all external matters. (*Hippocrates, Aphorism 1.*)

T. B. LAYTON.

AN AMERICAN MISSION IN ARABIA

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

AMERICAN Christian missionary activities in Asia are as widespread as those of Britain: they labour under the same handicaps, suffer the same kind of criticism and, among those to whom they minister, enjoy the same reputation for altruism. Having had some opportunity, over a period of nearly twenty years, of observing at close quarters the work of the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church in America, which will next year celebrate the jubilee of its entry into Arab lands, I feel moved to record here something of its history, growth and achievement.

The first American pioneer in Moslem lands was James Cantine, of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church of New Brunswick: he was not the first in the field. Henry Martyn, an Englishman, a scholar and a saint, had visited Muscat in 1811 in connexion with his translation of the Bible into Arabic, and another of his countrymen, Ian Keith Falconer, had founded at Shaikh Oltman, near Aden, in 1885 the mission which bears his name, only to die in 1887 after less than a year's work in what is now the Aden Protectorate. Islam was then as intolerant of Christianity as at any time in the past, and the Arabs, in whose hands lay its principal shrines, stood aloof, isolated and suspicious, because they saw Islam everywhere at issue with Christian Powers, and almost everywhere losing ground.

Cantine went first to Beirut to study the language. In 1890 he went with Dr. Zwemer to Aden, and there met an English missionary, the aged Bishop Valpy Franck, who died in Muscat in May 1891. After a preliminary study of the vast region which they had set themselves to convert, they established themselves in Basrah (1892), in Bahrain (1893), and in Muscat (1894), and in 1895 in Amarah. That

they should have encountered opposition is not surprising: that they should have accomplished little in the first few decades was likewise to be expected. Progress in other than mechanical inventions is to be reckoned in terms, not of calendar years, but of generations.

In 1895 Dr. Worrall went to Basrah as a permanent medical worker: with him was his wife, also a physician. In 1897 they opened a school in Muscat for emancipated slaves, released by British men-of-war from slave-dhows; here they printed the first Arabic missionary leaflets. In 1902 medical work began at Bahrain in a permanent building, the Mason Memorial Hospital, adjoining existing boys' and girls' schools. Death took a heavy toll during these years, but men and women to replace those who had fallen were not lacking, and by 1906, when I first went to the Persian Gulf, the American Mission was already a well-established institution.

My chief, Lieut.-Colonel (later Sir Percy) Cox, as British Consul-General in South Persia and Political Resident in charge of the Arabian coast, knew Cantine and Zwemer personally, and respected them both. A good Arabic scholar, he recognised their erudition; a man of high principles, he admired the tenacity with which they preserved their own ideals. His subordinates at Muscat and Bahrain and at Kuwait, and his colleagues at Basrah, were encouraged to help American missionary activities when they could properly do so, and the Arab chiefs were not encouraged to complain of the subversive activities of men who then, as in Ephesus nearly 1900 years before, seemed bent upon disturbing popular beliefs.

In 1909 medical work was started in Matrah, not far from Muscat. In 1916 the great influenza epidemic smote Arabia and Persia. Ibn Saud, of Arabian monarchs the most enlightened, sent for an American doctor from Bahrain; the call was answered and proved to be the first of many. The inauguration of an air service from Basrah to India *via* Bahrain made further visits possible to the Pirate Coast, as the long coastline of Muscat and Hasa was long appropriately called.

The discovery by an American company of petroleum in Bahrain, and of artesian water, has now transformed the

island which for centuries had depended mainly on the pearl fisheries and a precarious entrepot trade with the mainland. It brought to the American Mission fresh opportunities and fresh responsibilities.

In 1910 medical work was started at Kuwait, thanks to the good offices of Shaikh Mubarak with the Shaikh Khazal of Mohammerah and the Naqib of Basrah, whose son, despaired of in Bombay hospitals, was cured of a tumour on the neck by Dr. Bennett. They had a long tussle with local prejudice, for Kuwait had maintained its independence of Turkey mainly by keeping all foreigners at a distance. A school followed in 1913 and later a permanent hospital.

When the Great War broke out Ibn Saud was near-by with his army, and sought medical aid, not in vain, from Dr. C. S. G. Mylrea, who is still (1938) stationed at Kuwait, where he occupies a unique position. In the following year Mubarak died, regretted by every European who knew him, and most of all by a younger man, not less great, whom he had befriended in adversity, Ibn Saud, to-day King of Saudi Arabia. War came to the gates of Kuwait, the hospital was full of wounded; its value and the absolutely disinterested service of the staff was recognised. The young Ahmad, who succeeded to the Shaikhship of Kuwait, was encouraged to learn what he could from Mr. and Mrs. Calverley, of the American Mission in Kuwait, and from Dr. Mylrea, and owes much to his tutors. In 1931 a church was built in Kuwait: the services are well attended, as also at Bahrain, but, owing to lack of funds, the educational work in Kuwait has lapsed, though it was beginning to bear fruit.

To turn to Basrah. When the British expeditionary force entered the town in November 1914 they found the American Lansing Memorial Hospital full of Turkish wounded: Dr. Van Ess and his wife were in charge of the mission; their wide knowledge of local affairs was greatly in request. The army wanted an elementary grammar of Iraqi Arabic; Dr. Van Ess produced one with scholarly precision and unscholarlike speed. It required a supplementary local vocabulary; that, too, was forthcoming, and it was followed by an advanced Arabic grammar which is still the standard text-book in Iraq. But war also brought typhus; Dr. and Mrs. Bennett caught it from Turkish

prisoners they had been nursing. Mrs. Bennett died, followed to her grave by a great company of British officers and men, including the writer.

After the war the Lansing Memorial Hospital was transferred to Amarah,¹ as the Maude Memorial Hospital, recently erected, met the needs of Basrah, but the mission school remained at Basrah and prospered, for, as in Beirut, in Persia and elsewhere, so in Basrah, the parents of a child, whether Moslem or Christian, who has passed through a mission school have no reason to regret their choice, and the Government have learned that such boys can be trusted when they grow to be men.

Such, very briefly, with many omissions, is the history of a mission which for fifty years has sought to make good Moslems better citizens in the hope that some among them, and they the best, will make the sacrifice, to them second only to that of life itself, and profess Christ. Its work is not to be measured in terms of converts made, in bodies cured, or children taught, still less in gallant lives spent, and sometimes prematurely ended, in regions which to outsiders seem, in Lord Curzon's words when he toured the Persian Gulf in 1902, 'so intrinsically abominable and vile.' There is room in the world, and there is need, both for the priest and the missionary, for the acolyte at the altar and the surgeon at the mission hospital, for the preacher in the market-place, and for 'the school marm' in the classroom. This I can testify—as I draw upon rich stores of memory of those regions—that the last thirty years have witnessed a complete change in the attitude of Arabs to other religions than their own.

The four short years of the life and teaching of Jesus, says Lecky in his *History of European Morals*, did more to soften and to moralise mankind than all the disquisitions of the philosophers.

Fifty years of Christian witness in Arabia, the Persian Gulf and Persia has profoundly modified the ethical outlook of Moslems. Exponents of Islam to-day tend to emphasise its points of approach to, rather than its differences from, Christianity. Their legislation tends to approximate to Western patterns in many ways. A country once exposed to Western ideas can never be the same as before. The new

¹ It is now engaged, with considerable success, in the treatment of leprosy.

foundations must embody Western as well as Eastern material if what is built thereon is to endure. Christian missions in general, and the American Mission in Arabia in particular, are doing much, but not a tithe of what should be done, to ensure that Arabs, to whom it falls to choose Western material with which to build, shall be enabled to distinguish between good and bad and between true and false. On their ability to do so depends their future. As in China and in Persia, in India and elsewhere, Anglo-American co-operation in the missionary field is to-day cordial and complete. The contribution to the welfare of the world that America is making in this sphere is unheralded and little regarded by statesmen or merchants, but I believe that it will endure when much else has perished.

The missionary, medical or evangelistic, ordained or lay, is content to sow and not to reap. For us all, wise and foolish, slave and free, there is one end, yet do our works live after us; if we have worked faithfully, then it is well, *Potestas Dei est, et tibi, Domine, misericordia.*

ARNOLD WILSON.

REFORM OF THE LAW

By CHARLES MUIR

DURING the last few months there has been published in *The Nineteenth Century* a series of admirable articles by learned Professors of Law on the subject of Law Reform. In nearly every one of these articles some phase of the present legal system has been mildly criticised, and slight reforms have been put forward in a still more temperate and leisurely way. Admittedly, reform involves some interference with vested interests, and to a professor living comfortably in the cloistered security of an ancient university this is unfortunate. But one hopes there may be further articles from practical lawyers in close touch with working-class people in industrial areas, who see dangerous situations arising from wholesale injustice, and who may be a little impatient at the attitude of these mild and leisured gentlemen.

Mr. Peter Scott, an extremely able and experienced social worker, writes on January 28, 1938, in the correspondence columns of *The Times*, of conditions in Wales in the following terms :

From one end of these areas to the other, the accepted standards are collapsing, the process of moral and social disintegration creeping in to take their place. The rot is insidious, widespread, and deep-rooted; its seriousness is such that nothing but the awakening of the national conscience to its existence, and then long years of reconstruction, can stop it.

Elsewhere in the same letter he says :

Authority, aware of what is happening, is often forced by the magnitude of the problem to close its eyes to the facts.

Speaking with a good deal of experience of a 'special area,' I would agree in every particular with Mr. Scott's description, and I know many other experienced men and

women who would do the same. I would add this further point. The demoralisation (which I think arises from a feeling of injustice) is contagious, particularly in times of acute depression, and it must be resisted at its points of infection if it is not to spread widely. Mr. Peter Scott's remedy is artificially arranged 'subsistence employment.' I venture to assert that that is only a temporary expedient, and that the real remedy is a greater measure of justice, which will create a feeling of confidence and security, and which will of itself combat the demoralisation and dishonesty. Working men have often said to me: 'Why should I be honest and upright, when rich people, assisted by barristers and solicitors, are being dishonest?'

I do not concede the truth of such propositions, but one must admit that the artificial and patchwork condition of our law and its administration does enable those who are accurately and skilfully advised to avoid hardships and to obtain great advantages over those who are uninformed. Whether what is needed is called social justice or legal justice is immaterial, so long as there is the same measure of justice for rich and poor, and in rich areas and poor areas. That is not so at present.

In the comparatively rich area where I live, and where nearly every householder is engaged in some form of directing industry (that is, he belongs to the governing class), rules apply which are quite different from those which apply in working-class districts. For example, men and women are paid according to the work they do, and they are free within wide limits to live their lives as they please, and to find happiness as they think best. These features not only form the basis of middle-class society, but they appear to most people socially just. In the working-class area where much of my work has lain in recent years these socially just conditions do not exist. Men and women are frequently getting more for doing nothing than they would be if working at their normal employment. This appears appallingly unfair to most self-respecting people, especially in working-class districts where manual labour involves not only great physical effort, but frequently entails substantial personal risk.

There is an anecdote going round the unemployment centre of which I am chairman which is called 'The Labour

Exchange Manager's Gratitude.' It is said to be true, although not occurring in the immediate locality. An unemployed man was overpaid a substantial amount. Being honest, he went to the local labour exchange manager and disclosed the overpayment. The manager was greatly impressed with the man's honesty, and told him that, as a reward, an attempt would be made to place him in work. The following week he was placed in a job at 10s. a week less than he got on the 'dole'!

I have been told of very many cases where men and women would be financially much better off on the 'dole' than when working. Quite recently an extremely upright woman asked me what her daughter (aged twenty) ought to do in the following circumstances. The daughter's nett wage (excluding reasonable expenses) brought her in half as much as her unemployment benefit. The hours of work were fifty per week, to which had to be added about twelve per week for travelling. The girl was not very strong, and the mother thought that the work was overtaxing her. There was no chance of other work. Would it be right for her daughter to go on the 'dole'? I explained the law to the woman, whose comment (with which I partially agree) was that the law is very unjust and favours slackers.

The domestic injustices are at least as numerous and as demoralising as those relating to employment. A priest, who works heroically in the area with which I am acquainted, recently said to me: 'I have just been going round a place which has been declared a clearance area and where all the houses are to be pulled down, telling my parishioners what is to happen. They ask how much compensation they will get, and when I say that I do not think they will get any, they cannot believe that British justice can allow such things.' He added that the more respectable the people, the more they felt the injustice. Another clergyman spoke of 'the crescendo of misery and unhappiness' which followed upon a similar scheme. The rich and complacent citizen may quote the lawyers' excuse, that hard cases make bad law; but the knowledge of these hard cases, whether they be few or many, spreads through working-class districts, increasing the feeling of injustice, of uncertainty, and of bitterness against the more fortunate to an extent which is known only

to those who actually go into these areas and have friends among the sufferers. As the 'inflation' in Germany (which dispossessed so many respectable people of their life's savings) must have contributed to the present unfortunate state of Europe, so the manifest injustices in Britain may contribute to difficulties in years to come unless some comprehensive measures of legal reform are undertaken.

In lecturing to working-class audiences on Justice, I find the sense of unfairness deeply imbedded, and I can find no explanation of injustices such as those I have outlined, other than the fact that the laws are made and administered by rich absentee officials who have neither the time nor the inclination to visit working-class areas and to ascertain the true state of affairs. I find it difficult to restrain my contempt for the highly placed lawyers who speak complacently of English justice as it is to-day.

The improvement of transport renders the need for an impartial and efficient system of justice still more imperative, because the population is tending to break up into one-class communities, each having its own political views and prejudices; and a system of justice is the only way to prevent one set of sectional interests and prejudices from overriding others and establishing class tyranny. In industrial districts where class hatred has existed for generations, this segregation of the population into classes is emphasising class distinctions and class opinions. The situation is not going to be solved by setting up a bureaucracy. As Mr. Peter Scott points out, the magnitude of the problem (and, I would add, the potential political power of the working classes) makes the average Government official turn a blind eye to these matters. After all, he is a servant of the public; he has to do what he is told by his chiefs, and he is not required or permitted to criticise legislation or administration.

When it comes to suggesting immediate and effective reforms it seems to be a paramount consideration that the average citizen should not regard the courts as punitive so much as protective. Also, the personnel of the tribunals should have the confidence of the local people, and should not be capable of being labelled 'rich' (*i.e.*, drawing huge salaries) or 'absentee' (*i.e.*, living out of the area). I am convinced that qualified lawyers and laymen who are not

paid particularly large salaries, and who are familiar with industrial and working-class conditions in the area where they administer justice, are far more likely to be able to renew the respect for English justice than is a £5000-a-year judge of assize, who lives in London and is both 'rich' and 'absentee' in the eyes of working-class folk.

Regional courts are therefore essential. Further, a uniform or 'planned' system of justice is highly desirable, so that all types of justice—civil, administrative, and penal—may be conducted in the same manner. Specialisation is of course necessary. No judge or group of judges can hope to be qualified and experienced in every branch of law and business.

Theoretically, the weakness of regional courts is the tendency of local judges to become connected with, or partial to, one section of the community in the area where they administer justice; but there are many ways of guarding against this known weakness—*e.g.*, by having a court composed of persons drawn from different sections of the community, and by providing an effective appeal system. Actually, there are local courts existing to-day which have to a marked degree the confidence of the working people.

The psychological effect of such a system of justice would, I believe, renew the feeling of confidence in justice which used to exist before the war, and lay the foundation for the reconstruction which Mr. Scott urges. Tinkering with the law to prevent this hardship or to correct that abuse only causes repercussions in other spheres of business or domestic life, and not infrequently causes greater hardships and abuses than those which the Legislature set out to cure. The need for confidence in the law and in legal administration is emphasised in the statement continually being made by experienced judges—namely, that justice must not only be done, but must also appear to be done. This is merely one way of pointing out the psychological importance of having an apparently just system of legal administration.

In the course of my experience in a 'special area' (lecturing to working-class audiences on Justice, being connected with several types of social work and being on some administrative tribunals) I hear of a great number of cases of alleged injustice, and I have over a number of years attempted to

collect data with a view to ascertaining the real causes of injustice. I have reached the definite conclusion that not more than one out of every five injustices is due to faulty laws. I believe that about three out of every five are due to inefficient procedure, under which heading I include: (a) Inexperienced or unqualified judges who fail to ascertain the true facts owing to lack of experience or skill; (b) expensive and complicated procedure which handicaps a litigant in presenting his case adequately to the court; (c) oppressive procedure—in particular, fear of cross-examination and damaging publicity, which frightens away from the courts many persons who have suffered grave injustice.

The fifth injustice in every five cases is, I believe, due to the human frailty of judges; their prejudices have been played upon by advocates or have been aroused by other circumstances, so that unconsciously (or it may be recklessly) the facts have been distorted to fit in with those prejudices. I am personally acquainted with many lawyers—including judges—who have an astonishing capacity for treating as irrelevant facts which do not fit in with their prejudices.

I venture to conclude by saying that legal reform is an urgent need to counteract the demoralisation which is deep-seated in many industrial areas and that in any scheme of reform the psychological element is a primary consideration. Moreover, the measures must be framed in the light of their probable effect on public confidence in the administration of justice. In the large industrial area where I reside there is to-day a very able and critical body of opinion (not always well informed nor free from strong prejudices) which cannot be ignored or treated as if it were of no account. It has no faith in rich absentee judges.

As regards actual injustice, the three causes which I have enumerated must be attacked separately. Reform of substantive law is, I think, the least pressing need. Reform of procedure and safeguards against the prejudiced judge are, I believe, the most pressing needs if confidence in the impartial administration of English justice is to be regained and the present-day demoralisation resisted.

CHARLES MUIR

WILD GAME AND PRESERVATION

By SIR THOMAS COMYN-PLATT

It is only within comparatively recent years that Governments throughout the world have turned their attention to the question of Wild Game Preservation. The United States, Africa, Canada, India, however, are to-day one and all keen preservationists, and the interest is spreading. As to whether animals that cannot be domesticated are worth preserving is a question I will not discuss here. But there is this much to be said, in opposition to the extinctionist, that wild life, placed on the lowest basis, has certainly a commercial value which should not be overlooked. After all, no game, then, sportsmen, guns, ammunition, licences disappear, all of which go to swell any Government exchequer. And there are many other advantages in preservation.

Under which heading, Material or Æsthetic, a national game reserve should be classed—such, for example, as that in South Africa—is a little difficult to say. There, in the Kruger Park where wild animals of every kind roam freely, shooting is prohibited entirely; the sportsman gives way to the tourist. The Government nevertheless scores financially, though ostensibly preservation is the one object in view. One might describe such places—and there are several—as natural ‘zoos,’ for the game moves about freely, can be seen, and multiplies undisturbed. This is the ideal of preservation.

The next best thing is a ‘reserve,’ which is far more common. Such areas are carefully watched; there are strict game laws and close seasons, and the sportsman is strictly limited as to his ‘kill.’ The reserve in Ceylon is a case in point. Here, again, the Government scores by reason of licences, the sale of munitions, etc., whilst at the same time wild life is carefully preserved. Preservation, therefore, is

one better than the 'quality of mercy': it is thrice blessed, for Government, game and sportsmen all benefit. Not to mention the native, who poaches where possible, and either feeds on or sells the result of his labour. It is well to bear in mind this side of the question because of the statement, so often made, that sportsmen alone are interested in game preservation. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

But however that may be, I approach the question here from an entirely different angle, for reserves, game regulations and the best supervision in the world are no certain guarantee against the ultimate extinction of wild life: national parks are really the only possible safeguard. And even here one may speculate as to how long the Kruger Park would remain if gold, or some other mineral, was found near-by. But sufficient for the day.

Meanwhile, those who are interested in the preservation of wild life may turn with much satisfaction and great hope to Malaya, where a national park is now in course of formation. Here is a lead that other British Dependencies might follow; the circumstances are worth recalling. Some few years ago the Sultans of Pahang, Kelantan and Trengganu, wishing to commemorate the Jubilee of the late King George V., approached the home Government as to how they might give still further proof of their loyalty and goodwill. In reply, a national park for the preservation of Malayan fauna was suggested and at once agreed to. Accordingly an area of close upon 2000 square miles was set aside for the purpose in a district where the territories of the three sultanates met. I have visited the spot, and a more ideal refuge for game it would be hard to find. To begin with, as scenery the country is magnificent. Fringed with a deep belt of forest, there are many rivers that have their source in the surrounding hills; broad valleys; deep glades, and, in the highlands, large open patches that produce a coarse growth particularly good for feeding. The animals therefore are, so to speak, held to the spot.

And then, too (and this is of the utmost importance) there are many salt 'licks'—in other words, saline springs, which are as necessary to big game as food itself. Add to these attractions the almost complete absence of native life, the difficulty of approach—for there are only a few

tracks at present—and it requires little imagination to realise that Nature herself is on the side of the animals.

Exactly what game—I mean number and species—is to be found here is hard to say, for, so far, only a few officials have penetrated the country at all. But, judging by outward appearances, there would seem to be everything to satisfy the convenience and taste of the most shy and fastidious animal. My views are the result of only a short stay in the district, but they are backed by officials and others who have seen and heard much.

Accompanied by the chief game warden, I visited the outskirts of the proposed park last year. By a canoe journey of nearly twelve hours we made our way, by a fairly broad river that twisted and turned by steep banks and shallows, always through dense forest and impenetrable undergrowth. There was little sign of life; a few small birds of the kingfisher kind flitted across the water, or an inquisitive monkey, with the noise of a splash, would drop to a lower bough the better to see what was passing. Sometimes a rising fish, not unlike a carp, rippled the surface in a series of rings, whilst, in the tree-tops, bees in myriads, like smudges on the clear sky, swarmed above their natural hives that hung like huge witch-balls from the dead boughs.

Towards sunset, rounding a bend of the stream, we approached a small wooden hut perched on a steep bank ahead. Here we stayed the night with the native watcher, as he is called, whose duty it is to keep toll of the game seen, clear and cut tracks and, as far as possible, prevent poaching. As, however, the area for which he is responsible is about half the size of Rutland, it is a difficult job. And if his hut, raised on posts and built by himself, is somewhat primitive, it is better than a tent which attracts everything that crawls and bites.

At present, sight-seeing in these parts is not easy. Given time and money, however, things could be very different. But at least one can visit a few 'salt licks' where the animals collect from far and near.

Always difficult to arrive at, the 'licks' are in the thickest forest and always in an open space, sufficiently large to prevent an animal being taken by surprise. A rock surface and a muddy pool are all that one sees at first sight. But if one

looks closer there is a small crevice from which the salt water trickles. It is easy to tell by the spoor the various animals that have been there—elephant, rhinoceros, sambur, seladang and deer are constant visitors. And, if one sits in the 'hide' and waits, the chances are that one and all will arrive towards sunset for an evening dose!

It is a wonderful sight. One knows when a large animal is approaching by the breaking of the low boughs: the wild dog gives a curious bark; the pig a deep snuffle. The deer, more cautious and timid, put their heads through the undergrowth the better to make sure that the coast is clear.

During a wait of two hours I saw deer, pig and elephant. But being particularly anxious to meet with a seladang—the Malayan buffalo—I decided to visit a 'lick' another day's journey up river where the watcher reported two or three had lately been seen. The trouble was that in the upper reaches there were many rapids and the water was low. As the rowers, however, know every rock and shallow and the native canoes are as impervious as indiarubber, there was every chance that all would be well. Anyhow, at daybreak the next morning we started off.

For the first few hours we paddled along with ease, still with dense jungle on either side. By degrees, however, the current became stronger, paddling more difficult, until at last a number of half-submerged boulders barred our way. By the noise of the water, the many swirls and patches of foam, it was evident that we were near the first rapid. And a few minutes later we were out on the bank with the men above their waists in water, stumbling, shouting and falling as they dragged the canoe against the strong current. Round and over the huge rocks they struggled their way for the best part of an hour, until at last the canoe was in slack water again. Why it was not broken to bits and the men all drowned is a mystery. Such things do happen, but not often. The explanation is that they know every yard of the river and are past masters at their work. Passing two more rapids—always with the same struggle—we eventually reached the watcher's hut, and at daybreak started off for the 'lick' where we hoped to find the seladang.

It was a long walk, but the watcher had kept the way clear, filled in the swamps, and made a rough bridge

wherever a tree had fallen across a stream. More than that, he had cut new paths to connect up with existing tracks and other 'licks,' which must be easily accessible if the game is to be watched. As all roads lead to Rome, so all tracks lead to water, for where that is found game is sure to collect.

As we made our way through a tunnel of trees, every now and then some animal, scared at our approach, would move off to safer cover. One could see nothing; one could only judge the size of the animal by the snapping of twigs or the breaking of boughs. But the watcher knew and could tell you exactly whether it was a deer, a wild dog, or an elephant that was hurrying away. And so it happened, for on hearing a particularly loud crash he suddenly stopped, put his hand to his mouth and whispered 'Seladang.' Very cautiously we moved on, looking for a gap that might give us a clear sight, when I noticed that the path ahead was blocked. Thinking it was merely a sharp turn, I walked on. But the obstacle, whatever it was, puzzled me the nearer I approached it. To add to the mystery the trees shut out most of the light. All I could see was what appeared to be a huge boulder, several feet high and half as broad, with a grey patch in the centre and a sort of crescent on top. There was no movement, and not a sound.

It was all very odd, and, turning round, I saw the watcher lying on his back, beckoning to me to do the same. But curiosity got the better of me: I should see nothing if I lay down. So very slowly I walked on. And now the weird obstacle was scarcely twenty yards away—still immovable, still a puzzle. For at least five minutes I stood and watched, when suddenly something twitched, just below the crescent, a reddish leaf, so it appeared, was thrust out of the grey patch, and the obstacle began to move. Then I realised that what I had been looking at was the head and shoulders of an enormous animal—a seladang. Hoping that it would turn and give me a full-length view, I stepped slowly forward, when with a loud bellow it wheeled round and crashed away through the thick undergrowth.

One is always apt to magnify the size of the animals one hunts, particularly those that get away! But it was certainly a seladang, and far bigger than any buffalo I had ever set eyes upon. What I took for a crescent were its horns; the

grey patch its muzzle; the reddish leaf its tongue. The watcher—they are always out to please—said that it was one of the biggest seladangs he had ever seen, and that the spread of the horns was at least five feet! I doubt that. But certainly to my unaccustomed eye it appeared a mammoth.

One is told that the seladang, rarely seen, has reached extinction point. But I am not so certain. Difficult of approach, very shy, he is the hermit of beasts. For this reason I am inclined to think that there are many more in Malaya than one is led to believe. Add to this that it has no commercial value, why should it not be holding its own in the animal world?

The rhinoceros, on the other hand, is a very different proposition; for its horn, if weighed against dollars, is more precious than silver to the Chinaman, who firmly believes that, ground down and mixed with certain ingredients, it is a medicine that ensures health, strength and happiness! No wonder the animal is in demand and hunted wherever found! His one chance, therefore, of avoiding ultimate extinction is retreat into a sanctuary, such as a national park. The question is, will he live to arrive there? It is to be hoped so, otherwise he will soon follow the 'dodo' and be seen no more. And this is not the only animal on the danger list by any means.

Briefly stated, the race to-day is between man and beast. Unfortunately, preservation is a plant of slow and difficult growth; commercialism, on the other hand, runs wild. Still, I am prepared to back the beast if only he is given a fair chance. And herein lies the advantage of national parks, not only in Malaya, but wherever wild life exists.

It is an interesting fact, though little realised, that very slowly but very surely the camera is outwitting the gun: the urge to kill is subsiding; trophies are at a discount. To see animals in their natural surroundings, study their habits and take photographs as well, and all this at a saving of time, trouble and expense, is to appreciate wild life from the very best standpoint. And let no one imagine that this new orientation of sport eliminates danger. Rather the reverse, for to track an elephant or tiger with only a camera requires an unusually iron nerve. I do not suggest that the photographer-sportsman starts off without a gun, but I do

say that he never uses it except in cases of emergency. For instance, I have met a much daring photographer who approached to within ten yards of a rogue elephant: the animal turned on him, was photographed as it charged, but was shot within ten yards of the camera.

I believe that in time the near approach, not the deadly aim, will be the sportsman's object. Meanwhile, unless wild life is preserved, the day will come when there will be nothing left either to see or shoot. Preservation, therefore, is the immediate necessity, and the national park, as in Malaya, meets the case. It has been suggested that it should be run on some such lines as the Kruger Park. But I doubt whether that will be possible for many years to come. In the first place, it is very inaccessible, being forty-eight hours by rail and canoe from the nearest port of call—Singapore; in the second place, there are few large open spaces; and, lastly, when the rivers are in flood one might be held up for days.

Time may obviate all these drawbacks. For the present, however, one can only look upon the gift of the three Sultans as an ideal sanctuary where wild life can be left to live and thrive undisturbed; it is for Government to see that this is done. To watch and ward 2000 square miles, however, is no easy matter. But, from what I know of those in authority, everything possible will be done in this direction, and I believe with success. The pace may be slow, but nothing moves quickly east of Suez. Indeed, to hurry things is merely to invite trouble. The all-important factor is to convince the native—not only in Malaya, but in other countries—that game preservation, generally, is to his advantage. Once that is thoroughly realised, game regulations will be respected. Nevertheless, a national park is the goal to be aimed at if the fauna of the world is to be saved from destruction at the hands of man.

T. COMYN-PLATT.

EARLY VICTORIAN MEMORIES

By MRS. LIVEING

THE Victorian age has now passed into history. Few are now living who can recall its earlier and middle years, and the memories of one born in the hungry 'forties give us a glimpse of that past which, though it lives for many of us in the novels of Jane Austen and Anthony Trollope, has in its social conditions more affinity with those of 'Sybil.'

Frances Harriet Torlesse (she died only recently) was born in 1839, the youngest of the eleven children of the Rev. Charles Martin Torlesse, for fifty-eight years curate and vicar of Stoke by Nayland in the county of Suffolk, and of Catherine Gurney Wakefield, his wife—a remarkable couple, far in advance of their time. They—for Mrs. Torlesse was the leading spirit—ruled their parish with authority, striving with heart and soul to lift the agricultural labourer, earning starvation wages, ground down by the game laws, the workhouse for his old age, from his state of practical serfdom to conditions more approaching those of civilised life. At home they could do but little; the work was heartbreaking, for the unconscious tyranny of landowners and farmers was part of the accepted order of things, not to be questioned; but what could be done they did, and with fearless courage. Their daughter's recollections give a vivid picture of life in a scattered country parish in the 'thirties and 'forties, in the days before the repeal of the Corn Laws, the days when 'A wet harvest and a bloody war' was the favourite toast at the rent dinners, and when the vicar could expect to be tarred and feathered for his obstinate advocacy of their repeal—in the view of the farmers a most unnecessary and pernicious reform. When in 1850 the news of Sir Robert Peel's death reached the neighbouring village, the churchwarden, owner of a large flour mill, ordered

the church bells to be rung in rejoicing at the death of an enemy.

Sheep stealing was a common offence, punished, if not with death, with transportation. Commons were being enclosed apace. Rick burning, as an act of retaliation, began as soon as the harvest was gathered in, and night by night the horizon was lit by the 'Swing fires,' supposed to have been started by an imaginary 'Captain Swing.' The tower of Stoke Church dominated the surrounding country, and night after night the family would climb to its top to watch the fires burning in all directions.

Wages were 9s. a week, with additions at haysel and harvest. The boys left school at eight years old for bird scaring, by which they could earn 6d. a week. The girls were left untaught. In looking through the church registers of that date, while a few men could sign their names, no woman could do more than make a cross. Both women and girls worked at stone picking, and a woman with a good-sized family could glean enough corn to last from harvest to Christmas. But even with such additions to his income, the Suffolk agricultural labourer in the early days of the century was practically a pauper throughout his life.

Life at the vicarage was austere enough.

The chief impressions of my childhood [Fanny Torlesse writes] are those of poverty, and of having to be extremely careful about food. Milk was a rare commodity. There were no dairy farms in the parish, and milk for the household must be fetched from two, sometimes three farmers who only kept one cow each. Butter was equally scarce. Only the elders were allowed fresh butter. Bread was baked once a week, but was not eaten till the week following, but in spite of its age it was not stale, as might have been expected. The cottagers eked out their scanty food with turnips. To pick a turnip in a field was not looked upon as theft, and turnips consequently formed a large part of the labourers' diet.

The general poverty of the time was increased tenfold by the Irish famine of 1845, caused by the failure of the potato crop. Few people realise that its death roll was over a million lives. Wheaten bread was not touched by the vicarage household that winter, for though wheat flour could be had in England, Mr. and Mrs. Torlesse saved every possible expense to help the starving people. Bread was made from a mixture of maize flour and carrots, and was not unpalatable.

The game laws were perhaps the deepest source of oppression to the half-starved labourer. None but a land-owner and those allowed by him might kill ground game. To quote Fanny Torlesse :

We might watch the pheasants walking in our garden, and quietly eating our vegetables, but we dared not even turn them out. I once counted seventy hares in a field of springing wheat, carefully picking out the main shoots and eating them. They would come into the cottage gardens and eat what they liked without any fear, for no one was allowed to keep a dog. One family lived in an out of the way cottage in a remote part of the parish. In a very hard winter, the father snared and killed a hare in his garden. For this crime he was tried at the magistrates' bench, and sentenced to a month's imprisonment with hard labour. This meant the treadmill. When he returned home his health was hopelessly broken, and he died shortly after from pneumonia brought on by exposure, leaving a wife and seven young children as a charge on the rates.

Life in a remote village of the eastern counties would not appear at first glance to offer much scope for excitement. But Charles and Catherine Torlesse were immersed, not only in their parish activities, but in the larger interests of the time, and their children were brought up with a wider horizon before their eyes than ordinary village life could give. To begin with, there was the atmosphere of romance. Catherine Torlesse's brother was Edward Gibbon Wakefield, the pioneer of emigration. He was a widower with two children when he startled all England, and prejudiced his subsequent eminent career, by his famous elopement and Gretna Green marriage with Miss Turner, heiress and ward in Chancery. This extraordinary escapade caused a sensation throughout the country, and his trial and sentence of three years' imprisonment in Newgate was the not unnatural result. It should be made clear that Mr. and Mrs. Torlesse would have been horrified at the thought of this irresponsible action, undertaken for a bet, being looked on as romantic, which in fact it was not. They were shocked to the very depth of their being. Very properly they looked upon Wakefield as a black sheep. 'No words,' says their daughter, 'can describe the grief caused to them by his conduct, and by the social stigma attached to his name.' But their house was always open to him, and Catherine Torlesse cared for his motherless children as though they had been her own.

Newgate turned Edward Gibbon Wakefield out in 1830 a chastened and reformed character. He retrieved his past incredible folly, though he could never play the part in public life which his outstanding ability and far-sighted vision must otherwise have gained him. But during his three years' imprisonment he studied, and studied profoundly, the then barbarous convict system. He wrote a book on *Punishment by Death*, which went far to repeal the shocking laws which condemned even young children to capital punishment. He denounced the system of planting our colonies with criminals, and, deeply impressed with the futility of such methods, he evolved, and helped to put in practice, the far-seeing system of free colonies known by his name as the Wakefield theory.

This had a far-reaching effect on the remote country parish. The villagers of Stoke became the pioneers of nineteenth-century emigration. Catherine Torlesse threw herself heart and soul into her brother's projects. She shared his vision of the agricultural labourer, in serfdom at home, the hated workhouse the only shelter for his old age, as a respected and prosperous citizen in a free and untrammelled land. Emigration became the ruling passion of her life. She sent out her sons together with the flower of the parish. Christchurch, New Zealand, is peopled with the descendants of Stoke families; and who with any knowledge of the present colony would say that her dreams were not fulfilled?

In 1841 the first three ships left Gravesend to form the colony of Nelson, New Zealand, and Charles Torlesse, Catherine's eldest son, led the first party of emigrants from Stoke. His father preached to the assembled passengers and crews before they set sail, taking as his text 1 Peter iii. 13 : 'And who is he that will harm you, if ye be followers of that which is good?' A rough copy of that sermon is in the archives of the colony to-day.

On looking back [says Fanny Torlesse] it seems to me that the pivot on which my mother's life turned, was waiting for the mail. It is impossible to realise now what separation meant in those early days of colonisation. There was no certainty whatever when letters would arrive. They were sent by whalers, or returning emigrant ships, and sometimes a whole year would elapse without news. I have often thought that the peace and happiness of the last twelve months of her life were induced by the fact that her beloved sons had passed from this

world, and were nearer to her in the unseen than when she was constantly picturing their trials and illnesses in the Antipodes.

To us [she continues] the effect of emigration meant a constant outlook to the other ends of the world. Our life was coloured by it. One of my occupations as a very small child was to collect acorns, chestnuts, beechmast and other seeds for planting in New Zealand. Such collections took the place of toys. I cannot remember having any. As a rule the farmers resented the efforts made to send their best labourers, for my parents were determined that those who were to found a new country should be of the best quality. Never could they be persuaded to give a young ne'er do weel a last chance.

First the excitement of the elopement, with Newgate to follow, then murder and avenging dreams. The Red Barn murder in the adjoining parish was as famous as the Wakefield elopement. Maria Marten, a labourer's daughter, disappeared. No trace of her could be found, but night after night her mother dreamed that she had been murdered, and that her body lay beneath the flooring of the Red Barn near by. When this dream had persisted for many months, the farmer who owned the barn decided to clear the matter up. The mother pointed out the place, and the planks were removed. There lay the body of the girl. It was known that she had had a lover, a man named Corder. The crime was traced to him and he was hanged. The circumstances connected with the murder took hold of the public imagination, and it is not yet forgotten. The melodrama of the Red Barn Murder still tours the provinces, and when I was recently in the village of Polstead, a labourer took pains to show me how well the Red Barn could be seen from his cottage. Fanny Torlesse remembers how the church clerk told her father that he was working at the time in the field close by, and could not understand why ravens, unknown in those parts, should hover near the barn. She adds that he was a veracious man, and was certain that he saw three at a time!

Travel in the early days of the century was of course by coach, and as Stoke lay on the main road between Norwich and London, the arrival and return of the daily coach, as it swept through the village, was a never-failing excitement. In course of time the railway was brought as far as Colchester, and in 1851 the whole family travelled to London in open trucks to see the Great Exhibition—a marvellous event in their lives. The advent of the railway, far from bringing

Stoke nearer to the great world, added to its isolation, for the coaches no longer ran, the station was seven miles away, and the village, now far from the stream of life, was more and more left to its own resources.

Emigration, absorbing though it might be, formed only one of many activities. Charles and Catherine Torlesse could not alter the oppressive laws; they could get little sympathy from their better-class parishioners whom those laws benefited, and who complained with some reason that by emigration the parish was denuded of its best workers. But they could teach their people, and teach they did. The only school in the parish for the labourers' sons was kept by old Master Grimsey. He taught reading, writing and arithmetic, but as the boys mostly left when they were eight years old, the education could be of only the most elementary character. Catherine Torlesse made up her mind that there should be a school for girls. She faced the recalcitrant farmers' wives, who argued that if the 'mawthers' were taught to read and write they would never do their work, and with infinite difficulty and chiefly by means of a bazaar—unheard-of event in Stoke, but successful—she raised the money, the school was built, and the girls were taught reading, writing, the elements of arithmetic and the Catechism. The afternoons were given up to needlework, which was so beautiful that the school was able in great measure to support itself by the sale of trousseaux and layettes. Fine needlework had always been practised. No self-respecting mother would have her daughter's trousseau made except by hand. The labourers' smocks, with all their variety of intricate stitches, were works of art. Education difficulties were finally ended by the generosity of the squire, who built good schools for boys and girls. The vicar and his wife continued to teach in them, and Mr. Torlesse's lessons would be remembered by all who heard them, for he was a born teacher, and would make any subject interesting. The teaching of religion was of the first importance. Every Friday afternoon was given up to the hearing of lessons learnt during the week, and no child left school without a definite knowledge of both Bible and Prayer Book. With the Education Act of 1870 religious teaching could only be given before or after the register was marked. Mr. Torlesse, then an old man, was in the schools daily at

nine o'clock to give or superintend the scripture lesson, and not till he was eighty-four did he give up this self-imposed duty.

Music had always been a passion with him. He taught the schoolchildren on the tonic-sol-fa system with no aid but a tuning-fork, but they learned to sing accurately in four parts, and sometimes even eight. Suffolk is not a musical county, and such results were an achievement. Fanny Torlesse remembers the days when one servant at least at the vicarage must be able to sing. When all three maids were musical, it was something of a trial to Mrs. Torlesse, who had no love for music, and doubted the wisdom of spending so much time and energy on it. But the vicar had no doubts. He looked on music as a means for uplifting and influencing the whole of village life, and Stoke was the first village in England to hold a choral festival. From that time onwards, diocesan choral festivals were an annual event, and the choir would drive twenty miles or more in a springless waggon starting at five in the morning to take part in them.

By emigration, Charles and Catherine Torlesse gave new life and hope to those of their parishioners who would, they thought, be worthy of it, but they were equally desirous of saving those who could not leave the village, from an old age spent in the dreaded workhouse, an only too common lot. Catherine Torlesse had spent her girlhood with her grandmother, Priscilla Wakefield, the foundress of Frugality Banks, and knew that thrift could be practised under the most unpromising circumstances. She inspired her husband, and with the help of friends in the neighbourhood, the Stoke and Melford Benefit Society was founded in the year 1828, which by means of quarterly contributions ensured for its members payment in sickness and at death. The special feature of the club was that these payments carried with them an annuity at the age of sixty-five, thus anticipating old-age pensions. The society took firm root and spread over the county, and its annual feast became one of the events of the neighbourhood. Each village displayed its own banner, and the members marched in procession to the church, headed by a brass band, to have a service of thanksgiving, followed by a public dinner and speeches. The society has stood both the test of years and the strain of the annuities, and still flourishes.

Fanny Torlesse has vivid memories of the fashions. Petticoats were worn in abundance, flannel ones being a necessity. In 1859 she was one of twelve bridesmaids to a friend who was married in Westminster Abbey. She wore seven petticoats. First the flannel one; then one of moreen; thirdly, the crinoline made of steel hoops. Over it came a white embroidered longcloth petticoat reaching to the ankles; then a white silk one long to the ground, and over this two muslin petticoats exactly the length of the dress. Lastly came the actual dress of white tarlatan trimmed with bands of mauve ribbon down the front of the dress and round the skirt. The bridesmaids wore large sprays of white and purple lilac on their heads, with tulle veils reaching to the ground.

The muslin petticoats, Fanny Torlesse looked on as the bane of her girlhood, for she had to be her own laundry-maid. A full-dress muslin petticoat took seven widths of material, and to iron a starched skirt of such a circumference was a very serious matter.

The grand old church, built by the wealthy wool staplers of the fourteenth century, was the scene of many unfading memories. The pews were high and lined with green baize. They lent themselves to various quiet amusements during service, and the mouseholes in the corners were a great source of interest and pleasure. The pews were appropriated to the different families, and were looked on as private property. Naturally that of the squire was the most impressive. It had a large table in the middle in addition to a fireplace. When the squire thought that the sermon had lasted long enough, he poked the fire; if this hint were not sufficient, he rattled the door handle. 'Twenty minutes is long enough for one gentleman to keep another' was his verdict on the length of the sermons. The rest of the congregation did not consider that they had received full value if the sermon was under three-quarters of an hour. Two 'Questmen' walked up and down the aisles during the sermon, carrying long wands with which to wake the sleepers. At first the singing was led by a small band, consisting of flute, violin and 'cello, the pitch being set by the clerk with a tuning-fork. Readers of Hardy's novels will remember the description of the village choir in *Far from the Madding Crowd*. Later the band was replaced by an organ, with the daughters

of the vicarage as organists. The hymns used were metrical versions of the Psalms by Brady and Tate. The sole lights were the candles in the pulpit, and there was no heating except in the squire's pew. The schoolchildren sat together, and as the squire and his lady proceeded up the aisle, they all stood up and curtsied. Anna Bridges, a cousin, who was once placed in charge of them (a rash proceeding, for she had radical proclivities), was so shocked at this truckling to feudalism that she ordered the astounded children to sit down. Needless to say, she was severely reprimanded, for Mrs. Torlesse, though she had little love for the squirearchy as such, could not countenance such open rebellion against the higher powers.

The worth of the spiritual, educational, and constructive social work carried out by the country clergy and their families during those days of Evangelicalism at its best and highest has not, I think, been appreciated as it deserves to be. Charles and Catherine Torlesse did not stand alone, although they and their children were among the most remarkable of their contemporaries. It was they and their like who redeemed village life all over England from the degradation and squalor into which it had sunk, who were the forerunners of Kingsley and Maurice, and the pioneers of the clubs, the women's institutes, and the many social amenities which have made the dreariness of country life a century ago a thing of the past.

Their lives were not lived in vain. Though their names are for the most part forgotten, their self-sacrificing labours have left ineffaceable marks for good upon the happier rural conditions of to-day. Their work, or the fruit of their work, remains, and their memories shine out brightly amidst the ignorance and gloom of social life in that early Victorian age.

SUSAN LIVEING.

ANCIENT ESSAYS IN CALENDAR-MAKING

By C. E. DOUGLAS

ABOUT 10,000,000 people, in England alone, possess copies of the Book of Common Prayer. I wonder how many of them have read (much less attempted to understand) the little treatise on calendar-making entitled 'How to find Easter Day' which it contains! As long as Christendom keeps a moveable Easter the directions there given are of great practical importance, but we are for the most part as content to leave 'the unveiling of the mystery' to the 'wise' as were the citizens of Babylon and Jerusalem in ancient times. But, though of no interest to the uninitiate, the Church's 'Tables and Rules for the moveable and immovable feasts' have historical as well as practical importance. For they enshrine the last survivor of ancient essays in calendar-making in the days when accurate observance of a succession of fasts and feasts was an essential condition of the social contract governing both individual and nation.

The problem which the calendar-makers had to solve was not an easy one—namely, to bring into a single mathematical system the three natural units for measuring time—day, month, and year. These are incommensurable. Approximately¹ there are $365\frac{1}{4}$ days in the solar year and $354\frac{1}{3}$ in the lunar. That is to say, if we start reckoning from a date when the moon is new on the first day of the solar year, there will be what is called an epact of eleven days between the lunar and solar 'New Year's Day' at the end of twelve months. After another twelve the epact will be twenty-two days and so on. This difficulty the calendar-makers easily overcame

¹ 'Approximately' must be applied to all astronomical calculations. The ancients were as sufficiently accurate for their purpose as the modern astronomer, to whom an error of a few thousand million light-years in the distances of the nebulae is of no importance.

by the method followed in 'How to find Easter Day.' When the epact became inconveniently long² they shortened it arbitrarily by adding a thirteenth month to the lunar year.

To the worshipper it did not matter that the New Year's Day which he kept was not astronomically day 12 of the first month. His only interest in that detail of the calendar lay in properly discharging the ceremonial duties attaching to the epact of eleven days. During that interval the gods sat each year in judgment to 'fix the fates' of heaven and earth—to audit the spiritual accounts of the city, so to speak. At the end of it, if the balance was on the right side, they renewed the city's 'covenant with sacrifice,' and a new leaf was turned over for the year that followed. But to the astronomers any calendar was valueless in which the year had a variable number of days. Without fixed superior units for measuring time neither record nor calculation covering any considerable period was possible. They were compelled, therefore, to invent some sort of a calendar in which neither month nor year varied in length. Since the arithmetical notation in use was inadequate for working out calculations involving fractions, the standard 'month' and 'year' had to be divisible into an exact number of days. By means of the principle of the epact results arrived at in these arbitrary units could always be easily converted into terms of the secular calendar.

The best known of these theoretical calendars is that which was adopted by the Egyptians and others, including the Greeks of Hesiod's time, and which, in a debased form, is still in use. Here the year contains 365 days, the extra one-fourth of a day being allowed for by an epact of one day every fourth (leap) year. The month is standardised as thirty days, divided into three 'weeks' of ten days each, so that the annual epact is reduced to five days. Using this calendar the astronomer could calculate without difficulty in days, months, and years. By adding five days for each twelve months and an extra day for every forty-eight, he was able to keep the secular and the scientific calendars in harmony. The process was a little clumsy, but that was due, as already noted, to the

² Which it does three times in every eight years. Later observation led to the adoption of the more accurate cycle of seven intercalations in nineteen years, at the end of which (except for a difference of two hours) the relative positions of sun and moon are as at the beginning.

fact that he could only take account of fractions of a day by means of the epact.

Two simpler and better theoretical calendars are indicated in the curious (and hitherto unexplained) use of the principle of the epact in the apocalyptic miscellany attributed to the prophet Daniel. The author is adapting an Assyrian tradition³ (Dan. x. 4) to 'the number of the years, whereby the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah the prophet, that he would accomplish seventy years in the desolation of Jerusalem' (Dan. ix. 2). He assumes an apocalyptic week the 'days' of which are each ten years. The six days of labour (sixty years) have come to an end and the world is waiting for its Sabbath. But to those who 'understood by books'—i.e., to the instructed students of the heavens—the term Year was capable of more than one interpretation. Just as between the year of the lunar festivals and the true New Year's Day of the annual renewal there was an epact during which the King of Misrule reigned, so now. It was with the length of the epact, of the time of the great tribulation, that the prophet was concerned.

Daniel gives two answers to the inquiry addressed by the Two Witnesses to the One in the midst—'How long shall it be to the end?' (Dan. xii. 6).

(i.) 'From the time that the daily sacrifice shall be taken away and the abomination that maketh desolate set up there shall be 1290 days' (xii. 11).

(ii.) 'Blessed is he that waiteth and cometh to the 1335 days' (xii. 12).

Sixty solar years = 21,915 days. If we deduct the two variants of the epact (1290 days and 1335 days), we obtain for the comparable shorter period either 20,580 days, i.e., 60×343 (7^3) days, or 21,870 days, i.e., 30×729 (9^3) days. The numbers are much too large for it to be a mere coincidence that Daniel's two apocalyptic epacts are the difference between the lengths of solar years and theoretical 'years' 'stylised' in powers of 7 and of 9 respectively. For in ancient times the decimal system had no monopoly in the science of arithmetic. The abacus, on which instrument (owing to the lack of adequate written notation) all sums had to be worked out, could

³ In the original (i.e., pre-Babylonian) calendar of Assyria there was no intercalated month (Sidney Smith, *Early History of Assyria*, p. 115).

be constructed with any number of beads in a row. To the astronomer, moreover, either 7 or 9 was a more convenient basis of calculation than 10. The two 'stylised' years indicated by Daniel's epacts are, in fact, only modifications of the lunar and solar years in which the month is fixed—in the one case as containing twenty-eight days (quarter-month, seven days) and in the other as containing twenty-seven days (with a 'week' of nine days instead of the ten days of the zodiacal calendar).

The week of nine days is found among many races and had a place in the Celtic calendar (Hastings, *Dict. of Religion and Ethics*, III. 82a), possibly owing to connexion with the pre-Christian Druidic religion, which has other strongly marked astronomical features. As Kant pointed out, the use of a nine-day week implies a twenty-seven-day month—that is to say, the reckoning is in sidereal time, which any observer of the moon's motion would be bound to adopt for scientific purposes. For the month of twenty-nine and a half days could be no true unit of time even in elementary astronomy. Owing to the fact that the sun (from which the moon derives its light) is also in motion, the interval between two 'new moons,' as observed from the earth, is more than two days longer than the time taken by the moon to complete its circuit of the ecliptic. By using an abacus with nine beads to the row the astronomer, therefore, could reckon easily in terms of sidereal time, his calendar being constructed in ascending powers of 9—nine days to the week, 9×9 to the 'quarter' (three-month period), $9 \times 9 \times 9$ to the 'year.' The last of these units is approximately two solar years—729 days as against $730\frac{1}{2}$ days—its epact with the quadrennial (leap year) period being conveniently small, *i.e.*, only three days. Over a period of sixty solar years the epact is the number indicated by Daniel's second reckoning: 1335—1290, or forty-five days.

The year of 343 ($7 \times 7 \times 7$) days is more elaborate, for it takes into account the dogma of the Seven Great Gods who fix the Fates and declare them by the motions of their seven (planetary) signs in the heavens. Its original unit was, however, not the day, but the quarter-month. Starting with that, the calendar-maker divided the year into forty-nine parts—forty-eight for the twelve lunar months and the epact. By

fixing these as seven days each he obtained a simple method of calculating the dates of festivals by the use of an abacus with rows of seven beads, his epact with the solar year being twenty-two and a quarter days. Over a period of sixty years the total epact is that required for the 'time of trouble' according to Daniel—namely, 1335 days.

That this calendar was in actual use, though doubtless only as a mystery carefully guarded by the 'wise,' appears from the order concerning the Feast of Weeks and the Jubile in Leviticus. The reckoning for this series begins at 'the morrow after the sabbath' of the first month (Lev. xxiii. 15). *Sabbath* here is not the Hebrew seventh day of the week, but the Babylonian 'cut' (*sabattu*) in the middle of the month⁴—the moment of full-moon (*cf.* Isa. i. 13). Starting each year from that moment and reckoning in quarter-months, the priests obtained a simple festival sequence for the regulation of agriculture according to the will of the Seven Great Gods. After seven quarter-months came Harvest, after 7^2 the *Rosh-ha-shana*, after 7^3 the 'Sabbatic Year,' after 7^4 the Jubile. In this system no account is taken at all of days. But that defect was easily remedied by fixing the month as twenty-eight days. A new unit of time, the week of seven days—one of which was dedicated to each of the planets—thus came into general use (at least among the Hebrews) by the time of Jeremiah. In accordance with this the Harvest Festival was held after seven seven-day weeks instead of after seven quarter-months, but the 'Sabbatic Year' and the Jubile continued to follow the *Rosh-ha-shana* sequence.

Accepting the post-exilic Hebrew adherence to the continuous week system, Daniel uses the year 'stylised' in powers of 7 to determine the end of the old order and the beginning of the epact covering 'the time of trouble.' The duration of this depends upon the 'year' chosen for the coming of the new order. The ordinary festival calendar is useless because its New Year's Day is not astronomically fixed, but is variable like our Easter Day. The Assyrian year 'stylised' in powers of 9 affords a better comparison. But

⁴ S. H. Langdon, *Babylonian Menologies*, p. 91. There was also a 'former' and a 'latter' *sabattu*, presumably marking the 'half-crowns' of the moon. The adoption of the term for the 'cut' in time under the continuous week system is a quite natural development.

even that gives an epact forty-five days short of what Daniel holds to be *the* Day, the day for which the saints are waiting. He prefers the true solar year as the superior unit of time measurement, and by so doing records his agreement with the importance attached to the motion of the sun by the Persians (and later the Greeks), to whom both Jew and Gentile were subject.

C. E. DOUGLAS.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Those English, by Kurt von Stutterheim (Sidgwick and Jackson).

If Herr von Stutterheim approached the tents of Albion, like the Prophet Balaam, ready to curse, he has turned aside into some shrewd criticisms and unconscious praises. His criticisms are the more salutary and his shots often come near the John Bull's eye. Our main criticism of the book is that it concerns one class—and that the sporting and fashionable class—more than the bourgeois and working ranks, who in the last decision make up 'those English.'

He has, as a careful observer, tried to measure the English grades with their corresponding classes abroad. He finds class distinctions clearer abroad. The line between the English working classes and the lower middle is 'increasingly indeterminate.' This is one of the tendencies of our time which has worked very much to the good. What with increased pay for labour, cheap amusements and multiple education, it is easy for the young men and daughters of one class to slip into the other. Hence, perhaps, the symbolic value of the bowler hat. Herr von Stutterheim sees no 'Strength through Joy' movement in England, but he might have found a universal 'Joy through Sport' pervading the country.

This is a clever book but rather superficial, for the simple reason that journalists are not philosophers. Herr von Stutterheim has been genuinely struck by the aim and result of the Public School, which is to produce a real national type—a type of man who does not attempt what is beyond him nor supposes some great destiny awaits him. He underestimates life and he constantly understates his own values and achievements. There is no tendency towards sentimental

contemplation for a class that chiefly enjoys 'the drama of competitive games.'

But does the writer realise that out of this has come a fifth class distinct and apart from the graded nobility, bourgeois, peasants and workers of the Continent. There is a wide-spread class who never become rich or famous—who are untitled and show no outward variety save in their 'old school' ties. His strongest sense is his sporting sense. Without pride he thinks he is as good as any peer, or even as any working man. He will meet the aristocrat in games, he will take a humble profession amongst the bourgeois, and when there is a general strike he will do the work, which has been abandoned by the strikers, partly as his duty and partly as a joke. His contempt for the intellectuals is his profoundest sentiment, and he will pardon whatever can be shown to have a sporting excuse. It is true that he has no lip-motto like the Russian's 'Nietschevo' or the Spaniard's 'Manana.' 'Cheerio' for him covers a multitude of social verbiage.

The English, like England herself, are not to be judged by any rule except that rules are made up of exceptions. 'People with mild sheep-like faces,' pronounces Herr von Stutterheim, 'will suddenly elope with a pretty chorus-girl or set out to tramp through the Gobi desert on foot.' To themselves the English are not surprising, but only to foreigners. Albion appears perfidious for that reason, and here we have a profound statement to say that 'the foreign Chancellery, that assumes from what has been done in December what will be done in January, will do so at its own risk.'

Herr von Stutterheim is annoyingly near the truth at times. But, as a foreign journalist wrapped up in a diplomatist, he cannot let himself go as we should like in genial and strong criticism. It cannot really seem right to him that England is weathering the post-war conditions against all the rules. The value of his book can be sampled in light epigrams such as the following:

'The Englishman finds his way with the serenity of the sleep-walker.'

'London is incomparably more polite than Paris.'

'The lenient Englishman cannot forgive bad manners and the lack of a sense of humour.'

'The Englishman is sparing of the axe because he lets things grow like a tree.'

'England is not a country. It is a habit.'

'Though the Englishman does not care for specialists, he prefers an expert in the nursery.'

'The English realised the danger in knowledge not backed by character.'

'It has proved possible to unite a class system with a democracy.'

'English education is primarily an education in self-confidence.'

'England is more German and Germany more English than before the World War.'

'England is engaged in India on a task that is perhaps the greatest known to modern history.'

'The English nation does not fight like a lion, but like a boa-constrictor.'

'Anyone who hears an Englishman declare that he is a plain and ordinary fellow had better be on his guard.'

And now for a few criticisms. We are told that 'Founders Day at Eton is on June the 4th.' This is worthier of a Harrovian commentator than a first-class journalist. Founders Day at Eton is on December the 6th. But then foreigners who assume what Etonians do in December from what they do in June will be liable to mistakes!

Lord Rosebery's name is spelt as Queen Victoria used to spell it—wrong, with two r's; but the Premier was always too polite to contradict her. There is a curious Irishism when Sunday papers are described as 'daily papers published once a week!'

Most Englishmen want to be on better terms with Germany, and the best way is for the Germans to continue to learn our beautiful language and to study our beautiful characteristics, which it will always be a pleasure to read in the precise and excellent paragraphs of a correspondent like Herr von Stutterheim.

SHANE LESLIE.

THE NONESUCH 'COMUS'

Milton's *Comus*, with Henry Lawes's music (the Nonesuch Press, pp. xxiv + 44; 32s. 6d.).

The Nonesuch Press has found a good subject upon which

to exercise the pomp and refinements of modern book production. To bedizen the austerities of *Samson Agonistes* might be a questionable proceeding, but of all Milton's poems *Comus* first saw the light in the most gorgeous circumstances, and in the writing of it Milton set his seal of approval on a pompous and aristocratic art-form towards which in later life he may well have felt cooler. The masque was indeed one of the manifestations of a delight in pageantry and symbol that occupied so important a place in men's hearts during the Renaissance. Milton may indeed have sought in *Comus* to give to what was primarily a show a more solid content of sound doctrine and a more elevated verse than had been customary. 'These things,' said Bacon, writing *Of Masques and Triumphs*, 'are but toys to come amongst such serious observations; but yet, since princes will have such things, it is better they should be graced with elegance, than daubed with cost.' So, too, Milton (who at college had passionately upheld the new Baconian theories of education) may have thought, and on this opinion may have acted. Indeed, there is little doubt that if the pomp were elegant Milton was no more hostile to it at that time than the average courtier.

Then let *Hymen* oft appear
In Saffron robe, with Taper clear,
And pomp, and feast, and revelry
With mask, and antique Pageantry.

Thus it is that the Nonesuch *Comus* is more than a beautiful volume; it is a volume whose beauties are relevant to the work they embody.

The Earl of Ellesmere contributes a brief preface. And it is good to be reminded that the manuscript in his possession at Bridgewater House (known variously as the Ashridge, the Egerton, or the Bridgewater Manuscript) was the actual stage copy for the original presentation of *Comus* and that it has remained with the Earl's family ever since. (Not that this manuscript has been used for the present edition—Milton's finally corrected version of 1673 being, quite rightly, preferred.) The proper aristocratic associations having been aroused by the preface, we may pass on to E. H. Visiak's learned and informative introduction and to Hubert J.

Foss's note on the music: the latter especially interesting for the high value he puts on Lawes as a musician of the transitional age between the madrigal and the opera. The text is in Fell types, nobly set on a tall page, and is indeed 'graced' with the appropriate 'elegancy.' The five airs added to some of the lyrics and lyric passages have been printed with the words from Lawes's own autograph manuscript. There are five coloured plates by M. R. H. Farrar, which add a pleasing sumptuousness, without in any way attempting to compete with or to underline the text. The skill with which they have been made to harmonise with the actual printed page and to reinforce it deserves the highest praise. They add the final touch of pomp to an admirably organised volume.

E. M. W. TILLYARD.

ROYAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

The Significance of Investigations in British Politics, by H. McD. Clokie and J. W. Robinson (Stanford U.P., London: H. Milford, 1938, 14s.).

It is not creditable to British writers on our Constitution and parliamentary practice that it should have been left to two American professors to deal comprehensively, for the first time, with a subject of such historical and topical importance. They have done their work well, and if English readers dissent from some of their opinions and conclusions they must cast some of the blame on the English historians who have so neglected the topic, which Erskine May scarcely touches, and Anson almost ignores.

In January 1620-1 Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, then Lord Chancellor, wrote to King James I. as follows (*Works*, VI., p. 250):

There wants a fourth part of the square to make all complete, which is, if your majesty will be pleased to publish certain commonwealth commissions; which, as your majesty hath well begun to do in some things, and to speak of in some others; so, if your majesty will be pleased to make a solemn declaration of them in that place, this will follow:

First, that your majesty shall do yourself an infinite honour,

and win the hearts of your people to acknowledge you, as well the most politic king, as the most just.

Secondly, it will oblige your commissioners to a more strict account, when they shall be engaged by such a public charge and commandment. And thirdly, it will invite and direct any man, that finds himself to know anything concerning those commissions, to bring in their informations. So as I am persuaded it will eternise your name and merit, and that king James's commissions will be spoken of, and put in ure, as long as Britain lasts; at the least, in the region of all good kings.

For the particulars, besides the two commissions of the navy, and the buildings about London, wherein your majesty may consider, whether you will have anything altered or supplied, I wish these following to be added.

Commission for advancing the clothing of England, as well the old drapery as the new, and all the incidents thereunto.

Commission for staying treasure within the realm, and the reiglement of monies.

Commission for the provision of the realm with corn and grain, and the government of the exportation and importation thereof; and directing of public granaries, if cause be.

Commission for introducing and nourishing manufactures within the realm, for the setting people a-work, and the considering of all grants and privileges of that nature.

Commission to prevent the depopulation of towns and houses of husbandry, and for nuisances and high-ways.

Commission for the recovery of drowned lands.

Commission for the suppression of the grievances of informers.

Commission for the better proceedings in the plantations of Ireland.

Commission for the provision of the realm with all kind of warlike defence, ordnance, powder, munition, and armour.

Of these you may take and leave, as it shall please you: and I wish the articles concerning every one of them, first allowed by your council, to be read openly, and the commissioners' names.

For the good, that comes of particular and select committees and commissions, I need not common place, for your majesty hath found the good of them; but nothing to that, that will be, when such things are published; because it will vindicate them from neglect, and make many good spirits, that we little think of, co-operate in them.

I know very well, that the world, that commonly is apt to think, that the care of the commonwealth is but a pretext in matters of state, will perhaps conceive, that this is but a preparative to a

parliament. But let not that hinder your majesty's magnanimity, *in opere operato*, that is so good; and besides that opinion, for many respects, will do no hurt to your affairs.

This passage (not quoted by the authors) is a vivid illustration of the value of Royal Commissions then—and now; for there is scarcely a single subject mentioned which has not been examined by a Royal Commission or Committee during the past thirty years.

To turn to more modern times, the authors declare (p. 4) that 'the conditions of British politics restrict to a marked degree the less violent, the better informed, and the more thoughtful members. The whole process of parliamentary procedure—and in particular its operation—restricts and restrains the inquisitive and inquiring member, and enforces a conformity of conduct which is totally destructive of constructive individual thought.' That is a verdict which few close observers would endorse.

The statement at p. 15 that Bills dealt with by Standing Committees 'are nearly always non-controversial projects of a non-political nature which have been accepted in principle by the House at second reading' is contrary to fact. The authors' note (p. 68) that 'it took twenty-five years to secure passage . . . of legislation limiting a child of nine to sixty-nine hours of labour a week, and this only for cotton mills.' But they ignore the fact that Tories like Shaftesbury, and reformers like Tremenhare and Chadwick, had to fight the whole Liberal Party, including men like John Bright, who opposed any sort of limitation on hours, resented any and all measures to secure safety in factories and mines for workmen, and apprenticed pauper children of six upwards to miners, who could thus send their own children to more agreeable occupations.

The Royal Commission of 1842 on the Employment of Children, with its horrifying wood-cut illustrations and its detailed reports by salaried sub-commissioners, opened men's eyes. Legislation would have been less tardy had England produced a Harriet Beecher Stowe to arouse the conscience of the nation to conditions at home worse than any described in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

The recent tendency to suppress the evidence given before

Royal Commissions is noted (p. 180). The authors seem to doubt whether the evidence is of real value. The facts are against them: the acceptance of a Royal Commission's recommendations depends largely upon the verdict passed upon them by a comparatively small number of men who are immediately concerned, or closely interested. If the evidence in support is strong, the verdict is likely to be favourable. If, as recently happened in the case of Tyneside local government, the evidence is not published, and the recommendations of the Commissioners are rejected, Parliament is left with no material on which to form an alternative judgment and the labours of the Commission prove completely unfruitful.

The authors do not refer to the Royal Commission on Oil Supply set up in 1912, under the chairmanship of Lord Fisher, 'to assemble facts and state conclusions' (*The World Crisis*: Winston Churchill, vol. i., p. 133), whose Report was never published at all—an important precedent.

These are, however, comparatively minor points. The authors deserve the gratitude of all members of both Houses of Parliament and of all students of the English Constitution. On the termination of his labours, the chairman of a Royal Commission receives from His Majesty a silver inkstand. I wish the authors could receive a like recognition of their labours.

Ali Pasha and Great Britain, by John W. Baggaly, M.A.,
B.Litt., 95 pp. (Blackwell, 4s. 6d.).

Mr. Baggaly, whose first book¹ we reviewed in November 1936, here deals with a little-known aspect of British diplomatic and military history during 1800–1820. Unlike too many modern historians, he has made good use of the treasures of the Public Record Office and the British Museum and, as his select bibliography shows, of German and French writings, though Maurus Tokai's *Lion of Janina*, a brilliant translation from the Hungarian by R. N. Bain published by Jarrolds in 1897. To the circumstances of his father's death and to his mother's early training, Ali Pasha, an Albanian of good family,

¹ *Klephric Ballads in Relation to Greek History (1715–1821)* (Blackwell, 7s. 6d.).

owed his zest for power, in pursuit of which he grew to be one of the most powerful subjects of the Sultan and an international figure. His masters at the Sublime Porte enabled him, in serving them, to extend his sway beyond Epirus until he became, before his death, the autonomous viceroy of almost all continental Greece.

The rise of Napoleon, whose tyrannies have not, after the lapse of 140 years, been forgotten by Italians, gave Ali Pasha his chance. Napoleon wished to dismember Turkey, and made a beginning by seizing the Ionian Isles and part of Albania. He was checked by the Russo-Turkish Alliance, whereunder these islands and part of the adjoining mainland came under Russian influence. Ali Pasha hoped that Great Britain might save him and his ambitions alike from France, Russia and the Sultan of Turkey. James Morier was sent to negotiate with him, but could take no clear line, for Britain and Russia were acting together against Napoleon and Britain could not afford to lose a powerful friend. Ali Pasha, then, could be assured of our support only if he was reconciled with Russia, whose envoys he hated only less than those of the French. This extraordinarily able and gallant man, no more unscrupulous than his contemporaries and successors on the political scene, but unable or unwilling, like them, to clothe his designs in the conventional language of high morality, maintained and even strengthened his position over a period of forty years. He was at last lured to his death at the hands of the Sultan's servants by a form of treachery which he must have expected and with which he must have been familiar, for then, as now, false promises of mercy and forgiveness are a final and almost always the successful weapon in the hands of Eastern monarchs and policemen. In this connexion Mr. Baggaly might usefully have quoted the dramatic story of Haydée in chap. viii., Vol. VI., of *Le Comte de Monte-Christo*, which deals directly with Ali Pasha's death.

'Pour bien sçavoir les choses,' wrote La Rochefoucauld. 'Il faut en sçavoir le détail.' Mr. Baggaly has done his work well, and it is to be hoped that his visits to the Public Record Office may have revealed further rich veins of historical material which if quarried will, like this book, amply repay his reader, if not the author.

Speeches and Addresses of H.H. Sayaji Rao III., Maharaja of Baroda, vol. iv. (privately printed: Cambridge University Press, 1938).

The head of a State must keep the door of his lips, to use the words of the psalmist, more carefully than a Minister, who comes and goes, and may be disowned or overruled. Heads of States are seldom released from their responsibilities but by death. The Maharaja of Baroda has striven consistently for over sixty years to lead his people along new paths. His efforts have been as successful as his reign has been long: it has been given to few Eastern rulers to superintend the transition from ox cart to rail and motor car, from runner to radio, and to see the fruition of their labours. The first speech here recorded, delivered at the Mansion House in 1892, was in praise of progress. In the second, at the Guildhall, he noted that His Majesty's Ministers were so immersed in domestic problems that they could find little time to note the gigantic changes taking place overseas. In 1926, speaking on Cardinal Newman's *Ideal of an University*, he mentions the exploited labourers in the mills, and the untouchables working under a stigma ruinous to Hinduism. He pleads for radical changes of outlook and a common language, lamenting that, even in his own State, Gujarati, Marathi and Urdu schools are necessary. He observes bluntly that the schools and universities of India are still bent on propagating the 'remarkable hypocrisies of the twentieth century,' and that in India the vital question is not knowledge but food, to lack of which India's worst troubles are due. There is irreconcilable diversity in religion, but potential unity in religious thought. 'Are we cherishing religion to-day?' he asked, 'or superstition?'

Opening a Domestic Science Exhibition, he contrasts the importance of food with the low esteem in which cooks are held, and notes that the discomfort of his early life in the old palace was due not to lack of money but to the ignorance of those around him.

In one of the longest of his speeches, delivered five years ago at the golden jubilee of the college which he himself founded, he notes that those who in India and elsewhere sing so loudly the praise of democracy lack sincerity. The basis

of democracy to him is the passionate desire of each individual to make the community better, stronger and freer, and it must have a moral basis.

Of Indian literature, which the Maharaja has done much to preserve and to foster, he has much to say, and says it well. Too much is written 'by one special class for the same special class,' with the result that it is one-sided, and he notes shrewdly the greater range of English proverbial sayings. He deplores 'the apathy of educated people' towards Indian music and Indian folk songs—no new complaint in this country. Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism seem to him to rest upon a common foundation of truth: there is material to hand for a common code, but he sees little progress in this direction.

He appears throughout as the leader as well as the father of his people—less concerned with paper constitutions 'which provide a good deal of food for lawyers' than with the daily work of promoting rural as well as academic education, civic health and economic development through panchayits and the co-operative movements, and social legislation.

The volume, with its three precursors, is a valuable miscellany which, had it been published in the usual way, would have been assured on its merits of a wide sale.

Looking Back, by Dhondo Keshar Karve (published by B. D. Karve, Secretary, Hindu Widows' Home Association, Hingre Budrusk, Poona 4, 3s. 6d.).

Indian autobiographies are rare: those that deal, not with politics but with sociological and charitable activities, are rarer still. This modest little book of 200 pages will fit into any man's pocket and most women's hand-bags; it is attractively written with a sympathetic preface by Mr. Frederick Gould, and it embodies a warm tribute to the steadfast belief and personal efforts of the Gaekwar in the cause of the Depressed Classes.

Professor Karve's life-work is here described, in admirable English, with unpretentious simplicity. His native place, his ancestry, his early life and education, his attendance at a matriculation examination, to undergo which he had to walk 100 miles in bad weather, only to be refused because he looked too young, are dealt with in successive brief chapters. His domestic life and marriage, and his espousal of the cause of widow marriage and of a women's university, are of poignant interest.

I know nothing more impressive than Professor Karve's unassuming recital of facts: he may rest assured that, as he hopes, it will serve a useful purpose.

Euphrates Exile, by A. D. Macdonald (Bell, 7s. 6d.).

Mr. Macdonald was until 1933 engaged on intelligence work for the Royal Air Force in Iraq. He describes the book, in his preface, as the personal views of an insignificant observer who had unusual opportunities of rubbing shoulders with his fellow-men in faded and remote regions.

Euphrates Exile is much more than that. It is an important contribution to the thin stream of select books which seek to analyse the mutual interaction of men of Eastern and Western countries upon each other in the light of personal observations, recorded by a sympathetic and disciplined mind in a literary style and with a detachment which evokes unreserved admiration. It is the work of a mature mind; it is formless, but so is the society which the writer describes: its philosophic quality mirrors the outlook of his Eastern friends. It deserves a wide public, especially among those whose work or interests bring them into contact with the Near and Middle East.

ARNOLD WILSON.

Alone through the Forbidden Land, by Gustav Krist: translated by E. O. Lorimer (Faber & Faber, 12s. 6d.).

In the course of the last few years I have read quite a number of books of travel and adventure in the East, but I can recall none so thrilling or so vividly written as this one. The late Gustav Krist was indeed a born adventurer, if ever there was one. In a previous book (*Pascholl, Plenny!*), he recounted his adventures as an Austrian prisoner of war in Central Asia. He made repeated attempts to escape and ultimately succeeded, only to return and take part in counter-revolutionary activity. In the present book the author relates how a chance meeting with some Turkomans on the Caspian coast of Iran resulted in his making an entirely unauthorised entry into the 'Forbidden Land' of Soviet Central Asia in 1924. Most men with a record such as his would have fought shy of putting their heads into the lion's mouth in this way, but the spice of danger and the hope of adventure attracted Krist. Anxious not to reveal his real name, he obtained the identification papers of an ex-Austrian friend, who had become a Soviet citizen, and substituted his own photograph for that of his friend.

Adventures followed in quick succession. He all but perished in a sandstorm in the Qizil Qum desert. On reaching Charjui, he persuaded the local Soviet officials to accept him as a State geologist

and equip him for an expedition, but he could not follow the matter up, as, while waiting for his equipment, he read in a paper that his friend had been severely injured in a factory accident. He left hurriedly for Samarqand, where he was recognised and denounced by a Soviet official with whom he had had previous dealings. Krist, however, succeeded not only in disproving his real identity but in getting the authorities to let him carry out his geological scheme. Equipped with a free railway ticket, supplies and transport animals, he left Samarqand in quest not of geological specimens but of adventure. He worked his way eastwards to the mountainous country abutting on Chinese Turkestan, and joined for some months a friendly party of Qara Qirghiz tribesmen seeking escape in the high valleys of the Trans-Alai from Soviet officials.

Krist returned from the Qirghiz country by a different route. At a place called Hisar, in Uzbekistan, he went down with malaria. Before reaching Deh Nau he halted at a spring called Aq Su, where Enver Pasha had been killed; previously he had met the man who claimed to have given the ambitious Turk his quietus. At Baisun he lodged with the former beg or governor, who told him a great deal about the last days of the Amirate of Bukhara. After travelling for some distance down the Oxus by steamer, Krist struck inland and reached Bukhara, of which city he gives an interesting description.

Being unable to return to Iran by the route he had followed on his outward journey, because of the impossibility of crossing the waterless desert without a guide (he was by now too poor to engage one), Krist decided to attempt to get through the closely guarded section of the frontier between Dushak and Ashqabad. He was fired at and arrested by a Soviet frontier guard, but managed to capture his captor and cross into Iran without further incident. He then travelled to Tabriz *via* Meshed and Tehran. On reaching Tabriz he called on Qannadi, his employer, who fell off his chair in sheer astonishment on seeing him appearing as if from the dead.

Although he writes of conditions as they were a number of years ago, his remarks on the impact of Communism upon Islam are of much interest.

Gustav Krist is, alas! no longer living; if he were, we could be sure that his restless spirit would be spurring him on to further ventures of the sort so agreeably described in this most readable book.

Mrs. Lorimer has accomplished her task as translator very competently, and has provided a most useful glossary, as well as a

map. The book is well illustrated with the author's own excellent photographs; that of Demavend (plate 104) is not, however, taken from a good viewpoint, and the captions of some of the other plates are incorrect; for instance, the 'Qajar Mosque at Tehran' (plate 106) is certainly not in that city, but is, apparently, the sanctuary at Qum built over the grave of Fatima al-Ma'suma, the daughter of the Imam Musa al-Kazim.

L. LOCKHART.

Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires: vol. vi., 1784-1792.
 Edited by Dr. Dorothy George (British Museum, £2 12s. 6d.).

The cataloguing of the British Museum's collection of Satirical Prints and Drawings, interrupted in 1873, was resumed with the publication, three years ago, of a fifth volume covering the years 1771 to 1783. Down to that time English political satire, which may be said to open, pictorially, with the attack on Walpole and the Excise Bill of 1733, was almost wholly directed against the Government, and it reached its acme of virulence at the time of the Wilkes affair. In the dispute with the Colonies, the satirists are almost to a man on the American side. With the fall of North in 1782 the spirit changes. The convention that Ministers were creatures of the Crown, amplifying the prerogative and bartering the liberties of the subject for power, could hardly be sustained when Rockingham and Fox were in office together, and young Pitt joined them as Chancellor of the Exchequer. The way was opening to a new and better balanced type of political satire, reflecting both sides of the party debate, and other opinions than those of the 'outs' who would be 'ins.' Then in 1783 came the Coalition of Fox and North, the Peace of Paris, and Burke's India Bill. The Ministry fell, Pitt was sent for, and, after maintaining himself for four or five months against a majority in the Commons, appealed to the country in May 1784, and there gained one of the most famous victories on the political record.

Such is the historic background of this volume. And it is perhaps of equal consequence to remark that in 1784 Gillray and Rowlandson were both just twenty-eight and just at the beginning of their career. Gillray had brought himself into notice in 1782 by his prints celebrating Rodney's victory over the French—a departure from the rule that only defeats (for which, of course, the Government is responsible) are to be pictured. In the same year, a trip to Spithead at the time of the foundering of the *Royal George* seems definitely to have engaged Rowlandson in the calling of a humorous

and satirical artist. Apart altogether from the superior instruction which Rowlandson had received in London and Paris, between the natural genius of the two men there can be no comparison. But, entering the field together, they may be said to have picked up the tradition of Hogarth, fallen into the hands of smaller men, and to have developed it on parallel lines: Gillray inclining by temperament to all that was vehement and even ferocious in their common master; Rowlandson, more genial, more truly humorous, a lover of crowds and pretty faces seen in crowds: of ridiculous squires and preposterous beggars, observed against landscapes of soft primrose and lilac, villages out of a fairy-play, and shadowy grey-green hills.

Between them they made that art, of which the Goncourts, here quoted, speak as

'l'art d'Angleterre, un art inimitable, primesautier, unique, qui a la fantaisie, l'étrangeté, le dérèglement, la philosophie, le rire, l'éloquence, la majesté railleuse de Shakespeare.'

A recent exhibition in Paris gave one a good opportunity of verifying, or at least understanding, this judgment; and it left one spectator wondering what effect this passionate addiction to the ugly and the violent really has on the French. And a curious analogy crossed my mind. Some years ago, after hours spent among the Etruscan objects in the Villa del Papa Giulio, I was left with the same sense of passionate, and indeed violent, creative power, quite uncontrolled or undirected by any sense of beauty. I can imagine a Greek—a Greek of the third century—being carried off his feet by it—not, indeed, wishing to do anything like it, but finding it *primesautier*, *étrange* and, even, in its uncouth, uncharming way, *philosophique*. I am thinking now of our political satire: in the other province of personal satire, or social comedy, Rowlandson, as I have hinted, does seem to me to have no small part of the *fantaisie* of Shakespeare; of the sheep-shearing, for example, in *Winter's Tale*, and the love-making of the true Florizel and Perdita.

But materials for an æsthetic valuation of our satiric art must be sought elsewhere: in the books of Grego, for example, or, best of all, in the Print Room to which these volumes will be an indispensable guide. The student of manners or morals—and between them these words, rightly understood, cover three parts of history—will hardly find a page on which there is not something to stimulate or satisfy his curiosity. Of course, the satirical picture, even more than the novel, is to be used with caution as evidence. To be successful—and we know that the pavement in St. James's Street

was sometimes blocked when a new Gillray was in the window of No. 29—it must be topical, and, the topic usually being one that lies on the surface of the public mind, the picture may have little to tell us of its depths. What everybody is talking about to-day is not necessarily what everybody will be thinking about to-morrow. In the spring of 1784 there was only one theme for all the dwellers between Oxford Street and Palace Yard, and it was one which might have been designed by kind Providence to bring business to the print-sellers. Fox—the intrepid Fox of a still existing tavern—was standing for Westminster, and the Duchess of Devonshire was canvassing for him. The poll in those times was open for forty days, and Dr. George prints in an appendix the state of the voting each day. Hood was safe: the contest lay between Fox and the Ministerial candidate, Sir Cecil Wray, who reached his apogee on the tenth day, with a lead of 318 votes. Then ‘the lips of the ladies, more persuasive than those of Fox himself,’ began to tell. On the twentieth day, Wray had only 84 votes in hand, on the twenty-third he was 21 behind. And—

Taming thought to human pride !—

when the election, and the scrutiny, were over, Sir Cecil Wray was hardly ever heard of again. But the intervention of the Duchess was a theme too rich not to be exploited to the full. The poll opened on April 1 and the first print was in the shops on April 3. It is vulgar but harmless. But as Wray passes his meridian the Ministerial side seem to have felt that vigorous action was needed. On April 13 a grossly suggestive print of the Duchess canvassing appeared, and in the next six months Georgiana figured in the print-shops, in various guises and settings, some fifty times. Then she, too, makes way for more attractive novelties. So does Fox. Between 1784 and 1785 the interest in him, measured by prints, shrank to one-ninth; and in that retired position he remained till the King’s illness and the debate on the Regency called him to the front of the stage again. But, as Pitt follows much the same curve, it is clear that we are dealing, not with personal popularity or the opposite, but a fall and rise in the general political temperature. So measured, the year 1784 is one of maximum intensity, and those that follow a time of relaxation and apathy. Convalescence is not exciting, and the very extravagance of some of the attacks on Pitt in the years when he was nursing what Shelburne called ‘this once respectable Empire’ back to prosperity and power, only show that his enemies, though willing to wound and not at all afraid to strike if they got a chance, knew that they had no case.

Between Pitt’s triumph in 1784 and the fall of the Bastille five

years later, the only subjects of sufficient general interest to excite the public were the impeachment of Warren Hastings and the brief crisis over the King’s illness and the Regency. Hastings had returned to England in June 1785 and Burke had given notice of a motion. The official Opposition was luke-warm. Fox and Burke were determined; and the day before Parliament assembled in January 1786 a print of the Meeting of Parliament shows Major Scott, supporting Pitt, with a paper inscribed ‘Defence of Governor Hastings’ protruding from his pocket. Hastings himself first appears in March, after Burke had opened the attack, as—

An Eastern Chief. The Chiefs of which place is under great subjection of lacks of Rupees and berguders, or else deposed of their crowns: torn from their families or starved by our modern conquerors: which has been the case lately: he is called Tulgagee Mahah Rajah.

which reads like the composition of a very young apprentice to the trade. But Hastings had his friends, or Major Scott his agents, there, too; and they did not fail to drag up Burke’s conduct in shielding a peculating revenue official, named Powell, in contrast with his persecution of the saviour of Asia. Gillray was on his side (later he went over, perhaps from hatred of Thurlow), but the Nizam’s Diamond, which Hastings at an unlucky juncture presented to George III, was a godsend to hostile newspapers and print-sellers. Dent’s skit on the great ceremony in Westminster Hall, entitled ‘The Raree Show,’ with a poster of Hastings eating an Indian woman, while

Burke, standing in water produced by the tears of his audience, harangues seven ladies and a man, all up to the neck in a sea of tears,

would seem from the description to have real wit, and to convey a solemn judgment on the wisdom of the impeachment. Burke, it must be owned, did give himself away rather frequently.

To prove the veneration due by the Mahometan religion to the parental character, Burke quoted a treatise of Demetrius Cantemir. A passage read by the clerk stated that though young virgins were sent as presents to the Sultan, yet he touches none of them but what is brought by his mama.

On which, to his honour be it recorded, Sayers designed a print which is quite funny and not in the least improper.

In fact, it strikes me as possible, on a general view of this volume, that the public, disgusted by the excesses of 1784, were requiring a higher standard of decency in their satire (domestic, at

least : Catherine of Russia was too juicy a bit to be let alone) and a larger admixture of wit. Burke with a magic-lantern, showing a Bengal flea as big as a mountain, is, as a contemporary French visitor truly remarked, 'une critique assez gaie de son éloquence hyperbolique.' But the time was rapidly coming when that hyperbolical eloquence would enflame the world. On July 29, 1789, Gillray brought out a print inscribed

France
Freedom

Britain
Slavery,

contrasting in all seriousness the happiness of France under Necker with the servitude of England under the lean and arrogant Pitt. The delight with which the fall of the Bastille was welcomed in England is reflected in many of these prints ; and so also is the doubt and alarm which followed soon upon it : the divided views, and that sudden hardening of Conservative opinion into resistance to French principles at all costs, which postponed for forty years the emancipation of the Dissenters and the Reform of Parliament. And the friends of Hastings were not slow to let loose on Burke the Apostate the pictorial invective which Burke's friends had employed against Hastings the Tyrant. The prominence of Burke—commonly figured in a biretta as a crypto-Catholic—in the satire of these eight years is noticeable : the rupture with Fox is fully and maliciously developed ; and the public were not allowed to forget how he who had spoken of his own Sovereign as 'hurled by Providence from the throne' in 1788 was the adoring and weeping defender of the French monarchy in 1790—the 'Weird Sister of Beaconsfield'—premonitory title!—over whose head hovers a visionary coronet.

I have spoken only of the political satire. Those described as personal will provide much material for the 'curious and studious' in social ways, in the history of taste and costume. Already there are symptoms of a graver and soberer time approaching ; but decency, it must be owned, is advancing at no very alarming pace. I should expect, in the next volume, to see the gap between the Virtuous and the Vicious, the Sentimental and the Gross—in a word, the Respectable and the Disreputable—opening more widely. The actual technique of the cartoon merits attention too—the emblematic hodge-podge giving way to a well-conceived design which tells its own story : the use of the label ; or the animals with human faces, which persisted in *Punch* down till—when ? It is curious, among other things, in an age of sound workmanlike prose and verse, to notice how bad the letterpress usually is. So bad, that these verses stand out conspicuous, and make one wonder.

I cannot express how delighted I am
To hear we have taken Seringapatam.

Dundas fled from bottle, from chicken and ham,
To Windsor to tell of Seringapatam.

Pagodas and cannon, beef, mutton and lamb
Were found in the streets of Seringapatam.

That is not the Muse of Leicester Fields or Oxford Street. Was it
young Mr. Canning, perhaps ?

G. M. YOUNG.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

A FINE August afternoon tempted me to take the road again in some of the finest staple-land in England within thirty-five miles of London. An isolated church half a mile from the main road and a mile from the nearest village claimed my attention. It is closed now; only the graveyard is in use, as shown by incongruous granite and marble stones, set among the decent monuments of an earlier day. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century it was surrounded by houses of which no trace now remains. They were built, not of brick, but of mud, or mud and flint, or wattle and daub. When no longer tenanted, such houses melted quickly and blended with the soil whence they came. Only the old raised tracks winding round the strips and linches of the old common fields show what was once the lay-out. Here and there a few bricks are unearthed by the steam plough, and a freshly dug trench for the new water-pipes revealed traces of old flint foundations to my inquisitive eye. The crop of wheat was heavy: the beans on one side of the hill had done well, on the other poorly, for frost, followed by a hot sun, had touched them.

I walked across country for three miles to an old farm: the new tenant, a young man, was in the fields with his men. One more such day of fine weather and his wheat would be safely garnered. A water-cart by the stacks showed that straw for the thatch was being wetted: it had been carted two miles, for the ponds and wells were nearly dry. His main troubles were prices and labour. He was two men short: market prices did not bring in enough to pay them. Wheat, eggs, mutton, lamb—all were low. Wages (34s. minimum) were low enough, but more than he could afford as things were. In practice, however, no man got less than 40s. if rent,

charged at 2s. 6d. or 3s. a week, was reckoned as worth another 3s. and harvest and a bit of overtime worth 3s. Three out of four men in the country, in his belief, got about 40s. in cash wages, which was as good as 50s. in a town.

Aerodrome contractors had taken many men at 55s.: some would come back; others would go elsewhere on fresh contracts, and, having lost contact with farming, would take the dole in some great city. A few had enlisted: they were more likely to come back, if past experience was any guide. Girls went, too, to take jobs in towns at wages little if at all better than they could earn at home, but not one would milk a cow. He was not censorious of the Government, but saw no future for England except through a change of heart and of outlook and some guarantee of higher prices. Centralised slaughtering was worth trying; butchers certainly made rings round local markets: but middlemen in general fulfilled a useful purpose, and he saw little advantage in any extension of Government control over farming. Land nationalisation was arrant nonsense: no country except Russia had tried it, and results there were not encouraging, as far as he knew.

After taking tea with his handsome wife and two children, I walked on. The air was clear, the setting sun was bright and each cock of wheat threw its shadow on the stubble. I caught up with three carts laden with wheat and beans. The boy in charge of the leading cart gave me a lift: he praised the rubber tyres with which it was fitted; they enabled him to take a bigger load and to get over soft ground as the iron tyres never could. Our ways parted, and I overheard the talk as they went up the track. 'Who was that?' 'Our member, Mr. Wilson.' 'I thought I'd seen him before.' 'He talked one night in the village: he's going round seeing things: that's his way.'

In the fields, half a mile from his farm, I found the next man I sought, a greatly respected farmer, eighty-six years old, who had held the same land for over sixty years. His eye was clear, his hearing good: the stick he carried was not to lean on. He, too, had just stopped working with his men on the stacks. He pointed out one old man to me, still on the job, fork in hand. 'Sixty-one years with me, come Michaelmas,' he said; 'in the same cottage and three of his sons married in the village. I wish there were more like him.'

His views differed little from those I had heard an hour earlier except in the manner of presentation. The old gentleman was a pillar of nonconformity: a non-smoking teetotaller; a believer in independence and thrift and self-help and, until 1931, a stout Liberal. We spoke of death duties, which had ruined many farmers: land, he said, ought not to be valued like stocks and shares. A farmer could seldom sell part of his farm and run the rest without damaging it as a producing unit. It was like selling a few machines and a room or two in a factory. Farming land should be exempt. He deplored the urban undertone of the wireless and the cinema, and of much of our legislation. If we had spent a tenth of the money sunk in roads since the war in providing water to rural areas, we should have saved millions.

If we had built houses in rural areas as energetically as in slums, we could have kept the balance between town and country. Some of the houses recently built were less comfortable than those which had been condemned; they were often jerry-built and draughty, hard to keep warm, and costly to maintain. Men who worked in the open air wanted to be warm at home. He had an idea that wooden houses would do better than brick in some places: he owned four—all of them free of vermin, warm in winter, cool in summer, and with decent out-houses.

The last house at which I called, by appointment and on advice, was on an old lady who had lived some eighty years in a village just beyond constituency limits and was famous for her clear memory and good sense. 'I have heard much of you,' she said, 'and am glad to set eyes on you: I'm too old to go to meetings, but I have heard many members, and even Ministers, in my day. Votes for women has not made much difference so far as I can learn: people don't care so much for what they can get without asking so long as they're not insane or tramps on the road or still in prison. They don't go to political meetings as they used to do: I suppose that's why you have to walk round as you do.'

'No,' I said, 'I'm not vote-catching; I'm learning—from people I meet, instead of from books, though I'm given to reading too.'

'You've been talking to farmers?' she observed.

'I have.'

'And their men, too?'

'I have.'

'And the farmers want more men and the men more money?'

'They do.'

'You've seen schoolmasters?'

'I have.'

'And they want more children in school?'

'They do.'

'But have few or none themselves—I know 'em. And they would keep their jobs by keeping children longer at school?'

'That may be partly why they press for it.'

'And they know that the longer a child stays at school the harder it is to teach it a real job of work on a farm or in a factory afterwards.'

'Not in a factory.'

'That's not what my son in Leicester told me.'

The cross-examination continued for nearly half an hour: then, satisfied, I hope, of my open-mindedness, she began to give me her own views. They did not lack clarity.

'I don't see things black or rosy,' she began; 'I see them as they are and I take them as they come. In this very village where I was born there were 120 children at school with me in the 'eighties: there are thirty now; yet there are no fewer families. The girls took to service to learn how to run a house before a man came along, which wasn't long. The boys went to the Army or to the sea or the towns, or remained to follow their fathers; when they had done their time in the Services they mostly came back. There's fewer now to go round: and it's the exception to have over three children, and those that we have are not healthier or brighter. I've always noticed that the younger half of a family did best on the whole: they seemed to have better brains, and it was the younger mother who had most children and them the best.'

'Nowadays more women are barren: they make no secret of it to me; not one in a hundred is barren at twenty, but four times as many at thirty. There's some as want no children, or only one or two; there's as many as want them and can't get 'em. That's my opinion.'

We talked of housing: there was not much in it, in her view, as a social factor. Not all the new houses were as roomy or warm as the old, and rents ran much higher. She did not hold much with secondary education, though Cawston was not far off. Most boys and girls learned more 'on the job' than in school, and those that had it in them would get what they wanted from evening schools and books. Most school masters and mistresses coached any promising hobbledoys who wanted help in the long winter evenings.

The county libraries were the best of all innovations: the cinema was a habit, but had lost some of its hold. The wireless did more harm than good, for its whole bias, consciously or unconsciously, was urban, and its talks to farmers had an air of patronage which she noted and resented though she listened-in regularly. She was a farmer's daughter, and reckoned farmers had more judgment and honesty than most dealers or tradesmen, and never got justice because they were a scattered minority, too hard-worked to go in for log-rolling.

She set little store by national insurance. The district nurse was worth all sick benefits put together, except those paid in cash. Old age pensions were good: she would like them doubled, contributions being raised to pay the whole extra cost.

Of much else that is comparatively modern she had words of praise.

* * * * *

An international congress in London brought me by chance to lunch with French, Dutch, and Norwegian professors. We were discussing the extent to which, if at all, distinctive characteristics could be ascribed to different nations. Was a French crowd more excitable than one in London drawn from the same stratum of society? Were Germans less prone to individualism and happier under discipline, for its own sake, than Frenchmen? Had Flemings and Walloons any characteristics in common, or were they respectively imbued with Dutch and French ideas? As to the reality of British insularity they were unanimous; and they felt it to be greater now than in their youth: of our respect for the past, as evinced in our treatment of our

unrivalled inheritance of historical documents and buildings and of our scenic beauties, they were highly critical. Destruction seldom came from carelessness or neglect: it was deliberate, in the interest either of speed for pleasure or of individual money-making: the State itself did little: voluntary societies did much, but little compared with what was needed.

The Norwegian professor's comments were fresh and shrewd: 'Until 1924 the visible sign of continuity of government in England was the coinage. I loved to turn over my small change and find copper coins eighty years old, and silver even older, for every now and then a William IV. half-crown appeared. No other country in Europe had its dynastic history thus displayed on the current coin of the realm. Then, to make a profit of a few hundred thousand pounds on the silver content, you withdrew all your George IV. and William IV. and Victoria and Edward VII. and George V. silver pieces, and replaced them by the worst-looking tokens in Europe. I never felt quite the same about England after that, and we Scandinavians count ourselves nearer to you in temperament than to anyone else.'

We discussed current discontents in Europe in the light of our respective national histories. 'Language,' said the Norwegian, 'is the great divider, but there are other more powerful forces always at work. Norway has been happier and more prosperous since she seceded from her bigger neighbour Sweden. No one regrets the change.' 'During the next few decades,' said the Hollander, 'Flemish Belgium may unite with Holland, and Wallonia with France, on a linguistic basis. Will Wales and Scotland ever get the Home Rule of which I hear talk from time to time? You have not denied the twenty-six counties of Ireland their right to secede from the United Kingdom, though English was their tongue. Can you expect Europe to draw no deductions from your acceptance of the right of self-determination at home? The day of polyglot empires is past.'

'What of your Eastern colonies?' I asked. 'You are the second greatest colonial Power, east of Suez.'

'We were wise in time,' he replied: 'we gave them self-government with indirect elections to all the higher councils. We have had less trouble than you or the French.'

'Our troubles, and yours, will be from the mixed populations. Less than half the population of Malaya to-day is Malay: they are outnumbered by the Chinese and Indians combined, in the proportion of 5 Chinese and Indians to a little less than 3 Malays. Nationalism is the most deep-rooted of instincts and, as you have just seen in Burma, it is very much alive: it will spread to every country where imported labour has settled. In East Africa and South Africa it will be a bigger menace to peace than Anglo-Dutch or Anglo-German rivalry ever was. The spirit of Cetewayo is not dead.

'Instead of improving communications between Burma and her neighbours you should do your best to keep Chinese and Indians out, otherwise fresh racial riots are inevitable. The instinct of the tribe is all-powerful and the history of the rest of this century will be the re-creation in Africa and Asia of the national units which European Powers destroyed or superseded.'

The Frenchman was more hopeful: France had succeeded, where we and the Dutch had failed, in superimposing her civilisation, her culture and her language, upon an indigenous culture without destroying the latter. They might fail in distant Tonquin and Annam, though they had little to regret there: in North and West Africa they would succeed: Madagascar was far more contented than Mauritius. The position of France in Syria was difficult, but it was better than ours in Palestine: it was a pity we had not left France to run Egypt; they were geographically nearer neighbours and better interpreters of the West to the East than any other nation in Europe.

Of Italy and Germany no one spoke; but it is plain to me that the problems of Africa during the next few decades will be so urgent that their goodwill and co-operation, as well as that of Britain, France, Portugal and Spain, will be needed to if we are to avoid disaster.

* * * * *

My next walk was a week later. The wheat and barley was all in stack; wheeled coops had been moved into the stubble and the poultry were busy gleaning: men were putting up large-mesh wire to keep the sheep in the aftermath of hay

and clover, which, for lack of rain, was poor, and out of the mangolds and swedes, growing in alternate strips, some of which might serve them for food later in the year. Partridge shooting had not yet begun, but coveys were large and strong. In a long glade through a covert hens were still behind the bars in a score of coops watching the young pheasants, which they had fostered, fending for themselves in the undergrowth. The egg which lay in every other coop was a silent plea for release—a pathetic bribe to the keeper.

I walked across country for over four miles without crossing a public road—this within twenty-five miles of London. Two farms, almost adjoining, were held by brothers bearing a name which, as the churchyards of Hertfordshire testify, was as well known over a century ago as now. The future of the Wheat Quota was the theme of one farmer and his strongly built son, whom I met on his way to the milking-shed, where he showed me the electric milking plant he had installed. We discussed the respective merits of payment on acreage and on outturn, inclining on balance to the latter system, as at present in vogue. He predicted a drop ere long in milk supplies: the price level was not sufficiently elastic and the distributors' on-costs too high, owing mainly to the expense of the supply in bottles with straws—a system long abandoned in Europe, where milk is delivered to schools in churns, and consumed in mugs, which are washed carefully after use. No man in his employ drew less than 40s. a week: for those who were married he had decent cottages at 3s. a week. His best men got from 45s. to 55s., and had been twenty years with him. If, God forbid, there was a war, the farmers could not spare a man: there was no reserve labour these days—no girls who could milk cows and work on a farm; they were all in factories, or offices or hotels.

Cowmen were his greatest difficulty: they were apt to get into debt, and then one day walk off at a few days' notice or less. If only for this reason, he preferred to pay a bit extra for married men. His head was above water; he was 'on top of his land'—he had never let it get 'on top of him.' He knew exactly how each field responded to wet or dry seasons, to lime or chalk or slag, to deep steam-ploughing, and to various crops. He had watched it for twenty years: that was the secret of success, and that was why he had no

good opinion of the common-sense of those who preached land nationalisation as a cure for British agriculture. It was because the land was his own that he held it dear in a sense that no man can feel about stocks and shares.

I walked for some way with a gamekeeper: we passed his rogues' gallows, as he called a fence hung with his trophies—owls, great and small, kestrels, weasels, stoats and a couple of jays (foxes were, of course, preserved as carefully as pheasants). I wondered how far, on a basis of national economy, apart from the cash value of sport as an amenity, the preservation of game upsets the balance of Nature to the detriment of farming. The keepers' enemies are farmers' friends, for they prey on rabbits and rats, voles and mice—all voracious pests.

At the next farm I found the village schoolmaster taking tea with the owner, who had supplied milk to his pupils long before milk-in-schools schemes were common. Nearly half his children preferred, and were given, proprietary foods, delivered in packets, to milk. One in ten got free milk on grounds of poverty in the family. He thought it did good; but not as much as doctors and others had hoped. There was no substitute for regular meals at home, plentiful and plain, and, above all, plenty of sleep. Modern road conditions made many villages intolerably noisy for twenty hours out of the twenty-four in summer, and summer-time had done no good to children.

What did I think of the policy of taking children at eleven years from villages to senior schools, miles away, by omnibus or otherwise? He gave his own views with great earnestness. It had done great harm: some villages were being deprived of their schools, others of their schoolmasters; and 'You will admit that nowadays the schoolmaster is a more important person than the parson.' The influence of the headmaster out of school hours was a great power for good in many villages: 'old boys' looked to him for advice long after they had left school, sometimes when they had reached man's estate. Any probation officer would confirm what he said.

'Most of our County Education Committees,' he concluded, 'live, not in towns, but in rural parishes. They are Conservatives; but what are they conserving? Village

life is going down: what are they doing to bring it up? It's no good just building village-halls—repairing the stable once the horse has left. Housing and halls, and water and drains and electric light, are all to the good, but have not stopped the flight from the land—as the figures since 1931 show—for those that need them most get them last. If there's one thing Conservatives should have conserved it's the land.'

The farmer and his son nodded approval; and an old stockman, who had stopped repairing a rubber-tyred trolley for milk-churns in order to listen, drove home the schoolmaster's winged words—'the goads and nails fastened by masters of public assemblies'—by observing that he had brought up five children and only one was on the land now; the rest, against their desire and his, had left to better themselves.

I made the best defence I could for these results of our parliamentary system and took my leave by a short cut to the next village. Not far from the point where I regained the road my eye fell on a packing-case against a six-foot wooden fence separating private property from the main road, and I wondered idly who put it there, and why.

Two hours later on my way home in the omnibus I passed the same spot: on the footpath, leaning against the fence, was a youth on his cycle; on the opposite side appeared the head of a comely maiden. So that mystery was explained. A girl cannot walk out every evening of the week.

I called in turn upon a landowner and a rector, installed in a small house, newly built by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, who had sold the old rectory, with its spacious garden and panelled rooms. There was little room for books in the new rectory, or for children; in fact, it was in all respects modern. The rector and his wife were comparatively fresh arrivals, but no strangers to the county: they had much of interest to tell me which I cannot here record. I noted with pleasure that the church was in better order than when I had first visited it, and its notice-board was no longer cluttered with irrelevant and, to my mind, irreverent slogans equating the views of the League of Nations Union with the Will of God and the League of Nations with Christianity.

My last call was at an inn severely damaged by fire soon after midnight one Sunday morning after a crowd of visitors

from London had left. The burned-out rooms had been left untouched: the proprietor told me his woes; the insurance company's man had called at once with a cheque-book, ready to pay cash—at his own figure—for damage done by fire, but not by smoke or water. There had been correspondence, but no settlement. What should they do? I advised them to put the matter into the hands of a solicitor and to act on his advice.

* * * * *

On Sunday, September 4, I went, with two future cadets, to the Royal Military College, Camberley, to witness the annual parade of representatives of the South-Eastern Region of the British Legion, together with the gentlemen cadets of the college under Major-General Eastwood, the present commandant. Nearly 5000 men from 200 branches were present, each branch with its own standard. The salute was taken before church parade by Lieut.-General Lord Gort, V.C., and later by Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, President of the Legion.

The contrast between the uniformed cadets and the bemedalled veterans in civilian attire—retired officers and former private soldiers ranking alike to-day as comrades of the Great War—struck to some a note of sadness. But as the cadets passed the saluting point the cry of the Spartan host rang in our ears, 'What you were, we are: what you are, we shall be'; and I thought of Renan's saying:

Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel. Deux choses qui, à vrai dire, ne font qu'une, constituent cette âme, ce principe spirituel. L'une est dans le passé, l'autre dans le présent. L'une est la possession d'une riche légende de souvenirs, l'autre le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de faire valoir l'héritage qu'on a reçu indivis. Un passé héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire (j'entends la véritable), voilà le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale. Avoir des gloires communes dans le passé, une volonté commune dans le présent, avoir fait des grandes choses ensemble, vouloir en faire encore, voilà la condition essentielle pour être un peuple. On aime en proportion des sacrifices qu'on a faits, des maux qu'on a soufferts. On aime la maison qu'on a bâtie et qu'on transmet. Le chant spartiate 'Nous sommes ce que vous fûtes, nous serons ce que vous êtes,' c'est dans sa simplicité l'hymne abrégé de toute patrie.

The cadets, who had just cheered the Legion, were heartily applauded as they marched past by the crowd, who reserved a special cheer for those new arrivals who had not yet received their uniform. It is a small point, but I find it hard to believe that cadets could not be fitted with ready-made uniforms from store within seventy-two hours. At present they have to spend a month in 'civvies'—a great handicap, and one which could, I feel sure, be avoided. It does not occur, I believe, at Dartmouth.

A great crowd had assembled. A British Legion parade has nothing in it of pageantry, but no voluntary association in England is more firmly rooted in public esteem. A Union flag and a standard were in turn dedicated by the chaplain, who prayed, in the case of the latter, that it might be a sign of our duty towards our King and Country in the sight of God, and a symbol of the service the British Legion is called to render.

We prayed, too, that

all we who here do honour to the memory of our brethren's loyal sacrifice may be filled with the spirit of their love and courage and, forgetting all selfish and unworthy aims, may live together to the glory of God and in the service of our fellow-men.

Upon this note, after a short address, the service ended: the host dispersed. I entered the college by the main portico, under the royal cipher of George III., for the first time since 1903, and passed through its stone-flagged corridors, once so familiar.

After luncheon with a hospitable instructor, whose father had befriended me in India in 1903, I was taken to the old gymnasium, now one of the finest libraries that I have seen—spacious, well lit, and furnished with art and imagination. If any reader of these lines wishes to find a home for some really fine military paintings, he will be well advised to offer them to the commandant and lucky if they are accepted.

If any collectors of medals and decorations, or any man or woman who understands what they stand for in history and in imagination, wishes to secure immortality, let him present to this library a complete set of British Empire military medals and decorations for gallantry and for distinguished and meritorious service.

I made a pilgrimage, too, to the R.M.C. chapel, the Army officers' Valhalla—without equal, I believe, in any land. It is more than twice as large as it was when I was there: the names on the marble walls recalled poignant memories; the names of my friends and contemporaries were to be found on almost every panel. Certain names, in particular, occur again and again in campaigns in the 'fifties, the 'eighties, the early years of this century, and the world and subsequent wars. Four generations have left their mark here. I pray that it may ever be so. On the chancel arch are inscribed Horace's words, '*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*' The Latin tag is only appropriate when taken out of its context, for Swift thus rendered the whole passage:

How bless'd is he who for his country dies
Since death pursues the coward as he flies;
The youth in vain would fly from fate's attack,
With trembling knees and terror at his back.

A retired sergeant-major was showing the chapel to his friends, pointing out the names of officers he knew. He summed up Horace's four lines in as many words:

'One only dies once.'

* * * * *

While Mr. Chamberlain talked to Herr Hitler I walked in Hertfordshire. The sky was bright, the air was cool; tractors were already harrowing freshly ploughed fields which only ten days ago were covered with sheaves. I did not see a single horse plough. Twin steam engines, invisible to me and to each other, were harnessed to the gaunt steel frame which cuts four furrows at a single pull:

. . . wi' 'is kittle o' steām

Huzzin' an' maāzin the blessed feālds wi' the Divil's oān teām.¹

It reared itself on the horizon like a prehistoric animal before disappearing down the farther slope. I could hear the sharp whistles which marked the end of each course.

I called at a farm: the owner was ploughing; I sought him out and we exchanged views. He reminded me of the difference between the price of bread and of wheat now, as

¹ Tennyson, *Northern Farmer. Old Style.*

compared with 1914, and between the price of offals and of wheat. The 'spread' was too great: the millers' monopoly was complete. Rationalisation had helped them, but no one else. The fertility scheme, with subsidised slag and lime, was good, but farmers could not make full use of it unless prices were guaranteed over a long period.

The vicarage was a mile distant; an ancient footpath and right-of-way ran straight from the farm to the church across leys and linches, over ditches and through a long narrow strip of an ancient woodland in which the common rights to graze pigs and take wood, mentioned in *Domesday Book*, are still exercised by the people of the parish.

I found the vicar at home, but preoccupied, for in this parish they maintain the older custom of celebrating the harvest festival on a weekday. Produce was still arriving at the church door, where willing hands took charge of it. The harvest festival finds no place in the Book of Common Prayer; yet, with Rogation Days earlier in the year, and with other appointed days, it was once part of the rhythm of life in all Europe. To worship God without admitting any relation between man and the universe—the succession of the seasons, the turn of the year, the times of sowing and reaping, of lambing and of garnering—is to deprive religion of its significance and reality. Life in the city, which knows none of these things, breeds cranks and fanatics, starved of man's birthright.

At the foot of the war memorial in the churchyard I read:

It is better for us to die in battle than to behold the calamity of our people (I. Macc. iv. 59).

To whom, I wondered, would that text appeal to-day?

* * * * *

I was fortunate, an hour later, to find a friendly butcher in his yard. He greeted me warmly: he had just 'got through with' half a dozen young porkers which had 'turned out well.' He showed me the carcasses, explained their good and weak points—length, depth of fat over the back, weight of leg, and so on. We talked of central slaughter-houses: he was, on the whole, against them, except perhaps for beef and for large cities. He bought his animals from farmers within a few miles: he 'walked them home.' He knew how

to use every bit of a beast to the best advantage: his small *clientèle* had varied tastes. His wife made pies: he made several sorts of sausage, and could make the most of tripe and chitterlings and other delectable morsels. 'People round here,' he said, 'live pretty well: their wives are better cooks than in the town where I was last; in some places they only know how to use prime joints. Hereabouts they can make the most of every bit, and I can let them have everything, short of a prime joint, cheaper than imported stuff; but there—there's lots of folk who have forgotten, if they ever knew, what well-cooked fresh meat is like. They have got so accustomed to second-class stuff they don't recognise the best when they get it—just like men who drink red biddy have no use for whisky.'

The shadows began to lengthen fast as I left one valley for the next: pigeons scared by gun fire flew noisily from a copse to the stubble, disturbing coveys of partridges; pheasants scuttled from me on the other side of the hedge.

Such country within twenty miles of Westminster, on such a day, is a true *ψυχῆς ἰατρειὸν*—medicine for the soul. My goal was soon in sight for, though uplifted, I was thirsty. 'The Rose and Crown' lay snugly at the cross-roads in the valley marked by a hamlet known as 'The Pound,' though the enclosure for the custody of stray beasts has disappeared with the oncoming of cheap wire fences.

Over the door I saw a new name painted, across the bar a new face. The former publican, I learned, had retired: his comely daughter assisted her young husband to manage it. A few minutes later he arrived on his cycle: he was 'in the building trade' and engaged on a row of council houses in a village five miles distant. A man with a young family could not get a living as a publican in a small place: it was not a whole-time job, anyway. He spoke warmly of the new houses being put up by local councils: though the rent, at 8s. 10d. a week, was too high for those who needed them most. 'The building trade is doing a job of work for the old country,' he said proudly; 'I reckon we have rehoused nearly half England since 1920.' On my return I looked up the figures^a: by the end of 1938 the total number of houses built since January 1, 1920, in Great Britain and Northern

^a *Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom, 1937.*

Ireland by public and private enterprise will be well over 4,000,000—sheltering, say, 16,000,000 persons out of a population of 45,000,000. So he was not far wrong. But we need at least another 2,000,000 houses, particularly in Scotland and Wales.

He turned the conversation to the day's news. By going to see Herr Hitler, Mr. Chamberlain had 'got round the corner.' The way the newspapers of the world, so far as he could make out, were whipping up public feeling was something wicked. 'They' might have had a war yesterday, but they would not get one to-morrow, now that people had had time to think what was at stake.

* * * * *

A grey-haired man in corduroys cycled up and walked in with heavy step for a 'pint.' I introduced myself: he spoke freely. He was seventy-three, and cycled ten miles a day or more to one job after another. He could scythe and thatch, fix tiles and slates, paint and plaster. He preferred odd jobs to working for one farmer: he was his own master and, year in year out, made more money that way, for he had the skill that younger men often lacked. He had never been to 'the labour': farmers knew him and just sent him a postcard when he was wanted. He took 1s. an hour on some jobs, 1s. 6d. on others, and extra at harvest time. 'If I could not get a job,' he concluded, 'I would go on the road: I'm not the sort that could sit down and starve on 10s. a week or scrounge for sixpences. I want to be free.' He had another pint with me, then got the barman to fill an empty bottle with beer for to-morrow's lunch, and rode slowly homewards down the road.

'He's a character,' said the barman when he left, 'but he's well liked: he'll never go on the road; he talks that way, but he's got a bit of money put by, I reckon. He's in here every day for a pint to drink and one to take away. He's particular over what goes into his dinner pail and his pipe: I've never seen him ill, and he's got an allotment and a good Sunday suit.'

The omnibus drove up, dropping a group of workmen: I entered. The conductor at once began to talk of the chances of war. Our job was to be strong and to look after our own

possessions. Mr. Chamberlain had done the right thing, and had chosen the right moment: he had read all the papers and formed his own conclusions. He was patriotic and had served in the war, he said: he would stand no nonsense from these dictators, but this was not a good, clear case. He wished that the men, and women too, who wrote little letters to the papers and spoke from the foot of Nelson's monument, could be the first sent to fight. He reminded me of one of Æsop's fables:

A trumpeter, taken prisoner in battle, begged for quarter, protesting that he bore no arms but only his trumpet. 'For that very reason,' replied his captors, 'we spare you not for, though you never fight, with that wicked instrument you excite animosity in others.'

There are difficult moments and, perhaps, months ahead, but I firmly believe peace with justice to be nearer now than for twenty years. If it be achieved, as I believe it will be, the way will lie open for a great advance in the standard of living in Europe and this country, which, let us never forget, lies at the root of many international disputes. But commercial rivalry in the world's markets will become yet keener: it is not too soon for us to bend all our energies to the task of eliminating waste in every department of official and business life in order that we, whose life depends on exports, may not be found lacking in competitive ability. With these words I take respectful leave, in an editorial capacity, of my readers.

ARNOLD WILSON.

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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AFTER MUNICH

It will be many months before we can correctly assess the results of the Munich settlement. There are those to-day who have already abandoned themselves to unutterable dismay, who have rolled up the map of Europe, and who are convinced that after this second and more terrible Austerlitz our authority in Continental affairs has passed for ever. There are others who are still able to maintain an attitude of bright hopefulness and who contend that, although it may be true that Herr Hitler will henceforward rule the Continent, yet Britannia will still rule the waves. Surely it is possible, even without being in the position to appraise the ultimate results of Munich, to steer some middle course between these two extremes of hope and of despair?

It is essential, if any reasonable balance-sheet is to be drawn up, to admit from the outset that Germany has secured a resounding diplomatic victory and a tremendous accretion

of power. The English mind is all too apt to escape from the hard road of unpleasant reality into the adjoining meadows of self-deception. It is but slight avail in this our danger to comfort ourselves with such excuses as the artificiality of Czechoslovakia, the need of appeasement, our state of unpreparedness, or that dumb longing for Britain's friendship which was observed in the eyes of the watchers at Bad Godesberg. It may be true that the Czechoslovak Republic was a heterogeneous entity; yet it is also true that as a democratic and economic organism it was as sound as Switzerland and that as a fortress of strategic defence it was as vital as Gibraltar. It may be true that some violent gesture of conciliation was necessary if Europe were to be jerked out of a nose-dive into Armageddon; yet it is also true that there is a wide difference between appeasement and the justification of violence. It may be true that the condition of our defences was such that we should have been exposed, during the first months of war, to very serious disadvantages; yet such an argument, while it offers an explanation, does not constitute an excuse. It may be true that the great mass of the German people felt dumbly that their Führer for no apparent reason was risking the ordeals of a second world defeat; yet it is also true that the overwhelming success of his temerity has changed that dumb anxiety into a conviction that never again need his people doubt the certainties of their leader's somnambulism.

Let us therefore reject such comfortable evasions and face with unflinching eyes the effect of Munich upon Germany, upon Europe and upon ourselves.

It is essential in the first place to adjust our vision to the true proportions of the Czechoslovak controversy. One of the more frequent forms of escapism has been the fiction that this crisis was concerned solely with the problem of the Sudeten Germans. If approached from that local angle, the issue can be minimised by arguments regarding the actual merits of the case. If all that was at stake had been, in fact, the prevention of three and a half million Germans from joining the Reich, then there are many considerations which could be adduced to show that Munich was no more than an unpleasant but salutary surgical operation. It has been contended under this heading that in any case, as Lord Runciman

himself averred, it had become impossible for the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans to continue to live in amity within the same borders; that by the Munich settlement the transference of territory was effected without bloodshed; that Czechoslovakia has emerged from her operation as a more 'homogeneous' organism and that under our guarantee she can look forward to a humble but perfectly secure continuance of life; and that in any case it was impossible to expose Europe to a second German war upon an issue which the peoples of France and Great Britain did not regard as an interest directly affecting themselves.

Those who employ these arguments are either consciously or unconsciously ignoring the true proportions of the controversy. Had the issue really been confined to the allegiance of the Sudeten Germans, then assuredly the Munich settlement was one which should have been accepted with resignation if not without regret. The issue was not so confined. Herr Hitler had three objectives in mind. The first was the incorporation of the Sudeten Germans within the Reich. The second was the destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic as an independent State. And the third was to make it clear to the smaller Powers that Germany, and not Great Britain, was the dominant Power in Europe.

Had the British Government been less optimistic regarding the intentions of Herr Hitler, they would from the first have approached the problem with these three objectives in mind. They would have realised from the outset that, whereas some transaction might be possible upon the first of the Führer's three points, the second and third went far beyond the scope of any local adjustment and raised in an acute form the conflict between democracy and the totalitarian State. It may be the fact that the condition of our defences was such that we could not risk such a conflict. Yet the condition of those defences must assuredly have been known to the Prime Minister when he issued his challenge of March 24, when he permitted Sir John Simon to repeat that challenge four months later, and above all when he took upon his own shoulders the dramatic championship of that tremendous cause. Either he was prepared, having obtained the opinion of his service advisers, to assert our authority, or he was not so prepared. If he was, then he should not have surrendered

at Munich. If he was not, then he should have done everything in his power to evade the challenge and to restrict the issue to the mere problem of frontier rectification.

Nothing is so impertinent as to be wise after the event, nor can any purpose be served by criticism of past action. Yet if we are to appraise the future, we must assess the present, and we must start by admitting that Germany has, by the demonstration of amazing will-power, achieved each of her three objectives.

The Sudeten Germans have been incorporated within the frontier of the third Reich, bringing with them something like 800,000 Czechs. That was perhaps inevitable. It is the second and third of Herr Hitler's objectives that I now wish to examine.

In actual territory the Führer has obtained substantially more than what he asked for at Bad Godesberg. True it is that in the region of Leitmeritz and in the Taus area the territory now occupied is less than that laid down in the Bad Godesberg line. Yet there are other points, and notably in the direction of Prague and Brno, where the Munich zones exceed the Bad Godesberg zones, and on a general computation it would seem that as a result of the Munich settlement Germany has obtained more valuable territory than was demanded by the Bad Godesberg ultimatum. Herr Hitler's triumph in regard to the demarcation of the new frontier has been complete.

Not only has he obtained the whole Czech Maginot line with its expensive artillery; not only has he acquired a frontier which gives him a complete strategical domination over what remains; not only has he been able to prove to the Czech people that Dr. Benesh and all he stood for must now succumb; not only has he made it clear that no Czech Cabinet will be tolerated unless it be completely subservient to the will of Berlin; but he has acquired absolute control over the economic life of the country. Having downed his victim, he has now been enabled to bind him hand and foot.

It is true, of course, that the future Czech State will retain a certain proportion of its assets. The Czechs will still have their Slovak timber, their breweries, their machine factories and their cement works. But they will lose their textile industries and as much as 70 per cent. of their glass industry. They

will also lose most of their lignite, and Poland will acquire much of their Ostrau-Karvin black coal. It is true also that now that Bohumin junction is in Poland the Czech State will retain an alternative egress through Poland. Yet these slight palliatives will not affect the central fact that Czechoslovakia, in spite of the Bank of England, can only survive economically as an adjunct of the Reich. How far the Germans will emphasise this advantage remains to be seen. If they are wise, they will wait until the apricot drops into their basket. But in their present mood they are not inclined to a policy of patience. It is more probable that they will wish to incorporate Czechoslovakia within their own currency and tariff system. Should they decide upon such a course, there seems little hope that the Czechs will be able to create an alternative system by appealing to London or Paris and by creating an economic block from their fellow-victims of the Little Entente. I can see small hope of preventing Czechoslovakia from becoming a political and economic dependency of the Reich.

So much for Herr Hitler's first two objectives. He has secured the Sudeten areas, and more than the Sudeten areas, as an actual acquisition in territory and man-power. He has rid himself for ever of any military menace which Czechoslovakia, by its defences and geographical position, might have offered. The security which this gives him on his eastern frontier enables him to fling vast organs of power towards the west. The barrier against his advance towards the Danubian basin has been thrown down. His economic situation has been immensely fortified. His capacity for endurance has been enhanced.

Such victories, astounding though they be, are local victories. They are Central European and, as such, not directly effective upon British opinion. It is Herr Hitler's third triumph which raises the whole issue between liberty and force.

Owing to that terrible thing the chain of circumstance, the Czechoslovak issue became a test case in the conflict between the Nazi-Fascist theory and the democratic theory. Unfortunately, perhaps, the British Government decided that it was upon this ground that they would offer battle. They despatched their champion upon this tremendous tournament,

and he returned defeated. The results of this discomfiture will be immense.

The struggle, which was watched by all the world, centred upon the issue whether violence, and the threat of violence, were in fact the decisive factors in international affairs. The British Government, possibly without foresight, were edged into the position of becoming the protagonists of the one theory as against the other. The problem ceased to be a Czech, or even a European, problem; it became a world problem. The forces were demonstrably arrayed. On the one hand, you had England, France and Russia, supported by the desires, and even the determination, of all the small Powers and morally encouraged by the United States; and on the other hand, you had Germany and Italy confident only in the superior quality of their own unity and will-power. The battle, owing to regrettable mismanagement, was narrowed down to personal combat. And Hitler won.

It is possible to exaggerate the effect of this victory. There are many people who derive hope from the fact that the German people were patently anxious lest war should result. But was it really war of which they were so frightened? Is it not more probable that what they feared was that Germany might, as against such a combination, be again defeated? The dumb eyes of the crowd at Munich and Bad Godesberg conveyed to Mr. Chamberlain the impression that they were appealing to him to save them from war. Was that a wholly correct impression? Might it not be that the message which that silent appeal sent out to him was 'Save us from a second defeat'? He provided them with that salvation. Yet when the next crisis arises it will not be of defeat that the German public will be thinking but of vindictive victory.

It is true, also, that many of the more serious people in Germany, and notably the General Staff, were alarmed by the *nachtwandlerische Sicherheit* of the Führer and looked to our resolution to mitigate these risks. Yet, as Dr. Goebbels has since boasted, the hesitations of these intellectuals have been shown to have been unnecessary. The somnambulist certainty of Herr Hitler has again proved to be inspired.

Even more important is the effect of this victory upon the smaller Powers. The Baltic States, the Balkan States, the Scandinavian States, Holland, Belgium, and the Middle East

had up till that moment hoped that there would come a point at which Great Britain would show that she was still the deciding Power in European affairs. Munich has proved to them that Germany is the deciding Power. Inevitably they are questioning whether it would not be wiser, before it is too late, to make their terms with Berlin.

These pessimistic conclusions must be qualified. That the German people should have had a moment of doubt (even though that doubt was immediately and triumphantly dispelled) is a definite gain. It may recur. Nor should we forget that Mr. Chamberlain personally is regarded in Germany as the protagonist of peace. His name, his influence, have achieved what Germans call '*Resonanz*.' That is certainly an asset.

The smaller Powers, also, while they are impressed more than ever by the power of Germany, are more than ever alarmed. Their capitulation (and I see no other course before them) will not be a willing capitulation. If we can recover our strength, then our prestige will be waiting for us round the corner. We must at the moment make no promises, or encourage no resistance, which we cannot fulfil or fortify. But upon our side there will for long remain formidable elements of revolt.

We must face the fact that we have abandoned a great fortress of security in Central Europe. We must face the fact that Herr Hitler's personal position in his own country has been immensely increased. We must face the fact that the smaller Powers may now be obliged to capitulate and that Germany will within a few weeks acquire an economic hold over South-eastern Europe such as will render her almost impervious to anything but the most protracted blockade. We must face the fact that our own authority upon the Continent has declined almost to vanishing point. And we must recognise that were Germany wise enough to proceed slowly with the exploitation of her conquest, to lull us meanwhile into a sense of false security, the British public would as a man, and above all as a woman, adhere to the appeasement theory.

Yet there are other considerations. It may be true that in certain districts in this country the fear of aerial bombardment has become an obsession. A certain amount of panic,

with its electoral consequences, was assuredly created. Yet that panic was neither so deep nor so wide as many pessimists had supposed. The physical relief occasioned by the Munich settlement was justifiably immense. Yet when these emotions had passed, there emerged underneath them a widespread sense of shame, a deep sense of anger, and a perfectly calm decision that such a humiliation must not occur again.

Had Germany understood this tide of opinion in this country, she could have diverted it into channels which were profitable to herself. She did not understand it. Having knocked this country down, she proceeded to kick her in the stomach. That was an error, not of taste only, but also of politics. There existed a great body of opinion in Great Britain, as in America, which felt that the policy of appeasement had been justified and that reconciliation with Germany was now the only course. Herr Hitler could easily have exploited that emotion. He did the opposite. He went out of his way to sneer at our Palestinian difficulties; he indicated that he would not permit us to select as our Cabinet Ministers those persons of energy or acumen who had been proved to be right; and he allowed his Press to indicate that our armament programme would be regarded as an unfriendly act and that henceforward Great Britain must realise that she had no further voice in the affairs of Europe. Such menaces were not only vulgar, but unwise. They suggested to millions of people in Great Britain that it was not merely our authority, but even our independence, that was being challenged. The confidence and influence of those who sincerely believe in a policy of 'friendship with Germany' were seriously undermined; and the public came for the first time to realise that our liberties were at stake.

The effect of Munich was to split this country into several camps. There were those who proclaimed that 'Chamberlain has had a resounding diplomatic triumph and we must now double our armaments in order to prevent the repetition of another such humiliating defeat.' There were those who said, 'At least we have avoided war.' There were those who regarded Munich as a great opportunity woefully mismanaged, and who felt that now that Germany had obtained control of Eastern Europe she had in fact become invincible. And there were those who felt that we had learnt a great lesson,

that we now understood the true nature of our danger, and that we must unite to defend our liberties with our back against the wall.

It is this last school, I would suggest, which represents the more sensible and virile elements of the population. It is the belief that this view is the truly national view that tempts me to seek the middle path between escapism and despair.

Any discussion of British foreign policy after Munich must start from the assumption that this settlement represented a definite breach with our traditional principles. For 250 years it has been an axiom of policy that this country should, by its own strength and by diplomatic arrangements, prevent any single Power or group of Powers from obtaining the mastery of Europe. The effect of that axiom is often exaggerated or misunderstood. It is not historically true to say that we were by some law of nature always compelled to combat the dominant Power on the Continent. Nor would it be correct to assume that we were invariably obliged to prevent the Low Countries from falling into the hands of any possible enemy. What is incontestable is that for 250 years we have striven to prevent any possible enemy from acquiring such a position on the Continent as would enable him to threaten our trade or our maritime communications.

It would indeed be optimistic to suppose that Germany's political and commercial drive towards the East is not a grave menace to our commercial interests. It would be even more optimistic to imagine that the Berlin-Rome axis does not endanger our Imperial communications. Nor can we hide from ourselves the fact that the Balance of Power has shifted to our detriment. We have abandoned both the pre-war balance of the Triple Entente between France, Russia and ourselves; and we have also abandoned the post-war balance which was represented by the League of Nations. This relinquishment of our old landmarks may or may not have been necessary. That is not the point. The point is that the methods by which in the past we have sought to establish our security have now been jettisoned. Some new formula will have to be found.

The isolationists find that formula in the theory that we are in fact an oceanic and not a continental Power and that we can maintain our independence and authority by the use of

our naval supremacy, by close collaboration with the Dominions, and by allowing Germany to acquire and to digest the riches and the forces of the Continent. This theory offers temptations to many minds. It appeals to the xenophobe tendencies of the British people, it has the great merit of apparent simplicity, it flatters our pride of race, it comforts us with the fiction that our security is based upon the ocean that we love and not upon the intricacies of European affairs. Yet surely it rests upon a fundamental fallacy? Since the danger will arise, not from any desire on our part to intervene upon the Continent, but from a desire of the Continent to interfere with us.

I find it difficult to suppose that once Germany has reached the Bosphorus she will refrain from the desire to extend her influence over Turkey, Iraq and Iran. The armoured delivery wagon of the great emporium of the Reich will before long be seen at Haidar Pasha and a few months later will be on the Euphrates. This formidable penetration will be carried out with true Nazi speed, and while we are still waiting and wondering we shall find that the Continent has overflowed into Asia and that our oceanic supremacy is of slight avail.

Nor is this the only consideration. We should remember that this little island is the most vulnerable of all the Great Powers. Our commitments are enormous and dispersed; our dependence upon overseas supplies and commerce is a vital dependence. For whereas Germany or France can be defeated and still remain Germany and France, were once the British Empire to slip into a condition of subservience the whole fabric of our power would dissolve. In that event it would be of trifling value to inform the rapacious States that they must not lay a hand upon our rich booty since we had definitely decided to be isolationists in future.

A second formula is the formula of appeasement. It is based upon the assumption that Germany can become a 'satisfied' Power and that, by adjusting grievances, we can look forward to many years of amity and co-operation. The adherents of this doctrine must have been somewhat shaken by Herr Hitler's speech at Saarbrücken on October 9, when he demonstrated clearly that his ambition could not be glutted even by the most extreme concessions for more than a few

hours. It may well be that for the next few months we may be accorded an uneasy respite. But when the next challenge comes, it may come in a form which will render the peoples of Great Britain and the Empire indignant and dismayed. The outer fortifications have been pierced. The League of Nations, the Balance of Power, Spain, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, are crumbling before our eyes. We must retire to the keep. We must reorganise our scattered adherents, we must recover our discipline and our morale. We must prepare for the final attack.

Yet, what policy does such a necessity impose? Clearly, in our present condition, we cannot formulate any long-term policy. The most we can hope for is to devise some short-term policy such as will give us that national unity which is the vital pre-requisite of recovered strength. It is from this that the main problem arises, since no single policy that could be devised would command the assent of the Labour Party, the Liberal Opposition, the trades unionists, the pacifists, the isolationists, and the devotees of appeasement. A Four-Power Pact and the exclusion of Russia leaves us as junior partners in a most adventurous firm. The recreation of the League with French and Russian assistance would irritate without convincing our opponents. And isolationism, attractive though it may seem, is in fact not a policy but a negation of policy.

The middle course, to my mind, is to widen the issues by all possible means and to use all our diplomatic resources to secure the summoning of a world congress aiming at a settlement over the next five years. Should that prove dangerous or unacceptable, then nothing remains but to fall back upon our own resources. What are these resources?

In the first place strength, both physical and moral. Our physical strength necessitates our throwing into the task of rearmament all the resources of the country. It entails our resuming with France and Russia a co-ordinated policy such as we had in 1912. It implies the mobilisation upon our side of all democratic opinion and the lavish use of our financial resources to assist that mobilisation. Our moral strength lies in unity. The public mind must no longer be confused and divided by allowing any doubts to persist regarding the nature of our danger and the means by which it can be

averted. In the personality of Mr. Chamberlain we possess a popular asset. We must cease potting at him with pea-shooters and encourage him to those prodigies of energy and imagination which are now essential.

Then, as regards conciliation. It should be possible, now that the *Anschluss* has disturbed Italian opinion, to reach some agreement with Italy which may for a month or so diminish our Mediterranean dangers. It should be possible, with great caution, to reach some agreement with Germany which, while not sacrificing any vital principle, may at least convince the German people that we understand the magnitude of their power and are prepared to meet them on reasonable grounds. Yet in each case a line should be drawn beyond which we are not prepared to retreat. Where is that line? As regards Italy, it is Egypt. As regards Germany, it is (a) the Bosphorus and (b) our naval supremacy. Upon these, from the outset, we should make our stand.

HAROLD NICOLSON.

HITLER'S STRATEGY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

IN his speech to the German Reichstag on February 20, 1938, the German Chancellor made his first official reference to the Sudeten German problem. The passages of that speech dealing with the Austrian as well as with the Sudeten problem run as follows :

Over ten million Germans live in two of the States adjoining our frontiers. Till 1866 they were constitutionally united with the whole German people. They fought up to 1918 in the Great War, shoulder to shoulder with the German soldiers of the Reich. Under the terms of the Peace Treaty they were kept, against their will, from forming a union with the Reich. This in itself is sufficiently distressing. But about one thing there can be no doubt. The fact that they are now citizens of other States should not deprive them of their natural rights as members of a national community. Yet a people has the right of self-determination, as we were solemnly assured in Wilson's Fourteen Points which served as the basis of the Armistice. This cannot be overlooked simply because the people in question happen to be Germans! In the long run it is intolerable for a self-respecting World Power to be permanently deprived of its unity, and to know that across the frontier are kinsmen who have to suffer severe persecution simply because of their sympathy, their feeling of union, and their common point of view with the whole German people. Of course, we realise that a frontier settlement pleasing to all is scarcely possible in Europe. It should, therefore, be all the more important to avoid all unnecessary humiliation of national minorities, for it is quite enough that they are separated from their homeland without adding to this the distress of being persecuted merely because they belong to a different national community. We can prove that it is possible, with good will, to find ways of compensating—that is, of relieving the tension. If you try to prevent the solution of the problem in this way, and use force in so doing, then, one day, violence will be returned with violence. We cannot dispute the fact that as long as

Germany was feeble and powerless, she simply had to endure these persecutions of Germans across her frontiers. Just as England looks after her interests which cover a large part of the world, so also will the Germany of to-day look after her comparatively restricted interests. And amongst these interests of the German Reich there is the protection of those fellow-Germans who live beyond our frontiers and are unable to secure the right to a general freedom—personal, political, and ideological.

Statesmen in Czechoslovakia, France, and Great Britain felt that Hitler's speech contained little serious evidence for assuming that Germany had already made up her mind to pursue a policy of aggression towards Czechoslovakia. Hitler's references to the possibilities of compensating and relieving the tension were received with some satisfaction and the hope that his policy, in supporting the Sudeten Germans, was only aiming at a peaceful settlement of the problem in the framework of the Czechoslovak State. The Austrian lesson hardly helped to increase certain doubts, for Hitler, after his victory there, once again stressed his will for peace; while Field-Marshal Göring made certain special assurances to Czechoslovakia.

For the German leaders, Hitler's speech of February 20 has perfectly fulfilled its purpose, as it made the Sudeten question an international problem and it helped the German High Command to veil their own unalterable goal. This was the decisive point. Their final aim was to destroy Czechoslovakia as a factor in European affairs. Since the National Socialists came to power there have never been any doubts amongst their leaders on this subject. But it had to be risked, if success was to be certain. If necessary, it had to be denied and disavowed until the moment for action had come. Thus, until Godesberg, neither Great Britain nor France, nor even Czechoslovakia, had ever received any German suggestions which might have been regarded as a constructive contribution towards a settlement of the Sudeten question. Even less than that, the State which, on the grounds of its 'racial and national mission,' has claimed to be the protector of a 'terrorised minority' (which, in fact, did not only enjoy equal rights in their country, but misused these rights for terrorising all those parts of the population, Czechs or Germans, who disagreed with National Socialist policy)

has, during many months' struggle for a peaceful solution, withheld any declaration which might have made its position clear. And when at last, in consequence of German strategy, Czechoslovakia was forced from one concession to the other, and, in the end, had accepted the Anglo-French suggestions, Hitler produced his first offer in the form of the Godesberg ultimatum.

But in his speech, following the Godesberg discussions, on September 26, the German Chancellor said :

I have made Herr Benesh an offer. It is nothing more than the execution of what he has already accepted. Now he has war or peace in his hands. He will either accept this offer now and give the Germans their freedom at last, or we shall go and fetch this freedom.

The fact that his offer which Hitler referred to was entirely different from what Czechoslovakia had already accepted—namely, the Anglo-French suggestions—is plain. But it may not be irrelevant to these general facts, just when German propaganda sets out once more, to describe Hitler and his policy as though he were the only one who deserves credit for 'saving the peace.' The attitude of Germany cannot but be considered as the opposite of what German propaganda tries to make of it. If the idea of a peaceful settlement includes the 'peaceful destruction' of Czechoslovakia as an international influence, and the acquisition of territory for imperialist and strategic reasons, then, and only then, may German propaganda be right.

When Hitler opened the struggle against Czechoslovakia he felt strongly confident about the 'pro-German' attitude of the Sudeten German minority concerned. Years of intense preparation, the organisation of a rigid party body, obedient to National Socialist principles, made sure that the attitude of the Sudeten German population would be what the German High Command needed. Such an attitude was all the more likely as even a National Socialist minority, if well organised and clandestinely supported by German police and with weapons and military stores, were able to bring enough terroristic pressure to bear on a non-National Socialist majority. This the German leaders took into account. From February 20 the Sudeten German Party completely lost

their independence even in secondary questions. All its activities after this date were directed from Berlin. Berlin gave orders that the party leaders were to deal with the Sudeten problem as an internal matter, within the framework of the Czechoslovak State. Berlin indicated how much terroristic pressure could be applied by the party so as to make the internal position more acute. The degree of tension was determined by Berlin—Berlin either slowed down or accelerated the march of events.

Inside the Reich, and in particular after the success of the *Anschluss*, the influence of those who demanded the 'liquidation' of Czechoslovakia increased. The extremists in the National Socialist Party had made their demand long ago. It was now the demand of the Reichswehr which began to support the action full-heartedly, for the German General Staff is convinced that the level of armaments amongst the Western Powers will give Germany a free hand for 'minor activities' until the year 1940.

The plan was further supported by those National Socialist economists who, within the framework of the Four-Year Plan, feel responsible for the 'totalitarian rearmament' of the Reich, and who, under the leadership of the German Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Funk, aim at the economic domination of Germany in Central Europe and the Balkan countries largely because they regard this domination as extremely important for the German armament industry. So the preparation for action against Czechoslovakia did not meet with any serious difficulties on the 'home front.' There was more agreement on the subject than there had been in previous 'dangerous actions,' when either the army, or financiers or industrialists, or even certain sections of public opinion, seemed to advise caution instead of action.

The army itself has contributed its share to the unity of public opinion. In the instructional courses for reservists and regulars, the chances that Czechoslovakia would be able to resist were explained away as being very small. Lecturers 'gave' Czechoslovakia only 'a few days.' The 'lightning attack' on Czechoslovakia was represented as being an isolated procedure. The question of Russian support was simply disregarded, while the supports of France and Great Britain were, if at all, only mentioned as sure to arrive when

it would be too late. In spite of all the military experiences in Spain and China, the German political leaders seemed to rely on the views of the army in so far as a warlike solution played a part at all in their consideration. They were convinced that the defeat of Czechoslovakia would be another *fait accompli*.

Thus did Hitler himself judge the attitude of Czechoslovakia's allies and of Great Britain towards the problem. It is known that the Chancellor and his most intimate advisers and collaborators in foreign affairs have ever since been of opinion that action 'in the right moment' would keep France and Great Britain away from 'going to war on behalf of the 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans.' The working of the French-Czech and the co-ordinated Czech-Russian Pacts of Mutual Assistance against aggression seemed highly questionable to the German leaders. But they needed some kind of certainty. If Hitler wished his enterprise to be successful, he had to create a situation in which Germany would not appear to be the aggressor—a situation, too, in which the Powers would have to accept his demands, either because they would seem 'just,' or because no others would seem possible or practicable. The isolation of Czechoslovakia played an important part in this scheme. German propaganda was to present the 'untenability of Czechoslovak conditions' in such a way that the other interested Powers, after having exhausted their own efforts to find a solution, should be impressed by the German proposals as being the only way out. German policy and propaganda were to create these preliminary conditions for the action proper. They were carefully prepared from February to September, when Hitler addressed the Nuremberg Party Congress and Mr. Chamberlain arrived in Berchtesgaden. The preparations were but briefly interrupted by the crisis in May. It is probable that the 'movements of German troops' in May were nothing more than an attempt to influence the political outcome of the Czechoslovakian municipal elections by means of military pressure. For this purpose Germany concentrated military forces near the Czech border (it is certainly true that the German military measures were exaggerated in Prague; but it can be stated with just as much justification that Hitler's assertions that no special military

measures were taken did not correspond with the facts). Germany responded to the diplomatic and military warnings of May 21 with increased military preparations. The reaction of democratic world opinion and the manifestation of a united moral front with regard to aggressive German action against Czechoslovakia were analysed in Berlin with particular care. The effect was that Germany decided to intensify her propaganda with a view to splitting this united moral front. Dr. Goebbels, the German Minister of Propaganda, has never lost his confidence in his own activities. At a conference of German political leaders, a few days after May 21, under Hitler's chairmanship, Dr. Goebbels declared that he would be able to 'settle' the whole Czechoslovakian question by means of his propaganda alone. It cannot be denied that Herr Goebbels was right up to a point, but only to a point, because Germany's military activity, which began after the events in May, did not fail to make the desired impression on Czechoslovakia, France, and Great Britain. The mobilisation of more than one and a half million men was carried out in a certain exact conformity with the growing complications of the international situation—complications which Germany helped to promote with great skill and insight. The question of the Sudeten Germans developed according to an accurate plan, in co-ordination with the political and propagandist activities of the Reich and the Sudeten German Party. While the German army marched to the frontiers of Czechoslovakia (and while all the other mobilisation measures of Germany were being carried out), German policy frustrated all possibilities of a peaceful understanding, while German propaganda undermined the moral and political resistance of the outside world. The military procedure was quite clear. But German political and propagandist efforts need some explanation.

The political attitude of the Reich was unalterably directed by the principle of thwarting all possibilities of a settlement of the Sudeten question within the framework of the Czechoslovak State. This was achieved by designating as out of date, or as outstripped by recent events, any demand of the Sudeten Party in the very moment when it had been accepted or conceded by Prague as a result of mutual and normally binding negotiations. When such a phase was reached, the result had to be disavowed without delay. Whenever a

settlement appeared to be imminent, new and increased demands were put forward and supported by further pressure, as well as by growing terrorism in the Sudetenland.

For example, after Henlein's original demand for 'free civic rights' had been replaced (according to this method) by the further demand for local government under the first and second Hodza plan, this further demand was replaced by new claims to home rule. As the ever-increasing demands for home rule and for the fulfilment of the Carlsbad points were accepted by the Czechs under the influence of Lord Runciman and his collaborators, they were replaced by the demand for 'self-determination.' No valid reason or evidence has ever been given for this demand, either by Germany or by the Sudeten German Party.

This demand for self-determination was, in its turn, also treated as though it had been outstripped by events at the very moment when the British Prime Minister had arrived in Germany for his first visit to Hitler. According to the German interpretation, Henlein's new slogan, 'Back to the Reich,' had, once again, created a new situation. This situation, so Germany argued, could not but make it impossible for Mr. Chamberlain to conduct negotiations on a basis other than the basis of the new demand which was conveyed by this slogan—namely, the basis of cession. The discussions of Godesberg, a few days later, were again preceded by accomplished facts. In the night of September 21–22 formations of the Sudeten German Free Corps had, after disarming Czech police and officials, crossed the German-Czech border and attempted to occupy various places, particularly of Asch. Official buildings, post and telegraph offices and the railway station were seized. When the British and French representatives made inquiries about these proceedings they were told that the Czech authorities had voluntarily abdicated in the Asch district and had left the administration in the hands of Sudeten German officials.

The outcome of this political game would have been questionable without the most assiduous propagandist preparations. 'The task of propaganda,' Hitler argues in his book *My Struggle* (172nd edn., p. 200), 'is, e.g., not to balance the various rights, but to stress exclusively the one which is to be defended. It is not its duty to examine objectively the

truth and how far it is favourable to others, or to present it to the masses with academic frankness, but to serve its own (end) uninterruptedly.' 'The truth' in this case was a description of Czechoslovakia as a country whose internal circumstances threatened the peace of the world, whose existence was a danger not merely for the various nationalities living in the country, but also for the people outside—a country which built up her existence as an independent country from lies, treachery, crime and demoralisation.

Along these fundamental lines German propaganda was made to work by the will of its leaders. The untenability of political conditions in the Sudetenland as well as in Czechoslovakia had to be created *first*—and *then* proved by propaganda. The means for achieving these aims were those applied by German propaganda since the National Socialist régime has come to power. Press and wireless played the leading part. Day by day an enormous amount of false reports on alleged conditions in Czechoslovakia had to be printed or broadcast in a tone of utmost aggressiveness. No political or moral domain of State, social or individual life was spared in order to demonstrate, by means of distortion and direct or indirect falsification, the political, social and individual demoralisation of the Czech nation and its leading personalities. Without interruption or halt, a torrent of uncontrollable reports poured down upon the world which, standing against it. The nearer the crisis drew to its climax, the more destructive became these reports. Over two pages of the *Völkische Beobachter*, September 18, the following headline was printed (they are by no means unusual for the paper, and were, all of them, followed by articles which outshadowed, in their aggressiveness, all the propaganda of the Great War):

- 'Orgy of Murderous Sadism and Psychopathic Hatred.'
- 'The Streets of Prague will be Paved with Your Skulls.'
- 'Czech Bitches as Gunmen.'
- 'Running the Gauntlet through Bayonets.'
- 'Siege-guns Trained on German Towns.'
- 'Fierce Pursuit of Germans.'
- 'Dragged Off—whether Called Up or not.'
- 'Beaten to Death.'

- 'Father's Corpse Unburied.'
- 'Tied up like Animals.'
- 'Driven Bleeding on to the Roof of Moving Train.'
- 'Forced to Join Up and Shot Down in Cold Blood.'
- 'Czech Children Throw Bottles of Petrol.'
- 'Marxist Traitors.'
- 'Wireless Sets Stolen from Houses.'
- 'More Slovak Soldiers Cross into Germany.'
- 'Communists Uniformed and Armed.'
- 'What is Going On in the Graveyard at Eger?'
- 'Twenty-four Victims Shovelled Away in Secrecy.'
- 'Graveyard and Mortuary Guarded by Troops for Two Days.'
- 'All Visitors Turned Away.'
- 'Black List Murders.'
- 'Tricked and Shot by Czech Patrol.'
- 'Shots Along the Frontier.'
- 'German Consulate in Eger Cut Off.'
- 'Ministers' Bribes Whisked Away to Switzerland.'
- 'Mothers and Children Hunted Down, Separated, and Dragged Off.'
- 'Pursuit of Pregnant Woman with Eight Children.'
- 'Went Mad!'
- 'Desperate Act of Tortured Population.'
- 'New Fortified Positions.'
- 'Jewish Arms Depôts.'
- 'Moscow's Tool.'

When the present Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, General Sirovy, after Hodza's resignation on September 23, formed his first Cabinet, the *Völkische Beobachter* published a leading article with the headline 'Sirovy a Traitor by Profession,' and finished by saying:

'Treachery combined with sadistic cruelty amongst the armed Czechoslovak forces against the German and Hungarian prisoners of war living in Siberia, and was tolerated by the Bolsheviks. For ever, therefore, the name Sirovy will remain linked up with these two characteristics of the Czech people, treachery and cruelty against the defenceless. The first day of office has proved that the one-eyed blood-hound Sirovy is willing to live up to his reputation and his fame. Behind him stands Moscow, his chosen affinity.'

It must be remembered that this article was published in the main official organ in Germany, and the person described was the head of a Government of a sovereign country. The purpose of this propaganda becomes still more obvious if one

bears in mind that it was Germany who took the strongest diplomatic action and 'defensive measures' in Prague when, in August, an almost entirely unknown Slovak paper referred to the German soldiers of the World War as 'Huns.' On the other hand, diplomatic representations of any kind by Czechoslovakia as well as by France and Great Britain were disregarded in Berlin. According to Hitler and Goebbels, it was vital that German propaganda should be carried out with ruthless consistency, regardless of moral or ethical considerations. Public opinion at home and abroad, and the Governments of the interested countries as well, had to be persuaded that Czechoslovakia could not be kept alive, that she was in a condition of political agony, without, however, ceasing to be a danger to world peace. From this programme Germans would not depart by a hair's breadth. Propaganda was no less important than military, diplomatic and political efforts in the task of solving the Czechoslovak question to Germany's advantage. The climax of the campaign, however, was reserved for Hitler and his settling of accounts with Benesh. This had to come. As with Breitscheid and Stresemann, representatives of a 'corrupt system,' as with Max Braun, and, later still, with Schuschnigg, so it happened with Benesh. With him, the representative and personified will of a 'corrupt State' and a 'corrupt system,' with him, the 'intriguer,' Hitler wanted to measure his strength, just as he had measured his strength with former adversaries. The 'warmonger' Benesh had to face Hitler, the statesman, who never had desired anything but right and peace, and who would only consider a forcible solution if he was compelled to do so by—to use a new expression of Hitler's—'the war party.' This rhetorical settlement of accounts took place for the most part at a time when the fate of the Benesh 'system' had already been decided. It was carried out by familiar methods. The Chancellor's speeches were rich in self-appreciation, while they lacked any word of justice, humanity or conciliation for his adversary. His concluding words were typical: 'Two men face each other: there is Herr Benesh, and here am I! We are two people of a different sort. When during the Great War Herr Benesh sneaked from place to place in the world, I did my duty as a decent German soldier. And to-day I am facing this man as a soldier of my people.'

Hitler's settlement of accounts with Benesh took place during the period of his ultimatum which was to end on October 1. The German command did not actually believe in the possibility of general war at that stage. Great Britain and France had already gone too far, Germany felt, in recognising that the *status quo* was untenable, and that Germany had a claim to the Sudeten districts. ('And now at last England and France have placed before Czechoslovakia the only possible demand, to set the German area free at last and to give it up to the Reich.'—Hitler, September 26, 1938.) 'This memorandum' (the Godesberg demands), Hitler says in another part of his speech, 'is nothing else than the realisation of that which Herr Benesh had already promised, and he had done so under the widest international guarantees.' This equating of Benesh's promise (the Anglo-French suggestions) with his (Hitler's) ultimate demands at a time when all the Governments concerned were feeling the effects of long nervous strain, was well calculated to bring about the solution desired.

When the British Prime Minister arrived in Berchtesgaden on September 15, he faced a man who seemed only concerned about the fate of the threatened, persecuted Sudeten German population. Nothing seemed to move him more than the condition of this poor German minority, persecuted by the brutal Czechs. The conversation was planned entirely on this *leit-motiv*, and the keynote was provided by reports which, during the talks, kept arriving from Sudetenland. These reports gave Hitler an opportunity to enlarge further on the intolerable situation. Only when his partner suggested that in these circumstances an international discussion of the problem seemed no longer opportune did the discussion calm down, without, however, producing on the German side any practical suggestions for settling the question. In vague terms Hitler pleaded for a solution of the Sudeten problem, for the salvation of a terrorised minority, for their return to the Reich, and accompanied his pleas by the threat that he was prepared to wage a world war if necessary.

This procedure may have persuaded Mr. Chamberlain that the settlement of the Sudeten question meant to Hitler a matter of European peace or war. As a result of this impression the Anglo-French suggestions were delivered to

Czechoslovakia on September 18 and their acceptance demanded in what amounted to an ultimatum. These suggestions offered a 100 per cent. solution of the Sudeten German problem. This offer, however, was refused in Godesberg without examination. Here only Hitler 'got down to brass tacks' (the equivalent of '*fraktur sprechen*,' one of Hitler's favourite expressions). His Godesberg demands prove that the racial solution of the Sudeten problem, which had been in the foreground in the Berchtesgaden talks, was actually only a single item in the total of his demands. His strategic, economic and territorial demands were decisive, so was his purely imperialist policy, which had been kept in the background until then.

Hitler's Godesberg demands did not emerge spontaneously from the negotiations. They were, on the contrary, the result of long and careful preparations, carried out by the political and military chiefs, as well as by the directors of German economic policy. Just as in Berchtesgaden Hitler was prepared to wage a war on behalf of the racial issues of the Sudeten question, so, in Godesberg, he threatened to go to war for the imperialist solution. In Godesberg he declared, if a war were to break out about this question, he would take care that the future German Czechoslovak frontier should be drawn from other points of view than those adopted so far. Prague would then become a city in Germany. During the Four-Power Conference in Munich Hitler repeated his warlike threats, only adding that he would be prepared to go to war to keep up the date of his settlement.

The pressure of this threat was, he felt, bound to influence international policy and diplomacy, after matters had been pushed so far. The pressure went on, even after the Munich Agreement had been signed, in the negotiations of the International Commission nominated by the representatives of the Great Powers. This Commission, too, had to face the alternative: 'Either the German demands will be accepted, or we shall get what we want by force of arms.'

The success of their tactics induced Hitler and his lieutenants not to take the opportunity of displaying the German attitude towards other territorial questions in the course of these negotiations. All declarations and assurances with regard to Hitler's territorial aims have been vague and

hazy. In Godesberg as well as in Munich Hitler's vagueness about these matters, on the one hand, and his new tactical line, on the other, can be traced. He declared that, as German Chancellor, he would welcome many minorities back to the Reich, though some of the German minorities are too far away from its frontiers. Germany has, therefore, according to Hitler, renounced the return of the more distant German groups with a heavy heart. Hitler referred only to the 'impossible' ones, while with regard to the others, the 'possible' ones (Roumania, Poland, Lithuania, Denmark, Belgium, France, Switzerland), no essential assurances have been given. A certain scepticism towards former and recent assurances of German policy as being satisfied with regard to their territorial demands in Europe is natural, if one realises how they are interpreted by the German leaders in their internal discussions. For example, in these internal discussions Hitler maintains that the German-Polish frontier will remain final up to the time when Poland will voluntarily suggest a new demarcation of the frontier line. Poland's readiness for such voluntary proceedings can, of course, be promoted by Germany, directly or indirectly.

German strategy has brought about the success of the dictators by dictating the preservation of peace. What Great Britain and France knew about themselves, Hitler knew about Germany: he realised that Germany's military position would have had many weak points in the case of war. Germany's vulnerability in the air is still great. The Western fortifications were incomplete, the supply of raw material would have been problematic, the German reservists were ill-trained and there were great deficiencies in mobilisation measures, especially in the transport system. Yet the knowledge of these deficiencies did not result in a milder attitude or readiness for compromise on the German side. The fact that Germany estimated the war strength of the Western Powers very low accounted less for the German attitude than the conviction, frequently expressed by National Socialist leaders, that success goes to those who have the courage to venture on a dangerous policy.

J. W. STREET.

REMARKS OF A FRENCHMAN ON THE MUNICH AGREEMENT

I.

THE Munich Agreement drastically altered the territory of the Czechoslovak State. It leaves a greatly reduced country with no natural frontiers. Hitler also succeeded in bringing Czechoslovakia's independent and rather anti-German policy to an end.

Before October 1, 1938, Czechoslovakia was an independent State formed by the agglomeration of Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Subcarpathian Russians—somewhat centralised, and in which Czechs held a predominant rôle.

The German minority represents nearly 3,500,000 individuals. Geographically 850,000 of them live in Western and 800,000 in Northern Bohemia. Three other important groups in Southern Bohemia and Moravia aggregate over 400,000, and finally another mass of about 325,000 people lives in Northern Moravia and Silesia. About 2,500,000 Germans are concentrated in six groups, the balance being scattered over the country. It should also be mentioned that German inhabited districts are closely interwoven with others, where Czechs represent 50 per cent. or more of the population.

Czechoslovakia is a successor State of Austria-Hungary, and before the Munich Agreement inherited one-fifth of its territories, one-fourth of its population, and three-fourths of its industries: in particular, 93 per cent. of the sugar, 60 per cent. of the beer, 50 per cent. of the alcohol, 66 per cent. of the steel, and 80 per cent. of the textile industries. From an economic point of view this country was well balanced and almost self-supporting, and had a flourishing agriculture (35 per cent. of the population are farmers or live on farm products).

The republic was party to a pact of non-aggression with France on the one hand and with Russia on the other. These agreements were formulated so as to accord with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and particularly Article 16.

Czechoslovakia belonged to the Little Entente, of which Yugoslavia and Roumania are members. This combination was specially formed to defend the Treaty of Trianon which was concluded with Hungary in 1919, and to prevent infringements of its clauses. During the post-war period Czech leaders pursued a policy that aimed at the revival of the Austro-Hungarian entity. They were therefore strongly opposed to the restoration of the Habsburgs, and showed little or no comprehension of Austria's economic difficulties.

Czechoslovakia was one of the pillars of French foreign policy, of which the main features were the Covenant of the League of Nations and the regional pacts of mutual assistance, registered and approved by Geneva, and a friendly understanding with Great Britain. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Russia had agreements with France, so that in case of unprovoked aggression in Europe the parties would assist each other by military means. The purpose of this system was to prevent the forcible expansion of Germany. The Little Entente, in which French influence was all-important, was complementary to this system, and was meant to check any renewal of the military alliances between the former Central Powers.

The French system was the logical conclusion of the Versailles Treaty, having the Covenant of the League of Nations as keystone, the main idea being that territorial borders were definitely fixed and should only be modified by mutual consent.

The Austrian *Anschluss* has been a decisive blow to the system following the ominous military occupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. It had as a natural conclusion the German ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, which led to the Munich Agreement. The result from a political point of view is that France is confronted with a complete change in her relations in Eastern Europe. The League of Nations proved its impotence, nor did the network of pacts prove a sufficient barrier against the risk of war. A complete recon-

sideration of French foreign policy has therefore become essential.

The new conditions of Czechoslovakia create an economic and financial problem which will have to be solved. It is certainly premature to indicate solutions. But the magnitude and difficulty of the problems ought to be realised.

Before the Munich Agreement Czechoslovakia was mainly an industrial country. From now on she will remain a small agricultural entity. She certainly will be a greatly impoverished nation, as she will be severed from the territories where most of her industries were concentrated. The secession of districts where most of her export industries were located brings up an extremely difficult problem of adaptation to new conditions.

Coal mines were at the basis of the industry. The Ostrava-Karvina basin represented 70 to 80 per cent. of the total output, the major part of which is already occupied by the Poles, and the balance is also claimed by them. Another important mine lies west of Pilsen and furnished fuel for the Skoda steel works. It will be owned by Germany. Practically only the Kladno-Rakovnik basin will remain within the new boundaries. It represented only 15 per cent. of the total output. Nearly all the lignite located between Aussig and Karlsbad and in North-eastern Bohemia will pass into German hands.

The same applies to the kaolin output, supplying the important ceramic, chinaware, earthenware, and cement factories having their main locations in Karlsbad and Marienbad.

Germany will own the world's greatest glass industry by the absorption of Jablonec and Gablonz, representing 85 per cent. of the Czech glass industry. These two centres, the former being by far the larger, are highly equipped with most up-to-date material.

The best textile industries located in North-eastern Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia will also become German. The same applies to the old chemical and sugar industries located in Aussig and Schreckenstein. It should also be noted that practically the entire hydro-electrical industry, with all its fixed and semi-fixed equipment, and nearly all of the siderurgical industry, the entire radium, tin and tungsten production, will share this fate.

Czechoslovakia will still own two-thirds of her steel industry with Skoda, located at Pilsen, on the new German border. Large French interests are at stake there through the medium of the firm of Creusot. It is probable that Germany will insist that the ties with the French group shall be broken and that the exports of arms shall come to an end. Germany is in a position to exercise pressure, for she can cut off the supplies of iron ore—especially Swedish ore, as these supplies have to pass through German territory. Under these conditions the Munich Agreement brings up a most difficult problem regarding the Czech balance of trade. It was generally a creditor balance, as shown in the following table:

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN FOREIGN TRADE (in £1000)

Years		Exports	Imports	Balance
1929	. .	1714	560	+ 1154
1933	. .	605	185	+ 420
1936	. .	1337	411	+ 926
1937	. .	1845	675	+ 1170

The Czechs made strenuous efforts to improve their trade balance. The results were most encouraging, considering that their creditor balance for the first five months of 1938 was nearly 1,000,000,000 crowns, as compared with 170,000,000 for the same period of 1937.

The new conditions imposed by the Munich Agreement create new industrial, commercial, and transport problems.

Will Czechoslovakia build up a new industry? It seems impossible that she could create an industry having the magnitude and importance of the lost one. She no longer disposes of the raw material which sustained even the glass and earthenware industries still owned by her. All her hydro-electrical output is lost, so that readaptation with the remaining coal is necessary. The textile industry might be reorganised, but it will take time and will require the free importation of the necessary raw material. Most likely the wood and paper

industries will try to get reorganised further west, but this will require important capital. How this capital will be levied is a difficult question to answer.

With Skoda a large part of the steel industry is still in Czech hands, but serious difficulties are to be expected. The works may be able to do fairly good business without exporting arms, but the German steel industry will compete and play a prominent part, as the import and export routes are in the hands of the Reich. From a French point of view, imported Czechoslovakian goods represented in 1937 0.96 per cent. and in 1936 0.91 per cent. of the total French imports—*i.e.*, 407,836,000 and 230,961,000 francs respectively. As regards French exports, they were in 1937 1.76 per cent., against 1.70 per cent. in 1936.

Czechoslovakia ranked fifteenth in French exports in a total of 34. In 1937 the French trade balance with Czechoslovakia was a creditor one by 11,000,000 francs, against 33,000,000 in 1936. French exports consisted chiefly of wool, aluminium, chemicals and cotton yarns. The goods imported from Czechoslovakia were mainly paper paste, glass, crystal-ware and rubber goods. Unquestionably France will lose a valuable middle-sized customer.

The commercial difficulties bring up the transportation problem with which Czechoslovakia will be confronted. Where will the few goods go which she will be able to export? *Via* the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, Trieste, or the Balkans? All these routes are controlled by the Germans. Will they be free? Or is it likely that Germany will grant any economic facilities which might handicap her own economic penetration along the Danube? Germany will provide for the industrial requirements of the eastern agricultural countries and be paid by the barter system in the farm products which she lacks. Hitler's next step, in a more or less distant future, will be to build up a customs union with Prague and Budapest, but this, of course, is only possible providing Czechoslovakia does not recover a certain industrial independence. It is therefore our decided opinion that Germany will use every effort to prevent such an event. Herr Funck's visits in Eastern Europe are most typical examples of the Reich's economic aims and methods.

A brief survey of the monetary and financial condition of

Czechoslovakia is required. The Czechoslovakian crown has been very weak of late, and was affected by the recent events, and mainly by the expenses involved in the mobilisation of last March. The total circulation was 9,850,000,000, out of which 1,913,000,000 were coins, at the end of May 1938, against 6,812,000,000, with 1,024,000,000 coins, during the corresponding period of the previous year.

Czechoslovakia is the only country of Eastern Europe which has paid in full the interest charges on its debt. The amortisation of her internal debt had been suspended in 1934, and was to be resumed in 1938 with a lump sum of 150,000,000 crowns.

The total debt, both internal and external, was 44,754,000,000 in 1937, against 33,465,000,000 in 1931. The military expenditures account largely for this big increase. See table below.

TOTAL CZECHOSLOVAKIAN DEBT (in Million Czech Crowns)

	1931	1937
Consolidated . . .	21,843	28,007
Floating . . .	3,196	8,598
Total interior debt . .	25,039	36,605
External debt. . .	8,426	8,149
Total debt . . .	33,465	44,754 .

The large increase in the floating debt should be noted. A substantial part of the external debt, over 1,000,000,000 French francs, has been issued on the Paris market, with the guarantee of the French Government. It seems likely that to a certain extent this obligation might be claimed by the bondholders.

As regards the budget, the ordinary 1938 budget showed 10,120,233,070 crowns estimated revenue and 10,117,423,500 expenditure. The extraordinary budget to be covered by

borrowings was estimated at 3,508,688,300 crowns, of which 2,360,000,000 for national defence and 1,063,784,900 for the railroads, the balance for odd items. Two main problems have to be solved. Some device must be found to withdraw from circulation the Czechoslovakian crowns owned by the Germans, Poles, and Hungarians who will no longer be Czech citizens. Nothing has been provided as yet in that respect. Regarding the financial problem, will Czechoslovakia be in a position to meet her obligations after having been deprived of important sources of revenue, while neither Germany, Poland, nor Hungary has any kind of liability whatsoever? The answer does not seem dubious. The difficulties met in this respect after the Austrian *Anschluss* by Austria's creditors did not seem to have opened the eyes of the negotiators. Germany has now secured the surrender of all State-owned material in good condition without compensation, such as the obligation to take over the service charges of the debt used for the building of immovable plant and property.

II.

The importance of an independent Czechoslovakia was cardinal from a French military point of view. It should be borne in mind that the French never even consider the possibility of launching a preventive war. Therefore this country can only be a party in a conflict if Germany, or some allied country thereof, launches a non-provoked aggression. A limited war between Germany and some other European country is not conceivable. The strategical problem must therefore be considered in terms of a coalition war.

Before the Munich Agreement was signed, the Reich was in a position to use during the first hour of a conflict thirty divisions, four hours later four so-called '*Panzerdivisionen*' (armoured divisions), and six hours later a total of thirty-nine divisions; three days later sixty, and fifteen days later 150 divisions. The Germans were greatly handicapped by having seventeen classes with little or no military training. They also lack officers and non-commissioned officers, so that their units are insufficiently staffed to allow them the full use of their man-power. It therefore seems that in 1938 their maximum enrolment capacity should be estimated around

150 to 160 divisions. During the World War their maximum output was 243 divisions. But under conditions prevailing before the Munich Agreement German rearmament was pushed at such a pace that probably in 1940 Hitler would have been able to muster 300 divisions, all of them adequately staffed and amply provided with war material.

As regards aviation, Germany has an excellent and well-equipped air force. Nevertheless, certain published figures, such as 6000 'planes, seem to be grossly exaggerated. It is our candid belief that the Reich could dispose as first-line forces of about 3000 'planes, which, exclusive of hydroplanes, represent, roughly, 2600 available 'planes, of which 1200 would be bombers, 700 scouts, and 700 chasers. Their organisation is such that they are immediately available, and would build up a powerful, homogeneous and highly mobile mass. Their bombing capacity certainly exceeds 1000 tons per expedition. Thanks to thorough and well-organised ground-work, consisting of suitable and numerous landing-places, airports, and also underground shelters, the German air force was in a position to concentrate in a few hours either on a western or a south-eastern front. An air attack on France or Czechoslovakia or on Eastern Europe is possible at the outbreak of war.

Czechoslovakia was in a position to muster very rapidly thirty divisions, which after a few days might have numbered about forty. She enjoyed natural geographical borders formed by the Giant and Sudeten Mountains in North-eastern Bohemia, the Fichtel Mountains and the Bohemian Forest in the west. They were made stronger by different lines of permanent fortifications. Those in the north-eastern sector are in many respects similar to the Maginot Line in France. A large amount of French money and devices had been used in making them. The cost came to nearly £100,000,000. The principle of this organisation lies in shell- and gas-proof dug-outs, with an extensive cover, where troops in reserve could be sheltered and kept ready for immediate counter-attacks. These dug-outs communicated with turrets, keeping the ground in front of them under a dense curtain fire of automatic and anti-tank arms. In front of the lines the ground was organised with defences hampering the enemy's advance and keeping him under a

steady and murderous fire. Large barbed-wire entanglements and fellings would have proved most serious handicaps, necessitating an important waste of time and ammunition to overcome them. They would undoubtedly have greatly hampered the advance of German armoured divisions. To cope with the latter, large fields of mines had also been organised. Three lines of defence existed, the last being at the beginning of the plain where Prague is located.

If the Reichswehr had intended to attack Czechoslovakia and use the full weight of its power, obviously the Czechoslovak army would have been on the defensive. It would have had for its object to gain time and to use up as many German divisions as possible, so as to allow French and British forces to mobilise and to launch an offensive in turn.

It is our belief that the largest part of the Czech forces would have been kept in reserve behind the lines, so as to counter-attack every time the enemy pressed too hard on a given part of the line, or showed some weakness. A thorough application of the Napoleonic principle of economy of forces would have been applied there. It is our opinion that for the Bohemian battle the Germans could have been compelled to sacrifice a minimum of thirty-five divisions to break through, thus leaving at the most 115 divisions available to fight on other fronts. How much time the German army would have required to reduce Czechoslovakian resistance is of course hard to tell. The time-factor, always important in war, would, in this case, have been in direct relation to the manœuvring capacity of the Czech forces and to their morale. We think highly of the Czech organisations and of their army; we are therefore, in our best judgment, inclined to believe that the bulk of German forces operating there would not have been available elsewhere for a couple of months, though some of the German units on the Morava would have been in a position to intervene on a western front after about three weeks.

Another important factor from a military point of view is that Czechoslovakia would have been an ideal landing-place for the Russian air forces, allowing them to find all mechanical and fuel requirements. Berlin, Breslau, Leipzig, Dresden, Nuremberg, Munich, and Vienna would have been easily within their range of action. Should, on the contrary,

the main German forces have been directed on the eastern front, the Czechs would then have attacked in the direction of Leipzig, thus compelling the Germans to rush extra divisions to the spot.

The synchronisation of the armies located on the eastern and on the Bohemian fronts, with Leipzig as an axis, would have obliged the Reichswehr to manœuvre by interior lines with a minimum delay of six days for every transfer of one division from one front to another. For bigger units the delay would of course have been greater. Time necessary for movements to entraining and from detraining stations should be added. The Munich Agreement, from a purely French military angle, represents for many reasons an immeasurable loss.

Nearly all the Czech fortifications have been secured by Germany. These can with small expenditure be turned against the Czechs. All the dug-outs and infantry covers can be used as they are, with only some slight modifications of the entries and of the plane of infantry fire. All the hilly part of the Sudeten district will be owned by the Germans, whereas all the Czech defences will be on level ground. A large part of their communications and their railway system will be either German, Hungarian, or Polish. The incorporation of 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans represents a man-power equal to two French classes.

Last, but not least, the Czechoslovakian heavy industry was equipped so as to supply with war material most of the requirements, not only of its army, but also of the Yugoslav, Roumanian, and partially Polish armies. The Skoda works are practically impotent in this respect now.

To sum up, it seems as if, before the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia was the keystone of an eastern military front. To back such a front now requires much greater efforts, and at any rate the total and undisputed possession of the Mediterranean Sea.

CONCLUSIONS

The Munich Agreement, from a French point of view, is the logical consequence of the German reoccupation of the Rhineland (March 7, 1936) and of the *Anschluss* (March 23,

1938). For France the Munich Agreement represents the end of a European system of balance of power. It exacts a thorough reconsideration of her pledges—indeed, of her entire foreign policy.

The price paid for the actual maintenance of peace has been a high one. It conveys in Europe, from a moral point of view, the feeling that small States are no longer in safety on account of certain big Powers. It means the end of French influence in Czechoslovakia and the disappearance of a powerful obstacle against the German '*Drang nach Osten*' for wheat and crude oil. It suggests a disagreeable analogy with the barbarian invasions, taking the Danube as an axis so as to find grass for their horses. Nowadays motor cars have taken the place of horses, and mechanical units require a substantial amount of fuel to be found in the east! Furthermore, a purely economic domination of Central and Eastern Europe by Germany under prevailing conditions means a decided impoverishment of the Continent. This will have its reflection in the lowering of the standard of living in the democracies. The reason for this is that the German system of barter and self-sufficiency, like the Russian system, constitutes a real cancer in the capitalistic order. The prosperity of the pre-war period was based on free trade, the gold standard, commercial freedom and security—the opposite of all that dictatorships stand for in economic policy.

But, indeed, the price paid will not have been too heavy should the Munich Agreement be not only the end of an unfortunate past but also the preface of a more fortunate future, based on international and intellectual co-operation. This will only be possible if German 'dynamism' and its methods as they appeared during these last years come to an end. This 'dynamism' has been accurately described by Ludendorff, the first sponsor of the Nazi movement, when he wrote: 'We must realise that we live in warlike times. War will be the only and sole factor of politics. . . . Might makes the law, and the people to whom one belongs is everything.'

The same ideas can be found in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*: 'Our foreign policy is to assure the German people the territories which are due to them. . . . It is only in the force of the conqueror that law resides. . . . The right of claiming

a land might become a duty when a great people seems condemned to ruin without territorial increase.'

The people of France, recovering after having been on the very verge of a catastrophe, realise that peace can only be assured by a renewal of the spiritual and material forces of the democracies. Peace should mean not only the absence of war. It should be won by unceasing efforts and good-will capable of producing a counter-'dynamism.'

JACQUES ROUVIER.

THE EXPANSION OF GERMANY

GERMANY rejoices. While I am writing, German army corps are still marching through the Sudetenland. Within the next twenty-four hours they will reach the provisional borderline of the Fifth Zone, the new frontier of Greater Germany. Though further territorial changes by way of plebiscites seem unlikely now, it is, of course, possible that the final German frontier will have been pushed still further into Bohemia by the time this article goes to print. There are other, more important, uncertainties which cannot, however, remain uncertainties for long. While the suspense lasts, both Poland and Hungary will do their utmost to get the fullest satisfaction for what they call their 'grievances.' Within Czechoslovakia the old order of the Republic has been uprooted and the process of change and transition has only just begun. About these changes, which are bound to take place very shortly, more will be said below.

But while many aspects of the future are necessarily problematical, stock must be taken now. With the portentous Four-Power Agreement Germany has won a warless victory of a magnitude which has no parallel in her earlier history, nor in that of any other country. The victory was won by mere threat of war. The question whether Hitler's threat was 'real' or not is to-day, after the *fait accompli* of Munich, mainly of academic interest (and, we may be sure, many generations of historians will quarrel in search of the true answer). The European order of 1919, badly shaken on many occasions during the past six years, *but essentially intact until September 29*, is no more. The conception of the balance of power that will emerge in the Europe of the near future is still obscured by the very incompleteness of the transformation that has begun in Central and South-Eastern Europe, as also by the feeling which the unspeakably tragic fate of the victims has aroused.

What will be the power of Greater Germany in this new European order? To ascertain, as far as is possible, the full measure of the German victory two things must be examined: (1) the immediate advantages to Germany of the annexation of new territory; and (2) the effect on other nations, great and small, of Germany's increase in power. The first question may again be sub-divided into economic and political aspects.

As regards the territorial gains, it has now become quite clear that the full demands of the so-called Godesberg memorandum have formed the basis for the demarcation line of the Fifth Zone. In fact, they even surpass the Godesberg demands in places. The by now habitual German procedure of making the maximum demands of yesterday the minimum demands of to-morrow was once more successful. Following on the decision arrived at by the International Commission in Berlin (October 5), such districts as Opava (Silesia), Zabrek, Breclav, and other parts of Moravia which are conspicuous for their economic and strategic importance have been included in the Fifth Zone. These areas are not only, *not* 'predominantly German,' but almost entirely Czech. As to the number of Czechs who will thus become subjects of the Third Reich, no exact figures are as yet available; it has been stated, however, that their number will not be less than 800,000. This is, needless to say, in open contradiction to the most emphatic words of Herr Hitler that Germany does not want within her borders a single foreign subject. And the territorial changes, in so far as they have been carried into practice, are equally contradictory to 'the letter and spirit of the Munich Agreement.' Yet, in view of what has happened, any questioning of the 'legal validity' of Germany's action seems futile and indeed anachronistic.

In spite of many individual items made public in the Press, it is extremely difficult to make even a rough estimate of the value of material wealth that has now fallen to Germany with the ceded territories. The industrial importance of the Sudetenland is well known. It was at one time the seat of over 60 per cent. of the entire industry of the Habsburg Empire, and, during the past two decades under Czech rule, it has been further developed and modernised. There are very considerable deposits of lignite coal, pit coal, brown coal,

and graphite. There are, in addition, vast forests, supplying the raw material for an important paper and woodwork industry as well as for the chief chemical works of Aussig. The North Bohemian brown coal production alone represents one quarter of the total European output. According to provisional estimates, Germany has gained—49 per cent. of the Czechoslovak textile industry (roughly 26,000 individual factories); 55 per cent. of the glass industry; 51 per cent. of the coal mines (excluding brown coal); 30 per cent. of the leather industry. These figures may suffice as an indication of the great economic importance of the Sudeten areas and of the even greater potential value once these industries have been reorganised according to the requirements of the German Four-Year Plan.

Yet the real difficulties in assessing Germany's material gains arise precisely at this point. The incorporation of the Sudeten industries into the economic structure of the Third Reich raises for Germany a number of very thorny problems. A great part of the Sudeten industries are dependent either on raw material supplies from areas which remain Czechoslovak (as well as from other non-German sources) or else on export markets which will presumably be lost to Germany owing to currency difficulties. That applies, in particular, to the various branches of the textile industry. As an additional difficulty one might mention the fact that in most cases head offices are situated in Prague and Brno and that their old-established business connexions (often a firm's most valuable possession) will, of course, not automatically be ceded together with plant and machinery. Mention must also be made of the financial control which is naturally concentrated in Prague. The total share capital of twenty-four important Sudeten industries (whose shares used to be quoted at the Prague Stock Exchange) amounts to roughly 850,000,000 Czech Crowns. This figure represents, of course, a mere fraction of the Czech capital invested in the Sudeten industries. Lastly, it must be remembered that the ceded areas are far from being self-sufficient and, in addition to their own agricultural production, are dependent upon substantial imports of foodstuff and cereals.

How can Germany solve these problems and overcome the difficulties that are bound to arise? It is evident that,

whatever the practical solution may be, it cannot be a purely economic one. Any attempt to outline the next phase has to take into account the whole complex of Germany's Central and South-Eastern European policy. No further proof is needed for the fact that, apart from such tremendous economic losses as have been indicated, the forced surrender of Czechoslovakia has reduced her to complete vassalage of Greater Germany. The measure of political independence which the new Czechoslovak State will eventually retain may, perhaps, be comparable to that of Albania—if that is not rating it too high. Yet, neither economic and territorial losses nor political vassalage seem to warrant the idea one hears so frequently expressed—namely, that Czechoslovakia will now be driven to complete economic and social ruin. It would seem far more likely (and there is, indeed, ample evidence to support this) that Germany will spare no effort to keep Czechoslovakia's economic machinery intact. It has been pointed out before—at any rate, by implication—that the areas annexed to Germany are most closely linked with the remaining parts of the republic. These links will not be severed. On the contrary, they will be strengthened in order to make the whole of Czechoslovakia's industrial and agricultural resources subservient to German needs. More precisely: semi-finished products of Sudeten industries will also in the future be sent to finishing industries situated on the Czech side of the frontier; agricultural imports for the Sudetenland will, as before, be supplied by Slovakian producers.

All this means merely that the inter-regional trade that has stood the test of many decades will continue also under the new territorial order. Moreover, there can hardly be any doubt that the world-famous heavy iron and steel industry and the equally important shoe and boot industry in Bohemia will henceforth work according to German needs and requirements. These, perhaps the most important sections of Czechoslovakia's economy, might, it has been suggested, form the basis upon which some kind of economic independence could be maintained even after the republic's loss of political sovereignty. Any such possibility can be dismissed as wholly unreal even if one assumes that the future Czechoslovak administrators would feel inclined to make such an effort. This does not mean, however, that Germany will in

all circumstances try to curtail Czechoslovak exports to countries where free currencies are still available. If, as may well be expected, a German-Czech customs union, and, in addition, a currency union of one form or another are instituted, then such 'free' exports would become an invaluable source of foreign currencies of which the Reich is in such dire need. If all this took place, it could, however, hardly be mistaken for the economic independence of the remains of Czechoslovakia.

Thus, the immediate gains of the Third Reich following the subjugation of Czechoslovakia are enormous. But of far greater consequence, not only for the Reich but indirectly for the whole of Europe, are the further possibilities of German domination in Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Near East. Ever since the victory of Nazism in Germany the Reich has pursued a policy of gaining the maximum of influence in Eastern Europe. Ultimate aims of Nazi foreign policy, and economic difficulties arising from efforts to establish self-sufficiency at home, are seen to be complementary in every respect. Dr. Schacht's 'New Plan' of 1934 marked the beginning of Germany's trade drive in *Mittel-Europa* and the Balkans. The 'economic penetration' of these countries by Germany, and its very substantial success, have received the widest publicity in recent years. Indeed, a whole literature has been written about this subject, describing progress and setbacks as well as the peculiar, if ingenious, methods employed. There is therefore no need to repeat here what must now be common knowledge.

Now that Czechoslovakia has been effectively subdued, *Germany's policy of Eastern expansion will be carried on under conditions that are fundamentally different*, and, needless to say, infinitely more advantageous. It is true that in recent years, chiefly in 1936, Germany's trade drive reached what was probably the maximum of success attainable in the circumstances then prevailing. (In Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey Germany's share in the countries' foreign trade varied between 25 and 61 per cent. in 1936, constituting an increase of approximately 80 per cent. since the beginning of the campaign in 1934.) These impressive figures may easily give a false impression. It has to be remembered that this 'penetration' lacked a solid

basis, sufficiently solid, at any rate, to create a real trade monopoly, or to survive times of political uncertainty. For most, indeed one may say all, countries which have thus been forced into barter and clearing agreements with Germany viewed their own position with ill-concealed dismay. The general recovery of international trade in 1937 was therefore immediately followed by a rapidly increasing reluctance to renew trade agreements with Germany, and the beginning of a decline in her influence. Germany's actual losses were at first insignificant, but the waning of her influence, though not widely known, was fully realised in Berlin.

The crux of the whole problem was political and not economic. That, too, was appreciated in Germany. The new trend that became visible in 1937 throughout the Central European and Balkan region went to show that economic influence alone was of dubious value. This was a lesson the Nazis did not have to learn. But the fresh demonstration of the unreliability (and perhaps worthlessness) of mere economic 'spheres of influence,' without adequate political control, may have had a decisive influence on the foreign policy of the Third Reich since the beginning of this year. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the successful *Anschluss* with Austria and the ensuing subjection of Czechoslovakia have raised Germany's political power over the smaller nations of Eastern Europe to an extent that would have seemed quite fantastic only twelve months ago.

The decisive question is: What use will the Third Reich make of its increased power? It has already been emphasised that as from now on Germany is in a position to operate under essentially altered conditions. I have also tried to indicate her probable future relationship with the remnant of Czechoslovakia. The latter can, of course, only be regarded as one section of a carefully planned policy. The true significance of the disappearance of Czechoslovakia as one of the dominating forces in Central European affairs is that the old German dream of a *Grossraumwirtschaft* as well as *Grossraumpolitik* has now become a *real* possibility for the first time, not only in the history of the Third Reich, but indeed in the whole history of Germany.

Typical of the past period of trade penetration were arrangements by which Germany bought tremendous quan-

tities of such agricultural products as this or that country happened to offer. German industrial products took the place of cash payment, and the inevitably large balance remained in various Reichsbank accounts as 'frozen assets.' (Obviously, the amount of industrial merchandise which the agrarian countries could accept remained within rather narrow limits.) There is, therefore, every reason to assume that in the coming era of *Grossraumwirtschaft* these methods of barter will tend to become more and more obsolete and gradually give way to more efficient methods of agrarian and industrial planning, under German guidance and according to German needs. The principle of clearing accounts will, of course, have to be maintained as long as the present difficulties of foreign currency exchange prevail. The two main objects of such *Grossraumwirtschaft* can be described as: (1) the systematic increase of the purchasing power of the comparatively poor agrarian countries; and (2) the equally systematic elimination of all foreign economic influences. Under the first heading falls chiefly the industrial development of the countries concerned, based, wherever possible, on the exploitation of valuable raw material resources; and further, the modernisation and replanning of agricultural products for which Germany can guarantee a 'safe' market and stable prices. As regards the elimination of other influences, however small, in what Germany regards now as her exclusive domain, the following quotation from the *Essen National Zeitung* of October 11 is of particular interest. The paper refers to the recent British credit to the Turkish Government, and says: 'There is no justification for this credit. . . . A State which finds it necessary to accept credits can only pay these back by increasing its exports to the country which has granted them. The necessary conditions for this are lacking in the relations between Britain and Turkey.'

Both objects of *Grossraumwirtschaft*, even if only meeting with moderate success, would help greatly to solve Germany's dual problem of creating new and fairly prosperous markets for her industries and of securing a vast increase of her raw material basis. The German Government have not lost one minute (this is almost literally true) in reaping the harvest of their victory in Munich. Only four days after the German occupation of the Sudetenland began, Dr. Funk, German

Minister for Economics, successfully concluded a new German-Yugoslav trade agreement. This new agreement (the exact terms of which are not yet known) will undoubtedly serve as a model for further trade pacts with other Eastern European countries. Already during the past three years the economic structure of Yugoslavia, for example, has been decisively influenced by the German Four-Year Plan. The cultivation, exclusively for the German market, of soya beans, hemp, flax, and other valuable plants which are a vital necessity industrially, has been trebled since 1934. It has now been announced that under the new agreement Germany proposes to build a modern road system in Yugoslavia. In addition to old ones, the German Ministry for Economics is now acquiring new concessions for the exploitation of Yugoslavia's mineral resources, such as bauxite, zinc and copper mines. At present, German mining engineers are supervising the construction of new bauxite mines in Herzegovina. The exploitation of the Herzegovian mines is expected to begin early next spring, and their annual output has been estimated at from 100,000 to 150,000 tons. In this connexion it should be emphasised that the German Government is both willing and able to undertake the construction of new industries even at a cost which would be as prohibitive to, say, a French or British concessionaire as it would be to the Government of the country itself.

The development which is now beginning to take shape, as well as its eventual success, are therefore primarily based upon the greatly increased powers of political control of the Third Reich. It would be foolish to believe that such control must in all instances, say in Turkey or Rumania, take the form of direct interference. Two distinct elements have contributed to the recent increase in Germany's power: first, her own immediate gains in Central Europe—political, economic, and strategic; and, secondly, the diplomatic defeat and loss of prestige suffered by Britain and France. It is perhaps too early yet to appreciate fully the importance of the latter, but it is very likely that the moral and psychological effect of this may prove as important, if not more so, than the measurable gains of the Reich.

The Germans themselves seem very confident with regard to the 'moral effects.' The Hamburg *Wirtschaftsdienst* of

October 7, for instance, notes with satisfaction that '... the Provisional Prague Government seem to have recognised *where* the future for a united Czech national State is to be found: in a lasting good-neighbour relationship with Germany.' That Germany is hardly in a mood to beg where she can command is expressed in another paragraph dealing with Lord Runciman's suggestion of a Czecho-German trade agreement. It reads: 'Germany will first have to wait and see what kind of internal régime the Czech people will set up after the disappearance of Mr. Benesh.' The inference is plain. Still another paragraph in the same paper, referring to foreign capital investments in Eastern Europe, reads: 'The regained power of the Reich is bound to bring about a gradual decrease of political resistances against closer economic collaboration between Germany and the Danubian countries.' (It may be noted in this connexion that almost a replica of the first quotation is also to be found in the editorial of the important *Deutscher Volkswirt* of the same date.)

And, indeed, the German confidence is only too well justified. After her final surrender, the future political complexion of what will be left of the Czechoslovak Republic was never in doubt. No words can better express the present disposition of Prague than those which one finds in the embittered leading article of the liberal *Lidové Noviny* (October 4), the paper of Dr. Benesh. It says: 'Central Europe is no more. We have been abandoned. We can now do nothing but collaborate with Germany. Even in commercial relations we must refrain from engaging in combinations which would align us against Germany. We must recognise that Hitler and Mussolini are more powerful than France.' Similarly, the Polish Government paper *Gazeta Polska* wrote on October 5: 'The triumph of Fascism over democracy in the Abyssinian conflict has now been reaffirmed with emphasis in the case of Czechoslovakia.' The Hungarian *Pester Lloyd* of October 4 simply states: '... the entire Eastern system of France has broken down.' To conclude this by no means complete list I refer to an article which appeared in the semi-official Belgrade paper *Vreme* (whose bitter cynicism, however, one may regard as wholly official). After congratulating the Prime Minister, Dr. Stoyadinovitch, on his policy of absolute neutrality during the crisis, the paper

continues: '... any other policy would have brought the Germans and Italians against our frontier as enemies and not as friends ... and the country, just like the Czechs, would have had to deal instead with English and French friends who would have appeared as a "commission for the dismemberment of the country".'

The new and exalted self-confidence which is so striking in all German comments on the 'victory of Munich' is hardly surprising, nor is the natural tendency in the German Press to underestimate or wholly disregard any possible difficulties which may disturb the new drive for the domination of Central and South-Eastern Europe. A few of these possible difficulties have been hinted at above; many others have not been mentioned at all. Conflicts may, at a later time, arise out of a clash between Germany and the smaller nations' determination to preserve some measure of national independence. That is a question of the future, and to attempt a prophecy now would be idle.

At this moment, there can be no doubt, Germany is the unchallenged master of Central European and Balkan affairs, and free to make the fullest use of her gains and of what the Eastern nations must regard as the greatest defeat of the Western Powers. The one obstacle which, for many years, made an effective German *Grossraumpolitik* impossible was the independence and strength of Czechoslovakia. Upon her depended the post-war order of Central Europe, and indeed the whole system of independent national States east of the Rhine. Without her the Little Entente, and very largely also the Balkan Entente, have ceased to exist, or, at any rate, to be a political force of any importance. It may yet come to many as a tragically belated recognition how much more than merely the Central European order did in fact depend upon Czechoslovakia's independence.

A new stage is set. With powers such as it never had before the Third Reich can now enter a new era of expansion.

PAUL ANDERSON.

THE ARTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

THE Czechs are a small nation: they number less than the population of London. Their share in Western civilisation is remarkably high. Their thousand years of history, like all history, is a record of many sufferings, but it is a glorious past. They suffered long periods of serfdom, but never lost courage and the hope of recovering their independence. They fought the mighty Catholic Church when Zizka invaded half of Central Europe. His victories lasted for one decade, and the Czechs had to pay heavily for them. They rebelled against the Habsburgs and won their independence after 300 years: it has now been brought to an end after a brief twenty years. (Their Republic was born on October 28, 1918.) The national culture of the Czechs may be compared with one of those willow trees which are cut over and over again, and produce, unceasingly, fresh supple and graceful branches from the beheaded stump. In times of vassalage they had to surrender their best talents to the ruling class or nation. Under the Habsburgs their gifted children served in an alien army or administration. The rest were reduced to the status of poor peasants and small craftsmen, and the Viennese showed a good deal of contempt for the 'nation of cooks, tailors and fiddlers.' But Czech influence did penetrate to Vienna and elsewhere. Austrian children were brought up, not only on the wholesome food prepared by Mafenka from Moravia, but on Czech lullabies. The gay precision of Austrian military bands was largely based on Czech music. At times Vienna had as many Czech inhabitants as Prague and was sometimes called 'the greatest Czech city.'

The Czechs are of peasant stock, hard workers with a definite sense of beauty, and skilful hands. They were able to wait for their chance, and took it when it came. The present State, based upon the form of the ancient Bohemian kingdom, was carefully organised before and during the war.

When the Peace Treaty legalised the settlement, the Czechs rapidly adapted themselves to a new political, administrative, and cultural life. Prague was transformed from a sleepy provincial town into a centre of activity. Every part of the new republic gravitated towards this centre. Literature, music, art and architecture, modern technique and modern methods of social welfare, education and economic problems, all were tackled with confidence and enthusiasm. It was a bold attempt, and naturally mistakes were made. But they were mainly the mistakes of young people, and, on the whole, good-will, and even reason, prevailed.

A few figures may illustrate the speedy intellectual development. The country with 14,000,000 of inhabitants had, in 1936, 17,849 public libraries, and produced 11,467 books. The interplay between exclusive nationalism and cosmopolitan interests are characteristic of Czechoslovak culture. The causes are obvious. Czechs and Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians lived together in the villages. No commission on earth could disentangle those century-old relationships. And yet the desire to maintain their individual character kept the nationalities distinct from one another. As long as they were allowed a certain amount of liberty and general welfare, they were always able to get on together. But now and then their smouldering grievances were fanned into flame for some political purpose. It is notable that the Czechs at all times strove to uphold the ideal of democracy and humanity. Their great teacher, Jan Ambros Comenius (Komenský), created in the seventeenth century his system of education based on humanitarian principles. This ideal was steadily maintained from Hus's time to Masaryk, and it is significant that each of them was a national rebel, a reformer and a teacher of humanity at the same time. But the struggle for the dominating language at Prague's university is as old as the university itself—namely, 600 years. Then, Jan Hus (John Huss) fought for the Czech language in the church as well as in the lecture-room, and his struggle was against the decaying hierarchy of the clergy as well as against social and national oppression.

The Habsburgs made German the State language instead of the Latin of the Church. The Germans never lost contact with their own past, and their literature, in spite of the general

best represented by Karel Čapek, an author and playwright of the first order and a thoroughly original mind. Čapek is a true realist, exploring many of life's strata. His vivid imagination does not stop at the surface of things, nor does it play with superficial fantasies. He tests reality in imaginary situations. His short stories (*Stories from Two Pockets*) deal with the adventures of daily life only; his *Book of the Gardener* is just the humorous confession of a gardening enthusiast's experiences. Čapek looks at life with the watchful eye of a naturalist and with the patience and simplicity of a child at play. His observation of men and children, plants, and animals as they behave in various situations allows him to deduce their character and future possibilities. His special genius lies in his ability to see the small and build it up to the eternally valid and limitless truth.

The Insect Play, which he wrote, in collaboration with his brother Josef, when he was very young, is by no means his best. It contains elements of foreign influence, but it already shows his outlook, later deepened and reflected in other plays: *R.U.R.* (the drama of a world which is served, ruled and finally destroyed by mechanical men), the *Makropulos Affair*, which deals with prolonged life, and *Adam, the Creator*, describing the re-creation of a shattered world. Čapek combines ruthless knowledge of the destructive elements in life with an undaunted faith in the power of humanity to survive.

His language is concise, to the point—a true mirror of his personality, which is as versatile as it is sound. He is also an excellent journalist; amongst his travel books the *Letters from England* show his gift for observation. His paramount quality is profound honesty. He was a great friend of Masaryk, as well as of Beneš, and wrote several books about the late President. His *Conversations with Masaryk* should be read by everybody who seeks information concerning the atmosphere of the Czech Republic.

Perhaps those men's valiant fight for the essence of democracy will be doomed to failure for another couple of centuries. Perhaps they will go down in history as Don Quixote; and then Sancho Panza will be represented by *The Good Soldier Švejk*.

Jaroslav Hašek is not officially recognised as having

contributed to literature. His name might easily be forgotten—he died as a poor drunkard—he was only a writer of chatty stories, of soldiers' yarns. But Švejk will live, like Lazarillo de Tormes and Simplicius Simplizissimus, akin to all crude and simple creatures who flouted discipline and rebelled against the deadly nonsense of a Government. Švejk is the soldier of the Great War. The Austrian army, composed of fourteen nations and ruled by one, strong enough to fight but never to subdue the inner independence of its members, lives in this portrait for ever. Švejk became the tongue for the speechless and nameless masses who were driven to fight for Habsburg, which they hated. He is no hero—rather the reverse. He curses and laughs till you join in with him, in spite of the gloomy background of a decadent empire in a bloody war. Hašek wrote four volumes of Švejk's adventures, and after his death the story was continued—again contrary to all rules of literature; but Švejk is more alive, perhaps, than many works of art.

Besides Čapek, a number of modern playwrights became known, amongst them František Langer, who was successful with *Suburbs* and *Through the Eye of a Needle*. But the greater number of dramatic productions is too exclusively a part of local life to be translated.

The stage is extremely popular in Czechoslovakia: every provincial town has its own repertory theatre; Prague has twenty-two theatres, with nearly 6000 performances in one season, besides her cinemas, many amateur dramatic societies, and the puppet shows, some of these being of a high artistic standard. The latter form a special feature of Czech culture; the existing numbers are thirty-four in Prague, twenty and twenty-one in Plzeň and Olomouc respectively, many more in other places. These amusing and original shows, being always within reach of the masses, made a great appeal, not a small reason being that free speech, as the privilege of the traditional fool, offered an outlet for opinions as well as entertainment.

The same is true of the many amateur groups producing plays on the line of the old pantomime. Enthusiastic young students and workers amused themselves and their friends by dramatising political and social satire. Two of them, Voskovec and Verich, became too successful to remain

amateurs, turned professionals and started their 'Unfettered Theatre,' which for several years has attracted an ever larger public. Together with a group of spirited young artists, they perform their clever pointed attacks on topical events, expressing themselves in song, dance, rhythm, scenery and rhyme. Another collective group is headed by E. F. Burian — 'D 39' is this season's name of their theatre, as they follow the date. Like Voskovec and Verich, they are politically minded, splendid actors with modern technique, attractive in the witty and graceful quality of their performances.

Music has been rightly regarded as the paramount Czech talent. Even in peaceful times, when the outside world did not bother about the nation's existence, Bohemian musicians were famous on the Continent and abroad. Undoubtedly Czech musical genius is a genuine gift developed on a long and excellent tradition. The people are endowed with good singing voices and an inborn feeling for rhythm and harmony. The central situation of the country added to the folk songs the melancholy and primitive sensuality from the East, the serene spirit and fluent rhythm from the South, and with it met German sentiment and thoroughness. Moreover, music as an art resists the ups and downs of history better than any other branch of culture. Literature could be suppressed, practically eliminated for centuries, the language could deteriorate to a peasant's jargon; the fine art, dependent on a certain amount of luxury, has no chance to develop on national lines under a foreign rule. But music flourishes in good times and emanates even from the pit of despair. The song in the fields, the fiddle at dances, and the love song reveal the true character of a nation. Poor street musicians wandered over Europe, the Czech lackey of the Viennese aristocrat played his flute, Czech instrumentalists participated in the orchestras of the world, Czechs contributed to the world's music at all times. The flow of their original melodies never ceased.

Two composers achieved classical greatness in the nineteenth century—Bedřich Smetana and Anton Dvořák. Smetana lived as a poor schoolmaster, the member of a very humble, subdued nation. His work incorporated the simplicity and the soul of his people. Not that the romantic peasant's life pictured in *The Bartered Bride* is typical of the

Czechs, or even of the time. But the humour, the feeling, the gay polka, and the rustic love and laughter, thoroughly genuine. No translation could ever convey the simplicity of the text, for instance, in the first chorus 'Why shouldn't we be happy—if God gave us good health! The man who wrote this, in addition to many serious works, died, after a hard life in misery, deaf and finally mad.' The most beautiful String Quartette, *My Life*, although it is far from being programme music, describes some of his struggles. The persistent high-pitched 'E' in the last movement really expresses the pain of becoming deaf. Smetana never achieved international fame during his lifetime; only Vienna recognised his opera. He never left Bohemia except for a short time as a conductor in Sweden. His best symphony is *Ma Vlast* (*My Country*). Surprising richness of motive, variety of rhythm and deep expression enable him to picture, without any literary programme, the landscape and life which he knew and dearly loved. The land is hilly, softly waved, the stream strong and gentle, the fields rich and the forests dense; soft light of summer evenings and glaring sun at harvest-time; and dance and work and love of healthy people, conscious of beauty, sentimental and gay. It is this country which gave birth to the national anthem, one of the most beautiful emanations of love for the native soil: *Where is my Land? (Kde domov můj?)*.

Anton Dvořák (1841–1904) was more successful, living in the second half of the nineteenth century, which appreciated music on a large scale. He wrote nine symphonies (the ominous number—for Beethoven, Bruckner and Mahler died, as he did, whilst planning or composing the tenth). Drawing on national melodies, he adopted the classical sonata form in four movements for his chamber music and concertos, as well as for his symphonies. He filled this frame with vivid rhythm and colourful harmony, and, although his admiration for Wagner and Liszt as well as for Beethoven and Schubert can be felt, there is no doubt of his originality. His twelve String Quartettes and the Trios (the lovely *Dumky*), his concertos for violin and for 'cello, enrich the limited modern concert programme. Among a number of operas *Rusalka* (a mermaid's romantic story) made his name in most theatres. But his fame rests largely on the 'Slavonic dances,' which at

amateurs, ~~and~~ express the spirit of his country. Here pulses Theatre, ~~and~~ of his art.

public. ~~tern~~ composition started with remarkable inde- they peace. Josef Suk wrote his powerful String Quartette, ~~expre~~paraphrase on the old hymn of St. Wenceslas, in ~~rhym~~, using forms which were a novelty; and he as well — 'Ostrčil, Křička—to mention a few—developed soon ~~th~~ style of their own, absorbing Schönberg's influence and that of French composers from Debussy to Ravel and Eric Satie, as well as Stravinsky's. A. Hába's experiments in his quarter-tone system are ~~not~~eworthy for the sequence in method as well as for the ingenuity exercised in this new field. Like all contemporary music, these new works will only conquer the platform gradually. Immediate success went to opera music. Leoš Janáček, after waiting a lifetime for recognition, was rewarded in his seventies. *Jenufa* and *Katja Kabanová* made his name and encouraged his further production. His dramatic flair is well matched by his musical mastery. Besides his operas, his beautiful sextette and his sinfonieta at least have to be mentioned. The successful opera *Švanda the Piper*, in score and script much on the line of *The Bartered Bride*, was contributed by Jaromír Weinberger. He has a pleasing gift for lighter music.

Czechoslovakia has produced great virtuosos. Kubelik, the violinist, enchanted the world at his time; the singer Emmy Destinne, called 'The Lioness,' became famous for the strength of her dramatic voice and for her untamed temperament. Karel Burian, the tenor in a period of tenors, sang Wagner in America and Germany. At the same time the Bohemian Quartette made its triumphant appearance in every part of the musical world, noted for vigour of tone and sound musical interpretation. They were equalled by the Ondříček Quartette, in which three brothers took part, and many others earned fame. Musical education, being always on a high standard, is now promoted by the 'International Society of Musical Education' in Prague, which is supported by the Government. One of the greatest teachers was O. Šefčík, Kubelik's master; he became an idol of two generations of ambitious violinists. His method comprises, in fact, every detail of bow-and-finger technique.

What really matters is not only the standard of ~~can~~ the work in composition or reproduction, but the musical ~~the~~ vibrating in the veins of the people. Czechs 'feel' ~~mu~~ Amateur playing and singing has always been keenly exercised, especially string and wind instruments. School singing was very good, and as a result amateur choirs achieved high quality. The 'Choir of the Moravian Teachers' has travelled over the world, and it is only one of many excellent choir societies.

Consequently, the Czechs are as good as an audience as they are in performing music. There are, for instance, more than twenty concert-halls in Prague, and the best artists appreciate the musical atmosphere. Concerts at popular prices, with classical and modern programme, contributed for generations towards the musical education.

Independent activity in the fine arts was denied to the Czechs during the greater part of their national existence. Instead, they participated in the styles which were forced upon them at all periods. They witnessed the great days of architecture, working under foreign masters, as stonemasons, carvers and carpenters, from the Middle Ages on, when their Cathedral of St. Vitus was built by Matthew of Arras. They helped to decorate the rich baroque dominating the overwhelming majority of the buildings on Czechoslovakian territory. Perhaps they were able to add a few individual traits to this Catholic style, which in sense and form contradicted their own tendencies. Nothing could prove more convincingly the unconquerable national spirit than the co-ordination of contrasting styles welded together in the singular character of old Prague and other historical Czech places.

The individual artistic gift of the Czech was marked by a fondness for vivid unbroken colour, by a strong sense of balance, and by a general preference for solid material. This gift found expression almost exclusively in the small crafts and arts. The Czechs excelled in pottery, glass-painting (including stained glass), embroidery and weaving, lace-designing, the dexterous painting of Easter eggs in a sort of *scraffito* technique, and in geometrical patterns of ~~br~~ colour. Wood-carving of very great beauty can be ~~fo~~ in churches on pulpits and in figurative work (rare ~~examp~~

have been shown in an exhibition of Slovakian art in Prague (two years ago). Many anonymous works of art show the national character and an undeniable affinity with Slav art as a whole. The sound balanced state of the Czechs was often endangered in times of violent intellectual upheaval. The second half of the nineteenth century saw unbalanced styles in Prague as it did in Western Europe, and was responsible, too, for reckless interference with ancient monuments. The increased security of their national and economic well-being restored the Czechs to their equilibrium, but the crystallisation of an individual art on a broader basis was still in its beginnings and must be deeply disturbed by the renewed conflicts. The standard of modern architecture (including housing) is remarkably high. French and, to a lesser degree, German influences left their mark on buildings, but none have been mechanically copied. Even a problem like cubism has been successfully tackled, and the house 'To the Black Virgin' can hold its own in the close neighbourhood of powerful ancient architecture.

Painting had had no encouragement for centuries, and Czech art revived only about 1848—at a time when European painting flourished almost exclusively in France. Therefore this art in Czechoslovakia had no striking results. Josef Mánes, the first representative of national art, is a master in all branches, from portrait-painting to engraving, historical scenes, and book illustration. But he is at his best in his pencil drawings and water-colour sketches of national costumes. They display not only the daring fashion and charming colour scheme of the regional dress, but convey most convincingly in attitude and expression the spirit of the peasantry, in a slightly romantic disguise. Most Czech artists of the century went to Paris and participated in international art. The nationalist type of painter succumbed frequently to shallow literary or decorative schemes. Jozá Uprka became popular as the painter of rural life, in the *plein air* method which he had studied when in Munich. Mikulas Aleš was interesting more in his charcoal sketches than in his historical canvas.

But the Czechs' artistic talents developed in another direction. Their special aptitude in the dramatic field, for the opera, for scenario, found its way into the organisation of

pageants, processions, and public acting of all kinds. This became the natural outlet for an emotional patriotism and an interesting display of social unity.

We see the culmination in the gathering of the 'Sokol,' the gymnastic display in the summer of 1938. The *Slet* brought home thousands of Czech's countrymen, settled in various parts of the world, to take part in it. Athletic games were performed on a vast scale, and in the organisation of the masses there was revealed a sense of harmony that is far more impressive than enforced discipline. Without attempting to achieve more than an athletic festival, the performance gave an impressive picture of cultural unity.

It is regrettable that the interest of other nations did not turn towards the Czechoslovak Republic until the period of her downfall. Her dignity in grief has been universally admired, but we have missed the chance to share in her joys, and there seems little hope of recovering that loss in the near future.

MARGARET FISCHER.

COMMENTARY

Just after the Great War, a movement began in Paris which later became the Surrealist movement. The Dadaists, as they were then called, proclaimed anarchy and unreason as a faith. Looking about them at the ruins of post-war Europe, they said in effect: if this is what reason brings us to, let us be irrational; and at a meeting called to celebrate the new movement its precepts were at once put into operation. One of the Dadaist leaders spoke from a platform, but an electric bell was kept ringing so that his remarks could not be heard. A drawing on a blackboard was brought on to the platform and immediately rubbed out. Amid uproar, it was announced that all true Dadaists were opposed to Dadaism. The movement established itself in spite of fierce public resentment; its followers included many of the best writers and painters of the time; and, led by M. André Breton, it grew from its light-hearted beginnings into the earnest doctrine of Surrealism. It reached England a few years ago with an exhibition of paintings and 'objects'—among them a cast-iron tea-set lined with fur—and has since found a few English supporters.

The tenets of Surrealism are well known, but I mention them here because it seems to me that their relevance to the events of last September has been largely unnoticed. I have been forced to conclude that Surrealism is no longer the doctrine of a small sect, but a guiding principle in the conduct of world affairs. I can think of no other explanation which covers the facts. Viewed as an operation of reason, however confused, our Government's foreign policy in the last five years is baffling; but viewed as Surrealism it falls into a beautiful and coherent pattern. It can be said, indeed, that the professional Surrealist, with his paintings and objects and dream-writings, is now an anachronism. His aim—once regarded as novel—was to destroy the associations of habit

and logic by irrational combinations; but in a world given over to this practice he has no longer a special function; he certainly cannot hope to compete with the British Government. That England and France should assist Herr Hitler to carry out the programme of *Mein Kampf*, and should at the same time re-arm to prevent it, and should label the process 'Peace for our time'—this is Surrealism on a scale far beyond the resources of M. Breton and his followers.

If the Surrealist basis of our administration is admitted, a light is thrown on many puzzling details. The A.R.P. spade and bucket for dealing with incendiary bombs, for example, acquire a new plausibility when regarded as Surrealist objects in the same category as the fur-lined tea-set mentioned above. And one is strongly tempted to classify as Surrealist objects the small silver balloons which trailed their steel cables across London the other day, smashing windows and roofs, tearing down telegraph wires and short-circuiting an electric railway. Though perhaps unrehearsed, this behaviour of the ostensibly protective balloon is in perfect keeping with the times.

So is the remark I overheard one woman make to another the day after the Munich Agreement: 'And my house is *entirely* bomb-proof, my dear; but what a *waste*!'

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In the circumstances it is not surprising that two books which the Surrealists hail as masterpieces should provide the best commentary on international affairs, though they were published years ago. *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass* have been praised and admired for many reasons, but I think their prophetic nature has not hitherto been appreciated. They display, in elaborate detail, the whole spirit and substance of European politics at the present time.

In Alice herself we have portrayed that stoical acceptance of the irrational which is so characteristic of the British public; but, like the British public, even Alice has her moments of bewilderment.

'I don't understand you,' said Alice. 'It's dreadfully confusing!'

'That's the effect of living backwards,' the Queen said kindly: 'it always makes one a little giddy at first. . . .'

We have all felt something of that giddiness during the last few years, as little by little the forward movement of civilisation has been slowed down and finally reversed; already we have receded far from the comparative enlightenment of 1914. There is much more in the White Queen's account of living backwards which might be applied to our own situation—her attitude towards the approach of an already encountered misfortune is peculiarly appropriate—but she is difficult to quote from conveniently. Here is a simpler example of Carroll's prophetic insight, in which the essential 'logic' of, say, the arrangement whereby we help Germany to become so strong that we have to arm ourselves to resist her is neatly summarised in a few lines:

But I was thinking of a plan
To dye one's whiskers green,
And always use so large a fan
That they could not be seen.

Father William is also topical; and I remember hearing Louis Aragon, who is or was a noted Surrealist, quote from it at a meeting some months ago. M. Aragon implied that France might well address these lines to England:

'You are old, Father William,' the young man said,
'And your hair has become very white;
And yet you incessantly stand on your head—
Do you think, at your age, it is right?'

Whether, all things considered, the rôle of the young man is altogether a suitable one for France is perhaps open to question.

One forbears to quote 'The Walrus and the Carpenter,' but this, applied to some recent transfers of territory, has all the immediacy of a cartoon:

I passed by his garden, and marked, with one eye,
How the Owl and the Panther were sharing a pie:
The Panther took pie-crust, and gravy, and meat,
While the Owl had the dish as its share of the treat.
When the pie was all finished, the Owl, as a boon,
Was kindly permitted to pocket the spoon:
While the Panther received knife and fork with a growl,
And concluded the banquet by . . .

The ending is in the tactful spirit of modern diplomacy.

* * * * *

Among other tasks, the crisis has provided several for the lexicographer. Certain words and phrases will have to be re-defined. In the dictionary before me 'self-determination,' for example, is given as 'determination by one's self without extraneous impulse,' which is of course hopelessly wide of the mark. I suggest that forthcoming dictionaries might bring our terminology into line with current usage by including a few such definitions as the following: '*self-determination*: a collaborative arrangement whereby a group of States compels a State not in the group to cede its territory to one of their members'; '*crisis*: a term applied to the international situation from 1933 onwards'; '*Peace for our time*: postponement of war for six months'; '*pact*: paper cast aside as spoiled, superfluous, or useless for its original purpose.' (This last is the Oxford Dictionary's definition of waste-paper, but repetition could be avoided by a cross-reference.)

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A few weeks ago I read a newspaper report of a speech made at Gravesend by Sir Thomas Inskip. Here are a few extracts:

The issue was: 'Is it to be peace by negotiation or is it to be war by the deliberate choice of this great democratic electorate?' Sir Thomas said that the Prime Minister had made it clear on which side his vote would lie, and it meant the difference between a comparatively prosperous, happy and safe community—at this point a group at the back of the hall broke into laughter. . . . 'I believe that we have at last got on the road to friendly relations with that great nation Germany in the middle of Europe.' . . . Given skill and determination, there was no reason why this country should not repair any defects and gaps in its defences in as short a time as any other nation should accomplish. . . . None of them would hesitate for a moment between the expenditure of money and a state of security. Money did not count to-day when as a nation we had responsibilities which the whole world recognised.

A day or two after reading this speech, I came on the following report in another newspaper:

Seven-year-old N—— H—— of —— Buildings, Bow, E., went to his mother crying because he was hungry, and asked for

his dinner. She told him there was no dinner for him, no food in the house. She told the child to lie on the bed, and when he had done so she cut his throat with a knife. Then she cut her own throat. The boy got up and ran away. Help came, and the two were taken to hospital. This story was told to-day at the Old Bailey when Mrs. H——, 40 years old to-day, was bound over for two years for wounding and attempted suicide. Mr. O. S. Macleay, prosecuting, said that Mrs. H—— had also a daughter aged 8. . . . The woman was entirely destitute. A detective said that Mrs. H——'s husband had been almost continuously unemployed for seven years. The family existed on 31s. 6d. unemployment assistance, paying 15s. a week rent. Mr. C. G. L. Du Cann, defending, said that Mrs. H—— had passed through a terrible time. Her husband had obtained unemployment assistance by fraud because the doctor had ordered his wife extra nourishment, and there was no money to give it to her. His imprisonment was a terrible blow. She felt she had sent him there. Counsel said that Mrs. H—— had told him when she went to the area public assistance committee she was told it was nothing to do with them and that she must go to the relieving officer. She did so and he said he could give her no money or food for the moment, but gave her a form to fill up. She found she would have to take the form a long journey. . . . The relieving officer came next day and gave her a penny for her fare to take the form to some office. There she was told she could have nothing that day, and when she arrived home she found her children crying for food.

This is England, in 1938. This is the country in which, as Sir Thomas Inskip assures us, money does not count. Money does not count, Sir Thomas Inskip tells us, when it is a question of security. I take it that security is a relative term in this context, meaning security from war; but we should do well to remember, with the case quoted above in our minds, that there are in England to-day—in this 'comparatively prosperous, happy and safe community'—men and women for whom the issues of peace and war must seem wildly immaterial, for whom, indeed, death by bombing must seem preferable to death by starvation. We should do well to remember this, along with the gaps in our defences, when next we are told what we can do 'given skill and determination.'

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A curious collection of propaganda has just come into

my hands—seven leaflets in an envelope with a Swiss postmark. Three—*The Jewish Victory at Berne*, *The Triumvirate Blum*, *Litvinov*, *Hore-Belisha*, and *The British Press and Fair Play*—are issued by the Christian Aryan Protection League from a London address. On another, an anti-Semitic leaflet printed in London, the Protection League has a German address (Erfurt), cancelled in pencil, with a Swiss address substituted. There are also: *World Enemy No. 1—Bolshevism*, free copies of which are offered by 'Fichte Association (Fichte-Bund) Union for World Veracity' from an address in Hamburg; and a pro-Franco leaflet, explaining how General Franco 'reverences God's sanctuaries and fills the churches with worshippers,' published by Spanish Press Services, Ltd., London.

The Christian Aryan Protection League. . . . This title prompts me to wonder how many Christians are content that their faith should be associated with the régimes of Herr Hitler and General Franco and the campaign against the Jews; but theology is the subtlest of dialectics, and I suppose the application of Christ's teachings is not held to be a necessary qualification in those who profess Christianity. The Inquisition was, after all, a Spanish affair, conducted in the name of Christ. At times one can almost believe the story of the cleric who began his prayer with the words: 'Paradoxical as it may seem to Thee, O God . . .'

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One of the leaflets I read with apprehension, an apprehension which would have been unthinkable six months ago. This was *The British Press and Fair Play*, in which Princess Karadja asks: 'Is the Government unable (or unwilling) to prevent the British Press from libelling the Head of the Third Reich?', and 'Is it wise, at this critical moment, to provoke the just wrath of a proud nation?' She is referring in particular to an illustrated article in a daily paper, and one's misgivings are not based on any wish to defend such articles, or to make out a case for libel. It would be a disaster if the methods of the German Press, as in its campaign against Dr. Benesh for example, were to be copied here. But this pamphlet has an ominous ring. From now on, nothing is

fantastic; and one sees with a frightening clarity how easily criticism of Herr Hitler and his régime could be stifled here in the name of 'national interests'; how easily the cry of 'war-mongering' could be raised against believers in free speech; and how easily the right to suppress criticism of Germany (and perhaps Italy) could be extended to include criticism of the National Government.

As Mr. Winston Churchill put it in his recent broadcast to America, the dictators are afraid of words and thoughts:

words spoken abroad, thoughts stirring at home—all the more powerful because forbidden—terrify them. A little mouse of thought appears in the room, and even the mightiest potentates are thrown into panic. They make frantic efforts to bar out thoughts and words; they are afraid of the workings of the human mind.

And if we are to make friends with dictators, we shall have to rid ourselves of this detested privilege of using and speaking our minds, and we may very shortly have no choice in the matter.

A muffled, half-official kind of censorship has already been applied to news-reels, though impartiality in that medium has certainly not been preserved—one news-reel firm conducted what amounted to a campaign for Mr. Chamberlain during the crisis. The current *March of Time*, an American film-summary of the crisis and its antecedents, has been heavily censored, and its title changed from 'Britain's Dilemma' to 'Britain and Peace.' At a news theatre the other night I listened to an appeal by Mr. Vernon Bartlett on behalf of the Czech refugees. Part of his speech was accompanied by a booming noise which made it difficult to hear what he was saying, but one heard enough to understand that he was commenting on the events which had created the refugee problem. At any other time one might have considered this a technical defect, but as things are it seems a little too apt to have been unintentional.

Rumours are going round of semi-official intimations to newspapers, of discreet invitations to Whitehall. At the moment certain newspapers are putting up a courageous resistance; but how long can they hold out? The process whereby long-established and valued traditions are abandoned is, as we have seen recently, a rapid one. Even now, I write

these words with the sense of indulging a luxury, with the feeling that they must be hurried to the printer if they are to appear at all. Next month may be too late; by next month free speech may be a *casus belli*.

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Meanwhile, there are a few compensations for being in London this autumn, and among them is the production of *The White Guard*, by M. Michel Saint-Denis, at the Phoenix. This is an adaptation from Bulgakov's *The Days of the Turbins*, which was presented at the Moscow Art Theatre in 1926, but was later withdrawn as being too sympathetic towards the old régime. For some reason it was regarded as once more permissible in 1932, and is now said to be one of the most successful plays in the Russian theatre. As presented in Mr. Rodney Ackland's adaptation, it is an honest, almost 'documentary,' study of a household in Kiev a month after the Armistice, when three parties, including the Bolsheviks, were struggling for power. It shows, narrowed to the compass of personal relationships in a small group of men and one woman, the bewilderment of a generation caught in the transition between two epochs, and a crazy confusion of loyalties. Here are men who had fought against Germany, now fighting against Petlura with German support. Deserted by the Germans, they yield to Petlura, who is in turn driven out by the Bolsheviks, a force they do not know what to make of. The old régime dies in the last notes of a regimental song, while the officers listen in a hushed group to the unfamiliar strains of the 'Internationale' outside.

It is a good, straightforward play, without a hint of propaganda, superbly acted and produced. Production here—as might be expected from the founder and director of the famous 'Compagnie des Quinze'—is something more than the routine job it has become in most theatres. Every gesture and movement has its place in a controlled rhythm, which is the design of the play as a whole, to be expressed and implied in all its details. This is not to suggest that the playing is ever forced. One can imagine nothing more exquisitely natural than the effect achieved by Miss Peggy Ashcroft as the wife who takes to herself the troubles and affections of the whole group, or by Mr. Stephen Haggard as the romantic boy who

stumbles into the tragedy of Kiev in 1918; but to single out this or that player is unfair, not only to other members of a uniformly accomplished cast, but also to M. Saint-Denis' production, which ensures that no player shall have a greater prominence than his or her place in the design of the play permits.

The White Guard is the first of a series of plays which Bronson Albery and Michel Saint-Denis are putting on at the Phœnix with a permanent company of actors. Among future plays is *The Wild Duck*, which has not, I think, had a London run since the 1920's—I remember a fine production then, with Milton Rosmer and Ion Swinley in the cast. It is time London had a revival of this masterpiece, and one looks forward to seeing the Phœnix company in a play which offers such scope for their talents. In the meantime, it is to be hoped that all Londoners who care for the traditions of the theatre will give this distinguished company their support.

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At a time when we are 'living backwards' politically, it seemed appropriate to visit Mr. C. B. Cochran's *Flashbacks* at the Palace Theatre. Mr. Cochran has had the interesting idea of illustrating the development of films from their beginnings up to the present day; but it is a sketchy survey, in spite of a John Bunny, an early Chaplin and a complete Mary Pickford. There is little to indicate the growth of the film during the last twenty years.

There are none the less some interesting period pieces, particularly news-reels of the Edwardian era. Unfortunately these early news-films are chiefly films of State processions, and there is nothing duller or less flavoured by its time than a State procession. The side-whiskers and drooping moustaches, the knickerbockers and little caps, the bird's-nest hats and leg-o'-mutton sleeves, the penny-farthings and hansom—these are what one's eye longs to recover, not the gilded coach and the cavalry and the immemorial trappings of coronations and funerals. Even these have their moments, however, as when the Kaiser confronts the camera on his horse, or when the London Fire Brigade makes its undignified dash down the lane prepared for a royal procession.

Flashbacks has prompted me to wish that some cinema would revive the policy of the old Academy, which is now the Movietone News Theatre at the top of Shaftesbury Avenue. Some ten or twelve years ago—it seems incredibly remote—the Academy was a kind of film-museum. There, in suitably dingy surroundings and to the accompaniment of a small querulous orchestra, one could see again such venerable masterpieces as *The Loves of Jeanne Ney*, *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari*, *Tartuffe*, *Dr. Mabuse*, *Thérèse Raquin*, *The Street*, *Waxworks* . . . Films are perishable, like gas-masks, and these early achievements are no doubt mouldering into oblivion somewhere. It is a pity they cannot be brought out and run through a few times more, while they still hold together, so that a generation brought up on the 'talkies' might have a chance of seeing the best of this earlier and all but vanished art.

For the film is no longer an art in its own right. In the silent days it had built up for itself a technique which had little to do with the theatre. It sought expression not only in the miming of actors but in the juxtaposition of images, the selection of viewpoints. The camera itself took part in the dumb show, directing one's attention here and there, invoking comparisons and implications—the celebrated *montage*, of which one no longer hears. Then, at a promising moment in its development, the silent film became vocal; and with the spoken word to explain everything, the problems of communication which had evolved such brilliant pictorial expedients in the old days no longer existed, and film technique became merely an extension of stage effects. It need not have been so, for the combination of sound with the old visual technique is full of possibilities beyond the scope of the theatre; but little enterprise has been shown in this direction.

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As amplified theatre, the modern talkie offers a fairly intelligent entertainment, particularly the French talkie. But sound has brought with it a few unmitigated terrors. One is the travel-commentary which now, instead of music, accompanies films of remote lands, and is often spoken by the traveller himself. The qualities which enable a man to explore darkest Africa and to film hungry lions and cannibals do not neces-

sarily make him a good commentator ; and one can be almost certain nowadays that however engrossing a travel film may be to watch, it will be excruciating to hear. It is hard to say which is worse—guide-book eloquence about scenery, or patronising facetiousness about natives ; but these are the usual ingredients of the travel film commentary. This is a great pity, since travel films are among the most valuable products of the cinema. One needs a strong gift of inattention, however, to dissociate the spectacle from the familiar monologue : ‘ . . . here comes old poppa from the water-hole, he looks as if he’d had a couple . . . and here’s a pair of African cuties, all in their Sunday best though you mightn’t notice it. . . . Mr. Lion is Public Enemy Number One in these parts, yes sir. . . .’ And so it goes on, varied with a purple patch or two—‘ what painter’s brush could depict,’ etc. All one can hope for is the occasional howler, when the joke is on the explorer though he doesn’t know it. I remember once hearing this comment on a picture which showed natives washing in a stream : ‘ These natives have learned to keep themselves clean after coming in contact with white missionaries. . . .’

ALEX GLENDINNING.

THE LONDON REPORTER

WHEN the Romans were in London they guarded themselves from attack by enclosing the city within a great wall. The masonry was of Roman solidity, as may be measured by the portions that remain. Last month it seemed we were again in Roman days. After centuries as an open town, London was once more protected from an invader by a wall—a wall higher than the Romans dreamt of building, no less formidable perhaps, but seemingly as tenuous as a spider’s web, and like a web it floated in the air to catch the things that fly. We saw for the first time the balloon barrage, ropes of steel carried by little airships that shone like silver in the sun or vanished greyly in scurrying rain-clouds. Craning my neck in company with a million other citizens, I hoped some poet was also gazing upwards. This new London Wall was a theme at least as rich for meditation and surmise as that which Wordsworth found when, standing at dawn upon the bridge at Westminster, he wondered whether earth had anything to show more fair than the ships, towers, domes, theatres and temples shining in ‘ the beauty of the morning.’

Nothing, surely, could hope to give more dramatic point to the continuity of London’s history, or could illustrate more aptly the adage that the more things change the more they remain the same ? To the scholar, as to the poet, that scene may well have roused a feeling that perhaps the centuries shall later bring the wheel full circle in a sadder sense, so that London, yesterday a colonial outpost of a great Empire, to-day the centre of an Empire even greater, to-morrow may sink to its former insignificance to be the capital merely of a small island. Certainly I can remember only one other spectacle that evoked such a deep disconsolate emotion. That was when many years ago a large piece of old London was demolished to make room for new roads and buildings, and, long before the rubble was finally cleared for recon-

struction, grass and that delicate weed the purple willow herb had spread in profusion a carpet of colour over the grey earth and brickdust. Had this ground been left untouched behind the hoardings much longer, bushes and trees would have been growing there, obliterating all trace of former habitation. Thus the ancient cities were buried. So soon does Nature resume her sway even in the midst of a metropolis.

To me, the excellence of life in London lies in such rare, memorable moments, far more than in the pleasures, not contemptible neither, of meeting new wits and exploring old monuments. One would not have it thought, however, as such examples by themselves might suggest, that these keen delights are aroused in one only by melancholy occasions. One hugs to memory as equal treasures the lights of London first seen through the dark trees one night on Highgate Hill; the exhilaration of seeing what before one only knew from maps and words and figures—the astounding size of London, when one overlooked it from the cockpit of an aeroplane. But because such moments are as rare as they are fine, one is the more grateful for the daily entertainment that this great city affords. There are always minor players in the long list of *dramatis personæ* to get acquainted with, such as Bill the Brushman, a sprightly octogenarian who makes his own brushes near the ‘Elephant and Castle’ and drives himself and his wares across London to the Caledonian Market in an ancient cab. He has been going to market for forty years, in the same top hat, by its shaggy appearance, and he will tell you of his craft in the intervals between dealing with customers. There are always new things to discover—rediscover were perhaps the better word in many cases—for it is at least ten to one that your novelty is old news to a dozen other explorers.

The other day, for example, one set out to learn how, where and by whom barrel-organs were made; and, in addition to the interest of accomplishing the task, the result of meeting the London Italians who remain in this dying trade was the beginning of a better acquaintance with that part of Clerkenwell and Mount Pleasant that is still predominantly Italian, as the names on the shop-fronts show clearly enough. Here are grocery stores smelling strongly of

sausages and olives, of Parmesan cheese, dried mushrooms and exotic sweetmeats; butchers who sell live chickens and goats’ flesh, taverns crowded with gesticulating men playing cards and dominoes and smoking rat-tailed Italian cigars; clubs where they provide generous dishes of delicious spaghetti with a tumbler or two of chianti or barbera. There are people who think it a fiddling thing to gain acquaintance with such sides of London life; who would not give twopence to meet such odd London characters as, say, ‘the costers’ parson,’ a remarkable old clergyman who, after forty years of work in the Old Kent Road, was able on the Sunday of his retirement a few weeks ago to fill his choir with costers in pearlie suits, persuade a coster ‘king’ to read the Lesson, and set his crowded congregation laughing aloud with a sermon of superb unconventionality. Dr. Johnson, that great Londoner, thought otherwise. His knowledge embraced a vast amount of London trivia. When Boswell observed one day that the poor in London went about gathering bones, Johnson, erudite in more than bookish matters, was able to reply: ‘Yes, sir, they boil them, and extract a grease from them for greasing wheels and other purposes. Of the best pieces they make a mock ivory, which is used for hafts to knives, and various other things; the coarser pieces they burn, and pound, and sell the ashes for making a furnace for the chemists to melt iron.’ And when Boswell referred a little later in the same conversation to another trade—the collection of orange peel for scraping and drying, which he had noted was prepared and sold to the distillers—his learned friend was able to enlarge also on that subject.

If the great Dr. Johnson was pleased to know these domestic details of his fellow-citizens, we need not be ashamed to take joy in them. They are well worth finding and describing. For though of making books on London there is no end, the enthusiastic observer may always hope to tell of marvels unrecorded or forgotten or to give an individual picture of a hackneyed subject. Great volumes of reference, slim papers of anecdote, the painstaking Blue-book, the hurried pages of the daily Press, novels and essays, pictures and photographs, guide-books and maps vainly seek to keep abreast of London’s ceaseless activities, continual growth, and multitudinous population. ’Tis a

city that deserves a Hogarth and a Dickens for each generation.

'O Townes of Townes!' exclaimed William Dunbar in his verses in honour of the City, 'London, thou art the flour of Cities all.' Five hundred years later we repeat his boast. Now, as in the sixteenth century, London holds 'lords, barons and many a goodly knight, famous prelates, merchants full of substance, and most delectable lusty ladies bright.' Dunbar, to be sure, as does the modern spectator, chiefly seems to gape before 'the riches and royalty' of the capital; the great palaces, the towering churches (now rather diminished behind concrete skyscrapers), the Lord Mayor, 'Julyus Cesar his Tour,' and other obvious splendours. Doubtless these are things to be enjoyed. The royalty of St. James's and of Buckingham Palace are very well, though few of us may hope to see the interiors or to talk with those who live there; the riches of Bond Street and of Piccadilly are to be enjoyed by all, if only as children gaze at toys, through the windows. Let us by all means stand mouth open before the wonder of the Abbey and explore the beauties of those City churches that have not yet been sold to the builder by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. The great Lord Mayor, to us, as to Dunbar, 'above all Mayors, most worthy,' is a spectacle not to be missed whether in all the panoply of furs and civic ceremonial at a City feast, or in plain clothes flying to Prague to distribute Britain's conscience-money. The Tower of London, beefeaters, Crown Jewels and all, is indubitably worthy of respectful homage. So are the Monument, Big Ben, the Horse Guards and the Cenotaph, Croydon Airport, Tussaud's, Nelson on his pillar, and other familiar landmarks that were unknown to the old poet. The tourist, poor fellow, has scarce time to glance even at such celebrated geegaws, and the Cockney, who will pass an hour watching workmen dig a hole in the roadway, will pass his life without seeing even that much of London.

But we will not sneer at the Cockney. As Hazlitt pointed out, the Cockney often takes a concealed but jealous pride in his native city, though he knows so little of it and enjoys such a tiny portion of its fantastic luxury and wealth. Hazlitt, writing 'On Londoners and Country People,' is rather contemptuous of this pride, picturing the Cockney as a poor

creature who, because he lives in the first city in the world, thinks himself superior to those who live outside it. 'He resides in a garret, or a two pair of stairs' back room; yet he talks of the magnificence of London as if all the houses of Portman or Grosvenor Square were his by right or in reversion. He meets the Lord Mayor in his coach and without ceremony treats himself to an imaginary ride in it. He notices the people going to Court or to a City feast, and is quite satisfied with the show.' This seems to me a finely disinterested mind; such ability to enjoy vicarious pleasures is surely not ignoble? And the delight, to take Hazlitt's example, of a spectator gaping at those entering the Guildhall for a civic banquet, or the Palace for a royal ball, may easily be greater than that of some with tickets of admission. One remembers clearly enough the boredom of one such occasion, when the lengthening minutes of pompous speeches seemed to stretch to the crack of doom and were enlivened only by a fortunate side-view down the high table at which a royal prince, as bored as the reporter who watched him, was surreptitiously playing 'noughts and crosses' on the menu-card under the tablecloth.

But if the foreign and country visitors, and the Cockneys too, know so little even of the listed treasures of this vast metropolis, we who really love London with an appetite that grows by what it feeds on are not to be fobbed off, I hope, with guide-book exploration. We walk between the great thoroughfares and know more about famous places and historic buildings than caretakers can tell us. We find architectural gems in secluded squares, curious buildings in the side streets, queer trades in obscure alleys and treasures of human character everywhere. We are aware of other entrances into St. Paul's Cathedral than the great doors—the dark entry, for instance, that leads by winding stone stairs into the bellringers' chamber and into that little-visited gallery that gives the finest perspective of the interior. We have been to Drury Lane Theatre, but also know where to enjoy the unadvertised Yiddish players of Whitechapel. We have sauntered along the terrace at the Houses of Parliament and perambulated the towing-path from Putney to Hampton Court; but we are also acquainted with that river walk between Greenwich and Blackwall Tunnel which, at the turn

of the tide, gives such an intimate view of the crowding ships. We have seen the Pool of London from Tower Bridge, but can also find our way to where the bawley boats are moored. We have danced in Mayfair, but also on the asphalt of an Islington square.

I sing, it must be obvious, in praise of the London reporter, that indefatigable journalist who in search of 'copy' meets dustman and duke, publican and priest, and who finds his way, like the taxi-driver, to Battersea and Brixton, to Camden Town and Hackney, as well as Belgrave Square. The rich may toy with smoked salmon at the Savoy, the poor devour it at the *delicatessen* store, with equal lack of curiosity. It is the London reporter who traces their delicious morsel to its source and discovers that the fish is smoked for high and low in the same drab little street in the East End. Millionaire and bank clerk may buy the same make of razor blade; but neither will have the urge to find out—though pleased to be told—that their shaving tool is made by a firm that has forged swords since the eighteenth century and that still makes swords for the King, his courtiers and the officers of his Navy and Army. Many have heard of Wapping, if only in the old song; some know the way there; only the London reporter tried to save the ancient 'Turk's Head' tavern from closing, and learnt, from a sailor drinking in the bar, the secret of how to smuggle in and out of London, without detection, not only goods but men.

These and the like tit-bits of London life and scenes are not to be found in reference-books or catalogued by glib sightseers' guides. These are the oddities and domestic details, I repeat, that it pleased the lexicographer to know, and for which the London reporter searches for our amusement. He cannot hope to have a tithe of the genius of that prince of London reporters Charles Dickens, whose skill in describing, say, the sinister silence of a London fog, or in sharpening the comedy of Cockney talk, remains unsurpassed and inimitable. He will never gossip like Pepys; he cannot expect to have such gifts as a certain London perambulator's eye for the rainwashed beauties of Portland stone or his quick ear for the odder City lore: yet he will be a poor hand if he cannot find new toys in such a storehouse, untrodden corners in such a maze of streets. And he does find them, every day. He

finds them, of course, as the casual explorer with more leisure but less purpose fails to do—because he is looking for them.

I would not be thought, while praising him, to despise the more serious observer, or to disregard the importance of that mass of information, whole libraries of it, archæological, historical, political, statistical, anecdotal, and so forth, that stands ready to teach us a little about London. There cannot be too many books, too many methods of collecting facts and figures. All I would be saying is that the London reporter, though so much of his daily efforts is only for the day, and up to a point necessarily so, yet deserves an honourable place amongst those who strive to keep London's Domesday Book perpetually up to date. No historian, grave or gay, has yet, I fancy, written that long-needed book that will celebrate the old shops of London, shops such as the teamen's in the Strand, the grocer's near the Bank, the bookshop that lately closed its doors in Bond Street, the wine merchant's in St. James's Street, the snuff shop in Haymarket, the butcher's in Marylebone, the baker's in Lamb Conduit Street, and the bell foundry in Whitechapel, that have been in continuous trade in some cases as far back as Stuart or even Tudor times. When that book eventually goes to the printer it will not be less interesting if the writer has wisely used cuttings from the London reporter's forgotten columns.

The London reporter is constantly adding marginal notes of the greatest value for future historians of London. A pity that some industrious but selective compiler does not collect, collate and index choice specimens for the benefit of posterity. Perhaps he does? At any rate, except for the indispensable books of reference, I prefer the London reporter's pages to those of the more pretentious historians of the metropolitan scene. But it may be that is because the purely æsthetic delight does not come easily to me, and historical knowledge, as such, leaves me unexcited. I can never endure seeing places for the sake of seeing them. The finest building has little charm until some personal emotion endears it to me; only then does it become a source of pleasure. Vainly I once tried to feel, as others told me they felt, wonder and awe at the interior of Wren's masterpiece. But it was useless to pretend; the inside of St. Paul's seemed always rather depressing than exhilarating, until one day, attending a

national service there, I was taken as a privilege to a little balcony high in the dome. Alone above the multitude, yet at one with them, St. Paul's at last came to life for me. The thundering organ; the swelling voices of the choir; the kneeling crowd; the sudden shaft of light that for a moment illuminated like a visible benediction a group of royalties and commoners; above all the nation's need for the blessing we were there to pray for, these gave warmth to the cold beauty of the cathedral and a human proportion to the vast structure. St. Paul's for me ceased to be a great piece of architecture calling for admiration, it became what, after all, it really is—a church, a place for men to worship in. I saw that its size, beauty, fame, age, historic associations could enrich but could not (for me) create the emotion roused by the exercise of its true function. From that moment I was able to visit the cathedral with the ease of acquaintance. I could indeed admire it.

JOHN SHAND.

THE CHEMICAL ATTACK UPON DISEASE

THEOPHRASTUS BOMBASTUS VON HOHENHEIM, called Paracelsus, began his campaign for the enlightenment of medicine in 1527 in true Teutonic fashion by publicly burning the works of Galen and of Avicenna. He exasperated the pedants by lecturing in German instead of Latin, and rudely declared that 'all the universities have less experience than my beard.' But this roistering physician, who fittingly met his end in a tavern brawl in Salzburg, did inestimable service to his profession by discarding alchemy for the chemical treatment of disease. In the development of his ideas it is thought that he was strongly influenced by the experience he gained in the Fuggeris mines in Tirol. He made mercury, lead, sulphur, iron, arsenic, and copper part of the pharmacopœia. 'Ich hab,' he declared, 'ein Arcanum, heiss ich Laudanum, ist über des alles, wo es zum Tod reichen will.' And laudanum it is called to this day.

Paracelsus may well be called the father of chemotherapy, a term introduced by another great German, Ehrlich, and a subject which has undergone such startling developments during the past three years as a result of work started in the laboratories of the I.G. Farbenindustrie at Elberfeld.

Chemotherapy may be defined as the treatment by chemicals of the causative agents of disease, as distinct from the treatment of the symptoms of disease. The laudanum which Paracelsus introduced is given for the relief of the symptom pain; such substances as mercury and antimony have a more ambitious therapeutic aim—the destruction of the very cause of disease itself—although they, too, may be used symptomatically. The immediate clamour of the sick person is for the relief of painful and disagreeable sensations. Remedies which effect this are valuable, but the aim of the physician is, if possible, to strike at the roots of disease, and in this he has during the past two or three years been unex-

pectedly aided by the discovery of powerful chemicals. Before we discuss what has been described as 'the greatest discovery in modern therapeutics,' it may be of interest to return to Paracelsus and to retrace some of the steps that have been taken in what at times has seemed a hopeless quest.

The disease (syphilis) which provided the scene for Ehrlich's great therapeutic triumph in 1910, when he introduced the drug salvarsan, or 606, was attacked chemotherapeutically soon after its appearance in Europe at the end of the fifteenth century. According to the *Morbo gallico* of Fallopius, syphilis was introduced to Europe by soldiers who returned with Columbus from the West Indies in 1493, and who then joined the Spanish army at Naples to fight the French. The Spaniards 'had with them several wenches infected with the pox, and since they knew that this disease was dangerous and readily communicated, remembering that the French had a weakness for the fair sex, they sent these corrupt women into the French camp. The stratagem succeeded.' This might be cited as an example of bacterial warfare. In 1553 Paracelsus published his manual on the use of mercurials in syphilis, and mercury is to this day one of the chief weapons of attack against this malady. The hold that Galen had upon the physicians contemporary with Paracelsus may be judged by the fact that many of them refused to treat syphilis because Galen, being ignorant of the disease, had left no instruction how this should be done.

Another substance used by Paracelsus was antimony, and the energetic prescription of this came to be looked upon as the hall-mark of his followers. Molière attacked the new therapeutic vogue as mercilessly as he attacked so much else in medicine, but this in particular because he believed that it had killed his son. Antimony, however, came once more into favour after the recovery of Louis XIV. from typhoid fever, a recovery attributed to a dose of antimony prescribed for him by a quack. But the physician who gave tartar emetic (an antimony compound) to Napoleon during his illness on St. Helena was less fortunate. Napoleon, who was violently upset each time he took a dose, adopted a well-worn imperial device by trying it on an attendant, and found that it had the same ill-effect on him; so he dismissed the physician. Nevertheless, antimony has survived, and now, by the brilliant

successes it has achieved in the treatment of African sleeping sickness, bilharzia, and kala-azar, more than atones for the damage done in the past. The treatment of kala-azar with antimony has reduced the mortality of this disease from 90 per cent. to under 5 per cent.

The attack so boisterously begun by Paracelsus on Galenism was probably clinched by the discovery of what must at the time have seemed to be the miraculous healing properties of the cinchona bark. The first known instance of its use was in the year 1638, when the Countess Anna del Chinchon, the wife of the Governor of Peru, was cured by it of an attack of fever. The Jesuits introduced it into Europe, and it was known as Jesuit's bark. The chief alkaloids derived from cinchona bark are quinine, quinidine, cinchonine, and cinchonidine. Quinine was isolated from the bark in 1820, and in the second half of the nineteenth century attempts were made to introduce the cinchona trees into India, Ceylon, Jamaica, and Australia, as the reckless manner in which the native forests were being despoiled in South America led to fears for the cinchona tree's survival. Java is now the most important cinchona district in the world, and vast business interests are involved in the production of quinine. The Jesuit's bark has multiplied mightily, and millions of sufferers have cause to bless the chance discovery some 300 years ago of a substance that destroys the malaria parasite.

The seventeenth century saw the introduction of yet another substance that has proved of value in the chemical attack upon the cause of disease—*ippecacuanha*, which was not used in Europe before 1672. It formed the chief ingredient in a remedy for dysentery, and at the instigation of Louis XIV. this 'secret remedy' was bought by the French Government in 1688 for 1000 louis d'or. Emetine, one of the alkaloids of *ippecacuanha*, is now the most powerful remedy we have for treating amœbic dysentery.

It is of interest to note that syphilis was treated with mercury, dysentery with *ippecacuanha*, and malaria with cinchona, between 200 and 300 years before the discovery of the cause of these diseases. Empiricism needs no greater justification than this. Malaria is the result of infection with a protozoal parasite, as are amœbic dysentery, kala-azar,

bilharzia, African sleeping sickness, and syphilis. The 'first animals,' destructive as is their onslaught upon the highest mammal, Man, appear to be relatively vulnerable to counter-attack. Protozoal infections are commoner in tropical and semi-tropical countries than in Great Britain, and the vigorous development of tropical medicine has been of untold economic and social value to the British Empire. Fortunately we do not get kala-azar, or black fever, as it is called, here, but it occurs in India, Assam, China, Indo-China, the Sudan, Abyssinia, and along the Mediterranean littoral. Antimony is obviously a matter of importance to a great many people. It may be noted, too, that malaria (one protozoal infection in which chemotherapy has been successful) has been deliberately given to patients afflicted with another in which chemotherapy has also scored its triumphs—syphilis. For malaria is given to patients with general paralysis of the insane, due to syphilitic infection of the brain. The paroxysms of malaria—and so the duration of the treatment—are controlled with quinine.

The success of chemotherapy in the treatment of protozoal infections was unfortunately not paralleled in the treatment of infection with the lowlier vegetable parasites—bacteria. But in saying this, one must not forget that modern surgery was made possible by the crude but revolutionary chemotherapeutic experiment performed by Lister some seventy-odd years ago—in fact, one of the most important experiments in the history of medicine. Surgery was then practically restricted to the amputation of limbs, and sepsis carried off nearly half the patients operated on. Lister himself recorded a 45 per cent. mortality among the patients whose limbs he amputated between 1864 and 1866. The cause of sepsis was not known. Fortunately Lister became acquainted with Pasteur's work, and, acting upon the supposition that the decomposition of wounds was due to the presence of bacteria, and that the bacteria came from other bacteria, he set about destroying them. In applying carbolic acid to the wound Lister performed one of the simplest yet greatest experiments in chemotherapy. Sir St. Clair Thomson, who was Lister's house-surgeon in 1883, remarked last month that Lister 'did more for the progress of surgery than all the surgeons of the world since the days of Hippocrates had together been able to

effect.' The horrible state of affairs that prevailed before Lister's introduction of antisepsis may be imagined from the following description by the late Sir Clifford Allbutt:

Suppuration, phagedena, and septic poisonings of the system carried away even the most promising patients and followed even trifling operations. Often, too, these diseases rose to the height of epidemic pestilence, so that patients, however extreme their need, dreaded the very name of hospital, and the most skilful surgeons distrusted their own craft.

Lister was guided to carbolic acid by the fact that it was then being used for deodorising sewage in Carlisle. Carbolic acid (or hydroxy-benzene) was discovered by F. Runge in 1834, and its principal commercial source is coal-tar. Modern medicine might almost be said to revolve round the distillation products of coal-tar. One may refer, in passing, to the part played by tar in the elucidation of the cancer problem and to the isolation from it of cancer-producing chemicals. From the point of view of chemotherapy, one of the most momentous events was the preparation in 1856 by Sir W. H. Perkin of the first aniline dye—the purple colouring matter, mauve. Aniline is manufactured by treating nitro-benzene; nitro-benzene is prepared from benzene (C_6H_6), and this is prepared from coal-tar. After Perkin's discovery a bewildering profusion of coal-tar dyestuffs were prepared; and they can now be numbered in their hundreds.

Soon after the discovery of mauve came the portentous discoveries of Pasteur and of Koch and the opening of a new chapter in the history of medicine and of science. Among the brilliant band of bacteriologists at work during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the German Jew Paul Ehrlich was an outstanding figure. He shared the Nobel Prize for medicine in 1908 with Metchnikoff. Ehrlich's great achievement was the discovery in 1910 of salvarsan, or 606, the arsenical preparation which was found to have a specific chemotherapeutic effect on the *Treponema pallidum*, the micro-organism which is responsible for the infection known as syphilis. But long before this Ehrlich was busily occupied in experimenting with the staining properties of the new dyes obtained from coal-tar. He found that the granules in some white cells of the blood stained with basic dyes and

others with acid dyes, thus making an important contribution to physiology. (The staining of bodily tissues with coal-tar dyes has been of the highest significance in both physiology and pathology.) The staining of bacteria with coal-tar dyes is used not only for their identification, so that they may be easily seen under the microscope, but also for their differentiation. At an early stage of his work Ehrlich argued that this differential staining power of dyes for different tissues was due to differences in chemical affinity of certain dyes for different kinds of cells. He concluded, for example, that the staining power of methylene blue for the malaria parasite was the result of a chemical affinity between the two. He went further and supposed that this chemical affinity might influence the vitality of the malaria parasite in the body; and, indeed, found that it did. Later he directed his attention to the effect of dyes on the *trypanosomes*, the protozoan organisms which, conveyed to man by the bite of the tsetse fly, cause African sleeping sickness. (One may observe here that this work coincided with the development of Germany's African colonies.) He found that the dyes trypan red and trypan blue had a distinct preventive and therapeutic effect on trypanosome infection in mice. From trypan blue has evolved the substance Bayer 205, or germanin, which is the most powerful remedy there is against African sleeping sickness.

All this work gave rise to a great many problems. It was found, for example, that if the trypanosomes were not completely put out of action by the dye they might subsequently become resistant to its action. If this dye-resistant strain were to be transmitted by one tsetse fly to another it would, in multiplying, retain its dye resistance. With many patients ineffectively treated in a community it can be seen that a breed of dye-resistant trypanosomes might soon spring up and constitute a problem that would need another Ehrlich to solve. The natural deduction to make from the effect of various chemotherapeutic compounds was that they did their work by simply destroying the micro-organism. But it was found that many of the most efficient chemotherapeutic substances acted more slowly on micro-organisms isolated from the body than in the body itself. Evidently there must be a combined action in which the body shares. And it was found that the principal action of a chemotherapeutic drug was

in so weakening the micro-organism as to make it vulnerable to one of the natural defences of the body—Metchnikoff's phagocytes.

Further, micro-organisms so weakened and broken up liberate into the blood stream the chemical constituents of their own substance which provoke the formation of antibodies; and these, too, then come to the rescue of the body. Effective chemotherapy of internal infections (as opposed to external infections on the surface of the body) depends in the last resort upon utilising the natural defence mechanisms.

Knowledge of these natural mechanisms developed with the rapid advance of bacteriology, and here again Ehrlich's brilliant mind provided theoretical conceptions that were to be justified by practical results. But, in spite of this advance, the results of chemotherapy on protozoa in the body and on bacteria on the surface could not be obtained in the case of internal bacterial infection. The difficulty of finding antiseptics which were more injurious to bacteria than to the tissues themselves in the treatment of wounds was formidable enough, but this was slight in comparison with the obstacles placed in the way of 'internal antiseptics.' In the event of a general infection, when the bacteria multiply in the blood stream and constitute the condition known as septicæmia, it is obviously not an easy matter to introduce into the blood an antiseptic in sufficient concentration to kill the bacteria without killing the patient. Mercuric chloride, for example, is highly poisonous to the anthrax bacillus isolated from the body, but when Koch tried to cure a general anthrax infection by injecting a solution of mercuric chloride he failed. In 1911 Morgenroth and Levy raised great hopes by curing an otherwise fatal pneumococcal septicæmia in mice with injections of optoquine, a substance closely related to quinine. The pneumococcus is the bacterium responsible for a widely prevalent form of pneumonia. Unfortunately the repetition of this experiment in human beings suffering from pneumonia was unsuccessful. In the treatment of septicæmia, especially that due to the bacterium known as the *Streptococcus pyogenes*, numerous bactericidal drugs have been injected, a recent favourite being mercurochrome, a combination of mercury and an aniline dye. In the 1937 edition of a well-known text-book of medicine the past uselessness of chemotherapy

for this condition was acknowledged as follows: 'Drugs having reputed bactericidal action are numerous, but experience does not justify any degree of confidence in them, even when the chemical agent is exploited generously and by the intravenous route.' The next edition of this text-book will probably be more optimistic in view of the work that was in process at the time those words were written.


Although it is only during the last three years that the quite remarkable bactericidal properties of a series of drugs obtained as a result of work on that group of aniline dyes known as the azo dyes have come to light, they might well have been found nearly twenty years ago but for a kind of accident that is not uncommon in research work. In 1919 Heidelberger and Jacobs, of the Rockefeller Institute, published in a series of papers one with the rather forbidding title of 'Azo dyes derived from hydrocupreine and hydrocupreidine.' In this they referred to meta- and para-amino-benzene-sulphonamide, the latter of which is the drug now being used the world over in the treatment of internal bacterial infections, especially those due to the *Streptococcus pyogenes*. In their paper Heidelberger and Jacobs wrote: 'Many of the substances described in this paper were highly bactericidal *in vitro*, a property which will be discussed in the appropriate place by our colleague Dr. Martha Wollstein.' But tentative experiments were not encouraging and the work was dropped. The first description of the now highly important para-amino-benzene-sulphonamide was published in 1908, but with no reference, of course, to its then unknown chemotherapeutic properties.

The credit for the brilliant work that has already resulted in the saving of many lives must go to the workers in the Elberfeld laboratories of the I.G. Farbenindustrie. The starting-point of what is now a whole series of bactericidal drugs was the red dye-stuff patented on Christmas Day, 1932, as prontosil. Over 1000 related compounds have now been synthesised, and are the subject of experimental trial. Professor H. Hörlein, describing this work in a paper read to the Nottingham meeting of the British Association in 1937, said:

The results obtained with these and similar compounds seemed, however, too good to be true, so that, before publishing them, several years were devoted to intensive clinical and experimental

work. This explains why Domagk, the director of the experimental-pathological laboratory, delayed publishing the results of the chemotherapeutic action of prontosil, in experimental streptococcal infections in mice and rabbits, until February 1935.

One curious thing about prontosil, which may be described as an azo dye containing a sulphonamide group, was that it had no action on bacteria isolated from the body: on actual bacterial infection of the body its action was little short of marvellous. The next step was taken by the French workers Tréfouel, Nitti, and Bovet, who showed that the part of the molecule containing the sulphonamide group was as efficient a bactericide as prontosil itself. And it was found that the sulphonamide group was active when attached to the benzene ring in a certain position: this compound is known as para-amino-benzene-sulphonamide, called more shortly sulphanilamide, the chemical formula of which is:



One of the mysteries of prontosil was solved when it was found that sulphanilamide—a colourless compound—was formed from it in the body. The chemotherapeutic action of sulphanilamide and the fact that it was not protected by patent led to its widespread manufacture in this country and America under a variety of fanciful names.

It has already been said that sulphanilamide has a specific destructive effect on streptococcal infections. These infections have consistently defied rational therapeutics in the past and have levied a heavy toll in terms of health and life. Streptococci are responsible for the dread condition known as child-bed or puerperal fever. The work of Dr. Leonard Colebrook at Queen Charlotte's Hospital has shown the excellent results that can be obtained by treating this condition with sulphanilamide. The mortality used to be 20 per cent.: in a recent series of 106 cases treated with sulphanilamide there were only eight deaths. Streptococcal meningitis was formerly almost invariably fatal: out of seventeen patients with this condition recently treated with sulphanilamide thirteen recovered. Another streptococcal infection that bows down before sulphanilamide is erysipelas. The strepto-

coccus is indeed a ubiquitous organism, and the discovery of a drug that has a specific chemotherapeutic effect on it in the body is one of the most important discoveries in medicine during the present century. But sulphanilamide does not stop at the streptococcus. To everyone's amazement it was found to have a strongly deterrent action on the gonococcus (the causative organism in gonorrhœa), on *Bacterium coli* (which commonly gives rise to troublesome infections in the kidney and the bladder), on the meningococcus (the microbe of cerebro-spinal fever), and to a more or less degree on other bacteria.

Sulphanilamide, however, was of little use against the pneumococcus, and therefore not of much help in treating pneumonia. But early this year it was reported that a combination of sulphanilamide and pyridine, known conveniently as M. and B. 693, was effective against the pneumococcus as well as against the streptococcus and the meningococcus. This experimental work had subsequent clinical confirmation, and in one series of cases of pneumonia treated with M. and B. 693 the mortality rate was 8 per cent. as compared with 27 per cent. in a series for which the drug was not available.

It may be of interest to state a few more facts about sulphanilamide. It may be injected or taken by mouth. It is fortunately fully effective taken in the latter way, and it quickly enters the blood from the gastro-intestinal tract. It reaches a maximum concentration in the blood in about three hours and quickly appears in the body fluids. The fact that it reaches the fluid bathing the brain and the spinal cord enables it to be effective in the treatment of meningitis. With such a powerful remedy toxic effects are inevitable, and it is perhaps needless to point out that its administration should always be at the hands of an experienced and qualified medical practitioner. Self-administration has already proved disastrous to many. The question how the drug acts is an involved one, but it seems probable that sulphanilamide has a direct damaging action on, for example, streptococci, so that they are killed or that their power of multiplication is arrested: in this enfeebled state they are then finished off by the normal defence mechanisms of the body. That belief in this theory is growing is shown by the fact that many workers

now combine sulphanilamide therapy with immune therapy, the latter supplying or stimulating the supply in the blood of antibodies to bacteria. Finally, it appears that M. and B. 693 acts by destroying the capsule enveloping the pneumococcus, thus making it vulnerable to the natural defence mechanisms of the body.

With the aid of the cyclotron or 'atom-smasher' it is now possible to obtain by bombardment with deuterons artificial radio-active isotopes of nearly all the ordinary chemical elements. The radio-active isotope will follow its inactive isotope through any series of chemical processes. The first cyclotron was developed by Professor E. O. Laurence in the University of California. There are now two in Great Britain—one in Cambridge and the other in Liverpool. Some idea of the size of this apparatus is gained when it is stated that the magnet of the Liverpool cyclotron contains forty-six tons of iron and eight tons of copper. Phosphorus made radio-active by the cyclotron has been used in the treatment of a severe blood disease known as myelocytic leukaemia. In this the bone-marrow is in a diseased state. Phosphorus, when taken by the mouth as a phosphate, travels to the bones. By making the phosphorus in a phosphate radio-active, radio-active energy may in this way be directly applied to the bones and so to the bone-marrow. This artificial radio-activity fortunately soon decays. One or two patients with leukaemia have already been treated, and so far with success; but time has got to show whether the improvement is to be permanent.

It is hoped that this newest form of chemotherapy, depending as it does upon the practical application of the new atomic physics, may be used in the treatment of cancer. If it were discovered that there was some chemical element essential and specific to the growing cancer cell, that element could be made radio-active by the cyclotron and then be administered to the sufferer from cancer, thus bringing radio-active energy to bear upon each cancer cell.

All this is a far cry from Paracelsus and an indication of how medicine is energetically using the growing points of the various sciences in its attack upon disease.

HUGH CLEGG.

EDEN STINGS THE SERPENT

(1)

PERHAPS it was because he had slept so well on the smooth inter-island crossing; perhaps because it was Sunday morning; perhaps because Arachiqua really is the loveliest little islet in those Spanish waters. Whatever the reason, when Herr Conrad Schultze, traveller in lace, came up early on to the deck of the *Ramon Quedrasos* and saw Arachiqua sailing towards him along a floor of blue glass he was filled with those sensations he associated only with Christmas-time in Thuringia. He felt good. Arachiqua was a cone of green verdure picked out with shining white crags of rock that leapt to a bare volcanic summit; it was rose-tinted by a sun already warm with the promise of sub-tropical day; and the seascape that encased this jewel was in mauves and cobalts and mother-of-pearly transitions. The froth in front of the *Ramon Quedrasos*' easy-going prow was like snowy lace—like finer lace than any that reposed in Herr Schultze's leather-and-canvas cases below deck. Herr Schultze was overcome. He felt good, benevolent, bountiful.

Herr Schultze was twenty-four, blond and rosy, his blue eyes a little too hopefully protuberant, his lips full and eager as if they expanded to the kiss of new experience. He believed in goodness and kindness and Natural Beauty—above all, in Natural Beauty; and it seemed to him that a grave obligation lay upon the German race, who understood these values so well, to disseminate their culture among races who somehow could not get them right. It was his first trip to these sub-tropical Latin islands; he had been sent there by his firm to sell at a profit lace collars, lace scarves, lace boudoir caps, lace anything; but with Teutonic seriousness he was ready to regard himself as much more than a commercial traveller; he was a missionary. His line was not so much lace as loveli-

ness—the appreciation of Natural Beauty. It was astounding, thought Herr Schultze, how people, in the name of art, in the name of embellishment, disfigured the gift of Nature.

The deck of the *Ramon Quedrasos* was untenanted at that early hour save for the mate, who leaned over the rail staring morosely at the many-tinted sea. The mate seemed in no mood for conversation, but Herr Schultze, out of his bursting heart, must speak to someone. He said, in his serviceable but ill-sounding Spanish, 'Muy hermosa!'

The mate looked up sourly and said, 'Diga?' He understood perfectly, of course—indeed, that pointing finger, that flush of adoration, would have conveyed Herr Schultze's mental state to the deaf; but it was the mate's belief that passengers should be discouraged.

'Diga?'

'Muy hermosa. Muy, *muy* hermosa.'

'Tal vez.'

Herr Schultze said reprovingly, 'But it is like Paradise. It is the Garden of Eden.'

The mate spat. For a moment it seemed as if he would make no response; then, drawing himself together, he said, and contriving somehow to fill the word with disagreeable implication, 'Claro!'

* * * *

Presently Herr Schultze, with his three leather-and-canvas cases of lace goods, travelled up the steep road to Trujeda in an omnibus. The omnibus was not an object of Natural Beauty, nor had it even the merit of mechanical efficiency; but Herr Schultze was beyond caring about these un-German errors. He was sunk in a trance of titillated sensation, wrapped in a dream of worship. For the enchantment lent by distance to his first view of Arachiqua was not impaired by proximity: the island was the loveliest thing he had ever seen; its colours, its shapes, its proportions were perfect. It is, thought Herr Schultze, an older world, a primeval civilisation; we are back here in the Dawn with the satyrs and the nymphs. The Garden of Eden indeed! He was too charmed to reflect that the Dawn in Eden was perhaps an unpromising field for the peddling of lace what-nots.

Trujeda, however, was a town, and a dirty little town;

the street frontage of its *fonda* was depressing to a degree. even this redeemed itself; for at the back were hydrants and almond trees and the cooing of doves; and the little bare-floored bedroom they gave Herr Schultze was hung with pictures of dreamy and confiding saints. Waiting for his hot water, Herr Schultze was filled with pleasurable anticipation; it will be nice here, he thought—simple, natural. Presently, he thought, some little creature of the woods, some little island *Elfchen*, will come with my hot water; I shall tease her, joke with her, it will be fun. Ah, how sweet a thing is simplicity! How heavenly to be with Nature—unspoilt and undegraded by the hideous arts of man!

There was a knock at the door and his island *Elfchen* entered. . . .

She was perhaps eighteen: she wore an untidy and unpretentious cotton frock; but under it there appeared stockings of a silk so artificial that it shone like varnish. Her black hair had been comprehensively 'permed,' her nails were red as blood. But it was at her face that Herr Schultze gazed in horrified despair. It was what they call a heart-shaped face and of a Latin prettiness; but—the mess she had made of it! Her cheeks, which Heaven had meant to suggest warm ivory, were lurid with rouge, her eyebrows were tortured into hard pen-and-ink lines, her lashes were black and sticky, and all below her straight little nose was blasted by a slashing mouth of pillar-box red. It was as though some lunatic artist had flung a raging sunrise on the face of a marble Venus.

'Señor?' she said, and smiled at him; the red mouth ran flaming from ear to ear. Herr Schultze fell back; with an air of faint disappointment she went out and closed the door.

'Aber na!' thought Herr Schultze in dismay; 'Aber na!'

The island *Elfchen*, the creature of the woods, unsullied Nature! Oh, dear!

(2)

Arachiqua, unlike so much of this world's beauty, contrived to live up to first impressions. It was inexhaustibly lovely; when you thought you had extracted its ultimate enticement, it tossed you some capricious surprise that left

you gasping afresh. Herr Schultze had no words to express his endless delight. But though the island itself was wild, its people, he found, were more sophisticated than he could have wished. The population of Trujeda, while remaining in some respects very nymph-and-satyr indeed, had evidently studied in the books of modernity as well. And in the wrong books. The young men wore *Americano* suits and shoes, the island sports and pastimes had given way to a ramshackle cinema, the island music had been supplanted by wireless. But it was the young women who most pained Herr Schultze; in them he saw the island's worst betrayal of itself. For they were, one and all, like the little maid of the *fonda*, one and all they had succumbed to the false allurements of fashion. Their soft pretty faces were plastered with decoration, their round, magnificent eyes looked out through a mist of cosmetics, their mouths blazed, their cheeks smouldered like clouds above a bonfire. They must have seen some dreadful advertisement, thought Herr Schultze, some horrible film magazine; *who* can have done it? (It did not occur to him that the villain was probably someone like himself travelling not in lace but in make-up.) In the shop-window of the Trujeda hairdresser he saw the fatal stuff displayed—various concoctions of a brand calling itself *La Maxixa*; Herr Schultze longed to smash the windows and assault the intolerable display. That I cannot do, he thought, but there are things I *can* do and will. I must; why else am I here?

His *Elfchen* at the *fonda*, he found after a day or two, was called Rosa—a good German name, after all, that was somehow reassuring. And on further acquaintance the child was reassuring too; she *was* a child—quite ready for Herr Schultze's very harmless jokes, quite ready to be teased by him, to tease timidly in return. They had great—and childish—fun over his name, to which she could get no nearer than 'Señor Soos' on the one hand and 'Señor Chooz' on the other. She was a merry creature—woodland, indeed an *Elfchen*, Garden of Eden; all that he had hoped. But—that desecrated face! *La Maxixa*!

It was not till the morning of his fourth Sunday at Trujeda that Herr Schultze went into action. Meantime he had more or less exhausted the lace-buying possibilities of the town; very soon he would have to cross the mountains to Arachi-

qua's only other place of consequence—San Cristobal; relatively soon—alas, alas!—he would have to leave the Garden of Eden altogether. He had not done well so far, but he had not done badly; he had sold the bulk of his scarves and boudoir caps; the collars were hanging a little. Like a good salesman, Herr Schultze was struck by the idea of combining at a stroke advertisement value and missionary work.

On the morning of that fourth Sunday, when Rosa brought his early coffee, her eyes were instantly caught by a particularly resplendent lace collar displayed on the back of Herr Schultze's chair. And after a few preliminary and skirmishing jests, Herr Schultze asked her, 'How would you like that collar, Rosa, eh?'

She replied, with a quickness of uptake that was more *La Maxixa* than Garden of Eden, 'What would the señor wish me to do for him?'

Herr Schultze said hastily, 'Ach, nothing, nothing,' and strove to persuade himself that her look was not one of disappointment. 'Well, only a very little thing, Rosa, a little *nice* thing.'

'Señor?'

'Take all that nasty stuff off your face. Do not ever put it on again.'

'Is there, then, dirt on my face, señor?' She rushed to the mirror.

'Ach, no! But there is all that red stuff. That rouge. That lip-stick.'

'But, Señor Soos, all the girls do it.'

'Then they must stop doing it. They too.'

'But, señor . . .'

'Ah, then I see you do not want my little collar.'

But she did want it—desperately, as Herr Schultze was well aware. Her eyes flitted from it, hanging on the chair, to her reflection in the mirror. She made a face at herself.

'But, señor, I will feel undressed without my make-up.'

'You will look better undressed. No, no! That I did not mean.' For she had given him again that distressingly twentieth-century look. 'But without *that* you will look better. You will look as the good God meant you to be—Ach, Rosa, you will be beautiful.'

She was shaken. Herr Schultze picked up his collar.

'See. This is not an ordinary collar. This is not common machine lace. This is Convent lace; this is made by the good nuns at . . .' He ran on, the familiar words coming easily; he blarneyed her as he had blarneyed half the housewives of Trujeda. In the end he threw the collar deftly round her neck. 'See now, Rosa, you are beautiful. Or you would be if all that nasty stuff . . .' He nipped the collar away again. 'See now the difference.'

Rosa thought, 'This man is mad. But in a day or two he will go away, and then I will still have the collar, and I can put on *La Maxixa* again. He is telling stories about the lace, but still it is not so bad. With my Sunday frock which I will wear this afternoon . . .' She signified assent.

Herr Schultze's rosy kindly face beamed on her. 'That is a good girl; that is a very good girl. You will wear my collar and *nothing* on your face; and *how* the other girls will envy you! And you will tell every one of them, 'Give up making a mess of your pretty face and El Señor Soos will give you, too, a lovely collar . . .'

His *Elfchen* turned suddenly to a fury. She threw the lace collar on the ground. 'No! No! On no account. That you must *not* do.'

Herr Schultze, taken aback, relapsed into his mother tongue. 'Bitte?'

'You will not give a collar to *any* other girl. If you do, if you do . . .'

'Bitte?'

'If you do, I will put it all on again twice as thick. Twice.'

She snatched up the collar and rushed from the room, leaving Herr Schultze to wonder just how far his missionary endeavour had succeeded.

* * * * *

But later in the afternoon he was reassured. Taking a walk along the island's only half-mile of decent level road—the eucalyptus-lined Avenida Juan Sorel—he met his *Elfchen*. She was not alone—very much otherwise. It was the pleasant custom on Sunday afternoons in Trujeda for the youths and maidens of the town to saunter up and down, up and down the Avenida; a couple of maidens in front, a couple of swains a yard or two behind. This afternoon the mosaic was altered;

there were several pairs of maidens tramping the Avenida completely unescorted (and trying to show by their shrilly overdone laughter how much they preferred it). Behind Rosa and her chosen companion, on the contrary, there surged a positive cluster of young men. There were half a dozen of them at least, and the most oncoming and the nearest to Rosa was Andros, the son of the proprietor of the *fonda*. Herr Schultze's soft German heart had already suspected an attraction between Rosa and Andros; now here it was ripening with tropical and Arachiquan rapidity into vivid romance.

Nor was it difficult to understand why. Rosa had washed off *La Maxixa* (or most of it) and was wearing the lace collar, which looked infinitely better than it had done on the back of Herr Schultze's chair. Above it her round, solemn, subfusc little face had an expression of demure invitation that was positively devastating—that had manifestly devastated Andros. It made the other girls, with their ruby mouths and illuminated cheek-bones, look like a collection of second-rate street-walkers. Among them Rosa moved like a saint in hell—with the damned, after the manner of the damned, pursuing her.

'*Famos!*' thought Herr Schultze, watching the faces that passed him and listening to the too-hilarious mirth of the rejected, 'I have succeeded; doubly I have succeeded. For those others will take all the mess off their faces now without being told. And I will not give away my lace collars either. *Ganz nicht!* I will sell them. *Famos!*'

At the end of the Avenida was one of Herr Schultze's favourite views—down a long tree-clad valley to a V-shaped glimpse of sea. Away below there the *Ramon Quedrasos* was again lying, inert and tiny; painful reminder that Herr Schultze and his beautiful Arachiqua must very soon part. Ah, well, he thought; man was driven out of Eden. And this *is* Eden.

Eden—yes. But what am I in it? I am not Adam; I cannot be Eve; I must therefore be the Serpent. Beaming with delight, bursting with loving-kindness and satisfaction, he thought, 'Yes, yes, it is the Serpent I am, the Serpent. I tempt not with apples, but with little pieces of lace. And I tempt not to wickedness, but to virtue. Ach, *so!*'

(3)

After that Sunday afternoon Herr Schultze did sell a few more lace collars, but not so many more as he had hoped; it became evident that the purchasing power of Trujeda was for the time being exhausted. Reluctantly, therefore, he set about arranging for a *coche* to transplant himself and his depleted leather-and-canvas cases across the mountain road to San Cristobal. He was so deeply intrigued, however, by his experiments in the cause of Natural Beauty and by the rapidly progressing affair between Andros and Rosa that he put off his departure for one more Sunday. Unfortunately, as it proved.

Yet at the time it did not seem so. Strolling on the Avenida, Herr Schultze the Serpent was delighted to observe, in the first place, that Rosa's success continued; she was again attended by a group of admirers, a rather noisy group who were causing Andros a considerable amount of annoyance. But what gave him much more pleasure was to see that the war against *La Maxixa* made headway; Rosa's little companion had practically dispensed with make-up altogether, while—unless it was Herr Schultze's imagination—cheeks were less roseate and mouths less wildly incarnadined all along the Avenida. Rapturously he thought again, *Famos!* If I could only be here for a month, he thought, we could stamp out this horror altogether; alas, that I cannot! But progress has been made; they have seen, they will not revert.

Herr Schultze, pausing at the end of the Avenida to admire his favourite view, was suddenly conscious of eyes boring into his back. He turned and saw, leaning against a eucalyptus tree, a young man of some early and elemental Arachiquan type. He was lamentably dressed in a shirt and trousers and a slouch-hat of the utmost disreputableness, and he stared at Herr Schultze with the mindless hostility of a bullock in a field. He was a very dark young man and quite savage-looking. Herr Schultze, however, regarded him with nothing more critical than amusement; he thought, smiling inwardly, 'There is a primitive for you; *he* does not decorate himself.' He turned homewards, just conscious that the hostile eyes of the primitive followed his retreating back as if attached to it by strings.

And at the *fonda*, on his dressing-table, he found the letter. There was no mistake about the letter; however disagreeable, however startling, it was indubitably real. It was on an open sheet of notepaper, in holograph and in simple but lucid Spanish. 'Get out of this island,' it said, 'or you will regret it.'

Herr Schultze stared at this missive for some time, as—conceivably—Adam may have stared at his first scorpion. Then, on the impulse of the moment, he took it downstairs and showed it to Andros. Andros was a brazen-faced young man with an olive complexion and curious hair that alternated between dark brown and a clouded gold. He seemed more than a little upset by the letter; his smoky eyes evaded Herr Schultze's blue ones unpleasantly.

'Who could have written this, Andros?'

'Señor Soos . . . Señor Soos . . . You were on the Avenida this afternoon. . . .'

'Aber ja! What has that got to do with it?'

'Oh, nothing—nothing. . . . You are fond of our little Rosa, señor?'

Why, thought Herr Schultze, these clumsy attempts to change the subject? He said, 'Ach, *fond* of her? She amuses me. She is a child.'

'A child. Claro! Si-si-si! A child. . . . Señor Soos, there are savages who may think otherwise.'

'Savages?'

'Hombre, there are bad men in this island. Brigands.'

'What? Robbers?'

'Not exactly robbers. But a gang. Bad men, hombre.'

Herr Schultze was still bewildered; his blue eyes stuck out further than ever. 'What have they to do with me? Do you suggest they have written . . .?'

Andros said darkly, 'Who knows?' and then, somewhat hastily, excused himself. He left Herr Schultze feeling uneasy. Had Andros been evasive, secretive, shifty? Did he know or guess something about that note; or had he only been—as was, after all, not uncommon on Sunday afternoons—a little fuddled?

But darker thoughts followed. That the note had been meant for himself was evidenced by the presence of his name at the head of it—misspelt but recognisable. But how did it

get on to his dressing-table? Persistently the disagreeable theory obtruded itself upon Herr Schultze that it could only have been put there by Rosa. The theory obtruded itself so strongly that when next he saw Rosa in a quiet moment he put it into tentative speech. 'Rosa, tell me; you do not know of any bad men in this island, do you?'

The effect was catastrophic. Rosa's face fell; betrayed by the absence of *La Maxixa*, she went white; she burst into tears; she fled.

Poor Herr Schultze sat down in his chair in dismay. Bad men in Eden; threatening letters in Eden; mystery in Eden. Lieber Gott! is this Eden, or the snake-house at the Zoo!

* * * * *

However, the world does not stand still for shattered illusions, and the business of Herr Schultze's firm must be prosecuted. On Monday morning he paid his bill and boarded the *coche* that was to take him to San Cristobal. The *coche* was a dilapidated touring-car of North American make; Herr Schultze's cases were dumped in the back seats and he himself took his place beside the driver. It promised to be an extremely uncomfortable journey, for the road became almost immediately a stone-strewn track and the *coche* was in the last stage of senility. However, Arachiqua had rallied again to Herr Schultze's aid; the Serpent was again able to take an exhilarating pleasure in his Eden. It was a morning of such translucent brilliance, radiant yet cool, dazzling yet coloured in eye-soothing contrasts, that Herr Schultze's susceptible heart was turned to water. If tourists ever visited Arachiqua—which they do not—they would esteem the drive from Trujeda over the Cruz de Zoja to San Cristobal among their fairest memories; loveliness sprang to greet Herr Schultze from every side, embracing him fondly with a thousand arms. Fawning on him, his Arachiqua said, 'How could I be wicked; how could *you* think it of me?' This is indeed Paradise, thought Herr Schultze, brimming over. He said as much to the driver, but the driver, a taciturn lout, replied only that the road at least was infernal—which was true. But there was no suppressing the exuberance of Herr Schultze's delight; presently it was assuring him that the affair of the threatening letter must have been some delusion,

some mistake. Perhaps it was a joke; perhaps Andros, lit by wine, had given the thing to Rosa to put on El Señor Soos's dressing-table, and then the good girl, seeing El Señor Soos upset, had repented and run away weeping. Yes, thought Herr Schultze, that must have been it. Though *why* Andros . . . ?

A hundred times it seemed that the *coche* could never possibly reach the Cruz de Zoja; yet the summit appeared at last—a forbidding treeless saddle linking two volcanic cones. The only conspicuous object in the landscape was a small hut of mud and thatch surrounded by emaciated dogs, and outside this the driver stopped the car.

'It boils,' he said; and it unmistakably did, for the steam was roaring from the radiator-cap as if from the safety-valve of a locomotive. Muttering something about water, the driver shambled off to the hut.

What exactly happened next Herr Schultze was never quite sure. He sat for a minute or two in the warm friendly sunshine, drinking it in, loving Arachiqua with all his expansive nature. He thought for a minute or two of Natural Beauty, recalling his little ruse with the lace collar and chuckling over it. He had quite forgotten the threatening letter. It was the more surprising, therefore, to look up suddenly and see himself and his *coche* surrounded by some very rough-looking young men. They were, he saw, very crude young men indeed; there was nothing beautiful or Arachiquan about them at all. They wore shirts and trousers and large slouch-hats under which a variety of disagreeable expressions regarded Herr Schultze. In fact they were as villainous-looking a lot as a traveller in lace might meet in a very long journey.

Herr Schultze was annoyed with them; they spoilt the Beauty of Nature. But it did not at first occur to him that they would do anything more troublesome than beg. They would interrupt his beautiful thoughts with their aggressive importunities, and till the *coche* restarted he would be unable to get rid of them. It was not till their leader—and by far their most villainous-looking member—came forward and, leaning over the door of the *coche*, put his face almost against Herr Schultze's that he began to suppose them something more—something worse—than beggars.

'You are el Señor Soos?'

Herr Schultze corrected the mispronunciation. But he thought, 'I have seen that face before. *Where?* Ah, yes—the Avenida. The primitive. Yesterday.'

'Herr Chooz, eh? Then you are the man who has come here to corrupt our young girls?'

The accusation was so monstrous that Herr Schultze could only gasp.

'You propose to yourself that you have the right to invade this island and disfigure our young women? You give them presents to make themselves ugly? So that when other men no longer desire them they will turn to you. Is that what you do?'

Herr Schultze gasped again. 'To make themselves ugly? Herr Lieber Gott! *Ugly!*'

'So? Not ugly?'

'Ugly? Beautiful.'

'Claro! . . . So you wish to corrupt our girls by making them attractive to men?'

Herr Schultze's logical mind sought words to tell this rapsallion that he couldn't have it both ways. But instead he began to explain about Natural Beauty. He was cut short, however, by a long-faced lieutenant in a scarecrow outfit.

'Not to have too many words,' said this gentleman, yawning. 'It seems you have endeavoured to seduce the girl of this Robledo. The penalty for that is . . .'

His leader cursed him into silence. Herr Schultze said, spluttering, 'I seduce the girl? I? It is an insult, it is unpardonable.'

Robledo thrust his grim face even closer. 'But you gave a present; no?'

'I gave a piece of lace . . .'

'*Why* did you do that?'

'Because—because—*aber dies ist ganz ungeschickt!*—because I wanted her to stop putting paint on her face.'

'So! It was a bribe, then, to alter her appearance. Her appearance, it seems, did not please you, señor. Her appearance pleased *me*—me, Robledo. If we are to talk of insults . . .'

Herr Schultze saw suddenly that it would be better not to talk of insults. But he felt the bright beauty of Arachiqua crumbling round him; the pretty flowers, the laughing

nymph-and-satyr people, the suns, the seas, the whole little Paradise-on-earth collapsed with a run into this circle of brute faces, slum faces, cad faces from the underworld of anywhere. It was unbearably too much. Herr Schultze was not frightened—at least, not very—but he was shocked and disappointed beyond endurance. A great tear formed itself in his blue eyes; it overflowed and rolled down his rosy cheek.

'He weeps!' said Long-face bitterly. 'They are all the same, these harriers of women.'

The primitive leant forward further still. He smelt of garlic and tobacco and what seemed to be mule.

'You did not, then, desire this girl?'

'I? I? I tell you . . .'

'Then it was to help *el pequeño* at the *fonda* that you did it? El Señor Andros; you are his friend. . . . Andros! I spit upon Andros!' He did—just missing Herr Schultze.

'And I!' said Long-face heartily—and *not* missing Herr Schultze.

There are outrages that the most peaceful German lace-peddler, the kindest and most benevolent advocate of Natural Beauty, cannot allow to pass. It is possible that Herr Schultze would have struck, as he did certainly shout aloud an elaborate German swear; but at that moment—perhaps fortunately for himself—his senses were suddenly arrested by the smell of burning. It was mainly a petrol smell, but there was something else besides petrol. There was, in fact, leather and canvas and the remains of a stock of lace what-nots; for Herr Schultze's three cases had been taken out of the back of the *coche* and a tin of petrol poured over them and a match successfully applied.

'My God! My cases! You are burning my cases!'

'I should burn yourself. You come here to seduce . . .'

'I shall go to the police.'

'You can go to hell! . . . Who has asked you to come here? I did not ask you. But you come. And you give this girl, this Rosa, you give her a present to change her face; you say "Take off that dirty stuff." Dirty stuff, is it? And it is I'—his face almost brushed Herr Schultze's—'it is I who have given her the Beauty Box. Fifteen *duros* I paid for it—fifteen *duros*, I beg you in the name of all the saints! And now you—you . . .'

Herr Schultze suddenly broke down. He was a poor little blond, rosy-faced German all by himself in a circle of olive-skinned maniacs waving their arms and stamping and bawling unreasonable nonsense. He was deceived and cheated and turned to a common laughing-stock. He couldn't cope with it. He said, with sudden and pathetic surrender, 'Then what am I to do?'

'Do!' The primitive shook a thick fist under Herr Schultze's smooth and chubby little chin. 'Do? Get out of this and never come back. There is an omnibus. There is a steamer. Go, go, go!'

Herr Schultze might have shown fight, or he might not. But just at that awful moment—that moment when the illusion of Arachiqua's Eden for ever burst and vanished—he saw Rosa peeping at him round the doorway of the hut. Or at least he was practically sure it was Rosa. He could only be practically sure and not quite, because what he saw was not so much a face as an advertiser's display of *La Maxixa*, a blaze of it, a conflagration. But beneath this scarlet rhapsody there was a collar of lace, of fine lace, of convent lace. . . .

Herr Schultze capitulated. He saw suddenly that Eden was no place for a poor harmless Serpent.

(4)

The mate of the *Ramon Quedrasos* was still leaning over the rail, still gazing at the sea. But though he appeared to be incapable of motion, he clearly knew what went on. For he said to Herr Schultze with a grin that displayed his formidable teeth, 'Es muy hermosa, eh? Muy—muy—*muy* hermosa!'

The rattle of his corncrake laugh went jangling through the placid Arachiqua evening.

HILTON BROWN.

POEMS

WALKING IN THE SAVOY

We drank the flowing air within the shade,
Or let our wrists divide the icy fountains.
We saw the pinetrees buckled on the mountains,
Tasselled with water and its white brocade.

Far-off like David's brows before the Ark
Mont Blanc made vision terrible with dream,
As white, immense, and final as we deem
Heaven must be to souls chained to the dark.

The meadows negligent with flowers were drowned
In green as fresh as youth ; and shadows poured
From tranquil trees like blessings from the Lord.
The silence had all Time within its round.

When evening came, withdrawn within one mood,
We touched our blistered arms and blessed the night,
And blessed the loving lingering high peak's light
That held our day within its solitude.

Onnion.

THE HOMEWARD JOURNEY

The cry is : ' Back to God ! ' Without respite
The whip cracks. We stumble to our feet.
Mind cries : ' Lift up the burden of the Law.'
Flesh moans : ' It is the trough of darkest night.
I see no stars. I see no way. Winds gnaw
The roots of dreams. My body blesses earth.'

' Back to God and back to God ! ' The sand
Slides snakelike under foot. We toil. The ropes
That bind the Law bite into flesh. The East
Is darker than the West. The backward land
Sparkles with warmth of windowlight. The feast
Is on, the autumn bacchanal. Men touch.

Flesh weeps : ' I need the touch, the dance, the known
Communicable warmth, the happy death.
The fruit is plucked. The days are done. The wool
Of sleep is spun. Let me not die alone,
A wraith beneath the Law. The beautiful
Closed dance fits me within Leviathan.'

' Back to God, to God, to God ! ' The line winds
Out of the sandy plains into the rocks.
Limbs crack in slow ascent. Wild water breaks
From distant snows. ' Steady, my souls ! Who finds
The pass must kneel, must wait till sunlight wakes
Knowledge of what was known, and then descend.'

THE STATE IS ALL

Lying along the grass
 I saw the feet of marching men.
 I raised my eyes to watch these soldiers pass,
 But, horror ! all were faceless, all anonymous.

From end to end a rod
 Transfixed their sides. Their arms were raised
 In dead familiarity to God ;
 And from their faceless heads there whirled like planes their
 words.

' We are the living dead,
 And fear the certain death no more.
 The inner dreams that tortured us are shed.
 Shed are the seasons and their pain of Then and Now.

We are the good machine
 That feeds the food that feeds us. We
 Are God, for we are all that God can mean,
 Being one, and all in one, and resurrection's Now.'

The hills returned the song.
 The grasses nodded. But I saw
 Beyond the seahline in a bivouacked throng
 The apocalyptic clouds prepare the whirlwind doom.

Storrington, September 1936.

SWASTIKA

' Let us make God again,' they cried.
 They built in steel and clay and blood.
 His face was theirs and yet no living face.
 Hard were the body's lines, but touch
 Sank in the soft hermaphroditic flesh.

At night beneath the torches sighed
 A million voices as one voice
 Praying for death. So, rooted to that place,
 First they were trees and strong ; then sea
 Rose over them, and they were spawned like fish.

Morning was like the Chaos loud
 With water, but no God to kiss
 The world to knowledge of its shape. Beneath
 The cold dark dumbness horror reigned,
 For all men sought the cruel hook that frees.

' Ah pity us that were so proud,'
 They wept. ' We thought that God must be
 The god our loins desired ; and dreamed that death
 Was dedicate to earth like grass.
 True God, forgive us those false mysteries.'

Then God, who from the first had made
 This possible by blessing will,
 Came to the waters with His rod and line
 And fished for them ; Christ held the net.
 And as each found the air he died once more.

Then Christ said : ' Be not afraid.'
 And with His net He drew them in,
 And ate each whole ; and from Him sprang divine
 The individual soul, alive
 Praise God ! to air and heat and mortal shore.

September 1935.

THE TYRANTS. SEPTEMBER 11, 1938

Father! Give them sight of the true sky.
 Descend on them, again be manifest
 In Dove or Eagle, or Yourself confesst
 On unimaginable Sinai.
 Upon their banquets burst and the proud eye
 With what Belshazzar saw. For look! The breast
 That knows the need of Thee and would be blest,
 Becomes all pumping heart and fearful sigh.

Be Thou mortality to their dead pride.
 Let them remember death. Ah! Give them Christ
 To be sole audience to their diatribes.
 And if again their God be crucified,
 Let them like us, our race, be sacrificed,
 Scattered like foam amongst their several tribes.

AFTER HEARING HITLER'S SPEECH

SEPTEMBER 12, 1938

Run to your ritual now: search and consider
 What prayer, what conjuration, what great fast
 Reaches to miracles. This is no cast
 For reason, for the word that comes at last
 To known and simple things. Madness is master.
 All is translated to a private speech,
 To incantation, till the muscles twitch,
 And where the weapons are blind fingers reach.

Quick, to your God! Though untrained to this task
 Be humble, honest, hoping, mortal men.
 Search in your hearts for your essential sin.
 Ask for the miracle, and while you ask
 Devise no cheat for peace if peace you win.
 And, if He moves not, there is still Amen.

IN THE WOODS. DURING THE NAZI CONGRESS
AT NUREMBERG

All the trees before the wind
Have made a synagogue of the wood.
My brothers, O sad multitude,
You too atone mortality.

The body being, we have sinned.
The body being, we must call
On winter, that the clean cold fall
Upon us and our starkness free.

How clamped you are ! Like us, whose death
Is fuel for the false cold priests
Fearing their sinfulness. Like beasts
Our blood makes warmth for them, and power.

But they too, mortal, stand beneath
The shadow though they raze the earth.
They too, like us, declared at birth :
' We are Time's sons and this the hour.'

One hour for them and us. The sun
Declines too fast that we can make
Perpetual day, and overtake
The furious spinning. Pity them

That fear their seasons, and must run
Crying their innocence, and yearn
For sacrifice, till they can burn
Who built the first Jerusalem.

Pity their tortured hearts whose sign
Is like the spider. Winter snaps
The webs. Our roots remain. The traps
Can do no more than God decrees.

Pray. It is the autumn. The design
Completes its symbols for the year.
Now learn how death unlearns its fear.
The acorns hurry from the trees.

The dead leaves drop. The roots prepare
Their dreams. The common sustenance
Grows under wind and rain. The chance
That is the law of change reveals.

Come into conclave. Let us share
Our diverse fruits ; then each one sleep
In his own mystery, till leap
The new year's saps to break the seals.

UNCERTAINTY IS MAN'S DESTINY

If you said, 'Certain! Certain!
 For I have seen, have spoken face to face
 With God,' and took me to a place
 And showed the house, the room, the door, the curtain,
 Should I be convinced of grace?

I'd say: 'How looked He then?
 And was it not your father in disguise?
 Was there no conjuring of the eyes,
 No wish to be the chosen amongst men,
 God's special enterprise?'

For I, at heart, have known
 Such strong compulsion in rare moments' bliss,
 That I'd have testified to this,
 God was within, the marrow of my bone,
 And all I felt was His.

Yet were I singled out
 While other men went dense and dull in hope
 This were my God ungood. God's scope
 Is all or none, living as faith in doubt,
 The rough invisible rope.

I'd say: 'God tells us, Climb!
 And we must crook our hands in air, and seize
 What seems the cable. If it please
 God in eternity of our single time
 We come to God's unease.

No further and no more.
 For we are maimed and mortal, and our make
 Is doubt by nature and the Snake.
 Say you saw God. I cry, It needs Christ's lore.
 And Christ was God at stake!'

THE JEW. 1938

In a misty morning cobwebbed with the moon's meaning—
 The solace of the sun in the sanctuary of sleep,
 I climbed from fruit and stubble, gunned game and beagles'
 babel,
 To see tree-ambushed Amberley and find some rest to reap.

From my body's prison bitter with the day's poison
 I looked upon the Wealden world which once I thought was
 home.
 But now the modern masters with their massed mindless
 musters
 Roar, 'Run the homeless beast to ground,' from Berlin unto
 Rome.

In the free air homeless, homeless is not heart-helpless,
 Turf and thyme are antidote to poison and to fears;
 But woe! the Jewish burden where the blood must ask for
 pardon
 Amongst the blank harsh houses and the bitter Ghetto tears.

In the misty morning cobwebbed with another meaning
 I slowly slipped to Amberley to break my bread with all.
 Ah! Good the grace of greeting, no iron horror grating,
 Ah, joy! For Jew the gentle words that had no mocking call.

THE BAULKED BELIEVER

Crying 'The rooftops of Jerusalem
Are burning. The fire's amongst our groves. The gem,
Our Temple, cracks!' They leapt towards their swords.
But all I wield are words.

When Rome racked the martyrs, and the Ark
Was scrolled with frogs and snakes, the praising spark
Lit cobweb-tangled prayers to Sabbath flame.
God was all theirs to name.

I too have heard the trumpet and the news,
First, of one God who broke the stubborn Jews,
And then of Him Who shattering all Time
Made mortal flesh sublime.

Why must I shake when all comes round again,
The blind and dusty pride, the sin of Cain,
Thundering Sinai, and the lightning doom,
And prayers in a secret room?

The faith of faith is lost. I know the power
As men know time by each recorded hour,
But meaning has no motion in the sense
Lacking my innocence.

Storrington.

WHERE QUIET AVAILS

Where quiet avails,
Where thought like the high waters
Makes peace with the sky,
Where neither the shadow nor the echo nails
Sound to the word or substance to the sun,
There make me, Lord,
The sea floor's breathing flower
That from Your lave
Draws living love and food, though that bright word,
'Come,' be denied when You ascend from me.

For need I need
Your presence in Your knowledge—
Presence like light,
And knowledge like Time's mainspring in the seed.
Your going, then, becomes my law of loss.
In Your away
I dream myself to coral.
Your palms and feet
Above the flow are land-life all my day,
And what You were to me my colour shows.

L. AARONSON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Apropos of Dolores, by H. G. Wells (Jonathan Cape, 7s. 6d. net).

Whether you admire the novels of Mr. Wells or not, at least you can be sure that there will be a certain freshness of outlook in what he has to say. The reader may prefer a novel to tell a story more directly than this one does, but in spite of that a pleasant sense of expectancy as to the outcome of the tale persists to the end.

Apropos of Dolores is written in diary form by a publisher-cum-philosopher, Stephen Wilbeck. It is the story of his marriage and subsequent life with a virago of a woman who confuses originality with vulgarity. Having caught and married Mr. Wilbeck, on the plea that she is going to have a baby by him—the baby never materialises—she proceeds to enjoy bad health for the rest of her life. When the novel begins, Mr. Wilbeck is in France. He has run away from Dolores in Paris, where they live, on the pretext of finding a nice place for her to stay in Brittany. For two days he is happy, either because of his escape or because the weather is fine—he is not sure which. He finds the right place and, having visited one of his authors, who lives not far away, a biologist called Foxfield, he returns to Torquéstol to await the coming of Dolores.

His determination to write a book—the thesis of which is to be 'Is happiness the norm in human life?'—is somewhat disturbed by his wife's querulous demands, but he perseveres. The story unfolds his life and reactions in this unsuitable marriage which has already lasted for thirteen years; the reader cannot help wondering why. The background of the story is sketched in deftly, and a pleasant portrait appears of the part of France traversed by Mr. Wilbeck during his travels from August to October.

The narrative continues, linked with Mr. Wilbeck's argu-

ments on human happiness with Foxfield and the other people he meets and talks to at that time. Once more the reader is engaged in a tussle with Mr. Wells' ideas. How he would like to see sex, biology, religion taught and history presented. Whether the reader agrees or disagrees does not matter—the main thing is that Mr. Wells, through Mr. Wilbeck, Foxfield and Co., is able to set up a row of Aunt Sallys to knock down. As the tale progresses the reader becomes aware that Dolores' sands are running out. She becomes more and more preposterous. Her claims on the world, and particularly her husband, are fantastic. It is with a sense of relief that one learns of her death through an over-dose of a sedative, though whether it was administered by herself or her husband it is not possible to decide. So he is free, but, strangely enough, a little lonely with the loss of his gadfly.

The construction of this novel is leisurely and pleasant reading for an unhurried day. The reader can take it up or put it down whenever he feels like it. The publisher's note refers with some claim to truth to the book being Mr. Wells' Shandean Journey. The essential difference is that Mr. Wells is not Laurence Sterne.

NORAH C. JAMES.

Rococo: The Life and Times of Prince Henry of Prussia (1726–1802), by A. E. Grantham (The Bodley Head, 1938: 264 pages, 10s. 6d.).

The relatives of famous men are too often described by historians merely as accessories of the family star. And the brothers of kings, no matter how gifted they may be themselves, are relegated to the background as though their every act and gesture were destined only to bring out in stronger relief the greatness of their royal brother. Mrs. Grantham has done a service to English readers by presenting to them this portrait of the great Frederick's brother, who was undoubtedly one of the outstanding generals and diplomats of the age. The author also tells us much about Frederick the Great's other brothers and sisters and about his Court in Prussia—a Court which, dominated by men, was so different from life in Vienna or Versailles at the time.

But though Prince Henry is the central figure of this book,

it is by no means a biography in the usual sense of the term. The author, it should be emphasised, is entirely justified in her interpretation, for even in the publisher's notice *Rococo* is called a 'tapestry.' And such it is. It reads more like a contemporary memoir, written by someone at the Prussian Court who not only has knowledge of what is happening but perfect taste as well. Mrs. Grantham does not follow one date—one event upon the other. Anecdotes from various periods of Henry's life, from the life of his associates, are chosen with an audacious disregard of their historical sequence. Descriptions of furniture, gossip of the Court, scandals and discussions of the customs of the age are intermingled. And there is no question but that the author knows every part of this age.

The author has created a romantic atmosphere out of one of the most unromantic Courts in Europe. It is not that she in any way suppresses the brutality of Frederick William, or denies that Henry's and Frederick's childhood was horrible beyond words, but the harsh realities seem to be softened in *Rococo*. It depends entirely on the reader's taste whether or not this romanticism is appealing. To many readers, Henry's military successes and his diplomatic astuteness seem all the more remarkable, and more interesting, if his maladjustment to life, his small-mindedness in personal relations, his utter selfishness, are constantly borne in mind. In many ways Henry was like Frederick, and the charm of *Sans Souci* cannot really make one forget Frederick's unkempt appearance in his old age any more than his pettiness can detract from his essential greatness.

MARGARET GOLDSMITH.

WORLD OPINION

A PRESS SUMMARY

FRANCE

THE Paris newspapers welcome the Munich Agreement. A strong feeling of relief is universally expressed, though it is mingled with a good deal of criticism.

Temps (October 1). The Munich Agreement 'will have the effect of completely modifying the political atmosphere and is likely to create a new spirit in the international order.'

Temps (October 2) concludes that the Munich Agreement will not affect Franco-British friendship, and may help to create a better understanding between France, Italy, and Germany. The conflicting engagements of France in Eastern Europe are not considered as a handicap, since both the alliance with Poland and the Franco-Russian Pact have lost much of their practical value.

Le Petit Parisien (October 1). The Munich Agreement 'will cause immense satisfaction throughout the world. A new era of peace will begin.'

L'Epoque (October 1) is less optimistic, and asks: If in the past France was incapable of resisting Germany, how will she be able to resist German menaces in the future now that she has been weakened?

L'Ordre (October 1) argues on similar lines, predicting Hitler's unhampered victory in Eastern Europe.

L'Ordre (October 2). *Pertinax* predicts that all former allies of France will now openly go over to Germany.

Le Populaire (October 1) distrusts the Munich Agreement, but expresses profound relief that peace has been saved.

Le Figaro (October 1) expresses uneasiness about the Munich Agreement—'Real peace has not been achieved'—and fears that further changes in Europe will be unavoidable, while hoping that Britain and France together will be strong

nough to guarantee that these changes take place 'in an orderly fashion.'

L'Echo de Paris (October 1). 'This is peace. And peace is worth something. But this peace will be costly for us. This will soon be clear.'

Le Temps (October 4) continues the plea for complete revision of France's foreign policy. The Munich Agreement, according to *Le Temps*, has at least furnished the basis for co-operation between the democracies and the totalitarian states. 'This striking demonstration must serve as a starting-point of a new policy.' The balance of 1919 having been destroyed, a new balance must be found. 'For without a political balance lasting peace cannot be achieved in Europe. The common declaration of the British Prime Minister and the German Chancellor clearly indicates the road that must be followed.' A new Europe must be constructed 'in a realistic spirit' and 'without old doctrines and ideological passions.'

ITALY

The reactions of the Italian Press to the Munich Agreement are completely uniform. The chief feature in all papers is praise of Signor Mussolini, who is regarded as the true saviour of peace.

Giornale d'Italia (September 30). Signor Gayda points out that it is now necessary to continue direct negotiation. Only the Fascist style of settlement can produce satisfactory results. Mussolini, he continues, is now the leading personality in Europe. 'Everyone must admit that . . . and recognise the injustices committed against Italy and Germany which led Europe to the very brink of war.'

Giornale d'Italia (October 3). Attacking a French newspaper for omitting Signor Mussolini's name as one of the peace-makers of Munich, Signor Gayda writes: 'Neither Signor Mussolini nor the Italian nation were among those who begged for peace. They are prepared for war. Italy will fight anybody, even France, if necessary.'

GERMANY

The violent Press campaign against Czechoslovakia, continued till the very day of the Munich Agreement and reached

its climax on September 29. The following is a list of headlines of one single page of the *Voelkischer Beobachter* of that date: 'Planned Destruction according to Moscow Methods'; 'An Act of Madness by Command from Moscow'; 'Riots and Terror throughout the Land'; 'Bestial Threats of Czech Mercenaries'; 'German Areas under permanent Czech Fire'; 'The Number of Deaths grows endlessly'; 'Machine-gun Fire again in German Area'; 'Discouragement and Disintegration within the Czech Army.'

The Munich Agreement was hailed by the German Press as an achievement of Hitler's and as a tremendous German victory.

Berliner Tageblatt (October 1). The Agreement of Munich has 'freed the world overnight from poisonous and impotent doctrines and ideologies.'

Berliner Tageblatt (October 2) states that, 'not foggy illusions of the Locarno style, but a new, more exact and therefore better picture of the situation: that is what the leading statesmen brought home to their peoples from Munich.'

Frankfurter Zeitung (September 30). 'Economic points of view never played any part in Germany's reasoning. Germany does not care whether the incorporation of the Sudetenland would bring economic advantages or disadvantages; nor does she demand Czech areas because they contain industrial plant, the possession of which might seem desirable, but only because there are Germans living in this land who want to be united with the Reich.'

Frankfurter Zeitung (October 2). 'The worst crises, indeed the dreadful prospect of a war, were necessary in order to render the great Western democracies both capable and willing of action. Without pressure Germany would not have achieved her aim in the near future.'

Hamburger Fremdenblatt (October 2). 'The historical importance of Munich is that Hitler's perseverance and Mussolini's far-sightedness have finally succeeded in excluding the Soviet Union from the concert of the great European nations.'

National Zeitung (October 4). 'In Munich only the foundation-stone has been laid for a new constructive policy in Europe. Bitter fights are still ahead of us until this policy will triumph. . . . Perhaps the warning of a Fascist

newspaper to strike while the iron is hot will be taken seriously.'

SOVIET RUSSIA

The truly striking feature of the Soviet Press of the critical days, both before and after the Munich Agreement, is the complete absence of any editorial comment. That is true of *Pravda* as well as *Izvestia*. Both papers print the 'Tass' news and reproduce Litvinov's speeches in Geneva *in extenso*. This is all the more surprising if recent comments on Spain, China, and Japan which appeared in the Soviet Press are remembered. The only indication of the official attitude is a dispatch by this Geneva Correspondent which *Izvestia* published on October 1: 'The British and French Governments capitulated because they dared not risk arming the working class, thus betraying their national interest.'

The only other comment that has been forthcoming appears in the *Journal de Moscou* of October 4. After referring to France's 'nullification of the Soviet-Czech Pact,' the paper goes on to say: 'The question now arises, what is the value of the Franco-Soviet Pact since France destroyed her treaty with Czechoslovakia when the latter was under the heel of Fascist aggression. The loss of her allies and isolation is the price France must pay for capitulating to the aggressor.'

POLAND

During the crisis the tone of the Polish Government Press has often shown a striking similarity to that of Germany.

Gazeta Polska (September 30). 'Poland is one of the most peaceful countries of Europe. . . . But even Poland's patience is limited. The Teschen district is bleeding to death. Bestial hordes of gendarmes and Communist rubber truncheon-gangs are murdering hundreds of our blood brethren only because they are Poles. . . . Polish public opinion can therefore no longer tolerate any further delaying tactics on the part of Prague. . . . The only language understood by the Czech Government is that of Chancellor Hitler.' At the same time, the Government papers try to impress upon the public the necessity that the opposition parties must now disappear.

Gazeta Polska (September 30). 'In view of the historical

mission which our generation has to fulfil, all internal strife, every struggle, every fight in the name of party or class interest must disappear.'

The numerous opposition newspapers view the Munich Agreement with deep anxiety.

Kurjer Warszawski (September 30). 'But who can tell whether the method by which Hitler gets it (*i.e.*, his booty) is not much more important and dangerous. . . . Indeed, this strikes a powerful blow against the Versailles system which established the equality of States. . . .' The paper goes on to emphasise that Poland herself owes her existence to the Versailles Treaty.

Kurjer Warszawski (September 30), commenting on the Munich Agreement: 'It is a postponement of war—not peace. . . .'

The traditional Polish dislike of any combination of Powers in which she is not allowed to play a part is expressed in many Polish papers.

Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy (October 1). 'The Four-Power Accord and the Anglo-German understanding do not open up a pleasant perspective for Poland.'

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

After the Munich Agreement the Czech Press shows three distinct features: Deep sorrow, bitter attacks on former allies, and, most important of all, the new tendency towards collaboration with Germany.

Slovensky Denik (September 23). 'God knows that in certain moments of life greater courage is needed for life than for suicide. And God knows that there is no honest man in the world who could say that we have become afraid and cowardly. . . .'

Prager Presse (October 2) says that the celebrations in London and Paris give the impression 'as if these people had forgotten that this peace has been bought with the heaviest sacrifices—sacrifices, it is true, which not they but exclusively Czechoslovakia had to make. . . .' 'The hardest sacrifice was not forced upon a conquered nation by its enemies but upon an unconquered people by its allies. . . .'

Narodni Politika (October 4). 'Everybody would now

like to tear away a piece of Czechoslovakia, not because we are Czechs, but because France and England are weak. There is, therefore, only one correct principle that we can follow, and that is to solve all problems as quickly as possible by direct negotiations and face the unpleasant reality. . . . In last analysis we must admit honestly that we did not lose our case just in one night. We never achieved our main political aim, because in the post-war period when Germany was still too weak we were unable to conquer economically the Germanised Sudeten area without inflicting on the population unnecessary small grievances. . . .'

'France surrendered Poland to German pressure and released Yugoslavia from her sphere of influence. We understand perfectly the policy of Beck and Stoyadinovitch, who recognised that present-day France is no longer the France of the Poincarés, Clemenceaus and Barthous, but a France of merchants. . . .'

Lidove Noviny (October 5)—leading article under the title 'Farewell to France.' 'Long enough did we play the part of the policeman. We have been abandoned. We have no choice now but to collaborate with Germany. Even in commercial relations we must refrain from all groupings which might align us against Germany. We must clearly recognise that Hitler and Mussolini are stronger than France.'

HUNGARY

The chief feature of the Hungarian Press is the daily demand for an all-embracing solution of the Czechoslovak problem—i.e., the insistence that the crisis cannot really be said to have passed unless the Hungarian claims are as fully satisfied as those of Germany. Before the Munich Agreement these claims were not only put forward in a much more modest tone, but they also were much more restrained in their contents.

Pester Lloyd (September 30) welcomes the Munich Agreement and voices the new Hungarian demand for a cession, not only of all German, Hungarian and Polish territories of Czechoslovakia, but also for complete autonomy of the Slovaks and Carpathian Russians.

Pester Lloyd (October 1) publishes reports on alleged

'numerous Czech acts of terror in Slovakia.' 'We demand . . . the recognition of the right of self-determination for the Slovaks and Carpathian Russians and the immediate practical application of this recognition.'

Pester Lloyd (October 4). 'The entire Eastern system of France has gone to pieces.' The paper goes on to say that Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey are to-day no more allies of France than Poland or Russia.

Pester Lloyd (October 7) openly propagates a firm Polish-Hungarian-Rumanian block directed against Russia.

YUGOSLAVIA

It is noteworthy that five editions of the Belgrade *Politika* (September 28–October 2) do not contain a single word of comment on the crisis or the Munich Agreement. This may perhaps be explained by the fact that *Politika*, though still the most representative Yugoslav paper, has in recent years been increasingly critical of Stoyadinovitch, and may therefore have reason to fear suppression.

Samou Prava. 'During the recent crisis we Yugoslavs strictly adhered to our obligations. That was the only possible way. . . . The Czech example shows how dangerous a frontier can become if it is not a frontier of friends. It also proves the short-sightedness of the advice which our so-called democrats felt compelled to give when they urged us to align ourselves more closely with the Western democracies and Soviet Russia.'

Vreme (semi-official Belgrade organ) argues that another policy than that pursued by Stoyadinovitch would have compelled the country to deal with 'French and English friends,' who, just as in Czechoslovakia, would have appeared as a 'commission for the dismemberment of the country.'

TURKEY

Ulus publishes an article by Mr. Uunus Nadi entitled 'The Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic.' It contains the rather laconic statement: 'With our great neighbour in the North (Russia) we are on terms of friendship, as also with France and Britain, and we are not hostile towards Germany and Italy.'

SWEDEN

The Swedish papers give very little space to the part played by France in the crisis. All interest is concentrated on Great Britain. It is also characteristic that, while Germany's policy finds little sympathy, Poland is criticised most severely of all.

Nya Dagligt Allehand (October 1). 'Germany under Hitler is now the dominant Power in Europe, and it is doubtful whether Britain will any longer be able to play the part of the arbitrator. France is now a Power of second rank together with Poland. The result of Munich is that might is right.'

Dagens Nyheter (October 2). 'Small nations are richer in experience, having seen the risks they run and how unimportant they are when big nations confer.'

DENMARK

Politiken (October 2). Referring to the declaration signed by Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler, the paper declares that 'The past few days have shown how weak and insignificant these declarations often are when subjected to the pressure of realities.'

Berlingske Tidende (September 30). 'There will be some, especially among the small nations, who, in the midst of their joy that the avalanche has been stopped and heaven's light preserved, will feel a cold shiver.'

BELGIUM

The Munich Agreement was hailed with an even greater joy by the Belgian Press than by that of France. Elements of criticism were far less conspicuous than in the Press of other Western countries. The personal effort of Mr. Chamberlain found a particularly warm appreciation. The following quotation may be regarded as typical of a very important section of the Brussels Press:

Gazette (September 30). 'The conversations of Munich proved the superiority of personal contacts between statesmen over the methods used in Geneva.'

UNITED STATES

The American reaction to the Munich Agreement is fairly represented by the following quotations from some of the leading newspapers of the United States:

New York Times (October 2). 'The picture is for the time being a rosy one for Herr Hitler. He said he was ready to fight, and convinced Britain and France that he meant it. They were not ready to fight him, and by force he had his way. Will Britain and France be any better prepared should he make another drive next year?'

New York Herald Tribune (October 2). 'What the world would like to know is whether Herr Hitler's success will embolden him to further aggression in the conviction that he can do what he wants without fear of actual preventive measures by Britain and France? If he was bluffing, there is hope for Europe, despite his success this time. If, on the other hand, he is, like the madman he seemed to be, ready to plunge the world into war, if that is the only manner wherein he can have his own way, Europe and the world should realise that grave dangers lie ahead.'

Washington Post (September 30). 'The solution, whatever its imperfections, is fundamentally workable and stable, and is capable, by intelligent direction, of being converted into a really constructive settlement. To say that it may mean the opening of a new day for Europe is not at all far-fetched.'

Chicago Tribune (September 30). 'It becomes difficult to understand what Chamberlain and Daladier were contending for if they were willing to concede so much. There is little now to prevent Hitler from dominating and organising Middle and Eastern Europe.'

CANADA

Star (Montreal) (September 30). 'The dogged determination of Mr. Chamberlain has won another victory. He set out to prevent war and has succeeded. Mr. Chamberlain's great victory is that he won the fight for a civilised system of settling big issues around the council table, and not on the battlefield.'

Sun (Vancouver) (September 30). 'The democracies have

taken the measure of the dictatorships. In the final test the world's No. One dictator has been forced to yield to the democratic opinion of the world, backed by the will of that democratic opinion to match force against force and settle the issue for this period at least. Mr. Chamberlain . . . talked in a language which Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini recognised as sincere and unyielding. He saved civilisation from catastrophe.'

SOUTH AFRICA

Die Vaderland (October 2). Referring to the Munich Agreement, the paper says: 'The result is a source of great satisfaction to South Africa's Premier, who has always regarded Anglo-German friendship as a natural and necessary thing.'

AUSTRALIA

Sydney Morning Herald (September 30). 'The bastions of democracy in Europe have snapped. Britain and France have consented under a threat of war to give Germany control of important and strategic industrial areas.'

Sydney Sun (September 30). 'Czechoslovakia's loss of territory is to be regretted, but its retention was not worth the plunging of the world into terrible slaughter.'

Daily Telegraph (Sydney) (October 2). 'There is only one road back from the precipice, namely, collective responsibility for collective security. If we allow the leaders to keep us from that road, to-day's relief will become to-morrow's anxiety. The Munich Agreement is a stop-gap arrangement in the interests of British Imperialism. It is a complete, almost irrevocable, defeat for democracy. Chamberlain, Hitler, and Mussolini all know it.'

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

No. DCCXLII—DECEMBER 1938

HUGH OF LINCOLN

[*Supposedly murdered in 1253 by the Jews for Pascal rites according to a Jew, Copin, who informed against them.*]

'HUGH OF LINCOLN, when you went to them,
Did they seize you, kill you, slit your heart,
Sprinkle their doorposts with your blood?'

'I saw them eat their bitter herbs. They leaned
Against their pillows, and their brittle bread
And wine were given me. I supped.

They seemed to mourn, yet sing. They filled a cup.
And when a door was opened, I could hear
The work of wings, and the wine quivered.

Mild and meek their candlelight. I thought:
"Christ supped as now I sup." And I was glad
To be amongst the wise old men.

The boys, my playmates, thrust their stealthy hands
Under a napkin covering the bread
And seized it from the patriarch.

Then all the company laughed, and wildly sang
Ballads like ours, the words were round and strong.
And so I fell asleep for good.'

' They say one, Copin, said that you were bled,
And then your body buried in their House.'

' What Copin said was false. Red-eyed,

Red-bearded, fawning to our faith, and known
To all of us as Judas. How could they
Accept the word of Judas, say ?'

' They took his word because they needed blood
To prove themselves as innocent as you,
And guilt was best to serve their need.

Christ's death was not enough for them. The Spring
Had stirred their lusts. They needed visible blood.
They envied hawthorn-buds their green.

Up the Steep Hill they dragged the patriarch,
And hanged him, and went home as new as light.
They saw the flowers beyond each gate.

They lived your innocence who feared their guilt,
And did what once was done to Jesus Christ,
Even as once the Jews had done.

And so they sacrificed your innocence
Since your small bones provoked the deadly sin,
And raised a monument to sin.

And still they raise their monuments, and find
The guilty source without and not within,
And will not leave poor Hugh in peace.'

' Ah me ! If they could see what I have seen,
The silken fringes over wrinkled eyes,
Lockt lean dark hands at prayer, and all

In piety as do our own good folk,
They'd say : " These men are brothers, we are God's,
And these are garnered too in time." '

L. AARONSON.

' BUSINESS AS USUAL '

Two symptoms, which they believe themselves to detect in Britain since the September crisis, particularly dishearten our friends and encourage—well, our critics. The first is some appearance of the advance of strategic isolationism, not as an arguable thesis, but merely, so it is suggested, as a result of fear of German bombers. Certain continental and overseas observers were already noting this appearance early in October, and their impression was fortified by the debates in Parliament at the end of the old session and beginning of the new. They remarked that not only the main emphasis, but almost the whole and only emphasis, was laid here on the inadequacy of air-raid precautions, insufficiency of anti-aircraft guns and so forth. Sir Kingsley Wood's statement on November 11 regarding the priority of fighter 'planes over bombers seemed to them to point in the same direction. Even on the question of trade they thought they detected in the Prime Minister's references to developments in South-eastern Europe and in Spain a complacency which could hardly be explained in one who was so recently Chancellor of the Exchequer, except on the assumption that British policy henceforth was to amount to a kind of general '*désintéressement*' in Europe.

In the early days of last month I had occasion to note, from personal contacts with visitors, for example, from Scandinavia, with what anxiety they, who feel the full brunt of Nazi Germany's enhanced prestige and now overweening self-confidence, seek to discover whether this apparent indifference to continental affairs represents the new British policy, or a want of it, or may only be a temporary phase, a kind of political '*reculer pour mieux sauter*.' They had not been reassured at the time when I was writing. It is not possible for Britain to disinterest herself in Europe. If she is content to watch the domination of Nazism over the whole of

the Continent without any constructive effort to oppose to it a new virility and authority of the democratic Powers, it will not be only in Europe that British prestige will suffer.

Inevitably we shall feel the consequences even in our own Empire, to say nothing of such foreign countries as the South American republics. The truth, economic as well as political, was stated by Mr. Eden in his speech on November 10, when he declared that 'Great Britain is a first-class Power or nothing. She literally cannot survive as a second- or third-class Power.' He warned the people of Britain that the only alternative to a great national effort, amounting to something like a revolution in our national life, and comparable in scope and intensity with the effort imposed on totalitarian countries, must be 'a progressive weakening of their authority, a slow slithering down the slope.'

There are people who shy at the words 'national prestige,' confusing the idea of it vaguely with 'jingoism' and assuming that it cannot be reconciled with the pacific internationalism which has been preached here since the war. It ought to be obvious by now that the military weakness of Britain, especially in the air, and her consequent loss of prestige and authority—demonstrated finally at Godesberg and Munich—is the chief reason why any return to such pacific internationalism in Europe appears so painfully improbable in our time. As Mr. Eden said, 'we still think politically whereas others think in military terms.' He, at least, will not be accused of narrow nationalistic 'jingoism.'

It cannot be doubted that the country is capable of the effort which is demanded in every direction. But the doubt which does gravely disturb many people at home and abroad is whether the magnitude of the effort is yet understood, and especially whether our people have yet been led to understand the entirely new conditions in which it has to be made. I do not think they yet realise 'what we are up against,' what is really meant for us by the revolution in Europe. No doubt, sheer alarmism is to be deprecated. But while democracies are apt in any case to be slow in operation, we, in particular, are not in general a very quick-thinking people. Therefore comforting reassurances of a 'Christmassy' character, even if they are intended chiefly to give a fillip to seasonal trade, are apt to gloss over uncomfortable facts and consequently

to discourage that very national effort—of intellectual comprehension as well as of actual sacrifice—without which the prospect must be dark indeed.

In August 1914 I came out of Germany in the party which accompanied our Ambassador and the Embassy staff. We who had been long resident in Berlin had at any rate some conception of the kind of military machine which had to be faced, and of the effort which would be necessary to meet and defeat it. But we found that at least half the people we met expected the 'thin red line of 'eroes' in Flanders, together with the French army, to hold up the German war machine while the Russian steam-roller made its ponderous way to Berlin. In the meantime Britain was to conserve her economic resources under the slogan 'Business as usual pending alterations to the map of Europe.' What is to be avoided is a repetition of that kind of optimism in conditions which will not again allow of its slow replacement by a sterner realism and consequent national effort.

Let us try to look at some facts which already present themselves. We are witnessing the rapid development of the consequences of the collapse this autumn of democratic Europe before the greater determination, unity of control and more clearly defined aims of the two dictatorships; or rather, chiefly of the Nazi dictatorship. There is no doubt of the inevitable 'ideological' purpose of the Nazi régime. It can never feel wholly safe, even at home, so long as there survive in Europe, with a continuing influence and authority, strong and successful exponents of those free traditions and institutions which are associated with Britain and France.

The '*Gleichschaltung*' of Austria and the destruction of the Czechoslovak democracy were necessary for Nazism, not only for territorial and strategic reasons, but also because, so long as they survived, they were refuges on the German frontier for German liberals (not by any means only Jews) and other victims of Nazi persecution, and thus centres whence liberal and democratic ideas could most easily percolate into Germany. Similarly, Herr Hitler's vindictive, personal animosity against Dr. Benesh was doubtless due to the fact that the Czech statesman was a shrewd, well-informed, and therefore highly inconvenient, student of German internal affairs—notably in the economic sphere.

But criticism is not much less inconvenient when its source is rather further afield. That is why Herr Hitler and his Ministers and agents, including Herr von Ribbentrop, continue to insist that there can be no real peace, as they understand it, and no reduction of the financial and economic burden of armaments, so long as measures are not taken in the democratic countries to suppress in newspapers, on the radio, and in the speeches of public men criticism of the declared aims and methods of the dictatorships. They have two appeals wherewith they hope to induce in other countries, for their own benefit, a degree of imitation of their own rigid control of all forms of publicity. One is fear and the other is the temptation to envious imitation. For months past, beginning long before the Czechoslovak crisis became acute, efforts were made in this country, as the diplomatic correspondents of all leading newspapers have known (though the general public are hardly aware of it even now), to persuade competent journalists of the undesirability of 'provoking' the dictators. Criticism of Herr Hitler, for example, on account of his bellicose and flamboyant speeches, was at first privately and then less disguisedly reproved on the ground that the German people must necessarily be offended by such commentaries on their supposed idol. Of late these reprimands have been open, as when the Prime Minister complained in the House of Commons, and again at the Guildhall, that British newspapers and politicians were 'fouling their own nest' by suggesting that the so-called Munich Agreement was a defeat for the democracies, even though Lord Halifax himself declared that the Agreement was conceded under the German threat of force. Mr. Chamberlain complained that such things were not said in the authoritarian States. The remark seemed to suggest the influence that may be exercised even on a normally liberal mind by the apparent convenience for purposes of government of the suppression of public criticism under totalitarian régimes. It seems as though there were a growing temptation in this respect, as in certain others, to assume that, in order to hold their own against the successful dictatorships, the democracies must closely follow their 'totalitarian' example, thus abandoning all the inherent advantages of free institutions.

The appeal to fear is no less evident. It takes two forms. Assuming that the British and French Governments only yielded in September to the threat of force, and deducing—from outbursts of public relief in both countries when the immediate threat of war was lifted—that public opinion here is easily cowed, Nazi speakers set to work at once to insist that their huge war machine would only cease to be an immediate menace provided informative public criticism of Nazi methods and aims was sternly discountenanced. Nazis do not themselves believe that freedom of speech is an essential factor in British public life or that governmental determination to suppress it could be effectively resisted. That is why Herr von Ribbentrop declared in his speech on November 7 that in his opinion 'every foreign Government acting in good faith is in a position to enforce' what he called 'an objective method of reporting'—in other words, to suppress news and comments displeasing to the Nazi régime. The attempt to put pressure on the British Government in particular in this respect has been undisguised. Herr Hitler has repeatedly declared, for example, on November 8, that there could be no question of an arrest of German armaments, to say nothing of a reduction, so long as he could not be sure that the complaisant attitude towards Nazi methods and ambitions which he attributes—even if erroneously—to Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax was not in danger of being replaced by the views of Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, Mr. Duff Cooper and others. In other words, if Mr. Chamberlain wishes to be admitted as '*gleichgesinnt*' to the society of the dictators, he must manage, like them, to silence his political critics and to disarm them as potential successors. It ought not to be thought altogether extraordinary that Herr Hitler should try to impose such conditions upon a British Government. When Mr. Eden was driven to resign—a political event without parallel since the fall of M. Delcassé in France under German insistence in 1904—it may easily have appeared probable to Herr Hitler that he could secure the elimination from any position of public influence of all especially inconvenient critics. In September he probably became convinced of it. He will continue to try it until it is demonstrated to him that the advice apparently received on this account from Herr von Ribbentrop was mistaken.

So far as the British Government are concerned, the Nazi appeal to fear mainly concerns fear of non-success of Mr. Chamberlain's 'appeasement' plan. That plan evidently depends upon reaching such agreements with the dictators as will induce them to cease increasing, and if possible even to reduce, their armaments. Thus the British Government would be relieved of the need to put into force much more rapid and drastic plans for increase of armaments, involving a greater disturbance of normal processes of industry and of foreign export trade. If Mr. Chamberlain's Government should presently be seen not to have taken sufficiently drastic steps, for example, in control of supply and in the institution of a compulsory national register—for which latter there has been an all-party demand—and yet should not have obtained the desired arms agreement, the fate of the Government may seem to Germany to be assured. There is also in all German speeches on the matter the underlying suggestion that if Mr. Chamberlain should fail, the situation as between the two countries would be infinitely worse and Germany would not hesitate to use force. Thus Herr Hitler may believe that he holds the Government on the horns of a dilemma and can presently enforce such terms as he desires. Twice already have 'publicity-agreements'—in other words, undertakings to muzzle criticism of Germany—been pressed upon France. The decree-laws proclaimed in Paris in the middle of November were apparently intended, and in some reports actually stated, to include such powers in regard to the Press as would amount to a 'muzzling-order.' Why the Press-decree was dropped is another question. Herr von Ribbentrop's speech strongly suggests that something of the same sort may be or has been already attempted in regard to this country. Elsewhere, German pressure for the silencing of critical foreign opinion has no doubt been more unblushing. For example, German official representatives in Scandinavian countries are known to have intimated that, since Munich, Germany is in a much stronger position to enforce political conditions as the price of a continuance of trade favours. Even foreign booksellers displaying works disapproved by Nazism have been subjected to pressure to remove them from their windows. Here, then, are some illustrations of the kind of pressure which the Nazi system

believes that it can safely exercise. It follows in this respect exactly the same conviction that has governed its domestic policy—namely, that the dominant factor in all human affairs is fear and mastery is assured to the man and the party who are not afraid to exploit it.

I turn now to another consideration which has long been present to German as to Italian minds, the undesirable contrast, in their view, between the economic level of life in the democracies, but especially in Britain, and that forced upon the peoples of the totalitarian States. The suggestion that good Germans and good Italians of their own accord prefer 'guns to butter' is, of course, nonsense. But Nazis and Fascists alike fear lest if they cannot eventually show economic advantages, as far as the majority of the people are concerned, more or less comparable with those enjoyed under the democracies, then the influence of the higher democratic standard will eventually create a subversive sentiment in their own country, destructive of the complete subservience, intellectual as well as physical, to the dictators' orders, which they hold to be essential to the success of their aims. It follows that they are likely to use the only weapons they really understand—fear and political pressure—to lessen or destroy the international economic advantages of the democratic States. It must appear to them that the democracies, lacking unity and stern determination, at present hold only one effective weapon to oppose to their own rigid discipline and enforced sacrifice—namely, superior financial power based on trading capacity. If that can be broken, then the disparity in economic conditions between the two political systems should disappear and the danger to the totalitarian régimes on this account will likewise vanish. Therefore they tell their own people, and probably themselves believe, that if they prefer guns to butter, butter will presently be added to them. That, more or less, may have been what was meant by a suggestion reported from Italy earlier in the year—that Fascist Italy would presently 'inherit Britain's gold.' It should be sufficiently evident in the circumstances that it is absurd to expect the dictatorships to revert to what they consider the old-fashioned democratic trading methods. For whereas it is the sound tradition in Britain, for example, that we benefit by the prosperity of others, there being hardly

any limit to the world's capacity for improvement of standard of living and consequently of total economic demand, there is no evidence of any such conviction among Nazis, or indeed among most Fascists. Mr. Chamberlain said in the House of Commons on November 1 that this country in the past has thrived on competition. It is not entirely true, since the foundations of our nineteenth-century prosperity were virtual monopolies. But in any case, the Nazi and Fascist systems proffer no belief in such democratic theories, and it is therefore futile to expect them to revert to a freer trading system so long as their own methods appear to secure their objects. Barter may be a conception repugnant by its atavism to the City of London. It has no such repugnance to the Nazi. He believes in monopoly, and believes also firmly—so far on the basis of experience—that national prestige, based on armed strength, is the best instrument wherewith to induce in other countries an acceptance of his trading monopoly. Certainly Great Britain recognises the inevitability of effective German competition and is perfectly prepared both to meet it by methods hitherto considered loyal and even to seek agreements, as she had done before 1914, for the sharing of markets in such wise as to avoid as far as possible the provoking of political and national rivalries due to the pushing to extremes of economic rivalry. It is a common assumption, whether right or wrong, that such rivalry was one of the chief causes of Anglo-German friction and eventually, therefore, of the war. But, as I have tried to indicate, it is a mistake to assume that because we are so minded we shall find a similar mind in the totalitarian countries. The deliberate policy of Japan, for example, is avowedly to establish a monopolistic control of the Far Eastern trade. There are no signs of willingness to admit Britain or France to the Chinese market when that has been dominated by Japanese force: indeed, it is hard to believe that Japan would have incurred such enormous cost in lives and treasure unless a rigid monopoly were intended. But the German view does not differ in principle from the Japanese. The 'guns rather than butter' theory holds good for both. That is why British merchants actually concerned in the China trade on the spot took such prompt exception to Mr. Chamberlain's strange assumption that when Japan has

completed her military domination of China she will allow British finance to step in, restore the material damage, and take a corresponding trading benefit from the investment. Incidentally, the Prime Minister gave some appearance of overlooking the fact—which nevertheless he by his experience at the Treasury must surely be the first to recognise—that such investment of British capital is only possible when there is a balance on account of foreign trade which can be so invested. But the destruction in China is to a large extent at the cost of British investments in railways and other capital goods. Hence there is by so much the less British mercantile profit available for reinvestment. There seems to be needed to clear up this position some fairly accurate assessment of the value, in respect of interest as well as of capital, of the loss which Britain has hitherto sustained. To the Far Eastern loss must be added the loss, whatever it may be, by destruction in Spain, due chiefly to German and Italian bombing 'planes and heavy artillery.

But while these are direct losses, there are also other important losses now in process in Europe as a direct result of the increase in German and loss of British prestige. As one example of loss which is already more or less calculable, there is the former Czechoslovak textile industry, more than half of which, according to recent calculation, has now become German. Previously nearly 20 per cent. of Czechoslovakia's whole imports consisted of textile raw materials—jute, cotton, wool, and so forth—supplied by the British Empire, the United States, and Egypt. The textile requirements of the factories which Germany has now obtained will no doubt be met at present chiefly on the barter plan—that is to say, in strict exchange for German manufactured exports; but Germany will certainly seek more determinedly than ever to secure, under her own flag and within her own currency area, sources of supply for as much as possible of her textile requirements. Her further territorial appetite is not likely to be modified, as some people in this country appear to expect, but rather to be stimulated by the increase of territory gained by the seizure of Austria and the Munich surrender.

Presumably most people have become acquainted with the general geography of Eastern Europe in connexion with the

Czechoslovak crisis. They may even have grasped the fact that Czechoslovakia under German control is a bridgehead eastwards. The Berlin correspondent of *The Times*, in the issue of November 10, quoted 'National-Socialist circles' in Berlin as suggesting that Russia is about to break up from within, in which case 'the Russian Ukraine, with its rich resources, might be linked by way of what is now the Polish Ukraine and the Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) to the industries of the Reich.' He added that the realisation of the Nazi plans 'seems to depend on events not under the control of the Reich, unless, as seems highly probable, resort were had to military action before a Russian collapse.' (The italics are mine.).

It is natural that Nazi circles should discuss those plans, because they are the final territorial stage of the '*Mein Kampf*' programme. Ruthenia is perhaps to be employed rather as a channel of propaganda in the Ukraine than as the eventual main line of military attack, but in any case *The Times* article challenges the complacent assumption that Germany will halt of her own accord at any stage short of complete fulfilment of the '*Mein Kampf*' programme. Control of Czechoslovakia, however, no doubt has as its aim chiefly control of all practical land routes across Europe into the Danube basin and to the Black Sea and beyond. This consideration may well have been most immediately present to the Reich Government when it virtually forbade the providing of a common frontier for Poland and Hungary and the cession of the Danubian port of Bratislava to Hungary. One of the chief commercial efforts of Poland has been to establish a cheap and therefore popular trade route from her port of Gdynia *viâ* the Czechoslovak port of Bratislava to South-eastern Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, and even further afield. The development of that scheme would obviously challenge the profits of the German waterway scheme from the North Sea and Baltic to the Black Sea and the great military-commercial rapid motor-road scheme which, according to substantial reports, is intended to run from Vienna to Belgrade and thence to branch in one direction to the Adriatic and in the other either *viâ* Rumania or *viâ* Bulgaria to the Black Sea. At all events, it is evident that the domination of Czechoslovakia was demanded to a considerable extent by the project of securing a commercial monopoly in South-eastern Europe

whatever further military projects might eventually be subserved.

There is very little prospect, or even possibility, of normal trade in areas controlled by Germany. If she has her way, rigidly barter monopolies will be extended throughout the Danubian basin. Yugoslavia is reported to have been already largely 'attached.' Hungary cannot be expected to put up resistance, and it is to be feared that the policy will be extended to other countries of South-eastern Europe. Internationalism in our sense of the word, economic or political, does not enter into the Nazi scheme of things. It is indeed expressly repudiated in the Nazi political text-book *Mein Kampf*. Germany is committed to her system of rigidity and exclusiveness. It will not, and probably cannot, be abandoned until it is no longer materially tenable. But it is futile to imagine that we can trust—at least, at any period with which we need reckon—to the unaided operation of 'economic laws' to force a readjustment and a return to what we used to consider normal international economic relationships. The Nazi evidently believes that he can defy these old economic 'laws' just as he believes that he can defy Christianity itself. In the long run he will no doubt prove to have been wrong in one respect as in the other. But it will not necessarily be in our time, and the desirable lesson will certainly not be speeded by any mixture of fear and complacency. In the meantime, it is an illusion to imagine that our supposed economic and financial strength, of which the basis is no monopoly of this country, is an indefeasible inheritance which will automatically enable us to secure a proper share of the trade in areas controlled or influenced by the dictatorships. It is no doubt the case that the Danubian countries and others are reluctant, as Mr. Chamberlain said, to become economically, and therefore ultimately politically, dependent on the two dictatorships. King Carol of Roumania said as much during his visit to London in November. But the political pressure is enormous and is bound to be increased, nor will it be met by a mere policy of loans. We have to recover our political prestige before our financial and economic strength can again become effective. It may be added, as some Italian friends of this country have lately urged, that we shall probably have also to revise some of

our more individualistic trading methods—at least, in regard to commercial representation abroad.

If the situation in Central and South-eastern Europe represents already an actual or rapidly developing German domination, under the influence of a force to which apparently the two European democracies as yet appear to oppose little or no effective resistance, it would be a grave error to suppose that it remains there. It is quite obvious, even from the admissions of our Cabinet Ministers, that the two dictatorships are determined to bring about the victory of General Franco in Spain. In regard to Spain there have been some curiously contradictory ministerial statements. When asking Parliament to approve the bringing into force of the Anglo-Italian Treaty, the Prime Minister claimed as 'a substantial earnest of the good intentions of the Italian Government' the withdrawal of the 10,000 Italian infantry from Spain, together with an assurance that 'all the remaining Italian forces of all categories will be withdrawn when the non-intervention plan comes into operation.' In the same speech he declared that it 'cannot properly be said' that it is the fault of Italy that the British plan for the withdrawal of volunteers is not in force. Yet Lord Halifax has stated that the Anglo-Italian Treaty has never represented a lever which could be used for getting the Italian forces out of Spain, and that Signor Mussolini has never weakened in his determination to ensure General Franco's victory. That can only mean that Italy will only cease actively to support General Franco when the resistance of Republican Spain is completely crushed. How can that be made to rhyme with any genuine loyalty to the British evacuation plans? Is it surprising that the belief should gain ground that, in the opinion of the British Government, the crushing of the Republican forces is in any case inevitable, and that accordingly the continued intervention of Italy and Germany in Spain must be accepted as the best and quickest means of producing the only possible, and indeed even the most merciful, 'settlement' of the Spanish question? But if that is the Government's view, how can the British plan of evacuation fail to appear as a piece of political humbug, more discreditable to this country by comparison than even to the dictators, who at least do not conceal their intentions? If Italy and Germany had been willing and determined that the

evacuation scheme should come into force, General Franco, who is the only obstacle, would not and could not have resisted it. The British Government claim not to believe that Franco's victory with German and Italian aid will eventually have injurious effects on Great Britain. The Prime Minister deduced this, in his speech on November 2, from two facts. The first was that when he was at Munich, Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini assured him 'most definitely' that they had no territorial ambitions in Spain. He has twice deprecated as unworthy an attitude of suspicion towards such assurances, although all Herr Hitler's previous solemn declarations regarding the absence of territorial ambitions in Europe have been broken one after another. However, actual territorial occupation of any part of Spain is not necessary to make Spain in future a menace to Britain. If the future Government of Spain is a subordinate 'ally,' on the Manchukuo plan, of Germany, the menace to France and Britain may well prove just as serious as though the dictator Powers were still, as they are now, in actual territorial occupation. Therefore, the Prime Minister recalled that during the September crisis General Franco declared that 'he would not violate the French frontier unless he were attacked from that quarter.' It is true that this declaration of neutrality—for what it might have been worth—was momentarily disconcerting to Rome and Berlin. It may even have suggested that, once master of all Spain, General Franco might not necessarily be a completely trustworthy 'ideological' agent of the dictatorships. But it cannot on this account be safely assumed that General Franco's declaration of neutrality was dictated by any actual desire of his principal advisers—whatever may be his personal views—to avoid breaking all bridges between Franco-Spain and the democracies. There are certain facts which suggest that any other course than neutrality might at once have proved extremely dangerous to General Franco, whatever might have been the eventual results of a European war. It is not even very probable that France would have been obliged to send large forces across the Pyrenean frontier. There was, however, recently a widely current report, which might yet prove to have been well founded, that General Franco is not intended by his allies to remain at the head of affairs when once

Republican resistance is defeated. Not unnaturally, pagan Nazidom has no great desire to see established in Spain a Catholic administration with monarchical leanings, and therefore with characteristically Spanish sentiments of independence. It would suit Germany's book much better that there should presently be established a Phalangist Government which would be much more in line with Nazi ideas and methods. She would thus be much more completely assured of the maintenance of the economic stranglehold which she has established over Spain. Strategically as well as economically, Nazidom doubtless attaches particular importance to those mining areas whence France was able to obtain such highly important supplies of ore when her northern mining areas had been occupied. It must be assumed that in another war those same areas would at least be handicapped very seriously by bombing raids. Also, it is well known that French armaments factories are now largely concentrated in the south-west, so that the supply of Spanish ore would be of the greatest geographical value if the trans-frontier communications were assured.

The *Dépêche de Toulouse*, in its issue of October 23, gave a number of highly significant details of the German stranglehold on Spanish industry. German agents are not contented with a general control of the economic life of Spain. Wherever possible they have bought actual financial control of Spanish enterprises. Krupps, for example, according to this report, control one of the most important mines in Biscaya. The firm of Pach have bought two mines belonging to the Spanish firm of Juan Lesaca. The Moroccan ferro-manganese output is monopolised by the semi-official German 'Hisma' organisation. Mention is made of other mines in Spanish Morocco which have come under German control. Incidentally, some Spanish firms which might compete with German imports into Spain have been closed down. Examples are certain Spanish munition factories. So, too, Germany has obtained control of the Basque maritime services. The former ships of the Askari-Mendi are stated now to run under the German flag, as are those of other companies. Spanish exports to Germany have greatly increased. One Basque metallurgical factory has an annual contract of 60,000 tons of pig-iron and steel bars for Germany, while of the Biscayan

iron-ore output, averaging about 100,000 tons, fully half goes to Germany. Skins, at the rate of nearly 20,000 tons a year, sugar from the Alava factory, and even wheat are exported to Germany, though of wheat Spain herself goes short. These are only a few illustrations—they could be multiplied—of the hold which Germany has obtained over Spain. Such a hold is not comparable in kind with any trading advantage which Germany held before the war. Her grip of the country—by actual financial control, by the services of German experts who are the real managers of business concerns even when there is a Spanish figurehead, and especially by the barter system—is such that it must be very doubtful whether any mere loan system on the part of this country, or any Spanish dislike of economic servitude to a foreign country, will easily or quickly suffice to break it.

I have put down only a few illustrations of the kind of development which we have to confront in the economic sphere. That the development has a direct relation to military considerations must be apparent. It is essential, at all events, if the country is to make the effort demanded of it, that there should be no more comfortable illusions. Not even those who, despite the latest anti-Semitic barbarities in the Reich, continue apparently to believe that all Nazi methods can be both explained and excused by the Treaty of Versailles can doubt any longer that National-Socialist ambitions as well as methods will have to be met by a much sterner, completer, and more united effort than has yet been generally appreciated in this country.

CHARLES TOWER.

THE DECLINE OF THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND

ANYONE who sets out to describe or to deplore a 'decline' lays himself open to the charge either that he is constitutionally a *laudator temporis acti*, or that his attitude is, in the current jargon, 'subjective.' Certainly he must not treat of any subject so palpitating as theology without indicating his own standpoint and approach. The present article is that of a layman, with no special competence in theology, who was brought up as a Protestant dissenter, was for a brief period a member of the Church of England, and has been for the last twenty years a member of the Roman Catholic Church. It is in no sense an attempt to present 'the Catholic point of view' on the subject, assuming anything of the kind to exist. Few people whose reflective life covers the thirty-eight years of this century will deny the proposition that theology plays a very much smaller part in the life and thought of England to-day than it did at the end of Queen Victoria's reign. That the country is less 'religious' would be challenged with heat by every dean, film star, or tennis champion interviewed on the subject by the popular Press, but the term 'Religion' has been 'defecated to a pure transparency,' like so many other high-sounding words. We are concerned with Christian theology. In its broadest sense, it should include Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, and evangelical dissent, but, for obvious reasons, it is only Protestant theology which has excited any considerable influence on public life in this country. To say that this is because 'Rome discourages thought' would be misleading. The history of Roman Catholicism in England from the revival which followed the Oxford Movement down to the present time is one of storm and stress. The history of the Vatican Council or the biography of any prominent Roman Catholic of the nineteenth century will supply sufficient

evidence. All this, however, has been, so to speak, insulated from the general intellectual life of the country. The problems of Catholics have been ecclesiastical or philosophical. Outside a section of the Anglican Church, the former have not existed, except in relation to secular politics, and for philosophical thought the Englishman is constitutionally indisposed. On the other hand, the theological problems which so much preoccupied previous generations of Englishmen have not touched the Catholic layman. The classic problems of predestination and free will are for him *res judicata*. In this sense submission to Rome may be said to carry with it a 'decline of theological thought.' There is nothing corresponding in the Roman Catholic community to that solid body of middle-class and artisan society which had a definite theological culture and formed the backbone of English Nonconformity. We can remember simple men, uncultivated according to contemporary standards, who could discuss the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans with far more real intellectual force than their grandchildren display in passing London matriculation and repeating the catchwords of the newspapers.

The turning-point, in so far as these things can each be fixed, may be placed about the time of the New Theology controversy, half-way through the first decade of this century. The minister of the City Temple had offered a restatement of the Christian message which marked a violent departure from traditional Protestant theology. In every 'little bethel' throughout the country, protests thundered against this tampering with 'the faith that was once delivered to the saints.' Some of the most effective of these protests came from lay preachers, men who during the week were farmers, shoemakers, artisans. They were steeped in the Scriptures, and would travel miles on the Sunday, often at great inconvenience, to preach the Gospel. We heard many of these sermons, which, for real intellectual force, were not inferior to the more polished criticisms of Dr. Gore and other theologians. What we did not know was that we were witnessing a last stand. These men were prepared to fight for an iota as fiercely as the men of Nicea, and for the same reason, not because of any superstitious veneration, but because they knew how much it meant. They have gone

and the old 'local preacher' has given place to slick salesmen of spiritual uplift.

How it may be in the theological training colleges we do not know. There may still be men, like Dr. Fairbairn and Peter T. Forsyth, teaching a definite theology. What is certain is that there are no such evidences of it in the public life of the country as there were. 'Be ye reconciled to God' was the message on the chapel we attended as a child. 'Britain must support the League' is the announcement on the chapels we pass to-day. The pastors of our youth aimed at creating conviction of sin. A 'psychological clinic' at one centre of London Nonconformity offers to cure the sense of guilt. A Roman Catholic may, we think, without impertinence, deplore these things and wish they were otherwise.

An attempt to analyse this decline of theology brings to light two special features of it. One is the neglect of the English Bible, the other the decay of the sense of sin. The Anniversary of the Open Bible was the occasion recently of public demonstrations of gratitude by the leaders of Protestant religious life. We do not question the sincerity of their utterances, though they sometimes contained assertions or implications about the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to the reading of the Sacred Scriptures which it would be difficult to justify; but will anybody pretend that the Bible is as well known in England to-day as it was in the opening days of the century? Let any public speaker illustrate his argument with scriptural quotations which would have been perfectly familiar to pre-war hearers, and a working-class audience will have no idea what he is talking about. The greater part of what passes for educated Young England to-day has received its instruction in the State-maintained secondary schools. Bible teaching may figure on the curricula for aught we know, but the products of this system of education do not know their Bibles as the young people from the Victorian Board schools and National schools did. To submit a scriptural turn of expression to a young present-day sub-editor is to invite the blue pencil. We once hazarded 'evil communications have corrupted good manners,' but it evolved into something quite different, and a reference to 'rumours of wars' became 'threats of war.' The examples are trivial, but this neglect of the English Bible is not only,

as Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch would assure us, a loss to English writing and speaking, it represents a weakening of traditional Protestantism in which those who are not Protestants, but are concerned with our common Christianity, can find no reason for satisfaction.

The second element—the loss of the sense of sin—concerns a more restricted area. The neglect of the Bible directly affects the cultural life of the country as a whole, but here we are led to consider modern English Protestantism as a teaching body. A word of preliminary explanation is necessary if we say that we regard an emphasis on the sense of sin, the conviction that the human race is 'included under sin,' as a characteristically Protestant contribution to religious thought. We have spoken of 'our common Christianity'; but it is unnecessary to point out that no Roman Catholic can regard Catholicism, Protestantism, and other forms of belief as variants of a common religion, to be discussed on the same level in terms of resemblances and differences and with an implication that the differentia are subjective and psychological rather than inherent in the systems. From our point of view, integral Christianity is the *depositum fidei* held by the Catholic Church in communion with the See of Rome. Doctrines which conflict with her teachings we hold to be, not alternative expressions or other facets of a many-sided truth, but false. The eminent sanctity of millions of people outside the Church of Rome it would be preposterous to deny, and the indifferent morality, to say nothing of sanctity, of many inside it is an unpleasant fact. It is a statement of unimpeachable orthodoxy that there are many in the soul of the Church who are outside its body, and *vice versa*. Having guarded ourselves against any misunderstanding on that point, may we not say that there are features of Protestant thought, which are characteristic of it, without thereby participating in anything which belongs essentially (I speak as a Roman Catholic) to Protestant heresy? It is in that sense that we speak of the emphasis on the sense of sin as characteristically Protestant.

It may take exaggerated and morbid forms, as it seems to us to do in the classic case of Luther, but it remains true that the fact of sin is essential to Christianity. And by *sin* we do not here mean *sins*—acts of wrongdoing. We mean a

particular state, which belongs to human nature as we know it, and must be regarded, according to Christian teaching, as a consequence of the transgression of Adam. It is as much a part of the *depositum fidei* that 'in Adam all died' as that 'in Christ shall all be made alive.' Where this conception is lost, Christianity has lost its *raison d'être*. It is the answer to the question: 'What must I do to be saved?' It is centred not only in an Exemplar but in a Saviour, and there can no more be a real Christianity without a sense of sin than there can be a Christianity without Christ. In Catholic theology the term 'sin' is not used univocally of original and actual, mortal and venial sin. It is outside the scope of this article to discuss the distinctions. The point we wish to make is that it is the conception of sin as a systemic disease of the human soul due to a historic fact—the fall of man—that is so far in antagonism with contemporary modes of thought that it seems to be disappearing from popular preaching in this country.

This, as it seems to us, while it does not alter anything essential in the relations of Catholicism and Protestantism, considered as systems of thought, to one another, does affect the approach of both Catholic and Protestant to the intellectual problems of the age. A nineteenth-century Catholic apologist might well feel called upon to criticise certain Protestant conceptions of sin. He would have to attack the doctrine of the total corruption of human nature and the 'filthy rags' conception of good works. Sin in Catholic eyes is, like all forms of evil, a privation or deficiency. The tendency of most Protestant apologetics has been to treat it as a positive entity. It is difficult to give to the word *ἀμαρτία*, which is most frequently used for 'sin' in the New Testament, the content which the word holds in Protestant theology, and it may perhaps be doubted—we make the suggestion diffidently—whether the Greek language is capable of expressing many specifically Protestant ideas. Catholicism has been called 'Hellenised Christianity,' but our principal sources are in Greek, and when we are in a specifically Protestant atmosphere we have a feeling that the Scriptures have undergone a process of de-hellenisation. The argument that the New Testament is Hebrew thought in a Greek idiom is a dangerous one. Because he accepts it, Charles Maurras is *catholique mais pas chrétien*.

However that may be, the position to-day is not one in which Catholic and Protestant conceptions of sin confront one another. To the present-day 'liberal religionist' a discussion of sin has about as much value as speculations on 'phlogiston' would have for a contemporary scientist. The idea, implicit if not avowed, is that 'sin' was a hypothesis which is no longer useful. Even if the word be maintained, it has lost its old meaning. Probably the most powerful factor contributing to this was the extension to the sphere of religious thought of the biological speculations of the Darwinians. The idea of sin as 'a regression to an earlier evolutionary stage' is not the Catholic doctrine of the privation of metaphysical good. It is a denial of the fall of man, and without the fall all Christian theology is meaningless.

Here then, as it seems to us, it is more obvious to-day, than it was even a quarter of a century ago, that Protestant and Roman Catholic are united on matters more fundamental than those which divide them. If they are both out of touch with the attitude of the modern world, are we to conclude that this is the condemnation of both? Has the sense of sin so largely disappeared in our time because the doctrine has been found out of touch with human experience?

We must go cautiously here. A Christian cannot admit that the content of his religion is to be tried by the *Zeitgeist*. The fact of sin does not depend on human consciousness of it; the patient is not to diagnose the doctor. Yet the appeal to experience, if not ultimate, is certainly not irrelevant. Christianity is not true because it is revealed; it is revealed because it is true.

It is just here that modern thought and speculation seems to be at variance with itself, for modern man, having rejected original sin from the hands of the theologian, seems to be accepting something very like it from the psychologist. The reader of the New Testament, and especially of the Pauline writings, will find yet another division of the concept of sin in addition to those we have mentioned. We will call it a division into legalistic and biological interpretations. From the former, which appealed to St. Paul as one learned in the Jewish law, are derived all the ideas of 'imputed righteousness.' The latter fits naturally into our ideas of biological inheritance. The consequences of sin are a part

of the psycho-physical constitution with which we enter the world.

Let us restate the doctrine of original sin under this aspect. There is nothing alien to contemporary scientific thought in the notion that man to-day is largely conditioned by racial experiences which are very remote in time. We may have our own opinion of the value of Haeckel's law, 'Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,' according to which the embryonic history of the individual recapitulates the history of the race. It is one which has greatly influenced modern thought. Jung has applied it to psychology. The various systems which are loosely described as 'the New Psychology' concentrate very largely on the phenomenon of psychogenic illness. To the fashionable nineteenth-century idea of explaining human life in terms of physico-chemical processes there has succeeded a search into man's psychic life for the origin of his troubles. We hear more of neuroses than any previous generation has heard, and it seems to be concluded that we are all neurotic. 'Wretched man that I am,' exclaims St. Paul. 'Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?' Nineteen centuries later, savants, who would not waste time on the tent-maker, are discussing 'man's unconscious conflict.'

There is no lack of ingenuity in the suggested answers. Otto Rank advances 'the birth-trauma' as an explanation. But Freud, the high priest of the new psychologies, goes further back into the night of time. It is very suggestive to see how Freud and Jung find themselves forced by their clinical experience to the conclusion that contemporary man has some deep-rooted malady which is only to be explained in terms of remote racial history. The origin of religion and conscience, according to Freud, is to be found in the primitive totem feast. All this rests on a very insubstantial basis of anthropological theory, and, as far as we can gather, Freud's excursions into anthropology are no great improvement on Jung's travesties of ecclesiastical history. The significant thing in each case is that man is found to present a puzzle which can only be solved by reference to some decisive event in his remote history. To Freud religion itself is a neurosis. The trouble is not sin, but the illusion of sin. Jung, superficially viewed, is more friendly to Christianity, but here it is

wise to fear the Greeks, *et dona ferentes*. Fundamentally his view is the same. 'My problem,' he told a London audience, 'is to wrestle with the big monster of the historical past, the great snake of the centuries, the burden of the human mind, the problem of Christianity. . . . Other people are not worried by such problems, they do not care about the historical problems Christianity has heaped upon us.'

Now there is doubtless a great difference between accepting the Book of Genesis as fact and holding that a sense of conflict is inherent and vastly important in the deepest recesses of the human psyche, though it is doubtful if the new psychologists would recognise this, for they have been greatly influenced by the *Philosophie des Als Ob* of Vaishinger, and certainly it is to-day 'as if' the opening chapters of Genesis were true.

The point we wish to make is that at a time when religious leaders appear to be in full retreat from theology, when they are increasingly insistent on 'muscular Christianity' and a common-sense view of things, independent investigation on other lines is more than ever convincing us of the inadequacy of these things. It may satisfy a 'pleasant Sunday afternoon' audience to be told that 'just the art of being kind is all the sad world needs,' but the more thoughtful elements in modern life are less and less inclined to believe it. The platitudes of the 'wayside pulpit' are very degenerate successors of the message of men who were persecuted for 'turning the world upside down.' The non-theological Christianity so popular in our day would have had a less exciting history than historic Catholicism or Protestantism, but it would have been a shorter one.

REGINALD J. DINGLE.

THE THIRD WINTER OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

THE other day I was watching a maker of artificial limbs, whom war had summoned from New York to impart his experience to Spanish pupils, fashioning a foot in his workshop beneath the General Mola Hospital at San Sebastián. When he told me it was for a soldier who had lost his own foot through frostbite in the fight for Teruel last December, my mind went back to that harsh Aragon battlefield where outposts on both sides were frozen to death during the night. I thought of the insufficiently clad reserves whom I had seen huddling wretchedly together in snow and sleet as they waited for the command to go forwards; of the heavily muffled English-speaking captain who protested that his men would not fight if the cold lasted much longer, and envied me so hungrily because I was going to spend a night in bed at Saragossa; of the ill-lit, overcrowded dressing-stations where the wounded, lying on the floor awaiting their turn, asked in vain for warmer covering. It was oppressing to happen so long afterwards on this reminder that in hospitals up and down Spain men were still recovering from that severe engagement, and to reflect that the survivors now had another winter campaign ahead of them, that, for the third winter in succession, Spaniards were still bent on destroying Spaniards.

Last spring, when the Nationalist forces penetrated Catalonia as far as Lérida and soon afterwards sundered Government territory in two by driving a wedge through to the sea at Vinaroz, most persons in General Franco's part of the country assumed that Spain would not have to face another winter of civil war. In Burgos and Valladolid officials hurriedly drew up plans for policing and feeding the three most populous cities of Spain—Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia. In the crowded hotels of San Sebastián, where most of them have been living restlessly on credit for over two years,

well-to-do refugees from Government Spain discussed with fresh hope the prospects of soon rejoining their abandoned property and lost friends. Even as late as the middle of July, when the enemy had already rallied with surprising resolution, officers attached to army headquarters in Saragossa were expecting Valencia to fall in the early autumn, and Madrid, if not Barcelona, to follow suit soon afterwards. Then, on the night of July 24, a Catalan army, reinforced for the last time by detachments of the International Brigade, broke across the River Ebro and diverted the bulk of the aircraft and artillery which for several weeks had been methodically pulverising the outer defences of Valencia. That well-timed and cleverly directed stroke dashed Nationalist Spain's hope of achieving a final military victory in 1938.

There are a few untroubled persons in Nationalist Spain who are enjoying the war and will be much at a loss when it ends. The type exists in every country, but perhaps most numerous in the Peninsula, the spirit of whose *conquistadores* and *guerrilleros* still lives for all to see. The certainty of another winter's hostilities does not distress them. They give little, if any, thought to the part they are playing in history; they know life will never be so enthralling to them again as it is now. But, though naturally conspicuous, they are an unrepresentative minority. The majority of men and women living under General Franco's authority are perceptibly dejected by the remaining distance from war to peace. The hearty '*vivas*' of Press and platform can neither allay nor conceal the disappointment and foreboding in their hearts. Were they allowed to be articulate they would proclaim their desire for an immediate armistice on any reasonable terms.

It is not the fear of defeat, or of suffering hitherto unexperienced physical hardship, that is troubling the serenity of Nationalist Spain. War has not touched the civilian population nearly as sharply as it has touched the civilian population in Government territory. There has always been plenty of good things to eat and drink in General Franco's thirty-eight provinces. The *Día del plato unico*, a weekly exaggeration of Germany's monthly *Eintopfsonntag*, is observed out of moral, not economic, necessity. Meat is being more thriftily distributed than before, and beer cannot be brewed as quickly and copiously as it is sometimes drunk. There

is a scarcity of rice, oranges, lemons, and cigarettes. But these are deprivations of no great consequence; substitutes can be found for most of them. Up to now the only serious problem in Nationalist Spain's domestic economy has been to provide a sufficient quantity of textiles without placing orders abroad. For the bulk of Spain's textile goods has always been manufactured in Catalonia, a source still unpromisingly remote from Nationalist buyers. When we entered a newly conquered town or village in the course of General Franco's advance on Lérida, one of the Press officers seemed to have only one object in mind—that was, to find a shop where he could buy some towels, which he was looking forward to carrying in triumph to his wife in San Sebastián. Unluckily for him, the local stock had always been removed by the fugitive owner or appropriated by the first incoming soldiers. So eagerly are people in Nationalist Spain on the look-out for textile goods. It is even likely that some, less lucky in the search than others, may feel the cold more keenly this winter than before. But again there is no question of deprivation acute enough to cause grave suffering or even apprehension.

As for the military, they will be a little better off this winter than they were last, for they have pushed their major battlefields forwards to country where the climate is milder. General Franco's troops are fed remarkably well in the field; on stagnant sectors this winter they will, no doubt, be bartering their surplus bread, meat, and coffee for the enemy's surplus *anis*, as they did last year.

Yet, notwithstanding its resources and record of military success, Nationalist Spain is becoming more nervy and diffident as the war proceeds. Those who committed themselves voluntarily and wholeheartedly to General Franco's cause in 1936, anticipating victory within a few weeks, are beginning to ask themselves uneasily if the gains of the rising can ever be worth the appalling and utterly unexpected price. Although the cost of the civil war is never publicly discussed in Nationalist Spain, there are clues galore to the tune of the bill. Neither side publishes lists of casualties, and, such is the bitterness of spirit, neither has accepted the suggestion of the International Red Cross that a record should be kept as far as possible of the identity of enemy dead found

abandoned on the field. For obvious reasons no official record has been kept of assassinations. The number of judicial executions will probably never be known. But as one goes about Spain one rarely meets a person whose family has not been bereaved in one way or another. Spaniards who have been trying to keep count of the number of killed since the war began unanimously put the figure at at least 1,000,000. Of these the majority are young men who would have served their country well in time of peace.

While the war is costing thousands of valuable lives, it is simultaneously fast laying waste the country's economic resources. Both sides have understandably drawn impenetrable veils over their financial practices and over many of their commercial transactions. But anybody can figure that the bill for war material must be exceedingly heavy, and that it will take years to rebuild the scores of destroyed towns, villages and harbours, and the hundreds of sprung roads and bridges. Every honest Nationalist knows to his discomfort that a great deal of the damage has been done by General Franco's artillery and aircraft. Few are deceived by the customary announcement before the Nationalist troops enter a town which has been heavily shelled and bombed that, before retiring, the 'Marxist hordes' dynamited the principal buildings. It is realised that much more destruction will have to be wrought before the war is finished. And, for this reason, when peace is at last restored there will be little easing of the nation's burden. The longer the war lasts, the poorer Spain will be when she sets out to put her shattered house in order, and the more difficult it will be for the leaders of the country to fulfil their promises.

Another substantial bill which Nationalist Spain did not reckon for at the beginning of the war is that for foreign assistance over such a long period. The number of foreign troops and agents in Nationalist Spain has been variously exaggerated and underestimated. It may be said with confidence that there are about 5000 Germans in the Legion Condor, mostly serving as airmen, anti-aircraft officers, instructors, telephonists and drivers, and, since the withdrawal of 10,000 infantry, about 30,000 Italians serving as combatants on land and in the air. The Germans are volunteers; the Italians, save a few airmen, are conscripts. The

assistance of both is reinforced by invaluable supplies of war material, some of which is bought, some borrowed, by General Franco.

There is little doubt that Nationalist Spain is paying now in cash and goods for all the foreign help it is receiving except the guns and aeroplanes that have been lent for the duration of the war. But there is good reason for supposing that Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini expect to receive more from intervention in Spain than the employment of a certain number of their countries' youth. A German air officer told me that one of Germany's biggest gains from intervention in Spain is the experience of war being acquired by airmen and military technicians. An Italian pilot said much the same thing, and added that the Spanish war had occupied a large number of the soldiers who would have been at a loose end on their return from Ethiopia. Will that be sufficient for the two dictators? Many of General Franco's subjects have an uneasy suspicion that it will not, that the longer the war drags on the more difficult it will be to free the country afterwards from alien economic exploitation, the influence of alien ideas, and the dangerous consequences of alien alliances.

The Burgos Government has sought to forestall foreign exploitation of Spain's rich mineral resources by introducing a law that restricts the granting of mining concessions to Spanish companies, financed by Spanish capital, and advised as far as possible by Spanish engineers. But there are many other economic opportunities in the Peninsula, and 'Hisma,' the central German trading organisation in Spain, is busily finding them out and preparing to make the most of them. The continually expanding commercial air lines of Nationalist Spain, for instance, are now operated entirely by German pilots, flying German aeroplanes, and assisted by German radio operators and ground engineers.

It is unavoidable that the foreigners who are being given an exceptional opportunity to enter intimately and without competition into Spanish economic life are appreciably influencing the country's political ideas. Newspaper readers in General Franco's territory have to rely for the greater part of their foreign news on the not altogether unbiassed reports supplied for next to nothing by the official German and Italian news agencies. In Burgos the other day I bought a

small German-Spanish dictionary published before the war in which two or three supplementary pages have been inserted since 1936 giving the Spanish for German technical and political terms. The four pages devoted to political expressions for the use of propagandists give the Spanish for such significant Nazi concepts as Aryan, concentration camp, war-guilt lies, racial purity, and totalitarianism.

The one clear political development in Nationalist Spain since the beginning of the war has been the emergence, not without struggle, of the Falange Española Tradicionalista, a totalitarian party, as the ruling clique. The Falange has derived its policy and practices largely from Nazi and Fascist models, often regardless of their suitability for the Spanish people, who are by nature individualists and at the same time deeply religious. The devout Roman Catholics of Navarre, fighting to restore God and the king to their former places in Spain, are already murmuring openly but impotently against the Falange and the character it is assuming from association with totalitarian and anti-Catholic advisers.

It is impossible to tell at present how much the Spaniards of Nationalist Spain fear that General Franco's mounting obligations to Germany and Italy may one day involve Spain in a European war—at least, in so far as Spain's air and sea ports would be used as bases by German and Italian forces, and thus become military objectives. Perhaps such a contingency seems too remote at the moment from their own more pressing quarrel. But I know a few have not forgotten the truth of the Duke of Wellington's assertion that 'the Pyrenean boundary is the most vulnerable frontier of France, probably the only vulnerable frontier.' Those who understand something of the political rivalries of present-day Europe are wondering uneasily into what further experience of war Spain may yet be led.

No account of the cost of the civil war would be complete without taking into consideration the intangible but none the less grievous wounds inflicted upon the nation's spirit by two and a half years of fratricide. To persuade the citizens of a country to wage war continuously against their fellow-citizens it is necessary to kindle hatred by fair means or foul and feed the flames with unceasing extravagance. This has been happening in Spain, with ugly consequences from which

the longer the war continues the longer it will take the country to recover. The shooting of prisoners of war who are known to have taken an active part in politics, unchivalrous contempt for a brave enemy, spy mania, denunciation of neighbours, unjust executions, and gaols filled with harmless political suspects, are all manifestations of the peculiar brutality and hysteria of civil strife. In one of the few magnanimous speeches provoked by the war, General Yagüe tried to warn Nationalist Spain of the trouble it was laying up for itself by this cheap belittlement of a courageous foe and the fearful intolerance which was filling the gaols to overflowing. In April, shortly after his Moroccan Army Corps had broken through the Cinca fortifications and captured Lérida, General Yagüe told his Burgos audience that they were petty and mischievous who jeered at the retreating Government troops. 'They are Spaniards, and therefore valiant,' he declared. Referring at the same time to the crowded prisons of Nationalist Spain, he appealed for greater forbearance so that the people in Government territory might not be so frightened of the consequences of a Nationalist victory. But the text of General Yagüe's speech, which was delivered on the very day that General Franco was elsewhere threatening vengeance for 400,000 assassinations, was immediately suppressed. Nationalist newspapers and spokesmen continue to fan the hatred, which bodes ill for the future unity of Spain.

The increasing burden of the war would be lighter to bear were Nationalist Spain unshakably convinced that the struggle was worth while. But it is undeniable that the longer the war continues the less there is to fight about, except for the leaders, to whom defeat would mean death or exile. The struggle that began in July 1936 was, in the last analysis, principally a struggle for jobs, a conflict between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots.' As few persons are completely single-minded, secondary motives also played a part, and, sounding more respectable, were sometimes used to conceal the primary impulse. The Army, the Church, and the great landowners and industrialists, many of them Royalists, sided with General Franco in the expectation that he would restore and secure their interests. As the war has dragged on, General Franco has been compelled to exact more and more from all ranks of

the nation, but particularly from those which desire to raise their standard of living. His army of 800,000 men has been conscribed largely from the unprivileged classes. The obligations thus entailed have driven him so to modify his programme that the present political trend of Nationalist Spain is dismaying many of his original following among the well-to-do. A comparison of the official war-born programmes of Nationalist and Government Spain leads one to the conclusion that both sides are in agreement as to ends, and differ only as to the means by which the ends are to be attained. I do not believe that the majority of Spaniards on either side consider this difference in method to justify the unrelenting slaughter. Unfortunately, they are not allowed to know how nearly they have come together. The few that do know are not permitted to voice their questionings.

The first three points of the programme of Falang Española Tradicionalista, the official programme of Nationalist Spain, are as follows :

1. We believe in the supreme reality of Spain. To strengthen it, elevate it, and improve it is the urgent collective task of all Spaniards. In order to achieve this end, the interests of individuals, groups, and classes will have to be remorselessly waived.
2. Spain is a destined unity in the universe. Any conspiracy against this unity is abhorrent. Any form of separatism is an unpardonable crime. The existing Constitution, in so far as it encourages any disunity, commits a crime against the destiny of Spain. For this reason we demand its immediate abrogation.
3. We have a will to empire. We affirm that the full history of Spain implies an empire. We demand for Spain a pre-eminent place in Europe. We will not put up with international isolation or with foreign interference. With regard to the Hispano-American countries, we will aim at unification of culture, of economic interests and of power. Spain claims a pre-eminent place in all common tasks, because of her position as the spiritual cradle of the Spanish world.

Compare these with points 1, 2, and 5 of the Government programme (Dr. Negrin's Thirteen Points), which are :

1. To ensure the absolute independence and complete integrity of Spain. A Spain entirely free from all foreign interference, whatever its character and origin, with her peninsular and insular territory and her possessions untouched and safe from any attempt

at dismemberment, alienation, or mortgage and retaining the protectorate zones assigned to her by international agreements. . . . Fully conscious of her historical and traditional obligations, Spain will draw more closely together the links forged by a common origin and sense of universality—a traditional characteristic of her people—which bind her to the other Spanish-speaking countries.

2. The liberation of our territory from the foreign military forces that have invaded it, as well as from those who have entered Spain since 1936, and who, under the pretext of technical collaboration, are intervening or attempting to dominate the juridical life of Spain in their own interests.

5. Respect for regional liberties without prejudice to Spanish unity. Protection and development of the personality and individuality of the various regions of Spain, as imposed by historic law and fact; this, far from signifying disintegration, is the best means of welding together the various elements of the nation.

Obviously there is nothing in these almost identical aims to justify the prolongation of hostilities.

Point 4 of the Falange programme runs :

Our armed forces on land, on sea, and in the air must be as efficient and numerous as may be necessary to assure Spain's complete independence at all times. . . . We shall restore to the armies . . . all the dignity which they deserve, and, following their ideal, we shall see to it that a military view of life shall shape Spanish existence.

Is point 11 of the Government programme so uncompromisingly in antithesis?

The Spanish Army, at the service of the nation itself, shall be free of all leadership depending upon bias or party, and the people must be able to see in it the certain instrument for the defence of their liberties and independence.

One could continue comparing both programmes point by point, finding close similarity of view on all major issues save one. Even on the radical questions of the rights of labour and of the necessity for land reform the two programmes acknowledge the same ends. The Falange programme maintains :

We repudiate any capitalist system which ignores popular necessities, dehumanises private property and huddles workers into shapeless masses ripe for misery and despair. Our spiritual and

national sense also repudiates Marxism. . . . The first object of wealth . . . is to better the people's conditions of life. It is intolerable that great masses of people should live miserably whilst the few enjoy every luxury. . . . The State will recognise private property as a lawful means of fulfilling individual, family, and social ends, and will protect it against the abuses of the great financiers, speculators, and moneylenders.

Since these words were written, General Franco has promised further concessions to the workers in a generous Labour Charter, so that the Nationalist programme approximates still more closely to points 7 and 9 of the Government programme, which specify that

The State shall guarantee property legally and legitimately acquired within the limits imposed by the supreme interests of the nation, and the protection of producing elements. Without prejudice to individual initiative, it will prevent the exploitation of the citizen and the subjugation of collective effort by the accumulation of wealth which weakens the controlling action of the State in economic and social life. . . . The State shall guarantee the rights of the worker by means of an advanced social legislation. . . .

As for agricultural reform, both programmes advocate the redistribution of land so as to establish small family properties. Both reserve a place for religion in the nation's life.

The only major issue on which a difference of opinion is set forth in black and white is the manner in which the Spain of the future is to fulfil the tasks which everybody now agrees have to be taken in hand. The Falange programme asserts :

Our State will be a totalitarian instrument in the service of national integrity. All Spaniards will take part in it through their family, municipal, and syndical functions. No one shall take part in it through any political party. The system of political parties will be implacably abolished, with all that flows from them—inorganic suffrage, representation by conflicting parties, and parliament of the familiar type.

To which the Government programme replies :

A People's Republic, represented by a virile State based on principles of pure democracy, ruling by means of a Government dowered with the full authority conferred by universal suffrage, and symbolising a strong executive power dependent at all times on the will of the Spanish people. The legal and social structure of the

Republic shall be the work of the national will, freely expressed by means of a plebiscite to be held as soon as the war is over, one to be held without restrictions or limitations and with full guarantees to assure those taking part against every possible reprisal.

In spite of this last and important difference I am utterly convinced that, promised an immediate peace, the majority of Spaniards would accept either programme in the knowledge that nobody's peace can be perfect, and in confidence that time and the Spanish character would make the adjustments necessary for the welfare and happiness of Spain. Two and a half years of war have achieved the recognition of popular rights that no Spanish Government will ever again be able to ignore. For that reason Dr. Negrin is right in looking forward to the day when the names of the dead of both sides will be engraved together on every village war memorial.

K. S. ROBSON.

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

'VICTORIES in themselves are only the brutal destruction of one force by another,' wrote Clemenceau in 1920. 'It is for the conquerors to show themselves capable of drawing their consequences. For that men and time are needed. To-day, as yesterday and to-morrow, continuous success can only be expected from the capacity for inner discipline of nations worthy to conceive the new order of a just peace of labour. Neither noble feelings nor firm courage can fail us. Throughout history it is steadiness in our ideas, method, consequence that we have lacked. Can we not draw from the trials of our times, the strength to surpass the glories of war, which are insufficient to maintain a nation's life, in a loftier synthesis of those peace-time achievements which have often ennobled our past? To win the future we only need to forge it ourselves. The anvils and hammers are there; let us see the arms.' 'Alas!' comments General Weygand, who quotes these lines, 'the arms were lacking'—arms of flesh and blood, not arms of steel. General Weygand does not attribute France's present position to the refusal of various French demands during the negotiation of the peace settlement, to infidelities of her allies, or to insufficiencies of her armament and of her military discipline in 1938, but to lack of civil discipline, labour and piety. He contrasts the prevailing French atmosphere of facility with the conditions in Germany. 'Doubtless her pretensions to be a chosen race are evidence of an insensate pride, which no longer considers either a promise, or justice, does not even respect God, and will one day be punished. But, on the other hand, what an example is to be found in a movement which never appeals or makes concessions to the weaknesses of human nature, but always demands self-abnegation, duty and self-sacrifice!'

It would be a great mistake to dismiss General Weygand's

severe judgment of his fellow-Frenchmen as attributable to the dissatisfaction of a retired military man or to Fascist sympathies. The recent experience of mobilisation has caused a great many heart-searchings. At the end of September a million and a half Frenchmen were under arms. They were not called up by age groups in accordance with the traditional technique of mobilisation. Veterans of the last war formed a large proportion of the men in uniform, and there were many cases of fathers called to the colours before their sons. Men who had never expected to serve again were snatched out of civilian life and found themselves preparing for what looked like an offensive across the Lorraine frontier, into the area of which Hitler was to announce the intensified fortification in his Saarbrücken speech shortly after the Munich Agreement. Generations, classes, provinces, and races (for North African Moslems were shoulder to shoulder with French peasants and workmen) were submerged in the community of military service, and the millions of Frenchmen not yet called up all knew the place where they were to present themselves and the function they were to fulfil when the order for general mobilisation came. Young Englishmen who were in France at the time will not easily forget the kindly quizzing pride with which their French contemporaries asked them if they were 'mobilisables,' full-well knowing the answer. 'It lasted five days' (September 24-29), M. Jean Schlumberger writes in the *Nouvelle Revue Française*—'long enough to give us the certainty that this recovery was not due to docility without conviction or to the courage of a mood; that France was really on the march; that it was her pace, neither precipitate nor dragging, the pace of one who has set out on a long stage. Five days whose memory we must hope, for our honour, will not be effaced. For immediately afterwards everything collapsed in the rout of deliverance.'

It was not only the thought of a recently suffered bloodless defeat or of peace so unexpectedly preserved which lent special gravity to the celebration of what the French still call the Fête de la Victoire on November 11, but this intimate experience of Frenchmen unhesitatingly standing together in the hour of danger, although they are much more deeply divided than Englishmen by their personal convictions. This has set a standard by which to judge the political routine

and methods of France before, during and after the crisis, and has caused many Frenchmen suddenly to become acutely aware that France must submit to the same strains and tests as her neighbours. 'One thing is certain,' M. Schlumberger observes—'no frontiers are impermeable enough to stand such differences of tension and temperature on either side. They will give way if our vital heat does not rise.'

It must at once be said that after the sudden announcement of the Munich Agreement the relapse of the nation towards the atmosphere of facility and scepticism, mingled now with a flavour of disquiet and disgust, was much more noticeable than any moral bracing due to the experience through which it had just passed. To provoke a moral renaissance in France is the more difficult at the moment, because M. Daladier, the Foreign Minister and those other members of his Government who delivered speeches about the Munich Agreement in October were as anxious as Mr. Chamberlain to deny that their country had suffered a defeat. M. Daladier was perhaps the more vehement in his denial of a political reverse before the Radical Congress, because he certainly left Munich under the impression that the document he had signed was, however necessary, very inglorious, and he was quite uncertain what reception he would receive in Paris. He must have been greatly relieved, as far as his own political future was concerned, to discover how ready was the French nation to appreciate the achievements of his diplomacy, though a passage in his speech to the Chamber shows that he was also very properly disquieted as to the ultimate consequences for the country of the public's reaction. It was truly surprising to find so many Frenchmen blandly dismissing as of no account the collapse of the basis of their country's foreign policy for twenty years.

Denials, both public and private, that Munich was a defeat, though welcomed by so many people as contributing to a comfortable life, were evidently only accepted with a more or less unconscious moral reserve, for nobody expressed surprise at a series of newspaper campaigns, at least partly due to Government inspiration, which obviously presupposed that something unpleasant had happened. These campaigns served to distract public attention during the six weeks required by the Daladier Government to make up its mind

how the extraordinary powers obtained under a plea of extreme urgency on October 4 were to be employed.

For two weeks the Press was filled with articles about the air force, the reasons for the failure to produce new models quickly and in any number, and the urgency of procuring for France a large modern air fleet as soon as possible. The discussion was closed by a series of statements from the Minister for Air that past mistakes had now been repaired, that from the New Year onwards aeroplanes would pour from the factories, and that by 1940 France would have the air fleet she required. The criticism raised in some quarters that 1940 would be too late had few echoes, and public attention was soon transferred to the colonies.

France's colonial empire, it was argued, was proof in itself that France was still a great nation. Here was her true sphere, rather than the Continent, which indeed had rather distracted her energies from their proper direction. France had never been able to combine the rôles of great Continental and great Imperial power, it was suggested. This form of distraction was more dangerous to the Government than the discussion of aeroplanes. With the Japanese in Canton it was obvious that France could not, however much she reduced her Continental commitments, defend her remoter colonies alone, while her African colonies were threatened scarcely at all by an overseas enemy, and very directly from France's European neighbours. M. Daladier, in his speech to the Marseilles Congress, spoke of France's great Imperial mission, but by referring to a vast zone of security which was no less precious than the mother country itself, without making it clear whether this zone was co-extensive with the whole French colonial empire, he left the door ajar for further concessions in connexion with the future extension of the Munich policy to other spheres in accordance with M. Bonnet's promise to his constituents. M. Mandel, the Minister of Colonies, however, who was known to be one of the strongest critics within the Cabinet of the Munich policy, delivered a long speech a few days later indicating very fully the great economic possibilities of France's colonies and the prospect of notably improving with their help in the near future the French balance of trade. When on the top of this Herr Hitler launched his demand for colonies it became

evident that France's empire was not a harmless topic for comforting those who felt sore about Munich. Public opinion appeared a good deal more aroused than is usual on colonial issues. The Chamber lobbies became excited and indignant at the possibility that France, having sacrificed her allies in Central Europe, should be asked to pay any further Danegeld.

A third noticeable feature in the Press after Munich was a campaign against aliens, more especially against political and Jewish *émigrés* from Germany. If France was to be excluded from Central Europe, then at least she should not find strangers roaming about her own garden. The population of France includes nearly 3,000,000 foreign immigrants and 800,000 citizens of foreign origin naturalised since the war, not to mention a very large number already naturalised before the war. In other words, at least one-tenth of the population of France is of more or less recent foreign origin. There were 43,000 more deaths than births in the first half of 1938. Without the immigrant there would be acute labour shortage, especially in the least-agreeable and well-paid trades. In these circumstances the suggestion that France is being hospitable in sheltering these foreigners on her soil is grotesque, and the periodic campaigns against '*métèques*,' as Charles Maurras has dubbed them in reminiscence of ancient Athens, only shows that the Governments of the Third Republic have so far failed to work out an adequate administrative technique and a policy of internal colonisation to meet the problem of an immigration which is now essential to France.

Already before the Munich Agreement was reached the opponents of M. Bonnet's policy were accused of trying to provoke a war to serve Jewish interests. After Munich it was evident that popular xenophobia and anti-Semitism were rising. The spectacle of immigrant labourers remaining behind in the villages when the Frenchmen were called up naturally stimulated these emotions, which were not softened by the number of foreigners, especially of German refugees who volunteered for military service, because their names were only known to the recruiting offices. As usual, it was the offensive and arrogant foreigner who attracted all the attention. These feelings even find expression in the leader

columns of such a paper as the *Temps*, which wrote on November 2 :

It is contrary to the most elementary prudence to tolerate the presence on our territory of millions of foreigners capable of forming, in the long run, veritable national minorities in a country which, like ours, has a deficient birth rate. One can also say, without falling into racialism, which the French mind reproves and condemns, that the presence of all these foreigners amongst us threatens, by inevitable interbreeding, the balance of national characteristics to which we owe our originality as a people and our unity as a nation. . . . It is absolutely necessary and urgent that no foreigner should be allowed to settle permanently or for a long period within our frontier who does not satisfy very severe conditions, especially with regard to political neutrality and the possession of means of existence, so that he will not constitute a threat to Frenchmen as a rival in commerce or on the labour market.

This article contained no reference to the problems created by the Nazi attitude to Jews or by France's failure to fulfil her treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. The *Temps* leader of November 9, after the seventeen-year-old Jew Grynszpan had shot the unfortunate German diplomat vom Rath, is still more remarkable for its lack of any reference to the policy by which Herr Hitler was callously driving hundreds of thousands of Jews to desperation. This article demanded that the door of France should be slammed in the face of all political refugees. In view of this attitude of the *Temps*, it is not surprising that the scurrilous *Gringoire* (claiming the largest circulation amongst popular weeklies) should show on its front page a caricature of a hideous, self-satisfied young Jew holding a smoking revolver and looking at a bleeding corpse, with the title 'Métèque as it is talked.' The *Sturmer* could not have done better.

The *Temps*' comments on Herr vom Rath's murder were symptomatic of the extreme anxiety of influential circles, and in particular of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to avoid anything which might give offence, however well deserved, to Berlin. Elsewhere something much more like direct Nazi propaganda has been observable. The intensity with which the sale of very cheap selections from *Mein Kampf* in French translation is pushed at Paris street corners has

aroused the more disquiet because these volumes showed only faint and inaccurate traces of the passages in the original which are directed against France.

Aeroplanes, colonial empire, and aliens diverted the public's attention with varying degrees of success from M. Daladier's lack of a programme. There was, indeed, throughout France a singular dearth of ideas. Four and a half years ago, after the riots of February 6, 1934, political programmes sprang up like mushrooms under every tree. Voluntary committees met and drafted plans for the future of the country. For six months programmes were 'news' and almost a national sport. In 1936 there was one programme, that of the *Front Populaire* (France's New Deal). But the *Front Populaire* was a mere shadow by September of this year. The public was sick of labour disputes and strikes about the application of its social programme. Trade union membership was again on the wane. There was already a strong suspicion that the Government, which was still nominally based on a great militant anti-Fascist coalition, was slithering towards a compromise which would be all to the advantage of the Fascist Powers. After the Munich Agreement the mass of *Front Populaire* supporters was irremediably divided. The split ran right through the Socialist Party, which included a large mass of any-price pacifists as well as supporters of an energetic foreign policy. This fact was reflected in M. Blum's very hesitant pronouncements at the time. The Communist Party immediately opened a violent campaign against Munich, while in the Radical Party M. Daladier and M. Bonnet succeeded in stifling most of the murmurs of the minority which was unable to accept the excuses of their leaders for the Agreement. It only remained for the various parties which had formed the *Front Populaire* to make their arrangements to avoid blame for having broken it up.

The one stimulus that the Munich Agreement could supply to the internal affairs of the nation would have been through the recognition of the defeat which the Government was determined not to acknowledge. On the other hand, there was no doubt about the tasks which lay before the Government. While revenue for 1938 was estimated at about 56.5 milliard francs and would probably not reach that figure, expenses on the ordinary budget (including some

brought forward from the previous year) amounted to 62 milliard francs, the extraordinary budget to 21 milliard francs, the State railway deficit to 9 milliard francs, the Post Office deficit to 1 milliard francs, and the deficits of the French local governing bodies, which would have to be met provisionally by the French State Treasury, to about 10 milliard francs. In all, the Treasury had to find for the current year about 50 milliard francs in addition to revenue, and must borrow the same sum next year. The public debt had already risen from 319 milliard francs in 1934 to 416 milliard francs at the end of July 1938. Industry was paying 8 per cent. for long-term loans. The last index figure of industrial production published (April 1938) was 91 (1913, 100; 1937, 101). M. Daladier, in his speech on November 12 to the ex-servicemen's delegates, estimated that France's productivity in 1937 had fallen by 25 per cent. since 1929, while that of Germany had increased by 17 per cent., of England by 24 per cent., and of the Scandinavian countries between 30 and 50 per cent. Fugitive French capital lying idle abroad has been estimated at about 100 milliard francs. So far did the flight of capital go during the international crisis that some well-to-do *bourgeois* families found themselves in practical difficulties because they had not kept sufficiently large sums of francs in hand.

M. Daladier told the Chamber on October 4 when he asked for extraordinary powers that the nation must not lose an hour in restoring order in its economy, notably by the increase of production. On Thursday, October 27, he delivered his long-awaited speech to the Radical Congress, but still cast no light on the Government's economic and financial policy. He promised a statement and action for next Monday. On Monday the Cabinet met and failed to agree. On Tuesday it met again, and M. Paul Reynaud, hitherto Minister of Justice, changed places with M. Marchandeau, Minister of Finance. In spite of sceptical whisperings, the general public had believed for a month that behind closed doors in the Ministries a coherent policy was being worked out which at a given moment would be embodied in decrees. M. Daladier's popularity for having brought back peace from Munich was sufficient to counteract the rising impatience at the long delay. At the Marseilles

Radical Congress he was at the height of his power, and the energetic tone of his speech convinced most hearers that he really had a plan ready. The discovery that after a month there was no agreement within the Cabinet on matters which the Prime Minister himself had declared were of the utmost urgency, and that therefore there was no plan, dealt such a blow to his prestige that it began at once to be asked whether his Cabinet could survive the reassembly of Parliament. The change of Finance Minister did not, however, merely affect the Prime Minister's position. It threatened at once the whole position of those who were responsible for and approved the policy of the Munich Agreement.

M. Paul Reynaud, the new Minister of Finance, like M. Mandel, the Minister of Colonies, is well known to have been strongly opposed to the Munich policy. One of the best speakers in the Chamber, he has for years past played the rôle of Cassandra to each succeeding Finance Minister. His advice has never been followed, and he has usually been proved right by events. One of the last of the Liberals in economic and political theory, he has always maintained that political liberties can only be preserved in connexion with a healthily functioning capitalist system. He has been suspect on the Right (where he sits in the Chamber) because of his friendships with men on the Left, and his strong advocacy of an energetic foreign policy based on France's Continental alliances, including the Franco-Soviet pact. On the other hand, in spite of his sympathetic attitude to social reform, his pronounced views on financial and economic policy have made it impossible to throw in his lot with the Left. When he was included in the Daladier Government last April as Minister of Justice—that is, at the post which is theoretically most honorific after the Premiership, but is otherwise not very important—it was supposed (by himself as well as others) that he was to play a very influential part in the Inner Cabinet. The Inner Cabinet was never constituted, and M. Reynaud's Ministry proved a golden cage. It was M. Bonnet, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had M. Daladier's ear. M. Marchandeau, the very conservative and highly respected Radical Mayor of Rheims, could be relied upon not to cut a sufficiently brilliant figure at the Ministry of Finance to become a dangerous rival to M. Bonnet, who had a close ally

from the end of August onwards in M. de Monzie, the successor of M. Frossard at the Ministry of Public Works.

The really important issues in French politics after the Munich Agreement no longer correspond to party labels. M. Bonnet and his friends represent those elements in France who look forward to an international peace stabilised by concession to the dictatorships, and in internal politics hope for a consolidated *bourgeois* France—with wings clipped, it is true; but then, who wishes to fly? It would be wrong to call them Fascist, for Fascism is entirely alien to their mentality, although the Fascist States are an essential part of the world they conceive, since they guarantee its freedom from violent social disturbances. They look forward to a France governed by the parties of the Centre and the Right, with a working class rendered passive by its dislike of war and a reasonable degree of prosperity. The Franco-British Alliance would provide the counterpoise by which they hope to prevent the totalitarian Powers from presuming too far. It is a comfortable, unheroic policy, which has the advantage and the disadvantage of not presupposing any appeal to the electorate for a great moral effort. The disadvantage lies in the fact that France cannot extricate herself from her financial and economic difficulties without severe material sacrifices, and it is more difficult to get these accepted in connexion with an unheroic policy.

M. Reynaud at the moment of his transference from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Finance was one of the few remaining hopes of those elements in France for whom Munich was never anything but defeat and dishonour; who believe that only a policy of courage and cool-headed resolution can set bounds to the Fascist Powers; that only a France confident in the ideas she represents can offer this resistance; and that all classes of the nation must be rallied to active co-operation to save France's future. For M. Bonnet and M. de Monzie and their friends the attitude represented by M. Reynaud and his sympathisers is a dangerous threat to the effective execution of their policy.

It seemed after the Radical Congress as if what may be called the Munich Party had entire control of the situation. M. Reynaud was almost forgotten at the Ministry of Justice. M. Marchandau, however, driven desperate by the difficulties

of the financial situation, upset all their calculations by putting forward a financial programme including exchange control, which M. Daladier had committed himself not to introduce and which would have run counter to the tripartite agreement with England and the United States. M. Daladier was faced with the alternative of resigning or replacing M. Marchandau by the member of his Cabinet who, on the basis of speeches rather than achievement, it is true, enjoyed the highest financial reputation of any French politician.

The opportunity which thus unexpectedly came to M. Reynaud carried with it the possibility of securing a dominant position in the political life of France, for a solution of the country's financial difficulties in 1938 might well bring the same rewards as the solution of her financial difficulties in 1926 did to M. Poincaré.

Both the financial problem and the political problem before M. Reynaud are more difficult than those which faced his predecessor. He has not only to restore financial equilibrium but also to finance rearmament. M. Poincaré could rely upon the solid support of the French *bourgeoisie*. M. Reynaud, on the other hand, is denounced in important organs of the Right as a warmonger, a friend of the Soviet Union, and, in anti-Semitic circles, as an associate of Jews.

It is out of the question that M. Reynaud and his friends should for long share effective power with M. Bonnet and his friends; it is therefore essential for M. Reynaud to create for himself a position so strong that he cannot be driven from it. The first step to this must be his success as a Finance Minister. This involved the bold inauguration of a strictly capitalist policy, which his decrees of November 13 in fact embodied. In carrying out this policy M. Reynaud enjoys considerable support in financial circles (during his first twelve days at the Ministry of Finance before his decrees had been promulgated both rentes and French industrials rose higher on the Bourse than at any time in the current year), but the big employers of labour seem to prefer that their salvation should come from the Bonnet group. It may be for this reason that when M. Reynaud came to insist upon relaxation of the forty-hour week restrictions, and notably of the five-day working week, as part of his campaign to stimulate and cheapen production, he found the Minister of

Labour, M. Pomaret, who is a close friend of M. de Monzie, armed with declarations from employers to the effect that they did not desire radical changes.

It is in the teeth of the personal opposition of important groups of French capitalists, therefore, that M. Reynaud is trying to restore to working order the French capitalist system. It is, after all, to the failure of the French *bourgeoisie* to provide adequate economic leadership that France owes her eight years of economic depression. Yet since France has neither the time, the margin of safety, nor the revolutionary elements to carry out a social and economic revolution, it is on this *bourgeoisie* that M. Reynaud must to a great extent rely to carry out the economic restoration of France under the capitalist system. In the meanwhile he is necessarily incurring ill-will for his financial and economic policy in the ranks of organised labour, since he is burying the hopes that the *Front Populaire* would to some extent at least replace capitalist stimuli to the French economy by socialistic ones. No Minister of Finance can expect to be popular with the masses when he raises the prices of sugar, tobacco, postage stamps, and omnibus tickets.

Yet the cards in M. Reynaud's hands are by no means contemptible. Whereas his opponents were unable in the course of a month to produce a financial and economic policy, he has issued his decrees within a fortnight, after delivering over the wireless one of the boldest speeches delivered by any French politician for twenty years. No one can accuse him of playing for popularity. He has behind him elements of the nation which are on the whole healthier and more active than those on whom his opponents must rely. The new financial burdens he has imposed will be forgiven him if they bring with them steadier employment and business conditions as a result of increased confidence. Even those sections of the business world which dislike M. Reynaud cannot but wish his financial policy success.

M. Bonnet has, it is true, the advantage that his foreign policy is easy to co-ordinate with that of Mr. Chamberlain. Indeed, the announcement of the visit to Paris by the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary was immediately noted here as a success for the French Foreign Minister in home politics as well as in foreign policy. On the other

hand, the growth of opposition to Mr. Chamberlain's policy within the Conservative Party suggests that M. Reynaud's disadvantage here may not be of such great importance as it seemed a month ago.

At all events, it is no longer in the conflict between Right and Left that the fate of France is being decided, but in a bitter and, as far as the principals are concerned, an unspoken rivalry between two groups of *bourgeois* politicians both represented in M. Daladier's Cabinet.

Although superficially the dispute appears to be a personal one, the real issue is whether France has sufficient moral energy and material power to recover from the defeat of Munich, or must accept a subordinate status.

D. R. GILLIE.

THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE CRISIS

THE purpose of this article is to examine the military situation of the opposing *blocs* in September last and estimate the probable course and consequences of the Great War of 1938, had it actually broken out. It is not intended to enter upon the controversial but, to the writer's mind, somewhat barren topic of how things came to be as they were; there is a general though indefinite feeling throughout the country that the leadership that got us into the position in which we then found ourselves must have been grievously at fault, but no less widespread a suspicion that the only alternative leadership available would have got us into the same sort of position, if not a worse one, considerably earlier.

The numerical balance of military, naval, and air forces in the probable 'line up,' had it come to war, certainly seems at first sight highly favourable to the democratic *bloc*. Exact figures are not known, but, generally speaking, the position would have been somewhat as follows:

On the military side Germany could put into line some sixty divisions, or close on a million first-line troops, with another two million trained men behind as reserves, and Italy some forty divisions, or half a million men of her regular army, backed up by a million trained reservists. The total of the two Powers' armies on the outbreak of war could therefore hardly have exceeded a million and a half men, with three million more trained reserves to back them, and behind these, again, the military and industrial man-power of a population of 118,000,000 of souls. As against this could have been placed the fine army of France, two-thirds of a million of first-line troops with a formidable mass of trained reserves, over five million strong; the mighty army of Russia, with a million and a third men with the colours and fourteen million more behind; the efficient little Czechoslovak army of three quarters of a million men, capable of

being raised to over two million by the incorporation of its trained reserves; and the little British Army, insignificant in its actual numbers beside these mighty masses, yet expandable into a million or two, given time and resources, as the Great War of 1914-18 proved. Two and a half million men in the first-line armies as against a million and a half at the outbreak of hostilities, over twenty million trained reserves as against five million as the war drew on—such was in military manpower the balance of advantage on the side of the anti-totalitarian Powers.

On the sea the position of their forces was even more formidable. With the German navy only a third as strong as the British, and the Italian fleet, itself barely the equivalent of the French, outnumbered by the British in the ratio of two to one, the totalitarian States must certainly have resigned themselves to seeing their ships, naval and mercantile, driven from all the ocean highways of the world in the early stages of the war.

The air strengths on either side are less easy to assess with accuracy, on account of the widely varying estimates of different authorities. But we shall be on the safe side in saying that the German and Italian *bloc* would have had at its disposal a maximum of 5,500 first-line machines, with another 2,500 in reserve, while the opposing side could have put into the air at least 7,000 machines on the first outbreak of war, with another 3,000 more behind. Here, too, the balance on mere figures is decidedly in favour of the latter.

It is admitted, too, that not only in man-power resources, but also in what has been somewhat vaguely termed the war potential, the totalitarian States would have been far inferior to their adversaries. Roughly, France and Britain, assuming that their sea communications remained intact, could draw on the resources of the wide world for all the new materials of war they might need, while Russia has everything she requires available in great quantity within her own territory. Their opponents, on the other hand, would have been short of many vital necessities of war, for the seas would have been closed to them, and their own home-produced resources, whether in the form of natural supply, stocks or manufactured substitutes, would have been quite inadequate for a conflict of any considerable duration. Once more, the allied non-

totalitarian States would have enjoyed a great advantage over their foes, and one, moreover, which would have increased in proportion as time went on.

So far, then, with greatly superior forces on land, on sea, and in the air, and with a superior war potential behind to maintain and increase these forces, it would seem that France and Britain and Russia, with Czechoslovakia added, would have had little to fear, and everything to hope for, from a war with the two totalitarian Powers. But a somewhat more detailed examination of the position will show that things are not in this case quite what they seem, and that this universal and overwhelming superiority might well have been found under actual test more apparent than real.

The problem for Germany and Italy would have been to wage a two-front war, as did the Central Powers in 1914-18, and their best solution would have been, as it was then, to take a strong and resolute offensive on the one side with the maximum forces that could have been made available, while standing on the defensive on the other with the minimum men necessary to hold it, so as to prevent their enemies from securing a decision there until their own offensive had run its course to success. This policy might be combined, as opportunity offered, with useful subsidiary offensives elsewhere, designed to divert or pin down important forces of the enemy at a distance from the two main theatres of operations. For this policy the totalitarian States, had war broken out last autumn, would have been remarkably well placed.

In the actual attack against Czechoslovakia Germany could have deployed, as she actually did when the occupation of the Sudeten German areas was carried out in accordance with the terms of the Munich Agreement, some thirty first-line divisions, about half a million men, in the first line, with another ten divisions in support. Five hundred aircraft were actually used in co-operation with this force, but these were only a small fraction of what could have been made available for the purpose, had it been a question of overcoming determined hostile resistance; the air contingent could, with Italian assistance, probably have been at least quadrupled. Italian military support could have been called on, perhaps to the tune of a third of a million fully trained men, including practically the whole of her mechanised and motorised troops.

Thus the two aggressive Powers could have concentrated against Czechoslovakia amply sufficient first-line troops, reinforced by formations of trained reservists at need, to enable them to force their way rapidly into the heart of the country and overrun it in a brief campaign. Since the *Anschluss* the southern frontier of Czechoslovakia, unprotected either by natural or artificial defences, has lain exposed to a powerful German-Italian attack which could quickly penetrate right into the heart of the country and turn and render useless the strongly fortified mountain barriers of Bohemia and Moravia. By this route the offensive would undoubtedly have come, and it would almost certainly have been completely and swiftly successful. The Czech General Staff itself put the maximum limit of its own powers of resistance at four months, perhaps six with skill and good fortune. If no help had reached Czechoslovakia by then, she must have been overrun and her army, if not destroyed, at least so weakened as to be of little further service to the common cause. The Germans confidently expected that the campaign would be briefer still, and reckoned the probable duration of Czech resistance at not more than three months, perhaps a bare two.

In so brief a space of time no help could possibly have reached Czechoslovakia from the Western Powers. During the whole of August and September the Germans had been feverishly engaged in the erection of the formidable defences of the Siegfried Line over against the French Maginot Line on the common frontier in the Palatinate and along the Rhine. These fortifications, though not fully ready at the time of the crisis, were amply strong enough to make an attack on them no easy, and above all no speedy, matter. The French, even supposing them able to utilise all their forces, would have had available not more than 550,000 first-line troops against 350,000 to 400,000 defenders—quite an inadequate numerical superiority for a decisive break-through attack even against extemporised field defences, let alone against a permanent fortified belt such as the Siegfried Line. For the Great War has proved that a superiority of numbers even as high as three to one affords no certain guarantee of victory against modern defence. But it is quite certain that the French would not, in fact, have been able to dispose at once of all or nearly all their

full force for the purpose. A considerable proportion would have had to be brought over from North Africa, a process which Italian submarines and aircraft would assuredly have done their best, and a powerful best, to imperil and delay. The French Alpine frontier with Italy, too, would have required guarding, nor could the Pyrenees have been left entirely unobserved. As a rough guess, one may reckon that the French army could not have put into the field a force adequate for the storming of the Siegfried Line save by making use of her extensive superiority in trained reserves, and even then only after considerable delay. And time would have been the crux of the matter, for every week lost would bring nearer the date of Czechoslovakia's complete downfall and the setting free of German reinforcements to check the French offensive in the west. Even after the breaching of the Siegfried Line, a wide belt of German territory would still separate the victors from their isolated and hard-pressed little ally in the east.

British military aid, even assuming that it had been immediately available to the full extent of our peace-time resources, would have been quite inadequate to give the French army that heavy superiority necessary to enable it to arrive speedily to Czechoslovakia's rescue. Great as is Britain's military potential, it is inevitably slow to develop; in the last war it took us close on two years to raise an army strong and efficient enough to compare with those beside and against which it had to fight.

Help from the east, then, would have been Czechoslovakia's only hope. But portentous as are the paper figures of Russia's military strength, it is doubtful if it could or would have been fully applied. Of Russia's million and a third men under arms in peace-time, a good third are permanently stationed in the Far East, whence, in the then existing situation, not a man nor a gun nor an aeroplane could safely have been moved save at great peril to vital interests which she could hardly have been expected to jeopardise. Considerable forces, too, would probably have had to be earmarked to watch Poland, whose attitude during the crisis was, to say the least, equivocal. Probably not more than three-quarters of a million first-line troops, at most, could have been made available to come to the help of the Czechs in the first stage of the war. Geo-

graphical circumstances, moreover, would have rendered difficult the giving of Russian help on any adequate scale. There is no direct frontier contact between the two countries, so that Russian troop reinforcements for Czechoslovakia would have had to traverse either Polish or Roumanian territory, and the only direct support which could have been relied on to arrive at an early date and in strength would have been an air contingent. A certain number of lightly-armed infantry and machine-gunners might have been carried in troop-carrying aeroplanes or even dropped by parachute; but no artillery, no tanks, no mechanised or motorised units could have been despatched unless and until transit facilities had been arranged with Poland or Roumania. Even could this have been done, these facilities would hardly have sufficed for the rapid transport of a large Russian army or for its maintenance over any long period.

It is well known, moreover, that a large body of well-informed opinion, both in this country and elsewhere, felt considerable doubt as to the real value of Russian military aid. The recent purges in the higher commands of the Red army and fleet have seriously sapped morale and confidence in the surviving leaders of both services, who must be presumed to have owed their high positions at least as much to their political orthodoxy as to their professional qualifications. Neither the Red army nor the Red navy is likely to be able to stand the heavy strain of a first-class war for some time to come. A political purge is said to have recently been applied, too, to the skilled corps of pilots of the Soviet air force, with lamentable results on its efficiency. Those who feared that if Czechoslovakia relied for her salvation on the coming of effective Russian aid she would be leaning merely on a bruised reed had certainly good reason for their doubts. It is a fact of somewhat ominous significance that at the very height of the September crisis in Europe, the Russian Chief of Staff, Marshal Voroshiloff, with his chief political assistant, was far away in Siberia, engaged in an inquiry into the recent disorders in the Far Eastern army. This hardly looks as if the Russian High Command had taken the crisis very seriously, or expected or intended to engage in a first-class war in defence of Czechoslovakia.

So far as one can foresee, therefore, the first few weeks of

the conflict would have ended with Germany and Italy in complete or all but complete occupation of Czechoslovakia, Russia's aid, somewhat sparsely rendered, having been insufficient to save her small ally. France, compelled to leave troops on the Italian and on the Pyrenees frontiers, and the concentration of her colonial force on her eastern frontier having been delayed by Italian naval and air actions in the Western Mediterranean, might or might not have been in possession of the whole of the German Siegfried Line. But she could hardly have been in position to advance rapidly into Germany without effective British military aid in force, which could certainly not yet have been made available to her. In short, the totalitarian Powers would have conquered all they had set out to win and more, and would now only have had to hold their gains against attack; and for this task their resources would certainly have amply sufficed for a long time to come.

Eventually these resources would no doubt have been over-matched by the far greater ones at the disposal of their adversaries. But such a military superiority to-day has to be very great, almost overwhelming, before it can make itself decisively felt, and the process of attrition is bound to be lengthly, costly, and fearsome. The Great War of 1938, had it been fought out to a finish, must almost certainly have been longer, bloodier, and more expensive in lives and treasure even than its predecessor of twenty years before, for the aggressors were more favourably placed to score and consolidate an important initial success, and the defenders less able to prevent its being won or to wrest the gains so acquired from them.

There was, too, a serious possibility, to put it no higher, that Germany and Italy could have delayed for a considerable time the development of the superior potential resources of their adversaries by a judicious use of their formidable air forces. On the part of Italy, her air fleets, acting in co-operation with light naval craft, might not only have seriously interfered with the transfer of the French colonial troops from North Africa to Europe, but could also have closed the Mediterranean to British merchant shipping. She might also have given us much trouble in Egypt and Palestine at a very small expenditure of armed effort, so as to compel the reten-

tion of a great part of our already exiguous army in theatres far from the decisive front. Germany, for her part, could have taken advantage of our lamentable state of unpreparedness for effective defence at home against sudden aerial attack in force. It is well known that our anti-aircraft guns were too few and too antiquated; that there was a shortage of equipment, of searchlights, of transport, and of men; that our A.R.P. services were badly under-staffed, ill-trained, and inadequately equipped; that little had been done to provide the population of our big cities with shelter of any sort against bombing attacks; that our schemes for the evacuation of danger zones existed on paper only; and that our supply system for food and raw materials was defective and vulnerable to an alarming degree. We were, in fact, in such a parlous position that a hostile offensive from the air might well have involved the country in heavy loss of life and serious material destruction, if not in a widespread and long-lasting disorganisation of our whole industrial and social system. The conversion of our peace-time industrial machinery to a basis of full and intensive production for war purposes would certainly have been seriously delayed, if not thrown altogether out of gear, by such an intensive air offensive on Germany's part. There was indeed at least a possibility—so it may well have appeared to the more sanguine spirits among the German High Command—of the 'knock-out blow,' so often dreamed of by the believers in a short war, being administered to this country before the radical defects of our defence could be realised and remedied. Certainly we should have had to pay dearly for our neglect of them, even if we had managed to survive the day of trial. The price of victory would thus have been raised and the hour of victory postponed, if not *sine die*, then at least to a remote future. Even had we survived, the end of the first phase of the war would have found the democratic Powers at a serious disadvantage and without hope of retrieving the position save by prodigies of patience, service, sacrifice and self-surrender; and their peoples would have needed all their courage and tenacity and patriotism if they were to endure to the end of the long road.

E. W. SHEPPARD.

CANTON: AND WHAT NEXT?

WAR in China is full of surprises, especially in the contrast between incredibly stubborn defences and sudden collapses. The Chinese always announce a defence to the last man, and sometimes they face continuous bombardment with a courage and steadfastness which could not be exceeded anywhere, and which has probably never been equalled where the conditions were so pitilessly adverse; and sometimes they leave suddenly in circumstances where they could at least have held up the enemy's advance for a little while. No doubt the fate of Soochow and Nanking were bitter lessons in what was to be expected of a weak defence, and the Chinese now think that it is better to anticipate such horrors by destruction and evacuation. The rule seems to be to save the army if there is no hope of saving the city; but, obviously, judgments as well as circumstances will vary so greatly as to leave room for the very distant spectator to be puzzled at times. Moreover, whatever the hardships of evacuation for the civilian population, they are not so bad as those of remaining during a Japanese occupation; and evacuation makes destruction possible on a scale which leaves the victors in occupation of nothing but a ruin. Canton had suffered cruelly from aerial bombardment; but, in spite of the patches of ruin, it was still a city capable of housing, however inadequately, nearly a million people. The Japanese marched into a city in which there were few buildings in a state fit for occupation and little property worth looting.

The Japanese have always been very bitter about this policy on the part of the Chinese, for there is little satisfaction in occupying a city that no longer exists; but they have themselves shown no hesitation, when it suited their purpose, in utterly destroying the villages and small towns whose existence for any reason they found inconvenient. Indeed, it

there is no fear of reprisals against the civilian population, can be. One mark of the disapproval of the 'scorched earth' policy of the Chinese is the Japanese notification that Chinese property in Canton whose owners are not on the spot to lay claim to it will be confiscated.

The problem why Canton was not held longer is hardly even interesting compared with the question why it was not attacked sooner. Reasons in these matters are never quite simple. When one looks at the map and realises the vastness of the area bounded by the Great Wall on the north, the Peiping-Hankow Railway on the west, the Yangtse-kiang on the south, and the sea on the east, one might well conclude that the Japanese would think this was a large enough job to take in hand for conquest. Even that majority who follow the tradition of Hideyoshi, whose ambition was to conquer the whole of China, might well adopt the methodical Japanese custom of dividing any large undertaking into definite sections.

The excesses at Nanking brought about no cry for peace. China's nationalism, though a new development, took it for granted that the whole country was ready to suffer rather than submit, and merely shifted the Government to Hankow, and the Japanese rather light-heartedly essayed the task of following them thither. At the same time they put General Chiang Kai-shek into the same class with Napoleon and the Kaiser Wilhelm by proclaiming that it was against him, and not against the people, that they were fighting. This expedition to Hankow, however, took nine months. An effect of the constant inculcation in Japanese writings of a contempt for China began to appear. How was it that these contemptible foemen who admittedly had no arms comparable with those of Japan could hold up the legions so long? Excuses had to be found, and one of them was the aid received from Russia. It took some credulity to swallow this, as the Russian supplies had to come by caravan, which is a slow transport for modern war. A border dispute offered a chance of settling with Russia; but Japan wisely declined, and has since been silent on the subject of Russian aid to the Chinese.

More aid actually came from the south. So that her own trade should not be affected, Japan refrained from declaring war, and in consequence the Canton-Hankow Railway was

kept busy transporting necessities of every kind, including munitions, to Hankow, and carrying the produce of China to the sea for export in payment. It was a small trickle, but immensely important, and there was a much smaller trickle that passed through French Indo-China and by rail into Yunnan, whence there was a painful journey by bad and precipitous roads before it reached anywhere that was useful.

It is an old theory, that has lately come into favour again, that the power of a country's voice in diplomacy can be measured by the calibre of its guns. Of this there has been a curious illustration in connexion with these two routes for supplying arms to China. Japan wanted to stop both, and by threatening France extracted a promise not to use the Yunnan Railway for the transport of arms. Now, Hongkong has proved more of a liability than an asset, as a fortress, but it was considerably more than the French had in the neighbourhood, and there was Singapore in the rear, even though somewhat distant. So there were no direct threats regarding Hongkong, and German, American and English war materials were railed to Canton, just as they were also shipped to Japan. In their endeavour to prevent materials reaching Hankow, however, the Japanese carried out many air raids on Canton, and, in reply to the protests of a horrified world, declared that all such raids had a military objective. They also sank a good number of junks belonging to Hongkong, killing their crews, who were British subjects. But Hongkong uttered very feeble protests regarding this, and it was soon recognised that, with affairs not very smooth in Europe, the Colony must take no chances of bringing the Empire into war.

It is possible that the fate of Canton was decided in Munich—but not certain. Had the Cantonese been more easily frightened, or had the 1300 aeroplane attacks made on the Canton-Hankow Railway scored more hits, Canton might not have been taken at all; but it is certain that it would have been attacked much earlier but for Hongkong. Japan has found from experience that the capture and holding of railways is all-important in her Chinese adventures; and though she was not anxious for the time being to go south of the Yangtse, she would have taken Canton to put the railway out of action if she could have done so without risk of embroilment with Hongkong.

The temptation to start from the Canton end increased tremendously as the months went by without the combined army and navy reaching Hankow. Morale was declining both on the Yangtse front and on the home front. But Japan has been consistently lucky. The Czechoslovakian crisis made it certain that nothing was to be feared from Hongkong, so the swift descent was made, the landing of a highly mechanised force effected, and a definite attack made on Canton. There appears to have been little in the way of fortification on the landward side of Canton. Perhaps the Chinese had made the mistake of regarding Hongkong as sufficient protection. The destruction of the city, the complete suspension of work in the port, and the capture of the railway terminus, besides the cutting of the line at points to the northward, definitely severed the necessary connexion between Hankow and the outer world. The Japanese meanwhile had not slackened in their endeavours to reach the Yangtse city, and the immensely larger trek began there as well, with the same story of low-flying planes dropping bombs into the crowds of refugees and machine-gunning them at their ease—feats referred to in the Japanese Press as though they were the highest form of valour. There was also the general destruction before leaving, in order to deprive the conquerors of the fruits of victory. The destruction, though much less complete than at Canton, probably exceeded that of Canton in total amount, as the aggregation of cities—Wuchang on the right bank of the Yangtse and Hankow and Hanyang on the left—form a much larger mass of population than that of Canton. The destruction of Canton may not have greatly expedited the fall of Hankow; but it made that fall so certain that the decision to evacuate was made definite, and probably the destruction was greater in consequence. One piece of destruction which was emphasised was that of the great ironworks at Hanyang—one of the avowed objects of Japan's desire as far back as 1904, when Group III. of the Twenty-one Demands required China to surrender the works, with the coal and iron mines, to the Japanese.

The importance of the attack on Canton lies in the fact that it indicates a great change in the whole character of the war, a change probably not entirely unconnected with General Ugaki's resignation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and

indicating not merely a diversion from the slowness of progress up the Yangtse, but a surrender to the more headlong elements—those worshippers of Hideyoshi who want to conquer China all at once. To make this clear, it is necessary to go back some time. There is no need to discuss a whole century of China trade, but we must remember here that it is almost a hundred years ago since the island of Hongkong—a rocky fragment, harbouring some fishermen, pirates and a few cultivators—was ceded to Britain and the beginnings were made of that great entrepôt of Far Eastern trade which has been of such great service to all nations. For nearly another thirty years Japan remained in her mediæval seclusion, but when she emerged therefrom she enjoyed the benefits of this great free port on equal terms with everybody else. Without this privilege she would have been greatly handicapped in building up her shipping trade and her commerce with China. But naturally, for historic reasons, Britain created and maintained a predominant place in the South China trade—an ancient commerce radiating from Canton.

When Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, in 1935, visited China and Japan, his visit was very freely discussed in the Japanese Press. Japan had already taken steps in Manchuria which gave her the benefits without the responsibilities of annexation; she had set up fortified barracks in Shanghai after devastating a large part of the city; she defied the customs-houses in Shanghai and Tientsin for her own benefit; and her agents overran North China, where her military men protected the smuggling out of silver and the smuggling in of heroin; and her intention to get as much as possible of the trade of North China by fair means or foul was both plain and outspoken. It was taken for granted that the object of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross's visit was to save as much of Britain's trade as possible. The more moderate organs of public opinion suggested that it would be a fair division if Britain more or less withdrew from commercial activities north of the Yangtse and Japan refrained from any extreme commercial aggression in the south. But writers with a more exalted conviction of the historic destiny of their country asked why British interests in South China should be left to fatten themselves, seeing that the whole of China was destined to come under Japan's ægis at no distant date, and such a

division as that proposed would only hinder this desirable and necessary consummation. At the beginning of the present war, when foreign rights in Shanghai were the subject of hot discussion (British interests bulking most largely among these), a leading Japanese newspaper declared without contradiction or reproof that Japan was fighting, not against China, but against Britain. Only the other day, Mr. Shiratori, who for a long time was the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokyo, and has now been appointed ambassador in Rome, was quoted in an interview as declaring that the fall of Canton was the end of British influence in China.

With these typical points of view in mind, we may see the importance of the Japanese decision to carry the war into the South. It was not merely a somewhat risky expedient for bringing about a quicker capture of Hankow and allaying discontent with the slowness of that campaign, but was an extension of policy from the will to dominate the North to the determination to make a complete job of it and dominate the whole country. It would be altogether too Arcadian a view to imagine that the Japanese, having 'expended blood and treasure' in bringing South China to reason, will withdraw and leave this ancient and well-tilled field of British commerce to resume its old fertility. The Japanese idea is something very different from this. The Chinese have themselves considered projects for so improving the port of Canton as to attract ocean-going ships; and the Japanese might well carry such a project through for their own benefit and so arrange as to give cargo handled there immense advantages over that worked from Hongkong. Bonded warehouse and rail facilities would help towards making these advantages almost a monopoly. The Japanese would have little objection to a system nominally on an equal footing for all countries, for they are masters of the art, when controlling a port, of making things easy for one ship and difficult for another, all the time uttering bland regrets, and giving fervent assurances that apparent discriminations are fortuitous and unavoidable. It would also be easy, on the Chinese side of the border, to ensure that rail transport from Kowloon to Canton was no longer worth while. And, as has been found in Manchukuo, it is useless to think of invoking retaliation against a sham Chinese Government. In all probability the plan would be

put into effect only piecemeal, but it would be none the less effectual for that. Hongkong has service to offer, but it has little else; and if the service can be side-tracked and replaced, then there is an end of Hongkong and of Britain's trade in China. When Mr. Chamberlain said, on November 1, that the City would inevitably be asked for money for the reconstruction of China, one of the possibilities was that loans would be required for port schemes that would enable South China to do without Hongkong.

There are other possibilities, of course. All Japanese do not share the 'bag and baggage' views of Mr. Shiratori when considering how to monopolise the trade of China. More moderate men, like General Ugaki, lately pushed out of the Japanese Foreign Office, would be well pleased, notwithstanding the trouble and expense incurred in South China, to permit England to continue in enjoyment of her business there so long as she showed a sincere appreciation of Japan's aims in North China; but perhaps the political value of such approbation is no longer among the matters worth the consideration of the directors of Japanese policy. As matters stand at present, it looks as though Japan had the initiative in the future direction of China's foreign relations.

Former solutions to the Sino-Japanese problem are no longer available. The failure, for instance, to present a joint Note to Japan at the beginning of 1932 declaring that the vastness of the vested interests of other Powers made it impossible for them to permit war in Shanghai prevented such a course from being taken in 1937. Instead of anything so obvious there was only a hasty adjuration to evacuate. And the fact that Hongkong in 1938 was considered too weak to do anything for the protection of South China has been followed by a threat of its being sent to Coventry, commercially speaking. When in 1934 the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokyo made his famous Statement declaring that no activities by foreigners, even the lending of money, in China could be tolerated by Japan without her express permission, no notice was taken because, though the utterance of the Foreign Office, it had not come by the hand of an ambassador. But through neglect to make any comment and care not to contravene the Statement's injunctions, it has become an

international understanding which it would to-day be rather difficult to dispute.

The contrast between heroic defence and sudden collapse is at least partly explained by strategy—the determination that the Chinese army shall not lose its leg-room. It is clear that there is no uniform standard, and it would be rather absurd to expect one. It would be less easy to find a reason for the great diversity in the quality of railway defence. In some places a mile or two of railway has been defended with the utmost tenacity, and in others great lengths of line have fallen into the hands of the invaders with hardly a struggle. The chance maldistribution of troops may account for a good deal, and the varied nature of the country through which a line passes makes defence easy in one place and impossible in another. From the story of the Manchurian campaign we may learn a good deal regarding the war in China. Manchuria had more railways than all the rest of China, and they were the first object of Japan's attention. They were easy game, because a large proportion were already under Japanese management, and bombs were dropped on the termini of all that were purely Chinese. But for a long time the railways proved extremely vulnerable to attack by irregulars, though no millet was allowed for a thousand yards each side of the line, and a few miles away from the line there was no Japanese control whatever. The invaders concentrated on the railways as these were fundamental to transport, and they are doing this still more in China, where distances are greater and railways much scarcer. The Chinese have equally appreciated the extreme importance of the railway lines, and though in the northern provinces, already deeply penetrated by Japanese troops and poorly defended, the railways quickly fell into the invaders' hands, there were prolonged and bloody battles at Hsuechow and Chengchow, where the line running east and west crosses the Peking-Hankow and Peking-Nanking Railways; and, of course, the fight for the North Shanghai Station was one of epic heroism pitted against machinery and high-explosive.

A railway fight to which particular attention deserves to be drawn, however, has been over a detached piece of line which might seem, on a casual study of the map, to be of no great importance. This was the line from Kiukiang, on the

Yangtse, to Nanchang, a walled city of over a million inhabitants, some distance to the south of Poyang lake, and the capital of Kiangsi province. At one time it was on the shore of the lake, which, except in winter, provided transport to Kiukiang and the Yangtse; but with the partial drying up of the lake the railway has become exceedingly important, and Kiangsi is a wealthy and rather politically minded province. The Chinese defended the line with the greatest tenacity, partly because Nanchang, which had successfully defended itself against the Taiping rebels in the 1850's, is one of the finest cities in China, but also because its capture would have opened a new road to Changsha, another fine city, the capital of Hunan, on the Canton-Hankow Railway. The line was still being disputed with vigour when Hankow fell, and since then the telegrams have told us that the Japanese have destroyed a great part of Nanchang with their bombing 'planes. Still later messages state that the Japanese have given notice that Changsha had been included in the war zone, and that it had gone up in flames.

These details have their significance. There is an old plan for a line from Nanking to Nanchang, and there is a road (which might be made the route of a railway line) from Nanchang to a point on the Canton-Hankow Railway south of Changsha. It crosses a watershed, but not a formidable one. The inclusion of Changsha in the Japanese area of hostilities means, at least, that they want the coal that is railed there by a special line from the Pinghsiang collieries for the Hanyang ironworks. When the Japanese made Manchuria their own, the first thing they did was to construct some new railways which gave them alternative routes between some important strategic points. It is not to be supposed that their plans in China will fail to include a plan that is still more important there; and if they construct a line from Nanking *via* Nanchang to Pinghsiang, and so by already existing lines to Changsha and Hankow, they will immensely strengthen their hold on the Yangtse valley. Putnam Weale, writing in 1905, said: 'In no other part of the world could a better place, a better strategic position for biting into China, be found than Hankow.' And he prophesied an increasing importance for it, which it has not quite fulfilled, but only awaits better communications to fulfil. It is easy to under-

stand Japan's reason for this excursion south of the Yangtse, which is quite independent of the extension of the war to Canton.

There is another place south of the Yangtse which Japan considered that she could not leave alone—the port of Amoy and the provincial capital, Foochow, in Fukien. These are opposite to Formosa, and strategists always see danger next door. On the same principle the English used to keep Calais, and Amoy is written on the Japanese heart—at least, it was included in the Twenty-one Demands. Both places have been the subject of attack and are destined to be the subject of special dispositions. For years past also Fukien has been permeated not only with Japanese but with Formosan Japanese subjects whose business it is to be 'persecuted' by the Chinese as the Korean Japanese subjects were persecuted in Manchuria.

How much fighting the Japanese will have to do in order to get possession of the whole Canton-Hankow Railway remains to be seen; but, considering that north of the Yangtse the occupation of railway lines enclosing large areas definitely destroys Chinese authority within those areas and yet does not make Japanese control effective, the Japanese command may well be dubious of the advisability of holding merely the single line that traverses the vast area of South China, though it may be a useful counter to bargain with.

At the time of this writing there is no indication of the collapse of the Kuomintang Government or of its withdrawal of authority as Generalissimo from General Chiang Kai-shek. Indeed, that Government has broadcast a manifesto to the world affirming unanimity in its determination to continue the war. In occupied cities like Nanking and Peiping it is, of course, no difficult matter for the Japanese to set up puppet Governments just as independent as that of Manchukuo, and this, indeed, they have done, though they have found it extremely difficult to find respectable enough men or to protect their lives when they had found them. Still, they must act as though their pretences were genuine. Meanwhile, owing to the prolongation of the war, and their unwillingness to allow commerce to be resumed except on their own terms, foreign business has been obstructed, not merely to the

extent that Chinese communications have been interrupted and purchasing power reduced, but deliberately, by preventing occupation of premises and forbidding the transaction of business.

Against this, so far as it affected American interests, the State Department at Washington sent, on October 6, a sharp protest, to which, as well as to British and French protests, Japan sent an evasive reply.

At the beginning of November, however, Prince Konoe, the Premier, and Mr. Ikeda, the Finance Minister, issued broadcasts *urbi et orbi*. The Premier began by a boastful reference to a 'great victory,' in which the Japanese army had been kept at sufficient strength to deter any outside interference. He went on to say that the Kuomintang had been governing China in a manner that 'did not originate from the wisdom and knowledge of the Chinese people,' but had 'encouraged the bolshevising of China.' Japan should surely be the last to reproach another country with adopting foreign methods; and as for bolshevising China, ever since the 'purge' of the Kuomintang in 1927, General Chiang Kai-shek had carried on a relentless war against the Chinese Communist movement, thereby rendering himself unable to resist Japanese encroachments and lawlessness in the north of China. It was not until the Communists themselves pointed out that, while they were destroying each other, Japan was taking possession and that they must unite for defence that this stopped.

So long ago as 1932 the Japanese army in a *communiqué* declared its determination to extirpate the Kuomintang, and some of Japan's proclamations since the war began have echoed this; but in Prince Konoe's broadcast he only insisted on a reform in personnel, and, as General Chiang Kai-shek has been singled out for special condemnation in all Japanese proclamations, this may be regarded as a bid for Kuomintang rejection of the Generalissimo. The Kuomintang Government is not so perfect as to exclude personal jealousies, and it is believed that there are one or two who might be tempted by the tarnished glory of becoming a puppet to Japan, especially if this could be disguised by an outburst of organised praise for restoring peace to China—with or without honour.

For the benefit of the Powers, Prince Konoe added that

Japan recognised the need of a fundamental change and wished to establish a peace and order in East Asia based on justice. He did not specifically mention the suggestion recently made by the Foreign Office spokesman that Japan might repudiate the Nine-Power Treaty, as it had become inapplicable to China. Perhaps this was a little too cynical for his elaboration, since the Nine-Power Treaty (to which China was a party) guarantees China from attack and foreign citizens in China from unfavourable discrimination. Its provisions have been constantly ignored by Japan, who has flouted League of Nations' resolutions charging her with breaches; and Count Uchida, Foreign Minister in 1932, laid down the dictum that nothing in the Treaty prohibited separatist movements. This was in justification of the creation of Manchukuo, and would be equally valid for the justification of the phantom Governments of Peking and Nanking. In such circumstances it is hardly worth while to court the unfavourable glances with which the repudiation of treaties is inevitably greeted. Prince Konoe said that the rights of other Powers would be respected and their co-operation accepted provided they thoroughly understood and complied with the new conditions being created in China—a pronouncement which all those with Far Eastern interests regard as a polite notice to quit. It left room for the hope held out by Mr. Chamberlain that the City might find opportunity for new investment in the new conditions.

It was a little surprising when Prince Konoe went on to say that 'Japan expects to destroy the Comintern,' which he accused of encouraging China to resist invasion. It would be a little startling if Signor Mussolini, justifying the loan of technicians to General Franco, said he hoped thereby to destroy the British Labour Party, but it would not really be so bizarre and fantastic as Prince Konoe's remark. Reckoning on Communism being as great a bugbear as ever in Western Europe and America, the Japanese Premier evidently thought that if he represented Japan's actions as being really directed against the Communist International there would be no further inclination to question their righteousness.

The Minister of Finance spoke in idealistic terms of a new life in Eastern Asia which Japan was going to construct (not, apparently, to 'originate from the wisdom and knowledge of

the Chinese people'), but he did not expect an early end of the war, and warned his countrymen that still greater sacrifices are expected of them. One could feel sorry for the Japanese but for the infinitely greater sufferings that they have inflicted on the Chinese.

If you take the map and draw a line from Peiping down through Hankow to Canton, east of that line is much less than half of China. West of it there are some deserts and many mountains, but there are also vast cultivated areas and an enormous population. Japan has proclaimed her intention to go on and conquer the whole—unless it submits without conquest. There are few places where the Japanese dare go more than ten miles from the railway. Even a great navigable river like the Yangtse gives them little comfort. They cling to the rails. It will be a slow business to conquer China by constructing railways. The chief danger is that Japan must go on, whatever the cost to herself and to China. If some great Power or combination of Powers stopped her, the relief would be even greater to Japan than to China; but short of that she is committed to unlimited conquest with limited means. It is vain for Western investors cynically to wait for the pickings. At present they are merely watching their losses and are likely to watch them out of sight.

A. MORGAN YOUNG.

KONRAD HENLEIN

THE minor leaders who have led the flocks of Germans into Hitler's fold are usually forgotten soon after the immediate task assigned them by the Führer has been accomplished. Seyss-Inquart, whose name appeared daily in the newspapers before Austria was assimilated, has sunk back into obscurity. Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Germans, has been appointed Commissioner in Sudetenland. He has thus been allowed to retain his honorary designation as a leader, but 'he will be directly responsible to the Führer,' and it is improbable that he will have any real influence in the district which he has 'liberated.'

There is nothing about Konrad Henlein, either mentally, physically or spiritually, that is unusual. He is neither very tall nor very short, nor thin nor fat. His face is like that of hundreds of others, except that he wears glasses, and that, too, is not really remarkable. It is said that caricaturists have difficulty in drawing him: he has not even a small black moustache or a characteristic scowl to distinguish him from his followers.

Some people have remarked that his is, at least, an honest face. The story is told that when, after the War, he applied for a job as a bank clerk in Reichenau, he was chosen from amongst many applicants because, so the manager thought, 'Henlein had such an upright expression.' Nevertheless, he has shown great talent for making contradictory statements throughout his public career. For example, in a speech delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs on December 9, 1935, he declared that 'radicalism is always unwise, and the radicalism of the Sudeten Germans proved to be no exception to this rule.' About the same time, he declared to his followers at home: 'It is an iron law of history that only a radical movement leads to a goal; all

watering-down of issues by compromise, by considerations, by a mania for proportion, etc., mean the death of an idea.'

Konrad Henlein was born in Maffersdorf, near Reichenberg, on May 6, 1898. His father held a small post in the Civil Service of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Later, when the family moved to Gablonz, near Reichenau, in Northern Bohemia, the elder Henlein struggled to support his wife and children on the meagre profits of a little shop.

Konrad Henlein's ancestors have lived in Northern Bohemia for over a century, and he is proud of this. It is alleged, however, that one of his grandmothers was a Czech. This fact, from Henlein's point of view a terrible blot on the escutcheon, is not mentioned by his Nazi biographers.

Little is known about Henlein's boyhood, chiefly because there is not much to know. He never did anything unusual. He was not particularly clever, or particularly stupid, at school. Few of the old people in the district remember him as he was like so many other boys. This mediocrity has earned him high praise from Rudolf Jahn, one of his Nazi biographers, who writes :

Significant of Konrad Henlein at this time was his impulse towards the community ; and this at an age when most young people prefer to go their own way, when they wrestle with themselves to acquire a relationship towards the world and towards society, and when they consider any interference from outside as an antagonistic and restricting interference.

Henlein was never an individualist. He always marched dutifully in line at the *Bürgerschule*, where he was never lazy, at the *Handelsschule*, where he was trained to be a conscientious clerk, in the Austro-Hungarian army, which he joined in 1916.

He fought on the Italian front—at Col di Lana, at Monte Forno, at Melissa. He was wounded and was taken prisoner in 1917. He spent two years as an Italian prisoner of war on the island of Asinara, near Sardinia.

There are no reports or legends about the capture by Henlein single-handed of an Italian heavy gun. He wears no Order of the Austrian Golden Fleece. On the contrary, he is consistently described as an unknown warrior, one of the

hundreds of young Germans who, during the war, helped to create a race of fighters for Greater Germany.'

Henlein was demobilised in the summer of 1919. He found a modest job as a bank clerk in the Reichenau branch of the *Kreditanstalt der Deutschen*. From all accounts it is apparent that his employers were as pleased with him as his superior officers had been during the War. He was never late and never disrespectful. He took no part in political discussions. He harboured no wild ambitious schemes which decreased his concentration on his work. He had no wish to see the world, to travel, to leave Reichenau.

His hobby, too, was eminently respectable. He developed interest in gymnastic exercises. He was not attracted by competitive games. He obviously had no wish to measure his own physical strength with that of other men on a football field. What gave him the greatest pleasure in the evening when his work was done was to be one amongst rows and rows of young men who, neatly standing one next to the other in the local gymnasium, bent forward and back, turned round, raised their arms, and moved together in unison to the orders of the gymnasium instructor.

Henlein developed some agility as a gymnast. At last he had found something that raised him from the mediocre, something he did better than his fellows. His agility was discussed among *Turner* all over the district. In his own particular field he had become quite a famous little man.

In 1925 the *Deutscher Turnverband* in Asch was looking for a new professional instructor for their gymnasium. Henlein applied for this job, which was as well paid as his post at the bank. He travelled to Asch to perform in public before the club's selection committee. He was appointed.

The *Turnverband* at Asch was an excellent background for the future German Commissioner of Sudetenland. It was a branch of the German Gymnastic Federation of Czechoslovakia. In contrast to the liberal *Deutschfreihheitliche Turnverein*, Henlein's *Turnverband* followed the traditions of the old Austrian *Turnkreis Deutschösterreich*, which, as early as 1904, had emphasised the importance of racial purity in gymnastics by introducing an 'Aryan paragraph' and excluding Jews from its membership.

Originally the *Deutscher Turnverband* of Czechoslovakia

was unpolitical, but there was a great deal of vague talk about the *Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft*, about 'blood brotherhood,' in the local branches of the Federation. There was undoubtedly a Pan-German atmosphere, though among most of the *Turnverband* members this Pan-Germanism was still based on a more or less undefined desire for a communion of German cultural aspirations.

As a definite political aim Pan-Germany had, however, existed for a long time in Czechoslovakia (it should be remembered in this connexion that National-Socialism originated in Czechoslovakia, where Carl von Schönerer organised the first *Deutschnationaler Arbeiterverein* in the 'eighties).

One of the reasons why, at first, at the *Turnverband* in Asch and at other branches of the German Gymnastic Federation of Czechoslovakia, Pan-Germanism was confined to very general phrases was that the *Turnverband* members disagreed amongst themselves as to the particular brand of Pan-Germanism to be adopted. Some of the young gymnasts favoured Adolf Hitler, who had founded his party in Germany in 1920, while others preferred the teachings of Professor Othmar Spann, of the University of Vienna. He believed in a coming revival of the Holy German Empire, of the German nation with Vienna as the future capital.

'To-day we all understand,' Spann proclaimed, 'why Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, South Slavia (even Greece) were at one time German tenures. This must happen again. If the German people successfully take a stand and events take the course ordained for them by nature, a brilliant future, reminiscent of Old Imperial days, awaits us.'

Spann's ideas of past splendour appealed to many young Sudeten Germans who had joined the Youth Movement or the *Wandervögel* movement after the War. In 1926 Spann's followers in Czechoslovakia, under the leadership of Heinrich Rutha, Walter Heinrich and Walter Brand, founded the *Kameradschaftsbund*, which was to unite all those who believed in a mystical union of the German spirit. The world *bündisch*, the binding together, was used a great deal to mean the ties of the spirit and of the blood. In such a union, so the *Kameradschaftsbündler* believed, all the souls united were more or less equal. They were therefore not enthusiastic about the

leadership principle propounded by Hitler across the frontier in Germany.

Konrad Henlein was a great personal friend of Rutha and other *Kameradschaftsbündler*, and, of course, he believed in the insoluble bond of blood brotherhood, but Hitler's idea of one leader who would give orders to the rank and file, of a rank and file blindly obedient, attracted him more strongly. Life in a gymnasium had made him more accustomed to the conception of *one* leader and *one* mass of followers. 'Men,' he wrote in an article for a physical culture magazine published by his *Verband*—'men wish to be led in a manly fashion.' But he could not at once make up his mind to join one group or the other. He maintained the 'non-political' atmosphere of the *Turnverband* at Asch—that is to say, he did not prescribe any definite brand of nationalism to his members.

His contributions to the periodicals of the *Verband* show to what extent he remained on neutral ground. He offended none of his members when he wrote, for instance, in 1931:

The reason for this decay [of the gymnastics movement] is Liberalism, the dominating power of the nineteenth century. It is *unbündisch*, self-seeking. In the life of the State, Liberalism led to democracy and to the party system; in economic life Liberalism led to capitalism and to the class war. Liberalism, which is followed by the great disintegrating forces of the present (democracy, division into parties, capitalism, the class war), means a smashing up of the people's vitality, and this is expressed in pacifism, increasing sensuality and a decrease of the birth rate. All these scourges have made of the German people a powerless and aimless slave of the Great Powers, and this slave is seriously threatened by Americanism and Bolshevism.

In 1933, when the Nazi régime began in Germany, life suddenly changed for Konrad Henlein. Diffuse nationalistic emotions no longer met the needs of the day. His days of sentiment were over—the days of action had begun.

Hitler must have had his agents look round in the Sudetenland for suitable assistants, and his reports about Henlein were evidently favourable. Soon after Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, Henlein was summoned to Berchtesgaden to receive his instructions. It would be interesting to know more about this interview; but one thing is certain—Henlein accepted the orders given him by the Führer as unquestion-

ingly as he had obeyed his employer at the bank or the gymnastic instructors of his youth.

There were three stages in Hitler's propagandist campaign for the annexation of the Sudetenland. During the first stage, Henlein, in his speeches, emphasised the necessity of a larger representation of the Sudeten Germans in the Czech Parliament; then, for a long time, he talked in terms of autonomy within the structure of the Czech State. The actual words 'return to the Reich' were not used by Henlein until September 15, 1938, the day on which he made his inglorious escape from Asch.

In July 1933, at a large gymnastic festival at Saaz, Henlein was already greeted with shouts of '*Sieg Heil*' by his rows of loyal gymnasts, who had been taught to chant in the Nazi manner. This time they chanted '*Du Konrad Henlein, unser Führer, bist uns heilig.*' ('You, Konrad Henlein, our Führer, are sacred to us.')

During the critical months of 1933 Konrad Henlein showed that he had a great gift for making premeditated gestures with apparent spontaneity. His honest face has been a tremendous asset to the Nazis. Thus it came as a surprise to many when, on October 1, 1933, he suddenly announced that he was founding a new party, the *Sudeten-deutsche Heimatfront*, and that 'he placed himself at the head of this Sudeten German Home Front.' He described this Front as above party interests; he said that it would unite all Germans; he 'appealed to all parties and estates' in the Sudetenland.

In this first proclamation to the Sudeten Germans Henlein did not mention any concrete programme for the new party. He was equally vague in his talks about it, except that he included the usual vituperations against the Reds and the Jews. He was scrupulously careful not to offend any of his potential nationalist members by over-emphasising either the *bündisch* or the leadership principles.

His original proclamation consisted chiefly of slogans and clichés. He urged all brothers (presumably blood brothers) to cling together; he announced that the Home Front Party was a 'fighting troop and not a coffee party'; he declared 'enmity unto death to Liberalism even when it is masked as a worship of personalities.'

The difficulties confronting Henlein in building up the Home Front Party ought not to be underestimated. Many Sudeten Germans had still to be convinced that abstract 'ties of blood' were more important than concrete considerations such as business prosperity or social differences. Henlein's followers had to be persuaded that, as Elizabeth Wiskemann writes in her excellent study on *Czechs and Germans*, he 'had adopted the best things in Hitlerism, without the most brutal methods employed in the Reich.'

Hitler had probably impressed upon Henlein his own rather low opinion of the mentality of any German electorate, but it was Henlein's task to know instinctively when to play the rôle of the loyal Czech subject, when to praise democracy, and when to denounce it sharply. On the whole, for many months, despite the 'war to death to Liberalism' in his Proclamation, he was still relatively gentle in his references to democracy, though he was strengthening his own position as a leader according to the Nazi doctrines, and the Home Front Party itself was being organised along Nazi lines. No criticism was accepted from the rank and file within the party.

Henlein moved cautiously. Obviously some time would have to pass before the Third Realm could act decisively in Czechoslovakia. In October 1934, only a year after the founding of the Home Front Party, Henlein considered it wise to allay any suspicions that might have been roused at home or abroad. On October 21, in a speech at Böhmisches-Leipa, he declared: 'We shall never abandon Liberalism—that is to say, the unconditional respect for individual rights as a fundamental principle in determining human relations in general and the relation of the citizen to official authority in particular.'

In this same speech he also stated that he had no connexion whatsoever with Italian Fascism or German National-Socialism. He emphasised that both Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism would 'lead to the catastrophe of war.' He did say, however, that he believed in the decentralisation of authority in the Czech State, but he affirmed his support of the unity of the State as a whole. 'For this reason,' he said, 'it is ridiculous to suppose that self-government could mean a Sudeten German Parliament, or anything like it.'

The results of the 1935 elections in Czechoslovakia

showed clearly how many Sudeten Germans had been quite untroubled by Henlein's contradictory statements. Henlein's success at these elections proved conclusively that with his unquestioning electorate his tactics had been correct, for the Sudeten Germans polled 1,249,530 votes—that is to say, 62 per cent. of the total German electorate. The German Farmers' Party and the German Catholic Party each lost about 50 per cent. of the voters. (Konrad Henlein, who had been born a Catholic, had considered it best to change his faith and become a Protestant.) Even the Social Democrats, at the 1935 elections, had been defeated by Henlein's party. In the 1929 elections they had polled 506,761 votes, as compared with only 299,942 in 1935.

In the 1935 elections the Pan-Germans of Czechoslovakia (secreted behind Henlein's innocuous-looking Home Front Party) had laid a solid corner-stone for their schemes. Hitler's desire for 'legitimate means of success' had been satisfied by Henlein. Ironically enough, before these elections, Henlein had most willingly agreed to the Czech Government's demand that he change the name of his party. The words 'Home Front' had sounded ominously militant to the Czechs. Henceforth Henlein called his party simply the 'Sudeten German Party.'

Events began to move quickly—too quickly, perhaps, to coincide with Hitler's remarkable sense of timeliness. Much had to be accomplished in the Third Realm before the Sudeten problem could be tackled with any finality. Foreign countries had to be kept in the dark about Hitler's ultimate aims, so Henlein continued to obscure the issues. In December 1935 he went to London to make the soothing speech at Chatham House already mentioned. On March 17, 1936, he published an equally comforting article in the *Evening Standard*:

We Sudeten Germans [he wrote in this article] are neither directly nor indirectly affiliated with the Fascist or National-Socialists of any other country.

We are neither in fact nor in sentiment the 'Bohemian Nazis' which some of our opponents have been pleased to call us. We profess neither Hitlerism nor Fascism, but are loyal citizens of the State to which we belong, and whose constitution we acknowledge and approve.

At home in the Sudetenland he was talking in quite different terms. The Treaty of Locarno no longer existed, Germany had repudiated the mutual guarantee of the Czech-German frontier; Germany was rearming fast. German wireless stations were assuring the Sudeten Germans that conditions in the Third Realm were perfect. The Sudeten Germans were beginning, quite consciously now, to look to Germany for 'liberation.'

The German wireless and newspapers were assuming a more rapid pace than Henlein's. In his speech at Teplitz on October 20, 1935, he professed his loyalty to Germany in an indirect fashion by attacking Czech foreign policy, and by referring to Sudeten Germans 'as bridges and natural arbiters between the German and Czech people.' In June 1936, after Henlein had come to terms with the extremists in his own party, he went farther, announcing that his Sudeten Germans 'would rather be hated with Germany than derive any advantage from hatred against Germany.' He went on to say that 'every people and their responsible leaders must be acknowledged as being solely responsible for the adjustment of their own national status.'

From the time of the Eger speech onward Henlein expressed the German National-Socialist attitude with increasing frankness. He was gradually letting it appear that he was biding his time until other problems confronting the Third Realm had been solved. He refused to admit that any good whatsoever could be derived by the Sudeten Germans from the concessions offered them by the Czech Government in the Agreement of 1937. He attacked this Agreement in his speech at Aussig on February 28, and demanded complete autonomy for Sudetenland.

The type of autonomy he proposed was so rigid that it could not have been assimilated into a complex modern economic State. Trade would have been disrupted. He demanded, for instance, that anyone should be punished who 'sold, bequeathed or let landed property or factories, shops or other concerns, which had belonged to the same nationality for at least thirty years, to a member or to members of another nationality.'

Henlein's proposals were put before the Czech Parliament on April 27, 1937, but no decision was made about them.

This gave Henlein an opportunity to point out to his followers that the Czechs were unwilling to compromise. For him, the goal was in sight.

The annexation of Austria on March 13, 1938, was Henlein's signal for action. He issued a manifesto demanding equal status of Germans and Czechs and German national self-determination. In his Carlsbad speech on April 24 he repeated his demand for full self-government of the German areas.

Now the time had come for 'incidents' and 'German martyrs' in Sudetenland. Stories of Czech atrocities were spread in Germany and in foreign countries. Henlein rose to the occasion, making speeches at the graves of these martyrs, who, as he was fond of saying, 'had laid their lives on the altar of the Sudeten Germans' future.'

It is a curious fact that Henlein continued to maintain a conciliatory tone to the Press abroad. As late as June 15, 1938, he gave an interview to a correspondent of the *Evening Standard* in which he still denied that there was any question of Germany annexing the Sudetenland. The whole problem, he said, 'has nothing to do with a battle for supremacy—the German Reich against Czechoslovakia.' And in an interview given to a *Daily Telegraph* correspondent at Eger as late as July 26, 1938, he stated: 'We do not ask annexation to the German Reich, we do not demand a plebiscite, though, as a matter of fact, our people want all that. We are not opposed, as has been said, to the Czech people. . . .'

Many people believed this statement, all the more so as Henlein, when he was in London in May 1938, did not express any immoderate views.

It was not until September 15, during the crisis, that he openly demanded a 'return of Sudetenland to the Reich.' As soon as his proclamation incorporating this demand had been made public he packed his bag and fled from Asch. It is said by some that he was not yet ready to take this stand and that Goebbels at the German Propaganda Ministry in Berlin issued this declaration over Henlein's head. It is probable that the truth will never be known.

Another proclamation bearing his signature was issued in Berlin on September 18, in which the Sudeten Germans were assured that 'liberation was approaching.'

It is reported in the newspapers that Konrad Henlein once appeared on the balcony of the Chancellor's home in Berlin when Germany was celebrating her victory over the Czechs. Henlein was allowed to stand next to the Führer. He was not asked to accompany Hitler on his triumphal tour of the Sudetenland, but since then he has been appointed as Commissioner (or *Gauleiter*) of the district—'In recognition of his services during the struggle for the liberation of Sudetenland.' He has also been made a major of the reserve in a German infantry regiment. He has responded to these honours by attacking the Czechs: 'We had a flourishing industry in Sudetenland,' Henlein declared on October 17, 'but the Czechs changed all this into a heap of ruins.'

He has not been a very magnanimous victor. He announced that he would settle his accounts with the German Socialists, the Jews and other 'subversive' elements in Sudetenland, and that he would imprison all these enemies and keep them in prison 'until they are black in the face.'

MARGARET GOLDSMITH.

COMMENTARY

AMID exploding fireworks in the early days of November it occurred to me that, among other changes likely to be imposed on us, we may be expected to modify our attitude towards Guy Fawkes. His methods and ambitions can only be regarded with approval by the heads of certain foreign States, and it may well be considered unwise, and contrary to our policy of appeasement, to permit demonstrations against so sympathetic a figure. It must be remembered, too, that foreign dictators are not the only people who have lately shown some irritation with Parliament as an institution. I think, though, that the gunpowder technique is not likely to be adopted again—it is clear that Parliament can be more easily disposed of.

The vaults under the House of Commons are still searched annually before Parliament assembles, but without much apprehension. If the danger were real, I like to think that our Government would evolve some kind of inverted A.R.P., with perhaps a Guy Fawkes Precautions Handbook, a spade and bucket under the Speaker's chair, and sandbags for M.P.s to sit on.

G.F.P., as distinct from A.R.P., might bring about a salutary change in the official attitude towards cellars and basements.

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On Guy Fawkes Day I took a train into the country, to Tring. November had got mixed up with August, and the sun blazed above the bare trees and ruined chrysanthemums in the square outside my window. I had an impulse to escape from fireworks, traffic, politics and newspapers, to try a little country peace and quiet as a respite from too much peace with honour. But, as it turned out, Tring was a most unfortunate place to have chosen, for Tring celebrated Guy Fawkes Night by staging its first A.R.P. 'black-out.'

As far as I could judge, the A.R.P. manœuvres took place in the street under my bedroom window. That was certainly where the warning siren went off, at 11.45. Tring may feel proud of its siren. Mass pig-sticking could not produce a more frightful noise, though it might produce something similar. Broken and shaken by this overture, I tried to sleep; but the night was full of bumbling aeroplanes, tramping of A.R.P. squads, shouting and sometimes cheering. Sleep was impossible and, since this was a real black-out, so was reading. There was nothing for it but to lie in the uproarious darkness and reflect on peace with honour, the policy of appeasement, and the country quiet of the London square I had left. Counting sheep was worse than useless, since it led, by an obvious sequence of ideas, to painful ruminations on democracy. At 2.30 a.m., further pig-sticking (the 'all-clear'), but more nightmarish this time because exultant, as if the pigs were enjoying it. Then quiet and a few hours' uneasy sleep.

I learned from the maid who brought breakfast next morning that everything had gone off well, except that in the excitement somebody had fallen into a ditch and cut his lip, so the first-aid squad had had something genuine to bandage.

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On Monday another of Herr Hitler's speeches, to spoil breakfast. The technique of these speeches is becoming familiar. One can be sure that each will contain, at least: a contradiction of fact, a threatening profession of peace, and a *non sequitur*. This one runs true to form. The contradiction:

It goes without saying in the authoritarian States that no one has the right to abuse other nations or to slander them or to indulge in warmongering.

The pacific threat:

As a peace-loving man I have endeavoured to give the German people every means of defence so that other nations will also be convinced of the need of peace. There are people who blame the hedgehog because he has prickles, etc.

And the *non sequitur*, less obvious than usual:

This year is a year of great responsibilities—never to depart

from the road of success again and to arm ourselves spiritually, mentally and materially. When others talk about disarmament we are quite ready for it on one condition, etc.

We are not, perhaps, entitled to say much about the *non sequitur*. Did not our own Lord Halifax tell us the other day, in effect, that Signor Mussolini is determined to intervene in Spain, and if non-intervention fails it is no fault of Signor Mussolini's?

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As, in political speech, the gap widens between words and any tangible reality, the chances of enlightened government grow steadily less. Nothing could show better the close tie between standards of life and standards of literature than our present confusion. For some fifty years language has been allowed to degenerate, in bad novels and bad plays and bad newspapers, more or less unchecked by criticism, which has itself shared in the process; so that to-day most of our 'critics,' appointed not because of literary acumen but because they reflect average taste, no longer attempt to back their judgments with analysis, or comparison with past literature, or the application of critical standards, but merely announce their preferences—'I liked this book,' 'This struck me as dull'—and nothing further is expected of them.

The parallel in the world of affairs is obvious. Standards and traditions have been abandoned for the personal conviction, prejudice and preference; the course of history may actually depend on whether somebody believes, as a matter of private opinion, that somebody else is sincere; and words, once instruments of thought, are used as a kind of wadding to muffle controversy.

Mr. Ezra Pound, whose volcanic mind throws up material of all sorts, but occasionally a nugget of great value, summed up this matter a few years ago in a book called *How to Read*:

... the individual cannot think or communicate his thought, the governor and legislator cannot act effectively or frame his laws, without words, and the solidity and validity of these words is in the care of the damned and despised *literati*. When their work goes rotten—by that I do not mean when they express indecorous thoughts—but when their very medium, the very essence of their work, the application of word to thing goes rotten, *i.e.*, becomes

slushy and inexact, or excessive or bloated, the whole machinery of social and of individual thought and order goes to pot.

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Well, we can see how it is going to pot; but in England political speech is still at a floundering, transitional stage of disintegration; and our politicians are at a disadvantage, as compared with those in totalitarian States, because their speech is still held to be an articulation of thought, whereas in totalitarian States it is no longer expected to serve this purpose, but has become incantation.

Anyone who has listened on the wireless to Herr Hitler's speeches, and to the chanting responses of his audience, will recognise that this is not political speech-making, but a religious service, a ritual. It is still considered useful to have a 'subject,' a political theme, but I think that this is chiefly for the benefit of non-totalitarian nations who are not trained in the correct responses, and that otherwise a recital of slogans picked at random, or of some kind of doxology, would do just as well.

We have not quite reached that stage, because there are still people, scattered throughout the community, who continue to insist that words, whether spoken or written, shall carry some content of thought, continue to discriminate between thinking and vapouring, and to expose vapouring by means of thinking. This is fatal to political hypnosis, as some of our statesmen have irritably discovered, so fatal that in totalitarian States it is an offence punishable by imprisonment or death.

We have experimented in our own way with incantation. There was a time some years ago when certain spell-binding words (co-operation, co-ordination) occurred in every political speech, and the mere pronouncement of them was felt to have solved many problems. The word 'appeasement' is being developed in a similar way to-day. But in England the technique is still uncertain; the large-scale trance has not yet been achieved; and while criticism, however disorganised, continues to break the spell it is desperately important that freedom of speech and opinion should be preserved. Once that goes finally, we are done for as a civilised people.

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Comment on the following extracts is superfluous:

First of all I would like to get rid of the idea that at Munich there was a clash between different systems of government and that the result was a victory for one side or the other. [Mr. Chamberlain, on November 9, 1938.]

We knew their parliamentary tricks, their dilatory tactics. We had to say: 'By such and such a day we get what is ours, or we draw the sword.' That works. [Dr. Goebbels, Minister of Culture and Enlightenment, on October 21, 1938.]

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I ventured a while ago, with a proper diffidence, to the Woman's Fair at Olympia. I do not know why it is called the Woman's Fair, for it contains nearly everything. The catalogue explains that the Fair is

the first venture yet planned in Britain to bring within easily available compass the story of the ideals, activities and achievements of Woman during the past twenty years, and to demonstrate under one roof her present-day needs.

This admits a good deal—British railways, pneumatic tents, and the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, for example; but I am still not sure under which of the headings—ideals, activities, achievements and present-day needs of woman—one should include the Boy Scouts and Y.M.C.A.

One enters what is, however, an unmistakably feminine world in the 'Boulevard de Beauté,' where young women lie on chairs and couches and have their faces rubbed; where 'The Seven Ages of Make-up' are displayed by girls in period settings; and where one can listen to demonstrators explaining the intimacies of their craft. 'I shall be perfectly frank with you, ladies,' I heard one say. 'I am referring to your sweat glands.' (Swift, I think, would have enjoyed this exhibition.) In the Hollywood Garden one finds the 'palm-fringed, cascaded swimming pool,' where I watched an Olympic champion giving an imitation of a submarine; and nearby is the Fashion Theatre in which 'Glamour Parade' ingeniously combines advertisement with revue.

I had hoped to find somewhere in the Exhibition a display of fashions of all periods, but I was disappointed. I think it

was M. Jean Cocteau (if not, it ought to have been) who wished that a film could be made illustrating in all its phases the history of fashion, and then run through at great speed, so that one had the spectacle of sleeves and skirts alternately dwindling and billowing, headdresses mounting and falling, waists darting up and down, and so on. Such a film would illuminate history proper in an absorbingly eccentric way—eccentric because fashions in dress sometimes explain their period, but are just as often misleading and baffling.

I think one can see a whole attitude towards women summed up in the crinoline, for example (and I believe the crinoline is now held to explain the design of the Crystal Palace); but it is hard to interpret the bustle, say, or the 'Grecian bend,' or the revival of the hobble-skirt, once favoured by Egyptian princesses for reasons which remain occult.

The post-war period has been reflected in such fashions as the Eton crop and shorts (and conversely, no doubt, 'Oxford bags'), which have been suitably interpreted by the psychoanalysts; and there has been an occasional attempt to borrow inspiration from events, as in the Cagoulard hat which a crisis recently produced in Paris. But—unless a £400 dress made entirely of aluminium means anything—I could find nothing in the dress parade at Olympia to do justice to our own extraordinary epoch.

Perhaps A.R.P. in this country will start a vogue for the shovel-hat; or the policy of appeasement might certainly produce something—designs, say, incorporating the nettle and the flower.

* * * * *

I went out through the Grand Hall, which I should have visited first, while still fresh; for I was not equal to the 'twelve thousand yards of rayon thirty-five inches wide' which roofed the Grand Hall in rainbow colours, nor to the 22 feet-high silver Venus, symbolic 'not only of Woman but of the great service rendered to woman in the present age by Electricity.' At the door news-bills announced 'Blonde in £800 Smash and Grab' (an appropriate touch at the Woman's Fair), and others advertised the present appalling state of our civilisation.

It occurred to me, going out, that it would be a good thing if the Woman's Fair could adopt Lysistrata as its symbol instead of Venus. We very badly need a Lysistrata. Did I say one? We need at least half a dozen in this world.

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The September crisis emptied the theatres for a week or two, but now there is a boom in theatre-going. At all events, there is one at the Victoria Palace, where *Me and My Girl* seems to have settled down for a long run. It is a cheerful show, sustained largely by the acrobatic humour of Mr. Lupino Lane (a gift which runs in the Lupino family) and the rhythm and renown of 'The Lambeth Walk,' now internationally famous.

This song might be called the 'Tipperary' of the crisis. Though it originated earlier, it had, by September, reached the humming and whistling stage of ubiquity; and no doubt those who survive the next decade will find, oddly, that they are able to evoke the sinister tension of September 1938 with:

Any time you're Lambeth way
Any evening, any day,
You'll find us all
Doin' the Lambeth Walk—Oi!

The 'Oi!' is important. Though not indicated on the score, it is clearly specified in the instructions for dancing 'The Lambeth Walk': 'Take 3 steps towards partner and salute on 3rd beat of second bar, shouting "Oi".'¹

* * * * *

The popular song has not, I think, been much studied as a social phenomenon; yet its history, even in the last twenty years, reflects a vacillation of mood which would make an interesting subject for analysis.

Just after the war, Jazz brought in a raucous vitality which one would not altogether have expected. This was the period of 'How ya Gonna Keep 'em Down on the Farm After They've Seen Paree,' followed after a time by the half-Surrealist abandon, still vigorous, of 'Yes, We Have no Bananas'; 'When It's Night Time in Italy It's Wednesday Over Here,' and such interrogative pieces as 'Do Shrimps Make Good Mothers?'

¹ Quotations by kind permission of The Cinephonic Music Publishing Co. Ltd.

Then came the drooping period of 'sweet music,' blues, with their complaining rhythms and elegiac words. The title of one—'I'm Dancing with Tears in My Eyes'—sums up the whole cycle. This defeatist period is not quite over; but a cheerfuller note is beginning to sound (as in 'The Lambeth Walk') along with a new barbarism apparently based on the technique of the African witch-doctor, in which words are abandoned for noises—*hotcha hotcha, boop-a-doop, bi-de-bob*. Perhaps this is a true sign of the times.

* * * * *

To anyone interested in the remoter past of the popular song I commend *Ridgways' Late Joys* at the Players' Theatre, an after-theatre club where from eleven onwards one may sit over drinks and sandwiches and enjoy a carefully planned anachronism. The entertainment is entirely Victorian—songs, recitations, 'lectures,' and so on. The songs are performed seriously, or with a correct 'period' jocularly, which is as it should be. Some that no doubt brought tears to all eyes when first sung are now exquisitely funny, but the singers betray no awareness of the joke. They realise the importance of being earnest; and one is often astonished to find that a song which ought now to seem funny is in fact quite moving in its lugubrious way. At their best the Victorian song-writers were masters in the art of plucking heart-strings, and even our toughened fibres respond now and then to their persuasive technique.

Perhaps the most brilliant among these versatile players is Mr. Robert Eddison, who lectures quaveringly on foreign travel, assumes both genders (as he might put it) in his songs, and succeeds in giving the impression that Balmoral is his spiritual home. His medium is one which has to be exploited with great tact and delicacy. The period joke, for instance, must not be funny as a joke but only as an example of what used to be thought funny, and has therefore to be selected with scrupulous care. But amid these subtleties, on this precarious tight-rope between past and present, Mr. Eddison never causes us a moment's anxiety.

* * * * *

On the Frontier, the new play by Messrs. Auden and Isherwood, had its first night at Cambridge on November 14.

It is described as a melodrama, and shows the development of a crisis ending in war between Westland—ruled by the Guidanto (a euphemism in Esperanto to placate the censor: it means 'leader')—and Ostnia, a country much like England. The chief novelty of the production is a divided room, a half on each side of the frontier, in which two families react in their Westland or Ostnian way to the tensions of crisis and war. The Guidanto himself—admirably played by Mr. Ernest Milton—is the only figure developed much as a character, and his derivation is obvious. The others are types: the patriotic Westland professor with his Guidanto-worshipping sister; the invalid Ostnian colonel remembering his wars; the youth and girl, symbols of helpless enlightenment on both sides of the frontier, divided in all but spirit.

There are some excellent touches—the simultaneous broadcast by the King of Ostnia and the Guidanto, for example: gentle gravity alternating, phrase by phrase, with hysterical frenzy; or the fraternisation of the opposing troops, developed in a song to which both sides contribute—but as a whole this is a disappointing play from authors of whom we expect much. It sums up what must be the immediate feelings of most sensitive people about war and dictators and the crazy condition of the world, much as a good cartoon does; but it goes no deeper, and there is less wit and less poetry here than we are accustomed to from these collaborators.

The double room—which rather unhappily suggests adjoining maisonettes with the outer wall missing—and the study of Valerian, the armament-maker, are built up in a solidly naturalistic way, and the scenes acted in them are played more or less 'straight'; but the interludes, written for choral speech and song, are staged against plain curtains; and the transitions from one setting and technique to another, starkly different, are awkward and unsettling. One feels that a much simpler machinery of 'plot' and production could say all this piece has to say, and more effectively.

Perhaps its extreme topicality is unlucky. Nowadays no satire can keep pace with events; the wildest parody is true; and one feels one has seen this play before, many times, in the newspapers of the last few months.

* * * * *

November 15

It is some sixty years since Mr. Gladstone disturbed a parliamentary recess with a pamphlet called *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*. Provoked by the Government's indifference, he declared that he could no longer bear in silence his share of the responsibility for England's support of Turkey.

Let the Turks [he wrote] now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely, by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbashis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned.

We speak a different language nowadays. One of the worst recorded persecutions of a helpless people, ostensibly a reprisal for the murder of a German diplomat in another country, is referred to by our Prime Minister in these terms:

No one in this country would for a moment seek to defend the senseless crime committed in Paris, but at the same time there will be deep and widespread sympathy here for those who are being made to suffer so severely for it.

Mr. Chamberlain's moderation of speech is not reciprocated. As I write, the news-bills proclaim: 'Nazis Rage at Britain'; 'Germans Lash Britain'; 'Nazis Accuse Britain of Terrorism.' The *Voelkischer Beobachter* describes British history as 'an example of incessant bloody terror.' (As for these attacks—the revealing *tu quoque*—it can be answered that civilised opinion is as ready to condemn British injustice as any other, where it is proved to exist, and that such opinion has still a voice in this country, which it has not in modern Germany.) The *Zwoelf-Uhr Blatt*, stressing the humanitarianism of German as compared with English methods, writes:

In Paris a German diplomat was shot by a Jew. Germany did not shoot anyone as a reprisal. Not a single Jew was harmed.

But the *Schwarze Korps*, official organ of the Nazi S.S., takes a different line:

Let any who want to know, know that we shall make use of the hostages with which Judaism has miraculously provided us, in

accordance with the rule laid down by the Jews themselves: 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.' But we shall take a thousand eyes for one eye, a thousand teeth for one tooth. Woe to the Jews if yet another of them, or a helper employed or incited by them, should raise his hand against a German.

It would be all too easy to arrange that a hand should be raised somewhere, by somebody, a 'helper employed or incited,' but not by the Jews.

Memories are short nowadays; but I hope that the present activities of the German Government will be borne in mind when we are invited to place under their control large populations of natives.

The following account of the pogroms, from a correspondent who was in a German town while they were going on, throws an interesting light on the behaviour encouraged among children in modern Germany:

We were in the town and saw it all happening. The shops of these wretched creatures were absolutely smashed to atoms. The people who did it were small boys of ten to twelve years of age led by one or two older ones. Every pane of glass was broken; all fittings were ripped off the walls; doors were torn off their hinges, and then the shops were looted.

At times resignation appears to be the only possible attitude in a world given over to the rule of brute force; yet it still seems worth while to put on record some assertion of the civilised values we inherit from past centuries. If we can do nothing, let us at least make plain to the leaders of the Germans—to their Führers and their Field-M Marshals, their Ministers of Culture and Enlightenment, their S.A. men and their S.S. men and their Gauleiters—that the policy they are now pursuing stinks in the nostrils of all decent people.

ALEX GLENDINNING.

THREE ESSAYS

SADNESS AND THE SPRING

IN the springtime of life a young man's fancy turns to thoughts of suicide, as in the springtime of history the great masterpieces of pessimism were produced, or as, for a reflective person, the Spring is the cruellest season of the year; and it is perhaps a comfort to know that whatever torments await us we can never more be sad as were the great pagans. Sadness existed before pathos; pathos is reasonable and moral and clamours for reform, but sadness—the sadness one sees in the eyes and hears in the cries of animals—makes no speeches. Indeed, it is probable that the first man was the creature in whom the weight of sorrow first broke the beautiful cloud-form of the instinctive life, and that the first words spoken were words of passionate complaint—as the peasant who learns to read begins by becoming an agitator. And just as in the adventure-story the central shock is in those breathless words 'It was not a dream!' when the drugged and abducted hero awakes in the bandits' den, so the crisis of human history was in the moment when adolescent man first became fully aware of the tension of the Will and the World, of angelic and demoniac forces at war. This was the age of the great religious teachers; Buddha, Christ, Mahomet are like strong sleep-walkers suddenly awoken to the horror of their situation and crying out in words that seem to reach us across perilous gulfs. The story of the palace-bred Buddha's shock on beholding the first beggar is the perfect symbol of this psychological transition; for in Buddha we have the static moment of reaction and in Mahomet the dynamic moment of action, and in the central figure of the three we see the tragedy accepted and turning into the epic. And even in the renunciation of the Buddhist there is a dynamic element which marks it as more conscious than the sad classical resignation, the lack of hope which the Christian

poet regarded as the essential quality of hell; for the sadness of the ancients, like that of the animals, came from the fact that they had just enough soul to realise darkly their automatism. Yet to-day we are very weary of the great epic of the reasonable and moral soul, which, like an adventure-story, tends to repeat itself in endless instalments; we have learnt the romance-writer's 'formula,' which seems even more automatic than the 'realism' of unconscious spontaneous life. And very many would return to pagan primitiveness by various anti-intellectual cults—the cult of the machine, the cult of race, the cult of the passing moment. At the same time we have no temptation to the old pagan sadness, because we know in our hearts that it is we who have given these idols their power over us; so we still nurse the Christian aim while we shirk the Christian means, we cling to more and more deceiving hope after we have abandoned faith and charity, we carouse with the Beautiful after we have jilted the True and thrown the Good out of doors. For there is no return to childhood possible for us, and we can only lapse into second-childhood; we cannot once more become noble wild animals, but merely monkeys playing with mirrors. There is but one real escape from the automatism of reason and morality, and that is through fuller consciousness, through *waking up* as Christian man woke up from the automatism of instinct and nature, through an *objective* love of the Beautiful which, by bringing together a hundred aspects, finds that that wanton is in fact the True, and that man—the unfaithfully faithful—has never varied from his first love. For if the heroine has multiplied her moods and her masks, that also is part of the adventure-story.

HOPE, FAITH AND CHARITY

Sometimes it seems such a pity that Hope did not fly away out of Pandora's box. For all hope is a deferred-payment system, and produces the mean and starved life to which it ministers. The fairest forms of life live the shortest, as the Greek proverb said, and the perfection of the Greek civilisation was the expression of its fear and fatalism; Venus would not have been Venus without her squint. 'Who knows but

that the prevision of early and certain death may not have produced the peculiar autumnal loveliness of a Keats or a Giorgione, or that the shortest and most fruitful of all historic careers may not have received its purple glow from the shadow of the Cross? The longevity of the modern civilised man has slowed down the pulse of his life, and the 'rejuvenation' now promised us would certainly take away first youth; if we could live for ever we should actually cease to live at all—our very breathing would seem to us as fatiguing as panting. We have learnt to starve our souls and bodies for 'those who will come after us,' and learnt it so well that it is beginning to look as if nothing will come after us except a smell. . . . But it is senseless to grumble because the master-craftsman sets us new problems, or to be bad scene-painters because we would rather be miniaturists. As the canvases get bigger we can only try to rise to their height, and—who knows?—perhaps one day become again bigger than our problems. Our whole span of life may be then what the passing moment was for the ancients, a single miniature painting, instead of being, as now, the cut-off and jumbled fragments of various collective canvases assembled by a futurist. And for this we must discover a new faith in ourselves to set over against the modern faith in our posterity—a positive attraction towards our own centre to balance that negative attraction towards the future which is pulling us over the edge of a bottomless pit. A new ancestor-worship we may call it, to avoid the appearance of a conceit of our empirical selves; only this must not mean a romantic admiration of our great-grandfather—who lived for us in the same way as we are living for our great-grandchild, and therefore is insufficient as a counter-pull to the pull of futurity. The true ancestor-worship is a faith in our own deepest desires, which are the same in us and our fathers, for the subconscious will is always related as cause to the conscious self of the moment—that compromise of the will with its world; and it was these living desires which the Greeks symbolised by the Olympian gods, their first ancestors. The psycho-analysts will rediscover this Paradiso for us when they have got past the Inferno of the mere repressed conscious; for that is not the true or subconscious self, but a closet for the less respectable conclusions from our present conscious premises—an asylum for the mental progeny which,

Rousseau-like, we disclaim. And only when men have recovered faith in their subconscious to set over against the present hope in the unborn will they regain that third virtue, said to be the greatest—the Christian charity—and the milk of human kindness will once more begin to flow; for charity is a delicate balance of faith and hope, and implies a deep self-respect in each as individuals, as well as co-operation among all for the remoter purposes of the race. At present the deep respect is lacking, or, at best, we only respect ourselves and each other as fellow-workers for the future; with the result that we are moving towards a more frenzied intolerance than the world has yet seen, and the face of the future makes us pale.

THE AGE OF SHADOWS

The peculiarly torturing quality of the eighteenth century, as of a too intense dream in which the rapt sleeper is dimly and with horror aware of his own lethargy, is that never was there such a violent contrast between the soul and its conditions, between the conscious and the unconscious self. Never was the spirit so static, never were there such dynamic forces latent in the body; the eighteenth-century man—typified in the strange Janus-like figure of Frederick the Great—was *both* the Lilliputian and the Brobdingnagian, the eighteenth-century world was the world of Watteau stretched like a bubble-film across the world of Rowlandson; and a bubble can only break. At that time the great antithesis that Christianity substituted for the old simplicity had reached its insane conclusion; the soul had become a vapour, the flesh had become corruption, life was an exquisite garment worn—and about to be torn to shreds—by a brute. To be sure, corruption and death there must always be; but the modern man can escape into private universes and there seek an ideal wholeness, and pagan man always remembered he was a mortal and an animal. But the eighteenth-century man still lived in the flat mediæval world, and did not realise that a new dimension had opened under his feet; he still believed his order, if not himself, to be immortal, and did not perceive that Death had mingled with the dancers as in the story of

Poe. In the eighteenth century the static world of antiquity had broken thread after thread that suspended it from the arch of heaven, until it hung by a single gossamer; now the last thread has snapped, and we have become so used to hurtling through space that astronomers have almost ceased calculating when and where the final crash will come. Philosophically speaking, that last thread was the remains of the Aristotelian rationalism with which philosophers from Descartes to Berkeley rescued the intelligent and intelligible ordering of the universe after they had brought the mind to the verge of annihilation in the sensational flux; it was the apparently irreducible affirmation 'I think, therefore I am,' which was dangerously near to the more sceptical proposition 'I think I think, therefore I think I am.' Then Hume, with the somewhat officious thoroughness of the Scot—lumbering in where races of greater tact or timidity might have feared to tread—cut the last attachment, and since then the world has moved. . . . At first the novelty and thrill of the motion was pleasant, and we called it progress. Then came a first collision, the Great War; and since then we have become a little still, a little frightened. Yet most are drunken with the intoxication of speed, though a few are trying to attach the careering world to some subjective absolute of the Beautiful or the Useful (which is like hoping to break one's fall by pulling at one's own garters) and a very few are looking in themselves for a new faith—opposite to the dynamic Christian faith—which will *arrest* moving mountains by utterly *comprehending*; for to completely comprehend a thing is to set it in an eternal inviolable stillness. But whether our heart stops in the horror of the nightmare, or whether we awake to a new and refreshed sanity, we shall not see again that instant of pure and torturing beauty, that bubble-film of dream-consciousness which spanned the void perfectly in the mind of Berkeley, and snapped in the mind of Swift.

ARLAND USSHER.

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL, who, as deputy for the spirit of Old England, has lately 'had the honour' of crossing swords with the deputy for the spirit of New Germany, mentioned in his remarkable October broadcast speech to the United States the existence of the common people. 'The question,' he said, 'that is of interest to a lot of ordinary people, common people, is whether this destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic will bring a blessing or a curse upon the world.'

The common people are supposed to be inarticulate, and, taken as a whole, unfortunately they are. But the individuals that compose the mass, 'we petty men that walk under Cæsar's huge legs and peep about,' are by no means inarticulate. In our offices and factories, in our homes and clubs, in casual street conversation, in halls of arranged debate, and especially in the taverns where we imbibe our heavily taxed refreshments, we have a good deal to say. We do not speak with that full information behind us that seems so desirable to the Speaker of the House of Commons, who with truly democratic zeal recently deplored our habit of basing our conversation upon what we read in the newspapers—a source of information that the Government now threatens to curb with the Official Secrets Act. We are not fluent. We are apt to argue in circles, to wander from the point, to make personal remarks, to relieve the tension of impending quarrel with a light joke, and, in general, we are inclined to carry on our discussion of an important topic in a manner that is never seen in Parliament. Still, if we have no gifts as an orator, we use haltingly the gift of speech that is said to distinguish us from the brute creation; and, though one man cannot hope to make contact with many of his fellow-commons, I have tried this month to gather what a few have had to say about the crisis, about A.R.P. and all that, about any other

matter that relevantly arose from the nightmare days of September.

One has mentioned the Speaker's sneer the other day at our newspapers. His open contempt for the British Press, that rather tottering line of defence against attacks on public liberty of expression, has excited considerable comment in Fleet Street, and as the editors and journalists are in theory, and to some extent in practice, still credited spokesmen for us common people, any attempt to report some individual opinions on our present discontents may as well start in Fleet Street as anywhere else.

In a City tavern where journalists foregather one heard it stated, for instance—amid nods of agreement and shouts of 'nonsense!'—that public opinion in this country is coming to be as much disregarded here as in the dictator countries. 'The chief difference seems to be only in the method,' said one speaker. 'Our rulers control and manage and despise that opinion as do the rulers of Germany, Italy, and Japan, but they control and manage and despise it more discreetly. Or shall I say with more hypocrisy? But the mask of democracy almost dropped during the excitement over Munich. Anyway, it has worn so thin during the last few years that you would have to be very short-sighted not to see the real face behind it. Our national newspapers ['national my foot!'] rudely interjected someone]—our big-circulation papers, if you please, slaves to business managers, advertising managers, news managers and proprietors—do almost nothing to inquire into or to reflect the common opinion on subjects of vital interest. Attempts by the Press to guide, to organise, to fan public thought on political questions against the trend of Government policy are, with a few honourable exceptions, apparently things of the past.'

'Audited and found correct,' said one listener. 'Fouling your nest,' said another, taking his cue from Mr. Chamberlain. Opinion was loudly expressed in various ways between these extreme points, but many raised their glasses when one joker cried: 'Gentlemen, I toast the British Press, the Roman Emperor of our time, who diverts us from graver thoughts with circuses!'

That the newspapers are disturbed by the possible dangers of the Official Secrets Act, especially since the nervy days of

Munich, is now obvious enough to readers as well as to journalists, though how deeply the complacency of newspapers has been disturbed cannot be grasped by the 'lots of ordinary people' who do not hear the gossip of Fleet Street. One heard it said that, as the newspapers remain potential bulwarks of our ancient liberty of free speech, some of the public-spirited newspaper proprietors who are protesting against what appears to be carefully laid plans to tie up the printing press with official red tape should widely publish the more outspoken comments on this subject by informed journalists. Mr. Hannen Swaffer's weekly comments in the *World's Press News*, for example, should, he said, receive a wider circulation than that given to it by readers of the newspaper world.

There is no question, one believes, that us ordinary people were extraordinarily relieved that war was averted seemingly at the last moment. As a bank official said to me, 'What I felt during the last week in September was fear, undiluted fear. What I felt on September 30 was relief. What I felt later was that we had knuckled under to Hitler; but at least, thank Heaven! I was still alive, and so were millions of decent Germans who were no more responsible for the situation than I was.' Or as an actor said: 'You remember Dolittle in Shaw's *Pygmalion*? When someone, astounded at his attitude, said, "Good Heavens, man, have you no morality!" Dolittle answered, "Can't afford it, Gov'nor." Well, we could not afford to talk about honour, gov'nor, so we just had to take it lying down.'

In London and in the larger cities that were likely to be first objects of air attack we were, most of us, in a state of almost unbearable tension before Hitler presented us with peace at the end of the sword. A great many of us undoubtedly suffered from attacks of physical nausea, diarrhoea, and minor nervous complaints. We have all heard of the children who played games in their gas-masks, but we have not heard so much of those children who had nightmares and hysterics after trying them on. Some, like a retired farmer of my acquaintance in the Midlands, were entirely unmoved by it all. His only anxiety was to know whether in the event of war his favourite pastime, football pools, would be stopped by the Government.

Many observers noted that, except for the cheering of Mr. Chamberlain in Parliament and in Downing Street, there was no gaiety or patriotic pride in our relief when we found that the signal had been placed to green instead of red. 'For most of us,' writes a friend of mine in Birmingham, 'the sensational last scenes of the crisis came as a complete surprise. We did not have time to gather what the row was all about before it was over; but, though we were stunned, we were not in a panic.' 'All the more credit to us,' as a dustman said to me, 'for it is ignorance what makes people afraid. Perhaps the nobs thought they could trust us, which they could. Why not trust us a bit more? Why have we got to be treated as children what must do as they're told without asking questions? Why can't they tell us what they're blooming-well up to, whose side they're on, and what they think is going to happen next? They say we're going to have peace now. Bullies don't give any peace to those what bows and scrapes to them. Of course, if we weren't strong enough to fight, we had to give in. But if we were so weak, gov'nor, where's all the money got to?'

'Where's all the money got to?' That is a question one heard frequently enough. We have, after all, been spending a tidy sum on armaments during the last few years, and common people of all classes are asking themselves, no doubt very ignorantly, what we have to show for our millions. 'What I would like to know,' said my postman, who votes Conservative, 'is how Hitler and Mussolini have got so far ahead of us with armaments? If they are so powerful now that we can't argue with them, how did they manage to do it? It must have cost them a mint of money. Where did they get it? They ain't got more money than we have, that's certain. We ought to have kept pace with them; surely we must have known what they were up to?' Another man, a waiter, said he did not believe we were really so weak as not to be able to fight if we wanted to. 'The Government wanted Hitler to have his own way just to keep him quiet. But a man like that cannot keep quiet; he has got to keep on or bust.' The waiter also told me of a cynical old gentleman he had served who firmly told him that in his opinion the British Government knew they were going to give way to Hitler from the start, and just wanted to work up a nice

little war scare to worry us into accepting conscription, and perhaps to help some of their rich friends to make a fortune by buying shares on a falling market. The waiter shook his head dubiously over this shocking and indeed libellous point of view.

It was interesting to note that in any discussion one heard about 'Where has the money gone to?' there was, however, rarely any suggestion that the money had been corruptly or badly spent. Two or three hinted darkly that the profiteers were pocketing a pretty penny, but most of that kind of talk was confined to the obvious profiteering that began when the local authorities got busy buying A.R.P. materials. The people one talked to or overheard were just simply puzzled that we were so unready after spending so much money. Some Londoners were staggered by the defects in defence that came to their personal notice. An ex-gunner's descriptions of some of the guns he saw stationed round London to defend it from bombers were quite lurid and unprintable. The absence of guns was also a topic among Territorials who were called up. A Jewish trader in the East End who told me he was sent with his anti-aircraft battery to a Kentish village described an experience that may not have been a common one, but certainly deserves the attention of the War Office. 'When we got there,' he said, 'no preparations had been made to receive us, and for the first night we had to walk about in a drizzle, or sleep under trees or hedges. The sergeant found an old building for the next night, which we cleared of chickens and rubbish. Later they sent us some white tents—lovely targets for a raiding aeroplane. But they forgot to send us a gun at all, so we could not have shot anything, anyway. We only caught colds.'

An ex-sailor who now keeps a tavern in London was coolly disgusted with the price paid to keep Germany from going to war. He had seen, he said, enough fighting between 1914 and 1918, and did not want any young men to have to go through it. 'But it is my firm belief we ought to have had a whack at them. They weren't so strong as all that. If you can believe what you read—and you cannot disbelieve all you read—the Germans would have been more puzzled by a sudden war against us and France than we should have been. For we did know something of what it was all about,

but they seemed to be kept in the dark pretty completely. Anyway, we shall have to fight them in the end, sir, so it seems to me it would have been better to have got it over.' 'I don't see why we should fight at all unless we are attacked ourselves,' said someone who was standing at the counter. 'Let Hitler have all bloody Europe if he wants it.' At this the ex-sailor publican shut up, for he was too good a businessman to enjoy disputing with customers. The attitude that Hitler should be let do what he likes so long as he does not interfere with us was quite a common one in my experience. And one would add here the remark of a sailor in Wapping, that 'We're getting thin-skinned, afraid to fight. Chaps I saw being called up were in tears. They did not go on like that over there,' he said, pointing to a German ship loading at the quay.

'Afraid to fight? Well, perhaps we are all afraid to fight now we are all going to get hurt when war starts,' remarked a lawyer's clerk. His sentiments were echoed by the group that surrounded him.

It seems to me also an illuminating point, which others may be able to confirm, that though during those dark September days there was a kind of gloomy desperation everywhere, and a feeling that if war started we would grimly go on with it, without wanting it, until the end, there was no general sense of hatred against the German nation as such. One heard plenty of comments to the effect that 'We won't show them mercy this time. We will blow their cities to smithereens and see how they like it. We will wipe them off the face of the earth for good and all this time.' And so on. But this seemed to be largely a kind of ferocious despair at the thought that hell was going to be let loose for no good purpose, a kind of hatred that we were being forced to fall into that hell, accompanied by a blind desire to hit somebody hard in revenge. But there was, it seemed to me, no widespread feeling of dislike for Germans as Germans—only for Hitler and his counsellors. Hitler for many people seems to have become a sort of 'bogey-man,' as Napoleon was in the last century—a man who had better never be born.

In the cheap cinemas, where children are often in the majority, it was interesting to find them booing whenever Hitler or Mussolini appeared on the screen. On the other

hand, I noticed that they did not cheer Chamberlain. I once heard at one of these cinemas several shrill voices crying when they saw Chamberlain, 'Where's his umbrella?' Which proved, at least, that the children read their newspapers. Of humorous jokes, of course, there were plenty of all kinds from the ever-smiling Cockneys. The best joke I heard against the Prime Minister was while the crowd were waiting in Downing Street for his return from Germany. One of the latest types of refuse-vans drew up to No. 10, and when four dustmen brought out a dustbin a voice cried, 'You're too early, mate. He ain't back yet.' One of the better remarks I heard about Hitler was, 'What's the use of calling the b—— names now it's all over? Treat him like a gentleman, and perhaps he'll behave like one.' These by the way. Returning to the subject of anti-German feeling, it was one's own personal experience that the cruelty to homeless and hopeless Jews, especially the horrible riots of last month that followed the shooting of the German diplomat in Paris, aroused more loathing of the German nation than did the possibility of war against them. One did hear—one always does—those who remarked, 'The Jews deserve all they get'; but the feeling of most people seemed to be one of utter repulsion from such senseless barbarities. 'Like the days of Bloody Mary,' said one man to me.

As for the muddle of the A.R.P. precautions, one could write a whole book of the common people's comments on gas-masks, trenches, quantities of sand, and so on. But the Government has admitted that A.R.P. was a muddle, 'and nothing could be fairer than that,' as one air-raid warden sarcastically remarked to me. Now that people are calmer they seem to be resignedly aware that gas-masks, however effective, are not much help against explosive bombs. They realise that if they can fortunately get out of a big city in time, and stay out, they will be comparatively safe, but that if, like most ordinary people, they have a job to do and a living to earn, war or no war they will have to stay and chance it. A builder I know said that he was so busy constructing dug-outs for wealthy people that he had not time to have one dug for himself. 'Now some fools are using these dug-outs to throw refuse in. If that sort of insanitary folly is not stopped at once gas-masks will come in handy to keep out

the smell.' Most people I talked to were utterly determined not to run for shelter to any of the trenches dug in parks and open spaces. 'Think of a panicky crowd rushing for the entrances to the trenches,' said a policeman. 'That would be worse than a fire in a theatre. There would be more people crushed to death than bombed to death.' This is a point of view that one hopes the A.R.P. authorities are now considering, though one does not feel at all certain about it. These trenches are being completed, anyway.

An unemployed man who talked to me while he was digging trenches in a London Park said, 'Instead of letting me rust on the dole all these years, why haven't they used me and made me a happier man to dig great underground tunnels and chambers? Look at the work the unemployed could have done in that way since the depression started.' That remark summarises a pretty general feeling, I think, among us ordinary people—that something ought to have been done and that we ought to have been more prepared for air raids.

And, to conclude a narrative that it is not easy to know where to stop, the attitude that 'something ought to have been done' is, naturally enough, the common people's response to the 'defeat,' or 'appeasement,' as you choose to put it, at Munich. Most of us feel, according to my experience, that Chamberlain at Munich had no choice to do other than he did unless he decided to go to war. 'But something ought to have been done beforehand to prevent us from ever having reached such a humiliating position.' That seems to be the general verdict on the present state of affairs.

JOHN SHAND.

BOOKS RECEIVED

RECENT FICTION

The Death of the Heart, by Elizabeth Bowen (Gollancz, 8s.);
The Squire, by Enid Bagnold (Heinemann, 7s. 6d.);
The Dark Room, by R. K. Narayan (Macmillan, 6s.);
Here Comes a Candle, by Storm Jameson (Cassell, 7s. 6d.); *Entanglement*, by George Buchanan (Constable, 8s. 6d.).

The five books under notice illustrate two distinct and recognised methods or conventions—(a) many details about few people and (b) few details about many. The first three are closely intimate studies of family, personal, or domestic life; the other two project their characters against the wider background of current affairs—in the one case with a social and in the other with a political emphasis.

In the family, domestic, or intimate group Miss Elizabeth Bowen's *The Death of the Heart* is at once the most ambitious, the most profound, and the most varied; but its characters, unusual in themselves, are made elusive by an unusual lighting. The protagonists of the story are intense, nervous, difficult creatures; it is only in the subordinate characters (Major Brutt, the war hero who, for all his niceness and sahibry, could never somehow make good after it; Matchett, the grim imprisoned housekeeper-maid)—it is only with these that we meet the everyday. As a result, Major Brutt seems unforgettably well done; Matchett, an easier character, is excellent; the mainstays of the action—Thomas, Anna, Eddie—are, in that order, increasingly difficult to visualise.

But the story is really that of Portia, a shy, reserved child—one can only call her 'child'—of sixteen, transported from the nomadic hotel life of her discredited and defunct parents to live with her half-brother Thomas and his wife Anna in the glories of Regent's Park. In this household a frequent visitor is Eddie, a neurotic, caddish young intelligent employed (*via* Anna) in Thomas's advertising agency. A curious attraction, which seems to be a kind of love and is certainly so accepted by Portia, springs up between Eddie and the introverted,

uncomfortable child. Eddie is everything to Portia; Portia only an undefined satisfaction to Eddie: a mirror?—an Aunt-Sally?—a victim?—a toy? She goes to the seaside for a spell to stay with Anna's ex-governess and her heartily suburban stepchildren, comes back to find that Eddie does not want her after all, discovers that Anna has been reading her secret diary, turns in despair to Major Brutt (who, of course, can do nothing), and is brought safely home again by Matchett. The minutely executed picture of Portia, tongue-tied, keenly observing, innocent, timid, self-enclosed, must compensate—and it does compensate—for lack of more exciting incident.

The technique is superb and the writing a continual joy; again and again the *exact* adjective springs from the page. Keynotes of the characters are unfalteringly given: Portia 'did not count as a presence'; Eddie 'doesn't have to go far with anybody to fail them.' Miss Bowen is conscious of her mastery of language: sometimes she embarks upon a passage of sheer description almost too avidly—in a way that for a moment makes one think uncomfortably of those starred paragraphs in *Cold Comfort Farm*. But here unquestionably is a novel of excellence.

It is almost impossible for the male reviewer to assess Miss Bagnold's *The Squire*, since the book's preoccupations are entirely feminine. It is concerned throughout with the birth of a fifth child to a woman whose husband is in India; and the only other topic which bulks largely in it is that other perennial interest of the housewife—servant troubles. (For so capable a woman, *The Squire* chose her servants very badly.) A woman reader will have the further advantage over me that she will never tire of the obstetrics—as I did a little; and she will also be able to appreciate better the sterling solidity and euphonicism of the expectant mother. Had I been writing or attempting to write a book on this theme—which God forbid!—I should have tried to endow my heroine with something more of feminine charm; and no doubt made a hideous mess of it in consequence. But I do think it an error on the part of Miss Bagnold to have alluded throughout to the pregnant woman under the name of 'The Squire,' and to have otherwise insisted on certain

negations of the feminine in her outlook and ways; in the circumstances this seems a little embarrassing and indecent. And there is a defect of construction; *ex hypothesi*, the climax of the book must be the emergence of the child from the womb: it is surely a mistake to allow this to happen little more than half way through and to go on for 120 pages after it. Its climax gone, the book rather drifts into aimless talks on this and that; that these are beautifully, exquisitely, poetically rendered does not make them any more a story.

These qualities—beauty, fastidiousness, a touch of poetry—apply to the writing throughout; and where we come down to earth—as in the conversations between the children—we come down to real earth and real children. These are extraordinarily well done, and match such gems of descriptive summary as that of the window-cleaner—‘a brief half-baked Exister, kept going by something moderate that happened “after five”.’ How many of us are in the same boat? The Squire found many of the lower classes ‘half-baked’; but then, hers was a very grand house with a butler (the only adult male in the book), two housemaids and ‘unders’ of all sorts. The Squire took port in her gravy, and when a temporary butler got drunk ‘they managed with Queenie alone, and the under-housemaid helped.’ I was left with the final thought—‘What an utterly *maddening* book this would be to the expectant mother of her fifth in Stepney, say, or the Cowgate.’

Least pretentious of my family stories, least accomplished, Mr. Narayan’s picture of South Indian domesticity is perhaps the most captivating. *The Dark Room* is ‘the dark room next the store’ whither Savitri, the wife of Ramani the insurance agent of Bangalore, betook herself in times of stress to sulk, refusing food or speech till she felt better. The story of the book (which is slim enough) is that of a more serious quarrel arising out of Ramani’s infidelity with a lady canvasser—a rather unconvincing figure left unresolved. This time Savitri sulked herself into the Dark Room of the outer world; half-heartedly attempted to drown herself—failing, of course; stayed away for a few days; found it impossible; came back. This does not sound—and is not, in fact—very much; but I will be surprised if this altogether charming

South Indian interior—the children, the servants, the kitchen, the feast day, the cinema visits—does not capture and absorb. The whole is treated by Mr. Narayan with a humour at once sweet and dry, with an unblemished if somewhat paternal understanding and a selective taste. For all its lightness, the book clearly affirms two notable traits of the Indian character—first, the universal uncalculating charity which meets Savitri on her flight; and secondly, a certain fatal fecklessness as a result of which nothing is decided or done: time solves all. The passage where Ramani, ‘deciding’ at last to consult the police about his wife’s disappearance, calls on the inspector, ‘stayed for half an hour exchanging town gossip, and left’ without broaching the subject, is pure profound understanding. The book is delightful reading, and it has a value other than the literary—an explanatory, almost a political, value. Those who should know tell us that half of our failure in India is due to the inability of the Englishman and the Indian to comprehend one another’s domestic *ménage*; this enthralling glimpse beyond the veil should go far to remove these misunderstandings. It is, I think, Mr. Narayan’s most successful work to date; it is charming and in the best sense informative. With or without a special interest in India, it can be read with delight.

With Miss Storm Jameson’s *Here Comes a Candle* we pass to an entirely different order of writing. Her story is a variant on the familiar method which assembles a mixed company in what may be called a container, and narrates in detail the actions, feelings and thoughts of each over a brief period of time. The container this time is New Moon Yard—*née*, in the seventeenth century, New Moon House, but now degraded to a Soho slum. This is a warren in which a wide assortment of human creatures have their lairs: a night club, a cabinet-maker’s shop and dwelling, an Italian-run café bar, two prostitutes—one successful, the other not—a quiet, nice young woman called Harriet with her air instructor lover (*would* these two have been there?)—and a tail of elderly derelicts, male and female. Successive hints, plugged in from the early pages, suggest that in the *dénouement* the whole rubbish-heap will be destroyed by fire; it is so destroyed by the malice of Captain Ashton, the proprietor of

the unsuccessful night club, in connivance with a pair of professional fire-raisers. Captain Ashton was one of those dangerous people who would welcome another war because they enjoyed the last one; it is well to be reminded that there are still many such in our midst.

A book of this kind, dealing rapidly and cinematographically with a swarm of characters, is impossible to summarise; the method has the defects of its qualities. It is not very difficult to produce a score of thumbnail sketches of characters selected *ad hoc*; on the other hand, the resulting work is almost always readable because it is lifelike. The background of most lives is just such an assortment of half-known incongruities. Miss Storm Jameson knows a great deal about the lives and ways of all sorts of people, and she distributes her knowledge with candour. But we have met a good many of these people before, and the question arises, Do we want to meet any of them at all? Miss Jameson is convincingly—depressingly—realistic throughout. I impugn her artistry, however, in killing off in the fire only those of whom one could say 'better dead'; experience asserts that this would not have been so. Nor would any villain tough enough to be a professional fire-raiser have thrown away his life quite so feebly and idiotically as did her Franklin.

Miss Jameson's 'container' is a crumbling Soho house; Mr. George Buchanan's is a twelvemonth of crumbling security. The publishers call *Entanglement* 'the novel about NOW'; but how transient a thing is NOW! The Coronation, the International Brigade, *Mourning Becomes Electra*, *J'Accuse*, the *Anschluss*—all these are already yesterday, all pre-Crisis stuff as you might say. Still they are all sufficiently recent to be fresh in the memory, and subsequent events do but supply, as it were, the frame to Mr. Buchanan's picture. The book narrates several interrelated stories without special concentration upon any one of them; these stories are in themselves undistinguished and ordinary and deliberately unimportant; what matters, the book says, is the reaction of the individual to this increasingly menacing, increasingly dominating background of external events. *Imprimis*, he endeavours to escape from it along such lines as his personal make-up dictates. His attempt may be, as was Charles

Manwick's, a withdrawal into mystic inertia; or, as his wife's, a belated and unpromising love affair; or, as May Hill's, an over-developed woman's-bosom protectiveness; or, as Mark Shirwood's, the progressive (and ultimately fatal) adventure of long-distance flying; or, as Kevin Rede's, the discovery that only the present, the now, is real; or, as Vela and Vincent ffrend's, simply going on with things as if the background did not exist. But the background, admitted or not, is in control throughout.

The result is a clear, percipient, finely balanced, and cumulating survey of action and reaction within the book's period. Mr. Buchanan has a compressed, unassuming style, which is unexpectedly effective despite occasional downright clumsiness and some perverted words. I do not like his method of putting long dialectical speeches into the mouths of his characters; there are conversations in which I cannot believe—as, for example, when Kevin says 'I recall those words of Ossietzky' and reels off a forty-one-word sentence from this not too familiar exponent. On the other hand, the book abounds in thought-provoking interpretations, brilliant little summaries, and descriptive touches of pure insight. A fine and suggestive comment on the times just before to-morrow.

HILTON BROWN.

The Press, by Wickham Steed (Penguin Special, 6d.).

'Generally speaking,' wrote Swift in one of his political essays, 'the times which afford most plentiful matter for story are those wherein a man would least choose to live; such as the various events and revolutions of war . . . or the arbitrary unlawful acts of oppressing governors.' We live in such times, and civilisation stands in horror and amazement before the ever-growing violence of 'oppressing governors.' But the British Press, to the alarm of public-spirited citizens, seems scared to express with candour the verdict of civilisation. It still prints the news to a creditable extent; but, with rare exceptions, the voice of comment has dwindled almost to a frightened whisper.

The first defence of free speech, the most essential element of democracy, is free writing. And if free writing is in jeopardy, let us remember Milton's words: 'If it comes to

prohibiting, there is not aught more likely to be prohibited than truth itself,' and feel grateful that the Penguin Press, any volume from which is assured of a large circulation, published on Armistice Day a new '*Areopagita*,' Mr. Wickham Steed's *The Press*. This timely and most valuable book by a former editor of *The Times* will, one hopes, stir journalists to action and arouse the public. 'Of all liberties, freedom to know, to speak, to criticise, stands first,' writes Mr. Steed, and in his discussion of the Press in its various aspects he continually reveals his fear that the 'leading journals' seem unwilling to fight for this freedom. In a postscript dated as late as October 14, he states that 'The British Press has—with one or two notable exceptions—made further progress on the road that leads to totalitarian servitude.' He observes that no newspaper has yet publicly denounced the impertinent official meddling that caused the majority of our newspapers 'to tone down the news' during the crisis 'and to withhold frank comment on it'—though 'every national and humane interest demanded that British newspapers should assert their independence by giving full expression to the feelings of the public.'

Mr. Steed states that the whole nation was moved to wrath when Herr Hitler publicly told Great Britain to mind her own business 'and placed his veto upon the return to office' of Mr. Eden, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Duff Cooper. 'Of the depth of its wrath hardly a hint was given next morning in the leading British newspapers, some of which were almost apologetic.' Mr. Steed explains that 'this humiliating behaviour' by our newspapers was partly due to pressure exerted by 'certain large advertising agents' who 'warned journals for which they provide much revenue that advertisements would be withheld from them' if they wrote about the international situation as they ought to have written. He notes that 'none of the newspapers thus warned dared to publish the names of those advertisement agents or to hold them up to public contempt.' Since they were so feeble as to submit, one would hardly expect them to tell their public. But every newspaper reader who sees Mr. Steed's book should write to his newspaper for an explanation. If he gets no reply, he will know what to think.

JOHN SHAND.

WORLD OPINION

A PRESS SUMMARY

I. 'THE NEW EUROPE'

FRANCE

COMPARED with the expressions of relief and deep satisfaction that were so general during the days immediately following the Munich settlement, the French press has of late undergone a very noticeable change of tone. A more critical view of the prospects of M. Daladier's and Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement is expressed by almost all the representative newspapers.

L'Epoque (October 17) contains a leading article by M. de Kerillis which is typical of the attitude of an increasingly large number of well-known French publicists. M. de Kerillis says: 'What Hitler means to say is this: You British and French fools who tremblingly handed over to me the fortress of Czechoslovakia, did you really imagine that I was going to leave you alone so that you could rebuild Britain and France, train millions of soldiers and manufacture new tanks and aeroplanes? I command that henceforth things remain as they are. No conscription in Britain, if you please. And France, you must continue to produce your thirty aeroplanes per month. When I took Czechoslovakia I got you where I wanted you. Now you can stay there. . . .'

Le Temps (November 5) may be quoted for the opposite view: 'There might be differences of views regarding the ways and means of a policy which finds itself everywhere confronted with serious difficulties and which puts before the world solutions that are often painful—such as that which ended the German-Czech tension in Central Europe. But one cannot deny that this policy is capable of producing important results, since it has succeeded in avoiding the worst. . . . In

the light of the events it would seem that this policy is the only one that can lead towards a new European equilibrium.'

Le Temps (November 7) deals with Herr Hitler's Weimar speech and shows a degree of apprehension which is otherwise unusual in this newspaper. It says: 'The leaders of the totalitarian States must realise the necessity of accepting a normal working of the democratic order in other countries. . . . Herr Hitler's denial that he has any desire to dictate to the democracies is noted, but his constant harping on the possible danger to Germany from a change of Government in Great Britain or France, and in particular his specific references to British political personalities, are beginning to attract attention. . . .'

Fears as to the future of Franco-British relationship are widely expressed in all sections of the press.

L'Œuvre (November 3), referring to the House of Commons speech of Mr. Chamberlain, said: 'Mr. Chamberlain throws himself into a purely Anglo-German policy, and the vote of the House is disquieting, not only for Republican Spain, but as much for France, which must ask herself where she will find herself if Mr. Chamberlain really sticks to the strange utterances he made yesterday.'

L'Europe Nouvelle (November 5) concludes: 'France will be left alone in the bitter task of conducting the war on land. Britain will keep to the nobler tasks of war on sea and in the air.'

Le Petit Journal (November 5): 'Perhaps Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax will be able to dissipate certain apprehensions about the Prime Minister's foreign policy, and to show that his desire to conciliate the totalitarian Powers will not harm Franco-British relations.'

L'Ordre (November 5): 'The French and British ships of State, which were sailing in company, have been visited by a tempest. Their charts and compasses have been carried away.'

GERMANY

The keynote of the German press, too, is apprehension rather than satisfaction. While the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax were, on the whole, welcomed,

direct and indirect attacks against the great democracies have figured prominently in the German press.

Volksischer Beobachter (November 3) notes with approval Mr. Chamberlain's recognition that, 'from the geographical point of view, Germany is destined to be the dominating economic power in the South-eastern European area.'

Berliner Tageblatt (November 2) declares that Britain must make 'the ideological basis on which the four statesmen were united at Munich the starting-point for further developments.'

National Zeitung (Essen), reporting the speech of district leader Herr Terboven, says: 'We are clear that if Mr. Chamberlain found himself ready to sign the Munich Agreement it was not because he felt within himself an irrepressible desire to help the Sudeten Germans. It was because of two quite simple considerations: first of all, that the whole 80,000,000 people of the nation were determined, if must be, to use arms in order to establish the natural rights of our Sudeten German brothers; secondly, because this will was expressed not only in words, but behind it stood an air force which was ready to prove to the English nation within a few days that their so-called splendid isolation had for all time ceased to exist.'

The main characteristic of the German press in recent weeks is, however, a very distinct dissatisfaction and disappointment with the after-effects of the Munich settlement. This finds particularly strong expression in resentful comments on the 'post-Munich' armaments programmes in Britain, France, and the United States.

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (October 13) may be regarded as typical: 'There is no longer any doubt that in Great Britain, in spite of the Munich settlement, a regular armaments propaganda campaign is in progress. Besides the press, Cabinet Ministers are taking part in it. Germany is watching this British armaments propaganda with growing interest. In the long run, Germany will not be able to look on without taking part. . . . We are astonished that democratic England is so greatly under the influence of war agitators of the stamp of Eden, Churchill, and Duff Cooper. . . . Their aim is war!'

Frankfurter Zeitung (October 25) asserts that, regarding armaments, the existing 'proportion will not be changed to

our disadvantage. This is the decisive fact about European armaments.'

Deutsche Wehr (October 20) is the periodical expressing the views of the German War Office. It contains a leading article by Rear-Admiral Gadow dealing chiefly with Britain's armament: 'Here lies the danger which also existed in years previous to 1914, namely, that Britain's rearmament—if controlled by unfriendly hands—might once again lead to a feeling of security which means disregard for the risks of a war.'

Volksischer Beobachter (October 28), dealing with the efforts of the United States Government to strengthen the national defence forces, writes indignantly: 'Mr. Roosevelt does, apparently, not realise that he places himself in open contradiction to other democratic Governments in London and Paris, and that he thus attacks Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier from behind. . . . The President of the United States seems to have the ambition to lead his country back to the path of Woodrow Wilson.'

ITALY

The views expressed in the Italian press are of striking similarity to those in the German press. Many of the German views (quoted above) might have been taken from Italian papers. The only difference is that France rather than Great Britain is the target of Italian criticism. Lord Halifax's speech at Edinburgh and Mr. Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons have been 'well received.' Apprehension as to the ulterior aims of British and French rearmament is, however, strongly expressed.

Tribuna (October 25) comments on the all-party support for the British rearmament programme by saying: 'In liberal countries unanimity is always insidious.'

Giornale d'Italia (October 25) writes in a similar vein, regarding Britain's rearmament as a great danger, in spite of the good-will of 'the present rulers of Great Britain.'

The following quotation may be regarded as typical of the violence of the attacks against 'democracy' expressed in Italian papers:

Giornale d'Italia (November 8), referring to the murder of the German diplomat in Paris, says: 'Political crimes are

planned and committed on French territory because they find in the political atmosphere of France, with its incomprehension, its daily slanders, and its constant incitements, their first impulse and their fatal incentive. This atmosphere is responsible for the Paris crime, just as it is responsible for the obstacles which prevent an understanding between the peoples governed by the so-called democracies and the peoples to which strong Governments have given discipline, order, respect for the laws and the State.'

POLAND

Lack of space forbids lengthy quotations commenting upon the latest territorial changes in Central Europe after the Vienna Arbitration Award of November 2. However, it is worth noting that the official and semi-official press of Poland has been critical to the extent of hostility with regard to the Vienna Settlement. For the first time Germany has been openly attacked.

Express Poranny (November 2) publishes an authoritative statement asserting that 'any solution of the dispute which fails to return the province of Ruthenia to Hungary, thus giving Poland and Hungary a common frontier, must be regarded as only temporary. Poland could not regard as definite a decision which created a new provisional State. Such solution could lead only to new conflicts in the Danubian basin.'

Goniec Warszawski (November 4) speaks of the Vienna Settlement as of a 'political freak,' and goes on to say that 'A common frontier between Poland and Hungary must come sooner or later.'

II. GERMANY'S COLONIAL DEMANDS

Ever since the Munich settlement the German press has given much and prominent space to Germany's demand for the return of her former colonial possessions. Needless to say that the argumentation varies but little in different newspapers. Assumed efforts on the part of Great Britain and France to satisfy Germany's demands at the expense of smaller colonial Powers have come in for sharp criticism. It may also be noted that, in addition to familiar arguments, it is

now asserted that the entire system of colonial possessions might be in danger if Germany's claim should remain unsatisfied.

GERMANY

All important German newspapers reprinted the article which appeared in the official *Diplomatische und Politische Korrespondenz* (October 23), which says: 'The Reich claims the possessions which were taken from her on the basis of slanderous assertions. It makes no difference to which mandatory Power the colonies were handed over, even if the areas concerned have been found extremely useful by the beneficiary State or Dominion. In the German view, a healthy sense of justice demands that the trustees should now hand over to the owner the property of which he was deprived. The initiative for a settlement does not lie with Germany, but with all those whose business it is to take the work of restitution in hand.'

Volksischer Beobachter (October 28) protests against attempts to satisfy Germany's colonial demands at the expense of small colonial Powers like Belgium and Portugal, and continues: 'Germany's demand for the return of her colonies is a question of honour which in every respect is the result of her equality claims. . . . It is, moreover, of the greatest importance for the European economy as a whole that the mandate territories whose possibilities have so far been greatly neglected should be developed. This can be done only by returning them to Germany.'

Hamburger Fremdenblatt (October 26) publishes an article by its diplomatic correspondent, Dr. Halfeld, dealing with the question of Germany's colonial demands. The article contains the following rather mysterious remark: 'Developments have gone so far that the question arises imperatively whether the assured position of Europeans on the African continent can in the long run be maintained at all without the active co-operation of the German Reich.'

Frankfurter Zeitung (October 29) refers to 'Mr. Chamberlain's determination to settle, above all, the colonial question,' and continues: 'The fact that the colonial Powers have now taken up the discussion is in itself a moral recognition of our claim based on the principle of equal rights. . . .

The native inhabitants' right of self-determination is now being applied to the "dark continent" without any justification, and it reminds us of the darkest times of anti-German propaganda.'

Kölnische Zeitung (November 9) contains a particularly strong demand for the return of Germany's former colonies. It says: 'Now France and Great Britain have once more the opportunity of making a generous gesture and returning the colonies to Germany, thus providing the preliminary conditions for co-operation with a completely peaceful Germany. . . . It is urgently to be hoped that responsible French and British statesmen will realise the signs of the times and make a bold decision. . . .'

FRANCE

In the French press, too, a good deal of space is given to the discussion of the colonial problem. Apart from strong repudiation of the German demands (which is to be found in the press of the Left as well as of the Right), there is a noticeable consternation how to deal with this new problem.

L'Œuvre (October 27) says: 'It must be recognised that the situation is very difficult through the fact that Britain has commitments towards Portugal, and that, on the other hand, she cannot give up anything she has given to her Dominions.'

Le Temps (October 26), commenting on the German tactic of demanding back what has been taken away from her on the grounds of the 'colonial lie,' says: 'It is to be noted that the German tactic is more and more based upon a purely juridical point of view. . . . Apparently it is regarded easier to assail France and Great Britain by invoking the very principles to which they adhere themselves, as Germany did so successfully in Central Europe.'

POLAND

The inspired and Government-controlled press of Poland is wholeheartedly supporting Germany's colonial demands.

Kurjer Czerwony (October 27) accuses Great Britain of 'trying to satisfy Germany's colonial demands at the expense of France. . . .'

Gazeta Polska (October 27) says: 'The return of colonies

to Germany is an international problem which very closely interests Poland as well as others. Poland has the full right to demand that her interests shall also be taken into consideration in the new division of Africa which is soon to take place. . . .'

BELGIUM

The present international discussion on colonies has, of course, aroused more than ordinary interest and anxiety in Belgium.

L'Etoile Belge (October 7) publishes an article by the former Minister M. Marcel-Henri Jaspar which may be regarded as typical of a large majority of press comments on this matter. Referring to France's assurance to Belgium in regard to her colonies, M. Jaspar asks: 'Do we, in 1938, still have the same assurance which France gave us in April 1933? Does our policy of strict neutrality ensure the same guarantees? Are *démarches* being made in this sense in London and Paris?'

L'Avant-Garde (October 29)—a Catholic newspaper—writes: 'In the light of the colonial problem we are bound to criticise the policy of neutrality . . . as we find it incompatible with the necessity of being assured of the support of the great democratic Powers. It must be made clear that France and England have not the same interest in the defence of our colonies as in the defence of our frontiers. . . . Our diplomacy must cast off the restrictions which this policy of neutrality imposes upon it, and must prepare favourable ground in London and Paris. . . .'

EMPIRE PRESS

The vast majority of representative Dominion newspapers are, of course, strongly opposed to any return to Germany of her former possessions. There are, however, some few papers which seem to favour Germany's demands.

Johannesburg Star (October 19) argues that Germany's claims are no longer an academic question, and that the crucial point was whether Britain and France considered the issue big enough for war. It goes on to say: 'If anything is to be done, not in fear, nor with the idea of merely temporising, but with honest intention of ameliorating a difficult

position, it would be far better to offer it in advance of German threats.'

Cape Argus (November 9) stresses the fact that Hitler himself has not yet demanded the return of colonies.

Die Vaderland (October 13) says in a leading article: 'The Union's attitude to the former German colony of South-West Africa is unalterable.'

Rand Daily Mail (October 17) writes: 'If all colonies were returned to-morrow a small influential group would, no doubt, be pleased. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that such a gesture would improve the international situation in any way whatever.'

Sydney Morning Herald (October 11) publishes a leading article, under the title 'Australian New Guinea,' which says: 'African apprehensions that Britain, having helped to give away Czech territory, will next be importuned to return former German possessions held under mandate will be noted with interest in Australia. . . . There is no assurance that German demands will stop short of the Pacific. . . . It behoves Australians to consider in advance, not merely whether they are prepared to surrender a territory in which large sums of money are being expended, but whether they want Nazi Germany—especially as an ally of militant Japan—as a next-door neighbour. That is the crux of the question. . . . Our defence problems are already grave and would then be immensely complicated. . . . In an interview published in the *Herald* yesterday Mr. Hughes, Minister for External Relations, declared that any talk of surrendering the mandate entrusted to Australia by the League was "cowardly and unjust. . . . There is no question of relinquishing it." What Mr. Hughes said reflects the feeling of most of the Australian people.'

III. PALESTINE

(NOTE. The following is a brief collection of press comments on the present situation in Palestine from countries which have no direct concern with the settlement of the conflict.)

GERMANY

Comment on the troubled situation in Palestine figures

prominently in all German newspapers. It is invariably connected with bitter attacks against Great Britain and the Jews, and gives full support to the Arab cause. A thorough territorial revision of the 'post-war Near East' is demanded as the only just solution.

Frankfurter Zeitung (October 21), commenting on the plan of creating a mixed Arab-Jewish State under British guardianship: 'This would be in no way different from the *status quo*, and the Arab demands are directed precisely against this *status quo*. The old British means of a compromise has hardly any chance of being successful. England must come to a decision upon which her whole position in the Near East will depend for a long time to come.'

Berliner Tageblatt (October 20) writes: 'The essence of the present situation in the Near Eastern Islamic world is clear: the entire post-war construction, which was based upon the non-fulfilment of all those promises with which Colonel Lawrence induced the Arabs to support the Entente, has now become untenable. . . . The question of a total territorial revision in the Near East has been raised, a revision which must have as its aim a total solution for Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and surrounding areas. All those concerned are faced with the fact that postponement or half solutions are bound to increase tremendously the existing dangers. . . .'

Völkischer Beobachter (October 23) contains a long article under the title 'The Fiasco of Britain's Palestine Policy': 'Peaceful conditions can only be maintained with the help of 25,000 British bayonets. . . . Palestine is the victim of the darkest chapter of democratic Power politics. The world is receiving a demonstration that England, in defence of her own interests, has no consideration for vital rights of other peoples. . . .'

Berliner Tageblatt (October 21) publishes an article on British policy in Palestine under the title 'Suppression with All Means.' It says: 'The measures adopted by Great Britain show that the British Government is determined to restore order in Palestine at any price, even at the price of rousing the entire Arab world against her. . . . The brutal suppression of the Arab Free Corps by English troops continues. . . .'

UNITED STATES

Events in Palestine are widely commented upon in the United States press. None of the important papers favours the cause of the Arabs, and almost all of them express strong opposition against any limitation of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The letter addressed by President Roosevelt to Mr. Thomas V. Spellacy, in reply to an appeal, has received the widest possible publicity in the United States press. The essential sentence of President Roosevelt's letter was: 'The most we can do is to decline to accept as applicable to American interests any modification affecting such interests unless we have given assent to them. . . .'

New York Times (October 20) expresses the anxiety which is felt generally: 'A wave of anti-Americanism among Arabs is spreading through Palestine because of their feeling that the United States Government and people are sympathetic toward the Jews in Palestine.'

FRANCE

The French press is as alarmed about the state of affairs in Palestine and the Near East as a whole as the press of the United States. Statements which appeared in German newspapers about the alleged strength of the irregular Arab forces have received an anxious attention.

Le Temps (October 13), commenting upon these German statements, says: 'It is most urgent to solve the Palestine crisis if one wishes to prevent certain foreign influences from seeking to exploit the situation there even at the risk of provoking greater political complications. . . .'

SOVIET UNION


Pravda (November 1) publishes an editorial comment on the situation in Palestine that must be regarded as semi-official: 'The attempts made by Germany and Italy to exploit for their own aims of conquest and expansion the Arab struggle for liberation show that Anglo-German and Anglo-Italian conflicts in the Near East are bound to increase. Also in that part of the world the Fascist aggressors try to undermine the power and influence of the British Empire.'

IV. GERMAN PRESS ATTACKS AGAINST BRITISH 'WAR AGITATORS'

(NOTE. The following text appeared in the Berlin paper *Der Angriff* and led to a formal British protest to the Government of the Reich.)

Following the assassination of the German diplomat in Paris, Herr vom Rath, *Der Angriff* published the following paragraph under the headlines 'The Work of the Instigator-International. A Straight Line from Churchill to Grynspan':

'It is no coincidence: While in London the Churchill clique, unmasked by the Pöhlner, was busy with sanctimonious deception, in Paris the murder-weapon spat in the hands of a Jewish lout and destroyed the last measurable remnants of credibility in the assertion that agitation for war and murder against the Third Reich had never been carried on or contemplated. The Jewish murder-urchin Grynspan also assumed the pose of a world improver and avenger. Thereby he took the same line as is pursued by Messrs. Churchill, Eden, Duff Cooper, and their associates, indefatigably and in the most varied fashion, in association with the international of Jews and Freemasons.'



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